author: WEIMER, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Andre J. DAVIS
    No. 2015-K-1949
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/15/2017

      ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Hon. Leon A. Can-nizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Donna R. Andrieu, Christopher James Ponoroff, for Applicant.
    Brad Scott, for Respondent.
   WEIMER, Justice.

liWe granted a writ to determine whether the appellate court erroneously applied the domestic abuse battery statute, La. R.S. 14:35.3. The appellate court determined there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction under the statutory provision requiring that an offender and victim be past or present members of the same household. As interpreted by the appellate court, La. R.S. 14:35.3 requires the state to show the offender and victim engaged in a relationship comparable to the civil law concept of “open concubinage.”

We find that the appellate court’s requirement that the state prove “open concubinage” between the victim and offender is not grounded in the statute. Moreover, the appellate court’s requirement of proof of “open concubinage” thwarts the broader inquiry into the circumstances of the relationship intended by the legislature. For reasons that follow, we reverse the ruling of the appellate court and reinstate the trial court’s ruling that the totality of evidence was- sufficient to find the victim and offender were part of the same household and, therefore, was sufficient to support the conviction,

JjFACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The defendant was charged by bill of information with one count of domestic abuse battery involving strangulation, in violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3, The defendant pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a bench trial.

At trial, the state presented the testimony of Eugenia Leonard, who testified that on January .18, 2012, she was in an apartment she rented, and was caring for her six-week-old daughter. Also present in the apartment that day was the defendant, who is the father of Ms. Leonard’s daughter. The defendant was partially clothed and reclining in the bedroom when Ms. Leonard approached him and asked him to watch the child while Ms. Leonard took a shower.

According to Ms. Leonard, the defendant refused to help, so she told him to leave the apartment. The defendant got out of bed and dressed. As the defendant left the bedroom and walked down the hallway, he pushed Ms. Leonard against the wall. Ms. Leonard was holding the child in her arms, and ran into the hallway bathroom. The defendant followed, grabbed Ms. Leonard by the neck and began choking her until she closed her eyes and fell to the floor, still holding her baby in her arms. When she opened her eyes, the defendant was standing in the bathroom doorway, but left the apartment soon afterwards. .

Ms. Leonard explained that she and defendant had been involved in an intimate relationship for three or four years and had been to counseling to try to find a way to raise their daughter together. She stated that the defendant was a student’ at a local university at the time and had moved out of his dormitory to stay with her. However, when the defendant refused to help take care of their daughter, she told him to leave because he did not pay any of the bills or contribute to the household.

|sThe defendant took the stand and testified that at the time of the incident he did not want to have an intimate relationship with Ms. Leonard, but he did want to be present for his daughter, He stated that he was seeing other women at the time and Ms. Leonard was aware of this. The defendant claimed that when he tried to leave the bedroom, Ms. Leonard blocked him and pushed him back with her left arm as they argued about caring for the child. As he walked past her they continued to argue. Ms. Leonard then entered the bathroom while screaming at him. As he tried to enter the bathroom, Ms. Leonard pushed him and fell backwards onto the floor.

The defendant -denied that he choked Ms. Leonard or put his hands on her neck. He further denied pushing Ms. Leonard and claimed he would never do anything to hurt her when she had his daughter in her arms. Defendant also disputed Ms. Leonard’s testimony concerning their living arrangements. He claimed that at the time of the incident he had returned to living in a university dorm room. The defendant also testified that while he was not ordered to do so, he provided child support in the form of a Wal-Mart money card.

The district court found defendant guilty of domestic abuse battery involving strangulation and sentenced him to two years imprisonment at hard labor, suspended, and two years active probation.

When the appellate court vacated the defendant’s conviction for domestic abuse battery, the court found there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. According to the appellate court, the state failed to prove that defendant and Ms. Leonard were household members as required under La. R.S. 14:35.3. The appellate court noted that domestic abuse battery is defined as “the intentional use of force or violence committed by one household member upon the person of another household member.” La. R.S. 14:35,3, At the time this crime was committed in I ¿2012, household member was defined as “any person of the opposite sex presently living in the same residence or living in the same residence within five years of the occurrence of the domestic abuse battery with the defendant as a spouse, whether married or not.” La. R.S. 14:36.3(B)(2).

The appellate court analogized the statutory definition of “household member” to the civil law concept of “open concubinage,” which the court in Petty v. Petty, 560 So.2d 629 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990), noted has been historically defined as “a relationship of sexual content in which man and woman live together as husband and wife in a state of affairs approximating marriage,” although they are not legally married. Petty, 560 So.2d at 631 (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 440 So.2d 879, 881 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1983)). Applying that definition of “open concubinage,” the appellate court concluded that to prove defendant and the victim were living as unmarried “spouses,” the state must prove:

[S]ome of the indices of a marriage: for example, both parties had substantially all of their clothing at the same abode, both parties were receiving regular mail at the same address, .both parties acted like they were actually married or held themselves out to the world as a married couple, et cetera.

State v. Davis, 15-0456, pp. 18-19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/23/15), 176 So.3d 580, 592.

The appellate court acknowledged there was an intimate relationship between the defendant and victim; however, the court found that the defendant was not living with the victim at the time of the incident. Applying its “open concubinage” standard, the appellate court further found no evidence that the victim and defendant had lived together as spouses. The court noted that there was no evidence that | sdefendant kept personal items in the apartment, or had kept them there at any point in the relationship. The court further noted that the defendant did not contribute to household expenses. In the appellate court’s view, “the evidence at trial does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims [sic] were living in open concubinage.” Davis, 15-0466 at 18; 176 So.3d at 592.

DISCUSSION

The state contends the appellate court erred by vacating the defendant’s domestic abuse battery conviction. According to the state, the appellate court misapplied the Jackson v. Virginia standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the trial evidence and substituted'its judgment for that of the trier of fact. The state argues that, based on the evidence adduced at trial, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant was a “household member” as defined by La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). Central to the state’s argument is that the appellate court equated “household member” with the civil law concept of “open concubinage,” but “open concubinage” is an outdated concept and is not grounded in the statute.

