author:
PER CURIAM. LAWSON, J.,
      POLSTON, J.,

text:
    Donte Jermaine HALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Donte Jermaine Hall, Petitioner, v. Julie L. Jones, etc., Respondent.
    No. SC14-2225
    No. SC15-859
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [June 15, 2017]

      Ali Andrew Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant/Petitioner
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Tayo Popoola, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellee/Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

Donte Jermaine Hall appeals the denial of his postconviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habe-as corpus. As explained below, we affirm the denial of his postconviction guilt phase claims, deny his habeas guilt phase claims, but vacate his death sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase,

I. BACKGROUND

Hall was convicted and sentenced to death for the 2006 murder of Anthony Bernard Blunt. On direct appeal, this Court described the background of this case as follows:

The evidence at trial revealed that on September 8, 2006, 22-year-old Hall learned that his girlfriend, 18-year-old Angel Glenn, had been hired to dance and strip at a house party that night. Angel had been told she would make a lot of money for dancing, and Hall told Angel that he planned to rob the attendees of the party. Hall, along with his twin brother, Dante, and acquaintances Shoo-Shoo and Pig, followed Angel and her two fellow dancers from Orlando to the party in Eustis. At the party, several men were present, drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana, and using ecstasy. The girls entered the house, went into a back room, took ecstasy pills, and began changing clothes. Hall stayed in communication with Angel via cell phone while she was in the room, asking her how many men were in the house, whether there were guns in the house, and when the party would begin. After some delay, music began playing and the girls began dancing and stripping.
Within approximately five or ten minutes, Hall entered the house, carrying an assault rifle and saying he was going to “make this choppa dance.” Hall was followed by Dante, Shoo-Shoo, and Pig, and all four men were wearing dark clothing and had their faces partially covered. They were carrying handguns and assault rifles. The attendees of the party, as well as the three dancers, gathered in the living room.
The intruders started shooting, and the lights went out. The gunmen demanded money and told the partygoers to get down on the ground, and the partygoers began taking off their jewelry and handing it to the gunmen. The seized items included gold chains, bracelets, watches, and a Gucci bag containing about $1500 in cash.
Eyewitness testimony established that Hall was the first to fire a gun and that Hall did most of the talking. In order to stop the shooting and distract the gunmen, partygoer Keson Evans stated that there was a- box of money in the back room.'Hall went to'the back room but found the door locked; he returned to the living room and fired his gun again, fatally-shooting Evans in the head.
The four gunmen were in the house for ten minutes or less. During that time, Willie “Jay” Shelton, William Robinson, Joshua Daniel, Keson Evans, and Anthony Blunt were each shot. Daniel was the first to be shot, and he suffered several gunshot wounds to his hands, thighs, abdomen, and torso. Later, after being rushed to the hospital, Daniel spent eighteen hours in surgery to remove the bullets and treat his approximately twenty entrance and exit wounds, which were very severe but ultimately nonfatal. Shelton was shot once in the stomach and once in the forearm. His injuries caused him to be hospitalized for two years. Robinson was shot in the stomach and- in the shoulder. Blunt was fatally shot in his chest, right thigh, and left hand. Evans was shot in the face and the right thigh and died as a result.' ■
The gunmen fled the housé immediately after Evans was shot. The three women then left the house together with Angel driving them back to Orlando. Hall called Angel, asking her whether the women were okay and telling them to calm down. Hall and Angel arranged to meet at a gas station on a major road leading from Eustis back to Orlando. At the gas station, Hall got out of Dante’s car and into Angel’s car, carrying a gun and stolen property from the robbery. During the car ride, Hall stated that he ■was angry because he did not get enough money and the robbery did not go as he had planned. Angel dropped Hall off at his mother’s house, where he was living at the time.
The next morning, Angel went to Hall’s mother’s house to see him at his request. Twin brother Dante and Hall’s mother were also home. Dante was pull•ing jewelry from the robbery out of a Gucci bag, and the twins discussed what they would do with the jewelry, how much it was worth, and how they would make money off of it. Hall gave some of the jewelry to Dante’s girlfriend and instructed her to pawn it. Some of the robbery victims later identified jewelry that had been pawned, and Angel identified the same jewelry as jewelry she had seen in Hall’s possession at his mother’s house the day after the robbery.
The following day, Dante went to the hotel where Hall, Angel,, and Angel’s one-year-old son were staying and discussed with Hall the logistics of pawning the jewelry from the robbery. The twin brothers left the hotel together with most of the jewelry. Hall also gave Angel a few of pieces of jewelry to pawn, for which she received $1,000 that she then .gave to Hall. Over the next several days, Hall made phone calls to Shoo-Shoo and Pig to discuss the jewelry and how the proceeds would be divided.
Angel was soon arrested for pawning the stolen jewelry and was in jail.for several weeks, during which time she lied to police.about the events of September 9 because she was frightened for her family’s wellbeing. Meanwhile, one ■of.the other dancers from the party, Nikita Jackson, told police what had happened the night of the robbery and murders. Eventually,. Angel also admitted to-the police what had happened and agreed to testify against Hall.
During the penalty phase, the court received expert testimony regarding Hall’s mental health. Two psychologists testified that Hall was of very low intelligence with an IQ in the borderline range of intellectual abilities. Both psychologists also testified that Hall had some history of substance abuse.
Using special verdict forms, the.jury voted unanimously that three aggravating circumstances were established beyond a reasonable doubt for the murders of Anthony Blunt and Keson Evans: (1) that Hall had a prior violent felony conviction; (2) that he knowingly created a great risk of death to many people; and (3) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain. Additionally, the jury voted eleven to one that the murder of Anthony Blunt was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.[] The jury voted eight to four in favor of a death sentence for the murder of Blunt and recommended a life sentence for the murder of Evans.
After conducting a Spencer [v. State, 691 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 1996) ] hearing, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation of death for the murder of Anthony Blunt, concluding that the four aggravating factors outweighed several mitigating factors. Specifically, the trial court found the following aggravates for Blunt’s murder: (1) Hall was contemporaneously convicted of armed burglary, armed robbery, attempted felony murder of Willie Shelton, attempted felony murder of Joshua Daniel, and first-degree murder of Keson Evans (some weight); (2) Hall created a great risk of death to many people (great weight); (3) Hall committed the murder for pecuniary gain (great weight); and (4) Hall committed the murder of Blunt in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner (great weight). The trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance: Hall’s capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially ' impaired (some weight). The court also found the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) Hall demonstrated appropriate courtroom behavior (minimal weight); (2) Hall’s family background included generational drug and alcohol use (some weight); (3) Hall’s family background included generational criminal behavior (some weight); (4) Hall did not grow up with good role models (some weight); (5) Hall grew up in a dangerous neighborhood that reinforced drug use (some weight); (6) Hall may have been abused as a child (minimal weight); (7) Hall had many different living arrangements as a child (minimal weight); (8) Hall suffered from attention deficit disorder and is considered borderline mentally retarded (some weight); and (9) Hall has an extensive history of drug ■ and alcohol abuse (minimal weight).

