author:
PER CURIAM.
      PARIENTE, J.,

text:
    George James TREPAL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-892
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 26, 2018]

      Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Todd G. Scher, and Brittney Nicole Lacy, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Christina Z. Pacheco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review George James Tre-pal’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Trepal’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Trepal’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Tre-pal’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Trepal responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Trepal’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Tre-pal is not entitled to relief. Trepal was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of nine to three. Trepal v. State, 621 So.2d 1361, 1363 (Fla. 1993). Trepal’s sentence of death became final in 1994. Trepal v. Florida, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 892, 127 L.Ed.2d 85 (1994). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Trepal’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Trepal’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Trepal, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It -is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J.,- and POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

QUINCE, j., recused.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this' Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. PARIENTE,. J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Sonny Ray JEFFRIES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-920
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 26, 2018]
    James Viggiano, Jr.,' Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Maria Christine Peri-netti, Raheela Ahmed, and Lisa Marie Bort, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Stephen D. Ake’, Assistant Attorney General, Tainpa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Sonny Ray Jeffries’ appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Jeffries’ motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Jeffries’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Jef-fries’ appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Jeffries responded to. .this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Jeffries’ response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Jef-fries .is not entitled to relief. Jeffries was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one, and his sentence of death became final in January 2002. Jeffries v. State, 797 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla. 2001). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Jeffries’ sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Jeffries’ motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Jeffries, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE,. J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla, 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


author: PER CURIAM. PARIENTE, J.,

text:
    Melvin TROTTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-950
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 26, 2018]
    James Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ann Marie Mirialakis, and Ali Andrew Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Melvin Trotter’s appear of the circuit court’s order denying Trotter’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Trotter’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Trotter’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Trotter responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Trotter’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Trotter is not entitled to relief. Trotter was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one. Trotter v. State, 690 So.2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 1996). Trotter’s sentence of death became final in 1997. Trotter v. Florida, 522 U.S. 876, 118 S.Ct. 197, 139 L.Ed.2d 134 (1997). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Trotter’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Trotter’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Trotter, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

QUINCE, J., recused.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Ian Deco LIGHTBOURNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-837
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 26, 2018]

      Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Suzanne Myers Keffer, and Nicole M. Noel, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Doris Meacham, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Ian Deco Lightb-ourne’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Lightbourne’s motion filed pursuant to Florida.Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Lightbourne’s motion sought reliéf pursuant 'to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision- on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Lightbourne’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied,- — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Lightbourne responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Lightbourne’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Lightbourne is not entitled to relief. Lightbourne was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by an unrecorded vote. See Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380, 391 (Fla. 1983). Lightbourne’s sentence of death became final in 1984. Lightbourne v. Florida, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1330, 79 L.Ed.2d 725 (1984). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Lightbourne’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Lightb-ourne’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Lightbourne, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON,, JJ., .concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with ' an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to' the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.

      . The jury’s vote recommending a sentence of •death was unrecorded, and, therefore, is not reflected in this Court’s opinion on direct appeal. See Appellant’s Br, Resp. Show Cause Order, Lightbourne v. State, No. SCI 7-837 (Fla. Oct. 16, 2017), at 12, 2017 WL 4812802.


text:
    Michael Bernard BELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1045
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 29, 2018]
    Robert A. Norgard of Norgard, Norgard & Chastang, Bartow, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo‘Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer A. Donahue, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Michael Bernard Bell’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Bell’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art; V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. ,

Bell’s motion sought relief pursuant' to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So,3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, -— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Bell’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. ——, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Bell responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Bell’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Bell is not entitled to relief, A jury convicted Bell of two counts of first-degree murder and unanimously recommended a sentence of death for both murders. Bell v. State, 699 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 1997). Following the jury’s recommendations, the trial court sentenced Bell to- death on both counts. Id. at 976.- Bell’s sentences of death became final in 1998. Bell v. Florida. 522 U.S. 1123, 118 S.Ct. 1067, 140 L.Ed.2d 127 (1998). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Bell’s sentences of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Bell’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Bell, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Guy R. GAMBLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1101
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 29, 2018]
    James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ann Marie Mirialakis, and Ali A. Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris Meacham, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Guy R. Gamble’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Gamble’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Gamble’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Gamble’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Gamble responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Gamble’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Gamble is not entitled to relief. Gamble was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of ten to two. Gamble v. State, 659 So.2d 242, 244 (Fla. 1995). Gamble’s sentence of death became final in 1996. Gamble v. Florida, 516 U.S. 1122, 116 S.Ct. 933, 133 L.Ed.2d 860 (1996). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Gamble’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Gamble’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Gamble, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Paul Alfred BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1001
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 29, 2018]

      James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Lisa Marie Bort, Maria Christine Perinetti, and Ra-heela Ahmed, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant .
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Paul Alfred Brown’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Brown’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See ■ art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Brown’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Brown’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Brown responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Brown’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Brown is not entitled to relief. Brown was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of seven to five, Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 304, 308 (Fla. 1990). Brown’s sentence of death became final in 1990. Brown v. Florida, 498 U.S. 992, 111 S.Ct. 537, 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Brown’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Brown’s motion.

