source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHANDLER, Justice, RANDOLPH, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    The MISSISSIPPI METHODIST HOSPITAL AND REHABILITATION CENTER, INC. d/b/a Methodist Specialty Care Center v. MISSISSIPPI DIVISION OF MEDICAID and Robert L. Robinson, in his official capacity as Director of Mississippi Division of Medicaid.
    No. 2008-CA-01558-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Sept. 24, 2009.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 2009.

      Thomas L. Kirkland, Jr., Tammy Middleton Voynik, Andy Lowry, Allison C. Simpson, Ridgeland, attorneys for appellant.
    Charles Palmer Quarterman, Jackson, attorney for appellees.
   CHANDLER, Justice,

for the Court.

¶ 1. The Mississippi Division of Medicaid (DOM) amended its regulations, known as the “State Plan,” to reduce the reimbursement rate applicable to private nursing facilities for the severely disabled (PNFSDs). Specifically, State Plan Amendment 2006-006 (SPA 2006-006) placed a ceiling on the Medicaid reimbursement of a PNFSD for its administrative and operating costs. The only PNFSD in Mississippi is the Methodist Specialty Care Center, a division of the Mississippi Methodist Hospital and Rehabilitation Center (Methodist).

¶ 2. Aggrieved by the amendment reducing the reimbursement for its PNFSD, Methodist exhausted its administrative remedies with DOM and then appealed to the Chancery Court of Hinds County. The chancery court affirmed DOM’s decision, and Methodist timely appealed to this Court. Methodist argues that SPA 2006-006 violated a statute that requires DOM to reimburse PNFSDs “as a separate category of nursing facilities.” Miss.Code Ann. § 41 — 13—117(44)(b) (Rev.2004). Methodist also argues that, because DOM failed to comply with the notice provisions of either the Administrative Procedures Act or of the State Plan, the amendment is invalid.

¶ 3. This Court finds Methodist’s first issue to be dispositive. We find that SPA 2006-006 violates the statutory requirement that a PNFSD be reimbursed as a separate category of nursing facility; consequently, it is void and of no effect. Therefore, we reverse the decisions of the chancery court and DOM, and we remand this case to the chancery court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 4. In 1998, the Mississippi Legislature awarded Methodist a certificate of need to provide nursing facility services for the severely disabled. In 2001, the Legislature enacted a provision for the Medicaid reimbursement of Methodist’s PNFSD. The provision stated:

Medicaid as authorized by this article shall include payment of part or all of the costs, at the discretion of the division, with approval of the Governor, of the following types of care and services rendered to eligible applicants who have been determined to be eligible for that care and services, within the limits of state appropriations and federal matching funds:
(44) Nursing facility services for the severely disabled.
(a) Severe disabilities include, but are not limited to, spinal cord injuries, closed head injuries and ventilator dependent patients.
(b) Those services must be provided in a long-term care nursing facility dedicated to the care and treatment of persons with severe disabilities, and shall be reimbursed as a separate category of nursing facilities.

Miss.Code Ann. § 43-13-117 (Rev.2004).

¶ 5. Subsequent to the enactment, DOM proposed a payment methodology for Methodist that provided that no cost ceilings would be applied to Methodist’s Medicaid reimbursement until another PNFSD participated in the Medicaid program. Accordingly, DOM amended the State Plan to provide the following reimbursement for PNFSDs: “In years when the rate is calculated for only one PNFSD, reimbursement will be based upon allowable reported costs of the facility. Reimbursement for direct care, therapies, care related, and administrative and operating costs will be made at cost plus the applicable trend factors.” Thus, no ceiling was applied to Methodist’s reimbursement for any of the various expense categories, which include direct-care costs, therapies costs, care-related costs, and administrative and operating costs.

¶ 6. The State Plan provides for the use of each specific class of long-term care facilities “as a basis for evaluating the reasonableness of an individual provider’s costs.” State Plan, Attachment 4.19D, 1-2. The specific classes are: small nursing facilities (1-60 beds); large nursing facilities (61 or more beds); PNFSDs; Residential Psychiatric Treatment Facilities (PRTF); and Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded. (ICF-MR). State Plan, Attachment 4.19D, 1-2. The State Plan provides that “[i]t is the intent of the Division of Medicaid to reimburse nursing facilities at a rate that is adequate for an efficiently and economically operated facility.” State Plan, Attachment 4.19D, 3-1.

¶ 7. Methodist filed a reply brief in chancery court, with attachments from a prior proceeding, that supplies information relevant to the current dispute. Methodist opened its PNFSD in February 2004; it experienced a low initial patient occupancy rate of 26.34 percent. In January 2005, Methodist submitted a cost report to DOM that claimed $1,106.68 per patient per day. Of this amount, $454.42 was claimed for administrative and operating costs. Medicaid challenged Methodist’s rate of reimbursement at a November 21, 2005, hearing. At the hearing, a DOM employee expressed concern that Methodist’s costs per patient per day were too high. Medicaid sought to reimburse Methodist at a rate of $650 per diem. However, Medicaid subsequently performed a field audit that concluded that a reasonable per diem reimbursement rate for Methodist from February 27, 2004, to July 1, 2006, ranged between $989.52 and $1,156.15. On August 24, 2006, DOM confirmed the adjustment of the reimbursement rates in accordance with the audit.

¶ 8. On August 1, 2006, DOM promulgated State Plan Amendment 2006-006 (SPA 2006-006) to amend the rules applicable to the reimbursement of PNFSDs. The PNFSD reimbursement provision now stated:

In years when the rate is calculated for only one PNFSD, reimbursement will be based upon allowable reported costs of the facility. Reimbursement for direct care, therapies, care-related, and administrative and operating costs will be calculated at cost plus the applicable trend factors. Reimbursement for administrative and operating costs will be subject to the ceiling for the facility as described in Section 3-JpE.

(Emphasis applied to amended language.) Section 3-4E, governing the per diem rate for administrative and operating costs, was amended to state: “For PNFSD’s with 60 Medicaid certified beds or less, the ceiling calculated for the small nursing facility class will be used. For PNFSD’s with greater than 60 Medicaid certified beds, the large nursing facility class will be used.” Thus, SPA 2006-006 applied the reimbursement ceiling for either a small or a large nursing facility’s administrative and operating costs to a PNFSD’s administrative and operating costs. After SPA 2006-006, DOM calculated a per diem reimbursement rate for Methodist of $511.01.

¶ 9. DOM promulgated notice of the amendment by following the procedure prescribed by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). As required by the APA, at least twenty-five days prior to the adoption of SPA 2006-006, DOM filed notice of the proposed rule adoption with the Secretary of State for publication in the administrative bulletin. Miss.Code Ann. § 25-43-3.103(1) (Rev.2006). The APA also requires an agency to mail a copy of the proposed rule change to any agency that has timely requested notice of proposed rule adoptions. Miss.Code Ann. § 25 — 43—3.103(2). This must be done within three days after filing with the Secretary of State. Id. Methodist did not request notice of proposed rule adoptions. However, further notice requirements were imposed upon DOM by the State Plan, which provides that all nursing facilities will receive a copy of the public notice of any significant proposed change to payment rates. State Plan, Attachment 4.19D, 1-8. Despite this regulation, DOM did not mail Methodist a copy of the proposed SPA 2006-006 before its adoption. Instead, Methodist first received notice of SPA 2006-006 in a January 30, 2007, letter that advised Methodist of its reduced reimbursement beginning in January 2007.

¶ 10. On February 27, 2007, Methodist filed a request for an appeal with DOM. Methodist argued that: (1) SPA 2006-006 did not comply with Section 43-13-117(44), which requires DOM to reimburse Methodist as a sepai-ate category of nursing facilities, (2) SPA-2006-006 was not a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and (3) SPA-2006-006 was void due to DOM’s failure to afford proper notice to Methodist. On December 7, 2007, a hearing officer ruled in favor of DOM. The hearing officer found that SPA 2006-006 allowed DOM to reimburse Methodist as “a separate category of nursing facility” because, unlike any other type of facility, Methodist still had no ceiling for direct-care or care-related costs. The hearing officer found that DOM’s administrative and operating costs were unreasonable, and that “DOM’s actions allow Methodist to recover its reasonable administrative and operating costs by comparing its administrative and operating costs to a facility of similar size.” The hearing officer found that DOM had provided adequate notice of SPA 2006-006 under the APA. DOM adopted the hearing officer’s determinations as the final agency decision.

¶ 11. On January 2, 2008, Methodist filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Hinds County. Methodist alleged that the ceiling “substantially and drastically lowers Methodist’s reimbursement for administrative and operating costs (from $319.24 per day to $74.22) and it directly contradicts the plain language of both the statute and the [State] Plan which require that Methodist be treated as a separate category of nursing homes for purposes of reimbursement.” Methodist also argued that it was denied due process because it had not received notice of the proposed rule change until after the rule’s adoption. Methodist requested various forms of relief, including a permanent injunction to prevent DOM from imposing a payment ceiling that does not treat Methodist as a separate category of nursing facility until the opening of a second PNFSD facility.

