text:
    Jeffrey Lee ATWATER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-926
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 23, 2018]
    James Vigianno, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mark S. Gruber, and Julie A. Morley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Marilyn Muir Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Jeffrey Lee Atwa-ter’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Atwater’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Atwater’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed At-water’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Atwater responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Atwater’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Atwater is not entitled to relief. Atwa-ter was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one. Atwater v. State, 626 So.2d 1325, 1327 (Fla. 1993), Atwater’s sentence of death became final in 1994. Atwater v. Florida, 511 U.S. 1046, 114 S.Ct. 1578, 128 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to At-water’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Atwater’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Atwater, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. PARIENTE, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Carl PUIATTI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-552
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 23, 2018]

      Ardith Michelle Bronson, DLA Piper, LLP, Miami, Florida, and Adamn B. Banks, Miranda S. Schiller, and Steven A. Reiss, Weil, Gotshal, & Manges, New York, New York, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Carl Puiatti’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Puiat-ti’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Puiatti’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Puiatti’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Puiatti responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Puiatti’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Puiatti is not entitled to relief. Puiatti was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one. Puiatti v. State, 495 So.2d 128, 130 (Fla. 1986). Puiatti’s sentence of death became final in 1988. Puiatti v. Florida, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 184, 102 L.Ed.2d 153 (1988). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Puiatti’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Puiatti’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Puiatti, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

QUINCE, J., recused.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Curtis W. BEASLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-566
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 23, 2018]
    Bjorn Erik Brunvand and J. Jervis Wise, Brunvand Wise PA, Clearwater, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela- Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Lisa Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee .
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Curtis W. Beasley’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Beasley’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court' has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Beasley’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Beasley’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Beasley responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Beasley’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Beasley is not entitled to relief. Beasley was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of ten to two, and his sentence of death became final in 2001. Beasley v. State, 774 So.2d 649, 657 (Fla. 2000). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Beasley’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Beasley’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Beasley, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. Howevei', I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Richard Wallace RHODES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-628
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 23, 2018]
    Sarah S. Butters, Ausley McMullen, Tallahassee, Florida, and Bjorn Brunvand and J. Jervis Wise, Brunvand Wise, P.A., Clearwater, Florida, and Billy H. Ñolas, Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and C. Suzanne Bechard, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Richard Wallace Rhodes’ appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Rhodes’ motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Rhodes’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Rhodes’ appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Rhodes responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Rhodes’ response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Rhodes is not entitled to relief. Rhodes was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of ten to two. Rhodes v. State, 638 So.2d 920, 923 (Fla. 1994). Rhodes’ sentence of death became final in 1994. Rhodes v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1046, 115 S.Ct. 642, 130 L.Ed.2d 547 (1994). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Rhodes’ sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Rhodes’ motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Rhodes, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

QUINCE, J., recused.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitch-eock.


text:
    Daniel BURNS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-726
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 23, 2018]

      James Vigianno, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mark S. Gruber, and Julie A, Morley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Lisa Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee .
   PER CURIAM.

We have for reyiew Daniel Burns, Jr.’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Burns’ motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Burns’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Burns’ appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3.d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 act. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Burns responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Burns’ response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Burns is not entitled to relief. Burns was sentenced to death following a jury’s unanimous recommendation for death. Burns v. State, 699 So.2d 646, 652 (Fla. 1997). Burns’ sentence of. death became final in 1998. Burns v. Florida, 522 U.S. 1121, 118 S.Ct. 1063, 140 L.Ed.2d 123 (1998). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Burns’ sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Burns’ motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Burns, we caution that any rehearing motion containing rear-gument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, and , LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J;, concurs in result with, an opinion.'

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

QUINCE, J., recused.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognise that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I 'continue to- adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


author: PER CURIAM.. PARIENTE, J.,

text:
    Curtis WINDOM, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC17-902
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 23, 2018]

      James Vigianno, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ali Andrew Shakoor, and Ann Marie Mirialakis, Assistant Capital Collateral1 Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appel- • lant ; ;
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Scott A Browne, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM..

We have for review Curtis Windom’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Windom’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Windom’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Windom’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Windom responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Windom’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Windom is not entitled to relief. Windom was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death on each count following a jury’s unanimous recommendation for death. Windom v. State, 656 So.2d 432, 435 (Fla. 1995). Windom’s sentences of death became final in 1995. Windom v. Florida, 516 U.S. 1012, 116 S.Ct. 571, 133 L.Ed.2d 495 (1995). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Windom’s sentences of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Windom’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Windom, we' caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 613, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    Donald David DILLBECK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-847
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 24, 2018]
    Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Ap-pellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Donald David Dill-beck’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Dillbeck’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Dillbeck’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Dill-beck’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Dillbeck responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Dillbeck’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Dillbeck is not entitled to relief. Dill-beck was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eight to four. Dillbeck v. State, 643 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 1994). Dillbeek’s sentence of death became final in 1995. Dillbeck v. Florida, 514 U.S. 1022, 115 S.Ct. 1371, 131 L.Ed.2d 226 (1995). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Dillbeck’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm-the denial of Dillbeck’s motion.

