author: COLEMAN, JUSTICE, MAXWELL, JUSTICE, RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, BEAM, JUSTICE, CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE,

text:
    Tyler EDMONDS a/k/a Tyler W. Edmonds v. STATE of Mississippi
    NO. 2015-CA-01788-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    06/29/2017

      JIM WAIDE, VICTOR ISRAEL FLEI-TAS, TUPELO, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT '
    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL' BY: WILSON DOUGLAS MINOR, JACKSON, ATTORNEY FOR AP-PELLEE
   COLEMAN, JUSTICE,

FOR THE-COURT:

¶ 1. In July 2004, an Oktibbeha County jury found Tyler Edmonds guilty of the murder of Joey Fulgham, who was his half-sister’s husband. In May 2007,. the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed Ed-monds’s conviction and remanded the case to the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court for a new trial due to evidentiary errors. At his new trial in 2008, a jury found Ed-monds not guilty,

¶ 2. The present appeal stems, from Ed-monds’s suit against the State under the Compensation to Victims of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment statutes codified in Mississippi Code Sections 11-44-1 to 11-44-15, which permit a person wrongfully convieted and imprisoned to recover $50,000 for every year, of -wrongful incarceration. The circuit court concluded that Edmonds was not entitled, to compensation because he made a false confession to police officers regarding his involvement with the murder, which equated to a fabrication of evidence. Edmonds appeals, and we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the circuit court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. In 2003, Edmonds confessed that he, with the help of his half-sister Kristi Fulg-ham, shot Joey Fulgham. At the time, Joey was married to Kristi. Initially, Ed-monds and his mother voluntarily went to the police station, and Edmonds claimed that he did not know anything about the murder] However, Edmonds’s mother was removed from the room, Edmonds was informed that Kristi had implicated him in the murder, and Kristi, who was already at the police station, was brought into the room with Edmonds. She held Edmonds’s hand and told him that she had told the truth and that' he should tell the truth too. After his brief meeting with- Kristi, Ed-monds gave a confession that he and Kristi had killed Joey. Several days later, Ed-monds recanted his confession and stated that 'Kristi had acted alone in shooting Joey.

¶4. Following trial, the jury convicted Edmonds of murder, and the court sentenced him to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Edmonds appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence and conviction. Edmonds v. State, 955 So.2d 864, 900 (¶¶ 120-1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). The Supreme Court granted Edmonds’s petition for writ of certiorari review. Edmonds v. State, 955 So.2d 787, 790 (¶ 2) (Miss. 2007). The Court concluded that Edmonds did not receive a fair trial for a variety of reasons, so the Court reversed the circuit court’s and Court of Appeals’ judgments and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 798-9 (¶¶ 29-33).

¶ 5. Edmonds’s second trial resulted in a not-guilty verdict. Upon, the return of the not-guilty verdict, Edmonds filed the present action seeking compensation pursuant to Section 11-44-1 for the years he spent in custody. Edmonds’s bench trial resulted in a determination by the circuit court that Edmonds’s confession was fabricated evidence; thus, he could not recover under the Compensation to Victims of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment statutes. Edmonds appeals and raises the following issues:

I. Whether the circuit court erred- in -concluding that Edmonds fabricated evidence.
II. Whether the circuit court’s failure - to give Edmonds a fair trial at his first criminal trial was a superseding cause of Edmonds’s conviction, such that the false confession was not a legal cause of his conviction.
III. Whether the -circuit court should have granted Edmonds’s request to have a jury trial.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. As has been explained, the present appeal stems from the circuit court’s-judgment following a bench trial. It is well-settled that the Court defers to the factual findings and determinations of a trial judge sitting as the finder of fact at a bench trial; therefore, we will not disturb such findings if they are supported by substantial evidence and the trial court did not abuse its discretion, was not manifestly wrong, was not clearly erroneous, and did not apply an erroneous. legal standard. Covington County v. G.W., 767 So.2d 187, 189 (¶ 4) (Miss. 2000) (quoting Church of God Pentecostal, Inc. v. Freewill Pentecostal Church of God, Inc., 716 So.2d 200, 204 (¶ 15) (Miss. 1998)). As is customary, the Court reviews questions of law, including statutory interpretation, de novo. Tellus Operating Group, LLC v. Texas Petroleum Inv. Co., 105 So.3d 274, 277-8 (¶ 9) (Miss. 2012) (quoting Laurel Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Blakeney, 81 So.3d 1123, 1125 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2012)).

analysis

¶7. For purposes of our analysis, the first two issues raised by Edmonds can be consolidated into one issue: the appropriate interpretation and application of Section 11 — 44—7(l)(c), which provides that a plaintiff under the Compensation to Victims of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment Act (“Wrongful Conviction and Im-prisonmént Act”) must show he did not “fabricate evidence to bring about his conviction.” See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-48-7(1)(c) (Rev. 2012). The second primary issue before -us is whether Edmonds’s request for a jury trial should have been granted. On both issues, we hold in favor of Edmonds.

I. Section 11 — 44—7(l)(c) includes an element of intent to bring about one’s conviction when fabricating evidence and therefore, an issue of material fact remains as to Ed-monds’s intent.

¶ 8. According to Section 11-44-1, the reason for the passage of the Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment statutes was to provide monetary compensation to “innocent persons who have been wrongly convicted of felony crimes and subsequently imprisoned” because they “have been uniquely victimized, have distinct problems reentering society, and should be compensated.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-1 (Rev. 2012). Compensation is provided if a claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that “[h]e was convicted of one or more felonies and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or any part of the sentence; and ... his judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and ... [i]f a new trial was ordered, he was found not guilty at the new trial Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7(l)(a)(ii)(2) (Rev. 2012). Further, the claimant must prove that “[h]e did not commit the felony or felonies for which he was sentenced and which are the grounds for the complaint, or the acts or omissions for which he was sentenced did not constitute a felony.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7(l)(b). Finally, and most relevant to the present case, the claimant must prove that “[h]e did not commit or suborn perjury, or fabricate evidence to bring about his conviction.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11 — 44—7(l)(c).

¶ 9. The crux of Edmonds’s position is that the circuit court erred in finding that his false confession prohibits him from recovery pursuant to Section 11 — 44—7(l)(c). In support of his position, Edmonds outlines several facts that led to his confession, which include: his young age, his desire to help his half-sister avoid the death penalty, and the police allowing his half-sister to speak to him without his mother present. Essentially, Edmonds’s argument is two-fold: (1) the statute requires an element of intent to fabricate evidence, and (2) an issue of material fact exists as to the nature of Edmond’s intent. The State, on the other hand, contends that the “to bring about” language is merely causative and lacks any connotation of intent. We agree with Edmonds on both points.

¶ 10. First, the issue hinges upon the Court’s interpretation of the following language within the statute: “[The Claimant] did not ... fabricate evidence to bring about his conviction.” Miss. Code Ann. § ll-44-7(l)(c). “When interpreting a statute that is not ambiguous, this Court will apply the plain meaning of the statute.” Pitalo v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 933 So.2d 927, 929 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2006). To determine the plain meaning, “we must look at the words of the statute.” Adams v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-DeSoto, Inc., 965 So.2d 652, 656 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2007).

¶ 11. The word “fabricate” has no element of intent indicating ultimate purpose or motive for the fabrication embedded within its plain meaning; however, the phrase “to bring about” does. The word “to” carries many definitions, one of which is “used for expressing aim, purpose, or intention.” To, Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1989 (2d ed. 2001). The phrase “to bring about” reflects the function of the word “to” as expressing “aim, purpose, or intention,” as in “[The Claimant] did not ... fabricate evidence [with the “aim, purpose, or intention” of bringing] about his conviction.” As it means “[something, especially] willful desire, that leads one to act,” Motive, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), the word “motive” also would be appropriate to describe the requirement at issue. In more technical terms, the phrase “to bring about” produces an adverbial infinitive that modifies and directs the verb “fabricate.” Adverbial infinitives frequently are employed to express intent or motive behind a particular action, e.g., “I went to the store to buy groceries” (i.e., I went to the store with intent, and that intent was to buy groceries); “He ran for office to bring about change” (i.e., he ran for office with intent, and that intent was to bring about change). Turning the statute into a question simplifies the technical understanding: Why did the claimant fabricate evidence? To bring about his conviction. In other words, the claimant fabricated evidence in order to bring about his conviction, which denotes intention, purpose, or- motive. Moreover, no other understanding of the word “to” fits within the context of the phrase “to bring about,” and, therefore, a plain reading of the statute engenders an element of intent under subsection (l)(c).

