author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Leonardo FRANQUI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Leonardo Franqui, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC15-1441
    No. SC15-1630
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    January 26, 2017

      Todd Gerald Scher of the Law Office of Todd G. Scher, P.L., Dania Beach, Florida; and Martin J. McClain of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Melissa Jean Roca, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, Leonardo Franqui challenges the summary denial of his successive motions to vacate judgments of conviction and sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article Y, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution. Franqui contends he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of intellectual disability pursuant to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hall v. Florida, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014). For the reasons discussed below, we agree and remand both cases to the circuit court for a single evidentiary hearing.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Franqui was sentenced to death for the 1991 murder of Raul Lopez. See Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1316 (Fla. 1997) (the Hialeah case). Franqui was separately sentenced to death for the 1992 murder of law enforcement officer Steven Bauer. See Franqui v. State, 804 So.2d 1185, 1190-91 (Fla. 2001) (the North Miami case). We affirmed both sentences. See Franqui, 699 So.2d at 1329; Franqui, 804 So.2d at 1199.

The Hialeah Case

During the initial postconviction proceedings in the Hialeah case, Franqui alleged in a supplement that he was intellectually disabled and, therefore, could not be executed pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). See Franqui v. State, 59 So.3d 82, 89-90 (Fla. 2011). After the circuit court denied postconviction relief, Franqui appealed; however, because the lower court had failed to rule upon the intellectual disability claim, this Court relinquished jurisdiction so that it could be addressed. See id. at 90. Thereafter, the circuit court summarily denied the claim. See id. After the case was returned, this Court reversed the summary denial and again relinquished jurisdiction with directions that an eviden-tiary hearing be held. See Franqui v. State, 14 So.3d 238, 239 (Fla. 2009). We directed the lower tribunal to consider the requirements delineated in Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702 (Fla. 2007), for an intellectual disability determination under the applicable statute, which provided:

As used in this section, the term “mental retardation” means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18. The term “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,” for the purpose of this section, means performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. The term “adaptive behavior,” for the purpose of this definition, means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.

§ 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). Based upon this language, we explained that

[The defendant] must establish that he has significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning. If significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning is established, [the defendant] must also establish that this significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning exists with deficits in adaptive behavior. Finally, he must establish that the significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior manifested before the age of eighteen.

Franqui, 14 So.3d at 239 (alterations in original) (quoting Cherry, 959 So.2d at 711). In Cherry, 959 So.2d at 712-13, this Court held that a strict cutoff IQ score of 70 is required for a defendant to establish the significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning prong of intellectual disability. Under Cherry, where a defendant could not establish that he has an IQ of 70 or below, the court need not consider the remaining two prongs of the determination. See id. at 714.

Upon relinquishment, the circuit court appointed Dr. Enrique Suarez to evaluate Franqui for intellectual disability. Franqui subsequently notified the court that in 2003, Dr. Trudy Block-Garfield had conducted testing on Franqui at the request of Franqui’s prior collateral counsel. She determined that Franqui’s full-scale IQ score on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Third Edition (WAIS-III) was 75, and his composite score on the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale was 76. According to the report of Dr. Block-Garfield, “the DSM-IV does not consider an IQ of 75 as being in the mentally retarded range, rather it is in the Borderline range of functioning.” In Dr. Block-Garfield’s opinion, it was highly likely that Franqui’s true IQ score fell between 71 and 80. Her report also touched upon adaptive behavior:

Apart from actual IQ, there is also an adaptive level of functioning that must be considered. Mr. Franqui’s functioning at the time of his arrest was certainly somewhat impaired. He had difficulties in maintaining a job, but the likelihood that this was due to an inability to function is somewhat limited. Rather this may have been attributable to his immaturity and general impulsive behavior. Certainly, he was in some fashion supporting a family which could not be accomplished by an individual who is mentally retarded. Immaturity was a factor and this still seems to be the ease to some extent today.

Dr. Suarez’s testing revealed a full-scale IQ score of 75 on the WAIS-IV. However, Dr. Suarez administered five symptom validity tests to determine if Franqui was giving his best efforts. He concluded that Franqui’s scores indicated malingering with the intent to perform extremely poorly on the tests administered and strongly suggested that the score on the WAIS-IV underestimated Franqui’s actual abilities.

Franqui filed a motion asking the circuit court to declare unconstitutional this Court’s interpretation in Cherry of intellectual disability on the basis that it violates Atkins. In the motion, he acknowledged that the circuit court was “bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Cherry and that, under the analysis of Cherry, he cannot meet the first prong of the mental retardation test as a matter of law.” He further recognized that without a declaration of unconstitutionality, the circuit court would be required to deny his claim under Cherry.

During a status hearing, counsel for Franqui stated that while experts could testify on the adaptive deficits prong of intellectual disability, “if you don’t meet [the IQ] prong, that’s the end of the story, that’s where we find ourselves now.” The circuit court denied Franqui’s motion to declare the Court’s interpretation in Cherry of intellectual disability unconstitutional. During the evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated into evidence the reports of Dr. Block-Garfield and Dr. Suarez and also stipulated to the fact that if these experts were called to testify, they would testify consistently with the contents of their reports. The circuit court subsequently denied Franqui’s Atkins claim.

Upon return of the case, Franqui asked this Court to revisit the decision in Cherry and also that of Nixon v. State, 2 So.3d 137 (Fla. 2009), which reached the same conclusion as Cherry on the strict cutoff IQ score of 70. See Franqui, 59 So.3d at 92. We affirmed the denial of the intellectual disability claim and rejected Franqui’s assertion that our interpretation of Atkins was unconstitutional. See id. at 94.

The North Miami Case

In a successive posteonviction motion filed in the North Miami case, Franqui similarly contended that his death sentence violates Atkins. Franqui asserted, in part, that Dr. Jethro Toomer testified during the trial in the Hialeah case that Fran-qui was intellectually disabled based upon an IQ score of less than 60. The State attached to its response to the motion the evaluations of Dr. Block-Garfield and Dr. Suarez from the Hialeah case. After conducting a case management hearing, the circuit court summarily denied the successive motion. The court found that the Atkins claim was time-barred, and also that the issue of intellectual disability had been litigated and resolved adversely to Franqui in the Hialeah case. As to the latter conclusion, the circuit court stated that “[the] Defendant cannot be mentally retarded in one case and not in the other, as that would defy the definition of mental retardation.”

On appeal, this Court affirmed the denial of Franqui’s intellectual disability claim, stating:

[T]he only IQ tests that are acceptable for purposes of proving mental retardation are the Wechsler Intelligence Scale and the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale. See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(b); Fla. Admin. Code 65G-4.011. Here, Franqui alleged that his IQ score was under 70 based on a report prepared in 1993, but the test utilized to measure his IQ was not the Wechsler Intelligence Scale or the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale. His scores on the acceptable IQ tests were above 70. See Franqui, 59 So.3d at 92 (finding, based on the same evidence presented here, that the circuit court had competent, substantial evidence—two separate doctors found Franqui’s IQ was above 75 on the rule-approved psychological examinations—to find that Franqui is not mentally retarded). In addition, he did not plead whether the mental retardation manifested before he was 18 years of age. Thus, Franqui cannot demonstrate that he is mentally retarded under Florida law.

Franqui v. State, 118 So.3d 807, 2013 WL 2211675 *2 (Fla. 2013).

The Present Cases

In 2014, the United States Supreme Court held that this Court’s interpretation in Cherry of Florida’s intellectual disability statute was unconstitutional because it created an unacceptable risk that intellectually disabled individuals would be executed. See Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1990, 1994. The Supreme Court held that the standard error of measurement (SEM) must be taken into account in determining whether an individual meets the first prong of intellectual disability. See id. at 2001 (“[I]n using these scores to assess a defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty, a State must afford these test scores the same studied skepticism that those who design and use the tests do, and understand that an IQ test score represents a range rather than a fixed number.”). The Supreme Court further noted that a person with an IQ score over 70 may have such severe adaptive deficits that his actual functioning is comparable to someone with a lower IQ score. See id. at 2001. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the determination of intellectual disability must be a “conjunctive and interrelated assessment” and ultimately held that where a defendant’s IQ score is 75 or below, he must be given the opportunity to present evidence of intellectual disability, “including deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime.” Id.

