text:
    JAN WATCHES, LLC, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. GSD GLOBAL, INC., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0766
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Tommy MEEKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3624
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 29, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Franchilor DEVALON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3930
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Raymond RAMIREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3942
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Durell Willis SIMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-126
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 8, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Delivrance DELIEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3373
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 5, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Daniel E. GIBBS, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3786
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 5, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Arturo VALENZUELA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4325
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 5, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gordon CRITTENDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-92
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 5, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony WELLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2090
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Samuel R. CLARKE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2458
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Demetrius ELLIOT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2772
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 5, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Marlon GRANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-0113
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 5, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Mathew CRAVEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3454
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kimberly Renee ICON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3938
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gregory AZOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4053
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brian Javon BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4097
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    JENSHAW, LLC, Appellant, v. PROPERTY ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4300
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brian HIBBS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-144
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brigitte CHARBONNEAU, Appellant, v. Lawrence CHARBONNEAU, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-191
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Alicia ETHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-328
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Curt LOCKETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3626
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.W., the father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and Guardian ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-3652
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antrawn D. PRICE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3721
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Bernard SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3796
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.A., The Mother, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3968
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dominic MADISON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-131
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brian THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-196
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kelly MOSLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-0283
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Edward P. CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-395
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Raymond GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-517
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Clay E. BOYER, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-540
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Roger TOPALIAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4115
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 19, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed


text:
    Marie DUBREUS, Appellant, v. PRIMERICA LIFE INSURANCE CO., Appellee.
    No. 4D17-715
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 19, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ricky MONTGOMERY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-594
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ingram HARPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-259
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 12, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    S.P., the mother, Appellant, v. B.J., grandparent and A.E.P., grandparent, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-3621
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 23, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    HIGHLAND BEACH CLUB CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, v. Joel TODER, Marylin Toder, and Fred Toder, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-57
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 19, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sharon HAMPTON, Appellant, v. HOLLYWOOD TOWERS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida corporation not-for-profit, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-801
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 19, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Floyd D. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-4079
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 13, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    John Edward DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3946
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 27, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Anthony LAZZARONI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2594
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 20, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Sunaina GLAIZE, Appellant, v. Samuel Greer GLAIZE, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2098
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 20, 2018 Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kelley ANDERSON, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D15-647
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 20, 2018 Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Rodney Craig MOUNTJOY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-278
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Randy Keith JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3931
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 27, 2018 Rehearing En Banc Denied April 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Newman A. CRUNK, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3432
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 27, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 4, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Gary R. RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3270
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 27, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Larry D. ODUM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3761
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    James FULTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3531
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Donna R. WENDLER, Scott G. Wendler and Wendler Properties, III, LLC, Appellants, v. CITY OF ST. AUGUSTINE, Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-504
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    James H. SCHARFSCHWERDT, Appellant, v. CITY OF ST. AUGUSTINE, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2593
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 27, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Darrell WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-637
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Laura Mae WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2796
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Thomas Steve BURKE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-585
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Mark S. AMAR, Vera Amar a/k/a Veronica Amar, Appellants, v. Clarence BODEN, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3271
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Bryant CROSLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3918
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Edmond WILSON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3533
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Gregory WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3323
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Richard K. COLLINS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2539
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    John R. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2518
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Huascar HAWKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3994
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    David C. GRUBER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3765
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Dustin LANDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3716
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Willie James JONES, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1693
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Damien A. DUFF-PORTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-740
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Deshawn R. PERKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-453
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Joseph MODESTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-327
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Douglas W. KEENE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3686
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael WILLIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2666
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Wilmar JOLTEUS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-4428
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael CABREJA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2209
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    H.M., Mother of T.H., L.M., T.M., and Z.M., Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3962
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 4, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Luis CORDERO, Appellant, v. CRESTWYND BAY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as a Nominee for Countrywide KB Home Loans, a CountryWide Mortgage Ventures, LLC, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-1973
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Charles J. RHATIGAN and Cindy Rhatigan, Appellants, v. TD BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-845
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Delsie Marie DUGAN, Appellant, v. William David DUGAN, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-367
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    C.R.F., Father of K.R.-F., a Child, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3896
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    E.L., Mother of A.L., J.L., and V.L., Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-4049
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Marquis DUFOUR, Appellant, v. CIT BANK, N.A., Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3086
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Cassandra FAUFT-JOHNSON, Appellant, v. R & M RETAIL, L.P., Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2472
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Frank FARROW, Appellant, v. CANAVERAL CUSTOM BOATS, INC. and Mark G. Smith, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-636
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Charlie L. STOKES, First Choice Citrus, Inc., National Indemnity Company of the South, Appellants, v. Stephanie M. ANTONICH, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-2394, 5D16-2817
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Debra COURSEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Rebecca Fredenhagen, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    Case No. 5D16-3712
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    T.P., Father of A.P. and T.P., Children, Appellant, v. A.D., Mother of A.P. and T.P., Children, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3771
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 29, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    William F. SHERWOOD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2797
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 20, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Brian HOBBS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1845
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 13, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


