author: PER CURIAM

text:
    IN RE: Heather M. MURPHY
    NO. 2017-B-0068
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/29/2017

      OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Charles Bennett Plattsmier, Gregory Lynn Tweed, for Applicant.
    Heather Munoz Murphy, for Respondent.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM

_JjThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Heather M. Murphy, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension for threat of harm to the public. In re: Murphy, 13-2947 (La. 12/27/13), 131 So.3d 34.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Count I—The Chouest Matter

In August 2012, respondent began working for attorney Stephen M. Chouest. Four months later, Mr. Chouest terminated respondent’s employment. Shortly thereafter, respondent contacted Mr. Chouest about some prospective clients who needed representation. Mr. Chouest received a copy of an e-mail that respondent sent to the prospective clients, in which she identified herself as an attorney with Mr. Chouest’s law firm but provided her own cell phone number as the contact number. Mr. Chouest informed respondent that she would not be allowed to misrepresent herself as his current employee.

Later, respondent visited Mr. Chouest’s office to deliver the prospective clients’ files. However, she refused to deliver the files unless Mr. Chouest rehired her. He refused, but he was ultimately able to undertake the representation of the clients with their full authorization and consent.

1 ¡/Thereafter, respondent attempted to persuade the clients to terminate Mr. Chouest’s representation and hire her to represent them. To entice them, respondent offered the clients gift cards and basketball tickets. Respondent’s husband also attempted to contact the clients to entice them to hire respondent and left several angry voicemail messages for the clients.

In January 2013, Mr. Chouest filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. As part of the ODC’s investigation of the complaint, the ODC’s staff investigator interviewed LaTonya LaGarde, one of the clients. Ms. LaGarde confirmed that respondent misrepresented the status of her employment with Mr. Chouest. She also confirmed that respondent offered her family basketball tickets to entice them to terminate Mr. Chouest’s representation and, instead, hire her. She further confirmed that respondent’s husband left angry messages on her voicemail. As part of the ODC’s investigation, the ODC also served respondent with a subpoena to obtain her sworn statement. Despite being served with the subpoena, respondent failed to appear for the sworn statement.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 4.1 (truthfulness in statements to others), 4.2 (communication with persons represented by counsel), 7.4 (direct contact with prospective clients), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Count II—The Cheramie Matter

Between January 2013 and July 2013, Debra Cheramie paid respondent a total of $3,700 to handle her parents’ successions. Respondent did not deposit the checks into a trust account because she did not maintain such an account. On her [¡¡trust account disclosure statement, respondent indicated she does not maintain a trust account because she does not handle client funds.

Via an August 8, 2013 letter, Ms. Chera-mie terminated respondent’s services and demanded an accounting and refund of any unearned fees. Respondent did not provide either. Ms. Cheramie also demanded that respondent turn the files over to her new attorney, Steven Koehler. Although respondent met with Mr. Koehler on September 6, 2013, she failed to produce the files.

During the representation, respondent sent Ms. Cheramie e-mails indicating she had filed the succession pleadings with the court. However, when Mr. Koehler checked with the clerk of court, he learned nothing had been filed for either succession. When Mr. Koehler confronted respondent about this, she indicated she had “fax-filed” the succession pleadings. Mr. Koehler asked respondent to produce the confirmation return fax from the clerk of court, but she failed to do so.

In September 2013, Ms. Cheramie and Mr. Koehler filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. Despite receiving notice of the complaint, respondent failed to file a written response or otherwise cooperate with the ODC’s investigation.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.2 (scope of the representation), 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.5(f)(5) (failure to refund an unearned fee), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 8.1(c), and 8.4(c).

Count III—The Horn Matter

In July 2013, Charles Horn paid respondent a $300 flat fee to defend him in traffic court. Respondent appeared at the arraignment and was notified of the September 16, 2013 trial date. Respondent did not notify Mr. Horn of the trial date 14and did not appear at the trial on his behalf. As a result, a bench warrant was issued for Mr. Horn’s failure to appear.

In October 2013, Mr. Horn filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. Despite receiving notice of the complaint, respondent failed to submit a written response, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to obtain her sworn statement. Despite being served with the subpoena, respondent failed to appear for the sworn statement and, thereafter, failed to cooperate with the ODC’s investigation. As part of the ODC’s investigation, the ODC’s staff investigator interviewed Mr. Horn, who indicated he obtained the services of another attorney to have the bench warrant recalled. He also indicated that the other attorney advised him respondent had been interimly suspended from the practice of law in December 2013.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(f)(5), 8.1(c), and 8.4(c).

Count IV—The Criminal Matter

On October 21, 2010, respondent was arrested on charges of obtaining a controlled dangerous substance by fraud and deceit and altering a prescription. Respondent was allowed to resolve the charges through participation in a pre-trial diversion program, which she completed in October 2011. However, she failed to notify the ODC of her-arrest or the disposition of the criminal charges against her. ■

In November 2013, respondent’s former employer filed a disciplinary complaint, notifying the ODC of respondent’s arrest. Despite receiving notice of the complaint, respondent failed to submit a written response or otherwise ..cooperate with the ÓDC’s investigation.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 8.1(c), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal Bact that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c).

