text:
    Gay v. State
    2D15-1425
    02/18/2016
   App.dism.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Geib v. Geib
    2D16-1947
    05/11/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Ghent v. State
    2D15-5587
    05/10/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Godwin v. Pinellas County
    2D16-1521
    05/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Godwin v. State
    2D15-4826
    04/26/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Good v. Sarasota County Public Hosp. Bd.
    2D16-1635
    04/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Gooding v. State
    2D16-343
    04/25/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Gorman v. Dyck O'Neal, Inc.
    2D15-4936
    06/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Gould v. State
    2D16-1274, 2D16-739
    04/14/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Grayer v. State
    2D15-5140
    03/30/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Green v. State
    2D16-227
    05/25/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Greer v. HSBC Bank
    2D15-4815
    05/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Grooms v. State
    2D15-4823
    05/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Guardianship of Rhea v. Hayes
    2D16-790
    05/05/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ham v. State
    2D15-4142
    05/25/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ham v. State
    2D15-4142
    06/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Harrell v. State
    2D16-13
    05/10/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Harris v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc.
    2D15-5405
    07/06/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Harris v. State
    2D14-5976
    07/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Gelman
    2D16-293
    04/07/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hicks v. State
    2D15-1615
    07/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Hightower v. State
    2D15-4712
    04/12/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Hill v. State
    2D16-842
    04/22/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Hillery v. State
    2D15-5548
    04/26/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Hilliard v. Hilliard
    2D16-328
    04/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hippert v. M&T Bank
    2D16-1461
    05/19/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hoosier Property Investments, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A.
    2D16-404
    05/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hutchins v. State
    2D15-4276
    07/13/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Hymes v. State
    2D16-1852
    05/09/2016
   Hab.Corp.dism.


text:
    In re D.A.K.; D.L. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-287
    07/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    In re I.L.; A.W. v. Department of Children and Families
    2D15-4706
    07/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Collier)


text:
    Interest Holdings, Inc. v. Great Plains Capital, Inc.
    2D16-1761
    04/28/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    International Capital Inv. Co., II, LLC v. Wyldewood Lakes Condominium Assn., Inc.
    2D16-816
    06/09/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    J.G. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-45
    05/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    J.L. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-5581
    06/01/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    J.P.W. v. Seeber
    2D16-1606
    04/22/2016
   Hab.Corp.gr.


text:
    Jackson v. Jackson
    2D15-2691
    04/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Jackson v. State
    2D16-930
    04/13/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Jakub v. Oker
    2D15-2711
    04/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    James v. State
    2D16-184
    05/10/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    James v. State
    2D16-1156
    05/23/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Jennings v. State
    2D16-83
    04/26/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    John Bean Technologies Corp. v. Green
    2D16-37
    04/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Johnson v. State
    2D16-1060
    04/01/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Johnson v. State
    2D16-1345
    04/13/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Johnson v. State
    2D16-100
    04/26/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Jones v. State
    2D16-1003
    04/13/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Jones v. State
    2D16-1813
    05/05/2016
   Hab.Corb.den.


text:
    K.C. Tiles & Marble, Inc. v. Granada Ins. Co.
    2D16-2040
    06/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Kannberg v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n
    2D15-3837
    05/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Kassis v. State
    2D15-2907
    05/11/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Keene v. State
    2D16-505
    03/17/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Kelly v. State
    2D16-2250
    06/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Kelly v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    2D15-3103
    05/05/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Kendrick v. State
    2D15-4483
    08/05/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    King v. State
    2D16-800
    03/30/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    King v. State
    2D15-5058
    05/16/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Kinzie v. Kinzie
    2D16-1297
    04/22/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Kunselman v. State
    2D15-3674
    03/14/2016
   Dism.


text:
    L.J. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-813
    06/02/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    L.W.W. v. State
    2D16-1637
    05/16/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Lagodny v. State
    2D16-2014
    05/23/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Lail v. State
    2D16-1757
    05/23/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Lamar v. State
    2D16-419
    05/10/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Lamore v. State
    2D16-1040
    04/29/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Larkins v. Ray
    2D16-1195
    04/22/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lathrop v. Lathrop
    2D15-3326
    03/23/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lawless v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    2D16-1302
    05/05/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lewis v. Colon
    2D15-4794
    04/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lucas v. State
    2D16-325
    05/10/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    M.S. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-91
    06/02/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Mack v. State
    2D16-1624
    05/09/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Market Tampa Investments, LLC v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust
    2D16-119
    05/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Marshall v. Zink
    2D16-1537
    05/12/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Maxwell v. Maxwell
    2D16-821
    04/22/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    McCrae v. State
    2D16-1631
    05/02/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Miller v. State
    2D16-1471
    05/24/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Mitchell v. State
    2D16-1150
    04/06/2016
   Cert.den.


text:
    Monette v. State
    2D16-763
    04/13/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Moore v. State
    2D16-648
    04/14/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Munoz v. Munoz
    2D16-28
    04/12/2016
   Pet. dism.


text:
    Myatt v. State
    2D16-959
    04/22/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Rahdert, Steele & Reynolds, P.A.
    2D16-635
    06/03/2016
   App.dism.; Cross-Appeal dism.


text:
    Naraine v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co.
    2D16-1539
    05/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Norton v. Department of Children and Families
    2D15-2411
    04/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Oberwise v. State
    2D16-18
    05/10/2016
   Mand.den,


text:
    Olds v. State
    2D15-1621
    07/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir, Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Orona v. State
    2D16-1153
    04/27/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Orozco v. State
    2D16-1552
    05/24/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Ortiz v. State
    2D16-938
    03/30/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Parker v. Parker
    2D16-601
    04/05/2016
   Proh.den,


text:
    Perion v. State
    2D15-4820
    04/21/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Perry v. Department of Children and Families
    2D15-1554
    04/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Peterson v. State
    2D16-750
    05/05/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Physicians Group, LLC v. DiFiore
    2D15-1129
    07/15/2016
   Aff,

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Physicians Group, LLC v. Haas
    2D15-1127
    07/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Porter v. State
    2D16-1771
    05/24/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Pratt v. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services
    2D16-1511
    05/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Preston v. State
    2D16-1529
    04/14/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    R.A. v. Department of Children and Families
    2D16-1336, 2D16-1089
    04/14/2016
   Dism.


text:
    R.J. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-5152
    05/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Raker v. State
    2D15-5019
    05/05/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Ramkissoon v. Wilson
    2D16-513
    04/28/2016
   Cert.den.


text:
    Randolph v. State
    2D16-1751
    05/04/2016
   Cert.den.


text:
    Rangel v. State
    2D16-853
    05/04/2016
   Pet.den,


text:
    Ray v. Our Children’s Academy, Inc.
    2D15-5557
    05/11/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ray v. State
    2D16-1342
    04/12/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Ridley v. State
    2D16-1174
    04/22/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Rivera v. University of South Florida
    2D16-516
    04/07/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Roberson v. State
    2D16-1039
    04/13/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Roberts v. State
    2D15-5682, 2D15-5599
    04/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Robledo v. State
    2D15-4206
    04/27/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Robson v. State
    2D16-796
    05/25/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Rodriguez v. Mortgage Guar. Ins. Corp.
    2D16-1433
    05/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rodriguez v. 1947 Main Street, Inc.
    2D16-1213
    04/07/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rogers v. State
    2D15-4909
    04/01/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Rogers v. State
    2D16-367
    05/10/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Roman v. State
    2D09-5159
    07/13/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Romo v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC
    2D16-982
    04/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rosier v. State
    2D16-1753
    05/24/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Rotolo v. State
    2D15-1601
    03/30/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Ruemmely Maldonado v. Department of Revenue
    2D15-4916
    04/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Russ v. Wise
    2D16-1444
    04/20/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    S.C. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-826
    05/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Salinas v. State
    2D15-3763
    04/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Samaraweera v. Fee
    2D16-194
    03/22/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Santiago v. Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement
    2D16-1590
    05/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Santiago v. State
    2D16-869
    03/30/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Schofield v. State
    2D16-665
    04/01/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Hotz
    2D15-1501
    05/19/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Screen v. State
    2D14-5963
    07/13/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Sellers v. State
    2D16-666
    05/25/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Senson v. Nienhaus
    2D16-684
    05/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Seymore v. State
    2D16-1218
    05/23/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Sheffield v. State
    2D16-1112
    04/27/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Shepherd v. State
    2D16-951
    04/07/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Shomer v. State
    2D16-345
    04/22/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Silver King Entertainment, LLC v. Save the Tarpon, Inc.
    2D15-5037
    04/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Smith v. State
    2D16-1616
    05/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Spake v. State
    2D15-5470
    05/24/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Sparrow v. State
    2D16-366
    04/26/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Speed v. State
    2D16-1955
    05/24/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co v. Statsick
    2D15-5355
    05/05/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Statsick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
    2D16-950
    05/11/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Stec v. ALS III, LLC
    2D15-3844
    04/13/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Stennis v. State
    2D16-1139
    06/09/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Sturgis v. State
    2D16-1693, 2D15-4200
    05/05/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Suarez v. Gee
    2D16-901
    03/16/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Suntrust Bank v. Bolger
    2D15-1155
    05/18/2016
   Cross App. dism.


