author: WELCH, Judge.

text:
    Jimmy Shane CLICK v. STATE of Alabama.
    CR-12-0941.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    July 8, 2016.

      Stephen Andrew Strickland, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and James R. Houts, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   On Remand from the United States Supreme Court

WELCH, Judge.

Jimmy Shane Click appealed from the Madison Circuit Court’s dismissal of his Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition that sought relief from his sentence based on the authority of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The circuit court’s judgment dismissing Click’s Rule 32 petition was affirmed on appeal. Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s judgment in Click v. Alabama, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 1363, 194 L.Ed.2d 346 (2016), we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case to the Madison Circuit Court for further consideration in light of Montgomery v. Louisiana, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).

At the age of 17, Jimmy Shane Click committed a capital murder. Following his June 18, 1994, conviction, Click was sentenced to the mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. Click v. State, 695 So.2d 209 (Ala.Crim.App.1996). On April 20, 2001, this Court affirmed Click’s appeal from the circuit court’s dismissal of his first Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition seeking postconviction relief from his conviction and sentence. Click v. State, 821 So.2d 218 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (on return to remand). On November 16, 2001, the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review without opinion.

On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court released Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders” because, “the mandatory sentencing schemes ... violate [the] principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, and 489, 132 S.Ct. at 2469 and 2475.

“Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys.”

Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78, 132 S.Ct. at 2468.

Miller emphasized that imposing the harshest possible sentence on “all children convicted of homicide” would be uncommon,

“[g]iven all we[, the United States Supreme Court,] have said in Roper [v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005),] and Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) ], and this decision about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change.”

Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 and 489, 132 S.Ct. at 2469 and 2475. However, Miller “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics”—before “meting out” a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Miller, 567 U.S. at 483, 132 S.Ct. at 2471. “[A] judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 489, 132 S.Ct. at 2475.

On December 20, 2012, Click filed a Rule 32 petition “asserting that his mandatory life-without-parole sentence was unconstitutional in light of Miller,” On February 25, 2013, the circuit court entered an order summarily dismissing Click’s Rule 32 petition. Click appealed, contending that the rule announced in Miller was retroactive to cases on collateral review, that his claim was not procedurally barred, and that his Miller claim was jurisdictional.

On April 4, 2014, while Click’s Rule 32 petition was pending, this Court decided Williams v. State, 183 So.3d 198 (Ala.Crim.App.2014), aff'd Ex parte Williams, 183 So.3d 220, 221 (Ala.2015). Williams held that the rule announced in Miller does not apply to cases on collateral review. Williams v. State, 183 So.3d at 220 (“[T]he rule announced in Miller is subject to the general rule of nonretroactivity.”).

On June 6, 2014, this Court affirmed, by unpublished memorandum, the circuit court’s dismissal of Click’s postconviction petition based on the authority of Williams. Click v. State (No. 12-0941), 184 So.3d 464 (Ala.Crim.App.2014)(table). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari review. Click v. Alabama, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 1363, 194 L.Ed.2d 346 (2016). While Click was pending, the United States Supreme Court released its decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, — U.S. at-, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).

Montgomery was 17 years old when he committed a capital murder. Under the applicable Louisiana law, Montgomery received the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole. “The sentence was automatic upon the jury’s verdict, so Montgomery had no opportunity to present mitigation evidence to justify a less severe sentence.” Montgomery, — U.S. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 726. Montgomery collaterally attacked his sentence under a Louisiana statute providing that “ ‘[a]n illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence.’ ” Montgomery, — U.S. at-, 136 S.Ct. at 726 (quoting La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 882). Louisiana’s “collateral review procedures are open to claims that a decision of this Court has rendered certain sentences illegal, as a substantive matter, under the Eighth Amendment.” Montgomery, — U.S. at-, 136 S.Ct. at 732.

Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court held in Montgomery that the decision in Miller prohibiting a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders “announced a substantive rule of constitutional law” and was retroactive on collateral review. Montgomery, — U.S. at-, 136 S.Ct. at 736-37. In discussing retroactivity, the Montgomery Court recognized that a substantive constitutional rule that prohibits “ ‘a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense’ ” is subject to retroactive application in a state court. Montgomery, — U.S. at-, 136 S.Ct. at 729 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)). The Court noted that Miller had determined that “juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth” are a class of defendants. Montgomery, — U.S. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 734.

“Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is excessive for all but ‘ “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,”’ 567 U.S. at 479-80, (quoting Roper [v. Simmons], [543 U.S. 551], at 573 [ (2005) ]), it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their status’—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth. Penry [v. Lynaugh], 492 U.S. [302], at 330. As a result, Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. Like other substantive rules, Miller is retroactive because it “necessarily carries] a significant risk that a defendant” ’—here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders—‘ “faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” ’ Schriro [v. Summerlin], 542 U.S. [348] at 352 [ (2004) ] (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).”

Montgomery, — U.S. at-, 136 S.Ct. at 734. Montgomery continued to explain that “the sentence of life without parole is disproportionate for the vast majority of juvenile offenders” and, thus, that a juvenile offender “must be given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.” Montgomery, — U.S. at-, 136 S.Ct. at 736-37.

“A hearing where ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’ are considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not. The hearing does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller’s substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.”

Montgomery, — U.S. at-, 136 S.Ct. at 735.

Thus, the new rule of substantive constitutional law announced in Miller does not allow imposing upon a juvenile convicted of capital murder a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole unless the sentencing court has considered the juvenile’s “ ‘diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change’ before condemning him or her to die in prison.” Montgomery, — U.S. at-, 136 S.Ct. at 726 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. at 2469). The sentencing court must conclude that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is not disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.

At the time Click was sentenced, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was the only possible sentence for a juvenile convicted of capital murder. See § 13A-5-39(a), Ala.Code 1975; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)(holding that Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for juveniles). Thus, pursuant to its holding in Montgomery, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion vacating this Court’s judgment in Click and remanding the cause to this Court for “further consideration in light of Montgomery v. Louisiana.” Click v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1363, 194 L.Ed.2d 346 (2016).

“Where state collateral review proceedings permit prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional right that determines the outcome of that challenge.” Montgomery, — U.S. at-, 136 S.Ct. at 731-32. Alabama provides the criminally convicted a procedure to challenge his or her sentence in the postconviction scheme set forth in Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P. A defendant who has been convicted may seek postconviction relief from a sentence if: “The constitution of the United States or of the State of Alabama requires a new trial, a new sentence proceeding, or other relief,” Rule 32.1(a); “[t]he sentence imposed exceeds the maximum authorized by law or is otherwise not authorized by law,” Rule 32.1(c); “[t]he court was without jurisdiction to render judgment or to impose sentence,” Rule 32.1(b). Thus, Alabama’s “collateral review procedures are open to claims that a decision of [the United States Supreme Court] has rendered certain sentences illegal, as a substantive matter, under the Eighth Amendment.” Montgomery, — U.S. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 732.

The decisions in Miller and Montgomery prohibiting the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on a juvenile convicted of capital murder without consideration of the child’s “‘diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change’ before condemning him or her to die in prison” Montgomery, — U.S. at-, 136 S.Ct. at 726, constitute a significant change in Alabama law that is retroactively applicable. See State v. Valencia, 239 Ariz. 255, 370 P.3d 124, 128 (Ct.App.2016)(“The Supreme Court’s determination in Montgomery that a natural-life sentence imposed on a juvenile defendant is unconstitutional unless the juvenile’s offenses reflect permanent incorrigibility constitutes a significant change in Arizona law that is retroactively applicable.”).