Franqui filed successive motions for postconviction relief in his capital cases contending that this Court’s prior rejections of his claim were based upon Cherry, an interpretation of the intellectual disability statute which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Hall. Franqui asserted that he was entitled to an additional evi-dentiary hearing on his claim. As previously discussed, the circuit court summarily denied both motions. In the Hialeah case, the court concluded that Hall has “no effect on the individuals who were previously found not to be ... intellectually disabled[ ] due to a lack of deficits in adaptive functioning.” The court noted that, even if Franqui’s IQ score satisfied the first prong of intellectual disability after taking the SEM into account, Dr. Bloek-Garfield’s report did not find deficits in adaptive functioning. The circuit court then stated:

His prior motion was denied by this court for failure to meet any of the prongs. IQ was only one of [the] factors considered, as noted by the prior order. Defendant had a hearing and an opportunity to present evidence on all 3 prongs. His own expert did not find deficits in adaptive functioning, as he supported his family. Defendant also failed to meet the third prong. He is not entitled to another evidentiary hearing.

In the North Miami case, the circuit court concluded that Hall did not create a new right to bring a claim of intellectual disability. The court also held that Franqui’s motion was time-barred. The court attached to its denial order the report of Dr. Block-Garfield from the Hialeah case.

These appeals follow.

ANALYSIS

“Because a postconviction court’s decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule B.851 motion is ultimately based on written materials before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review.” Marek v. State, 8 So.3d 1128, 1127 (Fla. 2009). As a preliminary matter, in Walls v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S466 (Fla. Oct. 20, 2016), we held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall is retroactive. Therefore, Hall is applicable to Franqui. Accordingly, at issue in these cases is whether the circuit court should have granted Franqui an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim based upon the holding in Hall that where a defendant’s IQ score is 75 or below after taking into account the SEM, he must be afforded the opportunity to present evidence of intellectual disability, “including deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime.” 134 S.Ct. at 2001. See also Oats v. State, 181 So.3d 457, 467-68 (Fla. 2015) (noting that pursuant to Hall, “courts must consider all three prongs in determining an intellectual disability, as opposed to relying on just one factor as dispositive ... [Bjecause these factors are interdependent, if one of the prongs is relatively less strong, a finding of intellectual disability may still be warranted based on the strength of other prongs.”).

In the Hialeah case, Franqui obtained a range of full-scale IQ scores from qualifying tests. Those scores are: 75 on the WAIS-IV conducted by Dr. Suarez in 2009, 75 and 76 on the WAIS-III and the Stanford-Binet conducted by Dr. Block-Garfield in 2003, and 83 on the WAIS-Revised conducted by Dr. Toomer in 1993. It is not disputed that during his initial postconviction proceedings in the Hialeah case, Franqui received an evidentiary hearing on his claim of intellectual disability, but he asserts that an additional hearing is required so that the claim can be reviewed within the parameters of Hall and in light of the fact that Cherry was abrogated in that decision. We agree.

The rationale for granting a second evi-dentiary hearing is articulated in Walls:

[I]t is clear that although Walls has had an earlier evidentiary hearing as to intellectual disability and was allowed to present evidence of all three prongs of the test, he did not receive the type of holistic review to which he is now entitled. Also, Walls’ prior hearing was conducted under standards he could not meet because he did not have an IQ score below 70—a fact which may have affected his presentation of evidence at the hearing. Because Walls’ prior evi-dentiary hearing was directed toward satisfying the former definition of intellectual disability and was reviewed by the circuit court with the former IQ score cutoff rule in mind, we remand for the circuit court to conduct a new evi-dentiary hearing as to Walls’ claim of intellectual disability.

41 Fla. L. Weekly at S469 (emphasis added). In Franqui, 14 So.3d at 239, we specifically instructed the circuit court in the Hialeah case to hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Cherry, which implemented a strict cutoff IQ score of 70 and also held that if the first prong of intellectual disability was not satisfied, the second and third prongs need not be addressed. See Cherry, 959 So.2d at 713-14.

It appears that during the evidentiary hearing, Franqui may have significantly limited his presentation because he knew that he could not meet the first prong of intellectual disability due to the fact that none of his scores on the approved tests was 70 or below. Counsel for Franqui articulated the belief that reaching the second and third prongs of intellectual disability would be futile because of Cherry. As previously discussed, counsel stated that while experts could testify with regard to the adaptive deficits prong, “if you don’t meet [the IQ] prong, that’s the end of the story, that’s where we find ourselves now.” Thus, it appears that Franqui did not offer as complete a presentation on the second and third prongs of the intellectual disability determination as he might have under the standard articulated in Hall.

Further, the circuit court’s discussion of the adaptive deficits prong in its denial order was very brief and relied on Dr. Block-Garfield’s discussion of adaptive deficits, which was also very brief:

Dr. Block-Garfield’s report also states that while his functioning at the time of arrest was impaired, it was likely due to the Defendant’s immaturity and impulsive behavior. She further states that: “Certainly, he was in some fashion supporting a family which could not be accomplished by an individual who is mentally retarded.”

Because the circuit court was aware that pursuant to Cherry, Franqui’s intellectual disability claim failed because none of his IQ scores on the WAIS and Stanford-Binet tests was below 70, the circuit court may have determined that it was unnecessary to consider or discuss the second and third prongs in detail. If this is the case, then Franqui did not receive the “holistic” evaluation of his claim that he is entitled to under Hall. Requiring the circuit court to hold a second evidentiary hearing will afford Franqui a full opportunity to present evidence in support of his intellectual disability claims.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court’s summary denials in the Hialeah and North Miami cases and remand for the court to conduct a single evidentiary hearing on Franqui’s claims of intellectual disability.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., and PERRY, Senior Justice, concur.

LEWIS, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., dissent.

      . The term originally used in these proceedings was "mentally retarded.” This terminology has been changed to "intellectually disabled,” as recognized in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Both the Florida Statutes and the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure have been modified to conform to the change in terminology. Accordingly, throughout this opinion, we use the term "intellectually disabled.”

      . Franqui also asserts that he is entitled to relief from his death sentences based upon the decisions in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Because we are remanding Franqui’s cases for an evidentiary hearing on intellectual disability, we decline to address this claim at the present time.

      .For ease of understanding, we refer to each case by the location where the murder occurred. The Hialeah case is the subject of case number SC15-1441, and the North Miami case is the subject of case number SCI 5-1630.

      . Dr. Toomer also administered to Franqui the WAIS-Revised in 1993, and Franqui’s full-scale IQ score on that test was 83. See Franqui, 59 So.3d at 91.

      . The same judge presided over both cases.

      . Counsel for Franqui agree that only one evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve this claim in both cases.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
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    Dunbar v. State
    2D16-2988
    08/04/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    DOT (Sr), Inc. v. Telesur
    2D16-3854
    09/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Easterwood v. Onewest Bank FSB
    2D16-1608
    08/04/2016
   Den.


text:
    Eilernmann v. State
    2D15-5173
    09/13/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Elwell v. State
    2D16-2263
    06/30/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Emanuel v. State
    2D16-2057
    08/24/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    ECTR 1 LLC. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    2D15-5643
    09/09/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Fabris v. State
    2D16-1027
    06/29/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Farley v. State
    2D15-4716
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Feimster v. State
    2D16-2000
    06/29/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Flewellen v. State.
    2D16-1744
    06/28/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Flewellen v. State
    2D16-1880
    06/28/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Ford v. State
    2D16-2599
    08/23/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Fox v. State
    2D16-3314
    08/18/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Frumoso v. State
    2D15-4710
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Gage v. State
    2D16-2225
    08/11/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Gaiter v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.
    2D15-4657
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir, Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Gallon v. State
    2D16-3113
    08/08/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Garcia v. State
    2D16-3187
    08/05/2016
   Hab.Corp.gr.


text:
    Gardener v. State
    2D16-1508
    06/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Gaspar's Passage, LLC v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc.
    2D16-3061
    08/11/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Gibson v. State
    2D16-2865
    08/11/2016
   Cert. dism.


