author: WOODALL, Justice. LYONS, Justice

text:
    Ex parte Wesley Randall QUICK. (In re State of Alabama v. Wesley Randall Quick).
    1071644.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Jan. 23, 2009.
    Rehearing Denied March 13, 2009.

      Bryan A. Stevenson, Randall S. Suss-kind, and Kristen M. Nelson of Equal Justice Initiative, Montgomery, for petitioner.
    Kim T. Thomas, gen. counsel, and Greg Biggs, asst. gen. counsel, Alabama Department of Corrections, for respondent.

       Justice Shaw was a member of the Court of Criminal Appeals when that court considered this case.

   WOODALL, Justice.

We granted certiorari review to consider a material question of first impression for this Court, namely, how § 15-18-5, Ala. Code 1975, must be applied under the facts of this case. See Rule 39(a)(1)(C), Ala. R.App. P. Wesley Randall Quick filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the St. Clair Circuit Court, alleging that the Department of Corrections had miscalculated the amount of jail time to be credited against his sentences for two counts of first-degree burglary and one count of third-degree burglary. After an evidentia-ry hearing, the trial court granted Quick’s petition, and the State appealed.

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment. State v. Quick, 23 So.3d 63 (Ala.Crim.App.2008). In its opinion, that court summarized the undisputed facts:

“At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Quick had been continuously confined from the time of his arrest on November 5, 1995, until his sentencing for the burglary convictions on October 24, 2003. The record indicates that on November 5, 1995, Quick was arrested for one count of first-degree burglary (case no. CC-96-1746) and for one count of capital murder, and that on January 11, 1996, Quick was arrested for one count of first-degree burglary (case no. CC-96-3803) and one count of third-degree burglary (case no. CC-96-3804). The parties agreed that Quick never posted bond on the burglary charges, and the circuit court noted that an attempt to post bond would have been futile because Quick would not have been released with the capital charge pending.
“The record indicates that Quick’s first trial on the capital charge ended in a mistrial because of juror misconduct. Quick was again brought to trial for the capital offense; he was convicted of capital murder on September 30, 1997, and on March 6, 1998, the trial court sentenced Quick to death. On direct appeal from that conviction and sentence, this Court, finding that Quick had shown a particularized need for the transcript of his first trial and the absence of suitable alternatives, held that he was entitled to a free transcript of the prior trial, and we reversed Quick’s conviction and death sentence and remanded the cause for a new trial. Quick v. State, 825 So.2d 246 (Ala.Crim.App.2001). Quick was tried a third time on the capital charge, and on April 21, 2003, he was acquitted.
“The record further reflects that following his acquittal of the charge of capital murder the trial court set no bond on the three burglary charges. On October 24, 2003, Quick pleaded guilty to the three burglary charges and was sentenced to 33 years’ imprisonment for each first-degree-burglary conviction (cases no. CC-96-1746 and CC-96-3803) and to 10 years’ imprisonment for the third-degree-burglary conviction (case no. CC-96-3804); the sentences were to run consecutively. The record reflects, and Quick concedes, that he received jail credit for the time he spent incarcerated after he was acquitted of capital murder but before he was sentenced for the burglary charges. Kathy Holt, director of central records division for the DOC [Department of Corrections], testified at the evidentiary hearing that the calculation of Quick’s release date was correct and that she had spoken with the sentencing judge, who had confirmed that the jail credit Quick had received for the burglary charges was accurate.
“After the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the circuit court instructed the parties to submit briefs supporting their respective positions. Quick argued in his trial brief, as he did in his petition, and as he argues in his brief on appeal, that because he was eventually acquitted of the capital-murder charge, he should receive additional jail credit against his burglary sentences for the entire time he spent incarcerated from his arrest on November 5, 1995, until his acquittal of capital murder on April 21, 2003. The DOC argued in its trial brief, as it had argued to the trial court at the hearing, and as it argues in its brief on appeal, that Quick is not entitled to any jail credit for the time he spent incarcerated from November 5, 1995, to his acquittal on the capital-murder charge because, it said, the incarceration was due to the capital-murder charge, not the burglary charges, and that the sentencing judge had made the correct determination as to the proper jail credit. After receiving those briefs, the circuit court issued an order granting Quick’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”

Quick, 23 So.3d at 64-66.

