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    GROUND CONTROL, LLC d/b/a Ground Control of Alabama, LLC and Frank Beaton v. CAPSCO INDUSTRIES, INC., W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Company, Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc., and Christopher Killion
    NO. 2015-CA-01405-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    DISPOSITION: 03/09/2017

      BLEWETT W. THOMAS, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
    RODERICK MARK ALEXANDER, JR., MATTHEW WARD McDADE, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
   MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. When this case was before this Court on interlocutory appeal, we reversed in 'part. Ground Control, LLC v. Capsco Indus., Inc., 120 So.3d 365, 367 (Miss. 2013) (Ground Control I). Because it was undisputed that neither sub-subcontractor Ground Control, LLG, (Ground Control) nor subcontractor Capsco Industries, Inc., (Capsco)—both Alabama companies—had a statutorily required certificate of responsibility to work in this State, this Court agreed that the subcontract was void. But we found, despite the void contract, “Ground Control should not be precluded from having the opportunity to proceed in court under a claim for the value of what it expended in labor and supplies on the project.” Id. at 371. So we remanded this case to the trial court so Ground Control could pursue the non-barred “claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.” Id. at 367.

¶2. Despite this clear holding, Ground Control argues in this appeal that the trial court erred by limiting its claims on remand to unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. But we find no error. Instead, the trial court properly limited the issue at trial to Ground Control’s claim for quantum meruit damages.

¶3. We do, however, find W.G. Yates and Sons Construction Company (Yates) and Capsco have raised reversible errors in them cross-appeals. Based on the evidence presented at trial, we find Yates was entitled to a directed verdict because Ground Control failed to prove Yates’s liability for quantum meruit damages. We also find the quantum meruit damages award against Capsco was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Consequently, Capsco is entitled to a remitti-tur.

¶ 4. We affirm on Ground Control’s and Ground Control owner Frank Beaton’s direct appeals. On cross-appeal, we reverse the $36,644.69 judgment against Yates and render a judgment in Yates’s favor. We also reverse the $825,583.31 judgment against Capsco. We remand the quantum meruit claim against Capsco, instructing the trial court to conduct a new trial on damages alone, unless a remittitur of $626,407.31, making the damage award $199,096, is accepted by Ground Control and Capsco.

Background Facts and Procedural History

I. Interlocutory Appeal

¶ 5. This is the second time this case has come before this Court on appeal.

¶ 6. In 2009, sub-subcontractor Ground Control sued subcontractor Capsco over work performed on the Margaritaville Hotel in Biloxi. Ground Control also sued the project’s general contractor, Yates, and owner, Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (Har-rah’s). But the trial court discovered Ground Control’s subcontract with Capsco was void by statute, because neither party had a certificate of responsibility. See Miss. Code Ann. § 31-3-15 (Rev. 2010). So the trial court granted the defendants summary judgment on all of Ground Control’s claims, because they stemmed from the void subcontract.

¶7. On interlocutory appeal, we reversed in part. Ground Control I, 120 So.3d at 367. “Although we agree[d] with the trial court’s finding that the lack of certificates of responsibility rendered the parties’ contract null and void, we f[ou]nd that Ground Control’s claims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit were not barred by Mississippi Code Section 31-3-21.” Id. at 373. We also reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Harrah’s and Yates on purely procedural grounds— namely, the “ failure to give proper notice of the conversion of the Rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 371 (citing M.R.C.P. 12 and M.R.C.P. 56).

II. Supplemental Complaint

¶ 8. On September 24, 2013, the mandate issued on the interlocutory appeal.

¶ 9. Despite the clear directive in Ground Control I—remand for further proceedings on the issue of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit—Ground Control immediately moved to “supplement” its complaint with claims against Capsco and its principal, Christopher Killion, based on a panoply of equity-based and nonequity-based theories, such as contract, statutory rights, and tort. Against Yates and Harrah’s, Ground Control sought statutory relief under Mississippi Code Section 85-7-131 or Section 85-7-181 (Rev. 2011), as well as contract damages based on its claim that it was a “third-party beneficiary” to the contract between Harrah’s and Yates. Ground Control also asserted a claim for quantum meruit—as well as other unspecified “equitable claims”—seeking Yates and Harrah’s be jointly and severally liable with Capsco. In total, Ground Control requested $1.16 million in damages.

¶ 10. Operating under the assumption that its prior grant of summary judgment had been reversed in full, the trial court granted Ground Control’s motion to supplement its complaint. Capsco responded with a third-party claim for fraud against Ground Control’s principal, Frank Beaton. Beaton then asserted third-party counterclaims against Capsco and its officers for abuse of process, tortious interference with business relations, and repayment of a $75,000 construction loan, which Beaton had personally guaranteed.

III. Pretrial Motions

¶ 11. Before trial, several parties moved for summary judgment. Harrah’s and Yates’s motion was denied, as was Ground Control’s. But Beaton’s motion for summary judgment on the claims against him personally was granted. So the trial court dismissed Beaton as a third-party defendant. This left Killion as the only individual defendant.

¶ 12. Also before trial, Capsco filed a motion in limine requesting Ground Control’s damages claims be limited to the costs expended and materials purchased for the Margaritaville project. The trial court granted this motion. Specifically, the trial court ordered that Ground Control was limited to presenting evidence under a quantum meruit theory, based on this Court’s mandate in Ground Control I. Consequently, the trial court ordered that “[a]ny alleged tort claims are dismissed and will not be presented at trial.”

IV. Trial and Verdict

¶ 13. A six-day trial was held in October 2014. Beaton testified Ground Control had expended $920,252.80 in unpaid labor and materials. But on cross-examination, he admitted some expenses were counted twice or did not apply to the Margaritaville project. He also admitted that his company had been paid more than a half-million dollars before it stopped working on the project. When pressed, Beaton conceded that, once the figures were added up, Ground Control’s claim for unpaid labor and services was only $199,096.

¶ 14. At the end of Ground Control’s case-in-chief, Killion moved for a directed verdict in his favor individually. The trial court granted this motion, finding Ground Control had failed to present any evidence supporting its claim Killion was individually liable. The trial court also directed a verdict in Yates’s and Harrah’s favor on Ground Control’s statutory-based claims, as well as its claim that it was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between Yates and Harrah’s.

¶ 15. At the end of trial, on October 21, 2014, the jury was instructed that any recovery by Ground Control from Capsco, Yates, and/or Harrah’s would be based on quantum meruit only and limited to the value of unpaid labor and services rendered. The jury found Ground Control was entitled to $862,228. And using the agreed-to form supplied to it, the jury apportioned 95.75% liability ($825,583.31) to Capsco, 4.25% liability ($36,644.69) to Yates, and 0% liability ($0) to Harrah’s.

V. Post-trial Motions

¶ 16. What should have signaled the end of this case at the trial level actually set off protracted post-trial litigation. As the trial court noted in one of its many post-trial orders, there were ninety-nine docket entries following trial.

¶ 17. Among these voluminous motions were Ground Control’s motion to amend the verdict to “remove surplusage” (i.e., the apportionment of liability), its motion for pre- and post-judgment interest, and a motion for a new trial on the limited issue of Killion’s personal liability. All of Ground Control’s motions were denied, except that in its final order, the trial court awarded post-judgment interest. This interest was set to accrue from the date of the final order, which was entered eleven months after the jury’s verdict, due to Ground Control’s multiple post-trial filings.

¶ 18. Capsco,- Yates, and Harrah’s filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Alternatively, Capsco requested remittitur. These motions were denied.

¶ 19. Beaton, individually, also filed a post-trial motion. On September 9, 2015— the date of the final judgment—Beaton moved for entry of a scheduling order or, alternatively, for a final judgment on his third-party claims. The trial court denied this motion, finding “no further action is required ... as all claims alleged by any Party in this Cause have been adjudicated in the Final Judgment entered herein[J”

VI. Appeal and Cross-Appeals

¶ 20. With the final judgment being entered, finally, Ground Control and Beaton appealed. Capsco and Yates cross-appealed. Harrah’s is part of this appeal as appellee only.

Issues on Appeal/Cross-Appeal

¶ 21. Ground Control raises six issues on appeal—primarily challenging the limitation of its recovery to quantum meruit damages, the special verdict form apportioning liability, and the denial of prejudgment interest.

¶ 22. On cross-appeal, Capsco attacks the $825,583.31 judgment against it, arguing it was entitled to a JNOV, alternatively, a remittitur. Yates also cross-appeals, similarly asserting its motion for summary judgment, motion for directed verdict, and motion for JNOV should have been granted.

¶23. Finally, Beaton appeals in his capacity as third-party plaintiff. He claims his due-process rights were violated when the trial court denied him a jury trial on his third-party claims against Capsco and Capsco’s owner, Killion.

Discussion

¶ 24. Due to the multiple, often overlapping issues raised in the appeals and cross-appeals, we approach the questions raised categorically, instead of going through each party’s appellate issues one-by-one.

I. Did Ground Control forfeit its right to appeal when it seized $36,644.69 from Yates in satisfaction of the judgment?

¶ 25. The first question concerns a preliminary matter. In its brief, Yates suggests that Ground Control forfeited its right to appeal when it garnished $36,644.69 from Yates’s bank account to satisfy Yates’s portion of the judgment. But this Court has long held that “when the plaintiff accepted money paid, he may still appeal, where the object of the appeal is simply to have a judgment modified by increasing his demand, as where sufficient damages had not been alloioed, or where proper interest had not been allowed.” Inv’rs Prop. Mgmt., Ltd. v. Watkins, Pitts, Hill & Assocs., 511 So.2d 1379, 1383 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Adams v. Carter, 92 Miss. 579, 590-91, 47 So. 409, 410 (1908)). Here, the object of Ground Control’s appeal is a larger judgment and prejudgment interest. So we find it still may appeal, despite accepting Yates’s payment. See Davis v. Noblitt & Capers Elec. Co., 594 So.2d 610, 613 (Miss. 1992) (clarifying “that the acceptance of the fruits of a judgment at law does not preclude appeal”). But because it accepted payment while its appeal was pending, Ground Control “holds the funds subject to any judgment which is rendered on appeal or possible cross appeal.” Id.

