author:
HUGHES, J.
     WEIMER, J., GUIDRY, Justice,

text:
    Danielle LARSON v. XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2016-C-0745
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    05/03/2017
    Rehearing Denied June 29, 2017

      MUSGRAVE, MCLACHLAN. & PENN, LLC, Richard Todd Musgrave, Theresa S. Anderson; PALOWSKY LAW, LLC, Stacy Renee Palowsky; for Applicant.
    PRISCHHERTZ, POULLIARD, FRISHHERTZ & IMPASTATO, LL, Dominick P. Impastato, III, Marc Lloyd Frischhertz; for Respondent.
   HUGHES, J.

_JjWe granted the writ application in this case to review the applicability "of La. R.S. 9:2795.3, the Equine Immunity Statute. The trial court granted a motion for sura-mary judgment filed by Equest Farm, LLC, finding that the immunity statute applied because plaintiff Danielle Larson was a participant engaged in equine activity at the time the Equest Farm pony bit her. The court of appeal reversed, holding that Larson was not a “participant” under the immunity statute, and that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether another provision in the immunity statute .might apply. We hold that there are genuine issues of material fact on the issue of whether the immunity statute applies. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeal and remand to the trial court.

Facts

This suit concerns a horse bite injury sustained in 2013 by Danielle Larson, who visited Equest Farm for the purpose of visiting and feeding horses owned by that facility. Equest Farm is located in City Park in New Orleans, and it boards horses as well as offers camps, lessons, field trips, and birthday parties with horses.

LLarson, an Illinois resident, frequently came to the New Orleans area to visit her boyfriend. Larson testified that she has never owned a horse but that she had been riding horses since childhood- and she rode horses at a stable in Illinois. Larson testified that she had previously been shown how to feed a horse: with a flat hand, fingers together so that they are angled down and not sticking up. Larson testified that in the past she had fed horses common treats such as carrots, apples, and sugar cubes.

Larson testified in her deposition that she had been visiting Equest Farm since 2011 or 2012 to “talk to them” and “give them love and affection.” Larson testified that prior to the incident she had visited Equest Farm at least six times and that she tried to go every time she visited New Orleans. Larson testified that each time she went to Equest Farm for a visit she would first check in with someone from the equestrian center front office before heading into the stables. Larson testified that during a previous visit, a man who appeared to work for Equest Farm gave her mints to feed the horses. Approximately five days before the date of the accident, Larson dropped by Equest Farm to ask if in the coming days she could visit with the school horses, which are horses owned by facility used for lessons. She also wanted to return with treats and was seeking advice on what the horses liked. Larson said she spoke with someone who worked in the office, named Kaley or Kiley, who told her she could return with certain treats, including carrots, and feed and visit with the school horses.

When Larson returned with carrots on Monday, September 23, 2013, the Equest Farm office was closed in accordance with its regular schedule, and Larson proceeded to the stalls where the school horses were kept. On her way, she encountered two riders who boarded horses at Equest Farm, Joanna Deal and RSusan Gegen-heimer. Larson told them that she was going to feed the school horses carrots. Ms. Deal and Ms. Gegenheimer told Larson to be careful because they heard one of the school ponies had bitten a child.

As Larson was visiting with the school horses, she arrived at a stall where a pony, Wesley, was standing at the gate. Larson placed a carrot in her hand and held it out, but the carrot was knocked from her hand by the horse, causing the carrot to fall to the ground. As Larson squatted down to pick up the carrot, Wesley also reached for the carrot. Instead of biting the carrot, however, Wesley bit off Larson’s thumb.

Larson required substantial medical care. Doctors attached her injured hand to her groin for four weeks to keep what remained of her hand viable. Larson will have to be fitted for a prosthetic thumb or transfer a toe to her hand.

There is a dispute about the signage that was posted on the day of the incident. Larson testified that she did not see any signs at Equest Farm prohibiting visitors from feeding the horses. Ms. Deal also testified that on the day of the accident she did not recall any such signs, but that she did not go into the school horse barn often. Ms. Gegenheimer also testified that at the time of the accident she was not aware of any rules that would prevent visitors from feeding the horses. Ms. Ge-genheimer further testified that she did not see any signage specifically warning others about a prior nipping incident involving Wesley. Equest Farm LLC, member Leslie Kramer averred by affidavit that there have been signs posted since 2011 that feeding treats or petting horses is not allowed. She averred that the signs stated visitors could “look but not touch” the horses.

As for Wesley, he appears to have a good reputation at Equest Farm, although it is not without blemish. Ms. Deal testified that she saw small children [4ride on Wesley. Ms. Gegenheimer testified he was a “great lesson horse.” Ms. Kramer averred that Wesley “is considered to be one of Equest Farm’s best school ponies.” Ms. Kramer also averred that the only other time Wesley has bitten anyone was when a child who had been riding him was holding his ears and muzzle trying to get him to kiss her. Wesley nipped her and bruised her cheek, however, the student continued to take lessons riding Wesley, and no lawsuit was filed.

Procedural History

Larson filed a Petition for Damages alleging that Equest Farm and its insurer were liable for her injuries under theories of negligence and strict liability. Equest Farm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which argued that Larson’s suit should be dismissed due to the applicability of the Equine Immunity Statute, La. R.£j. 9:2795.3. Equest Farm asserted that Larson was a “participant” who was injured as a result of inherent risks of equine activity, and under the Equine Immunity Statute, the facts of her case preclude her from recovery against Equest Farm.

The trial court granted Equest Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Larson’s suit. In reasons given from the bench, the trial court found:

I believe that when you went and touched—when you touched that horse, when you went to feed that horse it was equine activity. You’re not a spectator and it could be—somebody could say that it’s inspecting. I don’t know. Evaluating, I don’t know. But I don’t know what that means. I do know horses and I know that you feed a horse, like this (Indicating), and I know if you drop that carrot a horse takes his tongue and he felt the finger and feels like a carrot, and he bites it.
Now, again, you’re saying maybe that’s comparative fault, whatever. That’s not a dangerous animal. I mean, that’s not—he didn’t do anything negligent. He did what a horse does. That’s all you get ....
And just the way he looks, his eyes are way up here, his mouth is way down here. I mean, we own horses. And it’s ugly. That picture that was submitted to us is absolutely ugly ....
|BI think the Fourth Circuit needs to look at it. The [Fjourth Circuit needs to tell me it was equine activity. I do. I think they need to tell me that. Because I do think she took herself out of a spectator position. Had she stayed behind and the horse came over and bit her, I’m with you. But when you go and put yourself in the middle of it, and you knew horses—what your client says, she loves horses, she knows them, she does that. I just don’t know. I think the definition—you know maybe you’re right but somebody might say that’s inspecting, that’s evaluating. I don’t know; But I think you need to let the Fourth Circuit tell you that I’m wrong. So I’m granting your Summary Judgment.

