author: GRIFFIS, P.J.,

text:
    Persephany ALLEN, as the Natural Daughter and Next Friend of Catina Allen Staffney, Deceased, and on Behalf of All the Heirs At Law and Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Catina Allen Staffney, Deceased, and as Next Friend of Minors, T.S. And T.S., Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. JACKSON SQUARE APARTMENT HOMES, LLC d/b/a Melrose Place Apartments and Justin Davis, Appellees/Cross-Appellants
    NO. 2016-CA-00876-COA
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    12/12/2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JEFFREY MATTHEW GRAVES, DENNIS C. SWEET III
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: DORIS’ THERESA BOBADILLA, MATTHEW MILES WILLIAMS ’
    BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND GREENLEE, JJ.
   GRIFFIS, P.J.,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Persephany Allen, as the natural daughter and next friend of Catina Allen Staffney, deceased, filed an action against Jackson Square Apartment Homes, LLC, for negligence following the death of Cati-na in an apartment fire. The'circuit court allowed Allen to withdraw admissions previously deemed admitted, but ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Jackson Square.

¶ 2. Upon review, we find the' circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the admissions, and did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Jackson Square. Thus, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. Terry Staffney executed a residential lease agreement with Melrose Place Apartments, an apartment complex owned and managed by Jackson Square. Staffney identified himself, Catina, Terry Allen, and Terrick Allen as the occupants of Unit L-205. The lease agreement expired February 28, -2014. Following the expiration of the lease agreement, the occupants remained on the premises despite their failure to pay additional rent. As a result, Jackson Square obtained a money' judgment against the occupants in the amount of $639. Thereafter, Jackson Square executed an affidavit for warrant of removal and, on May 6, 2014, deposited the requisite sum of money with the court clerk in order to obtain the removal of the occupants.

¶ 4. Despite the expiration of the lease agreement, their failure to pay rent, and Jackson Square’s actions to remove them, the occupants were inside the apartment unit on the night of May 16, 2014, when a fire occurred. All of the occupants were able to vacate the unit with the exception of Catina,- who unfortunately died. At the time of the fire, an order of removal had not yet been obtained.

¶ 5. On August 20, 2015, Allen filed a complaint on behalf of herself and all wrongful-death beneficiaries of Gatina, and alleged various premises-liability claims against Jackson Square and Justin Davis, the maintenance man for the apartment complex. Specifically, Allen alleged that Jackson Square had nonfunctioning or inadequate smoke detectors and fire alarms at the time of the fire, had inadequate and improperly trained maintenance personnel and managers, and knew’ or should have known that no warnings were provided and that the fire-protection measures in place were unreasonable and inadequate to warn tenants.

¶ 6. Jackson Square subsequently served written discovery, including requests for admission, upon Allen and her counsel. The discovery requests were served to Allen’s counsel via email on February 26, 2016, and again at the request of Allen’s counsel on February 29, 2016. Allen did not respond to the requests for admission within thirty days and, as a result, the admissions were deemed admitted by operation of law.

¶ 7. On April 12, 2016, Jackson Square’s counsel sent a good-faith request to Men’s counsel and requested that Men provide responses within ten days. Men’s counsel acknowledged the good-faith request and confirmed that discovery responses would be provided within ten days.

¶ 8. Despite the ágreed-upon extension, on April 13, 2016, Jackson Square moved for summary judgment based, in part, on Men’s failure to timely respond to the requests for admission. Thereafter, on April 28, 2016, Men filed a motion to withdraw the admissions and acknowledged her failure to timely respond to the requests for admission. Men asserted her failure to timely respond was due to1 her attorney being busy and interoffice mis-communication. Despite seeking to withdraw her admissions, Men did not respond to the requests for admission. In fact, Men did not respond to the requests until May 31, 2016, well after the original due date and less than- twenty-four hours prior to the hearing on Jackson Square’s motion for summary judgment.

¶ 9. Additionally, Men failed to provide any affidavits or documentation in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Moreover, Men failed to submit an affidavit pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f).

¶ 10. During the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Men’s counsel explained that he believed the ten-day agreed-upon extension to respond to discovery included the requests for admission. In response, Jackson Square’s counsel acknowledged that he had not communicated to Men’s counsel that the extension did not include the requests for admission since Jackson Square did not have the authority to give such an extension on requests for admission. Men’s counsel advised that in an effort to avoid additional time and expense, he did not conduct further discovery without the circuit court’s ruling on the motion to withdraw admissions.

¶ 11. Following the hearing, the circuit court found that Men’s counsel rightfully believed the extension included the requests for admission, and therefore allowed Men to withdraw all of the admissions with the exception of two, which were never answered due to “oversight.” However, the circuit court found Men failed to set forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial and, as a result, granted summary judgment in favor of Jackson Square.

¶ 12. Men now appeals and argues the circuit court erroneously granted summary judgment. Jackson Square also appeals and argues the circuit court abused its discretion in withdrawing the admissions.

ANALYSIS

I. Whether the circuit court erred in allowing .the withdrawal of the admissions.

¶ 13. We first address Jackson Square’s argument that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing Men to withdraw her admissions. “A [circuit] court’s decisions concerning discovery matters are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Prime Rx, LLC v. McKendree, Inc., 917 So.2d 791, 794 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2005) (citing DeBlanc v. Stancil, 814 So.2d 796, 798 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2002)). “A certain amount of discretion is vested in the trial judge with respect to whether he or she will take matters as admitted.” Earwood v. Reeves, 798 So.2d 508, 514 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2001).

¶ 14. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) provides that a request for admission is déemed admitted unless, within thirty days of service, the recipient serves an answer or objection to the request. M.R.C.P. 36(a). “Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.” M.R.C.P. 36(b).

¶ 15. The circuit court may permit withdrawal or amendment when: (1) “the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby,” and (2) “the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.” Id. The circuit court must “carefully examine a Rule 36(b) motion under [this] two-prong test.” DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 802 (¶ 26). However, “[e]ven when these two factors are established, a [circuit] court still has discretion to deny a request for leave to withdraw or amend an admission.” Carney v. IRS, 258 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2001).

¶ 16. Here, Jackson Square argues Men did not provide a justifiable excuse for her failure to timely respond to the requests for admission. However, Men asserts that nothing in Rule 36(b) requires a court to find a justifiable excuse for failure to timely respond. We hesitate to agree with this assertion given the number of cases decided by this Court that hold that a motion to withdraw admissions was properly denied where there was no justifiable excuse for the untimely responses. Nevertheless, the circuit court found that Allen’s counsel rightfully believed there was an agreed-upon extension to answer the requests for admission. We do not find such a finding to be an abuse of discretion. Allen’s mistaken belief that the agreed-upon extension included the requests for admission was likely justifiable considering Jackson Square’s acknowledgment that it did not clearly communicate otherwise.

¶ 17. In support of its argument, Jackson Square relies on the various cases mentioned] in footnote two. However, these cases can easily be distinguished from the present case, as they did not involve any claim that a party mistakenly believed opposing counsel had agreed to an extension regarding pretrial-discovery matters.

¶ 18. In Sanford v. Dudley, 196 So.3d 1106, 1115 (¶ 27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), a case similar to one before us, we reversed the circuit court’s denial of the plaintiffs motion to withdraw admissions. In Sanford, Sanford did not take corrective action until the Dudleys moved for summary judgment, since the motion for summary judgment was Sanford’s first notice that he mistakenly believed opposing counsel had agreed to an extension. Id. at 1108 (¶ 6). This is parallel to our case.

¶ 19. Here, Jackson Square’s counsel sent a good-faith request for Allen to respond to discovery. Allen accepted this request and notified Jackson Square that the answers would be served within ten days. However, the next day, Jackson Square moved for summary judgment based, in part, on the admissions. As in Sanford, the motion for summary judgment was Allen’s counsel’s first notice that he had mistakenly believed opposing counsel had agreed to an extension- regarding the requests for admission. The circuit court noted that it was “hard to hold [Allen’s counsel] to what his understanding was when [Jackson Square’s counsel] didn’t fully communicate what [Jackson Square]’s intent was in the extension.”

¶ 20. Jackson Square argues that Sanford is distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case immediately took corrective action following the motion for summary judgment by moving to withdraw the admissions and serving responses to the requests for admission. However, the discrepancy between the present case and Sanford regarding the time it took for the plaintiff to file a motion to withdraw the admissions was not substantial. We will not intervene with the circuit court’s broad discretion in this matter.

¶ 21. Rule 36 “is not intended to be applied in Draconian fashion.” Deblanc, 814 So.2d at 801 (¶ 26). Although “the Rule may sometimes seem harsh in its application, the harshness may be ameliorated by the [circuit] court’s power to grant amendments or withdrawals of admissions in proper circumstances.” Id. at 801-02 (¶ 26).

¶ 22. Based on the facts of this case, we find that the presentation of the merits of the action would be subserved by allowing Allen to withdraw her admissions and that the withdrawal of the admissions would not prejudice Jackson Square. See M.R.C.P. 36(b). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the circuit court in allowing Allen to withdraw her admissions. We therefore affirm as to this issue.