¶ 26. The same is true for Yates. Its payment was not voluntary but instead made through an execution of a writ of garnishment. So the payment does not render Yates’s cross-appeal moot. See In re Estate of Pethan, 475 S.W.3d 722, 727-28 (Mo.App. 2015).

II. Was Ground Control’s potential recovery properly limited to quantum meruit damages?

¶ 27. The next question is the most crucial to this appeal—Did the trial court properly limit the trial to Ground Control’s claim for quantum meruit damages? Ground Control asserts that the trial court “committed reversible error by denying Ground Control a trial on its tort claims against Capsco and Bullion that were pled in the Supplemental Complaint.” It also “submits that the circuit court committed reversible error concerning the claims alleged against Yates and Harrah’s.” But based on our clear mandate in Ground Control I, we find no reversible error.

A. Claims Against Capsco and Killion

¶ 28. Ground Control I was not a blanket reversal of the grants of summary judgment. Instead, we agreed with the trial court that the subcontract between Capsco and Ground Control was void by statute. Ground Control I, 120 So.3d at 368-69. Still, we reversed the grant of summary judgment “in part.” Id. at 367 (emphasis added). Despite the void contract, we found Ground Control could proceed with its lawsuit “under, a claim for the value of what it expended in labor and supplies on the project.” Id. at 372.

¶ 29. Despite this clear, narrow holding, the trial court initially proceeded post-remand as if its grants of summary judgment had been reversed in full. The court permitted Ground Control, over the defendants’ objection, to supplement its complaint to add various theories of recovery beyond unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. But before trial, the trial court properly recognized the limited scope of Ground Control I’s mandate and granted Capsco’s motion in limine, thereby dismissing the initially granted supplemental claims. The court permitted Ground Control to proceed solely on its claim that it was entitled to recover quantum meruit damages.

¶ 30. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the trial court was bound to follow Ground Control I’s mandate. See Moeller v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins., 812 So.2d 953, 960-61 (Miss. 2002) (discussing the law-of-the-case doctrine). And that opinion found Ground Control’s lawsuit based on the Margarita-ville project survived summary judgment only as to its “claim for the valué of what it expended in labor and supplies on the project.” Ground Control I, 120 So.3d at 371. Ground Control’s original complaint, like its supplemental complaint, had brought more than just contract claims. Id. at 367. But in remanding this case, we did not authorize Ground Control to pursue those dismissed claims. Rather, we expressly remanded for “proceedings on whether Ground Control [was] entitled to recover based on claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.” Id. at 367. Ground Control could not make an end run around our clear mandate by filing a “supplemental complaint” based on the same facts alleged in the original complaint.

¶ 31. Nor could Ground Control rely on Ground Control I’s “other penalties” language to support its argument it is entitled to recover more than unjust-enrichment and quantum meruit damages. In Ground Control I, at the end of its discussion on Ground Control’s ability to recover in light of its clear violation of Section 31-3-15, this Court stated, “We do not address the issue of other penalties, if any, that may be appropriate for the trial court to address.” Id. at 371. On appeal, Ground Control claims these “other penalties” include finding the defendants liable in tort. But placed in its context, it is obvious that “other penalties” refers to the statutory penalties imposed by Sections 31-3-15 and 31-3-21 in addition to the penalty of voiding the contract. See Ground Control I, 120 So.3d at 368 (noting the statutory “penalties that serve to deter parties from entering illegal contracts—such as voiding the contract and imposing fines—apply to both parties”); see also Ace Pipe Cleaning, Inc. v. Hemphill Constr. Co., Inc., 134 So.3d 799, 806 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ground Control I, 120 So.3d at 368) (finding the public policy behind Section 31-3-15. “was adequately protected by the statute’s provision for fines and penalties”). So the reference to “other penalties” did not open the door for Ground Control to recover under other theories beyond unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. Rather, it merely provided the trial court discretion to consider whether other statutory penalties applied. See Miss. Code Ann. § 31-3-21.

¶32. Based on Ground Control I, we find the trial- court properly granted Cap-sco’s motion in limine, which limited Ground Control’s .evidence to quantum meruit damages only.

B. Claims against Harrah’s and Yates

¶ 33. In Ground Control I, we also held that the trial court erroneously converted Harrah’s and Yates’s motion to dismiss to a-motion for summary judgment without, first giving Ground Control proper notice. Id. at 373. For this reason, the grant of summary judgment in Harrah’s and Yates’s favor was dismissed. Following remand, Harrah’s and Yates renewed their motion for summary judgment—this time ensuring proper notice. But the trial court ruled Ground Control should be permitted to present its claims against these defendants at trial. However, once Ground Control made its case-in-chief, the trial court granted Harrah’s and Yates’s motion for a directed verdict on all but Ground Control’s quantum meruit claim. Specifically, Ground Control’s contractual and statutory claims were dismissed.

¶ 34. We find no error. Ground Control I’s holding about the void subcontract impacted not only sub-subcontractor’s claims against Capsco, but also against Yates and Harrah’s. In other words, the law of the case dictated that Ground Control was limited to unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims against Yates and Harrah’s as well.

¶ 35. But even if Ground Control’s non -quantum meruit claims against Yates and Harrah’s had survived Ground Control I, we find the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict at the close of Ground Control’s evidence was still proper. We review the grant of a motion for a directed verdict de novo, viewing the evidence in the same light as the trial court—i.e., in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fulton v. Robinson Indus., Inc., 664 So.2d 170, 172 (Miss. 1995). A directed verdict is proper when “the plaintiffs evidence is so lacking that reasonable jurors would be unable to reach a verdict in favor of that party.” Id.

¶ 36. Ground Control’s evidence against Yates and Harrah’s was clearly lacking. Ground Control had contended it was a “third-party beneficiary” to the contract between Harrah’s and Yates. But to be a third-party beneficiary, the rights of the third-party must spring forth from the terms of the contract itself. Trammell v. State, 622 So.2d 1257, 1260 (Miss. 1993). And here, Ground Control failed to prove it had any right in the Harrah’s and Yates contract placed there for its benefit. See id. Ground Control also asserted statutory rights under Section 85-7-131 and Section 85-7-181 of the Mississippi Code. But recovery under Section 85-7-131 required Ground Control to prove it was in a contractual relationship with Harrah’s or Yates—something Ground Control did not prove and further could not prove based on its lack of a certificate of responsibility voiding any contract. See Miss. Code Ann. § 31-3-15. And Section 85-7-181, which has since been repealed, had been declared unconstitutional by the Fifth Circuit. Noatex Corp. v. King Constr. of Houston, L.L.C., 732 F.3d 479, 487 (5th Cir. 2013). So its statutory claims also failed as a matter of law.

¶37. Thus, we affirm the grant of a partial directed verdict in Yates and Har-rah’s favor.

III. Could Ground Control, the sub-subcontractor, bring a claim for quantum meruit damages against Yates, the primary contractor, or Harrah’s, the project owner?

¶ 38. On cross-appeal, Yates asserts the trial court did not go far enough when granting the directed verdict. Instead, Yates argues, the court should have dismissed the contractor completely through summary judgment, directed verdict, or JNOV.

¶ 39. Yates argues our opinion in Redd v. L & A Contracting Co., 246 Miss. 548, 556, 151 So.2d 205, 208 (1963), controls. After review, we agree. In Redd, the contractor hired a subcontractor, who in turn hired a sub-subcontractor. When the subcontractor, who became insolvent, failed to pay for sub-subcontractor’s services, the sub-subcontractor sued the general contractor. It reasoned that, because the general contractor had accepted the benefits of its work, it should be able to recover from the contractor “under the common law on the ‘theorem of quantum meruit.’” Id. at 554, 151 So.2d at 207.

¶ 40. This Court rejected the sub-subcontractor’s, claim. Because quantum, meruit is an implied contract theory, available only when there is no express contract, “[wjhere there is a contract, parties may not abandon same and resort to quantum meruit.” Id. at 556, 151 So.2d at 208. In Redd, this Court extended this prohibition to find “that a sub-subcontractor cannot sue on quantum meruit against a primary contractor for work done under an express contract with another person.” So because the sub-subcontractor in Redd had an express contract with the insolvent subcontractor, it could not sue the general contractor under a quantum meruit theory. Id.

¶ 41. Here, the facts are different—the express contract between Ground Control and Capsco was void for public policy. But the principle is the same. Ground Control could not sue general contractor Yates for quantum meruit for work done under the voided (i.e., implied) contract with Capsco.

¶ 42. Redd reinforced the “general rule [that], in order to recover for work and labor on the theory of an implied contract, it is ordinarily deemed essential to show that the services were rendered under the reasonable expectation that they would be paid for by the person sought to be charged, and the person sought to be charged knew that the services were being performed with the expectation that he would pay for such work.” Id. at 558, 151 So.2d at 209 (emphasis added). In Redd, it was undisputed that the aggrieved sub-subcontractor had dealt with the subcontractor only. Id. at 555, 151 So.2d at 208. Thus, it could only reasonably expect to be paid by the subcontractor.

¶ 43. Here, Beaton contended that Yates negotiated change orders directly with Ground Control. In other words, Ground Control presented evidence Yates knew Ground Control was performing the services under the change orders with the reasonable expectation it would be paid for them. See id. at 558, 151 So.2d at 209. But Ground Control presented no evidence it reasonably expected Yaies would be the one to pay Ground Control for these services. See id. Instead, both in his deposition and at trial, Beaton testified that his company looked solely to Capsco for payment for its services. Specifically, at trial, Beaton admitted Ground Control “worked for Capsco” and any payment for its services “was going to come from” Capsco.