The Court of Criminal Appeals held that Quick was not entitled to receive any jail credit against his sentences for the burglary convictions for the time he spent incarcerated from his arrest on November 5, 1995, until his acquittal on the capital-murder charge on April 21, 2003, reasoning, as follows:

“Section 15-18-5, Ala.Code 1975, provides:
“ ‘Upon conviction and imprisonment for any felony or misdemeanor, the sentencing court shall order that the convicted person be credited with all of his actual time spent incarcerated pending trial for such offense. The actual time spent incarcerated pending trial shall be certified by the circuit clerk or district clerk on forms to be prescribed by the Board of Corrections.’
“ ‘[Section 15-18-5, Ala.Code 1975,] does not suggest that the offender should receive credit for the same jail time more than once.’ Prichard v. State, 441 So.2d 1052, 1053 (Ala.Crim.App.1983). Further, it is well established that ‘[a] defendant is not entitled to accumulate credit for time served while he is serving time on another conviction.’ Young-blood v. State, 437 So.2d 629, 630 (Ala.Crim.App.1983). Rather, the inmate should receive credit only where the conviction resulting in the sentence is the cause of the inmate’s pretrial confinement. See id.
“Based on the record before this Court, including the stipulated facts and the specific arguments presented below and on appeal, it is apparent that although coinciding with the burglary convictions he now seeks credit against, the cause of Quick’s pretrial confinement was the capital-murder charge. At best, Quick’s incarceration beginning on November 5, 1995, was based in part on his arrest on that date for the first-degree-burglary charge in case no. CC-96-1746, but he has presented no set of facts indicating that that charge resulted in his remaining in jail. Rather, as the State argues, Quick was held without bond on the capital-murder charge, and he could not have gained his release at anytime before his acquittal on the capital-murder charge. Thus, although the time line of events in this case differs from that in Youngblood, supra, the underlying principle is the same — the cause of Quick’s pretrial confinement was the capital-murder charge, not the burglary charges. In addition, nothing in our research supports Quick’s bare assertions that because he was acquitted of the capital-murder charge, that acquittal somehow transformed the cause of his confinement during the period in question from the capital-murder proceedings to the pending burglary proceedings. Therefore, Quick was not entitled to the relief requested in his petition, and the circuit court erred in granting Quick’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering that Quick be credited with the jail time he requested in his petition.”

Quick, 23 So.3d at 66.

The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law; consequently, our review is de novo. Scott Bridge Co. v. Wright, 883 So.2d 1221, 1223 (Ala.2003). In our opinion, the proper interpretation of § 15-18-5 requires that Quick receive jail credit against his sentence for one of his burglary convictions for the time he spent incarcerated from his arrest on that charge on November 5, 1995, until his acquittal on the capital-murder charge on April 21, 2003. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to that court with the direction that it affirm the judgment of the St. Clair Circuit Court.

Prior to the enactment of § 15-18-5, “no sentence imposed by the court [could] be modified by allowing for time spent in jail while awaiting trial.” Bailey v. State, 55 Ala.App. 339, 340, 315 So.2d 136, 137 (Ala.Crim.App.1975). However, “ § 15-18-5 [now] requires that the time spent incarcerated by a defendant before he or she is convicted must be credited toward the sentence imposed.” Fuqua v. State, 910 So.2d 141, 143 (Ala.Crim.App.2005). In other words, “the plain language of § 15-18-5 does not permit the trial court to forgo ordering that the actual time spent in jail pending trial be credited against the sentence imposed.” Id.

In order to apply § 15-18-5 in the context of Quick’s burglary conviction, we must first determine the “actual time [he] spent incarcerated pending trial for [the burglary] offense.” As Quick argues, “[h]e was continuously held from November 5, 1995, when he was initially arrested for first-degree burglary, until October 24, 2003, when he pleaded guilty to the three burglary counts and was sentenced.” Quick’s brief, at 8-9. Thus, we agree with Quick that he “was undoubtedly ‘incarcerated pending trial’ for the burglary offenses within the meaning of [§ 15-18-5] during those years.” Quick’s brief, at 9. Consequently, he is entitled to a credit for all that time of incarceration, not just part of it.

We have not ignored the cases cited by the Court of Criminal Appeals and relied upon by the State. Instead, those cases are simply inapposite. It is true that the Court of Criminal Appeals, in Prichard v. State, 441 So.2d 1052, 1053 (Ala.Crim.App.1983), stated that § 15-18-5 “does not suggest that the offender should receive credit for the same jail time more than once.” However, Quick, who was sentenced for three burglary convictions, is seeking credit against only one of the sentences.

In Youngblood v. State, 437 So.2d 629 (Ala.Crim.App.1983), “Youngblood argue[d] that he [was] entitled to credit on his sentence for the time he spent in jail awaiting trial.” Youngblood, 437 So.2d at 630. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the issue had not been preserved for review, the court explained why Youngblood was not entitled to any credit:

“Alabama Code Section 15-18-5 (1975) provides that a convict should be credited with all time spent in jail in connection with the offense for which he has been sentenced.
“ ‘Upon conviction and imprisonment for any felony or misdemeanor, the sentencing court shall order that the convicted person be credited with all his actual time spent incarcerated pending trial for such offense. The actual time spent incarcerated pending trial shall be certified by the circuit clerk or district clerk on forms to be prescribed by the board of corrections.’
“Here, there is simply no showing that Youngblood spent any time incarcerated pending trial for such offense for the reason that he was already serving a life sentence.
“Youngblood is not entitled to any credit on his twenty-year sentence because the conviction resulting in that sentence was not the cause of his pretrial confinement.
“ ‘Even under statutes providing that time spent in jail prior to conviction may be credited toward the term of imprisonment imposed on conviction, a period of confinement under conviction of one crime may not be deducted from the term of a sentence imposed on conviction of another crime.’
“24B C.J.S. Criminal Law, Section 1995(4) (1962).”