II, ■ Whether the circuit court erred in , grafting summary judgment in favor of Jackson Square.

¶ 23. We next address Allen’s argument that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment. “We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made.’ ” Karpinsky v. Am. Nat’l Ins., 109 So.3d 84, 88 (¶ 9) (Miss. 2013) (quoting Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Reg’l Airport Auth., 97 So.3d 68, 71 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2012)).

■¶ 24. A motion for summary judgment is governed by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which provides:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported'as provided in Rule 56, “an adverse 'party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the] pleadingst; rather, the] response must set forth specific’ facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Stuckey v. Provident Bank, 912 So.2d 859, 864 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2005). If the nonmoving party does not .respond, accordingly, “summary judgment, if ■ appropriate, shall be entered against [the nonmoving party].” Id. '

¶ 25. Here, the record shows Allen failed to provide any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Instead, in response to Jackson Square’s motion for summary judgment, Allen simply relied upon the allegations set forth in her complaint and the arguments of counsel. However, mere allegations are insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial and arguments of counsel are not evidence. See One 1970 Mercury Cougar v. Tunica Cty., 115 So.3d 792, 796 (¶ 20) (Miss. 2013).

¶ 26. While Allen acknowledges the standard under Rule 56(c), she asserts an exception to this rule is set. forth in Rule 56(f). Rule 56(f) provides:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such order as is just.

However, despite Allen’s reliance on Rule 56(f), the record is void of any affidavit or motion pursuant to Rule 56(f). Indeed, Allen “admits that no affidavit was submitted [pursuant to Rule 56(f)] supporting the reasons for failure to obtain affidavits creating fact issues.”

¶27. Additionally, although Allen asserts '‘that there were fact issues 'that could likely have been established if the parties were allowed to conduct discovery,” the record shows that in the months during which this case was pending, Allen did not propound written discovery or even informally request that documentation be produced. Moreover, “parties may not ... escape summary judgment by outlining what they might discover later.” Franklin Collection Serv., Inc. v. Kyle, 955 So.2d 284, 291 (¶ 24) (Miss. 2007).

¶ 28. As Allen failed to set forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial, summary judgment was proper. Accordingly, we affirm.

¶ 29. AFFIRMED.

LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ, CONCUR. WILSON, J„ CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

      . There is no indication in the record that Davis was served with process. However, he has not been dismissed. Davis was not a party to the summary-judgment proceedings and is not included in this appeal. Final judgment was entered in favor of Jackson Square and certified pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

      . See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hale, 185 So.3d 1076 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016); Rainer v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 119 So.3d 398 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013); Boyd v. Boyd, 83 So.3d 409 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011); Triangle Constr. Co. v. Foshee Constr. Co., 976 So.2d 978 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); Langley ex rel. Langley v. Miles, 956 So.2d 970 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

      . In Sanford, the plaintiff moved to withdraw the admissions eight days after the defendant moved for summary judgment. Sanford, 196 So.3d at 1114 (¶ 24). Here, Allen moved to withdraw the admissions fifteen days after Jackson Square moved for summary judgment.

      . The record shows the case was pending less than one year and was in the early stages of .discovery.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Latrice JACKSON a/k/a Latrice Marlene Jackson a/k/a Latrice M. Jackson, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
    NO. 2016-KA-00924-COA
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    12/12/2017

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: ERIN E. BRIGGS
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE
    BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND GREENLEE, JJ.
   GRIFFIS, P.J.,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Latrice Jackson appeals her conviction of abuse of a vulnerable person and claims the circuit court erroneously denied her motion for a trial continuance. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Jackson was employed as a behavioral-health assistant (BHA) at Millcreek Behavioral Health Facility in Magee, Mississippi. Jackson was one of three BHAs who were assigned to the Pecan Grove Cottage at Millcreek. Pecan Grove is a residential facility, staffed twenty-four hours per day, for mentally disabled females between the ages of thirteen and seventeen years old.

¶ 3. Jane Doe is a resident of Pecan Grove. Jane is nonverbal. She can feed herself, but needs assistance with bathing, dressing, and going to the bathroom.

¶ 4. On June 4, 2013, Jackson and another BHA, Rebecca Ross, were working the 2:30-10:30 p.m. shift. Jackson, Ross, and Jane were upstairs in the day room. Jane was sitting in a chair by the doorway. Jackson asked Jane to come and take a bath. When Jane did not move, Jackson repeated her request. However, Jane again refused to move. According to Ross, Jackson then “grabbed [Jane] by her hair and like grabbed her hands around her hair and drug her out of the chair and down the hall to the bathroom.”

¶5. Ross went to get another BHA, Shequita Preston, who was doing laundry in the linen room. Ross stated that when Jane came out of the bathroom, she was crying and upset. Ross further stated that she heard Jackson call Jane “a fat B word” as she came out of the bathroom.

¶ 6. Preston described Jane’s scalp as “red” and stated that “it looked like a plug had kind of been pulled from [Jane’s] hair — from her head.” Preston further stated she could see bald spots on Jane’s head. Preston explained that if a resident refused to bathe, the BHA was simply supposed to note it in the resident’s chart. Preston reported the incident to her unit coordinator. As a result of the incident, Jackson was terminated.

¶ 7, On September 9, 2013, Jackson was indicted in the Simpson County Circuit Court on one count of abuse of a vulnerable person in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-47-19(1) and. (3) (Rev. 2015). On September 16, 2013, a public defender was appointed to represent Jackson. A jury trial was scheduled for March 17, 2014. For reasons unexplained in the record, the trial did not go forward as scheduled.

¶ 8. On April 7, 2015, an agreed order of continuance was entered, which reset the trial to September 8, 2015. Shortly before trial, on August 27, 2015, Jackson was appointed new counsel, who immediately moved for a continuance. As a result, another continuance was granted. A new trial date was set for March 31, 2016.

¶ 9. On March 10, 2016, twenty-one days before trial, Jackson filed a “motion to inspect and copy certain records and documents in the custody of Millcreek Behavioral Health Facility.” The State objected based on relevance and because Jackson requested the State to produce documents that were not in its possession. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted the motion and ordered the State to obtain from Millcreek: the employee files of all Mill-creek staff members who were interviewed and/or questioned in regard to the events on June 4, 2013; a copy of the Millcreek handbook; and Jane’s medical history. An “order to subpoena certain records and documents” was thereafter entered on March 14, 2016.

¶ 10. Millcreek was subsequently contacted and received a.copy of the circuit court’s order. Millcreek advised that due to the amount of time that had passed since the incident, many of the requested documents were in an off-site storage facility and would have to be located and brought back to the facility in order to be copied and produced. The documents, which amounted to approximately 1,000 pages, were ultimately delivered to defense counsel in three separate deliveries over the course of one week, with the final delivery on March 29,2016.

¶ 11. On March 24, 2016, just prior to the final delivery of the documents, Jackson filed a motion to dismiss or, in.the alternative, motion to continue, arguing that the State had failed to prpvide a speedy trial and failed to “fully comply” ■with the circuit court’s order regarding the production of the Millcreek documents. An agreed order of continuance was entered on March 28, 2016, to allow both parties additional time to review the recently produced documents. This was the third continuance of record granted by the circuit court, The trial was reset for April 18, 2016, which gave counsel approximately twenty days to review the documents prior to trial.

¶ 12. On the morning of trial, defense counsel moved ore tenus for a continuance. Defense counsel explained she did not have sufficient time to review the “hundreds and hundreds of documents” that were produced and needed additional time “to locate some of [the] witnesses that [would] be crucial to [Jackson’s] defense.” The circuit court ruled as follows:

Due process requires a speedy trial. This case was indicted on September the 9th, 2013. Today is April the 18th, 2016. We have a special venire out in the courtroom ready to go forward. On the order of arraignment this case was originally set for March 17th, 2014. That’s when Ray Therrell was the attorney for the defendant. On September- the 8th, 2015, because Megan [Stuard] had just been appointed to represent the defendant, this case was continued. It was originally set for 2015. At the request of the defendant it was continued until March 31st, 2016. At that time, the defendant stated that she had not or had recently received a voluminous discovery from the [State] and needed additional time. The Court offered to reset the case during the term and give [defense counsel] two weeks extra to go through those documents, but after all was said and done, on April 18th, 2016, which is today, the case was set for today from Wednesday,. March 31st, 2016. So we can go [into] the next term and you’ll have the same excuses that you’ve got this term. So I’m going to overrule your motion for a continuance.

¶ 13. Following a jury trial, Jackson was found guilty. The circuit court deferred sentencing and ordered a presentence report. On. May 24, 2016, Jackson was sentenced to twenty years, with fifteen years to serve in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, followed by five years’ postrelease supervision. Jackson was ordered to attend anger-management classes while in custody.

