text:
    STATE EX REL. Justin Terrell ATKINS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1082
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF OUACHITA

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator inexcusably failed to raise his claims in the proceedings leading to conviction. La.C.Cr.P. art 930.4(B). In addition, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof, La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr,P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the fib ing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.' '


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM GENOVESE, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    IN RE: Trisha Ann WARD
    NO. 2017-B-1047
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    9/29/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

_JjThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Trisha Ann Ward, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension pursuant to a joint motion of the parties filed in November 2016. In re: Ward, 16-2003 (La. 12/1/16), 207 So.3d 397.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Counts I, II & III-The Unauthorized Entry Matter

On December 28, 2013, respondent intentionally entered the home of S.S. and his wife, J.H., without authorization. During her sworn statement to the ODC, respondent acknowledged that she did not have express permission to enter the residence. Respondent was arrested and charged with unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, a felony. This charge was dropped as part of a plea bargain. On October 30, 2015, respondént pleaded guilty to stalking and to violation of a protective order, both misdemeanors. The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct) and 8.4(b) 12(commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count IV-The Credit Card Matter

In August 2014, respondent used J.H.’s credit card number to make purchases on Amazon.com. The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In February 2016, the ODC filed four counts of formal charges against respondent. Respondent answered the formal charges and generally denied the factual allegations as written. Respondent acknowledged that she did not have the express authority of J.H. to enter the residence, but stated that she had been given the implied authority to do so. Respondent added that J.H. provided her with the credit card at issue, gave her the authority to use the card at will, and never expressly revoked authorization to use the card. She indicated that the charges made to the card in August 2014 were accidental.

Formal Hearing

The hearing committee conducted a hearing in October 2016. The ODC introduced documentary evidence and called J.H., S.S., and Adonica Nelson (witness to the unauthorized entry incident) to testify. Respondent called Sergeant Francis Jar-rott (unauthorized entry matter), Detective Michael DiMarco (credit card matter), attorney Andrew Duffy (supervisor at the Orleans Parish Public Defender’s Office), and Phyllis Shnaider (clinical social worker) to testify. The transcript of the latestimony of Dr. Charles Billings (psychiatrist) was also accepted into evidence. Respondent testified bn her own behalf and on cross-examination by the ODC.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made factual findings, including the following:

Respondent was hired by S.S. in the Orleans Parish Public Defender’s Office in' 2008. She subsequently became friends with his wife (J.H.) and would occasionally babysit the children and house-sit for the family. The friendship between respondent and J.H. developed over the years and became romantic.

In October 2013, J.H. decided to end the relationship and so communicated that to respondent via e-mail on October 28th. The next day, respondent repeatedly tried to communicate with J.H., without success. That evening, respondent e-mailed J.H. that she was coming over to her house to see if she was alright. J.H. e-mailed respondent back and told her not to come over. Under the influence of alcohol, respondent. went to J.H.’s home and while outside, cursed and called J.H.’s name repeatedly. Respondent let herself inside via a magnetic key to the gate in the fence surrounding the home. .She had been entrusted with this key due to the relationship and the services she performed for the family. Eventually, respondent let herself in the house through a door she knew was kept unlocked. She was subsequently ejected by S.S. The accounts of that ejection differ. Nonetheless, both respondent and S.S. called 911, and the police came.

Despite this incident, respondent continued to .communicate with J.H. J.H. emailed her that the relationship between them was over and requested that she stop trying to communicate with her and get on with her life. In mid-November, I respondent again attempted to' communicate with J.H. via e-mail and was told in reply to stop. Respondent continued to email J.H. and later confessed to having inadvertently used J.H.’s credit card number on her Amazon account. Respondent apologized and promised to delete the card information from the account. However, several months later, she ordered some merchandise for herself using the same credit card number. Respondent claimed this was an accident.

In December 2013, J.H., S.S., and their children were visiting J.H.’s family in New York. Respondent knew they would be out of town. On December 28th, respondent used the aforementioned key she had to the family’s gate and gained access to the. residence through a door she knew was unlocked. Respondent subsequently claimed she was there to leave $2,500 which she had owed to J.H. Respondent was met by Adoniea Nelson, the fiancée of the family’s house sitter. When confronted by Ms. Nelson, respondent pretended to be in the wrong house. A criminal complaint was filed after the family returned and was informed of the home intrusion. The couple then obtained stay-away orders directed at respondent.

In November 2014, J.H. discovered that three purchases totaling $96.65 were made on her credit card. J.H. learned that respondent had made them using the credit card number that respondent had promised to remove from her Amazon account. A criminal complaint was then filed against respondent.

Based on these findings, the committee determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal 'charges. Additionally, the committee found the following:

Respondent acknowledged that on De-cembér 28, 2013, she intentionally entered the home of J.H. and S.S. without permission. Considering J.H.’s e-mails specifically telling respondent to stay away and cease contact, respondent did not have implied consent to enter the home. The alibi about wanting to leave money at the' house is difficult to believe based on respondent’s lack of credibility and the fact Rthat there were easier ways to give J.H. the money. Respondent acknowledged the act was ir~ rational and that her goal could have been accomplished by other means.

The charge of unauthorized use of a credit card was nolle prosequied, but respondent had no authority, express or implied, to use J.H.’s credit card to make purchases. Respondent admitted to “accidentally” using the card and lying about taking it off of her Amazon account. The card should have been taken off of the account after the breakup. Respondent was the first to notice it and informed J.H. However, she then again made a $96.65 purchase using the card. One time is an accident; however, respondent’s motive becomes suspicious under the circumstances related to the second incident. Considering her lack of credibility and continued attempts to make contact with J.H., one can infer the requisite intent to support the charge of unauthorized use.

The committee determined respondent violated duties owed to the public and acted negligently, knowingly, and intentionally. Respondent’s misconduct caused consternation to J.H. and had the potential of interfering with the efforts of J.H. and S.S. to save their marriage.

In aggravation, the committee found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and illegal conduct. In mitigation, the committee found the absence of a prior disciplinary record. The committee acknowledged the factors of “[mjental disability or émotional problems” but did not give these factors much weight as respondent’s therapist, Ms. Shnaider, did not attribute the behavior to her mental condition, and respondent’s psychiatrist, Dr. Billings, did not uncover any evidence that the behavior was related to mental illness,

After further considering -this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, a majority of the committee recommended respondent be suspended I «from the practice of law for two years. One committee member dissented and would recommend that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, fully deferred, subject to a period of probation conditioned on respondent being monitored by, an experienced attorney and continuing treatment for her emotional issues.

The ODC filed a notice of no objection to the hearing committee’s report. In her brief filed with the disciplinary board, respondent objected to certain conclusions by the hearing committee.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that the factual findings of the hearing committee are not'manifestly erroneous. Several findings by the majority of the committee are dependent upon, credibility determinations. The court will defer to such credibility determinations unless they are clearly wrong. Although the dissenting member came to a contradictory conclusion on some determinations, there is nothing in the record that indicates the credibility determinations of majority are manifestly erroneous. Particularly, the majority found respondent not to be credible, which, influenced its findings regarding Counts I and IV.

