text:
    Patrick Daniel COSTAIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2911
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    October 12, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County; James W. Midelis, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2016CF114A.

Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    J.F., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3158
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 12, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Stacy Ross, Judge; . L.T. Case No. 16-001876DLB.

Affirmed.


text:
    WING KEI HO, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3257
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 12, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Peter D. Blanc, Judge;- L.T. Case No. 50-2012-CA-006509-XXXX-MB.

Affirmed.


text:
    Guilibaldo Gonzalez LOPEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-142
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 12, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; John S. Kastrenakes, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502014CF 008551A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Marcos RAMOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2354
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 12, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Michael A. Robinson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13-13580CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Robert HARVEY a/k/a Robert L. Harvey, Appellant, v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING LLC, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2825
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    October 12, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Peter D. Blanc, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2014CA006293 AW.

Affirmed.


text:
    Geovany Javier ZUNIGA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-1037
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    October 12, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Glenn Kelley, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2008-CF-011497-FXXX-MB.

Affirmed.


text:
    David Charles STEVENSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-3920
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 12, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Lisa M. Porter, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13-017343-CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Gerald WALKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-1232
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 12, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Charles E. Burton, Judge; L.T. Case No. 501996CF 004502A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Robert MORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2020
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 12, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Michael A. Robinson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 14-14141 CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Ronald B. LOSNER, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A., as Trustee FOR LSF9 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST, The Australian of Palm Beach Condominium Association Inc., Jessica Peterson, City of West Palm Beach Florida, City of Palm Beach Gardens Florida, United States of America and Carol S. Callahan, Appellees.
    No. 4D16-2190
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 12, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Martin H. Colin, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502012CA000780XXXXMB.

Affirmed.


text:
    Eleanor H. BASS, Appellant, v. YELLOW BOOK SALES & DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2285
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 12, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Michael L. Gates, Judge; L.T. Case No. 10-5713.

Affirmed.


text:
    RICHARD MCDONALD CONSTRUCTION INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA, Appellee.
    No. 4D14-2476
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 19, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Gregory M. Keyser, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2013CA011592XXXXMB.

Affirmed.


text:
    Cory MINGO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D14-2766
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 19, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Paul L. Backman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 12014060CF10A.

Affirmed,


text:
    Keith BYRD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D14-1936
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    October 19, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Barry M. Cohen, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502009CF014532A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Sumora LIDELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-1499
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 19, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Krista Marx, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 502014CF000511AXXXXMB and 502014CF000507AXXXXMB.

Affirmed.


text:
    Jean Robert LAGRANDEUR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2279
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 19, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; James W. McCann, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562014CF000092A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Teresa SANTALUCIA, individually and as Settlor of the 2006 Teresa Santalucia Irrevocable Trust, and Aida Santalucia (“Aida”), individually and as the former Beneficiary of the Trust, Appellants, v. John WHITTLES, Esq. and Richman Greer, P.A., a professional association, Stephen P. Mathison, Esq. of Stephen Mathison P.A., a professional association, Jeffrey C. Schneider, Esq. and Levine Kellogg Lehman, Schneider, Grossman LLP, a limited liability partnership, Scott L. Silver, Esq. and Silver Law Group, Appellees.
    No. 4D16-2938
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 19, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Cheryl Caraeuzzo, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2015CA005657XXXXMB.

Affirmed.


text:
    Michael MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-1133
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 19, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Paul L. Backman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13015743CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Ramiro REYNA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2492
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 19, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Okeechobee County; Dan L. Vaughn, Judge; L.T. Case No. 47-2014-CF-0075.

Affirmed.


text:
    William Webster MILLSAPS, Appellant, v. GUARDIANSHIP OF Frances BERKOWITZ and Elizabeth Savitt, as Limited Guardian of the Person and Plenary Guardian of the Property of Frances Berkowitz, Appellees.
    No. 4D16-2132
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 26, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Howard K. Coates, Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2014-GA-000630-XXXX-NB.

Affirmed.


text:
    Iris L. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1491
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed September 26, 2017
   3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County, Jonathan D. Ohlman, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Z.M., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1082
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Gail A. Adams, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Donte T. MORGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case Nos. 5D17-901 and 5D17-954
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Robert J. Egan, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Steven Christopher HILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-4216
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volu-sia County, Joseph G. Will, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Darius GRAYSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2661
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, Robin C. Lemonidis, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ray CROSBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2646
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County, Lawrence J. Sementó, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Rodney D. WORTHEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2632
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.800Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County, William G. Law, Jr, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Roger SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2414
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.800Appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County, Melanie F. Chase, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Sayvon THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1879
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.800Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Man S. Apte, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Rakeem BLOCK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1829
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, David Dugan, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Corey C. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1587
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Marc L. Lubet, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    D.M.W., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1205
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volu-sia County, A. Kathleen McNeilly, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Joseph BAKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1171
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County, Willard Pope, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    David Matthew LINGO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-924
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County, Anthony M. Tatti, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jason A. BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-834
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Leticia J. Marques, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Stacy L. FREEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-827
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County, Mark A. Nacke, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Carl E. BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-537
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County, Robert W, Hodges, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jeff C. RIVERS-FINNEY, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and State of Florida, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-525
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County, Marlene M. Ava, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ancelemo RIVERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-377
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bre-vard County, Jeffrey F. Mahl, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Earnest L. MILLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-381
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Mark S. Blechman, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Tyrone DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-236
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volu-sia County, Leah R. Case, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Thomas HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-185
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   ■3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Renee A. Roche, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kyle POTTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-89
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Citrus County, Richard A. Howard, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Gabriel BORRELI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-4226
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Osceola County, Jon B. Morgan, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Gilbert DUDLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-4220
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County, Raul A. Zambrano, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jose Antonio TORRES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-4089
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Greg A. Tynan, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ronald Lee KEENER, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3154
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for St. Johns County, Howard M. Maltz, Judge.

'AFFIRMED.


text:
    Richard Alfonz BENNETT, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-2478
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volu-sia County, Terence R. Perkins, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Brendan Tremaine GRIFFIN, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross Appellant.
    Case No. 5D16-1937
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Mark S. Blechman, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Roy APONTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-1526
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Keith A. Carsten, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Richard Edward BRIDGES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-891
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Citrus County, Richard A. Howard, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael Scott SHEMANSKY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-991
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Marc L. Lubet, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Patrick S. WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-192
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Mark S. Blechman, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Joseph A. MEHTALA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D15-764
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Christi L. Underwood, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Roger Dennis CHURCHILL, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D14-1081
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2017
   Appeal fi’om the Circuit Court for Citrus County, Richard A. Howard, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    PALATKA HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant, v. PUTNAM COUNTY and Putnam County Solid Waste Collection and Disposal District, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D16-4113
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 17, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam County, Scott C. Dupont, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Joseph M. MARCIAL, Appellant, v. T.D. BANK, N.A., Ana Marcial, Amsouth Bank, Regions Bank and City of Deltona, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-429
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 17, 2017
   Appeal from' the Circuit Court for Volu-sia County, Sandra C. Upchurch, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    FAITH DELIVERANCE TEMPLE, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF ORLANDO, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3901
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 17, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Janet C. Thorpe, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Christopher CHIPOURAS, Appellant, v. Kimberly CHIPOURAS, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3729
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 17, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volu-sia County, Karen Adams Foxman, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Lawrence WALTER, Jr., Appellant, v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the United States of America, Angel Walter, and Magnolia Park of Lake County Homeowners Association, Inc., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D16-105
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 17, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County, Sandra E. Champ, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


author: Damoorgian, J.

text:
    DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, O/B/O Jordyn BAKER, Appellant, v. Gustaras BAKER, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D16-3129
    4D16-3131
    4D16-3132
    4D16-3175
    4D16-3176
    4D16-3179
    4D16-3180
    4D16-3183
    4D16-3184
    4D16-3185
    4D16-3186
    4D16-3189
    4D16-3192
    4D16-3194
    4D16-3298
    4D16-3300
    4D16-3302
    4D16-3316
    4D16-3317
    4D16-3325
    4D16-3332
    4D16-3335
    4D16-3336
    4D16-3338
    4D16-3342
    4D16-3344
    4D16-3346
    4D16-3352
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 13, 2017]

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Carrie R. McNair, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
   Damoorgian, J.