¶ 44. Even when viewing Ground Control’s evidence favorably, it failed to support its claim that Yates was liable under quantum meruit, because it admitted its “services were rendered under the reasonable expectation that they would be paid for by” Capsco, and not “the person sought to be charged,” Yates. Therefore, Yates’s motion for a directed verdict on the quantum meruit claim should have been granted. See Fulton v. Robinson Indus., Inc., 664 So.2d 170, 172 (Miss. 1995) (holding the grant of a directed verdict “is proper if the plaintiffs evidence is so lacking that reasonable jurors would be unable to reach a verdict in favor of that party”). We reverse the damages award against Yates and render a judgment in its favor. Consequently, Ground Control must repay Yates the $36,644.69 it seized prior to the outcome of this appeal. See Davis, 594 So.2d at 613.

¶ 45. We are of the same view for the jury’s apportionment of zero liability to Harrah’s. In its appeal, Ground Control challenges the jury’s finding as not being supported by the evidence. But Ground Control offered no testimony that Harrah’s knew Ground Control was working on the project or that Ground Control expected Harrah’s to pay for it. See Redd, 246 Miss. at 555-58, 151 So.2d at 208. So the jury’s finding of zero liability was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. And Ground Control’s motion for a new trial or JNOV against Harrah’s was properly denied.

IY. Should subcontractor Capsco, contractor Yates, and owner Harrah’s have been jointly and severally liable?

¶46. Shifting from the legal basis for damages to the damages award itself, Ground Control’s primary challenge on appeal is that the damages award should not have been apportioned between Capsco (95.75%) and Yates (4.25%). Instead, it makes the bold assertion that the jury intended Capsco, Yates, and Harrah’s to be jointly and severally liable. It describes the special verdict form used by the jury as “surplusage.” And it argues the trial court erred by not granting its motion to “remove” this surplusage from the verdict.

¶ 47. This argument fails for three reasons.

¶ 48. First, this argument is clearly waived. Ground Control made no objection to the special verdict form during trial. Instead, it raised its “surplusage” argument for the first time in a post-trial motion. And as this Court has said, “Objections to jury instructions made after the jury has returned a verdict and been discharged [are] simply too late.” Barnett v. State, 725 So.2d 797, 801 (Miss. 1998).

¶49. Second, even if not waived, this argument fails as a matter of law. As discussed in the previous section, this Court in Redd rejected Ground Control’s contention that every entity involved in a construction project is jointly and severally liable to a sub-subcontractor for quantum meruit damages. See Redd, 246 Miss. at 555-58, 151 So.2d at 208. Instead, a sub-subcontractor can recover only quantum meruit damages from the person to whom it reasonably looked'for payment. Id. So by instructing the jury to apportion liability based on who was reasonably expected to pay Ground Control, the trial court provided the jury with an accurate statement of the law.

¶ 50. Third, this argument is moot. Because we find Ground Control failed to present evidence that it reasonably expected either Harrah’s or Yates to pay it for services it performed on the Margaritaville project, neither owner nor general contractor could be liable at all—let alone jointly and severally liable with Capsco.

V. Was the jury’s verdict against Capsco supported by the evidence?

¶ 51. Capsco also challenges the jury’s verdict on cross-appeal. It argues damages awarded to Ground Control should have been limited to restitution damages (the value of the labor and supplies expended on the project) and not expectation damages (what Ground Control would have earned if the subcontract had not been void). And despite the motion in li-mine expressly limiting Ground Control’s evidence to restitution damages, Capsco contends “Ground Control nevertheless proceeded to introduce its expectation damages at trial.”

A. Inapplicable Quasi-Estoppel Doctrine

¶ 52. Capsco’s contention that Ground Control—in clear conflict with Ground Control Ts mandate—was seeking breach-of-contract damages instead of quantum meruit damages is bolstered by Ground Control’s own argument on appeal.

¶ 53. In an effort to obtain pre-judgment interest, Ground Control insists its damages claim was liquidated and based on quasi-estoppel, .not quantum meruit. Ground Control claims this case is just like T.C.B. Construction Co. v. W.C. Fore Trucking, Co., 134 So.3d 752 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (reversed in part on other grounds), where the contractor was es-topped from denying the existence of a modified contract with the subcontractor based on the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. There, because the contractor had clearly accepted the benefit of the subcontractor’s work outside the originally agreed-to geographical area, the Court of Appeals held the contractor could not deny the contract had been modified. Thus, the subcontractor was owed the contract price. Id. at 762-64. And because this price was fixed, or liquidated, the subcontractor was also entitled to pre-judgment interest. Id. at 766-67.

¶ 54. In an effort also to obtain pre-judgment interest, Ground Control insists that its judgment, like that in T.C.B., was based on quasi-estoppel, and not quantum meruit. But quasi-estoppel, as applied in T.C.B., is the doctrine that “[w]here one having the right to accept or reject a transaction takes and retains benefits thereunder, he ratifies the transaction, is bound by it, and cannot avoid its obligation or effect by taking a position inconsistent therewith.” T.C.B., 134 So.3d at 759 (quoting Wood Naval Stores Exp. Ass’n v. Latimer, 220 Miss. 652, 664, 71 So.2d 425, 430 (1954)). And here, as matter of public policy, Capsco “did not have the right to accept or reject the transaction, because the subcontract was void and unlawful under [Section 31-3-15].” Ace Pipe Cleaning, Inc. v. Hemphill Constr. Co., 134 So.3d 799, 805 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). So “the doctrine of quasi-estoppel does not apply.” Id. Indeed, this Court has already held that the contract between Capsco and Ground Control was void under Section 31-3-15. Ground Control I, 120 So.3d at 367. So Ground Control’s argument—that Capsco was estopped from denying the existence of a contract that this Court found never existed—defies logic.

¶ 55. It also defies the mandate of Ground Control I, which specifically found that the applicable equitable doctrine for when a contract is void under Section 31-1-15 is “quantum meruit or unjust enrichment,” and not quasi-estoppel. Ground Control I, 120 So.3d at 369. See also T.C.B., 134 So.3d at 760-61 (noting quantum meruit and unjust enrichment are not synonymous with quasi-estoppel). This is because “[u]njust enrichment applies to situations” like the one here “ ‘where there is no legal contract’ and ‘the person sought to be charge is in possession of money or property which in good conscience and justice he should not retain but should deliver to another.’” Ground Control I, 120 So.3d at 371 (quoting Powell v. Campbell, 912 So.2d 978, 982 (Miss. 2005)).

B. Unsupported Quantum Meruit Damages Award

¶ 56. Despite this Court’s clear pinpoint of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit as the appropriate equitable doctrine, Ground Control goes so far as to argue “no evidence at trial would substantiate an award of quantum meruit damages under Mississippi law.” Ground Control then doubles down in its cross-appellee brief, reasserting that it “did not allege a claim for quantum meruit recovery against Capsco in the Supplemental Complaint.”

¶ 57. In response, Capsco requests on cross-appeal that we reverse the jury’s award and render a judgment-in its favor. Capsco points out that the sole claim presented to the jury was damages based on quantum meruit. And since Ground Control insists there was no evidence to support a quantum meruit award, then the judgment must be reversed entirely.

¶ 58. Though we decline to impose such a harsh result, we do take Ground Control’s argument of no evidence of quantum meruit damages into account when reviewing the record evidence on damages. In other words, Ground Control’s assertion has prompted us to consider carefully whether its damages evidence fell under the category of quantum meruit damages or—as Capsco contends—actually reflects what it expected to earn under the contract. And having done so, we find, based on the evidence, no reasonable jury could have awarded $825,583.31 in quantum me-ruit damages against Capsco.

¶ 59. The jury had been instructed “that any recovery by Ground Control, LLC based in quantum meruit, is limited to the value of the labor and services rendered by Ground Control, LLC to the defendants for which payment has not been tendered yet.” And the jury heard Beaton concede that, after subtracting the half-million dollars in payments Capsco had already tendered to his company, Ground Control’s claim for unpaid labor and services was only $199,096. Thus, the jury had no evi-dentiary basis for finding Capsco liable for more than four times that amount.

¶ 60. For this reason, we find the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Capsco’s motion for remittitur. See Gatewood v. Sampson, 812 So.2d 212, 222 (Miss. 2002) (reviewing the denial of a motion for remittitur for abuse of discretion). While the amount of damages is primarily a question for the jury, Mississippi Code Section 11-1-55 (Rev. 2014) authorizes a trial court to grant a remitti-tur when “the damages awarded were contrary to the overwhelming weight of credible evidence.” Such is the case here—the damages awarded went against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

¶ 61. Of course, Section 11-1-55 also provides, in the case where a remitti-tur is warranted, the parties may accept the remittitur or proceed on a new trial on damages. See Dedeaux v. Pellerin Laundry, Inc., 947 So.2d 900, 908 (Miss. 2007) (clarifying that a “grant of an additur or remittitur shall take effect only if accepted by all the parties,” so “[i]f all parties do not agree to the additur or remittitur, then each party shall have the right to ... demand a new trial on damages”). So on remand, Ground Control and Capsco have two options—agree to a $626,407.81 remit-titur, making the damage award against Capsco $199,096, or proceed to a new trial on quantum meruit damages against Cap-sco only.

VI. Was Ground Control entitled to pre-judgment interest? Alternatively, should post-judgment interest have accrued from an earlier date?

¶ 62. Though we reverse the damages award against Yates and Capsco, we still find it prudent to address Ground Control’s interest-based claims, lest Ground Control try to seek on remand interest it is not entitled to.

A. Pre-judgment Interest

¶ 63. As mentioned in the previous section, because pre-judgment interest may be awarded in breach-of-contract cases, when the amount of damages is certain, ie., liquidated, Ground Control argues its damages claim was liquidated and based on breach of contract, not quantum meruit. But as already discussed, this argument fails in light of Ground Control I’s clear holding. The only damages available were for quantum meruit. As this Court has held, where—as is the case here—there is a bona fide dispute as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to a quantum meruit award and, if so, what amount, then pre-judgment interest is not warranted. In re Estate of Gillies, 830 So.2d 640, 647 (Miss. 2002).