For his part, the defendant also points to the element of the crime requiring an offender to be a “household member.” La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). While not directly arguing in favor of the appellate court’s “open concubinage” interpretation of the statute, the defendant nevertheless argues the appellate court reached the correct result. Emphasizing the statute’s use of the phrase “living in the same residence,” the defendant points to repeated instances in the trial record where the victim and the | fidefendant each testified that the defendant had been “staying in” the victim’s residence. In essence, the defendant argues “staying in” is different from “living in” the residence, and evidence of “staying in” the victim’s residence is insufficient to meet the requirement that the offender has attained the status of “household member” under La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2).

Although the state and defendant take different approaches, common to both litigants is that their arguments hinge on the definition of “household member” in La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). We turn, therefore, to the issue of how the term “household member” should be construed.

We begin, as we must, with the language of the statute itself. See La. R.S. 1:3 When this crime was committed in 2012, household member was statutorily-defined, in pertinent part, as “any person of the opposite sex presently living in the same residence or living in the same residence within five years of the occurrence of the domestic abuse battery with the defendant as a spouse, whether married or not.” La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2).

Before reaching the meaning of these words, we observe that the definition contains two clauses separated by the word “or.” Because the word “or” is normally disjunctive, each clause potentially offers a separate definition of “household member.” It may be possible to construe “household members” as either “any person of the opposite sex presently living in the same residence” (relying solely on the first clause) or, alternatively, as “any person of the opposite sex ... living in the same |7residence within five years of the occurrence of the domestic abuse battery with the defendant as a spouse, whether married or not” (relying solely on the second clause). That is, if the state relied solely on the first clause, the argument could be made that the first clause does not require proof of the victim “living ... with the defendant as a spouse, whether married or not,” because the language just quoted comes after the word “or.” Therefore, if the defendant and the victim were living together at the time of the domestic abuse battery and the provision is interpreted in that manner, it may not, in fact, matter whether they were doing so as “spouses, whether married or not” at the time. However, the state has conceded that it is relying on the second clause, which requires proof of the victim “living ... with the defendant as a spouse, whether married or not.” La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). Focus, then, is placed on the meaning of the second clause.

Pursuant to the legislature’s interpretive directions, the first step in our analysis is to determine if “living ... with the defendant as a spouse, whether married or not” in La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) refers to a technical term under the law. If La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) refers to a technical term, then that portion of the statute “shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning” as the technical term to which it refers. La. R.S. 1:3.

“Married” and “spouse” are technical terms, and there are very specific formal requirements for a marriage to exist. If the defendant and victim had indeed been married, it seems beyond debate that the relationship element of La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) would be met, as long as the evidence showed that the victim had been | ¿‘living in the same residence within five years of the occurrence of the domestic abuse battery with the defendant as a spouse.”

However, the legislature-indicated that the relationship element is satisfied “whether married or not.” (Emphasis added.) La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). In searching for intent, we are bound to give meaning to every word the legislature has used. See La. R.S. 1:4. Accordingly, from the words “whether married or not,” we find that the legislature intended the relationship element in La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) to be satisfied without evidence showing every specific formal requirement of a marriage. That is, the legislature intended both marriage, and something akin to but short of marriage.

The appellate court’s ruling that “open concubinage” was intended by the phrase “whether married or not” is not supported by La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) or by the meaning of “concubinage.” The term “concubinage” itself is a technical term, but is archaic, as it no longer appears in the Civil Code. Cf. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Roman Sources and Constitutional Mandates: The Alpha and Omega of Louisiana Laws on Concubinage and Natural Children, 56 La. L. Rev. 317, 331 (1995) (“Few remnants remain of the laws of concubinage and illegitimate children in Louisiana. The restriction on donations to concubines is no longer a part of Louisiana law.”). Moreover, when concubinage was a significant concept, concubinage was defined in opposition to marriage, not consistent with marriage. See id. 56 La. L. Rev. at 323 (“In Louisiana, [concubinage] is not necessarily a monogamous relationship .... [I]t was possible for a man to have a legal wife in one residence and a concubine in another.”) (Footnote omitted.)

19As observed earlier, by employing the phrase “whether married or not” in La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2), the legislature intended both marriage and something akin to but short of marriage. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to rely on the technical concept, concubinage, which is unrelated to the concept of marriage and, indeed, is defined in opposition to marriage. See La. R.S. 1:3. Moreover, in Petty, 560 So.2d at 631, on which the appellate court relied, the court indicated: “although living together is important to a finding of concubinage, it is not'absolutely essential.” In contrast, under La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2), living together during any point within five years of the offense is required. This difference between the technical meaning of concubinage (in which living together is not required) and La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) (in which living together is required) further highlights the appellate court’s error in relying on concubinage to interpret La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2).

Because the legislature has chosen not to rely on a technical term, it was appropriate for the factfinder at trial to draw on ordinary experience to determine whether the household relationship element of the offense had been met. See State v. Stowe, 93-2020 (La. 4/11/94), 635 So.2d 168, 170-72. in turn, an appellate court’s proper role is:

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, Louisiana appellate courts are controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Sylvia, 01-1406, p. 2 (La. 4/9/03), 845 So.2d 358, 361; State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La. 1984). Therefore, the appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proved beyond, a reasonable doubt. Sylvia, 01-1406 at p. 2-3, 845 So.2d at 361; Captville, 448 So.2d at 678.

State v. Johnson, 03-1228, p. 4 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 995, 998.

The following evidence, germane to the relationship between the defendant and Ms. Leonard, was adduced at trial. The defendant and Ms. Leonard began a sexually intimate relationship in 2009. The two met at a local, university that both were attending. Because the defendant did not have a car but Ms. Leonard did, she often, provided the defendant transportation to the. university. According to Ms. Leonard, at some point, the defendant moved out of the university dormitory to stay with her.

