author: KITCHENS, JUSTICE, WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

text:
    Charles Ray CRAWFORD a/k/a Crawford, Chuck a/k/a Charles Crawford v. Marshall L. FISHER, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, in His Official Capacity; Earnest Lee, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary, in His Official Capacity; the Mississippi State Executioner, in His Official Capacity; and Unknown Executioners, in Their Official Capacities
    NO. 2014-CA-01606-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    12/15/2016
    Rehearing Denied March 2, 2017

      JAMES W. CRAIG, VANESSA JUDITH CARROLL, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

      OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, BY: WILSON DOUGLAS MINOR, HAROLD EDWARD PIZZETTA III, JASON L. DAVIS, JAMES M. NORRIS, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
   KITCHENS, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Charles Ray Crawford, a Mississippi death row inmate, filed a civil lawsuit, pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, alleging various federal constitutional claims relating to the anesthetic, a compounded version of pentobarbital not approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), to be utilized in his execution. The chancery court, following a hearing, transferred the case to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County where the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) renewed its motion to dismiss. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the Section 1983 claims were the same as or similar to issues which were at the time pending in the Mississippi Supreme Court. For the reasons articulated below, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the circuit court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In 1994, a jury convicted Charles Ray Crawford of capital murder, rape, burglary, and sexual battery, and he received a death sentence in the Circuit Court of Tippah County. Crawford v. State, 716 So.2d 1028 (Miss. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S.Ct. 550, 142 L.Ed.2d 458 (1998), reh’g denied, 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S.Ct. 550, 142 L.Ed.2d 458, 143 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1999). On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Crawford’s conviction and death sentence. Id. at 1053.

¶ 3. Crawford sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, which was denied in 2008. Crawford v. Epps, 2012 WL 3777024, *4 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 29, 2012) (citing Crawford v. Epps, 2008 WL 4419347 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2008)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated judgment and remanded the case for further consideration. Crawford, 2012 WL 3777024, at *4 (citing Crawford v. Epps, 353 Fed.Appx. 977, 994 (5th Cir. 2009)). On remand, the district court dismissed Crawford’s petition for writ of habeas corpus with prejudice. Crawford, 2012 WL 3777024, at *11. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Crawford v. Epps, 531 Fed.Appx. 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1281, 188 L.Ed.2d 313 (2014).

¶ 4. The State’s February 24, 2014, Motion to Reset Execution Date was denied by the Mississippi Supreme Court on March 31, 2014, because Crawford’s direct appeal from his rape conviction remained pending. Crawford v. State, 2014-DP-01016-SCT (Miss. Mar. 31, 2014). This Court affirmed Crawford’s rape conviction. Crawford v. State, 192 So.3d 905 (Miss. 2015), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2527, 195 L.Ed.2d 855 (Mem.) (2016).

¶ 5. Crawford sought leave in the Mississippi Supreme Court to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief on February 25, 2014. This Court denied Crawford leave to proceed on August 4, 2016. See Crawford v. State, 2016 WL 4141748 (Miss. Aug. 4, 2016). Crawford’s motion for rehearing was denied by this Court on November 10, 2016.

¶ 6. Crawford, along with Michelle By-rom, filed the present Complaint for Equitable and Injunctive Relief in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County on March 28, 2014. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged “violations and threatened violations of ... rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 3, sections 14, 24, and 28 of the Mississippi Constitution.”

¶ 7. The MDOC filed a motion to dismiss under Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).The Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, after a hearing on June 12, 2014, acknowledged in an order entered on July 21, 2014, that Crawford had sought equitable and declaratory relief, but ruled that the “Complaint is actually based upon alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and seeks a determination of the same.” Accordingly, finding the claims to be “legal in substance,” the chancery court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County.

¶ 8. The MDOC renewed its motion to dismiss and the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County granted the MDOC’s motion to dismiss on October 30, 2014, “as Plaintiff Charles Crawford currently has the same or similar issues under review before the Mississippi Supreme Court.” Crawford appealed both the chancery court’s order of transfer and the circuit court’s order of dismissal on November 12, 2014.

DISCUSSION

1. The circuit court erred in finding that Crawford had the same or similar claims pending before this Court at the time the present Section 1983 lawsuit was filed.

¶ 9. The circuit court granted the MDOC’s motion to dismiss because “Plaintiff Charles Crawford currently has the same or similar issues under review before the Mississippi Supreme Court.” Crawford argues on appeal that no factual basis exists for the ruling because Crawford’s motion for leave to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief did not include the method-of-execution claim challenging Mississippi’s lethal injection protocol, which was advanced in the present Section 1983 civil suit. The MDOC’s brief does not respond to Crawford’s first assignment of error.

¶ 10. To consider Crawford’s argument, this Court must look outside the record to Crawford’s Motion for Leave to File Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, filed in this Court on February 25, 2014. “This Court takes judicial notice of its files.” In re Dunn, 166 So.3d 488, 492 n.6 (Miss. 2013). In his motion for leave to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief, Crawford presented no argument relating in any manner to the method-of-execution issue that is pled in his Section 1983 suit. The circuit court’s order therefore is factually mistaken. “ ‘When considering jurisdictional issues the Court sits in the same position as the trial court, “with all facts as set out in the pleadings or exhibits, and may reverse regardless of whether the error is manifest.” ’ ” Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Waltman, 94 So.3d 1111, 1115 (Miss. 2012) (quoting Knight v. Woodfield, 50 So.3d 995, 998 (Miss. 2011)).

¶ 11. Because the dismissal clearly was erroneous, we reverse. We remand for a consideration of the legal sufficiency of Crawford’s complaint under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

2. Challenges to the constitutionality of the State’s method of execution may be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.

¶ 12. The MDOC argues that the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA) provides Crawford’s exclusive remedy: “[t]he purpose [of the UP-CCRA] is to revise, streamline and clarify the rules and statutes pertaining to post-conviction collateral relief law and procedures, to resolve any conflicts therein and to provide the courts of this state with an exclusive and uniform procedure for the collateral review of convictions and sentences.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(1) (Rev. 2015) (emphases added).

¶ 13. The MDOC correctly states that this Court has held that “[a] pleading cognizable under the UPCCRA will be treated as a motion for post-conviction relief that is subject to the procedural rules promulgated therein, regardless of how the plaintiff has denominated or characterized the pleading.” Knox v. State, 75 So.3d 1030, 1035 (Miss. 2011) (citing Edmond v. Miss. Dep’t of Corrs., 783 So.2d 675, 677 (Miss. 2001)). Moreover, MDOC claims that “[b]y requesting an injunction prohibiting the State from carrying out his execution, Crawford mounted a collateral attack against the execution of his death sentence.”

¶14. Crawford, however, filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides the following:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Section 1983 suit, Crawford raises various constitutional claims relating to the specific lethal injection drugs the MDOC intends to employ to carry out his execution.

