author: SHAW, Justice. MURDOCK, Justice MOORE, Chief Justice

text:
    MOBILE COUNTY et al. v. Ashley RICH, District Attorney. Ashley Rich, District Attorney. v. Mobile County et al.
    1130359 and 1130404.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    March 11, 2016.
    Rehearing Applications Denied Aug. 26, 2016.-

      LaVeeda Morgan Battle of The Battle Law Firm, LLC, Birmingham; and Jay M. Ross of Adams & Reese LLP, Mobile, for appellants/cross-appellees Mobile County et al.
    R. Alan Alexander and Jeffery J. Hart-ley of Helmsing, Leach, Herlong, Newman & Rouse, P.C., Mobile, for appellee/cross-appellant Ashley Rich, district attorney.
   SHAW, Justice.

In case no. 1130359, Mobile County, the Mobile County Commission (“the Commission”), and the individual members of the Commission (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the County”), the defendants/counterclaim plaintiffs below, appeal from the Mobile Circuit Court’s judgment ordering the County to provide certain funding to the District Attorney’s Office for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit (hereinafter “the District Attorney’s Office”). In case no. 1130404, Ashley Rich, who is the district attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit and the plaintiff/counterclaim defendant below, cross-appeals. We affirm in case no. 1130359. In case no. 1130404, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 25, 2012, Rich, in her capacity as district attorney, filed a complaint against the County seeking declaratory relief and damages. Rich alleged that, under Act No. 82-675, Ala. Acts 1982 (“the 82 Act”), as amended by Act No. 88^23, Ala. Acts 1988 (“the 88 Act”) (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the local acts”), the County was obligated to provide certain funding to the District Attorney’s Office for the 2011-2012 fiscal year and it had failed to do so. Specifically, Rich contended that the 88 Act gave the district attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit the authority to appoint 27 assistant district attorneys (“ADAs”) and 1 chief assistant district attorney (“CADA”). At the time Rich filed the complaint, only 22 ADAs were employed in the District Attorney’s Office. Rich also argued that the local acts required the County to provide funding for certain other employees of the District Attorney’s Office and that the funding levels for those employees had increased over time. Rich alleged that the County had failed to provide sufficient funds to pay salaries for the full number of employees for the District Attorney’s Office as required by the local acts.

Rich contended that the 82 Act required the County to provide funds sufficient to compensate eight “legal stenographers” and to purchase certain equipment and supplies for the investigative unit of the District Attorney’s Office. Further, Rich contended that the 82 Act authorized the County to pay for office supplies and equipment for the District Attorney’s Office. Although the County had appropriated $1,555,203 for the District Attorney’s Office for the 2011-2012 fiscal year, Rich contended that significantly more funds were due to be appropriated under the local acts. The complaint was later amended to add similar claims for later fiscal years.

All the judges of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit recused themselves from the action. Judge George K. Elbrecht of the Monroe District Court was appointed to preside over the action.

The County filed an answer and a counterclaim. The County contended, among other things, that it had complied with the funding requirements of the local acts. Further, the County argued that the District Attorney’s Office had received funding from other sources and, thus, that Rich was required to remit to the County some of the funds that had previously been provided the District Attorney’s Office pursuant to the local acts.

The parties subsequently filed opposing motions for a summary judgment. The trial court held a hearing on the motions on March 26, 2013, and then ordered the parties to mediation, which was unsuccessful.

On April 15, 2013, the County filed its second amended counterclaim arguing, among other things, that the local acts were unconstitutional. Rich moved to strike the amendment, which motion was denied. On June 6, 2013, in what was styled as its third amended counterclaim, the County moved for leave to amend its pleadings to allege additional constitutional claims.

On August 27, 2013, the County again moved for leave to amend its answer, this time to allege waiver, stating that “[pjrior District Attorneys have failed to enforce and follow the requirements of the 82 and 88 Acts.” The trial court granted that request.

On November 18, 2013, the trial court issued an “order on pending motions.” The trial court denied the motion for leave to file the third amended counterclaim; thus, the trial court refused to consider certain constitutional arguments by the County contained in that pleading. The trial court went on to hold that the local acts were not unconstitutional based on the arguments presented by the County. Further, it held that Rich was entitled to hire a CADA and a total of 27 AD As, that the salary-funding schedule provided in the 88 Act applied and amended the salary-funding schedule in the 82 Act, and that the salary-funding schedule would increase when raises are provided to State or County employees. However, the trial court held that the fact that prior district attorneys and the County had previously not followed the salary-funding schedules in the local acts amounted to a waiver of any request for funding for those previous years; thus, no additional funding amounts were required to be paid for the period between 1982 and 2011. Additionally, the trial court held that the salary-funding schedules had not been modified by raises by the County or State occurring before its order, but would be increased by any future raises. Further, the trial court ruled that the County was responsible for providing all funding under the salary-funding schedule, less the State’s funding liability, which was limited to $15,000 for each position and did not increase.

Further, the trial court held that the 82 Act required the County to pay for up to eight “legal stenographers.” Although the District Attorney’s Office did not have employees with that title, the trial court held that the employees called “trial coordinators” filled the role contemplated by the phrase “legal stenographers” in the 82 Act and, thus, that the County must henceforth provide the funding for those positions. Further, the trial court held that the County was required under the 82 Act to purchase supplies for the investigative unit (but not to fund the salaries of employees for that unit) and that it had the discretion, but was not required, to fund the general-office expenses of the District Attorney’s Office. Finally, the trial court held that the County was not required under the local acts to provide funds for vacant employee positions.

On November 18, 2013, the trial court entered a “final order” making certain evi-dentiary rulings, denying a motion by the County to reconsider its decision to disallow the third amended counterclaim, and further noting that neither party owed the other any damages. Both sides filed post-judgment motions, which the trial court denied.

Case No. 1130359

I.

On appeal, the County contends that the local acts violate Ala. Const.1901, Art. IV, § 96, § 72, and § 68.

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As to § 96, the County notes that there exists a historical trend to eliminate local supplementary funding to county courts. It argues that the local acts are barred by § 96, which states: “The legislature shall not enact any law not applicable to all the counties in the State, regulating costs and charges of courts, or fees, commissions or allowances of public officers.” The County explains that the purpose of the provision is to ensure uniform court costs and charges Statewide. See Barnes v. State ex rel. Tate, 26 Ala.App. 450, 451, 162 So. 404, 405 (1935) (“ ‘Section 96 of the Constitution ... was a declaration of public policy of the State of Alabama that the costs and charges of court should be uniform throughout the State.’” (quoting circuit judge’s order)). It then argues that although local amendments to the constitution can exempt counties from this provision, no such local amendment exists for Mobile County. See Jefferson Cty. v. Dockerty, 33 Ala.App. 30, 33, 30 So.2d 469, 471 (1947) (noting that the “yoke” of § 96 was “lifted” in Jefferson County by the Jefferson County Salary Amendment to the constitution, now Ala. Const.1901, Local Amendments, Jefferson County, § 5 (Off. Recomp.)).

The County further contends that Act No. 1205, Ala. Acts 1975, the act implementing the Unified Judicial System provided in the judicial article to the constitution adopted by Amendment No. 328 to the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (now § 139 et al. (Off. Recomp.)), designates that the salaries of ADAs are “costs and charges of courts” as contemplated by § 96. The portion of Act No. 1205 the County cites, codified at Ala.Code 1975, § 12-19-2, states:

“(a) All counties shall continue, from January 16, 1977, through September 30,1977, to support court services within their respective counties at not less than the same level of expenditures for such court services during the fiscal year ending September 30, 1976; provided, that the county level of expenditure for court services may be decreased to the extent and for individual items, formerly paid by the county, assumed by the State on January 16,1977.
“(b) All authorized appropriations for court services of any kind, including but not limited to county solicitors, assistant district attorneys and other prosecution and defense expenses, in effect on January 15,1977, for county courts to be abolished and replaced by district courts and for circuit courts shall continue to be provided by the counties from January 16, 1977 through September 30, 1977, for district and circuit court services.”

(Emphasis added.)

The language in § 12-19-2 appears to describe appropriations for ADAs in terms of appropriations for “court services.” However, this is nothing more than a description of the appropriations arrangement under the structure that existed he-fore, and that was phased out by, the establishment of the Unified Judicial System. It does not designate appropriations for ADAs’ salaries as “costs and charges of courts” as contemplated by § 96.

Further, Rich notes that prior opinions indicate that § 96 governs only situations involving laws applicable to county officers. See Opinion of the Justices No. m, 255 Ala. 656, 658, 53 So.2d 367, 369-70 (1951) (“[S]ection 96 only applies to such county offices as are common to all counties.”); State ex rel Shirley v. Lutz, 226 Ala. 497, 501, 147 So. 429, 432 (1933) (“The members of the board here created are State officers, not county officers. Their fees and allowances provided in the act are not within section 96 of the Constitution. This section deals with county officers, and only such county officers as are common to all the counties of the State.”); and Baumhauer v. State ex rel. Smith, 240 Ala. 10, 13, 198 So. 272, 274 (1940) (“The act was not offensive to Section 96 of the Constitution. This section was only applicable to such county officials or officers as are common to all the counties of the State.”). The local acts explicitly designate the CADA and the ADAs as State officers. Thus, it does not appear that CADAs or ADAs are “public officers” as described in § 96. For these reasons, we see no merit in the argument that the local acts violate § 96.