author: Roberts, Kathleen, Associate Judge.

text:
    Michael ANGUILLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3706
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 11, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mark J. Hamel, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Roberts, Kathleen, Associate Judge.

The Defendant appeals a number of convictions and sentences resulting from DUI and reckless driving charges. He argues that several combinations of the convictions violate double jeopardy principles since they are degrees of the same offenses and involve a single victim. We agree with some of his arguments, and reverse in part. We hold that where there is a single victim and the charges arise from a single episode, dual convictions for DUI with serious bodily injury and DUI with property damage, as well as dual convictions for reckless driving with serious bodily injury and reckless driving with property damage, violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

The Defendant was involved in a horrific crash that left a single victim severely injured. After an investigation the Defendant was ultimately charged in an Amended Information with: 1. DUI with serious bodily injury; 2. reckless driving with serious bodily injury; 3. DUI with property damage; 4. reckless driving with property damage; and 5. refusal to submit.

The Defendant, on the day of trial, opted to enter an open plea to the five count Information as charged. The court accepted the plea and set the case for sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the defense argued that the Defendant could not be sentenced consecutively for the DUI with serious bodily injury and reckless driving with serious bodily injury.

After hearing argument from both sides, the court agreed with the State that there was not a double jeopardy issue in a conviction and sentence for DUI with serious bodily injury and reckless driving with serious bodily injury when there is only one victim. The trial court sentenced the Defendant on the two felony driving charges to incarceration in the Department of Corrections followed by a probationary period, and sentenced the Defendant to time served on each of the relevant misdemeanors. This appeal follows the sentence.

The Defendant challenges his convictions and sentences by asserting that he cannot be convicted and sentenced of both DUI and reckless driving with serious bodily injury, DUI and reckless driving with property damage, DUI with serious bodily injury and property damage as to the same victim, and reckless driving with serious bodily injury and property damage to the same victim. For the purposes of this discussion, the issues are reconfigured to address the relationship between DUI and reckless driving and secondly the relationship between DUI and its enhancements and reckless driving and its enhancements.

1. Convictions for both DUI and reckless driving do not violate Double Jeopardy.

The Defendant asserts that convictions for DUI with serious bodily injury and reckless driving with serious bodily injury violate the principles of double jeopardy. The defense's main contention appears to be that one cannot be punished twice for one injured person. However, this argument relies solely on the serious bodily injury enhancement of the charges and not the underlying charges themselves. Simply put, the question is whether the Defendant can be convicted of both DUI and reckless driving, and the answer to that question is yes.

While recognizing that principles of double jeopardy are of the utmost concern, the courts have long recognized the desire to punish for separate offenses that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, in accord with constitutional demands. "In determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions and sentences for offenses arising from the same criminal transaction, the dispositive question is whether the legislature 'intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes.' " M.P. v. State , 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Albernaz v. United States , 450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) ). "[T]here is no constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments for different offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction as long as the Legislature intends to authorize separate punishments." Valdes v. State , 3 So.3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009). "Legislative intent to authorize separate punishments can be explicitly stated in a statute, or can be discerned through the Blockburger test of statutory construction." M.P. , 682 So.2d at 81 (citation omitted).

The Legislature has stated its intent to convict and sentence for each offense defined as separate under the Blockburger test, with three exceptions: offenses requiring identical elements of proof, offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute, and lesser offenses which have elements wholly subsumed by the greater offense. § 775.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat.

Pizzo v. State , 945 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 2006). Specifically, section 775.021, "Rules of construction," provides in relevant part:

(4)(a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.
(b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this rule of construction are:
1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof.
2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.
3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.