Count V—The Keating Matter

On September 13, 2013, while employed by attorney Patrick Keating, respondent appeared in court to represent one of Mr. Keating’s clients. At that time, and, unbeknownst to Mr. Keating, respondent was ineligible to practice law for failing to pay bar dues and the disciplinary assessment. Mr. Keating fired respondent and, on October 30, 2013, obtained a preliminary injunction against her enjoining her from further contact with his clients because of her attempts to persuade them to retain her to handle their legal matters.

Mr. Keating filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent, but she failed to submit a written response. She. also failed to provide the ÓDC with a sworn statement despite being served with a subpoena to do so.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following' provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 5.5 (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(c), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Count VI—The Rabia Matter '

In November 2013, Nouredine Rabia hired respondent to handle the expunge-ments of his traffic citations. Mr. Rabia paid $400 as the full fee for the representation. Later, respondent requested an additional $350. Nevertheless, she took no actions to handle the matter for Mr. Rabia. She also failed to communicate with Mr. Rabia about the status of his legal matter and has not refunded the unearned portion of the fee.

Ifiln January 2014, Mr. Rabia filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. Notice of the complaint to respondent was returned unclaimed, and respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC’s investigation.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.15(a) (charging an unreasonable fee), 8.1(c), and 8.4(c).

Count VII—The Webb Matter

In the latter part of 2013, Carol Webb hired' respondent to represent her in a child support matter. At the time, respondent was employed by attorney Patrick Keating, and she collected a total of $1,550 .in fees from Ms. Webb. Thereafter, respondent failed to appear in court on Ms. Webb’s behalf as scheduled.

Eventually, respondent’s employment with Mr. Keating was terminated. Respondent managed to, convince Ms. Webb that her failure to, appear in court was Mr. Keating’s fault and, ultimately, convinced Ms,. Webb to allow her to continue with the representation. Ms. Webb also retained respondent to handle two malpractice claims, one of which was against Mr. Keating’s law firm.

When respondent failed to keep Ms. Webb informed about the status of her legal matters, Ms. Webb- contacted the court and learned respondent had failed to properly file the pleadings on her behalf. Later, Ms. Webb learned that respondent was interimly suspended-from the practice of law during this time period.

Respondent failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee, despite requests from Ms. Webb to do so. Because of her financial circumstances, Ms, Webb was unable to afford to hire another attorney to represent her.

In April 2014, Ms. Webb filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. Notice of the complaint mailed to respondent was returned unclaimed, -and- the ODC’s further attempts- to contact respondent were unsuccessful.

|7The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15(a), 8.1(c), and 8.4(c).

Count VIII—The Unauthorized Practice of Law Matter

On May 12, 2014, while she was interimly suspended from the practice' of law, respondent appeared in court on behalf of her client, Vernon Green. On June 18, 2014, respondent called the judge’s office and claimed that she had only just received notice of her interim suspension, despite the fact that she signed for the certified mail notice of the suspension on February 5, 2014.

In June 2014, the judge filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. The ODC mailed notice of the complaint to respondent, but the letter was returned unclaimed. The ODC’s further attempts to contact respondent were unsuccessful. .

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct:- Rules 3.3(a)(1) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer), 5.5, 8.1(c), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In April 2015, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. Respondent initially failed to answer the formal charges, and the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant' to Supreme’ Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3), After the hearing committee filed its report and recommendation in this matter, respondent filed a motion to recall the deemed admitted order. Accordingly, the disciplinary board vacated the deemed admitted order, and the matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

IsFormal Hearing

The hearing committee conducted the formal hearing on March 29,2Q16 and May 6, 2016. Respondent participated on the first day of the hearing, during which she provided testimony. She did not appear on the second day of the hearing and was not represented by counsel. On the. second day, the ODC introduced documentary evidence and presented the testimony of Deborah. Cheramie, Steven Koehler, Stephen Chouest, Patrick Keating,. Carol Webb, and Gwen Foret (a former client referred to respondent by Ms. Webb).

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made factual findings consistent with the underlying facts set forth above. The committee further found that all of the ODC’s witnesses provided credible testimony, which corroborated and supported the ODC’s documentary evidence. The committee determined that respondent’s testimony provided on the first day of the hearing was not credible or believable. She provided no exculpatory evidence or testimony, and she expressed no remorse or accountability for her misconduct. Based on these findings, the committee determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The committee further determined that respondent’s conduct caused actual, significant, and ongoing harm to her clients. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.

|9In aggravation, the committee found the following factors: a dishonest or .selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, and indifference to .making restitution. The committee found no mitigating factors present.

After considering respondent’s conduct in light of the permanent disbarment guidelines, the committee recommended respondent be permanently disbarred. The committee further recommended respondent be ordered to make full restitution to all former clients to whom she owes reimbursement of unearned fees or other funds to which she is not entitled.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board found that the hearing committee’s factual findings are supported by the testimony and documentary evidence and are not manifestly erroneous. The board also found that the committee correctly determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.