In this consolidated appeal, the Department of Revenue (the “DOR”) appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for civil contempt due to failure to pay child support in twenty-eight separate cases. In each case, the court’s denial was based on its conclusion that the DOR’s service of its motion via U.S. Mail was insufficient. Because this method of service is legislatively authorized and satisfies due process concerns, we reverse and remand.

In each of the underlying cases, the DOR filed a motion for civil contempt based on each appellee’s non-payment of court-ordered child support. Some of the appellees were ordered to pay child support in conjunction with final dissolutions of marriage entered pursuant to Chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes and others were ordered to pay child support in conjunction with paternity judgments entered pursuant to Chapter 742 of the Florida Statutes. In each case, the DOR attached a certificate of service representing that a copy of its motion was served on the appellee “by regular US Mail.” Similarly, the DOR sent a notice of hearing to each appellee “by regular US Mail.” The notices provided that “FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE HEARING MAY RESULT IN THE COURT ISSUING A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT FOR YOUR ARREST. IF YOU ARE ARRESTED, YOU MAY BE HELD IN JAIL UP TO 48 HOURS BEFORE A HEARING IS HELD.”

Each of the appellees failed to' appear at their respective hearings, which took place in front of a hearing officer. Each hearing officer recommended that the court grant the DOR’s motion for contempt and issue a writ of bodily attachment with varied purge amounts based on the individual facts of the case. Despite the foregoing, the trial court entered 'a blanket • order rejecting each hearing officer’s recommendations and denying the DOR’s motions. In its order, the court found that, although permitted by statute, notice of a civil contempt proceeding provided by mail was constitutionally inadequate. This was incorrect.

Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.615(b) governs the service of motions for civil contempt in support matters, and provides':

(b) Motion and Notice. Civil contempt may be initiated by motion. The motion must recite the essential facts constituting the acts alleged to be contemptuous. No civil contempt may be imposed without notice to the alleged eontemnor and without providing the alleged eontemnor with an opportunity to be heard. The civil contempt motion and notice of hearing may be served in accordance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 provided notice is reasonably calculated to apprise the alleged eontemnor of the pendency of the proceedings. The notice must specify the time and place of the hearing and must contain the following language: “FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE HEARING MAY RESULT IN THE COURT ISSUING A WRIT OF BODILY ATTACHMENT FOR YOUR ARREST. IF YOU ARE ARRESTED, YOU MAY BE HELD IN JAIL UP TO 48 HOURS BEFORE A HEARING IS HELD.” This notice must also state, whether electronic recording or a court reporter is provided by the court or whether a court reporter, if desired, must be provided by the party.

Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516(b)(2), in turn, states:

Service on and by all parties who are not represented by an attorney and who do not designate an e-mail address, and on and by all attorneys excused from e-mail service, must be made by .delivering a copy of the document or by mailing it to the party or attorney at their last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Service by mail is complete upon mailing.

Based on the foregoing, in a civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support, “service by mail is sufficient.” Pennington v. Pennington, 390 So.2d 809, 810 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

Additionally, both Chapter 61 (governing dissolution of marriages) and 742 (the paternity chapter) expressly provide that service of process via mail in child support actions comports with due process. In order to receive certain federal funding, the Legislature enacted section's 742.032(1) and 61.13(7i)(a) of the Florida Statutes, wherein it created a State Case Registry system which requires “each party to any paternity or child support proceeding” to file “information on location and identity of the party” with the tribunal and update that information as appropriate. Because the parties are statutorily required to keep their contact information current and accurate, the Legislature also provided that in any child support enforcement action, “the court of competent jurisdiction shall deem state due process requirements for notice and service of process to be met with respect to the party upon delivery of written notice to the most recent residential or employer address filed with the tribunal and State Case Registry.” § 742.032(2), Fla. Stat. (2016); see. also §. 61.13(7)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016),

Despite this authority, the trial court found that notice of a motion for civil contempt by U.S. mail is constitutionally insufficient and, in doing so, also implicitly found that sections ,742.032(2) . and 61.13(7)(c) were unconstitutional. “The constitutionality of a state statute is a pure question of law subject to de novo review.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So.3d 906, 911 (Fla. 2016).

When considering the constitutionality of a statute, including a notice statute, courts “have a ‘duty if reasonably possible ... to adopt a reasonable interpretation of a statute which removes it farthest from constitutional infirmity,’ ” State ex rel. Pittman v. Stanjeski, 562 So.2d 673, 677 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Corn v. State, 332 So.2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1976) (footnote omitted)). “In interpreting a statute under constitutional challenge, we also have a responsibility to ‘avoid declaring a statute unconstitutional if such statute can be fairly construed in a constitutional manner.’ ” Id. (quoting Sandlin v. Criminal Justice Standards & Training Comm’n, 531 So.2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. 1988)).

“While a person facing civil contempt is not entitled to all of the due process rights afforded to a person facing indirect criminal contempt, he or she is nonetheless entitled to a proceeding that meets the fundamental fairness requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Woolf v. Woolf, 901 So.2d 905, 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). “This requires that the alleged contemnor be provided with adequate notice and an opportunity tp be heard.” Id. “Determining whether,a particular method of notice is ‘reasonably calculated’ to provide adequate notice requires ‘due regard for the practicalities and .peculiarities .of the case.’ ” Vosilla v. Rosado, 944 So.2d 289, 294 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (I960)). “Subject to this limitation, the legislature has the authority to determine the extent and character of the notice which shall be given by the state” before adverse action is taken against a party. Dawson v. Saada, 608 So.2d 806, 808 (Fla. 1992) (noting that the legislature has authority to determine notice requirements for tax. deed sale).

The Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Stcmjeski is illustrative of these principles. 562 So.2d at 677-78. There, the court considered whether a provision within chapter 61 which allowed the clerk of court to automatically enter a judgment for unpaid child support after providing notice via certified mail complied with due process. Id. It held that it did, “fínd[ing] ho due process problem with the utilization of certified mail as a means to give notice under the circumstances where the obligor (a) was served personally in the original proceedings and (b) was directed to provide the clerk with his mailing address and any subsequent changes to that address.’-’ Id. at 679. Considering similar notice issues in the context of a tax deed sale, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that service of notice of a tax deed sale via mail to the titleholder’s last known address does not violate due process, even when the titleholder does not actually receive the notice, so long as the property appraiser has no reason to know or suspect that the address was no longer the titleholder’s correct address. Vosilla, 944 So.2d at 296 - 99. Collectively, these cases provide that notice by mail is sufficient for due process purposes when the party being notified has an ongoing duty to maintain its correct address with-the notifying agency and thd notifying agency has no indication that the address is incorrect. See also § 456.035, Fla. Stat. (providing that persons licensed by the Florida Department of Health are required to notify the Department of any change in address and, because of this requirement, service by regular mail to licensee’s last-known address of. record constitutes sufficient notice).

In the instant cases, the DOR sent ap-pellees a copy of its contempt motion as' well as the notice of hearing containing the required language outlined in Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.615(b) via IT.S. mail to each appellees’ last known address. Each appelleé was personally served in the underlying dissolution or paternity action giving rise to-the judgment requiring the payment of child-support and thereby knew that he or she had a continuing obligation to pay child support. Further, each appellee was required by statute to keep his or her mailing address updated in the State Court Registry. Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court erred in ruling that notice by mail was inadequate and reverse and remand each case for further proceedings.

Reversed and, remanded. .

Warner and Taylor, JJ., concur.

      . The other appellees and their case numbers are listed as follows: 4D16-3131/Paretty, 4D16-3132/Pierre, 4D16-3175/Philius, 4D16-3176/Muse, 4D16-3179/Henderson, 4016-3180/Williams, 4D16-3183/Puckett, . Jr., 4D16-3184/Guerrier, 4D16-3185/Justafort, 4D16-3186/Sanders, III, 4D16-3189/Thomp-kins, 4D16-3192/Davis, 4D16-3194/Shep-pard, 4D16-3298/Brown, 4D16-3300/Brown, Jr., 4D16-3302/Sobush, 4D16-3316/Dawson, 4D16-3317/Forrest, 4D16-3325/Hall, 4D16-3332/Colson,. 4D.16-3335/Bent, 4D16-333 6/Griffin, 4D16-3338/Williams, 4D16-3342/Fraser, 4D16-3344/Martinez, 4D16-3346/Dardy and 4D16-3352/Jean.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Guillermo Antonio MUNGIA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2784
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 20, 2017]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Alan T. Lipson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed. See Jones v. State, 189 So.3d 858 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

Warner, Conner and Kuntz, JJ., concur.


author: May, J.

text:
    Gregory M. OCHALEK, Appellant, v. Antonio RIVERA and Jocelyne Gomez, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-165
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 20, 2017]

      Gregory M. Ochalek of Gregory M. Ochalek, P.L.L.C, Miami, for appellant.
    No brief filed on behalf of appellees.
   May, J.