B. Post-judgment Interest

¶ 64. Alternatively, Ground Control claims the post-judgment interest it was awarded did not start accruing early enough. The trial court awarded post-judgment interest in its final judgment, entered September 2015. Ground Control claims interest should have begun to accrue in October 2014, when the jury entered its verdict. But we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

¶ 65. Because the judgment was not based on a contract with a set interest rate, the trial court had discretion to set the rate of interest, as well as the date from which interest would accrue. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (Rev. 2016). See also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Estate of Francis ex rel. Francis, 825 So.2d 38, 50 (Miss. 2002) (finding the trial court’s decision about post-judgment interest fell “within the bounds of his discretionary authority”). The trial court decided to impose an eight-percent rate from the date of the final judgment (September 18, 2015). Considering the eleven-month delay between the jury’s verdict and the final judgment was almost entirely attributable to Ground Control’s voluminous post-trial motions, there was nothing unfair about the trial court’s judgment, so far as post-judgment interest is concerned.

¶ 66. Thus, if the parties accept the $626,407.31 remittitur, Ground Control is not entitled to post-judgment interest before the final judgment date of September 18, 2015. If the parties elect to have a new trial on damages, the issue of post-judgment interest, if any, will be soundly within the trial court’s discretion.

VII. Were the individual claims properly dismissed?

¶ 67. There are two final matters to address.

A. Claims Against Killion Individually

¶ 68. The first is the trial court’s dismissal of Capsco officer Killion as an individual defendant. On appeal, Ground Control makes the broad assertion that Killion used Capsco as his “alter ego” and, thus, should be personally liable for its debts. But Ground Control fails to cite any applicable case law about piercing the corporate veil to find a corporate officer personally liable. Instead, it cites irrelevant cases about undoing fraudulent transfers. But that was not at issue. The issue concerning Killion was whether Ground Control could reasonably look to Killion personally to recover quantum, meruit damages. And Ground Control failed to present evidence that his Alabama company’s separate corporate identity should be disregarded. Ground Control presented no evidence that Killion incorporated Capsco “solely to avoid personal liability of the owner while reserving to the owner the benefits gained through use of the corporate name.” Bon Secour Fisheries, Inc. v. Barrentine, 408 So.2d 490, 491 (Ala. 1981). Nor did it show that Capsco was so organized and controlled as to make it a mere instrumentality of Killion. See id. Based on this lack of evidence, the trial court properly dismissed Killion as an individual defendant.

B. Claims by Beaton as a Third-party Plaintiff

¶ 69. The second issue is the sole claim raised in the appeal brought by Beaton in his capacity as third-party plaintiff. He claims his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court denied him a jury trial on his pending third-party claims. But we find the trial court did not reversibly err by denying Beaton’s post-trial motion and declaring all outstanding issues had been resolved in its final judgment.

¶ 70. This is because, with the exception of his abuse-of-process claim, the claims asserted in Beaton’s third-party complaint had been resolved. Prior to trial, Beaton had been dismissed as a third-party defendant because the trial court agreed that he had acted solely in his capacity as Ground Control’s owner, not individually. Consequently, he had no personal claims related to the Margaritaville project. Instead, these claims belonged to his company—Ground Control—which had been found to be the only “person” who dealt with Capsco. So the trial court was right to hold that “no further action is required ... as all claims alleged by any Party in this Cause have been adjudicated in the Final Judgment entered herein[.]”

¶71. The only personal claim that arguably was not adjudicated was the abuse-of-process claim. But we find the trial court did not reversibly err by dismissing this claim. The crucial element of an abuse-of-process claim is “the intent to abuse the privileges of the legal system.” McLain v. W. Side Bone & Joint Ctr., 656 So.2d 119, 123 (Miss. 1995). But here, in bringing claims against Beaton individually, Capsco was simply responding to similar claims made by Ground Control against Capsco’s officers individually. So we fail to see how the third-party complaint, in and of itself, was abusive.

¶ 72. Moreover, it was Beaton who moved pretrial to sever all claims against individual defendants due to his wanting to keep unsavory details about his and the officers of Capsco’s behavior during their work on the Margaritaville project. Having successfully kept this evidence out of the trial, Beaton then waited eleven months after trial—until the final judgment was entered on September 9, 2015—to request a trial on his third-party claims. At this point, the trial court had the authority to deem abandoned any outstanding claims, thus finally clearing this protracted litigation from its docket. See Cox v. Cox, 976 So.2d 869, 874 (Miss. 2008) (“The power to dismiss for failure to prosecute is granted not only by Rule 41(b), but is part of a trial court’s inherent authority and is necessary for “the orderly expedition of justice and the court’s control of its own docket.”).

Conclusion

¶ 73. On all issues raised on Ground Control’s appeal, we affirm. On the issue raised in Beaton’s appeal, we also affirm. But on the issue of quantum meruit recovery raised in Yates’s cross-appeal, we reverse the $36,644.69 judgment against Yates and render a judgment in Yates’s favor. Thus, Yates is entitled to the $36,644.69 it involuntarily paid to Ground Control through a writ of garnishment. Finally, on the issue of the amount of quantum meruit damages against Capsco, raised in Capsco’s cross-appeal, we reverse the $825,583.31 judgment against Capsco and remand the damages issue to the trial court. On remand, we instruct the trial court to grant Capsco a $626,407.31 remit-titur, making the damages award $199,096. If Ground Control and Capsco do not agree to remittitur, then the trial court should proceed with a new trial on damages against Capsco.

¶ 74. Based on what transpired following our mandate in Ground Control I, we feel compelled to make ourselves very clear. The only plaintiff on remand is Ground Control. The only defendant is Capsco. The only issue is quantum meruit damages. And the only options available to Ground Control and Capsco are to agree to a $199,096 damages award or proceed to a new trial on quantum meruit damages.

¶ 75. ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED; ON CROSS-APPEAL: REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Ground Control also sought to hold Capsco officers Loye Mcllveene and Jason Dollar, as individuals, jointly and severally liable.

      . In addition to asserting “extra-contractual” claims against Capsco, Ground Control added tort claims for fraud, failure to correct work, negligent supervision of employees, interference with business relations, conversion, bad faith, and self-dealing. Ground Control also alleged Capsco violated stop-pay notices and committed "other wrongs.” Ground Control requested an accounting by Capsco and punitive damages.

      . Since the filing of this suit, Section 85-7-131 has been amended to restrict application to water, oil, and gas wells and fixed machinery. Miss. Laws 2014, ch. 487, § 18, eff. from April 11, 2014. See Miss. Code Ann. § 85-7-131 (Supp. 2016). And Section 85-7-181 has been repealed in its entirety. Miss. Laws 2014, ch. 487, § 24, eff. from and after April 11, 2014.

      . By Ground Control’s ore terms motion, Mcllveene and Dollar also were dismissed as individual defendants.

      . While those motions were pending, Ground Control also filed a motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence presented at trial, followed by an amended motion to amend the pleadings. It also filed a motion for a trial setting of its tort claims.

      . When its motions were denied, Ground Control filed a motion for a correction of the order denying a trial setting on the dismissed tort claims and denying pre-judgment interest. When these motions were denied, Ground Control inexplicably filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its "tort claims under Miss. Code Ann. § 85-7-183.”

      . A week later, on September 18, 2015, the trial court entered a corrected final judgment, clarifying additional claims had also been dismissed on directed verdict.

      . In January 2016, Ground Control and Bea-ton moved to strike the notice of cross-appeal as untimely. But a panel of this Court denied the motion. It seems that Ground Control and Beaton were trying to have it both ways—on the one hand arguing to this Court that the judgment in this case had become final and appealable on September 9, 2015, triggering the thirty-day window to appeal, but on the other hand arguing to the trial court that the judgment was not final on September 9, 2015, because Beaton's third-party claims had not been disposed of.

      . Specifically, Ground Control argues:
      I. The circuit court committed reversible error by denying Ground Control's motion to delete surplusage from verdict.
      II. Should the apportionment of the verdict not be stricken as surplusage, Ground Control submits that the circuit court committed reversible error concerning the claims alleged against Yates and Harrah’s.
      III. The Corrected Final Judgment contains inaccurate statements of both the claims that were presented to the jury and dismissed by directed verdict.
      IV. The circuit court committed reversible error by denying Ground Control’s motion for the assessment of pre-judgment interest. Further, the assessment of post-judgment interest should accrue from October 21, 2014.
      V. The circuit court committed reversible error by dismissing Ground Control's claims alleging ultra vires acts by Capsco’s owner Christopher Killion.
      VI. The circuit court committed reversible error by denying Ground Control a trial on its tort claims against Capsco and Killion that were pled in the Supplemental Complaint.

      . In October 2015, after filing its notice of appeal, Ground Control filed a suggestion of garnishment with Yates’s banks. After the $36,644.69 was garnished, Yates moved for a satisfaction of judgment on November 6, 2015. This motion was granted on December 2, 2015.

      . Miss. Laws 2014, ch. 487, § 24, eff. from and after passage (approved April 11, 2014).

      . In its appellant’s brief, Ground Control argues the trial court’s Corrected Final Judgment does not "correctly represent the claims dismissed by directed verdict.” The final judgment stated that Ground Control had brought statutory claims under Section 85-7-131, - 181, and -183. Because Ground Control never asserted Section 85-7-183 in its complaint, it argues the trial court “could not have granted a directed verdict on an issue that was not raised.” While that may be so, there is obviously nothing “reversible” about this error. So we fail to comprehend why Ground Control raised this as a distinct issue on appeal.

      . See, e.g., Warwick v. Matheney, 603 So.2d 330, 342 (Miss.1992).