text:
    SA-PG-Tampa, LLC v. Toro
    2D14-1613
    05/25/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    T.E.H. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-14
    05/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Taylor v. State
    2D16-140
    04/26/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Taylor Bean & Whitaker Mortg. Corp. v. Ayoub
    2D16-633
    05/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Terminello v. State
    2D16-336
    05/10/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Thomas v. State
    2D16-623
    03/30/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Torres v. Department of Revenue
    2D15-1655
    04/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    True Holiness Chruch of The Living God, Inc. v. Happy State Bank
    2D15-2561
    04/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Trujillo v. State
    2D15-2386
    07/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Manatee)


text:
    Trust No. 13409cp v. Regions Bank
    2D16-1198
    04/22/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Trustbiz, LLC v. Bank of New York Mellon
    2D15-4885
    05/19/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Bell
    2D15-2424
    04/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Universal Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Shipman
    2D15-2446
    04/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Uppal v. Wells Fargo
    2D15-5753
    04/28/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Urban Financial of America, LLC v. Horne
    2D15-5660
    06/06/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    V.D. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-4306
    05/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Vari Const. Services, Inc. v. Centennial Bank
    2D16-1355
    05/11/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Vellardita v. Bank of New York Mellon
    2D16-604
    04/07/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wagner v. State
    2D16-1592
    04/26/2016
   Hab.Corp.dism.


text:
    Walker v. Boylan
    2D16-1371
    05/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Walker v. State
    2D15-5054
    07/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Walker v. State
    2D16-1910
    05/23/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Warden v. State
    2D16-1343
    05/05/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Washington v. State
    2D16-675
    04/13/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Weber v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
    2D15-356
    05/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Welch v. State
    2D15-4941
    04/25/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Whitburn, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    2D14-6043
    06/09/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    White v. State
    2D16-1807
    05/23/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Wicky v. Oxonian
    2D15-4908
    07/20/2016
   Cert, den,

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Wild v. Centennial Bank
    2D16-1226
    05/11/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wilds v. Citimortgage, Inc.
    2D16-1676
    04/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D16-615
    03/29/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D16-1019
    04/01/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D16-1142
    04/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D16-8
    04/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D16-479
    04/26/2016
   Mand.den,


text:
    Willis v. SA-Lakeland, LLC
    2D14-3645
    05/05/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wilson v. State
    2D16-1407
    04/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wolfe v. State
    2D15-5508
    04/14/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Y.W. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-5361
    04/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Yasir v. Aramark Correctional Services, LLC
    2D14-5555
    04/26/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    THIRD DISTRICT
    A.R. v. Agency for Health Care Admin.
    3D15-2756
    05/31/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    A.R. v. Agency For Health Care Admin.
    3D16-0694
    05/31/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    A.R. v. Agency For Health Care Admin.
    3D16-0734
    05/31/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Alcide v. State
    3D16-0206
    07/07/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Atkin v. Kane
    3D16-1404
    07/06/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Atkinson Trust, LLC v. Grandview Palace Condominium Ass’n, Inc.
    3D16-0120
    06/14/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    B.V.K., LLC v. Jockey Club, Inc.
    3D15-2715
    06/23/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Balmesa Soluciones Medicas, S.A. v. Lans Medicals, LLC
    3D15-2690
    07/07/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Bande Investments, LLC v. IL Lugano Holding, LLC
    3D16-1137
    07/28/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Baptiste v. Star Lakes Ass’n Inc.
    3D16-0820
    05/31/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Barrera v. Majorca Towers Condominium, Inc.
    3D15-2193
    07/25/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Barreto v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n
    3D16-1262
    06/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Boschetti v. Ocean Bank
    3D16-0678
    07/26/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Boschetti v. Ocean Bank
    3D16-0679
    07/26/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Braddy v. State
    3D16-1486
    06/27/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Brown v. Cohen
    3D16-0954
    06/20/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Brown v. State
    3D16-1094
    06/27/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Bruton v. State
    3D16-1477
    06/27/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Bryant v. Reemployment Assistance Appeals Com'n
    3D16-0469
    06/14/2016
   App.dism.

Reemployment Assistance Apps. Com’n


text:
    Burrell v. 3 Bros. Trucking, Inc.
    3D16-1229
    06/06/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Burrell v. 3 Bros. Trucking, Inc.
    3D16-1229
    07/13/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Butler v. Department of Revenue ex rel. Siman
    3D16-1249
    06/21/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Revenue


text:
    C.R. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-1516
    07/21/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    C.V. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-0876
    07/06/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Capo v. Capo
    3D16-1405
    07/12/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Cardelles v. State Farm Florida Ins. Co.
    3D16-1031
    07/18/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Carter v. Westland Eden Condominium II Ass’n, Inc.
    3D16-0597
    06/24/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Castillo v. Crystal Clear Holdings, LLC
    3D16-1537
    07/06/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    City of Homestead v. Figueroa
    3D16-1291
    06/29/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-'Dade)


text:
    Coburn v. Montalvan
    3D16-0726
    07/15/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Coconut Cove Resort & Marina, Inc. v. Florida Wood Treaters, Inc.
    3D16-1411
    06/22/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Cohen v. Williams Island Property Owners' Ass’n
    3D16-0624
    06/23/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Colonnade 101 SE, Inc. v. Cordero
    3D16-1263
    07/06/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Corner v. State
    3D16-1561
    07/06/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Curry v. State
    3D16-0011
    06/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Curvelo v. Department of Health
    3D16-1396
    06/23/2016
   Vol.dism.

Dept, of Health


text:
    Demosthenes v. State
    3D16-1489
    06/27/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Devoto v. Devoto
    3D16-0390
    07/01/2016
   Motion gr.


text:
    Dunn v. Department of Revenue ex rel. Dunn
    3D16-1225
    06/29/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Revenue


text:
    El-Ali v. Lamaa
    3D16-0541
    07/08/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Ennis v. Gutierrez
    3D16-1424
    07/25/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Enriquez v. Garcia
    3D16-0102
    07/19/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Estate of Martinez v. PNC Bank Nat. Ass'n
    3D16-0482
    06/23/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Fails v. State
    3D16-1428
    06/22/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Faison v. Epstein
    3D16-0942
    06/02/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Feliz v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.
    3D15-1887
    07/12/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Findlay v. Leslie Estates Homeowners' Ass'n No. 3, Inc.
    3D16-1347
    06/29/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Fox v. EW Investments LLC
    3D16-1227
    06/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Friends of Oleta River, Inc. v. City of North Miami Beach
    3D15-0609
    06/22/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Fuertes v. Christiana Trust
    3D16-1141
    06/30/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Garrison v. Garrison
    3D16-1241
    06/08/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Gipson v. State
    3D16-1520
    06/29/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Gipson v. State
    3D16-1521
    06/29/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Girls’ Town/Or Chadash v. Olsher
    3D16-0855
    07/20/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Gonzalez v. Rios
    3D16-1173
    06/24/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Gonzalez v. U.S. Bank Trust N.A.
    3D16-1068
    05/31/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Gonzalez-Barrera v. Majorca Towers Condominium, Inc.
    3D15-2659
    07/25/2016
   Vol.dism,

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Gorrin v. Poker Run Acquisitions, Inc.
    3D16-1473
    06/23/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Griffin v. State
    3D16-1136
    06/06/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Higgins v. Unknown
    3D16-0235
    06/02/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Hoffman v. Hoffman
    3D15-1097
    06/20/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Houttekier v. Stout
    3D16-0417
    05/31/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Monroe)


text:
    Howland v. Wein
    3D15-2359
    03/04/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Huggins v. State
    3D16-1296
    07/08/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Humphrey v. State
    3D16-0326
    06/21/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Ibarra v. First Franklin Financial Corp.
    3D16-1144
    06/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ingham v. Gonzalez
    3D16-1210
    06/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Johnson v. Department of Revenue ex rel. Hill
    3D16-1231
    06/21/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Revenue


text:
    Joseph v. White House Condominium Ass’n, Inc.
    3D16-0181
    07/28/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass’n v. Yacht Club at Portofino Condominium Ass'n, Inc.
    3D16-1197
    07/06/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    K.C. v. State
    3D16-69
    06/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Landa v. Household Finance Corp. III
    3D14-2961
    06/21/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Lewis v. Bank of America, N.A.
    3D15-2453
    06/15/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Lopez v. Carlos M. Fleites, P.A.
    3D16-1199
    06/06/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Lopez v. State
    3D16-1353
    06/14/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    M.B. v. Owens
    3D16-1671
    07/20/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Machado v. State
    3D16-1505
    06/27/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Malik v. Manzoor
    3D16-0524
    06/02/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Manning v. State
    3D16-0770
    06/10/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Masiello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    3D15-2807
    06/22/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Massey v. State
    3D16-1540
    06/29/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Maxwell Real Estate Group, Inc. v. 3050 Aventura Owner, LLC
    3D16-1250
    07/01/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    McKenzie v. Junior
    3D16-1471
    06/27/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Medina v. State
    3D16-1430
    06/21/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Mendez v. Florida Peninsula Ins. Co.
    3D16-1495
    06/27/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Milton v. State
    3D16-1452
    06/30/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Mintz v. Telemundo Media, LLC
    3D16-1166
    07/18/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Miranda v. Reemployment Assistance Appeals Com’n
    3D16-0365
    05/31/2016
   App.dism.