Hall v. State, 87 So.3d 667, 669-71 (Fla. 2012) (footnote omitted).

On October 16, 2013, Hall filed a motion for postconviction relief. Hall appeals the denial of that motion and also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Hall argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of evidence of uncharged offenses. Specifically, Hall contends that the State’s witness, Glenn, stated that Hall and others “do this kind of stuff,”. and this was a reference that Hall commits robbery or murder on a regular basis and trial counsel should have objected to that testimony. Hall also takes issue with statements made during the State’s closing argument, also allegedly referring to uncharged crimes. However, this Court affirms the trial court’s denial of relief.

Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court explained that two requirements must be met for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful:

First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness arid reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.

Bolin v. State, 41 So.3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).

Regarding the deficiency prong of Strickland, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Further, the defendant carries the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)).

Regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, ‘absent the [deficient performance], the fact-finder would have [had] a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’” Dennis v. State, 109 So.3d 680, 690 (Fla. 2012)) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052). “A reasonable probability is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Henry v. State, 948 So.2d 609, 617 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052).

“Because both prongs of Strickland present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Dennis, 109 So.3d at 690.

In this case, Hall has not demonstrated that counsel was deficient. Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he made a reasonable strategic decision to not object during Glenn’s testimony and the cited portion of the State’s closing argument. Specifically, trial counsel explained that he made a decision not to object because he did not want to bring this issue to the jury’s attention. Additionally, trial counsel explained during his testimony that “[Glenn] didn’t reference other uncharged robberies[, s]he wasn’t that specific and [trial counsel] didn’t want her to get any more specific than she was.” Choosing not to object and draw the jury’s attention to this area of the testimony was not outside the “broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards.” Bolin, 41 So.3d at 155 (quoting Maxwell, 490 So.2d at 932). Therefore, Hall has failed to demonstrate deficiency.

Additionally, Hall has not demonstrated prejudice. The challenged phrases “do this kind of stuff’ and “why do you do this” do not clearly reference uncharged crimes as Hall contends. As the trial court concluded, “Glenn’s testimony on this issue was not a feature of the trial nor was it a clear indication that [Hall] had committed any collateral offenses.” In the context of the testimony; these statements .could also simply be referring to the actual incident and criminal acts that are the subject of that proceeding. Also, the record demonstrates that the State did not question or elicit testimony from Glenn regarding uncharged crimes, and during closing argument, the State did not allude to or argue any uncharged crimes or propensity towards criminal activity. Further, as trial counsel understood it and as the trial court noted,. “Glenn spoke in a colloquial dialect[,] her testimony did not have verb-tense agreement, [and] she tended to mix up verbs and words.” Therefore, there is not “a reasonable probability that, ‘absent the [remarks], the factfinder would have [had] a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’ ” Dennis, 109 So.3d at 690 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In other words, our confidence in the outcome is not undermined. See id.

Accordingly, because Hall has failed to establish deficiency and prejudice, we affirm the trial court’s ■ denial of this claim.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel & Cumulative Error

In his habeas petition, Hall argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim involving the introduction of evidence of uncharged crimes on direct appeal. However, this claim is repetitive of the guilt phase issue raised in his appeal of his postconviction motion and is procedurally barred. See Hardwick v. Dugger, 648 So.2d 100, 105 (Fla. 1994) (“[Habeas corpus petitions are not to be used for additional appeals on questions which could have been, should have been, or were raised on appeal or in a rule 3.850 motion, or on matters that were not objected to at trial.” (quoting Parker v. Dugger, 550 So.2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989))). Moreover, for the reasons explained above, this claim is without merit, and appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise this non-meritorious claims on direct appeal. See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So.2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000). Therefore, we deny relief.

Additionally, in the appeal of the denial of his postconviction motion as well as in his habeas petition, Hall claims that he was denied a fundamentally fair trial based on cumulative error. “However, where the individual claims of error alleged are either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error also necessarily fails.” Israel v. State, 985 So.2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008) (citing Parker v. State, 904 So.2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2005)). Therefore, we affirm the summary denial of this claim and also deny habeas relief.

C. Hurst

Finally, we consider whether Hall is entitled to relief after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). Because the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eight to four, we conclude that Hall’s death sentence violates Hurst. See Kopsho v. State, 209 So.3d 568, 570 (Fla. 2017). We must then consider whether the Hurst error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:

The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.

Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40, 68 (Fla. 2016) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)), cert. denied, No. 16-998, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246, 2017 WL 635999 (U.S. May 22, 2017).

Because the jury in this case recommended death by a vote of eight to four, “we cannot determine that the jury unanimously found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigation.” Kopsho, 209 So.3d at 570. “We can only determine that the jury did not unanimously recommend a sentence of death.” Id. Therefore, because we cannot say that there is no possibility that the error did not contribute to the sentence, the error in Hall’s sentencing was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, we vacate the death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase. See Hurst, 202 So.3d at 69.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Hall’s posteonviction guilt phase claims, deny his guilt phase habeas claims, vacate his death sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion.

POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which CANADY, J., concurs.

LAWSON, J.,

concurring specially.

See Okafor v. State, No. SC15-2136, — So.3d -, 2017 WL 2481266, slip op. at 15 (Fla. June 8, 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially).

POLSTON, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority’s decision except its vacating of the death sentence pursuant to Hurst.

CANADY, J., concurs.

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. Because we remand for a new penalty phase, we do not address Hall’s penalty phase claims.

      . The State had not sought the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravate in regard to the murder of Keson Evans.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Anthony J. FAILS, Petitioner, v. Julie L. JONES, etc., Respondent.
    No. SC17-327
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [June 15, 2017]
    Original Proceeding—Habeas. Corpus
    Anthony J. Fails, pro se, Punta Gorda, Florida, for Petitioner
    No appearance for Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

Anthony' J. Fails, ah inmate in state custody, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court. His petition in this case is the twenty-seventh extraordinary writ petition or notice he-.has filed with this Court since 2008. It is..the thirteenth extraordinary writ petition or notice he has filed pertaining to -Escambia County Circuit ■ Court case number 172Q04CF003733XXXAXX. We dismissed Fails’ petition in this case and, in doing so, expressly, retained jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against him. Fails v. Jones, No. SC17-327, 2017 WL 1046225 (Fla. Mar. 20, 2017) (dismissing habeas petition and directing Fails to show cause why pro se filing restrictions should not be imposed); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.410(a) (Sanctions; Court’s Motion).

Fails was convicted in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, in and for Escambia County, Florida, in case number 172004CF003733XXXAXX, of attempted sexual. battery and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced in November' 2005 to fifteen years’ imprisonment on ’each count. All of Fails’ -filings in -this Court seeking to challenge these convictions and sentences have been frivolous, devoid of merit; or inappropriate for consideration by this Court. In addition to those filings specifically challenging his convictions and sentences in case number 172004CF003733XXXAXX, Fails has initiated fourteen other proceedings in this Court. We have never granted Fails the relief sought by him in any of his filings.

Fails’ habeas petition in this case is no exception. In it, Fails challenged his convictions in case number 172004CF003733XXXAXX, arguing that, he was wrongfully convicted based on an invalid charging information and,improper jury instructions. The petition raised claims that could have or should have been raised ,at trial and, if properly preserved, on direct appeal in his criminal case. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(c) (stating that relief on such claims is unauthorized). Because we determined that the relief Fails sought was unauthorized, we dismissed the petition pursuant to Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 2004), and in accordance with State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1999), we directed Fails to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any future pro se requests for relief in this Court pertaining to case number 172004CF003733XXXAXX. Subsequent to the issuance of the order to show cause, Fails filed eight pleadings. In his response to the show cause order, Fails continued to raise the same arguments raised in his previous petitions before this Court concerning his convictions. He argued that his convictions constituted a manifest injustice and that as a result, this Court should vacate his convictions. Upon due consideration of Fails’ response, we find that his arguments are without merit.

This Court has exercised its inherent authority to sanction litigants who abuse the judicial process and burden its limited resources with repeated requests for relief that are either frivolous or devoid of merit. E.g., Hastings v. State, 79 So.3d 739, 742 (Fla. 2011); Johnson v. Rundle, 59 So.3d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 2011). Through his persistent filing of frivolous or meritless requests for relief, Fails has abused the judicial process and burdened this Court’s limited judicial resources. Fails’ response to this Court’s order to show cause failed to offer any justification for his abuse or to express regret for his repeated misuse of this Court’s resources. His seven filings in addition to his response further indicate that Fails does not appreciate or respect the judicial process or this Court’s limited judicial resources. We are therefore convinced 'that if not restrained, Fails will continue to abuse the judicial process and burden this Court with frivolous and mer-itless filings pertaining to circuit court case number 172004CF003733XXXAXX.

Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Anthony J. Fails that pertain to case number 172004CF003733XXXAXX, unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. Under the sanction herein imposed, Fails may petition this Court about his convictions or sentences in case number 172004CF003733XXXAXX only when such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar whenever such counsel determines that the proceeding may have merit and can be filed in good faith.

Additionally, we find that the petition filed by Anthony J. Fails in this case is a frivolous proceeding brought before this Court by a state prisoner. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). Consistent with section 944.279(1), Florida Statutes (2016), we direct the Clerk of this Court to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the Florida Department of Corrections’ institution or facility where Fails is incarcerated. See Steele v. State, 14 So.3d 221, 224 (Fla. 2009).

All other pending motions and requests for relief are hereby denied. No motion for rehearing or clarification will be entertained by the Court.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.

      . See Fails v. Jones, No. SC16-1248, 2016 WL 4124117 (Fla. July 25, 2016) (habeas petition transferred to circuit court); Fails v. Jones, No. SC16-917, 2016 WL 3215660 (Fla. June 9, 2016) (habeas petition dismissed as unauthorized); Fails v. Jones, No. SC16-495, 2016 WL 2586137 (Fla. May 4, 2016) (habeas petition dismissed as unauthorized); Fails v. Jones, 192 So.3d 36 (Fla. 2015), (table) (habeas petition dismissed); Fails v. Jones, 171 So.3d 115 (Fla. 2015) (table) (habeas petition denied); Fails v. Jones, 168 So.3d 224 (Fla. 2015) (table) (habeas petition dismissed as unauthorized); Fails v. State, No. SC13-2144 (Fla. Apr. 10, 2014) (mandamus petition transferred to the district court); Fails v. State, 123 So.3d 557 (Fla. 2013) (table) (mandamus petition voluntarily dismissed); Fails v. State, 63 So.3d 748 (Fla. 2011) (table) (mandamus petition dismissed); Fails v. State, 59 So.3d 108 (Fla. 2011), (table) (mandamus petition dismissed); Fails v. McNeil, 37 So.3d 846 (Fla. 2010) (table) (habeas petition dismissed as unauthorized); Fails v. State, 4 So.3d 1220 (Fla. 2009) (table) (mandamus petition denied).