The board then determined respondent intentionally violated duties owed to her clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Her conduct caused significant, actual harm to her clients. Her lack of cooperation during these proceedings caused unwarranted delay and wasted resources. The board agreed with the committee that disbarment is the baseline sanction in this matter. The board also agreed with the aggravating factors found by the committee and agreed that no mitigating factors are present.

|inAfter considering respondent’s conduct in light of the permanent disbarment guidelines and this court’s prior jurisprudence, the board recommended respondent be permanently disbarred. The board also recommended respondent be ordered to make restitution to her former clients or the Client Assistance Fund, as appropriate.

Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b), the case was scheduled on our docket; however, respondent failed to file a brief and therefore waived her right to oral argument. Thereafter, the ODC filed a motion waiving its right to oral argument. We granted the ODC’s motion and now consider the case based upon the record and the brief filed by the ODC.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La. 3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record in this matter supports a finding that respondent neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients, failed to refund unearned fees, attempted to solicit clients from other attorneys, engaged in dishonest conduct, made misrepresentations to the court, practiced law while ineligible to do so, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law after being placed on interim suspension, engaged in criminal conduct, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in | nits investigations. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La. 1984).

The record further supports a finding that respondent intentionally violated duties owed to her clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession.. Her misconduct caused significant actual harm to several victims.

Both the hearing committee and disciplinary board recognized the baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is disbarment. Additionally,' both the hearing committee and the disciplinary board concluded that respondent’s offenses are so egregious that she should be permanently prohibited from applying for readmission to the bar.

The undisputed evidence in the record indicates respondent failed to refund at least $7,150 in unearned fees paid by her clients, effectively converting those funds to her own use. We acknowledge the total amount of these funds is relatively small in comparison to other cases in which we have imposed permanent disbarment. See, e.g., In re: Woods, 04-1543 (La. 10/29/04), 885 So.2d 551 (lawyer permanently disbarred for converting over $100,000 in client funds); In re: Morphis, 01-2803 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 934 (lawyer permanently disbarred for converting in excess of $2.5 million in client funds).

| ^Nonetheless, neither our jurisprudence nor our guidelines for permanent disbarment emphasize the quantum of the funds converted as a consideration in. determining whether permanent disbarment is appropriate. Rather, Guideline 1 focuses on “repeated or multiple instances” of conversion as well as the “substantial harm” caused by the conversion. Applying these factors, we have imposed permanent disbarment in' cases where the total amount of the converted funds is not large. See, e.g., In re: Meyer, 13-2410 (La. 1/17/14), 131 So.3d 43 (lawyer permanently disbarred based on multiple instances of conversion of client funds totaling $1,100, along with other misconduct).

In the instant case, respondent accepted fees from multiple clients and failed to perform any work on behalf of these clients. The hearing committee made a factual finding that these victims were vulnerable. It further found respondent’s actions caused significant actual harm to her clients and this harm remained ongoing due to respondent’s failure to make any. effort at restitution. All of these findings are amply, supported by ,the record. Accordingly, we find, respondent’s multiple instances of conversion, combined with the substantial harm created, satisfies the requirements of Guideline 1.

Moreover, the record establishes that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by representing a client in court after being placed on interim, suspension. Such conduct clearly falls under Guideline 8 of the permanent disbarment guidelines (following notice, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law subsequent to resigning from the Bar Association, or during the period of time in which the lawyer is suspended from the practice of law or disbarred).

In. summary, respondent’s actions demonstrate a clear disregard for her clients and for her duties as an attorney. In order to protect the public and maintain the high standards, of the legal profession in this state, we find respondent’s license |1fltb practice law in this state must be revoked, and she must permanently forfeit any opportunity to return to the practice of law in the future.

Accordingly, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and permanently disbar respondent. We will also order respondent to make restitution to her former clients or to the Client Assistance Fund, as appropriate.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record and the brief filed by the ODC, it is ordered that the name of Heather M. Murphy, Louisiana Bar Roll number 32068, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that her license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to' Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. It is further ordered that respondent 'shall' make restitution to her former clients or to the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Client Assistance Fund, as applicable. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

Hughes, J., would disbar.

      . Attorney Dane Ciolino appeared at the hearing to represent respondent and requested a continuance, which was denied. He then requested that he be allowed to withdraw from the representation due to respondent’s lack of cooperation and participation, which request was granted.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
CLARK, J.,
     KNOLL, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Paula CLAVIER v. COBURN SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., et al.
    No. 2016-CC-0625
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    06/29/2017
    Rehearing Denied September 6, 2017

      Michael Benny Miller, Crowley, for Applicant.
    THOMAS, • SOILEAU, JACKSON, BAKER and COLE, James Kristopher Jackson, Shreveport, Patrick Francis Cole, Shreveport, Ann Rene Shores, for Respondent. • • .
   CLARK, J.,

|!Following- the denial of writs by the appellate court in this workers’ compensation case, we granted the employee’s writ application to review whether the employee has a right to select a non-physician medical provider to perform a functional capacity evaluation (“FCE”) at -the employer’s expense.for the purpose of contesting the results of a prior FCE that was performed by an employer-referred physical therapist. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”) and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The workers’ compensation claimant in this case, Paula Clavier, injured her neck, shoulder, and back on May 16, 2006, while attempting to lift what she thought was a lightweight box, but which actually contained a heavy cast iron sink; the accident occurred within the course and scope of her employment with Coburn | PSupply Co,, Inc. (“Coburn”). Ms. Clavier sought medical treatment on the day of the accident, and she continued to receive treatment as of the hearing date.

