text:
    Flatt v. State
    5D15-4486
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Fleming v. State
    5D16-3911
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Fortune v. State
    5D15-3979
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Fox v. State
    5D16-1416
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Garcia v. State
    5D16-1300
    02/09/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Gardner v. Department of Corrections
    5D16-2985
    02/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


text:
    George v. State
    5D16-2814
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Giron v. State
    5D15-4295
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Osceola)


text:
    God's Healing Holiness Christian Church, Inc. v. Happy State Bank
    5D16-963
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Goldey v. Goldey
    5D16-2067
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


text:
    Gonzalez v. State
    5D16-2285
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Gotay v. State
    5D16-2692
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Grau v. State
    5D16-2717
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Citrus)


text:
    Greene v. State
    5D16-3625
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Greene v. State
    5D16-1167
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (St. Johns)


text:
    Guzman v. State
    5D16-3209
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Hall v. State
    5D16-2278
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Hall v. State
    5D16-436
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Hannaway v. School Board of Hernando County
    5D15-4401
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hernando)


text:
    Hardy v. Hardy
    5D15-4455
    02/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Osceola)


text:
    Hardy v. State
    5D16-3168
    02/16/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Harris v. State
    5D16-1073
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Flagler)


text:
    Hart v. State
    5D16-528
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Hayek v. Federal National Mortgage Association
    5D16-2847
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Hinnant v. State
    5D15-3866
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Holley v. State
    5D16-4075
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


text:
    Hollis v. State
    5D16-3045
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Holmes v. State
    5D16-2971
    02/01/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Holmes v. State
    5D15-2683
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Hope v. State
    5D16-3389
    02/23/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Putnam)


text:
    Horton v. State
    5D16-1781
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Hrachova v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas
    5D15-1436
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Hunter v. State
    5D16-560
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Ilarraza v. State
    5D15-4011
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Osceola)


text:
    Ivory v. State
    5D15-1815
    02/28/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


text:
    J.R. v. State
    5D16-2401
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    James v. State
    5D16-3481
    03/15/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Johnson v. State
    5D15-4472
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Johnson v. State
    5D16-3580
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


text:
    Johnson v. State
    5D16-1187
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Jones v. State
    5D15-2570
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Jones v. State
    5D16-1809
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Joseph v. State
    5D15-2012
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Kautz v. State
    5D16-3420
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Keene v. State
    5D16-944
    02/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Osceola)


text:
    Keisic v. Keisic
    5D16-2601
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Keller v. State
    5D16-38
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Kersey v. State
    5D16-3082
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hernando)


text:
    King v. State
    5D16-3669
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    King v. State
    5D16-3587
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Laberta v. State
    5D16-2551
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Lakeman v. State
    5D16-3179
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Lendzion v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    5D15-3713
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Lewis v. State
    5D16-3434
    02/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Lightbourne v. State
    5D16-870
    02/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Lister v. Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc.
    5D16-1392
    02/21/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Lizardo v. State
    5D15-3778
    01/03/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Lovell v. State
    5D16-508
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    M.J. v. Department of Children
    5D16-3127
    01/11/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Maciejka v. State
    5D16-3268
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Manno v. State
    5D16-323
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Martin v. State
    5D16-4024
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volu.sia)


text:
    Martorana v. Morrison
    5D16-1904, 5D16-1917
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    McClinton v. State
    5D16-1697
    03/01/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Millan-Piris v. State
    5D16-3755
    02/16/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Miller v. State
    5D15-4373
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Mineo, v. U.S. Bank National Association
    5D15-3700
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


text:
    Moore v. State
    5D15-3899
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (St. Johns)


text:
    Murphy v. State
    5D16-2811
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Myers v. State
    5D16-2337
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Navarrovargas v. State
    5D15-3113
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Nazario v. State
    5D16-2959
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Neil v. State
    5D16-707
    01/03/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Nelson v. State
    5D16-3664
    02/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Putnam)


text:
    Newsome v. State
    5D16-988
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Osceola)


text:
    Nieves v. State
    5D16-2830
    01/03/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Nieves v. State
    5D15-4338
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Nova v. State
    5D16-2812
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Nunez v. State
    5D16-2519
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Oliver v. State
    5D16-3047
    01/03/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Citrus)


text:
    Osborn v. State
    5D15-1763
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Citrus)


text:
    Osterback v. Johnson
    5D16-637
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sumter)


text:
    P.S. v. V.S.
    5D16-2349, 5D16-2546
    01/06/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Palma v. State
    5D16-1716
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Parsons v. State
    5D16-2319
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Parton v. State
    5D16-2716
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Pate v. State
    5D16-817
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Peterson v. Ventures Trust 2013-I-H-R
    5D15-1266
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Platinium Group Financial, LLC v. U.S. Bank National Association
    5D16-2234
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Plowman v. State
    5D16-2965
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hernando)


text:
    Ramirez v. State
    5D15-2553
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Rayford v. State
    5D16-3281
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Reyes v. Department of Corrections
    5D16-1876
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Rios v. State
    5D15-4290, 5D15-4292
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Roberts v. State
    5D16-3749
    01/03/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Citrus)


text:
    Rodriguez v. State
    5D16-3820
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Rodriguez-Uribe v. State
    5D16-3062
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    S.J. v. State
    5D16-1496
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Salerno v. State
    5D16-3810
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Samuels v. GQ Holding 1329, LLC
    5D16-2936
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir, Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Sanders v. State
    5D16-2553
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Schuler v. State
    5D16-3028
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Scoggins v. State
    5D16-2960
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hernando)


text:
    Scott v. State
    5D16-3751
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Seabrook v. Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission
    5D16-1466
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Reemployment Assistance Apps. Com’n