      . See Fails v. State, No. SC17-320, 2017 WL 749038 (Fla. Feb. 27, 2017) (petition for review dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Fails v. Reid, No. SC16-2226, 2017 WL 243392 (Fla. Jan. 20, 2017) (mandamus petition denied); Fails v. Jones, No. SC16-1613, 2016 WL 5405642 (Fla. Sept. 28, 2016) (habeas petition denied as procedurally barred); Fails v. Haas, 173 So.3d 962 (Fla. 2015) (table) (mandamus petition dismissed); Fails v. State, 153 So.3d 904 (Fla. 2014) (table) (mandamus petition dismissed); Fails v. Green, 147 So.3d 522 (Fla. 2014) (table) (petition for review dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Fails v. Harris, 145 So.3d 823 (Fla. 2014) (table) (petition for review denied); Fails v. Fla. Bar, 43 So.3d 690 (Fla. 2010). (table) (mandamus petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Fails v. State, 46 So.3d 47 (Fla. 2010) (table) (mandamus petition dismissed); Fails v. State, 51 So.3d 1154 (Fla. 2010) (table) (mandamus petition dismissed as moot); Fails v. State, 36 So.3d 83 (Fla. 2010) (table) (mandamus petition dismissed); Fails v. McNeil, No. SC09-4 (Fla. Jan. 15, 2009) (habeas petition transferred to circuit court); Fails v. State, 998 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 2008) (table) (petition for review dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Fails v. State, 994 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 2008) (table) (notice of appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).

      . The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[e]veiy paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s limited resources. A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.” In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109 S.Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989).


author: LEWIS, J.

text:
    TREASURE COAST MARINA, LC, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. The CITY OF FORT PIERCE, Florida, etc., et al., Respondents.
    No. SC16-1107
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [June 15, 2017]
    Brigid F. Cech Samóle of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Jerry Stouck of Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Washington, District of Columbia, for Petitioners
    Robert V. Schwerer and James T. Walker of Hayskar, Walker, Schwerer, Dundas & McCain, P.A., Fort Pierce, Florida, for Respondents City of Fort Pierce and Fort Pierce Redevelopment Agency
    Loren E. Levy and Jon F. Morris of The Levy Law Firm, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent Ken Pruitt, St. Lucie County Property Appraiser
    Harry Morrison, Jr., and Kraig Conn of Florida League of Cities, Tallahassee, Florida; and Benjamin K. Phipps of Phipps & Howell, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida League of Cities
   LEWIS, J.

This case is before the Court for 'review of the question certified in the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in City of Fort Pierce v. Treasure Coast Marina, LC, 195 So.3d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Our review involves consideration of the exemption from ad valorem taxation contained in article VII, section 3(a), of the Florida Constitution that applies to property owned and used exclusively by municipalities for municipal or public purposes. Specifically, in Treasure Coast Marina, the district court ruled upon the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:

IN LIGHT OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE V. CITY OF GAINESVILLE, 918 So.2d 250 (Fla. 2005), DOES A MUNICIPALLY OWNED AND OPERATED MARINA STILL QUALIFY AS A TRADITIONALLY EXEMPT “MUNICIPAL OR PUBLIC PURPOSE” UNDER ARTICLE VII, SECTION 3(a) OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?

Id. at 1147. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer this question in the affirmative and approve the decision below.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case commenced on October 28, 2011, when the owners of a private marina filed a complaint challenging the tax-exempt status of the Fort Pierce City Marina and the Fisherman’s Wharf Marina. Because the marinas were respectively owned by the City of Fort Pierce and the Fort Pierce Redevelopment Agency, the complaint was filed against those entities (collectively “the City”); the St. Lucie County Tax Appraiser (the Property Appraiser); and the Executive Director of the Florida Department of Revenue (the Department of Revenue). The plaintiffs who filed the complaint, Treasure Coast Marina, LC; Raincross Holdings, LC; and Riverfront Developers, LC (collectively “Riverfront”); own and operate a private marina in Fort Pierce which is subject to ad valorem taxation. Of relevance here, Riverfront’s amended complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that the Property Appraiser unconstitutionally granted ad valorem tax exemptions during tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013 to the two marina properties owned and operated by the City.

Following discovery, cross-motions for final summary judgment were filed and the parties conceded that there were no genuine issues of material fact. The trial court ruled in favor of Riverfront, concluding that neither of the City marinas qualified for the constitutional tax exemption. To reach this conclusion, the trial court determined that both City marina properties at issue were not used for a “municipal or public purpose,” and therefore, in its view the Property Appraiser unconstitutionally granted the exemptions at issue. The trial court applied an exceedingly nar-' row standard because it believed that we announced a new legal standard and discarded years of precedent when we issued our decision in Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250.

The City and Property Appraiser jointly appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. On appeal, the Fourth District reversed. Treasure Coast Marina, 195 So.3d at 1147. The Fourth District reasoned that this Court in Gainesville “did not change the legal standard for municipal purpose under article VII, section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution, and that it used the same definition of municipal or public purpose as in prior court opinions. Under this definition, municipal marinas are traditionally considered exempt from taxation,” Id. at 1142-43. The district court further reasoned that:

[t]he marinas are open to public use, are exclusively owned and operated by the City, and provide recreation for local residents and support the local economy by attracting rion-local residents.... Thus, not only do the City’s marinas serve a purpose that has been repeatedly and explicitly recognized as a “municipal or public purpose,” they also operate specifically “for the comfort, convenience, safety, and happiness of the municipality’s citizens[,]” and - serve the public purpose of developing recreational facilities in “increas[ing] trade by attracting tourists and [providing] recreation for the citizens.”

Id. at 1146-47 (internal citations omitted). Noting the large boating community in Florida and the economic impact of tax exemptions for municipal marinas, the district court certified -the question to this Court. Id. at 1147. This review follows.