Moreover, it appears that Click’s petition conformed with the requirements of Rule 32: It was timely filed within one year from the release of Miller and was already pending when Montgomery announced that Miller was to be applied retroactively; there is no dispute that Click was 17 years old at the time of the murder; Click was sentenced to a mandatory prison term of life imprisonment without parole as Alabama’s sentencing scheme provided at the time; and Alabama’s post-conviction scheme allows for challenges to sentences on constitutional grounds and illegal sentence grounds.

Accordingly, pursuant to Montgomery v. Louisiana, this Court finds the Madison circuit court’s summary dismissal of Click’s Rule 32 petition to be reversible error and remands the case for the Rule 32 court to determine if Click is entitled to relief in light of the new substantive law announced in Miller and Montgomery and, if so, to provide Click the appropriate postconviction relief.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WINDOM, P.J., and BURKE and JOINER, JJ., concur.

KELLUM, J., concurs in the result.

      . At the time Click was sentenced, "capital offense” was defined as: “An offense for which a defendant shall be punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole according to the provisions of this article.” § 13A-5-39(1), Ala,Code 1975. That statute was amended on May 11, 2016, to read: "An offense for which a defendant shall be punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, or in the case of a defendant who establishes that he err she was under the age of 18 years at the time of the capital offense, life imprisonment, or life imprisonment without parole, according to the provisions of this article.”

      . At the time Click was sentenced for capital murder, the sentencing statute stated: “Murder is a Class A felony; provided, that the punishment for murder or any offense committed under aggravating circumstances, as provided by Article 2 of Chapter 5 of this title, is death or life imprisonment without parole, which punishment shall be determined and fixed as provided by Article 2 Chapter 5 of this title or any amendments thereto.” § 13A-6-2(c), Ala.Code 1975. That statute was amended on May 11, 2016. See note 4, infra, for that and other statutory revisions.

      . Should Click be granted relief and subsequently obtain review of his sentence, the sentencing court is reminded that Miller does not prohibit imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Miller requires that before imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on a juvenile convicted of capital murder, the trial court must "conduct an individualized examination of mitigating circumstances in considering the fairness of imposing such a sentence.” Washington v. State, 103 So.3d 917, 920 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012). In Ex parte Henderson, 144 So.3d 1262 (Ala.2013), the Alabama Supreme Court stated that to achieve individualized sentencing, and thus be in accord with Miller, a sentencing hearing for a juvenile convicted of a capital offense must include consideration of the following:
      "(1) the juvenile’s chronological age at the time of the offense and the hallmark features of youth, such as immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile’s diminished culpability; (3) the circumstances of the offense; (4) the extent of the juvenile's participation in the crime; (5) the juvenile’s family, home, and neighborhood environment; (6) the juvenile’s emotional maturity and development; (7) whether familial and/or peer pressure affected the juvenile; (8) the juvenile’s past exposure to violence; (9) the juvenile’s drug and alcohol history; (10) the juvenile's ability to deal with the police; (11) the juvenile’s capacity to assist his or her attorney; (12) the juvenile’s mental-health history; (13) the juvenile's potential for rehabilitation; and (14) any other relevant factor related to the juvenile’s youth. See generally Commonwealth v. Knox[, 50 A.3d 732 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) ]. We recognize that some of the factors may not apply to a particular juvenile’s case and that some of the factors may overlap. Nevertheless, we believe that providing the trial court with guidance on individualized sentencing for juveniles charged with capital murder comports with the guidelines of Miller."

        Ex parte Henderson, 144 So.3d at 1284.

      . In addition to the statutes set forth in notes 1 and 2, supra, the following statutes have been recently amended to read as reflected below.
      Section 13A—5—2(f), Ala.Code 1975: "Every person convicted of murder shall be sentenced by the court to imprisonment for a term, or to death, life imprisonment without parole, or life imprisonment in the case of a defendant who establishes that he or she was under the age of 18 years at the time of the offense, as authorized by subsection (c) of Section 13A-6-2.”
      Section 13A-5-43(d) and (e), Ala.Code 1975:
      "(d) If the defendant is found guilty of a capital offense or offenses with which he is charged and the defendant does not establish to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was under the age of 18 years at the time of the capital offense or offenses with which he or she is found guilty, the sentence shall be determined as provided in Sections 13A-5-45 through 13A-5-53.
      "(e) If the defendant is found guilty of a capital offense or offenses with which he or she is charged and the defendant establishes to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was under the age of 18 years at the time of the capital offense or offenses, the sentence shall be either life without the possibility of parole or, in the alternative, life, and the sentence shall be determined by the procedures set forth in the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure for judicially imposing sentences within the range set by statute without a jury, rather than as provided in Sections 13A-5-45 to 13A-5-53, inclusive. The judge shall consider all relevant mitigating circumstances.
      "If the defendant is sentenced to life on a capital offense, the defendant must serve a minimum of 30 years, day for day, prior to first consideration of parole.”
      Section 13A-6-2(c), Ala.Code 1975:
      "(c) Murder is a Class A felony; provided, that the punishment for murder or any offense committed under aggravated circumstances by a person 18 years of age or older, as provided by Article 2 of Chapter 5 of this title, is death or life imprisonment without parole, which punishment shall be determined and fixed as provided by Article 2 of Chapter 5 of this title or any amendments thereto. The punishment for murder or any offense committed under aggravated circumstances by a person under the age of 18 years, as provided by Article 2 of Chapter 5, is either life imprisonment without parole, or life, which punishment shall be determined and fixed as provided by Article 2 of Chapter 5 of this title or any amendments thereto and the applicable Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.
      "If the defendant is sentenced to life on a capital offense, the defendant must serve a minimum of 30 years, day for day, prior to first consideration of parole.
      "Section 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a defendant is found guilty of any non-homicide crime for which the only sentence provided by law is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and that defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was under the age of 18 years at the time of the offense, the sentence shall be life imprisonment.
      "Section 3. This act shall apply to any person under the age of 18 years at the time an offense was committed who was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under Section 13A-5-2, 13A-5-39, 13A-5-43, or 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975, whether the person is currently incarcerated or hereinafter convicted.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    James David RICE, Jr. v. STATE of Alabama.
    CR-15-0043.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    July 8, 2016.

      James Matthew Jackson and David Gordon Thomas, Alexander City, for appellant.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Andy Scott Poole, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   WELCH, Judge.

James David Rice, Jr., appeals from his conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, for possession of a controlled substance—cocaine—a violation of § 13A-12-212, Ala. Code 1975. The trial court sentenced Rice to a term of 24 months in prison, then suspended the sentence and placed Rice on supervised probation for 18 months. Rice reserved for appeal his claim that the trial court erred when it denied the motion to suppress, in which he challenged the search of his vehicle that resulted in the discovery of cocaine.