¶ 12. In his dissent, Justice Cham-berlin eschews the analysis of the statutory language as unnecessary. Our law requires that we analyze the “words of the statute.” Adams, 965 So.2d at 656 (¶ 21). “The function of the Court is not to decide what a statute should provide, but to determine what it does provide.” Lawson v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 75 So.3d 1024, 1027 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2011). The simple principle that Justice Chamberlin would announce, to the effect that, “If you confess.a crime, and that confession is not coerced or otherwise induced by law enforcement or some state actor, then you cannot recover under the statute,” may very well be better policy.- However, the statute wholly excludes any mention of state actors' or law enforcement.

¶ 13. Presiding Justice Randolph takes the position that our interpretation is absurd because he “can fathom no one who would falsely confess to a crime with the aim, intent, or purpose of being imprisoned.” We decline to attempt to divine the full range of motivations human beings might have to give false confessions to or other false evidence indicating the commission of crimes, but we disagree that our interpretation is absurd. Certainly, if people actually commit crimes motivated by a desire to be separate from their spouses, for example, then a person might fabricate evidence to be convicted of a crime he or she did not commit for the same or a similar reason. Travis M. Andrews, “Rather be in jail": 70-year-old rdan robs bank to get arrested and away from wife, police say. The Washington Post (September 8, 2016). The unpredictable motivations of our fellow humans aside, our interpretation of the statute allows the hypothetical, wrongly convicted person who falsified a confession under coercion the opportunity to prove that he did not fabricate the evidence of the confession- to bring about his conviction but, rather, because he was coerced. If the statutory language requires causation in fact only, as urged by Justice Beam, then even coerced false confessions would be fatal to efforts to recover.

¶ 14. We further suggest that not all persons making false confessions would recover simply by claiming they had a motive other than getting themselves convicted. For a hypothetical example, if a father were to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit in order to keep his guilty child from prison, then getting convicted is the intent of the father. If such were the evidence, he would not have proven that he did not fabricate evidence to bring about his conviction, because bringing about his conviction was a necessary component of also misguidedly protecting his child. By contrast, Edmonds’s testimony below was that he had no appreciation for the possibility that he would go to jail. For the above reasons, we. are unpersuaded that our interpretation of the statute is absurd.

¶ 15. In response to a concern raised by Justice Beam’s dissent, we pause to make it clear that we agree that, in addition to the aim, intent, and purpose requirement, Section ll-44-7(l)(c) requires that the false evidence cause the conviction. It is not thé Court’s intent to ignore that the statute plainly requires that the falsified evidence bring about the conviction. However, as the disputé between the State and Edmonds is whether Section ll~44-7(l)(c) contains a requirement that the fabrication be motivated by or intended to bring about the conviction, we address what, if anything, the language has to say on the contested issue rather than an issue as to which, as Justice Beam points out,’ all parties agree. We isolate nothing when we consider ‘the Legislature’s purpose in choosing the phrase “to bring about” instead of any other phrase from a range of alternative verbiage including, e.g., “that brings about.” Rather, we are striving, as we must, -to give effect to the entire statute. DePriest v. Barber, 798 So.2d 456, 458 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2001) (“The primary rule of construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the statute as a whole and from the language used therein”). Had the Legislature intended to preclude recovery for claimants who fabricated evidence, that caused their convictions no matter the reason it was fabricated, then it easily could have chosen different language. For example, the Legislature could have substituted the words “which brings” for the phrase “to bring.” However, the Legislature did- not so choose and we are constrained to consider the words it did employ. “The duty of this Court is to interpret the statutes as written.”' Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1276 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2006).

¶ 16. Since we hold Section 11-44-7(l)(c) does provide for an element of intent, purpose, or motive, for fabricating evidence, an issue of material- fact still exists as to whether Edmonds confessed with the intent,., purpose, or motive of bringing about his own conviction.

II. Edmonds produced evidence that he confessed with the intent to help his sister and with no intention to be incarcerated.

¶ 17. In dissent, Justice Beam takes the position that no issue of material fact exists as to Edmonds’s motive for bringing about his conviction. The. record demonstrates otherwise. At the trial of the instant matter, counsel for Edmonds asked him several questions regarding his feelings for. his sister in order to establish evidence of motivations other than getting himself- convicted of the crime. Edmonds proffered, his testimony to the effect that, in confessing, he intended to “help and protect” his sister. He explicitly denied that he had made the confession with the intention of going to prison. During the trial, the following exchange took place during the direct examination of Edmonds:

Q. Tyler, what was your motive, your goal, your desire, in making the first statement? .What were you trying to do?
A. To protect and help my sister.
Q. Now, in your 13-year-old mind, did that seem like what you were doing?
A. At the time, yes.
Q. You’re a grown man now?
A. Yes.
Q. How does it seem to you, with the . benefit of the maturation as a result of age, experience, and simply enough, just the development of your brain?
A Stupid.
Q. Was your purpose at any time in making your first statement to go to prison?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. To get sent to jail?
A. Absolutely not.

In addition to the above-quoted testimony, Edmonds offered into evidence a handwritten letter from his sister, in which his sister entreated him to stand firm on his confession. Indeed, the trial judge noted and even, at least tacitly, found the evidence of Edmonds’s intent credible when he wrote in his judgment that Edmonds’s confession “was motivated by an attempt to shift at least part of the blame to himself in the mistaken belief that it would help his half-sister.”

¶ 18. To the extent that Justice Beam argues that there is no material issue of fact as to the whether Edmonds’s false -confession caused his conviction, we need not respond. It is not pertinent to the issue of whether proof exists that, if taken in a .light most favorable to Edmonds, shows that his false confession was motivated by some other goal than being convicted. As shown above, Edmonds has produced such evidence.

IV. When a statute is silent regarding a plaintiffs option to a jury trial, the right shall remain available to the litigant.

¶ 19. Edmonds argues that he was entitled to the jury trial he requested as opposed to the bench trial he received. Article 3, Section 31 of the Mississippi Constitution provides that “[t]he right of trial by,jury shall remain inviolate .., (Emphasis added.) The term “remain” has been interpreted as specifically grafting the right of trial by jury onto common-law causes of action. Isom v. Mississippi Cent. R. Co., 36 Miss. 300, 308 (Miss. 1858) (“The peculiar phraseology of [Section 31] will naturally suggest the idea, that it has reference to an existing state of the law securing this right, at the time of its adoption. It is to ‘remain inviolate.’ ”). In reference to the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial, the United States Supreme Court has “understood ‘suits at common law’ to refer ‘not merely [to] suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled .proceedings, but [to] , suits in ivhich legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction, to those where equitable rights alone were recognized .... ” Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348, 118 S.Ct. 1279, 1284, 140 L.Ed. 2d 438 (1998) (emphasis added).

¶20. In reliance upon the above-referenced rules, the State argues the cause of action established under the Wrongful. Conviction and Imprisonment statutes is not based in common law. The State is correct: .“At common law, suits' ... against the State were not available at all, due to sovereign .immunity.” Wells by Wells v. Panola Cty. Bd. of Educ., 645 So.2d 883, 898 (Miss. 1994). However, that Edmonds’s claim is created -by statute rather than, the common law does not alone determine whether he has a right to a jury trial. The Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment Act is completely silent as to whether a jury trial may be had, and pursuant to the following reasoning, we hold that — in a case where the statutes creating a cause of action against the State are silent as to whether the plaintiff has a right to a jury trial — a jury trial may be had.

¶21. Attempting to infer legislative intent, the State draws the Court’s attention to Section 11-44-7(4), which says “[a] claimant may choose to pursue a claim under this chapter in lieu of pursuing a claim against the State of Mississippi or a political subdivision thereof under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Section 11-46-1 et seq., Mississippi Code of 1972.” Using the quoted language, the State contends the Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment Act acts as an alternative to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act,‘and, therefore, the Legislature intended for trials under the statute to be conducted in the same manner as trials under the Tort Claims Act. The text yields the opposite conclusion. The Tort Claims Act specifically bars jury trials: “The judge of the appropriate court shall hear and determine, without a jury, any suit filed under the provisions of this chapter.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-13(1) (Rev. 2012) (emphasis added). No comparable language is found in the Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment Act, which, according to the above-quoted language, may be used in lieu, or instead, of the Tort Claims Act. City of Natchez, Miss. v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss. 1992) (“[T]he omission of language from a similar provision on a similar subject indicates that the legislature had a different intent in enacting the provisions, which it manifested by the omission of the language.”).