ANALYSIS

We embark on our voyage by looking to the underlying constitutional provisions at issue, and because this case involves questions of constitutional law, our review is de novo. See Lewis v. Leon Cty., 73 So.3d 151, 153 (Fla. 2011); The first provision of note is contained in article VII, section 4, of the Florida Constitution, and it specifically requires that real property be subject to ad valorem taxation with certain exceptions that do not apply here:

By general law regulations shall be prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation ....

Art. VII, § 4, Fla. Const. However, our Constitution also recognizes that certain properties owned and used exclusively by municipalities are constitutionally exempt from ad valorem taxation, pursuant to article VII, section 3(a), which provides in pertinent part:

All property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

Art. VII, § 3(a), Fla. Const.

Seeking to eject the City’s marinas from the safe harbor provided by that constitutional language, Riverfront attempts to transform the ripples from our decision in Gainesville into a landscape-altering tempest. Specifically, in challenging the exemptions historically applied to the City Marina and the Fisherman’s Wharf Marina, Riverfront contends that in Gainesville we announced an entirely new, more restrictive standard for the application of the constitutional exemption. While Riverfront acknowledges that the definition of “municipal or public purpose” has not changed, it asserts that the Gainesville' majority opinion changed application of the test by focusing on the word “essential.” According to Riverfront, our focus on the word “essential” in Gainesville was new and represents a different and more narrow application of the tax exemption than is reflected in prior cases, which Riverfront considers to be an indication that prior precedent is no longer relevant.

Although Riverfront’s misplaced reliance on Gainesville is understandable given the nature of the facts, our discussion in Gainesville, .and the fact-that Gainesville emanated from this Court—our state’s highest" court—Riverfront loses its bearings by extrapolating Gainesville beyond its narrow confines onto areas of law that have been well-settled for years. In reality, our decision in Gainesville was no more than a passing wave in the vast ocean of ad valorem taxation precedent. ■

As evidence of this truth, in Gainesville we explicitly noted the distinct circumstances' we were reviewing. First, in Gainesville we did not have before us an as-applied challenge to the issuance of an exemption, but rather, a facial challenge to a statute imposing ad valorem taxes on a municipality. 918 So.2d at 253. Thus, our review was limited to determining whether there were any circumstances under which the statute could be upheld. Id. at 256, 265. The statute in question authorized municipalities to provide telecommunications services for the first time but conditioned that authorization on a municipality paying ad valorem taxes on the relevant properties. See id. at 253-54. Prior to the statute authorizing municipalities to provide telecommunications services for the first time ever, the Public Service Commission was not authorized to issue such permits to a municipality. See id. Therefore, we recognized a second distinction by explicitly noting in Gainesville that we were analyzing the exemption in the context of a service that has historically been provided by the private sector rather than any traditional municipal function. Id. at 265. This critical distinction between telecommunication services and traditional municipal functions, such as electric services, housing, and parks, signals both that Gainesville applies to a limited circumstance and that the cases addressing those traditional municipal functions remain good law.

In fact, contrary to Riverfront’s understanding, our discussion in Gainesville actually further supports the continued vitality of the traditional municipal function course plotted by our precedent. For instance, as Riverfront acknowledges, in Gainesville we recognized that although the constitutional tax exemption provision was revised from its counterpart contained in the 1885 Constitution to curb perceived abuses in favor of private operators seeking a profit, that end was not advanced by changing the definition of “municipal or public purposes,” but rather by requiring ownership and use by the municipality. Id. at 261 (“Thus, although the framers of article VII, section 3(a) sought to limit the holding in Daytona Beach Racing[ & Recreational Facilities District v. Paul, 179 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1965) ], they did so by requiring both ownership and exclusive use of the property by the municipality rather than by narrowing the definition of municipal purposes.” (emphasis added)). Further, we reaffirmed at length that the phrase “municipal or public purposes” remains equal to that under prior precedent construing the terms, both under the 1885 Constitution and the 1968 Constitution:

In the absence of any indication in the Constitution to the contrary, we conclude that the term “municipal or public purposes” should be construed in accordance with the definition utilized by the Court in its prior decisions on the constitutional tax exemption. There is nothing in the language of article VII, section 3(a) that evinces an intent to create a more restrictive definition of “municipal or public purposes” for property that is owned and used exclusively by the municipality than the definition applied to “municipal purposes” under the 1885 Constitution in McDavid[] and Saunders[] through the 1968 adoption of the current provision. Although McDavid and Saunders rested at least in part on judicial deference to the Legislature’s assessment of what type of activity served municipal purposes, we have no basis to conclude that a narrower construction was intended when the self-executing exemption was included in the 1968 Constitution. To the contrary, had the framers of article VII, section 3(a) intended to narrow the exemption, they could have specifically defined “municipal or public purposes,” or used different terms altogether.
... As stated by one observer shortly after the adoption of the 1968 Constitution, cases construing the constitutional municipal purposes exemption and the statutory public purposes exemption “continue to be good law even after the adoption of the new constitution.” Robert F. Williams, Note, Property Tax Exemptions Under Article VII, Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution of 1968, 21 U. Fla. L. Rev. 641, 643 (1969).
We therefore conclude that the “municipal or public purposes” for which municipally owned property must be exclusively used in article VII, section 3(a) to qualify for an ád valorem tax exemption encompass activities that are essential to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the people within the municipality.

Id. at 263-64 (emphasis added). Thus, as all parties here agree, “municipal or public purposes” in the constitutional tax exemption context—both before and after Gainesville—“encompass activities that are essential to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the people within the municipality.” Id. at 264.

In performing a facial -constitutionality analysis in Gainesville and applying that definition of “municipal or public purposes,” we focused on the word “essential,” noting that the term involves the concept of great need or necessity:

In putting this definition into practice, we focus on the word “essential,” which is generally defined as something basic, necessary, or indispensable. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 396 (10th ed. 1999). For example, an “essential element” is one on which proof is required in order to establish a legal claim or criminal offense. See, e.g., Rubano v. Dep’t of Transp., 656 So.2d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 1995) (“Proof that the governmental body has effected a taking of the property is an essential element of an inverse condemnation action.”); Randall v. State, 760 So.2d 892, 901 (Fla. 2000) (“[PJremeditation is the essential element that distinguishes first-degree murder from second-degree murder.”). Thus, inherent in the word essential is the concept of great need or necessity.