Detective George Long with the Alexander City police department testified at the suppression hearing that he saw Rice back his vehicle up completely through an intersection that had a four-way stop. Detective Long stated that after he drove his patrol car through the intersection, he pulled to the side of the road and Rice drove past him. Detective Long then initiated a traffic stop. Detective Long further testified:

“At that time, I get out of my vehicle. I go up to the driver’s side vehicle. As I’m talking to the driver, I can tell he’s real nervous. I’m asking for his driver’s license, proof of insurance. And the driver turns out to be Mr. David Rice.
“Whenever he was getting his insurance papers and his driver’s license to hand me, his hand was shaking. He was very, very nervous. You could tell. I asked Mr. Rice to get out of the vehicle for me and step to the rear. I asked him while I was talking to him was there anything in the vehicle that I needed to know about, because you’re awful nervous just to be talking with me. And he said, ‘No, there’s nothing in the vehicle.’ And so I’m going to pat you down for my safety, and I had him put his hands up on top of the vehicle.
“As I pat him down, I come to his right front pocket, and I felt something that was about the size of a half dollar. It was real soft. And I asked him, I said, Mr. Rice, what’s that? And he dropped his head and he said, ‘Cocaine.’ So whenever I pulled it out, it was a bag about like this right here full of cocaine. I arrested Mr. Rice for possession of a controlled substance.... ”

(R. 4-5.)

On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Detective Long about whether he had any particularized reason to believe Rice was armed:

“Q. Did he give you any indication that he was armed and dangerous at any time?
“A. Most of them don’t give you an indication.
“Q. Well, I understand. But you said he was nervous, but a lot of people are nervous when you pull them over, correct?
“A. Right. But for my safety and him being as nervous as he was.
“Q. Right.
“A. I mean, you can’t even tell if the guy has got a gun down in his—
“Q. Sure.
“A. I want to use all precautions necessary to protect myself, and so I did. I did pull him out of the vehicle because of the way he was acting. He had—his speech, he could barely get any words out because he was nervous. I didn’t know if he was trying to hide something or if he had something on him.
“Q. But, when you got him out, again the only thing that you had going for—to indicate that there was anything problematic is you saw him run a stop sign, essentially?
“A. Correct.
“Q, And you knew he was nervous?
“A. Um-hum.
“Q, You had no reason to believe he was armed, though, did you?
“A. You never know.
“Q. Can you tell me any reason? Do you have any—can you say any reason, any particularized reason to believe that he was armed?
“A. Other than just him showing the signs of being nervous, you know, because of the traffic stop.”

(R. 8-9.)

Detective Long further acknowledged that he had no indication that, before the traffic stop, Rice had been engaged in criminal activity, and he acknowledged again that, but for Rice’s nervousness, he had no reason to believe that he was armed and dangerous. Detective Long then volunteered, “90 percent of the cops that get shot don’t know the person is armed and dangerous, you know.” (R. 10.)

At the conclusion of Detective Long’s testimony, defense counsel argued to the trial court that Grantham v. City of Tuscaloosa, 111 So.3d 174 (Ala.Crim.App.2012), holds that an investigatory stop and patdown search must be based on specific, reasonable inferences from the circumstances that he is entitled to draw based on the facts and in light of his experience, but it cannot be based on an unparticular-ized suspicion or hunch. He further argued that Alabama law holds that, in a routine traffic stop or when a driver is nervous, the officer must be able to articulate his reasons for believing that the driver is armed.

After defense counsel presented his argument to the trial court, Detective Long stated:

‘Your Honor, I do want to say there is no traffic stop that’s routine. We’ve learned that throughout the years. If that was so, then officers wouldn’t be getting killed out here on the street. Whenever a person shows signs of being as nervous as he was, it shows signs of there is something else there. It goes beyond the scope of the traffic stop.”

(R. 11-12.)

The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

Rice argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. He argues, as he did in the trial court, that the search of his person was unconstitutional because it was based solely on his nervousness.

The facts in this case are not in dispute. Therefore, our review of the trial court’s decision denying Rice’s motion to suppress is de novo, and there is no presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling. E.g., State v. Hill, 690 So.2d 1201, 1203 (Ala.1996); State v. Landrum, 18 So.3d 424 (Ala.Crim.App.2009). The only issue before this Court is whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts that were presented at the suppression hearing. We do not think it did, and we reverse the judgment.

Evidence is inadmissible if it was obtained by a search conducted in violation of the Constitution of the United States. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court stated: “[W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest.” Faced with concerns over the intrusion on individual rights and the need for officers to take action based on the circumstances presented during their contact with private citizens, the Terry Court held:

“Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Cf. Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-176 (1949); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unpartic-ularized suspicion or ‘hunch, but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”

392 U.S. at 27 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

In State v. Odom, 872 So.2d 887 (Ala. Crim.App.2003), this Court explained that, when reviewing whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion for a patdown search, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detaining officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting wrongdoing. 872 So.2d at 890, quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), in turn quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Law-enforcement officers are allowed to draw on their own training and experience, and their decisions might be made on information not apparent to a layperson. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.

The State argues that the patdown search was reasonable because, it says, “Detective Long was sufficiently concerned by the degree of Rice’s nervousness to feel the limited intrusion of a pat down for weapons was necessary for his safety,” and that “[t]he pat down was justified and shows no inappropriate action establishing a constitutional violation that would invoke the severity of the exclusionary rule.” (State’s brief, at p. 9.) We disagree.

Detective Long testified repeatedly that his sole reason for conducting the patdown search was that Rice was very nervous during the traffic stop. He acknowledged that he did not see any indication that Rice had been involved in any criminal activity other than the traffic violation, and he testified that, other than Rice’s being nervous, he had no reason to believe Rice was armed and dangerous. This Court has held that nervousness, alone, in the presence of a police officer does not establish reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal activity. See State v. Washington, 623 So.2d 392, 398 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), and cases cited therein.

Detective Long’s testimony demonstrates that he had no specific facts that would support a finding that he was justified in believing that Rice was armed and presently dangerous. Rather, his testimony that, when a person shows signs of being as nervous as Rice was during a traffic stop, then “something else” is there, established that his decision to conduct the patdown search was based on an unpartic-ularized suspicion or hunch, rather than the particularized and objective basis that Terry requires for a patdown search. See Grantham v. City of Tuscaloosa, 111 So.3d 174 (Ala.Crim.App.2012); Smith v. State, 19 So.3d 912 (Ala.Crim.App.2009). “The purpose of this limited search [pursuant to Terry ] is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.... So long as the officer ... has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective purpose.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (footnote omitted).

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the search here exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry patdown and that the trial court erred when it denied Rice’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his person.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WINDOM, P.J., and KELLUM, BURKE, and JOINER, JJ., concur.


text:
    FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: J.M.S.
    CASE NO.: SC17-626
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    APRIL 17, 2017
   Upon consideration of the Report and Recommendation filed by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, it is ordered that the Board’s recommendation is approved by the Court and J.M.S. shall be admitted to The Florida Bar subject to the following conditions:

1. The Applicant’s license to practice law shall be placed on probation for a period of two years.

2. During the period of probation, the Applicant shall:

(a) continue to consult with Karen Shell, LMHC, or other licensed mental health provider, at least, monthly or more frequently as her mental health provider deems necessary;
(b) follow promptly, diligently and completely all instructions by her mental health provider including the taking of any medication in the recommended manner as may be prescribed by her mental health provider;
(c) have her mental health provider submit quarterly reports to The Florida Bar during the entire probationary period. These reports shall confirm the Applicant’s consultations for the preceding quarter and shall advise The Florida Bar of the Applicant’s continuing ability to engage in the active practice of law;
(d) obtain an agreement from her mental health provider stating that the mental health provider will immediately notify The Florida Bar if the Applicant misses a scheduled appointment without prior rescheduling; and
(e)submit quarterly sworn statements to The Florida Bar by March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31 during the entire probationary period attesting to her compliance with the conditions set forth in 2 (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.