" The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Brown, we caution that any'rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J„ and POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

QUINCE, J., recused.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. -513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Charles Kenneth FOSTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1383
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 29, 2018]

      James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mark S. Gru-ber, Julie A. Morley, and Margaret S. Russell, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida; and Billy • H. Ñolas, Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Northern District of. Florida, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Charles Kenneth Foster’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Foster’s motion filed, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has .jurisdiction. See. art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.,

Foster’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This, Court stayed Foster’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 203.7), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Foster responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Foster’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we Conclude that Foster is not entitled to relief. Foster- was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eight to four. Foster v. State, 654 So.2d 112, 113 (Fla. 1995). Foster’s sentence of death became final in 1995. Foster v. Florida, 516 U.S. 920, 116 S.Ct. 314, 133 L.Ed.2d 217 (1995). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Foster’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Foster’s- motion.

The-Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Foster, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, . POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Gary Ray BOWLES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1754
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 29, 2018]
    Francis Jerome Shea, Jacksonville, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer A. Donahue, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Gary Ray Bowles’ appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Bowles’ motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Bowles’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), we ordered Bowles to show cause why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Bowles’ response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Bowles is not entitled to relief. Bowles was sentenced to death following a jury’s unanimous recommendation for death. Bowles v. State, 804 So.2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 2001). Bowles’s sentence of death became final on June 17, 2002. Bowles v. Florida, 536 U.S. 930, 122 S.Ct. 2603, 153 L.Ed.2d 790 (2002). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Bowles’ sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Bowles’ motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Bowles, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Robert Joe LONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-942
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 29, 2018]
    Robert Anthony Norgard of Norgard, Norgard <⅞ Chastang, P.A., Bartow, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Robert Joe Long’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Long’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision oh remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Long’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court- decided Hitchcock, Long responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Long’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Long is not entitled to relief. Long was sentenced to death following a jury’s unanimous recommendation for death. Long v. State, 610 So.2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. 1992). His sentence of death became final in 1993. Long v. Florida, 510 U.S. 832, 114 S.Ct. 104, 126 L.Ed.2d 70 (1993). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Long’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial- of Long’s motion.

The, Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Long, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken, It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, and LAWSON, Jj., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

' LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result'.

QUINCE, J., recused.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, —- U.S. -, 138 S.Ct, 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Kevin Don FOSTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1141
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 29, 2018]
    Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Jason Kruszka, Staff Attorney, and Scott -Gavin, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Kevin Don Foster’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Foster’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Foster’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Foster’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Foster responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Foster’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Foster is not entitled to relief. Foster was sentenced to death.following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of nine to three, and his sentence of death became final in 2001. Foster v. State, 778 So.2d 906, 912 (Fla. 2000). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Foster’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Foster’s motion.

The Court having ’carefully considered all arguments raised by Foster, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, . POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

’ PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in' Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —- 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in'Hitchcock.


text:
    Mark Allen DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1259
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 29, 2018]

      Linda McDermott of McClain & McDer-mott, P.A., Estero, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Candance M. Sabel-la, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Mark Alen Davis’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Davis’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Davis’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Davis’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). Ater this Court decided Hitchcock, Davis responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

Ater reviewing Davis’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Davis is not entitled to relief. Davis was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eight to four. Davis v. State, 620 So.2d 152, 153 n.3 (Fla. 1993). Davis’s sentence of death became final in 1994. Davis v. Florida, 510 U.S. 1170, 114 S.Ct. 1205, 127 L.Ed.2d 552 (1994). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Davis’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Davis’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Davis, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

QUINCE, J., recused.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Ernest WHITFIELD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1399
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 30, 2018]
    Robert A. Norgard of Norgard, Norgard & Chastang, Bartow, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and C. Suzanne Bech-ard, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Ernest Whitfield’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Whitfield’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla; Const.