Larson appealed. The court of appeal reversed the summary judgment, finding that Larson was not a participant engaged in equine activity, and thus Equest Farm was not afforded immunity under the statute. Larson v. XYZ Ins., 2015-0704 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/16), 192 So.3d 181. The appeal court concluded that the definition of “engages in equine activity” found in subsection .(A)(1) of the statute, which must be strictly construed, does not include “a visitor to a stable who feeds treats to a horse.” Id. at p.10, 187. The court noted that the definitions of “equine activity”' listed in subsection (A)(3) are to be considered in determining whether someone is a participant. Id. at p. 12, 189. However, the court of appeal determined that Larson was not “inspecting” or “evaluating” under subsection (A)(3)(d). Id. Larson’s visit to see the horses and give them “love and affection” does not meet the dictionary definitions of inspect or evaluate, and dictionary definitions are to be used because the statute does not define these terms. Id. Thus, the court of appeal concluded that-Larson was not a participant under the Equine Immunity Statute.

The majority also opined that even if Larson was a “spectator” pursuant to Subsection (A)(1), the statute could'still provide Equest Farm with immunity -if Larson, as a spectator, placed herself in an unauthorized area. Id. at p. 13, 189. The | f,court of appeal -found that there were genuine issues of material fact on this issue that-bar summary judgment. Specifically, Larson and the two riders testified that they could not recall- seeing signs that prohibited touching or feeding the horses. Id. at pp. 14-15, 190. But according to an affidavit of Ms. Kramer, such signs were posted. Id. at p. 15, 190. The court of appeal stated that whether Equest Farm is entitled to immunity under La. R.S. 9:2795.3 at this juncture should be decided by a trier of fact. Id. The court of appeal thus reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. .

Equest Farm filed an application for certiorari, which this court granted. Larson v. XYZ Ins. Co., 2016-0745 (La. 6/28/16), 192 So.3d 782.

Lav and Analysis

Appellate courts review summary" judgments de novo-under the same criteria that govern a distrfct court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Greemon v. City of Bossier City, 2010-2828 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1263, 1267; Samaha v. Rau, 2007-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 882; Allen v. State ex rel. Ernest N. Morial-New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority, 2002-1072 (La. 4/9/03), 842 So.2d 373, 377. In ruling on a motion for summary -judgment, the judge’s role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. All doubts should be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor. Hines v. Garrett, 2004-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765. A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one [ 7conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 765-66.

On motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof remains with the mov-ant. However, if the moving party will not bear the burden of proof on the issue at trial and points out that there is an absence of factual support for one" or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, then the non-moving party must produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the opponent of the motion fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be granted. See La. G.C.P. art. 966(D)(1); see also Schultz v. Guoth, 2010-0343 (La. 1/19/11), 57 So.3d 1002, 1006.

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in La. C.C.P. art. 967, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in La. C.C.P. art. 967, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him. La. C.C.P. art. 967(B); see also Dejoie v. Medley, 2008-2223 (La. 5/5/09), 9 So.3d 826, 832. Whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Richard v. Hall, 2003-1488 (La. 4/23/04), 874 So.2d 131, 137.

We agree with the court of appeal that there are contested issues of material fact that make summary judgment inappropriate. Issues of the applicability of the immunity statute and potential comparative negligence of the parties remain.

Decree

|sThe ruling of the court of appeal is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED and REMANDED

WEIMER, J.,

concurring in the result only.

|,I respectfully concur. As the majority acknowledges, this court granted writs “to review the applicability of La. R.S. 9:2795.3, the Equine Immunity Statute.” Larson v. XYZ Ins. Co., 16-745, op. at 413 (La. 5/3/17). Nevertheless, and without any discussion or analysis of the statute, the decision of the court of appeal is rather summarily affirmed, on the basis that there are genuine issues of material fact which make summary judgment inappropriate. The case is remanded, but not before the majority points out that “Tissues of the applicability of the immunity statute and potential comparative negligence ' of the parties remain.” Id. at 417.

Because we granted the writ for the specific purpose of reviewing the applicability of the immunity statute, I believe analysis of the statute insofar as the undisputed facts are concerned is appropriate in order to provide some guidance on the law to the parties on remand. At least one of my colleagues is in agreement on this point, as he has authored a concurring opinion in which he offers his own view of the immunity statute under “the evidence presented thus far.” Id. at 419 (Guidry J., concurs and assigns reasons).

|aI write separately ,to emphasize that this concurrence is but one Justice’s view of the statute and, because it is -only one Justice’s view, it should not be given undue weight by the district eourt in its analysis on remand. If a concurring opinion represented the majority view, this case would have been resolved on that basis.

With all due respect to the concurring opinion, I believe a different analysis is merited. While I do no suggest that my analysis - represents the prevailing view, I offer it by way of dem’onstrating the difficulty faced by the district court on remand in interpreting La. R.S. 9:2795.3 without definitive guidance from this court.

What our rules of statutory construction teach us is that the fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative intent, and we begin our search for that intent with the language of the statute; Moss v. State, 05-1963, p. 15 (La. 4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1185, 1196; see also, Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (“We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and' means in a statute what it says there.”). In this cas'e, even a cursory examination of the language of La. R.S. 9:2795.3 reveals that the legislature has extended immunity to some, but not all, activities involving equines. This is evidenced by the reality that, while there are many facts surrounding the accident that remain in dispute, it is undisputed that the activity in which the plaintiff was engaged-petting the horses and feeding them treats-is not among the activities specifically enumerated in the statute as falling within the definitions of “engages in an equine activity” or of “equine activity.”

The concurring opinion attempts to remedy this omission through an expansive reading of La. R.S. 9:2795.3(A)(3)(e), which defines an “equine activity” as “[a] ride, trip, hunt, or other equine activity of any type however informal or impromptu that are sponsored by an equine activity sponsor.” However, the language of this provision ladoes not allow for its interpretation as the non-exhaustive list of illustrative activities the concurring opinion would read it as. Rather, the “equine activity” must be “sponsored by an equine activity sponsor.” Moreover, the phrase “or other equine activity of any type however informal or impromptu” is preceded by the qualifying phrase “[a] ride, trip, hunt.” Petting, talking to and giving treats to horses hardly falls within the universe of activities relating to a ride, trip or hunt-the activities addressed in this subsection. Finally, and most significantly, the “equine activity” referenced in this subsection is itself a defined term, the definition being contained in La. R.S. 9:2795.3(A)(3)(a)-(f). Clearly, had the legislature intended to confer a broad, all-encompassing immunity, it could have done so very simply by extending immunity to all “equine activity,” without adding the extensive and detailed definitional language in the statute delineating what activity constitutes “equine activity” and what “engages in an equine activity” means. La. R.S. 9:2795.3(A)(1) and (3). The fact that the legislature did not choose that path is telling.