¶ 15. The United States Supreme Court considered a similar case in which the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Florida’s lethal injection protocol pursuant to Section 1983. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 576, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006). The question before the Court was whether the plaintiffs “claim must be brought by an action for a writ of habeas corpus under the statute authorizing that writ ... or whether it may proceed as an action for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida treated the Section 1983 claim as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and dismissed it as successive, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 578, 126 S.Ct. 2096.

¶ 16. The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, noting an important distinction. Id. at 585, 126 S.Ct. 2096. ‘Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.’ ” Id. at 579, 126 S.Ct. 2096 (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004) (per curiam)). Conversely, “[a]n inmate’s challenge to the circumstances of his confinement ... may be brought under § 1983.” Id.

¶ 17. The Court applied Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004), in which it had held that the plaintiff properly had used Section 1983, as opposed to filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to challenge Alabama’s planned use of a “cut down” procedure during his execution by lethal injection. The Court in Nelson had observed that “[i]n a State such as Alabama, where the legislature has established lethal injection as the preferred method of execution ... a constitutional challenge seeking to permanently enjoin the use of lethal injection may amount to a challenge to the fact of the sentence itself.” Id. But the Court continued, “[a] suit seeking to enjoin a particular means of effectuating a sentence of death does not directly call into question the ‘fact’ or ‘validity’ of the sentence itself—by simply altering its method of execution, the State can go forward with the sentence.” Id.

¶ 18. The Hill Court likewise observed that, “[i]f the relief sought would foreclose execution, recharacterizing a complaint as an action for habeas corpus might be proper.” Hill, 547 U.S. at 582, 126 S.Ct. 2096. The Court found that Hill’s “complaint does not challenge the lethal injection sentence as a general matter but seeks instead only to enjoin the respondents ‘from executing [Hill] in the manner they currently intend.’ ” Id. at 580, 126 S.Ct. 2096. Specifically, Hill claimed that “the anticipated protocol allegedly causes ‘a foreseeable risk of ... gratuitous and unnecessary’ pain.” Id. And “[although the injection of lethal chemicals is an obvious necessity for the execution, Hill alleges that the challenged procedure presents a risk of pain the State can avoid while still being able to enforce the sentence ordering a lethal injection.” Id. at 581, 126 S.Ct. 2096. The Court further determined that “Hill’s challenge appears to leave the State free to use an alternative lethal injection procedure ...” and that “[u]nder these circumstances a grant of injunctive relief could not be seen as barring the execution of Hill’s sentence.” Id. at 580-81, 126 S.Ct. 2096.

¶ 19. Here, as in Hill, Crawford has alleged that the “MDOC’s decision to use compounded drugs, specifically a compounded anesthetic that has not been tested or approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration (‘FDA’), means that Plaintiffs may be conscious throughout their executions and will experience a torturous death by suffocation and cardiac arrest.” Crawford is not seeking to preclude Mississippi from carrying out his execution by .lethal injection altogether. He asserts that Mississippi’s planned use of compounded lethal injection drugs presents an unnecessary risk of inflicting gratuitous pain during the execution in violation of the. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and of Article 3, Sections 14 and 28, of the Mississippi Constitution.

¶ 20. Further, state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction of suits brought pursuant to Section 1983 with their federal counterparts. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988) (citing Patsy v. Bd. of Reyents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 506-507, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982)). “Without a doubt the courts of this State have the authority to hear and adjudge a claim under § 1983.” City of Jackson v. Powell, 917 So.2d 59, 74 (Miss. 2005) (citing Barrett v. Miller, 599 So.2d 559, 564 (Miss. 1992)). “This authority is present even though the statute is not specifically cited .by name in the complaint.” Powell, 917 So.2d at 74 (citing Hood v. Miss. Dep’t of Wildlife Conservation, 571 So.2d 263, 267 (Miss.1990)). “This authority is strengthened by the duty and obligation our courts have to enforce federally created rights.” Powell, 917 So.2d at 74 (citing Burrell v. Miss. State Tax Comm’n, 536 So.2d 848, 863 (Miss. 1988)).

¶ 21. The United States Supreme Court has held that method-of-execution claims may be brought pursuant to Section 1983. Section 1983 claims are cognizable in state court. Crawford may proceed with his Section 1983 claim in state court.

3. Whether the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County erred by transferring Crawford’s Section 1983 suit to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County.

¶22. On July 21, 2014, the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County sua sponte ordered this case to be transferred to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County after finding the claims to be “legal in substance.” Crawford did not file a notice of appeal until November 12, 2014, nor was a petition for interlocutory appeal timely filed pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a). Accordingly, the transfer order is not before this Court at present and we decline to address the issue.

4. Whether Crawford’s complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted.

¶23. As discussed above, the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County never ruled on the MDOC’s dismissal sought under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), but instead granted dismissal because “Crawford currently has the same or similar issues under review before the Mississippi Supreme Court.” Because of the mistaken factual basis upon which the circuit court granted the MDOC’s motion to dismiss, we remand this case for a consideration of the sufficiency of Crawford’s complaint under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

CONCLUSION

¶24. Because the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County erroneously dismissed Crawford’s Section 1983 lawsuit on the basis of a factual misapprehension, we reverse and remand.

¶ 25. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. WALLER, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY RANDOLPH, P.J., AND BEAM, J.; MAXWELL, J., JOINS IN PART. MAXWELL, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, C.J.; RANDOLPH, P.J., AND BEAM, J., JOIN IN PART.

WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE,

DISSENTING:

¶ 26. It is clear that Crawford’s claims fall squarely within the purview of the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA). Crawford’s effort to disguise a collateral attack on his sentence as a civil-rights lawsuit under Section 1983 adds yet another avenue or layer of litigation to obfuscate and confuse the orderly administration of justice. Because the Section 1983 action filed by Crawford in chancery court is nothing more than an attempt to skirt the procedural requirements of the UPCCRA, I respectfully dissent.

DISCUSSION

I. Cases discussing the relationship between federal habeas corpus and Section 1983 are inapplicable to the instant case.

¶27. It is inescapable that Crawford’s method-of-execution claim is a collateral attack on his death sentence. Therefore, this case is controlled by the UPCCRA, the “exclusive and uniform procedure for the collateral review of convictions and sentences.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(1) (Rev. 2015). Indeed, Crawford concedes that he could have filed his claim as a petition for post-conviction relief under the UPCCRA. Nevertheless, the majority finds that Crawford is not bound by the UPCCRA because Crawford “filed his civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983[.]” But the label ascribed to Crawford’s claim does not change its substance, as Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979).