¶ 12. The chancery court affirmed DOM’s decision. The chancery court’s decision is perhaps the best articulation of the reasoning employed by DOM; it stated:

The primary claim asserted by Methodist is that SPA 2006-006 violates statutory law because it placed Methodist in the same category as another type of nursing home. It is true that the reimbursement ceiling imposed in SPA 2006-006 is the same as that imposed in “the small nursing facility class.” It is further true that the relevant statute directs that PNFSD services “shall be reimbursed as a separate category of nursing facilities.” However, it is not true that SPA 2006-006 is a violation of this statutory mandate. While SPA 2006-006 imposes a ceiling on administrative and operating costs like other classes of nursing facilities, Methodist is not subject to direct care and care-related costs ceilings like other classes of nursing facilities. Further, Methodist, unlike other nursing facilities, is allowed to recoup its costs related to the special facilities and equipment required to treat the acute needs of its patients. Therefore, it is obvious that the rate calculation for Methodist differs from the rate calculations for any other nursery [sic] facilities. Methodist alleges that no facet of its reimbursement may be on the same basis as any other category of nursing facility. However, the plain language of the statute simply does not support this assertion.... Clearly, the statute simply does not require that every component of reimbursement be determined as a completely separate entity from all other nursing facilities. Instead, the language provides that reimbursement shall be had as a separate category of nursing facilities. Clearly, Medicaid does reimburse Methodist as a separate category of nursing facility. In short, SPA 2006-006 provides a ceiling only for administrative and operating costs; Methodist is still treated as a separate class of facility as required by law.

The chancellor also found that, although DOM had violated its regulatory notice provision, because DOM’s notice of the proposed rule change had complied with the minimal due process requirements prescribed by the APA, the chancery court could not invalidate SPA 2006-006.

¶ 13. Methodist appeals, arguing that SPA 2006-006 violates Mississippi Code Section 43-13-117(44). Methodist also argues that SPA 2006-006 is invalid because DOM adopted it in violation of its own regulatory notice provision, and without providing Methodist with notice and an opportunity to be heard.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 14. We will reverse the decision of an administrative agency only if the decision (1) was unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) was arbitrary and capricious; (3) was beyond the power of the administrative agency to make; or (4) violated the complaining party’s statutory or constitutional right. Hinds County Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. R.B. ex rel. D.L.B., 10 So.3d 387, 394-95 (Miss.2008). An agency may not adopt rules and regulations which ax*e contrary to statutory provisions or which exceed or conflict with the authority granted by statute. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 593 So.2d 997, 1000, 1004 (Miss.1991). “[A]n agency’s rule-making power does not extend to the adoption of regulations which are inconsistent with actual statutes.” Tillmon v. Miss. State Dep’t of Health, 749 So.2d 1017, 1023 (Miss.1999) (citing State ex rel. Pittman v. Miss. Public Serv. Comm’n, 538 So.2d 367, 373 (Miss.1989)).

¶ 15. An agency’s interpretation of a rule or statute governing the agency’s operation is a matter of law that is reviewed de novo, but with great deference to the agency’s interpretation. Sierra Club v. Miss. Envtl. Quality Permit Bd., 943 So.2d 673, 678 (Miss.2006) (quoting McDerment v. Miss. Real Estate Comm’n, 748 So.2d 114, 118 (Miss.1999)). This “duty of deference derives from our realization that the everyday experience of the administrative agency gives it familiarity with the particularities and nuances of the problems committed to its care which no court can hope to replicate.” Gill v. Miss. Dep’t of Wildlife Conservation, 574 So.2d 586, 598 (Miss.1990). However, if an agency’s interpretation is contrary to the unambiguous terms or best reading of a statute, no deference is due. Sierra Club, 943 So.2d at 679. An agency’s interpretation will not be upheld if “it is so plainly erroneous or so inconsistent with either the underlying regulation or statute as to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Buelow v. Glidewell, 757 So.2d 216, 219 (Miss.2000).

ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER BY ADOPTING SPA 2006-006, DOM FAILED TO REIMBURSE METHODIST AS A SEPARATE CATEGORY OF NURSING FACILITY, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 43-13-117(44).

¶ 16. Methodist argues that SPA 2006-006 violates the plain language of Mississippi Code Section 43-13-117(44) that requires DOM to reimburse Methodist as a separate category of nursing facilities. Methodist claims the clear legislative intent was that DOM would subject Methodist to a reimbursement scheme tailored to its particular role as a PNFSD. Methodist argues, “[bjecause the ceiling for small nursing facilities is an average of their actual costs, which are incurred in the administration and operation of facilities whose patients are not nearly so ill or so challenging as those at Methodist’s facility for the severely disabled, such a ceiling can only reduce Methodist’s reimbursement, and is derived from the costs of a different category of nursing home that is not subject to Methodist’s particular needs.” Therefore, Methodist argues, SPA 2006-006 effectively makes Methodist reimbursable as a small nursing facility, not a PNFSD. Methodist takes issue with DOM’s determination that the statutory requirement is satisfied as long as Methodist’s reimbursement method does not mirror precisely that of another type of facility-

¶ 17. DOM argues that, because ceilings for direct-care and care-related costs apply to other facilities but not to Methodist, Methodist is still being reimbursed as a separate category of nursing facility, although it now shares the ceiling for administrative and operating costs with the small nursing facility category. DOM argues that the plain language of Mississippi Code Section 43-13-117(44) does not require that every aspect of a PNFSD’s reimbursement be separate from that of another category of facility. DOM also argues that it was reasonable for DOM to assign the small nursing facility ceiling for administrative and operating costs to a PNFSD. DOM contends that, while it is reasonable to expect Methodist to have higher costs for direct-care and care-related services due to its acute-care patients, it is unreasonable for Methodist to have higher costs for administration and operation than those of a similarly-sized ordinary nursing facility.

¶ 18. We turn to Section 43-13-117(44). This Court will not engage in statutory interpretation if a statute is plain and unambiguous. In re Guardianship of Duckett, 991 So.2d 1165, 1181 (Miss.2008) (citing Dupree v. Carroll, 967 So.2d 27, 30 (Miss.2007)). However, statutory interpretation is appropriate if a statute is ambiguous or is silent on a specific issue. Id. In either case, the ultimate goal of this Court is to discern the legislative intent. Allred v. Yarborough, 843 So.2d 727 (Miss. 2003) (quoting City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss.1992)). The best evidence of legislative intent is the text of the statute; the Court may also look to the statute’s historical background, purpose, and objectives. In re Duckett, 991 So.2d at 1181-82. If a statute is ambiguous, it is the Court’s duty to “carefully review statutory language and apply its most reasonable interpretation and meaning to the facts of a particular case.” Caldwell v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., 956 So.2d 888, 891 (Miss.2007) (quoting Pope v. Brock, 912 So.2d 935, 937 (Miss.2005)).

¶ 19. Section 43-13-117(44) provides that “nursing facility services for the severely disabled” are to be provided in “a long-term care nursing facility dedicated to the care and treatment of persons with severe disabilities.” This facility “shall be reimbursed as a separate category of nursing facilities.” Miss.Code Ann. § 43-13-117(44) (Rev.2004). We find that Section 43-13-117(44) is subject to interpretation, because it is silent on the specific issue of whether or not placing another facility’s ceiling on one component of a PNFSD’s reimbursement means that the PNFSD is being reimbursed as “a separate category of nursing facilities.” See In re Duckett, 991 So.2d at 1181.

¶ 20. This Court defers to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a governing statute. Sierm Club, 943 So.2d at 678. DOM has determined that SPA 2006-006 does not conflict with Section 43-13-117(44) because it makes only one component of Methodist’s reimbursement the same as that of another category of nursing facility. However, DOM admits that the legislative intent of Section 43-13-117(44) was to recognize the special needs of a PNFSD by providing for the reimbursement of a PNFSD as “a separate category of nursing facilities.” DOM argues that this legislative intent was satisfied by DOM’s use of another category’s ceiling to reimburse Methodist’s administrative and operating costs.

¶ 21. Although we give deference to DOM’s interpretation, it will not be upheld if “it is so plainly erroneous or so inconsistent with either the underlying regulation or statute as to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Buelow, 757 So.2d at 219. When reasonable, this Court is obliged to reach an interpretation that gives effect to all of the statutory language. Gilmer v. State, 955 So.2d 829, 835 (Miss.2007). Mississippi Code Section 43-13-117(44) was enacted to provide for the Medicaid reimbursement of services provided to severely disabled patients at long-term nursing care facilities dedicated to the care and treatment of those patients, known as PNFSDs. The State Plan lists several specific categories of facilities and promulgates reimbursement methodologies applicable to the categories. The Legislature saw fit to provide for the reimbursement of a PNFSD “as a separate category of nursing facilities.” We find that the provision that a PNFSD shall be reimbursed as “a separate category of nursing facilities” is best viewed as a legislative determination that a PNFSD is not comparable to another category of nursing facility for reimbursement purposes. Otherwise, the Legislature could have omitted this provision, and DOM would have been able to place PNFSDs into another reimbursement category.

