text:
    IN RE: J. Renee MARTIN
    NO. 2017-B-0220
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/15/2017
   ORDER

11 Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, J. Renee Martin, Louisiana Bar Roll number 30161, be and she hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate.

/s/ James T. Genovese JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM Hughes, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Michelle DOMINGUE, wife of, and Brian Domingne v. IMPERIAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION d/b/a Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company
    NO. 2016-CC-2108
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/17/2017
   PER CURIAM

11 Granted. In light of plaintiffs’ admission in open court that they were not seeking any damages (other than statutory attorney fees) in connection with their petition for nullity, we find the principal demand in this case does not satisfy the jurisdictional threshold for a jury trial pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1732. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the district court striking the jury trial is reinstated. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Hughes, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

Hughes, J.,

concurring.

hi concur in the result. The issue of damages on the merits is not reached in considering a petition for nullity. If the petition is denied, the judgment stands. If nullity is granted, the judgment is vacated and the parties are back to square one.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE EX REL. Patrick LEVIER v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2019
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/17/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the District Court’s written reasons denying relator’s application.

Relator has now fully litigated at least three applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has ^exhausted his right to state collateral review. The District Court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

GENOVESE, J., recused.

|sAttachment


text:
    STATE EX REL. Henry HICKSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-1973
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/17/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Furthermore, to the extent relator contends his claim is jurisdictional, relator fails to show that the indictment was defective and thus fails to show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea for armed robbery. See La.Ch.C. art. 305; see also La.C.Cr.P. art. 487.

Relator has now fully litigated five applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions | aauthorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The District Court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Allen GASKIN a/k/a Alan Gaskin v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-0225
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/17/2017
   PER CURIAM:

j iWrit granted. In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) announced a substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively, we vacate relator’s sentence and remand this case to the 26th Judicial District Court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in State v. Montgomery, 13-1163 (La. 6/28/16), 194 So.3d 606, and for resentencing pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. Art. 878.1. After defendant is resentenced, that judgment is included by statute among those which defendant may appeal. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 912(C)(1). Furthermore, although this court originally had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over this pre-1982 felony conviction and sentence, see La. Const, art. V, § 5(E), after the resentencing to which relator is now entitled, appellate jurisdiction for the purposes of any review of his new sentence will vest in the intermediate court of appeal. See La. Const. art. V, § 10 (eff. July 1, 1982, “[A] court of appeal has appellate jurisdiction of ... all criminal cases triable by a jury,” except when a law has been |2declared unconstitutional or when the death penalty has been imposed); see also State ex rel. Hudson v. State, 16-1731 (La. 1/9/17), 208 So.3d 882, 2017 WL 85558.


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Devon BUTLER, et al.
    No. 2016-KK-2183
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/17/2017
   PER CURIAM

? granted. Viewing the known facts objectively, and applying the proper approach to the determination of whether the facts demonstrate reasonable suspicion to justify a stop and frisk, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), we find the district court abused its discretion in granting the defendants’ motions to suppress evidence. First, upon seeing two men sitting in the parking lot of a closed service station, one of whom met the description of the perpetrator of a home invasion that had occurred minutes before and a few blocks away, the officers aeted reasonably in approaching the defendant and his co-defendant Fletcher, who matched the description given by the victim of the home invasion. Second, for the same reasons, the officers acted reasonably in questioning Fletcher as to his identity and what he was doing in that location. Third, the officers were similarly acting reasonably when they also questioned the defendant as a possible accomplice, because he was found with Fletcher in the immediate vicinity of the home invasion, even though only one perpetrator was described by the victim. Fourth, the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a pat-down of Fletcher, whom the officers observed reaching into his jacket pocket where a weapon could Rbe easily concealed. When a loaded weapon was retrieved from Fletcher’s person, the officers then had articulable reasons to suspect the defendant, as a possible accomplice of Fletcher, could also be armed and dangerous; therefore, the officers acted reasonably in commencing a pat-down of the defendant, who then admitted to also possessing a weapon. In sum, under the totality of the articulable facts, as well as the specific reasonable inferences therefrom, available at the moment of the stop, the officers were justified in temporarily detaining the men to inquire of their identities and their reasons for being at that location. The officers were also justified in conducting the subsequent frisk for weapons, because a reasonably prudent person in such circumstances would have been warranted in the belief that one’s safety or that of others was in danger. Accordingly, the trial court’s rulings on the motions to suppress are reversed, and the matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

JOHNSON, C.J. would deny the writ application.

Hughes, J., would deny the writ.

GENOVESE, J., would deny.


author: PER CURIAM CLARK, J., CRICHTON, J,,

text:
    IN RE: Frank J. FERRARA, Jr.
    NO. 2017-OB-0069
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/17/2017
   PER CURIAM

1 jThis proceeding arises out of an application for reinstatement to the practice of law filed by petitioner, Frank J. Ferrara, Jr., an attorney currently suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2013, we considered a joint petition for consent discipline filed by petitioner and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”). The misconduct at issue in that matter involved allegations that respondent drafted an affidavit at the request of his criminal defense client in which the victim in the underlying criminal proceeding agreed to drop the criminal charges in exchange for the payment of money. For this misconduct, the parties proposed that petitioner be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. On April 26, 2013, we accepted the joint petition for consent discipline. In re: Ferrara, 13-0722 (La. 4/26/13), 116 So.3d 664 (‘‘Ferrara I”).