The Court having, carefully considered all arguments raised by Dillbeck, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


text:
    William Gregory THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-809
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 24, 2018]

      Bjorn Brunvand and J. Jervis Wise, Brunvand Wise, P.A., Clearwater, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer Ann Donahue, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review William Gregory Thomas’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Thomas’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Thomas’s motion sought relief-pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Thomas’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct, 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Thomas responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Thomas’s response to the .order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Thomas is not entitled to relief. Thomas was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one. Thomas v. State, 693 So.2d 951, 951 (Fla. 1997). Thomas’s sentence of death became final in 1997. Thomas v. Florida, 522 U.S. 985, 118 S.Ct. 449, 139 L.Ed(2d 385 (1997). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Thomas’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Thomas’s motion. ,

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Thomas, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


author: PER CURIAM. -PARIENTE, J.,

text:
    John Christopher MARQUARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-862
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 24, 2018]

      James Vigianno, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Adriana Corso, and Ali Andrew Shakoor,. Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review John Christopher Marquard’s appeal \of the circuit court’s order denying Marquard’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Marquard’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on .remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Marquard’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 act. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Marquard responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Marquard’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Marquard, is not entitled to relief, Marquard was sentenced to death following a jury’s unanimous recommendation for death. Marquard v. State, 641 So.2d 54, 56 (Fla. 1994). Marquard’s sentence of death became final in 1995. Marquard v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1132, 115 S.Ct. 946, 130 L.Ed.2d 890 (1995). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively .fo Marquard’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Mar-quard’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Marquard, we caution that any rehearing,motion containing reargument will be .stricken. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J.; concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

-PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I- concur in result'- because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.


author: QUINCE, J. POLSTON, J.,

text:
    Charles LEE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC14-416
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 25, 2018]
    Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew D. Bernstein, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, for Petitioner
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Marilyn Muir Beccue, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, for Respondent
   QUINCE, J.

Charles Lee seeks review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Lee v. State, 130 So.3d 707 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The facts of this case were provided in the Second District’s decision as follows:

On the eveniiig of November 21, 1999, Mr. Lee was on a street and got into a disagreement with two people who were in a van attempting to purchase cocaine. The nature of the disagreement is not entirely clear, but there is evidence that Mr. Lee thought he was owed forty dollars. Mr. Lee threatened to shoot the driver if he drove away. When the driver attempted to leave, Mr. Lee carried through with his threat. He shot the driver, who sustained permanent, disabling injuries. Mr. Lee was fifteen years old at the time of these events.
The State filed an information charging Mr. Lee as an adult with attempted murder in the first degree. The information alleged that he “did attempt to kill and murder and inflict upon [the victim] mortal wounds by shooting with a firearm.” The testimony at trial included testimony from the treating physician about the gunshot wound and the extent of the injury. The jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Lee guilty of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm as charged in the information.

Lee v. State, 130 So.3d at 708-09.

Lee was originally sentenced to life imprisonment on April 20, 2001. Because section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2000), applied, the trial court classified the offense as a life felony and sentenced Lee to life without parole. Id. at 709. After the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), Lee filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, which the trial court granted. Id. At the conclusion of resentencing in 2011, a successor trial judge sentenced Lee to forty years’ imprisonment with a twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentence: Id.

On appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal, the district court held that Lee’s newly imposed sentence did not violate Graham. Lee, 130 So.3d at 710 (citing Walle v. State, 99 So.3d 967 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), quashed, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S455, 2016 WL 5165165 (Fla. Sept. 21, 2016)). The Second District denied Lee’s remaining claims. Id.

DISCUSSION

Lee raises four issues in this review proceeding. Because the first issue in this case is entirely controlled by this Court’s decisions in Kelsey v. State, 206 So.3d 5 (Fla. 2016), and Johnson v. State, 215 So.3d 1237 (Fla. 2017), Lee. is entitled to be resentenced.

In Kelsey, this Court stated:

After we made clear that Graham does indeed apply to term-of-years sentences, we have declined to require that such sentences must be “de facto -life” sentences for Graham to apply. See, e.g., Guzman v. State, 183 So.3d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 2016). By using chapter’ 2014-220 as a guide, we avoid second-guessing the legislative contemplation that resulted in the twenty-year cutoff for judicial review contained in the law.... Because we determine that resentencing is the appropriate remedy, the trial courts may embrace all of the provisions of chapter 2014-220 and are not required to limit themselves to only applying the judicial review provision.

Kelsey v. State, 206 So.3d at 10-11. Following Kelsey, this Court issued a, decision in Johnson, holding:

Post-Henry, we must ensure that a juvenile nonhomicide offender does not receive a sentence that provides for release only at the end of a sentence (e.g. a 45-year sentence with no provision for obtaining early release based on a demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation before the expiration of the imposed term, such as in Kelsey). Secondly, we must ensure that a juvenile nonhomicide offender who is sentenced post-Henry does not receive a sentence which includes early release that is not based on a demonstration of rehabilitation and maturity (i.e. gain time or other programs designed to relieve prison overpopulation). Last, we must ensure that a juvenile nonhomicide offender who is sentenced post-Henry does not receive a sentence that provides for early release at a time beyond his or her natural life (e.g. a 1,000-year sentence that provides parole-eligibility after the offender serves 100 years). To qualify as a “meaningful opportunity for early release,” a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s sentence must meet each of the three parameters described in Henry.