text:
    Searcy v. State
    5D16-4154
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Smeal v. State
    5D16-3332
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Smith v. State
    5D16-3738
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Citrus)


text:
    Sommerman v. Partners Federal Credit Union
    5D15-2559
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Osceola)


text:
    Soto-Soto v. State
    5D15-3976
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Spencer v. State
    5D16-527
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Stanley v. State
    5D16-456
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hernando)


text:
    State v. Acceus
    5D15-3572
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    State v. Rivera
    5D16-2094
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    State v. White
    5D15-3570
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Sullins v. State
    5D15-3620
    02/16/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Sweet v. State
    5D16-2273
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Taylor v. State
    5D16-1711
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Taylor v. State
    5D16-3482
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Teuta v. State
    5D16-3379
    02/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Simenole)


text:
    Tibby v. Tibby
    5D14-3415
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volu-sia)


text:
    Torres v. Department of Corrections State
    5D16-2081
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bre-vard)


text:
    Torres v. State
    5D16-2453
    01/03/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bre-vard)


text:
    Trammell v. State
    5D16-1150
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Her-nando)


text:
    Tullis v. State
    5D16-3633
    01/03/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Valenti v. Chamberlain
    5D16-1928
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bre-vard)


text:
    Van Auken v. State
    5D16-3951
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Her-nando)


text:
    Vencatasawmy v. State
    5D14-3966
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Vest v. Sirolli
    5D16-2718
    01/03/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sumter)


text:
    Walker v. Giangrande
    5D16-547
    02/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Wallace v. State
    5D15-2653
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Wallis v. State
    5D16-3985
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Her-nando)


text:
    Weekley v. Weekley
    5D16-1823
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bre-vard)


text:
    Wharen v. State
    5D16-1381
    03/15/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct, (Bre-vard)


text:
    William v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
    5D14-1994
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Williams v. State
    5D16-611
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Putnam)


text:
    Williams v. State
    5D15-1921
    02/28/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. ' (Orange)


text:
    Wilson v. State
    5D15-2346
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct (St. Johns)


text:
    Winfield Investments, LLC v. First American Title Insurance Company
    5D16-3383
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sime-nole)


text:
    Woods v. State
    5D16-1203
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sime-nole)


text:
    Young v. Young
    5D15-2408
    01/31/2017
   Aff,

Cir. Ct. (Sime-nole)


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Jorge MEDEROS-MORALES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-466
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 21, 2017
    Jorge Mederos-Morales, DeFuniak Springs, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Jorge Mederos-Morales, seeks review of a summary denial of his rule 3.850 motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel after he entered an open plea to the offense of failure to register as a career offender. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. In his motion, Appellant alleges that counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead to the offense because he does not meet some of the criteria of a “career offender” as set forth in section 775.261(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2014). Appellant, however, failed to allege that he did not meet the final criterion, designation as a prison releasee reoffender, which would also make him a “career offender.” As such, his motion is insufficient on its face. We reverse and remand with instructions to strike Appellant’s motion with leave to amend. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(2); see also Bhoj v. State, 172 So.3d 564, 565 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

COHEN, C.J., EVANDER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Zachary GONNELLI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3177
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 21, 2017
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Andrew Mich, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm this Anders appeal but remand to correct a scrivener’s error in the judgment. The trial court orally pronounced that it found Gonnelli qualified as a violent career criminal and sentenced him accordingly; however, the written judgment and sentence reflects that Gon-nelli was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender. On remand, the judgment should be corrected to reflect that Gonnelli was sentenced as a violent career criminal.

AFFIRMED and REMANDED.

EVANDER, BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.

      . Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967),


author: EDWARDS, J.

text:
    Stephen Vincent BARONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-1225
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 21, 2017
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Sean Kevin Gravel, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   EDWARDS, J.

After careful consideration, we affirm Appellant’s convictions of organized scheme to defraud, criminal use of personal identification, grand theft of $100,000 or more, grand theft of $20,000 or more, and two counts of money laundering financial instruments totaling or exceeding $100,000. We also, affirm Appellant’s sentences which consist of several five and ten year concurrent prison terms followed by twenty years probation. However, we reverse the restitution order that required Appellant to pay $508,031.79 to Chase Bank and $56,964.67 to Wells Fargo Bank because it was entered without a hearing and without Appellant’s waiver of a hearing. We remand for the trial court to conduct a hearing regarding restitution and for’ entry of an amended restitution order.

When restitution is sought in a criminal proceeding, the State has the burden of proving a victim’s loss by the preponderance of the evidence. Moore v. State, 643 So.2d 2, 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). A trial court should not enter a restitution order without a hearing absent an agreement by the defendant. See Bell v. State, 652 So.2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“Appellant’s alternative argument (that the court should not, absent agreement by Appellant, determine the amount of restitution without a hearing when one is requested) has merit.” (citing Miller v. State, 603 So.2d 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Pellot v. State, 582 So.2d 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991))).

Below, Appellant specifically objected to the restitution amounts proposed for Chase Bank and Wells Fargo Bank and requested the trial court to conduct a restitution hearing. Although the trial court indicated that a hearing would be permitted, it nevertheless entered the restitution order without conducting a hearing. In Gardipee v. State, 620 So.2d 255, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), the appellant objected to the amount of restitution being requested by the state during the sentencing hearing. While the trial court stated that the appellant would be permitted a restitution hearing, it was never held. The trial court later entered a restitution order based upon bills submitted by the victim at the sentencing hearing. On appeal, the' Second District Court of Appeal reversed the restitution order and remanded for a restitution hearing. Id. (citing Reynolds v. State, 598 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)). Due process requires a formal hearing on the amount of restitution. L.S. v. State, 975 So.2d 554, 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), We reverse the restitution order and remand with, instructions for the trial court to conduct a restitution hearing consistent with section 775,089(6)(a)-(b), Florida Statutes (2016).