By the time of the incident on January 18, 2012, Ms. Leonard had given birth to the defendant’s child, who was then about six weeks old. Ms, Leonard and the defendant attended counseling, which was focused on raising their daughter.

The day of the incident, Ms. Leonard and the defendant were in the apartment Ms. Leonard rented. Ms. Leonard asked the defendant to help by watching the child while Ms. Leonard took a shower. The defendant was partially clothed and reclining in the bedroom. The defendant refused to watch the child, and Ms. Leonard told him to leave. She explained: “I felt like, if he didn’t want to help me and he wasn’t working and he didn’t help me out with the baby and I paid all the bills in the house, then just go. If you are not going to contribute to the household, then leave.” The defendant did not promptly leave and, instead, engaged in the violent encounter for which he stands convicted,

In After enduring the violent encounter with- the defendant in the bathroom,- according to Ms. Leonard, she called the defendant’s parents. She explained: “I thought ... if I told somebody—if I told his parents, then he would leave,” According to the defendant, it was he who called his parents after the. incident. By the time of trial, Ms. Leonard and.her child had moved in with the defendant’s family.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution as required by the Jackson standard, the evidentiary record reasonably supports the conclusion that Ms. Leonard had been “living in the same residence within five years of the occurrence of the domestic abuse battery with the defendant as a spouse, whether married or not.” La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). The evidence shows an ongoing intimate relationship for at least three years and that Ms. Leonard and the defendant had a child together. While the defendant denied Ms. Leonard’s claim that he was staying in the apartment at the time of the offense, viewed most favorably to the prosecution, the evidence supports Ms. Leonard’s claim. Ms. Leonard testified to an- expectation that the défendant would contribute to their common household, and the defendant testified that he was intent on contributing to their child’s welfare,, in terms of both parenting activities and finances. Immediately prior to the battery incident, the defendant was partially clothed and reclining in the bedroom, which demonstrates he.was very familiar with and comfortable within the household. Furthermore, the argument between Ms. Leonard and the defendant just prior to the battery incident was premised on Ms. Leonard’s view that the defendant was not meeting his obligations to the household. With both Ms. Leonard and the defendant claiming to have called the defendant’s parents about the incident, it is reasonable to infer tliat both recognized their relationship was akin to a marriage in that both Ms. Leonard and the defendant were part of a larger family.

| ^Although the appellate court erroneously latched onto the archaic concept of “open concubinage,” the general approach of looking to the civil law was sound. It is true that at trial, the factfinder could draw on ordinary experience to ascertain whether the evidentiary record established a household arrangement that was similar to marriage. See Stowe, 635 So.2d 168, 170-72. However, to the extent .any further guidance was necessary, either at trial or on appeal, it would have been appropriate to also consider the record in light of the civil law on marriage, while bearing in mind that the legislature required only a relationship similar to marriage. Here, providing resources for living, bringing a child into the world, and sharing' child rearing ' responsibilities-as Ms. Leonard and the defendant are depicted when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution-are also described in the Civil Code as some of the incidents of marriage. See La. C.C. art. 98 (describing mutual duties of married persons, including “fidelity, support, and assistance”) and La. C.C. art. 99 (“Spouses mutually assume the moral and material direction of the family, exercise parental authority, and assume the moral and material obligations resulting therefrom.”).

As a final point in our analysis, we return to the defendant’s argument that, because both Ms. Leonard and the defendant described their relationship in terms of “staying with” each other, the definition of “household” contained in La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) is unmet. The crux of the defendant’s argument is that La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) defines household in terms of a couple “living in the same residence” with each other, rather than “staying with” each other. This argument lacks merit. 113There is no requirement that witnesses use the exact language in a statute for a court to determine that the conditions in the statute have been met. The defendant does not argue, and we do not find, that “living in the same residence” is a technical term. Pursuant to La. R.S. 1:3, in the absence of technical terminology, statutory “[wjords and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language.” Similarly, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:3, “all of [the] provisions [of the Criminal Code] shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.” Following the principles of La. R.S. 1:3 and La. R.S. 14:3, we have no difficulty in determining 114that the witnesses’ testimony that they were “staying with” each other is synonymous with “living in the same residence” under La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2).

DECREE

That portion of the appellate court’s opinion ruling that the elements of domestic abuse battery involving strangulation were unproven at trial is hereby reversed. Noting that the defendant did not seek a writ to challenge the appellate court’s opinion, we leave undisturbed the remainder of the opinion relating to other matters, including that portion finding that the district court failed to impose mandatory conditions on the defendant’s probation for domestic abuse battery. This matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . In 2015, the legislature amended the definition of household member to remove the phrase "or living in the same residence within five years of the occurrence of the domestic abuse battery” and replaced it with broader language stating that a household member is "any person of the opposite sex presently or formerly living in the same residence with the offender.” (Emphasis added.) 2015 La. Acts 440, § 1.

      . The appellate court was not unanimous in its reasoning, One judge in the three-judge panel did not ascribe to the opinion, but instead indicated “that on the facts of this case, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a ‘household member' within the meaning of La. R.S. 14:35.3.” Davis, 15-0456 at 1, 176 So.3d at 600 (Landrieu, J., concurring).

      . Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The sufficiency of evidence standard from Jackson is discussed later in this opinion.

      . "Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”

      . "Unless it is otherwise clearly indicated by the context, whenever the term ‘or’ is used in the Revised Statutes, it is used in the disjunctive and does not mean ‘and/or.’ ” La. R.S. 1:9.

      . See La. C.C. art. 86 (“The relationship [of marriage] and the contract are subject to special rules prescribed by law.”).