Youngblood, 437 So.2d at 630.

Unlike Youngblood, Quick’s incarceration pending trial did not involve any confinement under a conviction of another crime. In other words, the time that he was incarcerated pending trial did not fulfill any portion of a prior sentence. The dicta in Youngblood does not support the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in this case.

Quick was held without bond on the capital-murder charge. Thus, according to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the capital-murder charge was, while that charge was pending, the sole cause of Quick’s pretrial incarceration. Consequently, according to that court, Quick’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was due to be denied.

“However, in this case, Quick was serving time pending the trials of both the capital-murder charge and the burglary-charges, and when he was ultimately acquitted of the capital-murder charge, the time he spent in jail awaiting trial should have been applied to one of his remaining burglary convictions, regardless of whether he would have been able to make bond on a pending burglary charge.”

Quick, 23 So.3d at 67 (Welch, J., dissenting).

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the ease is remanded for that court to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

COBB, C.J., and SMITH, PARKER, and MURDOCK, JJ., concur.

LYONS, J., concurs specially.

STUART and BOLIN, JJ., dissent.

SHAW, J., recuses himself.

LYONS, Justice

(concurring specially).

I concur fully in the main opinion. I write specially to note that the plain meaning of § 15-18-5, Ala.Code 1975, compels the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Section 15-18-5 provides, in pertinent part: “Upon conviction and imprisonment for any felony or misdemeanor, the sentencing court shall order that the convicted person be credited with all of his actual time spent incarcerated pending trial for such offense.” (Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that Quick was incarcerated pending trial for, among other charges, the crime of burglary. That his application for release pending trial on the burglary charge would have been a waste of time because a capital-murder charge was pending against him is immaterial as § 15-18-5 provides for relief upon a showing only of incarceration pending trial on the charge for which he was convicted. The credit available under § 15-18-5 is in no way tied to a defendant’s ability to apply for release pending trial. For all that appears, had there been no capital-murder charge, upon Quick’s application for release pending trial on the burglary charge a bond could have been set that he was unable to post, requiring him to remain incarcerated. Under the plain meaning of § 15-18-5, Quick would have been entitled to credit for all of his “actual time spent incarcerated pending trial.” Likewise, if Quick had been charged only with burglary and did not seek release pending trial, the circumstance of the availability of procedures for pretrial release that he failed to invoke should not enter into his right to credit under § 15-18-5 for “all of his actual time spent incarcerated pending trial.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Ex parte State of Alabama (In re: STATE of Alabama v. Janet KING).
    CR-07-0693.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    July 25, 2008.

      Troy King, atty. gen., and Robin D. Scales, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.
    Richard S. Jaffe, J. Derek Drennan, and H. Hube Dodd, Birmingham, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

On November 17, 2006, the Jefferson County grand jury indicted Janet King for two instances of violating “The Woman’s Right to Know Act.” Specifically, the indictments allege that King,

“not being a physician as defined in Section 26-23A-3(7) of the Code of Alabama, did intentionally, knowingly or recklessly perform an abortion on a woman ... in violation of Section 26-23A-7 of the Code of Alabama.”

Section 26-23A-7, Ala.Code 1975, provides: “Only a physician may perform an abortion.” Section 26-23A-9(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides: “Any person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly violates this chapter is guilty on a first offense of a Class B misdemeanor, on a second offense of a Class A misdemeanor, and on a third or subsequent offense of a Class C felony.”

It appears from the record that King, who is a certified registered-nurse practitioner, was involved in the prescription and/or administration of medication that caused two women to have medical, or medicine induced, abortions. Her defense appears to be that she was allowed to be involved in the prescription and/or administration of such medication under a collaborative agreement with Dr. Deborah Le-vieh at Summit Medical Center; that she did not perform the abortions; that she simply followed the doctor’s protocols with regard to the prescription and/or administration of the medication; and that the doctor performed the abortions by supervising her actions.

King filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that she “acted at all times under the supervision of the Medical Director who was a physician and that, therefore, [she] was permitted by law to do exactly what she is accused of doing in this case.” The State filed a motion in limine, seeking to prevent King from introducing evidence about the collaborative agreement during the trial. Specifically, it argued that such evidence was not relevant and would serve only to confuse the jury. The defense argued that such evidence was relevant because it supported King’s defense that she did not actually “perform” the abortions. After hearing arguments, the trial court denied the State’s motion in limine. Thereafter, the State filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, asking this court to compel the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion in limine. We ordered the respondents to answer the State’s allegations and stayed further proceedings in the trial court pending our disposition of this petition.