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

PALMER and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tyrone L. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-3875
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 24, 2017
    Tyrone L. Smith, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

This Court previously affirmed the summary denial of Appellant’s postconviction motion brought pursuant to , Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, lout retained jurisdiction for consideration of the imposition of sanctions.

Appellant has failed to obtain relief in at least, three previous cases he filed in this Court to challenge his judgment and, sentence in Duval County Circuit Court pase number 2003-CF-8206. All three prior postconviction motions were meritless or procedurally barred, as is the instant motion. Accordingly, we ordered Appellant to show cause why he should not be prohibited from future pro se filings challenging this judgment and sentence. See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999). Appellant’s response does not provide a legal basis to prohibit the imposition of sanctions.

Therefore, because Appellant’s repeated frivolous attacks on his judgment and sentence have become an abuse of the legal process, we hold that he is barred from future pro se filings in this Court concerning Duval County Circuit Court ease number 2003-CF-8206. The Clerk of the Court is directed to not accept any future filings concerning this case unless they are filed by a member in good standing with The Florida Bar.

WETHERELL, RAY, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    James T. STIRK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-4294
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 25, 2017
    James Scarmozzino of Webb <⅞ .Scarmoz-zino, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant.
    Alexander R. Boler, Tallahassee and Tracy Cooper George, Chief Appellate Counsel, Agency for Health Care Administration, Tallahassee, for Appellee. .
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Giraldo v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 208 So.3d 244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and RAY and . KELSEY, JJ„ CONCUR.


text:
    A.M.B., Mother of N.R.B., Minor child and C.M., Natural Father of N.R.B., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-5850
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 26, 2017

      Candice K. Brower of the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Region One, Tallahassee; and Crystal M. Frusciante of The Frusciante Law Firm, Sunrise, for A.M.B, the Mother.
    Ryan Thomas Truskoski of Ryan Thomas Truskoski, P.A., Orlando, for C.J.M, the Father.
    Stephanie C. Zimmerman of the Department of Children and Families, Bradenton; and Kelly A. Swartz of the Guardian ad Litem Program, Sanford, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

A.M.B., the Mother, and C.J.M., the Father, appeal the termination of their parental rights to the minor child, N.R.B. The Department concedes that the evidence was insufficient to support a termination of the Father’s parental rights. Accordingly, we reverse the termination order as to the Father.

With respect to the Mother, as a result of the reversal of termination of the Father’s parental rights, and because the Department did not establish grounds for single parent termination, we must reverse the termination order as to the Mother as well.

“Unique problems arise when both parents’ parental rights are terminated in a single proceeding and the appellate court subsequently determines that the termination of one parent’s rights was improper.” In the Interest of R.R., a child, I.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 18 So.3d 26, 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). When terminating one parent’s rights without terminating the rights of the other parent, section 39.811(6), Florida Statutes (2016), requires consideration of additional factors by the trial court. When reversing a judgment as to one parent, such reversal “suddenly subjects the termination of the second parent’s rights to special requirements that were not material at the time the trial court made its ruling.” I.R., 18 So.3d at 27.

When an appellate court reverses the termination of parental rights as to one parent and the trial court has made no ruling with regard to a single-parent termination under section 39.811(6) concerning the other parent, the appellate court can still affirm the single-parent termination if the actual ground for termination as to that parent stated in the judgment is one of the grounds described in section 39.811(6)(e) and that portion of the judgment is otherwise affirmable. On the other hand, an appellate court will typically be unable to uphold a single-parent termination if one parent’s parental rights are terminated for a ground not contained in section 39.811(6)(e), such as failure to complete a case plan. In this situation, the appellate court will normally be constrained to reverse the parent’s judgment because the judgment and record will not contain findings of fact required by section 39.811(6) (a)-(d) sufficient to affirm the judgment as a matter of law.

J.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 908 So.2d 568, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

Here, the order terminating the Mother’s parental rights reflects that the termination was primarily based on section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes, due to the failure to complete her case plan. The Department did not put on evidence to establish any other grounds for termination under section 39.811(6)(a)-(d). Accordingly, in light of our reversal of the order terminating the Father’s parental rights, we are constrained to also reverse the termination order as to the Mother and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

WINOKUR, JAY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    David Anthony FEDUCIA, Appellant, v. Kimberly Ann FEDUCIA, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-3980
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 26, 2017
    David Anthony Feducia, pro se, Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the husband claims that (1) the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion for rehearing alleging that he was prevented by prison officials from- appearing telephonically at the final hearing; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motions to stay the dissolution proceeding until his anticipated release from prison. We affirm as to the second claim without discussion. However, we reverse and remand for further proceedings as to the first claim.

The trial court gave the husband the opportunity to appear telephonically at the final hearing, but the husband failed to appear. After the trial court entered its final judgment, the husband notified the court by letter—which was treated as a timely motion for rehearing—that he attempted to appear telephonically from prison, but that he was prevented from appearing by a prison official. Specifically, the husband alleged that his classification officer failed to answer the telephone when the trial court returned an earlier call from the officer and, consequently, the husband was unable to present his case at the final hearing.

“An incarcerated party has a right to be heard in civil matters if the party has brought to the court’s attention his or her desire to appear personally or telephoni-cally.” Miranda v. Munoz-Ortiz, 75 So.3d 843, 844 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 992 So.2d 399, 401 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). Therefore, the husband had “the due process right to be heard” at the final hearing. Munoz-Ortiz, 75 So.3d at 844. Because the husband argued that he attempted to appear but was prevented from attending by the actions of his classification officer, the trial court erred in summarily denying the husband’s motion as he should have been given an opportunity to prove that the officer prevented him from telephonically appearing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider the motion for rehearing and give the husband the chance “to prove ... that he attempted to appear telephonically at the final hearing but that he was denied the opportunity to do so.” Id.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

WINOKUR, JAY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Reganol COBB, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D17-2565
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 26, 2017
    Reganol Cobb, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied as premature.