3. The Florida Bar shall monitor the conditions set forth in the Consent Agreement pursuant to Rule l-3.2(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, and the costs thereof shall be paid by the Applicant.

4. To monitor effectively the provisions in this agreement, the Applicant shall reside within Florida during the entire period of probation. Any business or pleasure trips outside Florida that exceed ten days shall occur only with the advance approval of The Florida Bar. If the Applicant relocates outside Florida during the probationary period for any reason, the Applicant shall surrender her license to practice law in Florida and if the Applicant fails to do so, the Supreme Court of Florida shall terminate her license.

5. If the Applicant’s license is surrendered or terminated during the probationary period, the Applicant shall resume the practice of law in Florida only upon full compliance with the rules and regulations governing admission to The Florida Bar.

6. A failure to observe the conditions of the probation or a finding of probable cause by The Florida Bar as to conduct of the Applicant committed during the period of probation may terminate the probation and subject the Applicant to all available grievance procedures and disciplinary sanctions including disbarment under the Rules of Discipline. Upon receiving notice of a violation of the Court’s order of conditional admission, The Florida Bar may immediately petition the Court for an order of suspension. The Applicant shall have ten days to file a response. If no response is timely filed by the Applicant, then the Court shall issue an order suspending the Applicant. If a response is filed, the matter shall be disposed of as the Court directs. Unless terminated by the Court, an order of suspension shall remain in effect until final disposition of the grievance procedures commenced by The Florida Bar against the Applicant.

7. The Applicant shall immediately inform The Florida Bar of any criminal arrest or prosecution or the filing of any grievance or complaint related to the Applicant’s practice of law.

8. If circumstances so warrant it, the Applicant and The Florida Bar may stipulate to an extension of the period of probation or The Florida Bar may petition the Court for such an extension with a final decision to be made by the Court.

9. By executing this Agreement, the Applicant specifically consents to and authorizes the release of any and all materials in the Applicant’s file to The Florida Bar that the Bar may request from the Board to enable the Bar to fulfill its responsibilities under this Consent Agreement.


author: LEWIS, J.

text:
    ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RE: VOTING RESTORATION AMENDMENT. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Voting Restoration Amendment (FIS).
    No. SC16-1785
    No. SC16-1981
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [April 20, 2017]

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Ellen B. Gwynn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
    Jon L. Mills of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Miami, Florida; and Andrew M. Starling, Orlando Florida, for Floridians for a Fair Democracy, Sponsor
    Ion Sancho, Former Supervisor of Elections for Leon County, Tallahassee, Florida; and Dr. Brenda Snipes, Supervisor of Elections for Broward County, Fort Laud-erdale, Florida, as Proponents
   LEWIS, J.

The Attorney General of Florida has requested this Court’s opinion as to the validity of an initiative petition circulated pursuant to article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. We have jurisdiction. See art. IV, § 10, art. V, § 3(b)(10), Fla. Const.

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2016, the Attorney General petitioned this Court for an advisory opinion as to the validity of an initiative petition sponsored by Floridians for a Fair Democracy (“the Sponsor”) and circulated, pursuant to article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. The Sponsor submitted a brief supporting the validity of the initiative petition.

The full text of the proposed amendment to article VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution states:

Article VI, Section 4. Disqualifications.—
(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any disqualification from voting arising from a felony conviction shall terminate and voting rights shall be restored upon completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.
(b) No person convicted of murder or a felony sexual offense shall be qualified to vote until restoration of civil rights.
(be) No person may appear on the ballot for re-election to any of the following offices:
(1) Florida representative,
(2) Florida senator,
(3) Florida Lieutenant governor,
(4) any office of the Florida cabinet,
(5) U.S. Representative from Florida, or
(6) U.S. Senator from Florida
if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will have served (or, but for resignation, would have served) in that office for eight consecutive years.

The ballot title for the amendment is: “Voter Restoration Amendment.” The ballot summary states:

This amendment restores the voting rights of Floridians with felony convictions after they complete all terms of their sentence including parole or probation. The amendment would not apply to those convicted of murder or sexual offenses, who would continue to be permanently barred from voting unless the Governor and Cabinet vote to restore their voting rights on a case by case basis.

On October 28, 2016, the Financial Impact Estimating Conference forwarded to the Attorney General a financial impact statement on the initiative petition. On November 1, 2016, the Attorney General requested this Court’s opinion as to whether the financial impact statement prepared by the Financial Impact Estimating Conference on the constitutional amendment is in accordance with section 100.371, Florida Statutes (2016). The financial impact statement regarding the Voter Restoration Amendment states:

The precise effect of this amendment on state and local government costs cannot be determined, but the operation of current voter registration laws, combined with an increased number of felons registering to vote, will produce higher overall costs relative to the processes in place today. The impact, if any, on state and local government revenues cannot be determined. The fiscal impact of any future legislation that implements a different process cannot be reasonably determined.

No briefs or comments were submitted to this Court in response to the financial impact statement.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

We have explained the standard of review for citizen initiative petitions as follows:

“This Court has traditionally applied a deferential standard of review to the validity of a citizen initiative petition and ‘has been reluctant to interfere’ with ‘the right of self-determination for all Florida’s citizens’ to formulate ‘their own organic law.’ ” In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Certain Med. Conditions (Medical Marijuana I), 132 So.3d 786, 794 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So.2d 491, 494 (Fla. 2002)). This Court does “not consider or address the merits or wisdom of the proposed amendment” and must “act with extreme care, caution, and restraint before it removes a constitutional amendment from the vote of the people.” In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Limits or Prevents Barriers to Local Solar Elec. Supply, 177 So.3d 235, 242 (Fla. 2015) (quoting In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fairness Initiative Requiring Legis.Determination that Sales Tax Exemptions & Exclusions Serve a Pub. Purpose (Fairness Initiative), 880 So.2d 630, 633 (Fla. 2004)).

Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Rights of Elec. Consumers Regarding Solar Energy Choice (Solar Energy), 188 So.3d 822, 827 (Fla. 2016).

When this Court renders an advisory opinion concerning a proposed constitutional amendment arising through the citizen initiative process, the Court limits its inquiry to two issues: (1) whether the amendment itself satisfies the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution; and (2) whether the ballot title and summary satisfy the clarity requirements of section 101.161, Florida Statutes.

Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Debilitating Med. Conditions (Medical Marijuana II), 181 So.3d 471, 476 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Water & Land Conservation-Dedicates Funds to Acquire & Restore Fla. Conservation & Recreation Lands (Water & Land Conservation), 123 So.3d 47, 50 (Fla. 2013)). Accordingly, we are obligated to uphold the proposal unless it is “clearly and conclusively defective.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla.’s Amend. to Reduce Class Size, 816 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 2002).