Section 26-23A-7, Ala.Code 1975, clearly provides that only a physician may perform an abortion. A “[p]hysician” is defined as “[a]ny person licensed to practice medicine in this state. The term includes medical doctors and doctors of osteopathy.” § 26-23A-3(7), Ala.Code 1975. The issues in the case are whether what King, who is a certified registered-nurse practitioner, did constituted performing an abortion and, if so, whether she did so intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. Whether or not she intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly violated § 26-23A-7, Ala. Code 1975, is irrelevant. Also, whether or not she had permission to do it, through a collaborative agreement with Levich, is not relevant. See § 13A-2-6(b), Ala.Code 1975 (providing that “[a] person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in that conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless his mistaken belief is founded upon an official statement of the law contained in a statute or the latest judicial decision of the highest state or federal court which has decided on the matter”). Therefore, evidence regarding the collaborative agreement is not relevant, would serve only to confuse the jury, and would not be admissible at trial.

“ ‘Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and will be granted only where there is “(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.” Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991). This Court will not issue the writ of mandamus where the petitioner has ‘“full and adequate relief ” by appeal. State v. Cobb, 288 Ala. 675, 678, 264 So.2d 523, 526 (1972) (quoting State v. Williams, 69 Ala. 311, 316 (1881)).’
“Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So.2d 810, 813 (Ala.2003). Clearly, mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. Ex parte Houston County, 435 So.2d 1268 (Ala.1983).”

Ex parte Sysco Food Servs. of Jackson, LLC, 901 So.2d 671, 674 (Ala.2004).

“In some cases a motion in limine is a proper vehicle for preventing a jury from hearing prejudicial evidence. See, e.g., Addin v. Bramm, 374 So.2d 1348 (Ala.1979); Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Phillips, 293 Ala. 713, 310 So.2d 194 (1975); C. Gamble, The Motion in Limine: A Pretrial Procedure That Has Come of Age, 33 Ala. L.Rev. 1 (1981).
“Nevertheless, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. ‘The petitioner’s right to relief must be clear and there must be no other adequate remedy.’ Ex parte Harrington Manufacturing Co., Inc., 414 So.2d 74, 76 (Ala.1982); Ex parte Osborn, 375 So.2d 467 (Ala.1979); Campbell v. City of Hueytown, 289 Ala. 388, 268 So.2d 3 (1972); All American Life & Casualty Co. v. Moore, 286 Ala. 492, 242 So.2d 661 (1970). Mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal. Ex parte South Carolina Insurance Co., 412 So.2d 269 (Ala.1982); Echols v. Housing Authority of Auburn, 377 So.2d 952 (Ala.1979); Miller v. Holder, 292 Ala. 554, 297 So.2d 802 (1974).
“In some cases an order granting a motion in limine is not absolute, but only preliminary, and the non-moving party may offer the disputed evidence at trial and, if the other party objects and the court sustains the objection, the party offering the evidence may appeal from this ruling. See C. Gamble, The Motion in Limine, supra, 33 Ala. L.Rev. at 16. The order entered below appears to be of the preliminary sort allowing offers at trial, because it ends with the words ‘without further order of this Court.’
“In view of what we have said, we deem it appropriate for the trial court to reconsider the order granting the motion in limine. However, we are not inclined to issue the writ of mandamus in this discretionary area of evidence when the county has a remedy by appeal.”

Ex parte Houston County, 435 So.2d 1268, 1271 (Ala.1983).

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that evidence regarding the collaborative agreement is not relevant, and the trial court should have granted the State’s motion in limine. Also, the defense affirmatively indicated that it would seek to introduce evidence about the collaborative agreement, and the trial court affirmatively indicated that it would admit such evidence. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine was absolute, rather than preliminary or conditional. See Ex parte Burch, 730 So.2d 143, 146 (Ala.1999) (noting that “[a] reasonable reading of Houston County might lead one to conclude that when a denial of a motion in limine is ‘preliminary,’ as the denial was in that case, then the only appropriate method of challenging that order is an appeal. That reading of the case would, however, leave unanswered the question whether an ‘absolute’ denial of a motion in limine might appropriately give rise to a mandamus petition.”). Finally, if King is convicted, the trial court’s ruling on the motion would be reviewable if she chooses to file a direct appeal. However, because the State has only a limited right to appeal, the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine would not be reviewable on appeal by the State. Cf. Ex parte Sysco Food Servs. of Jackson, LLC, 901 So.2d at 676 (noting that, “if Sysco so desires after the trial in the retaliatory-discharge action, it can appeal the propriety of the trial court’s order granting the motion in limine”); Ex parte Army Aviation Ctr. Fed. Credit Union, Mil So.2d 379 (Ala.1985) (denying a petition for a writ of mandamus because a ruling on the petitioner’s motion in limine would be reviewable on direct appeal). Under these specific circumstances, we grant the State’s petition for a writ of mandamus and order the trial court to grant the State’s motion in limine to ex-elude evidence regarding the collaborative agreement between King and Levich.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

BASCHAB, P.J., and McMILLAN, WISE, and WELCH, JJ., concur. SHAW, J., dissents.