In 2015, the ODC commenced an investigation into allegations that petitioner promised or guaranteed a particular result or outcome of a representation. This misconduct occurred in the same time frame as the misconduct forming the basis of Ferrara I. Prior to the filing of new formal charges, petitioner and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline proposing that petitioner be adjudged guilty of additional violations which warrant Indiscipline and which may be considered in the event he applied for reinstatement from his suspension in Ferrara I. On June 30, 2015, we accepted the petition for consent discipline. In re: Ferrara, 15-1196 (La. 6/30/15), 167 So.3d 618.

In February 2016, petitioner filed an application for reinstatement with the disciplinary board, alleging he has complied with the reinstatement criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). Petitioner subsequently amended the application to disclose certain information, including assets, liabilities, and income, that was omitted from the initial application. The ODC took no position regarding the application for reinstatement. Accordingly, the matter was referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee.

Following the hearing, the hearing committee recommended that petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law, subject to a five-year period of supervised probation with conditions. Neither petitioner nor the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

After considering the record in its entirety, we find petitioner has met his burden of proving that he is entitled to be reinstated to the practice of law. Nevertheless, as recognized by the hearing committee, further precautions are warranted to insure that the public will be protected upon petitioner’s return to practice. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(J).

^Accordingly, we will order that petitioner be conditionally reinstated to the practice of law, subject to a two-year period of probation governed by the following conditions:

1. Petitioner shall request that the ODC appoint a practice monitor to supervise his professional activities during the probationary period, including his compliance with trust account rules, accounting procedures, law office management procedures, adequate communication with clients, diligence in the representation of clients, and otherwise verifying compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.

2. Petitioner shall cooperate with the ODC, and shall comply with any and all requirements imposed upon him by the ODC.

3. Petitioner must not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct throughout the period of his conditional reinstatement.

4. Should petitioner have a disciplinary complaint lodged against him at any time during the period of his conditional reinstatement, he must promptly and fully cooperate with the investigation conducted by the ODC.

Should petitioner fail to comply with these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated immediately, or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, as appropriate.

DECREE

Upon review of the recommendation of the hearing committee, and considering the record, it is ordered that Frank J. Ferrara, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 5539, be immediately reinstated to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a two-year period of supervised probation governed by the conditions set forth |4herein. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the ODC, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. Should petitioner fail to comply with the conditions of probation, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated immediately or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, as appropriate. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.

CLARK, J., dissents and would deny the application for reinstatement.

CRICHTON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

CLARK, J.,

dissenting.

|TI dissent and would deny the application for reinstatement.

CRICHTON, J,,

dissents and assigns reasons:

hi respectfully dissent from this court’s decision to grant petitioner conditional reinstatement to the practice of law. As a result of previous ethical violations, this Court suspended petitioner from the practice of law for one year and one day. In re Ferrara, 15-1196 (La. 6/30/15), 167 So.3d 618; In re Ferrara, 13-0722 (La. 4/26/13), 116 So.3d 654. In his petition for reinstatement, which the disciplinary hearing committee characterized as “sloppily prepared” and “concerning” that the petition “had such inaccuracies,” petitioner omitted a significant number of assets and income as well as a number of liabilities, including tax liens in excess of $380,000. Notwithstanding an amendment of his application, petitioner has disregarded the clearly delineated and non-negotiable reinstatement requirements set forth in La. Sup. Ct. Rule XIX, which calls into question whether he possesses the requisite character and fitness to practice law. This Court has stated time and time again, “[disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct.” Louisiana State Bar Association v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173, 86-1788 (La. 10/19/87) (internal citations omitted). Following suspension from the practice of law, one who petitions the supreme court for reinstatement ought to be scrupulous and fastidious—and accurate—in doing so. Given petitioner’s transgressions and his “sloppily prepared” application for reinstatement, I seriously question whether he has proven that he has the | ¡¡.requisites to return to this noble profession. Accordingly, I would deny even a conditional reinstatement.

      . The parties did note that the five-year period of probation recommended by the committee exceeds that permitted by Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(A)(3), which provides that the maximum period of probation is two years.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. August GARNETT
    NO. 2016-KK-1790
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 526-564; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-0828;

| denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant. WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terrence L. DANIELS
    NO. 2015-KO-1997
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 10-3138; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 15-KA-78.

| denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert L. Clark, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2015-KH-2049
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div, A, No. 189,249; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,-137-KA

| iDenied.

CRICHTON, J., would request an opposition brief and would consider granting for argument and decision.


text:
    M.S. RAU ANTIQUES, LLC v. Jean VIDOS, Michael Vidos, and Sidney Lambert
    NO. 2016-CC-1675
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 14-5874; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-C-0535

| denied.


text:
    MACE SCOTT ENTERPRISES, INC. and Dr. Mace Scott v. DOUG COOK ENTERPRISES, LLC and Doug Cook
    NO. 2016-CC-1686
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 748-945; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-C-350.