Ms. Clavier first filed a claim with the OWC for her work-related injuries on October 1, 2007, naming as defendants Co-bum and its insurer, CNA Insurance Companies. The matters initially presented were settled by a consent judgment rendered on January 13, 2010, which established that Ms. Clavier was entitled to temporary total disability benefits in the amount $344.02. per week, beginning May 17, 2006, as well as all reasonable and necessary medical treatment. In addition, Ms. Clavier was awarded $4,000 in penalties and $8,500 in attorney fees.

Upon the July 22, 2013 issuance of a work status report by Ms. Clavier’s treating physician, Dr. Hodges, which stated that “[t]he patient is unable to work pending treatment,” the defendants sought to have her examined by a physician of their choice. On August 20, 2013 Ms. Clavier was examined by the defendants’ physician, Dr. W. Stan Foster. Dr. Foster opined that Ms. Clavier exhibited “significant signs of symptom magnification” and that she had reached maximum medical improvement. He recommended an FCE to determine her work status.

liiOn Ms. Clavier’s refusal to attend an FCE, scheduled by the defendants for October 18, 2013 at the Fontana Center in Lafayette, Louisiana, the defendants filed a “Motion to Compel Functional Capacity Evaluation or Alternatively to Reduce Benefits or in the Further Alternative for Appointment of an IME.

Following a December 20, 2013, OWC hearing, Ms. Clavier was ordered to attend an independent medical examination (“IME”) with Dr. Clark Gunderson, in accordance with La. R.S. 23:1317.1 and La. R.S. 23:1124.1. Dr. Gunderson was directed by the OWC, in a February 6, 2014 letter, to “address claimant’s ability to return to work and disability status.”

The examination by Dr. Gunderson was conducted on April 29, 2014, and he issued a report on May 2, 2014 in which he opined that Ms. Clavier had reached maximum medical improvement. In addition, Dr. Gunderson recommended an FCE “with validity testing” and “a release to return to work within the parameters identified.”

The defendants subsequently rescheduled an FCE for Ms. Clavier at the Fonta-na Center, to be performed on June 11, 2014. Ms. Clavier responded by filing a motion to quash the FCE. When Ms. Clavier did not attend the scheduled FCE, the defendants filed a motion to compel the FCE and, alternatively, the suspension or reduction of the claimant’s benefits. Following a July 14, 2014 hearing, the OWC granted the motion to compel and ordered Ms. Clavier to attend a FCE “to be arranged by the Defendants,” and an order so stating was signed on July 23, 2014.

|4Ms. Clavier applied to the Third Circuit for supervisory review of the order compelling the FCE, and her application was denied. Clavier v. Coburn Supply Co., 14-0883 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/28/14) (unpublished). Ms. Clavier then filed a writ application with this Court, which was also denied. Clavier v. Coburn Supply Co., 14-2503 (La. 3/6/15), 161 So.3d 15.

Ms. Clavier underwent the FCE by the employer’s choice of provider, Fontana Center, on April 9, 2015. On May 6, 2015 the defendants filed a rule to show cause why the FCE report should not be forwarded to the court-appointed independent medical examiner, Dr. Gunderson, “for his review and comment on [Ms. Clavier’s] ability to return to work.” On June 1, 2015 Ms. Clavier filed a “Motion and Order to Compel Defendants] to Authorize and Pay for a[n] FCE to be Performed by a Physical Therapist of Paula Clavier’s Choice.” In her motion Ms. Clavier stated that she did “not agree with the findings of the report from the Fontana Center” and that it would be “improper to submit the FCE performed by the defendants’ physical therapist without having a[n] FCE prepared by [her] choice of facility to compare with the Fontana Center FCE.”

The defendants’ rule and the claimant’s motion to compel were heard on August 19, 2015, and the OWC judge ruled on August 28, 2015 in favor of the defendants, denying the claimant’s motion and ordering that the Fontana Center FCE be sent to Dr. Gunderson for review; an order so stating was signed on September 4, 2015. The claimant again filed a supervisory writ application with the Third Circuit, which was denied. Clavier v. Coburn Supply Co., 15-1005 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/2/16) (unpublished). The claimant then filed a second writ application with this Court, which was granted. Clavier v. Coburn Supply Co., 16-0625 (La. 5/27/16), 192 So.3d 742.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

While the parties in this case assert that resolution of the dispute hinges on a | {¡determination of whether the workers’ compensation claimant or his employer has the right to choose an FCE provider under La. R.S. 23:1121, the actual issue presented in this matter-is more narrow. Ms. Clavier is demanding that the employer pay for an FCE by a medical provider of her choice because she disagrees with the results of the FCE to which she was previously ordered to submit.

In support of their assertion, the defendants point to the contrast in the language of Paragraph (A) of La. R.S. 23:1121, providing that “[a]n injured employee shall submit himself to an examination by a duly qualified medical practitioner provided and paid for by the employer ... ”, as compared to the language appearing in Paragraph (B), stating that “[t]he employee shall have the right to select one treating physician in any field or specialty .... ” (Emphasis added.)