An attorney appeals a sanctions order entered against him. He argues the trial court erred in entering the order because he was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the court failed to make a bad faith finding and articulate the grounds for the sanctions. We agree and reverse.

The attorney previously represénted the mother in a family law dispute. He filed three motions- to withdraw. Following his first.motion, he filed a limited notice of appearance regarding a discovery matter. He subsequently filed two agreed, motions to withdraw, with the final motion reflecting the mother had obtained new counsel and the father was representing himself pro se.

The'mother’s new counsel filed a pleading, and the trial court granted the attorney’s motion to withdraw. When the father failed to respond to the pleading, the mother’s new counsel moved for a default.

The attorney suggests that although he had withdrawn from representation of the mother, he was still her “non-advocate” counsel. He claims the mother retained him to review her new counsel’s billing methods, case progress, and provide “strategic advice.” Due to this relationship, the mother asked him to attend the hearing on the motion for default.

He claims he pulled the docket to prepare for the hearing, and discovered that the mother’s new counsel filed a pleading before he withdrew as counsel. He appeared at the hearing on the motion for default and argued that the new counsel had inappropriately filed a pleading before he withdrew and had not filed a notice of appearance or substitution of counsel. He claims to have told the trial court that the Florida Bar had disciplined the new counsel in the past, and the father was unaware of any record activity since the new counsel became the'mother’s attorney.

The father filed a motion to strike the mother’s pleading six days before the attorney claims to have attended the hearing. In the motion, the father alleged the attorney informed him about the pending motion for default, and he moved for sanctions against the mother’s new counsel. He claimed that the new counsel was aware the father was pro se,-but served- her pleading and default motion on the fathers previous lawyer, who had withdrawn. '

The trial court denied the motion for default in light of the father’s motion to strike.' It also denied the father’s motion to strike and for sanctions against the mother’s new counsel.

The mother’s new counsel then set the father’s deposition. The same day, the attorney filed a notice of appearance so he could attend the deposition. The father failed to appear for the deposition.

The mother’s new counsel then filed a petition for a rule to show cause why the father should not be held in contempt for missing the deposition. She also moved to strike the attorney’s new notice of appearance and for sanctions against him. The motion alleged that the attorney was interfering in the case despite no longer representing the mother.

The mother requested the court to hold the attorney responsible for the fees and costs stemming from the missed deposition, and timé spent preparing the motion for sanctions. The attorney responded in opposition detailing his “non-advocate” relationship with the mother. He argued there was no record evidencé to support the mother’s allegations in the motion for sanctions. And, he requested an evidentia-ry hearing.

The trial court granted the motion for sanctions and entered the following order.

Granted. Mr. Ochalek’s is barred from interfering and involving, himself any further in the above captioned matter. Unless [the mother] comes into court and tells the court she no longer wishes Ms. Bassichis to represent her and wants Mr. Gregory M. Ochalek to represent her instead. Mr. Ochalek shall not file pleadings in this matter; The court award two (2) hour of attorney fees to respondent’s counsel, reasonable and necessary at $300 per hour, totaling $600 to be paid to Jodie Bassichis PA within thirty days (30). In regards to the order- to show cause, the court request same to be a- special set hearing. -

(Errors in the original). From the order, the attorney now appeals.

The'attorney argues the order is deficient because the trial court did not: 1) list the authority it relied' upon to impose sanctions; 2) make an express finding of bad faith' conduct; and 3) provide an opportunity to be heard.

We review a trial court’s sanctions order for an abuse of discretion, Rivero v. Meister, 46 So.3d 1161, 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Generally, a court may only award attorney’s fees if authorized by a statute, rule, or contract. Bane v. Bane, 775 So.2d 938, 940 (Fla. 2000). But, trial courts have the inherent authority to assess attorney’s fees for attorney misconduct. Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So.2d 221, 224 (Fla. 2002).

This inherent authority is known as the “inequitable conduct doctrine,” and is reserved for those extreme cases where a party acts in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. Id,.; see also Bitterman v. Bittemnan, 714 So.2d 356, 365 (Fla. 1998) (recognizing that such orders are rare).

- The inherent authority of the court- carries .with it the obligation of restrained use and due process. Moakley, 826 So.2d at 227. If the court exercises its inherent authority to assess attorneys’ fees against an attorney, it “must be based upon an express finding of bad faith- conduct and must be supported by detailed factual findings describing-the specific acts of bad faith .conduct that resulted in the unnecessary incurrence of attorneys’ fees.” Id.

• “Thus, a finding of bad- faith conduct must be predicated on a high degree of specificity in the factual finding.” Id. And, the amount of the award must be directly related to the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as a result of the specific bad faith conduct of the attorney. Id. “Moreover, such a sanction is appropriate only after notice and an opportunity to be heard-including the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence.” Id.

We have reversed orders when they failed to contain factual findings or state the basis for awarding personal sanctions. Rickard v. Bornscheuer, 937 So.2d 311, 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Similarly, we have reversed orders where notice and an opportunity to be heard are lacking. Id.

Hei’e, the trial court failed to make an express finding of bad faith conduct. It failed to make any detailed factual findings describing the specific conduct that resulted in the mother’s unnecessary incurrence of attorneys’ fees. The order merely recites'that the attorney must pay $600 to the mother’s new counsel because the attorneys’ fees were “reasonable and necessary.” This conclusory statement is insufficient under Moakley.

We therefore reverse and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Gross and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.


author: Gross, J.

text:
    David Stephen REIDY, Appellant, v. Liudmyla Y. REIDY, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-687
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 20, 2017]

      Carla Lowry of Lowry at Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Daniel A. Bushell of Bushell Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   Gross, J.

After trial, the circuit court rejected the Former Wife’s claim for alimony. The original judge granted a motion for disqualification. A successor judge ordered the payment of temporary alimony in a lump sum and monthly payments pending appeal. We reverse these awards because the successor judge did not apply the correct standard for an award of post-judgment temporary alimony when alimony has been rejected in the final judgment.

In August, 2016, Judge Timothy Bailey entered a Final Order of Dissolution of Marriage. The Final Judgment denied the Former Wife’s requests for both alimony and attorney’s fees.

As to alimony, the trial court noted that this was a short-term marriage and that the parties had been in divorce litigation for much of the marriage. The court also observed that Former Wife was going to receive a six-figure equitable distribution.

As to attorney’s fees, the court acknowledged that over $200,000 had been spent on lawyers, accountants, mediators, and court reporters. The court referenced the conduct of the Former Wife that unnecessarily prolonged the litigation.

.After entering the final judgment, Judge Bailey granted the Former Wife’s motion for disqualification and the case was reassigned to Judge Horowitz.

In October, 2016, the Former Wife moved for temporary alimony pending appeal. She also moved for appellate attorney’s fees. At the hearing on the motion, the trial judge framed the issue as “need and ability” to pay. The Former Wife put on evidence of her limited financial situation and the Former Husband’s ability to pay support. The court refused to hear the Former Husband’s evidence of the “frivolous litigation” that had “pervaded [the] entire divorce proceeding.” No evidence was presented regarding the necessity of temporary support to protect the Former Wife’s interests on appeal. There was no mention of the Former Wife’s ability to access the funds she was awarded as equitable distribution.

In February, 2017, the circuit judge ordered the Former Husband to pay $5,150 as a lump sum, $2,200 per month as temporary alimony, $20,000 in appellate attorney’s fees, and $3,008.85 as costs on appeal.

The Former Husband appealed this order. This court granted a stay as to the $2,200 monthly payments.