With regard to Count I, respondent argued that she had implied authority to enter J.H.’s home on December 28, 2013. Her lack of credibility, when viewed in light of the other evidence in the record, clearly demonstrates that she did not have implied authority. Any contrary assumption on her part was unreasonable.

As to Count IV, respondent argued that she mistakenly used J.H.’s credit card to make online purchases in August 2014. While her explanation may be reasonable, |7the majority did not find her explanation credible. This finding does not appear to be manifestly erroneous.

The board determined the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent knowingly violated a duty to the public by engaging in criminal conduct on multiple occasions. She caused actual harm to J.H. and S.S. in the form of frustration and fear. She caused nominal financial harm by her unauthorized use of J.H.’s credit card. After reviewing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the applicable baseline sanction is suspension.

In aggravation, the board found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and illegal conduct. In mitigation, the board found the absence of a prior disciplinary record, personal and emotional problems, and the imposition of other penalties or sanctions.

After reviewing prior jurisprudence involving similar misconduct, and considering the mitigating factors, the board recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, retroactive to December 1, 2016, the date of her interim suspension. The board further recommended that respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this, court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and 1 ^recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La. 3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

In this matter, the record supports a finding that respondent engaged in misconduct stemming from her disengagement from a personal relationship. The record also supports a finding that respondent violated Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. We agree with the findings of the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, with one exception:

Regarding the matter involving respondent’s use of J.H.’s credit card, respondent testified that she used the card in August 2014 by mistake. Although a majority of the hearing committee did not accept her explanation for the mistake, which the disciplinary board admitted was reasonable, no evidence was offered to contradict respondent’s testimony. More important, however, is that the formal charge specifically alleged that respondent “was never given permission to use the credit card at issue.” This was simply not the case. J.H. testified that she had assisted respondent financially on several occasions and even provided respondent with the numbers to the credit card so that respondent could make a purchase using the card. Considering that the specific allegation was directly contradicted by the evidence, including the testimony of J.H., we would be remiss in saying that the ODC has proven a violation of Rule 8.4(c) by clear and convincing evidence.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and lathe seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La. 1984).

The prior jurisprudence of this court suggests that the board’s recommended sanction is within the range of appropriate sanctions for respondent’s misconduct. Most recently, in In re: Fusilier, 16-0016 (La. 5/27/16), 193 So.3d 1150, we suspended an attorney for eighteen months after she had burglarized the home of her ex-husband, stealing a diamond ring and watch which she then pawned for money to gamble. In In re: Katner, 08-2398 (La. 2/6/09), 15 So.3d 52, we suspended an attorney for one year and one day after she pleaded guilty to stalking and harassing an individual via telephone, later had her related criminal probation revoked, and pleaded guilty to DWI. Finally, in In re: Robinson, 01-2772 (La. 5/14/02), 819 So.2d 280, we suspended an attorney for one year, with eleven months deferred, followed by one year of probation with the condition that the attorney seek an evaluation and treatment from a mental health care provider, after the attorney stalked her dentist, violated injunctions prohibiting her from contacting her dentist, and was held in contempt of court for those violations.

The board’s recommended sanction is reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, we will adopt the recommendation and impose a one year and one day suspension from the practice of law, retroactive to the date of respondent’s interim suspension.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Trisha Ann ■Ward, Louisiana Bar Roll number 31485, be and she hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, retroactive to December 1, 2016, the date Imof her interim suspension. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

GENOVESE, J.,

dissents.

hi would reject the suspension of respondent for only one year and one day and would impose a two-year suspension as recommended by the hearing committee. Respondent’s criminal activity warrants a more severe sanction.

      . Prior to the hearing in this matter, the ODC filed a motion seeking a protective' order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 16(D) to "protect the identity of the victims arising from the Respondent’s misconduct and under circumstances that are sensitive, highly personal, and injurious. The.hearing committee chair granted the motion. Accordingly, throughout this opinion, we have referred to the victims by their initials.

      . After the hearing, respondent attempted to submit exhibits into the record by delivering them to the law office of the committee chair, but the admission of the exhibits was denied.

      . The majority also recommended that as a condition of reinstatement, respondent be required to show that she has satisfactorily addressed her emotional and mental problems.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE EX REL. Ronald Lee WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1101
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO

PER CURIAM:

| ¶ Denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr,P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails, to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/6/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Furthermore, relator’s sen-, tencing claim is not cognizable on collateral review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.

Relator has now fully litigated at least four applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P, art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930,8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 261 amended that article to make the procedural bars 12against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated -in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the- narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Crichton, J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Willie GROSS, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1088
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

PER CURIAM:

| tDenied. Relator fails to show he received- ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to his remaining claims, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2; see also State v. Pierre, 13-0873 (La. 10/15/13), 125 So.3d 403.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 93Q.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent .with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Fard A. R. DICKERSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1076
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator’s sentencing claims are not cognizable on collateral review. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 103

Relator has now fully litigated at least one application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, Notably, the Legislature 'in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against- successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr;P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

J., n:s.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jamaal Cole DIGGS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0697
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF VERMILION

PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations, period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per'curiam.


author: GENOVESE, J.,

text:
    Ecetra N. AMES v. John B. OHLE, III, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. f/k/a Bank One Corporation, Douglas Steger and Kenneth A. Brown
    NO. 2017-C-892
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
    JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.
    HUGHES, J., would grant.
    GENOVESE, J., would grant and assigns reasons.
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

GENOVESE, J.,

would grant and assigns reasons:

hi disagree with the majority’s denial of this writ. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant bank and others, alleging fraud and civil conspiracy. Defendant bank then filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs allegations and defendant bank’s defenses reveal numerous ambiguities creating questions of material fact relative to defendant Ohle’s employment with the bank. In ruling on defendant bank’s motion for summary judgment relative to plaintiffs claims of fraud and civil conspiracy, the trial court weighed evidence and made credibility determinations which are not allowed when considering a motion for summary judgment. Weighing evidence and making credibility determinations are to be addressed at a trial on the merits, not at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. For these reasons, I would grant the writ, reverse the trial court’s grant of defendant bank’s motion for summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jamel EDGAR v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1049
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| jDenied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Ladoia SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1009
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator fails to- show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court.- Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S'.C. § 2244, Louisiana ' post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art, 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Tyson Von “Eric” SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1188
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST CARROLL

PER CURIAM:

■| denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentences, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application' for post-conviction relief: See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr,P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. In addition, relator’s sentencing claims are not cognizable on collateral review. La.C.Cr,P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against | ^successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in- accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless, he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Kirk Douglas CHARLES v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2152
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS

PER CURIAM:

11Denied. Because relator was convicted of second degree murder, committed after July 2, 1973, and before June 29, 1979, he is eligible for parole after serving 40 years of his sentence under 2017 Act 280. This term corresponds to the penalty in-effect at the time of relator’s offense, and therefore no relief is due. To the extent relator seeks to withdraw his guilty plea, his- application is time-barred. See La.C.Cr.P. Art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has .exhausted his right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P, art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr,P. art.930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a | ^successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


author: Hughes, J.,

text:
    Deborah BEEBE v. Hollis Charles LARCHE
    No. 2017-C-0900
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    9/29/2017
   Hughes, J.,

would grant the writ.

liThe issue before this court is contractual, not delictual. If the indemnitee paid out $40,000, the indemnitor only owes $40,000.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Dewayne Lakeith JOSEPH v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1087
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. MARTIN

PER CURIAM:

h Denied. Relator has previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Joseph v. State, 15-1126 (La. 5/20/16), 191 So.3d 572.