In crafting La. R.S. 9:2795.3, the legislature has gone to great lengths to delineate exactly what conduct is encompassed within the grant of statutory immunity. Petting and talking to horses, as well as feeding them treats, is not conduct that is delineated in the statute as being subject to the grant of immunity. Thus, consistent with the long-settled rule that statutes in derogation of common law or natural rights must be strictly construed,1 must, for the reasons cited above, respectfully disagree with the statutory analysis of my esteemed colleague.

Finally, and insofar as the majority opinion is concerned, I would note that La. R.S. 9:2795.3(C)(2) provides an exemption from statutory immunity for the failure of |4an equine activity sponsor, equine professional, or any other person to “make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity and to safely manage the particular equine based on the participant’s representations of his ability.” La. R.S. 9:2795.3(0(2) (emphasis added). In the present case, there is testimony that the school pony, Wesley, had previously bitten a child, creating a factual dispute as to whether the horse had a known history of biting. There is also disputed testimony as to whether signs had been posted warning people not to feed the horses. Given the existence of these disputed issues of material fact, I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the decision of the court of appeal and remand this matter to the district court.

GUIDRY, Justice,

concurs and assigns reasons.

|,I concur in the majority’s holding that summary judgment was not warranted at this juncture of the proceedings and that a remand for trial is necessary in this case, because there remain genuine issues of material fact on the issue of whether the Equine Immunity Statute applies. Ante, p. 413. In reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, a majority of the court of appeal reasoned the plaintiff was a “spectator” rather than a “participant” within the meaning of the Equine Immunity Statute, a view contrary to the finding of the trial court, which had determined the plaintiff was a “participant” and granted summary judgment without considering other relevant portions of the immunity statute. The concurring judge in the court of appeal found there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was a “participant.” In my view, the trial court was correct in finding the plaintiff to be a “participant” engaging in equine activity within the meaning of the statute. See La. R.S. 9:2795.3(A)(3)(e). Further, because the plaintiff asked for and was given permission by the defendant’s employee to touch and feed the horses, according to her own deposition testimony, the existence of a sign prohibiting such would not preclude a finding that the equine activity in which the plaintiff was engaged had been sponsored by the defendant.

|2N otwithstanding my appreciation of the Equine Immunity Statute and the evidence presented thus far in regard to the motion for summary judgment, I respectfully concur in the holding of the court’s opinion today, which simply affirms the “ruling” of the court of appeal reversing the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and remands the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Ante, p. 417.

CRICHTON, J., concurs for thq reasons assigned by Guidry, J.

      . Knoll, J., retired, participated in this decision, which was argued prior to her retirement.

      . While the concurrence mentions the possible applicability of La. R.S. 9:2795.3(A)(3)(e), it was not addressed by the majority opinion.

      . Ms. Kramer provided two affidavits in support of Equest Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment. ' Attached to' her second affidavit were photos of the posted signs that instructed visitors not to touch or feed the horses.

      . See, Monteville v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Government, 567 So.2d 1097, 1100-1101 (La. 1990) (and cases cited therein),


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM JOHNSON, C.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gary D. HOWARD
    No. 2015-KO-1404
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    05/03/2017
    Rehearing Denied June 29, 2017

      James S. Andes; LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT, Peggy Sullivan; for Applicant.
    CADDO PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE, Hon., James Edward Stewart, District Attorney, Rebecca.Armand Edwards, Tommy Jan Johnson; for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM

hln this matter we consider whether the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, reasonably permits a finding that defendant possessed 18 grams of marijuana with the intent to distribute it. We find that, while the quantity of marijuana is small, its packaging in conjunction with other indicia of drug trafficking found nearby, when viewed through the due process lens of the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) standard, sufficed to exclude the hypothesis of innocence that the marijuana was intended only for personal use.

On October 30, 2013, defendant Gary D. Howard was arrested in the home of his girlfriend Melissa Stewart pursuant to an arrest warrant for violating his probation and parole. Officers had received a tip that defendant could be found at that location, which included an allegation .that he possessed a firearm and was involved in narcotics distribution. The officers knocked on the door to the residence and, when Ms. Stewart answered, asked her where he was. According to her testimony, she responded that he was in the bedroom. According to an officer’s testimony, when asked if the officers could “go and get him” pursuant to the arrest warrant, she responded by mutely stepping aside so that the officers could enter.

hThe officers found defendant in bed. They also found 11 grams of marijuana, in four separate bags inside a larger bag tied around the waistband of his boxer shorts (which were on the floor), another bag containing 7 grams of marijuana inside the bedroom closet, and a box of sandwich bags sitting on a TV stand in the bedroom. Also inside the closet, the officers found a gun, some lxl jeweler bags, and an empty prescription bottle with a' small baggie inside containing marijuana residue. Defendant was arrested and subsequently charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana and with illegal possession of a weapon while in possession of a controlled dangerous. substance. After, his motion to suppress the evidence was denied, he proceeded to trial and a jury found him guilty as charged of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, but not guilty on the weapon charge. The state thereafter, filed a fourth-felony habitual offender bill. Defendant pleaded guilty to being a second-felony offender in exchange for a term of Í8 years imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

The court of appeal affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. State v. Howard, 49,965 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/24/15), 169 So.3d 777. The court of appeal found that the multiple bags containing marijuana, which an expert testified was consistent with having been packaged for distribution, as well as the quantity of similar empty bags and the absence of any smoking paraphernalia sufficed to support defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Id., p. 12, 169 So.3d at 786. After reviewing the record and with the benefit of briefing and argument, we agree.

“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) .... [T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence, ^viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Capt-ville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La. 1984).

Factors which give rise to a reasonable inference of an intent to distribute include: “(1) whether the defendant ever distributed or attempted to distribute the drug; (2) whether the drug was in a form usually associated with possession for distribution to others; (3) whether the amount of drug created an inference of an intent to distribute; (4) whether expert or other testimony established that the amount of drug found in the defendant’s possession is inconsistent with personal use only; and (5) whether there was any paraphernalia, such as baggies or scales, evidencing an intent to distribute.” State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 735 (La. 1992) (reciting factors provided in State v. House, 325 So.2d 222, 225 (La. 1975)). Mere possession of a controlled dangerous substance is not evidence of intent to distribute that substance unless the quantity is so large that no other inference is reasonable. State v. Greenway, 422 So.2d 1146, 1148 (La. 1982). However, “while the amount of drugs may be relevant in evaluating whether the defendant engaged in possession with the intent to distribute, it is not the determinative factor statutorily. Ultimately, it is the intent to distribute that must be proved regardless of the amount of drugs possessed.” State v. Ellis, 14-1511, p. 3 (La. 10/14/15), 179 So.3d 586, 588.