¶ 28. In support of its holding that Crawford’s attack on his death sentence may proceed as a Section 1983 action independent of the UPCCRA, the majority relies on the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004), and Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006), which were based on principles of federal law which have no application to this case. Critically, the inmates in Nelson and Hill filed challenges to their death sentences in federal court, not state court. This distinction is important because “[flederal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus ... and a complaint under [Section 1983].” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006). Thus, the question presented in Nelson and Hill was whether the inmates’ method-of-execution claims were required to be filed as habeas corpus proceedings, or whether they could proceed as actions for relief under Section 1983. The basis for the Court’s holding that the inmates’ claims could proceed under Section 1983 was the fact that those claims, if successful, would not invalidate their sentences. See Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643; Hill, 547 U.S. at 580-81, 126 S.Ct. 2096. Their claims, therefore, were removed from the narrow scope of habeas corpus. “Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty; when that right is denied and a person confined, the federal court has the power to release him. Indeed, it has no other power; it cannot revise the state court judgment; it can act only on the body of the petitioner.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), overruled in part on other grounds in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed. 2d 594 (1977). Put another way, federal habeas-corpus relief was unavailable to the inmates in Nelson and Hill. But unlike federal habeas corpus, the UPCCRA is broad enough to encompass the relief Crawford seeks.

¶ 29. The relationship between federal habeas corpus and Section 1983 is irrelevant to Crawford’s case, as he filed his complaint in state court. Additionally, Nelson and Hill do not address the application of state-law, post-conviction procedures, such as the UPCCRA, to Eighth-Amendment, method-of-execution claims filed in state court, such as the instant case. And finally, the UPCCRA does not feature limitations in its scope similar to federal habeas corpus. Accordingly, Hill and Nelson provide no support for the majority’s holding.

II. Crawford’s challenge to his death sentence is controlled by the UP-CCRA.

¶ 30. The UPCCRA applies to “[a]ny person sentenced by a court of record of the State of Mississippi” and allows a petitioner to attack collaterally his or her conviction or sentence “upon any grounds of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)® (Rev. 2015). Crawford’s characterization of his method-of-execution claim as a Section 1983 action, rather than a petition for post-conviction relief, is unavailing, as “[a] pleading cognizable under the UPCCRA will be treated as a motion for post-conviction relief that is subject to the procedural rules promulgated therein, regardless of how the plaintiff has denominated or characterized the pleading.” Knox v. State, 75 So.3d 1030, 1035 (Miss. 2011) (citing Edmond v. Miss. Dep’t of Corrs., 783 So.2d 675, 677 (Miss. 2001)). Crawford’s complaint is a collateral attack on his sentence, no matter how peripherally he attempts to characterize it. At the heart of his complaint, Crawford seeks to enjoin the State from executing him in a certain manner, without offering a readily available and constitutionally adequate alternative. Thus, while his complaint does not attack directly the general validity of his death sentence, it has the same practical effect under the facts presented.

¶ 31. This Court has reviewed similar claims under the UPCCRA. In Spicer v. State, 973 So.2d 184, 207 (Miss. 2007), a death-row inmate sought leave to seek post-conviction relief on the ground that “the use of pavulon, the second drug in Mississippi’s lethal injection protocol, ... amounts to an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech” in violation of the First Amendment. He also raised an Eighth-Amendment claim challenging the State’s use of sodium pentothal, the first drug in Mississippi’s lethal-injection protocol at the time. Id. This Court reviewed the merits of the prisoner’s claims and found his lethal-injection challenges to be without merit; however, this Court granted the prisoner’s petition in part on a separate issue and allowed him to proceed in the trial court with an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 211. See also Chamberlin v. State, 55 So.3d 1046, 1056 (Miss. 2010) (finding petitioner’s method-of-execution claim to be procedurally barred under the UPCCRA); King v. State, 23 So.3d 1067, 1071 (Miss. 2009) (same); Jordan v. State, 918 So.2d 636, 661-62 (Miss. 2005) (same).

¶ 32. In addition, this Court has rejected litigants’ attempts to file claims cognizable under the UPCCRA in chancery court on the sole ground that they sought equitable relief. For example, in Knox, a group of inmates filed a complaint in chancery court alleging violations of their constitutional rights to counsel and requesting various equitable relief, including an injunction requiring the State to appoint them competent post-conviction counsel and allowing them to file successive petitions for post-conviction relief. Knox, 75 So.3d at 1032. The chancery court dismissed the case, finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1034. This Court affirmed the chancery court’s dismissal, holding that the inmates’ claims were cognizable under the UPCCRA, and finding that the relief requested by the inmates would require the chancellor to interfere with, and even contravene, the UPCCRA’s procedural provisions. Id. at 1035-36. This Court concluded that it was “fully capable of considering the inmates’ claims in individual applications to file a motion for post-conviction relief.” Id. at 1036.

III. Because Crawford seeks to invalidate his death sentence, leave first must be sought in the Supreme Court.

¶33. This is a death-penalty case that has been subject to a direct appeal, UP-CCRA litigation, and federal habeas review. Accordingly, the UPCCRA and the procedural rules applicable to death-sentenced inmates established by this Court in Rule 22(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure require Crawford to file an application with this Court seeking leave to proceed in the trial court with a petition for post-conviction relief. Miss. Code Ann, § 99-39-27 (Rev. 2015); Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(5). Crawford cannot circumvent this requirement by labeling his claim a “Section 1983 action.” Nor does the Supremacy Clause bar this Court from imposing neutral rules of judicial administration on Crawford’s attempt to seek a federal remedy in state court. As a general rule, States “have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts. In addition, States may apply their own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, unless those rules are pre-empted by federal law.” Rowlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990) (quotation and citations omitted). Crawford’s complaint seeks a determination of constitutional law and an injunction prohibiting the State from executing him in a particular way. Through the enactment of the UPCCRA, the Legislature has decided that, under the facts of this case, this Court has exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over such a claim, as well as the exclusive authority to grant the relief Crawford seeks.

CONCLUSION

¶ 34. Because Crawford’s method-of-execution claim is a collateral attack on his death sentence, he is bound by the procedural provisions of the UPCCRA and Rule 22, which require him to file his claim with this Court in the first instance. Thus, I would find that the trial court reached the correct result in dismissing Crawford’s complaint. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

RANDOLPH, P.J., AND BEAM, J., JOIN THIS OPINION. MAXWELL, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.

MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

DISSENTING:

¶ 35. I agree the circuit court’s stated reason for dismissing Crawford’s complaint was -wrong—something even the State concedes. But dismissal was still the right result. Despite its characterization, Crawford’s complaint does not plead a cognizable Section 1983 method-of-execution claim, because Crawford failed to allege a known and available alternative execution procedure. Because there is no reason to remand a fatally defective complaint back to circuit court, I dissent.

¶ 36. As the majority points out, in Hill v. McDonough, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a claim that merely challenges the method of execution—versus execution itself—may be brought under Section 1983. Hill, 547 U.S. 573, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006). But the majority neglects to mention that, since Hill, the Supreme Court has more clearly distinguished the substantive elements of an Eighth Amendment method-of-execution challenge—as opposed to a claim seeking habeas corpus relief, Glossip v. Gross, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (2015); Base v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008).

¶ 37. In Hill, the Supreme Court cautioned that, “[i]f the relief sought would foreclose execution, recharacterizing a complaint as an action for habeas corpus might be proper.” Hill, 547 U.S. at 582, 126 S.Ct. at 2103 (emphasis added). But because the relief sought in that case “appeared] to leave the State free to use an alternative lethal injection procedure,” the Supreme Court permitted the method-of-execution challenge to proceed. Hill, 547 U.S. at 580-81, 126 S.Ct. at 2102 (“Under these circumstances a grant of injunctive relief could not be seen as barring the execution of Hill’s sentence.”).