¶ 22. This Court finds that DOM’s interpretation of Section 43-13-117(44) is inconsistent with that statute’s requirement that DOM reimburse Methodist as a separate category of nursing facility. DOM contends that, so long as Methodist is reimbursed in a manner unlike that of any other nursing facility, DOM may utilize ceilings applicable to other facility categories without running afoul of the statute. Simultaneously, DOM admits that it would be unreasonable for DOM to apply the small nursing facility ceilings for direct care and care-related costs to Methodist due to Methodist’s special role in caring for the severely disabled. Yet, under DOM’s interpretation of the statute, nothing prevents DOM from placing the small nursing facility ceilings upon Methodist’s direct-care and care-related costs, because as long as therapies costs were not subject to a ceiling, Methodist’s reimbursement still would be unlike that of any other facility. Therefore, carried to its logical end, DOM’s interpretation yields absurd results by rendering the “separate category of nursing facilities” language virtually meaningless. This interpretation contravenes the evident legislative intent that DOM evaluate the needs of a PNFSD separately for reimbursement purposes. We recognize that there certainly is no statutory restriction preventing DOM from curtailing Methodist’s reimbursement, whether through ceilings or otherwise. However, under Section 43-13-117(44), any ceiling or other limitation must be one calculated for a PNFSD, not for another type of nursing facility.

¶ 23. We also address Methodist’s argument that DOM’s application of a ceiling to costs previously not subject to a ceiling was arbitrary and capricious because “an agency must either conform to its prior norms and decisions or explain the reason for its departure from such precedent.” Miss. Valley Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 659 F.2d 488, 506 (5th Cir.1981). Methodist contends that if DOM believed Methodist’s costs to be unreasonable, then the appropriate remedy under the State Plan would have been a field audit followed by an adjustment to allowable costs. See State Plan, Attachment 4.19D, 1-7(A). Methodist points out that DOM already had performed a field audit, which concluded that Methodist’s costs were reasonable. Therefore, Methodist argues that DOM’s motivation in promulgating SPA 2006-006 was to rewrite its regulations to obtain the result it was unable to obtain by following its extant rules. DOM recognizes that “an agency must either conform to its prior norms and decisions or explain the reason for its departure from such precedent,” but it asserts that the reason for its adoption of SPA 2006-006 was that Methodist’s reported administrative costs were “grossly out of line with reasonable costs.”

¶24. We agree that “an agency must either conform to its prior norms and decisions or explain the reason for its departure from such precedent.” Miss. Valley Gas Co., 659 F.2d at 506. DOM argues that it promulgated SPA 2006-006 because it determined that Methodist’s administrative and operating costs were unreasonably high. However, this conclusion is cast into doubt by the fact that Methodist’s reported costs were found to be reasonable by DOM’s own internal audit. It appears that the amendment was adopted for the purpose of limiting the reimbursement for administrative and operating costs that DOM already had deemed reasonable.

¶ 25. In Beverly Enterprises v. Mississippi Division of Medicaid, 808 So.2d 939, 943 (Miss.2002), this Court examined the definitions of “arbitrary” and “capricious,” and stated:

In McGowan v. Miss. State Oil & Gas Bd., 604 So.2d 312, 322 (Miss.1992), this Court defined arbitrary and capricious as follows:
“Arbitrary” means fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure. An act is arbitrary when it is done without adequately determining principal; not done according to reason or judgment, but depending upon the will alone, — absolute in power, tyrannical, despotic, non-rational, — implying either a lack of understanding of or a disregard for the fundamental nature of things.
“Capricious” means freakish, fickle, or arbitrary. An act is capricious when it is done without reason, in a whimsical manner, implying either a lack of understanding of or a disregard for the surrounding facts and settled controlling principles.

We find that DOM’s promulgation of a regulation that limited Methodist’s reimbursement for costs which DOM already had deemed to be reasonable and reimbursable was, definitively, an arbitrary and capricious action by the agency.

¶ 26. In conclusion, we hold that SPA 2006-006 conflicts with the statutory requirement that a PNFSD be reimbursed as a separate category of nursing facility; therefore, the amendment is void and of no effect. Accordingly, we reverse the decisions of DOM and of the chancery court and we remand this case to the chancery court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. WHETHER SPA 2006-006 IS INVALID BECAUSE DOM VIOLATED THE APA OR ITS OWN REGULATIONS.

¶ 27. Methodist argues that SPA 2006-006 is invalid because DOM’s failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard, or to follow its own regulatory notice provisions, violated Methodist’s right to due process. The Court has already determined in Issue I that SPA 2006-006 is invalid. Therefore, this issue is moot and we do not address it.

CONCLUSION

¶ 28. Because SPA 2006-006 conflicts with the statutory requirement that a PNFSD be reimbursed as a separate category of nursing facility, it is void and of no effect. We reverse the decisions of the chancery court and of DOM and remand this case to the chancery court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 29. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., KITCHENS AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. DICKINSON, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT. RANDOLPH, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY LAMAR, J. GRAVES, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

RANDOLPH, Justice,

Dissenting.

¶ 30. I dissent from the majority’s determination that the Mississippi Division of Medicaid erred in interpreting Mississippi Code Section 43-13-117(44)(b) (Rev.2004). Giving the agency’s interpretation the “great deference” as is proper under our standard of review, I find that the rule is consistent with the statutory language at issue. See Sierra Club v. Miss. Envtl. Quality Permit Bd., 943 So.2d 673, 678 (Miss.2006).

¶ 31. The majority’s determination that Medicaid’s rulemaking was arbitrary and capricious (as opposed to reflecting sound judgment and common sense) allows Methodist Hospital and Rehabilitation Center unbridled authority to shift costs and set administrative salaries and expenses at its whim, and simply hand the amplified bill to our state’s taxpaying citizens’ representatives and demand satisfaction of its Brobdingnagian appetite. Is Medicaid to be castigated for its decision and determination that the nursing facility’s administrative and operating costs were unreasonable, given that Methodist’s overall reimbursement rate was nearly seven times greater than that of a standard skilled-nursing facility (“SNF”), and given that Methodist was billing twice the average daily rate of an SNF for administrative and operating costs? Such a decision does not facially appear to be “tyrannical [or] despotic,” or “freakish, fickle, or ... done without reason, in a whimsical manner....” McGowan v. Miss. State Oil & Gas Bd., 604 So.2d 312, 322 (Miss.1992). The majority opinion fails to acknowledge that Medicaid properly did not contest the expected enhanced costs for the necessary skills and equipment to serve and care for the needs of Methodist’s severely impaired residents. Reimbursements for direct care, therapies, and care-related expenses remain on a basis of cost, plus the applicable trend factors.

¶ 32. Regarding issue two, Methodist asserts that Medicaid violated the notice requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by failing to send Methodist a copy of the proposed rule change. See Miss Code Ann. § 25-43-3.103 (Rev.2004). However, that provision is inapplicable here; Methodist had never requested to be on the mailing list, as required by the statute. See Miss. Code Ann. § 25-43-3.103(2) (Rev.2004). Assuming arguendo that it applies, the APA does not allow for voiding a rule under these circumstances. See Miss.Code Ann. § 25-43-3.111(1) (Rev. 2004) (“Inadvertent failure to mail a notice of proposed rule adoption to any person as required by Section 25-43-3.103(2) does not invalidate a rule”). Of greater import, Methodist was accorded due-process rights for a hearing. Rather than appear and contest this rule, Methodist chose, as was its right, to submit a written complaint to a Medicaid hearing officer, whose decision then required acceptance or rejection by the Executive Director; and finally, by a chancellor. I find this issue to be -without merit.

¶ 33. Methodist raises a third issue in its brief — that Medicaid had violated the notice provisions of its own regulations— but Methodist failed to list this issue in its “Statement of Issues.” Thus, we need not consider this issue. See M.R.A.P. 28(a)(3). Once again, assuming arguendo, the issue was properly preserved, it is without merit. Medicaid’s notice requirements have no provision to invalidate a rule on this basis.

¶ 34. The chancellor fully considered the issues and found that “Methodist ha[d] not met its burden of proof that the final decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary or capricious, in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of Medicaid, or a violation of any vested constitutional rights of any party involved.” The chancellor concluded that his court would “not substitute its own judgment” for that of Medicaid, the agency charged with implementing the statute. This Court should exercise the same restraint, which we have imposed on ourselves previously. See Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid, 853 So.2d 1192, 1204 (Miss.2003) (citing State Bd. of Psychological Exam’rs v. Coxe, 355 So.2d 669, 671 (Miss.1978)).

¶ 35. The chancellor found that SPA 2006-006 was not inconsistent with the statutory mandate of Mississippi Code Section 43 — 13—117(44)(b) (Rev.2004). The chancellor astutely recognized that Methodist was not subject to any ceilings for direct-care or care-related costs, and that the new ceilings applied only to administrative and operating costs. He noted that the plain language of the statute does not prevent Medicaid from referring to the criteria for other categories of nursing facilities to establish a proper reimbursement formula for Methodist. The chancellor concluded that Methodist was “still treated as a separate class of facility as required by law.”