The defendants assert that, because the legislature, in Section 1121(A), authorized the employer to select medical practitioners for examinations, while it authorized the injured employee to select only treating physicians in Section 1121(B), and since a physical therapist who performs an FCE is a medical practitioner, not a physician, it is evident that the legislature intended the employer to choose the physical therapist for a functional capacity examination.

In contrast to defendants’ assertion, Ms. Clavier argues that the choice of medical providers should belong to the employee, not the employer, and, she contends that the term “medical practitioner” in Section 1121(A) should be interpreted to mean “physician,” citing La. R.S. 23:1122 (“The employer shall cause the examination provided for in ... Section [1121] to be made immediately after knowledge or notice of the accident, and to serve a copy of the report of such examination made by the employer’s physician upon the employee within six days after the employer’s receipt of the report of such examination.”) (emphasis added).

Ifllnitially, we note that “[w]hen a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” La. C.C. art. 9. Here, as defendants argue, the statute at issue, La. R.S. 23:1121(A) and (B), states that while “[a]n injured employee shall submit himself to an examination by a duly qualified medical practitioner provided and paid for by the employer ... ”, it further states that “[t]he employee shall have the right to select one treating physician in any field or specialty .... ” (Emphasis added.) The difference in the language is clear, and the courts of this state have been unanimous in finding that the terms “medical practitioner” and “physician” are not interchangeable, and that the term “medical practitioner” is more expansive than the term “physician.” See, e.g., Rison v. LifeCare Hosp. of Shreveport, 50,675, p. 11 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/18/16), 196 So.3d 657, 664; Miller v. Christus St. Patrick Hosp., 2012-370 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/24/12, 9), 100 So.3d 404, 411, writ denied, 12-2467 (La. 1/11/13), 107 So.3d 619; Gautreaux v. K.A.S. Construction, LLC, 05-1192, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/22/06), 923 So.2d 850, 852. The clear terms of the statute provide that an employee is enti-tied to select a physician for treatment purposes, and not any other medical practitioner for an examination.

Under the present procedural posture, then, and considering that there is no medical treatment plan by Ms. Clavier’s treating physician calling for an FCE, Ms. Clavier is not entitled, at this time, to an FCE with her choice of provider at the defendants’ cost. See H. Alston Johnson III, 13 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Workers’ Compensation Law and Practice § 287 (5th ed.) (“[Ejxpenses sought to be reimbursed [that] are incurred by the employee solely as preparation for trial of the 17matter rather than for curative purposes ... are properly disallowed. The purpose of the section [R.S. 23:1203 (“[T]he employer shall furnish all necessary drugs, supplies, hospital care and services, medical and surgical treatment, and any non-medical treatment recognized by the laws of this state as legal ....”)] is obviously to make available to the claimant the medical and related care that he needs at no cost to him, not to equip him to present the best possible law suit against his employer or the insurer.”) (footnote omitted) (citing Leonard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 So.2d 332, 336 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1991); Notto v. Morton-Norwich Prod. Inc., 498 So.2d 1158, 1161 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1986); Brown v. Celotex Corporation, 420 So.2d 205, 209 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1982); Caldwell v. Exxon Corporation, 320 So.2d 319, 322 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1975)). See also La. R.S. 23:1121(D) (“After all examinations have been conducted but prior to any order directing the injured employee to return to work, the employee shall be permitted, at his own expense, to consult with and be examined by a physician of his own choosing. Such report shall be considered in addition to all other medical reports in determining the injured employee’s fitness to return to work (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the OWC’s denial of the claimant’s motion to compel the defendants to pay for an FCE to be performed by a physical therapist of the claimant’s choice.

DECREE

Accordingly, the September 4, 2015 order of the Office of Workers’Compensation is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

JOHNSON, Chief Justice, dissents.

HUGHES, Justice, dissents and,will assign reasons.

KNOLL, Justice Ad Hoc, dissents with reasons.

KNOLL, J.,

dissents.

|TI share Justice Hughes’s interpretation of this problematic area of workers’ compensation. However, I write separately to urge the Legislature to address the critical policy issue presented by this.case which, as demonstrated by the majority’s analysis, is not resolved with sufficient clarity under the current statutory framework, resulting in undue delay through litigation.

       Knoll, J., retired, participating in this decision (argued prior to her retirement) as a justice ad hoc.

       This opinion was reassigned on May 10, 2017.