§ 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (2014) (codifying Blockburger ).

The Defendant specifically challenges the dual convictions for reckless driving and DUI as impermissible under the second exception, arguing they are degrees of the same offense. The Florida Supreme Court has explained that this exception for degrees of the same offense "is intended to apply narrowly" and "prohibits separate punishments only when a criminal statute provides for variations in degree of the same offense, so that the defendant would be punished for violating two or more degrees of a single offense." Valdes , 3 So.3d at 1076 (quoting State v. Paul , 934 So.2d 1167, 1177 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., concurring) ).

Utilizing this framework, separate charges for DUI and reckless driving do not violate the principles of double jeopardy. The cases relied upon by the defense to argue that degrees of the same offense may arise from different statutes are unpersuasive because they predate the Valdes case, which limits the degree variant exception to offenses arising from the same statute. See Brown v. State , 189 So.3d 837, 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Section 775.021(4) expressly states an inherent desire to punish under separate statutory schemes unless otherwise so defined. Adding the serious bodily injury enhancement to both reckless driving and the DUI charge does not change the underlying elements of the offense, but merely adds an element to enhance the penalties of the underlying charges. Reckless driving and DUI do not require identical elements of proof, they are not degrees of the same offense, nor is either a lesser offense that is subsumed within the other. Therefore, separate convictions for DUI with serious bodily injury and reckless driving with serious bodily injury, where the injury is to the same person, falls firmly within approved boundaries of double jeopardy principles and is expressly allowed within the legislative scheme.

2. Convictions for degrees of the same offense involving the same victim violate the principles of Double Jeopardy.

The second issue brought to this Court is the relationship between degrees of the same offense under the same statute and how those enhancements, that is, degrees of the same offense, are applied when there is but one victim. It is well established that multiple convictions for DUI can arise out of the same transaction or occurrence if there are injuries or damages to multiple persons. Melbourne v. State , 679 So.2d 759, 765 (Fla. 1996). In reading Melbourne in conjunction with Valdes , we hold that there can be but one conviction for each victim, regardless of whether that victim sustains property damage, serious bodily injury, or both. The Valdes case provides the framework for the analysis. As discussed above, the addition of the enhancement of "serious bodily injury" does not change the elements of the underlying offense. The charge itself puts the defendant on notice of the crime charged. The enhancement gives definition to the degree of the offense the defendant is facing for the charge. While Valdes allows for prosecution for separate offenses that involve the same victim, it also prohibits separate offenses for varying degrees of the same charge.

In the prosecution for multiple DUIs that arise out of a single transaction, in order to succeed the State must first establish the defendant is guilty of DUI and then establish a causal connection between the defendant's driving and the damage so caused by that driving:

(1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if the person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state and:
(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance 14 controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties are impaired;
(b) The person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or
(c) The person has a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
....
(3) Any person:
(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1);
(b) Who operates a vehicle; and
(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes or contributes to causing:
1. Damage to the property or person of another commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
2. Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

§ 316.193, Fla. Stat. (2014).

Similar language is found in the reckless driving statute:

(1)(a) Any person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.
....
(3) Any person:
(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1);
(b) Who operates a vehicle; and
(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes:
1. Damage to the property or person of another commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
2. Serious bodily injury to another commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. The term "serious bodily injury" means an injury to another person, which consists of a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death, serious personal disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

§ 316.192, Fla. Stat. (2014).

In looking at the statutory construction in line with section 775.021(4), to allow convictions for both the serious bodily injury and the property damage of the victim would run afoul of double jeopardy principles. The victim is the "another" for the purposes of statutory construction. She is the entity so damaged or injured, either to her person or to her property. The separation of the enhancements for serious bodily injury from personal injury or property damage delineates the degree of the offense for which the defendant can be convicted, for the causational damage inflicted upon one victim for the offense of DUI. Thus, since the offenses of DUI with serious bodily injury and DUI with property damage as they relate to one victim are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute, the convictions for both cannot stand. The same logic applies to the statutory construction of reckless driving.

It is for the foregoing reasons that we affirm the convictions for DUI with serious bodily injury and reckless driving with serious bodily injury as not violative of due process principles. Because the misdemeanor DUI with property damage and reckless driving with property damage convictions are degrees of the same offenses as the felony charges, we remand for the trial court to vacate those two misdemeanor convictions.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

Ciklin and Conner, JJ., concur.