Johnson, 215 So.3d at 1243 (discussing Henry v. State, 175 So.3d 675 (Fla. 2015)).

Lee, as was Kelsey, is serving a 40-year sentence for a nonhomicide crime that he committed when he was a juvenile. Like Kelsey, Lee was resentenced after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham but before the Florida Legislature passed chapter 2014-220. And, like Kelsey — and as noted in Johnson — Lee’s sentence does not provide him an opportunity to obtain early release based on a demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation before the expiration of the imposed term. Accordingly, Lee is entitled to resentenc-ing under .the juvenile sentencing provisions in chapter 2014-220.

We find Lee’s second claim without merit. The trial' court may, but is not required to under the rule or statute, order an updated PSI. See Fla. R. of Crim. P. 3.710(a); § 985.565(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2017); see, e.g., Barber v. State, 293 So.2d 710, 711 (Fla. 1974) (“The requirement- of [Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure] 3.710. does not continue or revive upon a second, future occasion of an adjudication of guilt and sentencing for violation of the probation earlier granted which had already fulfilled the mandate of the rule.”). Furthermore, because Lee is entitled to be resentenced under the provisions of chapter 2014-220, we decline to address the remaining issues on appeal.

It is so ordered,

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, J., concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result.

POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur.-

POLSTON, J.,

dissenting.

Unlike the majority, I believe that a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s sentence must violate Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), in order for that defendant to be entitled to resentencing pursuant to Graham. See Kelsey v. State, 206 So.3d 5, 14 (Fla. 2016) (Polston, J., dissenting). Here, because Lee’s 40-year sentence is not a life sentence or a de facto life sentence, his sentence does not violate Graham. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Therefore, Lee is not entitled to resentencing. I respectfully dissent.

CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      . The Second District Court of Appeal denied Lee's claim citing Walle v. State, 99 So.3d 967 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), quashed, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S455, 2016 WL 5165165 (Fla. Sept. 21, 2016), which was pending review at this Court.

      . Section 775.087 is known colloquially as the 10-20-Life statute.

      . Lee argues: (1) that he is entitled to be resentenced pursuant to chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida; (2) that the trial court is required to consider an updated presentence investigation report (PSI); (3) that a minimum mandatory sentence under section 775.087, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional as applied to him; and (4) that the trial court erred in imposing the 25-year minimum mandatory term because the information did not allege great bodily harm.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO the FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE—2017 OUT-OF-CYCLE REPORT.
    No. SC17-1005
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 25, 2018]
    Perry Michael Adair, Chair, ánd Gregory Paul Borgognoni, Past Chair, Code and Rules of Evidence Committee, Coral Gables, Florida; Jonathan Adam Galler, Chair, Florida Probate Rules Committee, Boca Raton, Florida, Michael Travis Hayes, Past Co-Chair, and Jon Scuderi, Past Co-Chair, Florida Probate Rules Committee, Naples, Florida; and Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Heather Savage Telfer, Staff Liaison, and Mikalla Andies Davis, Attorney Liaison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
    Robert W. Goldman, Naples, Florida; and George J. Taylor, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Responding with Comments
   PER CURIAM.

We háve for consideration the joint out-of-cycle report filed by the Florida Bar’s Probate Rules Committee (FPR Committee) and the Code and Rules of Evidence Committee (CRE Committee) (collectively Committees) asking this Court to reconsider its 2014 decision not to adopt, to the extent it is procedural, chapter 2011-188, section 1, Laws of Florida, which created section 90.5021, Florida Statutes (2017), (Fiduciary lawyer-client privilege) of the Florida Evidence Code. See In re Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 144 So.3d 536, 537 (Fla. 2014). We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const., and now adopt chapter 2011-183, section 1, Laws of Florida, to the extent that provision of the Evidence Code is procedural.

BACKGROUND

The Committees ask the Court to adopt section 90.5021 of the Florida Evidence Code in order to resolve what they refer to as a “conflict” between a 2011 amendment to Florida Probate Rule 5.240(b)(2) (Notice of Administration) and. the Court’s 2014 decision not to adopt section 90.6021. The CRE Committee voted 26-0 to ask- the Court to resolve the conflict between the 2014 decision and the probate rule. The FPR Committee voted 30-0 to ask the Court to adopt section 90.5021. The Board of Governors of The Florida Bar voted 41-0 to approve the Committees’ request. The Committees published the request for comment prior'to filing the report with the Court. The Committees received two comments. One comment opposed the Court adopting section 90.5021 and the other was not responsive to the request. The Court published the Committees’ request for comment. Two comments were filed with the Court. Óne comment urged the Court to adopt section 90.5021 and the other opposed adoption. .

