author: STUART, Justice. MURDOCK, Justice

text:
    UNIVERSITY TOYOTA and University Chevrolet Buick GMC v. Beverly HARDEMAN and Vivian Roberts
    1151204
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    January 27, 2017

      Jeffrey L. Ingram and David A. Butler of Galese & Ingram, P.C., Birmingham, for appellants.
    . Craig L. Lowell and D.G. Pantazis, Jr., of; Wiggins Childs Pantazis Fisher & Gold-farb, Birmingham, for appellees.
   STUART, Justice.

University Toyota and University Chevrolet Buick GMC (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the 'University dealerships”) appeal the order of the Colbert Circuit Court allowing Beverly Hardeman and Vivian Roberts to pursue their claims against the University dealerships in- arbitration proceedings conducted by the American Arbitration, Association (“the AAA”) instead of the. Better Business Bureau of North Alabama (“the BBB”),, the entity identified in the controlling arbitration agreements. We-reverse and remand.

I.

In December 2011, Hardeman purchased a 2Ó12 GMC Acadia sport-utility vehicle from Jim Bishop Buick in Tuscum-bia; in April. 2013, Roberts purchased a 2013 Toyota Tacoma - pickup truck from Jim Bishop Toyota in Tuscumbia (Jim Bishop Buick and Jim Bishop Toyota are hereinafter reférred to collectively as “the Jim Bishop dealerships”). In conjunction with their purchases of those vehicles, Hardeman and Roberts, purchased service contracts entitling them to. no-cost oil changes for as long as they owned their respective vehicles. The Jim Bishop dealerships thereafter provided Hardeman and Roberts free oil changes pursuant to those service contracts without issue.

.At some point in time, the Jim Bishop dealerships were sold and rebranded as the University dealerships. Initially, the University dealerships honored the no-cost oil-change service contracts sold by their predecessors in interest, the Jim Bishop dealerships; however, they-- eventually stopped providing no-cost oil changes, to customers who held those contracts, such as Hardeman and Roberts. On October 29, 2015, Hardeman and Roberts filed a demand for arbitration with the BBB, the dispute-resolution entity identified in arbitration agreements they-'had executed when they purchased their vehicles, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals, based on the University dealerships’ refusal to honor the service contracts sold by the Jim Bishop dealerships. The subject arbitration agreements provided, in relevant part:

“Buyer/lessee and dealer agree, that all claims, demands, disputes, or controversies of every kind or nature between them arising from, concerning or relating to ... service contracts or other products purchased as an incident to the sale, lease or financing of the vehicle ... shall be settled by binding arbitration conducted pursuant to the provision[s] of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Section 1 et seq. ...
“Either party may demand arbitration by filing with the Better Business Bureau of North Alabama, P.O. Box 383, Huntsville, AL 35804, (256) 532-1437, a written demand for .arbitration along with a statement of the matter in controversy.”

It appears, however, that the BBB informed Hardeman and Roberts that it did not conduct class-action arbitration proceedings, and they accordingly withdrew their arbitration demand.

On December 2, 2015, Hardeman and Roberts filed a complaint in the Colbert Circuit Court naming as - defendants the University dealerships and asserting breach-of-contract, conversion, and unjust-enrichment claims. Hardeman and Roberts also sought class certification of their claims, asserting that over 100 individuals had similarly been injured by the University dealerships’ failure to honor certain service contracts sold by their predecessors in interest, the Jim Bishop- dealerships. On January 17, 2016, the University dealerships moved the trial court to. compel Hardeman and Roberts to arbitrate their claims in accordance with the arbitration agreements they had executed when they purchased their vehicles and accompanying service contracts. In support of that motion, the University dealerships submitted into evidence copies of the arbitration agreements and an affidavit' from the former owner of the Jim Bishop dealerships authenticating the agreements and explaining the interstate nature of the underlying transactions with Hardeman and Roberts. Hardeman and Roberts thereafter filed a response opposing the University dealerships’ motion to compel arbitration, asking the trial court to allow their action to proceed either in state court or, in the alternative, in an arbitral forum other than the BBB, i.e., one that would conduct class-action arbitration proceedings. On May 19, 2016, the trial court entered an order directing that Harde-man’s and Robert’s claims be sent to arbitration before the AAA with the AAA arbitrator to subsequently decide whether class-action arbitration was available to them. On May 26, 2016, Hardeman and Roberts did in fact initiate an arbitration proceeding before the AAA.

On June 3, 2016, the University dealerships moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its May 19 order, arguing that the subject arbitration agreements required any arbitration proceedings between the parties to be conducted by the BBB and that Hardeman and Roberts had no right, contractual or otherwise, to engage in class-action arbitration proceedings. After becoming aware that Harde-man and Roberts had initiated the AAA arbitration proceeding,' the University dealerships also moved both the trial court and the AAA to stay those proceedings until their pending motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court’s May 19 order was decided. Hardeman and Roberts opposed the University dealerships’ motions, and, on August 19, 2016, the trial court entered its final order, stating:

“In the above-styled case, [Hardeman and Roberts] claim that [the University dealerships] failed to honor lifetime oil change contracts to customers who purchased cars from their dealership[s]. The dealership^] [were] sold, and [the University dealerships] deny any responsibility for the contracts. [Harde-man and Roberts] seek to enforce the contract for themselves, and any other customers similarly situated.
“At the time of [Hardeman’s and Roberts’s] purchased], ... arbitration agreements] [were] signed. The agreements] state[ ] that arbitration would be through the [BBB]. [Hardeman and Roberts] state, however that [the] BBB has refused, or is not capable of, making the initial determination as to whether they will be allowed to proceed as a class action.
“As a result of [the] BBB’s inability to make this determination, [Hardeman and Roberts] asked this court for an order allowing arbitration to proceed through [the] AAA [The University dealerships] object and request that the case proceed with a case-by-case arbitration with [the] BBB.
“After hearing arguments, this court does order that the parties shall begin arbitration with [the] AAA. The arbitrator should first determine whether [Hardeman and Roberts] may proceed as a class. If the arbitrator selected through the AAA determines that the parties may not proceed to seek a global settlement, arbitration by [the] AAA shall cease immediately. The parties, at that point, must seek arbitration through [the] BBB, on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the agreement.”

On August 23, 2016, the University dealerships filed their notice of appeal to this Court.

II.

In BankAmerica Housing Services v. Lee, 833 So.2d 609 (Ala. 2002), this Court considered a similar case in which the appellant had succeeded in the trial court in its attempt to compel arbitration but thereafter filed an appeal to this Court arguing that the trial court had compelled arbitration in a manner inconsistent with the governing arbitration provision. We stated then that we would review the order compelling arbitration de novo to determine whether the trial court, although granting the requested relief, had nevertheless committed an error substantially prejudicing the party seeking review. Lee, 833 So.2d at 617.

III.

It is undisputed in this case (1) that Hardeman’s and Roberts’s purchases of automobiles and service contracts from the Jim Bishop dealerships affected interstate commerce; (2) that both Hardeman and Roberts executed arbitration agreements in conjunction with their purchases; (3) that those arbitration agreements are valid;’ and (4) that those arbitration agree-merits encompass the underlying dispute regarding the University dealerships’ responsibility to honor the service contracts purchased by Hardeman and Roberts. Thus, it is also undisputed that-the University dealerships were entitled to have the arbitration agreements enforced and their motion to compel arbitration granted. Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Gantt, 882 So.2d 313, 315 (Ala. 2003). The issue before this Court is whether the trial court, though granting the motion to compel arbitration, properly enforced the arbitration agreements inasmuch as it did not require Hardeman and Roberts to arbitrate their claims before the BBB, the forum agreed to by the parties. For the reasons that follow, we must answer that inquiry in the negative.

In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 186 L.Ed.2d 417 (2013), the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that arbitration agreements are simply a species of contract and, like all contracts, must be enforced according to their terms:

“Congress enacted the [Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.,] in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration. See AT&T Mobility [LLC v. Concepcion], [563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) ]. As relevant here, the Act provides:
“ ‘A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ 9 U.S.C. § 2.
“This text reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract. See.Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010). And consistent with that text, courts must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration' agreements according to them terms, Dean Witter Refolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985), including terms that ‘specify with whom .[the parties] choose to arbitrate their disputes,’ Stolb-Nielsen [S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.], [559 U.S, 662,] 683 [(2010)], and ‘the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted,’ Volt Information, Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. (1989).”