      While the record only contains a redacted version of the Amended Information, the redacted portion is the "to wit" portion of the charge. The charge conference, the arguments, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing refer to only one victim and there is no reason to otherwise believe that another name lies beneath the redacted version.

      The defense did not raise any other double jeopardy concerns at the trial court level. The State hints at a preservation issue, but "because dual convictions in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy constitute fundamental error, 'a double jeopardy claim may be raised for the first time on appeal.' " Rimondi v. State , 89 So.3d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting DeLuise v. State , 72 So.3d 248, 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ). Further, "[a] defendant who enters a general or open plea does not waive double jeopardy claims." Demps v. State , 965 So.2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

      Many of the defense cases involve DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide. We are mindful of the fact that death is different; the "single homicide rule" may come into play. McCullough v. State , 230 So.3d 586, 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ; see also Houser v. State , 474 So.2d 1193, 1197 (Fla. 1985) ("Florida courts have repeatedly recognized that the legislature did not intend to punish a single homicide under two different statutes. ... The principle has been applied in the case of dual charges of DWI manslaughter and manslaughter." (citations omitted) ); Oakley v. State , 237 So.3d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) ("The Houser rule-'only one homicide conviction and sentence may be imposed for a single death'-instructs that Appellant's dual homicide charges ['of one count of first degree felony murder and one count of vehicular manslaughter'] for a single victim was in error.").


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Gerald SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1787
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 11, 2018]
    Gerald Smith, Mayo, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James Carney, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Gerald Smith appeals the summary denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. In his motion, Smith asserted that the trial court imposed an illegal fragmented sentence when it ordered his sentences for two burglary convictions to run concurrently, in part, and consecutively, in part. We agree that Smith's sentence is an illegal fragmented sentence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

In 2005, following a jury trial, Smith was convicted of two counts of burglary of a dwelling and one count of petit theft. He was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender to consecutive terms of fifteen years in prison for each count of burglary. For petit theft, he was sentenced to time served.

One week after Smith was sentenced, the trial court amended his burglary sentences, ordering them to run concurrently, in part, and consecutively, in part. Specifically, the court ordered the first ten years of each sentence to run concurrently, and the last five years of each sentence to run consecutively.

Imposing a sentence that is partly concurrent and partly consecutive to another sentence violates a defendant's right to "pay his debt to society in one stretch, not in bits and pieces." Segal v. Wainwright , 304 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1974) ; see also Francisco-Augustin v. State , 695 So.2d 1299, 1300 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Such a sentence is illegal under Rule 3.800(a). Stroman v. State , 837 So.2d 1070, 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

The state argues that under Gladden v. State , 556 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), Smith's sentence is not fragmented. In Gladden , the trial court ordered three twelve-year sentences to run concurrently but ordered the applicable three-year mandatory minimums to run consecutively. Id. at 1229. There, we determined that Gladden's sentence was not fragmented because the consecutive mandatory minimums would be fully served before Gladden finished serving the concurrent twelve-year sentences. Id. at 1230.

The state's reliance on Gladden is misplaced, because unlike in Gladden , the defendant's sentence here is fragmented. Smith's sentence requires him to serve the first ten years of each sentence simultaneously. Then he must serve the remaining five years of one sentence, while the remaining five years of the other sentence are put on hold to be served in the future. Because this is an illegal fragmented sentence, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

Reversed and Remanded .

Gerber, C.J., Taylor and Damoorgian, JJ., concur.


author: Damoorgian, J.

text:
    Britton BLACKWOOD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2021
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 11, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and James W. McIntire, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marc B. Hernandez, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Damoorgian, J.

Britton Blackwood appeals his judgment for one count of armed kidnapping, two counts of sexual battery, one count of robbery with a firearm, and one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

We affirm Appellant's judgment for these crimes and his incarceration for life.