11 Denied.


text:
    BIEVER REALTY—BENJAMIN, L.L.C. v. ROYAL ALICE PROPERTIES, L.L.C.
    NO. 2016-C-1780
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2014-10182; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-0080.

L Denied.


text:
    Cynthia D. SAMUEL v. Christine Falgoust REMY, Personally and as Director of/and the Remy Firm, a/k/a Christine Remy and Associates, P.L.C.; Charles N. Branton, Personally; Charles N. Branton, L.L.C.; Branton & Associates, LLC; ABC Insurance Company; EFG Insurance Company; XYZ Insurance Company; and TUV Insurance Company
    NO. 2016-C-1785
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2013-15489; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2015 CA 0464, 2015 CA 0465

| denied.


text:
    Daniel ARCENEAUX, Louis Daverde, Jr. Vives Lemmon, and Jules Messesses v. AMSTAR CORP., Amstar Sugar Corp., Tate & Lyle North American Sugars, Inc., and Domino Sugar Company
    NO. 2016-CC-1782
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 86-959 C/W 105-703 C/W 106-082; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-C-0641.

| denied.


text:
    Lindsey KING, Individually and On Behalf of Her Deceased Minor Child, Peyton Wilt v. OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Christopher P. Brupbacher, Dofin Fritts D/B/A Have Gyro Will Travel, and the Succession of Darren Joseph Mahler
    NO. 2016-C-1811
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 15-2377; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-0170.

JjDenied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jarvis BERARD
    NO. 2015-KO-2066
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016


text:
    STATE EX REL. Sabrina DOWELL v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-1875
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 475-067; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-KA-0371.

11 Writ not considered.


text:
    Richard Charles BENTS v. Kathrine Pilar BENTS
    NO. 2016-C-1822
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2011-14086; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CU 1306;

| denied.


text:
    Leonard BRACKEN v. PAYNE & KELLER CO., INC, Workman Compensation Tribunal, District [5], Baton Rouge, Louisiana
    NO. 2016-C-1791
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. C636835; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1760;

| ^Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Olivia Rioffell, Wife of/and Gustave JUDICE
    NO. 2016-CC-1801
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court, Div. J, No. 2016-30182; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW 0756

h Denied.


text:
    Sharon STUMP, Donald “Duck” Williams II, Jon Shannon White, Roy Sandefer, and Kevin Hall, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Similarly Situated v. Samuel M. CAMP, Judith M. Camp, Camline, LLC f/k/a and Pamlab, LLC
    NO. 2016-C-1805
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    November 29, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2013-15378; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1158;

| ¶ Denied.


text:
    ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, The Louisiana State Board of Elementary & Secondary Education, and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Education
    NO. 2016-C-1798
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 5, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 622,693; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 0264.

| denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant. HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Taylor MCINTYRE
    NO. 2016-KK-2010
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 5, 2016
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 529-517; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-1082

| denied.


text:
    SWEPI, LP v. RED RIVER PARISH TAX AGENCY & Elaine Moore In Her Capacity As Tax Administrator of Red River Parish Tax Agency
    NO. 2016-CC-1861
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 5, 2016
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Red River, 39th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 35877; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,113-CW.

| iDenied.


text:
    Mary Sue MARIONEAUX the Lela Mae Johnson Marioneaux Trust F/B/O Mary Sue Marioneaux v. Lucien Harry MARIONEAUX, Sr. Individually, and as Former Trustee of the Lela Mae Johnson Marioneaux Trust, Lucien Harry Marioneaux, Jr. Marioneaux Properties, L.L.P. HBM Interests, L.L.C. Eighty Acres, L.L.C. Wallace Lake Marioneaux, L.L.C.
    NO. 2016-CC-2164
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 14, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C 588685; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-423-CW;

| denied.


text:
    Todd HUVAL and Chad Boyer v. STATE of Louisiana through the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, Office of State Police, Master Trooper Hal Hutchinson, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police, Lieutenant Rhett Trahan, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police, Investigator Buzzy Trahan, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police, Lieutenant Kevin Devall, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police, Investigator Bart Morris, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police, Investigator Hampton Guillory, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police, and Lt Colonel Stanley Griffin, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police
    NO. 2016-CC-1857
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
    Grant Lloyd Willis Esq.; Counsel for Applicant;
    Danny Joseph Louviere Esq.; Counsel for Respondent
   IN RE: Office of State Police; State of Louisiana through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, et al.;—Defen-dants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. D, No. 572,272; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CW 1151 R

| í Granted.


text:
    Raymond MELADINE Sr., et al. v. STONE ENERGY, et al.
    NO. 2016-C-1450
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 48-436; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-CA-1068

[ , Writ granted. Lower court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed. There are genuine issues of material fact that prohibit grant of summary judgment as a matter of law. Case remanded to district court for further proceedings.

WEIMER, J., would deny.

GUIDRY, J., would deny.