Single-Subject Requirement
Article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution establishes the general requirement that a proposed citizen initiative amendment “shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith.” Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const. “In evaluating whether a proposed amendment violates the single-subject requirement, the Court must determine whether it has a logical and natural oneness of purpose.” [Medical Marijuana II], 181 So.3d 471, 477 (Fla. 2015) (internal citations omitted). The single-subject requirement applies to the citizen initiative method of amending the Florida Constitution because the citizen initiative process does not afford the same opportunity for public hearing and debate that accompanies other constitutional proposal and drafting processes. See Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re 1,35% Prop. Tax Cap, Unless Voter Approved, 2 So.3d 968, 972 (Fla. 2009).
The single-subject rule prevents an amendment from (1) engaging in “logrolling” or (2) “substantially altering or performing the functions of multiple aspects of government.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla. Transp. Initiative for Statewide High Speed Monorail, Fixed Guideway or Magnetic Levitation Sys., 769 So.2d 367, 369 (Fla. 2000). The term logrolling refers to a practice whereby an amendment is proposed which contains unrelated provisions, some of which electors might wish to support, in order to get an otherwise disfavored provision passed. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re: Protect People, Especially Youth, from Addiction, Disease, & Other Health Hazards of Using Tobacco, 926 So.2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 2006).

Solar Energy, 188 So.3d at 827-28. This Court has further explained that “[a] proposal that affects several branches of government will not automatically fail; rather, it is when a proposal substantially alters or performs the functions of multiple branches that it violates the single-subject test.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen, re Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So.2d 1351, 1353-54 (Fla. 1998).

Here, the initiative has “a logical and natural oneness of purpose,” specifically, whether Floridians wish to include a provision in our state constitution permitting the restoration of voting rights to Floridians with felony convictions, excluding those with murder and felony sex offenses, once they have completed all of the terms of their sentences. The proposed amendment’s provision excluding persons with convictions for murder or felony sex offenses is directly connected with this purpose. Furthermore, this exclusion removes a class of offenders from automatic voter restoration eligibility based on the nature of their offenses, thus removing the possibility that voters be forced to “accept part of an initiative proposal which they oppose in order to obtain a change in the constitution which they support.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen, re Standards for Establishing Legis. Dist. Boundaries, 2 So.3d 175, 180 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Amend, to Bar Gov’t From Treating People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So.2d 888, 891 (Fla. 2000)). Therefore, the proposed amendment does not engage in impermissible logrolling. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla. Transp. Initiative for Statewide High Speed Monorail, Fixed Guideway or Magnetic Levitation System, 769 So.2d at 369 (holding that “there is no impermissible logrolling” where “[t]he only subject embraced in the proposed amendment is whether the people of this State want to include a provision in them Constitution mandating that the government build a high speed ground transportation system”).

Additionally, the proposed amendment does not substantially alter or perform the functions of multiple branches. As it currently stands, the Governor, with the approval of two members of the Florida Cabinet, may restore civil rights on a case-by-case basis. See art. IV, § 8, Fla. Const. If the proposed amendment passes, the Governor and the Florida Cabinet would still review the restoration of civil rights on a case-by-ease basis, but only for those persons convicted of murder or felony sexual offenses, rather than for all felony offenders, which would reduce their current obligations in an insignificant way. “[I]t [is] difficult to conceive of a constitutional amendment that would not affect other aspects of government to some extent.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Ltd. Casinos, 644 So.2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1994). A proposed amendment having some effect on government does not necessarily result in the substantial alteration or performance of functions of government. See Solar Energy, 188 So.3d at 830 (“Although the proposed amendment would affect the government in a literal sense by requiring State and local governments to comply with a provision of the Florida Constitution while retaining their existing abilities, it does not cause the ‘precipitous’ or ‘cataclysmic’ changes to the government structure indicative of substantially altering or performing the functions of multiple branches of government.”). Therefore, the proposed amendment does not substantially alter or perform the functions of multiple branches of government.

Accordingly, we conclude that the proposed amendment complies with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution.

Ballot Title and Summary

Section 101.161(1) provides the following requirements for the ballot title and summary:

The ballot summary of the amendment or other public measure shall be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of that measure. ... The ballot title shall consist of a caption, not exceeding 15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken of.

§ 101.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2016).

The purpose of these requirements is “to provide fair notice of the content of the proposed amendment so that the voter will not be misled as to its purpose, and can cast an intelligent and informed ballot,” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Term Limits Pledge, 718 So.2d 798, 803 (Fla. 1998).
This Court’s review of the validity of a ballot title and summary under section 101.161(1) involves two inquiries:
First, the Court asks whether “the ballot title and summary ... fairly inform the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment.” Right to Treatment and Rehabilitation for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So.2d [491, 497 (Fla. 2002)]. Second, the Court asks “whether the language of the title and summary, as written, misleads the public.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1998).

Medical Marijuana II, 181 So.3d at 478 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fairness Initiative Requiring Legis. Determination That Sales Tax Exemptions & Exclusions Serve a Pub. Purpose, 880 So.2d 630, 635-36 (Fla. 2004)). “While the ballot title and summary must state in clear and unambiguous language the chief purpose of the measure, they need not explain every detail or ramification of the proposed amendment.” Solar Energy, 188 So.03d at 831 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen, re 1.35% Prop. Tax Cap, 2 So.3d 968, 974 (Fla. 2016)).

Here, the ballot title and summary comply with the respective word limitations. The title is three words in length and the summary contains sixty-two words, which is within the word requirements of section 101.161(1).

Thus, the remaining issues are: (1) whether the ballot title and summary inform voters of the chief purpose of the proposed amendment; and (2) whether the ballot title and summary are misleading. We conclude that both issues are satisfied here.

First, the ballot title and summary clearly and unambiguously inform the voters of the chief purpose of the proposed amendment. Read together, the title and summary would reasonably lead voters to understand that the chief purpose of the amendment is to automatically restore voting rights to felony offenders, except those convicted of murder or felony sexual offenses, upon completion of all terms of their sentence.

Second, the ballot title and summary also do not mislead voters with regard to the actual content of the proposed amendment. Rather, together they recite the language of the amendment almost in full. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Funding of Embryonic Stem Cell Res., 959 So.2d 195 (Fla. 2007) (upholding a summary, which reiterated almost all of the language contained in the amendment); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Florida Marriage Prot. Amend., 926 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 2006) (same); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Medical Liab. Claimant’s Comp. Amend., 880 So.2d 675 (Fla. 2004) (same).

Accordingly, for the reasons expressed above, we conclude that the ballot title and summary comply with the clarity requirements of section 101.161.

Financial Impact Statement

We have also detailed our obligation to review financial impact statements:

We have an independent obligation to review the financial impact statement to ensure that it is clear and unambiguous and in compliance with Florida law. See Adv. Op. to Atty. Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Certain Medical Conditions, 182 So.3d [786, 809 (Fla. 2014) ] (citing Adv. Op. to Atty. Gen. re Referenda Required for Adoption & Amend. of Local Gov’t Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 963 So. 2d 210, 214 (Fla. 2007)). Article XI, section 5(c), of the Florida Constitution provides, “The legislature shall provide by general law, prior to the holding of an election pursuant to this section, for the provision of a statement to the public regarding the probable financial impact of any amendment proposed by initiative pursuant to section 3.” Additionally, section 100.371(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), provides that the financial impact statement must address “the estimated increase or decrease in any revenues or costs to state or local governments resulting from the proposed initiative.” Section 100.371(5)(c) 2, Florida Statutes (2015), requires the financial impact statement to be “clear and unambiguous” and “no more than 75 words in length.”[]
We have explained that our “review of financial impact statements is narrow.” Adv. Op. to Att’y Gen. re Water & Land Conservation, 123 So.3d [47, 52 (Fla. 2013)]. We address only “whether the statement is clear, unambiguous, consists of no more than seventy-five words, and is limited to address the estimated increase or decrease in any revenues or costs to the state or local governments.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Local Gov’t Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 963 So.2d [210, 214 (Fla. 2007) ].