Genovese, recused


author: 11 GENOVESE, Justice,

text:
    Jerry VOSBURG, et ux v. Eddie LAMPERT, et al.
    NO. 2017-OC-1511
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/05/2017
   11 GENOVESE, Justice,

would deny the writ as premature.


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    IN RE: Robert B. PURSER
    NO. 2017-B-1170
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/09/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

11This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Robert B. Purser, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension for threat of harm to the public. In re: Purser, 13-0875 (La. 4/24/13), 117 So.3d 1246.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Count I—The Amerisafe Matter

Between 2003 and 2012, respondent represented insurance companies Amerisafe, Inc. and American Interstate Insurance Company (collectively referred to as “Am-erisafe”) in various subrogation claims against third parties. In December 2012, Amerisafe filed a disciplinary complaint against. respondent, alleging that he settled three separate claims on Amerisafe’s behalf and failed to remit the funds to Amerisafe. Specifically, Amerisafe alleged the following: (1) Respondent settled a subrogation claim on Amerisafe’s behalf in the amount of $25,000, and Amerisafe never received the funds despite respondent indicating that he placed a check in the mail; (2) Amerisafe resolved a claim by accepting a $40,000 settlement. Respondent indicated that he placed the funds into his client trust account, but Amerisafe never received the funds despite repeated requests for respondent to remit same; and (3) Amerisafe agreed to accept $35,000 in satisfaction of a lien. When Amerisafe repeatedly demanded that respondent remit the funds, he informed Amerisafe that |ahe was holding the funds in his client trust account. In response to the complaint, respondent denied any misconduct and indicated that he sent Amerisafe the funds shortly after receiving the complaint. However, Amerisafe indicated it only received $25,000 in connection with one claim and that the check was returned because of a stop payment on it.

Amerisafe filed a lawsuit against respondent to recover the above-mentioned funds and, through discovery, confirmed that respondent deposited the funds into his client trust account. The lawsuit resulted in a default judgment against respondent in the approximate amount of $120,000, which included the subrogation recovery-amounts and attorney’s fees. Amerisafe has not yet been able to collect any of the funds due under the judgment.

Respondent further failed to inform Am-erisafe of a judgment rendered against it in a case he was handling on its behalf. He then missed oral argument 'in the case when it was before the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal on November 2, 2011.

The ODC requested that respondent provide documentation related to his client trust account for the period between January 2011 and March 13, 2013. Respondent failed to provide the requested documéntation.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of. the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional .Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or .misrepresentation).

| nCount II—The Bower Matter

Brenda Ann Bower hired respondent to represent her in a lawsuit against her former boyfriend to-obtain her share of Certificates of Deposit that she and her former boyfriend had purchased together. Respondent took the case on a contingency fee basis, and after a trial, Ms. Bower was awarded $177,503.82. Respondent received the funds on Ms, Bower’s behalf in February and March 2012. He took his attorney’s fees and informed Ms. Bower he was holding the remaining funds in his client trust account until she decided how she wanted to proceed.

Ms. Bower wanted to purchase a mobile home but was unable to obtain financing. While she could have used the proceeds from the judgment to purchase the mobile home, respondent convinced her to let him finance the purchase instead. Respondent obtained a loan and purchased the mobile home for Ms. Bower but put it in his name.

Ms. Bower,then instructed respondent to put her portion of the proceeds in a trust, but respondent failed to do so. Therefore, on December 19, 2012, Ms. Bower sent a letter to respondent, via certified mail, requesting information about the whereabouts of her funds. Respondent received the letter on December 21, 2012 but did not provide Ms. Bower with the requested information.

In January 2013, Ms. Bower filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. Respondent provided the ODC with a written response on March 25, 2013, but he failed to appear for a sworn statement scheduled for April 18, 2013 and failed to produce subpoenaed documents,

On March 6, 2013, respondent sent Ms. Bower a check in the amount of $47,312.13. On March 23, 2013, respondent sent Ms. Bower another check in the amount of $52,000. Ms. Bower reported that both checks were returned due to insufficient funds in the accounts. Ms. Bower also provided the ODC with copies of text messages in which respondent made repeated promises to provide her with |4her funds, which promises he failed to fulfill. Eventually, Ms. Bower filed a claim with and received $25,000 from the Louisiana State Bar Association’s (“LSBA”) Client Assistance Fund.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 11.4, 1.5(c) (contingency fee agreements), 1.8(a) (a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possesso-ry, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c).

Count III—The Client Trust Account Overdraft Matter

On February 15,2013, the ODC received notice from American Bank and Trust Company that an overdraft occurred in respondent’s client trust account when a $54,116 item was presented for payment and the account balance was not sufficient to pay the item. The bank returned the item due to insufficient funds in the account, leaving the account with a positive balance. The bank’s notice to the ODC, also indicated that the bank closed the account on February 11,2013. Respondent failed to register this particular client trust account with the LSBA, as required.

On February 22, 2013, the ODC sent a letter, via certified mail, to respondent requesting a written explanation for the overdraft and copies of documents related to the client trust account for the previous six months. Despite receiving the letter, respondent never provided the ODC with the requested information. As such, the ODC subpoenaed the records from American Bank and Trust Company.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c).

| ¿Count IV—The Elder/Sikora Matter

In May 2011, Joseph Elder and Cherie Sikora hired respondent to defend them in a civil lawsuit brought by the buyer of their former home. They initially paid respondent a $2,500 fee. In February 2013, respondent informed Mr. Elder and Ms. Sikora that he needed an additional $2,500 to proceed with the case. They paid him the additional $2,500, and shortly thereafter, respondent was interimly suspended from the practice of law. Respondent did not notify Mr. Elder and Ms. Sikora of his interim suspension.

Upon learning of the interim suspension from another source, Mr. Elder and Ms: Sikora filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. Their complaint alleged that respondent did nothing to move their case to conclusion. They also alleged that depositions were set several times but always continued, and they would only find out about the continuances by calling respondent’s secretary. Respondent never provided a written response to the complaint but did appear to provide the ODC with a sworn statement. Mr.' Elder filed a claim with and received $4,500 from the Client Assistance Fund.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3,' 1.4,1.5(b) (the scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client), 1.5(f)(5) (failure to refund an unearned fee), and 8.4(a). In addition, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Supreme' Court Rule XIX, § 26(A) by failing to notify the appropriate parties of his interim suspension.