      . With regard to advance practice nursing, § 34-21-80, Ala.Code 1975, provides:
      "The Legislature of the State of Alabama declares that the recognition and regulation of all areas of advanced practice nursing and the collaborative practices between licensed physicians and certified registered nurse practitioners and certified nurse midwives are essential to protect and maintain the public health and safety.”
      Section 34-21-81(4), Ala.Code 1975, defines "[a]dvance practice nursing,” in part, as follows:
      “The delivery of health care services by registered nurses who have gained additional knowledge and skills through successful completion of an organized program of nursing education that prepares nurses for advanced practice roles as certified registered nurse practitioners ...:
      "a. Practice as a certified registered nurse practitioner (CRNP) means the performance of nursing skills by a registered nurse who has demonstrated by certification that he or she has advanced knowledge and skills in the delivery of nursing services within a health care system that provides for consultation, collaborative management, or referral as indicated by the health status of the client.”
      Section 34-21-81(5), Ala.Code 1975, defines ”[c]ollaboration” as follows:
      “A formal relationship between one or more certified registered nurse practitioners and certified nurse midwives and a physician or physicians under which these nurses may engage in advanced practice nursing as evidenced by written protocols approved in accordance with the requirements of this article or exempted in accordance with the requirements of this article. The term collaboration does not require direct, on-site supervision of the activities of a certified registered nurse practitioner or a certified nurse midwife by the collaborating physician. The term does require such professional oversight and direction as may be required by the rules and regulations of the State Board of Medical Examiners and the Board of Nursing.”
      Finally, § 34-21-86(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides:
      "Certified registered nurse practitioners and certified nurse midwives, engaged in collaborative practice with physicians practicing under protocols approved in the manner prescribed by this article may prescribe legend drugs to their patients, subject to both of the following conditions:
      "(1) The drug type, dosage, quantity prescribed, and number of refills shall be authorized in an approved protocol signed by the collaborating physician; and

        "(2) The drug shall be on the formulary recommended by the joint committee and adopted by the State Board of Medical Examiners and the Board of Nursing.”


author: WOODALL, Justice.

text:
    Ex parte Janet KING. (In re Ex parte State (In re State of Alabama v. Janet King)).
    1071540.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Jan. 9, 2009.
    Rehearing Denied March 13, 2009.

      Richard S. Jaffe, J. Derek Drennan, and H. Hube Dodd of Jaffe, Strickland, Dren-nan & Dodd, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner.
    Troy King, atty. gen., and Robin D. Scales and Cheairs Porter, asst, attys. gen., for respondents.
    Pamela W. Baschab, presiding judge, H.W. “Bucky” McMillan, Greg Shaw, A. Kelli Wise, and Samuel H. Welch, judges, Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, as respondents.
   WOODALL, Justice.

Janet King, a certified registered-nurse practitioner, was indicted for two alleged violations of § 26-23A-7, Ala.Code 1975, which is part of “The Woman’s Right to Know Act.” The State filed a motion in limine, requesting an order barring King from introducing at trial any evidence relating to her “collaborative practice” with a medical doctor. See §§ 34-21-80 to -93, Ala. Code 1975. The State argued that such evidence was not relevant and that it would confuse the jury. After hearing arguments, the trial court denied the State’s motion in limine.

The State filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, asking the Court of Criminal Appeals to direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the State’s motion in limine and to enter an order granting it. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition, ordering the trial court to grant the State’s motion and to exclude evidence regarding King’s collaborative practice with a medical doctor. State v. King, 23 So.3d 72 (Ala.Crim.App.2008). King, now petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its order. See Rule 21(c)(1), Ala. R.App. P. We grant King’s petition and issue the writ.

The threshold issue in this case is whether the State is entitled to seek mandamus review of the pretrial denial of its motion in limine in a criminal case. According to King, the order of the Court of Criminal Appeals is without precedent in “any other court at any other time in the history of our Republic.” King’s petition, at 5. As the State concedes, “there seem to be no published opinions addressing [this] specific scenario.” State’s brief, at 14. Although there may be no prior decisions directly on point, it is clear to this Court that the State is not entitled to seek mandamus review of a pretrial denial of its motion in limine in a criminal case.

“In Alabama, the State has a limited right to appeal” in a criminal case. State v. A.R.C., 873 So.2d 261, 266 (Ala.Crim.App.2003).

“The State’s power to appeal from an adverse ruling in a criminal case is governed by § 12-12-70(c), Ala.Code 1975 (providing that an appeal may be taken from a judgment declaring an ordinance or statute invalid); § 12-22-91, Ala. Code 1975 (providing that an appeal may be taken from a judgment holding an indictment or information unconstitutional); and by Rule 15.7, Ala. R.Crim. P. (providing that appeals may be taken from certain pre-trial orders).”