COMMITTEES’ REQUEST

According to the report, the conflict, the Committees ask the Court to resolve arose as a result of the timing of (1) the Court amending the probate rule in response to section 8 of chapter 2011-183, Laws of Florida; and (2) the Court later declining to adopt section 1 of chapter 2011-183, which created section 90.5021 of the Evidence Code. In 2011, the Florida Legislature enacted chapter 2011-183, Laws of Florida, which became effective June 21, 2011. See ch. 2011-183, § 14, Laws of Fla. Section 1 of chapter 2011-183 created section 90.5021, Florida Statutes, which eliminated what the Committees refer to as the common law fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege, to the extent that exception existed in Florida. Section 8 of chapter 2011-183, Laws of Florida, amended section 733.212(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), to require that a notice of estate administration include a statement that “the fiduciary lawyer-client privilege in section 90.5021, Florida Statutes, applies with respect to the personal representative and any attorney employed by the personal representative.”

In response to the amendment to section 733.212(2)(b), in 2011, the FPR Committee proposed a fast-track out-of-cycle amendment to Florida Probate Rule 5.240(b)(2) that, consistent with the statute, requires a notice of estate administration to include a statement that “the fiduciary lawyer-client privilege in section 90.5021, Florida Statutes, applies with respect to the personal representative and any attorney employed by the personal representative.” The Court adopted, effective September 28, 2011, the proposed probate rule amendment in In re Amendments to the Florida Probate Rules, 73 So.3d 205 (Fla. 2011). Then, in its 2013 regular-cycle report, the CRE Committee recommended that the Court adopt, to the extent it was procedural, chapter 2011-183, section 1, Laws of Florida, which created the section 90.5021 fiduciary lawyer-client' privilege. However, in the 2014 opinion addressing that recommendation, the Court declined to follow the Committee’s recommendation to adopt the new provision of the Code. In re Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 144 So.3d at 537.

According to the Committees’ report, the resulting conflict between the probate rule that requires notice of the section 90.5021 fiduciary lawyer-client privilege and the Court’s refusal to adopt that privilege to the extent it is procedural has led to confusion for lawyers who represent fiduciaries, such as personal representatives, as well as for circuit court judges. After considering the Committees’ report, the comments submitted to the Committees and filed with the Court, and the Committees’ response, we now adopt section 1 of chapter 2011-183, Laws of Florida, as provided in the appendix to this opinion, to the extent it is procedural. Our adoption of chapter 2011-183 is effective retroactively to June 21, 2011, the date it became law.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result.

APPENDIX

Chapter 2011-183, § 1:

90.5021 Fiduciary lawyer-client privilege.—

(1) For the purpose of this section, a client acts as a fiduciary when serving as a personal representative or a trustee as defined in ss. 731.201 and 736.0103, an administrator ad litem as described in s. 733.308, a curator as described in s, 733.501, a guardian or guardian ad litem as defined in s. 744.102, a conservator as defined in s. 710.102, or an attorney in fact as described in chapter 709.

(2) A communication between a lawyer and a client acting as a fiduciary is privileged and protected from disclosure under s. 90.502 to the same extent as if the client were not acting as a fiduciary. In applying s. 90.502 to a communication under this section, only the person or entity acting as a fiduciary is considered a client of the lawyer.

(B) This section does not affect the crime or fraud exception to the lawyer-client privilege provided in s. 90.502(4)(a).

      . See In re Amends, to Fla. Probate Rules, 73 So.34 205 (Fla. 2011).

      . See ch. 2011-183, § 14, Laws of Fla.


author: PER CURIAM. LAWSON, J., QUINCE, J.,

text:
    Lenard James PHILMORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-711
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 25, 2018]

      James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Adriana C. Corso, and Ali A. Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, -Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

Lenard James Philmore is a prisoner under sentence of death whose sentence became final on October 7, 2002. See Philmore v. State, 820 So.2d 919 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 895, 123. S.Ct. 179, 154 L.Ed.2d 162 (2002). The facts underlying Philmore’s sentence of death, which 'was imposed after a jury unanimously recommended death, id. at 925, were-fully explained in this Court’s opinion on direct appeal. Id. at 923-25. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and this Court’s decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017), Philmore filed a successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, arguing that these decisions render his death sentence unconstitutional under both the United States and Florida Constitutions. This Court has jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order denying relief.

As the postconviction court found, Hurst applies retroactively to Philmore’s sentence of death. See Mosley v. State, 209 So.3d 1248, 1283 (Fla. 2016). In its order below, the postconviction court found “beyond a reasonable doubt that any Hurst error was harmless,” stating:

This was a highly aggravated case, the jury was instructed that the aggravators must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence supporting the ag-gravators for prior and contemporaneous violent felony convictions was significant and uncontested, there was no statutory mitigation, the nonstatutory mitigation was minimal, the jury was not required to recommend death if the ag-gravators outweighed the mitigators, and the jury.recommendation was unanimous. And to date, the Florida Supreme Court has not found Hurst error harmful in any unanimous jury cases.

(Citation omitted.) Based on the jury’s unanimous recommendation for .a sentence of death, coupled with Philmore’s confession and the aggravation in this case, we agree with the postconviction court that the Hurst error in( Philmore’s case is harmless beyond a réasonable doubt. See Davis v. State, 207 So.3d 142, 173-75 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2218, 198 L.Ed.2d 663 (2017).

As to Philmore’s other claims alleging due process and Eighth Amendment violations, we conclude that Philmore is not entitled to relief on these claims because the jury’s unanimous recommendation renders any Hurst error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, Philmore is not entitled to relitigate his Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), claim in light of Hurst, which does not affect the merits of a Batson claim. A Batson claim addresses who sits on the jury while Hurst affects what the jury must do, once empaneled, in order to constitutionally sentence the defendant to death.