Where the trial court has rejected a claim for alimony after a full trial, an award of temporary alimony pending appeal is permitted only in narrow circumstances. Section 61.071, Florida Statutes (2017), pertains to alimony in a dissolution proceeding and does not address a temporary award post-dissolution. Section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2017), provides for attorney’s fees and costs “reasonably necessary to prosecute or defend an appeal,” but is silent on the issue of temporary alimony pending appeal; contrary to the Former Wife’s argument, this section cannot be read to authorize an award of temporary alimony post-dissolution where a request for alimony has been rejected in the final judgment.

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c)(1) provides that, pending an appeal, the “lower tribunal” retains jurisdiction to make “awards necessary to protect the welfare and rights of any party pending appeal.”

This court has read the rule to allow temporary alimony necessary to “protect the welfare and rights” of a party; the “rule does not limit the court’s power to award alimony pending appeal to those cases where alimony has been awarded in the final judgment.” McPherson v. McPherson, 775 So.2d 973, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

McPherson presents a situation where an equitable distribution award had been stayed, so temporary alimony was necessary to protect the welfare of a party. There, the former wife moved for alimony pending appeal, arguing that the stay of her equitable distribution funds “had placed her in a difficult financial position, since that was the only liquid asset she was to receive as a result of the final judgment.” The trial court denied the motion due to its concern that alimony had been denied in the final judgment. Id. at 973. On appeal, we held that the circuit court had the power to award temporary alimony if it found that alimony was necessary to protect the welfare and rights of the former wife pending appeal. Id. at 974, We noted that a significant cash payment had been stayed until the resolution of the appeal, and stated that “[a] party’s ‘welfare’ piay well depend on receiving an equitable distribution.” Id.

There, we cited Goodman v. Goodman, 664 So.2d 975, 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), which “recognized that under rule 9.600(c), a court might properly award temporary alimony pending appeal in an amount in excess of the award in the judgment, where the alimony award “was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an equitable distribution, the benefits of which will be delayed until resolution of the appeal.” ” McPherson, 775 So.2d at 974.

Here, the circuit court improperly treated the issue as one of “need and ability to pay,” the test to be applied at a pre-judgment temporary relief hearing. The awards of $5,150 as a lump sum and $2,200 per month were authorized only if they were necessary to protect the welfare and rights of the former wife pending appeal. We therefore reverse as to these amounts and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. If the court determines that post-judgment alimony was appropriate, the court should consider whether the Former Husband is entitled to a credit on the equitable distribution. See Markin v. Markin, 896 So.2d 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

We affirm the award of appellate attorney’s fees and costs without further comment.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

May and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.

      . This court affirmed the August, 2016 final judgment. See Reidy v. Reidy, No. 4D16-3731, 2017 WL 4550851 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 12, 2017).


author: B.L. THOMAS, C.J.

text:
    Randy ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D17-1277
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed August 28, 2017
    Rehearing Denied January 17, 2018
    Randy Anderson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   B.L. THOMAS, C.J.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion asserting that his 25-year minimum-mandatory sentence, imposed for a conviction of trafficking in between 28 grams and 30 kilograms of hydrocodone, section 893.135(l)(c)l.c., Florida Statutes (2014), is illegal. Appellant argues that in 2014 the Florida Legislature passed chapter 14-176, section 1, Laws of Florida, which reduced the minimum-mandatory sentence for. trafficking in this amount of hydrocodone. Chapter 14-176, section 1, became effective on July 1, 2014, and did in fact reduce the minimum-mandatory sentence applicable to the amount of hydrocodone charged against Appellant from 25 years to 7 years. But the State charged Appellant with committing this offense on May 28, 2014, before the effective date of the statute reducing the applicable minimum-mandatory term, and the sentence to be imposed must conform to the statute in effect at the time a defendant commits his offense. See generally Davis v. State, 892 So.2d 518, 519-20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (discussing that Article X, section 9, of the Florida Constitution states that “jrjepeal or amendment of a criminal statute shall not affect prosecution or punishment for any crime previously committed”). Appellant’s -25-year minimum-mandatory sentence is therefore legal.

AFFIRMED.

OSTERHAUS and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Harold HAMMOND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-0897
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed September 27, 2017
    Rehearing Denied January 12, 2018

      Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Megan Lynne Long, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Robert Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Harold Hammond appeals his convictions for second-degree murder, tampering with evidence (clothing and a firearm), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and battery. He raises a single issue: whether the trial court should have severed his battery count from his other charges, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152(a)(2)(A). We review the trial court’s decision for an abusé of discretion. Russ v. State, 832 So.2d 901, 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

While the exact timeline of events was disputed throughout Hammond’s prosecution, Hammond admitted both before and during trial that, at some point during the evening hours of February 21st and morning hours of February 22nd, 2009, he not only shot and killed his neighbor, Kenneth Solada, but also battered, his liyerin girlfriend’s son, Timothy Mossman. Hammond claimed self-defense as to both, but the jury convicted him on all counts.

On appeal, Hammond argues that Lis battering Mossman arose from an encounter-wholly unrelated to his shooting Sola-da. He explains the crimes had different victims and took place at different times and plaees. And, he argues, they had different causes — namely, that he fought with Mossman because of a- strained living situation and shot Solada' because Solada threatened him with a gun. Hammond claims the charges therefore could not have been' joined and that the joinder denied him a fair trial. See Hart v. State, 70 So.3d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding that joinder can deprive a defendant of a fair trial when evidence of one crime is improperly .used to bolster proof of the other). The State counters by arguing that the murder and battery were connected by temporal proximity, physical proximity, and a common motive (Hammond’s desire to obtain and use drugs), thereby constituting a single criminal episode and making their consolidation proper. See Fletcher v. State, 168 So.3d 186 (Fla. 2015) (affirming the denial of the defendant’s motion to sever when his criminal acts shared temporal proximity, physical proximity, and a common motive). We find the State’s argument more persuasive.

The record included evidence that Hammond beat Mossman because Mossman’s mother refused to give Hammond money for drugs, and that Hammond murdered Solada because Solada refused to share a bottle of Xanax pills. While Hammond contested these claims throughout his trial (and on appeal), we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Hammond’s motion to sever. Given the facts presented, a reasonable judge could conclude that the crimes were “temporally [and] geographically associated” and “linked in some significant way.” Fletcher, 168 So.3d at 202; see also Trease v. State, 768 So.2d 1050, 1053 n.2 (Fla. 2000) (“[D]iscretion is abused only where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.”) (alteration in original) (quoting' Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990)). In fact, a reasonable judge could find that,the crimes were separated by only a few hours and a few yards. Moreover, a reasonable judge could conclude that severance was not “necessary to achieve a fair determination of guilt or innocence,” when the evidence suggested both crimes were relevant to understanding the motive behind Hammond’s entire criminal episode. Fletcher, 168 So.3d at 203.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and OSTERHAUS and WINSOR, JJ.', CONCUR.


author: ROTHENBERG, C.J.

text:
    Rodney PETITHOMME, Appellant, v. Monise PETITHOMME, Modeline Petithomme, and Wilkins Petithomme, Appellees.
    No. 3D16-2457
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed October 04, 2017
    Rehearing Denied November 13, 2017

      Faudlin Pierre, for appellant.
    Vera + Skiscim PL, and Michael J. Skiscim and Michael A. Vera, for appel-lees.
    Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SALTER and LINDSEY, JJ.
   ROTHENBERG, C.J.

The plaintiff below, Rodney Petithomme (“Rodney”), appeals a final summary judgment entered in favor of three of the four defendants below, Monise Petithomme (“Monise”), Modeline Petithomme (“Mode-line”), and Wilkins Petithomme (“Wilkins”) (collectively, “the appellees”). As genuine issues of material fact exist, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law by entering summary judgment in favor of these three defendants. Therefore, we reverse the order under review and. remand for further proceedings.

This appeal stems from a dispute between family 'members- relating to real property purchased in early 2004 in the name of Pharamon Petithomme (“Phara-mon”), who passed away in October 2010. In August 2012, Rodney filed a complaint against the Estate 'of Pharamon Peti-thomme (“the Estate”); his sister, Monise; Pharamon’s daughter, Modeline; and Pharamon’s son, Wilkins (collectively, “the Defendants”), alleging as follows.