¶ 36. Our precedent requires us to give “great deference” to statutory interpretations done by administrative agencies concerning their governing statutes. Sierra Club, 943 So.2d at 678. “[N]o court can hope to replicate” an agency’s “familiarity with the particularities and nuances of the problems committed to its care....” Gill v. Miss. Dep’t of Wildlife Conservation, 574 So.2d 586, 593 (Miss.1990). Further, “this Court has no right, prerogative, or duty to bend a statute to make it say what it does not say.... [Cjourts, judges, and justices sit to apply the law as it is, not make the law as they think it should be.” Franklin Collection Serv., Inc. v. Kyle, 955 So.2d 284, 288-89 (Miss.2007).

¶ 37. The statutory language at issue is silent on the specific issue here. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-13-117(44)00 (Rev.2004) (“a separate category of nursing facilities”). The chancellor found that “the plain language to the statute [did] not support [Methodist’s] assertion.” I agree with this finding. Under the rule, Methodist is not subject to any ceilings for direct-care or care-related costs. Thus, for these costs — those that are increased because of the treatment of severely-disabled patients — Methodist will continue to be reimbursed on a “cost-plus” basis. That is, Methodist will get everything it claims and more, as the total claimed costs are multiplied by a “trend factor.” Under the rule, Methodist would be subject only to a ceiling for administrative and operating costs, with no ceiling on costs related to direct care for patients. Medicaid points out that when Methodist was appointed as a provider, effective February 27, 2004, Medicaid set the interim rate based on estimated funding by Methodist, at a daily rate of $487.74 for all costs. Ten months later, Methodist submitted its initial cost report projecting $1,106.68, of which $454.42 was for administrative and operating costs. Medicaid accepted the high care costs related to the special-need patients, but at the same time determined that Methodist’s administrative and operating costs should be comparable to those of a similarly-sized nursing home.

¶ 38. Methodist argues that the “separate category” language requires that it not be subject to any ceiling, for any of its costs, and that comparison to another type of facility cannot be any part of its reimbursement formula. As the statute is silent, I cannot in good conscience accept Methodist’s interpretation. One has to amend the statutory language to get to this desired result. I decline. Methodist accuses Medicaid, unconvincingly, of seeking to add statutory language. Methodist argues that an administrative-and-operating exception should be treated as a separate category. The statute has no such exception. Medicaid has accorded a fair interpretation of the statute, and we, like the chancellor, owe Medicaid’s interpretation “great deference.”

¶ 39. Methodist argues also that the statute requires Medicaid to tailor a reimbursement scheme to Methodist’s particular role as a private nursing facility for the severely disabled (“PNFSD”). The rule precisely accomplishes the statutory requirement, albeit in a different way than did the prior reimbursement rule, which granted Methodist carte blanche. Methodist was reimbursed for all of its expenses on a “cost-plus” basis, taking into consideration the high costs of the facility’s special functions of caring for persons with severe disabilities. Under the new rule, Methodist continues to receive “cost-plus” reimbursement for the high direct-care and care-related costs, subject only to a ceiling for administrative and operating costs.

¶ 40. The majority parrots Methodist’s argument that Medicaid’s interpretation, if taken to its logical conclusion, would yield absurd results in futuro. The claim is that if we defer to this interpretation, nothing would stop Medicaid from placing ceilings on direct-care and care-related costs. Should this imaginary concern develop, we will deal with it when it is properly before the Court. We are precluded from ruling on controversies not presented. See Gartrell v. Gartrell, 936 So.2d 915, 917 (Miss.2006) (citing McDaniel v. Hurt, 92 Miss. 197, 41 So. 381 (1906)).

¶ 41. The citizens of this state who pick up the tab for government services are entitled to have the expenses monitored by the government they put into power, and not by the whim of a vendor of services. Administrative and operating costs include such items as the salaries and fringe benefits of the administrator and assistant administrator, as well as other labor costs such as: dietary, housekeeping, laundry, maintenance, medical records, and other personnel. Other costs in this category include noncapital amortization and depreciation fees for vehicles. Does Methodist pay its housekeepers, maintenance staff, and laundry workers more than other health-care providers? Is its secretarial staff compensated differently, or its food costs higher, or do they pay a higher rate for them utilities and vehicles? Medicaid certainly has a right, a duty, to analyze these costs. When it does, we should not interfere.

¶42. Should a government agency be prohibited from “tightening its belt,” as many Mississippians are having to do during this time of high unemployment and economic uncertainty? Cost control is important to all Mississippians, and is essentially important to the other beneficiaries of Medicaid, our poor and disadvantaged.

¶ 43. Statistics provided by Medicaid demonstrate the differences between Methodist’s reimbursement and those of facilities in other categories: “For skilled nursing facility care, the average per diem reimbursement rate paid by Medicaid is $169.03.... At $511.01, Methodist’s total rate as calculated by Medicaid is clearly distinguishable from the rates of other nursing facilities.”

¶ 44. Our statute authorizes Medicaid to make payments, including those for the severely disabled, as follows:

Medicaid as authorized by this article shall include payment of part or all of the costs, at the discretion of the division, with approval of the Governor, of ... care and services rendered to eligible applicants who have been determined to be eligible for that care and services, within the limits of state appropriations and federal matching funds.

Miss.Code Ann. § 43-18-177 (Rev.2004). Here, Medicaid adopted a rule concerning administrative and operating costs. The rule change does not result in a ceiling on costs for the patients’ care, but affects only the administrative and operating expenses of the facility. The expenses subject to a ceiling are costs that any nursing home expends (accounting fees, bank service charges, dietary supplies, utilities), as well as others that are less essential (educational seminars, travel, and home-office expenses), and those in between (administrative salaries and fringe benefits). Cost cutting, not in violation of a statute, is laudable, and should not be micromanaged by this Court. “[T]he everyday experience of [Medicaid] gives it familiarity with the particularities and nuances of the problems committed to its care [that we cannot] hope to replicate.” Gill, 574 So.2d at 593.

¶ 45. Therefore, considering the great deference we should rightly give to an agency’s interpretation of its governing statutes, I would affirm the holdings of the administrative hearing officer, Medicaid, and the chancellor.

LAMAR, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

      . A schedule included in the record breaks down a long-term care facility’s expenses by category:
      Direct-care expenses include salaries and benefits for aides, LPNs, RNs, and feeding assistants; drugs; direct-care medical supplies; medical-waste disposal; and other listed expenses.
      Care-related expenses include food; the salaries and benefits for the director of nursing, the assistant director of nursing, the pharmacy, and social services; care-related supplies; the allowable costs for uniforms and barber and beauty expenses; consultant fees; and other listed expenses.
      Therapies costs include costs attributable to occupational, speech, and other therapists.
      Administrative and operating costs include administrative salaries and benefits, certain contract expenses, accounting fees, auto leases, bank service charges, board of directors’ fees, dietary supplies, depreciation, dues, educational seminars and training, housekeeping supplies, professional liability and other insurance, laundry supplies, linen and laundry alternatives, management fees and home office costs, nonemergency medical transportation, office supplies and subscriptions, postage, taxes and licenses, telephone and communications, travel, utilities, and other listed expenses.

      . "An efficiently and economically operated facility is defined as one with direct care and care related costs greater than 90% of the median and less than the maximum rate, therapy costs of PNFSD less than the maximum rate, administrative and operating costs of less than the maximum rate, property costs that do not require a payment of the hold harmless provision and an occupancy rate of 80% or more." State Plan, Attachment 4.19D, 3-1.

      . In its reply brief, Methodist states that its reimbursement would be significantly less today than it was at start-up.

      . Methodist asserts that given its number of beds, it is subject to the reimbursement ceiling for the small nursing facility class. For the sake of brevity, the Court refers to the small nursing facility ceiling throughout our analysis, although if Methodist exceeded the sixty-bed limit for the small nursing facility class, then under SPA 2006-006, the ceiling for the large nursing facility class would apply-

      . The dissent accuses this Court of failing to afford proper deference to Medicaid. Regarding the interpretation of statutes, it is the Legislature, not Medicaid, that is entitled to our ultimate deference. While this Court is well-aware of the problems currently experienced by the Medicaid system, it is the role of the Legislature, not this Court, to shield the public from Medicaid over-billing. It would be improper for this Court to undertake that substantial task at the expense of established principles of agency law and statutory interpretation. We note that Medicaid remains free to curtail Methodist's administrative and operating costs reimbursement by placing a ceiling upon Methodist's administrative and operating costs that is not tied to another category's ceiling.

      . Because the hearing officer's opinion discussed the prior proceeding, this information clearly was a part of the record before the agency.

      . For the year from July 2004 through June, 2005, the trend factors called for the following increases over actual costs: Direct Care, 10.575%; Therapy, 11.125%; Administrative and Operating, 21.775%.