¶ 22. We return, then, to the question at hand, which is whether a plaintiff'enjoys the right to a trial by jury in the context of a statutorily created cause of action against the sovereign when the pertinent statutes are silent on the issue.

¶ 23. In Riverboat Corporation of Mississippi v. Harrison County Board of Supervisors, 198 So.3d 289, 291 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2016), the Court considered “whether there is a right to a jury trial in an appeal of a county’s ad valorem tax assessment.” The issue in Riverboat was the same as the issue Edmonds presents today: “The statute authorizing this suit ... is silent regarding the right to a jury trial.” Id. Edmonds’s appeal is distinguishable in that tax-assessment cases have had a “longstanding use of jury trials,” whereas cases against the Sovereign do not have a similar history. Id. at 294 (¶ 14). Nevertheless, we reiterated in Riverboat that “[tjhis Court, on prior occasion and well before the adoption of our 1890 Constitution, addressed the right to trial by jury when statutes giving rise to actions were silent as to that right.” Id. at 291 (¶ 8). We have “emphatically declared the right to a jury trial ‘is unquestionably the parties’ right, and the court will not be departing from its well established rules of practice in granting it, though the statute may be silent on the subject.’ Id. (second emphasis added).

¶ 24. Riverboat reflects that, when faced with a silent statute, our historic and customary proclivity has been to recognize the right to a jury trial. We do so again today. Our ancestors viewed a jury trial right as so fundamental that they included it in both our federal and state constitutions. Therefore, we hold that, in the context of a statutory claim against the Sovereign, whose provisions are silent as to whether or not the action receives a jury or not, the plaintiff continues to enjoy the right to a jury trial. To the extent that the Court of Appeals held otherwise in Hymes v. State, 121 So.3d 938 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), which also involved a claim under the Compensation to Victims of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment statutes, we today overrule it.

CONCLUSION

¶ 25. Pursuant to the foregoing reasoning, we reverse the judgment of the Oktib-beha County Circuit Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the instant opinion.

¶ 26. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. MAXWELL, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY RANDOLPH, P.J.; BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., JOIN IN PART. RANDOLPH, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BEAM, J.; MAXWELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., JOIN IN PART. BEAM, J„ DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY RANDOLPH, P.J., MAXWELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ. CHAMBERLIN, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY RANDOLPH, P.J., MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ.

MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:

¶ 27. Because the majority has decided to reverse and remand this case, I agree Riverboat entitles Edmonds to a jury trial on remand. But I do not join the majority’s interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 11 — 44—7(l)(c) or And remand for a jury trial solves Edmonds’s • confession-based dilemma.

¶28. Like Presiding Justice Randolph and Justice Chamberlin, I find the clear language of Section ll-44-7(l)(c) forecloses Edmonds’s compensation claim based on his admittedly false confession. The trial judge believed so too. And, as Justice Beam points out, even if a jury had been seated for Edmonds’s trial, the judge certainly would have directed a verdict in the State’s favor because he correctly believed Edmonds’s admittedly false confession prevented compensation under Mississippi’s wrongful-conviction compensation law.

¶ 29. For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part.

RANDOLPH, P.J., JOINS THIS OPINION. BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART.

RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE,

DISSENTING:

¶ 30. With all due respect to my fellow justices, the majority’s interpretation of the statute leads to an absurd result. I cannot fathom that a reasonable person (let alone a person with an IQ of 119) (see Justice Beam’s Dissent at ¶45) would falsely confess to a crime with the aim, intent, or purpose of being imprisoned. There are limitations which this Court, over the years, has established in the interpretation of our Constitution and statutes. Our law is clear. We do not ascribe an absurd result to pronouncements by the Legislature. See USF & G Co. v. Conservatorship of Melson, 809 So.2d 647, 660 (Miss. 2002) (“It is our duty to support a construction which would purge the legislative purpose of any invalidity, absurdity or unjust inequality.”); Drane v. State, 493 So.2d 294, 298 (Miss. 1986) (“Nor will this Court impute an unjust or absurd purpose to the legislature when any other reasonable construction can save it from such an imputation.”).

¶ 31. Despite these truths, the majority reverses the trial-court judgment and remands this case. Since trial anew is to be had, Edmonds also must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, every element required by the Wrongful Conviction Act, including actual innocence (which also was not established in the ease sub judi-ce).

BEAM, J, JOINS THIS OPINION. MAXWELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ, JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART.

BEAM, JUSTICE,

DISSENTING:

¶ 32. Our principal duty as Mississippi’s court of last resort is to consider impartially the decisions-of the courts below and rule on matters through sound reasoning and common sense. This duty is especially rigid when we review those matters in light of any applicable statutes. As a remedy intended for a select few, the Wrongful Conviction Compensation Act was established to provide prompt assistance to the wrongfully eonvicted through monetary amends. In establishing the Act, oúr Legislature carved out this cause to provide adequate and prompt justice and restoration to the'wrongly convicted; requiring the petitioner to bear the burden of proving the elements of the'Act by a preponderance of the evidence. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7 (Rev. 2013). On appeal, it becomes “[o]ur duty [] to carefully review statutory'language and apply its most reasonable interpretation and meaning to the facts of a particular case.” Pope v. Brock, 912 So.2d 935, 937 (Miss. 2005). In so doing, we cannot throw common sense to the wind. Instead, we must use the established laws and years of precedent, coupled with the Court’s wisdom and reason to determine the legislative intent behind the elements of the Act.

¶ 33. The remedy provided by the Wrongful Conviction Compensation Act is unique in that it recognizes the need to redress the injuries suffered by innocent individuals languishing in prison. Throughout the country, states have established similar acts providing for compensation to factually innocent people who have been wrongfully convicted. Mississippi, like our sister states, established the Wrongful Conviction Compensation Act with the intent to remove some of the financial obstacles incurred by the factually innocent and ease their transition back into society. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-1 (Rev. 2012). To that end, when strictly construed, the Act was intended to apply to -a minority of select cases. Because I find that Edmonds failed to meet the specific criteria to prove he was entitled to compensation through the Act, and that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to his intent to bring about his conviction under the statute, I respectfully dissent.

I. While Mississippi Code Section H-44_7(l)(c) includes an element of intent as it relates to the fabrication of evidence, the Act does not provide for an element of intent as to a claimant’s effort to “bring about his conviction.”

¶ 34. The majority outlines a linguistic argument for the interpretation of a specific portion of the statute in question, However, I find that this analysis is flawed in two distinct areas: the argument ignores the intent requirement found in the element of fabrication and it implies that the clause “to bring about his conviction” lacks causation. This labored description of the statutory language results in a technical explanation of what the author views as the overarching question, at hand: why did the claimant fabricate evidence? This question leads to several responses, all with one common theme: to protect his sister Kristi. The majority concludes that this denotes intent, and as a result, an issue of material fact exists as to Edmonds’s intent (or lack of intent) to bring about his conviction through the falsified confession. Reviewing the majority opinion, a reader would infer that the circuit court failed to consider Edmonds’s reason behind the initial confession — most notably questioning why Edmonds would confess if he did not commit the crime. Resultantly, the majority would have the Court remand the question to the circuit court for resolution on that issue. But, because the circuit court already reviewed- and answered the question at its bench trial on the matter— directly addressing Edmonds’s reason and motive behind his actions — I see no purpose in remanding the cause.

A. Intent to Fabricate

¶ 35. The majority defines the statute’s pertinent language to provide the Gourt with a “plain reading” of the law. Following this suggestion, if we divide the applicable section of the statute into two elements, it appears that the argument- the majority makes for Edmonds is that intent exists in both parts. In the first part, the statute provides that “[h]e did not ... fabricate evidence.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7(l)(e) (Rev. 2012). There, the section plainly requires an intent to fabricate — an interpretation to which the circuit court and the parties agreed. A key component of the proceedings under Section 11-44-7 is the plaintiffs burden to prove the elements under the statute before the court can enter a judgment in his favor. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7(1). Importantly, this required that Edmonds prove “a negative” and show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not invent or concoct a false confession. In an effort to meet this burden, Edmonds argued that, although he falsified the confession which lead to the jury’s conviction, he' lacked the requisite intent to fabricate that evidence under the statute. He then framed his argument to show that he was “pressured to give a false confession” by both his .sister and law-enforcement officials, and that this confession was not a free and deliberate decision on his part.