text:
    Gilchrist v. Bank of America, N.A.
    2D15-846
    09/28/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Golf Course Associates of Spring Lake, Inc. v. Rider
    2D15-5348
    07/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Green Emerald Homes, LLC v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC
    2D16-3820
    09/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Greene v. Northwood of Pasco Homeowners Ass’n, Inc.
    2D16-3094
    08/19/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Griffin v. Reemployment Assistance Appeals Com’n
    2D16-2446
    08/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Gulf Coast Medical Park, LLC v. Gulf Coast Lorain Partners, LLC
    2D16-3269
    08/15/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Haile v. State
    2D15-5390
    05/11/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Hall v. State
    2D16-481
    06/28/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Hamilton v. Hamilton
    2D15-3519
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Manatee)


text:
    Haney v. State
    2D15-5293
    09/14/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Hanrahan v. State
    2D16-2156
    08/19/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hanson v. Brown
    2D16-2321
    08/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Harper v. State
    2D16-2966
    08/18/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Harris v. State
    2D16-2050
    08/24/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Harris v. State
    2D16-2659
    08/09/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Harris v. State
    2D16-2855
    08/08/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Hartig v. City of Sarasota.
    2D16-2068
    07/14/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Hastings v. Sirt-Hastings
    2D16-2374
    08/10/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Henry v. State
    2D15-4876
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Heptner v. Its Billing Inc.
    2D15-3768
    08/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Heritage Operating, L.P. v. Williams
    2D15-680
    09/28/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Heritage Pacific Financial v. Gelman
    2D16-2338
    09/01/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Herron v. State
    2D15-5378
    10/05/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Hill v. State
    2D16-912
    08/01/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Hoffman v. Hoffman
    2D16-2130
    07/13/2016
   Pet.gr.

Cir. Ct. (Pasco)


text:
    Hoffman v. State
    2D16-2774
    08/24/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Honorato v. Manzano
    2D10-5245
    07/21/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Howard v. State
    2D16-1995
    06/30/2016
   BelatedApp.gr.


text:
    Hudson v. State
    2D15-1387
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Huff v. State
    2D16-2270
    06/30/2016
   BelatedApp.gr.


text:
    Hume v. State
    2D16-2322
    07/19/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hutchinson v. State
    2D16-2291
    08/01/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    In re J.B.; T.M. v. Department of Children and Families
    2D16-174
    09/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    In re R.L.; T.R. v. Department of Children and Families
    2D15-5610
    09/28/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pasco)


text:
    Integon Indem. Corp. v. Armstrong-Mujica
    2D16-3147
    09/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ivan v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.
    2D16-2184
    07/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Jackson v. State
    2D16-644
    06/28/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    James v. Doggett
    2D16-1956
    06/28/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    James v. State
    2D16-597
    07/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    James v. State
    2D16-3138
    08/23/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Janowska v. Wilsey
    2D15-3833
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    John v. State
    2D16-3528
    08/23/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Johnson v. Casa Del Mar Condominium Assn.
    2D16-2858
    07/13/2016
   Proh.dism.


text:
    Johnson v. Johnson
    2D16-2366
    09/15/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Johnson v. Judd
    2D16-3191
    08/09/2016
   Hab.Corp.gr.


text:
    Johnson v. Office of State Attorney for Tenth Judicial Circuit
    2D15-2344
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Johnson v. State
    2D16-1978
    06/28/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Jones v. Department of Revenue ex rel. Jones
    2D16-3386
    09/09/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Jones v. State
    2D15-4881
    07/20/2016
   Den.


text:
    Jones v. State
    2D14-5295
    10/05/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pasco)


text:
    Jones v. State
    2D16-3101
    08/09/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Jordan v. Landrigan
    2D16-2486
    08/11/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    K. B. v. Adoption of B. A. J.
    2D16-2921
    08/10/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    K.B.L. v. State
    2D15-4577
    09/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Kannberg v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
    2D15-5727
    09/09/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Katz v. Everbank
    2D16-3409
    08/18/2016
   Cert. den.


text:
    Kimbrough v. State
    2D15-5467
    08/09/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    King v. State
    2D16-3655
    08/23/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    King v. State
    2D16-3302
    08/23/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Kleinknecht v. Kleinknecht
    2D16-3808
    09/16/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Kuykendall v. State
    2D16-2282
    06/30/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Latek v. Staack & Sims, P.A.
    2D16-1188
    09/28/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Lee v. State
    2D16-2060
    06/14/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    M. C. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-426
    07/06/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    M.I.H. v. State
    2D15-2534, 2D15-2536
    09/23/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct, (Manatee)


text:
    M.W. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-2269
    08/31/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Mabe v. State
    2D15-5447
    08/23/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Mamourieh v. Mamourieh.
    2D16-2950
    08/30/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Market Tampa Investments, LLC v. HMC Assets, LLC
    2D16-2693
    09/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Marshall v. Brown
    2D16-1954
    08/18/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Masa Wholesale, LLC v. Saisurya, LLC
    2D15-3324
    08/18/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    McClaughlin v. State
    2D16-653
    08/03/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    McCloud v. State
    2D16-3536
    08/18/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    McGee v. State
    2D16-2666
    07/25/2016
   Hab.Corp.dism.


text:
    McGee v. State
    2D16-2845
    07/25/2016
   Hab.Corp.dism.


text:
    McGee v. State
    2D16-2845
    08/08/2016
   Hab.Corp.dism.


text:
    McKnight v. State
    2D16-504
    06/28/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Mejia-Calix v. State
    2D15-5549
    08/03/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Melendez v. State
    2D15-3544
    08/09/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Mendoza-Miranda v. State
    2D16-1136
    07/07/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Menendez-Collazo v. State
    2D16-2376
    08/09/2016
   Pet. dism.


text:
    Metro Ice, Inc. v. Quinn
    2D15-5078
    09/28/2016
   Cert. den.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Minns v. State
    2D15-3057
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Moore v. Livingston Family Communities, LLC
    2D16-1396
    05/12/2016
   Cert. den.


text:
    Moore v. State
    2D16-2550
    06/30/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Moore v. State
    2D16-2498
    08/08/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Morrell v. State
    2D16-1990
    08/09/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Morrin v. State
    2D16-2646
    08/10/2016
   Hab.Corp. transferred

Cir. Ct. (Charlotte)


text:
    Murphy v. State
    2D16-1900
    08/01/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    MQ Windows, Inc. v. Armour
    2D15-3633
    09/28/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    N.V. v. M.R.V.
    2D15-1715
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Filipskiy
    2D16-1349
    09/14/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Neff v. State
    2D16-1389
    08/09/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Nelson v. State
    2D16-2867
    08/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Nelson v. State
    2D16-3048
    08/11/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Newmon v. Bank of America, N.A.
    2D15-4711
    07/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    NIC 4 Royal Palm Leasing, LLC v. Johnson
    2D16-3313
    08/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ogilvie v. Pacifica Interbay, L L C
    2D16-2688
    08/11/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Olds v. Engle Progeny Cases Tobacco Litigation
    2D16-1096
    09/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Olds v. Judd
    2D16-2309
    07/07/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Papaleo v. State
    2D14-4300
    10/05/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Parham v. Department of Revenue
    2D15-5486
    08/11/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Parnell v. Anderson
    2D16-3057
    08/12/2016
   Pet.transferred

Cir. Ct. (Hamilton)


text:
    Patrick v. Department of Revenue
    2D15-5221
    08/10/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Pavlak v. PCL Civil Constructors, Inc.
    2D16-998
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Paylan v. Florida Dept. of Health
    2D16-2934
    08/11/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Pelzer v. State
    2D16-3552
    08/24/2016
   Pet.gr.


text:
    Peterson v. State
    2D15-4837
    06/28/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Phelps v. USAA Federal Savings Bank
    2D15-4280

    07/06/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Piccoli v. State
    2D16-51
    07/26/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Plantz v. John
    2D16-1032
    08/09/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Pore v. State
    2D15-4509
    10/14/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Pratt v. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services
    2D16-1512
    07/25/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Prosper v. State
    2D16-2055
    08/03/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    R.A. v. Department of Children and Families
    2D16-1776
    09/16/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    R.W. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-1843
    09/21/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Radford v. State
    2D16-2196
    07/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ragan v. State
    2D15-3183
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Raia v. State
    2D16-465
    07/29/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Reiblich v. Knight
    2D16-2650
    07/07/2016
   Hab.Corp.dism.