¶ 38. But in Baze, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to specifically “address[] the substantive elements of an Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claim[.]” Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2739 (emphasis added) (discussing Baze, 553 U.S. 35, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420). And in doing so, “it made clear that the Eighth Amendment requires a prisoner to plead and prove a known and available alternative.” Id. Following Baze, the Supreme Court rejected a method-of-execution claim in Glossip because it “failed to identify a known and available alternative method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain, a requirement of all Eighth Amendment method-of execution claims.” Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2731.

¶ 39. Like Glossip, Crawford’s complaint does not contain this required substantive element of an Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claim. Crawford has not alleged there exists a drug readily available to the MDOC that would significantly reduce the risk of pain during his execution. Nor has he identified any other alternative execution method that is feasible and readily implemented. So he fails to meet even the minimal pleading requirement.

¶ 40. Instead, what Crawford does allege is that the MDOC’s drug protocol carries risks that the anesthetic may be “sub-potent” and cause him to feel effects of the other drugs administered to carry out his death sentence. But this allegation, even if true, falls short of establishing an Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claim. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 50, 128 S. Ct. at 1531. “[Bjecause it is settled that capital punishment is constitutional,” the Supreme Court has reasoned that “it necessarily follows that there must be a constitutional means of carrying it out.” Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2732-33 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 47, 128 S.Ct. at 1529). And “[sjimply because an execution method may result in pain, either by accident or as an inescapable consequence, does not establish the sort of ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that qualifies as cruel and unusual.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. at 1531. Rather, what qualifies as cruel and unusual punishment is “the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake of pain”—over and above that arising from carrying out the death sentence. Id. at 48, 128 S.Ct. at 1530 (emphasis added). So under existing law, for Crawford to establish a method-of-execution claim, he must plead and prove (1) that the State has an “alternative procedure ... [that is] feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain,” and (2) the State “refuses to adopt such an alternative in the face of these documented advantages.” Id. at 52, 128 S.Ct. at 1532.

¶ 41. Here, Crawford has made no such assertions. So on its face, his complaint does not plead an Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claim. Thus, it cannot brought as a Section 1983 action. Instead, I agree with Chief Justice Waller’s rechar-acterization of Crawford’s complaint as seeking habeas corpus relief. See Hill, 547 U.S. at 582, 126 S. Ct. at 2103. As such, Crawford had to file his complaint with this Court, not the circuit court. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2015); M.R.A.P. 22. And by no means could Crawford seek his requested relief in chancery court. Knox v. State, 75 So.3d 1030, 1035 (Miss. 2011) (“Claims cognizable under the UPCCRA are outside the equity jurisdiction of the chancery court.”).

¶42. Because Crawford’s complaint, on its face, substantively and procedurally fails, the circuit court’s judgment reached the right result—dismissal—and should be affirmed. Therefore, I dissent.

WALLER, C.J., JOINS THIS OPINION. RANDOLPH, P.J., AND BEAM, J., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART.

      . Byrom’s claims in this case were dismissed voluntarily following the Mississippi Supreme Court’s vacating her capital murder conviction. See Byrom v. State, 2014-DR-00230-SCT (Miss. Mar. 31, 2014)

      . Crawford’s attorney in this case was the inmates’ attorney in Knox.

      . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

      . While the majority dodges this issue, in my view, the chancery court would still lack subject-matter jurisdiction even if Crawford’s complaint had asserted a cognizable Section 1983 method-of-execution claim. I agree with the Florida Supreme Court that a Section 1983 method-of-execution claim—though technically civil—is "quasi-criminal.” See Darling v. State, 45 So. 3d 444, 452-53 (Fla. 2010). And as a matter of Mississippi constitutional law, "chancery courts do not hear criminal cases[.]” In re Bell, 962 So.2d 537, 543 (Miss. 2007) (citing Miss. Const. art. 6, § 159). Consequently, they lack "the jurisdiction to enjoin ... or to otherwise interfere with” criminal sentences, including executions. Id. at 540.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Jon A. SWARTZFAGER v. Thomas R. SAUL
    NO. 2015-CA-01187-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    02/16/2017

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: GLENN S. SWARTZFAGER
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: CORY NATHAN FERRAEZ, SAMUEL STEVEN McHARD
   MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Thomas R. Saul and Jon A. Swartz-fager initially reached a verbal agreement for Saul’s purchase of a piece of property located within a larger tract of land Swartzfager owned. But another person came along and offered Swartzfager a significant sum to buy the whole tract. So Swartzfager approached Saul and asked if he would forego their original land deal and in exchange accept a separate parcel within a different tract of land. Saul agreed to Swartzfager’s new offer, and Swartzfager reduced their agreement to writing—stating that for “good and valuable consideration” already received, he would transfer the second parcel to Saul upon request. However, Swartzfager later backed out and never transferred any land to Saul.

¶ 2. Saul filed suit against Swartzfager seeking damages and specific performance. The chancellor found a valid contract existed between Saul and Swartzfager, and awarded him damages, attorney’s fees, and prejudgment interest. After review, this Court finds the chancellor correctly ruled that Saul and Swartzfager had a contract. And even absent the contract, Saul proved he detrimentally relied on Swartzfager’s offers and promises. So Swartzfager is equitably estopped from denying the land deal. Additionally, we find the chancellor’s awards for intentional infliction of emotional distress and attorney’s fees are supported. But the chancellor did err in awarding prejudgment interest, because Saul did not plead a request for prejudgment interest. We thus affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a recalculation of damages and attorney’s fees that does not include prejudgment interest.

Background Facts and Procedural History

¶3. Swartzfager, an attorney in Jones County, approached Thomas Saul in January 2007 at his home. He offered Saul an opportunity to purchase acreage of his choosing at a low price, in a large tract of land. Swartzfager owned approximately sixty-three acres near Saul’s home, which he planned to develop into a subdivision— Deerfield. Swartzfager wanted Saul, who was a Mississippi highway patrolman, to be one of the first homeowners so the neighborhood “would have a law enforcement presence.” Saul agreed and had a five-acre tract surveyed near the center of the development. He presented the survey to Swartzfager and tried to close on the transaction numerous times. But Swartz-fager either did not respond or delayed delivering closing documents. Meanwhile, relying on Swartzfager’s representations, Saul and his family sold their home and planned to build a “shop” on the property. Saul intended to live in the shop with his family while his new house was under construction.

¶ 4. With the closing on their own home approaching and no closing in sight for the Deerfield acreage, Saul and his family were forced to purchase and live in a mobile home. They also had to pay to store their belongings. Saul continued to ask Swartzfager to close on the property. But Swartzfager dodged him. During this time, Swartzfager was ironing out a separate proposal with a man named Bill Jenkins. And Jenkins eventually offered to purchase the entire sixty-three acre Deerfield tract. The offer would net Swartzfager a substantial profit.