B. § 72

The County next argues that the local acts violate § 72. That section provides:

“No money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appropriations made by law, and on warrant drawn by the proper officer in pursuance thereof; and a regular statement and account of receipts and expenditures of all public moneys shall be published annually, in such manner as may be by law directed.”

(Emphasis added.)

The County maintains that the salaries of the employees of the District Attorney’s Office are paid by checks drawn on the State treasury. It states: “[The salaries] were ‘payable’ and paid out of the State treasury. With this direct evidence of payment of State employees in the [District Attorney’s Office] from the State treasury, it is clear that the Local Acts compelling solely Mobile County to do the same are unconstitutional and void.” Specifically, the County argues that to compel it “to pay these State expenses violates Section 72.”

Section 72 is a “legislative restriction on the power to make appropriations.” Opinion of the Justices No. 78, 249 Ala. 389, 390, 31 So.2d 558, 559 (1947). Here, the local acts do not, themselves, “appropriate” money from the State treasury; instead, they require the County to provide funding to the District Attorney’s Office. Nothing before us indicates that the County’s payments are “paid out of the [State] treasury.” There is also no authority cited or argument presented that funding provided by a county must comply with § 72. Further, there is no argument that the actual warrants received by the employees of the District Attorney’s Office were not properly issued pursuant to lawful appropriations. The County thus has not demonstrated a violation of § 72.

C. § 68

The County argues that the local acts violate § 68. That section provides:

“The legislature shall have no power to grant or to authorize or require any county or municipal authority to grant, nor shall any county or municipal authority have power to grant any extra compensation, fee, or allowance to any public officer, servant, or employee, agent or contractor, after service shall have been rendered or contract made, nor to increase or decrease the fees and compensation of such officers during their terms of office.... ” .

The County contends that Rich “sought retroactive pay for her [ADAs] and [CADA] by mathematically assuming all State and county merit and cost .of living increases be included in her new salary schedule for [ADAs]. This remedy is unconstitutional under Section 68.” County’s brief at 31.

No “retroactive pay” was awarded in this case. Specifically, the trial court held that previous district attorneys and the County had, in the past, not followed the funding requirements of the local acts. Thus, the trial court held that it would not grant “back pay or amounts due” for salary increases that should have occurred before 2011.

The County acknowledges that the trial court “denied the retroactive claim,” but it states that the trial court’s remedy “is outright unconstitutional under Section 68.” County’s brief at 32. However, the County does not explain why this is the case.

As Rich argues, the local acts do not require “extra” compensation for ADAs “after service [has] been rendered,” but instead require funding for compensation provided at the time “services” were rendered. See generally Op. Att’y Gen. No.1982-00336 (May 11,1982) (“Section 68 does not prohibit the payment for services previously rendered where the right to compensation arose at the time services were rendered.”). Additionally, it does not appear that the CADA and the ADAs, who, according to Rich, are at-will employees, are “officers” with “terms of office” who, under § 68, cannot have an “increase” in “compensation.” Specifically, in Cobbs v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, 18 Ala.App. 206, 208, 91 So. 627, 628-29 (1920), the Court of Appeals suggested that § 68 does not apply to at-will employees, because their “salary or wage may be changed at any time, either by law or by mutual contract,” and that the subsequent creation of a pension for such employees “is not a gratuity, but a part of the stipulated consideration, for which they contracted and served.” 18 AlaApp. at 208, 91 So. at 629, Further, in Opinion of the Justices No. 72, 249 Ala. 88, 91, 30 So.2d 14, 17 (1947), the Justices stated that an “increase in compensation” to “officers who have a fixed and unexpired term” would violate § 68, but no such increase in compensation to “all others whose compensation may be increased” would violate § 68.

Here, the County has not demonstrated that the CADA and the ADAs are “officers” for purposes of § 68, or that the requirement to provide funding for any employee positions in the District Attorney’s Office constitutes “extra compensation .-.. after service [was] rendered.'” Therefore, the trial court’s judgment is due to be affirmed on this ground.

II.

The County contends that the trial court erred in disallowing its June 6, 2013, third amended counterclaim, which attempted to add allegations that the local acts violated certain constitutional provisions.

The factual scenario leading to the trial court’s decision is as follows. At the March 26 hearing on the motions for a summary judgment, the trial court noted that there was no challenge to the constitutionality of the local acts and indicated that it was inclined to enter a summary judgment for Rich on several dispositive issues. However, it desired the parties to mediate the issue of the proper salary-funding schedule required by the 88 Act. The County suggested that there was no need for a trial, and the trial court thus ordered that the hearing on the remaining summary-judgment issues be heard on April 15, the date originally scheduled for trial.

At the April 15 hearing, it was reported in open court that mediation to arrive at the proper salary-funding schedule had failed. The County also raised several constitutional issues and filed a motion for leave to file a second amended counterclaim delineating those claims. Rich objected to those new arguments, maintaining, among other things, that the County was raising new, purportedly dispositive issues after the trial court had previously indicated its intentions to rule in Rich’s favor. The trial court, however, accepted the second amended counterclaim and ordered briefs.

On May 13, the County filed its brief. Rich argued that the County raised constitutional issues in that brief that were not specifically alleged in the second amended counterclaim, including the challenge to the 82 Act on the basis of Ala. Const.1901, Art. IV, § 106; Art. XII, § 218; Art. XVII, § 281; and Amendment No. 397 (now Local Amendments, .Geneva County, § 6 (Off. Recomp.)). Thereafter, on June 6, the County filed its request to submit its third amended counterclaim, which alleged the new constitutional arguments discussed in the May 13 brief. The request stated:

“In accordance with Rule 15(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] the County files this Third Amended Counterclaim to conform to the evidence presented in the County’s Brief on Constitutional Issues and responded to by the District Attorney in its Motion to Strike and Response to the County’s brief.”

Rich filed a response to the motion, contending that the latest effort to amend the pleadings was “in response to [her] uncontested averment that the defendants have failed to plead several constitutional arguments made in their [May] brief.” Rich challenged the applicability of Rule 15(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and whether the County had shown good cause under Rule 15(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. Further, Rich argued that Rule 15(b) does not allow parties to “ambush” opposing parties at the last minute. The motion for leave to file the third amended counterclaim was denied in open court at a July 1 hearing.

On appeal, the County’s sole argument is that the trial court was required by Rule 15(b) to accept the third amended counterclaim.

Rule 15(b) states:

“When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be sub-served thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining the party’s action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. An amendment shall not be refused under subdivision (a) and (b) of this rule solely because it adds a claim or defense, changes a claim or defense, or works a complete change in parties. The Court is to be liberal in granting permission to amend when justice so requires.”

In deciding whether a trial court should accept an amendment under Rule 15(b), this Court has stated:

“ ‘Rule 15(b) is not permissive: it provides that issues tried by express or implied consent shall be treated as if raised in the pleadings.’ Hawk v. Bavarian Motor Works, 342 So.2d 355, 358 (Ala.1977) (first emphasis added). ‘If a party objects to the introduction of evidence at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues framed by the pleadings, he must show that he would be actually prejudiced in maintaining his action or defense on the merits by the admission of the evidence.’ Id. (emphasis added).
‘“We also note that a determination “as to whether [an] issue has been tried by express or implied consent under Rule 15(b) is a matter for the trial court's sound discretion, which ivill not be altered on appeal absent an abuse [of that discretion].” International Rehab. Assocs., Inc. v. Adams, 613 So.2d 1207, 1214 (Ala.1992) (quoting McCollum v. Reeves, 521 So.2d 13, 16 (Ala.1987)). ‘ “[Wjhether pleadings are deemed to be amended in order to conform to the evidence presented is also a matter within the discretion of the trial court,” and a decision in that regard will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.’ Adams, 613 So.2d at 1214 (quoting McCollum, 521 So.2d at 16-17).”

Ammons v. Tesker Mfg. Corp., 853 So.2d 210, 216-17 (Ala.2002) (final emphasis added).

As Rich notes, the request for leave to file the third amended counterclaim was not filed after a “trial.”

“Regardless of whether [the defendants] would be prejudiced by the proposed amendment, the plaintiffs’ motion is ill-founded because Rule 15(b) provides for amendments to the complaint in order to conform to evidence presented during a trial, and there has been no trial in this case. Rule 15(b) states, in pertinent part: When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.’ (Emphasis added.)”

Swanstrom v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., 43 So.3d 564, 582 (Ala.2009) (first emphasis added).