On appeal, Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on a comment one of the testifying officers made regarding the victim's believability. While the officer's comment was improper, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial in light of the following facts: 1) the court immediately provided a curative instruction, 2) there was substantial, independent evidence corroborating the victim's story, and 3) the comment was brief and unanticipated. See Tirado v. State , 219 So.3d 146, 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

Next, Appellant argues that the court committed fundamental error when it did not consider the possibility of a youthful offender sentence. Appellant concedes that because he was twenty-one or older at the time of sentencing, he was not eligible for a youthful offender sentence under the Youthful Offender Act as amended in 2008. § 958.04(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). However, Appellant asserts that by using the age at sentencing instead of the age at the time of the offense as a barometer for eligibility, the Youthful Offender Act violates substantive due process since it may force an offender on the brink of turning twenty-one to forego a trial in hopes of obtaining a youthful offender sentence. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this very same argument in Jackson v. State , 191 So.3d 423, 428 (Fla. 2016), wherein it held that the Youthful Offender Act's age restrictions do not violate substantive due process.

Despite this binding Florida Supreme Court precedent, Appellant urges us to find the Youthful Offender Act unconstitutional, pointing to Justice Pariente's dissent in Jackson . Id. at 428-29 (Pariente, J., dissenting). We are not inclined nor are we permitted to ignore the binding majority in lieu of a dissent. Hoffman v. Jones , 280 So.2d 431, 440 (Fla. 1973) ("We hold that a District Court of Appeal does not have the authority to overrule a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida.").

Affirmed.

Gerber, C.J., and May, J., concur.


author: Taylor, J.

text:
    Demetrius ELLIOT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1046
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 18, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Taylor, J.

This appeal arises from two burglaries of the same residence discovered five days apart. In both incidents, the house was ransacked and property was taken. Appellant was convicted of the residential burglary count alleging property damage over $1,000, but he was acquitted of the other residential burglary. He was also convicted of grand theft of property worth $20,000 or more. We address appellant's argument on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal because the state failed to prove: (1) the amount of the property damage alleged in the residential burglary charge, and (2) the value of the property stolen as alleged in the grand theft charge. As to the other issues raised in this appeal, we find no error.

Appellant was charged by information in Count I with residential burglary of the victims' home between October 25, 2013 and October 28, 2013, with the intent to commit theft and causing property damage in excess of $1,000. In Count II, appellant was charged with residential burglary of the same victims' home between November 1, 2013 and November 2, 2013 with the intent to commit theft. In Count III, appellant was charged with grand theft of property valued at $20,000 or more from the victims' home between October 25, 2013 and November 2, 2013.

At trial, the state presented the following evidence. On October 25, 2013, while the homeowners were away on a cruise, their son checked on their home. When he returned on October 28, 2013, he discovered that it had been burglarized. He found damage to the rear French doors and hurricane windows, items strewn all over the floor, and contents from the trunks of two vehicles on the garage floor. He called the Fort Lauderdale police, who processed the scene for evidence and took photographs. Police also found a cigarette butt containing a single DNA source sample that was later matched to appellant's DNA sample.

On November 2, 2013, when the son returned to the house, he noticed further damage to the French doors, additional items strewn on the floor, including some of his mother's purses, and more missing items, including chinaware and a silver tea set. The son reported the burglary, and the police again processed the home and took photographs. The son told police the damage to the French doors was more extensive after the second incident such that the doors could not be secured.

Based on information from a confidential informant, in August 2014, police obtained and served search warrants on two apartments in Fort Lauderdale-one on 19th Street and the other on 18th Court. Police found property from the victims' house in both apartments. They identified the 19th Street apartment as appellant's residence, which he shared with his girlfriend. The victims' chinaware was located at appellant's residence, dirty and stacked on the side of the kitchen sink. Police also recovered other items belonging to the victims, including dining ware, purses, binoculars, a silver urn, and jewelry. The state, however, did not specify which property of the victims was found in the 18th Court apartment, nor did it itemize the value of the items recovered from each of the apartments.

After the two burglaries, the victims paid $3,724 to replace the French doors and a hurricane window, and $408.10 to replace the locks after noticing that their house keys were missing. They paid to replace door handles but did not provide that receipt at trial. One of the witnesses testified that the total value of the items taken during the two burglaries was $24,597. Of that total, $709 worth of items returned was from the first burglary and $1,954 was from the second. The remaining $21,934 was for items that had not been returned.

When the state rested its case, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on each count. He argued that the state failed to establish that the damage resulting from the October burglary (Count I) was more than one thousand dollars and that the state had not presented actual evidence linking him to the November burglary (Count II). As to the grand theft charge in Count III, appellant argued that the state had not proven that the items found in the 19th Street residence were knowingly stolen or that appellant had anything to do with the theft of the items. The trial court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal on all charges.