¶ 5. Swartzfager first floated the idea of selling Jenkins the tract, less Saul’s five acres. But eventually he approached Saul with a separate proposal. He asked Saul if he would relinquish any interest in the five acres at Deerfield, and in exchange accept six acres in the Grand View Estates subdivision. Saul agreed to this proposal. And on June 7, 2007, Swartzfager drafted a basic agreement to this effect on his letterhead and signed it.

¶ 6. In his letter, Swartzfager wrote:

I, Jon A. Swartzfager, do hereby contract to sell to Thomas “Sonny” Saul and wife six acres of land of the twelve acres belonging to me within Grandview subdivision on the Sharon Moss road in the Second Judicial District of Jones County, Miss. This contract is made after I have received good and valuable consideration from Mr. Saul and the transfer of property by warranty deed from me to him is to take place within 10 days of a request for same by Mr. Saul.

/s/ Jon A. Swartzfager

Dated: June 7, 2007

¶ 7. Saul visited the Grand View Estates property and picked the northern six acres. He then drew a map of the chosen land. With both the drawing and agreement in hand, Saul made requests for Swartzfager to close on the Grand View Estates property. But again, Swartzfager either did not respond or delayed. So, on August 23, 2007, Saul filed suit against Swartzfager, his wife Helen, and Helen’s real estate company, Pinehurst Realty, LLC. Saul sought to enforce his agreement with Swartzfager, claiming breach of contract, equitable estoppel, and promissory estoppel. And he requested related damages. Saul filed his complaint in Jones County, and it was assigned to Chancery Judge Franklin McKenzie Jr. But Judge McKenzie recused, citing conflicts, and requested a special chancellor be appointed. This Court appointed Judge James Thomas Jr. on September 5, 2007.

¶ 8. After conducting some initial discovery, the parties met with Judge Thomas and prepared a scheduling order for the remaining discovery, which he signed on July 1, 2008. By August 26,2008, Saul filed for summary judgment. Soon after, the defendants responded and likewise filed a motion for summary judgment. Judge Thomas considered the arguments and granted partial summary judgment to Saul on February 12, 2009. In doing so, Judge Thomas declared the June 7, 2007 writing by Swartzfager a valid, enforceable contract. Judge Thomas then set the matter for trial. But before he could conduct the trial, Judge Thomas passed away. And on March 15, 2011, this Court appointed Judge Ray H. Montgomery to hear the case. On June 29, 2011, Judge Montgomery held a hearing on all pending motions and granted summary judgment to Helen Swartzfager and Pinehurst Realty, LLC— dismissing all claims against them. This left only the claims against Jon Swartzfager individually.

¶ 9. The parties then conferenced with Judge Montgomery and, by agreed order, the matter was set for a November 29, 2012 trial. The trial took place over November 29, 2012; January 25, 2013; and April 8, 2013. But Judge Montgomery also died before rendering a final decision. And on December 19, 2014, this Court appointed Judge Hollis McGehee to preside over the ease. Judge McGehee met with the parties and, after discussion, the parties agreed that Judge McGehee should review the existing record and render a decision. The parties agreed this was a better course than conducting an entirely new trial. Judge McGehee entered an agreed order memorializing this method for handling the case.

¶ 10. On May 6, 2015, Judge McGehee mailed the parties a letter opinion and decision. He asked Saul’s attorney to incorporate the rulings into a final opinion and judgment. On May 21, 2015, the final memorandum and judgment was signed by Judge McGehee and acknowledged by both attorneys. Judge McGehee found Saul had given Swartzfager valuable consideration for the Grand View Estates property by relinquishing any interest in the Deer-field property. He also found Swartzfager’s testimony supported this, along with his apparent authority to act on his wife’s behalf. Judge McGehee held Saul had relied on Swartzfager’s original and “substitute” offers and promises, resulting in the sale of his family home, moving his family to a mobile home, and requiring he' secure storage for many of their personal belongings.

¶ 11. As the judge saw it, “the June 7, 2007 alternate offer was, in essence, a pay back or payment to [Saul] and his wife” for the troubles they suffered while acting “in full detrimental reliance on [Swartzfager’s] unsolicited offers and promises.” Judge McGehee described these representations as “[p]romises and offers which [Swartz-fager] fully failed to perform on for the purpose of making a substantial profit.”

¶ 12. Judge McGehee found the June 7, 2007 letter clearly stated Swartzfager “was giving the six acres to [Saul] and the consideration was [Saul’s] foregoing his right to buy five acres of his choosing in Deer-field which facilitated the sale of the sixty three acres in Deerfield which greatly ben-efitted [Swartzfager].”

¶ 13. Based on Swartzfager’s intentional breach, Judge McGehee found Saul was entitled to monetary damages—$53,400 for breaching the contract, plus $79,098.81 in prejudgment interest. The chancellor also held Swartzfager liable for $22,785 in losses and costs incurred by Saul, as a “direct and proximate result of the egregious actions and omissions by [Swartzfager].” And he awarded Saul $60,000 for his emotional distress. All tallied, the judgment against Swartzfager totaled $205,283.81.

¶ 14. Furthermore, because of Swartz-fager’s actions, Judge McGehee found a separate hearing on attorney’s fees was necessary. Saul filed a memorandum in support of attorney’s fees. But Swartzfager did not. And after an unsuccessful conference on the issue, the parties filed a joint motion to determine attorney’s fees. At that point, Judge McGehee ruled on the matter. Both parties acknowledged his amended memorandum opinion and judgment, which was entered on July 8, 2015. In it, he found Swartzfager’s actions were so egregious and intentional that Saul was entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of $88,362.40—raising the total judgment against Swartzfager to $293,646.21.

¶ 15. Swartzfager now appeals. He claims the chancellor erred by—(1) finding the June 7, 2007 writing a valid and enforceable contract; (2) not, alternatively, finding the June 7, 2007 writing was an undelivered promise for a gift; (3) awarding damages for emotional distress; (4) awarding attorney’s fees; and (5) improperly awarding prejudgment interest.

Analysis

Standard of Review and Judicial Estop-pel

¶ 16. We will not disturb a chancellor’s decision unless it was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied the wrong legal standard. McNeil v. Hester, 753 So.2d 1057, 1063 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2000) (citing Bank of Mississippi v. Hollingsworth, 609 So.2d 422, 424 (Miss. 1992)). But questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Consol. Pipe & Supply Co. v. Colter, 735 So.2d 958, 961 (Miss. 1999)).

¶ 17. While these standards typically apply to a chancellor’s decisions, Swartzfager suggests our review of his appeal should differ. He argues a de novo review of all issues is required because Judge McGehee based his decision on testimony from hearings before previously assigned chancellors. And he insists these chancellor’s findings should be given no deference. We disagree.