Whitfield’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Whitfield’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Whitfield responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Whitfield’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Whitfield is not entitled to relief. Whitfield was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of seven to five. Whitfield v. State, 706 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1997). Whitfield’s sentence of death became final in 1998. Whitfield v. Florida, 525 U.S. 840, 119 S.Ct. 103, 142 L.Ed.2d 82 (1998). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Whitfield’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Whitfield’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Whitfield, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LÁBARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, ' ' POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —-, 138, S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Stephen Todd BOOKER, Petitioner, v. Julie L. JONES, etc., Respondent.
    No. SC17-1205
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 30, 2018]
    Ann Finnell of Finnell, McGuinness, Nezami & Andux, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida; and Billy H.' Ñolas, Chief, Capital Ha-beas Unit, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Lisa A.' Hopkins, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

Stephen Todd Booker petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016); cert. denied, — U.S. , 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.

This Court stayed Booker’s case pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S - 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Booker responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this ease.

After reviewing Booker’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Booker is not entitled to relief. Booker was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eight to four; Booker v. State, 773 So.2d 1079, 1086 (Fla. 2001). Booker’s sentence of death became final in 2001. Booker v. Florida. 532 U.S. 1033, 121 S.Ct. 1989, 149 L.Ed.2d 779 (2001). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Booker’s sentence. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we deny Booker’s petition.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Booker, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in . result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State. 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied. — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Dominick A. OCCHICONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1112
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 30, 2018]

      James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Maria Christine Perinetti, Raheela Ahmed and Lisa Marie Bort, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Dominick A. Occhi-cone’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Occhicone’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Occhicone’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Occhicone’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Occhicone respondéd to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Occhicone’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Occhicone is not entitled to relief. Occhicone was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of seven to five. See Occhicone v. State, 570 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1990). His sentence of death became final in 1991. Occhicone v. Florida, 500 U.S. 938, 111 S.Ct. 2067, 114 L.Ed.2d 471 (1991). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Oc-chicone’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Occhicone’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Occhicone, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

QUINCE, J., recused.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.

      . Occhicone was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, and the jury recommended a sentence of death for each count; however, the trial court sentenced Occhicone to death for only one count of first-degree murder. Occhicone, 570 So.2d at 904. While the jury vote is not in this Court’s opinion on direct appeal, this Court’s opinion addressing the circuit court’s denial of Occhicone's initial postconviction motion states that the jury recommended sentences of death for both murders by a vote of seven to five. Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 2000).


text:
    Toney Deron DAVIS, Petitioner, v. Julie L. JONES, etc., Respondent.
    No. SC17-1711
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 30, 2018]
    Rick A, Sichta, Susanne K. Sichta, and Joe Hamrick of The Sichta Firm, LLC, Jacksonville, Florida, for Petitioner
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer L. Keegan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

Toney Deron Davis petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.

After this Court decided Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), we ordered Davis to show cause why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Davis’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Davis is not entitled to relief. Davis was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one. Davis v. State, 703 So.2d 1055, 1057 (Fla. 1997). Davis’s sentence of death became final in 1998. Davis v. Florida, 524 U.S. 930, 118 S.Ct. 2327, 141 L.Ed.2d 701 (1998). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Davis’s sentence. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we deny Davis’s petition.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Davis, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —-, 138 act. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock. ' •


text:
    Marbel MENDOZA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1324
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 30, 2018]
    Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Bryan E. Martinez, Staff Attorney, and Rachel L. Day, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Melissa J. Roca, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Marbel Mendoza’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Mendoza’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Mendoza’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Mendoza’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Mendoza responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive.in this case.

After reviewing Mendoza’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Mendoza is not entitled to relief. Mendoza was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of seven to five. Mendoza v. State, 700 So.2d 670, 673 (Fla. 1997). Mendoza’s sentence of death became final in 1998. Mendoza v. Florida, 525 U.S. 839, 119 S.Ct. 101, 142 L.Ed.2d 81 (1998). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Mendoza’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Mendoza’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Mendoza, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Thomas Lee GUDINAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-919
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 30, 2018]

      James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Ali A. Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris Meacham, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Thomas Lee Gudi-nas’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Gudinas’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Gudinas’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Gu-dinas’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Gudinas responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Gudinas’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Gudinas is not entitled to relief. Gudi-nas was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of ten to two. Gudinas v. State, 693 So.2d 953, 959 (Fla. 1997). His sentence of death became final in 1997. Gudinas v. Florida, 522 U.S. 936, 118 S.Ct. 345, 139 L.Ed.2d 267 (1997). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Gudinas’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Gudi-nas’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Gudinas, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Dennis SOCHOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1343
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 30, 2018]

      Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Jason Kruszka, Staff Attorney, and Rachel L. Day, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Donna M. Perry, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Dennis Soehor’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Sochor’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Sochor’s motion sought-relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. - 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed So-chor’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Sochor responded td this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Sochor’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that So-chor is riot entitled to relief. Sochor was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for déath by a vote of ten to two. Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1993). Sochor’s sentence of death became final in 1994. Sochor v. Florida, 510 U.S. 1025, 114 S.Ct. 638, 126 L.Ed.2d 596 (1994). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Sochor’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Sochor’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Sochor, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in - Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Glen Edward ROGERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-945
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 30, 2018]
    James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Ali A. Shakoor, Assistant Capital'Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    . Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Glen Edward Rogers’ appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Rogers’ motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has- jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Rogers’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Rogers’ appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017); cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Rogers responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

. After reviewing Rogers’ response to the order to show.cause,'as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Rogers is not entitled to-relief. Rogers was sentenced to death following a jury’s unanimous recommendation for death, and his sentence of death became final in 2001. Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 987 (Fla. 2001). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Rogers’ sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Rogers’ motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Rogers, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017),. is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Robert A. CONSALVO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1309
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 31, 2018]
    Ira W. Still, III, Coral Springs, Florida, for Appellant '•
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palin Beach, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Robert A. Consal-vo’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Consalvo’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Consalvo’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Consalvo’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Consalvo responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Consalvo’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Consalvo is not entitled to relief. Con-salvo was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one. Consalvo v. State, 697 So.2d 805, 811 (Fla. 1996). Consalvo’s sentence of death became final in 1998. Consalvo v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1109, 118 S.Ct. 1681, 140 L.Ed.2d 819 (1998). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Consalvo’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Consalvo’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Consalvo, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


author: PER CURIAM. PARIENTE, J,,

text:
    Joshua D. NELSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-939
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 31, 2018]

      Linda McDermott of McClain & McDer-mott, P.A., Estero, Florida; and John Aba-tecola of John Abatecola, P.A., Estero, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Lisa Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Joshua D. Nelson’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Nelson’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule ■ of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Nelson’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert-denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Nelson’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Nelson responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Nelson’s' response to the order to show cause, as wel as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Nelson is not entitled to relief. Nelson was sentenced to death following a jury’s unanimous recommendation for death. Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 240 (Fla. 1999). His sentence of death became final in 2000. Nelson v. Florida, 528 U.S. 1123, 120 S.Ct. 950, 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Nelson’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Nelson’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Nelson, we caution that any rehearing motion' containing rear-gument will be stricken; It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J.,- and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.-

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J,,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue- to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Jack R. SLINEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1074
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 31, 2018]
    James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Julissa R. Fontán, Maria E. DeLiberato-and Chelsea Shirley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Scott A. Browne, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Jack R. Sliney’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Sliney’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule, of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Sliney’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and-our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Sli-ney’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Sliney responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Sliney’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Sli-ney is not entitled to relief. Sliney was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of seven to five. Sliney v. State, 699 So.2d 662, 667 (Ela. 1997). His sentence of death became final in 1998. Sliney v. Florida, 522 U.S. 1129, 118 S.Ct. 1079, 140 L.Ed.2d 137 (1998). Thus,-Hurst does not apply retroactively to Sliney’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the- denial of .Sliney’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Sliney, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. ——, 138 S.Ct. 613, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitch-coek.


text:
    Robert R. GORDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1133
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 31, 2018]
    Bjorn E. Brunvand and J. Jervis Wise of Brunvand Wise, P.A., Clearwater, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Timothy A. Free-land, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Robert R, Gordon’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Gordon’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.861. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla; Const.

Gordon’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States. Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), and our, decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40. (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Gordon’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Gordon responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Gordon’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Gordon is not entitled to relief. Gordon was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of nine to three, and his sentence became final in 1998. Gordon v. State, 704 So.2d 107, 110 (Fla. 1997). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Gordon’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Gordon’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Gordon, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Ronnie J. KNIGHTON, Respondent.
    No. SC16-1426
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [February 1, 2018]

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Jeanine M. Germanowiez, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Petitioner
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant Public Defehder, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

The State of Florida seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Knighton v. State, 193 So.3d 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision' of the Second District Court of Appeal in Harris v. State, 742 So.2d 835 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Knighton was charged with one count of lewd or lascivious battery. Knighton, 193 So.3d at 116. The information charged Knighton by specifically alleging penile union or penetration with the child victim’s vagina. Id. “During the charge conference, Knighton requested the'jury be instructed on the lesser-included offense of unnatural and lascivious act. The State objected to the request, reasoning that there is nothing ‘unnatural’ about traditional penile-vaginal intercourse.” Id. The trial court denied Knighton’s request and the jury .ultimately convicted Knighton of lewd or lascivious battery. Id.