Appellant testified and also called his girlfriend's brother as a witness. The brother, who admitted he had 16 felony convictions, testified that his sister lived with appellant at the 19th Street apartment. The apartment shared its backyard with the 18th Court apartment, which belonged to a handyman. The handyman, who had access to appellant's apartment, was always doing odd jobs and could get people whatever they wanted. He would bring various items to the apartment, like a safe and jewelry.

Appellant testified that he was not involved in burglaries. He said he was a drug dealer, who supplied drugs to the handyman in exchange for goods. However, he never asked the handyman where he obtained the goods. Appellant testified that he had 23 felony convictions.

After appellant testified, he renewed his earlier motions for judgment of acquittal, adding that the state had not proven the dollar amount for the October burglary charged in Count I. The court denied the motions, finding that after reviewing all the evidence, reasonable minds could differ and thus, these were issues for the jury to resolve.

The court instructed the jury as follows regarding determining value of property on Count III's grand theft charge: "[a]mounts of value of separate properties involved in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether the thefts are from the same person or several persons, may be added together to determine the total value of the theft." Neither side objected.

Ultimately, the jury found appellant guilty of the October burglary (Count I), not guilty of the November burglary (Count II), and guilty of grand theft of property worth $20,000 or more (Count III). The court denied appellant's motion for new trial. On Count I, the trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison as a habitual felony offender under section 775.084, with a 30-year prison releasee reoffender mandatory minimum pursuant to section 775.082. On Count III, the court sentenced appellant to 30 years as a habitual felony offender to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on Count I.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal, because the state did not prove the damage over $1,000 element of the October burglary charge, nor the $20,000 or more property value alleged in the grand theft charge.

We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. Pagan v. State , 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002).

As to the October burglary, the state alleged a violation of section 810.02(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2015). This section converts a second-degree felony residential burglary into a first-degree felony if the defendant "[c]auses damage to the dwelling or structure, or to property within the dwelling or structure in excess of $1,000." The state presented evidence that some damage to the French doors and hurricane windows was found after the October burglary, and that there was more extensive damage to the French doors following the November burglary. After the November burglary, the victims paid $3,724 for damage to the French doors and to a roller window. However, the state's evidence did not apportion the amount of damage done to the doors and windows between the two burglaries. This is significant because appellant was convicted only of the October burglary, and there was no evidence proving that the amount of damage caused by the October burglary exceeded $1,000. For this reason, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.

Appellant cites Marrero v. State , 71 So.3d 881 (Fla. 2011), to support his argument on proof of the amount of damages. In Marrero , the defendant was charged and convicted of felony criminal mischief after he drove his Ford F150 pickup truck through the entrance of a casino building in Miami-Dade County. 71 So.3d at 883-85. The crash required the replacement of four impact-resistant glass doors. Id. at 883. The charge of criminal mischief required proof of damages of more than $1,000, but the state failed to present evidence of the repair or replacement costs of the damaged property. Id. at 884, 887. Instead, the state presented surveillance footage of the defendant's truck crashing through the doors and testimony from the facilities director of the casino, who had no knowledge of the cost or dollar amount of the damage. Id. at 884. The Third District relied on a "life experience" exception to affirm the conviction. Id. at 890.

The Florida Supreme Court reversed Marrero's conviction, holding that the conviction was improper because the state failed to prove the amount of damages-an essential element of the crime. Id. at 890-91. While noting "some conflict among our district courts as to whether the amount of damage is an essential element of a felony criminal mischief charge," it observed that our court had previously held that the amount of damage is an essential element of the crime of felony criminal mischief. Id. at 886 (citing Zanger v. State , 42 So.3d 944, 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ).

The court in Marrero further explained:

[A] plain reading of the criminal mischief statute reveals that the amount of damage is an essential element of the crime of felony criminal mischief. The only difference between second-degree misdemeanor mischief and third-degree felony mischief is the value of the damaged property. Felony criminal mischief requires proof of the amount of damage, whereas second-degree misdemeanor mischief does not. Absent proof of the amount of damage, an act of criminal mischief, as defined by the criminal mischief statute, is a misdemeanor of the second degree. The value of damage, therefore, is clearly an essential element of felony criminal mischief.

Id. at 887 (emphasis in original).