RAY, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Latoria Shanise FRAZIER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D17-1772
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 26, 2017

      Bruce A. Miller, Public Defender, and Melissa Scarbrough, Assistant Public Defender, Pensacola, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Samuel B. Steinberg, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The amended petition for belated appeal is granted. Petitioner shall be allowed a belated appeal from the judgment and sentence in Escambia County Circuit Court case number 2016 CF 002079 A. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

RAY, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Monica Nicole-Gonzalez JONES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D17-1144
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 26, 2017
    Bruce A. Miller, Public Defender, and W. Timothy Weekley, Assistant Public Defender, Milton, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. Petitioner shall be allowed a belated appeal from the judgments and sentences in Santa Rosa County Circuit Court case number 15001294CFMXAX Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

RAY, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Willie WATTS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D17-0949
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 26, 2017
    Willie Watts, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking a belated appeal of the order denying motion for correction of jail credit, rendered on September 16, 2016, in Taylor County Circuit Court case number 2015-213-CF, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate, a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal.

RAY, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Lee E. DAVIS, Appellant, v. REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION and Pyramid Marathon Management LLC, Appellees.
    CASE NO. 1D16-5311
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 26, 2017
    Lee E. Davis, pro se, Appellant.
    Norman A. Blessing, General Counsel, and Cristina A. Velez, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellee’s motion to dismiss is granted, and this appeal is dismissed as moot.

RAY, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Keith RODGERS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-3884
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 26, 2017
    Keith Rodgers, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The amended petition for belated appeal is granted. Petitioner shall be allowed a belated appeal from the judgment and sentence in Escambia County Circuit Court case number 2015 CF 004791 B. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

RAY, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Herrod J. BEASLEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D17-0433
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 26, 2017
    Herrod J. Beasley, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking a belated appeal of the order dismissing defendant’s motion to vacate and set aside, rendered on February 19, 2015, in Duval County Circuit Court case number 16-2006-CF-01642-AXXX-MA, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate, a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal.

RAY, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Zachary LITTLETON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D17-1029
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 26, 2017
    Lanitra S. Sanchez of Sanchez Law, Tampa, for Petitioner, •
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. Petitioner shall be allowed a belated appeal from the order denying defendant’s pro se amended motion for postconviction relief in Escambia County Circuit Court case number 2009-CF-5574. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal.

RAY, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE EX REL. Clarence JONES v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1512
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CONCORDIA

PER CURIAM:

| j Denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Moreover, relator has previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Jones v. State, 16-0613 (La. 8/4/17), 222 So.3d 1246.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Rigoberto FUNES v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0640
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P, art. 930,6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review, The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Lester Scott GEORGE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0639
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

PER CURIAM:

| ^Denied. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. In addition, relator’s sentencing claims are not cognizable on collateral review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.

Relator has now fully litigated three applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator lahas exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Timothy ROBERTSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0911
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

PER CURIAM:

| denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Moreover, relator’s sentencing claim is not cognizable on collateral review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.

Relator has now fully litigated four applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his | aright to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Clarence JONES v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0613
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CONCORDIA

PER CURIAM:

| iDenied. Relator’s sentencing claim is not cognizable on collateral review. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030. As to the remaining claims, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies,' relator has exhausted his [ aright to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Johnson, C.J. n.s.

Genovese, J., recused


text:
    IN RE: Michael Langdon CAVE
    NO. 2017-B-1307
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    7/27/2017
   ORDER

|, Considering the Joint Petition for Interim Suspension filed by respondent, Michael Langdon Cave, and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Michael Lang-don Cave, Louisiana Bar Roll number 26002, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.3, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Joe SMITH, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2237
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF MADISON

PER CURIAM:

11 Writ granted in part. The District Attorney for the Sixth Judicial District is ordered to inform relator whether the public records relator has requested still exist, and if they do exist to provide relator with an estimate of the costs of reproducing them. La. Const. art. XII, § 3; La.R.S. 44:31; La.R.S. 44:31.1; State ex rel. Barbee v. State, 10-0275 (La. 2/4/11), 57 So.3d 318. In all other respects, the application is denied.

Relator has fully litigated five previous applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive .filings mandatory. Relator’s previous claims have been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and their denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral preview. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Cody COLEMAN v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0791
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LA-FOURCHE

PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P, art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions- the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr,P. art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. David M. MOSS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0770
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FORTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF DE-SOTO

PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated an application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive ^application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. David A. LEE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0272
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| ^Denied. The district court’s minute entry provided sufficient notice of the court’s denial of relator’s documents motion. Cf. State ex rel. Foy v. Criminal Dist. Court, 96-0519, pp. 1-2 (La. 3/15/96), 669 So.2d 393.

Relator has exhausted his right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jerry MOORE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 16-KH-0341
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

PER CURIAM:

| iDenied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated several applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La, Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Johnson, C.J. n.s.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Christopher Jude LORMAND v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2192
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LAFAYETTE

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. In addition, relator’s sentencing claim is not cognizable on collateral review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

Relator has now fully litigated three applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction pi-ocedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in |2accord with La. C,Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Corey Lynn GAY v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0693
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO

PER CURIAM:

| ] Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In addition, relator’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4. See also State v. Gay, 48,832 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/14), 136 So.3d 919, writ denied, 14-0605 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So.3d 600. Finally, relator does not show that a stay of the matter is required, and thus his motion to stay these proceedings is likewise denied. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relief.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and 12this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Johnson, C.J. n.s.