CLARK, J., would deny.


text:
    Thomas H. HAYDEN and Jacqueline S. Hayden v. 3M COMPANY, et al.
    NO. 2016-CC-1986
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 2015-03732; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-C-1030

It Granted and remanded to the Court of Appeal for briefing, argument and full opinion.


text:
    Kerry MAGGIO v. James PARKER; The Sandwich Kings, LLC (d/b/a Jimmy Johns); Republic Vanguard Insurance Company; and Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company
    NO. 2016-CC-1988
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 113,206; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW 1075;

It Granted and remanded to the court of appeal for briefing, argument, and full opinion.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.

HUGHES, J., would deny.


text:
    William Artmer LUCKY, IV v. Lindsay Diane WAY
    NO. 2016-CJ-2197
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. C 126336; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,426-CW;

h Granted. Having denied the writ, the court of appeal exceeded its authority in ordering the trial court to conduct a hearing on December 14, 2016 on certain issues. See Davis v. Jazz Casino Co., L.L.C., 03-0276 (La. 6/6/03), 849 So. 2d 497; Bulot v. Intercoastal Tubular Services, Inc., 02-1035 (La. 6/14/02), 817 So. 2d 1149. Accordingly, this language is struck from the court of appeal’s disposition, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to the trial court’s December 8, 2016 pre-trial order.


text:
    IN RE: APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 16-PDB-041
    NO. 2016-OB-1883
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 16-PDB-041;

h Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    Joseph P. ROUMAIN, Barbara Ann Gully, James Barry Labatut, Catherine A. Propkop, Joseph AL. Lprokop, Jr. Individually, Joseph A. Prokop, Jr. as Executor of the Succession of Joseph A. Prokop, Sr., David R. Prokop, James B. Reno, Individually, James B. Reno as Administrator of the Succession of Vic Reno, John F. Sanchez, John F. Sanchez, Jr., Millard Williams and Barry Mecgee v. 320, IN.C, Michael R. Brassett and Leo Lieux Brassett, Sr.
    2016-CC-2019
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 643,756; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW 1189

11 Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wilbert THOMAS
    2016-KK-2184
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 529-694; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-1100

|! Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thaddeus J. ROSS
    NO. 2016-K-1344
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 516-273; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-KA-1031;

11 Denied.


text:
    Linda C. MAY, et al. v. EAGLE US 2 LLC, et al.
    NO. 2016-CC-1972
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2014-5001; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 16-00319

| denied.


text:
    Loretha BRIGNAC, et al. v. EAGLE US 2 LLC, et al.
    NO. 2016-CC-1974
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review/ Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2014-5057; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 16-00312

11 Denied.


text:
    Crystal MOTT, et al. v. EAGLE US 2 LLC, et al.
    NO. 2016-CC-1978
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2014-5097; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 16-00318;

| denied.


text:
    Tyneisha HOLLOWAY, et al. v. EAGLE US 2 LLC, et al.
    NO. 2016-CC-1980
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court, Div. B, No. 2014-5096; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 16-00324

| ]Denied.


text:
    NEW LINE ENVIRONMENTAL AND CANAL HR v. Bobby L. DAVIS Bobby L. Davis v. New Line Environmental and Canal HR
    NO. 2016-C-1996
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 16, 2016
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 6, No. 14-04133 C/W 15-00426; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1885;

|, Denied.


author: WELCH, J. CRAIN, J.,

text:
    Hani SALAMA, Ruan Salama, Reem Salama, Rami Salama, and Abdul Hamid Salama, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Child, Nadin Salama v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development, Mohamed Abu-Jaber, GEICO Indemnity Insurance Company, Carl J. Robert, Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, Avis Bell, and Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana
    NO. 2015 CA 1992
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    JANUARY 05, 2017

      Jeff Landry, Attorney General, Thomas A. Lane, Assistant Attorney General, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development
    Christian A. Shofstahl, Mandeville, Louisiana, and, William D. Cass, Mandeville, Louisiana, Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appel-lees, Hani Salama, Ruan Salama, Reem Salama, Rami Salama, Abdul Hamid Sala-ma, and Nadin Salama
    BEFORE: MCDONALD, WELCH, CRAIN, THERIOT, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.
   WELCH, J.

LThe State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), appeals a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) that increased the wrongful death damages awarded by the jury to three of the six plaintiffs. We reverse the JNOV and reinstate the jury’s verdict as to two of those plaintiffs, and we affirm the JNOV as to one plaintiff, but amend the amount of damages awarded.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On Sunday, May 10, 2009, Noha Salama arrived in Louisiana, having traveled from her home in Israel to visit family. Her nephew, Mohamed Abu-Jaber, picked her up at the airport in New Orleans, and the two proceeded toward Baton Rouge on Interstate 10, with Mrs. Salama riding as the front seat passenger in her nephew’s vehicle. The vehicle exited the interstate at Louisiana Highway 44/Burnside Drive in Gonzales and stopped at the stop sign at the end of the exit ramp. Intending to reenter the interstate, the vehicle proceeded straight across the four-lane highway without stopping in the median that divided the two northbound lanes from the two southbound lanes. After crossing the northbound lanes and median, the vehicle was broadsided by two southbound vehicles. Mrs. Salama died at the scene of the accident.