¶ 18. We find Swartzfager is judicially estopped from taking this new approach. A litigant is “estopped from taking a subsequent position if (1) the position is inconsistent with one previously taken during litigation, (2) a court accepted the previous position, and (3) the party did not inadvertently take the inconsistent positions.” Clark v. Neese, 131 So.3d 556, 560 (¶ 16) (Miss. 2013) (citing Kirk v. Pope, 973 So.2d 981, 991 (Miss. 2007) (quoting In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2004)). The parties and Judge McGehee specifically discussed whether to hold a new trial. And the parties agreed Judge McGehee could, and should, render a decision based on the existing record rather than hold a new trial. Indeed, the record contains Judge McGehee’s email to the parties confirming this approach, along with an agreed order memorializing the agreement, signed by the chancellor and parties. So Swartzfager is estopped from now claiming that, because the final decision did not favor him, this Court should apply a de novo review.

¶ 19. We also find no merit to Swartzfager’s argument that the chancellor’s findings be given no deference because they are verbatim adoptions of Saul’s proposed findings. We find that Judge McGehee made his own findings, with few exceptions, based on the record. It is true that Judge McGehee adopted findings from the previous chancellors from prior partial summary judgment rulings, but if Swartz-fager takes issue with these particular findings he should have appealed the summary judgment rulings. And the record shows Swartzfager, in many instances, either agreed or conceded to Saul’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, or simply did not provide proposed findings or conclusions of his own. Heightened scrutiny by this Court is not required.

I. 2007 Writing as a Contract

¶ 20. Turning to the merits, Swartzfager first attacks his written agreement. He argues the June 7, 2007 writing is defective and does not survive the Statute of Frauds as an enforceable contract. He also claims that because the contract does not describe the Grand View Estates land with sufficient specificity or include a price, it fails as a matter of law.

¶ 21. Mississippi’s Statute of Frauds requires a contract for the sale of land to be in writing and “signed by the person to be charged therewith .... ” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-3-l(c) (Rev. 2012). But “[tjhese written memoranda need not necessarily be embodied in one writing: there may be one or more, if they are connected by physical contact, by reference, or by necessary connection.” Fisher v. Kuhn, 54 Miss. 480, 483 (1877) (citing Jelks v. Barrett, 52 Miss. 315, 322-23 (1876)). Swartzfager himself wrote and signed the June 7, 2007 letter, in which he agreed to convey to Saul six acres of the Grand View Estates property within ten days of Saul’s request to close. Swartzfager then asked Saul to choose which six acres he wanted. Saul complied and requested the northern six acres of the Grand View Estates property. He also drew a map of this area. Saul then combined his drawing with Swartzfager’s writing and delivered the documents to Swartzfager’s office, with a request to close. Together, the June 7, 2007 writing and Saul’s mapped out description—which was made at Swartzfager’s request— formed an agreement for the sale of the northernmost six acres of Swartzfager’s property within Grand View Estates.

A. Description of the Land

¶ 22. Swartzfager next takes issue with the map. He argues Saul’s map does not sufficiently describe the chosen property. Swartzfager is correct that “[t]he description of the land in a contract for the sale of real property is unquestionably an essential term that must be stated with specificity.” Woodruff v. Thames, 143 So.3d 546, 554 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2014) (citations omitted). But generally, a description is sufficient if a surveyor can locate the boundaries by following the description. See Trotter v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc., 452 So.2d 453, 456 (Miss. 1984); Overby v. Cavanaugh, 434 So.2d 1365, 1366 (Miss. 1983). Moreover, a description may still be considered sufficient, though it contains inaccuracies, if the property could be located with some certainty. See Stockstill v. Gammill, 943 So.2d 35, 41-42 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2006). Swartzfager’s June 7, 2007 letter identifies the selected land as “six acres of land of the twelve acres belonging to me in the Grandview subdivision on the Sharon Moss Road in the Second Judicial District of Jones County, Mississippi.” He identified half of a twelve-acre parcel, within a specific subdivision, in a specific judicial district of Jones County. Swartzfager then asked Saul to pick which half of the twelve-acre parcel he wanted, which Saul did. Saul mapped the northern half along the adjacent neighbor’s property line. He also included several roads and noticeable boundaries, as well at the map’s orientation. Swartzfager had no misunderstanding about the chosen land. And this description is more than sufficient for a surveyor to locate the property’s boundaries. Thus, the chancellor did not err in finding the land was sufficiently described.

B.Price of the Land

¶ 23. Swartzfager also insists his writing failed for not including a purchase price. He relies heavily on Duke v. Whatley, arguing the failure to include a price is a fatal defect which renders the June 7, 2007 writing an indication of intent rather than a contract. Duke v. Whatley, 580 So.2d 1267, 1273-74 (Miss. 1991) (collecting authorities). We note, however, that Duke and the other cases cited by Swartz-fager largely concern contracts to enter a later contract, or agreements for future agreements—something we do not face here. By Swartzfager’s own written words, he had “received good and valuable consideration” and would transfer the property to Saul within a specified time, upon request. Swartzfager expressed, in writing, that consideration had already been exchanged. He likewise expressed in writing his readiness to convey the six acres. Therefore, Swartzfager’s June 7, 2007 writing did not fail to include a price to be paid. It just did not include the price already paid—and that is where the ambiguity lies. And where contracts “evade clarity as to the parties’ intent, the court should consider extrinsic or parol evidence.” Facilities, Inc. v. Rogers-Usry Chevrolet, Inc., 908 So.2d 107, 112 (Miss. 2005) (citations omitted).

¶24. Judge McGehee recognized this maxim and considered Swartzfager’s own testimony and statements, along with Saul’s. And he found that Swartzfager agreed he was going to convey the six acres in Grand View Estates to Saul in exchange for Saul’s consent to the sale of the entire Deerfield property to Bill Jenkins. Swartzfager only began to back out from this agreement when Saul “picked property he shouldn’t have” and heard rumors Saul was going to flip the property. But Judge McGehee did not find any such limitations or restrictions in the June 7, 2007 agreement. And Swartzfager’s own testimony established he had agreed that in exchange for Saul’s consent to the Deer-field sale, he would transfer six acres of Saul’s choosing to him. We find the record supports the trial court’s finding that consideration had already changed hands— specifically Saul’s forbearance of any claim to the Deerfield property.

C. Contract Ambiguities and Vagaries

¶ 25. A consistent rule of contract construction is that “when the terms of a contract are vague or ambiguous, they are always construed more strongly against the party preparing it.” Stampley v. Gilbert, 332 So.2d 61, 63 (Miss. 1976) (citing Globe Music Corp. v. Johnson, 226 Miss. 329, 84 So.2d 509 (1956), and Love Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., 169 Miss. 259, 152 So. 829 (1934)). Here, Swartzfager proposed and drafted the agreement. He is an attorney, knowledgeable of the Statute of Frauds, who held a superior position to Saul in terms of legal expertise and experience. We find the chancellor did not err in holding ambiguities or vagaries against Swartzfager as drafter. Nor was the chancellor wrong to find the June 7, 2007 writing a valid, enforceable contract.

D. Equitable Estoppel

¶26. Still, even if we disagreed with the finding that a contract existed, Saul alternatively pled equitable estoppel. And the chancellor found that Saul did, in fact, detrimentally rely on Swartzfager’s representations. So Swartzfager is es-topped from denying the land deal.