UAttachment


text:
    STATE EX REL. Eugene JARROW v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0480
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

h Denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. In addition, relator’s sentencing claim is not cognizable on collateral review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030. Finally, the application is repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4.

Denied. Relator has previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Jarrow v. State, 15-02238 (La. 8/4/17), — So.3d -.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Rogers V. ATKINS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0522
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF MORE-HOUSE

PER CURIAM:

|! Denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Moreover, relator has previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Atkins v. State, 15-2294 (La. 8/4/17), 223 So.3d 502, 2017 WL 3367642.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Willie FRANKLIN v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0521
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

PER CURIAM:

h Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In addition, relator fails to show counsel labored under a conflict of interest. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. Finally, relator’s claims regarding the admission of his transcribed confession and the sufficiency of the evidence are repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relief.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P, art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.O.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive ^application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam,

^Attachment


text:
    STATE EX REL. Edward George CREAUX v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0226
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.

      8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. CHARLES

PER CURIAM:

| ^Denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has exhausted his right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art, 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to‘ make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Johnson, C.J., n.s.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Nathan FOREMAN v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0520
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE . CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P, art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr,P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Brian Noel MATHIEU v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0666
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

PER CURIAM:

It Denied. Relator’s sentencing claim is not cognizable on collateral review. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Johnson, C.J. n.s.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jamar STOCKMAN v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0193
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. CHARLES

PER CURIAM:

| ] Denied. Relator fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Relator’s remaining claim is repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the court of appeal’s written reasons denying writs.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Attachment

STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS JAMAR STOCKMAN

NO. 15-KH-755

FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

WRIT DENIED

In this writ application, relator challenges the district court’s denial of his application for post conviction relief. After reviewing the writ application and supplement, we deny relief.

On September 10, 2013, relator was found guilty, by a six-person jury, of one count of possession of hydrocodone and one count of possession of cocaine, both violations of La. R.S. 40:967(A). On November 19, 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant to five years imprisonment with the Department of Corrections, on each count, to be served consecutively. Meanwhile, on December 12, 2013, relator stipulated to his status as a fourth felony offender. On that date, the trial court imposed an enhanced sentence of 20 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Relator appealed his underlying convictions and sentences, but not his enhanced sentence. This Court affirmed' both convictions and sentences and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied certiorari. State v. Stockman, 14-149 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/30/14), 147 So.3d 263, 264-65, writ denied, 14-1865 (La. 04/02/15), 163 So.3d 792.

On June 18, 2015, relator filed an application for post conviction relief in the Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Charles. On June 25,2015 and July 10, 2015, relator filed supplemental claims for post conviction relief. In these applications, relator claimed that (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (2) there was “insufficient evidence as to who was the suspect;” and (3) his arrest after a nonconsensual search and seizure was unconstitutional.

On August 17, 2015, after reviewing relator’s application for post conviction relief and the State’s response, the district court denied relief on all claims finding that relator’s claims were procedurally barred as they were fully litigated on appeal and, even if the merits were considered, relator failed to bear his burden of proof on any of his claims.

On September 8, 2015, relator filed a “Notice of Intent to Seek Supervisory/Remedial Writs,” which the trial judge set “as prescribed by law.” On October 8, 2015, relator filed an application with this Court seeking review of the ^August 17, 2015 ruling. On October 19, 2015, this Court denied relator’s writ application finding that the application did not contain a copy of the judgment at issue or a copy of the pleading upon which the judgment was based. State v. Stockman, 15-KH-630 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/19/15) (unpublished writ application).

On or about November 6, 2015, relator placed this writ application with the prison officials for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988); State ex rel Johnson v. Whitley, 92-2689 (La. 1/6/95), 648 So.2d 909. Although we recognize .that relator’s filing was delivered to prison officials more than 30 days .after the judgment at issue in contravention of La. U.R.C.A, 4-3, we will, in the interest of justice, review the merits of relator’s pro se writ application.

In his writ application, relator alleges (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to -suppress statement; and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

First, relator’s claims that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress statement. On appeal, this Court found:

Here, the testimony adduced at the motion to suppress hearing established that defendant was orally advised of his Miranda rights and voluntarily spoke with Detective Ehrmann, who noted that defendant was not under duress and gave the statement freely and voluntarily. Additionally, the trial testimony established defendant understood his rights and voluntarily waived them prior to making the inculpatory statement. Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress does not appear to present an issue for appellate review. (Footnote omitted).

Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of relief as procedurally barred. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A). Further, as the issue was reviewed on appeal, the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not pursuing the claim is moot.

Turning finally to relator’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he contends that his trial attorney (1) failed to interview or procure a specific witness; (2) failed to introduce the police report of his arrest; and (3) erred in failing to object when the trial judge took judicial notice that “everyone is against drugs.” The trial judge found that relator failed to establish either a deficiency or prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We find no error in the trial -court’s ruling.

First, the decision to call or not to call a particular witness is a matter of trial strategy and not, per se, evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Folse, 623 So.2d 69, 71 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993). Second, regarding the police Rreport of relator’s arrest, relator has not attached a copy of the report so he fails to show that any error by counsel “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; State v. Russell, 04-1622 (La. 2/25/05), 896 So.2d 982, 983. Third, relator makes an allegation without support from a transcript to allege that the trial judge took judicial notice. Without further substantiation, relator again fails to show that any error by counsel “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result,” Id.

For .the foregoing reasons, we .decline relator’s request for relief and deny this writ application.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 15th day of January, 2016.