This Court has held likewise, explaining this principle as follows in Lee:

“When a trial court compels arbitration, it must do so in a manner consistent with the terms of the" arbitration provision. See Ex parte Cappaert Manufactured Homes, 822 So.2d 385, 387 (Ala. 2001) (‘[section] 5 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] mandates that the method set forth in the arbitration agreement be followed’); Southern Energy Homes Retail Corp. v. McCool, 814 So.2d 845 (Ala. 2001) (trial court directed to vacate its order because it failed to compel arbitration in a manner consistent with the terms of the agreement between the parties); Ex parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales, [718 So.2d 33, 36-38 (Ala. 1998)] (trial court erred in assigning administrative fees of arbitration to the defendant when the Rules of the AAA provided for the relief of a party in the event of hardship). A trial court’s order compelling arbitration that changes the terms of the arbitration provision will be reversed when
‘“it appears that the trial court, although it ordered the parties to arbitrate, failed to compel arbitration in a manner consistent with the terms of [the] arbitration provision.’■
“McCool, 814 So.2d at 849.”

833 So.2d at 618. See also Okay v. Murray, 51 So.3d 285, 291 (Ala. 2010) (holding that a trial court must give effect to the terms of an arbitration provision when compelling arbitration).

The arbitration agreements executed by Hardeman and Roberts in this case required them to resolve disputes “concerning or relating to .., service contracts or other products purchased as ah incident to the sale, lease or financing of the vehicle ... by binding arbitration.” Moreover, the arbitration agreements specifically set forth the procedure for initiating any arbitration proceedings—“[e]ither party may demand arbitration by filing with the [BBB] ... a written demand for arbitration along with a statement of the matter in controversy.” This fact distinguishes the instant case from cases like Robertson v. Mount Royal Towers, 134 So.3d 862, 863 (Ala. 2013), in which the parties executed a predispute arbitration agreement that did not name a forum for arbitration and the trial court accordingly had to fill in the “gap” and appoint an arbitrator of its choosing to hear the dispute. This Court affirmed the order of the trial - court compelling arbitration in Robertson, concluding that the fact the parties did not name an arbitrator indicated that the identity of the arbitrator was not “an integral and essential part” of their agreement to arbitrate. 134 So.3d at 869. Conversely, however, the arbitration agreements in this case do identify a forum for arbitration—the BBB, The fact that the parties named a specific forum in which either party could initiate arbitration indicates that the specific forum was “an integral and essential part” of their agreement to arbitrate, and the trial court was accordingly required to give effect to that intent when it compelled arbitration.'

Justice Murdock in his dissent argues that this case is essentially undistinguishable from Robertson, because, he asserts, once the BBB forum “became unavailable, a gap was effectively created, just as in Robertson, that was left to be filled by the trial court.” 228 So.3d at 402. In fact, however, there is no' evidence indicating that the BBB forum is unavailable to Hardeman and Roberts. To the contrary, Hardeman and Roberts initiated arbitration before the BBB and, for all that appears, the BBB would have conducted arbitration proceedings resolving Hardeman’s and Roberts’s disputes with the University dealerships had Hardeman and Roberts not voluntarily chose to withdraw their arbitration demand. Indeed, the BBB is presumably still willing and ready to conduct arbitration proceedings to resolve Hardeman’s and Roberts’s disputes with the University dealerships; it has merely indicated that it .will not conduct, a single class-action, arbitration proceeding to resolve the claims of every aggrieved customer that purchased a. no-cost oil-change service contract from the Jim Bishop dealerships- that the University dealerships now will not honor;

To the extent the dissent is concluding that the BBB forum is unavailable because of the BBB’s policy not to conduct class-action arbitration, we disagree. Hardeman and Roberts have no right to engage in class-action arbitration proceedings, because the arbitration agreements they entered into contain no provision authorizing the arbitration of class-action claims. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are sufficiently great that it should not be assumed that the parties to an arbitration agreement have implicitly agreed to allow class-action arbitration merely because they failed to address that issue in the arbitration agreement. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010) (“We think that the differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited powers under the [Federal Arbitration Act], that the parties’ mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration . constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.”). The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama has further explained:

“It is helpful initially to address the effect of a valid arbitration agreement’s silence as to the availability of class-wide relief in the arbitrable forum. Under Alabama law, ‘classwide arbitration is permitted only when the arbitration agreement provides for it.’ Taylor v. First N. Am. Nat’l Bank, 325 F.Supp.2d 1304, 1320 n. 28 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (citing Med. Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So.2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998)); see also Hornsby v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., No. 10cv680 ... (M.D. Ala. June 13, 2012) (explaining that, because the arbitration agreement ‘says nothing about classwide arbitration,’ Alabama’s ‘default rule, that “classwide arbitration is permitted only when the arbitration agreement provides for it,” kicks in.’) (quoting Taylor, 325 F.Supp.2d at 1320 n. 28). Based upon these authorities, if Plaintiffs ultimately are required to arbitrate their disputes, class-wide arbitration would be unavailable because the Arbitration Agreement does not expressly provide for it.-
“Moreover, and more to the point for purposes of this opinion, the fact that there is no class-action vehicle available to Plaintiffs in the arbitral forum does not mean, as Plaintiffs contend, that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable and that class litigation is available in a judicial forum. As the district court highlighted in Hornsby, ‘the Eleventh Circuit has held that arbitration clauses are enforceable even when, their application may effectively prevent plaintiffs from pursuing their claims as a class action.’ ... (citing Caley [v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.], 428 F.3d [1359,] 1378 [ (11th Cir. 2005) ], which rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under Georgia law because it ‘preclude[d] class actions’). And post-Caley, the Supreme Court has ruled that ‘a party may not be compelled under the [Federal Arbitration Act] to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so’ and that consent to class arbitration cannot be inferred where the agreement is silent as to the availability of class-action procedures. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010).”

Chambers v. Groome Transp. of Alabama, 41 F.Supp.3d 1327, 1350 (M.D. Ala. 2014). In sum, Hardeman and Roberts have no basis on which to force the University dealerships to engage in class-action arbitration proceedings before the. BBB—or the AAA for that matter—and the BBB’s policy of not conducting class-action arbi-trations accordingly -in no way renders the BBB forum unavailable to .Hardeman and Roberts.

Finally, in spite , of the clear language in the arbitration agreements, Hardeman and Roberts make the argument—unsupported by any citations to caselaw, statute, or other authority—that “[a]ll the arbitration agreement explicitly states is that ‘either party may demand arbitration by filing with the [BBB].’ What occurs after filing this demand is left unsaid.” Hardeman and Roberts’s brief, p. 10. To the extent that Hardeman and Roberts are arguing that they were required only to initiate arbitration with the BBB, but were then free to withdraw that claim and to pursue a resolution in some other forum, their argument is clearly without merit; to accept it would defeat the very purpose of having an arbitration agreement. •

IV.

The University dealerships appeal the order, of the trial court allowing Hardeman and Roberts to arbitrate the claims they asserted against the University dealerships in arbitration proceedings conducted by the AAA, notwithstanding the fact that the arbitration agreements executed by Hardeman and Roberts identify the BBB as the entity that is to resolve any disputes that are subject to the arbitration agreements. Because a trial court can compel arbitration only in a manner consistent with the terms of the applicable arbitration agreement, we reverse the trial court’s order compelling arbitration and remand the cause for the entry of a new order compelling Hardeman and Roberts to arbitrate their claims against the University dealerships before the BBB if they wish to pursue those claims.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Bolin, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.

Parker, J., concurs in the result.

Murdock, J., dissents.

MURDOCK, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I see no basis in the text of the parties’ arbitration agreements for concluding that the provision in the agreements that a party may demand arbitration by making a filing with the Better Business Bureau of North Alabama (“the BBB”) establishes a requirement that such a claim be arbitrated with the BBB that is “an integral and essential part” of the parties’ contract that, if incapable of being performed, undermines the parties’ more fundamental agreement to arbitrate their disputes. This is especially true given the strong federal policy in favor .of arbitration upon which .this Court has frequently relied.

The arbitration agreements executed by Beverly Hardeman, Vivian Roberts, and Jim Bishop Buick and Jim' Bishop Toyota, the predecessor dealerships to University Toyota and University Chevrolet Buick GMC (“the University dealerships”), require them to resolve disputes “concerning or relating to ... service contracts or other products purchased as an incident to the sale, lease or financing of the vehicle ... by binding arbitration.” Although those agreements subsequently set forth a procedure for initiating an arbitration proceeding—“[ejither party may demand arbitration by filing with the [BBB] ... a written demand for arbitration”—nothing in the arbitration agreements explicitly states that only the BBB may conduct the arbitration. At a minimum, nothing in the agreements states that the- agreement to arbitrate is a nullity if the organization chosen to conduct the arbitration is unable to do so.