Mrs. Salama’s surviving husband, Abdul Hamid Salama, and five children, Hani, Ruan, Reem, Rami, and Nadin, instituted the instant wrongful death and survival action against her nephew and his insurer, the drivers of the two southbound vehicles and their insurers, and DOTD. The family settled its claims against all other parties and their insurers and proceeded to a jury trial against DOTD. At trial, the family argued that DOTD, which had care, custody, and control of the intersection, was at fault for treating the exit and entrance ramps and Highway 44 as a single intersection, rather than two separate intersections, and for |sfailing to install a stop or yield sign in the median of Highway 44. The jury found DOTD 18% at fault in causing the accident and Mrs. Salama’s nephew 82% at fault. The jury awarded wrongful death damages in the amount of $300,000.00 to Mr. Salama and $150,000.00 to each of the five children. The jury awarded no survival damages. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.

The family filed a motion for JNOV, arguing that both the percentage of fault assessed to DOTD and the amount of damages awarded to each plaintiff were insufficient. After a hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement, and then it subsequently issued written reasons denying the motion as to the fault assessed to DOTD, and denying the motion as to the damages awarded to three of the children, Rami, Reem, and Ruan. However, the trial court granted the motion as to the damages awarded to Mr. Salama, increasing those damages from $300,000.00 to $400,000.00, and as to the damages awarded to two of the children, increasing the damages awarded to Nadin from $150,000.00 to $350,000.00, and the damages awarded to Hani from $150,000.00 to $300,000.00. The trial court signed a judgment on August 3, 2015 reflecting the JNOV and increased awards, and it is from this judgment that DOTD has appealed.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

A JNOV is a procedural device authorized by La. C.C.P. art. 1811, by which the trial court may correct an erroneous jury verdict by modifying the jury’s finding of fault or damages, or both. Bourg v. Cajun Cutters, Inc., 2014-0210 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/7/15), 174 So.3d 56, 61, writs denied, 2015-1306 (La. 4/4/16), 190 So.3d 1201 and 2015-1253 (La. 4/4/16), 190 So.3d 1205. The standard for granting a JNOV is rigorous because “[w]hen there is a jury, the jury is the trier of fact.” Joseph v. Broussard Rice Mill, Inc., 2000-0628 (La. 10/30/00), 772 So.2d 94, 99, quoting Scott v. Hospital Service District No. 1, 496 So.2d 270, 273 (La. 1986). A JNOV is allowable only when the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that reasonable persons could not reach different conclusions. Falcon v. Louisiana Department of Transportation, 2013-1404 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/19/14), 168 So.3d 476, 488, writ denied, 2015-0133 (La. 4/10/15), 163 So.3d 813. It is not enough that there is a preponderance of evidence for the mover. Smith v. State, Department of Transportation & Development, 2004-1317 (La. 3/11/05), 899 So.2d 516, 525. If there is evidence opposed to the motion that is of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, a JNOV is not warranted. Id. In making its decision the court should not evaluate the witnesses’ credibility and should resolve all reasonable inferences or factual questions in favor of the non-moving party. Joseph, 772 So.2d at 99.

When a JNOV is granted on the issue of quantum because the trial court concludes reasonable men could not disagree on the fact that the award is abusively high or low, the trial court must next determine the proper amount of damages to be awarded. Falcon, 168 So.3d at 488. The trial court is not constrained as courts of appeal are to raising or lowering the award to the lowest or highest point that is reasonably within the discretion afforded the court. Hanchett v. State, ex rel. Department of Transportation and Development, 2006-1678 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/7/07), 977 So.2d 78, 84. Rather, after granting a JNOV on the damage award, the trial court replaces the jury as the trier of fact and makes an independent assessment of the damages and awards what it determines to be the proper amount of compensation under the facts of the case. Falcon, 168 So.3d at 488; Hanchett, 977 So.2d at 85.

An appellate court reviewing a trial court’s grant of a JNOV employs the same criteria used by the trial court in deciding whether to grant the motion. Hanchett, 977 So.2d at 85. Thus, when the JNOV is granted on the issue of | ^quantum, the appellate court first considers whether reasonable minds could differ as to the fact that the jury award was abusively high or low. See Falcon, 168 So.3d at 488. If the appellate court finds that reasonable minds could differ, then the trial court erred in granting the JNOV and the jury verdict should be reinstated. Id. If the appellate court determines that the JNOV was properly granted, the trial court’s independent assessment of damages is then reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hanchett, 977 So.2d at 85.

Our initial inquiry, then, is whether the JNOV was properly granted because reasonable persons could not disagree that the jury’s awards for wrongful death damages to Mr. Salama and the two children, Hani and Nadin, were abusively low. See Falcon, 168 So.3d at 488. In conducting our review, we are mindful that neither the trial court nor this court may substitute its evaluation of the proper amount of damages for that of the jury unless the jury’s awards totally offend reasonable inferences from the evidence. Pitts v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co., 2015-0848 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/3/16), 197 So.3d 221, 226.