/§/ CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN M. CHEHAR-DY

/W JUDGE MARC E. JOHNSON

/s/ JUDGE HANS J. LILJEBERG


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jerry Wayne PRICE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0517
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In addition, relator’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct is repetitive and/or unsupported, La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2, and barred from collateral review by La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relief.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive ^application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Attachment A

STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS JERRY PRICE

FILED: September 15, 2015

NO. 496718 “J”

22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

STATE OF LOUISIANA

/§/ DEPUTY CLERK

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

On May 13, 2015, petitioner Jerry Price filed an Application for Post Conviction Relief. On May 28, 2015, the Court ordered .the District Attorney’s office to file an answer or procedural objections thereto. Through a clerical error, the District Attorney’s office did not receive notice of this order until August 20, 2015. On August 28, 2015, the District Attorney filed an answer to the application.

Petitioner Price raises three claims in his application and supporting memorandum. First, Price contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in that counsel failed to prepare adequately for trial or to conduct any meaningful investigation of the case. Petitioner Price fails to provide any support to the mere allegations and conclusory statements that his trial counsel failed to properly investigate the case and was ineffective. In order to carry his burden of proof relative to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner must offer proof beyond general, conclusory statements. Petitioner Price has not done so. Therefore, the Court finds that this claim is without merit and it is denied.

Secondly, petitioner argues that the State appealed to the prejudice of the jurors in closing arguments and undermined the outcome of the trial by referring to “credibility of the truthfulness and identity of the detectives and confidential informants.” Additionally, petitioner Price argues that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were prejudicial when he used the phrase “smoking gun.” Again, petitioner has failed to demonstrate, beyond mere conclusory allegations, how the prosecutor’s closing remarks were prejudicial and how they denied him a fair trial. The Court finds this claim is without merit and it is likewise denied.

In his third claim, Petitioner states that the prosecutor gave his personal opinion on the evidence and also withheld evidence. Again, petitioner fails to offer any support for this claim and fails to identify what evidence was allegedly withheld. Therefore, the Court finds this claim is without merit and it is denied. The Court notes that petitioner Price also identified claims in his | ¿application which were not addressed in the memorandum. Petitioner Price states that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the act prior to first being approached by government agents, and that the law enforcement involved formulated plans wherein detectives would work in an undercover capacity. Petitioner Price states that a confidential informant was instructed by law enforcement “to attempt to identify Jerry Price distribution of cocaine in St. Tammany Parish and if the opportunity presented itself to make small purchases” of controlled dangerous substances. Petitioner Price offers no support for these claims and does not elaborate upon them in the memorandum attached to his application. The Court finds that the record of this matter demonstrates that the First Circuit Court of Appeal reviewed the record for errors patent and ultimately affirmed defendant Price’s convictions, habitual offender adjudication and sentences. Thereafter, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs on October 10, 2014.

Accordingly, the Court denies the Application for Post Conviction Relief filed by petitioner Jerry Price and dismisses the application in its entirety.

Covington, Louisiana, this 1# day of September, 2015.

Judge William J. Knight 22nd Judicial District Court, Division “J”

Attachment B

STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS JERRY PRICE

FILED: September 15, 2015

NO. 496718 “J”

22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

STATE OF LOUISIANA

M DEPUTY CLERK

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the foregoing Reasons for Judgment;

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that petitioner Jerry Price’s Application for Post Conviction Relief be and is hereby denied and dismissed in its entirety.

Covington, Louisiana, this 1#¡ day of September, 2015

M Judge William J. Knight 22nd Judicial District Court, Division “J”


text:
    STATE EX REL. Kendrick CHRISTMAS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0326
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF IBER-VILLE

PER CURIAM:

[iDenied. Relator fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to the remaining claims, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr,P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Derrick JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0944
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE THIRTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF TER- ' REBONNE

PER CURIAM:

[ iDenied. The application was not timely filed in the district court,.and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Moreover, relator does not identify any claim cognizable on collateral review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3.

Relator has exhausted his right to obtain post-cOnviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Johnson, C.J. n.s.

Weimer, J., recused


text:
    STATE EX REL. Vincent STEWART v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0486
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relief.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 Ú.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against, successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims . have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C,Cr.P, art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can. show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Attachment

TWENTY FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF JEFFERSON

STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 14-6454, 14-6702

DIVISION “P”

STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS VINCENT STEWART

FILED: January 5, 2016

M DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER

This matter comes before the court on petitioner’s

LETTER TO COURT: STATUS OF MOTION STYLED LETTER FILED 3-24-15: OR RULING MADE: OR RENDER DECISION. STAMPED AS FILED DECEMBER 9, 2015;

AND LETTER TO COURT: TO SEND THIS COURT’S RULING ON THE 3-24-15 MOTION STYLED LETTER TO DOC, OR TO STEWART, STAMPED AS FILED DECEMBER 17, 2015.

On March 30, 2015, in case # 14-6454, petitioner pled guilty to the amended charge of LSA-R.S. 40:967C, possession of cocaine. The State dismissed count #2, LSA-R.S. 40:966C, possession of marijuana 2nd offense. The court sentenced him in accordance, with his plea agreement to 5 years imprisonment at hard labor, to run concurrently with case # 14:6702 and with parole time.

On March 30, 2015, in case # 14-6702, petitioner pled guilty to count #1, LSA-R.S, 14:102, resisting an officer, and LSA-R.S, 40:966C, possession of marijuana (both misdemeanors). The court sentenced him in accordance with his plea agreement to 6 months in Parish Prison, concurrently, and also concurrently with case # 14-6454 and parole, time.

Petitioner argues that the court never ruled on a letter addressed to the court and written by the defendant on March 24, 2015, and filed in the record on March 26, 2015. There is no record of any ruling in the court record, however, there is nothing in defendant’s letter requiring or requesting action by this court.