      . Ms. Clavier first saw her family doctor on the day of the accident. However, after an MRI was performed on August 17, 2006, which revealed two herniated cervical discs impinging on the spinal cord, Ms. Clavier was referred to Dr. Fraser Landreneau, a neurosurgeon at the Baton Rouge Neuromedical Center, who performed an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion, on November 29, 2006, at the C5-6 and C6-7 levels of her neck. Ms. Clavier was also treated at the Lafayette Bone & Joint Clinic ("LB & J") -by Dn John Cobb, who diagnosed impingement tendonitis of the right shoulder with bursitis, and he performed an anterior acromioplasty and bur-sectomy of the shoulder on March 19, 2008. In addition, Ms-. Clavier was diagnosed by Dr. Landreneau, Dr. Cobb, Dr. Daniel Hodges, and Dr. Patrick A. Juneau with an entrapment of. the right median nerve at the wrist, which required carpal tunnel surgery. Dr, Juneau confirmed that the wrist problem arose from compression of the cervical nerves, The carpal tunnel surgery was performed by Dr, Cobb on July 26, 2Ó11. After the death of Dr, Cobb, Ms. Clavier's treatment was assumed by LB & J Doctors John Sledge and Daniel Hodges, who treated her for continued neck and shoulder pain and numbness in her left hand causing her to drop objects; Ms. Clavier was diagnosed with "complex regional pain syndrome.” On July 22, 2013 Dr. Hodges issued a work status report, stating, "The patient is unable to work pending treatment.”

      . We note that two subsequent rules, not relevant to the dispute at issue herein, were filed by Ms. Clavier against her employer, in July of 2010 and in February of 2013, which were ultimately resolved in Ms. Clavier's favor and resulted in the assessment of additional penalties and attorney fees.

      . ”[T]he workers’ compensation judge, on his own motion, may order that any claimant appearing before it be examined by other physicians.” La. R.S. 23:1124.1. "Any party wishing to request an independent medical examination of the claimant pursuant to R.S. 23:1123 and 1124.1 shall be required to make its request at or prior to the pretrial conference. Requests for independent medical examinations made after that time shall be denied except for good cause or if it is found to be in the best interest of justice to order such examination.” La. R.S. 23:1317.1(A).

      . The claimant here is admittedly seeking an FCE performed by a physical therapist of her choosing for the purpose of contesting the FCE report issue by the physical therapist to whom the claimant was referred by the employer. Without an employer-paid FCE by a physical therapist of her choice, the claimant urges that she will not "have a medical opinion ... to contest the disability opinion of the medical provider selected by the employer/insurer.”


author: CRICHTON, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Woodrow KAREY, Jr. a/k/a Woodrow Karey, II
    No. 2016-K-0377
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/06/2017
   CRICHTON, J.,

would grant rehearing and assigns reasons:

hFor the reasons assigned in my dissent, State v. Karey, 16-K-0377, 224 So.3d 959 (Crichton, J,, dissenting), I would grant this rehearing application. Based on a paltry yet highly disputed set of facts, this Court found that there was evidence to support the district court’s finding of an enforceable agreement not to prosecute. I remain bewildered as to why such an 'important' agreement was not reduced to writing and, in terms of the civilian contractual concept of cause, even more puzzled as to what benefit the prosecution gained from entering into any such arrangement. Fortunately, the plurality opinion lacks precedential authority but, in my view,' it results in an injustice in this case. Moreover, this case tolerates a bad example, which I fear will likely have a chilling effect on communications between prosecutors and defense attorneys.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE EX REL. Paul M. POUPART v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1237
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

PER CURIAM:

|, WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 5.

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Arthur NICHOLAS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1233
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ASCENSION

PER CURIAM:

11 WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct. Rule X § 5.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Eric Dean OXLEY v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1215
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF SABINE

PER CURIAM:

JjWRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 5.

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the naiTow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a mmute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    IN RE: COMMITTEE ON BAR ADMISSIONS CFN-726076
    NO. 2017-BA-1330
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   BAR ADMISSIONS PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

|, After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner is immediately eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of twenty-four months. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. During the probationary period, petitioner shall comply with all of the terms and conditions of the consent agreement executed by her with the Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, and such other conditions as may be imposed upon her by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy these conditions, or should she commit any misconduct during the period of probation, her conditional right to practice may be terminated or she may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Carlos ARIAS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1229
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LAFAYETTE

PER CURIAM:

JjWRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 5.

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state' collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. John Colby MANUEL v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1184
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    9/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE THIRTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ALLEN

PER CURIAM:

JjWRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown'the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    IN RE: Todd A. HARRIS
    NO. 2017-B-0726
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

h The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent was arrested for alcohol-related misconduct on several occasions. Prior to the institution of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Todd A. Harris, Louisiana Bar Roll number 18937, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day, with all but six months deferred. Following the active portion of the suspension, respondent shall be placed on probation for a period to coincide with the term of his recovery agreement with the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program. Any failure of respondent to comply with the terms of the agreement may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

CRICHTON, J., would reject the consent discipline.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Vance SCOTT, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1217
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. CHARLES

PER CURIAM:

11 WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Ernest CARTER, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1212
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LAFAYETTE

PER CURIAM:

WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct. Rule X § 5.


text:
    STATE EX REL. James Anthony HEBERT v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1189
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE THIRTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF TER-REBONNE

PER CURIAM:

|;WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct. Rule X § 5.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Roland Damond FOSTER v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0948
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO

PER CURIAM:

| ¶ Denied. Relator has previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Foster v. State, 14-2377 (La. 9/25/15), 174 So.3d 1138. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s -written reasons denying relief,