While it is impossible to place a monetary value on the life of a person, our jurisprudential system has established that a monetary award is the appropriate remedy to one who has suffered the loss of a loved one as a result of the fault of another. Moss v. State, 2007-1686 (La.App. 1st Cir. 8/8/08), 993 So.2d 687, 704, writ denied, 2008-2166 (La. 11/14/08), 996 So.2d 1092. Wrongful death damages are meant to compensate the designated survivors for their loss of the decedent. See La. C.C. art. 2315.2. The elements of the award include loss of love, affection, companionship, and support, as well as funeral expenses. Maldonado v. Kiewit Louisiana Co., 2012-1868 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/30/14), 152 So.3d 909, 938, writ denied, 2014-2246 (La. 1/16/15), 157 So.3d 1129.

Mrs. Salama was forty-eight years old when she died. She and Mr. Salama had been married for twenty-nine years and had five children. Their oldest son, |fiBami, was twenty-nine when Mrs. Salama died, and had lived in the family home until he married, a few weeks prior to her death. Their son Hani was twenty-seven, was not married and lived at home. As a child Hani was diagnosed with diabetes, and his mother had always been involved caring for his health. Their twenty-six-year-old daughter, Reem, also lived at home, was studying English education, and was working. Their daughter, Ruan, was twenty-one and had moved away from home to attend school approximately six months prior to Mrs. Salama’s death. The youngest child, Nadin, turned sixteen on the day her mother died. At trial, Mr. Salama and each of the five children testified about their love for Mrs. Salama, the special relationships they shared with her, and the impact her loss has had on their family.

Mr. Salama described his wife as an “incredible” and “wonderful” woman. He testified that he loved his wife very much and described their relationship as “incredible,” claiming that other couples were envious of them. He stated that he missed her very much, and that he had not remarried and could not touch another woman. He explained, “I have woken up from all of this about a year or ago [sic]. For three or four years I had to only understand the thing that was going on there. I don’t have until today a partner.”

The children described the difficult time their father had after their mother’s death. Ruan testified that her father “gave up on everything,” including his children, and did not do anything. She described her father as “depressed” and stated that he does not talk to anyone. Reem indicated that her father had difficulty continuing working and was still not working. Reem explained that her “father stopped caring about life.” Ruan stated that at one point she returned from school |7to find no food or electricity at the house. Nadin testified that her mother was “everything for” her father and that her mother’s death “ruined” him.

The children also described how their close-knit family drifted apart after their mother died. Hani described his mother as “the connector of the family,” and Rami described her as “the glue that held everyone together.” Ruan testified that after their mother died, “We fell apart completely... Everyone is by himself trying to survive.” Reem testified that she was expected to take her mother’s place in the household, and tried for a year to do things such as cooking and cleaning, but could not do it and moved out of the house. She returned for a time, but in 2012, she and her sisters moved to another city in Israel, where they continue to struggle. Rami described his relationship with his sisters as being “not like I would want them [sic] to be,” and opined that the relationship would be better if his mother was alive. Nadin testified, “She held it all. She did [sic] the connection between us.”

Both Nadin and Hani testified that they experienced health problems after their mother died. Nadin testified that she had recently been diagnosed with cancer, had undergone one surgical procedure, and needed another. Nadin testified that if she were alive, her mother would have been a help to her. Nadin also testified that she believed she would not have cancer if her mother were alive. Hani testified that his diabetic condition deteriorated, requiring that one of his legs be amputated. Like Nadin, he testified that if his mother were alive she would be able to help him with his condition and speculated, “I would never come into this situation without her lost.” Hani continued to live at home with his father, explaining that his father had to care for him because he could not care for himself.

Mr. Salama confirmed that Mrs. Salama was important to him and his children and that Mrs. Salama “is really missed in the house,” explaining that she “took care of everything” and that he “[did not] know how to do anything.” Mr. Salama testified that after his wife’s death, the children “couldn’t last. After they |ssaw the body in the living room, they couldn’t keep living in that house, they all moved out.” He also confirmed that his family had drifted apart “in a large scale.” He noted that Mrs. Salama’s death was hard for everyone. When asked about his work history, Mr. Salama indicated he was no longer in the same business because “everything collapsed.” In response to being questioned whether he stopped working after he learned of his wife’s death, he responded, “It’s not exactly like that. The situation that happened to me with a child and that, and the combination of the stuff.” Mr. Salama clarified that he was referring to Hani losing his leg, which required a lengthy hospitalization.

The trial court’s written reasons state that it granted the JNOV as to the wrongful death damages awarded to Mr. Salama because:

reasonable persons could not disagree that the $300,000 in wrongful death damages awarded by the jury was abusively low based on the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and his wife. Mr. Salama was married to the deceased for almost thirty (30) years at the time of her death and the testimony established that they had a uniquely close and loving relationship. The couple had five (5) children together, all of whom lived in the family home within six (6) months of the fatal accident. Mr. Salama has not remarried to this day, and he has been unable to be with another woman during the six (6) years since his wife’s death. His children testified that their mother’s death ruined him, and he stopped caring about life after the accident. The family split apart after the accident and Mr. Salama lost his businesses, which ultimately resulted in the utilities being turned off at the family home. Based on the length of the relationship, the age of the spouses at the time of [Mrs.] Salama’s death, the uniquely close and loving relationship, and the devastating effects [Mrs.] Sala-ma’s death had on Mr. Salama, the wrongful death award is raised to $400,000.00 based on a de novo review of damages.