This Court addressed the sufficiency of evidence required to convict a defendant of possession with intent to distribute marijuana most recently in State v. Tong, 609 So.2d 822 (La. 1992). In Tong, the defendant and his friend were stopped for a routine traffic stop when the officer noticed a strong smell of marijuana emanating from the car. After obtaining a search warrant for the defendant’s car, the officer recovered two plastic bags containing marijuana, three empty plastic sandwich bags and a dietetic scale. At trial, the state’s expert | conceded that the “reeking smell of marijuana from the car indicated that the occupants “were users,,’ and that the small quantity in the bags ‘could be consistent’ with personal use.” The expert also noted that the dietetic scale was too crude to measure the marijuana in the individual plastic bags. Id. at 824-825. After the jury found defendant guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, this Court reversed and entered a conviction for simple possession. Id. at 826.

The similarities between the present case and Tong begin and end with the small quantities of marijuana involved. In contrast with Tong, in which there was substantial evidence in favor of the hypothesis of innocence, i.e. that the marijuana was for personal use, there were no such indicia in the present case. Officers here detected no smell of burnt marijuana and no means of using the marijuana was found. While defendant proposes there might have been smoking paraphernalia elsewhere in the residence but not found, a jury cannot be permitted to base its verdict on speculation; otherwise, they might just as easily speculate that a substantial quantity of cash, drugs, and a scale were present elsewhere but not found, and a jury cannot speculate as to a defendant’s guilt.

When applied to a case involving circumstantial evidence, such as this, the Jackson standard requires an appellate court to determine whether viewing the 1 ^evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact would have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence had been excluded. State v. Morris, 414 So.2d 320, 321-22 (La. 1982); R.S. 15:438; see also State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La. 1984) (when fact finder reasonably rejects hypothesis of innocence offered by the defendant, that hypothesis fails and the defendant is guilty unless another hypothesis of innocence is suggested by the record that would cause rational fact finder to have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt).

Defendant offers two hypotheses of innocence. The first can quickly be dismissed. Defendant claims he divided 11 grams of marijuana into four separate bags, and then placed those inside one larger bag, which he tied around the waist band of his boxer shorts, all in an effort to decrease the chance of it being discovered in a pat-down search. However, the arresting officer testified that marijuana packaged and concealed in this form would “more than likely” be detected in a pat-down search, and the officer further opined that whether packaged as here or simply left in one bag, it would not have affected the outcome of any search. In the absence of any evidence this tactic would stand any chance of rendering the marijuana less-likely to be found in a pat-down, this hypothesis is not so reasonable “that no rational factfinder, if properly instructed on the principles of | r,circumstantial evidence, could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Davis, 559 So.2d 114 (La.1990) (per curiam).

Defendant’s second, and more reasonable, hypothesis of innocence is that he purchased the 11 grams of marijuana for personal use just as it was found, individually packaged in four bags, roughly, equal in weight, and contained within the larger bag. This hypothesis, however, fails to account for the large quantity of similar plastic bags found in the bedroom with him, or the firearm in the closet of the bedroom in which defendant was evidently comfortable (and in a residence for which he had a key), or why the marijuana was concealed in' the manner it was within the boxer shorts, or the absence of any indication of marijuana use such as smoking paraphernalia, or the testimony of a law enforcement officer who qualified as .an expert and testified that the foregoing was all more consistent with distribution rather than personal use. A reasonable alternative hypothesis is not .one that merely “could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion,” but one that, after viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, “is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not ‘have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia). Here, defendant’s hypothesis of innocence, that the drugs were for personal use, when all of the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is not so reasonable that a rational juror could not 17have found proof beyond.a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the marijuana with the intent to distribute it rather than use it.

After finding the evidence sufficient, we also briefly address defendant’s contention that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence. The court of appeal found that the trial court correctly denied this motion to suppress, finding that Ms. Stewart consented to the. officers’ entry to her home and the bedroom in which defendant was apprehended, and in which defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Howard, 49,965, pp. 17-18, 169 So.3d at 789. We agree.

A search warrant must be obtained, absent exigent circumstances or consent, to enter the house of a third party to search for the subject of an arrest warrant. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981); State v. Wolfe, 398 So.2d 1117 (La.1981). However, in State v. Barrett, 408 So.2d 903 (La. 1981), this Court declined to extend the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained from a warrantless, non-consensual entry into a home of a third party when exigent circumstances did not exist because; finding under those circumstances that defendant lacked standing to challenge the legality of the search. Defendant here asks us to overrule Barrett. However, because the court of ^appeal’s determination appears correct that Ms. Stewart consented to the officers’ entry without being coerced into doing so, it is not necessary to reach the issue of whether defendant has standing to challenge the legality of the search.

The prohibition against war-rantless searches does not apply to a search that is conducted pursuant to consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043-44, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). To be valid, consent must 19be (1) free and voluntary, in circumstances that indicate the consent was not the product of coercion, threat, promise, pressure or duress that would negate the voluntariness; and (2) given by someone with apparent authority to grant consent, such that the police officer reasonably believes the person has the authority to grant consent to search. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969).

Although defendant alleges numerous coercive elements, none are borne out by the record. Instead, the record reflects that the officers asked whether defendant was present in the residence, Ms. Stewart indicated that he was in the bedroom, and she stepped back to allow them to enter. Other than defendant’s unsupported allegations regarding coercion and shows of force, there appears to be nothing showing the court of appeal erred in its determination that Ms. Stewart consented to the search. Therefore, the court below correctly affirmed the conviction.

| inAFFIRMED

JOHNSON, C.J.,

dissents in part and assigns reasons.

hi And it outrageous that defendant’s conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and sentence of 18 years imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, resulting from the discovery of a mere 18 grams of marijuana, will be allowed to stand. Considering the rapidly relaxing social attitudes toward the use of marijuana, the increasing number of states whose voters have approved the recreational use of marijuana, and changing laws (even in Louisiana) providing more lenient penalties relative to marijuana possession, the result of this case is even more ridiculous. By odd “coincidence,” defendant was sentenced to 18 years in prison—exactly one year per gram of marijuana—a fact suggesting defendant’s sentence was arbitrary rather than the result of careful consideration of the appropriate sentencing factors. As a practical matter, in light of the inconsequential amount of marijuana found, imprisoning defendant for this extreme length of time at a cost of about $23,000 per year (costing our state over |2$400,000 in total) provides little societal value and only serves to further burden our financially strapped state and its tax payers.