¶ 36. Counsel for Edmonds urged the lower court to recognize that, because fabrication requires some type of intent to mislead, and because Edmonds’s only motive was to protect his sister, he in no way intended his statement to bring about his conviction.- His only aim was to protect Kristi. His attorneys claimed- that, under these circumstances, Edmonds’s .motivation to fabricate should serve as an exception under the statute, overriding any intent to deceive. However, throughout the trial, the circuit judge halted questioning and arguments to rule on the admissibility of evidence and to delineate between the issues of motive to fabricate and intent to fabricate. On the subject, the trial court held that,’ while the fabrication requirement included an' element of intent, the plaintiffs motivation behind his fabrication was not relevant. .According to the court, while “fabricate” may embrace an element of intent, it does not involve an element of motive. The court ruled that, although Edmonds advocated a coercion exception -to the statute, his motive in making the confession was not relevant for the purpose of the trial, noting that “by the common definition of the word [fabricate], it appears that there was a false confession made.”

¶ 37. Ultimately, the circuit court found that Edmonds had failed to prove that he lacked any intent to fabricate evidence. Recognizing that our courts “do not engage in statutory interpretation if a statute is plain and unambiguous,” the judge determined that Edmonds’s attempt to illustrate the formation of motive through coercion read mofe into the statute than the Legislature intended. Miss. Methodist Hosp. & Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. Mississippi Div. of Medicaid, 21 So.3d 600, 607 (Miss. 2009). Because our “[c]ourts have a duty to give statutes a practical application consistent with their wording,” the judge properly dismissed Edmonds’s suggestion that a coercion-based exception exists in the statute. Marx v. Broom, 632 So.2d 1315, 1318 (Miss. 1994). I find no error in the judge’s interpretation of the first part of the statute or his eventual ruling that Edmonds had failed to satisfy his burden to prove that he did not fabricate evidence through the falsified confession.

B. Intent to Bring About, Cause, or Contribute

¶38. The latter part of the pertinent subsection requires that the claimant “did not ... fabricate evidence to bring about his conviction.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7 (emphasis added). Throughout its analysis, the majority fails to find that the phrase “to bring about his conviction” plainly indicates an element of causation. Instead, it suggests that the language creates a factual question as to the intent to be incarcerated. Ultimately, the function of the Court is to determine what the written language of the statute provides. Lawson v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 75 So.3d 1024, 1027 (Miss. 2011) (citing Russell v. State, 231 Miss. 176, 94 So.2d 916, 917 (1957)). Howeyer, “[i]f the words , of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the Court applies the plain meaning of the statute and refrains from using principles of statutory construction.” Id. (citing Clark v. State ex rel. Miss. State Med. Ass’n, 381 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1980)); see also Gilmer v. State, 955 So.2d 829, 833 (Miss. 2007). Here, we must not broaden or restrict legislative acts; rather, we must give effect to the intent of the Legislature through the plain meaning of the statutes. Id. Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority that this statute requires such an elaborate dissection, as the words of the Act present clear requirements for a claimant’s burden of proof.

¶39. In both this appeal and at trial, Edmonds argued that an issue of material fact exists as to his reason for fabricating the confession. As discussed above, he claims that, because he was coerced to confess by a host of outside forces, the com-ts should create an exception to the statute for those who confess without “free and deliberate intention.”-But the majority focuses its attention on the claimant’s failure to fabricate evidence with the “aim, purpose, or intention of bringing .about his conviction.” Unlike the majority, I fail to see where an issue of fact exists. I think the better question to be addressed is: if such a claimant, of a sound and willing mind, made a false confession under these circumstances without the “aim, purpose, or intention of bringing about his conviction,” what , other outcome might he think was possible? Are we to suggest that, although no one authoritatively told him that his youthfulness or age did not make him immune from any punishment, his naivete is an adequate excuse and he is free to receive compensation from the State for a product of his own error? I think not.

¶ 40. In its ruling, the circuit court addressed the need for the false confession to bring about the conviction by labeling it as '“causation.” There, the court determined that the plaintiffs alleged false confession caused or contributed to his conviction at his first trial. During the civil trial, the State argued that Edmonds’s criminal conviction was a direct result of his confession: without the confession, the jury in the first criminal trial had no other evidence upon which to convict.' Counsel for Edmonds, however, focused on the reasons behind his fabrication, creating a narrative about his motive rather than his intent. Edmonds argued that, under Kristi’s coercion, he was focused on shifting blame for the murder off his sister, to himself. The court again ruled that motive was not an element of the statute, and any arguments regarding his reasons to falsify the confession were irrelevant. Edmonds then failed to present any other arguments that he did not falsify his confession “to bring about his conviction.” As a result, the court ruled that Edmonds simply had failed to support his burden to show that his conviction was not proximately caused or contributed to by his confession.

¶ 41. The majority holds that intent to “bring about” and intent to “cause or contribute” are different concepts under the law. I disagree. The Wrongful Conviction Compensation Act plainly requires that a plaintiff show that “[h]e did not ... fabricate evidence to bring about his conviction.” Miss; Code Ann, § 11 — 44—7(l)(c). Therein, the language creates an element of intent, which serves as the causal factor leading to the eventual effect of the plaintiffs decision. More simply stated, the fabrication of evidence — the cause — brought about the conviction — the effect.

¶ 42. Though the majority makes a convincing argument that Edmonds may have lacked the requisite intent to be incarcerated, the statute plainly requires intent only as it relates to fabrication. A party’s desired outcome upon fabrication is irrelevant: whether a defendant intended to be incarcerated, fined, or to evade penalty altogether was not the Legislature’s concern when it drafted the Act. Rather, the clear and unambiguous terms under the statute require that the fabricated evidence lead to a conviction. It matters not that the conviction included jail time, community service, or a fine, because the language at the end of the statute merely describes the effect of the plaintiffs actions in fabricating evidence. As with any crime, conviction was the natural and probable consequence of Edmonds’s false confession. Therefore, while intent remains a crucial part of this statute, I find that it ends at Edmonds’s decision to fabricate evidence.

¶ 43. Having determined that “to bring about” involves an element of causation, my analysis turns to the trial court’s' findings to address whether an issue of material fact exists. A reading, of the trial transcript clearly reveals one does not. Repeatedly throughout the trial, the court and the parties discussed the causation requirement and whether the fabrication brought about the conviction. Specifically, counsel for the plaintiff explained that “the parties are iii agreement ... that the legislature engrafted a causation requirement on the issue of fabrication, which is to say if the fabrication brought about the conviction.” The court then explained that “the court’s view is that if the fabrication of the evidence contributed to the conyietion, then in that event it would bar the plaintiff from recovery in this case .... So the opinion o'f the court is, unless you can quote me some authority different ... to present its ... defense of fabrication [the State] would need only to show that [the fabrication] caused or contributed to [the conviction].” Moreover, the circuit court provided both parties' assistance, instructing Edmonds’s attorney that he needed “to persuade the court that his ... conviction was not proximately caused or contributed to by the confession,” while the State need show only that Edmonds “fabricated evidence which caused or contributed to his being found guilty in the first trial.”

¶44. In discussing the testimony and evidence proffered by the parties, the lower court questioned the attorneys at length to ensure all arguments and elements regarding causation were submitted to the court before the trial ceased. With the court’s questions directed to the State, the following discourse took place between the judge and the parties:

BY THE COURT: The evidence that I’ve seen that you produced in support of that theory is that there was no scientific or physical evidence or any eyewitness testimony as to his guilt.
BY THE STATE: Yeah; the—
BY THE COURT: So basically his finding of guilty came on the — based on the confession that he made?
BY THE STATE:' The'only direct evidence against him was that — his own creation. His own fabrication.
BY THE COURT: But as far . as his participation in it, there.was nothing other than his confession. Am I correct?
BY THE STATE: That is correct, Your Honor. Yes, that is correct. .
BY THE COURT: Am I correct?
BY COUNSEL FOR EDMONDS: Yes, Your Honor.

The record makes it clear that the court was diligent in its role as the factfinder. The judge asked several specific questions of the parties, reviewed testimony and record evidence, and made a judgment based on the requireménts of the statute. Substantially supported and without error, the court found that Edmonds had failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he did not fabricate evidence to bring about his conviction.