¶ 14. Jackson filed a motion for a new trial, a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty, all of which were denied. Jackson now appeals and argues the circuit court’s denial of her motion for a continuance was reversible error.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 15. It is within the circuit court’s discretion to grant or deny a motion for a continuance. Shelton v. State, 853 So.2d 1171, 1181 (¶ 35) (Miss. 2003). A circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance will not -be reversed unless “manifest injustice” results. Id. “A denial of the continuance shall not be ground for reversal unless the [appellate] court shall be satisfied that injustice resulted therefrom.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-29 (Rev. 2015).

ANALYSIS

¶ 16. Jackson’s sole argument on appeal is that the circuit court erroneously denied her motion for a continuance. Jackson claims the circuit court’s denial of her motion for a continuance was an. abuse of discretion for three reasons. Wé address each in detail.

7. Unprepared Counsel

¶ 17. Jackson first claims that by denying her motion for a continuance, the circuit court “knowingly subjected [her] to the situation where she was defended by an unprepared attorney.” However, Jackson fails to explain how her counsel.was unprepared or to provide evidence from the record of such a lack of preparedness. Our review of the record shows defense counsel actively participated in voir dire, thoroughly questioned and cross-examined the witnesses, made numerous objections during trial, and assisted in drafting the jury instructions.

¶ 18. Although Jackson claims she needed additional time to “locate some witnesses,” she failed to offer the witnesses’ names or to explain what information the witnesses would provide that would. be “crucial to the defense.” Section 99-15-29 states in part:

On all applications for a continuance the party shall set forth in his affidavit the facts which he expects to prove by his absent witness or documents that the court may judge of the'materiality of such facts, the name and residence of the absent witness, that he has used due diligence to procure the absent documents, or presence of the absent witness, as the case may be, stating in what such diligence consists, and that the continuance is not "sought for delay only, but that justice may be done.

¶ 19. Here, the denied motion for a continuance about which Jackson complains was an ore tenus motion. ,-In other words, Jackson “made [no],effort to.comply with the procedural requirements of [section] 99-15~29[.]” Stack v. State, 860 So.2d 687, 692 (¶ 8). (Miss. 2003). As Jackson failed to provide the necessary -information, she failed to comply with the procedural guidelines in order to secure a continuance. Id.; Johnson v. State, 872 So.2d 65, 70 (¶ 20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-29 (Rev. 2000)). Our supreme court “has repeatedly held that a judge did not abuse his ,.. discretion ,.. in denying a defendant’s motion for continuance .., when that.' defendant failed to comply with the procedural guidelines[.]” Stack, 860 So.2d at 692 (¶ 8).

¶20. Additionally, while Jackson asserts her counsel did not have sufficient time to review the Millcreek documents, the record shows that the prosecutor received the same amount of documents at the same time as defense .counsel and was able to timely review those documents and prepare for trial. Importantly, defense counsel admitted she had this case for almost one year. Thus, the delayed request for the Millcreek documents and the resultant time crunch were defense counsel’s own creation.

¶ 21. “Denials of motions for continuance have been upheld where defense counsel was afforded fewer days to prepare for trial than here[.]” Id. at (¶ 9). See also Lyle v. State, 908 So.2d 189, 194 (¶ 21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) . (negatively referenced on other grounds by Archer v. State, 986 So.2d 951 (Miss. 2008)). Overall, we find Jackson’s claim is not supported by the record.

II. Speedy Trial

¶22. Jackson next claims the cir- ■ cuit court placed her speedy-trial rights over the rights of effective representation and a fair trial. We disagree. It was Jackson who first expressed her- right to a speedy trial. In her last written motion to the circuit court, Jackson asserted she was “entitled to a reasonably[] speedy trial, which the Constitution guarantees tinto her,” and she moved to dismiss the charge based on the State’s failure to provide a fast and speedy trial.

¶ 23. Given the number of continuances previously granted, the amount of time since Jackson had been indicted, and Jackson’s expressed entitlement to a speedy trial, we do not find the circuit court’s consideration of and concern for Jackson’s speedy-trial rights were reversible error.

III. Alleged Disability

¶24. Jackson asserts her defense counsel “discovered, post-trial, that Jackson was suffering under some sort of disability and “graduated from high school with a special[-]education diploma or certificate.” Jackson last claims that had defense counsel “been given sufficient time to prepare for this case, she would have had time to properly investigate Jackson’s psychological background.” We disagree and find no evidence to support Jackson’s claim.

¶25. The record shows that an evaluation of Jackson was completed by Region 8 Mental Health Services on May 4, 2016, prior to sentencing. It appears the evaluation was performed at defense counsel’s request. The evaluation report noted that Jackson had been charged with and convicted of “pulling a patient’s hair and dragging her down the hallway into the bathroom,” and was currently incarcerated and awaiting sentencing. The information contained in the report was provided by Jackson.

¶ 26. The evaluation report does’ not indicate that Jackson suffers or suffered from any mental illness or disability. In fact, the report specifically notes that Jackson did not advise of any prior mental-health hospitalization or service, or alcohol or drug treatment. Additionally, there were no physical disabilities, “depressive-like behavior,” “manic-like behavior,” “dementia-like characteristics,” or “psychotic-like behavior” noted in the report.

¶ 27. The report does indicate that Jackson suffers from a developmental disability. Under the “developmental disability!’ section, the report notes that Jackson was a “special ed” student since elementary school, with “[significantly sub-average intellectual functioning before age 18” and “[substantial limitations in adaptive skills!” However, simply because Jackson attended special-education classes and graduated with a special-education diploma does not mean she suffered from a disability sufficient to avoid criminal responsibility.

¶ 28. “[T]he test of criminal responsibility is the [defendant’s] ability ..., at the time [of] ... the act, to realize and appreciate the nature and quality thereof — his ability to distinguish right and wrong.” Keeler v. State, 226 Miss. 199, 204, 84 So.2d 153, 156 (1955) (citation omitted). There is nothing in the report to indicate Jackson was incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of her actions. While the report indicates that Jackson “would benefit from further psychological assessment,” there was no finding of the need for commitment, nor any indication that Jackson was unable to distinguish right from wrong.

¶ 29. Importantly, Jackson was administered and passed all exams and evaluations necessary for employment at Millcreek. Specifically, on March 18, 2013, just three months prior to the incident, Jackson was administered and passed the “Abuse/Neglect/Confidentiality/Patient Rights Competency Exam.” The first question on the exam asked the following:

1. A deliberate act of physical, mental/verbal, or sexual mistreatment is considered to be which of the following?
a. Part of the program
b. Abuse
c. Necessary to maintain control

In response, Jackson correctly circled “b.” Additionally, question number seven asked the following:

7. According to [Mississippi Code Annotated' section] 43-47-5 [ (Rev. 2015) ] of the Mississippi Vulnerable Adults Act, abuse is:
a. A method that can be used to prevent abnormal behavior.
b. The willful infliction of physical pain, injury or mental anguish on a vulnerable adult by unreasonable confinement or deprivation by a care taker of service.
c. An act by staff members that results in injury only.
d. Only applied to the adult population.

In response, Jackson, again, correctly circled “b.”

¶ 30. Thus, it is clear Jackson knew and understood the definition of abuse and what actions constituted abuse. Based on Jackson’s responses to the remaining exam questions, it is also clear that Jackson knew and understood that “[n]o abuse w[ould] be tolerated,” and that if found guilty of abuse, she could be fined and/or sent to prison.

¶ 31. Additionally, the record includes a letter from Jackson to Millcreek, wherein Jackson claim's Ross was responsible for Jane’s injuries. The letter states as follows:

I, Latrice Jackson, witnessed Rebecca Ross harming [Jane] on the day of Tuesday, June 4, 2013[,] at approximately 8:45 p.m. [Ross] drug [Jane] down the hall after [Jane] refused to complete her p.m, hygiene. [Ross] pulled [Jane] by the hair trying to get her to the tub, [and] as a result of the hair pulling some of [Jane’s] hair came out. [Jane] was sitting in the chair and was pulled out of it against her will. [Ross] started to call her names[;] this has been going on for a while now. [Ross] would say that [Jane] was a fat b[ — -]. I feel that the other children are in danger because [Ross] carries a gun in the trunk of her car and everyone [is] aware of it.
Latrice Jackson
June 11, 2013

We find this letter further evidences Jackson’s understanding that the alleged actions (i.e., “harming [Jane]” by grabbing her by the hair and dragging her down the hall) were wrong.

¶ 32, Overall, despite her claim of “some sort of disability,” the record shows Jackson clearly understood her employment duties and obligations at Millcreek. Moreover, the record shows Jackson understood the nature and consequences of her actions and that pulling a resident’s hair and dragging her dawn the hall constituted abuse and was punishable by law.

¶ 33. Although Jackson claims additional time would have allowed defense counsel the opportunity to investigate her psychological background, “there has been no showing that [Jackson’s] counsel would have done, anything differently or presented any different type of defense had the motion [for á continuance] been granted.” Stack, 860 So.2d at 692 (¶ 10). At no time during the almost three'years of litigation was any alleged disability raised by either defense counsel or Jackson herself. Moreover, no evaluation of Jackson was ever requested prior to or during trial. Notably, no reason for this failure was given, We can only speculate whether the failure to have the evaluation performed was negligence or an intentional tactical maneuver. See id. Regardless, we do not find merit to Jackson’s claim.