Unemployment Apps. Com’n


text:
    Naranjo v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
    3D16-1357
    06/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Nicholson v. State
    3D16-0245
    06/08/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    O'Neal v. State
    3D16-1238
    05/31/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Ochipa v. Skylake Auto Center, LLC
    3D16-1022
    07/08/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir, Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Ohana v. Schwelling
    3D16-0952
    05/26/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Palacio v. State
    3D15-2258
    07/06/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Parera v. Christiana Trust
    3D15-2519
    06/03/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Mooney
    3D16-1313
    06/04/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Pino-Allen v. Miami Dade College
    3D16-454
    06/22/2016
   Aff.

PERC


text:
    Plantation Spice Growers Nursery, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Revenue
    3D16-0601
    06/20/2016
   App.dism.

Dept. of Revenue


text:
    Plummer v. Bank of the West
    3D15-2564
    06/02/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Poker Run Acquisitions, Inc. v. Diaz
    3D16-0056
    07/14/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Porter v. CitiMortgage, Inc.
    3D16-0288
    06/13/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Price v. Sortino
    3D16-1100
    06/07/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Price v. Sortino
    3D16-1386
    07/01/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Primevestors, LLC v. Cadenza, LLC
    3D16-1269, 3D16-1259
    06/29/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Proenza v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
    3D16-1391
    07/12/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Quickest Messenger Services, Inc. v. Rodriguez
    3D16-0321
    07/26/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Quintana v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.
    3D16-0018
    07/26/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    R.R. v. Department of Children
    3D16-0766
    06/20/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    R.S. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-1574
    07/19/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Ramos v. Ramos
    3D16-1157
    06/09/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Real Estate Asset Trust 2011-2 v. Grisales
    3D15-2245
    06/20/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Reyes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    3D16-1389
    07/01/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Rivas v. State
    3D15-0273
    06/02/2016
   Pet.den,


text:
    Rivera v. Garcia
    3D15-2520
    06/21/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Rivera v. State
    3D16-0385
    06/14/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Riveron v. ASI Assur. Corp.
    3D15-2089
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Roca v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC
    3D16-0438
    06/14/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Rodriguez v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
    3D15-1774
    07/26/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Rojas v. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Com’n
    3D15-2143
    07/06/2016
   App.dism.

Fish and Wildlife Conservation Com’m


text:
    Roman v. Lewis
    3D16-1401
    07/06/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ruiz v. Bank of America, N.A.
    3D16-1178
    06/30/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Sanchez v. Khouri
    3D16-1001
    06/20/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Scriven v. Jones
    3D16-0946
    06/29/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Shaver v. Drew
    3D16-1434
    07/15/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Slaton v. State
    3D16-1261
    06/06/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Smith v. State
    3D16-1080
    07/01/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Socarras v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
    3D15-2909
    06/29/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Soler v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
    3D16-1179
    06/07/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    South Miami Health Center v. Florida Ins. Guarantee Ass'n
    3D15-2904
    06/06/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    State v. Blackmon
    3D16-1538
    06/28/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    State Farm Florida Ins. Co. v. Xirinachs
    3D16-0021
    06/24/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Apple Medical Center, LLC
    3D16-0553
    06/10/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Stonington Ins. Co. v. Wilcox
    3D15-2729
    07/13/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Sundance Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Brito
    3D16-1408
    07/27/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Swoop, LLC v. Brooks
    3D16-1674
    07/27/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Teslar Inside Corp. v. Pstein, Inc.
    3D16-1332
    06/20/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Tien v. Rivera
    3D16-1103
    07/06/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Tower Hill Signature Ins. Co. v. Figueroa
    3D16-0256
    07/18/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Travelers Cas. and Surety Co. of America v. 900 Biscayne, LLC
    3D16-1026
    06/01/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Turkish v. Brody
    3D16-0773
    06/07/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Raheb
    3D16-0041
    06/28/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Vasallo v. Bean
    3D16-1014
    06/07/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Vertical Reality Mfg., Inc. v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
    3D16-0853
    06/30/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Agr.


text:
    Visconti v. Island Breakers-A Condominium, Inc.
    3D16-1631
    07/20/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    White v. Department of Educ.
    3D16-0080
    06/22/2016
   Vol.dism.

Dept, of Educ.


text:
    Williams v. State
    3D16-1163
    06/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Old Cutler Lakes by the Bay Recovery
    3D16-0836, 3D16-0936
    05/26/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Worthen v. State
    3D16-1273
    06/13/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    31-36, LLC v. Prostar Holding, LLC4
    3D16-0293
    06/13/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    Davis v. State
    4D15-4144
    03/10/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Dilorenzo v. Westport Recovery Corp.
    4D15-1196
    03/31/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Foeman v. Foeman
    4D14-95
    03/24/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    H.A. v. State
    4D15-2488
    03/31/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Jean v. State
    4D13-3261
    03/24/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Walker v. State
    4D15-4149
    03/17/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Williams v. State
    4D15-3101
    03/31/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


author: Damoorgian, J.

text:
    Robert K. PACETTI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-4732
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 1, 2017]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Alan T. Lipson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Damoorgian, J.

Appellant, Robert Pacetti, appeals his judgment and sentence for one count of felony battery (great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement) and one count of felony battery (prior conviction). Appellant argues that reversal is warranted because the prosecutor made an improper comment during closing and his judgment erroneously reflects that he was convicted of felony battery (prior conviction). We affirm on the closing comment issue but reverse and remand for the correction of Appellant’s judgment.

Appellant was arrested and charged with one count of felony battery (great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement) and one count of felony battery (prior conviction) after he allegedly battered one of his employees. Prior to trial, Appellant argued that the State could not proceed on both charges because of double jeopardy concerns. The State conceded Appellant’s position and announced that it was nolle prossing the felony battery based on a prior conviction count and proceeding to trial on the felony battery causing great bodily harm count only.

At trial, the victim testified that on the day in question he met up with Appellant, Appellant’s then girlfriend, and one of Appellant’s employees at Appellant’s girlfriend’s house. The four then drove to a bar in Appellant’s vehicle. At the bar, Appellant approached the victim and asked, in a nonthreatening manner, to speak with him outside. The victim followed Appellant outside where Appellant proceeded to punch the victim in the face. The victim fell to the ground and Appellant kicked him several times. Eventually, a bartender came outside and broke up the fight. Appellant, the girlfriend, and the employee then left without the victim. Later in the day, the victim returned to Appellant’s girlfriend’s house to retrieve his transportation. There, the victim claimed that Appellant attacked him again. After the altercation, the victim went to the hospital where he was treated for a fractured pelvis and a broken wrist.

The victim contacted law enforcement about the incident about a month later. The investigator testified that after interviewing the victim, he tried to interview Appellant’s girlfriend and employee, but that neither were cooperative. He also interviewed Appellant who, after initially denying that there was an altercation, admitted to “slapping” the victim after they got into a fight about money.

Appellant’s position was that the victim instigated a physical altercation because he was mad Appellant would not front him money. To support his defense that the victim was the aggressor, Appellant testified on his own behalf. He explained that as he was walking out of the bar, the victim swung at him. Appellant fell while avoiding the blow, but the victim continued to come at him. Appellant then kicked the victim in self-defense. Shortly thereafter, the bartender came out and broke up the fight. At that point, Appellant, his girlfriend, and his employee got into Appellant’s truck and drove away. That was the last Appellant saw the victim.

During closing arguments, the prosecutor sought to discredit Appellant’s version of the events, with the following comments:

The only people that witnessed the second attack is the defendant’s employee, and his girlfriend at the time, now his wife .... Neither one of them would cooperate with the police. That makes absolutely zero sense. Why would these two witnesses not want to cooperate with police? It just doesn’t ’make any sense if what the defendant says is true.

Appellant objected on the grounds that the prosecutor made an improper burden shifting argument, and the court overruled his objection. The prosecutor continued:

[Why did] these two main witnesses, who witnessed the incident, not to want to talk to the police? I want you to think about that when you are back there deliberating. Why would they not want to cooperate with police? I ask you to use your common sense about that.

The jury found Appellant guilty of felony battery (great bodily harm) as charged in the information and the court adjudicated Appellant guilty and sentenced him to three years in prison. Although the State elected not to prosecute the charge of felony battery (prior conviction), Appellant’s judgment reflects that the court also adjudicated him guilty of felony battery (prior conviction), but did not impose a sentence.

On appeal, Appellant argues that the prosecutor’s comments regarding Appellant’s girlfriend and employee’s refusal to cooperate with police were impermissible because they left the jury “with the wrong impression that defendant had the burden to call these witnesses to rebut [the victim’s] story.” We disagree.

“[Generally speaking, the state may not comment upon a defendant’s failure to produce evidence to refute an element of the crime, because doing so could erroneously lead the jury to conclude that the defendant carried the burden of introducing evidence.” Otero v. State, 754 So.2d 765, 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). “A narrow exception to this general rule, however, allows the state to comment on the absence of evidence where the defendant voluntarily assumes some burden of proof as by asserting the defenses of alibi, self-defense, and defense of others, or by relying on facts that could be elicited only from a witness who is not equally available to the state.” Id.