Id. Riverfront seizes on this singular passage and our recognition of certain distinctions of prior precedent to conclude that we narrowed the legal standard for municipal or public purpose tax exemptions, suggesting that the standard requires indispensability and a lack of private sector competition.

However, the very next two paragraphs in Gainesville indicate that Riverfront reads too much into that language. Instead of discarding our prior precedent, we embraced ⅜ and noted that “a .thread of necessity also runs through .the precedent concerning tax exemptions for municipal use of municipally owned property that we have discussed.” Id.

Accordingly, in Gainesville, we specifically distinguished telecommunication services from “electrical power and public parks” because “telecommunication services have historically been provided by the private sector.” Id. at 265. Further reflecting this distinction, we noted that “[t]he presumption underlying [City of Sarasota v. Mikos, 374 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1979)], that vacant land owned by a municipality is héld for a public purpose, would be inappropriate for municipally owned property used by the municipality to engage in a business venture to provide services in competition with the private sec-, tor.” Id. at 261 n.12. Ultimately, in the next paragraphs we explained why traditional municipal functions, such as providing public housing, electricity, and parks are presumed to satisfy the -“essential” component of a “municipal or public purpose”:

In McDavid, which held a tax exemption for a public housing facility valid, the Legislature had declared that housing conditions were “a menace to the health, safety, and morals of the people ... necessitating] excessive expenditures for crime and fire prevention, health, and welfare,” and that public safety “demand[ed]” replacement of slums by “sanitary and better housing facilities.” In upholding the tax exemption for property owned by a municipal power company located in another county in Saunders, we recognized that the Legislature “was doubtless well aware of the need for light, heat and power by those areas outside of municipalities.” Similarly, in Ford,[] this Court held that the production of electricity by a municipality’s power company served a municipal purpose. Such services are essential in that municipally owned power companies have legally protected monopolies within their territorial boundaries, and have traditionally provided these services. Finally, the tax-exempt status upheld in Mikos for vacant land held by a municipality to preserve natural open spaces or for future needs is consistent, with the traditional municipal function of providing parks for the municipal population. Cf. City of Miami Beach v. Hogan, 63 So.2d 493, 495 (Fla. 1953) (stating that “[i]n all heavily populated municipalities the police power should be exercised by municipal officials to afford all of the people light, air, [and] ah opportunity for recreation”).

Id. at 264-65 (some internal citations omitted). Therefore, in Gainesville we did not announce a new standard, but rather simply recognized, a critical distinction between traditional municipal functions- and functions historically provided- by the private sector for purposes of the “municipal or public purposes” constitutional tax exemption.

Our district courts have had" no trouble recognizing this critical distinction. In Zingale v. Crossings at Fleming Island Community Development District, the First District correctly rejected the contention that Gainesville altered—let alone narrowed—the test for a “municipal or public purpose.” Zingale, 960 So.2d 20, 24-25 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), decision quashed sub nom. Crossings at Fleming Island Cmty. Dev. Dist. v. Echeverri, 991 So.2d 793 (Fla. 2008). At the time, the district court recognized that our decision in Gainesville had noted that municipalities traditionally provide parks and opportunity for recreation, but also that telecommunication services have been historically prpvided by the private sector. Id. at 25. Thus, the Zingale court affirmed the application of the constitutional exemption to a “golf course, swimming pools, tennis, courts, and playgrounds.” Id, at 24-25. Likewise, even the two decisions upon which Riverfront relies do not support its argument. The same year Zingale was decided, the First District once again correctly recognized the distinction in City of Gainesville v. Crapo, noting that this Court made clear in Gainesville that telecommunication services are distinct in that they have traditionally been provided by the private sector. City of Gainesville v. Crapo, 953 So.2d 557, 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Similarly, in CAPFA Capital Corp. 2000A v. Donegan, the Fifth District recognized that in Gainesville we “suggested that certain categories of services which have been traditionally provided by municipalities, such as public housing and utilities, are within the concept [of municipal and public purposes] and thus remain exempt from taxation.” CAPFA, 929 So.2d 569, 572 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Correctly applying the law, the CAPFA court then held that a student housing investment project located in an adjacent county was not tax exempt, specifically noting: “Nor are student housing projects at market prices a traditional service historically provided by municipalities. Such services have typically been provided by the private sector, or the educational institutions themselves.” Id. at 574.

Therefore, our inquiry turns to whether public marinas are traditional municipal functions that are presumed to be tax exempt under’ article VII, section (3)(a). Whilé we have not previously addressed application of this exemption specifically to municipally owned marinas, as the decision below recognized, other district courts have opined on the subject. In Page v. City of Fernandina Beach, the First District considered the tax-exempt status of a marina 'Owned by the City of Fernandina Beach, but operated by a private lessee for private gain. Page, 714 So.2d 1070, 1077 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Due to the lease to a private operator, the First District held that the marina was not entitled to a tax exemption. Id. However, relevant here, the district court opined in dicta that a marina both owned and operated by the municipality would be constitutionally exempt:

Municipal operation of a marina is a legitimate municipal corporate undertaking for the comfort, convenience, safety, and happiness of the municipality’s citizens. Indeed, the uncontradicted expert testimony was that operation of this marina constituted a proper municipal or public function. When a city operates a marina it owns, marina property it has hot leased to a nongovernmental entity is exempt from ad valorem taxation.

Id. at 1076-77 (emphasis added).