^Attachment


text:
    IN RE: Alexandra E. MORA
    NO. 2017-B-1318
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent mishandled her client trust account by commingling client funds with her personal funds. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in which respondent admitted that her conduct violated Rule 1.15(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Alexandra E. Mora, Louisiana Bar Roll number 23535, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a two-year period of supervised probation governed by the conditions set forth in the petition for consent discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the probation monitor, and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Christopher HANDY v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1234
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. LANDRY

PER CURIAM:

I ¡WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Nicholas REVISH v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1202
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    9/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINETEENTH, JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

PER CURIAM:

| jWRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Terrence Lamont JOHNSON a/k/a Terrance L. Johnson v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1188
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE THIRTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ALLEN

PER CURIAM:

11 WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Robert Paul RHODES, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1178
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF RAPIDES

PER CURIAM:

11 WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. George GEORGETOWN v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1173
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    9/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

PER CURIAM:

|,WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 5.

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Avis J. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1143
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE THIRTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF TER-REBONNE

PER CURIAM:

11 WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 5.

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered tp, record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Andre Derrell LEE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1129
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    9/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO

PER CURIAM:

I,WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. David P. CARRERE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1064
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE THIRTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF TER-REBONNE

PER CURIAM:

I,WRIT NOT'CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that hé sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).

WEIMER, J;, recused. ■


text:
    STATE EX REL. Frankie CLARKSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1045
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF BIENVILLE

PER CURIAM:

I,WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Untimely filed pursuant to La.S.Ct.R. X § 5.

Relator has now exhausted the right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator has filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, and the district court’s ruling denying relief is now final. Hereafter, unless relator can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted the right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per cu-riam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Michael A. RUSHING v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1042
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    09/15/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

PER CURIAM:

I,WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


author: JUSTICE GENOVESE CLARK, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kirby HUNTER
    No. 2017-KK-1523
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 8, 2017
    CLARK, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by Justice Genovese-.
    HUGHES, J., would grant.
    GENOVESE,J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

JUSTICE GENOVESE

additionally concurs and assigns reasons:

11Although “[t]he accused shall have a right to full voir dire examination of prospective jurors ..,as set forth in La. Const. art. I, § 17, for the purpose of determining prospective jurors’ qualifications and assisting counsel in articulating intelligent reasons for the exercise of cause and peremptory challenges, State v. Ball, 00-2277, p. 23 (La. 1/25/02), 824 So.2d 1089, 1110, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 864, 123 S.Ct. 260, 154 L.Ed.2d 107 (2002), defendant does not show that the trial court has abused its discretion in regulating voir dire at this time. See generally State v. Williams, 457 So.2d 610 (La.1984) (trial court has discretion to limit voir dire, as long as the limitation is not so restrictive as to deprive the defense of a reasonable opportunity to probe to determine a basis for challenges for cause and for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges). As noted by Judge Lobrano’s concurrence in the court below, “[bjecause the district court repeatedly stated that it would reexamine its ruling if issues arise during voir dire that require additional questioning, I am convinced that the district court will follow Justice Marcus’s instruction to ‘afford wide latitude to counsel in the conduct of voir dire examination to effectuate the accused’s right to full voir dire of prospective jurors embodied in La. Const. art. I, § 17.’” State v. Kirby, 17-0725 (La.App. 4 Cir. 09/01/17), — So.3d — (quoting State v. Hall, 616 So.2d 664, 669 (La.1993)). Because defendant’s allegation of error that the trial judge has abused his discretion and unreasonably restricted voir dire is speculative, his application is premature.

CLARK, J.,

additionally concurring.

hi would deny for the reasons expressed by Justice Genevese.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Horatio JOHNSON
    NO. 2017-KD-1462
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 25, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 521-673; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-K-708

| (Writ granted. The decision of the district court to terminate the compelled testimony prior to the completion of questioning of the witness by the State and the defense is reversed and set aside for the reasons assigned by Judge Lobrano in her dissent.

WEIMER, J., would deny.

HUGHES, J., would deny.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles TURNER
    NO. 2017-KK-1485
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 30, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 15-5781; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 17-K-479;

|¶ Denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sherman TOLBERT
    NO. 2017-KK-1296
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 1, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 531-823; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-K-0580;

I iDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Matthew JOSEPH, et al.
    NO. 2017-KK-1505
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 4, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 521-755; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-K-0739;

11 Stay denied. Writ denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana IN the INTEREST OF C.F.
    NO. 2017-CJ-1054
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. J-1699; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 17-CA-24

11 Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darryl JONES
    NO. 2016-K-1502
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 31,028; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 0649;

11 Granted.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Eddie Ray FORD v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-0361
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 103,863; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50755-KH

| iDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Skylleur HAZES
    NO. 2016-KO-1886
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 679,499; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0441;

| iDenied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Adam BATISTE, III
    NO. 2016-KO-1180
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. CR-141203; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 15-1008,15 01008-KA

| tDenied,


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin BROADWAY
    NO. 2016-KO-1912
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 01-13-0742; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0275;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brian A. RODAS
    NO. 2016-KO-1881
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 14-5933; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 15-KA-792;

| denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.