      . Mississippi Code Section 75-17-7 provides—
      All judgments or decrees founded on any sale or contract shall bear interest at the same rate as the contract evidencing the debt on which the judgment or decree was rendered. All other judgments or decrees shall bear interest at a per annum rate set by the judge hearing the complaint from a date determined by such judge to be fair but in no event prior to the filing of the complaint.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Tameshia SHELTON a/k/a Mickey v. STATE of Mississippi
    NO. 2015-KA-01274-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    03/16/2017

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RODNEY A. RAY
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LAURA H. TEDDER
    BEFORE WALLER, C.J., COLEMAN AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
   CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. On July 17, 2015, a Clay County jury convicted Tameshia Shelton of the murder of Daniel Young. After the trial, Shelton filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. Shelton now appeals three issues. First, Shelton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Second, Shelton claims that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Third, she alleges that the trial court erred by denying her requested two-theory jury instruction. Finding no error, we affirm Shelton’s conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Ketina Tutton—Tameshia Shelton’s younger sister—lived in the Mhoon Valley Community of Clay County (“Mhoon Valley”) near West Point, Mississippi, and Daniel Young lived in Forest, Mississippi. Tutton and Young maintained a long-distance, romantic relationship, and Young often would visit Tutton in Mhoon Valley. Because Tutton lived with her mother, who disapproved of the couple cohabiting before marriage, Tutton and Young would sometimes spend the night together at Shelton’s nearby residence.

¶ 3. On Monday, October 12, 2009, Young arrived to visit Tutton for the week. Throughout the week, Tutton went to work at Sitel, Inc., in Starkville, Mississippi, and Young visited with Tutton’s family.

¶ 4. On Friday, October 16, Young spent a large portion of the day at Shelton’s house. He repaired her car, changed her oil, and worked on an old truck parked at Shelton’s house. At some point in the day, Shelton’s cousin asked to see Shelton’s .22 caliber revolver. She showed him the handgun and then cleaned and oiled all six of its chambers. Late in the afternoon, Shelton cooked dinner, and Young ate with Shelton and Tutton’s mother at Shelton’s house.

¶ 5. Around 8:00 p.m., after running some errands, Tutton and Young returned to Tutton’s house. While parked in the driveway, Tutton told Young that she was no longer planning to relocate to Meridian in the immediate future to be closer to Young as Sitel had hired her permanently. The couple had a heated discussion that lasted fifteen to twenty minutes before they exited the car. Tutton testified that there was no physical altercation between her and Young. After the discussion, Tut-ton walked toward the rear of her mother’s house, and Young walked toward Shelton’s house along the driveway that connected the two houses. Tutton entered her mother’s house and watched television with her mother and a sister.

¶ 6. Sometime after Tutton saw Young walking toward Shelton’s house, Shelton alleged that she heard a knock on her bedroom window. Shelton claims that Young was at the window and asked her for her pistol in order to shoot a raccoon out of a tree. Young asked for just one bullet, but Shelton loaded six bullets into the handgun. Shelton claimed that she walked to the front room of the house and gave Young the handgun. She asked him to return and show her the raccoon once he had shot it.

¶ 7. Shelton claimed to have heard one shot shortly after Young left her house. She alleged that she searched for Young, calling his name. According to Shelton, she found Young ten to fifteen yards from the driveway, lying face-down in the grass under a large tree. She claimed that Young was grunting. Shelton immediately called 911 and remained on the phone until officers responded to the scene. She reported the incident to the 911 dispatcher as “an accidental shooting” and mentioned—several times—that Young had intended to shoot a raccoon.

¶ 8. Tutton—still at her mother’s house—heard the gunshot but thought the sound was a firecracker exploding. It was not until a neighbor informed Tutton’s mother of a shooting in Mhoon Valley that Tutton knew the sound had been a gunshot. Tutton drove to her sister’s house on the back driveway because her sister owned a black Mustang car, and the neighbor said that it was mentioned on the police scanner. After looking in Shelton’s house, Tutton saw Shelton standing in the road. Shelton told Tutton that Young had been shot. Tutton found Young in the grass and “went crazy.” She screamed and pulled her hair and clothing. Tutton remembered hearing sirens shortly after this.

¶ 9. Deputy Cassandra Smith and Officer Torrey Williams (“Torrey”), an auxiliary officer with Clay County, were the first responders to the scene. They saw Shelton standing in the middle of the road, pointing toward her house. Shelton was crying and appeared distressed. Smith followed Shelton up the driveway to where Young lay in the grass.

¶ 10. Smith testified that Shelton was hysterically screaming, “You’re late. You’re late. He’s dead.” Smith called out to Young and touched his back but felt no movement. Shelton began searching for the pistol, prompting Smith to ask her if Young had been shot. Shelton kept repeating, “I’ve got to find the gun.” She told Smith that the gun was an heirloom and that she had “to find it.” Smith saw the pistol on the ground and did not mention it to Shelton. Instead, Smith escorted Shelton away from Young and back toward the front of the trailer. Smith then instructed Torrey to call Officer Ramirez Williams (“Ramirez”) and inform him that she suspected that there had been a murder.

¶ 11. Smith said that Shelton remained hysterical and she noticed that Shelton was constantly wiping her hands on her baby’s blanket as she held her baby. Tor-rey also testified that Shelton was upset and constantly wiping her hands together when she was in the trailer later that evening.

¶ 12. As Smith and Torrey began to cordon off the area around Young, Officer William Knowles responded to the scene. Knowles checked Young for a pulse but did not feel one. He then assisted the EMTs in turning Young over. The EMTs pronounced Young deceased, and Knowles took charge of Young’s body and began a homicide investigation. Knowles noted the gunshot wound on Young’s chest and discovered the handgun which lay below Young’s feet.

¶ 13. Once Ramirez arrived at the scene, he examined Young’s body and the position of the handgun. He then briefly interviewed Shelton. Ramirez testified that, after inspecting the scene and interviewing Shelton, “it just wasn’t looking like an accidental shooting to me.”

¶ 14. Next, Smith and Torrey escorted Shelton to the sheriffs department for a more detailed statement. Both officers testified that Shelton was calmer on the drive to the sheriffs department than earlier in the evening. On cross-examination, Torrey claimed that Shelton was no longer wiping her hands together, but on re-direct examination stated that Shelton was still wiping her hands together at the sheriffs department.

¶ 15. Meanwhile, after photos had been made of the scene, Knowles recovered the handgun. He unloaded five unfired live casings along with one empty casing. Also, Officer Brad Pettit placed paper bags over Young’s hands to preserve evidence. Ramirez and the other officers also performed a grid search for other evidence in the vicinity of Young’s body. They discovered evidence of a scuffle or altercation in the gravel driveway, five to ten yards from where Young’s body lay. At the site of the scuffle, the officers recovered a banana hair-clip—with hair in it.

¶ 16. Around 12:00 a.m. the next morning, Ramirez interviewed Shelton again at the sheriffs department. Ramirez questioned Shelton about the scuffle that had occurred in the driveway. Shelton denied any knowledge of an altercation. She also denied wearing a banana hair-clip, but claimed that Tutton sometimes wore them. Without prompting—and for the first time by anyone in the investigation, Shelton raised the issue of gunpowder residue: “You can test my clothes to see if I have any powder on it [sic]. If I would have shot him, I would have gun residue all up my arms—gun burn.” At the end of the interview, Ramirez conducted a gunshot residue test on Shelton and Tutton. The tests were sent to the Mississippi Crime Laboratory.

¶ 17. Over the next few days, Shelton was re-interviewed a number of times. Chief Deputy Eddie Scott interviewed Shelton on October 19. In this interview, Shelton claimed that she suffered from amnesia due to her hospitalization for seizures in January 2009. She also alleged that she was inside her house when the shot was fired. Further, Shelton claimed to have fired the handgun on Wednesday, October 14, at a stray dog in her yard. While she did not fire the handgun on October 16, she did claim to have cleaned it that afternoon.

¶ 18. Later in the afternoon of October 19, Agent Geoffrey Still interviewed Shelton. For the first time, Shelton claimed that she wore the same pajamas on October 14 when she shot at the stray dog as she did the night of October 16.

¶ 19. On April 8, 2011, a Clay County grand jury indicted Shelton for murder. After her indictment, Shelton was interviewed for a final time by Lieutenant Brett Watson on March 21, 2014. Shelton claimed that Ramirez had sprinkled a substance onto her hands and looked at the substance under ultraviolet light. Ramirez denied doing so. Shelton also was hesitant in answering whether or not Tutton and Young had fought that Friday before telling Watson that she did not remember.

¶20. Shelton was tried for murder in Clay County from July 14 to July 17, 2015. At trial, the State called several officers to testify to their personal knowledge of the events. Still testified concerning his interview with Shelton that she appeared “evasive! ]” and was “trying to distance herself from what was taking place.” He also noted the discrepancy that Shelton claimed to have amnesia but was able to recount the week before with great detail.

¶ 21. Lisa Funte, a medical examiner who had conducted Young’s autopsy, testified that she had examined the gunshot wound and determined that it was consistent with a small-caliber handgun, such as a .22. She also had found a bullet inside Young. Further, Funte testified that Young’s death was a homicide. Funte ruled out suicide as a cause of death because the path of the bullet did not have any deviation. The pathway of the bullet was straight back and down. In addition to the autopsy, Funte performed a gunshot residue test on Young’s hands and submitted the test to the Mississippi Crime Laboratory.

¶ 22. Felicia Robinson, a forensic scientist, testified that she had determined that the bullet recovered by Funte had been fired from Shelton’s handgun. She also determined that the shell casing had been fired in the handgun. In addition, Robinson testified that her investigation revealed that the handgun had been fired from a contact or near-contact position against Young’s chest in light of the burn marks on Young’s clothes.