The Fourth District reversed, explaining that Knighton was entitled to the unnatural and lascivious instruction because, agreeing with the Fifth District in Funiciello v. State, 179 So.3d 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), “digital penetration and sexual intercourse between an adult perpetrator and a child victim constitute unnatural and lascivious acts in that such conduct is not in accordance with nature or with normal feelings or behavior and are lustful acts performed with sensual intent on the part of the defendant.” Knighton, 193 So.3d at 117 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Funiciello, 179 So.3d at 391). Because Knighton, an adult, engaged in sexual intercourse with a minor victim, the Fourth District found that he was entitled to the unnatural and lascivious instruction. Id. The State then ■ sought review of the Fourth District’s decision in Knighton in this Court, alleging conflict with Harris, 742 So.2d 835,

In Harris, which also involved an adult perpetrator having sexual intercourse with a child victim, the Second District came to the opposite conclusion, holding that a defendant charged with lewd or lascivious battery is not entitled to an instruction on unnatural and lascivious act where penile union with a child victim’s vagina is alleged in the information, regardless of the evidence adduced at trial. 742 So.2d at 838. The Second District reasoned that “the legislature intended for section 800.02 [unnatural and lascivious act] to be applied to different factual situations than would fall under section 800.04 [lewd or lascivious battery], The term ‘unnatural’ in 800.02 distinguishes 800.02 from 800.04, and implies something more than what is covered by 800.04” Id.

This review follows.

ANALYSIS

Because this matter involves a solely legal determination based on undisputed facts, our standard of review is de novo. See Khianthalat v. State, 974 So.2d 359, 360-61 (Fla. 2008); Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 595, 598 (Fla. 2007).

At issue in this case is whether Knighton was entitled to an instruction on the permissive lesser included offense of unnatural and lascivious act.

We begin by defining lesser included offenses. Lesser included offenses fall into two categories: necessary and permissive. Necessarily lesser included offenses are those offenses in which the statutory elements of the lesser included offensie are always subsümed within those of the charged offense. State v. Paul, 934 So.2d 1167, 1176 (Fla. 2006). A permissive lesser included offense exists when “the two offenses appear to be separate [on the face of the statutes], but the facts-alleged in the accusatory-pleadings are such that the lesser [included] offense cannot help but be perpetrated once the greater offense has been.” State v. Weller, 590 So.2d 923, 925 n.2 (Fla. 1991).

Sanders v. State, 944 So.2d 203, 206 (Fla. 2006) (alterations in original). We have previously explained the circumstances under which a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a permissive lesser included offense:

Upon request, a trial judge must give a jury instruction on a permissive lesser included offense if the following two conditions are met: “(1) the indictment or information must allege all the statutory elements of the permissive lesser included offense; and (2) there must be some evidence adduced at trial establishing all of these elements.” We recently reiterated this’ longstanding rule by stating that “[a]n instruction on a permissive lesser included offense is appropriate only if the allegations of the greater offense contain all the elements of the lesser offense and the evidence at trial would support a verdict on the lesser offense.”

Khianthalat, 974 So.2d at 361 (citations omitted) (quoting Jones v. State, 666 So.2d 960, 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Williams, 957 So.2d at 599).

Knighton was charged with and convicted of lewd or lascivious battery under section 800.04(4), Florida Statutes (2013). The standard jury instruction for lewd or lascivious battery (engaging in sexual activity) reads as follows:

To prove the crime of Lewd or Lascivious Battery, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. (Victim) was twelve years of age or older, but under the age of sixteen years.
2. (Defendant)
a. [committed an act [upon] [with] (victim) in which the sexual organ of the [(defendant)] [(victim)] penetrated or had union with the [anus] [vagina] [mouth] of the [(victim)] [ (defendant) ].]
b. [committed an act [upon] [with] (victim)' in which the [anus] [vagina] of [ (victim) ] [ (defendant) ] was penetrated by an object.] The definition of “an object” includes a finger.

Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.10(a). “ ‘Union’ means contact.” Id. Furthermore, “ ‘lewd’ and ‘lascivious’ mean the same thing and mean a wicked, lustful, unchaste, licentious, or sensual intent on the part of the person doing an act.” Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.10.