Ex parte Sullivan, 779 So.2d 1157, 1160 n. 2 (Ala.2000). The parties agree that the order denying the State’s motion in limine was not appealable.

“The Court of Criminal Appeals has authority to issue such remedial and original writs as are necessary to give it a general superintendence and control of the circuit courts in criminal matters, over which it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.” Ex parte Nice, 407 So.2d 874, 876 (Ala.1981). However, “[m]andamus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, when no appeal is authorized by law or court rule .... ” Nice, 407 So.2d at 879 (emphasis omitted). Instead, mandamus “is appropriate in exceptional circumstances which amount to judicial usurpation of power.” Nice, 407 So.2d at 878 (emphasis omitted). Moreover, “mandamus can be used to prevent a gross disruption in the administration of criminal justice.” Nice, 407 So.2d at 879 (emphasis omitted). Thus, when the trial court has acted without lawful authority, the State has been afforded mandamus relief. See, e.g., State v. Blane, 985 So.2d 384 (Ala.2007) (directing circuit court to vacate order expunging criminal record); D.B.Y. v. State, 910 So.2d 820 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (directing trial court to reinstate juvenile’s probation and direct that juvenile undergo sexual-offender risk assessment before being released from probation).

King argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals, by granting the State’s petition for a writ of mandamus, “has granted to the State ... the ability to file what amounts to an interlocutory appeal under the guise of mandamus relief.” King’s petition, at 4. On the other hand, the State argues that it was entitled to the writ of mandamus, because, according to the State, the trial court’s denial of its motion in limine “presents a gross disruption in the administration of criminal justice that justified the appellate court’s exercise of its supervisory authority.” State’s brief, at 15. We agree with King.

It is beyond cavil that the trial court acts within its lawful authority in deciding issues concerning the admissibility of evidence. Indeed, “[w]e review issues concerning the admission of evidence [only] to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion.” Ex parte Key, 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.2003). Obviously, “simply because an order may have been erroneous does not mean that an inferior court lacked the power to enter it.” Nice, 407 So.2d at 878. Consequently, “circumstances involving alleged errors of judgment, or errors in the exercise of judicial discretion, [do] not constitute grounds for invoking supervisory mandamus.” Nice, 407 So.2d at 882.

According to the State, if the trial court allows the jury to consider the evidence at issue, there will be “a gross disruption in the administration of criminal justice.” State’s brief, at 15. Although the trial court denied the State’s motion in limine, “ ‘ “the material against which the objection has been made has not yet been heard by the jury and may never be heard by them.” ’ ” Parks v. State, 587 So.2d 1012, 1015 (Ala.1991) (quoting White v. State, 527 So.2d 1349, 1350 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), quoting in turn Brooks v. State, 443 So.2d 1301, 1303 (Ala.Crim.App.1983)). If the trial court allows the jury to consider the evidence the State seeks to keep out, it will be acting within its lawful authority, and the State will have no right of appellate review. Such an outcome would reflect the ordinary and proper administration of criminal justice, not a disruption thereof.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant King’s petition and issue a writ of mandamus directing the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its order granting the State’s petition for a writ of mandamus.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

COBB, C.J., and SEE, LYONS, STUART, and PARKER, JJ., concur.

BOLIN, J., recuses himself.


text:
    Ex parte State of Alabama. (In re STATE of Alabama v. Janet KING).
    CR-07-0693.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    May 1, 2009.
    Troy King, atty. gen., and Robin D. Scales, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.
    Richard S. Jaffe, J. Derek Drennan, and H. Hube Dodd, Birmingham, for respondent.
   After Issuance of Writ of Mandamus by Alabama Supreme Court

PER CURIAM.

In compliance with the Alabama Supreme Court’s directive in Ex parte King, 23 So.3d 77 (Ala.2009), this Court’s order in State v. King, 23 So.3d 72 (Ala.Crim.App.2008), granting the State’s petition for the writ of mandamus is hereby vacated.

ORDER ISSUED JULY 25, 2008, VACATED.

WISE, P.J., and WELCH, WINDOM, and KELLUM, JJ., concur.


text:
    Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 08-373 Re: Peter A. BELL.
    No. SC09-782.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Nov. 5, 2009.

      Miles A. McGrane, Chair, and Michael L. Schneider, General Counsel, Tallahassee, FL, for Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner.
    Latour Rey Lafferty of Fowler White Boggs, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Judge Bell, Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court for review of the recommendation of the Investigative Panel of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) that Judge Peter A. Bell, be publicly reprimanded. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 12, Fla. Const. We approve the JQC’s findings and recommended sanctions.