Count.V—The Comeaux Matter

In early 2013, Dori Comeaux hired respondent to represent her in a child support and custody matter. Ms. Comeaux paid respondent a $3,500 retainer, which ^respondent would bill against-at a rate of $150 perhour. They met three times about Ms. Comeaux’s legal matter, and respondent attended one hearing before a hearing officer with Ms. Comeaux. Thereafter, respondent would not return Ms. Co-meaux’s telephone calls or communicate with her.

Eventually, Ms. Comeaux learned that respondent was interimly suspended from the practice of law and questioned respondent about it. Respondent assured her that he could continue to represent her and made an appointment with her for June 20, 2013. However, he failed to show for the appointment and has since failed to refund any of the unearned portion of the fee Ms. Comeaux paid. Eventually, Ms. Comeaux hired another attorney to complete the matter. She paid the new attorney $500, and he was able to complete the matter in about two weeks. The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(f)(5), and 8.4(a). In addition, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Rule XIX, § 26(A).

Count VI—The Briley Matter

In February 2013, Kasie Briley hired respondent to defend her against DWI charges. Ms. Briley paid respondent a $3,500 flat fee for the representation. Ms. Briley had a court date scheduled for June 13, 2013. She spoke to respondent on June 11, 2013, and he did not inform her he was on interim suspension. Respondent failed to appear for the June 13, 2013 court date. When Ms. Briley’s mother contacted respondent later that morning, he indicated he would arrange for another attorney to represent Ms. Briley. The other attorney appeared and obtained a continuance on Ms. Briley’s behalf.

Ms. Briley later learned that respondent had been placed on interim suspension. After learning this, she contacted respondent via text messages. Respondent informed her he would have the DWI charges dismissed. However, Ms. [7Briley ultimately had to obtain a court-appointed attorney to represent her. She requested a refund and her client file from respondent, but respondent has not returned the file or refunded the fee.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(f)(5), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), and 8.4(a). In addition, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Rule XIX, § 26(A).

Count VII—The Unauthorized, Practice of Law Matter

The ODC received information that respondent continued to practice law following his April 24, 2013 interim suspension by thereafter continuing to represent Dr. Lionel Mayer and bill for his time. The ODC opened an investigation and, on August 15, 2013, sent respondent notice of the investigation, requesting a written response. Respondent failed to provide a written response but did provide the ODC with a sworn statement on December 10, 2013.

On October 21, 2013, the ODC received notice from Peter Caviness, the curator appointed to inventory respondent’s files after he was placed on interim suspension, that respondent was continuing to practice law and that he converted funds owed to his client, Jennifer Durousseau. Despite receiving notice of Mr. Caviness’ complaint, respondent did not provide a written response. He did, however, provide the ODC with a sworn statement on December 10, 2013.

According to respondent, Ms. Durous-seau did not want to interact with her ex-husband. Therefore, her ex-husband sent community property installment payments owed to her directly to respondent, who was, in turn, supposed to forward the funds to her. Documentation from Mr. Ca-viness indicated that respondent received seven payments totaling $7,000 on Ms. Du-rousseau’s behalf as of August 18, 2013. Respondent received five of those payments after he was placed on interim | ^suspension, and he failed to forward the $7,000 to Ms. Durousseau. Ms. Durousseau filed a claim with and received $5,000 from the Client Assistance Fund.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions, of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rulés 5.5(a) (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c). In addition, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Rule XIX, § 26(A)..

Count VIII—The Cates Matter

Jennifer Cates hired respondent to defend her against a DWI charge and to process an expungement of her DWI arrest from her criminal record. Respondent represented Ms. Cates during the DWI prosecution, and she was ultimately placed on probation.

In February 2013, Ms. Cates paid respondent $2,500 for the expungement. Respondent informed Ms. Cates that he had filed for the expungement after her probation ended in May 2013 when, in fact; he never did any legal work on the expungement. Nevertheless, respondent did not refund any of the attorney’s fees he collected for the expungement. Ms. Cates filed a claim with and received $2,500 from the Client Assistance Fund.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3,1.4, 1.5(f)(5), 1.16(d), and 8.4(a). In addition, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Rule XIX, § 26(A).

Count IX—The Gordon Matter

Herbert Gordon hired respondent to open and finalize a succession, and the two met to discuss the succession on July 24, 2013. Mr. Gordon paid respondent a $3,000 fee on August 22,2013.

| ¡According to respondent, he performed the bulk of the legal work for the succession before he was interimly suspended from the practice of law, but he could not conclude the succession because of his interim suspension. He also claimed to have informed Mr. Gordon of his interim suspension. According to Mr. Gordon, his brother informed him of respondent’s interim suspension, and when he e-mailed respondent about it, respondent confirmed he was on interim suspension. Respondent returned Mr. Gordon’s file to him, but he did not refund any of the $3,000 fee Mr. Gordon paid. Mr. Gordon filed a claim with and received $2,500 from the Client Assistance Fund.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3,1.4, 1.5(f)(5), 1.16(d), 5.5(a), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c). In addition, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Rule XIX, § 26(A).

Count X—The Thomas Matter

In 2008, Ethel Thomas hired respondent to handle a community property matter, paying him $1,500. In February 2014, Ms. Thomas filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent because the community property matter was still not resolved. She also indicated that respondent never informed her of his interim suspension.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3,1.4, 1.5(f)(5), 1.16(d), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c). In addition, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Rule XIX, § 26(A).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In November 2015, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. The ODC filed amended formal charges in June 2016. Respondent filed an answer to both the initial set of formal charges and the amended formal charges, essentially | ^denying any misconduct. The matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

Formal Hearing

The hearing committee conducted the formal hearing on'September 27, 2016. Respondent did not appear and was not represented by counsel. The ODC introduced documentary evidence and called several witnesses to testify before the committee.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made the following factual findings:

Count I—The Amerisafe Matter—The committee determined that respondent received three subrogation recovery checks on Amerisafe’s behalf and deposited them into his client trust account. Respondent neither remitted or disbursed those funds to Amerisafe nor informed Amerisafé he was holding the funds; the committee determined this conduct was intentional. Furthermore, respondent did not inform Amerisafe that a judgment had been rendered against it in a case he was handling on its behalf;' in the related appeal, respondent failed to appear for a scheduled hearing before the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in November 2011. Respondent’s conduct caused actual harm to Amerisafe by depriving it of its subrogation recovery funds, by failing to .inform Amerisafe of a judgment rendered against it, and by failing to appear for the appellate argument on that judgment.

Count II—The Bower Matter—The committee determined that respondent obtained a judgment in favor, of Ms. Bower, collected funds in satisfaction of the judgment, and then intentionally failed to disburse Ms. Bower’s portion of the funds. Respondent also failed to indicate how much money he kept as his attorney’s fees. InThe committee further determined that respondent engaged in, a pattern of failing to keep Ms. Bower informed, repeatedly failed to account for or disburse the settlement funds, knowingly entered into a business transaction with Ms. Bower, which was adverse to her, without disclosing the actual or potential conflict of interest inherent in the transaction, and intentionally and repeatedly misrepresented the status and availability of Ms. Bower’s funds. According to the committee, respondent acted intentionally and caused actual harm to Ms. Bower by depriving her of at least $145,000 ,of the settlement funds to which she was entitled.