CONCLUSION

¶ 34. “The burden of showing manifest injustice is not satisfied by conclusory arguments alone[;] rather the defendant is required to show concrete facts that demonstrate the particular prejudice to the defense.” Id. at 691-92 (¶ 7) (quotation marks omitted). We find Jackson failed to meet this burden. Accordingly, we do not find the circuit court abused its. discretion in denying Jackson’s motion for a trial continuance. We therefore affirm the conviction and sentence,

¶ 35. AFFIRMED.

LEE, C.J., BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

      . For privacy purposes, the victim’s name has been changed to a fictitious one.

      . It is unclear the number of continuances granted by the circuit court between March 17, 2014, and April 7, 2015, as the record is void of any case activity.

      . Jackson’s original counsel, Ray Therrell, resigned as the Simpson County Public Defender, Megan Stuard was appointed to take over Therrell's remaining court-appointed public-defender cases. Stuard continued as Jackson’s counsel throughout the remainder of the litigation and trial.

      . The ore tenus motion for a continuance was heard in chambers.

      . "Ore tenus” is Latin for "by word of mouth.” Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 2000). An ore tenus motion is one “[m]ade or presented orally.” Id.

      . The presentence-investigation report also notes Jackson has never been diagnosed with any mental illnesses.

      .' The record shows Jackson graduated from high school in 2005 with a special-education diploma.

      . The record shows that at least four separate exams were administered. The exams included detailed questions and hypothetical scenarios specific to employment at Millcreek, including abuse and neglect issues.


author: PARKER, Justice. SHAW, Justice

text:
    The WATER WORKS BOARD of the CITY OF ARAB v. CITY OF ARAB
    1150674
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    December 23, 2016
    Rehearing Denied March 17, 2017

      Scott Burnett Smith and J. Jameson Hughston of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Huntsville, for appellant.
    Jeffrey McLaughlin and Rodney Edmondson of McLaughlin & Edmondson, LLC, Guntersville, for appellee.
   PARKER, Justice.

The Water Works Board of the City of Arab (“the Board”) appeals the denial by the Marshall Circuit Court (“the circuit court”) of the Board’s motion to dismiss and the entry of a preliminary injunction requested by the City of Arab (“the City”). We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

The relevant facts are undisputed. Pursuant to § 11-50-230 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, the Board operates a waterworks system that supplies water tq the City and its residents (“the waterworks system”); the Board was incorporated for this purpose in 1947.

On September 19, 1972, the City adopted a resolution (“the 1972 resolution”) stating that the Boarfi “be, and it hereby is, directed to secure the necessary approval of the State Department of Health and to procure the necessary supplies and materials for the addition of fluoride to the water supply system of the City.” After the City adopted the 1972 resolution, the Board began fluoridating the water it supplies to the City.

On August 1, 2015, the Board, citing studies indicating negative health consequences resulting from fluoride, stopped fluoridating the water it supplies to the City. The City disagreed with the Board’s decision. On November 2, 2015, the City, citing studies indicating negative health consequences resulting from the failure to fluoridate water, passed a resolution (“the 2015 resolution”) ordering the Board “to immediately restart the addition of fluoride into the water supply system of the municipality.” The 2015 resolution also stated

“that if the Board desires to remove the fluoride from the water supply system, that any such removal request should be made to the City Council of Arab who will consider any request of such a drastic change in due time and after public notice and consideration of all scientific data available, so that an informed decision that is in the best interest of the public health and well[-]being of the citizens may be had.”

On November 10, 2015, the Board wrote a letter to the City stating that it did not intend to comply with the 2015 resolution.

On February 17, 2016, the City filed an action against the Board requesting, among other things, that the circuit court enter an injunction requiring the Board to fluoridate the water it supplies to the City. The City also sought a judgment declaring

“that both the [1972] Resolution and the [2015] resolution directing the ... Board are lawful directives of the City, and that the ... Board ,.., as an agent and arm of the City, must follow said directive and that further ... the ... Board ... [did not have] the requisite authority to unilaterally cause the removal of fluoride from the public water system of the City, as it had been ordered by the City since 1972.”

The City requested that the circuit court enter a preliminary injunction “enjoining [the Board] from removing the fluoridation from the public water system and/or requiring reintroduction of the same to maintain the status quo.” Although the City recognized that there is no federal or state law requiring the Board to fluoridate the water it supplies to the City, the City argued that the Board’s decision to stop fluoridating the water it supplies to the City is “unlawful.”

On March 3, 2016, the Board filed a motion to dismiss the City’s declaratory-judgment action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.; on March 7, 2016, the Board filed a motion in opposition to the City’s request for a preliminary injunction. On March 17, 2016, the circuit court granted the City’s request for a preliminary injunction, stating:

“[T]he City ... filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking an order to require the [Board] to continue fluoridating the water supply of the City ... during the pendency of this lawsuit. After a hearing on" March 8, 2016, and March 9, 2016, where both parties were present with- their counsel, the court having considering the testimony, evidence presented, and legal argument, and applying the four-part standard which a party must meet in- order for a preliminary injunction to be issued,[*] the court finds as follows:
“The court heard ore tenus testimony from the Mayor of the City ..., Bob Joslin, regarding a resolution of permanent nature passed by the City ... in 1972 instructing the ... Board to fluoridate the City’s water supply. The ... Board followed the resolution and did so for 43 years without objection, until some point around August of 2016, when the ... Board ... unilaterally removed fluoride from the water supply without notice to the City Council or to the citizens of Arab. After unsuccessful efforts to have fluoride reintroduced into the water • supply, the City filed this lawsuit.
“The Court then heard ore tenus testimony from the Director of the Alabama Department of Public Health, Dr. Robert Meador, from dentist Dr. Tom Willis, board certified pediatrician Dr. Don Jones, and board certified pediatric dentist, Dr. Steven Mitchell. All medical professionals in attendance were qualified as experts in their fields and each offered the opinion that systemic- fluoride is important for the public health, and that removal of fluoride from the water supply would cause immediate, irreversible, irreparable harm — especially to children who need systemic fluoride as their teeth develop, elderly, and poor citizens served by the ... Board .... In addition, the court notes that it found each of the experts to be credible and knowledgeable. It further accepts their collective, testimony that the only reputable; reliable, and credible evidence on the issue of fluoridation of water is that it promotes public health. Based on the abundance of undisputed medical testimony on the issue of irreparable harm, the court finds that irreparable harm would result if no injunction is issued. And finally on this issue, based on the medical evidence presented that ceasing systemic fluoridation through treatment of the public water supply would result in immediate irreversible harm to the same groups noted above, especially to children with developing teeth, the court finds that there is no adequate remedy at law for the [City],
“The [City] presented Alabama Code [ (1975),] '§ 11 — 45—1[,] and its 1972 Resolution (supported by its 2015 Resolution) to establish its authority to direct the [Board] to fluoridate [the City’s] water. The [Board] offered no evidence of its authority to remove fluoride over the objection of the City. The [Board] offered no evidence at all of the procedure, parliamentary or otherwise, that it followed in determining that fluoride should be removed. The- [Board] also failed to offer any evidence of harm that would result if it is required to fluoridate the water supply during the pendency of this litigation. To the contrary, the only evidence before the court is that [the Board] fluoridated the water for 43 years without any complaint or claim of hardship. And - while the [Board] has presented no evidence of hardship, the City has shown through- the testimony presented that immediate and irreparable harm,- will indeed occur if-fluoride is not reintroduced into the [C]ity[’s] -water system.- Thus the court finds that-no hardship, will be suffered by the [Board] by the granting of the injunction; certainly any hardship imposed on the [Board] by the injunction will not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to the [City].
“Based on the evidence offered and Alabama statutory and case law, the court finds that the City is properly acting within the scope of its authority in seeking to enforce'its own resolutions as they relate to' protecting the- public health, especially in light of the fact that the ... Board abided by the instruction in the resolution for 43 years with no objection and only now argues that it should not have to follow it. See Water & Wastewater Bd. of City of Madison v. City of Athens, 17 So.3d 241, 245 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (holding ‘Despite the language in cases like [Water Works Bd. of Leeds v.]Huffstutler[, 292 Ala. 669, 299 So.2d 268 (1974),] and [City of Mobile v.] Cochran[, 276 Ala. 530, 165 So.2d 81 (1964),] regarding the separate and independent nature of public corporations, our supreme court has also, long held that, in at least some respects, a public corporation like the [water] Board is an agency of the municipality it serves.’); see also, Wetumpka v. Central Elmore Water Auth., 703 So.2d 907 (Ala. 1997) (the Alabama Supreme,, Court holding ‘that a water works board organized and operating pursuant to §§ 11-50-230 through 11-50-241 is an agency qf the municipality it serves’) (citing City of Montgomery v. Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgomery, 660 So.2d 588 (Ala. 1995)). Considering the 1972 resolution, the 43 year history of uninterrupted, unquestioned fluoridation of the water supply by the [Board],'and based on the authority of the City under Alabama statutes including but not limited to § 11-45-1, Code of Alabama [ (1975) ], the caselaw presented (including that cited above), and the evidence offered at the hearing, the court finds that the [City] has a.reasonable chance of success on the merits.
“Based on the [City’s] having met all four elements required for the issuance of a preliminary injunction as detailed above, the court hereby orders as follows: ■
“The ... Board ;.. is to immediately resume the addition of fluoride to the water supply at the optimal level as recommended by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, currently 0.7 milligrams of fluoride per liter of water, and otherwise in accord with the same practices followed by the Board over the past 43 years prior to August, 2015, and is enjoined from ceasing the same until further orders of this court; and
“The City ... shall post a bond in the sum of $50,000.00 (fifty thousand and 00/100 dollars), which the court finds to be sufficient security.'
“Additionally, the [Board’s] motion to dismiss is hereby denied. The court instructs the [Board] to answer the complaint within 30 days.”