Although evidentiary materials were filed in the various hearings on the parties’ motions, we see no “trial” on the evidence as contemplated by Rule 15(b). Here, the County’s third amended counterclaim, for all that appears, was not in response to evidence presented at trial, but in response to Rich’s objection that certain constitutional issues argued by the County in support of the second amended counterclaim were not specifically alleged in that pleading. The County cites no authority for the proposition that amendments to the pleadings under Rule 15(b) are applicable in the context of responses to dueling summary-judgment motions; no authority is cited showing that such a scenario equates to a trial on the evidence.

“Generally, amendments are to be liberally allowed. However, the trial court is given discretion in the exercise of that liberality.” First Alabama Bank of South Baldwin v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 619 So.2d 1313, 1317 (Ala.1993). Although by no means an automatic rule, this Court has upheld the exercise of discretion by trial courts in disallowing, in certain contexts, amendments filed shortly before or after motions for summary judgment are filed or heard. See Brackin v. Trimmier Law Firm, 897 So.2d 207, 228 (Ala.2004) (holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in disallowing an amended complaint that, among other things, was filed “after the defendants had already submitted their motions seeking a summary judgment and briefs in support of those motions”); Hays Corp. v. Bunge Corp., 777 So.2d 62 (Ala.2000) (holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in disallowing an amendment to a complaint filed six days before a hearing on a motion for summary judgment), overruled on other grounds, Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Saxton, 880 So.2d 428 (Ala.2003); Government Street Lumber Co. v. AmSouth Bank, NA., 553 So.2d 68 (Ala.1989) (holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in striking an amended complaint filed contemporaneously with a response to the opposing party’s motion for summary judgment); and Puckett, Taul & Underwood, Inc. v. Schreiber Corp., 551 So.2d 979, 984 (Ala.1989) (holding that the trial court properly struck an amendment to a complaint that was filed within two weeks of the setting for hearing of the motion for summary judgment). Cf. Deputy Sheriffs Law Enforcement Ass’n of Mobile Cty. v. Mobile Cty., 590 So.2d 239, 243 (Ala.1991) (holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in disallowing an amendment Sled after summary judgment had been entered). Rule 15(b) does not, on its face, appear applicable in this case, and we do not believe that the County has demonstrated that the trial court exceeded its discretion or otherwise erred in refusing the tardy amendment. Because the claims in the third amended counterclaim were not ruled upon by the trial court and the County has suffered no adverse judgment on the merits of those claims, we pretermit any discussion of them.

III.

The County next argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted the local acts.

“ < “Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.” ’ “Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So.2d 293, 296 (Ala.1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992))....”

DeKalb Cty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 275-76 (Ala.1998).

First, as noted above, Rich argued in the trial court that the 82 Act required that the funding levels for the salaries of the CADA and the ADAs be increased every time either the State or the County gave raises to their employees. Specifically, § 14 of the 82 Act provides:

“At any time that the Legislature ... shall approve an increase in the salaries of State employees, and at any time [the County] shall approve an increase in the salaries of County employees, the salaries paid employees of the District Attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit shall be increased accordingly; and the schedules of salaries paid personnel of the District Attorney’s Office as set out in the provisions of this Act shall be increased.”

(Emphasis added.) Rich also contended that, after the enactment of the 88 Act, the County was obligated to provide funding for raises provided by both the County and the State. Section 1(d) of the 88 Act provides:

“Of the total annual compensation to be paid the aforementioned [CADA] and [ADAs], each shall be paid an annual salary by the State of Alabama of $15,000.00.... The remainder of the annual compensation as provided in the schedule of salaries hereinabove set out, of each of the aforementioned [CADA] and [ADAs] shall be paid by the county comprising the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, which sum shall be paid from the general funds of said County, in equal installments as the salaries of other county officers are paid.”

(Emphasis added.)

The trial court agreed with Rich and held:

“[T]he plain language of this provision makes the County responsible for all but $15,000 of the salaries of each [ADA], Prospectively the County shall be responsible for paying raises approved by the State and/or County. When the State approves a raise [for] State employees and/or when the County approves a raise for County employees, the County shall fund all but $15,000 of the salaries of [ADAs].... ”

On appeal, the County contends that, under the language of § 1(d) of the 88 Act, the County is obligated to provide funding only at the levels explicitly stated in the salary-funding schedule found in the 88 Act. Specifically, it points to the language in that section stating that, after $15,000 is paid by the State for the CADA and each ADA, the County pays the remainder of the compensation found “in the schedule of salaries.” The County appears to interpret this to mean that it pays only the amounts listed in the schedule found in the 88 Act, not adjusted to reflect any raises that might have subsequently followed.

The County’s argument does not, however, square with the language of § 14 of the 82 Act, which remains effective after the enactment of the 88 Act. Specifically, § 14 of the 82 Act requires that any raises by either the State or the County increase the salary-funding schedules. The 88 Act replaced the CADA and the ADA schedule in the 82 Act; there is now a new funding schedule, but that schedule is still “increased” under § 14 every time the County or the State gives its respective employees a raise. The State’s obligation is now, by the 88 Act, “capped” at $15,000, necessarily requiring the County to fund the remainder of the salaries. In other words, the State is required to fund only the first $15,000 of each position, and the County pays the remainder found in the salary-funding schedules as modified, via § 14 of the 82 Act, by subsequent raises to State or County employees. We see no merit in the County’s argument.

The County also contends that the trial court misinterpreted § 14 of the 82 Act. Specifically, it argues that the language of § 14 actually requires the County and the State separately to fund the raises they may provide their employees. Any time either the legislature or the County increases the salaries of their respective employees, the County explains, under § 14 “the salaries paid employees of the District Attorney ... shall be increased accordingly.” The County contends that what is “increased accordingly” is the State’s or the County’s respective obligation to provide funding for the raises they may have adopted.

We disagree. It is clear from the language that the salary-funding levels of the employees are “increased accordingly” by any raises those entities may provide, and not the County or State’s respective funding obligations. The County contends that this historically has not been the case, and that the State has actually funded past increases. Nevertheless, the language of the local acts is clear on this particular issue, despite both the County’s and State’s prior widespread failure to follow the local acts.

IV.

The County also challenges the trial court’s holding that it must fund eight “legal stenographer” positions in the District Attorney’s Office. Specifically, § 7 of the 82 Act permitted the appointment of up to eight “legal stenographers.” The section provided a “compensation” range with a maximum of $12,000 and provided that the salaries of the legal stenographers be funded by the County. The trial court held that Rich’s employees designated as “Trial Coordinators,” which, under § 5 of the 82 Act, were funded by the State, were actually “legal stenographers” that must be, under § 7, funded by the County.

On appeal, however, the County contends that Rich does not actually employ “legal stenographers”; instead, she employs persons who have the title “Trial Coordinators.” Section 5 of the 82 Act authorized the district attorney to hire a “Trial Coordinator” and designated that the State would fund that employee’s compensation. The County contends that the 82 Act contemplates that “Trial Coordinators” and “legal stenographers” are different positions funded by different sources.

In support of its argument, the County cites Rich’s deposition testimony. In it, she explains that the employees at issue, although classified as “Trial Coordinators,” actually performed the duties of legal stenographers and that “[t]hey take notes for the lawyer.” They were called “Trial Coordinators,” she testified, because “many legal secretaries ... don’t like to be called legal secretaries” and because they “perform services for the lawyer. They go to court with the lawyer. They write down everything the lawyer does in court. They write down in the—they document, document, document. Their job is to document everything that the lawyer is doing with regard to that file.” The business manager for Rich’s office also testified that those employees “do more than just legal stenographer work.”

The 82 Act does not define either the term “Trial Coordinator” or the term “legal stenographer.” This Court is presented with nothing more than undisputed testimony that the employees in Rich's office called “Trial Coordinators” actually perform the work of “legal stenographers” (among other things). With no analysis by the County as to how those employees should be considered “Trial Coordinators” and not “legal stenographers,” as those terms are used in the 82 Act, we have been given no reason to overturn the trial court’s decision on this ground.

V.

The County claimed in the trial court, and claims on appeal, that it is entitled to a reimbursement of certain funds it has previously provided to the District Attorney's Office. Specifically, the County contends that that office has received funding from certain outside sources (e.g., grants) that was earmarked to pay salaries or portions of salaries of members of Rich’s staff whose salaries were also being funded by the County. The County thus contends that it is entitled to a reimbursement for the portions of the salaries it funded that were also covered by funding from other sources.

Alabama law, through the local acts, requires the County to provide certain funding for certain positions in the District Attorney’s Office. That Rich’s office may receive funding from other sources does not impact that requirement; the outside funding does not impact the County’s statutory obligation. The County contends that Rich was forbidden from wrongfully expending funds, see Ala.Code 1975, § 41-4-95, but provides no authority or legal argument to demonstrate that any funds that the County was required to provide and that were duplicative must be refunded. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment on this issue is affirmed.

VI.