Count III—The Client Trust Account Overdraft Matter—The, committee determined that respondent issued checks from his client trust account that were dishonored by the bank due to insufficient funds in the account.

Count IV—-The • Elder/Sikora Matter— The committee- determined respondent neglected Mr. Elder and Ms. Sikora’s legal matter and failed to communicate with them. He failed to. communicate the scope of the representation and the basis of the legal fee. He also failed to account for the fees after his clients specifically requested that he do so and failed to refund the unearned fees. Additionally, he failed to notify his clients of his interim suspension. The committee determined respondent’s failure to account for the fees was intentional, and his conduct caused actual harm to his clients.

Count V—The Comeaux Matter—The committee determined respondent neglected Ms. Comeaux’s legal matter, failed to communicate with her, failed to refund the' unearned portion of the fee paid by Ms. Comeaux, and failed to notify her of his interim suspension. The committee also determined respondent acted intentionally by continuing to assure Ms. Comeaux that he could represent her following his interim suspension and by refusing to refund the unearned fee.

Count VI—The Briley Matter—The committee determined respondent neglected Ms. Briley’s legal matter, failed to communicate with her, and failed to | ^refund the unearned portion of the fee. Respondent also failed to return Ms. Briley’s file to her, failed to protect her interests upon termination of the representation, and failed to notify her of his interim suspension.

Count VII—The Unauthorized Practice of Law Matter—The committee determined that respondent has continued to practice law since being placed on interim suspension on April 24, 2013. In particular, the record reflects that respondent continued to offer legal advice and continued to actively represent Dr. Lionel Maya’, Jennifer Cates, Herbert Gordon, Trey Elder, Cherie Sikora, Dori Comeaux, and Kasie Briley after the date of his interim suspension. Additionally, the record reflects that respondent accepted legal fees in connection with Dr. Mayer’s legal matter but performed no legal work except to render preliminary legal advice during the time he was on interim suspension. The committee further determined that respondent’s conduct was intentional and caused actual harm.

Count VIII—The Cates Matter—The committee determined respondent failed to perform any legal services for which he was paid. Respondent also failed to keep Ms. Cates reasonably informed about the status of her legal matter and failed to inform her of his interim suspension. Respondent then failed to refund any of the fee he collected.

Count IX—-The Gordon Matter—The committee determined respondent agreed' to handle Mr. Gordon’s legal matter after being placed on interim suspension. Respondent also failed to inform Mr. Gordon of his interim suspension, failed, to return Mr. Gordon’s file, and failed to refund the legal fee. The committee determined that respondent’s conduct was intentional and caused actual harm to Mr. Gordon.

Count X—The Thomas Matter—The committee determined that respondent neglected Ms. Thomas’ legal matter and failed to' communicate with her. | ^Respondent also failed to account for the fee paid by Ms. Thomas and failed to notify her of his interim suspension.

Based on these facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(c), 1.5(f)(5), 1.8(a), 1.16(d), 5.5(a), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional •Conduct. The committee also determined that respondent violated Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(A). The committee then determined that respondent intentionally Violated duties owed to his clients. By engaging in a pattern and practice of intentionally misappropriating and converting client funds, he caused actual harm to his clients. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.

In aggravation, the committee found'the following to be present: a pattern of misconduct, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1990), indifference to making restitution, and “continued acceptance of engagements after having been placed on interim suspension.” The only mitigating factor found by the. committee was the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended respondent be permanently disbarred;

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation. Respondent, however, filed a motion for continuance of oral argument before the disciplinary-board, citing his recent employment in Carlsbad, New Mexico. Respondent requested a continuance until the end of July 2017 when he would have accrued vacation time after six months of employment. In an order dated February 15, 2017, the board panel chair granted respondent’s motion but continued oral argument only until May 18, 2017. Respondent did not appear for oral argument before the board.

| uDisciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings do not appear to be manifestly erroneous and are supported by the record, with three exceptions. First, in the Bower matter, the committee found that respondent deprived Ms. Bower of at least $145,000. However, the board noted that Ms. Bower testified respondent’s fee was a one-third contingency fee. One-third of $177,503.82 is $58,576.26, which means Ms. Bower should have received $118,927.56 from respondent. Since she received no funds from respondent, the board determined he converted $118,927.56 of her funds. Second, in the Client Trust Account Overdraft matter, the committee made no specific findings other than to state that respondent had overdrawn his account. The board found that respondent deposited a $53,733 ■ check into his client trust account on December 11, 2012. This check was for “Stephen C. Lazaro.” Between December 11, 2012 and December 20, 2012, respondent issued $52,500 worth of checks to “Purser Law Firm.” On January 29, 2013, respondent issued a $54,116 check for the “Lazaro Settlement/Estate.” At that point, the client trust account had a balance of $83, and the $54,116 check was returned due to insufficient funds in the account. Thus, the board determined respondent converted more than $50,000 in client or third party funds. Finally, in the Unauthorized Practice of Law matter, the committee did not make any factual findings regarding respondent’s representation of Jennifer Durousseau. The board found that respondent collected $7,000 from Ms. Durousseau’s ex-husband, which was to be forwarded to Ms. Durousseau. Respondent never forwarded her the funds, but she was able to recover $5,000 of this amount from the Client Assistance Fund.

Based on these facts, the board determined that the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, the committee failed to address Rule 1.5(b) (Count IV only), Rule 8.1(c) (Count VII only), Rule 8.4(b) [^(Counts I—III), and Rule 8.4(a) (all counts). With respect to these alleged rule violations, the board determined respondent violated all of them. Finally, the board determined that the Rule 5.5(a) violation applies only to respondent’s representation of Dr. Mayer and Mr. Gordon because the ODC only charged respondent with this rule violation with respect to those two clients.

The board determined that respondent intentionally violated duties owed to his clients, the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct caused serious actual harm and significant potential for harm. In all, respondent converted $297,753.56 from multiple clients. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.

In aggravation, the board found the following: a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. The only mitigating factor found by the board was the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

After considering respondent’s conduct in light of the permanent disbarment guidelines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix E, as well as this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the board recommended respondent be permanently disbarred. The board further recommended that respondent be ordered to pay restitution to his clients and/or the Client Assistance Fund, as appropriate.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. Y, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an 1 ^independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La. 3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record in this matter supports a finding that respondent neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients, converted client funds to his own use, allowed his client trust account to become overdrawn, practiced law after being placed on interim suspension, and failed to refund unearned fees. The record further supports a finding that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as determined by the disciplinary board.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La. 1987). The discipline to. be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La. 1984).