Accordingly, we affirm the. postconviction court’s order denying relief.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.

CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.

LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion. .

QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.

LAWSON, J.,

concurring specially.

See Okafor v. State, 225 So.3d 768, 775-76 (Fla. 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially).

QUINCE, J.,

dissenting.

I cannot agree with the majority’s finding that the Hurst error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As I have stated • in other - cases, “[b]ecause Hurst requires ‘a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death,’ the error cannot be harmless where such a factual determination was not made.” Hall v. State, 212 So.3d 1001, 1036-37 (Fla. 2017) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 619, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016)); see also Truehill v. State, 211 So.3d 930, 961 (Fla. 2017) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, I dissent.

      . Specifically, Philmore relied on- Hurst v. Florida and Hurst to argue in the court below that his death sentence is unconstitutional under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as the corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution. Philmore’s Eighth Amendment claim also includes the assertion that the jury was improperly instructed as to its sentencing responsibility pursuant to Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).


author: LAWSON, J.

text:
    Juan A. SALINAS, et al., Appellants, v. Sue Ann RAMSEY, et al., Appellees.
    No. SC17-823
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 25, 2018]

      J.H. Zidell, Rivkah F. Jaff, Neil Tobak, and Joshua H. Sheskin of J.H. Zidell, P.A., Miami Beach, Florida, for Appellant
    Lara O’Donnell Grillo of Mark, Migdal & Hayden, Miami, Florida, for Appellee
   LAWSON, J.

This case is before the Court for review of a question of Florida law certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that is determinative of a cause pending in that court and for which there appears to be no controlling precedent. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has asked us to answer the following question:

WHAT LIMITATIONS PERIOD, IF ANY, APPLIES TO A REQUEST FOR POST-JUDGMENT DISCOVERY BROUGHT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT IN FLORIDA ON A JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THAT SAME FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT?

Salinas v. Ramsey, 858 F.3d 1360, 1362 (11th Cir. 2017). We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const., and rephrase the certified question as follows:

WHAT IS THE DEADLINE UNDER FLORIDA LAW FOR COMPLETING POST-JUDGMENT DISCOVERY FOR THE PURPOSE OF COLLECTING A FEDERAL MONEY JUDGMENT ISSUED BY A FEDERAL COURT IN FLORIDA?

As we explain more fully below, such discovery is permitted for a period of twenty years from the date the judgment was entered.

On September 23, 2004, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered a judgment awarding Juan A. Salinas and Lucila Fuentes (the judgment creditors) money damages against Sue Ann Ramsey (the judgment debtor). The procedure on execution or in aid of this federal judgment is governed by the rules of Florida. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). In accordance with this procedure, on May 15, 2015, the judgment creditors filed a motion in the federal district court requesting an order compelling the judgment debtor to complete a fact information sheet under Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.560 and 1.977. The federal district court denied the motion under the authority of Balfour Beatty Bahamas, Ltd. v. Bush, 170 F.3d 1048, 1051 (11th Cir. 1999), which holds that post-judgment discovery aimed at collecting a money judgment issued by a federal court in Florida is governed by the five-year limitations period provided in section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes.

The judgment creditors appealed the district court’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit recognized the applicability of Balfour but observed that Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal called Balfour into question in Burshan v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 805 So.2d 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Salinas, 858 F.3d at 1361. Having developed substantial doubt about the correctness of its decision in Balfour, the Eleventh Circuit' sought our assistance. Id. at 1361-62. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Fourth District’s holding in Burshan that collection activity on a federal judgment is not governed by section 95.11(2)(a), but instead is permitted for the twenty-year life of the judgment. See 805 So.2d at 843-44.

The judgment debtor urges üs to conclude, as did the Balfour court, that post-judgment discovery in aid of enforcing a federal judgment constitutes an “action on a judgment” and is, therefore, subject to the five-year limitations period applicable to bringing an action on a federal judgment. See § 95.11(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). However, we explained long ago that such discovery does not constitute an “action upon a judgment” under the statute of limitations, as the term was then phrased. Young v. McKenzie, 46 So.2d 184, 185 (Fla. 1950). The phrase “action on a judgment” in the current statute is equivalent. As the Fourth District observed in Burshan, “[s]ince the nineteenth century, the phrase ‘action on a judgment’ in the statute has had a precise meaning as a common law cause of action.” 805 So.2d at 840. An “action on a judgment” is an action independent of the original action in which the judgment was obtained, the main purpose of which is “to obtain a new judgment which will facilitate the ultimate goal of securing satisfaction of the original cause of action.” Burshan, 805 So.2d at 841 (quoting Adams v. Adams, 691 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). An action on a judgment provides an opportunity, when the limitations period has almost run on the judgment, to obtain a new judgment that will “start the limitations period anew.” Burshan, 805 So.2d at 841 (quoting 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 945 (1995)); accord Desert Palace, Inc. v. Wiley, 145 So.3d 946, 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 61 So.3d 1285, 1288-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Petersen v. Whitson, 14 So.3d 300, 301-02 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Marsh v. Patchett, 788 So.2d 353, 355 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