      . Reference to other categories to compute Methodist’s reimbursement is not unprecedented. For one aspect of its reimbursement formula, return on equity, Methodist has been paid at the same rate as other nursing facilities since Methodist first opened its PNFSD.


author: DICKINSON, Justice, GRAVES, Presiding Justice, KITCHENS, Justice,

text:
    Shannon HOLMES and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Lee McMILLAN.
    No. 2008-IA-01191-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Nov. 19, 2009.

      Henderson Jones, Tupelo, Philip W. Gaines, Jeremy T. Hutto, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
    Gregory K. Davis, Tylvester Otis Goss, Jackson, attorneys for appellee.
   DICKINSON, Justice,

for the Court.

¶ 1. This case arises out of a traffic accident between a resident of Rankin County, Mississippi, and a resident of Hinds County, Mississippi. The parties dispute whether the accident occurred in Rankin County or in Hinds County. The plaintiff sued the defendants in Hinds County, and the defendants filed a motion to transfer venue to Rankin County. The trial court found that venue was proper in Hinds County, and the defendants filed this interlocutory appeal. Finding the trial court to be in error, we reverse.

FACTS

¶2. On July 8, 2006, at approximately 10:18 p.m., Shannon Holmes was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Lee McMillan in the roundabout intersection of International Drive and Old Brandon Road, at the entrance to the Jackson-Evers International Airport. Officer Patrick Minor of the Jackson Police Department arrived at the scene within minutes of the accident to investigate. Officer Minor noted in his Uniform Crash Report that the accident had occurred in the City of Jackson and stated in the “Collision Narrative” that:

[Holmes] was driving west on Old Brandon Road and said the brakes on her car would [sic] stop her vehicle and that is what caused the accident. [McMillan] was traveling east on Old Brandon Road headed to the Jackson-Evers International Airport. He entered into the round-a-bout and was hit by [Holmes].

¶ 3. Officer Minor further noted that Holmes had a valid driver’s license, but that she had no proof of insurance. He indicated that McMillan had a valid driver’s license and an insurance policy with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. At the time of the accident, Holmes resided in Rankin County, Mississippi, and McMillan resided in Hinds County, Mississippi.

¶ 4. McMillan claims to have been injured in the accident resulting in medical expenses in excess of $60,000. After the accident, McMillan filed a claim for uninsured motorist benefits with State Farm. State Farm refused to pay McMillan an amount that was satisfactory to him, but sent him a letter along with a check for $3,000.

¶ 5. McMillan filed a complaint in the County Court of Hinds County against State Farm, alleging breach of contract with McMillan by failure to honor his insurance policies and Holmes against alleging negligent conduct on the night of the accident. Both State Farm and Holmes (hereinafter, jointly referred to as “the Defendants”) timely filed their answers. State Farm also filed a motion to dismiss or transfer venue, and Holmes filed a motion to transfer venue. McMillan responded to these motions, and both Defendants filed rebuttals to McMillan’s response.

¶ 6. The trial court held a hearing regarding the motions to transfer venue, denied both motions, and entered an order to that effect. In finding that venue was proper in Hinds County, the trial court stated at the conclusion of the hearing:

According to the evidence presented here this morning, the accident occurred on International Drive and Old Brandon Road, which is physically located in Rankin County. However, the City of Jackson has jurisdiction over that matter in that it is leading to the airport and it is part of the airport property. So that falls within the jurisdiction of the City of Jackson.
Also from the evidence presented this morning, the accident was investigated by the Jackson Police Department and not by Rankin County or any other official, which shows that the venue should be proper in Hinds County.
For the foregoing reasons, we will allow venue to remain in Hinds County where the original suit was filed.

¶ 7. The Defendants timely filed a joint petition for interlocutory appeal. McMillan filed an answer in opposition to the Defendants’ joint petition for interlocutory appeal, and a panel on this Court granted the Defendants’ joint petition. The Defendants raise one issue on appeal: whether venue is proper in Rankin County pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-11-3, notwithstanding Mississippi Code Annotated Section 61-9-3(3).

ANALYSIS

¶ 8. “Of right, the plaintiff selects among the permissible venues, and his choice must be sustained unless in the end there is no credible evidence supporting the factual basis for the claim of venue.” Hedgepeth v. Johnson, 975 So.2d 235, 238 (Miss.2008) (quoting Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley, 608 So.2d 1149, 1155 (Miss. 1992)). This Court reviews trial court decisions regarding venue for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., id. at 237. We will not disturb a trial court’s ruling regarding venue “unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion or that the discretion has not been justly and properly exercised under the circumstances of the case.” Id. (quoting Hayes v. Entergy Miss., Inc., 871 So.2d 743, 746 (Miss. 2004)). But if the interpretation of a venue statute is at issue, this Court will review the trial court’s decision de novo. Id. (citing Champluvier v. State, 942 So.2d 145,150 (Miss.2006)).

I. Mississippi Code Section 61-9-3

¶ 9. McMillan argues that Mississippi Code Section 61-9-3(3), which regulates “ordinancefs] to incorporate properties constituting an airport or air navigational facility into the corporate boundaries of a municipality,” places venue in Hinds County. The relevant portion of the statute reads as follows:

Subject only to the provisions hereof, and irrespective of the geographic location of the airport or air navigational facility in a county or judicial district other than the county or judicial district within which the principal office of the municipality is located, any such ordinance shall become effective upon the effective date fixed therein. On and after such effective date and on or after March 10, 1976 all laws, municipal ordinances, and local options effective in the mimicipality as a result of municipal, judicial district and county options exercised in the municipality, judicial district or the county within which the principal office of the municipality is located, and all other laws, orders, codes and resolutions of and applicable to the municipality availing or having availed itself of the provisions hereof as well as those of the board of supervisors of the county in which the principal office of the municipality is located, shall be applicable to such airport or air navigational facility; provided, however, that no permit for the sale of any alcoholic beverage as defined in section 67-1-5, Mississippi Code of 1972, except an on-premises retailer’s permit as authorized by section 67-l-51(c), shall be issued for use at such airport or air navigational facility. Venue for the trial of all offenses against such laws and ordinances shall be in the county in which the principal office of the municipality is located.

Miss. Code Ann. § 61-9-3(3) (Rev.2004) (emphasis added). The plain language of Section 61-9-3(3) indicates that the venue requirement of this section applies for trials of violations of laws, ordinances, and local options which result from actions by municipal officials and any laws which are “of and applicable to the municipality ” which incorporated an airport or air navigational facility.

¶ 10. McMillan argues only that Holmes violated Mississippi Code Sections 63-15-43 and 63-3-801, and that State Farm violated Mississippi Code Section 83-11-101. These allegations do not meet the requirements of Mississippi Code Section 61-9-3(3), as stated above, because the alleged violations are not against laws resulting from action by the municipal officials of Jackson, nor are they laws which are “of and applicable to” the City of Jackson. The Mississippi statutes are “of’ the Mississippi State Legislature and result from state action, not actions by the municipality of Jackson. Therefore, Mississippi Code Section 61-9-3(3) is inapplicable in the present matter and need not here be interpreted further.

II. Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1) (a) (i)

¶ 11. That being said, pursuant to Section 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(i), venue is proper in Rankin County. Mississippi Code Section § 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(I), Mississippi’s venue statute, reads as follows:

Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction shall be commenced in the county where the defendant resides, OR, if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of business, OR in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred OR where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred.

Miss.Code Ann. § ll-ll-3(l)(a)(I) (Rev. 2004) (emphasis added pursuant to Hedgepeth v. Johnson, 975 So.2d 285, 238 (Miss. 2008)).

¶ 12. Pursuant to Section 11 — 11— 3(l)(a)(I), this Court holds that the plaintiff cannot establish venue in Hinds County pursuant to any basis provided for in the statute for the following reasons: (1) Holmes, the resident defendant, resided in Rankin County at the time of the accident; (2) corporate defendant State Farm’s principal place of business is in Bloomington, Illinois, i.e., outside of Mississippi; (3) under the facts of this case, the communications received in Hinds County by McMillan between himself and State Farm are not sufficient to show that a “substantial alleged act or omission occurred” in Hinds County, pursuant to this Court’s precedents in Myers and Hedgepeth, and (4) the accident — which certainly occurred in Rankin County — is “a substantial event that caused the injury.”

¶ 13. Here, there is no dispute that Holmes was a Rankin County resident. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the location where the accident occurred, giving rise to this suit, is physically in Rankin County. Even the trial judge acknowledge such by concluding: “The accident occurred on International Drive and Old Brandon Road, which is physically located in Rankin County.” (Emphasis added.) The venue statute says nothing about who happens to own the property where an automobile accident occurs; nor does it concern itself with whose police officers respond to the accident scene. Therefore, venue for the action against Holmes is not proper in Hinds County, but rather in Rankin County.

¶ 14. McMillan also sued his uninsured motorist insurance carrier, State Farm, for breach of contract, claiming it breached the contract of insurance by its failure to pay the claim. According to McMillan’s complaint, “State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is a non-resident corporation, created organized and existing [sic] under the laws of the Statute of Illinois and has its principal place of business located at One State Farm Plaza, Bloomington, IL 61710.”