At trial, Knighton requested- that the trial court instruct the jury on the permissive lesser included offense of unnatural and lascivious act under section 800.02, Florida Statutes (2013). The standard jury instruction for unnatural and lascivious act reads as follows:

To prove the crime of Committing an Unnatural and Lascivious Act, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. (Defendant) (copy from charge) with (person named in charge).
2. The act was unnatural and lascivious. -
Definitions.
“Unnatural” means not in accordance with nature or with normal feelings or . behavior.
“Lascivious” means a wicked, lustful or unchaste, licentious, or sensual intent on the part of the person doing an act.

Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Grim.) 11.8.

In addressing the question of whether “unnatural” in the unnatural and lascivious act instruction includes penile-vaginal sexual intercourse, we must look to the well-established rules of statutory interpretation.

Statutory interpretation is a “holistic endeavor,” and when engaged in the task of discerning the meaning of a statute, we “ ‘will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute Adverting to our catalogue of rules of statutory construction,
[w]e are required to give effect to “every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute, if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.” Moreover, “a basic rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.” “[R]elated statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent whole, and ... ‘[w]here possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.’ ”
[see also] Goode v. State, 50 Fla. 45, 39 So. 461 (1905) (“It is the general rule, in construing statutes, ‘that construction is favored which gives effect to every clause and every part of the statute, thus producing a consistent and harmonious whole. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language used should be rejected, if an interpretation can be found which will give it effect.’ ”).

Quarantello v. Leroy, 977 So.2d 648, 651-52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (some citations omitted) (quoting United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650, 94 S.Ct. 2431, 41 L.Ed.2d 374 (1974); and Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 198-99 (Fla. 2007)).

Notably, the term “unnatural” in the unnatural and lascivious act instruction is separately defined from the term “lascivious,” which distinguishes unnatural from lascivious. Therefore, the “unnatural” element of section 800.02 is what separates the crime of unnatural and lascivious act from the crime of lewd and lascivious battery under section 800.04(4). Thus, in reading sections 800.02 and 800.04(4) in a way that gives full effect to all statutory provisions, we conclude that the Legislature must have intended for the crime of unnatural and lascivious act under section 800.02 to be separate and distinct from the crime of lewd and lascivious battery under section 800.04(4).

The Fourth District’s contrary conclusion below renders the crimes under sections 800.02 and 800.04(4) as identical crimes with differing penalties. In other words, the decision below results in one crime essentially subsuming the other—a result that clearly cannot stand when the two statutes are read and construed to give logical and orderly meaning to all sections. See Harris, 742 So.2d at 838.

Moreover, as we previously stated in Wong v. State, 212 So.3d 351 (Fla. 2017), in cases not involving penile-vaginal sexual intercourse, the instruction on unnatural or lascivious act is a permissive lesser included offense of lewd and lascivious battery. Id. at 361. We acknowledge that, historically, section 800.02 “has been applied to homosexual acts, bestiality, digital sex, and oral sex—anything other than adult male and female sexual intercourse.” Harris, 742 So.2d at 838 (citing Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1971); Button v. State, 641 So.2d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Mohammed v. State, 561 So.2d 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); McGahee v. State, 561 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)). Thus, we conclude that it was not error here for the trial court to decline to give the permissive lesser instruction of unnatural and lascivious acts'.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, we quash the decision of the Fourth District in Knighton and remand to the district court for any further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Furthermore, we disapprove of the Second District’s decision in Harris, to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion, and we approve of Harris, to the extent that it is consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.


author: PER CURIAM. POLSTON, J., LAWSON, J.,

text:
    Alex PAGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-872
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [February 1, 2018]

      James Vincent Viggiano,. .Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Maria E. De-Liberato, Julissa R. Fontán, and Chelsea Shirley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Donna M.' Perry, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

Alex Pagan appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his sentence of death under Florida Rule of-Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We vacate Pagan’s death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase consistent with Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

Pagan was convicted of the murders of Michael Lynn and Freddy Jones, the attempted murders of Latasha and Lafayette Jones, the robbery of the Joneses’ home, and the theft of their vehicle. Pagan v. State, 830. So.2d 792, 798-802 (Fla. 2002). The jury recommended death by a vote of seven to five, and the trial court sentenced Pagan to death for each of the murders. Id. This Court, affirmed Pagan’s convictions and sentences and denied rehearing on November 7, 2002. Id. The United States Supreme Court denied cer-tiorari on June 9, 2003. See Pagan v. Florida, 539 U.S. 919, 123 S.Ct. 2278, 156 L.Ed.2d 137 (2003). This Court affirmed the denial of Pagan’s initial postconviction motion and denied his simultaneously filed writ of habeas corpus. See Pagan v. State, 29 So.3d 938 (Fla. 2009), Pagan’s federal habeas petition was. subsequently denied, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See Pagan v. Tucker, 568 U.S. 1093, 133 S.Ct. 842, 184 L.Ed.2d 666 (2013).