¶27. Equitable estoppel prevents a party from denying any material fact, induced by his or her words or conduct, upon which another person relied and changed his or her position and would suffer injury if the denial or contrary assertion was allowed. See Koval v. Koval, 576 So.2d 134, 137 (Miss. 1991). The doctrine is based on “public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice[.]” Id. (citations omitted). It is premised on “the belief that a person should do what he says he will do in situations where another party is injured by reliance on the first party’s representations.” Id. at 138. And its aim is to “forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon,” Id. at 137 (citations omitted).

¶ 28. To prove equitable estop-pel, a party must show he or she has changed position, to his or her detriment, in reliance upon the conduct of another. PMZ Oil v. Lucroy, 449 So.2d 201, 206 (Miss. 1984) (citing Birmingham v. Conger, 222 So.2d 388, 392-93 (Miss.1969); Ivy v. Grenada Bank, 401 So.2d 1302, 1303 (Miss.1981); and Thomas v. Bailey, 375 So.2d 1049, 1052 (Miss.1979)). It requires we consider whether “it would be substantially unfair to allow a person to deny what he has previously induced another to believe and take action on.” Id.

¶ 29. Judge McGehee found Saul had detrimentally relied on Swartzfager’s promises about both the Deerfield and Grand View Estates properties—“Promises and offers which [Swartzfager] fully failed to perform on for the sole purpose of making a substantial personal profit.” As Judge McGehee saw it, Swartzfager acted “with total disregard for the welfare of [Saul and his wife].” And “their entire lives” were “disrupted” by “[Swartzfager’s] unsolicited offers and promises.” Our review shows the chancellor’s findings are supported.

¶ 30. Saul detrimentally relied on Swartzfager’s inducements—most notably selling his home. Furthermore, Swartzfager was able to negotiate his deal with Bill Jenkins, without interference or objection from Saul, only because he represented to Saul that, in exchange for his approval, Swartzfager would convey to him the Grand View Estates property. And Saul relied on these representations, acting unquestionably to his detriment. Thus, Swartzfager should not reap “the benefits of a contract while simultaneously trying to avoid its burdens.” Cmty. Bank of Miss, v. Stuckey, 52 So. 2d 1179, 1183 (¶ 25) (Miss. 2010) (citations omitted). So, even if there was no enforceable contract, Swartz-fager is estopped from denying the Grand View Estates deal he struck with Saul.

II. 2007 Writing as a Promise

¶ 31. Swartzfager also tries to shirk his deal with Saul by characterizing the June 7, 2007 writing as an inter vivos gift—a gift he never delivered. Swartzfager suggests that, because there was no written agreement between himself and Saul for the Deerfield property, Saul could not legally forbear any rights as consideration for the June 7, 2007 contract.

¶ 32. Generally, forbearance to assert a claim that is unenforceable at law or equity is not sufficient consideration. Stanley v. Sumrall, 167 Miss. 714, 147 So. 786, 788 (1933) (collecting authorities). This rule however is not absolute, since “... forbearance to assert a claim which might reasonably be doubtful is sufficient consideration to support a promise.” Id.

¶ 38. Swartzfager is correct that there was no written agreement between himself and Saul for the Deerfield property. And the Statute of Frauds requires a written contract for land. See Milam v. Paxton, 160 Miss. 562, 134 So. 171, 172 (1931) (a claim for specific performance to convey land requires a written contract). Again, however, Swartzfager is equitably estopped from denying his later Grand View Estates deal with Saul. Equitable estoppel “is a well-established exception to our statute of frauds.” PMZ Oil Co., 449 So.2d at 206. Furthermore, the Statute of Frauds does not bar enforcement “of that to which a party has agreed.” Id. (citing Martin v. Franklin, 245 So.2d 602 (Miss. 1971), and Sanders v. Dantzler, 375 So.2d 774, 776-77 (Miss. 1979)). While Saul could not prosecute a claim, successfully, for specific performance, there are other potential remedies that he could forbear as consideration. See Powell v. Campbell, 912 So.2d 978 (Miss. 2005); C.E. Frazier Constr. Co., Inc. v. Campbell Roofing & Metal Works, Inc., 373 So.2d 1036 (Miss. 1979). For example, like equitable estoppel, this Court stated in Frazier that promissory estoppel “may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetuation of fraud or would result in other injustice.” Frazier, 373 So.2d at 1038 (quoting 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver, § 48 (1966)).

¶ 34. So we find Swartzfager’s argument really holds no water. Saul could have asserted equity rights, certainly more than a mere “dispute or controversy” between himself and Swartzfager over the Deerfeld property. See Gunning v. Royal, 59 Miss. 45, 46 (1881). And the fact that Saul forbore any claim or suit, regardless of its likelihood- of success, to the Deerfield land is sufficient consideration for the June 7, 2007 writing concerning the Grand View Estates property. Second, Swartzfager’s own hand-picked wording in the June 7, 2007 writing acknowledges that “[t]his contract is made after I have received good and valuable consideration ....” (emphasis added). Thus, Swartzfager’s own written words express his then-held view that the consideration was both already received and valuable. For these reasons, we find the chancellor did not err by -rejecting Swartzfager’s notion that the June 7, 2007 writing was merely an undelivered gift inter vivos. And again, even if the chancellor had erred in this view, at a minimum Saul proved his alternative claim of equitable estoppel.

III. Emotional Distress

¶ 35. Swartzfager next contends the chancellor wrongly awarded damages for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. He asserts Saul did not make a prima facie case for either claim. But the chancellor disagreed, and so do we.

¶ 36. Judge McGehee specifically found Swartzfager’s intentional actions surrounding the agreement caused Saul significant emotional distress. There is no indication that damages were awarded for negligent infliction of emotional distress, so we need not address that argument. We limit our discussion to intentional infliction of emotional distress.

¶ 37. Typically, to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a “defendant’s conduct must be Svanton and wilful.’” Speed v. Scott, 787 So.2d 626, 630 (¶ 17) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So.2d 648, 659 (Miss. 1995)). It must be the type of conduct that “ ‘would evoke outrage or revulsion’ ” Id. The acts must be “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” Id. at (¶ 18) (quoting Pegues v. Emerson Elec. Co., 913 F.Supp. 976, 982 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (citations omitted)). This no doubt is a high bar, but as Saul also notes, this Court apparently has “moved away from this requirement” for breach of contract claims. See Univ. of S. Miss. v. Williams, 891 So.2d 160, 172 (¶ 30) (Miss. 2004) (citations omitted).

¶ 38. When the claim is based on a contract, a plaintiff must show that (1) the emotional distress was a foreseeable consequence of the particular breach-of-contract and (2) that he or she actually suffered emotional distress; plaintiffs need not prove any physical manifestation. Id. at 172-73 (¶ 31). However, the plaintiff must show specific suffering during a specific time frame; generalizations are not sufficient. Id.