Legally, the state proved nothing more than simple possession of marijuana in this case. As noted by the majority, mere possession of a controlled dangerous substance is not evidence of intent to distribute that substance unless the quantity is so large that no other inference is reasonable. State v. Greenway, 422 So.2d 1146, 1148 (La. 1982). In State v. Tong, 609 So.2d 822 (La. 1992), this court addressed the sufficiency of evidence required to convict a defendant of intent to distribute marijuana and summarized this court’s previous determinations on the amounts of marijuana needed to reach the “intent to distribute” threshold:

In this case, the state presented no evidence of the number of cigarettes that defendant’s marijuana could supply and Seller’s testimony made clear that defendant’s plastic bags contained minimal amounts of packaged marijuana. Compare State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982) (8 ounces of marijuana, enough for 1000 cigarettes, in small bags established an intent to distribute); State v. Sibley, 310 So.2d 100 (La.1975) (amount of marijuana for 600 cigarettes supported an inference of intent to distribute); State v. Stewart, 465 So.2d 206 (La. App. 3rd Cir.1985), writ denied, 468 So.2d 571 (La.1985) (1½ pounds of marijuana in small bags sufficient to establish an intent to distribute); see also State v. Green, 524 So.2d 927 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1988), writ denied, 532 So.2d 129 (La. 1988) (possession of 51 marijuana cigarettes not sufficient to raise an inference of intent to distribute).

Id. at 824.

The state’s expert in this case testified that the amount of marijuana in defendant’s possession could have been rolled into 18 marijuana cigarettes of one gram each or 36 cigarettes of one' half gram each. This small quantity of marijuana (18 grams or just four grams over a half-ounce) is more consistent with personal use than intent to distribute. A jury cannot speculate that the defendant intended to | {¡distribute the marijuana; it must base its determination on evidence. Because the quantity of marijuana is consistent with personal use, the state’s case was thus dependent on'the presence of other evidence suggestive of an intent by- defendant to distribute the marijuana.

In my view, there was a complete lack of evidence presented by the state that the marijuana was not for personal use. Notably there was no evidence of cash or scales, or any other, pertinent indicia of distribution, found at the house. Additionally, the state’s expert conceded that the marijuana found could have been for personal use. The state’s expert also acknowledged it was possible that the marijuana was purchased in the same form in which police found it (four separate baggies, inside of a larger one). It is apparent to me that the state’s overreaction in this case was colored by the fact that a firearm was found in the closet of the bedroom. The majority also appears to find this fact significant. However, defendant was acquitted of the weapons charge (illegal possession of the firearm while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance) thereby eliminating any evidentiary value of the firearm with regard to proving his intent to distribute the marijuana.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s finding that the evidence presented by the state was sufficient to convict defendant of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. I would vacate the conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and enter the responsive verdict of guilty of simple possession of marijuana, and remand for resentencing thereon.

      . For example, in State v. Lubrano, 563 So.2d 847 (La. 1990), this Court found the evidence insufficient to prove public payroll fraud because it forced the jury to speculate:
      The due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), does not permit a reviewing court to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the jury. State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983). Nevertheless, " ‘the jury cannot be permitted to speculate if the evidence is such that reasonable jurors must have a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La. 1988) [quoting 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, Criminal 2d § 467 (2d ed. 1982)]. While the state’s case invited the jury to speculate on defendant's guilt, we think that a rational, pro-prosecution trier of fact would necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to the reliability of the movie time cards. With no other independent evidence indicating that the defendant’s particular time cards were in fact accurate, a rational fact-finder could not reasonably reject the possibility that the defendant worked those hours on different days or that he simply took advantage of the chaotic conditions on the movie set to claim hours that he actually spent walking his beat in the French Quarter.

        Lubrano, 563 So.2d at 850.

      . Mr. Andes: If those same 11 grams had been all in one bag in my client's front pocket, would you have likely discovered them during a pat-down search?”
      Corporal Anderson: More than likely.
      Mr. Andes: More than likely? Now if those same 11 grams, back to how you found them in four separate bags like that, would that have made it more difficult or easier to discover during a pat-down search?
      Corporal Anderson: It’s still all packaged together. It would have been the same way.
      Tr.,p. 212.

      .. Corporal Anderson: These are the sandwich bags right here, the ones in the box, the Family Value ones.
      State: Those Family Value bags, were they consistent with the way tire marijuana was wrapped—
      Corporal Anderson: Yes-, ma’am,
      State:—same bags? They were?
      Corporal Anderson: Yes ma’am.
      Tr„ pp. 204-205.

      . It appears that the district court may have granted the motion to suppress on different grounds than those endorsed by the court of appeal. That is of no moment. This Court has found that, while "a new basis for an objection may not be urged for the first time on appeal .,. [that] rule does not, however, preclude the proponent of a ruling' on a motion to suppress from offering additional reasons for sustaining the result on review that do not require going outside of the record in the trial court,” State v. Butler, 12-2359, p. 4 (La. 5/17/13), 117 So.3d 87, 89; see also La.C.C.P, art. 2133(B) ("A party who does not seek modification, revision, or reversal of a judgment in an appellate court, including the supreme court, may assert, in support of the judgment, any argument supported by the record, although he has. not appealed, answered the appeal, or applied for supervisory writs,”).

      . Under La. Const, art. I, § 5, any person adversely affected by a search or seizure allegedly conducted in violation of 'Article I, § 5, has standing to raise that illegality. Thus, there is no equivalent under Louisiana constitutional law to the federal rule that one may not raise the violation of a third person's Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Hamilton, 572 So.2d 269, 272 n.1 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1990), writ denied, 578 So.2d 929 (La. 1991). This court framed the issue in Barrett as follows:
      However, in [Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981)] and [State v. Wolfe, 398 So.2d 1117 (La.1981)], the constitutional challenge was asserted by the third party whose house had been entered without a search warrant and not by the subject of the arrest warrant. Such is not the case here. Condriff (third party) is not claiming that his constitutional right to be secure in his house against an unreasonable search has been violated. Rather, defendant, the subject of the arrest warrant, is claiming that since he was "adversely affécted” by the entry into Condriff’s house in violation of Condriff’s constitutional rights, he (defendant) has standing to raise its illegality. Defendant relies on La.Const. art. 1, § 5 (1974) as interpreted by this court.
      Therefore, the narrow issue presented for our determination is whether, within the meaning and purpose of our constitutional provision, the subject of an arrest warrant in the house of a third person where entry was accomplished without a search warrant or exigent circumstances or consent, was “adversely affected” so as to require suppression of evidence seized incidental to his lawful arrest. We think not.