      . "When the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”

      . In Stowe, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of evidence in a second degree battery case, contending the state had failed to prove the victim suffered the element of “extreme physical pain.” Stowe, 635 So.2d at 170 (citing La. R.S. 14:34.1), This court noted it had determined in an earlier case that " ‘extreme physical pain’ ... ‘describes a condition which most people of common intelligence can understand.' " Stowe, 635 So.2d at 171 (quoting State v. Thompson, 399 So.2d 1161, 1168 (La. 1981)). Consistent with the determination that "extreme physical pain” was subject to common understanding, this court then found the evidence describing the victim’s experience of being hit in the face, along with photographs of the victim and testimony of an eyewitness, sufficiently established the element of "extreme physical pain” to support the battery conviction. See Stowe, 635 So.2d at 171-72.

      . The defendant does not challenge the appellate court’s finding that he committed a simple battery upon Ms. Leonard. The dispute in the present case is confined to whether the household relationship element was met- to support the conviction for domestic .abuse battery, a more weighty offense than simple battery.

      . The defendant supports his grammatical argument with a dictionary definition, of uncertain attribution, by which “stay” means to "live somewhere temporarily as a visitor or guest.” However, noting the defendant testified that he was "staying on campus” in "a dorm room at the time” of the incident, the defendant’s grammatical argument is self-defeating. [R 71] By the defendant's reasoning, he would have been a mere visitor or guest in his own dorm room. Relatedly, even though Ms. Leonard testified the defendant had no dorm room at the time, but the defendant testified he did, under the Jackson standard, we resolve their dispute in the light most favorable to the prosecution, i.e., that the defendant had no dorm room at the time of the incident.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CRICHTON, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Zaine KASEM v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Joyce B. Williams, and H.R. Williams Cattle Company
    NO. 2017-C-0636
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
    GUIDRY, J., would grant.
    CRICHTON, J., would grant and assigns reasons.
   CRICHTON, J.,

would grant and assigns reasons:

_JjFor the reasons assigned by Judges McDonald and Holdridge in their dissent from the First Circuit opinion, I would grant this writ application filed by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Joyce B. Williams, and H.R. Williams Cattle Company and dismiss plaintiff’s claims.


text:
    IN RE: Kenneth Robin BOWEN
    NO. 2017-OB-0712
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   ORDER

| Respondent was convicted of deprivation of rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242; conspiracy to obstruct justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and obstruction of justice by engaging in misleading conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). Respondent now seeks to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) has concurred in respondent’s petition.

Having considered the Petition for Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Kenneth Robin Bowen, Louisiana Bar Roll number 29773, and the concurrence thereto filed by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of Kenneth Robin Bowen for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Kenneth Robin Bowen shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Bernette J. Johnson JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA


text:
    IN RE: Ramsey T. MARCELLO
    NO. 2017-OB-0703
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   ORDER

|, Considering the record of this matter, and the “Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss Objection filed by Office of Disciplinary Counsel” filed by petitioner,

IT IS ORDERED that petitioner’s motion be and hereby, is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter shall be' remanded to the Disciplinary Board for consideration pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(H)(2).

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ James T. Genovese JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Abdellatif E. DEVOL
    No. 2017-KK-0646
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 12-14-0663; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 KW 0023.

hWRIT GRANTED. The defendant has moved for a subpoena duces tecum or alternatively for an in camera inspection of certain medical records of the victims. While such records are not ordinarily discoverable, the defendant has made a’sufficient showing of possible materiality and relevance under the particular facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the district court for an in camera review of the requested medical records for any evidence favorable to the defense.


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    Janice Hebert BARBER, John H. Fairbanks, M.D., Pierce D. Nunley, M.D., John Logan, M.D., John Faulkner, Darrell Cormier, Peggy Edwards, Joan Savoy, Karin Frierson and Vanessa Arnold v. LOUISIANA WORKFORCE COMMISSION; The Louisiana Office of Workers’ Compensation; Christopher Rich, M.D., Wes Hataway and Curt Eysink
    NO. 2017-CA-0750
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM

[ i Defendants, the Louisiana Workforce Commission, the Louisiana Office of Workers’ Compensation, and numerous state officers (collectively referred to hereinafter as “State”), invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this court pursuant to La. Const, art. V, § 5(D), on the ground that the district court declared certain provisions of the medical treatment schedule contained in the Workers Compensation Act to be unconstitutional.

Pretermitting the merits, we find the appeal is not properly before this court. Article V, § 5(D) vests appellate jurisdiction in this court in cases in which “a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional. ...” A review of the district court’s judgment indicates the court permanently enjoined the application of certain medical treatment schedule provisions. However, nothing in the district court’s judgment declares a law or ordinance, unconstitutional.

Although the district court’s reasons for judgment discuss the constitutionality of the medical treatment schedule provisions, it is well-settled law that the district court’s oral or written reasons form no part of the judgment. In the absence of declaration of unconstitutionality in the district court’s judgment, this court lacks [ 2appellate jurisdiction. See Meaux v. Galtier, 07-2474 at p. 1 (La. 1/25/08), 972 So.2d 1137; Carmena v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, 06-2680 (La. 2/2/07), 947 So.2d 715; Burmaster v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 07-1311 (La. 8/31/07), 963 So.2d 378; Greater New Orleans Expressway Com’n v. Olivier, 02-2795 (La. 11/18/03), 860 So.2d 22.

Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 2162, “[i]f an appeal is taken to an appellate court which has no jurisdiction over it, the court may transfer the appeal to the proper court....” Accordingly, the appeal is hereby transferred to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, for further proceedings.


text:
    IN RE: CONFIDENTIAL PARTY
    NO. 2017-B-0711
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   ORDER

| t Considering the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline, filed by respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline be and hereby is rejected pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be remanded for, .expedited consideration of - the previously filed formal charges.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Marcus Clark JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA


text:
    IN RE: Greta L. WILSON
    NO. 2017-B-0622
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM

_JjThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Greta L. Wilson, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently inactive.