Finally, the County contends that the trial court erred in granting a post-judgment motion by Rich seeking to require the County to provide funding for two additional ADAs hired in October 2013 during the proceedings in this case and before the trial court’s final judgment. Specifically, the County notes that the trial court’s judgment requires Rich, under Ala. Code 1975, § 11-8-3, to submit a budget request to the County so that it can budget the funds it will provide to the District Attorney’s Office. The County contends that the hires that occurred during the middle of the budget year by Rich and her demand that the County fund those hires are outside the normal budgetary process and violate the trial court’s order that Rich participate in that process. It is unclear whether those hires violate the trial court’s judgment, because they were made before the trial court's November 18, 2018, orders in this case directing Rich to submit a budget under § 11-8-3. Additionally, it is unclear how the hires negatively impacted the County’s budgeting process, because it appears that the County was, pursuant to its position that the local acts were ineffective, not fully funding the District Attorney’s Office as required by the local acts in the first place. Thus, the trial court’s order on this ground is affirmed.

VII.

The trial court’s rulings that are challenged by the County are affirmed.

Case No. 1130I0I

I.

Rich, in her cross-appeal, appears to identify two issues as to which she says the trial court erred. First, she contends that the trial court erred in holding that the 82 Act did not require the County to provide funding for the salaries of certain individuals working in the investigation unit of the District Attorney’s Office. Specifically, Rich notes that § 2(d) of the 82 Act states:

“The County ... shall purchase from its general fund, upon application by the District Attorney, all equipment and supplies, including but not limited to automobiles, radios and other electronic equipment, which are necessary in the proper performance of the duties of such investigators and pay for such other expenses which are reasonably necessary in the suppression of crime, the apprehension of criminals and the duties assigned them. The governing body of said county shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of such equipment.”

Rich contends that “other expenses which are reasonably necessary” includes the “expense” of compensating non-investigators in the unit, including a criminal-history investigator, a secretary, and off-duty sheriffs deputies “who serve as warrant officers.”

In light of the full text of § 2 of the 82 Act, we disagree. The remainder of the section states:

“(a) The District Attorney ... shall be authorized to appoint not less than four investigators....
“(b) The District Attorney ... shall be authorized to designate one investigator to serve as Chief Investigator.... The total annual compensation paid to the Chief Investigator shall be paid by the State of Aabama from the general fund of the State in equal installments as the salaries of other State officers are paid.
“(c) The total annual compensation paid to each investigator, excluding the Chief Investigator, shall be not less than $16,000.00 nor more than $27,000.00, said compensation to be determined by the District Attorney. The total annual compensation paid to each investigator shall be paid by the State of Alabama from the general fund of the State in equal installments as the salaries of other State officials are paid.”

It is clear from the text of the 82 Act that the salaries of certain personnel in the investigation unit are explicitly referred to by the terms “salaries” and “compensation.” It also explicitly designates the entity that must fund those salaries: the State. Nothing before us indicates that “salaries” or “compensation” of other personnel would be included in the different term “expenses.” Further, § 2(d) generally appears to refer to funding for equipment and supplies, not personnel. The language of the 82 Act does not support Rich’s argument; therefore, the trial court’s judgment on this issue is affirmed.

Second, Rich argues that the trial court erred in determining the amounts required by the salary-funding schedule for the CADA, the ADAs, and the legal stenographers. Specifically, in the trial court Rich noted that § 14 of the 82 Act, quoted above, which was not impacted by the amendments effected by the 88 Act, required that the salary-funding schedule set forth in the local acts be increased concomitantly with any raises granted by either the County or the State. She thus argued that the salary-funding schedule for the CADA and the ADAs found in the 88 Act, as well as the range provided for legal stenographers in § 7 of the 82 Act, had been modified by raises given over subsequent years to both County and State employees.

The trial court, however, declined to adjust the salary-funding schedule for past raises. As for the CADA and the ADAs, the trial court held that the schedule found in the 88 Act “is the salary schedule that applies today,” and that it would not be modified by County or State raises effected since 1988. According to the trial court, § 14 would require adjustment to the funding levels only when future raises are given by the County or the State to its employees. The trial court’s rationale appears premised on the fact that the funding requirements of the local acts had never been adhered to:

“[A]s a result of the prior agreements and/or practices between previous District Attorneys of this Circuit and the County, the statutory scheme for increasing the schedule of salaries was not followed. It appears to this court that with regard to office funding, the relationship between previous District Attorneys and the County was different from the relationship between the present District Attorney and the County. The Court finds and declares that the decision by previous District Attorneys and the County not to follow Section 14 of the 1982 Act, constitutes a waiver of strict compliance with the statutes. By not adhering to the statutes, the raises authorized therein were waived. Accordingly, this court finds and declares that it will not consider nor grant any back pay or amounts due for County and State salary increases that should have occurred in accordance with the 1982 and 1988 Acts, between 1982 and 2011.”

For similar reasons, it also appears that the trial court did not accept the argument that the salary scale for legal stenographers should be increased to reflect past raises by the County or State and instead declared that the County was required to fund legal stenographers’ salaries at no less than $12,000 per legal stenographer.

On appeal, Rich contends that the result of the trial court’s order saddles the District Attorney’s Office with funding at a 1988 salary level. Specifically, the 88 Act salary-funding schedule adopted by the trial court set the funding levels for ADAs at a salary range from $28,000 to $58,000. According to the record, the salaries actually paid to the ADAs in the District Attorney’s Office during the proceedings ranged from $46,315.50 to $123,306.02.

On the other hand, the County notes that, if all the County and State salary raises are used to adjust the salary-funding schedule in the 88 Act, then the funding obligation would be astronomically higher: Rich’s motion for a summary judgment presented a salary-funding schedule adjusted for both County and State raises that ranged from $103,752 for the lowest level ADA to $245,676 for the highest level CADA.

On appeal, Rich challenges whether the doctrine of waiver can be applied in this case. Specifically, she notes that it is an affirmative defense that was not pleaded by the County until late in the proceedings when it filed an amended answer on August 27. The amended answer contended that “[pjrior District Attorneys have failed to enforce and follow the requirements of the 82 and 88 Acts. Therefore any claims between 1982 and 2011 have been waived.” The trial court allowed this amended answer, even though it was filed after the third amended counterclaim, which the trial court declined to accept.

We find no authority for the proposition that the failure of past district attorneys to insist that the County adhere to statutorily mandated funding requirements prevents self-executing modification of the salary-funding-schedule amounts provided by the local acts. “[Wjaiver consists of a ‘voluntary and intentional surrender or relinquishment of a known right,’ and the burden of proof in establishing a waiver rests upon the party asserting the claim.” Bentley Sys., Inc. v. Intergraph Corp., 922 So.2d 61, 93 (Ala.2005) (quoting Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So.2d 1047, 1057 (Ala.1984)). Although prior district attorneys used their discretion to make agreements with the County to accept lesser funding amounts, nothing before us indicates that they waived—or could have waived—the actual changes to the CADA and ADA salary-funding schedule or the legal-stenographer salary range that were effected when the County and State gave raises. They accepted lesser amounts, but this did not alter the text of the local acts.

The portions of the trial court’s decision denying modification of salary-funding amounts for the CADA, the ADAs, and the legal stenographers for all raises that occurred after the enactment of the local acts is reversed; the trial court, on remand, shall increase the salary-funding schedule and legal-stenographer scale in accord with any County and State raises that have occurred since the enactment of the local Acts.

II.

The portion of the trial court’s judgment holding that the 82 Act did not require the County to provide funding for the salaries of certain individuals working in the investigation unit of the District Attorney’s Office is affirmed. The portion of the judgment holding that raises subsequently effected by the County and the State did not impact the salary-funding amounts found in the local acts is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1130359—AFFIRMED.

STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, MAIN, WISE, and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

MURDOCK, J., concurs specially.

MOORE, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

1130404—AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, MURDOCK, MAIN, WISE, and BRYAN, JJ., concur,

MOORE, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

MURDOCK, Justice

(concurring specially in case no. 1130359).

I write specially to emphasize that Rule 15(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., has not been asserted as a ground for reversal of the trial court’s disallowance of the County’s third amended complaint; only Rule 15(b) has been asserted. Because I agree with the main opinion’s conclusion that Rule 15(b) is not applicable in this case, I concur. No issue as to whether the trial court otherwise exceeded its discretion or erred in disallowing the County’s third amended complaint is before us.

Like the present case, the status of a summary-judgment motion was a consideration in the cases cited in the final paragraph of Part II of the discussion in case no. 1130359 of the main opinion and, in each of them, this Court upheld a trial court’s decision disallowing an amendment to a pleading. It also appears the trial courts in those cases considered something more than just the pendency of a summary-judgment motion (e.g., an extended litigation history) that further augured in favor of the trial court’s decision. Because those decisions were made under Rule 15(a), any differences or similarities between those cases and the present case need not be addressed further here.

MOORE, Chief Justice

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur with Parts I, II, IV, V, and VI of the main opinion in its discussion of case no. 1130359. Because I believe that Act No. 88-423, Ala. Acts 1988, nullified the effect of § 14 of Act No. 82-675, Ala. Acts 1982 ( the 82 Act ), however, I dissent from Part III of its discussion of case no. 1130359 and from its discussion of case no. 1130404 insofar as the Court applies § 14 of the 82 Act.