Similarly, a plain reading of the residential burglary statute shows that the amount of damage is an essential element of the crime of residential burglary causing "damage to the dwelling or property within the dwelling in excess of $1,000." § 810.02(2)(c)2., Fla. Stat. First-degree felony residential burglary requires proof of the amount of damage, whereas second-degree felony residential burglary does not.

Appellant also argues that the state did not prove that the value of the property stolen by appellant was worth $20,000 or more to support the grand theft charge in Count III. Appellant contends that the state relied solely on testimony that the homeowners recovered $709 worth of property taken during the October burglary and $1,954 worth of property taken during the November burglary, and that they were unable to recover an additional $21,934 worth of property still missing as a result of the combined burglaries. Appellant argues that there was no evidence tying him to the November burglary, of which he was acquitted, and that the items retrieved from his apartment were found more than eight months after the burglaries.

To form the basis for the alleged property value of $20,000 or more, appellant asserts that the state combined two separate scenarios-his theft of some of the property during the October burglary and his receipt of some of the property taken in the November burglary at some point during the eight months after the October burglary. Appellant argues that construing this theft and receipt of stolen property as "one scheme or course of conduct," as the state urges, would allow convictions for conduct outside the time period alleged in the charging document-between October 25 and November 2. Cf. Sebastiano v. State , 14 So.3d 1160 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (finding common scheme or course of conduct where defendant enticed victim into series of fraudulent real estate purchases and the defendant was found guilty of organized fraud). Appellant argues that there was no evidence that he received the November burglary proceeds within the time period alleged in Count III's grand theft charge.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motions for judgment of acquittal on the residential burglary and grand theft counts, as charged in the information, and reverse and remand for the trial court to reduce appellant's first-degree felony conviction for residential burglary with property damage in excess of $1,000 to second-degree residential burglary (Count I), to reduce appellant's second-degree felony conviction of grand theft of property worth $20,000 or more to third-degree grand theft, and to resentence appellant accordingly. See Marrero , 71 So.3d at 891.

Reversed and Remanded .

May and Damoorgian, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Michael TRAMEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-2285.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 14, 2015.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Courtenay H. Miller, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Lauren L. Gonzalez, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    ON MOTION FOR REHEARING, REHEARING EN BANC AND CLARIFICATION
   PER CURIAM.

Upon Appellant Michael Tramel's motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc and clarification, we grant rehearing and withdraw our opinion of May 12, 2015, and substitute the following opinion in its place.

Tramel seeks reversal of his convictions and sentences for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon raising several issues. Finding fundamental error in the jury instructions given for each offense on the justifiable use of deadly force, we reverse both convictions and sentences, and remand for a new trial.

According to witnesses at Tramel's trial, Tramel fought with and stabbed victim Jonathan Key during the funeral for Tramel's half-brother, Enoch. Tramel and Key got into a graveside argument and scuffle, which Tramel initiated by first pushing then punching Key. The fight was broken up by fellow mourners. Several witnesses testified they saw Tramel in possession of a small knife or a pocketknife during the fight. After Tramel and Key were separated, Tramel went to his car and returned with what some witnesses testified was another, larger knife. The fight between the two men resumed, and ended with Key being stabbed. Testifying in his own defense, Tramel said that it was Key who initiated the first altercation, that Key had a knife, that Tramel armed himself with a knife after the fight broke up when he became aware Key and others were chasing him, that Key reinitiated the fight, and that he did not purposely stab Key.

For each of the charged offenses, Tramel claimed self-defense pursuant to the "stand your ground" law. In accordance with the discussion between the parties and the court during the charge conference, the trial court instructed the jury as follows, in pertinent part, regarding the use of deadly force in self-defense and the duty to retreat:

An issue in this case is whether the Defendant acted in self-defense. It is a defense to the offense with which MICHAEL GARRICK TRAMEL is charged if the injury to Jonathan Key resulted from the justifiable use of deadly force.
"Deadly force" means force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
A person is justified in using deadly force if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another.
However, the use of deadly force is not justifiable if you find:
MICHAEL GARRICK TRAMEL initially provoked the use of force against himself unless:
a. The force asserted toward the Defendant was so great that he reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, other than using deadly force on Jonathan Key.
b. In good faith, the Defendant withdrew from physical contact with Jonathan Key and clearly indicated to Jonathan Key that he wanted to withdraw and stop the use of deadly force, but Jonathan Key resumed the use of deadly force.
...
If the Defendant was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was attacked in any place where he had a right to be, he had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand his ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if he reasonably believed that it was necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself.
If you find that the Defendant who because of threats or prior difficulties with Jonathan Key had reasonable grounds to believe that he was in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of Jonathan Key then the Defendant had the right to arm himself. However, the Defendant cannot justify the use of deadly force, if after arming himself he renewed his difficulty with Jonathan Key when he could have avoided the difficulty, although as previously explained if the Defendant was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was attacked in any place where he had a right to be, he had no duty to retreat.