Respondent intentionally violated duties owed to his clients, the legal system, and the legal profession. He caused significant actual and potential harm. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is disbarment. The record supports the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the disciplinary board.

| ¶ ./Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we find permanent disbarment is warranted under Guideline 1 (repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm) of the permanent disbarment guidelines. On numerous occasions, respondent received funds on his clients’ behalf and failed to remit those funds to the clients, thereby converting client funds to his own use. Respondent was also paid to perform legal work that he either never performed or never completed. Nevertheless, he did not refund the unearned fees, which likewise constitutes a conversion of client funds. We further find that permanent disbarment is warranted under Guideline 8 (following notice, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law subsequent to resigning from the Bar Association, or during the period of time in which the lawyer is suspended from the practice of law or disbarred). Respondent was interimly suspended from the practice of law on April 24, 2013, but he continued to accept fees and represent clients. Under these circumstances, and in order to protect the public, respondent must be permanently disbarred.

Accordingly, we will adopt the disciplinary board’s recommendation and permanently disbar respondent. We will also order respondent to pay restitution to his clients and/or the Client Assistance Fund, as appropriate. '

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Robert B. Purser, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19981, be and he hereby is permanently disbarred. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall .be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. It is further ordered that [ ^respondent make full restitution to each of his clients subject of the formal charges, or to the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Client Assistance Fund, as applicable. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with- Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days-from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    IN RE: Joseph M. BRUNO
    NO. 2017-B-1012
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/09/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

11 This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Joseph M. Bruno, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 1978. In 1989, respondent was appointed to the Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee in federal class action litigation arising out of an explosion at the Shell Oil Company refinery in Norco. During the litigation, respondent made a prohibited monetary payment to a witness, and later, he failed to correct his co-counsel who told a federal judge that the payment had not been made. In 1999, following disciplinary proceedings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, respondent was suspended from practicing law in that court for a period of one year. Respondent was reinstated to practice in federal court in 2000.

Thereafter, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent arising out of his misconduct in the Shell/Norco litigation. In In re: Bruno, 06-2791 (La. 5/11/07), 956 So.2d 577 (“Bruno I”), this court . suspended respondent from the practice of law for three years, with eighteen months deferred. Respondent was reinstated to laPractice in Louisiana on November 20, 2009. In re: Bruno, 09-2227 (La. 11/20/09), 21 So.3d 933.

Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at issue in the present proceeding.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Clarence Phoenix and his wife owned a home in Baton Rouge that they maintained as rental property.. The home sustained wind and water damage when Hurricane Gustav made landfall in Louisiana on September 1, 2008. Mr. Phoenix, an experienced . property owner who was retired from an insurance company, attempted to negotiate directly with his insurer, Repub-lie Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (“Republic”), to resolve his claim. Mr. Phoenix successfully obtained payments from Republic in the amount of $4,099.17 and $269.28, but despite his best efforts, he was unable to secure what he believed to be a reasonable additional payment for the loss he had sustained. After battling with Republic for nearly a year without success, Mr. Phoenix decided to retain the services of respondent, who had previously assisted him with a claim for property damages following Hurricane Katrina.

On August 11, 2009, Mr. Phoenix signed a contingency fee agreement with the law firm of Bruno and Bruno, LLC (“the firm”). Unbeknownst to Mr. Phoenix, respondent was suspended from the practice of law at this time as a result of this court’s order in Bruma I.

In connection with the representation of clients with hurricane property damage claims, including Mr. Phoenix, the firm engaged Full Scope Services, LLC (“Full Scope”), a claims management and adjustment services company, to inspect the property in question and document the damages. Following the inspection of Mr. Phoenix’s property, Full Scope generated a report titled “Proof of Claim” which |sestimated losses to the dwelling totaling $34,574.61. Mr. Phoenix was not provided a copy of the Full Scope report.

On August 20, 2009, respondent’s son, Joseph Bruno, Jr., forwarded the Full Scope report to Republic. He demanded an additional $20,000 to compensate Mr. Phoenix for loss of use of the dwelling and damage to the contents, for a total claim of $54,574.61. Mr. Phoenix was not provided a copy of the settlement demand. On September 30, 2009, Republic’s adjuster, Amy Hill, advised Mr. Bruno, Jr. that Republic had rejected the proof of loss as incom-píete. She also requested the submission of photos, receipts, and other items to substantiate the additional damages claimed. Upon receipt of Ms. Hill’s correspondence, Mr. Bruno, Jr. put it into the Phoenix file, set the file aside, and did nothing further.

By November 2009, respondent had been reinstated to the practice of law, and on January 1, 2010, he assumed full responsibility for Mr. Phoenix’s file. On February 3, 2010, Ms. Hill spoke by telephone with Phillip Lee, a co-owner of Full Scope, about Mr. Phoenix’s claim, and they arrived at a tentative settlement that would cover property damages. However, Ms. Hill understood that a lawyer would have to speak to Mr. Phoenix about the offer, and Mr. Phoenix would necessarily have to agree to the terms. The amounts tentatively agreed upon were a $5,219.55 supplement for dwelling damages; a $1,000 supplement for contents; and a $1,000 supplement for additional living expenses. On February 8, 2010, Ms. Hill issued three settlement checks and forwarded the checks and settlement release documents to Mr. Lee.

Thereafter, according to respondent’s file notes, both Mr. Lee and Daniel Smart, a law student employed by respondent’s law firm, called and presented the settlement offer to Mr. Phoenix. Mr. Smart spoke to Mr. Phoenix on March 12, 2010 Land Mr. Lee spoke to Mr. Phoenix on March 16, 2010. Mr. Phoenix immediately rejected the settlement offer.

Respondent claims that he then met with Mr. Phoenix in April 2010 and secured his permission to settle the claim for the amounts previously rejected; however, Mr. Phoenix denies that such a meeting took place at that time, and there is nothing in respondent’s file documenting the meeting. In any event, the settlement checks which had been issued by Republic were not endorsed by Mr. Phoenix or respondent, and respondent took no action to secure the endorsement of the mortgage holder Bank of America on the checks. Ultimately, there is no activity documented in Mr. Phoenix’s file between March 2010 and December 2010, by which time the two-year prescriptive period had run on the claim against Republic. Respondent did not file a lawsuit against Republic on behalf of Mr. Phoenix prior to the running of prescription. For his part, Mr. Phoenix contends that he did not meet with respondent until January 2011, approximately four months after prescription had run on his claim against Republic. According to Mr. Phoenix, he initially declined tó accept the settlement that had been negotiated on his behalf, but after discussing the matter with his wife, he informed respondent that he would settle the matter for what was offered in an effort to “move on.” Respondent agreed to waive his attorney’s fees and advised Mr. Phoenix of his right to assert a malpractice action against him. Despite the fact that the claim against it was prescribed,. Republic issued new checks in amounts identical to the previous offers. Mr. Phoenix and his wife executed releases and accepted the checks on January 5, 2011.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.7 (a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest wherein there is á significant risk that the ^representation of the client will be materially limited by a personal interest of the lawyer), 5.3 (a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In April 2013, Mr. Phoenix filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. In August 2015, the ODC filed formal charges against ■ respondent. Respondent, through counsel, answered the formal charges and denied the charged misconduct.

This matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits, conducted by a hearing committee on December 14-15, 2015. The committee heard testimony from the following witnesses: respondent’s son, Joseph Bruno, Jr.; Brandon Duhon, James Freeman, and Phillip Lee of Full Scope; Republic claims adjuster Amy Hill; Daniel Smart, a law student employed by respondent; Mallory Comeaux, formerly employed by respondent as a legal assistant; complainants Clarence and Darlene Phoenix; Melissa DeBarbieris, an associate attorney employed by respondent; and respondent.

Hearing Committee Report

The hearing committee’s report is sixty pages in length and contains sixty-three separate findings of fact. The majority of the committee’s factual findings are incorporated into the factual findings section above. Based on its factual findings, the committee determined respondent violated Rules 1.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to communicate with Mr. Phoenix for | ¡¡approximately nine months, during which time prescription ran on his claim against Republic, and by failing to timely file suit against Republic. The committee did not find a violation of the remaining rules charged in the formal charges.

The committee determined that respondent’s misconduct was largely negligent, but to the extent that procedures he had in place in his firm contributed to the misconduct, the conduct was knowing. The injury caused was slight, if any at all, but the potential for injury was significant. The applicable baseline sanction is suspension.

The committee recognized the following aggravating factors: a prior disciplinary record and substantial experience in the practice of law. The committee found the following mitigating factors are present: absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, timely good faith effort to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, delay in the disciplinary proceedings, and remorse.

Based upon these findings and a review of similar case law, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, with all but ninety days deferred, followed by a two-year period of unsupervised probation. The committee further recommended that respondent be required to attend the Louisiana State Bar Association’s (“LSBA”) Ethics School.

The ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommended sanction. The ODC took issue with some of the committee’s factual findings, as well as its finding that some of the alleged rule violations were not proven by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent accepted the committee’s findings of fact and rule violations, but asserted the violations do not warrant a sanction, or alternatively, warrant only a public reprimand.

| ^Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that ■ the hearing committee’s findings of fact are supported by the record and are not manifestly erroneous. The board also determined that the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct,' except that the board also found a violation of Rule 8.4(a).

The board determined that respondent violated duties owed to his client. The board agreed with the committee that respondent acted both negligently and knowingly - negligently in the specific failure to exercise due diligence and to communicate adequately, but knowingly to the extent that he relied on case management procedures that failed in this instance. Respondent’s misconduct caused actual harm because Mr, Phoenix lost his right of action against Republic. However, the extent of the harm does not appear to be significant because Mr. Phoenix ultimately accepted the offer from Republic, and there is no evidence that' Mr. Phoenix would have obtained a greater recovery from the insurance company had a lawsuit been filed. The board determined that the applicable baseline sanction is suspension.

The board, recognized the following aggravating factors: a prior disciplinary record and substantial experience in the practice of law. The board found the following mitigating factors are present: absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, timely good faith effort, to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, delay in the disciplinary proceedings, remorse, and remoteness of prior offenses.

Considering these circumstances, and the court’s prior jurisprudence addressing neglect of client matters which results in the.client losing his right of action, the board concluded that a ninety-day suspension is appropriate here. However, given the significant mitigating factors and respondent’s attempt to |smitigate the harm to Mr. Phoenix by waiving his fees, the board recommended that all but thirty days of the suspension be deferred. The board determined that nothing in the record supports a recommendation for monitoring via a probationary period or that respondent would benefit from attending the LSBA’s Ethics School

Accordingly, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for ninety days, with all but thirty days deferred. The board additionally recommended that any violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct within that time period should result in the deferred suspension becoming executory. Finally, the board recommended respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La. 3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record convincingly supports the hearing committee’s finding that respondent neglected Mr. Phoenix’s insurance claim, causing it to prescribe. Respondent also failed to communicate with Mr. Phoenix in an adequate manner. | nThis misconduct amounts to a violation of Rules 1.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination-of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La. 1987). The discipline' to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La. 1984).

Respondent violated duties owed to his client. His neglect caused actual harm because Mr. Phoenix lost his right of action against his insurance company; however, the harm is minimal, because Mr. Phoenix was ultimately compensated by the insurer. Respondent's misconduct was negligent and knowing. The applicable baseline sanction in this matter is suspension. The record supports the aggravating and'mitigating factors found by the disciplinary board.

In prior cases involving a lawyer’s neglect' of a-client matter that results in the client losing his right of action, we have imposed discipline ranging from a public reprimand to short suspensions which may be fully or partially deferred. See, e.g., In re: Regan, 04-1365 (La. 10/15/04), 885 So.2d 514. The board recommended that respondent be suspended for ninety days, with all but thirty days deferred in consideration of the substantial mitigating factors present. Considering the record of this matter, and the absence of any objection by the parties to the board’s recom'mendation, we cannot say that this sanction is inappropriate.

|! (Accordingly, we will suspend respondent from the practice of law for ninety days, with all but thirty days deferred. Any misconduct during that time will be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Joseph M. Bruno, Louisiana Bar Roll number 3604, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of ninety days. It is further ordered that all but thirty days of the suspension shall be deferred. Any misconduct during that time will be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

GENOVESE, J.,

dissents and assigns reasons.

h GENOVESE, Justice, dissents and would accept the recommendation of the hearing committee.

      , Mr. Bruno, Jr. is not charged with any misconduct in relation to this matter.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Samuel L. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-2206
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/09/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

11Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2062, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered - to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana IN the INTEREST OF O.G.
    NO. 2017-CK-1655
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 27, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Juvenile Court Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 111457; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 KW 1310;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tamera Jean KNAEBEL
    NO. 2017-KK-0828
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 214,694, 214,-695, 214,696; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit,'No. 51580-KW C/W 51581-KW C/W 51582-KW

h Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.

GENOVESE, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Willie J. GROSS v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-2016
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 16-WCR-488

h Denied.


text:
    MISTY FINCHUM AGENCY, LLC, et al. v. JAMIE THIBODEAUX AND ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0824
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2012-2792; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-760;

hDenied.


text:
    HARRIS BUILDERS, LLC v. CYPRESS REALTY PARTNERS, L.L.C., Housing Authority of New Orleans, et al. Beep Me Plumbing v. Hanover Insurance Group, Inc., et al.
    NO. 2017-OC-0894
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 2013-628 C/W 2013-1478 AND 2011-12191; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-C-0142

hNot considered; not timely filed. Relator’s May 30, 2017 writ application to this court was filed more than thirty days from the court of appeal’s March 8, 2017 judgment dismissing the writ application and its April 18, 2017 disposition declining to consider the rehearing application. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 6(a). Motion to dismiss denied as moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Adam CHARLES
    NO. 2017-KK-0837
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 16-197,443; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 KW 0268;

h Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kyron FOLSE
    NO. 2017-K-0162
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. C-542902; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0808

h Denied.