This Court often has acknowledged, and espoused, that the policy in favor of arbitration imposed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“the FAA”) is a strong one, See, e.g., Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Washington, 939 So.2d 6, 14 (Ala. 2006) (noting that the United States Supreme Court recognized a strong federal policy favoring arbitration and that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration); Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Bentley, 851 So.2d 458, 463 (Ala. 2002); Auto Owners Ins., Inc. v. Blackmon Ins. Agency, Inc., 99 So.3d 1193, 1196 (Ala. 2012). See generally Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). Consistent with this policy, in Robertson v. Mount Royal Towers, 134 So.3d 862, 863 (Ala. 2013), when the chosen arbitrator was not available, the Court nonetheless said that arbitration must go forward with the trial'court filling the gap.

I disagree’with the main opinion that this case is distinguishable from cases like Robertson, in which the parties executed a predispute arbitration agreement that did not name a forum for arbitration, Even reading the parties’ agreements, as designating the BBB as the forum for arbitration, once that forum became unavailable, a gap was effectively created, just as in Robertson, that was left to be filled by the trial court. Nothing in the arbitration agreements states that the use of arbitration will be contingent upon the availability of the BBB as the forum. And any effort somehow to glean this intent from the language of the agreements (which, in my view, would fail in any event) is made that much more difficult by the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. In short, as was the case in Robertson, and especially in the context of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, I do not find in the language of the parties’ agreements any language that allows me to agree with the main opinion that the agreements indicate that the identity of the arbitrator was “an integral and essential part” of their agreements to arbitrate.

In fact, the indistinguishability of this case from Robertson is borne out by this Court’s decision in Ex parte Warren, 718 So.2d 45 (Ala. 1998). In Warren, as in the present case (according to. the University dealerships’ reading of the arbitration agreements), the arbitration agreement specified a particular arbitrator but, as in the present case, the designated arbitrator was not available to conduct the arbitration. Nonetheless, as in Robertson, the parties’ agreement to arbitrate was upheld, The Warren opinion reasons as follows:

“The Warrens next argue that the arbitration agreement is void because the arbitrator that it specifies ... is no longer in existence....
“Under the Federal Arbitration Act, the fact that an arbitrator named in the arbitration agreement is unable to act as an arbitrator over the parties’ controversy does not necessarily void the arbitration agreement'.,..
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“Based upon § 5 [of the FAA], federal courts have established the general rule that, where the arbitrator named in. the arbitration agreement cannot or will not arbitrate the dispute, a court does not void the agreement but instead appoints a different arbitrator. Astra Footwear Industry v. Harwyn Int’l Inc., 442 F.Supp. 907 (S.D. N.Y. 1978);. see, also, McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey v. Grider, 771 F.Supp. 319 (D. Colo. 1991)....
“However, the federal courts have also recognized an exception to the general rule: where it is clear that a specific failed term of an arbitration agreement is not, an ancillary logistical concern but, rather, is as important a consideration as the arbitration agreement itself, a court will not sever the failed term from the rest of the agreement and the entire arbitration provision will fail. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1990).”

718 So.2d at 48. The Warren "opinion then proceeds to uphold the parties’ arbitration agreement despite the unavailability of the designated arbitrator, citing, inter alia, McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey v. Grider, 771 F.Supp. 319 (D. Colo. 1991); for the proposition that “where there was no indication that the naming of a specific arbitrator was central to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, the named arbitrator’s unwillingness to arbitrate the parties’ dispute did not void the arbitration agreement.” 718 So.2d at 48-49. It appears to' the that the same proposition applies to the present case.

The main opinion takes issue with the proposition that the BBB is unavailable to arbitrate this matter because, it posits, the parties have no right to engage in class-arbitration proceedings in the first place. Because the only type of claim that may be arbitrated, according to the main opinion, is the individual claim of each plaintiff, and because the BBB is available to arbitrate such a claim, the BBB is not “unavailable.” In this regard, the main opinion states:

“To the extent the dissent is concluding that the BBB forum- is unavailable because of the BBB’s policy not to conduct class-action arbitration, we disagree. Hardeman and Roberts have no right to engage in class-action arbitration proceedings .... ”

228 So.3d at 400.

But the question whether Hardeman and Roberts have á right to engage in class-action arbitration is itself, as the trial court held, a question for the arbitrator. As Hardeman and Roberts-point out, their contracts with the University dealerships expressly state that “any question regarding whether a particular controversy is subject to arbitration shall be decided by the arbitrator.” Compare, e.g., Max of Birmingham, Inc. v. Edwards, 973 So.2d 1050, 1054 (Ala. 2007); Polaris Sales, Inc. v. Heritage Imports, Inc., 879 So.2d 1129, 1133-34 (Ala. 2003).

And, contrary to the main opinion, existing precedents do not 'establish that the proper answer to the question of arbitra-bility 'necessarily turns on the lack of any verbiage in the parties’ agreements expressly authorizing the arbitration of such claims. It is certainly true that the United States Supreme Court made a couple of statements in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010), that, at first glance, might appear to indicate that arbitration of class claims requires contractual language that expressly provides for the arbitration of such claims. For example, the Court stated: '

“An implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration, however, is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. This is so because class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented, to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”

559 U.S. at 685. Later in the opinion the Court concluded: “We think that the differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties’ mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.” 559 U.S. at 687.

But, in actuality, the Stolt-Nielsen opinion is one that merely holds—and this really was nothing novel but, instead, was the application of a very basic principle— that the arbitrators could not decide to arbitrate class claims, as they attempted to do, without basing that decision on some contractual agreement by the parties to do so. In Stolt-Nielsen, the arbitration panel actually undertook to arbitrate the class claims in deference to policy concerns, not based on a contractual agreement, express or implied, for the arbitration of such claims. The panel was forced to resort to such policy concerns as the basis for its decision because—and this is the distinguishing characteristic of Stolt-Nielsen— the parties had actually stipulated to the arbitration panel that they did have any agreement between themselves on this issue. In effect, the parties actually stipulated that their arbitration agreement could not be read as either expressly or implicitly providing for arbitration of class claims.

The Stolt-Nielsen Court explained-itself as follows:

“The parties selected a panel of arbitrators and stipulated that the arbitration clause was ‘silent’ with respect to class arbitration. Counsel for Animal-Feeds explained to the arbitration panel that the term ‘silent’ did not simply mean that the clause made no express reference to class arbitration. Rather, he said, ‘[a]ll the parties agree that when a contract is silent on an issue there’s been no agreement that has been reached on that issue.’ ”
“Whether enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or construing an arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must ‘give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties.’ Volt [Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468] at 479 [ (1989) ]. In this endeavor, ‘as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control.’ Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985). This is because an arbitrator derives his or her powers from the parties’ agreement to forgo the legal process and submit their disputes to private dispute resolution. See AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648-649 (1986) (‘[A]rbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration’)....
“From these principles, it follows that a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so. In this case, however, the arbitration panel imposed class arbitration .even though the parties concurred that they had reached ‘no agreement’ on that issue .... The panel’s conclusion is fundamentally at war with the foundational FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of consent.”

559 U.S. at 668-69, 682-84 (some emphasis added).

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted in Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011):

“The [Supreme] Court’s interpretation of the parties’ ‘silence’ is key. Our dissenting colleague states that he believes the ‘silence’ in Stolt-Nielsen was interpreted as ‘simply reflect[ing] the fact each party recognized the arbitration clause neither specifically authorized nor specifically prohibited class arbitration.’ Dissenting Op. at 128 (citing Brief for Respondent at 26, Stolt-Nielsen ...). The dissent, however, fails to acknowledge that although' that is the interpretation that the Respondent in Stolt-Nielsen wishe’d the Court to adopt, that is not the interpretation that the Court did adopt. To the contrary, the Court interpreted the stipulated silence to mean that ‘the parties agreed their agreement was “silent” in the sense that they had not reached any agreement on the issue of class arbitration.’ Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1768. See also id. at 1766 (‘The parties ... stipulated that the arbitration clause was “silent” with respect to class arbitration. Counsel for [the Respondent] explained to the arbitration panel that the term “silent”- did not simply mean that the clause made no express reference to class arbitration. Rather, he said, “[a]ll the parties agree that when a contract is silent on an issue there’s been no agreement that has been reached on the issue.” ’). The Court further noted that ‘parties were in complete agreement regarding their intent.’ Id. at 1770. That is to say, according to the majority in StollANielsen, there was no express or implicit intent to submit to class arbitration. Indeed, the dissent in Stolt-Nielsen pointed out that the majority’s interpretation of ‘silence’ was incongruous with the Respondent’s interpretation. Id. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) .... ”

646 F.3d at 120 (some emphasis added).

In other words, the facts before the Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen involved a unique situation in which the parties had stipulated that they there was no agreement between them—express or implied— regarding the arbitrability of class claims. Because of this, the Jock court concluded in the case before it that “[t]he plaintiffs’ concession that there was no explicit agreement to permit class arbitration ... is not the same thing as stipulating that the parties had reached no agreement on the issue.” 646 F.3d at 123 (emphasis added).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Reed v. Florida Metropolitan University, Inc., 681 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2012), reached the opposite conclusion about what Stolt-Nielsen meant. The Fifth Circuit surmised that an agreement stating that “any dispute” could be arbitrated could not be interpreted as implicitly permitting arbitration of class claims because the agreement, did , not expressly discuss such claims. The Fifth Circuit concluded: “At most, the agreement in this case could support a finding that the parties did not preclude class arbitration, but under Stolt-Nielsen this is not. enough.” Id. at 644.