      . This case presents numerous and complicated legal issues. Several different court reporters shared responsibility in reporting this case. Judge Elbrecht’s efforts in handling such a case, away from his home jurisdiction, deserve to be complimented,

      . The trial court required Rich to submit, under Ala.Code 1975, § 11-8-3, a budget to the County. However, because the County and prior district attorneys had a past agreement that a budget was not necessary, and because no budget package had been submitted by the County to Rich, Rich was not required to submit a budget for the 2014 fiscal year.

      . The County also contends that this act is a general law that supersedes the local acts.

      . The County also contends that Ala.Code 1975, § 12-10A-6(a), prevents county supplements for district attorneys. That Code section provides:
      "Any district attorney or constitutional officer other than a judge whose compensation is affected by this chapter who receives a local supplement shall have his or her supplement reduced by any increase in his or her State compensation until the supplement is eliminated. No officer appointed or elected after October 1, 2001, shall receive a county supplement or expense allowance in addition to his or her State salary and no salary supplement or expense allowance may increase after June 10, 1999."
      Although the County appears to cite this Code section to show a general trend of ending county supplements to certain officials, we nevertheless note that the local acts do not appear to run afoul of this Code section. The "compensation" of Rich, as district attorney, is not impacted by the local acts, and no argument is presented indicating that employees of the District Attorney’s Office are "constitutional officers” as contemplated by this Code section or that funding of their salaries equates to a local or county supplement or expense allowance "in addition " to their salaries.

      . Although Rich argues that the salary-funding amounts in the local acts are nevertheless deemed to have increased, see the discussion, infra, under the heading “Case No. 1130404,” there is no challenge to the trial court’s ruling that backpay or past amounts due from the County would not be awarded.

      . The County denies that it is seeking relief under Rule 15 (a).

      . The County's and the State’s funding obligations were originally addressed in § 1(d) of the 82 Act. The 82 Act required 60% of the ADAs' salaries to be paid by the State and 40% by the County, irrespective of which gave a raise to its employees. The 88 Act amended § 1 and, in part (d), capped the State's obligation at $15,000.

      . There were, at the time of lower court proceedings, five Level 1 Step 6 ADAs, whose salaries ranged from $77,817.11 to $123,306.02, that, under Rich’s calculations, would be funded at $211,542 each if the salary-funding levels were adjusted to reflect County and State raises.

      . The County does note that, in its first answer, it pleaded waiver as to Rich’s claim for funds to pay the salaries of legal stenographers.

      . We note that the arguments in this case and the historic practice are based on the premise that the local acts govern the funding amounts that must be provided by the County for salaries of certain employees in the District Attorney’s Office. As the trial court held, funding does not have to be provided for positions not occupied and, by necessity, does not have to be provided above the salary amounts the varying levels of District Attorney’s Office employees are currently being paid. Thus, although the ceiling for salary funding for the CADA and ADA positions, adjusted as mandated in the local acts, may be shockingly high, the County is to provide funding for the actual salaries, and not funding for the potential funding levels the local acts anticipated. The adjusted salary-funding schedule provides merely a maximum. As the record demonstrates, the actual salaries paid to the CADA and ADAs do not come near the potential funding obligation required of the County for each position.

      . Rich also twice mentions in her brief that the trial court erred in holding that the County was not required to fund vacant positions. However, we see no argument elaborating on this purported error.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BOLIN, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Ex parte Jimmy HARRIS. (In re Geraldine Grant Bryson v. Town of Mosses and Jimmy Harris). Ex parte Town of Mosses. (In re Geraldine Grant Bryson v. Town of Mosses and Jimmy Harris).
    1141345 and 1141385.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    July 29, 2016.

      Rick A. Howard and April W. McKay of Holtsford, Gilliland, Higgins, Hitson & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, for petitioner Jimmy Harris.
    Randall Morgan and Elizabeth Brannen Carter of Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, P.C., Montgomery, for petitioner Town of Mosses.
    Michael G. Strickland and Blakely W. Barnes of Strickland & Kendall, LLC, Montgomery, for respondent Geraldine Grant Bryson.
   BOLIN, Justice.

The Town of Mosses (“the Town”) and its employee, Jimmy Harris, the Town’s chief of police, separately petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Geraldine Grant Bryson. We have consolidated their petitions for the purpose of writing one opinion.

Facts

At the time of the events giving rise to this action, Bryson operated an entertainment venue known as “The Spot.” Bryson described “The Spot” as a “community center for all activities.” “The Spot” had pool tables and arcade games, sold food, and hosted social and recreational events. Bryson obtained from the Town a business license to operate “The Spot”; the license prohibited the sale of alcohol on its premises. Bryson subsequently requested that the Town grant her a liquor license, but the Town’s council denied her request. It is undisputed that Bryson was never granted a liquor license for “The Spot,” by either the Town or the State of Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (“the ABC Board”).

Bryson rented “The Spot” to a deejay, who planned to host an event on its premises on the evening of May 2, 2010. Bry-son was paid a rental fee of $75. The deejay hosting the event distributed flyers in the community advertising that a “beer bash” was going to be held at “The Spot” on May 2, 2010. Bryson testified that she did not participate in distributing the flyers in the community and that she did not learn of the flyers until the evening of the event. Approximately 200 people turned out for the event at “The Spot,” even though the entertainment portion of the event was ultimately canceled by the deejay. Although Bryson, who was at “The Spot” on the night of May 2, 2010, testified that she did not see anyone consuming alcoholic beverages at the event, she acknowledged that the deejay hosting the event had brought alcohol to “The Spot” that he planned to “give .., away [to] the community for showing support for the center.”

Walter Hill, the Town’s mayor, was contacted by a citizen and was told that flyers were being circulated in the community advertising a “beer bash” at “The Spot” at which individuals could pay an admission fee and consume alcohol inside “The Spot.” Hill stated that he notified Harris, the Town’s police chief, of the call informing him of the “beer bash” being advertised at “The Spot.” Hill told Harris that the matter needed to be investigated and that he would contact the Drug Task Force for the 2d Judicial Circuit (“the task force”) as to how to proceed. In the meantime, Harris had obtained one of the flyers advertising the “beer bash” at the “The Spot,” which stated that the price of admission to the event was $7.00. Harris then drove by “The Spot” and witnessed several people standing outside. Pursuant to the instructions received from the task force, Harris, along with officers from other law-enforcement agencies, entered “The Spot,” where they observed people consuming alcohol.

Harris testified that he did not actually witness the sale of alcohol on the premises of “The Spot,” but he stated that it was his understanding that the business license the Town issued for “The Spot” prohibited alcohol from even being present on the premises. According to the police report of the events on May 2, 2010, Bryson was arrested for “selling alcohol without [a] license.” Harris testified that Kelvip Mitchell, police chief for the City of Hayneville, which participated in the seizure and arrest at “The Spot,” made the determination to arrest Bryson. Bryson testified that Harris arrested her. Over 200 bottles of beer were seized from the premises. The charges against Bryson were ultimately dismissed because the Town was unable to produce a witness who could testify to paying an admission to “The Spot” and drinking alcohol on the premises.

On May 2, 2012, Bryson sued the Town and Harris, in his individual capacity, in the Lowndes Circuit Court, asserting claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and slander. Bryson specifically alleged that Harris was acting within the line and scope of his employment as the Town’s chief of police when she was arrested and that her claims arose from the willful and intentional acts of the defendants, which she says were designed to embarrass and harm her. On August 24, 2012, the defendants answered Bryson’s complaint, generally denying the allegations and asserting certain affirmative defenses, including the defense of immunity.

On May 18, 2015, the defendants moved the trial court for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Harris had probable cause to arrest Bryson and that Harris was immune from suit pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala.Code 1975, and the doctrine of State-agent immunity set forth in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000), a plurality opinion, and adopted by this Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000). The Town argued that it is absolutely immune from suit for all intentional torts of its agents pursuant to § 11-47-90, Ala.Code 1975, and that it also enjoys the State-agent immunity afforded Harris, as its employee.

On August 3, 2015, Bryson filed a response in opposition to the defendants’ summary-judgment motion, presenting certain evidence that, she says, establishes that Harris’s actions relative to her arrest were motivated by malice toward her. Bryson also challenged the defendants’ reliance upon the affidavit of Valencia Aaron, an enforcement agent with the ABC Board, that the defendants presented in support of their summary-judgment motion. Bryson moved to strike the affidavit, arguing that the defendants failed to produce the affidavit in a timely manner and that Aaron had failed and/or refused to make herself available to Bryson for a deposition.

On August 4, 2015, the defendants filed a response in opposition to Bryson’s motion to strike Aaron’s affidavit, contending that they had produced Aaron’s statement to Bryson on May 8, 2014, in response to certain interrogatories propounded to them on April 24, 2014. The defendants also argued that they had no affiliation with Aaron and thus had no ability to compel her testimony.

On August 13, 2015, the trial court entered an order striking Aaron’s affidavit and denying the defendants’ motion for a summary judgment. The defendants separately petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus. We grant Harris’s petition in part and deny it in part and issue the writ (case no. 1141345); we grant the Town’s petition and issue the writ (case no. 1141385).