FACTS

The Investigative Panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) issued a notice of formal charges against County Judge Peter A. Bell, charging him with conduct alleged to violate Canons 1, 2A, 3B(1), and 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The charges against Judge Bell stem from his actions on March 14, 2008, while he was sitting as a county judge for Charlotte County, Florida. On that date, a former husband appeared before him as a defendant in a domestic violence battery case. After reading the probable cause affidavit, Judge Bell found that probable cause existed for the former husband’s domestic battery charge. Moreover, Judge Bell found that the probable cause affidavit contained facts sufficient to establish probable cause that the former wife had also committed an act of domestic battery in attempting to force the former husband from her home. Despite Deputy Rivera’s findings and law enforcement’s determination to arrest only the former husband, and in the absence of a complaint from the former husband, the Charlotte County Sheriffs Office, or the State Attorney’s Office, Judge Bell ordered sua sponte for the former wife, who was present in court as a victim of domestic violence, to be taken into custody. In accord with Judge Bell’s order, the former wife was arrested, incarcerated overnight, and ordered to appear the next day for first appearance.

At the JQC investigatory proceeding, Judge Bell explained his relationship with the former couple. Judge Bell stated that he met the former husband, an attorney practicing criminal law, approximately fifteen years ago while they both worked as sole practitioners and before the former husband’s marriage to the former wife. During the marriage, the former couple attended the same church as Judge Bell and the judge would interact with them. The judge’s children also provided babysitting services for the former couple. After the former couple were divorced, the former husband would come before Judge Bell in a professional setting, with Judge Bell reviewing his cases on a monthly basis. Judge Bell had also spoken to the former wife at a social event.

Judge Bell then explained the reasons behind his conduct, asserting that he had the former wife arrested because it was she who pushed the former husband first, thus transforming the argument from a verbal to a physical argument. Therefore, it appeared to the judge that the former wife was the primary aggressor and that the police officer had arrested the former husband for some other reason than his being the primary aggressor. Judge Bell found that the facts in the probable cause affidavit did not support the officer’s conclusion that the former husband was the primary aggressor. It appeared to him that the officer had arrested the former husband because he was a male, and that the officer had exhibited bias towards the man and leniency toward the woman. Thus, he found gender bias or some other inappropriate conduct on the part of the police officer. Accordingly, Judge Bell stated that he believed he acted lawfully in his orders as to the former wife. Yet Judge Bell admitted that he would not have had the former wife arrested or taken any other action if she had not been in the courtroom that day. Judge Bell also acknowledged that his actions had the potential appearance of impropriety.

The JQC and Judge Bell reached an agreement and entered into a stipulation in which Judge Bell acknowledged that he violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(1), and 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. According to the stipulation, Judge Bell accepted full responsibility for the conduct and admitted that it should not have occurred and that his actions had the appearance of unfairness, which eroded the confidence of the public in the impartiality and integrity of the court system. Moreover, Judge Bell expressed his regret and apologies for such conduct and, in light of the Florida Canons, he acknowledged that “his understanding of the effect of his conduct was erroneous” and that he failed to properly appreciate the implementation of his duties as judge. Additionally, Judge Bell denied that he intended to violate the applicable Canons and contended that he acted honestly and with a good faith belief that such conduct was appropriate. Because the JQC concluded that Judge Bell’s conduct was misguided but not ill-intentioned, it recommended a public reprimand.

ANALYSIS

In our previous reviews of JQC cases, we have explained:

[W]e are authorized under the Florida Constitution to “accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the commission” and to “order that the justice or judge be subjected to appropriate discipline.” Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const. “This Court reviews the findings of the JQC to determine if they are supported by clear and convincing evidence and reviews the recommendation of discipline to determine whether it should be approved.” In re Pando, 903 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla.2005). While the Court gives the JQC’s findings and recommendations great weight, “the ultimate power and responsibility in making a determination rests with this Court.” In re Davey, 645 So.2d 398, 404 (Fla.1994). Thus, “we review the findings to ensure that there is ‘clear and convincing evidence’ to support the alleged ethical violations” and determine whether to approve the recommendation of discipline. In re Andrews, 875 So.2d 441, 442 (Fla.2004) (quoting In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77, 85 (Fla.2003)).

In re Maloney, 916 So.2d 786, 787 (Fla.2005). Moreover, “[i]n cases where a judge admits to wrongdoing and the JQC’s findings are undisputed this Court will ordinarily conclude that the JQC’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Diaz, 908 So.2d 334, 337 (Fla.2005).