FORMAL CHARGES

15-DB-041

In May 2013, respondent filed suit on behalf of Lawrence Gates, Jr., without his consent or authorization, regarding funds recovered from the sale of property located in New Orleans. After the suit was filed, respondent received a check in the amount of $20,141. On May 21, 2013, respondent affixed Mr. Gates’ signature to the check and deposited it into her client trust account. Upon learning of this, Mr. Gates retained attorney Herbert A. Cade. In January 2014, Mr. Cade sent respondent a demand letter requesting that he issue a cashier’s check made payable to Mr. Gates in the aforementioned amount. Respondent complied with this request in February 2014. Prior to that time, however, Mr, Gates had received no funds from respondent.

| gIn January 2014, Mr. Cade filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent regarding these events. In response to the complaint, respondent indicated that Mr. Gates had closed his file in the matter because he was satisfied with her response and compliance with his demand. In a supplementary response to the complaint, respondent described a personal illness and her father’s terminal illness, both of which she claimed contributed to the delay in forwarding the funds to Mr. Gates.

In August 2014, respondent gave a sworn statement to the ODC in which she acknowledged receiving the funds from the court registry and depositing the funds in her trust account. Respondent claimed that she was entitled to one-third of the $20,141 ($6,713.67). However, the funds in her account dipped below $13,427.34 on numerous occasions between the date of deposit and the date of her issuance of the cashier’s check to Mr. Gates. Respondent was unable to provide a copy of her contract with Mr. Gates and the trust account records reflect that the refund did not come from her trust account.

The ODC alleged respondent’s misconduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.16 (obligations upon termination of the representation), 3.3 (false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

15-DB-058

On January 8, 2014, respondent filed an ex parte motion for order to enroll as counsel of record in the matter of New Orleans Redevelopment Authority v. Harry Lee Pittman, et al., No. 2009-2899, Div. “M,” Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. In the pleading, respondent indicated that she was retained as counsel by |aMr. Pittman for the sole purpose of withdrawing funds deposited in connection with the matter. This was followed by an ex parte motion for order to withdraw funds from the registry of the court. In' the pleading, respondent again identified herself as counsel for Mr. Pittman.'

In connection with the filings, the court ordered disbursement of a check in the amount of $32,959.14 (together with interest) payable to Mr, Pittman and respondent. On February 18, 2014, the clerk issued a check in the amount of $83,220.81 payable to Mr. Pittman and respondent. On March 11, 2014, the check was negotiated, bearing the purported endorsements of Mr. Pittman and respondent.

In reality, Mr. Pittman had never hired or even met respondent. Due to physical limitations, which existed at the time of the issuance of the check, Mr. Pittman would not have been physically able to sign his name to endorse the check. Upon learning of respondent’s actions, Mr. Pittman enlisted the assistance of attorney Edwin R. Murray, who attempted to obtain information from respondent relative to this matter.

Respondent provided Mr. Murray with a copy of a contract for services executed by Zealous Pittman, the brother of Mr. Pittman. The contract identifies Zealous as having power of attorney over Mr. Pittman; however, no such power of attorney existed or was in effect at that time. No proceeds from the monies obtained by respondent through her actions were distributed to Mr. Pittman or to any other party on his behalf.

The ODC alleged respondent’s misconduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct; Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d),

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

| ¿The. ODC filed two sets of formal charges against respondent under disciplinary board docket numbers 15-DB-041 and 15-DB-058, Respondent failed to answer either set of formal charges. Accordingly, the factual' allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3).

In March 20Í6, the matters were consolidated by order of the hearing committee chair. No formal hearing was held, but the parties, were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee, noting that the factual allegations in the formal charges were deemed admitted, accepted those facts as true and correct. Based on those facts, the committee determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The committee determined that by obtaining funds as to two clients by fraudulent methods, and then converting those funds to her own use, respondent violated duties owed to her clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Respondent acted knowingly and intentionally, causing actual harm to her clients. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the baseline sanction is disbarment.

|fiIn aggravation, the committee found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victims, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1989). In mitigation, the committee found the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

After also considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be disbarred. The committee further recommended respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing these- consolidated matters, the 'disciplinary board determined that the factual allegations of the formal charges are deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. The board further determined that the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct, with one exception. In 15-DB-041, the board declined to find a violation of Rule 1.16, which concern's an attorney’s duties upon termination of a client, noting that there is no evidence showing that an attorney-client relationship ever formed.

The board determined respondent violated duties owed to the legal system and the legal profession by converting Mr. Gates’ and Mr. Pittman’s money, by acting on their behalf without having the authority to do so, and by causing the ODC to expend additional resources in its investigation of these matters. Her conduct was knowing, if not intentional, and caused significant actual harm. She knowingly converted Mr. Gates’ funds by’ placing the funds in her trust-account | (¡and then allowing the account balance to fall below the amount required to avoid (inversion. Respondent did not disburse Mr. Gates’ funds until his attorney contacted her to demand them. She collected Mr. Pittman’s funds but failed to disburse them. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Laimjer Sanctions, the- board determined the baseline, sanction is disbarment. The board agreed with the. committee’s , assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors.

After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the board recommended respondent'be disbarred. The board also recommended respondent be required to pay restitution to Mr. Pittman. The board further recommended respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this'proceeding.

Neither respondent nor the ODG filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s report and recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the adeemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La. 1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

The evidence in the record of this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent, without having the authority or consent to do so, filed suit and enrolled as counsel in another suit for the purpose of obtaining funds, and then converted those funds to her own use. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as found by the disciplinary board.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La. 1984).

The record also supports a finding that respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to her clients, the legal system, and the legal profession, causing actual harm. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is disbarment. Like the board, we also agree with the committee’s assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors.

In Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La. 1986), the court established a range of sanctions addressing misconduct involving the conversion of client funds. Specifically relevant to the instant matter is the court’s determination that disbarment is warranted when

|sone or more of the following elements are present: the lawyer acts in bad faith and intends a result inconsistent with his client’s interest; the lawyer commits forgery or other fraudulent acts in connection with the violation; the magnitude or the duration of the deprivation is extensive; the magnitude of the damage or risk of damage, expense and inconvenience caused the client is great; the lawyer either fails to make full restitution or does so tardily after extended pressure of disciplinary or legal proceedings.