Although that portion of Page was dicta, in Islamorada, Village of Islands v. Higgs, the Third District, sitting en banc, expressly approved that reasoning and held that a marina owned and operated by a municipality was exempt. Islamorada, 882 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). In Islamorada, the marina generated revenues that exceeded the marina’s expenses, its customers were both residents and the general public, including out-of-town visitors, and the marina was contained within a recreational facility. Id. at 1010-11. The Islamorada ‘ court’s analysis turned on whether the municipality used,the marina for municipal or public purposes. Id. at 1011. In so analyzing, the district court noted that “the term ‘municipal purpose’ embraces all activities essential to the health, morals, protection and welfare ,of the municipality,” Id. (citing Greater Orlando Aviation Auth. v. Crotty, 775 So.2d 978, 980 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)). It further noted that “municipal functions”, are functions which “specifically and peculiarly promote the comfort, convenience, safety and happiness of the citizens of the municipality rather than the welfare of the general public.” Id. (citing Crotty, 775 So.2d at 980-81). Islamorada also expressly agreed with the First District’s dicta in Page, emphasizing the language, “When a city operates a marina it owns, marina property it has not leased to a nongovernmental entity is exempt from ad valorem taxation.” Id. (citing Page, 714 So.2d at 1076). The Third District concluded Islamorada by noting that the marina fulfills a public purpose, “despite the fact that the Village earns a profit from its operation of the Marina.” Id. We agree and approve the analysis in Islamorada.

Indeed, we have little difficulty in concluding that marinas undoubtedly fall in the same category of traditionally-exempt property occupied by public housing projects, electrical infrastructure, and parks. We perceive at least three different ways in which a nexus is formed between marinas and “municipal or public purposes.”

First, one need not have special training to realize that marinas provide an invaluable contribution to serving the transportation needs of coastal communities dating to the birth of this nation and our state. Prior to January 22, 1912, when the Florida East Coast Railway’s Over-Sea Railroad to Key West was completed, the Florida Straits were only accessible by sea. Reflecting on the importance of marinas and ports, at the time, nearly twenty thousand people lived in Key West. Likewise, the record in this case discloses that the City Marina, although formally established in 1938, traces its roots to various iterations of a town dock on the same site dating back to the early 1900s. Further, Florida’s 1,197 statute miles of coast line, significant contribution to the Intracoastal Waterway, and peninsular shape quickly impress the historic importance of marine transportation in Florida upon even the casual observer.

Second, public marinas also serve municipal or public purposes by ensuring access to the waterfront, which grows more essential by the day as a result of private development. Municipalities across the state have struggled in recent years to protect both a view of and access to the water to the citizenry from the profit-oriented grips of developers seeking to privatize the waterfront through the construction of towering condominium and apartment buildings that block the waterfront from those who do not have the means or simply do not want to live in a condominium.

Third, marinas also serve to advance the recreational needs of a municipality’s citizens. Landlocked citizens may break free from the confines of their yards or apartment complexes and enjoy the magnificent Florida waters through public marinas. Moreover, the fact that not everyone enjoys boating by virtue of the varied and wide-ranging interests that render us human has no bearing on our analysis. Florida courts have repeatedly recognized that similar taste-based recreational activities, such as golf and tennis, are sufficiently essential recreational activities that support application of the constitutional exemption. See, e.g., Zingale, 960 So.2d at 24-26; Sun ’N Lake of Sebring Imp. Dist. v. McIntyre, 800 So.2d 716, 723 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“It is possible that a golf course or tennis courts, owned by a municipality and held open to the public, and not operated in conjunction with a for-profit business, may serve an exclusively public purpose.”).

Furthermore, as the City contends, the Legislature has expressly recognized the importance of the waterfront and the role of public marinas in furthering those interests:

342.07 Recreational and commercial working waterfronts; legislative findings; definitions.—
(1) The Legislature recognizes that there is an important state interest in facilitating boating and other recreational access to the state’s navigable waters. This access is vital to tourists and recreational users and the marine industry in the state, to maintaining or enhancing .the $57 billion economic impact of tourism and the $14 billion economic impact of boating in the state annually, and to ensuring continued access to all residents and visitors to the navigable waters of the state. The Legislature recognizes that there is an-important state interest in maintaining viable water-dependent support facilities, such as public lodging establishments and boat hauling and repairing and commercial fishing facilities, and in maintaining the availability of public access to the navigable waters of the state. The Legislature further recognizes that the waterways of the state are important for engaging in commerce and the transportation of goods and people upon such waterways and that such commerce and transportation is not feasible unless there is access to and from the navigable waters of the state through recreational and commercial working waterfronts.

§ 342.07, Fla. Stat. (2016). Moreover, the importance of public marinas and their nexus to providing transportation and commerce was enshrined in the Florida Constitution when the voters passed the “Assessment of Working Waterfront Property Based' Upon Current Use” amendment in 2008, which is contained in article VII, section 4(j), of the Florida Constitution and provides in pertinent part:

(j)(l) The assessment of the following working waterfront properties shall be based upon the current use of the property:
a. Land used predominantly for commercial fishing purposes;
b. Land that is accessible to the public and used' for vessel launches into waters that are navigable.
c. Marinas and drystacks.that are open to the public.
d. Water-dependent marine manufacturing facilities, commercial fishing facilities, and marine vessel construction and repair facilities and their support activities.

Art. VII, § 4(j)(1), Fla. Const. (2008) (emphasis added); Amends. Proposed, by Tax’n & Budget Reform Comm’n, Revision Nos. 3, 4, and 6, 2008, filed with the Secretary of State April 28, 2008; adopted 2008.

Therefore, because public marinas have been considered traditional municipal functions and our decision in Gainesville did not announce any new standard, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and expressly approve the decision below.

Having untangled the constitutional question, we now turn to the record in this case and the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Riverfront. In declaring the tax exemptions at issue here unconstitutional, the trial court essentially ruled that Riverfront had rebutted the presumption of tax-exempt status for properties owned and used exclusively by a municipality for municipal or public purposes that attaches where the property involves a traditional municipal function, such as a public marina. We disagree with that understanding.