After Jock and Reed were decided, the Supreme Court decided Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 186 L.Ed.2d 113 (2013). Sutter involved a putative class action in state court by physicians who alleged that Oxford had failed to make “full and prompt” payment in violation of their agreements and state laws. Oxford moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in the agreements, and the state court granted the motion. The arbitrator allowed the arbitration to proceed on a class basis, on the ground that the agreement permitted in arbitration everything that it prohibited from being brought in court. In the arbitrator’s view, because class action “is plainly one of the possible forms of civil action that could be brought in a court,” but had been prohibited by the agreement from being brought in court, it must be permitted in arbitration. 569 U.S. 567, 133 S.Ct. at 2067. While the arbitration proceeded, the United -States Supreme Court issued its- ruling in Stolt-Nielsen, and Oxford asked the arbitrator to reconsider his class-arbitration decision. The arbitrator issued a new opinion holding that Stolt-Nielsen had no effect because, unlike the parties in Stolt-Nielsen, the parties before him disputed the meaning of their contract, and, in his view the agreement authorized class arbitration. On appeal, the district court declined to vacate the arbitrator’s decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed it.

The United States ' Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the split among the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits on the issue whether an arbitrator who has'allowed class arbitration ’ in circumstances in which the agreement is silent on the matter “exceeded [his] powers” under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA. In unanimously affirming the judgment of the Third Circuit, the Supreme Cpurt.ruled that, under § 10(a)(4), the “sole question” for a reviewing court is whether the decision as to arbitrability is based in the parties’ contract: the “sole question” “is not whether the arbitrator construed the parties’ contract correctly, but whether he construed it at all.” 569 U.S. 573, 133 S.Ct. at 2071. The Court specifically emphasized that

“[w]e overturned the arbitral decision [in Stolte-Nielsen] because it lacked any contractual basis for ordering class procedures, not because it lacked, in Oxford’s terminology, a ‘sufficient’ one. The parties in Stolt-Nielsen had entered into an unusual stipulation that they had never reached an agreement on class arbitration. See 559 U.S. at 668-669. In that circumstance, we noted, the panel's decision- was not—indeed, could not have been—‘based on á determination regarding thé parties’ intent,’ Id., at 673 n.4.”

669 U.S. 571, 133 S.Ct. at 2069.

. The, main opinion quotes Chambers v. Groome Transportation of Alabama, 41 F.Supp.3d 1327, 1350 (M.D. Ala. 2014), as summarizing, Alabama’s position on, the matter. And, indeed, this Court has stated: “[C]lass-wide arbitration is not permitted absent an agreement permitting disposition of claims on such a basis ....,” Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P., 854 So.2d 529, 535 n.2 (Ala. 2002) (citing Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So.2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998) (emphasis added)). This Court’s very few pronouncements- on the issue, however, do not go further than do the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court and, in particular, do not hold that an-intent by the parties to provide for the disposition of class claims through arbitration may be found only in express contractual language to-that-effect and may not be implied fi’om more general contractual language providing for the arbitration of disputes.

In accordance with the foregoing, I am compelled to conclude that the trial court did not err in consigning to the arbitrator the question' of' arbitrability presented here or in designating an arbitrator other than the BBB in this regard.

      . On September 1, 2016, this Court entered an order staying all court and arbitration proceedings involving this case pending further order of the Court.

      . Hardeman and Roberts have not explicitly argued that the arbitration agreements they executed are unconscionable or otherwise invalid either because they do not specifically provide for class-action arbitration or because the chosen forum does not conduct class-action arbitration. Both federal and state 'caselaw is clear, however, that such arguments have no merit. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010) (''[A] party may not be compelled under the [Federal Arbitration Act] to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”), and Med Center Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So.2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998) ("Although the plaintiffs' contentions are practically appealing, after reviewing the authorities we conclude that to require class-wide arbitration would alter the agreements of the parties, whose arbitration agreements do not provide for class-wide arbitration.”).

      . See Stuart Boyarsky', Silence Is Golden: How Oxford Health Affects Class Arbitration; 20 westlawjoumalclassaction 1 (August 23, 2013), for a succinct summary of federal case history on this issue.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Janice M. STEPPES v. BRUNO’S SUPERMARKETS, INC., d/b/a Food World, Inc.
    2080365
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/28/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    James C. WILLIAMS and Crest Investments, LLC v. BRYANT BANK
    2140156
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Randy Dwayne FROST v. Tamela Lea FROST
    2140432
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ronald A. ARAMINI v. Irene Ann ARAMINI
    2140547
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/08/2016
   Affirmed (reh. granted 07/15/2016; no-opinion order withdrawn; see opinion at 220 So. 3d 322).


text:
    Fletcher Doyle TURNER v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC.
    2140564
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    ELLIOTT BUILDERS, INC., et al. v. TIMBERCREEK PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION et al.
    2140593
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/08/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Jimmy Dale JONES v. Glenda Sue JONES
    2140673
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    K.H. v. K.N.
    2140724
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Tina Morris MILLER v. John Michael MORRIS
    2140772
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016.
   Affirmed.


text:
    Darrell PIATT v. Terri PIATT
    2140785
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Haywood Jackson MIZELL v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
    2140791
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Clifton Levan SHAMBURGER v. Euvonia SHAMBURGER
    2140796
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/10/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    S.S. v. D.C. and K.C.
    2140798
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Appeal—Affirmed.

Cross-appeal—Affirmed.


text:
    S.S. v. D.C. and K.C.
    2140799
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Appeal—Affirmed.

Cross-appeal—Affirmed.


text:
    S.S. v. D.C. and K.C.
    2140806
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    April Danyale CAMERON-MORIN (Miller) v. Spencer William CAMERON-MORIN
    2140842
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Reh, denied.


text:
    Jesse Edward ALBRIGHT, Jr. v. Bette Ann ALBRIGHT
    2140844
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/08/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Don CARTEE, Rebecca Cartee, and Alan Cartee v. MSPC, INC., and Mike Madden
    2140868
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/08/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Michael Shane NIX v. Lindsay Darlene NIX
    2140894
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Kathy K. TORBERT v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
    2140900
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/08/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Vickie SCONYERS v. William C. OWENS and Margaret D. Owens
    2140909
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Angela Charlene CALDWELL v. Clyde Randall CALDWELL, Jr.
    2140928
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/22/2016
    Reh. denied 06/17/2016
   Appeal—Affirmed.

Cross-appeal—Affirmed.


text:
    Alex SIMPSON, Jr. v. Amanda Simpson FOWLER et al.
    2140938
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Melissa P. PARKER v. Douglas R. PARKER III
    2140949
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Derek LANKFORD v. Dolly B. LANKFORD
    2140961
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Deborah Carol BROWN v. Philip Dale BROWN
    2140968
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Timothy Wayne GANN v. Tracey GANN
    2140969
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/06/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tina M. HILL and Billy J. Hill v. Kameron Danielle COOPER
    2140977
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/08/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Deanna RHYNE v. William RHYNE, Jr.
    2140978
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kelly Elizabeth THOMPSON v. Jeffery Morris THOMPSON
    2140979
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Reh, denied.


text:
    Gordon MCWHORTER v. Vicky PARSONS
    2140982
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/31/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Wilson FALLIN, Jr. v. Dovie BELL et al.
    2140985
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
    Reh. denied. 05/27/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Andrew J. FOLK v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
    2140994
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/22/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Bruce Bunyan THOMPSON v. Marina Lynn THOMPSON
    2141007
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/27/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Monica GARCIA v. Gerald L. HICKS
    2141019
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Doyle Jerome CLARK v. June Marie CLARK
    2141020
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    AES MECHANICAL SERVICES GROUP, INC. v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO. and Elkins Constructors, Inc.
    2141023
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Franklin David STEWART v. Laurel Brooke STEWART
    2141026
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert EATMON v. Jeffery Don CAMP
    2141028
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/31/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    CITY OF MOBILE v. John COLLINS, Jr., and Mobile County Personnel Board
    2141030
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Denise D. VANARIA v. Philip F. VANARIA
    2141050
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.Y.M. v. HENRY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2141053
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    John W. JACKSON and Quintella Jackson v. CITY OF EVERGREEN
    2141059
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
    Reh. denied. 05/13/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Charles Eugene RUTLEDGE and Sharon Lee Rutledge v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC.
    2141062
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/10/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    A.S.M. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2141070
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    James LARRY v. Dewayne ESTES
    2150001
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
    Reh. denied. 05/27/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michelle Lynn COBBLE v. Tracy Dewayne THORNTON
    2150006
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/22/2016
    Reh. denied. 06/03/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.S. v. B.B. and D.B.
    2150008
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/27/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.W. v. D.B.
    2150015
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/17/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    S.S. v. T.Y. and D.Y.
    2150025
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Luanne W. WOOLEN v. Johnny Nelson WOOLEN
    2150027
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Matthew E. HOLLOWAY v. Judith Waters HOLLOWAY
    2150034
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/02/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Sherri Senn WIGGINS v. Ronnie D. WIGGINS
    2150035
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rebecca Wilson SOTO v. Rodney D. SOTO
    2150037
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Appeal—Affirmed.