Medical Marijuana II, 181 So.3d at 479.

We conclude that the financial impact statement complies with the word limit and meets the other statutory requirements set forth in section 100.371(5), Florida Statutes (2016). The financial impact statement is seventy-four words in length, thus complying with the seventy-five-word limit, and is limited to the subject of the estimated increase or decrease in revenues or costs to state and local governments. Additionally, it clearly and unambiguously states that there are likely increased costs associated with the influx of felons registering to vote, but that the exact amount of cost increase cannot be determined. Moreover, the financial impact statement clearly and unambiguously explains that the Financial Impact Estimating Conference could not determine the impact on state and local government revenue. Therefore, we conclude that the financial impact statement complies with section 100.371(5). See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla. Growth Mgmt. Initiative Giving Citizens Right to Decide Local Growth Mgmt. Plan Changes, 2 So.3d 118, 124 (Fla. 2008) (“Overall, the financial impact statement is necessarily indefinite but not unclear or unambiguous.”); see also Medical Marijuana II, 181 So.3d at 479 (holding that the financial impact statement’s indeterminate conclusion with regard to the increase or decrease in costs or revenues to state and local government nonetheless complied with section 100.371); Water & Land Conservation, 123 So.3d at 52 (same); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Health Hazards of Tobacco, 926 So.2d 1186, 1195 (Fla. 2006) (same).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we hold that the proposed amendment meets the legal requirements of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and that the ballot title and summary complies with section 101.161(1). Moreover, we conclude that the financial impact statement complies with section 100.371(5). Accordingly, we approve the amendment for placement on the ballot.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      . The language of section 100.371(5), Florida Statutes (2016), is identical to the 2015 version quoted in Medical Marijuana II,


author: PER CURIAM. POLSTON, J.,

text:
    ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RE: VOTER CONTROL OF GAMBLING in Florida. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Voter Control of Gambling in Florida (FIS).
    No. SC16-778
    No. SC16-871
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [April 20, 2017]

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, La-gran Saunders, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Rachel Erin Nordby, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
    Dan Gelber, Adam M. Schachter, and Freddy R. Funes of Gelber Schachter & Greenberg, P.A., Miami, Florida, for Voters in Charge, Sponsor
    John M. Lockwood, Thomas J. Morton, and Kala Kelly Shankle of The Lockwood Law Firm, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of Jacksonville Kennel Club, Inc., Dania Entertainment, LLC, Investment Corporation of Palm Beach, West Flagler Associates, LTD., Bonita-Fort Myers Corporation, and Melbourne Greyhound Park, LLC, and Marc W. Dunbar, Daniel R. Russell, and Daniel J. McGinn of Jones Walker LLP, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of Floridians for Clarity in Gaming Control, as Opponents
   PER CURIAM.

The Attorney General of Florida has requested this Court’s opinion as to the validity of an initiative petition circulated pursuant to article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution. We have jurisdiction. See art. IV, § 10, art. V, § 3(b)(10), Fla. Const.

“Our review of the proposed amendment is confined to two issues: (1) whether the proposed amendment itself satisfies the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution; and (2) whether the ballot title and summary satisfy the requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (201[6]).” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Certain Med. Conditions, 132 So.3d 786, 791 (Fla. 2014).

The proposed initiative petition in this case, Voter Control of Gambling in Florida (“the Initiative”), would require “casino gambling,” as defined by the proposal, to be authorized only through the citizens’ initiative process. We approve the Initiative for placement on the ballot, concluding that it complies with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution; the title and summary of the Initiative do not affirmatively mislead voters; and the financial impact statement complies with section 100.371, Florida Statutes (2016),

BACKGROUND

On May 6, 2016, the Attorney General petitioned this Court for an opinion as to the validity of an initiative petition sponsored by Voters in Charge and circulated pursuant to article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution. The sponsor submitted a brief supporting the Initiative, while two groups associated with the gaming industry submitted briefs in opposition. The amendment would add the following new section 29 to article X, of the Florida Constitution:

ARTICLE X, FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, is amended to include the following new section:
Voter Control of Gambling in Florida.
(a) This amendment ensures that Florida voters shall have the exclusive right to decide whether to authorize casino gambling in the State of Florida. This amendment requires a vote by citizens’ initiative pursuant to Article XI, section 3, in order for casino gambling to be authorized under Florida law. This section amends this Article; and also affects Article XI, by making citizens’ initiatives the exclusive method of authorizing casino gambling.
(b) As used in this section, “casino gambling” means any of the types of games typically found in casinos and that are within the definition of Class III gaming in the Federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (“IGRA”), and in 25 C.F.R. § 502.4, upon adoption of this amendment, and any that are added to such definition of Class III gaming in the future. This includes, but is not limited to, any house banking game, including but not limited to card games such as baccarat, chemin de fer, blackjack (21), and pai gow (if played as house banking games); any player-banked game that simulates a house banking game, such as California black jack; casino games such as roulette, craps, and keno; any slot machines as defined in 15 U.S.C. [§ ] 1171(a)(1); and any other game not authorized by Article X, section 15, whether or not defined as a slot machine, in which outcomes are determined by random number generator or are similarly assigned randomly, such as instant or historical racing. As used herein, “casino gambling” includes any electronic gambling devices, simulated gambling devices, video lottery devices, internet sweepstakes devices, and any other form of electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance, slot machine, or casino-style game, regardless of how such devices are defined under IGRA. As used herein, “casino gambling” does not include pari-mutual wagering on horse racing, dog racing, or jai alai exhibitions. For purposes of this section, “gambling” and “gaming” are synonymous.
(c) Nothing herein shall be deemed to limit the right of the Legislature to exercise its authority through general law to restrict, regulate, or tax any gaming or gambling activities. In addition, nothing herein shall be construed to limit the ability of the state or Native American tribes to negotiate gaming compacts pursuant to the Federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act for the conduct of casino gambling on tribal lands, or to affect any existing gambling on tribal lands pursuant to compacts executed by the state and Native American tribes pursuant to IGRA.
(d) This section is effective upon approval by the voters, is self-executing, and no Legislative implementation is required.
(e) If any part of this section is held invalid for any reason, the remaining portion or portions shall be severed from the invalid portion and given the fullest possible force and effect.

The ballot title for the proposed amendment is “Voter Control of Gambling in Florida.” The ballot summary states:

This amendment ensures that Florida voters shall have the exclusive right to decide whether to authorize casino gambling by requiring that in order for casino gambling to be authorized under Florida law, it must be approved by Florida voters pursuant to Article XI, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Affects articles X and XI. Defines casino gambling and clarifies that this amendment does not conflict with federal law regarding state/tribal compacts.

On May 19, 2016, the Financial Impact Estimating Conference forwarded to the Attorney General the following financial impact statement regarding the Initiative:

The amendment’s impact on state and local government revenues and costs, if any, cannot be determined at this time because of its unknown effect on gambling operations that have not been approved by voters through a constitutional amendment proposed by a citizens’ initiative petition process.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“This Court has traditionally applied a deferential standard of review to the validity of a citizen initiative petition and ‘has been reluctant to interfere’ with ‘the right of self-determination for ah Florida’s citizens’ to formulate ‘their own organic law.’ ” Advisory Op. re Use of Marijuana, 132 So.3d at 794 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So.2d 491, 494 (Fla. 2002)). Indeed, this Court’s “duty is to uphold the proposal unless it can be shown to be ‘clearly and conclusively defective.’” Id. at 795 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla.’s Amend. to Reduce Class Size, 816 So.2d 580, 582 (Fla. 2002)).