Here, the prosecutor’s comments during closing did not imply that Appellant was required to call his girlfriend or employee as a witness. Rather, they summarized the investigating detective’s testimony which established that Appellant’s girlfriend and employee did not cooperate with law enforcement’s investigation. See Lubin v. State, 963 So.2d 822, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (when evaluating a prosecutor’s comment, the comment “should be examined in the context in which it is made”). Thus, the challenged comments were a fair summary of the evidence. Further, to the extent the comments could reasonably be construed as burden shifting, they were permissible since Appellant raised self-defense as an issue. Otero, 754 So.2d at 769. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s objection to the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument.

Appellant next argues that his judgment erroneously reflects that he was convicted of felony battery (prior conviction) when, in fact, the State nolle prossed the charge before trial. Appellant is correct and the State properly concedes error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting a conviction only as to felony battery (great bodily harm).

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded with instructions.

Ciklin, C.J., and Gerber, J., concur.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    MARLIN FINANCIAL, LLC, Appellant, v. Joy STEWART, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3796
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2017]
    Allison L. Friedman of Allison L. Friedman, P.A., Aventura, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1979).

Ciklin, C.J., Conner and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.


author: Ciklin, C.J.

text:
    Perry THURSTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-2590
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2017]

      Mark Herron and Robert J. Telfer III of Messer Caparello, PA.., Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Stephanie J. Cunningham, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for appellee.
   Ciklin, C.J.

In 2014, prior to the primary election for the office of Florida Attorney General, Perry Thurston submitted documents to the Division of Elections (“the Division”) in an attempt to meet the threshold required to qualify for state matching funds from the Election Campaign Financing Trust Fund. The Division rejected some of the documents—photocopies of checks—because necessary information contained on the face of the documents could not be read. The Division notified Thurston of the legibility problems after he was eliminated as a candidate in the primary election. In response, he submitted new, legible photocopies of the required documents, which the Division declined to review.

In this appeal, Thurston challenges the Division’s decision not to review his corrected documentation to determine whether Thurston had met the qualifying threshold, and the Florida Election Commission’s (“the FEC”) affirmance of that decision. Because the relevant statutes and administrative rules do not impose a deadline on curing defective paperwork submitted pri- or to a primary election in support of a request for matching funds, we reverse and remand to the Division to process Thurston’s request for certification.

In November 2013, Thurston filed his appointment of campaign treasurer and designation of campaign depository related to his candidacy for Florida Attorney General. The primary election was scheduled for August 26, 2014. In June 2014, Thur-ston filed with the Division a request for matching funds pursuant to section 106.33, Florida Statutes.

By e-mail dated August 7, 2014, Thur-ston’s representative submitted to the Division two financial reports for 2013 and two for 2014. By email dated August 15, 2014, Thurston’s representative submitted “missing matching funds documentation,” which he requested be included in “[Thurston’s] matching funds report.” The documents comprised proof of financial contributions which were required to be reported by June 27 and July 25 in order to avoid a delay in disbursement of the funds. On August 21, in response to an inquiry from Thurston’s representative, the Division informed the Thurston campaign that it could not disburse matching funds because the submissions were untimely and he had not submitted “verifiable documentation establishing he had received at least $100,000 in eligible contributions.”

The following day, August 22, Thur-ston’s representative e-mailed documents to the Division, which he asserted would establish that the campaign had met the $100,000 threshold to be certified eligible for matching funds. Based on the looming primary election, the Division accelerated the verification process. Upon completion of the verification process on August 25, the Division determined that “[t]he verifiable documentation supported receipt of only $99,251.70 in eligible contributions.” Further, there were claimed contributions that could not be considered for various reasons, including “No Documentation,” “Not a Florida Resident,” “Occupation not specific,” “Invalid Signature,” and “Incomplete/Improper Documentation.”

On August 26, 2014, the primary election was held and Thurston was defeated. The next day, the Division informed Thurston’s campaign that he had not met the requirements for certification. Relevant to this appeal, five contributions were disallowed because the portion of the checks containing the contributors’ names and addresses had been turned down during the photocopying process so that the complete names and addresses could not be read.

By letter dated October 14, 2014, Thur-ston’s representative renewed the campaign’s request for disbursement of matching funds. New, legible, photocopies of the five checks were attached to the letter.

The Division confirmed its receipt of the corrected photocopies of the checks but declined to certify Thurston’s eligibility to receive matching funds. No reason was provided in the letter for the Division’s decision. On appeal, the FEC affirmed.

On appeal to this court, Thurston argues that Florida’s Election Campaign Financing Act does not provide for disallowance of contributions merely because deficiencies in the paperwork submitted to qualify for matching contributions were not cured until after a candidate was eliminated as a candidate. The FEC argues that by the time Thurston submitted documentation purporting to show that he had raised $100,000 in qualifying contributions, he was no longer a candidate and thus the Division lacked statutory authority to certify his eligibility to receive matching funds.

The issue on appeal is a purely legal one, namely the interpretation of the statutes and administrative rule that apply to the distribution of matching campaign funds. “The standard of review of an agency decision based upon an issue of law is whether the agency erroneously interpreted the law and, if so, whether a correct interpretation compels a particular action.” Abram v. State, Dep’t of Health, Bd. of Med., 13 So.3d 85, 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Fla. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 823 So.2d 844, 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)).

The relevant statutes are contained in Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2014). Sections 106.30-106.36, Florida Statutes, are known as the Florida Election Campaign Financing Act (“the Act”). § 106.30. Section 106.32 establishes an Election Campaign Financing Trust Fund. The Legislature provided its intent in enacting the Act:

The Legislature finds that the costs of running an effective campaign for statewide office have reached a level which tends to discourage persons from becoming candidates and to limit the persons who run for such office to those who are independently wealthy, who are supported by political committees representing special interests which are able to generate substantial campaign contributions, or who must appeal to special interest groups for campaign contributions. The Legislature further finds that campaign contributions generated by such political committees are having a disproportionate impact vis-a-vis contributions from unaffiliated individuals, which leads to the misperception of government officials unduly influenced by those special interests to the detriment of the public interest. Furthermore, it is the intent of the Legislature that the purpose of public campaign financing is to make candidates more responsive to the voters of the State of Florida and as insulated as possible from special interest groups. The Legislature intends ss. 106.30-106.36 to alleviate these factors, dispel the misperception, and encourage qualified persons to seek statewide elective office who would not, or could not otherwise do so and to protect the effective competition by a candidate who uses public funding.

§ 106.31.

Section 106.38 provides that to be eligible for matching funds, a candidate for the office of Governor or member of the Cabinet, “upon qualifying for office, shall file a request for such contributions with the filing officer on forms provided by the Division of Elections.” The statute further provides that a candidate for a Cabinet office must not be “an unopposed candidate as defined in s. 106.011.” § 106.33. A candidate for Cabinet office must agree to abide by the expenditure limits provided by law, and must raise $100,000. § 106.33(l)-(2). Contributions from individuals who are not state residents may not be used to meet the $100,000 threshold. § 106.33(2)(b).

“Candidate” is defined as “a person to whom any of the following applies:”

(a) A person who seeks to qualify for nomination or election by means of the petitioning process.
(b) A person who seeks to qualify for election as a write-in candidate.
(c) A person who receives contributions or makes expenditures, or consents for any other person to receive contributions or make expenditures, with a view to bring about his or her nomination or election to, or retention in, public office.
(d) A person who appoints a treasurer and designates a primary depository.
(e) A person who files qualification papers and subscribes to a candidate’s oath as required by law.

§ 106.011(3), Fla. Stat.

“Unopposed candidate” is defined as follows in pertinent part:

[A] candidate for nomination or election to an office who, after the last day on which a person, including a write-in candidate, may qualify, is without opposition in the election at which the office is to be filled or who is without such opposition after such date as a result of a primary election or of withdrawal by other candidates seeking the same office.

§ 106.011(18).

Section 106.36(1), Florida Statutes, provides that the “division shall review each request for contributions from the Election Campaign Financing Trust Fund and certify whether the candidate is eligible for such contributions. Notice of the certification decision shall be provided to the candidate.” § 106.35(1) (footnote omitted). The statute further provides as follows in pertinent part:

(3)(a) Certification and distribution of funds shall be based on contributions to the candidate reported to the division for such purpose. The division shall review each report and verify the amount of funds to be distributed prior to authorizing the release of funds. The division may prescribe separate reporting forms for candidates for Governor and Cabinet officer.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 106.11, a candidate who is eligible for a distribution of funds based upon qualifying matching contributions received and certified to the division on the report due on the 4th day prior to the election, may obligate funds not to exceed the amount which the campaign treasurer’s report shows the candidate is eligible to receive from the Election Campaign Financing Trust Fund without the funds actually being on deposit in the campaign account.
(4) Distribution of funds shall be made beginning on the 32nd day prior to the primary and every 7 days thereafter.
(5) The division shall adopt rules providing for the weekly reports and certification and distribution of funds pursuant thereto required by this section.

§ 106.35(3)-(5) (footnote omitted).

Section 106.07(1), Florida Statutes, provides that campaign contribution and expenditure reports shall be filed “on the 10th day following the end of each calendar month,” or the next day that is not a weekend day or holiday. Reports must also be filed by statewide candidates “[o]n the 60th day immediately preceding the primary election, and each week thereafter, with the last weekly report being filed on the 4th day immediately preceding the general election.” § 106.07(l)(a)l., Fla. Stat. Additionally, statewide candidates must file reports “[o]n the 10th day immediately preceding the general election, and each day thereafter, with the last daily report being filed the 6th day immediately preceding the general election.” § 106.07(l)(a)2.