Standard of Review

‘While the general rule is that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, the exception is that the denial of a motion grounded on a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus. Ex parte. Purvis, 689 So.2d 794 (Ala.1996)....
“‘Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So.2d 402 (Ala.1996). A court considering a motion for summary judgment will view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Hurst v. Alabama Power Co., 675 So,2d 397 (Ala.1996), Fuqua v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 591 So.2d 486 (Ala.1991); will accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence, Fuqua, supra, Aldridge v. Valley Steel Constr., Inc., 603 So.2d 981 (Ala.1992); and will resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex parte Brislin, 719 So.2d 185 (Ala. 1998).
“ ‘An appellate court reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment will, de novo, apply these same standards applicable in the trial court. Fu-qua, supra, Brislin, supra. Likewise, the appellate court will consider only that factual material available of record to the trial court for its consideration in deciding the motion. Dynasty Corp. v. Alpha Resins Corp., 577 So.2d 1278 (Ala,1991), Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat’l Bank, 599 So.2d 595 (Ala.1992), Rowe v. Isbell, 599 So.2d 35 (Ala.1992).’ ”

Ex parte Turner, 840 So.2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912-13 (Ala.2000)). A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the petitioner can demonstrate: “ ‘(1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’” Ex parte Nall, 879 So.2d 541, 543 (Ala.2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.2001)).

Discussion

As an initial matter, we note that Bry-son filed in this Court—in response to each petition for a writ of mandamus—a document entitled “preliminary opposition” to the petition. Bryson states in each of those documents that the Town and Harris have relied so extensively on Aaron’s stricken affidavit in the briefs filed in support of their petitions for a writ of mandamus as to have irreparably tainted those petitions. Bryson moves this Court to strike the briefs filed by the Town and Harris in support of their petitions for a writ of mandamus and to deny their petitions.

Despite the fact that the Aaron affidavit was stricken by the trial court, the defendants now rely upon it in their petitions for a writ of mandamus. Whether to strike an affidavit is a decision left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Ex parte Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 92 So.3d 771 (Ala.2012). On review by mandamus, this Court must look only at the facts and evidence that were before the trial court. Ex parte East Alabama Med. Ctr., 109 So.3d 1114 (Ala.2012); Ex parte Verbena United Methodist Church, 953 So.2d 395 (Ala.2006).

We cannot say the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting Bry-son’s motion to strike the Aaron affidavit. Therefore, because that affidavit was not considered by the trial court, we will not give it any consideration in deciding the merits of the defendants’ petitions. Ex parte Michelin North America, Inc., 161 So.3d 164 (Ala.2014). However, because the Aaron affidavit was one of a number of evidentiary filings submitted in support of the defendants’ summary-judgment motion and because those other evidentiary materials have been submitted to this Court as exhibits to the defendants’ petitions, we deny Bryson’s motion to strike their briefs filed in support of those petitions in their entirety because there is sufficient evidence before this Court to make a determination as to the merits of the petitions without considering the Aaron affidavit.

1. Harris’s Petition (No. 11⅛13⅛5)

The False-Arrest/False-Imprisonment Claims

Harris argues that he is immune from suit based on the immunity afforded peace officers by § 6-5-338(a), Ala.Code 1975, and by the doctrine of State-agent immunity set forth in Ex parte Cranman, supra.

Section 6-5-338(a) provides:

“Every peace officer, except constables, who is employed or appointed pursuant to the Constitution or statutes of this state, whether appointed or employed as such peace officer by the state or a county or municipality thereof, or by an agency or institution, corporate or otherwise, created pursuant to the Constitution or laws of this state and authorized by the Constitution or laws to appoint or employ police officers or other peace officers, and whose duties prescribed by law, or by the lawful terms of their employment or appointment, include the enforcement of, or the investigation and reporting of violations of, the criminal laws of this state, and who is empowered by the laws of this state to execute warrants, to arrest and to take into custody persons who violate, or who are lawfully charged by warrant, indictment, or other lawful process, with violations of, the criminal laws of this state, shall at all times be deemed to be officers of this state, and as such shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties.”

The restatement of State-agent immunity as set out by this Court in Ex parte Cran-man, supra, governs the determination whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a). Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So.2d 895, 904 (Ala.2005). This Court, in Cranman, set out the following test for State-agent immunity:

“A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent’s
“(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or
“(2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as:
“(a) making administrative adjudications;
“(b) allocating resources;
“(c) negotiating contracts;
“(d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or
“(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; or
“(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers’ arresting or attempting to arrest persons; or
“(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students.
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity
“(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency require otherwise; or
“(2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.”

792 So.2d at 405. Because the scope of immunity afforded law-enforcement officers set forth in § 6—5—338(a) was broader than category (4) of the Cmnman restatement, this Court, in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So,2d 300, 309 (Ala.2006), expanded and modified category (4) of the Cmnman restatement to read as follows:

“ ‘A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent’s
“ ‘(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers’ arresting or attempting to arrest persons, or serving as peace officers under circumstances entitling such officers to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala.Code 1975’”

(Added language emphasized.)

‘“This Court has established a “burden-shifting” process when a party raises the defense of State-agent immunity.’ Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So.2d 450, 452 (Ala.2006). A State agent asserting State-agent immunity ‘bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiffs claims arise from a function that would entitle the State agent to immunity.’ 946 So.2d at 452. Should the State agent make such a showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of the two categories of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cmnman is applicable.”

Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So.2d 1276, 1282 (Ala.2008).

It is undisputed that Harris, as the Town’s police chief, qualified as a law-enforcement officer for the purposes of § 6-5-338(a) and Ex parte Cranman, as modified by Hollis. In order to enjoy the immunity afforded law-enforcement officers under § 6-5-338(a) and Ex parte Cranman, Harris must have been, at the time of the complained-of action, “exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State ... including ... arresting or attempting to arrest persons,” or serving as a peace officer under circumstances entitling such officer to immunity “from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties.” Generally, arresting a person is considered an exercise of a discretionary function entitling the arresting officer to State-agent immunity. Swan v. City of Hueytoivn, 920 So.2d 1075 (Ala.2005).

After reviewing the materials in support of the defendants’ petitions for a writ of mandamus, we conclude that Harris has satisfied his initial burden of demonstrating that at the time of the incident made the basis of Bryson’s claims Harris was engaged in a law-enforcement function for which State-agent immunity would be available under § 6-5-338(a) and Ex parte Cranman, as modified by Hollis. The evidence presented in support of the defendants’ summary-judgment motion demonstrates the following: (1) that Harris was aware that Bryson did not have a license “to sell, [to] offer for sale, or [to] have in possession for sale,” § 28-3A-25(a)(14), Ala.Code 1975, any alcohol at “The Spot”; (2) that Harris was notified of the existence of flyers advertising that a “beer bash” was going to be held at “The Spot” on May 2, 2010; (3) that Harris obtained a flyer advertising the “beer bash” at the “The Spot”; (4) that Harris drove by “The Spot” on May 2, 2010, and witnessed several people standing outside; (5) that Harris and other law-enforcement officers entered “The Spot” and saw people consuming alcohol inside; (6) that Bry-son was arrested; and (7) that over 200 bottles of beer were seized from the premises.

However, relying upon this Court’s decision in Telfare v. City of Huntsville, 841 So.2d 1222 (Ala.2002), Bryson argues that Harris was not engaged in a discretionary function and, therefore, was not entitled to State-agent immunity because, she says, he lacked the lawful authority to arrest her. Specifically, Bryson argues that, because the criminal conduct for which she was arrested was classified as a misdemeanor and because Harris did not witness her actually selling alcohol on the premises, Harris, in arresting her, could not be considered as being engaged in a discretionary function, i.e., Harris was not making a lawful arrest. Thus, Bryson contends, Harris is not entitled immunity.

In Telfare, the plaintiff and his girlfriend became involved in a physical altercation with other patrons at a nightclub. After the initial altercation, the plaintiff and his girlfriend attempted to leave the nightclub. However, as the two left the nightclub several patrons followed them and attacked the girlfriend. The plaintiff attempted to break up the altercation; he ultimately removed his girlfriend from the altercation, and they retreated to the plaintiffs vehicle and prepared to leave the scene. In the meantime, a police officer arrived at the nightclub in response to a call regarding the altercation. The patrons who had been fighting with the plaintiffs girlfriend indicated to the police officer that the plaintiff and his girlfriend had instigated the altercation. The police officer approached the plaintiffs vehicle with his gun drawn and ordered the plaintiff to get out of his vehicle and to lie on the ground. The plaintiff got out of the vehicle but refused to lie on the ground. The police officer holstered his gun and withdrew an expandable baton that he used to strike the plaintiff in the legs until he was subdued and handcuffed. The plaintiff, who had sustained numerous contusions to his legs and lower body, was charged with disorderly conduct, harassment, and resisting arrest. Telfare, supra,

The plaintiff sued the police officer and the city, alleging, among other things, false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. The city moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was entitled to discretionary immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338. The trial court granted the city’s motion to dismiss. Telfare, supra.