In early 2004, he (Rodney) and Phara-mon entered into an oral agreement whereby Pharamon' agreed to take title to the subject real property in trust for Rodney, and in exchange, Rodney agreed to “furnish the money to pay the property.” Following the oral agreement, Pharamon obtained a loan to purchase the property, and after the property closed in Phara-mon’s name, Rodney, not Pharamon, moved into the property. Thereafter, Rodney began to pay the property taxes and mortgage, and he made' improvements and repairs to the property.

On December 8, 2004, while Pharamon was critically ill, Monise, without Rodney’s knowledge, “fraudulently induced and forged” Pharamon’s signature on a quitclaim deed in which Pharamon conveyed the property to himself and Monise as joint tenants with right of survivorship. At some point thereafter, Rodney permitted Monise and her husband to move into the property in exchange for rent. Rodney instructed Monise to make the rent checks payable to Jean Petithomme, and instructed Jean to remit Monise’s payments to the note holder. Rodney would then pay the balance of the monthly mortgage payment with his own funds.

A few months after Jean passed away in August 2008, Monise stopped making the rent payments,- and therefore, Rodney asked. Monise to move out of the property. After Monise refused to move out, disputes ensued between Rodney and Monise, and thereafter, Monise ousted Rodney from the property.

Based on these allegations, Rodney asserted the following counts: Count I— quiet title against all Defendants; Count II — purchase money resulting - trust against .the Estate; Count III — ejectment against Monise; and Count IV — unjust enrichment against Monise based on her failure to pay rent. In response, Monise and Modeline filed an answer and affirmative defenses, denying material allegations. The Estate filed an answer denying all allegations in the complaint and asserted as an affirmative defense that Pharamon’s interest in the property “was ‘with right-of-survivorship’ and therefore negates the necessity to,probate his estate as there are no assets and/or real property.” Wilkins did not file an answer, and the trial court entered a default against him.

Following discovery, Rodney filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to his claims to quiet title (Count I), for a purchase money resulting trust (Count II), and for ejectment (Count III), attaching numerous exhibits, affidavits, and depositions, including a $500 check remitted by Rodney for the initial purchase deposit and two cashier’s ! check totaling over $12,057.82 utilized to purchase the property. In response, the appellees filed an opposition, attaching additional exhibits. On May 14, 2015, the trial court denied Rodney’s motion for partial summary judgment finding that there were material issues of fact in dispute.

Approximately a year after the trial court denied Rodney’s motion for partial summary judgment, the appellees filed á motion for' partial summary judgment. As to Rodney’s claim for a resulting trust filed against the Estate (Count II), Monise argued that, as the sole title owner of the subject property -via the quitclaim deed, she was the correct person to defend the claim. Monise further asserted that there was no resulting trust because Rodney failed to pay the purchase price or “bind himself by an .absolute’ obligation to pay the purchase price at the time title vested in Pharamon.” The appellees also sought summary judgment as to the claims to quiet title (Count I), for ejectment (Count III), and unjust enrichment (Count IV). Finally, the appellees asserted that the only remaining issues to be decided at trial were: (1) whether the $500 contract deposit was a gift or a loan, (2) whether the $12,057.82 down payment was provided by Rodney, and (3) whether a resulting trust was created as to either the alleged deposit and/or the alleged down payment.

The appellees submitted evidence in support of their motion for partial summary judgment, including Monise’s affidavit in which she averred that she is the only person who paid the mortgage from the date the property was purchased in early 2004; that in December 2004, she, Rodney, and others were present when Pharamon executed the quitclaim deed; and that Pharamon appeared to be competent when he executed the quitclaim deed.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment as to ■ Count II (resulting trust) in favor of the appellees and, as to Counts I (quiet title), III (ejectment), and IV (unjust enrichment) in favor of the appellees. In addition, the trial court ruled that the order has no-effect as to the claim against the. Estate for a resulting trust relating to the $500 contract deposit or the two cashier’s checks totaling $12,057.82, which issue remains pending for trial. Rodney’s appeal followed.

Rodney contends that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of the appellees where genuine issues of material fact exist. Based on our de novo review, we agree. See Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) (noting that a final summary judgment is reviewed de novo); Tropical Glass & Constr. Co. v. Gitlin, 13 So.3d 156, 158 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

“[Sjummary judgment is only appropriate when the ‘pleadings and summary judgment evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Demir v. Schollmeier, 199 So.3d 442, 444-45 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)); see also Volusia Cnty., 760 So.2d at 130. Further, “[i]f the record reflects even the possibility of a material issue of fact, or if different inferences can be drawn reasonably from the facts, that doubt must be resolved against the moving party and summary judgment must be denied.” Cox v. CSX Intermodal, Inc., 732 So.2d 1092, 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). '

In the instant case, Rodney asserted that he and Pharamon entered into an oral agreement whereby Pharamon agreed to take title to the subject real property in trust for Rodney, and in exchange, Rodney agreed to furnish the money to pay for the property. In Florida, “[a] resulting trust arises where ... a person furnishes money to purchase property in the name of another, with both parties intending at the time that the legal title be held by . the named grantee for the, benefit of the unnamed purchaser of the property.” Key v. Trattmann, 959 So.2d 339, 342-43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Womack v. Madison Drug Co., 155 Fla. 335, 20 So.2d 256, 257 (Fla. 1944) (“A resulting trust must arise, if at all, at the instant the deed is. taken and the legal title vests' in the grantee. The complaining party must have -paid his share of the purchase price, or bound himself to the grant- or-by an absolute obligation to pay it'.”); F.J. Holmes Equip., Inc. v. Babcock Bldg. Supply, Inc., 553 So.2d 748, 749 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (“A resulting trust may arise in favor of one who furnishes money used to purchase property the legal title to which is taken in the name of another. The equities in this direction are' especially strong when the parties intended that the title was to be held by the legal grantee for the use and benefit of the person supplying the consideration for the purchase.”). Further, “[pjayment of part of the consideration carries with it a proportional interest in the property and the party taking title to the whole becomes the trustee for the other party pro tanto.” Towerhouse Condo., Inc. v. Millman, 475 So.2d 674, 677 (Fla. 1985).

Rodney’s claim for a resulting trust cannot be disposed of on summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact relating to this issue exist. Rodney presented evidence to support his claim that he and Pharamon entered into an oral agreement whereby Pharamon agreed to take title to the subject real property in trust for Rodney, and in exchange, Rodney agreed to furnish the funds to pay for the property. For example, the evidence showed that Rodney submitted a $500 check as the initial deposit for the purchase of the subject property; Rodney, not Pharamon, took immediate possession of the subject property following the closing; Rodney paid the mortgage until he was ousted by Monise; and in several forms filled out by Pharamon’s family members, including Monise, seeking financial assistance for Pharamon, Monise and Pharamon’s family members denied that Pharamon owned any real property. On the other hand, the appellees presented evidence that Pharamon did not intend to purchase the' property in trust for Rodney, and Pharamon used his own funds to purchase the property. Although it is clear that the $500 deposit was provided by Rodney, it is unclear whether Rodney merely gifted the $500 to Pharamon, and it is also unclear who provided the funds to obtain the cashier’s checks totaling $12,057.82, which Rodney claims he paid towards the purchase price. Thus, Rodney’s claim for a resulting trust cannot be disposed of by summary judgment.

In Count I of the complaint, Rodney sought to quiet title to the subject property, asserting that Monise fraudulently “induced and forged Pharamon’s signature” while Pharamon was ill. Further, based on his claim that he was the rightful owner of the property, Rodney also filed a claim to eject Monise (Count III) and for unjust enrichment against Monise based on her failure to pay rent (Count IV). In moving for summary judgment, the appel-lees presented evidence reflecting that on December 8, 2004, Pharamon executed the quitclaim deed in front of others, including Rodney; Pharamon was not suffering from any sort of mental deficiency when he executed the quitclaim deed; and Phara-mon’s mental deficiencies did not arise until 2010, years after he executed the quitclaim deed. In contrast, Rodney presented evidence that the week after executing the quitclaim deed, Pharamon was admitted to •the hospital with a specific type of dementia and an altered mental status, which conditions existed three weeks prior to the hospital admission, and therefore, Phara-mon’s mental deficits existed at the time he executed the quitclaim deed. The conflicting evidence clearly demonstrates the presence .of material issues of fact, and therefore, the trial court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of the appel-lees as to Rodney’s claims to quiet title (Count I), for ejectment (Count III), and for unjust enrichment (Count IV).