WEIMER, J„ recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shawn J. BROWN
    NO. 2017-KO-0163
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 14-5396; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-KA-301;

| denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Gabrielle COOPER v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-0607
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration ' of this Court’s action dated August 4, 2017; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 288109; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50807-KH

hNot considered. See La.S.Ct. Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joharri O. WALKER
    NO. 2017-KO-0190
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 14-3589; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-KA-293;

| jDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Richard VERDIN, Jr.
    NO. 2016-K-2107
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 642610; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0439

| denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Odeal Pippins LIRETTE
    NO. 2016-K-1272
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 13-K-5183-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-72

11 Denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Steven SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-1110
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 56482-H; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 16-00033

[denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Daniel CASTRO
    NO. 2017-KO-0235
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 518-338; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-KA-0284

1 iDenied.


text:
    Anthony MATTHEWS v. The BATON ROUGE WATER WORKS COMPANY and American Alternative Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-CC-0827
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 588858; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 0104;

h Denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Dustin Ryan THOMPSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-1392
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Allen, 33rd Judicial District Court Div., No. 2010-5580;

h Granted for the sole purpose of transfer to the district court for consideration and a ruling, if the district court has not already acted. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darrius R. COPELIN
    NO. 2017-K-0047
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 522-255; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-KA-0264

ltDenied.

JOHNSON, C.J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Curtis Allen BRIDGES v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-1176
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 515,163; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KW 0454;

|! Denied.


text:
    Harold Joe BLACK v. Judge Craig O. MARCOTTE, Former Judges Charles Rex Scott & Sheriff Donald Hathaway, Clerk Gary Loftin, Asst District Attorney Donna Hall, Asst District Attorned Brian B. Barber, Agent Rick Faaris & April Wright, Atty Alan Harris, Attt J. Keene, Atty William D. Hall
    NO. 2017-OC-0938
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 574,799; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51078-CW;

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kerry BERTRAND
    NO. 2017-KO-0234
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 81,691; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-659;

h Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jekran DIGGS, et al.
    NO. 2017-KK-0899
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 59884-R; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 17-161

I iDenied.


text:
    HEW JAX CONDOMINIUMS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. VANDERBILT NEW ORLEANS, LLC and the Penthouse at Jax, LLC
    NO. 2017-C-0887
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or. Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 2015-04267; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No, 2016-CA-0643

| iDenied.


text:
    Kelli WILKERSON v. Denardo. D. DUNHAM, DPM, and ABC Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-C-0932
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2015-3203; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-1056

11 Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Bob WELCH & Daniel Hoover v. PLANNING & ZONING COMMISSION OF EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH S 2590 ASSOCIATES, LLC
    NO. 2017-C-0885
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana September 29, 2017
   IN RE: City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge; -Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 608,569; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0735; September 29,2017 Denied.

JLW


text:
    KHOOBEHI PROPERTIES, LLC v. BARONNE DEVELOPMENT NO. 2, L.L.C., Kailas Family Limited Partnership and Kailas Properties, L.L.C. Khoobehi Properties, L.L.C. v. Baronne Development No. 2, L.L.C., Kailas Family Limited Partnership, and Kailas Properties, L.L.C. Khoobehi Properties, L.L.C. v. Baronne Development No. 2, L.L.C., et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0893
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div., No. 733-258; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-506 C/W16-C-354 & 16-C-356;

| denied.


text:
    Grady Wayne BRYANT and Rhonda Patten Bryant v. PREMIUM FOOD CONCEPTS, INC. dba Popeye’s Fried Chicken #4065 and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
    NO. 2017-C-0873
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 106857; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0770

| denied.


text:
    Dan S. COLLINS and Dan S. Collins, CPL and Associates, Inc. v. STATE of Louisiana, THROUGH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Robert Benoit, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant Director Atchafalaya Basin Program, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
    NO. 2017-C-0879
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 592,154; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 1195

1 denied.


text:
    Roger REEVES, Susan Fullerton, Henry Gregory, Rodney Broadway, Anita Darbonne and Ray Powell v. EXPLO SYSTEMS, INC. and Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-CC-0986
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 72,717; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,576-CW;

| denied.


text:
    Truman STANLEY, III v. AIRGAS-SOUTHWEST, INC., Praxair, Inc., Gulp Coast Hydrostatic Testers, LLC, Engineered Controls International, LLC, and T.H. Laboratories, Ltd.
    NO. 2017-C-0927
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish, of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 104,043; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, NO. 2016 CA 0461;

h Denied.


text:
    John JOHNSON, individually and as representative of the class of those similarly situated v. ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, XYZ Insurance Company, City of New Orleans, and ABC Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-C-0907
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 93-14333 C/W 94-5446 C/W 94-12996 C/W 95-13271; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-CA-0277

I denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael Lorenzo BARNETT, Jr.
    NO. 2017-KK-0946
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. ll-F-003407; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No- 51,493-KW

|, Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.

HUGHES, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ashley H. GARY
    NO. 2017-KK-0942
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/o Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 15-249,508; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW17-00326;

| denied.


text:
    Russell MARICLE, et ux. v. AXIS MEDICAL & FITNESS EQUIPMENT, LLC, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0930
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div, G, No. 247,765; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 17-109

| denied.


text:
    Patrick Kent Lindsey JONES and Jennifer Elizabeth Jones v. Allen Kent JUNES; Pioneer Natural Resources, USA, Inc.; Cimarex Energy Company of Colorado; Quantum Resources Management, LLC; Breitburn Energy Partners LP; Edward Oil Co; Milagrio Exploration, LLC; White Oak Resources VI, LLC; ABC Pipeline Company
    NO. 2017-C-0883
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 767-820; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-536;

I, Denied.


text:
    Evette HEAL v. Justin WASCOM, Jr., Clean Water Opportunities, Inc., and Hallmark Specialty Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-C-0897
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari áñd/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div; F, No. 146878 F; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 1230

| iDenied,

WEIMER, J., would grant.

CLARK, J., would grant. ■

CRICHTON, J., would grant.


text:
    C.C.M.P., LLC v. CHEVRON USA HOLDINGS, INC., Three Sisters Petroleum, Inc., The Young Oil Company, Calument Industries, Inc., Calumet Lubricants Co., Limited Partnership, Legacy Resources Co., L.P., Hollenshead Oil & Gas, LLC, and Gemini Explorations, Inc.
    NO. 2017-CC-0926
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 549,376; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-542-CW;

L Denied.

GENOVESE, J., would grant.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF John Patrick THERIOT, Jr., et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0919
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 15421; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-639 C/W16-961

11 Denied.


text:
    Carlos MARTINEZ v. RELIABLE SOIL CO., INC., Anthony James and Houston Specialty Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-CC-0925
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2014-8301; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-C-0341

| iDenied.


text:
    Thomas J. BELL, Sr. v. The CITY OF LAKE CHARLES
    NO. 2017-00842
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 29, 2017
   IN RE: Thomas J. Bell, Sr.; -Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2015-4786; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-764; September 29, 2017

Denied.