On March 22, 2016, the Board appealed.

On March 23, 2016, the Board requested that the circuit court stay during the pen-dency of this appeal the preliminary injunction it had entered. The circuit court denied the Board’s motion to stay on March 30, 2016. On the same day, the Board then requested that this Court stay the preliminary injunction entered by" the circuit court during the pendency of this appeal. This Court denied the Board’s motion for a stay,-' • ■

Standard of Review

“When this Court reviews the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, ‘ “[w]e review the ... [c]ourt’s legal rulings de novo and its ultimate decision to issue the preliminary injunction for [an excess] of discretion.” ’ Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So.3d 1173, 1176 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006)).
“‘A preliminary injunction should be issued only-when the party seeking an injunction demonstrates:
“f “‘(i) that without the injunction the [party] would suffer irreparable injury; (2) that the [party] has no adequate remedy at law;- (3) that the [party] has at least a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of his case; and (4) that the hardship imposed on the [party opposing the preliminary injunction] by the injunction would not unreasonably outweigh the benefit- accruing to the [party seeking the injunction].””- ,■
“Holiday Isle, 12 So.3d at 1176 (quoting Ormco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Perley v. Tapscan, Inc., 646 So.2d 585, 587 (Ala. 1994) (alterations in Holiday Isle)).”

Monte Sano Research Corp. v. Kratos Defense & Sec. Solutions, Inc., 99 So.3d 855, 861-62 (Ala. 2012).

Discussion

The Board- argues that “[t]he preliminary injunction should be dissolved because the City does not have a likelihood of success on the merits” of-its case. The Board’s brief, at p. 31. The Board argues that the City has no authority or control over the Board, other than the City’s statutory right to elect the-members of the Board pursuant to § 11-50-234, Ala. Code 1975, because the Board is a statutorily created independent corporation tasked with operating the -waterworks system. The Board, argues that neither the 1972 resolution nor the 2015 resolution operates to curtail the Board’s statutory authority to make operational decisions concerning the waterworks system. The Board is correct

It is. undisputed that the Board has authority over the waterworks system. This Court stated in Randall v. Water Works & Sewer Board of Birmingham, 885 So.2d 757, 765 (Ala. 2003), that “Section 11-50-235, Ala. Code 1975, specifies the powers that [a public-utility corporation formed under § 11-50-230 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,] shall have, once created.” Section 11-50-235, Ala. Code 1975, states, in pertinent part:' •

“(a) Each corporation formed under this division shall have the following powers together with all powers incidental thereto or necessary to the discharge thereof in corporate form:
“(4) To acquire, purchase, construct, operate, maintain, enlarge, extend, and improve any system or systems, the operation of which is provided for in the certificate of incorporation of such corporation (whether or not such system or systems were in existence or whether or not such system or systems were privately owned prior to acquisition by such corporation) and to receive, acquire, take, and hold, whether by purchase, gift, lease, devise, or otherwise, real, personal, and mixed property of any nature whatsoever that its board of directors may deem a necessary or convenient part of such system or systems.”

(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to' this statute, the Board has operational control over the waterworks system that supplies water to the City and its residents.

' The City does not dispute that the Board has the authority to operate the waterworks' system but argues that the Board must comply with the law in doing so and that the 1972 resolution and the 2015’ resolution constitute law the Board must comply with in operating the waterworks system. This is so, the City argues, because the Board is merely an agency of the City and, thus, under the City’s authority. We disagree.

The pivotal question in this case concerns the competing jurisdictions- of the City and the Board. Initially, we recognize that a municipality, such as the City, has general authority under § 11-45-1,' Ala. Code 1975, to “adopt ordinances and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state ... to ... preserve the health ... of [its] inhabitants.” A municipality certainly has the authority to adopt ordinances and resolutions concerning the fluoridation of its water supply, an issue that concerns the preservation of the health of its inhabitants, under this general grant of authority. However, the plain language of § 11-45-1 limits a municipality’s authority by noting that any ordinance or resolution adopted must be consistent with the laws of Alabama; § 11^5-1 must be read in pari materia with the other laws of Alabama. Under § 11-50-230 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, the Legislature has established the Board as an independent public-utility corporation and vested it with all authority over the waterworks system. In so doing, the Legislature limited the City’s general authority under § 11 — 45—1 as it relates to the waterworks system and gave that authority to the Board.

The independence of a public-utility corporation, such as the Board, formed pursuant to § 11-50-230 et seq., from the municipality it serves is well established under Alabama law. In Water Works Board of Leeds v. Huffstutler, 292 Ala. 669, 299 So.2d 268 (1974), this Court considered a case in which; “‘[t]he central issue .;. concerned] the independence of public corporations such as the water works board here involved and their right to manage their affairs free of control by the governing bodies of the cites they serve.’ ” 292 Ala. at 674, 299 So.2d at 272 (quoting the trial court’s final judgment adopted as the opinion of this Court). In addressing this issue, this Court, adopting the trial court’s opinion, set forth the origins of public-utility corporations, such as the Board, which demonstrate that the Legislature intended public-utility corporations to be independent of the municipalities they serve:

“‘In order to make it possible for municipalities to finance utility systems without being blocked by the limitations contained in .the Constitution of 1901 (particularly Sections 222 and 225 relating to the creation of debt by municipalities), a number of statutes permitting municipalities to issue revenue bonds were enacted in the early 1.930’s, varying in detail, but in general making such bonds payable out of the revenues of the utility to be constructed, expanded or improved with the proceeds of such bonds. The opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Alabama on the constitutionality of such statutes were sought in several instances, e.g., Opinion of the Justices[ No. 21], 226 Ala. 18, 145 So. 481 (1933) (considering the Goodwyn Act, Act No. 265 adopted at the 1932 Extraordinary Session of the Legislature of Alabama (hereinafter called “the Legislature”)), Opinion of the Justices[ No. 26], 226 Ala. 570, 148 So. 111 (1933) (considering the Kelley Act, Act No. 102 adopted at-the 1933 Extraordinary Session of the Legislature), Opinion of the Justices[ No. 30], 228 Ala. 140, 152 So. 901 (1934) (considering the Carmichael Act, Act No. 107 adopted at the 1933 Extraordinary Session of the Legislature); and several leading test cases concerning such statutes were decided' by the Supreme Court, Bankhead v. Town of Sulligent, 229 Ala. 45, 155 So. 869 (1934), Oppenheim v. City of Florence, 229 Ala. 50, 155 So. 859 (1934), Smith v. Town of Guin, 229 Ala. 61, 155 So. 865 (1934).
“‘A considerable body, of law developed from the State’s experimentation with the power of a municipality to issue its revenue bonds and to use the proceeds thereof to construct or improve a utility which it owned. Although such body of law did in a great number of instances permit desired financing arrangements, the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipality itself was, nevertheless, circumscribed by a fairly elaborate set of rules which could not always accommodate reasonable projects. See Town of Opp v. Donaldson, 230 Ala. 689, 163 So. 332 (1935).
“ ‘The ultimate solution to the complexity of financing municipal utility systems was achieved by legislation permitting the establishment of independent public corporations to own and operate the utility systems for the municipalities to be served by such system. Such public corporations derived their immense usefulness in this respect from their legal status as special political entities created by the Legislature which, so long as they maintained their corporate separation from the municipalities they served, were not subject to the constitutional limitations on such municipalities.’ ” "

292 Ala. at 674-75, 299 So.2d at 272-73 (quoting the trial court’s final judgment adopted as the opinion of this Court). Concerning the independence of public-utility corporations formed under § 11-50-230 et seq., this Court adopted the trial court’s statement that, “‘[i]n a number of eases considering the status of boards organized under the [predecessor statutes to § 11-50-230 et seq.], the Supreme Court has emphasized the corporate independence of such boards, distinct and apart from the cities they serve, and-has thereby preserved their usefulness in financing utility systems.’ ” 292 Ala. at 675, 299 So.2d at 273 (quoting the trial court’s final judgment). .This Court further stated “‘that water boards are independent corporations which do not derive their powers from the cities they serve,’ ” but “ ‘that the grant of the franchise to operate a water system was from the Legislature'in the exercise of its soverign [sic] power and not from the city.’ ” 292 Ala. at 675, 299 So.2d at 274 (quoting the trial court’s final judgment).