¶ 15. Because State Farm’s principal place of business is outside the state of Mississippi, the venue issue on this claim is controlled by Myers, 956 So.2d 213 (Miss. 2007), and Hedgepeth, 975 So.2d 235 (Miss.2008). Myers involved a lawsuit filed by an insured doctor against his insurance company for failure to renew his malpractice insurance policy. In interpreting the statutory language, “in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred,' we held that — for venue purposes — the relevant actions of the insurance company were those associated with the company’s decision not to renew the policy. Myers, 956 So.2d at 218-19. We further held that other acts, such as the application for the policy, the receipt of mail, and the payment of premiums, were “insufficient ... for establishing venue.” Id.

¶ 16. According to Myers, “even if an act or omission did not cause the injury, it can nevertheless establish venue if it is both substantial and alleged by the plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis added). However, “the venue statute does not allow the piling of acts or events to establish venue. It specifically requires a substantial alleged act, omission, or injury-causing event to have happened in a particular jurisdiction in order for venue to be proper there.” Id.

¶ 17. In Hedgepeth, this Court distinguished the facts in Myers, but affirmed that in Myers, the “substantial alleged act or omission” was the failure to renew the insurance policy at issue. Hedgepeth, 975 So.2d at 239-240. In Hedgepeth, however, insurance adjusters personally visited the plaintiffs at their home and denied their claims which resulted from Hurricane Katrina. Id. Furthermore, the Hedgepeth’s insurance agent — the defendant in that matter — came to their home and encouraged the plaintiffs to commit insurance fraud, leading to the plaintiffs emotional distress. The Hedgepeths filed suit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, which was the county in which their home was located. We held that “substantial alleged acts” and “a substantial event that caused injury” occurred in Jackson County, and therefore, Jackson County was a proper venue in that matter.

¶ 18. With respect to McMillan’s breach-of-contract claim against State Farm, the relevant acts to be examined are those associated with the denial of the claim. The record clearly establishes that the decision to reject the plaintiffs settlement demand was made in Alabama, and was communicated by letter which bore an Alabama return address — not in person at McMillan’s residence. Nothing in the record' — and nothing provided by McMillan— suggests that the rejection of the settlement demand was connected to Hinds County. Thus, in accord with our precedent, Hinds County is not an appropriate venue for McMillan’s breach-of-contract claim.

¶ 19. In his dissent, Justice Kitchens relies on Snyder v. Logan, 905 So.2d 531 (Miss.2005). However, Snyder simply states in dictum that “[t]he trial court was correct in holding that venue was proper in Adams County ...and neither the trial court nor this Court held the reason to be because Snyder had purchased her auto insurance there. Indeed, venue was proper in Adams County because that is where one of the defendants (Logan Insurance Agency) was located. See id. at 533 (“Because there is a resident defendant (Logan Insurance Agency) in the case.... ”). Furthermore, Adams County is where the plaintiff alleged that fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations took place which formed the basis for the fraud claim in the lawsuit. Id. at 532. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the only issue before this Court in Snyder was whether venue was proper in Jefferson County, the county where the automobile accident had occurred. Id. at 534. We, of course, held that it was.

¶ 20. Because venue of this civil action cleaiiy is not in Hinds County, venue in this case is proper in Rankin County, pursuant to Section ll-ll-3(l)(a)(i). Thus, we find that the trial court erred in concluding that venue was proper in Hinds County.

CONCLUSION

¶ 21. We hold that venue in this action is not proper in Hinds County, but rather is proper in Rankin County. Therefore, the trial court’s order denying the motions to transfer venue filed by State Farm and Holmes is reversed and this matter is remanded for transfer of venue pursuant to this opinion.

¶ 22. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., RANDOLPH, LAMAR, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. KITCHENS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

GRAVES, Presiding Justice,

Dissenting.

¶ 23. I disagree with the majority’s findings that the car accident occurred in Rankin County and that venue is proper only in Rankin County. As the majority notes, pursuant to Mississippi Code Section ll-ll-3(l)(a)(i), venue is proper in the county where “a substantial event that caused the injury occurred,” and in the instant case, the substantial event that caused the injury is the car accident that occurred in the roundabout at the intersection of International Drive and Old Brandon Road. The defendants do not dispute that the roundabout is part of the Jackson-Evers International Airport. By operation of law, the airport is located in the City of Jackson, which is in Hinds County. Therefore, as the trial court held, venue is proper in Hinds County. Accordingly, I must dissent and would affirm the trial court’s order denying the defendants’ motions to transfer venue to Rankin County.

¶ 24. By operation of law, the airport property is located in the City of Jackson, which is in Hinds County. As noted in the majority opinion and in the paragraph above, the accident occurred in the roundabout at the intersection of International Drive and Old Brandon Road. The defendants do not dispute that the roundabout is part of the Jackson-Evers International Airport. The Jackson-Evers International Airport is, for all intents and purposes, located in the City of Jackson, which is in Hinds County. This is so because the City of Jackson adopted an ordinance in 1964 that incorporated into the City of Jackson all of the territory comprising the airport. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Shivers, 206 So.2d 190, 191 (Miss.1968) (“[T]he City of Jackson adopted an ordinance, effective July 1, 1964, incorporating into the city all of the territory comprising the Jackson Municipal Airport [i.e., the Jackson-Evers International Airport] in Rankin County.... [The Airport] is owned exclusively by the City of Jackson.... ”). See also Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. State, 196 So .2d 884, 884-85 (Miss.1967) (“The [Jackson Municipal] Airport Authority is a public corporate body and an agency of the City of Jackson.... The Airport Authority purchased land in Rankin County and constructed an airport on it.”). Cf Jackson, Miss., Code of Ordinances §§ 1-2 (1971) (stating in the Rules of Construction and Definitions section under General Provisions that “[t]he words ‘the county’ or ‘this county’ shall mean and refer to Hinds County, Mississippi, and, where applicable, to that part of the city known as the Allan Thompson Airport [i.e., the Jackson-Evers International Airport] which lies in Rankin County”); Id. at § 126-3 (stating in the Definitions section of the Vehicles for Hire Ordinance that “City means and includes all the area within the corporate limits of the City of Jackson, including the Jackson International Airport [i.e., the Jackson-Evers International Airport] and public facilities outside the corporate limits owned and operated by the city”). No qualified electors or other residents of Rankin County reside on any of the property constituting the airport, and all the laws and ordinances of and applicable to the City of Jackson apply to the airport territory. Shivers, 206 So.2d at 191; Jackson Mun. Aitport Auth. v. State, 196 So.2d at 885-86. Thus, the roundabout where the car accident occurred is located in the City of Jackson, and venue is proper in Hinds County.

¶ 25. The fact that a police officer from the Jackson Police Department was dispatched to the scene of the accident is evidence that the airport roundabout is located in the City of Jackson. As is customary when an accident occurs at the Jackson-Evers International Airport, a police officer from the Jackson Police Department, not from the Rankin County Sheriffs Department, was dispatched to investigate. The police officer arrived at the scene seven minutes after the accident occurred. The officer stated in the Uniform Crash Report that the accident occurred at the intersection of Old Brandon Road and International Drive in the City of Jackson. As the trial court correctly stated, “the accident was investigated by the Jackson Police Department and not by Rankin County or any other official, which shows that the venue should be proper in Hinds County.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 26. Moreover, although the defendants assert to this Court that the accident occurred in Rankin County, Holmes acknowledged at the trial court hearing that the airport roundabout is located in the City of Jackson. Furthermore, Holmes conceded that the traffic citation she received for driving without insurance was properly adjudicated in the Municipal Court of the City of Jackson; in other words, she already once submitted to venue in Hinds County regarding a wrongful act she committed at the airport roundabout.

¶ 27. Lastly, I am compelled to reiterate my disagreement with this Court’s recent rulings regarding venue, as previously expressed in my special concurrence in American Family Life Assurance of Columbus v. Ellison, 4 So.3d 1049, 1052-53 (Miss.2009) (Graves, P.J., specially concurring). In Ellison, I expressed my disagreement with this Court’s legal analyses and holdings in both Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto, Inc. v. Bailey, 919 So.2d 1 (Miss.2005), and Medical Assurance Company v. Myers, 956 So.2d 213 (Miss.2007). Ellison, 4 So.3d at 1052. Below, I briefly summarize the analyses and holdings of Bailey and Myers, as well those of Ellison, for the sole purpose of illustrating that the instant majority opinion is not the first, but rather one of many opinions in which this Court relies on illegitimate reasons to support unjustified results regarding venue.