Rule 1S-2.047, Florida Administrative Code, governs the distribution of matching funds. The rule provides the following timetable for distributions:

(2) Distribution of Funds.
(a) State matching funds shall be distributed to eligible candidates beginning on the 32nd day prior to the primary election and every 7 days thereafter. Distributions are based on verified matching contributions as shown on campaign finance reports, required to be filed by Section 106.07(l)(a), F.S., listing the contributions received after September 1 of the calendar year prior to the election.
(b) Funds shall be distributed as follows:
1. The first distribution of funds is based on campaign finance reports required to be filed on or before the 60th day before the primary election.
2. The second distribution of funds is based on campaign finance reports required to be filed after the 60th day but no later than the 32nd day prior to the primary election.
3. Each subsequent distribution of funds will be based on the prior week’s timely filed report or reports.
4. Distributions of funds based on untimely documentation or reports, amended reports, or supplemental documentation will be distributed no later than the weekly cycle occurring three weeks after receipt of such documentation or report.

Fla. Admin. Code R. lS-2.047(2). The rule further provides that reports of contributions are timely for purposes of matching funds only if filed “no later than 12:00 Noon (Eastern Time), on the date it is due.” Id. R. lS-2.047(3)(a). A report filed after the 12:00 Noon deadline, “will be deemed late for matching fund purposes and any eligible matching funds will be distributed as provided in subparagraph (2)(b)4. of this rule.” Id. R. lS-2.047(3)(b). Further:

Reports of contributions filed by candidates requesting matching funds must include all information required by Sections 106.07 and 106.30-.36, F.S. If information related to a matchable contribution is missing, incomplete, or cannot be verified, no match will be made for that contribution and the Division will notify the candidate. Upon the Division’s receipt and verification of the missing or incomplete information, matching funds will be distributed as provided in sub-paragraph (2)(b)4. of this rule.

Id. R. lS-2.047(3)(c).

The rule provides the following with respect to documentation, in pertinent part:

(4) Documentation.
(a)l.Documentation for each contribution report must satisfy the requirements of this rule to permit verification of the applicable contribution on the campaign finance report for which matching funds are requested.
2. Documentation for each contribution report is timely if it is received by the Division no later than 12:00 Noon (Eastern Time) on the date the report is due.
3. If documentation for such report is received by the Division after 12:00 Noon (Eastern Time) on the due date, the documentation will be deemed late for matching fund purposes and any eligible matching funds will be distributed as provided in subparagraph (2)(b)4. of this rule.
4. Documentation for the first distribution must be received by the Division on or before the 60th day prior to the primary election.
5. Documentation for the second distribution must be received by the Division on or before the 32nd day prior to the primary election.
6. Documentation for subsequent distributions must be received weekly by the Division each Friday.
7. If documentation for a report is untimely, any eligible matching funds will be distributed as provided in subpara-graph (2)(b)4. of this rule.
(c) In order to verify contributions, the Division must receive the following documentation:
1. For a contribution made by check or cashier’s check, a copy of the check or cashier’s check;
(d) Documentation that does not conform to the specifications in this paragraph will not be processed and the Division will notify the candidate. Upon the Division’s receipt and verification of documentation that is in compliance with these specifications, matching funds will be distributed as provided in subpara-graph (2)(b)4. of this rule.

Id. R. lS-2.047(4).

Because a statute controls the distribution of matching funds, the starting point for our analysis is the language of the statute. See Smith v. Crawford, 645 So.2d 513, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA1994) (relying on language of campaign finance statutes to determine whether contributions to a candidate’s campaign for Commissioner of Agriculture had to be applied to his campaign for a different office after he withdrew his candidacy for Governor, so that his total expenditures would exceed that allowed to be eligible for public campaign financing). If the statute’s language “is susceptible to more than one interpretation,” legislative history may provide guidance. Id. at 524 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Magaw v. State, 537 So.2d 564, 566 (Fla. 1989)).

The statute and rule do not explicitly address the situation that arose here. But the administrative rule does provide for the distribution of matching funds in the event of untimely filed financial reports and documentation. See Fla. Admin. Code R. lS-2.047(2)(b)4., (3)(b), (4)(a)7. To the extent any of Thurston’s reports or documentation were untimely filed, his distributions would be delayed to “no later than the weekly cycle occurring three weeks after receipt of such documentation or report.” Id. R. lS-2.047(2)(b)4.

Additionally, the FEC acknowledges in its answer brief that the Act and administrative rule “[do] not explicitly state when a deficiency must be cured.” It argues, however, that “it is apparent from the plain meaning of the statute that it must be cured while a person is a candidate who is not unopposed since only those candidates are eligible to be certified.” The FEC cites to section 106.33 for this proposition. However, nothing in that section or in the rule speak to the circumstances of this case. Instead, the statute provides that an unopposed candidate is not eligible to receive contributions from the fund. The definition of “unopposed candidate,” as provided for in section 106.011(18), Florida Statutes, does not include a candidate who was at one point eligible to receive matching funds but who is then ultimately eliminated in the primary election.

The FEC also argues that, pursuant to section 106.141(10), Florida Statutes, which imposes criminal penalties for accepting post-election “contributions,” the Division cannot distribute funds after a candidate is eliminated, because at that point, a candidate is not allowed to accept them. This argument lacks merit. The Act’s definition of “contributions” does not encompass the distribution of matching funds by the Division pursuant to the Act. The distribution of matching funds is not “made for the purpose of influencing the results of an election or making an electioneering communication,” nor does it otherwise meet the definition of “contribution.” See § 106.011(5).

The applicable statutes and rule do not support the action of the Division in this case. Additionally, the position of the Division and the FEC, under these circumstances, is contrary to the Legislature’s intent in passing the Act, to “encourage qualified persons to seek statewide elective office who would not, or could not otherwise do so and to protect the effective competition by a candidate who uses public funding.” § 106.31, Fla. Stat. We conclude that where a candidate for a Cabinet office submitted documentation before the primary election, some of the documentation contained legibility defects which made verification impossible, the candidate was advised of the defects after he was eliminated in the primary election, and he submitted clearer photocopies of some of the checks which had been disallowed, it would subvert the purpose of the Act to permit the Division to refuse to determine whether the candidate met the threshold amount for matching funds.

Based on the foregoing, we reverse and remand to the Division to conduct its review pursuant to section 106.35(1), and determine whether Thurston met the threshold for distribution of matching funds. If so, the Division shall distribute the funds.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Levine and Forst, JJ., concur.

      . The statute provides, among other things, for matching funds for candidates for a Cabinet office who meet certain requirements in-eluding raising $100,000. § 106.33(2)(a)2,, Fla. Stat. (2014).


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Mirta GROSECLOSE, Appellant, v. OPTIMUM ONCOLOGY-COMPREHENSIVE CANCER CENTER/GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC., Appellees.
    No. 1D12-3912.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 23, 2013.
    Bram J. Gechtman, Miami, Robert J. Fiore of Robert J. Fiore, P.A., Miami, and Marjorie Gadarian Graham of Marjorie Gadarian Graham, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for Appellant.
    Eduardo E. Neret and Javier A. Finlay of the Law Offices of Eduardo E. Neret, P.A., Miami, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying permanent total disability (PTD) benefits and associated penalties, interest, costs, and attorney’s fees. Because neither the parties nor the JCC had the benefit of Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Risk Management and State of Florida, 122 So.3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), and the considerations therein thus were not addressed below, we reverse the order, and remand the case for further proceedings. See generally City of Pensacola v. Capital Realty Holding Co., 417 So.2d 687, 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (“It is well settled that upon reversal and remand with general directions for further proceedings, a trial judge is vested with broad discretion in handling or directing the course of the cause thereafter.”).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

VAN NORTWICK, MARSTILLER, and RAY, JJ., concur.


author: GERBER, J.

text:
    Meranda W. BOLOUS, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-12, Regent Park Condominium Association, Inc., and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 4D15-2608.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 2, 2016.
    Alix J. Montes of The AJM Law Group, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
    Sara F. Holladay-Tobias, Emily Rott-mann, and Gabriel M. Hartsell of McGuire Woods LLP, Jacksonville, for appellee U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-12.
   GERBER, J.

The borrower appeals from the trial court’s final judgment of foreclosure in the bank’s favor. The borrower argues the evidence was insufficient to establish the bank’s standing as the owner or holder of the borrower’s note at the time the bank filed the original complaint. We disagree with the borrower’s argument and affirm.

We write to distinguish this case from Lewis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 188 So.3d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), where we held, without a detailed explanation, that a bank’s reliance on a pooling and servicing agreement was insufficient to establish the bank’s standing to bring suit at the time the suit was filed. Our review of Lems indicates that the bank in that case could not prove that the pooling and servicing agreement at issue included the note at issue. Here, however, the bank’s pre-com-plaint pooling and servicing agreement and corresponding mortgage loan schedule expressly indicated that the agreement included the borrower’s loan in this case. That evidence, plus the other evidence in this case, was sufficient to establish the bank’s standing as the owner or holder of the borrower’s note at the time the bank filed the original complaint.

We present this opinion in three parts:

1. the procedural history;
2. the evidentiary basis for our decision; and
3. why this case is distinguishable from Lewis.