Although many decades, have passed since we decided Young, no amendment of section 95.11 has provided any reason for us to reconsider our determination that post-judgment discovery does not constitute an “action [ ]on a judgment.” See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 609 (Fla. 2004) (“The Legislature is presumed to know the judicial constructions of a law when amending that law, ,and the Legislature is presumed to have adopted prior judicial constructions of a law unless a contrary intention is expressed.”) (citing City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770 So.2d 1196, 1202 (Fla. 2000)). The judgment debtor attempts to find such a reason in the Legislature’s 1974 enactment of section 95.011, which contains a statement of chapter 95’s applicability and an explanation of the term “action” as used in the chapter. Ch. 74-382, § 1, Laws of Fla. Section 95.011, Florida Statutes (2014), explains that the term “action” refers to “[a] civil action or proceeding,” Contrary to the judgment debt- or’s assertion, this explanation does not express any intention to change the meaning of “action []on a judgment” as we understood it in Young.

Not only is post-judgment discovery in aid of execution or enforcement not an action on a judgment; it is not an “action” at all within the meaning of section 95.011. We reach this conclusion by examining the language of section 95.011 and applying the principle that “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, ... the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning,” Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)), which “can be ascertained by reference .to a dictionary,” Bennett v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., Inc., 71 So.3d 828, 839 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys. v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological, 997 So.2d 426, 431 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)).

A “civil action” is “[a]n action brought to enforce, redress, or protect a private or civil right; a noncriminal litigation.” “Civil Action,” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “action” simply as “[a] civil or criminal judicial proceeding”.and offers the following explanation:

An action has been defined to be an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another party for the enforcemént or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense.... More accurately, it is defined to be any judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to a determination, will result in a judgment or decree. The action is said to terminate,at judgment.

Action, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (quoting 1 Morris M. Estee, Estee’s Pleadings, Practice, and Forms § 3, at 1 (Carter P. Pomeroy ed., 3d ed. 1885)). Another explanatory quotation provided in Black’s Law Dictionary in reference to “action” states that when the judicial system recognized a “more marked distinction” between “action” and “suit,” an “action” ended when the judgment was rendered, and a “suit” included the execution. Id. (quoting Edwin E. Bryant, The Law of Pleading Under the Codes of Civil Procedure 3 (2d ed. 1899)). These definitions and explanations establish that a “civil action” is a process that is intended to result in a judgment or decree and, after the merging of “action” and, “suit,” may include execution as part of the original “action.” In fact, this Court’s precedent confirms that execution has long been considered a continuation of the •action in which the judgment was obtained and is “a remedy, not an action.” Massey v. Pineapple Orange Co., 87 Fla. 374, 100 So. 170, 171 (1924).

The definitions for “proceeding,” . the other, expression of “action” under section 95.011, are broader:

1. The regular , and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment. 2. Any 'procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency. 3. An act or step that is part' of a larger action. 4. The business conducted by a court or other official body; a hearing. 5. Bankruptcy. A particular dispute or matter arising within a pending case — as opposed to the case as a whole.

Proceeding, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). An explanatory quotation states that “proceeding” is a “more comprehensive” word than “action” and may cover a number of concepts, including but not limited to “all ancillary or provisional steps, such as ... garnishment,” “the execution,” “proceedings supplementary to execution,” or “the enforcement of the judgment.” Id. (quoting Edwin E. Bryant, The Law of Pleading Under the Codes of Civil Procedure 3-4 (2d ed. 1899)). In Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So.3d 186 (Fla. 2013), when determining whether arbitration is an “action” under section 95.11, this Court found that the most relevant definition of “proceeding” is “[a]ny procedural means for seeking- redress from a tribunal or agency.” Id. at 190 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (9th ed. 2009)).. “[Rjedress” is “[rjelief” or a “remedy,” such, as money damages. Redress, Black’s. Law Dictionary. (10th ed. 2014).

While “proceeding” can include any-step in the process of obtaining redress, even a single hearing, this understanding of “proceeding” does not fit the context in' which the word. “proceeding” is used in section 95.011. Section 95.011 explains that a civil action or proceeding must be . “begun within the time prescribed”. in, chapter 95, If “proceeding” in this context meant any step of a lawsuit, as the judgment debtor seems to suggest, then the statute would require any lawsuit to both begin and end within the limitations period, as the final hearing or trial would be barred if it occurred-after the-end. of the limitations period, even if .the action, began many years earlier. The Legislature, however, did not say that any. civil action- .must “begin and end” within the limitations period .or that any discrete proceeding within a lawsuit must occur within the limitations period. The Legislature chose the word “begun,” signifying that its concern was .with the,initiation of a new and independent procedural means for obtaining a judgment or seeking redress.

Post-judgment discovery in aid of execution or enforcement of a judgment is not ,a new and independent procedural means for obtaining a-judgment or seeking redress. Rather, the judgment has been issued and redress in the form of money damages has been ordered. Discovery is part of the collection effort, which occurs after the issuance of the judgment as part of the final process for the case. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.560(a), 1.570(a) (describing execution and garnishment as the “[f|inal process to enforce a judgment ... for the payment of money”). Therefore, post-judgment discovery is not an “action,” and section 95.11 does not establish when it. must begin.