¶ 28. In Bailey, the plaintiff, a resident of Quitman County, sued two defendants: a nonresident (i.e., out-of-state) individual defendant and a resident (i.e., in-state) corporate defendant that had its principal place of business in DeSoto County. Bailey, 919 So.2d at 1-2. The plaintiff argued that because one of the defendants — the individual defendant — was a nonresident, the venue statute allowed him to sue in his county of residence. Id: at 2. This Court rejected that argument, reasoning that “the Legislature never intended an interpretation of the venue statutes that would allow a resident defendant to be sued in the plaintiffs county of residence simply because a non-resident defendant, be it an individual or a corporation^] is joined in the same suit.” Id. at 3. The Bailey Court thus found that, because the resident defendant’s principal place of business was located in DeSoto County, venue was proper in DeSoto County and not in Quitman County. Id. at 4.

¶ 29. In Myers, the plaintiff doctor sued the defendant insurance company in Holmes County, alleging that the insurance company wrongfully had refused to renew the insurance policy covering the plaintiffs medical clinics. Myers, 956 So.2d at 214. The defendant’s principal place of business was located in Madison County, but “Holmes County was the county 1) in which [the plaintiff doctor] completed his insurance application, 2) from which he paid an insurance premium under his policy, 3) from which he communicated with the defendant about his insurance policy, 4) in which he received the denial letter, and 5) in which one of his insured clinics was located.” Ellison, 4 So.3d at 1053 (citing Myers, 956 So.2d at 214, 218). This Court reasoned that, although the plaintiff experienced being uninsured in Holmes County, this could be the result of substantial acts, omissions, or injury-causing events that occurred in Madison County alone. Myers, 956 So.2d at 219. Thus, this Court held that under Section ll-ll-3(l)(a)(i), venue was proper only in Madison County (where the defendant’s principal place of business was located) and therefore improper in Holmes County. Id. at 220.

¶ 30. In Ellison, the plaintiff, a resident of Smith County, sued multiple defendants: two insurance agents, both of whom resided in Rankin County, and an insurance company, which had its principal place of business outside of Mississippi. Ellison, 4 So.3d at 1050-51. The plaintiff alleged that the codefendants had breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing in failing to pay him the insurance benefits to which he was entitled. Id. at 1050. The plaintiff argued that venue was proper in Smith County because he was informed of the denial of the insurance benefits in Smith County, and thus his cause of action occurred or accrued in Smith County. Id. This Court reasoned that, pursuant to Section 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(i), unless the plaintiff could show that a “substantial act or omission” or a “substantial event causing the injury” had occurred in Smith County, venue would be proper only in Rankin County, where the resident defendants resided. Id. at 1051. The Court went on to find that the plaintiff’s being informed of the denial of insurance benefits in Smith County was insufficient to establish venue there, and thus venue was proper only in Rankin County. Id.

¶ 31. These three decisions — Bailey, Myers, and Ellison — as well as the majority’s decision in the instant case, are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1
Case Counties Involved Mississippi Supreme Court’s Ruling
Bailey Quitman and DeSoto Venue Proper in DeSoto County
Myers Holmes and Madison Venue Proper in Madison County
Ellison Smith and Rankin Venue Proper in Rankin County
Holmes Hinds and Rankin Venue Proper in Rankin County

¶ 32. For the foregoing reasons, I must conclude that the instant case is yet another example of this Court using illegitimate rationale to support unjustified results regarding venue. The airport roundabout where the car accident occurred is not located in Rankin County, but rather in the City of Jackson in Hinds County, and therefore, pursuant to Section 11 — 11— 3(l)(a)(i), venue is proper in Hinds County. Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the trial court’s order denying the defendants’ motions to transfer venue to Rankin County.

KITCHENS, Justice,

Dissenting.

¶ 33. Although I agree with the majority’s holding that Section 61-9-3(3) does not apply here, I dissent to express my concerns with the holding that venue is proper only in Rankin County and not in the First Judicial District of Hinds County-

¶ 34. As acknowledged by the majority and according to Mississippi Code Section 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(i), a plaintiff has the following options from which he or she may choose in establishing proper venue: (1) if the defendant is a resident of Mississippi, venue is proper in the defendant’s county of residence; (2) if the defendant is a Mississippi corporation, venue is proper in the county of the corporation’s principal place of business; (3) venue is proper in any county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred; or (4) venue is proper in any county where a substantial event that caused injury occurred. Miss.Code Ann. § 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(i) (Rev.2004). From these four venue options, a plaintiff may choose “among the permissible venues, and his choice must be sustained unless in the end there is no credible evidence supporting the factual basis for the claim of venue.” Hedgepeth v. Johnson, 975 So.2d 235, 238 (Miss.2008) (quoting Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley, 608 So.2d 1149, 1155 (Miss.1992)).

¶ 35. Applying Section 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(i) to the facts before us, venue is proper in either the First Judicial District of Hinds County or in Rankin County, and before filing suit, McMillan was free to choose between the two. As for Rankin County, venue is proper for two reasons. First, the defendant, Holmes, allegedly was a resident of Rankin County at the time the complaint was filed. Second, the automobile accident — which was a substantial event that caused injury — occurred there.

¶ 36. With regard to the First Judicial District of Hinds County, venue was proper because a substantial, alleged act occurred there when McMillan entered into a contract with defendant State Farm through its agent, Jackie Bland, whose office was located in the First Judicial District of Hinds County. Accordingly, since he has supported his venue choice with credible evidence, McMillan’s choice of venue — the First Judicial District of Hinds County — should be sustained.

¶ 37. Moreover, this Court has held venue to be proper in the county where the office of the insurance company’s agent was located, regardless of whether the insured met with the agent there; and, although the majority holds differently, the relevant acts to be considered in a breach-of-contract claim extend beyond the acts of the insurer’s decision to deny a claim. In Snyder v. Logan, a Jefferson County resident purchased automobile insurance from a foreign insurance company’s branch in Adams County. Snyder v. Logan, 905 So.2d 531, 532-34 (Miss.2005). Although there was minimal evidence that Snyder had any significant connection with the branch in Adams County, this Court upheld the trial court’s finding that venue was proper in Adams County. Id. In doing so, this Court did not specify its reasons for considering Adams County an appropriate venue; however, the only evidence before the Court was that: a) it was the branch from which Snyder had obtained her insurance; and b) Snyder allegedly had visited the branch on two occasions — once to pay an outstanding bill, and second, to verify coverage. Id. at 532. Moreover, the Adams County agency was relocated to Vicksburg, in Warren County, and this Court held that venue also was proper in Warren County. Id. The Court again failed to provide its logic for so holding; however, there was no evidence before the Court that Snyder had made a single visit to the new branch location in Warren County. Id. at 534.

¶ 38. Also, the majority cites Medical Assurance Co. of Mississippi v. Myers, where a physician filed suit against his insurance company for failure to renew his policy. Med. Assurance Co. of Miss. v. Myers, 956 So.2d 213, 214 (Miss.2007). This Court noted that, because there was no single, substantial act to establish venue in Holmes County, venue was proper in Madison County, where “the parties did meet....” Id. at 219.

¶ 39. Clearly, this Court has placed emphasis on activities other than those pertaining to the decisions made by foreign corporations in their distant headquarters, and recognizes the importance of an instate, face-to-face encounter between a corporation and a citizen of this state. And while the majority is correct in stating that, according to Myers, the venue statute requires at least one substantial alleged act or omission, not a conglomeration of minor occurrences, McMillan’s entering into a contract with State Farm’s agent, Jackie Bland, in the First Judicial District of Hinds County was substantial enough and supported by enough credible evidence, that McMillan’s choice of venue should be upheld. To be sure, the venue statute does not require that the action cause injury. Id. at 218. The only requirement is that the action be substantial and alleged. Id. Whether an act is substantial is a subjective question, the answer to which is, ordinarily, best determined in the trial court.

¶ 40. Because venue against State Farm was proper in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, venue also was proper against Holmes in the First Judicial District of Hinds County. “Where several claims or parties have been properly joined, the suit may be brought in any county in which any one of the claims could properly have been brought.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 82(c). Said another way, “[i]n suits involving multiple defendants, venue properly established against one defendant generally is proper against all defendants.” Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc. v. Ratliff, 954 So.2d 427, 432 (Miss.2007) (citations omitted).

¶41. Therefore, I agree with the majority’s holding that venue was proper in Rankin County; however, because I find that venue was also proper in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal or Transfer.

      . McMillan asserted that he had three separate insurance policies with State Farm, all of which provided for uninsured motorist coverage.

      . Section 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(I) governs ''[c]ivil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction.” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3(l)(a)(I) (Rev.2004) (emphasis added). Although this case was initiated in county court in Hinds County, county courts “have jurisdiction concurrent with the circuit and chancery courts in all matters of law and equity wherein the amount of value of the thing in controversy shall not exceed, exclusively of costs and interests, the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00).” Miss.Code Ann. § 9-9-21 (Rev.2002). Though McMillan’s complaint does not specify a damages amount, he states in his answer to the Defendants' joint petition for interlocutory appeal that he incurred medical expenses in excess of $60,000. Therefore, this Court applies Section 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(I).

      . Medical Assurance Co. of Miss. v. Myers, 956 So.2d 213 (Miss 2007).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § ll-ll-3(l)(a)(I) (Rev. 2004) (emphasis added).