1. Procedural History

In 2005, the borrower executed and delivered a note and mortgage to the original lender.

In 2009, the borrower defaulted on the loan. Shortly thereafter, the bank filed its foreclosure complaint against the borrower. In its complaint, the bank alleged that it owns and holds the note and mortgage. However, the copy of the note which the bank attached to the complaint remained payable to the original lender, and did not contain any endorsements.

In 2014, the bank filed a verified amended complaint. The bank alleged it “is the holder of the Note and entitled to enforce the terms thereof as [the bank] is in possession of the original Note endorsed in blank.” Attached to the verified amended complaint was an allonge containing the original lender’s undated blank endorsement of the note.

The borrower filed an answer alleging the affirmative defense of lack of standing.

At trial, the bank presented the testimony of its servicer’s loan analyst. The analyst testified that in 2005, the borrower’s loan was transferred to the bank’s trust. In 2006, the servicer began servicing the borrower’s loan on the trust’s behalf. The servicer sent a welcome letter to the borrower, advising the borrower to direct payments to the servicer. The bank moved the welcome letter into evidence without objection.

The analyst then identified the trust’s pooling and servicing agreement and corresponding mortgage loan schedule. The bank moved both of those documents into evidence without objection. The analyst explained that the trust’s pooling and servicing agreement, entered into in 2005, “houses [the borrower’s loan] within the trust,” and the mortgage loan schedule listed the loans maintained in the trust, including the borrower’s loan. The analyst further testified that the bank, as trastee, was the plaintiff in this action, and that a limited power of attorney from the bank as trustee allowed the servicer to act on the trust’s behalf. The bank moved the limited power of attorney into evidence over the borrower’s objection.

The analyst next identified the allonge containing the original lender’s undated blank endorsement of the note. The analyst did not know the date when the original lender endorsed the allonge. The bank moved the note and the allonge into evidence over the borrower’s objection.

The bank next moved the default letter and the complete loan payment history into evidence without objection. The loan payment history showed that the servicer began receiving the borrower’s payments from 2006 until the borrower defaulted on the note.

After the parties rested, the borrower argued the bank failed to prove standing, because the note attached to the original complaint was not endorsed, the later-filed blank-endorsed allonge was undated, and the bank’s witness did not know when the allonge was created.

The trial court entered its final judgment of foreclosure in the bank’s favor,

This appeal followed. The borrower argues the evidence was insufficient to establish the bank’s standing as the owner or holder of the borrower’s note at the time the bank filed the original complaint. Our review is de novo. See Caraccia v. U.S. Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 185 So.3d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence to prove standing to bring a foreclosure action de novo.).

2. The Evidentiary Basis for Our Decision

We conclude the borrower’s argument lacks merit. We recognize that the note attached to the original complaint was not endorsed, the later-filed blank-endorsed allonge was undated, and the bank’s witness did not know when the allonge was created. However, the bank’s other evidence established that the bank was the owner or holder of the note before it filed the original complaint, and thus had standing to foreclose. The analyst testified that in 2005, the borrower’s loan was transferred to the bank’s trust, and in 2006, the servicer began servicing the borrower’s loan on the trust’s behalf. The bank also moved into evidence, without objection, the 2005 pooling and servicing agreement identifying the bank as trustee, and the corresponding mortgage loan schedule listing the loans maintained in the trust, including the borrower’s loan.

We emphasize in more detail the terms of the pooling and servicing agreement. The pooling and servicing agreement stated, in pertinent part: “The parties hereto intend to effect an absolute sale and assignment of the Mortgage Loans to the Trustee for the benefit of Certificatehold-ers under this Agreement.” Additionally, section 2.01 of the pooling and servicing agreement, titled “Conveyance of Trust Fund,” stated in pertinent part:

(a) The Depositor hereby sells, transfers, assigns, delivers, sets over and otherwise conveys to the Trustee in trust for the benefit of the Certificateholders, without recourse, the Depositor’s right, title and interest in and to ... the Mortgage Loans listed in the Mortgage Loan Schedule....
(b) In connection with the transfer and assignment set forth in clause (a) above, the Depositor has delivered or caused to be delivered to the Custodian for the benefit of the Certificateholders, the documents and instruments with respect to each Mortgage Loan as assigned: ... the original Mortgage Note bearing all intervening endorsements and including any riders to the Mortgage Note, endorsed “Pay to the order of _, without recourse” and signed in the name of the last named endorsee by an authorized officer.

We conclude that the pooling and servicing agreement’s terms and corresponding mortgage loan schedule identifying the borrower’s loan at issue, along with the other evidence presented through the analyst, was sufficient to demonstrate that the bank was the owner or holder of the borrower’s note at the time the bank filed the original complaint.

3. Why This Case is Distinguishable from Lems

In Lewis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 188 So.3d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), a one-paragraph opinion, we stated:

In 2008, appellee bank filed a foreclosure action and included a count seeking to reestablish a lost note. No copy of the original note was attached to the complaint. The case went to trial in 2014. The endorsements on an allonge to the note were undated and the bank’s witness could not testify when the endorsements were placed on the allonge. The bank’s reliance on a pooling and servicing agreement was insufficient to establish the bank’s standing to bring suit at the time the suit was filed.

Id. at 47 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

Our review of Lewis indicates that the bank in that case could not prove that the pooling and servicing agreement at issue included the note at issue. Here, however, the 2005 pooling and servicing agreement identified the bank as trustee, and the corresponding mortgage loan schedule listed the loans maintained in the trust, including the borrower’s loan.

We are not the first Florida court to reassess the possible evidentiary weight of a pooling and servicing agreement. In Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Marciano, 190 So.3d 166 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), the Fifth District found that a similar section 2.01 of a pooling and servicing agreement was sufficient to establish that the plaintiff possessed the borrower’s promissory note at the time it filed the foreclosure action. We examine Marciano in more detail.

In Marciano, the plaintiff did not attach a copy of the note to its foreclosure complaint. Id. at 167. The plaintiff later filed the original note containing an undated blank endorsement. Id. At trial, the plaintiff moved into evidence a pooling and servicing agreement containing a closing date which pre-dated the complaint. Id. The plaintiff also presented its loan servi-cer’s testimony that the pooling and servicing agreement’s corresponding master loan schedule showed that the plaintiff possessed the borrowers’ note before the pooling and servicing agreement’s closing date. Id. Despite this evidence, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to foreclose. Id. at 167-68.

The Fifth District reversed. Our sister court concluded that the plaintiff had standing to foreclose, as the pooling and servicing agreement demonstrated that the plaintiff possessed the blank-endorsed note at the time the complaint was filed. Id. at 168. Section 2.01 of the pooling and servicing agreement provided:

The Depositor, as of the Closing Date, and concurrently with the execution and delivery hereof, does hereby assign, transfer, sell, set over and otherwise convey to the Trustee without recourse all the right, title and interest of the Depositor in and to the Mortgage Loans identified on the Mortgage Loan Schedule[ ] .... In connection with such transfer and assignment, the Depositor has caused the Sponsor, with respect to each Mortgage Loan, to deliver to, and deposit to or at the direction of the Trustee, as described in the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, with respect to each Mortgage loan, the following documents or instruments: ... (a) the original Mortgage Note endorsed without recourse to the order of the Trustee or in blank....

Id. at 167.

Significantly, the Fifth District also noted:

We have not overlooked our decision in Schmidt v. Deutsche Bank, 170 So.3d 938, 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), or the Fourth District’s recent decision in Lewis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 188 So.3d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). In each case, the court determined that the lender failed to prove standing despite the admission of a [pooling and servicing agreement]. However, neither decision discussed any particular provisions of the respective [pooling and servicing agreements]. Our independent research has found no Florida decision discussing comparable language in a [pooling and servicing agreement] within the context of a lender’s standing to foreclose.

Id. at 168 n. 1 (emphasis added; other internal citations omitted). Our decision today, following Marciano, appears to be the second Florida decision now discussing language in a pooling and servicing agreement which supports an evidentiary basis for a lender’s standing to foreclose.

Conclusion

In sum, the pooling and servicing agreement’s terms, along with its corresponding mortgage loan schedule and the other evidence presented through the analyst, was sufficient to demonstrate that the bank was the owner or holder of the note at the time it filed the original complaint. Therefore, we affirm.

Affirmed.

WARNER and CONNER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Duncan MURPHY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D16-2770, 4D16-3087.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 9, 2016.
    Duncan Murphy, Jr., Indiantown, pro se.
    No appearance for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant appeals and seeks certiorari review of the circuit court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We consolidate the appeal and petition for writ of certiorari, treat the petition as an initial brief, and summarily affirm pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.315(a).

Affirmed.

GERBER, FORST and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.


author: DAMOORGIAN, J.

text:
    R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant, v. Gwendolyn E. ODOM, Personal Representative of the Estate of Juanita Thurston, Appellee.
    No. 4D14-3867.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 30, 2016.

      Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Val Leppert, William L. Durham II, Philip R. Green and Jeffrey L. Furr of King & Spalding LLP, Washington, DC, Atlanta, GA, and Charlotte, NC, for appellant.
    David J. Sales of David J. Sales, P.A., Jupiter, and Rosalyn Sia Baker-Barnes, Mariano Garcia and T. Hardee Bass of Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Ship-ley, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   DAMOORGIAN, J.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (“RJR”) appeals the final judgment entered in favor of Gwendolyn Odom as Representative of the estate of her deceased mother, Juanita Thurston (“Plaintiff”). RJR argues for reversal on multiple grounds. First, it argues that the court erred in denying its motion to remit the jury’s compensatory damages award. Second, it maintains that the court improperly-denied its motion for directed verdict on Plaintiff’s concealment and conspiracy claims because Plaintiff failed to prove that her mother relied on a false or misleading-statement made by RJR after May 5,1992. Third, it asserts that certain comments made by Plaintiffs counsel during closing of the punitive phase necessitate a new trial. Fourth, it argues that the court’s application of the Engle findings violated its due process rights. Plaintiff cross-appeals, arguing that in the event of a new trial: 1) the trial court provided an erroneous instruction on the applicable statute of repose, and 2) improperly ruled that Plaintiff was not permitted to pursue punitive damages for her product defect and negligence claims.

We affirm on the reliance and due process issues without further comment. See Hess v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 175 So.3d 687, 698 (Fla.2015); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So.3d 419, 430-35 (Fla.2013). As discussed further below, we also affirm on the closing comments issue. However, we reverse and remand for remittitur of the jury’s damage awards. In the event that the parties reject the court’s remittitur and a new trial on damages results, we grant Plaintiff the relief requested in her second point on cross-appeal.

Background

Plaintiff filed suit against RJR asserting membership in the Engle class because her mother died from lung cancer “caused by her addiction to cigarettes.” In her suit, Plaintiff alleged causes of action for strict liability, negligence, fraud by concealment, and conspiracy to commit fraud by concealment. The case proceeded to trial in two phases. In the first phase, the jury was asked to: 1) determine whether Ms. Thurston was a member of the Engle class; 2) if so, whether RJR’s conduct was the legal cause of her death; and 3) determine damages/entitlement to punitive damages. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded her $6 million in compensatory damages. It allocated Ms. Thurston’s comparative fault for her injuries at 25%. It also found that punitive damages were warranted.

The second phase of the trial concerned the proper amount of punitive damages. During Phase II, RJR argued to the jury that the “conduct that injured Juanita Thurston ... ended at least 25 years ago” and since then, RJR had “turned the corner, changed its ways, became a new company and started doing things the right way, acting as a responsible company in the tobacco industry.” In support of its position, RJR presented testimony from its vice president of cigarette product development, who testified that RJR was focused on developing safer alternatives to smoking. In turn, during its closing, Plaintiffs counsel argued that despite its rhetoric, RJR deserved to be punished for Ms. Thurston’s death and had yet to accept responsibility or apologize for its actions. At the conclusion of Phase II, the jury awarded Plaintiff $14 million in punitive damages.

Following the trial, RJR moved to set aside the verdict in accordance with its motions for directed verdict on the detrimental reliance issue. Alternatively, it asked for a new trial on the grounds that Plaintiff improperly disparaged RJR for defending itself during closing arguments. Lastly, RJR moved for remittitur of the compensatory award, arguing that the award was excessive when compared to other awards made to surviving adult children. The trial court denied all of RJR’s motions and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff for $18.5 million. This appeal follows.

Analysis

a) Remittitur of the Compensatory Damage Award

“We review an order denying a motion for remittitur or a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard.” City of Hollywood v. Hogan, 986 So.2d 634, 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Pursuant to Florida’s remittitur and ad-ditur statute, section 768.74 of the Florida Statutes, the trial court has the responsibility to review the amount of an award and determine if it is excessive or inadequate “in light of the facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact.” § 768.74(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). “If the court finds that the amount awarded is excessive or inadequate, it shall order a remittitur or additur, as the case may be.” § 768.74(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). In making its determination, the trial court is guided by the following statutory considerations:

(a) Whether the amount awarded is indicative of prejudice, passion, or corruption on the part of the trier of fact;
(b) Whether it appears that the trier of fact ignored the evidence in reaching a verdict or misconceived the merits of the case relating to the amounts of damages recoverable;
(c) Whether the trier of fact took improper elements of damages into account or arrived at the amount of damages by speculation and conjecture;
(d) Whether the amount awarded bears a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the injury suffered; and
(e) Whether the amount awarded is supported by the evidence and is such that it could be adduced in a logical manner by reasonable persons.

§ 768.74(5), Fla. Stat. (2014).

Compensatory damages are intended to redress or compensate for a concrete loss. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 90 So.3d 307, 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Where the loss is of a non-economic nature, however, such as for mental pain and anguish and for loss of consortium, the valuation is inherently difficult. Id. at 310-11. Because no formula can determine the value of such a loss, great deference is given the jury’s estimation of the monetary value of the plaintiffs mental and emotional pain and suffering. Id. ‘“The fact that a damage award is large does not in itself render it excessive nor does it indicate that the jury was motivated by improper consideration in arriving at the award.’ ” Id. (quoting Allred v. Chittenden Pool Supply, Inc., 298 So.2d 361, 365 (Fla.1974)). Rather, a compensatory damage award is only excessive if it is so large that it exceeds the maximum limit of a reasonable range. Id. “In reviewing an award of damages for excessiveness, the court may consider the philosophy and general trend of decisions in comparable cases.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Webb, 93 So.3d 331, 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

When it comes to wrongful death awards, including those in the Engle context, courts have drawn a distinction between compensatory damages awarded to surviving spouses and to adult children. In Webb, the First District reversed an $8 million award to an adult surviving child of a cigarette smoker on the grounds that it was excessive as compared to other awards. 93 So.3d at 337, 339. It explained:

Of the thirty-five Engle cases we examined in which the jury awarded compensatory damages, the juries awarded compensatory damages as great as $7 million in only eight cases. Of these eight cases, three were cases in which the plaintiff was the cigarette smoker and the verdicts included economic damage awards. In the others, the decedents died at a much younger age than Mr. Horner did, or were survived by a spouse, by spouse and child, or by two or more children. Our research has failed to uncover a single case in which an adult child received a wrongful death award of this magnitude that was affirmed on appeal (either in Engle progeny cases or other wrongful death actions).

Id. at 337-38 (footnotes omitted).

The Webb court arrived at this decision even though the evidence established that the adult child plaintiff and her decedent father shared a very “close relationship.” Id. at 338. Specifically, the evidence established that the adult child became deaf as an adult and also had a special needs child who required around-the-clock care. Id. at 338-39. Due to her and her child’s disabilities, the adult child moved across the street from her father who was instrumental in caring for his grandchild until the grandchild died of her disability. Id. The court held that rather than serving as justification, this evidence actually tainted the jury’s award. Id. at 339. In other words, it held that evidence of the parties’ relationship before the decedent’s illness and death was not a proper basis for awarding compensatory damages. Id. Rather, the Webb court clarified that the proper measure of damages should have been based on “evidence of [the decedent’s] illness, subsequent death, and the noneconomic consequences of the death itself.” Id. Because the evidence established that at the time her father died, the adult child plaintiff was “not wholly dependent on his companionship, instruction and guidance,” the court held that the jury’s award could not stand. Id.

Citing to Webb in Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Putney, 199 So.3d 465, 470-71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), this Court considered whether the following evidence concerning the impact of a decedent’s illness and subsequent death on her adult children was sufficient to justify a $5 million award to each child:

One of [the decedent’s] sons testified how he visited his mother as often as he could once he heard of her lung cancer diagnosis, but it was difficult to do because he had his own family. He further testified that his mother never forgot birthdays and she gave all three of her children a goodbye letter on her last birthday. Another of [the decedent’s] sons testified that his mother’s diagnosis had an emotional impact on him, and he would visit or call every day. Not surprisingly, he misses his mother most on special occasions, such as holidays and birthdays. The Plaintiff, [the decedent’s] daughter, testified that when she learned of her mother’s diagnosis, she was too emotional to talk about it. She accompanied her mother to chemotherapy treatments, which ‘killed’ her on the inside, because it made her think about losing her mother. The Plaintiff also told the jury how her mother was so ill on the Plaintiffs birthday that her mother could not say ‘happy birthday,’ and she went into a coma soon after, dying nine days later. The Plaintiffs boyfriend testified as to how upset the Plaintiff had been since her mother’s death and how it devastated her.

Analyzing similar cases, we held that awards of such magnitude are reserved for cases involving “much closer relationships between the parties and the decedents during the decedent’s illness.” Id. at 471. For example, we noted that in Townsend, a $10.8 million compensatory award was affirmed in favor of the wife of a deceased smoker where the wife and the decedent were married for 39 years and the wife had to be separated from her husband while he received treatment for financial reasons, was not able to retire as a result of his illness, and then personally cared for him as he “laid dying” for six months. Id. (citing Townsend, 90 So.3d at 307). Based on Townsend and other precedent, we concluded that in the Putney case, “there was not evidence of the type of close or supportive relationship that would justify such an award.” Id.

Read together, Webb and Putney establish that no matter how strong the emotional bond between an adult child and a decedent parent may be, an adult child who lives independent of the parent during the parent’s smoking related illness and death is not entitled to multi-million dollar compensatory damages award, even if the child was involved in the facilitation of the parent’s treatments and suffered tremendous grief over the loss of the parent. Cases from outside the tobacco arena support this conclusion.