HUGHES, J., would grant in part.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tremond THOMAS
    NO. 2016-KO-1642
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 196,859 AND 205,005; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,929-KA C/W 50,420-KA

h Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry THAMES
    NO. 2016-KO-1911
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div., No. 1400133; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 1298;

11 Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant on excessive sentence claim.

CRICHTON, J., would grant on excessive sentence claim.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shane GRIGSBY
    NO. 2016-K-1917
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 31903; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0291

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Raco ALLEN aka Rico Allen
    NO. 2016-KO-1734
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 317,540; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,-703-KA;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth F. JONES aka Kenneth Paul Jones
    NO. 2016-KO-1775
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 15-CR-26373; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,815-KA

|, Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles FRANKLIN
    NO. 2016-KO-1754
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. Li No. 496-305; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-KA-1060

I denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shawn Miron STEVENSON
    NO. 2016-K-1806
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 641509; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0277

^Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sareel POINDEXTER
    NO. 2016-K-1868
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. C-531327; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016-KA-0132;

| t Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.

WEIMER, J., recused.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James Richard ELEY
    NO. 2016-KO-1844
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 523565; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 1925

|¶ Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Cardell FLOWERS
    NO. 2016-K-1871
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 536912; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0130

| í Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Davis L. JACKSON
    NO. 2016-KO-2055
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 15CR26272; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,864-KA;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brandy MIZE
    NO. 2016-KO-2089
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 87684; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-158; September 6, 2017

| denied.

GENOVESE, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Travis R. MCKEE
    NO. 2016-KO-2125
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 87683; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-300

11 Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David Wayne SIMS
    NO. 2016-KO-2076
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 26735-13; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-20;

h Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James SPIKES, Sr.
    NO. 2016-KO-2090
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 13 CR4 123350; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0690;

11 Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Quincy Joseph GAUDET
    NO. 2016-KO-2176
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 700,751; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0903

| denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    Mark Anthony JENKINS, Sr. v. Latasha JACKSON
    NO. 2017-C-0652
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 711-419; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-482

| ¶ Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lemerick Vernell CHRISTOPHER
    NO. 2016-KO-2187
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 14-F-2667; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,943-KA;

|, Denied.


text:
    Letitxa GREEN, Individually and on Behalf of her Minor Child, Kyra Jones and Chad Hudson and Letitia Green on Behalf of their Minor Children Cierra Hudson and Caleb Hudson v. Larry BROWN and Safeway Insurance Co. of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-C-0707
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 569,015; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-152-CA

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kia STEWART
    NO. 2016-OK-2154
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 464-435; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-0855;

JjWRIT GRANTED IN PART. The district court ruling reopening this case for the receipt of additional evidence is set aside. On remand, the district court is not limited to consideration of the evidence presented at the hearing, but is instructed to consider the entirety of the record, including evidence previously admitted as part of defendant’s post-conviction proceedings. In all other respects, the writ is denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny.

GENOVESE, J., would deny.


text:
    Aimee KITCHEN (Kelly) v. Frederick W. KELLY, III
    NO. 2017-CJ-1084
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 636-024; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No 17-C-251;

11 Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Raymond Charles CRESSY, et al. v. HUFFINES HYUNDAI MCKINNEY, LP, et al.
    No. 2017-C-0510
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated May 19, 2017; Parish of Natichitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 84,772; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-712

hNot considered. See La.S.Ct.R. IX, § 6.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Ann Tomlinson AUTIN
    NO. 2017-CC-1321
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 696-468; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 17-C-290

11 Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Troy GREENUP v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2015-KH-2128
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated April 7, 2017, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 11-810; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 15-KH-556;

hNot considered. See La.S.Ct.R. IX, § 6.


text:
    STATE EX REL. George Adonis CARTER v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-0399
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 24, 2017; Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 77,666; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 1078;

11 Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Sabrina DOWELL v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-1875
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated November 29, 2016, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 475-067; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-KA-0371;

|, Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Abdellatif E. DEVOL
    NO. 2017-KK-0646
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying for Rehearing of this Courts order dated Juné 5, 2017; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 12-14-0663; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 KW 0023

11 Rehearing denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Roy Anthony WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-0730
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 44,261; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50805-KH

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert E. RICARD, Jr.
    NO. 2016-KO-1880
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 1302326; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 1855;

h Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ricardo M. YOUNG, Jr.
    NO. 2016-K-1961
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 515691; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-KA-0358.

|; Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tyrone WELLS
    NO. 2016-K-1939
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 441-698; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-KA-0612

11Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony Paul CAMINITA
    NO. 2016-KO-2045
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 531694; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0121;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cory WALL
    NO. 2016-OK-2057
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 507-243; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-0941

|, Demed-


text:
    Reginald MIMS v. METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION, City of Shreveport and ABC Insurance
    NO. 2017-CC-1362
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 594,551-C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,776-CW

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bryan K. HILL
    NO. 2016-K-1245
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 486-534; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-KA-0123;

11 Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana IN the INTEREST OF A.S., Z.H., Z.H., and X.H.
    NO. 2017-CJ-1134
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. J-2G15-010-C; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-CA-0028

|, Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    IN RE: Appeal of the DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD
    NO. 17-PDB-001
    NO. 2017-OB-0728
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 6, 2017
   Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 17-PDB-001

11 Leave to appeal denied.