Cross-appeal—Affirmed.


text:
    Kristy KIRKLAND v. In re: A.D.P.P.
    2150039
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/10/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    S.S. v. J.L.H.
    2150041
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Katherine SULLIVAN v. Eddie WARD and Eileen Ward
    2150045
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Eddie WARD and Eileen Ward v. Andrea PARSONS, Robert Williams, and Theresa Langenbach
    2150046
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Shanon Leigh LEE v. Jeffery Paxton BAGGETT
    2150049
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    R.W.R. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150060
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    R.W.R. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150061
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tarmeka COLE v. SOUTHERN GENTLEMEN’S LOUNGE, LLC
    2150064
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/10/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.M. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150071
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Katherine Marie DAVENPORT v. Andrew Atkins DAVENPORT
    2150072
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
    Reh. denied. 06/17/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Carla LONGMIRE v. CITY OF MOBILE
    2150075
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/22/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ander Lee TYSON and Melody Lee Tyson v. Slater JENKINS et al.
    2150077
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Ander Lee TYSON and Melody Lee Tyson v. Slater JENKINS et al.
    2150078
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Larico LEE v. SOTERIA U.S. PROPERTY, INC.
    2150079
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/10/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    L.G. v. ETOWAH COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150087
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.W. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150089
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.D. v. ETOWAH COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150090
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.J.C. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150091
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.D.C. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150092
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Levy Morris LAWSON v. Linda Ann CHARLESTON
    2150095
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    IT ALL LLC, It All Leasing LLC, Roller Knights LLC, and Jim Wilhelm v. Austin HINDS, Randall Ferguson, Jacqueline Hinds, and Ferguson Properties, LLC
    2150096
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/09/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    M.D. v. HOUSTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150099
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.D. v. HOUSTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150100
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.D. v. HOUSTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150101
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    MULKEY CONSTRUCTION CO. v. RENT, LLC, et al.
    2150111
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/27/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Arlene DURHAM v. J. Michael KORNOSKY
    2150114
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.R.F. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150119
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jennifer KAMERER v. Elizabeth HILYER d/b/a Barnes & Hilyer Attorneys at Law
    2150122
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.H. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150123
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rodney Norris RIVES, Jr. v. Karen Michelle Falls RIVES
    2150125
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/10/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.T.B. v. A.N.B.
    2150128
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.R. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150132
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.R. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150133
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rebecca S. CAIN v. W. Jay SUGGS, M.D.
    2150135
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/22/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Margaret Ann HARRISON v. Boyde Jerome HARRISON
    2150138
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/28/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Danny R. TIDMORE v. CITIZENS BANK & TRUST, INC.
    2150139
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/30/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Robert W. LONG v. Claudia PROSSER
    2150140
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/10/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Derrick A. MOTT v. Renee P. MARTIN
    2150141
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/28/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    CITY OF HUNTSVILLE v. Donda RAYSOR
    2150142
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    David SENDOWSKI v. Kelly HOVATER
    2150143
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/08/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    T.C. v. HOUSTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150154
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    T.C. v. HOUSTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150155
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    T.C. v. HOUSTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150156
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/01/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Christopher W. ARIVETT v. Danielle R. FREEMAN
    2150159
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/10/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    George H. HUGHES and Lorie L. Hughes v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC
    2150162
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/03/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.L. v. MORGAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150167
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/30/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    J.A.P. v. MARSHALL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150169
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.A.P. v. MARSHALL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150170
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    P.R. v. HENRY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150171
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/06/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    P.R. v. HENRY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150172
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/06/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    P.R. v. HENRY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150173
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/06/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    T.N. v. HENRY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150174
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/06/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    T.N. v. HENRY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150175
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/06/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    T.N. v. HENRY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150176
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/06/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gregory A. WILLIAMS v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
    2150177
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/27/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Britteany TURNER v. Justin TURNER
    2150178
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.M. v. C.K.M.
    2150184
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/03/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Erick K. PRATT, guardian ad litem for D.C.M., B.P., and A.M., minors v. D.M. and J.P
    2150186
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/10/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kimberly P. LITTLE v. Fredrick E. LITTLE
    2150191
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    MORGAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES v. D.M. and J.P
    2150200
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/10/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.S. v. ETOWAH COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150204
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.S. v. ETOWAH COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150205
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.S. v. ETOWAH COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150206
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/13/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    ALABAMA BOARD OF LICENSURE FOR PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS AND LAND SURVEYORS v. OMNI FIRE AND SAFETY, LLC, d/b/a Holt Fire and Safety
    2150207
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/03/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jessica Christine MULVEHILL, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Herman Tavis Mulvehill, Jr., and Jane Mulvehill v. Barbara JONES
    2150208
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/15/2016
    Reh. denied. 05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Alethia Nicole HALE v. Robert Britt HALE
    2150223
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/27/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Howard ROSS v. Kaiser LESLIE
    2150228
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
    Reh. denied. 06/17/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Willilam Gregory WHITSON v. AUTOMATION PERSONNEL SERVICES, INC.
    2150234
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/06/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    S.S. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150246
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/20/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.G. v. BALDWIN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150247
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/27/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.S. v. BALDWIN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150248
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/27/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Nolanda Hatcher BEARDEN v. M. Wayne WHEELER
    2150249
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael A. NATION v. WALKER COUNTY CHIEF JAILER
    2150261
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/12/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Kenneth SCROGGIN, Jr. v. Catherine SCROGGIN
    2150272
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/05/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Monikah ANDREWS (Hosanna) v. Eric Ladon Taylor HOSANNA
    2150275
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/26/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Loyd RINER v. Calva Jane RINER
    2150276
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    C.E. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150294
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.E. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150295
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    E.S. v. P.M.
    2150303
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/06/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    IMPERIAL ALUMINUM-SCOTTSBORO, LLC v. Tyler D. TAYLOR
    2150306
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Carrel E. COMETTI, Jr. v. BALDWIN COUNTY COMMISSION et al.
    2150313
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/23/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    A.D. v. N.R.
    2150343
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.D.W. v. PIKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150360
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/28/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Tommy RIVES v. PATTILLO BALANCE AND HEARING CENTER
    2150362
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/12/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Timothy B. DAVIS v. Dianne James DAVIS
    2150371
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/02/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Bobby D. TOWNSON v. Regina McDaniel PETTIS
    2150372
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/14/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Bobby D. TOWNSON v. Regina McDaniel PETTIS
    2150373
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/14/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    H.T. v. W.G. and R.G.
    2150375
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.D. v. T.J. and S.J.
    2150377
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/24/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Dianca MCDANIEL v. FLYING J TRAVEL PLAZA et al.
    2150383
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/24/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Steve R. HOWARD v. Terri R. HOWARD
    2150402
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/08/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    HONDA MANUFACTURING OF ALABAMA, LLC v. Vanessa SHELL
    2150405
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/10/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    CITY OF MONTGOMERY v. Jonathon Charles ATKINS
    2150407
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/03/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Brian GAUTHIER v. STATE
    2150409
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/12/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    C.H. v. C.P.
    2150412
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/06/2016
   Transferred to Dallas Cir. Ct. for trial de novo pursuant to Rule 28(D), Ala. R.Juv.P.


text:
    Joe Clark OSBURN, Sr. v. Alma Griffin OSBURN
    2150424
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/16/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Rusty A. NAIL v. FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP.
    2150427
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/23/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Thomas R. MCADAMS v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA
    2150431
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/12/2016
   Dismissed


text:
    John BOMAN v. CITY OF GADSDEN
    2150438
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/22/2016
   Transferred to the Sup. Ct.