text:
    Retreat at Port of Islands, LLC v. Port of Islands Resort Hotel Condo
    2D15-1915
    07/21/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rice v. State
    2D16-2959
    08/24/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Ridley v. State
    2D16-1174
    08/25/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Roberts v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank
    2D16-2970
    08/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rocha v. State
    2D15-4265
    08/23/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Rodriguez v. Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement
    2D16-1790
    07/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rodriguez v. State
    2D16-2930
    08/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rome Trust Holdings, LLC v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.
    2D16-2694
    07/13/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rome Trust Holdings, LLC v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
    2D15-2668
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pasco)


text:
    Romero v. Henriquez-Romero
    2D16-578, 2D16-579
    09/16/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Romero v. Henriquez-Romero
    2D16-2634
    06/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rosier v. State
    2D16-2957
    08/08/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Rowell v. State
    2D16-1457
    06/29/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Rudd v. State
    2D16-2341
    08/18/2016
   Proh.dism.


text:
    Ruiz v. State
    2D16-2948
    08/05/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Salvatore v. State
    2D16-1137
    06/30/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Santoyo-Cruz v. Santoyo
    2D15-3086
    09/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Sawitski v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.
    2D16-2536
    07/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Schmidt v. State
    2D15-3063
    08/23/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Searcy v. State
    2D15-856
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Shadow Ridge Properties, LLC v. AS Arete LLC
    2D15-5220
    09/28/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Collier)


text:
    Shepherd v. State
    2D16-1952
    06/30/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Smith v. State
    2D16-2531
    06/28/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Smith v. State
    2D16-3498
    08/17/2016
   Hab.Coip.dism.


text:
    Smith v. State
    2D15-3799
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Smith v. State
    2D15-3017
    10/14/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Sotolongo-Mesa v. State
    2D16-2063
    08/09/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Speight v. Gee
    2D16-1844
    08/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Spencer v. American Exp. Bank, FSB
    2D16-2485
    07/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Spinks v. State
    2D15-4195
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Sproull ex rel. Sproull v. Jackson ex rel. Jackson
    2D16-1943
    07/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    St. Cyr v. US Bank Nat. Ass’n
    2D16-3164
    09/15/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    State v. Matthews
    2D15-4207
    09/30/2016
   Aff,

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    State Farm Florida Ins. Co. v. Hunt
    2D15-1016
    09/28/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Stona v. State
    2D16-1175
    10/05/2016
   Aff.

Cir, Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Stratton v. Solutions Real Estate, Inc.
    2D15-4518
    09/23/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Strole v. State
    2D16-3574
    08/23/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Tampa Hyde Park Cafe, LLC v. Palscher, Inc.
    2D15-3960
    09/28/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Tarpon Springs Plaza, LLC v. A Civil Design Group, LLC
    2D16-806
    09/23/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Tarver v. State
    2D15-1536
    09/30/2016
   Aff,

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Taylor v. State
    2D16-3135
    08/23/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Tramontana v. Bank of America
    2D15-5639
    08/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Trustbiz, LLC v. DLJ Mortg. Capital Inc.
    2D16-1665
    08/31/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    United Martial Arts Center v. Reemployment Assistance Appeals Com’n
    2D16-1793
    09/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    V.L. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-1857
    09/16/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Vann v. State
    2D16-778
    08/09/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Vargas & Agelan Investments, Corp. v. Advanceme, Inc.
    2D16-3271
    08/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ventura v. State
    2D16-2790
    08/08/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Vilardi v. State
    2D16-3240
    08/18/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Wagner v. Bank of America
    2D15-1532
    07/22/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Waits v. State
    2D13-5920
    09/14/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Walker v. State
    2D16-2463
    06/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Walker v. State
    2D16-2427
    08/12/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Walker v. State
    2D16-3104
    08/11/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Walker v. State
    2D16-1479
    08/09/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Walrdon v. State
    2D16-1018
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Highlands)


text:
    Waugh v. Sarasota County Sheriff’s Dept.
    2D16-1417
    08/09/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Waugh v. State
    2D16-2139
    08/09/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    West v. State
    2D15-3093
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Wheeler v. State
    2D16-2894
    08/12/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Whitburn LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA
    2D15-1752, 2D15-3670
    09/14/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Whitburn, LLC v. Bank of New York Mellon
    2D16-1329
    07/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    White v. State
    2D16-3252
    08/23/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    White v. State
    2D16-823
    08/03/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Wilbur v. State
    2D16-2191
    08/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wilkerson v. State
    2D16-3119
    08/05/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D15-2003
    08/10/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wilson v. State
    2D15-4749
    06/23/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wood v. State
    2D16-1721
    06/28/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Wooden v. State
    2D15-4748
    09/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Highlands)


text:
    Wright v. State
    2D16-2809
    08/08/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Z.L. v. State
    2D16-3589
    09/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    THIRD DISTRICT
    Acevedo v. Department of Revenue
    3D16-2157
    10/18/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Revenue


text:
    Adhemar v. Department of Revenue
    3D16-2031
    09/27/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Revenue


text:
    Albanes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    3D16-1439
    09/16/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Alco Handling Service Corp. v. Coto
    3D16-1321, 3D16-0971
    08/30/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    American Sales and Management Organization, LLC v. Lopez
    3D16-2010
    10/28/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Anderson Landscaping, Inc. v. Sandman
    3D16-2060
    09/14/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Avarez-Mena v. Miami-Dade County
    3D16-2188
    11/03/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Aventura Restaurant Group, LLC v. Aventura Fashion Island, LLC
    3D16-1066
    09/27/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Aviation Repair Technologies, LLC v. Holmes
    3D16-0725
    09/16/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Ayala v. State
    3D16-0275
    10/13/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    B.B. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-1303, 3D16-1302
    09/20/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Bailey v. State
    3D16-1667
    10/26/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Barrios v. Lopez
    3D16-1151
    09/19/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Batista v. E*Trade Bank
    3D16-1918
    09/27/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Bazquez v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
    3D16-2006
    10/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Bejerano v. State
    3D16-1375
    09/27/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Benoit v. State
    3D16-2201
    09/27/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Bensoussan v. Banon5, LLC
    3D16-1198
    10/27/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Borges v. Borges
    3D16-1372
    10/19/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Braithwaite v. Bank of New York (TR)
    3D16-2305
    11/01/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Brewer v. State
    3D16-1952
    09/22/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    C.L. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-2165
    10/11/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Children and Families


text:
    Caison v. State
    3D16-1524
    09/09/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Caison v. State
    3D16-2050
    09/23/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Carrillo v. U.S. Bank Nat Ass’n
    3D15-2334
    07/20/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Charles v. State
    3D16-2024
    09/02/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Charles v. State
    3D16-2024
    09/20/2016
   Motion gr.


text:
    City of Miami v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC
    3D16-0791
    10/11/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    City of Miami v. Vasquez
    3D16-0809
    10/31/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Cockran v. Jones
    3D16-0376
    09/12/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Cohen v. Brown
    3D16-0125
    10/20/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Cohen v. Cohen
    3D16-2054
    10/05/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    D.B. v. Department of Children
    3D16-1270
    09/08/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Dade)


text:
    D'ascoli v. D’ascoli
    3D16-1284
    09/26/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    De Bizemont v. Rollet
    3D16-2035
    09/19/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Desilvio v. Save-A-House, Inc.
    3D16-2034
    10/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Diaz v. Florida Peninsula Ins. Co.
    3D16-2206
    10/05/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Douglas v. State
    3D16-1949
    08/31/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Dugger v. North Bay Village
    3D16-2156
    10/26/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Eason v. State
    3D16-2131
    10/18/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Engstrom v. Engstrom
    3D16-1607
    08/11/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Entrada Corp. v. Silver
    3D15-2943
    09/27/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Evans v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
    3D16-1658
    09/16/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n v. Becke
    3D16-1038
    09/19/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Forte Bleu (De), LLC v. Icarus Lived, LLC
    3D16-1947
    09/19/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Frost v. Bank of New York Mellon
    3D16-1810
    09/19/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Monroe)


text:
    G.C. v. Department of Children
    3D16-1646
    09/19/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Garcia v. Diaz
    3D16-1965
    10/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Gardiasz v. Munilla
    3D15-2705
    09/15/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Giles v. South Florida Stadium, LLC
    3D16-0714
    10/19/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Gilly Vending, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Miami-Dade College
    3D16-1228
    09/22/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade, District Board of Trustees)