Relying on this court's decision in Floyd v. State, 151 So.3d 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), rev. granted, 168 So.3d 229, 2014 WL 7251662 (Fla. Dec. 16, 2014), Tramel argues the trial court gave conflicting instructions when it told the jury both that he had no duty to retreat in the face of imminent death or great bodily harm, and that he had to exhaust every reasonable means to escape danger before using deadly force. In doing so, he argues, the court committed fundamental error.

"[F]or jury instructions to constitute fundamental error, the error must 'reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.' " Garzon v. State, 980 So.2d 1038, 1042 (Fla.2008) (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So.2d 481, 484 (Fla.1960) ). "In determining whether the jury instructions constituted fundamental error, we must consider 'the effect of the erroneous instruction in the context of the other instructions given, the evidence adduced in the case, and the arguments and trial strategies of counsel.' " Floyd, 151 So.3d at 454 (citing Smith v. State, 76 So.3d 379, 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ).

As in this case, the defendant in Floyd claimed self-defense under the "stand your ground" law, and the trial court gave the standard justifiable-use-of-deadly-force instructions that (1) the use of deadly force was not justified if the defendant initially provoked the use of force unless he exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger and (2) if the defendant was not engaged in an unlawful activity and attacked in a place he had a right to be, he had no duty to retreat and could stand his ground with force. Floyd, 151 So.3d at 453-54. On appeal from his convictions, Floyd argued the first instruction negated the second one because the jury was told he had no duty to retreat, on one hand, but on the other, he had to exhaust every reasonable means of escape. Id. at 454. We agreed, reasoning:

[T]he jury was instructed that if the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to oneself or others, then deadly force is justified without regard to any effort to retreat so long as the defendant is not engaged in unlawful activity. A defendant may not use deadly force if the defendant provoked another showing force; however, if the defendant provoked another, who then uses force so great as to put the defendant in fear of death or great bodily harm, then the defendant may use deadly force, but only if the defendant has first exhausted every means of escape. In effect, the jury instruction here provided that Floyd did not have to retreat before meeting deadly force with deadly force if in fear of death or great bodily harm and did have a duty to try to retreat before using deadly force if in fear of death or great bodily harm.

Id. (emphasis in original). We concluded the contradiction in the instructions effectively negated possible application to Floyd's only defense, resulting in fundamental error and requiring reversal of Floyd's convictions. Id. (citing Carter v. State, 469 So.2d 194, 196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) ).

Our reasoning and conclusion in Floyd dictate the same result in this factually indistinguishable case. The State contends that Tramel asserted defenses at trial other than self-defense, and therefore, even if the instructions were inconsistent, Tramel did not lose his sole defense and the error is not fundamental. The trial transcript does not support the State's argument, however. The only defense clearly asserted by Tramel and argued by defense counsel was self-defense. Based on our decision in Floyd, we conclude the justifiable-use-of-deadly-force instructions given in this case inconsistently provided that Tramel did not have to retreat before meeting deadly force with deadly force if in fear of death or great bodily harm and did have a duty to try to retreat before using deadly force if in fear of death or great bodily harm. This inconsistency rendered the instructions inapplicable to Tramel's sole defense, and consequently, fundamental error occurred. For this reason, we reverse Tramel's convictions and sentences for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ROBERTS, C.J., MARSTILLER and SWANSON, JJ., concur.

      See § 776.013(3), Fla. Stat. (2011).

      See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f).

      The Florida Supreme Court, having granted the State's petition for discretionary review of the decision in Floyd, issued an order on December 11, 2014, granting the State's motion to recall this court's mandate, and staying proceedings until disposition of the petition for review. Order, State v. Floyd, No. SC14-2162, 168 So.3d 229 (Fla. Dec. 11, 2014) (order staying proceedings).