¶ 39. Saul testified that during the six to seven months following the collapse of his dealings with Swartzfager, both he and his ■wife were on “an emotional roller coaster.” Saul felt betrayed, helpless, angry, and disappointed. He testified about the significant stress his family endured by moving from a house to a much smaller mobile home. These events certainly would cause a reasonable person great distress. Still, even if Saul’s suffering and the disruption of his family’s life are categorized as mere discomfort, “testimony concerning ‘discomforts’ ... take[s] on a different importance when viewed in light of the event which engendered the mental anguish.” Id. at 173 (¶ 32) (citing Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1, 10-11 (Miss. 2000)). And here, the chancellor described the events, particularly Swartzfager’s conduct, as “self-serving greed from start to finish”—something akin to “a portrait of egregious behavior.” He found Swartzfager’s acts “were clearly and intentionally made in self-serving bad faith .., with total disregard for the welfare of Sonny and Gail.”

¶ 40. We find support for the chancellor’s finding that Swartzfager’s behavior was repetitive and egregious, resulting in the disruption of Saul’s and his wife’s lives, with the sole result being Swartzfager’s financial benefit. Saul’s emotional distress clearly was a foreseeable result of Swartz-fager repeatedly breaking his promises. And under our deferential review, regardless of whether Saul’s emotional-distress claim is considered in the contractual context or in the traditional sense, nothing in the record suggests the chancellor erred by finding Swartzfager’s intentional and egregious acts caused Saul emotional distress. We thus find the award is factually supported.

IV. Attorney’s Fees

¶ 41. Swartzfager further complains the chancellor incorrectly awarded attorney’s fees to Saul. He argues that, absent statutory or contractual authority, attorneys fees are warranted only where punitive damages also are proper. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Cook, 832 So.2d 474, 486 (¶40) (Miss. 2002) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Steele, 373 So.2d 797, 801 (Miss. 1979); Smith v. Dorsey, 599 So.2d 529, 549-50 (Miss. 1992); Defenbaugh & Co. of Leland v. Rogers, 543 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Miss. 1989); and Tideway Oil Programs, Inc., v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454, 456 (Miss. 1983)). He insists that, because punitive damages were not awarded, the chancellor erred in awarding attorney’s fees.

¶ 42. Judge McGehee told the parties he would hold a separate hearing on attorney’s fees. And he asked each party to submit briefs. Saul briefed the court on the issue, but Swartzfager did not. With his brief, Saul provided affidavits from attorneys, describing the forty-percent contingency fee charged by Saul’s attorney as fair and reasonable for the work performed. And to support the nature of his attorney’s legal work, Saul attached time sheets, depicting the various tasks performed. The detailed work records listed the dates and tasks provided by each attorney, including the hours worked and each attorney’s usual billable rate. Swartz-fager, by comparison, opted not to pursue a separate hearing on attorney’s fees. Nor did he provide a brief or memorandum contesting the fees. Instead, he agreed to a joint motion, with Saul, for a ruling on the matter—effectively waiving the separate hearing. So, at no point did Swartzfager seriously challenge the issue of attorney’s fees or contest Saul’s submissions.

¶ 43. This Court has held attorney’s fees may be awarded in cases where punitive damages are, or would be, proper, but are not actually awarded. See AquaCulture Technologies, Ltd. v. Holly, 677 So.2d 171, 184-85 (Miss. 1996); see also Pursue Energy Corp. v. Abernathy, 77 So.3d 1094, 1100-01 (Miss. 2011). Furthermore, punitive damages are not a prerequisite for attorney’s fees, and a chancellor does not abuse his or her discretion by awarding such fees where an award of punitive damages would have been justified. Aqua-Culture, 677 So.2d at 184-85. Judge McGehee found Swartzfager’s actions were egregious—“ the ultimate bad faith in disrupting someone else’s life for the sole purpose of benefitting his own.” Clearly, punitive damages would have been justified here. So, we review Judge McGe-hee’s award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. Id. at 185. And based on the record and the chancellor’s findings, we see no abuse of discretion on this issue and affirm.

Y. Prejudgment Interest

¶ 44. Swartzfager’s final claim is that the chancellor improperly awarded prejudgment interest. While a party is no longer required to plead with specificity the date from which prejudgment interest accrues, a party must assert a demand for prejudgment interest in the appropriate pleading. Bailey Brake Farms, Inc. v. Trout, 116 So.3d 1064, 1071 (¶ 25) (Miss. 2013) (citing Upchurch Plumbing, Inc. v. Greenwood Utils. Comm’n, 964 So.2d 1100, 1118 (¶ 45) (Miss. 2007)). Saul did not specifically demand prejudgment interest in either his original or amended complaint. He merely made a request for general relief. And a request for general relief in a complaint seeking equitable relief does not give the defendant notice of a claim for prejudgment interest. Id. (citing M.R.C.P. 8); see also Arcadia Farms P’ship v. Audubon Ins. Co., 77 So.3d 107, 115 (¶ 22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (the purpose of M.R.C.P. 8 is to provide sufficient notice of the claims and grounds upon which relief is sought).

1145. Saul failed to make a demand for prejudgment interest, and no record evidence exists to show that Swartzfager was on notice of a claim for prejudgment interest. So the issue of prejudgment interest was not before the court, and the chancellor erred by awarding prejudgment interest.

Conclusion

¶ 46. Swartzfager’s June 7, 2007 writing, along with Saul’s drawing, constitute a valid, enforceable agreement. Swartzfager, as both the agreement’s drafter and an attorney, is responsible for any deficiencies or ambiguities. And, even if there was no enforceable contract, Swartzfager is equitably estopped from denying the land deal. We thus find the awards and related expenses, including the intentional infliction of emotional distress award and attorney’s fees, were proper. However, the chancellor erred in awarding prejudgment interest. We therefore affirm the trial court in part, reverse the award of prejudgment interest, and remand for a new calculation of damages and attorney’s fees that does not include prejudgment interest, based on the evidence already submitted to the trial court and consistent with this Court’s opinion.

¶ 47. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., KING, COLEMAN, BEAM, AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ„ CONCUR. RANDOLPH, P.J., AND KITCHENS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . The record also contains an email from Judge McGehee to the parties confirming their desire to have him review the record to reach a final disposition, rather than conduct a new trial.

      . Judge McGehee computed prejudgment interest at eight percent per annum from July 13, 2007 until May 13, 2015—or 7.8356 years.

      . Judge McGehee also adopted unchallenged findings from the previous chancellor's summary judgment rulings.

      . Judge Thomas granted partial summary judgment in favor of Saul, finding that the June 7, 2007 writing was a contract.

      . Swartzfager’s testimony is the only source, in the record, of the claim that Saul intended to "flip” the property.

      . Saul also testified that during this time he was diagnosed with cancer, and his wife was diagnosed a few years later, and that fighting cancer was more difficult and stressful while they lived in the mobile home and had their belongings in storage.

      . Because we reverse and render the prejudgment interest award, we need not discuss whether Saul’s damages were liquidated when he filed his complaint or if Swartzfager acted in bad faith.