text:
    Guardamagna v. Florida Family Ins. Co.
    3D16-1596
    10/14/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Guillaume v. Hollander
    3D16-1830
    09/12/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Guillen v. State
    3D16-1774
    09/09/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Haarer v. Rizo
    3D16-1937
    09/19/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Herman v. Schlesinger
    3D16-1555
    11/03/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Hernandez v. Y.H.
    3D16-1887
    09/09/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Higgins v. Miami-Dade College
    3D16-1354
    09/20/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Hyland v. State
    3D16-2107
    09/19/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Desamour
    3D16-1267
    09/27/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Imery v. Vangil Ingenieros, C.A.
    3D16-800
    11/02/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Insurance Co. of North America, Inc. v. Stewart
    3D15-1713
    10/18/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    J.L. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-1971
    09/16/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Jackson v. Bank of New York Mellon
    3D16-1932
    09/09/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Jackson v. Reemployment Assistance Appeals Com’n
    3D16-1956
    08/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Johnson v. Acosta
    3D16-2005
    08/31/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Johnson v. State
    3D16-1987
    08/31/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    K.D. Const. of Florida, Inc. v. Gil
    3D16-1258
    08/29/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    K.D. Const. of Florida, Inc. v. Gil
    3D16-2148
    10/27/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Lau v. Chase Home Finance, LLC
    3D15-1790
    11/02/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Leroy v. Hall
    3D16-1388
    09/09/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Lista v. Fernandez
    3D16-2179
    10/26/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct, (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Lorenzo v. State
    3D16-0581
    10/13/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Maqueira v. State
    3D16-2033
    09/09/2016
   Belated App. stricken


text:
    Mariah v. State
    3D16-1769
    08/12/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Marin v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass’n
    3D16-1878
    08/31/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Martinez v. HSBC Mortg. Corp. USA
    3D16-1657
    09/19/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Matheus v. BLB Trading, LLC
    3D16-0542
    10/11/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Maxwell v. State
    3D14-0318
    08/30/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Mazzone v. Mulloy
    3D16-1390
    10/20/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Mero Custom Const. LLC v. AM 280 Sierra Drive, LLC
    3D16-0973
    09/20/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Morrow v. ROA, Corp.
    3D16-1272, 3D16-1271
    09/23/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Naranjo v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n
    3D16-2095
    10/13/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Nestor v. Ritvo
    3D16-1208
    09/12/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    O.G. v. Department of Children
    3D16-1110
    09/19/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Paez v. Department of Revenue
    3D16-2142
    10/11/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Revenue


text:
    Palomino v. State
    3D16-2160
    09/26/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Pantera Boat, Inc. v. Nogues
    3D16-1957
    09/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Paris v. State
    3D16-1954
    10/18/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Pazrivero v. State
    3D16-0818
    09/16/2016
   Cause transferred

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade) ■


text:
    Peterson v. Strong
    3D16-1829
    10/18/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Petit-Louis v. State
    3D16-2105
    10/14/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Pirela v. State
    3D16-2369
    10/24/2016
   App. transferred

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Pompano Imports, Inc. v. BMW of North America, LLC
    3D16-1138
    09/16/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Popovits v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
    3D16-2126
    09/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Puerta Del Sol of Kendall Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzalez
    3D16-0397
    09/23/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    R&P Medical Center, Inc. v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co.
    3D16-1730
    09/22/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Richardson v. State
    3D16-1825
    09/09/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Rodriguez v. State
    3D16-2058
    10/05/2016
   Proh.dism.


text:
    Rodriguez v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n
    3D16-0852
    10/05/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rossar Const. Corp. v. Camaguey Plaza (LLC)
    3D16-2172
    10/05/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Rozier v. State
    3D16-1485
    09/23/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Rubio v. State
    3D15-1617
    09/27/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Monroe)


text:
    Ruderman v. Ruderman
    3D16-0147
    10/14/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    S.R. Kalb and Associates, Inc. v. 2250 & 2233 NW 77th TER, LLC
    3D16-2402
    11/03/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Sanchez v. State
    3D16-1778
    09/15/2016
   Pet.’den.


text:
    Sanders v. Estate of Sanders
    3D16-1484
    09/26/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Sayih v. State
    3D16-1955
    09/22/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Schlesinger v. Schlesinger
    3D16-0721
    11/03/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Schneer v. Llaurado
    3D16-1744
    09/12/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Sellers v. Driss
    3D16-2130
    09/23/2016
   VoLdism.

Cir. Ct. (Monroe)


text:
    Small v. State
    3D16-2316
    10/14/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Smathers v. Force Protection Sec. L.L.C.
    3D16-1568
    10/18/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    South Beach Ocean Parcel II, Ltd. v. Artecity Park, LLC
    3D15-1746, 3D15-1747
    10/18/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Southeast Housing LLC v. Russell
    3D16-2291
    10/20/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Monroe)


text:
    Southeastern Conference Ass’n of Seventh-Day Adventists, Inc. v. Naima Group, LLC
    3D16-2042
    09/19/2016
   VoLdism.


text:
    Strachan v. Dome
    3D16-2113
    10/11/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Strachan v. State
    3D16-1311
    08/29/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Suarez v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
    3D15-2751
    10/19/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Success v. CIT Bank, N.A.
    3D16-1898
    08/31/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Thomas v. State
    3D15-2929
    10/05/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Thomas v. State
    3D16-0584
    09/09/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Thorne v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.
    3D16-2307
    11/01/2016
   VoLdism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Top US Inv. LLC v. Citizens Property Ins. Corp.
    3D16-1127
    11/01/2016
   VoLdism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Tropical Foods, LLC v. Quirch Foods Co.
    3D16-2003
    09/30/2016
   VoLdism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Truestar, USA v. Miami-Dade County
    3D16-1446
    10/14/2016
   VoLdism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Active Spine Center of Homestead, Inc.
    3D15-0225
    10/14/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    United Services Auto. Ass’n v. Law Offices of Herssein
    3D16-0342
    09/12/2016
   Cert.den.


text:
    United Teachers of Dade v. Gimenez
    3D15-2666
    10/14/2016
   VoLdism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    V.J. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-2051
    09/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Vasquez-Gomez v. State
    3D15-1623
    10/05/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Vernell v. Wachovia Mortg. FSB
    3D16-0238
    09/29/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct, Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Vinson v. State
    3D16-2163
    09/27/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Weiss v. Weiss
    3D16-1283
    09/30/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Weiss v. Weiss
    3D16-0899
    09/30/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Williams v. State
    3D16-1999
    08/30/2016
   Pet.den,


text:
    Williams v. State
    3D16-1896
    09/09/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Wilson v. Wilson
    3D15-2764
    09/21/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Wilson v. Wilson
    3D16-0150
    09/21/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Intercontinental Enterprises, LLC
    3D16-0029
    09/14/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Wong v. Hernandez
    3D16-2139
    10/18/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct, Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Wromas v. State
    3D15-2774
    09/20/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    940 Lincoln Road Associates LLC v. 940 Lincoln Road Enterprises, Inc.
    3D16-1916
    09/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    Algaba v. State
    4D14-2591
    06/02/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Bart-Swezy v. Swezy
    4D14-3096
    06/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Bethel v. State
    4D16-164
    05/19/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Bickelhaupt v. State
    4D13-4621
    06/02/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Bussey v. State
    4D16-918
    06/02/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    City of Pompano Beach v. Swerdlow
    4D14-1990
    06/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Cleckley v. State
    4D15-376
    06/02/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Dryden v. State
    4D15-1409
    06/02/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Durante v. State
    4D13-2507
    06/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    FVP Miami Lakes, LLC v. Indian River County
    4D15-1475
    05/26/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Indian River)


text:
    Hecht Consulting Corp. v. Dorothy Island
    4D13-4163
    06/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Henson v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n
    4D14-2630
    06/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    J.R. v. State
    4D15-1206
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author: Per Curiam.

text:
    FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION (“Fannie Mae”), Petitioner, v. Stella GALLANT, Mary M. Saleneiks a/k/a Mary Saleneiks, Century Harmony Lakes Estates Association, Inc. f/k/a Weitzer Harmony Lakes Estates Association, Inc., and Harmony Lakes Central Homeowners Association, Inc., Respondents.
    No. 4D16-3152
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2017]

      Nancy M. Wallace, Michael J. Larson and William P. Heller of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee and Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.
    George N. Andrews of Loan Lawyers, LLC, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent Stella Gallant.
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner, Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), seeks certio-rari review of an order granting respondent Stella Gallant’s (“Gallant”) post-judgment motion to intervene and stay the proceedings. We find that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law, resulting in material harm to Fannie Mae that cannot be remedied on appeal.