After thorough review, we find that the jury’s award does not totally offend reasonable inferences from the evidence, and therefore conclude that the trial court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the jury. Mr. Salama unquestionably loves and misses his wife of twenty-nine years. However, we cannot conclude that no reasonable person could find an award of $300,000.00 to Mr. Salama to be appropriate. Because reasonable and fair-minded persons in the |aexercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions as to whether the jury’s award is abusively low, we find that a JNOV was not warranted. Accordingly, the jury’s award to Mr. Salama must be reinstated.

The trial court also granted a JNOV as to the wrongful death damages awarded to two of Mrs. Salama’s children, Nadin and Hani. The trial court stated that the jury failed to consider Nadin’s and Hani’s claims individually, as they were awarded $150,000.00, the same amount in damages as their siblings. Under Louisiana law, amounts recoverable in a wrongful death action for loss of care, guidance, and affection of the deceased may differ among the plaintiffs on the basis of differing degrees of affection which existed between the deceased and the different plaintiffs or differing degrees of guidance needed by minor plaintiffs. Scott v. Pyles, 99-1775 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/25/00), 770 So.2d 492, 505, writ denied, 2000-3222 (La. 1/26/01), 782 So.2d 633. In a wrongful death action brought by a child for the loss of a parent, the child may recover for loss of financial support, including all financial contributions that the decedent would have made to her dependents but for her wrongful death, as well as the monetary value of services the decedent provided and would have continued to provide but for her wrongful death. See Cavalier v. State, ex rel. Department of Transportation and Development, 2008-0561 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/12/08), 994 So.2d 635, 647. These services include the nurture, training, education, and guidance a child would have received had his or her parent not been killed. Cavalier, 994 So.2d at 647-648.

Nadin lost her mother on her sixteenth birthday. She testified that she was close to her mother, explaining that she did not have friends and did not go out, and spent all of her time with her mother. They cooked, shopped, and went to the forest together. She described her mother as “the support” and “the guidance.” Since her mother’s death, Nadin testified that her life changed “180 degrees.” She | inexpressed that it was difficult to describe how hard it has been on her since her mother died, stating, “Relationship got ruined to lose her and to reestablish myself in a life without her to build a new life.” Nadin also expressed that now she cannot celebrate her birthday because now the anniversary of her mother’s death is “the saddest day.”

Nadin described how her home life changed after her mother’s death, stating, “Everything fell apart after she died.” She testified that her family was not able to “connect” without her mother, and there was fighting amongst them. She testified that her mother’s death distanced her from her father, then got her closer, “then later on the connection just went, and we are less meaningful and less meaningful.” Nadin testified that she moved out of the family home when she was twenty because the situation there was “very bad,” referencing the water and electricity in the house being disconnected after her father did not pay the bills. Reem testified that that the sisters moved out of the family home and live together in another city. Nadin testified that she works in a kindergarten guiding autistic children.

Nadin also testified that she recently discovered that she has cancer, for which she has had one operation and requires another, as well as radiation treatments. Nadin testified that she missed her mother and that her mother would have helped her deal with cancer. Nadin also testified that she thought “that [she] wouldn’t have cancer if [her mother] would have been here.”

Hani was twenty-seven years old when his mother died and also lived at home. Hani’s sisters, Reem and Ruan, testified that Hani took his mother’s death very hard. Hani is diabetic and testified that his mother was always involved in his life and his health. He considered his mother to be his best friend and counselor and relied on her “[f|or everything.” He explained that they talked daily, that he | n“never talked to any friends,” and that there was no one closer to him than his mother.

Hani testified that prior to Mrs. Sala-ma’s death, they had “the perfect house.” Hani described the family home after her death as “empty” and “too messy.” He stated that his sisters moved away and that he still lives in the house with his father, explaining that though it is a three-story house, he lives in the living room because he cannot get to the upper floors after having his leg amputated. He testified that he does not leave the house and does not have contact with or talk to anyone now.

Hani’s diabetic condition worsened after his mother’s death, though he indicated that he continued taking his medication, without which he would collapse. He explained that his condition jumped from a “[seven] and a half, [eight] ... to [eleven] ... to [fourteen]” and he had to be hospitalized. He testified that his leg had to be amputated approximately eighteen months prior to his testimony. Hani stated that he continues to live at home with his father because, “I can’t take care of myself. He has to take care of me. I can’t take care of myself.” Hani indicated that if she were alive his mother would have been able to help with his worsening condition and recovery, speculating, “I would never come into this situation without her lost.”