Because post-judgment discovery is part of the final process of an action, Florida law is not concerned with when it begins, but does dictate when it must be completed. Post-judgment discovery is appropriate as long as the judgment is enforceable. See Young, 46 So.2d at 185. Florida judgments have a twenty-year “life” during which they are enforceable. See id. at 185-86; Norwich Union Indem. Co. v. Willis, 124 Fla. 137, 168 So. 418, 420 (1936); § 55.081, Fla. Stat. (2004) (providing that a lien imposed under a judgment lasts no longer than twenty years). Likewise, a federal judgment issued by a court in Florida has a twenty-year life. See 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012) (providing that a federal judgment operates as a lien on property located in the state where the judgment was issued “in the same manner, to the same extent and under the same conditions as a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction in such State, and ... cease[s] to be a lien in the same manner and time”); B.A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 304,14 So.2d 667, 669 (1943) (acknowledging that a federal judgment lien was effective for twenty years from the date the judgment was rendered). Accordingly, all post-judgment discovery efforts aimed at collecting such a judgment must occur— and may be compelled — within twenty years of entry of the judgment.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, and CANADY, JJ., concur. LEWIS and POLSTON, JJ„ concur in result.

      . We, therefore, disagree with Balfour. Balfour relied on Kiesel v. Graham, 388 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), which was criticized in Burshan, 805 So.2d at 843-44. To the extent Kiesel is inconsistent with our holding in this case, we disapprove of Kiesel.

      . See, e.g., Crane v. Nuta, 157 Fla. 613, 26 So.2d 670 (1946) (action by an assignee of a judgment to obtain a new judgment in the amount of the original); Workingmens Co-op. Bank v. Wallace, 151 Fla. 329, 9 So.2d 731 (1942) (action by the judgment creditor of a Massachusetts judgment to enforce the judgment in Florida even though the underlying cause of action might not have been valid in Florida); Van Deren v. Lory, 87 Fla. 422, 100 So. 794 (1924) (action to enforce an Indiana judgment in Florida); Whiteside v. Dinkins, 86 Fla. 261, 97 So. 517 (1923) (action by the devisee of a judgment to obtain a judgment for the same amount).

      . We recognize that our reasoning in Young could lead one to conclude that federal judgments issued by courts sitting in Florida are enforceable for only five years. See 46 So.2d at 185-86. But, we have stated otherwise, Padgett, 14 So.2d at 669, and any other holding would conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).


author: PER CURIAM..

text:
    Michael A. KENDRICK, Petitioner, v. Julie L. JONES, etc., Respondent.
    No. SC17-679
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [January 25, 2018]

      Michael A. Kendrick, pro se, Raiford, Florida, for Petitioner
    No appearance for Respondent
   PER CURIAM..

Michael A. Kendrick filed with the Court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. It is the thirty-ninth pro se petition or notice that he has filed with this Court since 2006. We dismissed Kendrick’s petition in this case and expressly retained jurisdiction to consider the imposition of sanctions. See Kendrick v. Jones, No. SC17-679, 2017 WL 2391701, at *1 (Fla. June 2, 2017).

In 2008, Kendrick was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and'sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment by the Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Hillsborough County, Florida, in case number 292005CF0Í3532000AHC. His conviction and sentence were per curiam affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal. See Kendrick v. State, 36 So.3d 668 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (table). Since his case became final, Kendrick has initiated numerous challenges to his conviction and sentence in the circuit and district courts, as well as in this Court. In this Court alone, Kendrick has filed forty’pro se petitions and 'notices. This Court has never granted Kendrick any. of the relief that he has sought in any of the petitions and notices that' he has filed with this Court; each of Kendrick’s cases in this' Court' has been dismissed, denied, or transferred.

Kendrick’s petition in this case was no exception. The petition was another challenge to his conviction and sentence, filed almost seven years after they became final. We simultaneously dismissed "Kendrick’s petition in this case and-ordered him' to show cause why he should not be barred from fifing further pro se docur ments here. He did not respond to the Court’s order, but instead chose to file yet another meritless notice to invoke this Court’s, discretionary jurisdiction, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Kendrick v. State, No. SC17-1232, 2017 WL 2829191 (Fla. June 30, 2017). Therefore, based on Kendrick’s extensive history of meritless pro se filings in this Court, most of which have challenged his conviction and sentence, we now find that he has abused the Court’s limited judicial resources. See Pettway v. McNeil, 987 So.2d 20, 22 (Fla. 2008) (explaining that this Court has previously “exercised the inherent judicial authority to sanction an abusive litigant” and that “[o]ne justification for such a sanction lies in the protection of the rights of others to have the Court conduct timely reviews of their legitimate filings”). If no action is taken, Kendrick will continue to burden this Court’s resources.