On appeal, the city contended that § 6-5-338(a) granted the police officer immunity from tort liability arising out of the performance of his discretionary functions so long as those functions were within the line and scope of his official duties. The city further asserted that § 6-5-338(b) extended to the city the same immunity afforded the police officer pursuant to § 6-5-338(a). The plaintiff argued that the police officer was not engaged in a discretionary function because, he said, the police officer arrested him for a misdemean- or that was not committed in the officer’s presence. This Court set forth the rule and statutory provisions that govern a warrantless arrest. Rule 4.1(a)(1), Ala. R.Crim. P., states:

“(1) A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant if:
“(i) The law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed, or is being committed, and that the person to be arrested committed it, or
“(ii) Any offense has been committed in the law enforcement officer’s presence or view, or
“(iii) The arrest is otherwise authorized by statute, such as Ala.Code 1975, §§ 32-5-171, 32-5A-191, 15-10-3.”

Further, § 15-10-3(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides:

“An officer may arrest a person without a warrant, on any day and at any time in any of the following instances:
“(1) If a public offense has been committed or a breach of the peace threatened in the presence of the officer.
“(2) When a felony has been committed, though not in the presence of the officer, by the person arrested.
“(3) When a felony has been committed and the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested committed the felony.
“(4) When the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony, although it may afterwards appear that a felony had not in fact been committed.
“(5) When a charge has been made, upon reasonable cause, that the person arrested has committed a felony.
“(6) When the officer has actual knowledge that a warrant for the person’s arrest for the commission of a felony or misdemeanor has been issued. ...
“(7) When the officer has reasonable cause to believe that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed by the person arrested in violation of a protection order....
“(8) When an offense involves domestic violence ... and the arrest is based on probable cause, regardless of whether the offense is a felony or misdemeanor.”

In determining that the police officer was not engaged in a discretionary function and therefore was not entitled to discretionary-function immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), this Court stated:

“The City correctly asserts that Officer McCarver was effectuating an arrest. However, the record before this Court indicates that [the plaintiff] was apparently arrested for misdemeanor offenses not committed in the presence of Officer McCarver. Generally, Alabama’s Rules of Criminal Procedure and the statutes quoted above do not allow law-enforcement officers the discretion to arrest alleged wrongdoers for misdemeanors not committed in the presence of the arresting officer.
“Here, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to [the plaintiff] as the nonmovant, we must conclude that Officer McCarver arrested [the plaintiff] for various misdemeanors, none of which was committed in Officer McCarver’s presence. Because there is no evidence in the record tending to show that Officer McCarver was pursuing a discretionary function, i.e., was effectuating a lawful arrest, the City has failed to demonstrate that it is entitled to immunity. Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to [the plaintiff], as we must, we believe the trial court erred in dismissing [the plaintiffs] state-law claims.”

Telfare, 841 So.2d at 1229.

The facts in Telfare are distinguishable from the facts in the present case. The police officer in Telfare arrived on the scene after the altercation between the plaintiff, his girlfriend, and the other patrons had ended and the plaintiff and his girlfriend had returned to their vehicle and were preparing to leave. Based on statements from the patrons involved in the altercation, the police officer ordered the plaintiff to get out of his car and the plaintiff was then arrested following a straggle with the police officer. The events that prompted the police officer to arrest the plaintiff did not occur in the police officer’s “presence or view.” Rule 4.1(a)(l)(ii), Ala. R.Crim. P.

Here, although the evidence indicates that Harris did not witness Bryson selling alcohol, the evidence does indicate that Harris entered “The Spot” and saw people consuming alcohol with the knowledge that Bryson did not have a liquor license “to sell, [to] offer for sale, or [to] have in possession for sale,” § 28-3A-25(a)(14), Ala.Code 1975, any alcohol on the premises of “The Spot.” Further, over 200 bottles of beer were seized from “The Spot” while Harris was present. Based on these circumstances, we conclude that the conduct that prompted Bryson’s arrest occurred in Harris’s “presence or view.” Thus, Harris was engaged in a law-enforcement function, i.e., making a lawful arrest, that would entitle him to State-agent immunity. Because Harris established that he was engaged in a law-enforcement function that would entitle him to State-agent immunity, the burden then shifted to Bryson to show that one of the two categories of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman is applicable. Ex parte Kennedy, supra.

The exception Bryson argues here is that “the State agent act[ed] willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, [or] beyond his or her authority.” Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405. Bryson alleged in her complaint that Harris’s conduct in arresting her was “willful” and “malicious” and that it was done “intentionally” to embarrass and harm her. Bryson argued in her response in opposition to the defendants’ summary-judgment motion that Harris was not entitled to State-agent immunity because, she said, he acted “willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [and] in bad faith” in arresting her. Ex parte Kennedy, supra. Bryson supports her argument by presenting evidence indicating that Harris and Bryson had a conflicting financial interest and that he held some personal animosity toward her. Bryson presented evidence indicating that Harris was involved in a personal relationship with Bryson’s sister, Mary Ann Hester Briscoe. Bryson and Briscoe had initially planned on being partners in “The Spot” and, according to Bryson, Harris had initially supported “The Spot.” However, Bryson and Briscoe had a “personal family disagreement,” and Briscoe decided to open a competing business known as “Barlow and Ann’s.” Bris-coe testified that Harris and Mayor Hill were partners with her in “Barlow and Ann’s.” Briscoe further testified that she intended for “Barlow and Ann’s” to be a restaurant but that Harris and Mayor Hill envisioned the business as a club that served alcohol. Bryson stated that Harris began harassing her and patrons of “The Spot” by parking his patrol car in front of the building to intimidate her and her customers. According to Briscoe, Harris and Mayor Hill were “desperate” to shut down “The Spot”—even to the extent of discussing the idea of planting drugs on Bryson or at “The Spot”—because, Briscoe testified, “The Spot” was “taking money out of their pockets.” Additionally, Bryson presented testimony indicating that Harris and Mayor Hill had conspired to expedite Briscoe’s liquor-licensing process while attempting to impede Bryson’s liquor-licensing process. There was also testimony indicating that when Harris received the flier advertising the “beer bash” he exclaimed: “Now I’ve got her ... I’m going to close her ass down tonight.”

Harris argues that, on the occasion made the basis of this action, he had probable cause to arrest Bryson and that there is no evidence indicating that he acted fraudulently or with any personal ill will, willfulness, or maliciousness, or in bad faith toward Bryson on the occasion of Bryson’s arrest.

A false arrest requires proof “‘that the defendant caused [her] to be arrested without probable cause.’ ” Walker v. City of Huntsville, 62 So.3d 474, 493 (Ala.2010) (quoting Higgins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 512 So.2d 766 (Ala.1987)). “[F]or a detention to be valid, the officer must reasonably, and in good faith, suspect the individual detained of being involved in some form of criminality.” Walker, 62 So.3d at 493 (quoting Higgins, 512 So.2d at 768). “Section 6-5-170, Ala.Code 1975, defines false imprisonment as ‘the unlawful detention of the person of another for any length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty.’ ” Walker, 62 So.3d at 492. A false arrest will support a claim of false imprisonment. Upshaw v. McArdle, 650 So.2d 875 (Ala.1994). As to false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims, “[p]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Walker, 62 So.3d at 492 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So.2d 1168 (Ala.2003), this Court applied the standard of “arguable probable cause” in determining whether a police officer was immune from plaintiffs false-arrest claim pursuant to the immunity provided police officers in § 6-5-338(a). Arguable probable cause exists “when an officer makes an arrest lacking probable cause if officers of reasonable competence in the same circumstances and with the same knowledge would disagree as to whether probable cause existed.” Borders, 875 So.2d at 1179. See also Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir.2004)(noting that arguable probable cause exists where “ ‘reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the [arresting officer] could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff ”). Whether a police officer possesses probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest an individual depends on the elements of the alleged offense and the operative set of facts. Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 735 (11th Cir. 2010). Further, a showing of probable cause does not require evidence or information sufficient to support a conviction. Dixon v. State, 588 So.2d 903 (Ala.1991).