“When determining the validity of an amendment arising through the citizen initiative process, our inquiry is limited to two legal issues: (1) whether the proposed amendment violates the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution; and (2) whether the ballot title and summary violate the requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes.” Id. (citing Advisory Op. re Right to Treatment & Rehab., 818 So.2d at 494). We do not address the merits of the proposed initiative. Id. (citing Advisory Op. re Right to Treatment & Rehab., 818 So.2d at 494).

ANALYSIS

I. Single-Subject Requirement

Article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution provides that citizen initiative petitions like the Voter Control of Gambling Initiative at issue in this case “shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith.” Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const. “In evaluating whether a proposed amendment violates the single-subject requirement, the Court must determine whether it has a ‘logical and natural oneness of purpose.’” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Amend. to Bar Gov’t from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So.2d 888, 891-92 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Term Limits Pledge, 718 So.2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1998)).

This single-subject rule prevents a proposed amendment “from engaging in either of two practices: (a) logrolling; or (b) substantially altering or performing the functions of multiple branches of state government.” Advisory Op. re Use of Marijuana, 132 So.3d at 795 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Water & Land Conservation, 123 So.3d 47, 50-51 (Fla. 2013)). Logrolling, as defined by this Court, is “a practice wherein several separate issues are rolled into a single initiative in order to aggregate votes or secure approval of an otherwise unpopular issue,” Id. (quoting In re Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen.—Save Our Everglades, 636 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1994)). This Court has previously held that “there is no impermissible logrolling” where “[t]he only subject embraced in the proposed amendment is whether the people of this State want to include a provision in their Constitution mandating that the government build a high speed ground transportation system.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla. Transp. Initiative for Statewide High Speed Monorail, Fixed Guideway or Magnetic Levitation Sys., 769 So.2d 367, 369 (Fla. 2000).

As to the second part of the single-subject analysis, this Court has explained that “[a] proposal that affects several branches of government will not automatically fail; rather, it is when a proposal substantially alters or performs the functions of multiple branches that it violates the single-subject test.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So.2d 1351, 1353-54 (Fla. 1998).

In this case, the Initiative has “a logical and natural oneness of purpose,” namely whether voters wish to authorize casino gambling in Florida through the citizens’ initiative process, which is outlined in the Florida Constitution. Advisory Op. re Treating People Differently, 778 So.2d at 892. The other provisions of the Initiative, which define “casino” and “gambling” and provide that the amendment would be self-executing, are directly connected with the Initiative’s one purpose. Similarly, in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General—Fee on Everglades Sugar Production, 681 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 1996), this Court concluded that the proposal did not violate the single-subject rule because “[t]he imposition of the fee and the designation of the revenue ... [were] two components directly connected to the fundamental policy of requiring first processors to contribute towards ongoing Everglades restoration efforts.” Id. at 1128. The ballot summary at issue in this case explains that the Legislature would retain its authority to regulate and tax any gambling activities and that the amendment does not conflict with federal law regarding state and tribal compacts, which is also connected to the Initiative’s purpose. Therefore, the Initiative does not engage in impermissible logrolling.

Additionally, the Initiative does not substantially alter or perform the functions of multiple branches of government. While the amendment restricts the ability of the Legislature to authorize casino gambling through general law, it does not substantially alter the functions or powers of the executive or judicial branches. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Term Limits Pledge, 718 So.2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1998) (holding that the initiative did not substantially alter the functions of multiple branches “even though [it] affect[ed] the constitutional authority of the Secretary of State and affect[ed] more than one provision of the constitution”). Accordingly, we conclude that the Initiative complies with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution.

II. Ballot Title and Summary

Next, we address whether the proposed amendment will be “accurately represented on the ballot.” Advisory Op. re Use of Marijuana, 132 So.3d at 797 (quoting Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7, 12 (Fla. 2000)). “This requires us to consider two questions: (1) whether the ballot title and summary, in clear and unambiguous language, fairly inform the voters of the chief purpose of the amendment; and (2) whether the language of the ballot title and summary, as written, will be affirmatively misleading to voters.” Id. Section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2016), “governs the requirements for the ballot title and summary of an initiative petition,” id. and provides as follows:

The ballot summary of the amendment or other public measure shall be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure.... The ballot title shall consist of a caption, not exceeding 15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken of.

§ 101.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2016).

These statutory requirements serve to ensure that the ballot summary and title “provide fair notice of the content of the proposed amendment” to voters so that they “will not be misled as to [the proposed amendment’s] purpose, and can cast an intelligent and informed ballot.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Fee on Everglades Sugar, 681 So.2d at 1127).

In this case, the ballot title is “Voter Control of Gambling in Florida,” and the summary states:

This amendment ensures that Florida voters shall have the exclusive right to decide whether to authorize casino gambling by requiring that in order for casino gambling to be authorized under Florida law, it must be approved by Florida voters pursuant to Article XI, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Affects articles X and XI. Defines casino gambling and clarifies that this amendment does not conflict with federal law regarding state/tribal compacts.

Primarily, the ballot title is six words, and the ballot summary is seventy-one words. Therefore, the ballot title and summary comply with the statutory word limitations. See § 101.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). We now turn to address the opponents’ challenges to the title and summary.

A. Retroactive Application

The opponents primarily argue that the Initiative should not be placed on the ballot because it is unclear whether, if passed, the amendment would apply retroactively and what effect, if any, the amendment would have on gambling that is currently legal in Florida—including gambling that was previously authorized by general law rather than by citizens’ initiative. However, as the sponsor points out, the opponents’ arguments concern the ambiguous legal effect of the amendment’s text rather than the clarity of the ballot title and summary.

Opponent Jacksonville Kennel Club cites State v. Lavazolli, 434 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1983), and Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2008), for support of its argument that the ballot summary does not properly advise voters whether the Initiative will have any retroactive impact on Florida’s current gambling laws. But, in both of those cases, this Court addressed whether the constitutional amendments at issue applied retroactively after the electorate approved the amendments. Likewise, we review the clarity of only the ballot title and summary to determine whether the Initiative may be placed on the ballot. Thus, we do not address whether the amendment would apply retroactively if the Initiative is placed on the ballot and passed by voters, including whether the Initiative would retroactively affect licenses previously issued pursuant to article X, section 23, of the Florida Constitution and section 551.102, Florida Statutes (2016).

B. Amendment’s Purpose and Effect

As this Court has explained, “a ballot title and summary cannot ‘fly under false colors’ or ‘hide the ball’ with regard to the true effect of an amendment.” Fla. Dep’t of State v. Slough, 992 So.2d 142, 147 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d at 16). This Court has explained that “the ballot title and summary may not be read in isolation, but must be read together in determining whether the ballot information properly informs the voters.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Voluntary Univ. Pre-Kindergarten Educ., 824 So.2d 161, 166 (Fla. 2002).

Reading together the ballot title and summary of the Initiative, it is reasonably clear that the chief purpose of the Initiative is to make the citizens’ initiative process addressed in article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution the only means for authorizing casino gambling in Florida.