        State v. Barrett, 408 So.2d 903, 905 (La. 1981) (citations omitted). The court then reasoned as follows:
      Had defendant been arrested in his own home, under [Payton v. United States, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)], the arrest warrant would have been adequate to safeguard his constitutional rights. Hence, if we were to agree with defendant’s contention, the result would be that he would enjoy greater protection against “unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy” in the house of a third party than in his own home. On the other hand, we recognize that but for the fact of defendant’s presence in Condriff's house, he would not have been arrested and evidence seized from his person. Nonetheless, we are not prepared to say that, within the meaning and purpose of our constitutional provision, defendant was “adversely affected” by the illegal entry into Condriff’s house, so as to require suppression of the evidence seized from his person. We do not consider that the previously issued valid arrest warrant was affected by the illegal entry into Condriff’s house. Nor did it affect the search of defendant made as an incident to that arrest within the area of his immediate control, Hence, the trial judge properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.

        Barrett, 408 So.2d at 905.

      . Schneckloth v. Bustamonte is the landmark case in the area of consent search. In Schneckloth, the Supreme Court set out the requirements for a "voluntary” consent. The Court applied the "voluntariness” standard used for purposes of determining the validity of confessions under the fourteenth, amendment. See, e.g., Blackburn v. State of Ala., 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961); Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940). The Court decided that whether consent was voluntary or the product of express or implied coercion must be determined from the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223-24, 93 S.Ct. at 2045-46. The state need not demonstrate that the individual understood his right to refuse consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047. Knowledge of the right to refuse consent is but one factor in determining the "voluntariness" of consent, and no single factor is controlling.

      . For example, Ms. Stewart testified on cross-examination as follows:
      State: Did you ever tell the officers that they couldn’t come in your home?
      Ms. Stewart: No I didn't.
      State: Did you ever tell the officers that they could not search your home?
      Ms. Stewart: No, I did not.

      State: Did you allow them to come in and look for Gary?
      Ms. Stewart: Yeah. I told them he was in the bedroom.
      Tr., pp. 162, 163.

      . Although just two intermediate state circuit courts have previously found that a gesture may be sufficient to convey valid consent to search, State v. Howard, 37,580, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/24/03), 855 So.2d 881, 887; State v. Brown, 598 So.2d 565, 572-573 (La. App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1092 (La. 1992), the federal circuits have generally found that consent to a search may be in the form of words, gesture, or conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Carillo, 536 Fed.Appx. 762, 769 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Jones, 254 F.3d 692, 695-696 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1976); Robbins v. MacKenzie, 364 F.2d 45, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 913, 87 S.Ct. 215, 17 L.Ed.2d 140 (1966).

      . Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia currently have laws legalizing marijuana in some form. Recreational use of marijuana has been legalized in California, Massachusetts, Maine, Nevada, Colorado, Washington, Oregon, Alaska and Washington D.C.

      .In 2015, the legislature amended La. R.S. 40:966 to establish significantly more lenient penalties for possession of marijuana. Specifically, 2015 La Acts 295, eff. June 29, 2015, allows more lenient sentencing "when the amount possessed is fourteen grams or more, but less than two and one-half pounds.” Notably, the amount of marijuana possessed by defendant (18 grams) only slightly exceeds the first possession benchmark (14 grams), which qualifies for the most lenient sentencing under the new law, and falls far short of the two and one-half pound benchmark for penalties that are substantially higher.

      . The average per diem cost for housing a state inmate is $55.00-$65.00.

      . See, e.g., State v. Ramoin, 410 So.2d 1010, 1014 (La. 1981) (proof of possession of 27 marijuana cigarettes is insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to distribute marijuana); State v. House, 325 So.2d 222, 225 (La. 1975) (possession of 21 marijuana cigarettes and a small plastic bag containing seeds and stems was insufficient to establish intent to distribute); State v. Taylor, 99-1154 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/29/00), 757 So.2d 63, writ denied, 00-1021 (La. 3/30/01), 788 So.2d 441 (74 grams of marijuana held insufficient to establish intent to distribute); State v. Green, 18,547 (La. App. 2 Cir 6/10/97), 508 So.2d 602 (1.62 ounces of marijuana was not a sufficient amount to create-a presumption of intent to distribute); State v. Green, 524 So.2d 927 (La. App, 2 Cir. 1988) writ denied, 532 So.2d 129 (La. 1988) (possession of 51 marijuana cigarettes not sufficient to raise an inference of intent to distribute).


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE EX REL. Voltaire SULLIVAN v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0895
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF WEB- , STER

PER CURIAM:

11 WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 6.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Dennis JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0888
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

PER CURIAM:

|,WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 5.

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Marlon CARTER v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0878
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

PER CURIAM:

hWRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 5,

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P, art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district . court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    STATE EX REL., Stephon SAMPSON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0875
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF RAPIDES

PER CURIAM:

|,WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jerxavier LANE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0870
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST FELICIANA

PER CURIAM:

I,WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Christopher GIPSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0869
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF BOSSIER

PER CURIAM:

|/WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La,S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Ricky Lionel LAURANT v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0845
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

PER CURIAM:

I/WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 5.

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that, article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Joseph Tyrone ZENO v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0830
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LAFAYETTE

PER CURIAM:

J_jWRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La,S.Ct.R. X § 5.

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Eric BRIDGES v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-CI-0807
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

PER CURIAM:

|,WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Roy Van NORTRICK v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0804
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

PER CURIAM:

I,WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Vernell DAY v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0778
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

PER CURIAM:

| WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


author: CRICHTON, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cameron Phillip WILLIAMS
    NO. 2016-K-1280
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
    HUGHES, J., would grant.
    CRICHTON, J., would grant in part and assigns reasons.
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

CRICHTON, J.,

would grant in part and assigns reasons:

hi would grant in part this writ application to address the defendant’s claim that, under the particular circumstances of this case, his 20-year sentence for a simple rape conviction is excessive. See State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La. 1993).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Warren CIRAVOLA, Jr.
    NO. 2015-K-1604
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
    HUGHES, J., dissents for the reasons given by Judge McDonald in his dissent.
    CRICHTON, J., would grant and assigns reasons
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF WASHINGTON

CRICHTON, J.,

would grant and

assigns reasons:

liFor the reasons assigned by Judge McDonald in his dissent, see State v. Ciravola, 2015-0032 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/5/15), 2015 WL 4657546 (McDonald, J., dissenting), I would grant this writ application and docket for thorough consideration and opinion.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Katina CARTER v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0922
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

11 WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 5.

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La, C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jeremy LACKEY v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0913
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

PER CURIAM:

I,WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the eourt(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Myles DOLLIOLE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0904
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| ¶WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 5.