Accordingly, because there exist genuine issues of material fact, we conclude that the trial court erred by entering final sum-, mary judgment in favor of the appellees. We therefore reverse the order on review and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

      . Certain claims filed against the Estate of Pharamon Petithomme remain pending.

      . Jean Petithomme is Rodney’s, Pharamon’s, Monise’s, and Modeline’s brother.

      . Although a default had been entered against Wilkins, he joined in the opposition filed by Monise and Modeline.

      . These are only a few of the disputed issues of material fact.

      . As we are reversing the order under review and remanding for further proceedings, we do not address Rodney’s assertion that the trial court granted certain appellees relief that was not sought in the complaint. For example, although Count IV for unjust enrichment was only asserted as to Monise, the trial court granted relief as to the three appellees, including Wilkins, who had defaulted.


text:
    Seth Andrew WOODRUFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3613
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed October 6, 2017
    Rehearing Denied November 14, 2017
    Rehearing Denied January 18, 2018

      Seth Andrew Woodruff, Perry, pro se.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Ali L. Hansen, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm without prejudice to the defendant to file a proper motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, TORPY, and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


author: LOGUE, J.

text:
    Haim Michel IFERGANE, Appellant, v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-1142
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed October 18, 2017
    Ligman Martin, P.L., and Michael- R. Seward and James C. Ligman, for appellant.
    Methe & Rockenbach, P.A., and Kara Berard Rockenbach (West Palm Beach), for appellee.
    Before EMAS, LOGUE, and LUCK, JJ.
   LOGUE, J.

Haim Ifergane, the owner of a Miami Beach residence, appeals a final judgment entered in favor of Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. This case comes before us a second time after we previously reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment against Citizens and in favor of the homeowner, Ifergane. Because a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether a letter from Citizens constituted a denial of-coverage, we conclude that summary judgment was improper and we reverse and remand for further proceedings. . ..

Haim. Ifergane and his now former wife, Alexandra Ifergane, purchased the Miami Beach residence in 2004. The property was insured by a Citizens wind-only dwelling policy, and Alexandra was the only named insured on the policy.. Hurricane Wilma damaged the property in October 2005, and the Iferganes initiated a claim with Citizens. Meanwhile, the Iferganes entered into a marital settlement agreement. Based on the agreement, Alexandra assigned to Haim all her “right, title, interest, claim and demand” in the property.

Citizens made an initial payment of $44,955.08 on the claim. When Haim requested additional payment, Citizens requested a sworn proof of loss and sought examinations under oath of both Haim and Alexandra. Haim complied; Alexandra did not. Citizens notified Alexandra that without her examination under oath (EUO), it could not complete its investigation of the claim or determine whether Haim was entitled to coverage under the policy as a “resident spouse” at the time of loss.

In April 2008, Haim made a demand for appraisal under the policy. Citizens filed a declaratory action against the Iferganes, seeking a determination of its coverage obligations. As we explained in detail in Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. Ifergane, 114 So.3d 190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (Ifergane I), the parties filed several motions and cross-motions. The trial court granted Alexandra’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that she had assigned her interest to the insurance claim to Haim. It later granted her motion' to dismiss' the complaint against her, finding she was not a party to the lawsuit. It denied Citizens’ motion for summary judgment which argued that recovery was precluded under the poljey because Alexandra refused to comply with policy duties. The trial court also granted Haim’s motion for summary judgment as to coverage. Ultimately, after compelling appraisal, the trial court entered a final judgment against Citizens, awarding Haim the appraised amount of $476,594.61. Citizens then filed the first appeal in this case.

On appeal in. Ifergane I, this court concluded that the complaint against Alexandra was properly dismissed. But we reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of Haim because the assignment did not relieve Alexandra of her post-loss obligations as a named insured under the policy. Accordingly, we concluded that it was error for the trial court to find coverage as a matter of law because “Alexandra’s refusal to submit to a requested EUO precludes recovery under the policy.” Ifergane 1, 114 So.3d at 197.

On remand, Citizens moved for summary judgment based on this court’s holding that Alexandra’s refusal to submit to a requested examination under oath precludes recovery. In opposition, Haim argued that factual issues remained to be determined by the trial court, including whether a June 28, 2007 letter that Citizens sent to Alexandra Ifergáne was a letter of denial of coverage. The trial court entered final summary judgment in favor of Citizens, and this appeal followed.

We again reverse and remand for further proceedings in the trial court because a material issue of fact remains as to whether the letter from Citizens to Alexandra Ifergane was a denial letter. On one hand, there is a reasonable inference that the letter contains a typographical error and the sentence that reads, “By stating the above reason or denial, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation does not intend to waive any other rights,” should be read as, “By stating the above reason for denial ...(Emphasis added.) This inference supports a finding that the letter is a denial. On the other hand, subsequent correspondence between the parties indicate that Citizens continued to adjust and investigate the claim, which supports an inference that the letter is not a denial. Accordingly, the issue of whether the letter is a denial or not is an issue of fact that must be resolved by a factfinder. Because there is a genuine material issue of fact based on the conflicting evidence, this point cannot be resolved by summary judgment.

It is necessary to resolve this issue because should the factfinder determine that Citizens’ letter was a denial of coverage letter, then as a matter of law, Citizens waived any right it had to enforce the insured’s post-loss conditions — including the right to take Alexandra’s examination under oath. See, e.g., Wegener v. Int’l Bankers Ins. Co., 494 So.2d 259, 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (concluding as a matter of law that “the effect of the ... repudiation of coverage was to waive any right to insist upon the insureds’ ... compliance with the various conditions to recovery”); Castro v. Homeowners Choice Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2D15-5456, 228 So.3d 596, 599, 2017 WL 3614102, at *2 (Fla. 2d DCA Aug. 23, 2017) (“When an insurance carrier investigates a claim of loss and denies coverage because it concludes that a covered loss has not occurred, the insurance carrier cannot assert the insured’s failure to comply with the policy’s conditions precedent to filing suit as a basis for summary judgment.”). If the letter was not a denial, but a request for further information, then Citizens did not waive its right to demand an EUO, and under our prior decision in Ifer-gane I, Alexandra’s noncompliance precludes coverage. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment entered in favor of . Citizens and remand for further proceedings consistent with this -opinion.

Reversed-and remanded.

      . Haim Ifergane raised this issue in his answer to the first appeal in this case, but it was ultimately not germane to this court’s narrow disposition in Ifergane I, 114 So.3d at 194— 97.


author: SALTER, J.

text:
    Cedric S. BROWN, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 3D17-1271
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed October 18, 2017
    Rehearing Denied November 6, 2017

      Cedric S. Brown, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Douglas J. Glaid, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
    Before SALTER, FERNANDEZ and LUCK, JJ.
   SALTER, J.

Cedric Brown’s petition for habeas corpus raises three claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Finding that one of the claims merits consideration and conditional relief, we grant in part and deny in part the petition.

In April 2013, Brown was charged with 12 counts of sexual battery without serious injury (section 794.011(5)(a), Florida Statutes) and one count of incest (section 826.04, Florida Statutes). In May 2015, the State filed an amended information, containing three counts. Count 1 was a restatement of Count 12 of the original information, alleging sexual battery on a child between the ages of 12 and 16 based on acts committed between February 1 and 29, 2012. Count 2 was a new charge alleging lewd or lascivious sexual battery on a child between the years of 12 and 16 (section 800.04(4)(a)l., Florida Statutes) based on acts occurring between January 1. 2001, and December 31, 2007. Count 3 was a restatement of Count 13 of the original information, alleging incest.

Brown was convicted on all three counts of the amended information. At his sentencing in January 2016, the State candidly raised with the trial court the possibility that the charge and conviction on Count 2 might be barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to lewd or lascivious sexual battery (section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes). Specifically, Count 2 of the 2015 amended information alleged that the criminal incidents occurred between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2007. As a result, Brown argues, the three year statute of limitations expired at the end of 2010, years before Count 2 was added to the amended information.