¶ 23. Jacob Burchfield, an analyst with the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, testified about the results of the gunshot residue tests. He stated that there were three ways for a person to have gunshot residue on them: (1) discharge a firearm, (2) be within two to three feet of a firearm as it is discharged, or (3) handle “something with gunshot residue on its surface.” Burchfield testified that a person who shoots a firearm likely would have more residue on him than someone who was only in proximity to the firearm. He also testified that gunshot residue typically remains on a person’s skin for four hours before a marked decrease is noted as a result of normal activity. Further, according to Burchfield, residue can remain in clothing indefinitely.

¶24. Burchfield testified that Young’s test revealed particles indicative of gunshot residue on the backs of his hands. Young’s palms, though, tested negative for gunshot residue. Shelton’s test also revealed particles indicative of gunshot residue on her palms and the back of her right hand. Her test also revealed particles indicative of gunshot residue on Shelton’s pajamas—both the pants and the shirt. Burchfield also testified that Tutton’s test was negative for gunshot residue.

¶ 25. Also at trial, Tutton testified to her memory of the events leading up to and after Young’s death. She alleged that she had informed Ramirez about a time when Young almost overdosed on pain pills after a dental procedure. On direct examination, Tutton claimed that she told Ramirez about the incident in response to an open-ended question about any concerns that she had had about Young during their relationship. On cross-examination, though, Tutton admitted that she had not been asked a question by Ramirez before she had volunteered the information on her own. Tutton also admitted that she had not been concerned about suicide the night that Young died.

¶ 26. Edith Young—Daniel Young’s mother—testified that her son did not have a history of mental illness, and had not, to her knowledge, contemplated suicide. She also stated that her son had not taken a number of pain pills after a dental procedure that he had when he was living in Nashville, Tennessee.

¶ 27. After the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court instructed the jury— including two instructions that each addressed circumstantial evidence. The jury then convicted Shelton of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Shelton to a life sentence in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Shelton filed a motion for judgement notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial, and the trial court denied this motion. Shelton now timely appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶ 28. To convict Shelton of murder, the State had to prove that Shelton (1) killed Young (2) with the deliberate design to effect the death of Young and (3) without the authority of law and not in necessary self-defense. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(a) (Supp. 2016).

I. The evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the verdict.

¶ 29. This Court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard detailed in Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005). We recognize that “the critical inquiry” under the standard is whether the evidence supports a finding that the accused “committed the act charged ... under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed.” Id. “‘[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original)). Further:

if a review of the evidence reveals that it is of such quality and weight that, “having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense,” the evidence will be deemed to have been sufficient.

Id.; see also Roby v. State, 183 So.3d 857, 869 (Miss. 2016).

¶ 30. We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of murder. The evidence was undisputed that Young was killed. Ample expert testimony demonstrated that he was killed from a single round fired from the handgun recovered at the scene. Shelton admitted that she owned this handgun and stated—multiple times, in separate interviews—that she loaded the weapon before Young was shot. Shelton also had gunshot residue on her hands and pajamas. In addition, she was the first person in the investigation to reference gunshot residue when she stated in an interview soon after the shooting: “You can test my clothes to see if I have any powder on it. [sic] If I would have shot him, I would have gun residue all up my arms—gun burn.” Further, there was no evidence to show that Shelton was acting in self-defense. All the evidence together was sufficient since a rational trier of fact could establish each element beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 31. The forensic evidence supported the jury’s. determination that Shelton had fired the firearm. Burchfield testified that he would expect to see more gunshot residue on the person who discharged the firearm than on a person who was only in the vicinity of the discharged firearm. The results of the forensic tests demonstrated that Shelton did have more gunshot residue on her skin at the time of testing than Young did. This was the case even though Young’s hands were placed inside paper bags to preserve the gunshot residue on them. Also, more gunshot residue was present on Shelton’s hands than on Young’s hands despite the fact that she was tested four hours after the shooting— after she had continued to wipe her hands. Burchfield also testified that normal activity over a period of four hours would significantly reduce the amount of gunshot residue on a person’s hands. While Shelton claimed to have cleaned the firearm earlier in the day, she cleaned the firearm well over four hours before the shooting and prepared and ate dinner in the interim. Thus, it is not likely that the gunshot residue was on Shelton from handling the firearm earlier that day. This evidence supported the argument that Shelton fired the firearm the evening that Young died.

¶32. The combined evidence also allowed the jury to determine that Shelton had shot Young deliberately. Funte testified that she had determined Young’s death to be a homicide based on the trajectory of the bullet. Robinson’s testimony supported Funte’s conclusion, as the weapon was fired from a contact or near-contact position. Ramirez also testified to his impression that the shooting was not accidental. Further, the evidence of the scuffle or altercation, along with Shelton wiping her hands after the shooting, was sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Shelton intended to shoot Young.

¶33. There also was no evidence that Shelton’s intentional killing was justified by law. None of the forensic evidence supported a theory of self-defense. There was no testimony to support such a claim either.

¶ 34. Further, there was evidence that showed that Young did not commit suicide. Young’s mother testified that, to her knowledge, Young had not attempted suicide and did not have any mental illnesses. Additionally, Funte’s testimony concerning the trajectory of the bullet in Young’s body demonstrated that suicide would have been unlikely.

¶ 35. Beyond the testimony and forensic evidence, there was reason for the jury to doubt Shelton’s account of the evening. She claimed to suffer from amnesia but was readily able to recount the events of the week in great detail. She also insinuated that the police planted the gunshot residue on her—an allegation that was not supported by any evidence in the record. Thus, the jury had reason to doubt Shelton’s account.

¶ 36. Under our standard of review, the question before us is not whether we believe that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We find that each element of the crime is supported by sufficient evidence.

II. The verdict is not against the weight of the evidence.

¶37. When reviewing a challenge that the verdict is against weight of the evidence, this Court “will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush, 895 So.2d at 844. Under this standard, “the evidence should be weighed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id.

¶ 38. We find that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence. Much of the analysis under the sufficiency of the evidence applies to this discussion as well. The forensic evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Shelton had shot Young. In addition, the trajectory of the bullet through Young’s body made the theory of suicide highly unlikely. Further, Young did not have any known mental illnesses and had not attempted suicide. Weighing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict,” we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence.

III. The trial court’s refusal of the two-theory jury instruction was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 39. Shelton argues that the trial court erred in refusing her requested two-theory jury instruction. This Court reviews the grant or refusal of a jury instruction “under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” McInnis v. State, 61 So.3d 872, 875 (Miss. 2011). The trial court is “allowed to refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence.” Roberson v. State, 199 So.3d 660, 664 (Miss. 2016). “Jury instructions must be read as a whole to determine if they fairly announce the law.” McInnis, 61 So.3d at 875 (citations omitted).

¶ 40. “Circumstantial evidence is ‘evidence which, without going directly to prove the existence of a fact, gives rise to a logical inference that such fact does exist.’” Id. (quoting Keys v. State, 478 So.2d 266, 268 (Miss. 1985)). The trial court is allowed to “refuse a two-theory instruction if it has granted a (general) circumstantial evidence instruction.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Goff v. State, 14 So.3d 625, 662 (Miss.2009) (quoting Kitchens v. State, 300 So.2d 922, 926 (Miss. 1974)) (“ ‘In a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence, if an instruction is allowed that the evidence must exclude every reasonable theory" other than that of guilt, that is held to embody the essentials of the two-theory instruction, and refusal of the latter is not reversible error.’”).

¶ 41. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested two-theory instruction since two other jury instructions fairly instructed the jury as to the law. Further, it is not necessary for us to determine whether the evidence against Shelton was completely circumstantial because a trial court, under Mcln-nis, may refuse a two-theory instruction— even where all of the evidence is circumstantial—if it has given a circumstantial evidence instruction as the trial court did here.

¶ 42. The trial court gave Instruction C-12, a circumstantial-evidence instruction, which read:

The Court instructs the jury that the law presumes every person charged with the commission of a crime to be innocent. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. The presumption of innocence of the Defendant prevails unless overcome by evidence which satisfies the jury of the Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis, consistent with innocence, The Defendant is not required to prove his or her innocence.

(Emphasis added.) The language of this instruction fairly instructed the jury on the law governing circumstantial evidence. While the refused, two-theory instruction included stronger language concerning circumstantial evidence, it did not provide instruction that was materially different or additional to the law covered in Instruction C-12. The trial court also instructed the jury with Instruction S-2A:

The Court instructs the Jury that if you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence that the Defendant, Tameshia Shelton, did on or about October 16, 2009, unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, purposely and knowingly with the deliberate design to effect death, kill and murder Daniel Young, a human being without authority of law and not in necessary self-defense[, t]hen you shall find the Defendant guilty as charged. If the State has failed to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, then you shall find the Defendant not guilty.

(Emphasis added.) This instruction reinforced Instruction C-12’s guidance on circumstantial evidence. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the two-theory instruction.

CONCLUSION

¶ 43. The evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdict and the verdict is not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused Shelton’s requested instruction, Thus, finding no error, we affirm Shelton’s conviction and sentence.

¶ 44. CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Shelton was interviewed several times throughout the investigation. At trial, the State entered the recordings of her interviews into evidence and played them to the jury.

      . Officer Torrey Williams will be referred to by first name in order to avoid confusion with Officer Ramirez Williams.

      . Officer Ramirez Williams will be referred to by first name in order to avoid confusion with Officer Torrey Williams.

      . As discussed infra, the results of the forensic testing revealed that Shelton did have particles indicative of gunshot residue on her hands and clothing. Before this final interview, Shelton had been informed about the results of the forensic testing. This statement appeared to be Shelton’s attempt to discredit the results of the gunshot residue tests by claiming that Ramirez placed the gunshot residue on her hands.

      . Funte explained in her testimony that when a person shoots himself in the chest "the bullet goes to one side or the other. She explained that this was the case because the person has to bend his or her wrist to hold the firearm and bring the barrel against the chest.