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    IN RE: Philip T. DEAL
    NO. 2017-OB-1337
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ORDER

JjThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) received a complaint alleging that respondent converted client funds to his own use." Respondent now seeks to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The ODC has concurred in respondent’s petition.

Having considered the Petition for Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Philip T. Deal, Louisiana Bar Roll number 4762, and the concurrence thereto filed by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of Philip T. Deal for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be. and .is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Philip T. Deal shall be permanently .prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently -prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dominique JENKINS
    No. 2017-KD-1553
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
    GUIDRY, J., would grant. .
    CLARK, J., would grant the writ, order a stay and assigns reasons.
    CRICHTON, J., would grant, for the reasons assigned by Justice Clark.
   ON SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

hi respectfully dissent and would have granted the wrii and ordered a stay of the proceedings to five this issue the closer scrutiny it warn mts in this second degree murder case. Generally, a witness’s refusal to testify despite a court order to do so is punishable for contempt, as the court imposed here. Cf La. C.C.P. art. 226 (“When a contempt of court consists of the omission to perform an act which is yet in the power of the person charged with contempt to perform, he may be imprisoned until he performs it, and in such a case this shall be specified in the court’s order.”); see also Johnson v. Nguyen, 00-1148, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/11/01), 793 So.2d 370, 375 (“The trial court has vast discretion in its determination to impose sanctions for contempt of court.”), writ not considered, 01-2790 (La. 1/4/02), 805 So.2d 1195.

A district court’s authority to control the proceedings and punish for contempt also includes other necessary and reasonable steps to ensure the administration of justice, including the possibility of granting a stay. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 73, 78 S.Ct. 128, 133, 2 L.Ed.2d 95 (1957) (“The management of the trial rests with the judge and no party can be permitted to usurp that function.”); Sapp v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 415, 559 S.E.2d 645, 650 (2002) (“While it is the litigants’ responsibility to produce the evidence, appropriate judicial pressure should be 12employed to test the resolve of the witness. ... ”); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Just as the judge necessarily has discretion to control the form and scope of cross-examination, so he must have discretion to order a witness to answer a proper question. Where the court’s order is defied, appropriate sanctions must be invoked. There are no inflexible rules to guide the court’s discretion. The propriety of a given sanction will vary with the circumstances.”). See also State v. Bertrand, 381 So.2d 489, 491 (La. 1980) (“The grant or denial of a recess is largely within the discretion of the trial court.”); State v. Gordy, 380 So.2d 1347, 1355 (La. 1980) (trial judge has “much discretion in determining whether to grant a recess in order that the proceedings be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner.”).


text:
    Ryan AUCOIN v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE
    No. 2017-C-0817
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
    GUIDRY, J., would grant.
    CRICHTON, J., would grant and assigns reasons.
    GENOVESE, J., would grant.
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CRICHTON, J.,

would grant.

hFor the reasons assigned by Judge Love in her dissent to the denial of rehearing, I would grant this writ application.


text:
    Marsha WILLIS v. EAN HOLDINGS d/b/a Enterprise Rent a Car, et al.
    No. 2017-C-789
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

CRICHTON, J.,

additionally concurs and assigns reasons:

14 agree with the denial of this writ application and the related writ applications filed by Ms. Willis, a licensed attorney representing herself in this legal matter. I write separately to note, first, that, in my view, and as made clear by the court of appeal in this matter, Ms. Willis’s applications lack any iota of legal merit. See Willis v. EAN Holdings D/B/A Enterprise Rent a Car, et al., 15-1538 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 177; 15-1539 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 1063. Though the court of appeal found her claims did not warrant the imposition of damages for a frivolous appeal, due to the fact that damages statutes are strictly construed, I find it troubling that Ms. Willis failed to present even a “scintilla of evidence” to support her allegations. Id., 15-1538, p.7, 218 So.3d at 183. See also 15-1539, p.6, 218 So.3d at 1067; Willis v. EAN Holdings D/B/A Enterprise Rent a Car, et al., 16-0473 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 661, (“A thorough review of the record revealed that Ms. Willis, a licensed attorney, presented a case against Empire with no basis in law or fact, filed numerous unfounded pleadings, and caused unnecessary litigation.”).

Additionally, I write to point out that Ms. Willis filed her writ application in forma pauperis. However, the original informa pauperis order was issued by the |2trial court on August 7, 2012, and rescinded by the trial court on January 4, 2016. Therefore, when Ms. Willis filed this writ application, she did not enjoy informa pauper-is status, nor did she pay the required filing fees. Despite being a member of the bar of this state, and having sworn to meet her obligations with respect to that membership, Ms. Willis did not call this Court’s attention to the fact that her pauper status had been revoked by the trial court. In my view, this omission may be a derogation of her duty of candor to this Court. See La. R. Prof. Conduct R. 3.3.

      . Additionally, for unknown reasons, Ms. Willis filed three separate writ applications related to the three court of appeal rulings against her, but she apparently makes the same arguments in all three. In my view, this is a waste of judicial resources.


text:
    Katherine S. JOHNSON v. LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS
    No. 2017-C-776
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017

      CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

CRICHTON, J.,

additionally concurs and assigns reasons:

hi agree with the denial of this writ application. I write separately to note that, in my view, the insulting and untrue statements made by this applicant against Loyola University in her writ application come close to violating LASC R.VII, § 7. (“The language used in any brief or document filed in this court must be courteous, and free from insulting criticism of any person, individually or officially, or of any class or association of persons, or of any court of justice, or other institution....”)