This Court," adopting the trial court’s judgment as its" own, definitively stated in Huffstutler:

“ ‘The cases considered establish that it is the law of this State that a public corporation organized under the [predecessor to § 11-50-230 et seq.], such as the Board in this case, is an entity separate and independent from the ■ city which it serves and that the city can lawfully exercise- only such power over such corporations as is conferred on the city by the charter of such corporation and the general laws of the State under which it is organized. If such corporation functioned as a mere arm or agency of the city; subject to the legislative power of the city, it could not, without making a mockery of the Constitution of this State, perform its "intended function of financing and operating municipal utility systems.’ ” ’ •

292 Ala. at 677, 299 So.2d at 275-76 (emphasis added).

Based on Huffstutler, we conclude that the Board is not a mere agency of the City but a public, corporation entirely separate and independent from, the City., Concerning operational decisions of the waterworks system, such as whether to fluoridate the water the Board supplies to the City, the Board is not subject to. the legislative power of the City. Allowing the City to control the Board’s operational decisions concerning the waterworks system by adopting ordinances or resolutions would make a mockery of the Constitution of Alabama in that the Board would not truly be an entirely separate and independent public corporation.

. We hold that the Board is not required to comply with the 1972 resolution or the 2015 resolution. The City’s entire case is based on -its assertion that the Board is required to comply with those resolutions. Accordingly, we, conclude that the City does not have a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of its case.

The City also argues that, even if the Board is not subject to the City’s legislative power, “[f]or 43 years, [the Board] abided by the 1972 [resolution calling for the fluoridation' of the water supply; any objection to that Resolution has been waived and/or is barred by laches.” The City’s brief, at p. 31. The City argues that the Board fluoridated the water it supplied to the City “pursuant to” the 1972 resolution. The City’s argument appears to be that the Board surrendered its operational authority of the waterworks.system to the City by its compliance with the 1972 resolution and that the Board cannot now reassert its operational authority over the waterworks system. We disagree with the City’s characterization of the Board's decision, following the City’s adoption of the 1972 resolution, to fluoridate the water it supplied to the City.

The Board’s decision to fluoridate the water it supplied to the City following the City’s adoption of the 1972 resolution is not an indication that the Board surrendered its operational authority over. the waterworks system to the City at that time. As set forth above, the Board is a public - corporation entirely independent and separate from the, City. The Board exercised its operational authority in choosing to fluoridate the water it supplied to the City. The fact that the City passed the 1972 resolution before the Board exercised its operational authority does not change that fact. -Even if the Board took into consideration the 1972 resolution in deciding to fluoridate the water it supplied to the City, that does not change the fact that the Board alone, as an independent public Corporation, has the authority, as derived from the Legislature, to make all operational decisions concerning the waterworks system. We do not find convincing the City’s argument that the doctrine of waiver or of laches applies in this situation.

Our conclusion that the City does not have a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of its case pretermits discussion of the other issues raised by the Board.

Conclusion

The City does not have a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of its case. We conclude, therefore, that the circuit court erred in granting the City’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Further, our decision is dispositive of the only issue raise! by the City in its declaratory-judgment action against the Board. We also conclude, therefore, that the circuit court erred in denying the Board’s motion to dismiss the City’s declaratory-judgment action. Accordingly, the circuit court’s March 17, 2016, order is reversed and the case is remanded for the entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Stuart, Bolin, Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.

Shaw, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.

SHAW, Justice

(concurring in part and concurring in the result).

I concur in the portion of the main opinion holding that the trial court erred in entering the preliminary injunction sought by the City of Arab. As to the portion of the main opinion reversing the trial court’s denial of the Water Works Board of the City of Arab’s motion to dismiss and directing the entry of a judgment dismissing the complaint, I concur in the result.

This Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from “any interlocutory order granting ... an injunction.” Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P. However, generally, an interlocutory denial of a motion to dismiss is not appealable unless this Court has granted permission to appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P. See, e.g., American Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Burns, 81 So.3d 320, 321 (Ala. 2011); Conseco Fin. Corp. v. Sharman, 828 So.2d 890, 894 (Ala. 2001); and Robinson v. Computer Servicenters, Inc., 360 So.2d 299 (Ala. 1978). So, although it is clear that we have jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal from the order granting the injunction, it is not clear how we can “bootstrap” to that jurisdiction an appeal from an interlocutory ruling on a motion to dismiss that, standing alone, we would have no jurisdiction to decide.

Nevertheless, in City of Birmingham v. Link Carnival, Inc., 514 So.2d 792, 797 (Ala. 1987), it appears that this Court did just that. There is no express holding as to this issue or an analysis in Link Carnival as to how that could be done. It also does not appear that Link Carnival has subsequently been cited for that proposition. Although the authority of Link Carnival appears questionable, it is still, by implication, precedent supporting the main opinion’s holding on this issue. Stare decisis, to which I continue to adhere, counsels that the decision should be followed despite my misgivings.

      . The circuit court appears to be referring to the following four-part test:
      “A preliminary injunction should be issued only when the party seeking an injunction demonstrates:
      "  "(1) that without the injunction the [partyl would suffer irreparable injury; (2) that the [party] has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that the [party] has at least a reasonable phance of success on the ultimate merits of his case; and (4) that the hardship imposed on the [party opposing the preliminary injunction] by the injunction would not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to the [party seeking the injunction].”'
      “Ormco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Perley v. Tapscan, Inc., 646 So.2d 585, 587 (Ala. 1994)).”
      Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So.3d 1173, 1176 (Ala. 2008).

      . As the City notes in its brief, we recognize that this Court has -stated that public-utility corporations formed pursuant to § 11-50-230 et seq. are, in limited respects, considered to be agencies of the municipalities they serve. See Jackson v. Hubbard, 256 Ala. 114, 120, 53 So.2d 723, 728 (1951)("We agree with counsel for appellants, respondents below, that" the supplying of water to a city and its inhabitants' is a municipal function and that the Water Works Board of the City of Auburn is in that sence [sic] an agency of the city.”). In fact, in Huffstutler, this Court noted that very principle from Jackson. See Huffstutler, 292 Ala. at 676, 299 So.2d at 275. However, even if the Board is considered to be an agency of the City in some limited respects] this does not mean that the Board is subject to the City’s legislative power. This Court, adopting the trial court's judgment, explained in Huffstutler:
      ■ " 'The case of City of Mobile v. Cochran, 276 Ala. 530, 165 So.2d 81 (1964), considered the question of whether an officer of the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile was an employee or officer of the city itself within the meaning of the anti-conflict-of-interest statutes which prohibit the city from dealing with its own officers .and employees.... Cochran was an agent.for a fire insurance company, and while he was serving as an officer of the’ Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners, his company submitted a winning bid for fire insurance to cover a project owned by the city. Cochran would share in the premium paid for such insurance. The city declined to pay the premium because it was afraid that Cochran’s status a[s] an officer of the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners made it illegal for the city to have any business dealings with him or his company. Because of its interest in having the legal question decided, the Water Works Board of the City of Mobile, a board organized (like the Leeds Board) under the [predecessor to'§ 11-50-230" et seq.], intervened in the case.
      " ‘The .Court held that Cochran was an officer of a corporation separate and distinct from the City of Mobile and that the payment of- the premium to his company was not barred by the conflict of interest statutes applicable to municipalities.
      ' “Being distinct and separate corporations, the relátionship of appellee Cochran as an officer of the Board does not necessarily clothe him-with any-official duties in connection with the City of Mobile, nor is he necessarily cast as an employee of said municipality by virtue of his official connections with said Board.
      " ‘ "Although there may be some relationship in ultimate objectives of the two, and some kindred authority to engage in activities of a proprietary or governmental character for the benefit of the inhabitants-. of the City of Mobile, and in such respect the Board is an agency or arm of the City of Mobile, nevertheless, the two corporations are distinct, separate and independent corporations, each charged with respective separate -and distinct duties and authority under the law. The .legislature had defined and limited the functions of each corporation, and provided for its officers and prescribed their duties. There are no provisions, for common or mutual control, nor do the same overlap. Each set of officers control in their own right with no cross-currents of authority.” 276 Ala. at 531, 532, [165 So.2d 81].