      . Burchfield testified that three types of results were reported by the Mississippi Crime Laboratory: positive, negative, and indicative. A “positive” result was reported when gunshot residue was found. A “negative” result was reported when there was no gunshot residue found. Lastly, an "indicative” result was reported when at least three out of four of the categories of particles in gunshot residue were found.

      . Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-19(1)(a) reads as follows:
      (1) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be murder in the following cases:
      (a) When done with deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any human being, shall be first-degree murder; ....

      . "A two-theory instruction instructs the jury what to do when the ‘record supports two or more hypotheses of the crime committed’ and all the evidence of the crime is circumstantial.” McInnis v. State, 61 So.3d 872, 875 (Miss. 2011). The instruction refused here, Instruction D-6, provided:
      The Court instructs the jury that if the State has relied on circumstantial evidence to establish its theory of guilt of the Defendants, then the evidence for the State must be so strong as to establish the guilt of the Defendant, not only beyond a reasonable doubt, but the evidence must be so strong as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt.


author: MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

text:
    PIONEER COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF NEWTON and Dr. Bernard Boka v. Tyteanna D. ROBERTS, Individually, and on Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Tina Roberts, Deceased
    NO. 2015-IA-01874-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    03/23/2017

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: GAYE NELL CURRIE
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: ALAN D. LANCASTER, JONATHAN RYAN TAYLOR
    BEFORE DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS AND MAXWELL, JJ.
   MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. The case before us involves timeliness of a wrongful-death action and the interplay between the wrongful-death statute and the minors savings clause. In 1999, this Court held “[tjhere is no question now that the savings clause, set out in [Section] 15-1-59 of the Mississippi Code, applies to a wrongful death action” brought under Section 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code. Thiroux ex rel. Cruz v. Austin ex rel. Arceneaux, 749 So.2d 1040, 1041 (Miss. 1999). But just three years later, this Court found reason not to apply the minors savings clause to the wrongful-death action filed in Curry v. Turner, 832 So.2d 508, 517 (Miss. 2002). Instead, this Court found the two statutes to be “at irreconcilable odds with one another where there exists a person qualified under the wrongful death statute to bring suit.”

¶ 2. In the present wrongful-death lawsuit, the defendants rely on Curry to claim the action is time-barred. They argue the minors savings clause did not apply because the minor beneficiaries had a maternal aunt who was “qualified under the statute to bring suit.” While this may be so, we find there is a material distinction between Cuiry and the case now before us. In Curry, not only was the minor beneficiaries’ mother qualified to bring suit, but she also in fact filed a wrongful-death action. Thus, under Section 11-7-13’s “one-suit” requirement, this Court found the minor beneficiaries could not rely on the application of the minors savings clause to file what essentially would be a second wrongful-death action.

¶3. But here, by contrast, the minor beneficiaries’ aunt never filed a wrongful-death action, though Section 11-7-13 authorized her to do so as the deceased’s sister. Instead, the first and only suit filed was by the deceased’s children. For this reason, to the extent Cuiry held that the mere existence of someone qualified to bring a wrongful-death suit created an irreconcilable conflict between Section 11-7-13 and Section 15-1-59 and precluded the application of the latter statute, we explicitly overrule this part of our holding. Instead, we hold that only when someone who is qualified to bring a -wrongful-death suit actually files a iwongful-death suit on the minor beneficiaries’ behalf will the minors savings clause not apply, because, once the suit is filed, the running of the statute of limitations is immaterial.

¶ 4. With that premise in mind, we find the minors savings statute clearly applied in this case. Under that statute, the deceased’s oldest child had two years from when she reached the age of majority to file a wrongful-death suit based on medical negligence. Because she timely filed within this two-year period, we affirm the denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.

Background Facts and Procedural History

I. Tina’s Death

¶ 5. Tina Roberts died on July 23, 2010, shortly after being discharged from the emergency room at Pioneer Community Hospital of Newton (Pioneer Hospital). When Tina died, she was unmarried with two minor children—sixteen-year-old Tyte-anna (born July 30, 1993) and nine-year-old Breanna (born October 29, 2001).

II. Attempted Guardianships

¶ 6. A little more than two years later, on July 31, 2012, a lawyer claiming to “represent the surviving minor children of Tina Roberts” filed a notice-of-claim letter against Pioneer Community Hospital and emergency-room physician Dr. Bernard Boka. In this letter, counsel informed the potential defendants, “we are in the process of establishing guardianships for the minor children of Tina Roberts, deceased. Their maternal aunt, Theresa Ellis will be serving as their guardian[.]”

¶ 7. The next week, August 9, 2012, Tina’s sister Ellis filed two petitions for guardianship, one for Tyteanna and one for Breanna. In both petitions, Ellis requested “that she be authorized to make a claim for and make settlement (upon further approval of this Court) for damages against any and all persons who may be liable as a result of the death of Tina Roberts[.]”

¶ 8. On August 29, 2012, the chancery court entered a judgment appointing Ellis guardian of Tyteanna. As part of its judgment, the chancery court expressly “authorized [Ellis] to prosecute a civil action on behalf of said minor against any and all persons who may be liable as a result of the death of Tina Roberts.” But according to the court’s later order, after eight months, “no oath [had] been filed and no letters of guardianship [had] been entered.” So on May 5, 2013, the chancery court dismissed Ellis’s guardianship action. No judgment was ever entered appointing Ellis guardian of Breanna. This guardianship action also was dismissed on May 5, 2013, for Ellis’s failure to take any further action.

III. Tyteanna’s Wrongful-Death Suit

¶ 9. Tyteanna turned twenty-one the following year, on July 30, 2014. In December 2014, she sent notice-of-claim letters to Pioneer Hospital and Dr. Boka, on behalf of herself and her younger sister, Breanna. Six months later, on May 4, 2015, she filed a complaint in the Newton County Circuit Court against Pioneer Hospital and Dr. Boka on her own behalf and as representative of Tina’s wrongful-death beneficiaries.

¶ 10. Simultaneously with their answer, the hospital and doctor moved to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. They acknowledged that, since Tina’s daughters were minors when Tina died, the applicable two-year statute of limitations had been tolled by the minors savings clause. See Miss. Code Ann. ¶ 15-1-59 (tolling the applicable statute of limitations for any claimant “under the disability of infancy” when the cause of action accrued until “after his disability shall be removed”). But they still claimed the wrongful-death suit was time-barred, even though Tyteanna had reached the age of majority less than two years ago.

¶ 11. According to them, the applicable two-year statute of limitations was not tolled until Tyteanna turned twenty-one. Rather, it had begun to run as early as July 31, 2012—when her aunt Ellis’s attorney sent a notice-of-claim letter—and at the latest on October 29, 2012—when the order was entered appointing Ellis guardian of Tyteanna. At that point, they argued, Ellis became a “person in esse” acting on Tyteanna and Breanna’s behalf, just like the mother and administratrix in Curry. See Curry, 832 So.2d at 515. Thus, they reasoned, Ellis’s actions stopped the operation of Section 15-1-59. And because no complaint was filed within two years of October 29, 2012, the wrongful-death suit was untimely.

¶ 12. The circuit court disagreed and denied the motion for summary judgment.

IV, Interlocutory Appeal

¶ 13. Pioneer Hospital and Dr. Boka immediately petitioned this Court for interlocutory appeal, which we granted. On appeal, Pioneer and Dr. Boka argue that, since Ellis was qualified to file a wrongful-death action within two years of Tina’s death, the minors savings clause did not apply.

Discussion

¶ 14. We review the denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,' Tyteanna. Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson Ins., Inc., 891 So.2d 224, 228 (Miss. 2005). We will reverse the order denying summary judgment only if the evidence shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see also M.R.C.P. 56(c). Here, as a matter of law, we find the minors savings clause did apply, tolling the statute of limitations until Tyteanna turned twenty-one. This makes her action timely.

I. Section 15-1-59 applies.

¶ 15. Mississippi Code Section 15-1-59 contains a savings clause for minors

If any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions mentioned shall, at the time at which the cause of action accrued, be under the disability of infancy ..., he may bring the actions within the times in this chapter respectively limited, after his disability shall be removed as provided by law.

¶ 16. In Arender v. Smith County Hospital, 431 So.2d 491 (Miss. 1983), we first faced whether Section 15-1-59’s tolling provision applied to claims brought under Section 11-7-13, Mississippi’s wrongful-death statute. See Miss. Code Ann. ¶ 11-7-13. And we determined the minors saving clause would not apply to a wrongful-death action. Arender, 431 So.2d at 493.

¶ 17. But sixteen years later, in Thiroux ex rel. Cruz v. Austin ex rel. Arceneaux, 749 So.2d 1040, 1041 (Miss. 1999), we acknowledged our error. In Arender, we mistakenly relied on an outmoded version of the wrongful-death statute. Looking at the wrongful-death statute in its current form, we concluded, “There is no question now that the savings clause, set out in [Section] 15-1-59 of the Mississippi Code, applies to a wrongful death action.” Thiroux, 749 So.2d at 1041.

¶ 18. The decedent in Thiroux, like Tina, was survived by two minor children only. While the applicable statute of limitations was only one year, we found the wrongful-death suit brought by the minors’ guardian three years after their father’s death was timely, due to the operation of the minors savings clause. Id. at 1041-42. Applying Thiroux to this case would lead to the same result—Tyteanna’s wrongful-death suit filed more than two years after her mother’s death was timely based on the minors savings clause.

¶ 19. But three years after Thiroux, in Curry, we questioned if the minors savings statute should apply in that case. In contrast to Thiroux, the deceased in Curry was survived not only by his minor children but also by Betty Curry, the deceased’s wife and the children’s mother. Before the one-year statute of limitations that was running against her passed, Curry filed a •wrongful-death action on behalf of the estate and all the wrongful-death beneficiaries, including her minor children. But after the one-year statute had run, she attempted to add additional defendants. While she conceded the statute had run against her, she contended it had not run against her minor children.