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    IN RE: Spencer Brimmer BOWMAN
    NO. 2017-B-1472
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Prior to the institution of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Spencer Brimmer Bowman, Louisiana Bar Roll number 33515, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a five-year period of probation to coincide with his Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program recovery agreement. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid. ,


text:
    IN RE: Jalonda Marie MORRIS
    NO. 2017-B-1471
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

_JjThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent neglected a legal matter and failed to communicate with a client. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in which respondent admitted that her conduct violated Rules 1.3,1.4, and 1.16 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Jalonda Marie Morris, Louisiana Bar Roll number 27017, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence. thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    IN RE: Lynden BURTON
    NO. 2017-B-0560
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ORDER

| j Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the report and recommendation of the hearing committee, and the responses thereto filed by the parties,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Lyn-den Burton, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24988, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _ day of-, 2017. FOR THE COURT:

/V JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA


text:
    IN RE: Lucretia PECANTTE
    NO. 2017-B-0552
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ORDER

| Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the report and recommendation of the hearing committee, and the responses thereto filed by the parties,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Lucretia Pecantte, Louisiana Bar Roll number 23545, be and she hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tremond THOMAS
    No. 2016-K-1862
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND CIRCUIT, PARISH OF BOSSIER

CRICHTON, J.,

would grant and docket and assigns reasons:

hi would grant and docket the State’s writ application. Defendant was charged and convicted of second degree murder and aggravated burglary. The court of appeal found that from the record it was unable to conclude that the predicate underlying felony for the charge of second degree murder was not aggravated burglary. State v. Thomas, 50,929, p. 30 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 201 So.3d 263, 280. Because the double jeopardy clause prohibits prosecution for both a felony murder and an underlying felony, see, e.g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 2913, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1977), the court of appeal vacated. defendant’s conviction for aggravated burglary. But the State argues that the court of appeal may have conflated separate and distinct acts of aggravated burglary. In my view, this record-intensive question requires a more thorough treatment than what was performed by the court of appeal. Therefore, I would grant the State’s writ application, order briefing, and docket for oral argument.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Karon BOSTON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1296
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO

PER CURIAM:

I,Denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. In addition, relator’s sentencing claim is not cognizable on collateral review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against |2successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jerry SIMMONS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1055
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. CHARLES

PER CURIAM:

[ jDenied. Relator shows no error in the district court’s ruling. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Wiley Ernest MONCEAUX, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 16-KH-1048
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS

PER CURIAM:

| tDenied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentences, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application | ¡applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Lawrence WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1008
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, /PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

It Denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies, La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/96), 660 So.2d 1189. We attach hereto and make a part' hereof the district court’s written reasons denying- relief.

Relator has now fully litigated at least two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art-. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 261 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La, C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and'this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has. exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute -entry consistent with this per curiam.

[aAttachment

JUDGMENT


text:
    STATE EX REL. Andrew J. FUSILIER v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1007
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.

      09/22/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CALCASIEU

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Hughes, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE EX REL. David Fezell STUBBS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 16-KH-0975
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF RAPIDES

PER CURIAM:

|, Denied. Relator fails to show a particularized need for the requested documents. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174.

GENOVESE, J„ recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jarvis EDWARDS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 16-KH-0974
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator fails to show entitlement to DNA testing. La.C.Cr.P. art. 926.1.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Brodie A. CHIASSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 16-KH-0900
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LA-FOURCHE

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator fails to show any lower court error.

Relator has now exhausted his right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Weimer, J, recused


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jessie James DUPLANTIS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 16-KH-0874
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/22/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF VERMILION

PER CURIAM:

hDenied. Relator fails to show any lower court error.

Relator has now exhausted his right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the harrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as. set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Russell Gene WARE, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1108
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF RAPIDES

PER CURIAM:

■ hDenied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In addition, relator’s claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of other crimes evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct are repetitive. La.C.Cr.P.' art. 930.4. As to the remaining claims, relator-fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C,Cr.P. art. 930.2. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relief.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive ^application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam,

GENOVESE, J., recused.

I ¡Attachment

CRIMINA!. SOCKET NUMBER; 293,902 DIVISION: V STATE OF LOfflSIANA PRNTH jüDÍCÍAL DISTRICT VERSOS PARISH OF RAJSDBS ROSSEIi GENE WARE, JR. STATE. OF-TOUISIANA ⅞⅛ REASONS ON APRÜtCAT&N .FORPOST-CQNyiCTIQN jKEKHSg STATEMENT!!»? THE ¡TASE Russell Gene Ware, Jr. (“Mr. Ware"] was indicted f>y the Rapides Parish Gíand Jury on September 25, 2008, for the offenses of Aggravated Rape, fa Violation of La. R.S. 14:42, and Sexual Battery, ⅛ violation of La: R.S. 14:43.1, The vfctfm in tttís case, M.H., was eleven years old at the tíme. On November 7, 2008, Mr, Ware was arraigned and entered ptea? of not guilty to both charges, Attorney Bridget Brown was appointed to represent Mi Ware on November 7, 2008. On January 22,2009, a pre-trial-conference was held,>at which time Mr. Ware chose to proceed-to trial, and both matters w^re set few-trial on -July 13,2009. The State Sled a Priehr Motion, and the hear ng Was conducted on May 26, 2009, At the hearing, the trial court, giran ted the State's motion and filed written reasons to support &ereo£ On Juiy 13, 2809, the trial' in these matters was continued by joist motions of the State aad-Pefensa to September 14, 2009. The case-proceeded to trial before .the bench on September 16, 2009. On September. 17,2009, Mr. Ware was found guiljy as charged on both counts of the indictment At his sentencing hearing held on September 25, 2009, Mr. Ware was sentenced to life imprisonment -without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for the &arge of Aggravated Rape, and- to twenty-five (25] years at hard iabon, with the Louisiana Department of Corrections without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension l

JLl

Jll

JLl

_k

k

Jifi

Jil

Jj3

_b

STATE OR LOUISIANA COURT OP ARPEAS, TRIED CIRCUIT NO: KH15-01149 .Judgment- rendered and mailed to all pashes Or counsel ©f record on May 4, Z816. STATS OE LOUISIANA VERSUS RÜSSKLL GSNB WAKE, JR. FEED: 12/09/15 On appEoation. of Russell Gene Ware, Jr. for Writ of Review in'No. 293-902 sm the dodfcet qf the- Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish, of Rapides, Hon. John C. Davidson. Prose Counsel for: Russell Gene Ware, Jr. Counsel for. Hon. Phillip Terrell, Jr, State of Louisians Lake Charles, Louisiana, on May 4,201 & WRIT DENIED-. We Sad no error to the trM court’s ruling bf April % 2015. Accordingly, Relator’s writ application, is denied as to the issues addressed in -that ruling, Regarding the trial court's ruling of November 9,2015, &⅛ Writ application is deficient in that it &ils ⅛ contain the transcript txf &e .evidentiary hearing, which is essentia! to review the issue of whether Relator was denied ⅛ right to testify at trial. City of Baton Rouge v. Plain, 43,3 So.2d 710 (La.), cert, -denied, 464 U,S, 896, -104 S.Cfc 246 (1983). Thus, we deny Relator’s writ application otx that issue on ⅛® showtagmade, SPvO SRC TEC JBC &⅜ X, dissents in part and would grant file writ and «maud assignment of error number four to the trial court for consideration and soling. M


text:
    STATE EX REL. Quvadirs RUFFIN v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1080
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/29/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

PER CURIAM:

h Denied. Relator fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to his remaining claims, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.