      . The Myers Court specifically held: "Completing an application in, and making payments from, Holmes County cannot be considered substantial acts or injury-causing events in this case.” Id. at 219. Myers makes clear that where the injury-causing event that forms the basis of the suit is an act or omission by a party, venue may lie in the county in which that party's act or omission took place, not the county in which the plaintiff acted. Id. The injury-causing event which gives rise to the suit against State Farm in the present matter is the denial of coverage. All substantial events related to that denial occurred in Birmingham, Alabama — the location of State Farm's office at which the decision was made to deny the claim.

      . Mississippi Code Section 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(i) states in full:
      Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction shall be commenced in the county where the defendant resides, or, if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of business, or in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred.
      Miss.Code. Ann. § ll-ll-3(l)(a)(i) (Rev. 2004).

      . McMillan filed suit in the County Court of Hinds County. The jurisdiction of circuit court and county court are concurrent “in all matters of law and equity wherein the amount of value of the thing in controversy shall not exceed, exclusive of costs and interest, the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00)....” Miss.Code Ann. § 9-9-21 (Rev.2003). Thus, an analysis under Section 11-1 l-3(l)(a)(i) is proper.


author: CHANDLER, J.,

text:
    Louis R. REESE, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2OO7-KP-OO360-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Aug. 19, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 17, 2009.

      Louis R. Reese (Pro Se), attorney for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorney for appellee.
    Before MYERS, P.J., CHANDLER and BARNES, JJ.
   CHANDLER, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Louis R. Reese filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) challenging the revocation of his post-release supervision and suspended sentence by the Circuit Court of Monroe County. The circuit court dismissed the PCR motion, and Reese appeals. Reese contends that: (1) because he was a prior felon, the circuit court lacked the authority to impose a suspended sentence; therefore, the revocation was improper, and (2) there was insufficient evidence supporting the revocation.

¶ 2. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3. Reese pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of a controlled substance, Oxyco-done, and to one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, Oxyco-done. At a sentencing hearing on November 19, 2001, for the first count, the circuit court sentenced Reese to thirty years, with eight years to serve, twenty-two years suspended, and five years on post-release supervision, and to pay fines, court costs, and restitution. For the second count, the circuit court imposed a fine and a ten-year suspended sentence to run consecutively to the thirty-year sentence. For conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, the circuit court imposed a suspended sentence of twenty years to run concurrently with the thirty-year sentence, and the court ordered Reese to pay court costs. The circuit court retained a right to review Reese’s sentences for a period of one year.

¶ 4. On November 13, 2002, the circuit court exercised its jurisdiction to review Reese’s sentences. After a hearing, the circuit court increased the suspended portion of Reese’s thirty-year sentence from twenty-two years to twenty-six years, leaving him with only four years to serve. Otherwise, Reese’s sentences remained the same.

¶ 5. On September 13, 2005, shortly after Reese’s release from incarceration on post-release supervision, the State filed a petition requesting that the court revoke Reese’s twenty-six-year suspended sentence. The State alleged that the Monroe County Sheriffs Department had arrested Reese on a charge of selling stolen property; that when Reese was arrested, he was found to be in possession of a stolen four-wheeler; and that in a tape-recorded statement to the authorities, Reese admitted to having sold a stolen trailer and a stolen mower. The State also alleged that Reese was in arrears in his monthly payments of the court-ordered fines, court costs, and restitution.

¶ 6. At the revocation hearing, the court read the State’s allegations aloud, and Reese admitted to the allegations. Reese stated he understood that his arrest on new charges and his failure to pay the court-ordered sums violated the terms and conditions of his post-release supervision and suspended sentences. The State agreed not to prosecute Reese on the new felony charges pending the outcome of the revocation hearing. The circuit court found that Reese had violated the terms of his post-release supervision and suspended sentence requiring him to live at liberty without violating any laws and to pay the court-ordered sums. Accordingly, the circuit court revoked Reese’s post-release supervision and suspended sentence, and the court imposed the twenty-six-year sentence. The circuit court ordered Reese to serve fifteen years and ordered nine years suspended and on post-release supervision, with five years reporting and four years non-reporting. Reese’s suspended sentences in his other two convictions remained intact.

¶ 7. Reese timely filed a PCR motion challenging the circuit court’s authority to terminate his post-release supervision and suspended sentence. Reese contended that because he was a prior felon, the circuit court had lacked the authority to give him a partially suspended thirty-year sentence for sale of a controlled substance. According to Reese, because his suspended sentence was illegal, the suspended sentence could not be revoked. Reese requested that the circuit court vacate the fifteen-year portion he was to serve of the twenty-six-year sentence, which the court imposed upon revocation. The circuit court dismissed Reese’s PCR motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8. The circuit court may dismiss a PCR motion summarily and without an evidentiary hearing “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief.” Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Rev.2007). On appeal, this Court reviews the record de novo and will affirm the summary dismissal of a PCR motion if the petitioner has failed to demonstrate “a claim procedurally alive ‘substantially showing denial of a state or federal right,’-” Young v. State, 731 So.2d 1120, 1122(¶ 9) (Miss.1999) (quoting Myers v. State, 583 So.2d 174, 176 (Miss.1991)).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

DID THE CIRCUIT COURT ERR BY DISMISSING REESE’S PCR MOTION WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING?

¶ 9. Reese makes three arguments that the circuit court erred by summarily dismissing his PCR motion. Reese’s arguments are somewhat illogical, but because he proceeds pro se, we afford his arguments substantial latitude in an effort to ensure that a meritorious claim is not lost due to unartful drafting. Myers, 583 So.2d at 176. Reese’s first argument focuses upon the propriety of his sentence for sale of a controlled substance of thirty years, with twenty-six years suspended, and five years on post-release supervision. Reese argues that under Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-33 (Rev.2004), the circuit court lacked the authority to suspend any portion of his sentence, because when he pleaded guilty he was already a convicted felon. Thus, he contends that the partially suspended sentence was illegal. Reese reasons that because the partially suspended sentence was illegal, it could not be revoked.

¶ 10. Contrary to Reese’s argument, he was not given an illegal suspended sentence. Section 47-7-33 provides that a circuit court or county court has the power “to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence, and place the defendant on probation” except when the defendant previously has been convicted of a felony. In Johnson v. State, 925 So.2d 86, 105(¶ 39) (Miss.2006), the supreme court clarified that:

Section 47-7-33 prohibits the imposition of a suspended sentence and supervised probation on a prior convicted felon; however, this statute does not prohibit the imposition of a suspended sentence, in whole or in part, upon a prior convicted felon, so long as the sentence does not involve a period of supervised probation....

According to Johnson, a prior convicted felon is not eligible to receive a suspended sentence along with a period of supervised probation. However, Reese’s sentence was not comprised of a suspended sentence and supervised probation. Instead, Reese was given a suspended sentence and a period of post-release supervision under Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-34 (Rev.2004). Post-release supervision is an alternative to probation that is available for prior convicted felons. Johnson, 925 So.2d at 105(¶ 39). Therefore, Reese’s argument that his suspended sentence was illegal is without merit. Moreover, even if Reese’s suspended sentence had been illegal, a defendant suffers no prejudice from a sentencing error that benefits the defendant in the form of a more lenient sentence. Sweat v. State, 912 So.2d 458, 461 (¶ 9) (Miss.2005).

¶ 11. The appropriate standard for revocation of post-release supervision is whether the circuit court believes that it was more likely than not that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of his post-release supervision. Jones v. State, 976 So.2d 407, 413(¶ 19) (Miss.Ct. App.2008). Reese’s second argument challenges the circuit court’s statement in its order dismissing his PCR motion that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard did not apply to the revocation of Reese’s post-release supervision and suspended sentence. This argument rests upon Reese’s assertion that his suspended sentence was illegal. Reese contends that because the suspended sentence was illegal and, according to Reese, could not have been revoked, the State had to prove him guilty of new charges beyond a reasonable doubt in order to secure his incarceration. Reese’s argument is without merit; we have already found that Reese’s suspended sentence was not illegal. We do not address this argument further.

¶ 12. Reese’s final issue is that there was no proof before the circuit court showing that he had violated the terms and conditions of his post-release supervision. However, Reese did not raise this argument in his PCR motion, but he raises it for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the argument is procedurally barred. Taylor v. State, 682 So.2d 359, 362 (Miss. 1996). Notwithstanding the procedural bar, the evidence was sufficient to enable the circuit court to find that Reese more likely than not violated the terms and conditions of his post-release supervision by failing to live at liberty without violating any laws and failing to pay court-ordered sums. Reese gave sworn testimony admitting to the alleged' violations contained in the State’s petition for revocation, including that he had sold stolen property, was in possession of stolen property when he was arrested, and had failed to pay the court costs, fees, and restitution as ordered by the court. See Riely v. State, 562 So.2d 1206, 1211-12 (Miss.1990). We affirm the dismissal of Reese’s PCR motion.

¶ 13. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONROE COUNTY DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MONROE COUNTY.

KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.