In the case before us, we accept the findings of the JQC. Judge Bell has acknowledged that he violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(1), and 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Our own independent review confirms that Canons 1 and 2A were violated when Judge Bell’s actions resulted in the former wife’s improper incarceration. First, Judge Bell failed to “participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct,” and to personally observe those standards so that the integrity of the judiciary may be preserved. Fla.Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 1. Second, Judge Bell failed to fulfill his duty to “respect and comply with the law and [to] act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” Fla. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 2A. Instead, Judge Bell’s noncompliance with the law and the appearance of impropriety in his conduct impaired public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

In addition, Judge Bell violated Canons 3B(1) and 3B(2) when he usurped the role of the State Attorney’s Office by ordering sua sponte the arrest of the former wife. Canon 3B(1) requires a judge to “hear and decide matters assigned to the judge,” while Canon 3B(2) requires a judge to “be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it.” Fla. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canons 3B(1) and 3B(2). In In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, J.Q.C. No. 77-16, 357 So.2d 172 (Fla.1978), this Court noted the limits that every judge must observe in his or her administration of the law:

Judges are required to follow the law and apply it fairly and objectively to all who appear before them. No judge is permitted to substitute his concept of what the law ought to be for what the law actually is. He may exercise his judicial discretion conservatively or liberally, and he may temper justice with mercy, but he may not deny justice to any person. He may not withhold justice from one litigant in favor of another for whatever reason. Every judge is answerable for excesses or abuse of his awesome power. There is no place in our system for justice by whim or capricious notion.

Id. at 179. By engaging in the conduct outlined in the stipulation agreement, Judge Bell has failed to follow these directives. As the JQC found, Judge Bell’s conduct “resulted in the inappropriate incarceration of the victim of a domestic battery case.”

Based on our independent review of the stipulation and Judge Bell’s acknowledgement of his wrongdoing, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence supporting the JQC’s findings.

Discipline

Because we have concluded that the findings of the JQC are supported by clear and convincing evidence, we give the findings “persuasive force and great weight” in our consideration of the JQC’s recommended discipline. In re Maloney, 916 So.2d at 787-88. In its amended findings and recommendation, the JQC stated that “in the interests of justice, the public welfare and sound juridical administration will be well served by a public reprimand of Judge Bell.” Judge Bell does not challenge the propriety of a public reprimand. Considering the nature of Judge Bell’s conduct, we approve the JQC’s recommendation.

Although the conduct in this case is one of first impression for this Court, the JQC’s recommendation is appropriate when compared to the discipline in other cases involving a judge’s (1) failure to observe high standards of conduct, (2) noncompliance with the law and appearance of impropriety that impaired public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, (3) failure to hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, or (4) failure to remain faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. See In re Barnes, 2 So.3d 166, 175 (Fla.2009) (approving public reprimand where judge filed petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel compliance with his view of proper pretrial release procedures); In re Allen, 998 So.2d 557, 566 (Fla.2008) (finding public reprimand appropriate discipline where judge issued a concurring opinion accusing a fellow appellate judge of judicial corruption based on unverified facts that were not in the record); In re Aleman, 995 So.2d 395, 401 (Fla.2008) (holding that judge’s conduct of forcing defense counsel to prepare handwritten motion for disqualification of judge within a very short period of time and then threatening counsel with contempt in first-degree murder prosecution warranted public reprimand); In re Brown, 748 So.2d 960, 961-62 (Fla.1999) (concluding that a public reprimand was warranted where judge signed judicial documents relating to actions involving his daughter-in-law); In re Miller, 644 So.2d 75, 79 (Fla.1994) (finding public reprimand appropriate discipline where judge wrote letters to newspaper criticizing judicial system, gave mother notice of child custody hearing after hearing began, and forced mother to act as her own attorney in a case in which judge lacked jurisdiction); In re Gridley, 417 So.2d 950, 955 (Fla.1982) (approving public reprimand where judge personally injected himself and his office into a criminal matter as an advocate for the defendant). Accordingly, we find that a public reprimand, as disciplinary action, is consistent with governing precedent and is an appropriate discipline.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we approve of the stipulation and the JQC’s recommendation that Judge Bell receive a public reprimand. Accordingly, we hereby command Judge Bell to appear before this Court for administration of a public reprimand at a time to be established by the Clerk of this Court.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

      . Canon 1 is titled, "A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary” and provides:
      An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.
      Fla.Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 1.

      . Canon 2 is titled, “A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in all of the Judge's Activities." Subsection A provides: “A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” Fla.Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 2k.

      . Canon 3 is titled, "A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently.” Subsection B(l) provides: "A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required.” Fla.Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 3B(1).

      . Canon 3B(2) provides: "A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.” Fla.Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 3B(2).

      . In the Notice of Formal Charges, the JQC alleged that Judge Bell's actions "usurped the role of the State Attorney's Office and altered public documents to effect [his] decision.” However, neither the Amended Findings and Recommendation of Discipline nor the Stipulation addressed the altering of public documents.

      . Charlotte County Deputy Sheriff Liborio Rivera, who was the law enforcement officer dispatched to the former wife's home, executed the probable cause affidavit. The affidavit stated that Deputy Rivera had interviewed the defendant, the former wife, and their two minor children. The affidavit further stated that the defendant was the primary aggressor based on the interviews, the injuries inflicted on the former wife, and the location of the incident.

      . Judge Bell came to this conclusion after doing about five minutes worth of research on his computer. During that time, Judge Bell researched whether the former wife had a defense because the former husband was in her home and whether a battery had actually occurred.