        " ‘With respect to corporations organized under [the predecessor to. § 11-50-230 et seq.], the Court further said that:

        " ‘ "What we have said above with reference to the distinctions and authority of the City of Mobile and the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners apply with equal force to appellant, City of Mobile, and appellee, Water Works Board; and also to the authority and respective duties of the officers of each corporation. 276 Ala. at 532, [165 So.2d 81].”"‘
      292 Ala. at 676-77, 299 So.2d at 274-75 (quoting and adopting the trial court’s final judgment (emphasis added)).
      For the reasons set forth in the above-quoted portion of Huffstutler, we are not persuaded by the City's argument that the Board is subject to the City’s legislative.power simply because the Board may be considered to be an agency of the City in some limited respects. ,,

      . Our decision today should not be read to alter the general rule that a trial court’s decision denying a party’s motion to dismiss a complaint filed against it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., is not reviewable on appeal. See Conseco Fin. Corp. v. Sharman, 828 So.2d 890, 894 (Ala. 2001). However, in City of Birmingham v. Link Carnival, Inc., 514 So.2d 792, 797, this Court considered an appeal from a preliminary injunction and determined, after answering "the pivotal question” involved in that case, that the plaintiff had no legal basis upon which the plaintiff could prevail. Accordingly, this Court vacated the preliminary injunction and ordered that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed. As in Link Carnival, we have answered the pivotal question involved in the present case, and, on this basis, we are ordering the circuit court to dismiss the City's complaint.


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text:
    K.K. v. LAUDERDALE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150056
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/01/2016
    Reh. denied 08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO. v. Terry C. THOMPSON and Alisa Thompson
    2150066
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/20/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Carla LONGMIRE v. CITY OF MOBILE
    2150075
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Levy Morris LAWSON v. Linda Ann CHARLESTON
    2150095
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/29/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Sharon Marie BURNETTE v. Johnny Ray BURNETTE
    2150107
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/01/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Paul J. VISHAWAY v. BALDWIN COUNTY COMMISSION et al.
    2150112
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/29/2016
    Reh. denied. 09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.R.F. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150119
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/05/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Rodney Norris RIVES, Jr. v. Karen Michelle Falls RIVES
    2150125
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Christopher E. SANSPREE, Sr. v. STERLING BANK
    2150130
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/02/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Garrett E. CARSTARPHEN et al. v. Frank L. LAMBERT
    2150164
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/08/2016.
   Affirmed,


text:
    Roderick BLACKMON v. Jennifer BLACKMON
    2150182
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rebecca Walker TAYLOR v. Christopher J. KENNEDY
    2150193
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    B.D. v. J.H. and R.H.
    2150194
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/01/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    H.C.G. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150202
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/08/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    L.C. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150203
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/08/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    H.C.G. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150218
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/08/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Christopher Andrew ZIMMERMAN v. Leah Mary ZIMMERMAN
    2150227
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/08/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jhermara MOON v. Vincent OKORO
    2150235
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/01/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    W.L.L. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150238
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/22/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    S.S. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150246
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Gilbert JOHNSTON v. Charlotte Mallory RICE
    2150253
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/12/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    John Robins LANGLOW III v. Jackie Jean LANGLOW
    2150256
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/05/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Laurie Catherine DARDEN v. Phillip Michael DARDEN
    2150258
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/14/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Lorenzo PEARSON and Clarissa A. Pearson v. The COMMERCIAL BANK OF OZARK
    2150285
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/01/2016
    Reh. denied. 08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lorenza HICKS v. IRBY CONSTRUCTION CO.
    2150288
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    G.I. v. MORGAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150292
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/30/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    B.I. v. MORGAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150293
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/30/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.C.R. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150296
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.G. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150297
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brittany NIX v. Billy YATES, Tammy Yates, and Thomas Yates
    2150300
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/26/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gary Russell MILLS v. Francis Monalisa MILLS
    2150301
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/09/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Charissa A. SMALLS and Eugene C. Smalls v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al.
    2150308
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.L.W. v. J.D.B.
    2150311
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/02/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lisa ANTOINE v. OXMOOR PRESERVATION/ONE, LLC, Johnson Realty Co., and Hager Co.
    2150315
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
    Reh. denied. 08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lisa Hope ANTOINE v. Alvin JOHNSON et al.
    2150321
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
    Reh. denied. 08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ashley Marie JAMES v. Patrick CAGLE
    2150324
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robin Renee Eslinger SMITH v. Phillip T. SMITH
    2150328
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    D.K. v. N.M. and B.M., Jr.
    2150330
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ronald Perry GRIFFITH v. Brenda Gail GRIFFITH
    2150334
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/19/2016
   Dismissed,


text:
    Robert Dale ENTREKIN and Amanda Entrekin v. Jeffrey M. ROBINSON and Ramona Robinson
    2150337
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
    Reh. denied. 08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Peter A. MCINISH v. Jennifer S. MCINISH
    2150340
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/22/2016
    Reh. denied 09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Deborah S. GAZZIER v. Edward H. GAZZIER
    2150346
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/30/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    James Taylor FRANKLIN v. Brandie HOWARD
    2150351
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/01/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Melissa P. PARKER v. Douglas R. PARKER III
    2150353
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
    Reh. denied. 08/26/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    H.J.B. v. SHELBY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150354
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    H.J.B. v. SHELBY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150355
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.L. v. SHELBY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150356
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Veronica KEY v. Kenneth KEY
    2150363
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/22/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    W.R. v. DALLAS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150366
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.R. v. DALLAS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150367
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Skylar Blake RAY v. Kayla Collins RAY
    2150369
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/02/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Amanda Joy GATES v. Jerry Scott GATES
    2150376
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/12/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Chris PATTON v. Elizabeth PATTON
    2150378
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/08/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Douglass PEGUES v. SHAMROCK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
    2150381
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Joshua Michael THOMAS v. Elsie Wells THOMAS
    2150384
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/01/2016
    Reh. denied. 08/12/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Norma GOVAN v. Douglas LIGHTNER, as the personal representative for the estate of Asia Lightner, deceased
    2150386
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.J. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150392
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/22/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.J. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150393
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/22/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.J. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150394
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/22/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.J. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150395
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/22/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.P. v. JACKSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150396
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.P. v. JACKSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150397
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.P. v. JACKSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150398
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.G.P. v. JACKSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150399
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.G.P. v. JACKSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150400
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.G.P. v. JACKSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150401
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Timothy Glenn BURCH, Jr. v. CITY OF TUSCALOOSA
    2150403
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/12/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tom SOLICH and Christine Solich v. Lynn GREER and Rebecca Greer
    2150411
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/02/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.O. v. CALHOUN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150413
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rebecca Shipp CLEVELAND v. Edna TUCKER
    2150417
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.B. v. LEE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150419
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/22/2016
    Reh. denied. 09/02/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    T.B. v. LEE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150420
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/22/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Thomas J. SCOVILL v. Cathy A. SCOVILL
    2150425
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/30/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    GEORGIA-PACIFIC CONSUMER PRODUCTS, LP v. Debbie ANDRUS, as next friend of Nicholas Clowers and Morgan Clowers
    2150426
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
    Reh. denied. 09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    CITY OF GADSDEN v. Lonnie NIPPER
    2150433
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/29/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    R.R. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150436
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Walter HERNANDEZ-ULLOA v. Damian DELIKAT
    2150441
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/02/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Bryana M. LINDSAY v. George E. LINDSAY III
    2150442
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/09/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    I.S. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150444
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/04/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    S.A.H. v. J.H.M. and J.M.
    2150446
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/05/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    D.E. v. RUSSELL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150448
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/28/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Timothy W. CLARKE v. Gina Lynn THOMAS
    2150449
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    MERCHANTS ADJUSTMENT SERVICE, INC., Gulf Coast Financial Associates, Inc., and Gregory B. McAtee, P.C. v. Jerry L. TURNER
    2150452
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/14/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Terry MCKELVY v. GOSS ELECTRIC, INC.
    2150453
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/09/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    A.M. v. S.M. and G.M.
    2150465
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/05/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jeremy G. ALDRIDGE v. Deidra G. ALDRIDGE
    2150466
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/18/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Gerald M. CIMIS v. CITY OF PRATTVILLE BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENT
    2150470
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/26/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    L.T. v. ETOWAH COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150471
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/08/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Imran M. KHAN v. Alicia White KHAN
    2150472
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.L. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150475
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/05/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.L. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150476
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/05/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.L. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150477
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/05/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lisa Michelle LYONS v. Davon Monteaous LYONS
    2150480
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.D.B. v. C.K.W.
    2150483
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/08/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kenia ARITAS v. MI PUEBLO GROCERY
    2150488
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael SMITH v. CITY OF MOBILE
    2150493
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/05/2016
    Reh. denied. 09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tommy SMITH v. BANK OF AMERICA et al.
    2150496
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/05/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jessi BRYAN v. Travis BLANKENSHIP
    2150497
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/12/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Elbert ABDUR-RASHID v. Hanane TOURIZ
    2150500
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/09/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Allyson SANDERS v. Lewis SANDERS
    2150502
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Angelica JONES v. Jonathan Scott JONES
    2150504
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/21/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    C.Y. v. D.O. and P.O.
    2150506
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/02/2016.
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.D.K. v. MOBILE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150507
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/09/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gerald WATKINS, Sr. v. Tamara BENNETT
    2150510
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    HEADWATERS, LLC v. AIR-RITE CONTRACTORS, INC.
    2150512
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Caleb Eugene STEWART v. Brandie Nicole STEWART
    2150514
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/02/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    B.F. v. K.H.
    2150520
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Christopher G. MEADOWS v. Lisa Meadows CAMPBELL
    2150526
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/02/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Mitchell Otis EDWARDS v. Breeshun (Callier) EDWARDS
    2150530
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/06/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Kenneth S. TRAYWICK v. Michael L. KIDD
    2150531
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/26/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Carmenita CADY v. Theodis CADY, Jr.
    2150536
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/02/2016
   Affirmed,