¶45. Assuming for a moment that the majority is correct in its finding that intent through “aim or purpose” is crucial to the second half of Section ll-44-7(l)(c), I nevertheless find no question of fact as to whether Edmonds intended his false confession to bring about his conviction. The facts as presented to the court clearly indicated that, even at thirteen years old, Edmonds was able to understand the gravity of the situation before him. Testimony showed he was a bright young man. His mother testified that he had an IQ of 119, which denotes above-average or superior intelligence. He was in the gifted program at school and maintained above-average reading and • comprehension . skills. Although his sister may have convinced him that his status as a minor provided a level of protection- from eventual punishment, Tyler testified at the first trial, “I would say we did it together so that way it would be helping Kristi, but I was kind of scared about getting'in trouble too. ...”

¶ 46. The most pivotal indication of his intent (aim or purpose), though, is found in his confession to his neighbor, Marcus Sullivan. Edmonds made his first confession to police on Sunday, after which he was arrested and then booked into the jail. By Wednesday, he was still in jail and attempting to get in touch with his mother and grandmother. After several attempts, he called Marcus Sullivan in hopes that he would pass along a message to his mother. Sullivan testified in the first trial regarding this call, explaining that “[Edmonds] asked had I heard about Joey, and I said I had. There was a pause and I asked him, did you do it? He said, Yes, sir.’ ”

¶ 47. At this point, if Edmonds lacked the requisite intent, aim, or purpose, to bring about his conviction through the false confession, his presence in jail and his impending arraignment would serve as clear notice that his youth was not going to save him from trial or a possible conviction. As a minor of above-average intelligence, with gifted levels of reading and comprehension skills, if he did not intend to “shift the blame” from his sister by confessing to a crime and then being convicted, why would he continue to confess with his potential punishment so glaringly obvious? He would not. Whether that conviction amounted to incarceration, work-release, or a fine, Edmonds displayed time and again that he comprehended the gravity of the situation. With no argument or evidence presented to the contrary, the judge recognized this apparent understanding and ruled accordingly.

. ¶ 48. Related to this decision is the concern that publishing the majority’s opinion will misconstrue an unambiguous statute and set a dangerous precedent for future claims under the Wrongful Conviction Compensation Act. At issue in the criminal trials and'the civil matter before us was Edmonds’s claim that several factors created an environment of coercion and led to his choice' to fabricate the confession. He asserted that he confessed only to save his sister. Throughout his testimony in the first trial, Edmonds explained that his sister had assured him that his status as a minor would protect him from punishment, and that by sharing the blame, he .would be able to help her escape th$ death penalty. However, he als.o indicated a concern for his own shelter from the authorities if his youthfulness did not, in fact, shield him. Through his testimony and his call to Marcus. Sullivan, Edmonds indicated that he, was actively trying to protect Kristi, but that he also was aware of the very real possibility that he too would be punished.

¶ 49. “The duty of this Court -is to interpret the statutes as written. It is not the duty of this Court to add language where we see fit. ‘[0]ur primary objective when construing statutes is to adopt that interpretation which will meet the true meaning of the Legislature.’ ” Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Stockstill v. State, 864 So.2d 1017, 1022-23 (Miss. 2003)). In doing so, we must “interpret statutes consistent with reason and common sense,” applying the most rational meaning of the words. Dulaney v. Nat’l Pizza Co., 733 So.2d 301, 305 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998); “Furthermore, ‘[cjourts should avoid constructions which will render legislation absurd. Rather, statutes must be interpreted in such a manner as to render-their meaning rational, sensible, and logical.’ ” In re Whitaker Constr. Co., Inc., 411 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting State Through Dep’t of Public Safety and Corr., Office of State, 655 So.2d 292, 302 (La. 1995)).

¶ 50.' Drawing on the Court’s judicial experiencé and coíhmón sense, no rational reading 'Of the Wrongful Conviction Compensation Act'¿reates an inference that the Legislature intended a third-party, coercion-based exception to apply. Nor can it be said that the Legislature embedded an exception for those convicted by acts of their own error to receive compensation when they riéver intended "“to go to j ail.” Such' interpretations border' on absurdity arid cannot be supported. See Quitman Cty. v. Turner, 196 Miss. 746, 18 So.2d 122, 124 (1944) (citing Robertson v. Texas Oil Co., 141 Miss. 356, 106 So. 449 (1925)). Where it is evident that thé Legisláture aimed only to’'compensate the factually innocent when uniquely victimized through an erroneous incarceration, we must enforce that'’purpose and not read into the statute more than the" drafters' intended. “Legislators must be presumed to be reasonable and sane men, ‘and to intend the natural, direct, and probable consequences of their acts, that these shall not be absurdly or unreasonably construed, and therefore that they intend to avoid absurdities and nonsense.’ ” Kennington v. Hemingway, 101 Miss. 259, 57 So. 809, 810 (1912) (quoting 4 Hughes, Grounds and Rudiments of the Law, 1104 (1908)). Plainly stated: statutes are to be interpreted logically, with the most reasonable interpretation applied. Considering the issue at hand, under what circumstances would safeguards of this statute apply if they did not apply here?

¶ 51. Although the majority is not ruling in favor of Edmonds by remanding the cause for a finding of fact, it indicates that the Court would consider affirming a judgment in favor of a claimant who had a “good reason” to lie about his involvement in a crime, only to be exonerated and then sue the. State for convicting him based on that same false confession. This ruling would go too far, while twisting the words behind the statue. Those who drafted the Act did not allow for motive in the statute as a consideration for compensation because a claimant’s motive is not relevant. Likewise, the statute places no importance on the reason for fabrication. It requires only that evidence was not fabricated in an effort to cause or contribute to the claimant’s conviction. Therefore, I suggest the Court reflect on the words of the statute and consider the likelihood that the language “to bring, about” is causative in nature and does not require simply that a claimant intended to be incarcerated.

II. The plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial.

¶52. I stand by the principle plainly articulated in our state Constitution that “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Miss. Const, art. 3, § 31. However, having found no question of material fact exits in the matter, I do not think this case merits reversal and remand for a trial by jury.

¶53. In its opinion, the majority cites several cases acknowledging that, when faced with a statute silent on the issue, this Court customarily has recognized the right to a jury trial. . But because the circuit court judge properly ruled on the matter, determining that the parties had agreed on the facts at issue and the only question remaining was an interpretation of law,- no rational jury could have found that Ed-monds was entitled to compensation through the Act. With the facts established and the law defined, the request for a jury becomes inconsequential.

¶ 54. Assuming arguendo that the circuit judge erred in denying Edmonds the right to a jury, his decision is of no consequence to resolution of the matter and can be viewed as nothing more than harmless. For the sake of discussion, to warrant reversal, the judge’s decision to deprive 'Edmonds of a jury must have “affect[ed] the final result of the case and work[ed] adversely to a substantial right of the party assigning it.” Bay Point Props., Inc. v. Mississippi Transp. Comm’n, 201 So.3d 1046, 1056 (Miss. 2016) (citing Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson v. Jaquith, 224 So.2d 216, 221 (Miss. 1969)). See also Gray v. State, 799 So.2d 53, 61 (Miss. 2001). Here, it is clear that if the parties had presented their case before a jury, at the conclusion of proof and upon proper motion, the judge would have arrived at the same conclusion, thereafter granting the State’s inevitable motion for directed verdict. As discussed supra, the lower court held that, while the fabrication requirement in the statute involved an element of intent, the plaintiffs motivation behind his fabrication was not relevant. Both parties agreed that, by the common definition of the word “fabricate,” the false confession was an obvious fabrication of evidence. The discussion leading to this agreement served as the only portion of the hearing which focused on disputed issues of fact, leaving no factual questions to be answered thereafter.

¶ 55. Moving on to the second part of the statute, attorneys for both the plaintiff and the State agreed as a matter of fact that, during the plaintiffs first trial, only the plaintiffs confession linked him to any participation in the killing. However, the parties differed on their interpretation of the law and whether the statute required that the false confession caused or contributed to his conviction. While counsel for Ed-monds argued that his motivation to fabricate was an important factor for the court to consider, the judge reiterated that motivation was not a material element of the statute. The State then argued that the element in question was causative in nature and required that Edmonds prove that his confession did not cause him to be convicted (i.e., but for the admission of the fabricated evidence, he would not have been convicted). Having ruled that Ed-monds’s interpretation of the statute was erroneous and that he presented no other arguments to the contrary, the judge found that the plaintiffs confession unquestionably caused or contributed to his conviction at his first trial.