This case has a long and complicated history. In October 2011, CitiMortgage, Inc. brought a residential foreclosure action against respondent Mary Salenieks, respondent Century Harmony Lakes Estates Association (“the HOA”), and others. A notice of lis pendens was recorded immediately. During the pendency of Citi-Mortgage’s foreclosure action, the HOA commenced its own foreclosure action which, in November 2013, resulted in a foreclosure sale. Gallant purchased the property at that sale for $10,800. She then renovated the property and attempted to sell it for $350,000 but the sale fell through because the prospective buyer could not obtain title insurance.

In February 2014, CitiMortgage assigned the subject mortgage to Fannie Mae and Fannie Mae was substituted as party plaintiff in the case. The record reflects that shortly after assigning the mortgage, CitiMortgage inadvertently recorded a release of mortgage. The release was subsequently rescinded in May 2015. Prior to the release being rescinded, however, a consent final judgment was entered and Fannie Mae voluntarily dismissed the case. Fannie Mae later filed a Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 motion to set aside the voluntary dismissal. At this point, Gallant moved to intervene in the foreclosure action. On October 1, 2015, the trial court, after denying Gallant’s motion to intervene, also granted Fannie Mae’s motion and reinstated the final judgment.

Gallant subsequently filed a renewed motion to intervene, arguing that she should be allowed to intervene “in the interest of justice” because she had improved the property in reliance upon Citi-Mortgage’s release of the mortgage and Fannie Mae’s voluntary dismissal of the foreclosure action. The court granted the motion on October 29, 2015, and cancelled the upcoming foreclosure sale. Fannie Mae moved for reconsideration and the matter proceeded to a hearing. On the day of the scheduled hearing, Judge Lazarus, the assigned judge, was unavailable and Judge Stone heard argument instead. On February 11, 2016, Judge Stone granted Fannie Mae’s motion for reconsideration and vacated Judge Lazarus’s order granting Gallant’s renewed motion to intervene. Gallant did not appeal that order or move for rehearing.

In June 2016, Gallant filed yet another motion to intervene and a request to stay the proceedings. Therein, she argued that a stay of the foreclosure action was warranted pending the outcome of a quiet title action she had filed against Fannie Mae and CitiMortgage after the denial of her last motion to intervene. After hearing argument, but without reaching the merits of Gallant’s motion, Judge Lazarus concluded simply that Judge Stone did not have authority to vacate his previous order granting intervention. Judge Lazarus thereafter granted Gallant’s motion to intervene and stay the proceedings, and cancelled the upcoming foreclosure sale. Fannie Mae’s timely petition follows.

The trial court’s order granting Gallant’s motion to intervene and stay the proceedings is subject to certiorari review. See Doerschuck v. Doerschuck, 481 So.2d 1317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (Glickstein, J., concurring specially); Dep’t of Children & Families v. L.D., 840 So.2d 432, 434 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Fannie Mae must establish that the court departed from the essential requirements of the law, resulting in material harm that cannot be remedied on appeal. See Williams v. Oken, 62 So.3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011).

We find that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in a number of respects. First, Judge Stone did in fact have the authority to vacate Judge Lazarus’s previous order granting intervention. See Tingle v. Dade Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 245 So.2d 76, 78 (Fla. 1971) (holding that a successor judge has the authority, up until final judgment is entered, to “vacate or modify the [[Interlocutory rulings or orders of his predecessor in the case”); Duke v. Russell, 557 So.2d 587, 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (noting that an order granting intervention is a non-final order). The effect of Judge Stone’s February 11, 2016 order was to deny Gallant’s renewed motion to intervene. An order denying a motion to intervene is a final, appealable order. See J.R. v. R.M., 679 So.2d 64, 65 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Superior Fence & Rail of N. Fla. v. Lucas, 35 So.3d 104, 105 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). Gallant did not appeal Judge Stone’s order or timely seek rehearing. Therefore, Judge Lazarus lacked authority to reconsider that final order on the same facts, absent the grounds set forth in Rule 1.540. See Tingle, 245 So.2d at 78; see also Quinones v. Se. Inv. Grp. Corp., 138 So.3d 549, 549-50 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

Second, although we do not need to reach the merits of Gallant’s repeated requests to intervene in this case, we find that the court departed from the essential requirements of the law by permitting her to do so. “ ‘[W]hen property is purchased during a pending foreclosure action in which a lis pendens has been filed, the purchaser generally is not entitled to intervene in the pending foreclosure action.’” Bonafide Props. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 198 So.3d 694, 695 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (quoting Mkt. Tampa Invs., LLC v. Stobaugh, 177 So.3d 31, 32 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)). See also De Sousa v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., 170 So.3d 928, 929-30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Furthermore, intervention after final judgment is generally disfavored. See De Sousa, 170 So.3d at 930; Sedra Family Ltd. P’ship v. 4750, LLC, 124 So.3d 935, 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

Gallant acknowledges these general rules, but argues that the “interests of justice” support intervention in this case. We disagree. The events that transpired after Gallant purchased the property, namely CitiMortgage’s release of the mortgage and Fannie Mae’s voluntary dismissal of the foreclosure action, do not change the fact that Gallant purchased the property with full notice of the pending foreclosure action. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bevans, 138 So.3d 1185, 1188-89 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“A lis pendens serves as constructive notice of the claims asserted against the property in the pending litigation.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Gallant accordingly knew, or should have known, that she was taking title subject to the first mortgage. See id. Furthermore, Gallant’s allegations against Fannie Mae and CitiMortgage can be litigated in the quiet title action irrespective of the outcome of this case.

Third, we further conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by granting Gallant’s request to stay the foreclosure proceedings pending the outcome of the quiet title case. The two cases do not involve the same parties or the same subject matter, and Fannie Mae’s foreclosure case was filed well before Gallant’s quiet title action. See Harper v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 802 So.2d 505, 509-10 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Sunshine State Serv. Corp. v. Dove Invs. of Hillsborough, 468 So.2d 281, 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

In addition to departing from the essential requirements of the law, the trial court’s order causes material harm because Fannie Mae is being prevented from resolving this case, in which a consent final judgment was entered over two years ago. This harm cannot be remedied on appeal because the trial court’s order is not appealable and the time for appealing the final judgment has expired. We therefore grant the petition, quash the order, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petition granted; order quashed; remanded.

Damoorgian, Gerber and Conner, JJ., concur.


author: SALTER, J. SHEPHERD, J.,

text:
    ESCADOTE I CORP., Appellant, v. OCEAN THREE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D15-668
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed December 21, 2016.
    Rehearing Denied February 15, 2017

      GrayRobinson and Juan C. Martinez, for appellant.
    Koeller, Nebeker, Carlson & Haluck and Chad N. Dunigan (Orlando); Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert and John J. Shahady and Thomas R. Shahady (Fort Lauderdale), for appellees.
    Before SUAREZ, C.J., and SHEPHERD and SALTER, JJ.
   SALTER, J.

Escadote I Corporation (“Escadote”) appeals two aspects of a final judgment entered following years of construction-related litigation: (a) the amount of a set-off allowed by the trial court against Esca-dote’s jury verdict for $2,050,000.00 as against the appellees, and (b) the denial of prejudgment interest on the amount of the collateral settlement that was the basis for the set-off claimed by appellees. We reverse with respect to the order on the amount of the set-off, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest as applied to the corrected set-off amount.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Escadote purchased a high-rise condominium in the Ocean Three Condominium in Sunny Isles, Florida. In 2006, Escadote commenced a circuit court action against the developer (appellee Ocean Three Limited Partnership; “Developer”), the general contractor (appellee John Moriarty & Associates of Florida, Inc.; “Contractor”), and the Ocean Three Condominium Association (“Association”), for claims of water intrusion and mold infestation in Esea-dote’s unit. Escadote’s claims included separate counts against the various defendants, but only the statutory claim against the Association included a demand for Escadote’s attorney’s fees. The basis for attorney’s fees against the Association was alleged to be section 718.303, Florida Statutes (2007).