Respondent’s misconduct squarely falls into this category. By failing to disburse funds to Mr. Pittman or Mr. Gates, respondent demonstrated that she intended a result inconsistent with their interests. By all indications, she forged the signature on Mr. Gates’ check from the clerk of court, and likewise, she endorsed Mr. Pittman’s check on his behalf without apparent authorization. The magnitude and the duration of the deprivation has been extensive and both parties were greatly inconvenienced. Mr. Gates was deprived of his funds for nine months and had to undertake legal action to obtain the $20,141 to which he was entitled. Respondent only paid Mr. Gates after receiving a demand letter from his attorney and after the disciplinary complaint had been filed. Mr. Pittman has still not received the $33,220.81 to which he has been entitled since February 2014, despite the efforts of his attorney.

Considering Hinrichs. and the numerous aggravating factors present, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and impose disbarment. We will also order respondent to pay restitution to Mr. Pittman.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Greta L. Wilson, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19834, be and she hereby is disbarred. Her name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and her license to practice law in |9the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. It is further ordered that respondent shall make restitution of $33,220.81, plus legal interest, to Harry Lee Pittman. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent's status with the Louisiana State Bar Association has been inactive since September 17, 2016.

      . On February 24, 2016, after the factual allegations of the formal charges in 15-DB-041 were deemed admitted, respondent filed a motion to recall the deemed admitted order, In her letter to the disciplinary board, respondent stated that she did not receive service of formal charges, has not practiced law in over one year, and is rarely in New Orleans. She also requested that "this matter be placed into mitigation so that whatever issues need to be resolved, be resolved expeditiously, amicably, and withput the need for further action.” The hearing committee chair granted her motion and gave her twenty days to file an answer to the formal charges. When respondent failed to do so, the ODC again moved to have all formal charges deemed admitted.

      . The committee acknowledged that respondent had referenced emotional problems regarding an undisclosed personal illness and her father’s terminal illness, but ultimately declined to adopt this factor in mitigation since there was no further evidence on either issue and since there was no' causal connection between the personal issues and the misconduct.


text:
    Linda M. POTIER v. MORRIS BART, L.L.C.
    No. 2017-C-630
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
    CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
   CRICHTON, J.,

additionally concurs and assigns reasons:

hi agree with the decision to deny this writ. I write separately to make clear that, in my view, a contract between an attorney and a client requires a heightened burden on the attorney to make “full and complete” disclosures related to arbitration clauses. Hodges v. Reasonover, 12-0043 (La. 7/2/12), 103 So.3d 1069. As noted by Justice Knoll in her plurality opinion in Hodges, these disclosures should detail the effects of an arbitration clause, and may include “the waiver of a jury trial, the waiver of the right to appeal, the waiver of broad discovery rights, and the possible high upfront costs of arbitration.” Id. at 1078. It is my opinion that additional disclosures are essential to respecting the sancrosanct nature of the attorney-client relationship.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jacob JOHNSTON
    No. 16-KO-1460
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM

I (Writ granted in part; otherwise denied. The case is remanded to'the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the juvenile defendant’s guilty plea to the reduced charge of attempted aggravated rape was entered knowingly and voluntarily.

A defendant’s receipt of misinformation as to'his sentencing exposure may impede, if not foreclose, his ability to make a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternatives. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); State ex rel. LaFleur v. Donnelly, 416 So.2d 82, 84 (La. 1982) (though it is critical that a defendant pleading guilty understand his Boykin rights, “it is probably much more important to the defendant’s decision (about whether to plead guilty) that he understand the maximum penalty exposure.”).

The court of appeal affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence, rejecting defendant’s argument that his guilty plea was not intelligently (and therefore not voluntarily) entered because he was unaware that a juvenile non-homicide |2offender, such as defendant, can no longer be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole eligibility. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 65, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2024, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Under the holding of Graham, as effectuated in La. R.S. 15:574.4(D), if defendant had pleaded guilty as charged to aggravated rape, he could have been eligible for parole after serving 30 years of a life sentence. However, his plea of guilty to attempted aggravated rápe subjected him to a sentence without benefit of parole for the entire 50-year sentence. Thus, defendant is arguably worse off in the context of parole eligibility for having pleaded guilty to the lesser offense, thereby raising the possibility he was misadvised regarding his sentencing exposure. Because" the precise sentencing advisements that' defendant received remain unclear from the materials before us, we reverse the court of appeal’s decision to the extent it rejected this claim and remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. The application is otherwise denied,

      . Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael RHODES
    No. 2016-KP-0746
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM:

h Denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Even absent this procedural bar, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated at least five applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr,P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral | areview. The district court is.ordered to record,a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Walter Cody HAMPTON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0736
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr,P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 .La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the.filing of a successive application applies, relator, has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Leslie YOUNG v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0674
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. In addition, relator fails to show the state withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

Relator has now fully litigated six applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Luis RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0505
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to the remaining claims, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relator’s application.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

^Attachment


text:
    STATE EX REL. Hennessy CHRISTOF v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0504
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to the remaining claims, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La,C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930,6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Murphy L. CALAIS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0476
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| iDenied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies, La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Furthermore, to the extent relator contends his claim is jurisdictional, relator fails to show that the indictment was defective. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 487.

Relator has now fully litigated at least two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral |2review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Rodney HAMILTON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0468
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| iDenied. Relator previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Hamilton v. State, 15-1916 (La. 12/16/16), 208 So.3d 357.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jeffery DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0227
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM:

h Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), In addition, relator’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct are procedurally-barred. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4. As to the remaining claim, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relator’s application.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C,Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive ^application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

1 ^Attachment


text:
    STATE EX REL. John MURPHY v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0171
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/05/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| denied. The application was not timely filed in th,e district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. The application is also repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relator’s application.