text:
    Mack BARLOW v. RUSTY’S FEED & SEED, LLC
    2150540
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/22/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    A.P. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150544
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/26/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rita Marie EDWARDS v. Michael Val EDWARDS
    2150545
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/01/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    C.C. v. TALLAPOOSA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150552
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/21/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    C.C. v. TALLAPOOSA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150553
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/21/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    T.F. v. CALHOUN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150556
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/30/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.F. v. CALHOUN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150557
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/30/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Chana HODGES v. Christopher BLACK
    2150559
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Billie Jo GRIFFIN v. Samuel Hurd GRIFFIN
    2150568
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/26/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Mecheca Shante PRINCE v. Jeffery Josa PRINCE
    2150571
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/30/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Bartley WATKINS v. Susan Rae WATKINS
    2150576
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/02/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Mecheca PRINCE v. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM and Jeffery Prince
    2150578
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/30/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.A. v. J.T. and R.T.
    2150581
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/09/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Elizabeth ZWIEBEL v. Lewis SANDERS
    2150586
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    R.B. v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150591
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/04/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Khan RAHMAN v. SOMERSET APARTMENT MANAGEMENT LLC
    2150593
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/13/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Eric BRIER v. ALABAMA BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES et al.
    2150598
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/08/2016
   Transferred to Ct. of Crim. App. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.


text:
    Kenneth E. MOORE II v. Jennifer OSMAN and Hossam Osman
    2150602
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/05/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    B.M.S. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150605
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Elbert L. COLE, Jr. v. Ashlie BARNES
    2150610
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/06/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Rodney THORNTON v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC.
    2150615
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/10/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    HASRA, INC. v. PAWS, INC.
    2150620
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/02/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Glenn H. GLASS v. Jennifer R. MILAZZO f/k/a Jennifer R. Glass
    2150621
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/11/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    MOBILE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES v. G.G. and J.H.
    2150624
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/25/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Glenn H. GLASS v. Jennifer R. MILAZZO f/k/a Jennifer R. Glass
    2150634
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/11/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    S.H. v. CALHOUN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150635
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sergio ANDREWS v. Kayla MOORE
    2150636
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kenneth WARD v. Don GRIFFIN
    2150641
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/28/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Deborah RAMER v. Matthew C. RAMER
    2150642
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/01/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Brenda VARNER and Dean Scott v. SOUTHEAST ALABAMA REGIONAL PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION et al.
    2150643
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/11/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Annessa WHITE v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2006-1
    2150644
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/04/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    N.M. v. T.T.
    2150647
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/10/2016
   Transferred to Talladega Cir. Ct. for trial de novo pursuant to Rule 28(D), Ala.R. Juv.P.


text:
    N.M. v. T.T.
    2150648
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/10/2016
   Transferred to Talladega Cir. Ct. for trial de novo pursuant to Rule 28(D), Ala.R. Juv.P.


text:
    Michael Allen ALFRED v. Susan Murphy ALFRED
    2150649
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/30/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.J. v. D.T.
    2150654
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/30/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Catherine L. PRINCE v. Jeffrey Z. PRINCE
    2150656
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.P. v. BARBOUR COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150666
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    R.A.F. v. COFFEE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150669
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/15/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Earletha MCCALL v. STATE BOARD OF APPEALS
    2150671
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/27/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    T.F. v. MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150672
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    B.L.D. v. C.D.T.
    2150674
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/13/2016
   Transferred to Jefferson Cir. Ct., Bessemer Div., pursuant to Rule 28(D), Ala. R.Juv.P.


text:
    D.S., Sr. v. PIKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150677
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/19/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    T.B. v. J.H. and S.H.
    2150678
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/09/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Hubert W. CANNON, Jr. v. Lynda F. CANNON
    2150682
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/27/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Jeffrey WEBB and Belinda Webb v. AT & T CORP.
    2150683
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    JERRY’S TRUCKING, INC. v. Curtis RHODES
    2150691
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/08/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Matthew Carl NABORS, Jr. v. Yolanda Nabors SMITH
    2150694
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/29/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Jason B. THOMAS et al. v. CITY OF TROY et al.
    2150696
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/01/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Elizabeth A. LAW v. Tarvis LAW
    2150697
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/08/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION v. GLENBROOK AT OXMOOR I, LLC
    2150706
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/15/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    Marguerite Louise (Eckl) POOL v. James Norman POOL
    2150711
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/15/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Benaye CHANCE v. Walter GRAHAM
    2150713
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/26/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Irving JOHNSON v. Ruby D. SALTER et al.
    2150714
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    ALABAMA TRUCK & EQUIPMENT, LLC v. Brad MILLER and Big M Excavating, Inc.
    2150716
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/16/2016
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.K.R. v. E.S.
    2150718
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/09/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Curtis Wayne EDWARDS v. Samuel Ray HOLMES et al.
    2150720
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/26/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Montrezs LEWIS v. STATE
    2150721
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/01/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    J.S. v. In re: M.N.R., minor child
    2150727
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    J.S. v. In re: N.G.R., minor child
    2150728
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Dusty HAVNER v. BOB WALLACE APPLIANCE SALES, INC.
    2150729
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/23/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Robert Charles BLACKMON IV v. Angelia Deniese BLACKMON
    2150733
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/07/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Allen D. STEWART v. Kathrin S. HOQUE
    2150735
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/08/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    K.H.W. v. In re: G.A.F.W., minor child
    2150736
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/08/2016
   Transferred to DeKalb Cir. Ct. for trial de novo pursuant to Rule 28 (D), Ala. R.Juv.P.


text:
    MCP HOLDINGS, INC., et al. v. RESTORATION SERVICES OF ETOWAH COUNTY, INC.
    2150738
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/01/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Miryan Z. TENORIO-TAYLOR v. Paul Evander TAYLOR
    2150746
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/02/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE TTR CONSTRUCTION, LLC, et al. (In re: TTR Construction, LLC, et al. v. Judge Bentley H. Patrick, Circuit Court of Jefferson County)
    2150747
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/20/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    Larry Moore MILLER v. Judy Shipman MILLER
    2150750
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/26/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Ruth HOOD v. PECO FOODS, INC.
    2150763
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/15/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Tamara NELSON and Anthony Nelson v. John T. MCDONALD, M.D.
    2150764
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/29/2016
   Transferred to Sup. Ct. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.


text:
    L.P. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150765
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/14/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Shelley Switzer BAUGH (In re: Joseph Christopher Baugh v. Shelley Switzer Baugh)
    2150766
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/25/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    E.B.C. v. STATE EX REL. A.B.
    2150769
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/27/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE MOBILE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES (In re: Mobile County Department of Human Resources v. In re B.A.S. and C.L.S., minor children)
    2150771
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/12/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE MOBILE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES (In re: Mobile County Department of Human Resources v. In re L.S.W., minor child)
    2150772
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/12/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    Ex parte Melvin Graham (In re: Melvin GRAHAM v. ALABAMA BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT)
    2150773
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/06/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Van ALLEN (In re: Julie Allen v. Van Allen)
    2150777
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/04/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    B.W. v. CALHOUN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    2150790
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/09/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE MARSHALL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES (In re: Marshall County Department of Human Resources v. J.V.)
    2150795
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/01/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    Reginald JONES v. Albert STERNS, M.D.
    2150802
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/13/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Richard D. KENNEDY (In re: Richard D. Kennedy v. Judge Charles A. Graddick)
    2150812
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/22/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    James Randall LAWLESS and John Doe and One 2007 Toyota Tacoma v. STATE
    2150816
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/09/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    James Chadwick MILLER v. Miranda Dell LOCKHART
    2150826
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/26/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    VALERIO’S AUTO SALES v. Raytoria MCBRYDE
    2150827
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    07/18/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Terry G. BLAND (In re: Terry G. Bland v. Judge W.A. Shashy)
    2150831
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/17/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    Anthony W. JONES v. Bobby N. BENTLEY, Dianne J. Bentley, and Aaron Bentley
    2150837
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/16/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Alice PLANT v. William J. PLANT
    2150841
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/03/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    J.T.B. v. In re: A.J.B., minor child
    2150842
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/09/2016
   Transferred to Sup. Ct. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.


text:
    STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. FORD MILLS APARTMENTS, LTD
    2150846
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/20/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Melvin STEIB v. ARMY AVIATION CENTER FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
    2150857
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/19/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Richard D. KENNEDY (In re: Richard D. Kennedy v. Judge Charles A. Graddick)
    2150860
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    08/11/2016
   Petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Terry G. BLAND (In re: Terry G. Bland v. Judge W.A. Shashy)
    2150861
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    09/01/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.