The other statements in the ballot summary—that the amendment “[a]ffects articles X and XI” of the Florida Constitution and “[d]eflnes casino gambling and clarifies that this amendment does not conflict with federal law regarding state/tribal compacts”—fairly represent the amendment’s actual text and effect. Subsection (b) of the amendment’s text contains an extensive definition of what is considered “casino gambling” for the purposes of the amendment; and, contrary to the opponents’ argument, these definitions generally comport with the plain meaning of these words. Subsection (c) of the amendment’s text explains that the amendment shall not be construed to affect gambling on tribal lands pursuant to compacts executed under federal law or to affect the ability of the State or tribes to negotiate such compacts under federal law. The text in subsection (c) comports with the ballot summary’s brief mention of federal law and tribal compacts. Therefore, the ballot title and summary do not affirmatively mislead the voter or “hide the ball” regarding the amendment.

Furthermore, regarding the opponents’ complaint that the summary and title do not detail every possible effect the Initiative could have on gaming in Florida and on tribal lands, this Court has explained that “an exhaustive explanation of the interpretation and future possible effects of [an] amendment [is] not required” in the ballot title and summary. Advisory Op. re Treating People Differently, 778 So.2d at 899); see Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Standards for Establishing Legislative Dist. Boundaries, 2 So.3d 175, 186 (Fla. 2009) (“[A] ballot summary need not (and because of the statutory word limit, often cannot) explain ‘at great and undue length’ the complete details of a proposed amendment, and some onus falls upon voters to educate themselves about the substance of the proposed amendment.” (quoting Advisory Op. re Right to Treatment & Rehab., 818 So.2d at 498)).

The opponents also argue that the title and summary mislead voters by using the word “control” in the title but “authorize” in the summary. However, when the title and summary are read together, a voter should reasonably understand that the vote is whether to ensure “that Florida voters shall have the exclusive right to decide whether to authorize casino gambling by requiring” such authorization to take place only through the citizens’ initiative process. Accordingly, for the reasons expressed above, we conclude that the ballot title and summary of the Initiative comply with the clarity requirements of section 101.161, Florida Statutes.

III. Financial Impact Statement

As this Court has previously stated, “[a]lthough neither the proponent of the amendment nor the opponents assert that the Financial Impact Statement is misleading, this Court still has an independent obligation to review the statement to ensure that it is clear and unambiguous and in compliance with Florida law.” Advisory Op. re Use of Marijuana, 132 So.3d at 809. Article XI, section 5(c), of the Florida Constitution provides: “The legislature shall provide by general law, prior to the holding of an election pursuant to this section, for the provision of a statement to the public regarding the probable financial impact of any amendment proposed by initiative pursuant to section 3.” Section 100.371(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), provides that the constitutionally required financial impact statement must address “the estimated increase or decrease in any revenues or costs to state or local governments resulting from the proposed initiative.” Section 100.371(5)(c)2 adds that the financial impact statement must be “clear and unambiguous” and “no more than 75 words in length.”

This Court has explained that its “review of financial impact statements is narrow.” Advisory Op. re Water & Land Conservation, 123 So.3d at 52. This Court only addresses “whether the statement is clear, unambiguous, consists of no more than seventy-five words, and is limited to address the estimated increase or decrease in any revenues or costs to the state or local governments.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Referenda Required for Adoption & Amend. of Local Gov’t Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 963 So.2d 210, 214 (Fla. 2007).

Turning to this case, the financial impact statement for the Initiative states, in full:

The amendment’s impact on state and local government revenues and costs, if any, cannot be determined at this time because of its unknown effect on gambling operations that have not been approved by voters through a constitutional amendment proposed by a citizens’ initiative petition process.

Being only forty-five words, the financial impact statement complies with the statutory word limit. § 100.371(5)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2016). The financial impact statement merely states that the “impact on state and local government revenues and costs, if any,” that the Initiative would have “cannot be determined at this time” because of the unknown effect the amendment may have on gambling operations that have not been approved through the citizens’ initiative process.

In Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Fla. Growth Management Initiative Giving Citizens the Right to Decide Local Growth Management Plan Changes, 2 So.3d 118 (Fla. 2008), this Court concluded, “Overall, the financial impact statement is necessarily indefinite but not unclear or ambiguous.” Id. at 124. Likewise, although the financial impact statement in this case is indefinite, it complies with section 100.371(5), Florida Statutes.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we approve the Voter Control of Gambling in Florida Initiative for placement on the ballot.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE and CANADY, JJ„ concur.

POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LEWIS, J., concurs.

LAWSON, J., did not participate.

POLSTON, J.,

dissenting.

I would not approve the Voter Control of Gambling Initiative for placement on the ballot because it is both misleading and violates the single-subject requirement.

When addressing the clarity requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes, this Court has explained that “a ballot title and summary cannot ‘fly under false colors’ or ‘hide the ball’ with regard to the true effect of an amendment.” Fla. Dep’t of State v. Slough, 992 So.2d 142, 147 (Fla. 2008). Further, regarding whether an initiative violates the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, this Court has explained that “we must consider whether the proposal affects separate functions of government and how the proposal affects other provisions of the constitution.” In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So.2d 1018, 1020 (Fla. 1994).

Here, the ballot title and summary do not clearly inform the public that the proposed amendment may substantially affect slot machines approved by county-wide re-ferenda pursuant to article X, section 23, Florida Constitution, or pursuant to validly enacted statutes. Although the ballot summary references article X of the Florida Constitution, there is no explanation whatsoever of how the proposal affects the slot machines constitutional provision found there. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.— Ltd. Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So.2d 225, 228 (Fla. 1991) (“A ballot summary may be defective if it omits material facts necessary to make the summary not misleading.”); Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151, 156 (Fla. 1982) (“The problem, therefore, lies not with what the summary says, but, rather, with what it does not say”). As a result, the public cannot fully comprehend how the initiative will affect article X, and the initiative’s effect is left unresolved and open to multiple interpretations. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d 563, 565-66 (Fla. 1998) (“[I]t is imperative that an initiative identify the provisions of the constitution substantially affected by the proposed amendment in order for the public to fully comprehend the contemplatr ed changes and to ensure that the initiative’s effect on other unnamed provisions is not left unresolved and open to various interpretations.”).

The initiative is placing voters in the position of deciding between a preference for controlling the expansion of full-fledged casino gambling and Florida’s current legal gaming landscape. See id. at 566 (striking initiative because “[t]he amendment forces the voter who may favor or oppose one aspect of the ballot initiative to vote on the health care provider issue in an ‘all or nothing’ manner”). And it is doing so without clearly informing the voters that this is the choiee they are making. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re 1.35% Prop. Tax Cap, Unless Voter Approved, 2 So.3d 968, 974 (Fla. 2009) (striking initiative and explaining that “the ballot must give the voter fair notice of the decision he must make”).

Accordingly, I would not approve this initiative for placement on the ballot.

I respectfully dissent.

LEWIS, J., concurs.

      . For example, Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged defines "casino” as "a building or room for gambling,” and "gambling” as "the act or practice of betting: the act of playing a game and consciously risking money or other stakes on its outcome." Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 347, 932 (1993 ed.).

      . Cf. In re Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. English—The Official Language of Fla., 520 So.2d 11, 13 (Fla. 1988) (holding that the difference in terminology between the text and the summary did not reasonably mislead even ‘‘[t]hough [the] meanings [of ‘implement’ and ‘enforce’] are not precisely the same”).