¶ 56. Just after counsel for Edmonds concluded its case-in-chief, the representative for the State remarked that “[njormally I would have a motion, Your Honor, but this being nonjury, I will not.” Here, the defense clearly provided that its intent— had there been a jury trial — would be to make a Rule 50 motion for directed verdict at this point. See M.R.C.P. 50. Though, because the judge was to rule directly on the case with or without the presentation of evidence by the State, the representa-five opted to proffer several trial-testimony transcripts for the court’s review prior to its' ruling. The brief introduction of these transcripts into evidence concluded the State’s presentation, after which it rested its case.

¶ 57. A review of the hearing and the evidence submitted provides that, with or without a jury, the matter would conclude with the same result: in either scenario, Tyler Edmonds fails — as a matter of law— to support his burden to show that his fabrication of evidence was not in an effort to bring about his conviction. As we have said before, “an error is harmless only when it is apparent on the face of the record that a fair minded jury could have arrived at no [other] verdict .... ” Gray v. State, 799 So.2d 53, 61 (Miss. 2001) (citing Forrest v. State, 335 So.2d 900, 903 (Miss. 1976)). Because Edmonds failed to meet his burden and the circuit judge properly would have granted the State’s motion for directed verdict, his decision to conduct a bench trial is of no consequence. Accordingly, I find that if the circuit judge erred in requiring a bench trial on the matter, that error was nothing more than harmless and his decision should stand.

¶ 58. Therefore, I respectfully dissent with the majority opinion and would affirm the circuit court’s ruling based on the reasoning and caselaw outlined above.

RANDOLPH, P.J., MAXWELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ„ JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART.

CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE,

DISSENTING:

¶ 59. I dissent. However, because I feel the opinions have overly complicated the issue, I write separately. Do not misunderstand, I enjoy diagramming and parsing sentences as much as the next person. In this case, it is just not necessary. The principle that controls in this case is simple. If you confess to a crime, and that confession is not coerced or otherwise induced by law enforcement or some state actor, then you cannot recover under the statute. This is the exact situation that the language “fabricate evidence to bring about his conviction” is meant to prevent.

¶ 60. To be clear, a confession that is coerced by law enforcement or some state actor would not prohibit a cause of'action under the statute. That is because, in such a scenario, the State would be guilty of some type of wrongdoing. In Edmonds’s case, the State has done nothing wrong and logic would dictate it should not be answerable to Edmonds.

¶ 61. To hold otherwise basically gives the phrase “fabricate evidence to bring about his conviction” no meaning. There is always an ulterior motive other than being convicted. It does not take much of an. imagination to think of egregious results that can occur under the majority’s opinion.

¶ 62. To conclude, this is the exact case the language “fabricate evidence to bring about his conviction” is meant to prohibit, and therefore, I dissent.

RANDOLPH, P.J., MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      . While the language from Feltner is instructive, the right to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment does not extend to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 2221, 135 L.Ed. 2d 659 (1996).

      . Riverboat Corp. of Miss. v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 198 So.3d 289 (Miss. 2016).

      . Today's decision addresses a putative alleged "false” confession, under coercion, and not a true, voluntary confession (if the Washington Post article is to be believed) (Maj. Op. at ¶ 13), which is inapplicable to the issue sub judice. Edmonds, when asked by his mother, “What is the truth?” responded, "That me and Christy did it.” Edmonds v. State, 955 So.2d 787, 814 (Miss. 2007) (Randolph, P.J., specially concurring). Two days later, in a phone call to Marcus Sullivan, the father of one of his friends, “[Tyler] asked had I [Sullivan] heard about Joey and I said I had. There was a pause and I asked him, [d]id you do it? He said, [y]es sir.” Id. Whether Edmonds’s confessions were true or false or made under coercion will be one of the issues for a jury to decide.

        . See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7(1 )(b) (Rev. 2012).

      . The majority quotes an important part of Edmonds’s testimony in which he notes that his intent was not to "go to prison” or to "get sent to jail." (Maj. Op. ¶ 17). While Edmonds may not have sought to protect Kristi by being incarcerated himself, his remaining testimony and previous actions clearly indicate that he thought his “conviction” may have led to other punishments, which (in his mind) may not have been serving jail or prison time. His perception of what sentences may have resulted is not relevant, however, as his conviction . and eventual sentence are two separate matters.

        . The transcript from the first trial was 'submitted by Edmonds as evidence of the pres- . :sure his sister applied to encourage him to confess to the murder.

      . Sarcasm is "the use of words that mean the opposite of what you really want to say.” Sarcasm, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KITCHENS, JUSTICE, DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE, COLEMAN, JUSTICE, MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Timothy VIVIANS v. BAPTIST HEALTHPLEX, Becky Vrieland and Helen Wilson
    NO. 2014-CT-01828-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    06/29/2017
    Rehearing Denied August 17, 2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: HOWARD BROWN, MERRIDA COX-WELL
    ATTORNEYS- FOR APPELLEES: MALLORY MILLER STREET, WADE G. MANOR, JAMES LEROY BANKS, IV
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

KITCHENS, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT: .

¶ 1. A patron of the Baptist Healthplex in Clinton, Mississippi, slipped, fell, and sustained injuries when stepping into the Healthplex therapy pool. He sued, alleging, inter alia, that the Healthplex had failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. The Circuit. Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County granted, summary judgment to Baptist, and .the Mississippi Court,of Appeals affirmed. .Finding that genuine issues of material fact exist, we reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2.. Timothy Vivians, a member of the Baptist Healthplex in Clinton, Mississippi, entered, the , Healthplex pool area on February 12, 2008. As he stepped off the first step and onto the second step of the therapy pool, he slipped and fell backward onto the concrete stairs. Vivians was holding onto the railing and had his walking, cane in hand at the time of his fall. He was transported by ambulance to the VA Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi.

¶3. Vivians sued the Healthplex along with , Becky Vrieland, the Healthplex’s Aquatics Director; Helen Wilson, a Healthplex employee; ABC Companies; and John Does 1-10.

¶ 4. Drs. Maurice McShan and Edward Hobgood, who were among ViviansVtreat-ing.physicians, were designated by Vivians as expert witnesses. Dr. McShan, an internist, was designated by Vivians to testify as an expert that Vivians was treated for shoulder pain after the accident on several occasions and that the fall was the sole proximate cause of the injuries suffered. Vivians designated Dr. Hobgood, an ortho-paedic surgeon, to testify as an expert that Vivians’s fall was the sole proximate cause of a surgical rotator cuff tear to his right shoulder and that the tear necessitated a rotator cuff repair.

¶ 5. Baptist moved for summary judgment, arguing that Vivians had failed to present evidence of the existence of a dangerous condition. In response, Vivans produced thirteen incident reports detailing other slip and fall occurrences in the Healthplex pool area from 2005 to 2010. The incident reports indicated that, of those thirteen occurrences, six involved the steps into the therapy pool. Vivians also produced the deposition of William D. Carpenter, then-executive director of the Healthplex, taken pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). Carpenter indicated in his deposition that, because of the incidents, the handrails were wrapped with a yellow abrasive wrapping containing the word “Caution” and the therapy pool and steps were replastered, but he did not know when those safety measures had been implemented.

¶ 6. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Baptist, ruling that, while Vivans had offered “testimony of one prior fall at the therapy pool steps, this Court does not find that one prior fall is sufficient to establish a dangerous condition.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circumstances surrounding Vi-vians’s fall were not substantially similar to the circumstances surrounding the slip and fall incidents prior to and subsequent to Vivians’s fall. Vivians v. Baptist Healthplex, 200 So.3d 485, 488-89 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

¶ 7. We granted Vivians’s petition for writ of certiorari to consider the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the steps into the therapy pool at the Healthplex constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition and whether Baptist was negligent for failure to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. •

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8. When reviewing a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies a de novo standard of review. Whitaker v. Limeco Corp., 32 So.3d 429, 433-34 (Miss. 2010).

The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If, in this view, there is no genuine issue of material fact and, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor. Otherwise, the motion should be denied.

Leslie v. City of Biloxi, 758 So.2d 430, 431-32 (Miss. 2000) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶ 9. The parties stipulated that Vivians was an invitee. We have held that a “landowner owes an invitee the ‘duty to keep the premises reasonably safe and when not reasonably safe to warn only where there is hidden danger or peril that is not in plain and open view.’ ” Mayfield v. The Hairbender, 903 So.2d 733, 737-38 (Miss. 2005) (quoting Corley v. Evans, 835 So.2d 30, 37 (Miss. 2003)).