text:
    ALABAMA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION v. Randal HILSMAN
    2150440
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/12/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    C.R.C. v. LAMAR COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150445
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/15/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    S.A.H. v. J.H.M. and J.M.
    2150446
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/17/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    D.E. and T.G. v. RUSSELL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150448
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/21/2016
   Dismissed as to T.G.


text:
    EX PARTE T.L.B. (In re: B.B. and B.B.)
    2150450
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/28/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Terry S. TINSLEY (In re: Terry S. Tinsley v. Karen Elizabeth Tinsley)
    2150464
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/14/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE J.D. (In re: J.D. v. In re: M.B., a minor)
    2150468
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/14/2016
   Mand. pet, denied.


text:
    Jack GRIESER v. ADVANCED DISPOSAL SERVICES ALABAMA, LLC
    2150482
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/07/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    L.M.P. v. J.G.R.
    2150484
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/25/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Jessi BRYAN v. Travis BLANKENSHIP
    2150497
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/07/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    D.K.C. v. V.F.S.
    2150505
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/04/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE B.A. LITTLE (In re: Erica Gaston v. B.A. Little)
    2150509
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/06/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    LEE CO. v. Dera Lee HOLLAND
    2150513
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/28/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    John Dale LARGE III v. Heather Lee LARGE
    2150518
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/19/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Shannon QUALLS v. STATE
    2150522
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/09/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Marshall L. SPATES v. ALFA MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. et al.
    2150523
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/20/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    C.B.G. v. TALLAPOOSA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150524
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/27/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Kristin SCALES v. GUARDIAN CREDIT UNION
    2150537
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/04/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    M.M. v. S.A.S. and A.W.
    2150543
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/19/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Mack Carlos GLENN v. Chief Eric BAILEY
    2150549
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/20/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Beverly Jo JONES (In re: Beverly Jo Jones v. Hon. Ben H. Brooks, Circuit Judge)
    2150550
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/06/2016
    Reh. denied. 05/04/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    Willie Frank JONES v. CITY OF TROY et al.
    2150560
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/15/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE STOR’N LOK, INC. (In re: Stor’n Lok, Inc. v. SunSouth Bank)
    2150565
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/12/2016
   Transferred to Sup. Ct. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.


text:
    Matthew TSE v. John L. DENNEY III
    2150569
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/01/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Antonio JONES v. ADVANCED EMS, INC.
    2150572
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Dwain DENNISTON, Jr., et al. v. HUEY LAW FIRM, LLC
    2150573
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/09/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    N.H. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150587
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/20/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    D.M.M. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150590
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/27/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE A.O. (In re: A.O. v. State)
    2150594
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/21/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    MODHU PUR INC., c/o Mohammed S. Islam v. Nancy GILL
    2150595
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/22/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    J.C. v. In re: J.C., a minor child
    2150599
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/16/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Richard Joseph WILLOUGHBY v. Jennifer Erin WILLOUGHBY
    2150601
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/16/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Truman BILLINGSLEY, Jr. v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION
    2150604
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/17/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    John C. STALLWORTH, Sr. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES et al.
    2150609
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/12/2016
    Reh. denied. 06/21/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Hubert Wayne CUMBIE (In re: Laura Angela Cumbie v. Hubert Wayne Cumbie)
    2150612
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/28/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Woodburck NOE (In re: Woodburck Noe v. State)
    2150614
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/03/2016
    Reh. denied. 06/07/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Johnny Ray COX (In re: Johnny Ray Cox v. Circuit Judge Robert M. Baker)
    2150616
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    04/29/2016
   Transferred to Ct. of Crim. App. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.


text:
    David G. PRICE v. John W. PRICE
    2150617
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/12/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Kristian MCKEE (In re: Kristian McKee v. Samuel Coleman)
    2150619
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/26/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Woodburck NOE (In re: Woodburck Noe v. State)
    2150628
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/03/2016
    Reh. denied. 06/07/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    Andy YOUNG v. Karen HOLLINGSHEAD
    2150638
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/30/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    L.E.J. v. M.A.S., JR.
    2150661
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/10/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Wanda Harris VAUGHN v. DISCOVER BANK c/o Nathan & Nathan
    2150662
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/25/2016
   Transferred to Colbert Cir. Ct.


text:
    EX PARTE Renarda N. HARRIS (In re: Alec P. Armstrong v. Renarda Nichole Harris)
    2150665
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    05/27/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    T.J.F. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150670
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/16/2016
   Transferred to Madison Cir. Ct. for trial de novo pursuant to Rule 28 (D), Ala. R.Juv.P.


text:
    Patrick Slade BOOTHE v. Amy Angel BOOTHE
    2150673
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/28/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Quinton A. DIAL (In re: Quinton A. Dial v. Jasmine C. Dial)
    2150703
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/29/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE T.G. (In re: B.T.L.)
    2150723
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/27/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Jessica Jean PUGH-LOWERY (In re: Michael Edward Pugh v. Jessica Jean Lowery)
    2150731
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/09/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE R.B. and J.R. (In re: R.B. and J.R. v. In re: K.N.B., minor child)
    2150744
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/14/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE TTR CONSTRUCTION, LLC, et al. (In re: TTR Construction, LLC, et al. v. Judge Bentley H. Patrick and the Circuit Court of Jefferson County)
    2150747
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/14/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Joe Ranger PICKETT (In re: Joe Ranger Pickett v. Hon. Ben H. Brooks, Circuit Judge, Jo Jo Schwarzauer, Circuit Clerk, E.L.S., Assistant Clerk, and Wanda Lightner, Warden)
    2150755
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/15/2016
   Transferred to Ct. of Crim. App, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.


text:
    EX PARTE Richard Lavant ARRINGTON (In re: Richard Lavant Arrington v. Eugene W. Reese, Circuit Judge, and J. David Jordan, Circuit Judge)
    2150756
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/15/2016
   Transferred to Sup. Ct. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.


text:
    EX PARTE David Lamar JOHNSON (In re: David Lamar Johnson v. Jefferson S. Dunn et al.)
    2150758
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/29/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    T.G. v. JACKSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150761
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/22/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Tara Jean JOHNSON v. Betty Jean JOHNSON
    2150782
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    06/30/2016


author: PER CURIAM. PITTMAN, Judge,

text:
    EX PARTE M.F.B. (In re: Matter of E.B. and Matter of G.B.)
    2160136
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    January 13, 2017
    J. Edward Lowe, Oneonta, for petitioner M.F.B.
   PER CURIAM.

M.F.B. (“the mother”), who is the mother of E.B. and G.B. (“the children”), seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus directed to the Blount Juvenile Court mandating that that court vacate several orders entered on October 21, 2016, in ongoing cases concerning the custodial disposition of the children following the entry of the juvenile court’s September 2015 judgment finding the children to be dependent and awarding physical custody of the children to A,G. (“the custodian”), a friend of the mother’s family, subject to “reasonable” supervised visitation by the mother.

The factual averments in and the attachments to the mother’s petition indicate the following pertinent facts. In February 2016, the mother and the custodian entered into an agreement, which was ratified by the juvenile1 court, to the effect that the mother would be entitled to supervised visitation with the children for a minimum of two hours per week and that “the parties shall remain calm and shall have no discord in the presence of the ..'. children].” After a hearing on September 1. 2016, the custodian and the mother entered into an agreement to expand the mother’s visitation up to four hours per week in advance of the next hearing date scheduled in the matter on October 27, 2016. However, in response to a motion filed by the custodian on October 18, 2016, seeking a continuance of that hearing and immediate suspension of the mother’s visitation, the juvenile court, without having held a hearing at which the mother’s position could have been heard, entered several interlocutory orders on October 21, 2016, that, taken together, added the Blount County Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) as a party, required DHR or its designee to supervise all visitation between the mother and the children, limited the mother’s supervised visitation to two hours per week, and set a new review date for February 23, 2017. The mother filed in each case a “motion to set aside” .the October 21 orders, asserting, among other things, that the juvenile court’s orders had been entered in violation of her due-process rights to notice and a hearing. The juvenile court did not act on the two “motion[s] to set aside,” and the mother filed her mandamus petition in this court on November 23, 2016, 33 days after the entry of the juvenile-court orders she challenges.

“Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., provides that a petition for an extraordinary writ directed to an appellate court, such as this court, ‘shall be filed within a reasonable time’ and that the presumptively reasonable time for filing a petition seeking review of a trial court’s order ‘shall be the same as the time for taking an appeal.’ In juvenile actions, an appeal must be taken within 14 days of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Rule 4(a)(1)(E), Ala. R. App. P.; Rule 28(C), Ala. R. Juv. P. [A party’s] motion to set aside the juvenile court’s order does not affect the timeliness analysis because, ‘unlike a postjudgment motion following a final judgment, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order does not toll the presumptively reasonable time period that a party has to petition an appellate court for a writ of mandamus.’ Ex parte Onyx Waste Servs. of Florida, 979 So.2d 833, 834 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). (citing Ex parte Troutman Sanders, LLP, 866 So.2d 547, 549-50 (Ala. 2003)).”