This issue was not raised by appellate counsel in Brown’s appeal to this Court in 2016. His conviction was affirmed, per cu-riam, in March 2017. Brown v. State, 2017 WL 1174761 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (unpublished). In response to Brown’s petition for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the State now argues that Count 2 is not barred by the statute of limitations because it was a “continuation” of the sexual battery claims in Counts 1 to 11 of the original information, or was sufficiently connected to those initial charges, citing State v. Douglas, 919 So.2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), to survive a statute of limitations bar.

We disagree. The sexual battery claim in Count 12 of the original information was based on alleged criminal conduct that concluded by February 29, 2012. But the lewd or lascivious battery claim in Count 2, the subject of an entirely different statute, was based on alleged incidents occurring no later than December 31, 2007, and would have been barred by the applicable statute of limitations even if included in the original information filed in April 2013.

Evaluating Brown’s claim on this point under the standard in Bevel v. State, 221 So.3d 1168, 1180 (Fla. 2017), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), we find that both of the requisite prongs — deficient performance on the part of counsel, and prejudice — are satisfied. The record discloses no tactical basis for trial or appellate counsel to have failed to pursue the statute of limitations defense available to Brown regarding Count 2 of the amended information. The prejudice is apparent in the fifteen-year sentence on that Count, to be served consecutively with the thirty-year sentence on Count 1.

We grant the petition in part as to Count 2. We remand to the trial court to re-sentence Brown based on his convictions on Count 1 and 3, but not Count 2, as Count 2 was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

We find no merit in Brown’s other claims, which aré denied. Petition granted in part and denied in part, with instructions for further proceedings.

      .Each of the first 11 counts alleged the sexu- . al battery crimes between January 1 and December 31 of the years between 2001 and 2011, respectively. Count 12 alleged sexual battery between February 1, 2012, and February 29, 2012. Count 13 alleged that the acts of incest were committed between January 7, 2001, and February 29, 2012, The pertinent portions of the statutes were unchanged during the applicable time periods.

      . The State nol prossed Counts 1 through 11 of the original, 2013 information.

      . In an equally candid colloquy, Brown’s defense counsel at the sentencing advised the Court that her research indicated that the statute of limitations did not bar the prosecution of Count 2 of the amended information.

      . See, e.g., Mathis v. State, 204 So.3d 104, 105-06 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

      . Whether the statute of limitations defense was raised and ruled upon in the first instance before or during trial could subsequently become pertinent depending on a determination of the preservation issue detailed in Smith v. State, 211 So.3d 176, 187-204 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (Ernas, J., concurring), review granted, 2017 WL 3483657 (Fla. May 24, 2017). Although we note this point in passing, we express no opinion regarding the applicability of any ruling in Smith to the record in the present case.


author: LINDSEY, J.

text:
    Elizabeth BORJAS, Appellant, v. Jorge Lopez VERGARA, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-1788
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed October 18, 2017

      Private Advising Group, P.A., and Jaime D. Guttman, for appellant.
    ADR Miami, LLC, and Juan Ramirez, Jr., for appellee.
    Before SALTER, LOGUE and LINDSEY, JJ.
   LINDSEY, J.

This is an appeal from a final judgment in favor of Appellee, Jorge Lopez Vergara, awarding back rent and possession of an apartment and finding entitlement to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 83.48, Florida Statutes. Because there is no landlord/tenant relationship between the parties to this action, we reverse.

Appellant, Elizabeth Borjas, and her son, Erick Vaiana, owned an apartment located at the Skyline on Brickell (the “Apartment”) until their interest was foreclosed by Branch Banking & Trust Co. (“BB & T”). Mr. Vergara acquired title to the Apartment from BB & T in September of 2012 by Special Warranty Deed in exchange for $450,000. According to Mr. Ver-gara, he purchased the Apartment from BB & T at the request of, and as a favor to, his friend, Mr. Vaiana. Mr. Vaiana’s mother, Ms. Borjas, was residing in the Apartment when Mr. Vergara obtained title. Mr. Vergara purchased the Apartment with the understanding that Mr. Vaiana would repay him for the purchase price “in a couple of months” and, in exchange, he would transfer title to Mr. Vaiana. Instead, a couple of years went by and, when Mr. Vergara still had not been repaid, he and Mr. Vaiana entered into a handwritten agreement to attempt to resolve their dispute. Their attempt would prove to be unsuccessful.

After yet another year had passed, Ms. Borjas and Mr. Vaiana sued Mr. Vergara in the circuit court of the-Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County in an eight-count complaint alleging a partnership between the three of them with respect to various real estate investments in Miami, one of which was the Apartment (the “Pending Case”). Three months later, Mr. Vergara filed this action in the county court in and for Miami-Dade County against Ms. Borjas, who was still residing in the Apartment, seeking possession, back rent and attorney’s fees. Ms. Borjas asserted in her answer that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that there was no rental agreement under section 83.43, Florida Statutes, and that she had an ownership interest in the Apartment. She then moved to have the casé transferred and consolidated with the Pending Case. The county court transferred this case to the same division of the circuit court as the Pending Case. Upon receipt of the transfer, the circuit court denied consolidation, granted Mr. Ver-gara’s motion for an expedited trial pursuant to sections 83.59 and 51.011, Florida Statutes, and entered the Final Judgment that is the subject of this appeal.

The Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, found in Chapter 83, Part II of the Florida Statutes, affords a landlord a summary procedure in county court when seeking to remove a tenant from its premises. Toledo v. Escamilla, 962 So.2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). “Section 83.43(4), Florida Statutes (2004), defines ‘tenant’ as ‘any person entitled to occupy a dwelling unit under a rental agreement.’ ” Id. at 1030. “Moreover, section 83.43(7) defines ‘rental agreement’ as ‘any written agreement, or oral agreement if for less duration than 1 year, providing for use and occupancy of premises.’” Id. This court further explained in Toledo that a landlord/tenant relationship is a condition precedent to applying this statutory remedy. Id. at 1029-30. And, “[i]n any civil action brought to enforce the provisions of the rental agreement or this part, the party in whose favor a judgment or decree has been rendered may recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs from the non-prevailing party.” § 83.48, Fla. Stat. (2017).

While there is record evidence of some form of agreement between Mr. Vergara and Mr. Vaiana, Mr. Vaiana is not-a party to this action. On the other hand, there is no record evidence of a lease or any other form of agreement between Mr. Vergara and Ms. Borjas. Thus, Mr. Vergara is not entitled to relief herein under Chapters 83 and 51 of the Florida Statutes. See Toledo, 962 So.2d 1028 (finding no rental agreement and holding that when the defendant asserted in her answer that she was not a tenant and had an equitable interest in the property, ejectment, not eviction, was the proper remedy). As such, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . See Vaiana v. Vergara, No. 15-12023-CA-01, 2017 WL 2494605 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. May 4, 2017) (entering a final judgment for Mr. Vaiana and Ms. Borjas after a jury verdict was rendered in their favor), appeal docketed, No. 3D17-1072 (Fla. 3d DCA May 9, 2017).

      . Pursuant to section 83,59, a landlord "is entitled to the summary procedure provided in s. 51.011, and the court shall advance the cause on the calendar.” § 83.59(2), Fla. Stat. 2017. Toledo, 962 So.2d at 1030.


author: SUAREZ, J.

text:
    CITY OF HOMESTEAD, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Dr. James Eric MCDONOUGH, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    No. 3D16-2462
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 1, 2017.

      Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L. and Edward G. Guedes and Samuel I. Zeskind, for appellant/cross-appellee.
    Alan J. Greenstein, P.A. and Alan Greenstein, for appellee/cross-appellant.
    Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SUAREZ and SALTER, JJ.
   SUAREZ, J.

This appeal concerns a public records request propounded by the Appel-lee/Cross-Appellant Dr. James E. McDon-ough (“McDonough”) on the City of Homestead (“City”) after McDonough had filed a Notice of Intent to File Claim against the City. The City objected to production of the documents requested and, after a hearing, the trial court sustained in part and denied in part the City’s objections ordering production of certain documents. The City appeals from that part of the non-final order granting McDonough’s request for records. McDonough cross-appeals the trial court’s denial in part of his request for records. We affirm in part and reverse in part finding, essentially, that all of the documents requested are privileged and not subject to production pursuant to Chapter 119 or section 768.28 (16)(b), Florida Statutes (2015).