Bryson was arrested for selling alcohol without a license. Section 28-3A-25(a)(14) makes it unlawful “[f]or any person ... who ... has not been properly licensed under the appropriate provisions of this chapter to sell, offer for sale, or have in possession for sale, any alcoholic beverages.” Here, the evidence indicates that at the time Bryson was arrested, Harris knew that she did not possess a license “to sell, [to] offer for sale, or [to] have in possession for sale, any alcoholic beverages.” Harris had information via a flyer that a “beer bash” was to be held at “The Spot” on the night in question and that, upon payment of an admission fee of $7.00, patrons could enter the premises and be provided alcohol for consumption. Finally, upon Harris’s arrival at “The Spot” at the time designated on the flyer, he saw patrons of “The Spot” consuming alcohol. Based on the facts known to Hams at the time, he had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Bryson for illegally selling alcohol without a license. Because Harris had arguable probable cause to arrest Bry-son, we cannot say that he acted “willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith” so as to remove him from the umbrella of State-agent immunity afforded him under Ex parte Cranman. See Ex parte Tuscaloosa Cty., 796 So.2d 1100 (Ala.2000); Borders, supra; Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 884 (11th Cir.2003)(“The existence of probable cause, and in particular the facts showing that probable cause, contradict any suggestion of malicious intents or bad faith.”). Although we recognize that Bry-son has presented evidence indicating that Harris held some personal animosity toward her and that he had a competing financial interest, the fact remains that Harris had probable cause to arrest Bry-son for selling alcohol without a license on the occasion made the basis of this action. “When considering whether an arrest is valid, a police officer’s subjective intent is immaterial; the only requisite is that at the time the arrest is made, the police officer have probable cause.” Carruth v. Barker, 454 So.2d 539, 540 (Ala.1984). Thus, we conclude that Harris is entitled to State-agent immunity on Bryson’s false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims.

The Malicious-Prosecution Claim

To the extent that Bryson seeks to assert a malicious-prosecution claim against Harris, we note that she must prove “ ‘(1) that there was a judicial proceeding initiated by the present defendant; (2) that it was initiated without probable cause; (3) that it was initiated with malice on the part of the present defendant; (4) that that judicial proceeding was terminated in favor of the present plaintiff; and (5) that the present plaintiff suffered damage from the prosecution of that earlier action.’ ” Ex parte Tuscaloosa Cty., 796 So.2d at 1106 (quoting Kmart Corp. v. Perdue, 708 So.2d 106, 108 (Ala. 1997)). A malicious-prosecution claim is disfavored in the law because “[p]ublic policy requires that all persons shall resort freely to the courts for redress of wrongs and to enforce their rights, and that this may be done without the peril of a suit for damages in the event of an unfavorable judgment by jury or judge.” Moon v. Pillion, 2 So.3d 842, 845 (Ala.2008)(internal quotation marks omitted). Probable cause in the context of a malicious-prosecution claim is defined as “ ‘ “[a] reasonable ground for suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged.” ’ ” Moon, 2 So.3d at 846 (quoting Eidson v. Olin Corp., 527 So.2d 1283, 1285 (Ala.1988), quoting in turn Parisian Co. v. Williams, 203 Ala. 378, 383, 83 So. 122, 127 (1919)). This Court has stated:

“ ‘The test that this Court must apply when reviewing the lack-of-probable-cause element in a malicious prosecution case in which summary judgment has been granted to a defendant is as follows: Can one or more undisputed facts be found in the record below establishing that the defendant acted in good faith on the appearance of things as they existed when suit was filed, based upon direct evidence, or upon circumstantial evidence and inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom?’ ”

Moon, 2 So.3d at 846 (quoting Eidson, 527 So.2d at 1285-86). Additionally, we have stated:

“It is well established that for purposes of a malicious-prosecution claim, the element of malice may be inferred from the lack of probable cause, see, e.g., Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So.2d 824, 833 (Ala.1999); McLeod v. McLeod, 75 Ala. 483, 486 (1883), but this Court has recognized that malice in law, or legal malice, for purposes of a malicious-prosecution claim, is not sufficient to defeat a state agent’s defense of discretionary-function immunity. This Court has required the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s conduct was ‘so egregious as to amount to willful or malicious conduct or conduct engaged in in bad faith,’ by, for example, showing that the defendant had ‘a personal ill will against the [plaintiff] and that he maliciously or in bad faith arrested him solely for purposes of harassment.’ Couch v. City of Sheffield, 708 So.2d 144, 153-54 (Ala.1998) (affirming the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendant, a municipal police officer, who, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-338, was entitled to discretionary-function immunity in the same manner as a state agent).... ”

Ex parte Tuscaloosa Cty., 796 So.2d at 1107.

Here, it is undisputed that Bryson did not have a license to sell alcohol at “The Spot” and that Harris was aware of this fact. It is further undisputed that Harris had acquired information indicating that a “beer bash” was to be held at “The Spot” on the night in question and that, for the payment of a $7.00 admission fee, patrons could enter the premises and be provided alcohol for consumption. Finally, it is undisputed that upon Harris’s entry into “The Spot” he saw its patrons consuming alcohol. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Harris had probable cause to initiate a judicial proceeding against Bryson and that he did so without malice. Because Harris had probable cause to initiate a judicial proceeding against Bryson and because he did so without malice, he is immune from suit on Bryson’s malicious-prosecution claim under the doctrine of State-agent immunity set forth in Ex parte Cranman. See Ex parte Tuscaloosa Cty., supra; Borders, supra; Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir.2010). As mentioned above, Bryson presented some evidence indicating that Harris harbored some personal animosity toward her and that he had a competing financial interest, but that evidence does not alter the fact that he had probable cause to initiate a judicial proceeding against her, given his knowledge of the facts and circumstances giving rise to that proceeding. Carruth, supra.

The Other Claims

In addition to the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims, Bryson asserted claims alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, libel, and slander. Harris did not raise immunity as a defense to those claims. Rather, he argued in his summary-judgment motion that the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress, libel, and slander claims were not supported by the evidence. He also argued that Alabama does not recognize a civil cause of action for harassment. Because the motion for a summary judgment as to those claims was not grounded on a claim of immunity, to the extent that Harris seeks mandamus review of those claims, we conclude that they are not reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus. Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794 (Ala.1996). Accordingly, to the extent that Harris seeks mandamus review of those claims, his petition is due to be denied.

II. The Town’s Petition (No. 1111285)

The Town argues that, under § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, it cannot be held vicariously liable for the intentional acts of its employees. This Court has stated:

“Section 11-47-190, Ala.1975, provides that a municipality is immune from tort liability ‘unless such injury or wrong was done or'suffered through the neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness of some agent, officer or employed of the municipality engaged in work therefor and while acting in the line of his or her duty.’ This statute limits a municipality’s liability for the acts of its agents to those acts that are negligent, careless, or unskillful. Section 11-47-190 pro-¡ vides a municipality immunity from liability for the acts of its agents that are carried out in bad faith or with malice. Borders [v. City of Huntsville], 875 So.2d [1168] at 1188 [ (Ala.2003) ] (quoting Ex parte City of Gadsden, 718 So.2d 716, 721 (Ala.1998)).”

Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So.2d 895, 910 (Ala.2005). See also Cremeens v. City of Montgomery, 779 So.2d 1190, 1201 (Ala. 2000)(“A municipality cannot be held liable for the intentional torts of its employees. See Ala.Code 1975, § 11-47-190.”); Town of Loxley v. Coleman, 720 So.2d 907, 909 (Ala.1998) (“This Court has construed § 11-47-190 to exclude liability for wanton misconduct.”).

Here, Bryson asserted in her complaint claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and slander. Bryson specifically alleged that Harris was acting within the line and scope of his employment as the Town’s police chief and that the claims arose from Harris’s willful and intentional acts, which, she says, were designed to embarrass and harm her. Because Bry-son has alleged intentional tortious conduct on Harris’s part, the Town is immune from suit under § 11-47-190 as to each claim asserted against it.

We would further note that, to the extent that we have concluded above that Harris was entitled to State-agent immunity, the Town would also be immune from suit. Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So.2d 300 (Ala.2006); Ex parte Dixon, 55 So.3d 1171 (Ala.2010); City of Crossville v. Haynes, 925 So.2d 944, 955 (Ala.2005); Thurmond v. City of Huntsville, 904 So.2d 314, 326 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), and § 6-5-338(b), AkuCode 1975.

Conclusion

The trial court is directed to vacate its order denying Harris’s summary-judgment motion as to the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims and to enter a summary judgment for Harris as to those claims. To the extent Harris seeks mandamus review of the claims alleging an intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, libel, and slander, the petition is denied. The trial court is further directed to vacate its order denying the Town’s summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment for the Town as to each claim asserted against it.

1141345—MOTION TO STRIKE DENIED; PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.

1141385—MOTION TO STRIKE DENIED; PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

STUART, MURDOCK, MAIN, and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

      . Section 28-3A-25(a)(14), Ala.Code 1975, makes it unlawful "[f]or any person ... who ... has not been properly licensed under the appropriate provisions of this chapter to sell, offer for sale, or have in possession for sale, any alcoholic beverages.”

      . Malicious-prosecution actions are not disallowed against arresting police officers simply because they are not the individuals who ultimately decide to institute a criminal proceeding. See Exford ■v. City of Montgomery, 887 F.Supp.2d 1210 (M.D.Ala.2012). Probable cause for a malicious-prosecution claim is not determined at the time of the arrest but when the defendant (usually the arresting officer) initiates the prosecution by filing a report with the prosecutor, submitting an affidavit, or giving grand-jury testimony. Beyond Police Misconduct and False Arrest: Expanding the Scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Litigation, 8 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 39. Here, it was Harris who completed the Alabama Uniform Incident/Offense Report and provided the supporting deposition.