The court notes that defendant pled guilty on March 30, 2015. The defendant is now precluded from challenging the merits of the State’s case. A plea of guilty normally waives all non-jurisdietional defects in the proceedings prior to. the plea. State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584, 586 (La. 1976). It is well settled that a validly entered guilty plea waives any right a defendant might have had to. question the merits of the state’s case and the factual basis underlying the conviction. State v. Lemon, 923 So.2d 794 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/14/06). (citing State v. Bourgeois, 406 So.2d 550, 552 (La. 1981); State v. Lewis, 01-490 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/30/01), 800 So.2d 1032, 1035.)

Under Crosby, a defendant who pleads guilty may appeal adverse rulings if, at the time of the guilty plea, he reserves his right to appeal specific adverse rulings in his- case. However, in this case, no issues are preserved for review. Furthermore, no evidence or facts are presented to the court that might indicate or prove that any such Crosby plea would have been beneficial or would have affected the case upon appeal.

The petitioner pled guilty in negotiated plea agreements. The waiver of rights forms are in the record; these forms contain no unfulfilled promises but do contain the petitioner’s waiver of his Boykin rights and his agreement that he was satisfied with the way his attorney had handled his case. Furthermore, petitioner had not yet pled guilty on that date that he claims he filed the original letter/motion. The defendant freely chose to plead guilty in both cases, knowing the information included in his letter to the court, and effectively waiving any issues with the State’s case, and also waiving any pending pre-trial motions.

IsThe issues presented in defendant’s present pleadings are similar to those previously addressed in petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief, which the court denied in orders dated May 28, 2015, and June 19, 2015. The court also addressed similar issue(s) in its recent order of December 4, 2015. The court, therefore, finds petitioner’s pleadings successive and repetitive.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED BY THE COURT that the petitioner’s motions and the same are hereby DENIED.

Gretna, Louisiana this 5th day of JAN, 2016.

(É. JUDGE

PLEASE SERVE:

Defendant: Vincent Stewart, DOC # 404508, Richwood Corr. Ins't., 180 Pine Bayou Circle, Richwood, LA 71202


text:
    STATE EX REL. Derek M. HALE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0842
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

1 tDenied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relief.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Attachment

STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS DEREK HALE

CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF ORLEANS

NO. 459-388 SECTION “I”

JUDGMENT

Petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief was filed on January 13, 2016, more than nine years after petitioner’s conviction became final. This application is clearly time barred and “shall not be considered” by this Honorable Court unless “[t]he claim asserted in the petition is based upon a final ruling of an appellate court establishing a theretofore unknown interpretation of constitutional law and petitioner establishes that this interpretation is retroactively applicable to his case, and the petition is filed within one year of the finality of such ruling.” La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8(A)(2) The case that Mr. Hale cites in an effort to avoid this provision is Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), which was decide by the United States Supreme Court more than three years before the instant application. Accordingly, the application for post-conviction relief is untimely and DENIED.

New Orleans, La., this 21st day of January 2016.

/s/ JUDGE


text:
    STATE EX REL. Donald ROBINSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0800
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    8/04/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. MARY

PER CURIAM:

I,WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct. Rule X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Kyide D. TOLBERT v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-0672
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 4, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 09-09-0260; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KW 0188.

| j Denied. Moot.

HUGHES, J., would grant the writ.


author: WHIPPLE, C.J.

text:
    Montraygo DRAKE v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
    NUMBER 2016 CA 1356
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    JUNE 02, 2017
    Montraygo Drake, Kinder, LA, Plaintiff/Appellant, pro se
    William L. Kline, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
    BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUIDRY and McClendon, jj.
   WHIPPLE, C.J.

|2In this appeal, an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his petition for judicial review of the final agency decision rendered in a disciplinary matter on the grounds that he failed to raise a “substantial right” violation and, thus, failed to state a cause of action. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 19, 2015, Montraygo Drake, an inmate in the custody of the DPSC, was issued a disciplinary report for violating the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures for Adult Inmates. Specifically, he was charged with violating Rule 17 (Property Destruction), for having “a double mattress double ‘stitched.’ ” Following a hearing, the Disciplinary Board found him guilty and sentenced him to four weeks loss of canteen privileges and restitution for damage to the mattress in the amount of $39.75. He appealed the decision to the warden and the Secretary of the DPSC, and his appeal was denied at both steps.

Drake then filed a petition for judicial review in the district court below, complaining about the procedures utilized in the disciplinary proceeding and contending that his due process rights were violated. In a Screening Report issued pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:1178(B), 15:1184(B) and 15:1188(A), the commissioner concluded that Drake had failed to state a cause of action or cognizable claim because, in light of the penalties imposed and considering that plaintiff was afforded a hearing and a two-step appeal process, this disciplinary matter does not involve a violation of a “substantial right.” Thus, the commissioner recommended that Drake’s petition for judicial review be dismissed without prejudice and | ^without service on the DPSC for failure to raise a “substantial right” violation and, thus, failing to state a cause of action.

In accordance with the commissioner’s Screening Report, the district court rendered judgment dismissing Drake’s petition without prejudice and without service on the DPSC, for failure to raise a substantial right violation and, thus, for failing to state a cognizable claim or cause of action. From this judgment, Drake appeals.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:1177(A)(9), a district court may modify or reverse a decision of the DPSC in a prison disciplinary action “only if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced” because the DPSC’s findings or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion; or (6) manifestly erroneous in view of , the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. (Emphasis added).

The notion that the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause are triggered by any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities has been soundly rejected. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2301, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Thus, in order for Drake’s petition to state a cognizable claim for judicial review of a disciplinary matter, it must allege Lfacts demonstrating that his “substantial rights” were prejudiced by the agency’s decision. Giles v. Cain, 99-1201 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/23/00), 762 So.2d 734, 738.