Ex parte C.J.A., 12 So.3d 1214, 1215-16 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009). In this case, the mother has not submitted a statement .of good cause for this court’s, consideration of her mandamus petition, notwithstanding its having been filed after the expiration of the presumptively reasonable time. See Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.

That said, however, this, court has interpreted a recent decision, Ex parte K.R., 210 So.3d 1106 (Ala. 2016), in which our supreme court addressed on mandamus review the merits of a challenge to the lawfulness of a particular probate-court judge’s temporary appointment by a clerk of that'court, as having held that “in situations in which a petition for the writ of mandamus challenges' the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court in which the challenged interlocutory order was rendered, the petition need not timely invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court.” Ex parte J.B., 223 So.3d 251, 254 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). Application of Ex parte J.B. to the circumstances of this case, in which the mother’s contentions regarding lack of notice and a hearing in -connection with a court’s ex parte limitation of her visitation rights implicate due-process guarantees, see Ex parte C.T., 154 So.3d 149, 152-53 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014), and do in fact go to the power of the juvenile court to enter the October 21, 2016, orders, warrants consideration of the merits, notwithstanding the mother’s noncompliance with Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P. See M.G.D. v. L.B., 164 So.3d 606, 608, 611-12 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (holding void, as violative of procedural due-process principles, juvenile court’s order restricting removal of minor children from Alabama without permission because order was issued without notice and opportunity to be heard).

On the merits of the mother’s contentions, we conclude that the writ is due to be issued to compel the vacation of the October 21, 2016, orders. Our decision in Ex parte C.T. stands for the proposition that a party having visitation rights as to a particular child or particular children has an accompanying procedural due-process right to notice of a proceeding to deprive that party of visitation rights and either a right to a predeprivation hearing or to a postdeprivation hearing “ ‘as expeditiously as-possible.’ ” 154 So.3d at 153 (quoting Ex parte Couey, 110 So.3d 378, 381 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012)) (emphasis omitted). Here, for all that appears in the mother’s petition and the attachments thereto, the mother has received neither notice nor a timely hearing as to the curtailment of her visitation rights as sought by the custodian and as ordered by the juvenile court. Thus, we grant the mother’s petition and direct the juvenile court to vacate its orders of October 21, 2016, without prejudice to the authority of the juvenile court to entertain subsequent motions by the custodian seeking limitation or suspension of the mother’s yisitation rights as to the children and, after notice and a- hearing have been afforded, to determine the merits of such motions based'upon the evidence adduced at a hearing thereon,

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

■Thompson, P.J., and Moore, J., concur.

Pittman, J., concurs specially, which Thomas and Donaldson, JJ,, join.

PITTMAN, Judge,

concurring specially.

I concur in the main opinion. However, I write specially to note that it will ultimately be a matter for our supreme court finally to determine whether this court’s interpretation in Ex parte J.B., 223 So.3d 251, 254-55 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016), of the breadth of that court’s holding in Ex parte K.R., 210 So.3d 1106 (Ala. 2016), is or is not correct. In my view, there is, at the least, some room for doubt that our supreme court, which has the power to adopt amendments to Rule 21, Ala. R. App. P., pertaining to the timeliness of extraordinary-writ petitions, intended a broad holding that Alabama’s appellate courts must consider all jurisdictional arguments made in untimely petitions filed under Rule 21. See K.R., 210 So.3d at 1112 (“[W]e may consider KR.’s argument because it concerns the probate, court’s jurisdiction. .,. [W]e will consider her argument ... because it concerns the jurisdiction of the probate court..-..” (emphasis added)).

Thomas and Donaldson, JJ., concur.

      . Neither the respondent juvenile-court judge nor any respondent constituting a real party in interest in the cases involving the status of the children filed any response to the mother’s petition, and the failure by any respondent to respond to a petition for an extraordinary writ compels an appellate court to consider the averments of fact in that petition as true. See Ex parte Turner, 840 So.2d 132, 134-35 (Ala. 2002).

      . That motion alleged that the mother had, among other things, subjected the children to physical and verbal abuse and had also subjected the custodian to verbal abuse and threats.

      . Because the juvenile court’s orders of October 21, 2016, were interlocutory, the mother’s motions seeking reconsideration of those orders did not constitute postjudgment motions within the scope of the automatic-denial rule set forth in Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., as made applicable to the juvenile courts pursuant to Rule 1, Ala. R. Juv. P. See Wessex House of Jacksonville, Inc. v. Kelley, 908 So.2d 226, 228-29 (Ala. 2005).


author: MOORE, Judge.

text:
    ATHEER WIRELESS, LLC v. STATE Department of Revenue
    2150645
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Jan. 20, 2017

      Dwight W. Pridgen,. Montgomery, for appellant.
    Jason C. Paulk and Mary Martin Majors ' Mitchell, Legal Division, Alabama Department of Revenue, for appellee.
   On Application for Rehearing

MOORE, Judge.

This court’s opinion issued on Noyember 10, 2016, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.

Atheer Wireless, LLC (“Atheer”), appeals from a judgment entered -by the Montgomery Circuit Court granting a motion for a summary judgment filed by the State Department of Revenue (“.the Department’^ and denying Atheer’s motion- to amend the complaint. We affirm , the summary judgment and dismiss the appeal insofar as it relates to the motion to amend the complaint.

Procedural History

On August 21, 2013, the Department sent Atheer a final assessment of sales tax, notifying Atheer that it owed $60,028.68 in taxes, plus $4,391.11 in interest, for the prepaid wireless services it had sold during the period occurring from September 1, 2009, through August 31, 2012. At the time of the notice and during the period of the assessment, Ala. Code 1975, § 40-23-1(a)(13), provided:

“Prepaid Telephone Calling Card. A sale of a prepaid telephone calling card or a prepaid authorization number, or both, shall be deemed the sale of tangible personal property subject to the tax imposed on the sale of tangible personal property pursuant to this chapter.”

On August 26, 2013, Atheer filed with the Department’s Administrative Law Division its notice of appeal from the final assessment, arguing that prepaid wireless services were not subject to sales tax under § 40-23-1(a)(13), and that appeal was ultimately heard by the recently created Alabama Tax Tribunal, see Ala. Code 1975, § 40-2B-2(a) (creating the tax tribunal to “to resolve disputes between the Department ... and taxpayers”). On September 30, 2013, the Department filed an answer to the appeal.

On October 3, 2013, the appeal was held in abeyance pending a decision in a case that involved a similar issue, Beauty & More, Inc. v. State of Alabama, Docket No. S. 12-236, Montgomery Circuit Court Case No. CV-13-901682. On August 27, 2014, the Department filed an amended answer and a motion to set the case for a hearing. The Department asserted that the legislature had passed Act No. 2014-336, Ala. Acts 2014 (“the 2014 Act”), effective July 1, 2014, amending § 40-23-1(a)(13) by clarifying that sales of prepaid wireless services are subject to sales tax. Specifically, § 40-23-1(a)(13) was amended to provide:

“Prepaid Telephone Calling Card. A sale of a prepaid telephone calling card or a prepaid authorization number, or both, shall be deemed the sale of tangible personal property subject to the tax imposed on the sale of tangible personal property pursuant to this chapter. For purposes of this subdivision, the sale of prepaid wireless service that is evidenced by a physical card constitutes the sale of a prepaid telephone calling card, and the sale of prepaid wireless service that is not evidenced by a physical card constitutes the sale- of a prepaid authorization number.” -

Additionally, pursuant to the 2014 Act, Ala. Code 1975, 40—23—1(a)(14), was added; that subsection provides:

“Prepaid Wireless Service. The right to use mobile telecommunications service, which must be paid for in advance and that is sold in predetermined units or dollars of which the number declines with use in a known amount, and which may include rights to use non-telecommunications services or to download digital products or digital content. For 'purposes of this subdivision, mobile telecommunications service has the meaning ascribed by Section 40-21-120[, Ala. Code 1975].”

In response to the Department’s amended answer and motipn to set the matter for. a hearing, Atheer asserted that the 2014 Act was unconstitutional.

After a hearing, the tax tribunal entered an order on June 5, 2015, finding that “[the] Department [had] correctly assessed [Atheer] pursuant to § 40-23-1(a)(13), as amended by [the 2014 Act].” The tax tribunal also noted that it was without jurisdiction to consider Atheer’s constitutional challenges and that those challenges could be made in an appeal to the circuit court.