In MBL Life Assurance Corp. v. Suarez, 768 So.2d 1129, 1136 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), the Third District held that an award of $1 million to each of a decedent’s four adult surviving children was “excessive” where none of the children were financially dependent on or residing with the decedent at the time of his death. In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Ahmed, 653 So.2d 1055, 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), this Court affirmed a $400,000 compensatory damages award to adult surviving children for the loss of their parent with whom they did not live at the time of his death, but in doing so, noted that it was “indeed a generous award” that “raises a judicial eyebrow.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Based on the foregoing precedent, the jury’s award of $6 million in compensatory damages to Plaintiff for the loss of her mother was excessive. Although the evidence established that Plaintiff and her mother had a very close and unique relationship, at the time of Ms. Thurston’s illness and death, Plaintiff was not living with Ms. Thurston and was not financially or otherwise dependent on her. Instead, Plaintiff was married with two children of her own and Ms. Thurston was living with her long-time partner. Although Plaintiff took her mother to many of her appointments and was devastated by her decline and subsequent death, the relationship between an adult child living independent of their parent is simply not the type of relationship which can justify the magnitude of the Plaintiffs compensatory damage award. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied RJR’s motion for remittitur or a new trial.

“Because the award of compensatory damages must be vacated, we also vacate the award of punitive damages.” Webb, 93 So.3d at 339-40.

b) Closing Comments During the Punitive Phase

“A trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial and a motion for new trial based on improper closing arguments are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Whitney v. Milien, 125 So.3d 817, 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

A recent line of cases from this Court establishes that “[i]t is improper for counsel to suggest in closing argument that a ‘defendant should be punished for contesting damages at trial’ or that defending a ‘claim in court’ is improper.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Marotta, 125 So.3d 956, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Intramed, Inc. v. Guider, 93 So.3d 503, 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). In the tobacco context, we have held that if preserved, comments disparaging a tobacco company for failing to take responsibility warrant a new trial. Compare Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Tullo, 121 So.3d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (comments disparaging the tobacco company for defending itself and for failing to take responsibility for its actions were improper but did not warrant a new trial because they were unpreserved), with Cohen v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 203 So.3d 942, 949, 41 Fla L. Weekly D2073, D2075, 2016 WL 4649570 (Fla. 4th DCA Sep. 7, 2016) (court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial based on objected to closing comments by plaintiff concerning the tobacco company’s failure to take responsibility), and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Calloway, 201 So.3d 753, 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (preserved objections to tobacco plaintiff’s “failure to accept responsibility” comments during closing comments mandated reversal).

During its Phase II closing, Plaintiffs counsel made several arguments focusing on RJR’s failure to accept responsibility. These comments were similar to those identified as improper in Tullo, Cohen, and Calloway. However, although indistinguishable in substance, the comments ai*e distinguishable in their context.

Explaining the reason why such comments are improper, the Intramed Court wrote:

The closing argument shifted the focus of the case from compensating the plaintiff to punishing the defendant. The life expectancy of the plaintiff and the cost of her future care were legitimate issues for the defense. The purpose of damages here was to compensate, not to make the defendant care, ‘take responsibility,’ or say it was sorry. Counsel’s arguments improperly suggested that the defendant should be punished for contesting damages at trial and that its defense of the claim in court was improper.

93 So.3d 503 at 507 (emphasis added).

Indeed, in Tullo, Cohen, and Calloway, the problematic comments were all made during the phase of the trial wherein the jury was asked to consider the issue of compensatory damages. On appeal in both Cohen and Calloway, the plaintiffs argued that the comments were permissible because, in addition to determining the proper amount of compensation, the jury, was asked to determine if punitive damages were warranted. We rejected these arguments on the grounds that the comments, while perhaps relevant to the issue of punitive damages, may have tainted the jury’s compensatory liability determination. Cohen, _ So.3d at _, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at D2073; Calloway, 201 So.3d at 760 (explaining that “[ajlthough plaintiff asserts that the punitive damages claim made these comments appropriate because the issue of entitlement to such damages was at issue [in the phase wherein the comments were made], so too was the claim for compensatory damages”). See also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Gafney, 188 So.3d 53, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that “when both [punitive and compensatory] claims are at issue, a plaintiff may not utilize ‘send a message’ and conscience of the community arguments when discussing whether the plaintiff should be compensated, due to the potential for the jury to punish through the compensatory award”).

In this case, the challenged comments were made after the jury determined the issue of compensatory damages and during the phase wherein the jury was charged with the sole task of determining the proper amount of punitive damages. Thus, the concerns espoused by Intramed, Tullo, Cohen, and Calloway are simply not present in this case. As such, the fact that RJR failed to acknowledge its conduct was wrongful was a proper topic for discussion. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Alexander, 123 So.3d 67, 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“Unlike compensatory damages, which are intended to redress a concrete loss, punitive damages, like criminal penalties, are intended to punish past conduct and to deter future behavior.”).

Conclusion

We reverse both the compensatory and the punitive damage awards and remand the case with directions that the trial court grant the motion for remittitur or order a new trial on damages only. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. However, in the event of a new trial, Plaintiff is entitled to seek punitive damages on her product defect and negligence claims pursuant to Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 187 So.3d 1219, 1227 (Fla.2016).

Reversed and remanded.

CIKLIN, C.J., and MAY J., concur.

      . Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla.2006).


text:
    David JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D13-1564, 4D13-3337.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 30, 2016.
    David Jones, Live Oak, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant appeals the amount of jail credit awarded following his sentence to two consecutive five-year prison terms. In orally pronouncing the sentence, the court did not make any statements with respect to credit for time served. Subsequently, in its written sentencing order, the court gave appellant 629 days’ credit for time served on both counts. The state moved to correct a sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), arguing that appellant was entitled to only 164 days credit for time served on the first count and no credit for time served on the second count. The lower court granted the state’s motion, and following the denial of appellant’s own 3.800 motion, appellant appealed.

Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), the state may file a motion to correct a sentencing error “only if the correction of the sentencing error would benefit the defendant or to correct a scrivener’s error.” In this case, the state’s 3.800(b) motion neither benefited appellant nor corrected a scrivener’s error. See Linnon v. State, 988 So.2d 70, 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (adding a mandatory minimum term to the defendant’s sentence was not permitted because it did not benefit the defendant); Thomas v. State, 648 So.2d 298, 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (reducing the defendant’s credit for time served did not correct a clerical error because “the purpose of the order was not to conform the order to the court’s oral pronouncement”). As such, the state’s motion was not permitted under rule 3.800(b). Therefore, we reverse and remand with directions to reinstate the original sentence. We find the remaining issues on appeal to be without merit and affirm without comment.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

GERBER, LEVINE and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.


text:
    Samuel WHITE, Petitioner, v. Julie L. JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-4696
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed December 6, 2016
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 23, 2017
    Samuel White, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee; Kenneth S. Steely, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 2004).

ROBERTS, C.J., MAKAR and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Jon SHEPHERD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-2646
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed December 30, 2016
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 23, 2017
    Jon Shepherd, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of appellant’s response to the Court’s order of June 13, 2016, the Court has determined that the appeal is untimely. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

ROBERTS, C.J., ROWE and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Paris D. EVANS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-1033
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 13, 2017
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 16, 2017

      Paula C. Coffman, of Law Office of Paula C. Coffman, Orlando, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Paris D. Evans appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm as to Grounds One and Three. However, because the record does not conclusively refute Evans’ claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Carmen G. Leite as an alibi witness at trial, we reverse the summary denial of Ground Two and remand for attachment of those portions of the record conclusively refuting that claim or for an evidentiary hearing. See Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.” (citing Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1996))).

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

PALMER, TORPY and BERGER, JJ., concur.

      . We note that it is generally necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine why trial counsel did not call a particular witness. See Jacobs v. State, 880 So.2d 548, 555 (Fla. 2004); see also Murrah v. State, 773 So.2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("[S]ummary denial is rarely appropriate if the trial court needs to assess the credibility of the new testimony.”); Evans v. State, 737 So.2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“A trial court’s finding that defense action or inaction is the result of trial strategy will generally be disapproved if the decision is made without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing.” (citing Guisasola v. State, 667 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995))). Moreover, a statement of satisfaction with counsel alone is generally insufficient to conclusively refute a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness. See Law v. State, 847 So.2d 599, 600-01 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).


text:
    Barbara QUALMANN and Christopher Qualmann, Appellants, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST, etc., et al., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D15-2579
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 13, 2017
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 2017
    Barbara Qualmann, Longwood and Christopher R. Qualmann, Ocoee, pro se.

      Michael W. Smith, of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Orlando, for Appellee, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee of Am-eriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. Asset Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2004-R-12 Under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.
    No Appearance for Other Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellants challenge the foreclosure judgment entered after a non-jury trial. Concluding that one issue on appeal is partially meritorious, we reverse and remand this cause for a new hearing on damages. Although the evidence supports a substantial component of the aggregate damage award, the evidentiary foundation for the total amount of damages is lacking. Upon remand, the trial court shall conduct a new hearing on damages. See Peuguero v. Bank of Am., N.A., 169 So.3d 1198, 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (remanding for new damages hearing where properly admitted evidence did not support total amount awarded in foreclosure judgment). We reject Appellants’ other points on appeal without discussion. In all other respects, we affirm.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

COHEN, C.J., TORPY and BERGER, JJ., concur.