In the instant case, Drake failed to set forth facts demonstrating that his “substantial rights” were prejudiced on the basis that prison officials violated his right to due process, abused their discretion, exceeded their authority, or committed any other error in finding him guilty of property destruction and imposing loss of canteen privileges and restitution, The disciplinary sentence of four weeks loss of canteen privileges and restitution in the amount of $39.75 are not unusual or a significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life and did not prejudice plaintiffs substantial rights. See Black v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2015-1908, 2016 WL 3132157 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/3/16) (unpublished) (custody change and restitution of $8.00); Hall v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2013-0053, 2013 WL 5915223 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/1/13) (unpublished), writ denied, 2013-2906 (La. 9/12/14), 147 So.3d 180 (custody change and restitution of $25.00); Boatner v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 2012-0973, 2013 WL 593989 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/15/13) (unpublished) (custody change and restitution of $13.00) but see Anderson v. LeBlanc, 2011-1800, 2012 WL 1550529 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/2/12) (unpublished) (imposition of restitution in the amount of $1,217.50 affected inmate’s substantial rights). As such, Drake has failed to state a cognizable claim or cause of action.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the June 1, 2016 screening judgment, dismissing, without prejudice and without service, Drake’s petition for judicial review, is hereby affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Montraygo Drake.

AFFIRMED.

      . These rules are compiled in the Louisiana Administrative Code, Title 22, Part I, Chapter 3, Subchapter B. See LAC 22:1.341.

      . LAC 22:1.341(1).


author: THERIOT, J.

text:
    Jermaine ATKINS v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
    NO. 2016 CA 1567
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Judgment Rendered: June 2, 2017

      Jermaine Atkins Homer, Louisiana, Plaintiff/Appellant Pro Se
    Terri L. Cannon Angola, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
    BEFORE: HIGGINBOTHAM, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
   THERIOT, J.

|2The appellant, Jermaine Atkins, appeals the judgment of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in favor of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (LDPSC). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Atkins, an inmate in LDPSC’s custody, filed a petition for judicial review by the 19th JDC on July 16, 2015, In the petition, Mr. Atkins claimed he had exhausted his administrative remedy action and included his disciplinary board appeal number. He also claimed he never received a response on the appeal.

On August 4, 2015, the district court determined that Mr. Atkins’s petition failed to show an exhaustion of his appeal remedy, and ordered him to show compliance within fifteen days of the issuance of the order by supplying the district court a final decision of the appeal. In a handwritten letter received by the district court on August 26, 2015, Mr. Atkins claimed that all his efforts to receive a final decision on his appeal had failed. The district court then issued a service order to LDPSC and requested that LDPSC file in response any final decision on the appeal.

LDPSC filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Atkins’s petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, claiming that Mr. Atkins received a final decision to his appeal on October 27, 2015, and that Mr. Atkins had appealed his complaint to the Secretary of LPDSC. LPDSC claimed that since that appeal was pending, Mr. Atkins had not exhausted hhy>_ administrative remedies. A receipt of Mr. Atkins’s request for second step review was attached to LDPSC’s motion.

With the Secretary’s final decision pending, the district court held a video status conference between the parties on March 17, 2016. At that conference, the district court granted LDPSC extra time to issue the Secretary’s final decision. The Secretary’s final decision was eventually issued, in which it upheld the disciplinary action against Mr. Atkins, except for reducing the loss of canteen privileges from 24 weeks to 12 weeks. The commissioner’s recommendation stated that Mr. Atkins failed to raise a violation of a substantial right, and that his appeal should be dismissed without prejudice.

Mr. Atkins filed a motion and order to traverse the commissioner’s report and recommendation, seeking judicial review of his sentence by the district court. The district court signed a screening judgment on August 10, 2016, dismissing Mr. Atkins’s appeal with prejudice for failing to raise a substantial right violation. Mr,, Atkins has appealed this judgment;

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Mr. Atkins’s pro se brief does npt contain any assignments of error; however, in his “issues presented” section, it is apparent that Mr. Atkins'contends that the district court erred in not finding that one of his substantial rights had been violated by the Secretary’s decision, and that his right to due process was violated when he was not allowed to confront his accusers in the disciplinary hearing.

DISCUSSION

A district court is only authorized to intervene in the administrative decisions of LDPSC if an inmate’s substantial rights have been violated. Brown v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2015-1958 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/19/16) (unpublished), — So.3d -, -, 2016 WL 5210746, p. 3. In determining what an inmate’s 'substantial rights are, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that inmates do not have a constitutional right to any particular form of housing classification, job classification, or recreational hobby craft. Id.; See also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2299-2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). This Court has previously relied on Sandin to hold that a change in custody status from medium to maximum and a 30-day confinement did not equate to a deprivation of an inmate’s substantial rights. Parker v. LeBlanc, 2002-0399 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So.2d 445, 446. As such, Mr: Atkins’s loss of canteen privileges, something less severe than a change in custody, would not equate to a deprivation óf his substantial rights. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in determining that LDPSC did not violate Mr. Atkins’s substantial rights. Since Mr. Atkins has failed to show that his substantial rights were violated, he has no prejudiced liberty interest that would require due process protection. See Davies v. Stalder, 2000-0101 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/00), 762 So.2d 1239, 1241. Any constitutional due process rights; such as the right to confrontation of accusers, would not have attached in the instant case.

DECREE

The judgment ,of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court dismissing Jermaine Atkins’s petition for judicial review without prejudice is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant, Jermaine Atkins.

AFFIRMED.

      . The basis for the appeal is that Mr. Atkins claimed he was denied confrontation of his accuser in a disciplinary case against him, where he was charged with possessing contraband based- on reports made by confidential informants. Mr. Atkins specifically complains that a prison employee was not brought to the hearing to testify as to the reliability and credibility of the confidential informant reports.

      . LDPSC acknowledged there was an unusually long delay in rendering a decision on the appeal.