Nothing in the record indicates that the marinas in this case do not serve .a municipal or public purpose. Riverfront contends that the placement of a lock on some of the docks destroys the public nature of these marinas. However, the protection of boats and other property from vandalism and crime is entirely consistent with the operation of a marina, and the record indicates that the locks here were put in place to address security concerns. Moreover, the fact remains that the marinas in this case are open to the public and any member of the public may go to the office at either marina, as would a patron at any public golf club or tennis club with an office. Furthermore, while most of the. slips may be leased to individuals, the record here indicates that the marinas do not charge any fee for boaters who wish to dock just for the day. Similarly unavailing, the fact that more nonresidents than residents of the • municipality might use the marina is also entirely consistent with the objectives of a municipal marina to operate as a component of the transportation infrastructure and bring economic activity into the municipality.

Further, depriving the City of its constitutional right to the exemptions at issue here on the basis that marinas may also be run by the private sector or compete with the private sector would sink the exemption in nearly every context because almost any function today may be equally provided by the private sector. Cf. Saunders, 25 So.2d at 650 (“We are not justified in declaring the act invalid because it might' enable the City to compete with private utilities required to pay taxes.”). Such an analysis ignores the fact that publicly owned and- operated facilities are open to the public, as opposed to private facilities which generally may-freely pick and choose among those clients they wish to serve, or be far more motivated by pecuniary interests. In any event, here the Property Appraiser has correctly created separate tax folios for the portions of the marina properties that are leased to private operators and the City pays ad valo-rem taxes on those portions.

Therefore, Riverfront has not carried its burden to rebut the presumption that the municipally owned properties here that are used exclusively by the municipality to provide traditional municipal functions are constitutionally exempt from ad valorem taxation. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly reversed the trial court for erroneously disturbing the tax-exempt status of the City’s marinas.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, we reaffirm that our decision in Gainesville did not announce a new standard for applying the municipal or public purposes tax exemption contained in article VII, section 3(a), of the Florida Constitution. We also hold that for purposes of applying that constitutional tax exemption, a public marina owned and operated by a municipality is a traditional municipal function'that carries a presumption of tax-exempt status. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative, approve the decision below, and direct upon remand that the trial court enter a final summary judgment in favor of the Respondents recognizing that the public marinas at issue here are properly tax-exempt for the tax years at issue.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE,' QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      . State ex rel. Harper v. McDavid, 145 Fla. 605, 200 So. 100 (1941).

      . Saunders v. City of Jacksonville, 157 Fla. 240, 25 So.2d 648 (1946).

      . Ford v. Orlando Utilities Comm'n, 629 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1994) (holding tax-exempt under article VII, section (3)(a), Florida Constitution, a municipally owned electric generating plant, but located in adjacent county and not serving residents of the adjacent county).

      . Although We reviewed and quashed Zingale on the question of standing of one of the parties to raise a particular defense, there was standing with regard to the issue of application of the tax exemption. We did not .address or disturb the correct analysis in that case. See generally Echeverri, 991 So.2d 793.

      . As a result, we are concerned by the errant dicta language in CAPFA referring to "the more stringent definition of municipal or public purposes espoused by the [Gainesville] case.” CAPFA, 929 So.2d at 573. We expressly disapprove that language, but recognize that ultimately the CAPFA court' correctly applied the law and aptly noted the distinction between traditional municipal functions and those functions historically provided by the private sector,

      . Tax exemptions for privaté leasehold interests in municipally owned property are subject to a stricter test known as the "governmental-governmental” standard. See generally Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 783 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2001).

      . Linking the Keys, Library of Cong., https:// www.loc.gov/item/today-in-history/january-22 (last visited June 5, 2017).

      . Linking the Keys, Library of Cong., https:// www.loc.gov/item/today-in-history/january-22 (last visited June 5, 2017). See generally Florida East Coast Railway, The Story of a Pioneer: A Brief History of the Florida East Coast Railway and Its Part in the Remarkable Development of the Florida East Coast 30 (1946).

      . Quick Facts, Florida Dep’t of State, http:// dos.myflorida.com/florida-facts/quick-facts/ (last visited June 5, 2017).

      . See, e.g., Nicholas Nehamas, As Waterfront Land Dries Up, Developers Rush to Miami River, Miami Herald (June 7, 2015), http:// www.miamiherald.com/news/business/biz-monday/article23356026.html; Harry Emilio Gottlieb, Letter to the Editor, Condos Eat Up Miami's Waterfront Property, Miami Herald (June 23, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/letters-to-the-editor/article85671387.html.

      . Public marinas are expressly contemplated within the definition of "recreational and commercial waterfront." § 342.201(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“The term includes water-dependent facilities that are open to the public and offer public access by vessels to the waters of the state.... These facilities include ... wet and dry marinas .... ”).

      . We note that this amendment concerning the assessed taxable value of such property does not in any way intrude on the applicability of the constitutional exemption. For instance, there are publicly owned marinas that are leased to private operators that would not qualify for the exemption, See, e.g., Page, 714 So.2d 1070. The amendment merely protects against assessment of the highest and best use of the waterfront property on which a marina would sit, which might, for instance, be assessed at a. higher tax rate if the property could support construction of a sophisticated office tower.

      . Our review of orders entering summary judgment is also de novo. Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000).

      . Three of the eight docks at the City Marina are usually locked, The only dock at the Fisherman’s Wharf Marina is usually locked, The record indicates that these locks were put in place by the City due to security concerns.

      . In Saunders, this Court noted that the Legislature was a safeguard against abuses that might allow municipalities to "take business from competing tax paying utilities." Id. (“Our answer, if any is needed, is that the legislature is the arbiter of this question ánd its judgment Under Article 8, Section 8, Constitution, is final unless an abuse of power is shown.”). While the constitutional provision at issue in Saunders was replaced with article VII, section 3(a), which is now self-executing, we note that the concern of cities abusing tax-exempt status to take business away from competing private entities is likewise tamed by the requirement in article VII, section (3)(a), that the municipality simultaneously own and exclusively use the tax exempt properly.

      . For this reason, the. "exclusive use” requirement of the constitutional exemption is not at issue on this record.