¶ 10. “Under certain conditions, reports of ... subsequent accidents at a certain location may be admissible into evidence.” We have held that “[a]s to the admissibility of acts subsequent to the accident, discretion rests largely with the trial court in determining if the evidence offered meets the prerequisite of substantial similarity of conditions.” Hartford Ins. Grp. v. Massey, 216 So.2d 415, 418 (Miss. 1968). Vivians submitted five incident reports detailing slip and fall occurrences on the Healthplex therapy pool steps. Vivians argues in his petition for writ of certioriari that the five subsequent incidents create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the existence of a dangerous condition. The facts of those incidents are reproduced, verbatim, below:

• March 9, 2008: Patron “entering, the water and slipped on the steps. He was holding rail with both hands, but still slipped.”
• May 12, 2008: Patron “slipped on the stairs, but caught himself on the hand rail .... ”
• October 27, 2008: Patron “stated that steps going into the therapy pool are very slick. [Patron] was holding onto rail and slipped on step and hit back and head.”
• June 19, 2009: Patron “was getting into the warm therapy pool .... She slipped and fell on the steps as she was going down the steps into the pool.”
• December 20, 2010: Patron “was coming out of the pool after 8 AM ... class. She was holding onto another woman when exiting on the steps and slipped down on the top of the steps when she turned loose of woman.”

¶ 11. The Court of Appeals determined that, “[although the evidence demonstrates that five other Baptist Healthplex members slipped on the therapy pool’s steps subsequent to Vivians’s' accidént, there is insufficient evidence that the accidents occurred under or were caused by ‘substantially similar circumstances.’” Vivians, 200 So.3d at 488. But the five subsequent slip and fall occurrences took place on the steps leading into the Healthplex therapy pool. Two of the incidents, more specifically, involved patrons like Vivians who, despite holding onto the rail, still slipped. Three of the incidents resulted in minor injuries. One patron “hit his back and head” when he slipped and fell. Another patron’s fall resulted in a hurt ankle with “a few cuts on it.” A third patron’s fall caused “bleeding on her right knee and left shin.”

¶ 12. We find that Vivians adduced ample evidence that his slip and fall on the Healthplex therapy pool steps was substantially similar to the subsequent slip and fall occurrences, and that a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to the existence of a dangerous condition.

¶ 13, We next consider whether a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to whether Baptist breached its duty to Vivians to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. The Mayfield Court found that the “two duties — (1) to keep the premises reasonably safe, and (2) to warn of hidden dangers — are separate,” that “[t]he breach of either duty supports a claim of negligence,” and that “[e]ach must be separately analyzed.” Mayfield, 903 So.2d at 738.

¶ 14. In its brief in the Court of Appeals, Baptist argued that:

It is common knowledge that steps leading into a pool will be covered in water •and will be slicker than' a dry flight of steps. Such a “danger” should have been obvious to Vivians ' in the exercise of ordinary care. In the absence of any evidence from Vivians that the step in question was rendered unusually slippery due to some defect, Vivians cannot prove, as a matter of law, that the step presented the sort of non-obvious “danger” of which BHP had a duty to warn. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment with respect to Vivians’s failure to warn claims against. BHP, and its decision should be affirmed.

This argument is maintained in Baptist’s response to Vivians’s petition for writ of certiorari: “Vivians has failed to demonstrate the presence of any non-obvious dangers on the therapy pool steps about which [Baptist] had a -duty to warn Vivi-ans.”

¶ 15. In Mayfield, Anita Mayfield, who was making a delivery to The Hairbender salon, “tripped on pavement she described as ‘broken, unlevel - pavement’ which was ‘pushed up, probably jutted up two inches over ,the bottom step.’ ” Mayfield, 903 So.2d at 734. She sued, alleging that The Hairbender had been negligent both in failing to warn her of the pavement’s condition and in failing to repair it. Id. Summary judgment was granted to The Hair-bender because the “dangerous condition was open and obvious.” Id. at 735.

¶ 16. This Court agreed that the dangerous condition was open and obvious and held that summary judgment was proper as to Mayfield on her failure to warn claim because “evidence established not only that the hazard was open and obvious, but also that Mayfield actually knew of the danger.” Id. at 736. As to the claim for failure to maintain the premises claim, this Court reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment. Id.

¶ 17. We noted first that this Court had “abolished the open and obvious theory as an absolute defense in. premises liability cases.” Id. at 737 (citing Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641 So.2d 20, 25 (Miss. 1994)). In Tharp, this Court had reasoned that:

This Court should discourage unreasonably dangerous conditions rather than fostering them in their obvious forms. It is anomalous to find that a defendant has a duty to provide reasonably safe premises and at the same- time deny a plaintiff recovery from a breach of that same duty. The party in. the best position to eliminate a dangerous condition should be burdened with that responsibility. If a- dangerous condition is- obvious to the plaintiff, then surely it is obvious to the defendant as well. The defendant, accordingly, should alleviate the danger. -

Tharp, 641 So.2d at 25. In Mayfield, this Court applied Tharp: “Tharp’s authority extends to cases (including the case before us today) in which a plaintiff alleges the defendant was negligent in creating or failing to repair a dangerous condition, and the defendant alleges the dangerous condition was open and obvious.” Mayfield, 903 So.2d at 737.

¶ 18. The Mayfield Court held that, while no hidden dangers existed and The Hairbender had -no duty to warn, “[t]o the extent Mayfield’s case is based upon an allegation that The Hairbender failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition by its negligent failure to repair the raised asphalt, the fact that the hazard was ‘open and obvious’ does not serve as a complete bar to recovery.” Id. at 739. The Court continued that landowners cannot avoid liability for failure tp repair a dangerous condition merely by pointing out that the dangerous condition was open and-obvious: “Following this logic, brown motor oil spilled on a store’s white floor would be an open and obvious danger. Therefore, the store could have no liability for failing to clean up the motor oil since its presence on the white floor would be ‘open and obvious.’ ” Id. at 738.

¶ 19. The Court found that, because the question of whether a landowner was negligent for failure to correct an allegedly dangerous condition is one for the jury to decide, a genuine issue of material fact existed “as to whether' The Hairbender negligently failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition.” Id, at 739. “In the event Mayfield convinces the jury that the raised asphalt constituted a dangerous condition which The Hairbender failed to repair, the jury may find The Hairbender liable.” Id, The Court observed, however, that the jury should, as in any case of comparative negligence, compare The Hairbender’s negligence to any negligence attributable to Mayfield and reduce her award accordingly. Id.

¶20. Here, Vivians alleged in his complaint that “[t]he Defendants were negligent, and/or failed to exercise reasonable care in maintaining its premises in a safe manner.” Baptist answered: “The Plaintiffs’ damages and/or injuries, if any exist, are the proximate result of the negligence of the Plaintiff and not a result of any acts or omissions of the Defendant.” Baptist is correct that common knowledge dictates that submerged pool steps are more slippery than dry steps and that caution is warranted on the part of patrons. But Baptist owed Vivians “[t]he duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition.” Mayfield, 903 So.2d at 739. And, as noted above, the slip and fall at issue in this case was one of many similar slip and fall occurrences on the steps of the Health-plex therapy pool. As in Mayfield, not only does a genuine issue of material fact exist with regard to whether the steps leading into the therapy pool constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition, but a genuine issue of material fact also exists with regard to whether Baptist negligently failed to repair the steps leading into the therapy pool. See id.

CONCLUSION

¶ 21. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Vivians, we find that genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to whether the therapy pool steps at the Healthplex constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition and Baptist was negligent in failing to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Mississippi Court of Appeals and the judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. We remand this case to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County for further proceedings consistent with this decision. •

¶ 22. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KING, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. DICKINSON, P.J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING AND BEAM, JJ. COLEMAN, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY MAXWELL, J. MAXWELL, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COLEMAN, J.

DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE,

SPECIALLY CONCURRING:

’ ¶ 23. I join Justice Kitchens’s well-reasoned majority, and I write separately only to amplify a point of- particular concern to me. The existence of a jury question in this case derives from the frequency of the falls on the therapy pool steps. Negligence is “[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation.” The duty to maintain a premises in a reasonably safe condition rests on what a reasonably prudent property owner would do. Were there thousands of similar incidents on the steps, it would be obvious that a reasonably prudent property owner would take corrective action. Were there none, no reasonable jury could conclude the steps were unreasonably dangerous. In my view, the number of prior incidents in this case falls squarely within the zone that must be left to a jury.