On June 26, 2015, Atheer filed in the circuit court an appeal from the tax tribunal’s order, alleging that the Department had “improperly and erroneously assessed sales taxes in-excess of $60,000 against Atheer for the period of September 2009 through August 2012 ,.. based on Atheer’s gross proceeds from the sale of prepaid wireless cellular services during the period in issue.” Atheer specifically argued that the 2014 Act was unconstitutional.

On August 26, 2015, Atheer moved for a summary judgment. On October 23, 2015, the Department filed á motion for a summary judgment. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the competing motions on October 27, 2015. By an order entered on November 17, 2015, the circuit court denied Atheer’s motion but did not rule on the Department’s motion. On February 29, 2016, the Department filed a second motion for a summary judgment, along with a brief and evidentiary materials in support thereof. Oh March 9, 2016, Atheer -responded to the Department’s second summary-judgment motion. In support of its response, Atheer submitted the affidavit of Cynthia Underwood, who “served as Assistant Commissioner of Revenue during the years 2001 through 2012.” In her affidavit, Underwood attested,' among other things, that, during her tenure, “the Department had not previously construed the sales of the prepaid cellular minutes as being subject to Alabama’s sales taxes.”

On March 17, 2016, Atheer, based on the content of Underwood’s affidavit, filed a motion for leave to amend its complaint to assert a violation of the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act (“the AAPA”), § 40-22-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. On March 23, 2016, the circuit court entered a judgment granting the Department’s summary-judgment motion and denying Atheer’s motion to amend its complaint. On March 29,2016, the circuit court entered an order stating that the motion to amend the complaint was “dismissed as moot.” On April 29, 2016, Atheer filed its notice of appeal to this court.

Discussion '

L

On appeal, Atheer argues that the circuit court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of the Department. In its final order, the tax tribunal determined that the Department had property assessed the sales taxes against Atheer under the 2014 Act. Atheer raised " various constitutional challenges to the 2014 Act, but the tax tribunal determined that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on those issues. In its appeal to the circuit court, Atheer asserted that the 2014 Act is unconstitutional based on six different grounds. The Department initially moved for a summary judgment, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because Atheer had failed to serve the attorney general with notice of the appeal challenging the constitutionality of the 2014 Act, as required by Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-227. The Department further contended that the 2014 Act was not unconstitutional as alleged by Atheer, an argument it reiterated more thoroughly in its second motion for a summary judgment. The circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Department without specifying its reasons.

On original submission, this court concluded that because Atheer had failed to discuss the Department’s contention that Atheer had failed to comply with § 6-6-227, it had waived any argument as, to that ground and, therefore, that it was unnecessary for this court to address Atheer’s other arguments directed to the summary judgment. On application for rehearing, Atheer asserts that the circuit court had resolved that issue during the October 27, 2015, hearing on the Department’s first summary-judgment motion. In that hearing, counsel for Atheer stated that he had served a copy of the notice of appeal on the attorney general’s office and that “somebody in the Attorney General’s office signed for it, and I got a receipt,” which counsel displayed to the circuit court. Counsel for Atheer also cited Morgan County Department of Human Resources v. B.W.J., 723 So.2d 689 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), for the proposition that Atheer had complied with § 6-6-227 by serving the assistant' attorneys general representing the Department. The following colloquy then occurred:

“[Counsel for the Department]: And that’s fíne, Your Honor. That’s fine.
“[Counsel for Atheer]: Okay.
“[Circuit court]: All right. Let’s move on to I guess your other argument.”

Atheer maintains that the foregoing colloquy establishes that the circuit court disposed of the jurisdictional matter in its favor and that, therefore, it did not have to address the issue in its principal appellate brief. However, at the close of the hearing, the circuit court stated: “All right, guys. I’ll look at what you filed. I’ve heard your arguments. I’ll get you an order out.” (Emphasis added.) The record shows that the circuit court did not issue any order denying any aspect of the Department’s first summary-judgment motion. See Rule 58(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. (governing rendition of orders). Atheer has not provided this court with a record supporting its factual assertion that the circuit court resolved the issue regarding service on the attorney general in its- favor. See generally Teng v. Diners Club, Inc., 424 So.2d 629, 629 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982) (holding that appellate court can consider only those factual assertions supported by the record).

According to the record, - the Department’s first summary-judgment motion remained pending at the time the Department filed its second summary-judgment motion. Atheer does not argue that the Department, by filing a second summary-judgment motion, amended or withdrew its first summary-judgment motion, so that argument, is waived. See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P. Instead, Atheer, in its application for rehearing, argues that the circuit court adjudicated only the second summary-judgment motion filed by the Department. The judgment states, in pertinent part: “The Court having considered the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the [Department], the argument of the parties on March 23, 2016, and the numerous filings, it is hereby ORDERED that the said Motion is due to be and is hereby GRANTED.” .(Capitalization and bold typeface in original.) In its application for rehearing, Atheer notes that the judgment refers to only “the [m]otion” and not to “ ‘[m]otions,’ in the plural,” inferring from that language that the circuit court intended to grant only one of the summary-judgment motions filed by the Department, i.e., the second one. However, At-heer ignores that the circuit court expressly considered “the numerous filings” in the case, which would include the first summary-judgment motion filed by the Department, in entering a summary judgment in favor of the Department. Atheer has not clearly demonstrated that the circuit court based its judgment solely on the second summary-judgment motion. See Teng, supra.

When a trial court enters a summary - judgment without • specifying the bases for its ruling, the appellant must set forth an argument in its principal brief as to the invalidity of each and every ground asserted in the motion, or motions, for a summary judgment; if not, the appellant waives any argument as to the omitted ground, resulting in the automatic affirmance of the summary judgment. See Fogarty v. Southworth, 953 So.2d 1225, 1232 (Ala. 2006). In its application for rehearing, Atheer argues, for the first time, that it complied with § 6-6-227 by serving the assistant attorneys general representing the Department. See Ala. Code 1975, § 40-2-64 (providing that any legal counsel appointed by the commissioner of revenue with the approval of the attorney general shall be “commissioned as an Assistant Attorney General”), and Bowdoin v. State, 884 So.2d 865, 867 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (holding that notice of constitutional challenge to commissioned assistant attorney general satisfies § 6-6-227). However, this court cannot consider an argument raised for the first time in an application for rehearing. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Selma v. Randolph, 833 So.2d 604, 608 (Ala. 2002). Thus, we do not decide whether the Department was entitled to a summary jhdgmeht on this ground. We hold only that Atheer waived the issue by failing to assert it in its original brief, resulting in an automatic affirmance of the summary judgment.

IL

On March 17, 2016, Atheer moved the circuit court to grant it leave to amend its complaint to add a claim asserting that, before the' passage of the 2014 Act, the Department, without first complying with the public-notice provisions of Ala. Code 1975, §§ 41-22-4 and 41-22-5, which are part- of the AAPA, had adopted an interpretation of § 40-23-1(a)(13) treating the sale of prepaid cellular-wireless-telephone minutes like those sold by Atheer as taxable transactions. The circuit court originally denied the motion to amend the complaint without explanation, but it subsequently entered an order indicating that the motion was moot. Atheer argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to amend the complaint. Based on our affirmance of the summary judgment, we do not address this argument.

The Department requested that the circuit court find that “the 2014 Act is constitutional in all respects” and-that “Atheer’s assessment for sales tax is due to "be upheld on appeal.” The circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of the-Department, thereby concluding that ¿he Department had properly assessed the sales tax under the 2014 Act despite Atheer’s constitutional objections. See Rule 58(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. (providing that a written order or judgment suffices if it “indicates an intention to adjudicate, considering the whole record, and if it indicates the substance of the adjudication”). We have affirmed that judgment. Atheer cannot obtain relief by proving that the Department could not have assessed Atheer under its allegedly unlawful or unauthorized interpretation of the previous version of § 40-23-1(a)(13). The assessment would still stand under the 2014 Act.

This court will not decide an issue after a decision on this issue has become useless or moot. Arrington v. State ex rel. Parsons, 422 So.2d 759, 760 (Ala. 1982). The question whether the circuit court should have - allowed the amended complaint no longer matters. Moreover, any error the circuit court might have committed would be harmless in light of the fact that the we have affirmed the summary judgment. See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. Therefore, we dismiss that' part of the appeal relating to the motion to amend the complaint.

APPLICATION GRANTED; OPINION OF NOVEMBER 10, 2016, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED.

Thompson, P.J., and Pittman and Donaldson, JJ., concur.

Thomas, J., concurs in the result, without writing.

      . Pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 40-2B-3, "all administrative proceedings commenced prior to October 1, 2014, that ha[d] not beferr the subject of a final and irrevocable administrative action as of October 1, 2014," were transferred from the Department’s Administrative Law Division to the tax tribunal for the remainder of the proceeding, and the statutes applicable to the tax tribunal are applicable to those transferred proceedings.