Relator has now fully litigated at least three applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

12Attachment


text:
    Dwight BRIDGES v. Antoinette ANDERSON
    No. 2017-C-0194
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 11, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated March 24, 2017; Parish of Orleans, First City Court of the City of New Orleans, No. 2016-00914-F, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-0432;

|, Stay denied. Request for reconsideration not considered. See Sup. Ct. Rule DC, § 6.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brian SMITH
    NO. 2017-KK-0020
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying for Rehearing of this Courts order dated March 13, 2017; Parish of St John the Baptist, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 12-313; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-K-622;

11 Rehearing denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brian SMITH
    No. 2017-KK-0021
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated March 13, 2017; Parish of St John the Baptist, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 12-CR-313; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-K-623;

I,Rehearing denied.


text:
    Gerald HATCHER v. Jeffrey ROUSE, M.D.
    NO. 2017-CP-0427
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No, 2015-07201; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-0666;

I denied.


text:
    Reginald GREEN, et al. v. Franklin Eliezer GARCIA-VICTOR, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0436
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2016-00905; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-C-0041;

11 Denied.


text:
    Jonathan VINCE and Brandi Vince v. Dale KOONTZ and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-00429
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 35,607; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-521

I denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Virginia STAFFORD v. EXXON MOBILE CORPORATION, ABC Insurance Company, Lard Oil Company and Federated Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-C-0447
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2013-237; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 1067;

I denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would ¿rant.

HUGHES, J., would grant.

GENOVESE, J., would grant; '


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rigoberto Fragmesio VENTURA
    NO. 2016-KO-0945
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 513,715; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA1784;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leroy A. LODGE
    NO. 2016-KO-1276
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 502-192; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-KA-0538;

| rDenied.


text:
    CROSSTEX ENERGY SERVICES, LP, Crosstex LIG, LLC and Crosstex Processing Services, LLC v. TEXAS BRINE COMPANY, LLC, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0419
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 34,202; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW 1656;

1 rDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Earl Mack BROWN
    NO. 2017-KK-0422
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying Fox Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 14-192280; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KW 1034;

11 Denied.


text:
    Michael W. ALLEN v. GRAPHIC PACKAGING INTERNATIONAL, INC.
    NO. 2017-C-0426
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, No. 14-04632; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,080-WCA

Denied.


text:
    Thomas C. ROYER v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & DEVELOPMENT
    NO. 2017-C-0288
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 80,379; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-534

| ^Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana IN the INTEREST OF M.J.M. and T.T.B. State of Louisiana in the Interest of J.M., M.M. and T.B.
    NO. 2017-CJ-0543
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, Juvenile Court of the Parish of Jefferson, No. 16 TP 20; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-652 C/W 16-CA-653

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James E. COTTON
    NO. 2016-K-0897
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 14-CR4-126598; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 1623;

11 Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. ALLEN W.
    No. 2017-KK-0276
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated March 31, 2017; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 526-550; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-1212

11 Reconsideration denied.


text:
    LAKE CHARLES POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION LOCAL 830 AFL-CIO and Craig Desormeaux, Individually and as President of Tee Local 830 v. The Honorable Randall Edmund ROACH and the City of Lake Charles
    NO. 2017-C-0461
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 2015-1786; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-71-9

Denied.


text:
    Antonio WHITE v. HOB INTERNATIONAL GULF SOUTH, J.I.T. Distributing, LLC, David Hornak, Rush Trucking, Inc., State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation & Development and American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania (in its capacity as Uninsured/Under-Insured Motorist Carrier)
    NO. 2017-C-0463
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 636425; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0830;

h Denied.


text:
    Pauline Moss RODOCK v. Brad Allen POMMIER
    NO. 2017-CJ-0631
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 79820B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-809;

| denied.


text:
    Cesar ESPINOZA and Mayra Moreno, individually and on behalf of their Minor Children, Jair Espinoza and Jimena Moreno v. Jane DOE, ABC Insurance Company, and Go Auto Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-C-0466
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 109,022; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0424

|, Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    CAMERON PARISH POLICE JURY, Cameron Parish Sheriff and Cameron Parish School Board v. ALL TAXPAYERS, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0504
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 10-19872; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 17-55;

Denied.


text:
    Pauline RODOCK v. Brad POMMIER
    NO. 2017-CJ-0570
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 79,820 & 94217; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW17-00288;

Denied.


text:
    William P. MARCAURELE v. The CITY OF BATON ROUGE/PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, Kelly Cullen, Joshua Kirst & Michael Edwards
    NO. 2017-C-0464
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 573,008; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0915;

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bradford SKINNER
    NO. 2016-KO-0961
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Civ. G, No. 512-469; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-KA-0510.

Not considered. See La.S.Ct. Rule X, § 4.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tommy Lee WILSON
    NO. 2016-KO-1102
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 316,914; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,-589-KA;

| denied.


text:
    Alice COMPTON, Leo Burgess Cumpton, II, and Melissa Cumpton Morris v. ST. FRANCIS SPECIALTY HOSPITAL, INC. and Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund
    NO. 2017-C-0492
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 13-3822; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-079-CW

| denied.


text:
    George R. TRELLES v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO.
    NO. 2017-C-0495
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 623940; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0894;

Denied.


text:
    Gloria VALLARE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. VILLE PLATTE MEDICAL CENTER, LLC and Louisiana Health Service and Indemnity Co., d/b/a Blue Cross Blue Shield of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-CC-0498
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 72,711-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-868 C/W 16-958

Denied.


text:
    Robert CHERAMIE and his Wife Emma Cheramie v. PORT FOURCHON MARINA, INC.
    NO. 2017-C-0499
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 122136; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0895

Denied.


text:
    Gloria VALLARE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. VILLE PLATTE MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, and Louisiana Health Service and Indemnity Co., d/b/a Blue Cross Blue Shield of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-CC-0513
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div, A, No. 72,711; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-863 C/W 16-953;