The case proceeded to trial by jury in March 2010. On the last day before submission of the case to the jury, the Association and Escadote reached a settlement for $375,000.00. The jury later returned a verdict against the Developer and Contractor, jointly and severally, for $2,050,000.00. The trial judge at the time granted the Developer’s and Contractor’s motion for judgment in accordance with prior motions for directed verdict, entering a final judgment for the Developer and Contractor. Escadote appealed that ruling to this Court, which reinstated the jury verdict. John Moriarty & Assocs. of Fla. v. Murton Roofing Corp., 128 So.3d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

In its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment entered after remand, the trial court described the Escadote-Association settlement:

Under the terms of the settlement, the Association was to tender $375,000 in exchange for a full release of all claims. The settlement agreement provided that $500 of the settlement was attributable to damages and the remainder was intended to reimburse Escadote for attorney’s fees. Funds were tendered and a joint release was executed on April 28, 2010.

The trial court was aware of the allocation and referred to it in her order on setoff. The fact of allocation and amount of the allocation to Escadote’s attorney’s fee claim against the Association, $374,500.00, were uncontroverted.

On remand following Escadote’s successful appeal and reinstatement of the jury verdict, the Developer and Contractor filed a motion for collateral set-off, claiming that the entire $375,000.00 recovery by Escadote from the Association should be applied to reduce the amount of the jury verdict to be reflected in the final judgment. Escadote argued that only $500.00 of the recovery should be applied to reduce the jury verdict and judgment amount, as $374,500.00 had been apportioned by the settling parties in their settlement agreement to compensate Escadote for a claim unique to its case against the Association—a claim for statutory attorney’s fees under the condominium statute.

The trial court disallowed the apportionment sought by Escadote and instead ordered that the entire amount would be allowed as a set-off to reduce Escadote’s judgment against the Developer and Contractor. In a separate order, the trial court also denied Escadote’s claim for prejudgment interest on the full set-off amount from the date of loss (found in a previous order to be December 24, 2003) through the date the Association actually paid the $375,000.00 settlement. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

Each of the issues presented—the determination of the proper set-off amount and Escadote’s entitlement to prejudgment interest from the date of loss to the date the settlement amount was paid—is a question of law which we consider under a de novo standard of review. Cornerstone SMR, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 163 So.3d 565, 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (stating that set-off is a pure question of law, with no deference given to the judgment of the trial court); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1985) (finding that prejudgment interest on a party’s out-of-pocket pecuniary losses is a legal entitlement once a verdict has liquidated those damages as of a date certain). The trial court’s interpretation of the release as a waiver by Escadote of a right to prejudgment interest on the set-off amount is also reviewed de novo. Muniz v. Crystal Lake Project, LLC, 947 So.2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

A. Set-off

Set-offs for collateral recoveries are available pursuant to section 768.041(2), Florida Statutes (2010). The statute specifies that if a defendant demonstrates that a plaintiff has released a “person, firm, or corporation in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly.” Section 46.015(2), Florida Statutes (2010), includes a nearly-identical provision that, for purposes of this case, operates in the same way as section 768.041(2). Cases interpreting the statutes have established two principles that apply to this case.

1. “The Damages Sued For”

First, as the statute requires, the settlement recovery sought to be set off must be “in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for.” If the settlement funds are applicable to a claim asserted only against the settling co-defendant, the non-settling co-defendants are not eligible for a set-off in the amount of the settlement. Wells v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., 659 So.2d 249 (Fla. 1995). Expressed another way, the statutes “presuppose the existence of multiple defendants jointly and severally liable for the same damages.” Id. at 253 (emphasis provided); D’Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So.2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003); Gouty v. Schnepel, 795 So.2d 959, 965 (Fla. 2001) (the underlying rationale of Wells is that “the operation of the setoff statutes was premised upon the determination that the defendant was jointly and severally liable for the same damages.”) (emphasis provided).

The record demonstrates that Escadote responded in interrogatory answers and in pretrial compliance with a distinct articulation that attorney’s fees were claimed as damages under Count IV (and only in Count IV) against the Association. In the memorandum in support of their joint motion for set-off in 2014, the Developer and Contractor attached Escadote’s responses to interrogatories of August 5, 2009, itemizing $8,508,895.72 in damages through June 26, 2009. Item 8 of that damages list was characterized by Escadote as an affirmative claim under Count IV, the claim against the Association, for attorney’s fees in the amount of $496,371.40. The preface to the interrogatory answers included a statement that “The figures for Carrying expenses, Interest, Attorneys’ fees and Costs are very likely to change as these damages will continue to accrue until trial and beyond.” (Emphasis provided).

The Developer’s and Contractor’s memo in support of their 2014 motion for set-off acknowledged, in paragraph 6, that “Plaintiff also disclosed damages for attorney’s fees in the amount of $496,371.40 against the Association, which represents only 5.8% of [Escadote’s] claim.” (Emphasis provided). The memo also attached Esca-dote’s pretrial compliance filed in February 2010, which included in its “Specification of Damages” a claim for attorney’s fees of $741,000.00. Escadote neither sought nor recovered any attorney’s fees from the Developer or the Contractor.

2. Apportionment vs. Undifferentiated Recovery

The second principle applicable to the record in this case is that, in a case in which a settlement recovery is not apportioned between (a) claims for which co-defendants are jointly and severally liable with the settling co-defendant, and (b) claims which were only asserted against the settling co-defendant, the entire amount of the undifferentiated recovery is allowable as a set-off. Dionese v. City of West Palm Beach, 500 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 1987) (reasoning that although plaintiffs apportioned settlement funds among the plaintiffs in a particular manner, the funds were not allocated among the separate and distinctive causes of action, so the total amount of the settlement was allowed as a set-off). In the present case, Escadote and the Association were on opposite sides of the ease and Escadote’s claim against the Association included an element of damages that was not a part of Escadote’s claim against the Developer and the Contractor.

When a settlement recovery is allocated between claims with different and distinctive damage elements, set-off should only be allowed to co-defendants jointly and severally liable for the same claims. Devlin v. McMannis, 231 So.2d 194, 196 (Fla. 1970) (section 768.041(2) “authorizes to be set off from a judgment against one joint tort-feasor only the amount constituting a settlement for the damages or damage elements recoverable in the same cause of action against another joint tort-feasor”).

The obvious purpose of the statutory provisions is to prevent a windfall to a plaintiff—a double recovery on a particular claim for which the non-settling defendants are identically liable. “The set-off provision in section 768.041(2) “was designed to prevent duplicate or overlapping compensation for identical damages.’ ” Cornerstone SMR, 163 So.3d at 569 (quoting Gordon v. Marvin M. Rosenberg, D.D.S., P.A., 654 So.2d 643, 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)) (emphasis provided).

•3. Application of the Principles in This Case

Applying these two principles to the present case, Escadote asserted a claim for statutory attorney’s fees against the Association which was not and could not be asserted against the co-defendants, Developer and Contractor. Although the Developer and Contractor argue here that Escadote could have claimed attorney’s fees in the counts of its complaint directed against the Developer and Contractor (under the original purchase agreement relating to the unit), Escadote made no such claim and could not have recovered legal fees that it did not plead. See Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.2d 835, 837-38 (Fla. 1991). It follows that the Developer and Contractor were not jointly and severally liable for attorney’s fees and costs claimed by Esca-dote against the Association and only the Association.

Further, Escadote’s responses to interrogatories and its pretrial disclosures in this record demonstrate that the allocation of $374,500.00 cannot objectively be characterized as a “windfall” or double recovery. Escadote’s attorney’s fees, as disclosed by Escadote a month before the trial, were nearly twice the settlement amount paid by the Association, and none of those fees were recoverable from the Developer or Contractor. The jury verdict form naturally omitted any reference to attorney’s fees, as these are determined by the court rather than a jury, and the damages of $2,050,000.00 were awarded based upon “the breach(es) of implied warranty relating to the diminished value of Unit 3405.” Those damages are not the “same” damages collectible by Escadote from the Association, because the Association was also uniquely liable for statutory attorney’s fees.