Pagan appealed the denial of his first successive postconviction motion to vacate his death sentence,' seeking relief under Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct, 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016). On June 9, 2017, this Court issued an order to show cause asking the State to demonstrate why relief’ should not’ be granted in Pagan’s case in light of Hurst, Davis v. State, 207 So.3d 142 (Fla. 2016), cert, denied, U.S;-, 137 S.Ct. 2218, 198 L.Ed.2d 663 (2017), and Mosley v. State, 209 So.3d 1248 (Fla. 2016). Because the jury recommended death by a vote of seven to five and because Pagan’s sentence became final after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, his sentence is the result of Hurst error.

In considering whether the error was harmless, we decline the State’s invitation to model our Hurst harmless error analysis after the Supreme Court’s recent analysis of procedural default in Jenkins v. Hutton, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1769, 198 L.Ed.2d 415 (2017). The State has not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in this case did not contribute to the sentence. See Armstrong v. State, 211 So.3d 864, 865 (Fla. 2017). While the aggravation in Pagan’s case is substantial, we cannot determine whether the jury would have unanimously found that the aggravation outweighed the mitigation. Id. Accordingly, the Hurst error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse' the postconviction court’s order and remand for a new penalty phase. See Hurst, 202 So.3d at 69.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ,, concur.

CANADY, J., dissents.

POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion.

LAWSON, J., dissents with an opinion.

POLSTON, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent to the majority’s decision to remand for a new penalty • phase. First, Hurst does not.apply retroactively to1 this case. See Mosley v. State, 209 So.3d 1248, 1285 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, J., concurring in part and dissenting, in part). Second, because the prior violent felony and during the course of' a felony aggravators 'are supported by jury findings, I do not believe a Hurst error is present in this case even if Hurst applied retroactively. See Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40, 82 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, J., dissenting). Third, for the reasons explained by Justice Lawson in his dissenting- opinion, Pagan would not be entitled to relief under a proper harmless error analysis. The majority inexplicably has converted Hurst error into pér se reversible error despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court remanded Hurst back to this Court for a harmless error analysis. See Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 624, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016).

LAWSON, J.,

dissenting.

I agree with the State that if this Court were to apply a proper harmless error analysis to the facts of this ease, Pagan would not be entitled to relief on his claim of Hurst error. In Hurst, we held that error resulting from “the judge rather than the jury marking] all the necessary findings to impose a death sentence, is not structural error incapable of harmless error review.” Hurst, 202 So.3d at 67. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, we further recognized that whether Hurst error is harmless requires this Court to determine-whether there is a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed, “rational” 'jury would have made the findings necessary to impose death. Id. (quoting Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 522 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999))); cf. Jenkins v. Hutton, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1769, 1772,' 198 L.Ed.2d 415 (2017) (recognizing that :the proper, focus in an instructional error case is on whether , a properly instructed, reasonable jury cpuld have recommended death).-

In practice, however, the majority has replaced the proper harmless error analysis with the same per se reversible error rule that Hurst rejected, finding Hurst error' harmful in every case in which the jury did not unanimously recommend death—because the jury’s recommendation was not unanimous. See, e.g., Kopsho v. State, 209 So.3d 568, 570 (Fla. 2017) (holding Hurst error was not harmless after explaining that all that can be determined from the jury’s 10-2 death recommendation is “that the-jury did not unanimously recommend a sentence of death”).

Rather than find Hurst error harmful because there was Hurst, error, I would apply the proper rational jury test. Judged by this standard, the Hurst error in Pagan’s case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Pagan’s case presents some of the weightiest aggravation in Florida’s capital sentencing'scheme: prior and contemporaneous violent felonies, all of which' were found by unanimous juries; the in the course of a felony aggravator—two felonies, in fact, both of which were unanimously found by Pagan’s jury; and the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggra-vator, which inescapably flows from the evidence of Pagan’s planned execution of a six-year-old child and his father, in the presence of his wife, whom Pagan also shot along with the couple’s eighteen-month-old other child. That these aggravators are established, sufficient, and substantially outweigh the scant mitigation presented are findings that no objectively reasonable jury, properly instructed, would have failed to unanimously make in support of a unanimous death recommendation.

Accordingly, because the Hurst error in Pagan’s case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I respectfully dissent.

      . Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428/153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002).

      . Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla, 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct, 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). Although I adhere to my view that this Court’s Hurst decision was incorrectly decided, Okafor v. State, 225 So.3d 768, 775-76 (Fla. 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially), I have elected to follow the Hurst precedent for the reasons explained in Okafor.


author: LAWSON, J.

text:
    Darryl Lewis DAVIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. Darryl Lewis Davis, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC16-1738
    No. SC16-1739
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [February 1, 2018]
    1 Rocco J. Carbone, III of The Law Office of Rocco J. Carbone, III, PLLC, St. Augustine, Florida, for Petitioner
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Wesley Heidt, Bureau Chief, and Andrea K. Totten, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent
   LAWSON, J.

In the decisions on review involving two separate robberies committed by the same defendant, the Fifth District Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to reduce Darryl Lewis Davis’s convictions of robbery with a deadly weapon to robbery with a weapon after explaining that Davis’s juries found that he • did not possess the only weapon alleged in the information—a firearm—and that no evidence was presented that Davis used any weapon other than a firearm. Davis v. State, 197 So. 3d 615, 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016); Davis v. State, 197 So.3d 615, 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). We accepted jurisdiction because the Fifth District’s decisions expressly and directly conflict with the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in Starling v. State, 152 So.3d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), and the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Deleon v. State, 66 So.3d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), where, on similar facts, the district courts ordered the trial courts to reduce the defendants’ convictions to simple robbery and simple carjacking, respectively. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We write briefly to explain why the records in Davis’s cases resolve the apparent conflict and why the Fifth District reached the correct result on the merits.

The records in Davis’s cases contradict the Fifth District’s statement that there was no evidence Davis used “any weapon other than a firearm.” Davis, 197 So.3d at 615. To the contrary, in both of Davis’s trials for two separate robberies, evidence was presented that the object Davis used to commit the crime was either ‘a firearm or a BB gun replica of a firearm. The absence of a similar dispute in Starling or Deleon distinguishes those cases. See Starling, 152 So.3d at 868 (“[T]he only weapon referenced in the record as being involved in the crime was the firearm allegedly wielded by Appellant, which the jury affirmatively concluded Appellant did not possess.”); Deleon, 66 So.3d at 394 (“[T]he victim testified that Deleon carried a gun, and there was no evidence that he carried any other weapon during the commission of the offense.”).

In addition to resolving the apparent conflict with Starling and Deleon, the records establish that the Fifth District correctly directed the trial court to reduce Davis’s convictions from robbery with a deadly weapon to robbery with a weapon. In both of Davis’s cases, the State charged Davis with robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2001); it did not charge him with robbery with a deadly weapon. Moreover, robbery with a deadly weapon is ■ not a lesser-included offense of robbery with a firearm, although the trial court wrongly instructed on it as such. See Davis, 197 So.3d at 615 (“[I]t was error to list robbery with a deadly weapon as a lesser-included offense on the verdict forms in [Davis’s] cases,”); cf. Deleon, 66 So.3d at 395 (holding that carjacking with a deadly weapon is neither a necessary nor permissive lesser-included offense of carjacking with a firearm). Rather, robbery with a weapon, on which Davis’s juries were also instructed, is .the next immediate lesser-included offense of robbery with a firearm. See Reddick v. State, 394 So.2d 417, 417-18 (Fla. 1981); see also Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 15.1 Robbery.

Thus, while Davis’s convictions for the uncharged offense of robbery with a deadly weapon cannot stand, see Jaimes v. State, 51 So. 3d 445, 448 (Fla. 2010) (“It is a fundamental principle of due process that a defendant may not be convicted of a crime that has not been charged by the state.”), the evidence that the object Davis used in the robberies was, if not a firearm, a BB gun replica of a firearm—which Davis’s juries clearly found to be a weapon—is sufficient to sustain convictions- for robbery with a weapon. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr, (Crim) 15.1 Robbery (defining “weapon” as “any object that could be used to cause death or inflict serious bodily harm”); see also Dale v. State, 703 So.2d 1045, 1046-47 (Fla. 1997) (concluding that the definitions in the standard jury instructions on robbery are “a.correct statement of the law” and recognizing that a BB or pellet gun may be a deadly weapon). Accordingly, the Fifth District correctly ordered the trial court to reduce Davis’s convictions to robbery with a weapon. Cf. § 924.34, Fla. Stat. (2017) (allowing an appellate court to direct a judgment for a lesser-included offense that is established by the record where the evidence does not sustain the offense for which the defendant was found guilty); State v. Sigler, 967 So.2d 835, 844 (Fla. 2007) (“[W]hen all of the elements of a lesser offense have been determined by the jury, section 924.34 is a valid exercise of the legislative prerogative allowing appellate courts to direct a judgment for such an offense.”).

Therefore, we approve the result of the Fifth District’s' decisions.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result.