KING AND BEAM, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

COLEMAN, JUSTICE,

DISSENTING:

¶ 24. Unlike the majority opinion above, I am unable to locate a genuine issue of material fact that warrants our reversal of summary judgment granted in favor of Baptist. The only evidence Vivians offers in support of his negligence claim are the prior and subsequent accident reports involving slip-and-fall incidents on the therapy pool steps, but, even taking the evidence in a light most favorable to Vivians, he has proven the existence of nothing more than steps and a pool. Accordingly and with respect, I would affirm.

¶ 25. Due to Vivians’s status as an invitee, Baptist owed him a duty to keep its premises reasonably safe, and when not reasonably safe, a duty to warn only where there is hidden danger that is not in plain view. Mayfield v. The Hairbender, 903 So.2d 733, 737-38 (¶ 20) (Miss. 2005). Recovery for a slip and fall under premises liability requires more than proof of falling. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Tisdale, 185 So.2d 916, 917 (Miss. 1966). In Munford, Inc. v. Fleming, 597 So.2d 1282, 1284 (Miss. 1992), the Court explained:

[F]or a plaintiff to recover in a slip-and-fall case, he must show the proprietor had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition, or the dangerous condition existed for a sufficient amount of time to establish constructive knowledge, in that the proprietor should have known of the condition, or the dangerous condition was created through a negligent act of a store’s proprietor or his employees.

Thus, in order to recover, Vivians must show that a dangerous condition existed and then, that Baptist had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or that Baptist, through its employees, created the dangerous condition. I submit that Vivians, even with the accident reports, has failed to show that a dangerous condition existed at all because I am unwilling to find that pool steps are inherently a dangerous condition.

¶ 26. In Tate v. Southern Jitney Jungle Co., 650 So.2d 1347, 1351 (Miss. 1995), the Court reversed a trial court’s judgment granting a directed verdict in favor of Jitney Jungle. Tate injured her knee on a piece of metal on the deli counter, and the trial court granted a directed verdict in Jitney Jungle’s favor because the deli counter was open and obvious. The Court explained that its decision to reverse was because the deli counter’s defect was not a “danger[ ] which [is] usual and which customers normally expect to encounter on business premises, such as thresholds, curbs, and steps.” Id. (emphasis added). Again, in Fulton v. Robinson Industries, 664 So.2d 170, 174-5 (Miss. 1995) (citing Tate, 650 So.2d at 1351), the Court stated: “This Court has recently reamplified this line of thinking by acknowledging that there is a difference between dangers which are “usual and which customers normally expect to encounter on the business premises [and] claimed physical defect[s] on the defendant’s premises ... which may be found to be unusual and unreasonably dangerous.” The Fifth Circuit applied Tate in its 2009 opinion Wood v. RIH Acquisitions MS II, LLC, 556 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2009), in which it held that “the Tate concept of usual and normally expected hazards has for over a decade been applied on summary judgments in federal courts when considering Mississippi premises liability!;] we do not suggest a change to that practice. At least those hazards that are similar to undamaged thresholds, curbs, and steps, which are common architectural features for buildings and parking lots .... ” As discussed above, all Vivians has done is prove that there are steps leading into Baptist’s therapy pool. He has not claimed that the steps were unreasonably slippery; that the steps were cracked, crumbling, or in any state of disrepair; that the steps were improperly designed or built; that he slipped on an unknown object; or any other reason to explain his fall. I find persuasive the following language from a unanimous Mississippi Court of Appeals in Huguley v. Imperial Palace of Mississippi, Inc., 930 So.2d 1278 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006):

Merely proving that an accident occurred on a business premise is not sufficient to prove liability or by itself prove that a dangerous condition existed at the time of the accident. There must be proof that the business was negligent. Here there is no proof that Imperial Palace was in any way negligent. The testimonies of Mr. Huguley and Mrs. Dale cannot and do not show what caused Mr. Huguley to fall or any negligence on the part of Imperial Palace in the maintenance of construction of the parking garage.

Id. at 1281 (¶ 14) (citations omitted). Simply, he slipped on what appear to be, based on the record before us, normal pool steps, and I cannot fathom where the Court would find that steps, by themselves, are a dangerous condition.

¶ 27. Presiding Justice Dickinson, in his specially concurring opinion, offers an extreme hypothetical, positing that if thousands of accidents happened on the same set of steps, surely a premises owner would take corrective action. Leaving aside that, like Vivians, Presiding Justice Dickinson offers no description of the dangerous condition that underlies his thousands of accidents (or what his hypothetical premises-owner can do to correct it); in the end his hypothetical illustrates the deleterious effect of today’s result. Absent evidence identifying the dangerous condition at issue, how many accidents is enough? Presiding Justice Dickinson suggests thousands, but why not one hundred or, for that matter two? Pursuant to today’s majority, one who owns a perfectly safe building may well face litigation that goes to a jury for no better reason than two people fell in the same place within a certain period of time — despite the complete absence of any proof of an actual dangerous condition. The hapless premises owner would face attorneys’ fees, possible settlement or trial expenses,, and the headache of litigation, despite there being nothing wrong with the premises at all. Today, the majority effectively changes Mississippi law such that, instead of plaintiffs being required to provide evidence of a dangerous condition to make a prima facie case soundipg in premises liability, they need prove only (a yet-to-be determined number of) other accidents. Such has never been Mississippi’s premises liability law, and we should refrain from making it so today.

¶ 28. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of- summary judgment in far vor of Baptist because there is no genuine issue of material fact that a dangerous condition existed at all.

MAXWELL, J., JOINS' THIS OPINION. .

MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

DISSENTING:

¶ 29. I -agree with the bulk of Justice Coleman’s well-stated dissent. Vivians has presented no proof the therapy-pool steps were a dangerous condition. I write separately to voice'my grave concern that the majority’s opinion expands the scope of premises liability-and imposes an almost strict-liability standard on property owners.

¶ 30. The majority finds the potential existence of a dangerous condition enough to establish a triable premises-liability claim — even though Vivians presented no proof Baptist had any knowledge, actual or constructive, that the therapy-pool steps were unreasonably dangerous and in need of repair. Until Vivians' fell, there had been only one incident' on the therapy-pool steps. And that incident1-was three years earlier. In other words, for the three years leading up to Vivians’s fall, there had been zero incidents on the therapy-pool steps. And there was no reason for Baptist to suspect the steps posed an unreasonable danger — i.e., one beyond the unavoidable danger associated with climbing on1 wet pool steps. After Vivians fell, -there were other incidents. But these áfter-the-fact falls are not proof Baptist should have known or did know the therapy-pool steps posed an unreasonable danger on February 8,2008, the day Vivians fell.

¶ 31, Until today’s opinion, the mere potential presence of an unreasonably dangerous condition was not enough to establish a premises-liability claim. The plaintiff also had to present a theory and proof that the property owner was negligent — either because it created the dangerous condition, or it knew or should have known about the condition and failed to repair it or warn about it. E.g, Anderson v. B. H. Acquisition, Inc., 771 So.2d 914, 918 (Miss. 2000) (citing Downs v. Choo, 656 So.2d 84, 86 (Miss. 1995); Munford, Inc. v. Fleming, 597 So.2d 1282, 1284 (Miss. 1992)). Here, Vivians has presented no proof of either. So the claim we are remanding back to the circuit court is more akin to a strict-liability claim than a slip-and-fall claim as previously defined by this Court.

¶ 32. Holding property owners to this new standard where they can be potentially liable for a slip and fall on their premises — even when there is no proof they acted negligently — imposes an unnecessary and unfair burden. on them. For this reason, I strongly dissent. I would affirm the judgments of the trial court and Court of Appeals because Vivians failed to present any proof -Baptist committed a negligent act that led to his injuries.

COLEMAN, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

      . We refer to all defendants collectively as “Baptist.”

      . Negligence, Black’s Law Dictionary (abr. 9th ed. 2010).

      . See, e.g., Moore v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 252 Miss. 693, 704-5, 173 So.2d 603 (1965).

      . The opinion noted the change in our jurisprudence of “open and obvious” not being an absolutely defense to liability based on Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641 So.2d 20 (Miss. 1994). Tate, 650 So.2d at 1351.

      . The stage for Presiding Justice Dickinson’s hypothetical could as well be a well-lit, wide, perfectly level hallway with no dangerous condition whatsoever as the pool involved in the case sub judice'.