The second principle, that apportionment of settlement funds is only appropriate when the settling parties have allocated the settlement between (a) claims for which co-defendants are jointly and severally liable with the settling co-defendant, and (b) claims which were only asserted against the settling co-defendant, is also satisfied in the present case. As already noted, the trial court’s order entering judgment found that “[t]he settlement agreement provided that $500 of the settlement was attributable to damages and the remainder was intended to reimburse Escadote for attorney’s fees.” Reliance by the Developer and Contractor on Dionese, supra, is misplaced because the “private, unilateral agreement” in that case was among the plaintiffs, not among the separately pleaded claims for differing elements of liability. Dionese actually held that “an agreement to apportion the proceeds of a settlement agreement must be found on the face of the settlement agreement and agreed to by all of the parties involved in the settlement.” 500 So.2d at 1351. There is no dispute that the allocation was in the settlement agreement and that Escadote and the Association were “all of the parties” involved in that settlement.

The Developer and Contractor argue that Dionese, supra, and Alexander v. Seaquest, Inc., 575 So.2d 765 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), require the trial court to reject a “private and unilateral” settlement apportionment taking place after a jury verdict without notice to the non-settling party, because “the non-settling tort-feasors lose the right to settle.” They candidly concede that this issue was not raised by them in the trial court.

We reject the argument for other reasons as well: as noted, Dionese involved an apportionment among the plaintiffs, not among different claims with differing damages elements. Alexander involved the inconsistency between a probate court’s apportionment of a settlement to an estate (“just under six percent”) and an earlier jury verdict determining that the estate was entitled to “thirty percent of the total verdict” against the non-settling defendants. Alexander, 575 So.2d at 766. As the Fourth District observed in Alexander, “[ajpparently, the probate judge did not know that the wrongful death action had gone to trial and that the jury had determined that the estate was entitled to thirty percent of the total verdict.” Id. No such record is before us in the present case.

Finally, the Developer and Contractor did not demonstrate that the terms agreed upon by Escadote and the Association, including apportionment, were reached after the jury verdict. There is no dispute that the settlement was reached before the claims against the Developer and Contractor were submitted to the jury, and that the Developer and Contractor were aware that the settlement had occurred before their own claims went to the jury. The Developer and Contractor cannot claim, and have not claimed, that they could not have renewed settlement negotiations based on the announcement that the Association had settled with Escadote (an announcement made before the presentation of the remaining claims against the Developer and Contractor to the jury).

For these reasons, there was no overlapping or duplicate recovery beyond the $500.00 allocated to the compensatory damages, and no windfall inherent in the recovery of legal fees by Escadote against the Association on the Association’s unique statutory obligation to pay attorney’s fees. We reverse the order granting the defendants’ motion for a collateral set-off of $375,000.00, and remand for the entry of an order granting that motion to the limited extent of $500.00.

B. Prejudgment Interest

We affirm the trial court’s denial of Escadote’s motion for prejudgment interest on the amount of the set-off, with such interest commencing on the date of loss established for other compensatory damages, through the date of the jury verdict (as was allowed for the amounts awarded by the jury on the claims against the Developer and Contractor). Such an award of prejudgment interest is inappropriate, because Escadote settled with the Association and issued a release that was all-inclusive as of the date of the settlement. Escadote did not carve out or preserve any claim for prejudgment interest antedating the settlement and payment. To the contrary, Escadote accepted a liquidated sum for its claims asserted against the Association, and this included any additional sum for prejudgment interest. See AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Gelpi, 12 So.3d 783, 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). We thus affirm the trial court’s denial of Escadote’s claim for prejudgment interest on the amount of the set-off (though on remand prejudgment interest will be payable on the jüry verdict amount as reduced by $500.00 rather than $375,000.00).

III. Conclusion

We reverse the Order on Defendant’s Motion for Collateral Set-Off, and remand the case to the trial court for a reduction of the set-off amount to $500.00 and the entry of an amended final judgment against the Developer and the Contractor reflecting that reduction (effective as of the date of the jury verdict). We affirm the trial court’s order denying prejudgment interest on the amount of the settlement proceeds recovered by Escadote from the Association to be applied as a reduced setoff.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

SUAREZ, C.J., concurs.

SHEPHERD, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in Part II.B of the majority opinion, holding that pre-judgment interest on the amount of the settlement proceeds recovered by Escadote I Corp. from Ocean Three Condominium Association should be calculated from the date of the settlement. However, I respectfully dissent from Part II.A, in which the majority reverses the order of the trial court setting off the full $875,000 settlement sum against the jury verdict based upon a private agreement between the parties about which we know nothing, not even the date the deal was struck. In fact, the only written evidence the parties deigned to supply this court confirming their settlement is a general release signed by Eseadote I more than thirty days after the end of the trial in which Eseadote I acknowledged “receipt” of the an undifferentiated $375,000 in consideration of the release.

On the record as we have it, we cannot decipher why the trial court ruled as it did. Although the settlement agreement was exhibited to the trial judge at the hearing on the motion for collateral set-off, Esea-dote elected not to trust this court with a copy of this all-important document “because of concerns regarding confidentiality.” Not only that, we also are not favored with a transcript of the hearing on the Developer’s and Contractor’s joint motion for set off. It may be that the facts as they unfolded at the hearing revealed the apportionment was an afterthought. See Alexander v. Seaquest, Inc., 575 So.2d 765 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (“[T]he apportionment of a settlement comes too late if done after the jury verdict because the non-settling tortfeasors lose their right to settle, thus frustrating the purpose of section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes 1987.”). It may be the hearing revealed that the apportionment was not reached as a result of an arms-length negotiation, that the amounts of the respective allocations could not be substantiated, or that it was executed after the general release and therefore unenforceable. It seems apparent on the record as we have it that it is unlikely the Association had any particular interest or care in whether or how the settlement amount was allocated. All we have from the trial court on the motion and hearing thereon is a one-line trial court order stating that the motion for collateral set-off is “granted.”

Eseadote has the burden of demonstrating error in the record of the proceedings. All we know from the record in this case is that at some unknown time the condominium unit owner and its governing body made a private agreement to allocate $375,000 in settlement funds, $500 to “damages” and $374,500 to attorney’s fees. Eseadote I and the Association agree that at least some part of the settlement proceeds must be assigned to the defendants’ joint and several liability to Eseadote I. Where an apportionment agreement is unenforceable, the entire amount of the settlement is set off against the jury verdict. See Dionese v. City of West Palm Beach, 500 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 1987). Eseadote I has not brought us a sufficient record to overturn the decision of the trial court. For this reason, I respectfully dissent from Part II.A of the majority opinion.

      . Escadote's claim against the Association (Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint) alleged a breach of the Association’s duty to maintain and repair common elements under section 718.113, Florida Statutes (2007).

      . To address a concern expressed in the dissent, the confidentiality of the settlement agreement was recognized and consented to by the appellees. In footnote 2 of the Developer’s and Contractor’s memorandum in support of their motion for set-off, they acknowledged that "[t]he Settlement Agreement was produced by Plaintiff’s counsel to Defendants’ counsel and is referred to in this Memorandum. However, the Settlement Agreement contains a confidentiality provision that prohibits it from being filed with the Court. As a result, Defendants have not attached the Settlement Agreement to this Memorandum.” In short, both sides acknowledged the pertinent allocation provision (including the amounts allocated to each claim) within the Escadote-Association agreement, but they agreed not to file the agreement itself.

      . In interrogatory responses in August 2009, Escadote listed its attorney’s fees through May 31, 2009, as $496,371.40. In its pretrial compliance filing a month before trial, Esca-dote disclosed attorney's fees of $741,000.00.

      . Section 718.303, Florida Statutes (2010), provides for an award of legal fees to the prevailing party in litigation between an association and a unit owner.

      . By virtue of our reduction of the allowable set-off to $500.00, this issue on appeal becomes far less consequential.

      . The writer hopes he can be forgiven if he takes offense at Escadote’s lack of trust in the ability of this court to maintain confidentiality of documents submitted to us on appeal. The courts of this state regularly receive documents, and in certain types of cases complete case files, under seal.


text:
    Pablo MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3773
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2016

      Pablo Martinez, Graceville, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. Graham v. State, 207 So.3d 135, 2016 WL 4566059, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S359 (Fla. Sept. 1, 2016).

BERGER, LAMBERT, and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.