In October 2012, an incident allegedly occurred between McDonough and City of Homestead police officer Murguido while Officer Murguido was off-duty. McDon-ough filed a Notice of Intent to file a claim against the City. While that Notice of Intent was pending, McDonough filed a complaint against Officer Murguido for defamation, for alleged actions taken while Officer Murguido was off-duty and not acting in his official capacity. The City was not named in that complaint. McDon-ough then filed a public records request with the City for documents related to the City’s decision to defend Officer Murguido in the defamation action and to retain the law firm of Weiss, Serota, Helfman, Cole and Bierman to defend the action. The City responded that the documents requested were exempt from production under Chapter 119, section 768.28(16)(b), and section 90.502, as they contained the impressions of attorneys retained by the City related to the pending Notice of Intent claim, which allegedly arose out of the same October 2012 incident. At the September 2016 hearing on McDonough’s records claim, the trial court reviewed the documents in camera and found that the Notice of Intent claim and the Murguido action were inextricably intertwined. The five emails in question were all contained in the City’s risk management file. At the end of the proceedings, the trial court determined that of the five email correspondence documents at issue, the City properly claimed Records 1 and 2 as exempt based on the claims file exception in section 768.28(16)(b); the court concluded that although Records 3 and 4 were contained in the risk management file they were not confidential and exempt and ordered the City to produce them. Record 5 was acknowledged in open court by Mc-Donough to be confidential, privileged and exempt. The trial court additionally denied McDonough’s claim that the City violated Chapter 119 by failing to produce additional non-exempt responsive records. The City has appealed from that part of the order requiring it to disclose Records 3 and 4; McDonough has cross-appealed from that part of the order determining Records 1 and 2 to be exempt from disclosure.

We disagree with the trial court’s determination that Records 3 and 4 are not exempt from disclosure, for two reasons. First, Records 3 and 4 are contained in the City’s risk management file and are, pursuant to the plain language of section 768.28(16)(b), exempt from disclosure for that reason alone. Second, there is no statutory exception to that statute that would allow the trial court to require disclosure of some risk management file records and not others based on the court’s determination that the records do not compromise the government’s risk management analysis or settlement negotiations. In other words, the court cannot find that although the documents are exempt from disclosure based on 768.28(16)(b), they must still be produced because the court finds there is no prejudice in such production.

The record on appeal indicates that the email correspondence documents at issue were generated in July 2015, well after McDonough filed his April 2014 Notice of Intent to the City. Those documents were placed in the City’s risk management file prior to McDonough’s October 2015 first public records request. The trial court recognized on the record that the claims potentially exposing the City to liability in McDonough’s Notice of Intent were inextricably intertwined with McDonough’s complaint against Officer Murguido, as both the Notice of Intent and Murguido complaint arose out of the same set of alleged facts and circumstances. The City would necessarily have to evaluate its exposure to liability in its decision to defend Officer Murguido, as well as address any potential and related risk inherent in Mc-Donough’s Notice of Inteht. As Records 3 and 4 were generated and placed in the City’s risk management claims file in response to McDonough’s Notice of Intent, those records are, regardless of their content, confidential pursuant to the plain language of section 768.28(16)(b), Florida Statutes (2015). That statute provides,

Claims files maintained by any risk management program administered by the state, its agencies, and its subdivisions are confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution until termination of all litigation and settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident, although portions of the ciatos files may remain exempt, as otherwise provided by law. (emphasis added).

This statute clearly indicates that all of the email correspondence documents at issue contained in the City’s risk management claims file, including Records 3 and 4, are confidential and exempt from disclosure until such time as the issues or claims related to McDonough’s Notice of Intent have been resolved.

In addition, with regard to Records 3 and 4, the trial court erred by creating a “no harm” exception to section 768.28 that is not contained in either statute or case law. While finding that the documents were contained in the risk file and as such should be exempt, the trial court determined that their production would not harm the City , and would not place the City at any disadvantage, and thus were not confidential. This ignores the plain language of the statute indicating that the entire claims file is exempt from disclosure until resolution of the claim or claims. The statute does not contain such an exception to the privilege. As much as judges, both trial court and appellate, would like to carve out such an exception to help expedite the case, we cannot do so. Florida courts are “without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting American Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Florida v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)); State v. McMahon, 94 So.3d 468, 472-73 (Fla. 2012); McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998).

We thus reverse that part of the order on appeal finding Records 3 and 4 nonexempt and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith. For the same reasons as discussed above, we affirm that part of the order 'finding Records 1 and 2 are confidential and exempt from disclosure where hot only are those documents part of the claim file, but also clearly contain attorney mental impressions; work product, and insurance claim negotiations. We affirm all remaining issues.

Affirmed in 'part, reversed and remanded in part. ;


text:
    The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Yanker PEREZ-DIAZ, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2420
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 1, 2017
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael W. Mervine, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. ■
    Kenneth P. Speiller, for appellee.
    Before SUAREZ, EMAS and LUCK, JJ.
   ON MOTION TO ENFORCE MANDATE

PER CURIAM.

.In State v. Perez-Diaz, 189 So.3d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), the State appealed the trial court’s downward departure sentence, which was imposed following an open, non-negotiated plea. We held that the trial court erred in imposing a downward departure- sentence, reversed the sentence, and remanded “for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines.” H. at 902. The mandate issued on April 28, 2016.

Following our remand, and while the case remained pending in the trial court for imposition of a sentence under the sentencing guidelines, Perez-Diaz filed a motion for postconviction reliéf. Instead of carrying out the mandate of this court, the trial court heard the motion for postconviction relief, granted the motion, and vacated the plea, the finding of guilt, the judgment and the sentence. The State filed a notice of appeal from that order.

We treat this appeal as a motion to enforce the mandate in case number 3D14-2885, grant the motion, and quash the trial court’s order granting the motion for postconviction, relief. A trial court is “not authorized to deviate from the terms of an appellate court’s instructions.” Hearns v. State, 54 So.3d 500, 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (quoting Akins v. Akins, 839 So.2d 910, 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)). This court reversed the sentence and remanded this cause to the trial court for the singular purpose of imposing a sentence under the sentencing guidelines. The trial court’s action, regardless of how well-intentioned, violated that mandate. As we have said before: “A trial court’s role upon the issuance of a mandate from an appellate court becomes purely miriisterial, and its function is limited to obeying the appellate court’s order or decree.” Hearns, 54 So.Sd at 502. Accordingly, we quash the order vacating the guilty plea, finding of guilt, judgment and sentence, and instruct the trial court to comply with this court’s mandate by sentencing Perez-Diaz under the sentencing guidelines.

      . We note that, given our earlier reversal of the downward departure sentence, there was no sentence for the trial court to vacate on remand.

      . Following sentencing, Perez-Diaz may refile his motion for post-conviction relief if appropriate, and the trial court may entertain such motion. We express no opinion oh the merits of Perez-Diaz’s previously-filed motion.


text:
    Glenn Steven HANES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-1550
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 1, 2017
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Harvey J. Sepler, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SUAREZ, LAGOA, and EMAS, JJ.
   SUAREZ, J.

Glen Steven Hanes appeals from a final judgment of conviction and sentence following a negotiated written plea agreement. Hanes argues that because the plea colloquy was not thorough, the plea is involuntary.

Generally, to obtain appellate review of a plea of guilty or no contest, the defendant must .specifically reserve dispositive issues for appeal or file a motion to withdraw the plea in the trial court. Burns v. State, 884 So.2d 1010, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Following a guilty or no contest plea, a defendant may appeal only the trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction; a violation of a plea agreement, if preserved by a motion to withdraw the plea; an involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion to withdraw the plea; and a ■ sentencing error, if. preserved. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A); Liebman v. State, 853 So.2d 514, 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). ... An issue relating to the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea falls within the limited class of issues which a defendant may raise on appeal from a guilty or no contest plea without having specifically reserved the right to do so. Robinson v. State, 373 So.2d 898, 902 (Fla. 1979); Burns, 884 So.2d at 1013. However, before raising such an issue on appeal, the defendant must first file a motion .to withdraw the plea with the trial court.

Garcia-Manriquez v. State, 146 So.3d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (quoting Hicks v. State, 915 So.2d 740, 741 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.140. Hanes concedes that he did not timely file a motion to withdraw the plea. As such, we have no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. We therefore dismiss without prejudice for Hanes to pursue appropriate post-conviction remedies.