[T Denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Eduardo ROBINSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-1987
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of tins Court’s action dated March 13, 2017; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div, G, No. 279-500

11 Reconsideration denied.


text:
    Robert GROS v. STMG LAPEYRE, LLC d/b/a St. Mary Galvanizing Company, LLC
    NO. 2017-CC-0344
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 167970; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW 0976;

I denied.


text:
    Celeste Snipes PARKER, et al. v. MINDEN MEDICAL CENTER
    NO. 2017-CC-0404
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation, Dist. 1W, No. 16-04903; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,424-WCW

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael BAUGH
    NO. 2017-KK-0469
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans,, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 526-729; to the Court.of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-1201


text:
    201 ST. CHARLES PLACE, LLC v. The LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION, Erroll G. Williams, in his Official Capacity as Assessor for the Parish of Orleans, and Norman Foster, in his Capacity as Chief Financial Officer of City of New Orleans Department of Finance and Ex-Officio Tax Collector for the Parish of Orleans
    NO. 2017-C-0500
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C634717; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0510

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wendell GARCIA
    NO. 2017-KK-0628
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 530-439; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-1308;

Denied.


text:
    DELTA LAND & INVESTMENTS, LLC v. HUNTER ESTATES, INC., et al.
    No. 2017-C-264
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated March 3, 2017; Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A No. 09-90; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,069-CA;

Not considered. See La.S.Ct. Rule IX, § 6.

WEIMER, J., would grant the reconsideration.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Otis MCKINLEY v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2015 KH 1998
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated February 24, 2017; Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2015-1806; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 15-00801;

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    Paul VITELLARO v. Ryan ZANCA, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
    No. 2017-C-0339
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 19, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 7, 2017; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2014-3419; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-CA-1365;

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    Ann MEXIC v. Ginja A. MEXIC individually and in her capacity as trustee of the Harry Rittenberg Trust and the Hilda Rittenberg Trust Ann Mexic v. Ginja A. Mexic and individually and in her capacity as trustee of the Harry Rittenberg Trust and the Hilda Rittenberg Trust
    NO. 2017-CC-0561
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 19, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 1999-13297 C/W 2001-19018 C/W 2007-15035; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-0058 C/W 2017-C-0059

Denied.


text:
    Tonealya ARCHANGEL v. THUY NGUYEN, DDS, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0563
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 19, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 127305; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 16-00981;

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Allen YATES
    NO. 2017-KK-0771
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 19, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 533-611; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-K-0390;

Denied.


text:
    Meagan LEMOINE, et al. v. Lionel AUGUSTINE, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0534
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 19, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2014-1044-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-862

Denied.


text:
    Mark PATOUT v. UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S LONDON, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0544
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 19, 2017
   IN RE: Allen J. Patout; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory, and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 10-19543; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-879

Denied.


text:
    Sheila GUIDRY v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Environmental Quality
    NO. 2017-C-0554
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 19, 2017
   IN RE: The Dow Chemical Company; Union Carbide Company; Union Carbide Corporation; —Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2009-7832; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-0757

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lequarta R. ROBINSON
    NO. 2016-KO-1479
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 19, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 328626; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,-643-KA.

denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William SERIGNE & Lionel Serigne
    NO. 2016-K-1034
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 381-740; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-KA-0379

Granted.


text:
    The COTTONPORT BANK v. LSJ, L.L.C., et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0595
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2015-2516; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-569

Not considered; not timely filed. See State v. Crandell, 05-1060 (La. 3/10/06), 924 So.2d 122; Morris v. Stueben, 01-0137 (La. 3/16/01), 781 So. 2d 1220.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Douglas J. PAULSON
    NO. 2015-K-2009
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 519-774; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-KA-0454

denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant in part. GENOVESE, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robbie Ray FRITH
    NO. 2016-K-1011
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No, 11-241841; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 15-630;

denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeffery Washington Myron JACKSON
    NO. 2016-KO-1294
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 514-734; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-KA-0809;

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. PROPERTY SEIZED FROM ERIC HAMILTON $12,040.00 IN U.S. CURRENCY and 1978 Chevrolet Caprice VIN #1N47L8S128460
    NO. 2016-OK-1312
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For'Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2011-13010 “B”; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1648;

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jackie Delane BLAKE
    NO. 2016-KO-1456
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   ' Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Winn, 8th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 42,877; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,732-KA

denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Deneil GIROD
    NO. 2016-KO-1547
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 14-5556; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-KA-74

denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rory B. DIMES
    NO. 2016-KO-1461
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 514-104; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-KA-0129;

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Frank MCGEE, as Trustee of the TRPLT Unsecured Creditors’ Trust v. DENHAM HOLDINGS, L.L.C. d/b/a Performance Insurance Services, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0478
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 624729; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0766

denied.


text:
    Michelle DOMINGUE, Wife of, and Brian Domingue v. LOUISIANA STATE POLICE CRIME LAB THROUGH the LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
    NO. 2017-CC-0580
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. C636432; to- the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW 1685;

|, Denied.


text:
    Eashell REED-SALSBERRY v. STATE of Louisiana, THROUGH the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, YOUTH SERVICES, Office of Juvenile Justice
    NO. 2017-CC-0494
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 14-2589; to, the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-104-CW

| denied.


text:
    Calvin and Denise GUIDRY v. USAGENCIES CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Patricia Mousseau, Glenn Mousseau, Venture Transports Logistics, L.L.C. and Zurich American Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-C-0601
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 106901; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0562

| iDenied.


text:
    IN RE: Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 16-PDB-105
    NO. 2017-OB-0405
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2017
   Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Counsel, No, 16-PDB-105

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rudy FRANCIS
    NO. 2017-KP-0951
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 16, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 443-175; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-K-0367

Denied.


text:
    JUDICIARY COMMISSION NO. 17-181
    NO. 2017-0-0786
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 16, 2017
   Applying For Appeal Judiciary Commission, No. 17-191;

denied.