¶ 20. This argument forced this Court to consider something not considered in Thiroux—how to apply both the minors savings statute and the wrongful-death statute’s requirement that there be only one suit. In Curry, we compared the two relevant statutes—Section 11-7-13 and Section 15-1-59. And we found that “the plain language of the wrongful death statute § 11-7-13 sets it at odds with the minors savings statute § 15-1-59.” Curry, 832 So.2d at 516. This was because “[t]he wrongful death statute requires that only one suit be brought to recover damages for the wrongful death of the deceased.” Id. “Conceivably,” however, “the minors savings statute would allow for two groups of plaintiffs to file suits at two separate times for damages caused by one event: 1) those plaintiffs of majority age and sound mind within the statute of limitations and 2) those plaintiffs protected by the savings statute when their disability is removed or they reach the age of majority.” Id. To avoid such a result, we found “the wrongful-death statute and minors savings statute are at irreconcilable odds with one another where there exists a person qualified under the wrongful death statute to bring suit.” Id. at 517.

¶ 21. Because Curry was not only qualified to bring suit, but in fact had brought suit on her and her minor children’s behalf, this Corn! found the statute of limitations that barred her from amending the wrongful-death complaint also barred her minor children. Id.

¶ 22. Pioneer Hospital and Dr. Boka argue, because Ellis is authorized to file a Section 11-7-13 action as Tina’s sister, under Curry, she is “a person qualified under the wrongful death statute to bring suit.” Curry, 832 So.2d at 517. And because “there exists a person qualified under the wrongful death statute to bring suit,” just as in Curry, the minors savings statute should not apply to the wrongful-death action against them. But this argument essentially renders the minors savings clause inapplicable to any wrongful-death action, which is directly contrary to our clear holding that the minors savings clause does apply. Thiroux, 749 So.2d at 1041. We are hard-pressed to envision a scenario where there would not be at least one interested party of majority age whose mere existence would preclude the application of the minors savings clause. This is because the wrongful-death statute authorizes a broad category of persons to bring an action—the personal representative on behalf of the estate, one of the listed relatives, and “all interested parties.” Burley v. Douglas, 26 So.3d 1013, 1020 (Miss. 2009).

¶ 23. Indeed, as we distinguished in Burley, who has statutory standing to bring suit is broader than who may recover damages. Id. at 1022. Thus, while Ellis has statutory standing under Section 11-7-13 to bring suit as Tina’s sister, she is statutorily precluded from recovering any damages. Instead, any wrongful-death damages belong exclusively to Tina’s two daughters. Miss. Code Ann. ¶ 11-7-13. The defendants essentially ask us to ignore the fact Ellis has no statutory right to recover any wrongful-death benefits and find her mere existence as one with statutory standing precludes application of the minors savings clause. We find this is stretching Curry too far.

¶ 24. To the extent we held in Curry that the mere existence of a person of majority age with statutory standing to file a wrongful-death suit prevents the application of the minors savings clause, we explicitly overrule this holding. See Curry, 832 So.2d at 517. Instead, we find Curry should be limited to its facts—specifically the fact Betty Curry actually had filed suit on behalf of all the wrongful-death beneficiaries. Thus, it was the filing of the suit that triggered the “one-suit” rule and rendered the statute of limitations, and any tolling thereof, irrelevant, so long as the suit was pending. See Curry, 832 So.2d at 516. See also Lee, 859 So.2d at 990 (“[Because of her disability of minority, [the minor beneficiary] was protected under ¶ 15-1-59 until the suit was initially filed in her behalf. That action, however, commenced the running of the applicable statute(s) of limitations concerning subsequently filed suits arising from the same cause of action.”); Anderson, 913 So.2d at 398 (“Thus, when any person statutorily entitled to do so files a wrongful death action, that action ensues for the benefit of all parties entitled to recover for the death.”).

¶ 25. Here, Ellis never filed a wrongful-death suit. Thus, we find Curry has no application to this case. Instead, the controlling case is Thiroux. And under Thiroux, “[tjhere is no question ... that the savings clause, set out in § 15-1-59 of the Mississippi Code, applies to [this] wrongful death action.” Thiroux, 749 So.2d at 1041. So just like the deceased’s minor children in Thiroux, we find Tina’s two minor children could rely on the application of the minors savings clause to toll the running of the two-year statute of limitations.

II. Section 15-1-53 does not apply.

¶26. Alternatively, Pioneer Hospital and Dr. Boka assert that, if the statute of limitations was tolled by Section 15—1— 59, such tolling ceased when Ellis took steps to act on her nieces’ behalf. According to them, the statute of limitations began to run on one of two dates—(1) July 31, 2012, when her aunt Ellis’s attorney sent a notice-of-claim letter; or (2) October 29, 2012, when the order was entered appointing Ellis guardian of Tyteanna.

¶ 27. The defendants rely on Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Blackwood, 919 So.2d 1053, 1057 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), for the contention that the disability of majority is removed when the minor reaches the age of majority or when a trustee is authorized to act on behalf of the minor. They argue Ellis was such a “trustee” authorized to act on her nieces’ behalf and did in fact act on her nieces’ behalf when her attorney sent Pioneer Hospital and Dr. Boka notice-of-suit letters on July 31, 2012. Though they admit Ellis took this action before she petitioned to become Tyteanna and Brean-na’s guardian, they contend this fact “was of no consequence.”

¶ 28. But the fact that Ellis was not her nieces’ legally appointed guardian on July 31, 2012, is of consequence. In Blackwood, the Court of Appeals relied on a case from this Court, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty. Co. v. Conservatorship of Melson, 809 So.2d 647 (Miss. 2002). In Melson, this Court in turn relied on Mississippi Code Section 15-1-53 (Rev. 2012). “[U]nder Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-53, if a person who is subject to infancy or unsoundness of mind does in fact have a guardian or conservator appointed for them, then the action may be brought in the name of that guardian or conservator, without the consideration of any savings clause.” Melson, 809 So.2d at 653-54 (emphasis added). Thus, we reasoned, “[wjhere a guardian or conservator has been court appointed for a ward, there is no logical or equitable reason to prevent the running of the statute of limitations inasmuch as that guardian or conservator is fully authorized to employ attorneys and bring actions on their behalf.” Id. at 654 (emphasis added) (citing McCain v. Memphis Hardwood Flooring Co., 725 So.2d 788 (Miss. 1998)).

¶29. In this case, the defendants concede that when Ellis’s attorney sent the notice letters on July 31, 2012, Ellis had been neither appointed guardian nor authorized by the chancery court to bring an action on their behalf. So their argument that the statute of limitations began to run against her minor nieces on July 31, 2012, fails.

¶ 30. For the same reason, their alternate contention that the statute of limitations began to run on October 29, 2012, when the order was entered appointing Ellis guardian of Tyteanna, also fails. While this order expressly authorized Ellis to bring suit on Tyteanna’s behalf, according to the chancery court’s later May 5, 2013 order, “no oath ha[d] been filed and no letters of guardianship ha[d] been entered”—resulting in the court’s dismissal of Ellis’s guardianship petition. Thus, Ty-teanana did not “in fact have a guardian ... appointed for [her]” who had the legal authority to bring a suit on her behalf. Melson, 809 So.2d at 654 (emphasis added). So the savings clause remained in operation, despite the October 29, 2012 order.

Conclusion

¶ 31. Section 15-1-59 tolled the statute of limitations to bring a wrongful-death suit based on Tina’s death until her daughter Tyteanna reached the age of majority. Ellis’s mere existence as a person with statutory standing to bring a wrongful-death suit did not prevent Section 15-1-59’s application. Thus, Tyteanna’s suit— filed within two years of her turning twenty-one—was timely. For this reason, we affirm the circuit court’s order, which denied Pioneer Hospital and Dr. Boka’s statute-of-limitations-based motion for summary judgment.

¶ 32. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Miss. Code Ann. ¶ 11-7-13 (Supp. 2016).

      . Miss. Code Ann. ¶ 15-1-59 (Rev. 2012).

      . That is not to say, however, that the minors savings clause disappears. Should the suit be dismissed for reasons other than on the merits, the minor’s right to refile the suit remains protected by the savings clause.

      . That same day, Ellis also filed a petition for letters of administration over Tina's estate. But according to Tyteanna, no letters of administration were ever issued. And there is no evidence in the record that contradicts this assertion.

      . For wrongful-death actions, the statute of limitations for the alleged cause of death applies—in this case medical negligence. See Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust, Inc., 933 So.2d 923, 926 (Miss. 2006), as modified by Saul ex rel. Heirs of Cook v. S. Cent. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 25 So.3d 1037 (Miss. 2010). Mississippi Code Section 15-1-36 (Rev. 2012) provides a two-year statute of limitations for medical-negligence claims.

      . The statute also tolls statutes of limitations from running against those of unsound mind. Miss. Code Ann. ¶ 15-1-59.

      . Since Curry, both this Court and the Court of Appeals have relied on that case to hold that the minors savings clause did not apply to minors' wrongful-death claims. Lee v. Thompson, 859 So.2d 981 (Miss. 2003); Anderson v. II & D Foods, Inc., 913 So.2d 394 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). See also Bulley v. Toastmaster, Inc., 86 Fed.Appx. 6 (5th Cir. 2003) (unreported) (applying Curry to hold the minor wrongful-death beneficiary was bound by the same statute of limitations as his father).

      . Under Section 11-7-13, "The action for such [wrongful-death] damages may be brought ... by a sister for the death of a sister.” But because Tina was survived by children, the statute directs “the damages shall be equally distributed to the children.” Miss. Code Ann. ¶ 11-7-13. Only "if the deceased has no husband, nor wife, nor children,” shall “the damages ... be distributed equally to the father, mother, brothers and sisters, or such of them as the deceased may have living at his or her death.” Id.