After thorough review, we find the trial court did not err in granting the JNOV as to the minor child Nadin. The jury erred in awarding Nadin, the youngest of the decedent’s children and the only minor at the time of her mother’s death, the same wrongful death damages as her sisters and brothers. Considering that Na-din was a minor living at home with her mother and father, that she had an exceptionally close and loving relationship with her mother, and that her mother’s death on her birthday would have a life-long impact on her, reasonable minds could not disagree that the jury’s $150,000.00 damages award was abusively low. See Hanchett, 977 So.2d at 84. However, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Nadin in $350,000.00. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the highest award reasonably within the discretion of the trial court is $250,000.00. See Maldonado, 152 So.3d at 939 (seven and three year old boys were awarded $450,000.00 for the wrongful death of their father); Moss v. State, 993 So.2d at 705-707 (high school senior awarded $100,000.00 for the wrongful death of his father); Ratliff v. State, ex rel Department of Transportation and Development, 2002-0733 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/28/03), 844 So.2d 926, 939, writ denied, 2003-1739 (La. 10/10/03), 855 So.2d 350 (two minor children aged fifteen and older awarded $125,000.00 each for the wrongful death of their mother); and Scott, 770 So.2d at 504-505 (thirteen and ten year old girls were awarded $500,000.00 and $400,000.00, respectively, for the wrongful death of their father).

As to Hani, who was an adult at the time of his mother’s death, we find that reasonable minds could disagree that the jury’s award of damages of $150,000.00 was abusively low. The record establishes that Mrs. Salama had a close and loving relationship with each of her children and that each of them feels her loss acutely as they face the challenges of life without their mother. Rami now has a young son who will never know his grandmother. Reem testified that she had a normal life and plans for her future but after her mother’s death has “nothing” and “feel[s] like an orphan” from whom everything has been taken. Ruan also testified that since her mother’s death her “life has changed [one hundred eighty] degrees.” Ruan explained that she became depressed, stopped going to school, and could not hold a job, although she had recently begun working as “a guide in a rehabilitation center.” Considering the testimony adduced, a reasonable person could have concluded that even though Hani experienced health issues, he should be compensated for the loss of his mother by an award equal to that of his three |1ssiblings who were also adults when their mother died. Therefore, as to Hani, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting the JNOV and the jury’s award must be reinstated.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the August 3, 2015 judgment is reversed in part and affirmed in part. That part of the trial court’s August 3, 2015 judgment granting a JNOV as to Nadin Salama is affirmed but the judgment is amended to lower the damages award to $250,000.00. That part of the trial court’s judgment granting a JNOV and increasing the damages awarded to Abdul Hamid Salama and Hani Sala-ma is reversed, and as to Abdul Hamid Salama and Hani Salama, the trial court’s June 1,2015 judgment rendered in accordance with the jury’s verdict is reinstated. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $19,549.70 are assessed equally between the plaintiffs, Abdul Hamid Salama, Rami Salama, Hani Salama, Reem Salama, Ruan Salama, and Nadin Salama and the defendant, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development.

AUGUST 3, 2015 JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART, AMENDED IN PART, AND AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED; JUNE 1, 2015 JUDGMENT REINSTATED IN PART.

Crain, J., agrees in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.

Theriot, J., agrees in part, dissents in part for reasons assigned by J. Crain.

CRAIN, J.,

agreeing in part and dissenting in part.

LAs correctly noted by the majority, while necessary, the placement of a monetary award on the life of a person is impossible. It is imprecise. At times, it may appear quite arbitrary. But, the fact finder is free to award an amount that it determines to be fair. Under the JNOV standard, neither the trial court nor this court is authorized to substitute its evaluation of the proper amount of damages for that of the fact finder unless no reasonable person could disagree that the award is either abusively high or abusively low. See Falcon v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp., 13-1404 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/19/14), 168 So.3d 476, 488, writ denied, 15-0133 (La. 4/10/15), 163 So.3d 813; Gutierrez v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. and Development, 11-1774 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/23/12), 92 So.3d 380, writ denied, 12-1237 (La. 9/21/12), 98 So.3d 343.

It is not inherently wrong to award siblings the same amount of damages, although their circumstances are different. See, e.g., Dakmak v. Baton Rouge City Police Dept., 12-1468 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/4/14), 153 So.3d 498, 510 (an award of $10,000.00 to each of three of adult sons for the wrongful death of their father was not an abuse of discretion); Maldonado, 152 So.3d at 939 (after finding that the jury’s award was abusively high, this court reduced awards to a seven-year-old and a three-year-old for the wrongful death of their father to $450,000.00 each). While the jury’s award of $150,000.00 to Nadin may be on the low end of reasonable, or it could be that the amounts awarded to her brothers and sisters are on the high end of reasonable, the awards are nevertheless reasonable, and the fact that they are the same does not negate that.

Both the trial court and the majority have simply substituted their opinions for that of the jury—the trial court by granting the JNOV and this court by reducing the trial court’s award to just $100,000.00 more than the jury awarded. Since reasonable persons could disagree as to whether the jury’s wrongful death damages awards to Mr. Salama, Hani, and Nadin are abusively low, the JNOV should be reversed in its entirety, and the jury’s verdict should be reinstated as to all plaintiffs.

      . All of the family members testified by video deposition through an interpreter, explaining that they were unable to travel from their homes in Israel to attend the trial.

      . The awards to Rami, Remm, and Rúan are not subject to review in this appeal.