Accordingly, we direct the Clerk of this Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Michael A. Kendrick that concern circuit court' case number 292005CF013532000AHC, unless such filings are signed by a member' in good standing of The Florida Bar. Henceforth, Kendrick may , only petition the Court about his conviction and sentence in ease number 292005CF013532000AHC through the assistance of counsel whenever such counsel determines that the proceeding may have merit and can be filed in good faith. Additionally, we find the petition filed in this case by Kendrick is a frivolous proceeding filed by a state prisoner. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). Consistent with section 944.279(1), Florida Statutes (2017), we direct the- Clerk of this Court to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the Department of Corrections’ institution or facility where Kendrick is incarcerated. See Steele v. State, 14 So.3d 221, 224 (Fla. 2009).

No motion for rehearing or clarification will be entertained by the Court.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.

      . See Kendrick v. State, No. SC17-1232, 2017 WL 2829191 (Fla. June 30, 2017) (dismissing notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction); Kendrick v. State, No. SC16-1435, 2017 WL 225066 (Fla. Jan. 19, 2017) (dismissing mandamus petition); Kendrick v. Jones, No. SC16-1933, 2016 WL 6538662 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2016) (transferring mandamus petition to the district court); Kendrick v. State, No. SC 16-1982, 2016 WL 6462428 (Fla. Nov. 1, 2016) (dismissing notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction); Kendrick v. State, No. SC 16-1687, 2016 WL 5162601 (Fla. Sept. 19, 2016) (dismissing mandamus petition); Kendrick v. Jones, No. SC16-1418, 2016 WL 4194777 (Fla. Aug. 9, 2016) (transferring habeas petition to the circuit court); Kendrick v. Jones, No. SC16-918, 2016 WL 3450456 (Fla. June 6, 2016) (transferring habeas petition to the circuit court); Kendrick v. State, No. SC16-191, 2016 WL 1600823 (Fla. Apr. 21, 2016) (transferring mandamus petition to the district court); Kendrick v. Jones, No. SC 16-524, 2016 WL 1183763 (Fla. Mar. 24, 2016) (transferring habeas petition to the circuit court); Kendrick v. State, No. SC15-2118, 2016 WL 374448 (Fla. Jan 28, 2016) (dismissing notice to invoke' discretionary jurisdiction); Kendrick v. State, 192 So.3d 38 (Fla. 2015) (table) (denying mandamus petition); Kendrick v. State, 192 So.3d 38 (Fla. 2015) (table) (denying mandamus petition); Kendrick v. State, 192 So.3d 38 (Fla. 2015) (table) (dismissing mandamus petition); Kendrick v. State, No. SC15-1637 (Fla. Oct. 22, 2015) (transferring mandamus petition to the circuit court); Kendrick v. State, No. SC15-1572 (Fla. Oct. 16, 2015) (transferring mandamus petition to the district court); Kendrick v. State, 173 So.3d 963 (Fla. 2015) (table) (dismissing notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction); Kendrick v. Jones, 171 So.3d 117 (Fla. 2015) (table) (dismissing notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction); Kendrick v. James B. Nutter & Co., 163 So.3d 510 (Fla. 2015) (table) (dismissing notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction); Kendrick v. Crews, No. SC14-1571 (Fla. Sept. 22, 2014) (transferring-mandamus petition to the circuit court); Kendrick v. James B. Nutter & Co., 157 So.3d 1045 (Fla. 2014) (table) (dismissing notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction); Kendrick v. State, No. SC14-1384 (Fla. Aug. 13, 2014) (transferring mandamus petition to the circuit court); Kendrick v. Crews, 147 So.3d 524 (Fla. 2014) (table) (dismissing notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction); Kendrick v. Crews, No. SC14-1041 (Fla. June 6, 2014) (transferring habeas petition to the circuit- court); Kendrick v. State, 145 So.3d 825 (Fla. 2014) (table) (dismissing mandamus petition); Kendrick v. State, 143 So.3d 919 (Fla. 2014) (table) (dismissing notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction); Kendrick v. State, No. SC14-65 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2014) (transferring mandamus petition to the district court); Kendrick v. Crews, No. SC14-249 (Fla. Mar. 12, 2014) (transferring habeas petition to the circuit court); Kendrick v. State, No. SC 13-1422 (Fla. Dec. 16, 2013) (transferring mandamus petition to the district court); Kendrick v. Crews, No. SC13-1398 (Fla. Nov. 27, 2013) (transferring habeas petition to the circuit court); Kendrick v. State, 120 So.3d 560 (Fla. 2013) (table) (dismissing mandamus petition); Kendrick v. State, 110 So.3d 440 (Fla. 2013) (table) (dismissing notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction); Kendrick v. State, 70 So.3d 587 (Fla. 2011) (table) (dismissing mandamus petition); Kendrick v. Buss, 64 So.3d 1260 (Fla. 2011) (table) (denying notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction); Kendrick v. State, 64 So.3d 679 (Fla. 2011) (table) (dismissing mandamus petition); Kendrick v. State, No. SC11-660 (Fla. Apr. 13, 2011) (transferring mandamus petition to the district court); Kendrick v. State, No. SC11-336 (Fla. Feb. 23, 2011) (transferring mandamus petition to the district court); Kendrick v. State, No, SC10-1046 (Fla. Aug. 11, 2010) (transferring mandamus petition to the circuit court); Kendrick v. McNeil, No. SC09-2324 (Fla. Feb. 17, 2010) (transferring habeas petition to the district court); Kendrick v. State, 944 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2006) (table) (denying notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction).