text:
    O.P., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1210 and 5D17-1211
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 12, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Alison A. Havens,' Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nora H. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

O.P. appeals his sentence, challenging a special condition of probation that provides there will be no consideration of' early termination. We reverse.

Sixteen-year-old O.P. entered negotiated pleas in two cases that were consolidated for this appeal. In each case, O.P. pleaded no contest to burglary. The trial court withheld adjudication of guilt and sentenced O.P. to probation until his nineteenth birthday in accordance with the plea agreement. However, the court orally pronounced that it would not consider early termination of OJP.’s probation. The oral pronouncement was included in the written judgment and sentence.

O.P. filed a motion to correct sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). He argued that the no early termination condition should be stricken because “[t]he trial court is not empowered to prevent the Department of Juvenile Justice from recommending early termination, nor does it have the authority to prevent the circuit court in the future from discharging the probationer.” At a hearing on the motion, the State conceded that the probationary condition was improper and requested an amendment to the court minutes removing the condition. Nonetheless, the court indicated that it “does not have to accept pleas that are negotiated,” and that O.P. was free to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.

In the context of an adult sentence, this Court has previously concluded that a “no early termination” condition is an invalid special condition of probation. See Harris v. State, 51 So.3d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). We explained:

The Department of Corrections [“DOC”] has discretion to recommend early termination under specified statutory conditions. The trial court cannot preempt the DOC’s statutory right to recommend early termination, nor could DOC’s decision to do so constitute a violation of probation condition. The State asserts that the early termination condition was merely an expression of the sentencing judge’s intent, rather than a true “condition.” If this were merely a statement of the trial court’s view, we would find no error, as there could be no misunderstanding that it might be binding on DOC or on the probationer. Here, it is specifically identified as a condition of probation. Appellant is entitled to have it removed from the-judgment and order of probation.

Id. Both the Second and Fourth Districts have also concluded that a trial court is not authorized to impose a no early termination condition of probation on an adult defendant. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 976 So.2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Arriaga v. State, 666 So.2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In Arriaga, the court concluded, “If the probationer has fulfilled his obligations and has been a ‘model probationer,’ the interests of justice (not to mention the wise allocation of scarce resources) may require that early termination be considered.” 666 So.2d at 950. To allow otherwise would “defeat[] the salutary purpose of the statute.” Id.

The only issue, then, is whether this principle applies within the framework of the juvenile justice system. We conclude that it does. Like in chapter 948, the trial court retains discretion to terminate probation early under the juvenile rules governing probation:

The court may conduct judicial review hearings for a child placed on probation for the purpose of fostering accountability to the judge and compliance with other requirements, such as restitution and community service. The court may allow early termination of probation for a child who has substantially complied with the terms and conditions of probation.

§ 985.435(7), Fla. Stat. (2017). The State’s argument that the court had discretion to impose the no early termination condition is unpersuasive because it conflates the court’s discretionary authority to grant a probationer’s request for early termination and the court’s authority to impose a special condition that early termination will not be considered at all. Moreover, the distinction drawn by the State between the statutory provisions applicable to adults subject to probation versus those that apply to juveniles is unavailing because both chapters 948 and 985 permit the trial court to terminate probation early. Compare § 948.05, Fla. Stat. (“A court ... when satisfied that its action will be for the best interests of justice and the welfare of society ... may discharge the probationer or offender in community control from further supervision.”), with § 985.435(7), Fla. Stat. (“The court may allow early termination of probation for a child who has substantially complied with the terms and conditions of probation.”).

In addition, the no early termination condition conflicts with the dual purposes of the juvenile justice system— preventing acts of delinquency and rehabilitating the juvenile. See § 985.02(3), Fla. Stat. (2017). A probationary condition that does not allow for early termination runs counter to the purpose of rehabilitation, and it does not allow for the consideration of the release of a juvenile who has “substantially complied” with the terms and conditions of his or her probation. See id. § 985.435(7).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to strike the condition of probation that prohibits consideration of the early termination of probation.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

COHEN, C.J., PALMER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.

      . In case no. 17-1210, O.P. also pleaded no contest to petit theft.

      . The record on appeal does not include a written order denying the motion, but the hearing transcript reflects that the court orally denied the motion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    R.H., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4541
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 12, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Robert D. Rosen, Assistant Public, Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Brandon R. Christian, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm without further comment the trial court’s disposition order. But, as the State appropriately concedes, the trial court erred by failing to enter a written revocation order specifying the conditions of probation that R.H. violated. See L.D. v. State, 107 So.3d 514, 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). Accordingly, we affirm the disposition order but remand for the trial court to enter such a written revocation order.

Affirmed; remanded.

MORRIS, BADALAMENTI, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


author: COHEN, C.J. NICHOLS,'D., Associate Judge, BERGER, J.,

text:
    Phillip LANDERS, Appellant, v. STATE FARM FLORIDA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D15-4032
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 19, 2018
    George'A. Vaka and Nancy A. Lauten, of Vaka Law Group, PL, Tampa, and Kelly L. Kubiak, of Merlin Law Group, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Matthew J. Lavisky, Anthony J. Russo and Lee Craig, of Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, for Appellee.
   ON. MOTION FOR REHEARING

COHEN, C.J.

Upon consideration of Appellee State Farm Florida Insurance- Company’s Motion for Rehearing, we grant the motion, withdraw our prior opinion, and substitute this one' in its place.

In this appeal, we consider whether, when an insurance contract provides for an appraisal process, an insured must wait until that process is completed before filing a civil remedy notice pursuant to section 624.155, 'Florida Statutes (2008). Because we find no such limitation in the statute or relevant case law, we reverse.

In 2009, Phillip Landers’s home sustained a loss from suspected sinkhole activity. He submitted a claim to his insurer, State Farm Florida Insurance Company (“State Farm”). State Farm hired SDII Global Corporation (“SDII”) to conduct a subsidence investigation. SDII verified that sinkhole activity was the cause of the damage, and State Farm admitted coverage'. SDII initially concluded that 975 cubic yards of grout needed to be injected into forty-nine holes around the home’s perimeter. SDII did not recommend underpinning. After considering the report of a neutral evaluator from the Department of Financial Services, pursuant to section 627.7074, Florida Statutes (2008), SDII amended its report to require an additional fifteen grout injection points.

Landers obtained an independent opinion from Biller Reinhart Structural Group (“Reinhart”). In Reinhart’s opinion, proper stabilization required underpinning. State Farm provided Reinhart’s report- for review by the neutral evaluator. The neutral evaluator concluded that underpinning was unwarranted. While State Farm demanded appraisal under the policy to resolve the parties’ disagreement over the amount of the loss, Landers agreed, pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract, to proceed with SDH’s recommended repair plan, despite his belief that the repairs were inadequate. State Farm placed its appraisal demand on hold while the stabilization repairs were made. Further appraisal would be required to address cosmetic repairs to the home.

After the repairs were completed in September 2011, State Farm reiterated its request for appraisal of the cosmetic damage to the home. The home continued to experience damage after repairs were completed. As a result, Landers hired Sonny Gulati, a geotechnical engineer, to examine the property. In January 2012, while Gulati’s-report was pending, Landers filed a civil remedy-notice (“CRN”), alleging,-among other things, claim delay,, failure to promptly and properly investigate the claim, failure to adjust the loss, and the failure to fender policy limits. Landers contended that the repairs were completed pursuant to State Farm’s .expert’s recommendation, yet his home remained unlivable. Landers demanded the immediate tender of “the policy limits for dwelling ... of $1,026,500.00. minus any . prior payments that have been made to the insured ... so that [Landers] may adequately complete the repairs [he] has started to [his] home.” In response, State Farm requested that all issues be submitted to appraisal.

In March 2012, Landers brought suit against State Farm for breach of contract. In that suit, State Farm sought to compel appraisal, which Landers opposed. The circuit court compelled appraisal, and Lan-ders appealed from that order. This Court affirmed. Landers v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 149 So.3d 33 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). In July 2014, the appraisal panel determined that the amount of loss exceeded the policy limits. State Farm tendered the policy limits in August 2014, without any deduction for the amounts previously paid.

Landers then brought the underlying first-party bad-faith suit against State Farm, alleging ten purported violations of sections 624.155(1)(b)(1) and 626.9541(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2008), including allegations of claim delay and low-balling. Lan-ders contended that his damages always exceeded the policy limits and that State Farm acted in bad faith by delaying payment of the policy limits until after appraisal.

State Farm moved for summary judgment. State Farm asserted that when Ldn-ders filed the CRN, “there was no contractual amount due and no damages owed under the contract” because a condition precedent to - payment — determining the amount of loss through appraisal — had not been fulfilled. Therefore, the CRN was not valid and Landers had no claim. The trial court granted summary judgment, but the order granting summary judgment contained no explanation, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. This appeal followed.

This Court reviews orders granting summary judgment de novo. Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, 760 So.2d 126, 180 (Fla. 2000). The issue presented on appeal is primarily a question of law: whether the insurer’s demand for appraisal tolls the filing of a CRN until the amount of the appraisal has been established. State Farm asserts the CRN was void because Landers’s claim was not yet ripe.

Bad-faith claims are governed by section 624.155, Florida Statutes (2008). Section 624.155(1) provides that:

(1) Any person may bring a civil action against an insurer when such person is damaged:
(b) By the commission of any of the following acts by the insurer:
1. Not attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all the circumstances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insured and with due regard for her or his interests ....

§ 624.155(1)(b) 1., Fla. Stat.

As a condition precedent to bringing such an action, Florida’s Department of Financial Services and the insurer must be given sixty days’ written notice of the claim. See id. § 624.155(3)(a). The CRN must set forth the specific statutory provision the insurer allegedly violated, the facts giving rise to the violation, the relevant policy language, and a statement that the notice is given to perfect the right to pursue the civil remedy authorized by the statute. Id. § 624.155(3)(b). During the sixty-day period, the insurer has an opportunity to cure the alleged violation — no action will lie if, within those sixty days, “the damages are paid or the circumstances giving rise to the violation are corrected.” See id § 624.155(3)(d).

There are three ■ prerequisites to filing a statutory bad-faith claim: (1) determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; (2) determination of the extent of the insured’s damages; and (3) the required notice must be filed under section 624.155(3)(a). See Cammarata v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 152 So.3d 606, 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). The settlement of a sinkhole claim via the appraisal process is sufficient to satisfy the first two requirements. See id. (finding,, that appraisal award was “ ‘favorable resolution’ of an action for insurance benefits, so that [the insured] ... satisfied the necessary prerequisite to filing a bad faith claim” (alteration in original) (quoting Trafalgar at Greenacres, Ltd. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 100 So.3d 1155, 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012))).

State Farm argues that the CRN is not effective until all of the contractual preconditions to suit are met and there has been a final determination of coverage and the amount owed. The plain language' of section 624.155(3)(d) provides no time limitation for when a CRN may be filed and does not require a final determination of coverage and damages before it is filed. The statute simply states that “no action shall lie” if the bad-faith allegation is corrected or the damages are paid within sixty days of the insurer receiving the notice.

This case is controlled by Vest v. Travelers Insurance Co., 753 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 2000). In Vest, the Florida Supreme Court expressly noted .that under section 624.155, “there is no statutory requirement which prevents the insured from sending the statutory notice before there is a determination of liability or damages. Nor is the insurer’s appropriate response to that notice dependant on such a determination.” 753 So.2d at 1275. Vest clarifies that the purpose of the CRN is to facilitate and encourage good-faith efforts to timely settle claims before litigation, not to vindicate continuing efforts to delay. Filing a CRN before the appraisal process is complete and damages are determined does not render the CRN a legal nullity, precluding Landers’s bad-faith claim.

Preventing an insured from filing a CRN before coverage and liability have been conclusively established would frustrate the purpose of the statute by further delaying the time necessary to assess and pay out claims and discouraging insurers from taking timely,-independent action on claims. Accordingly, we find that pursuant to the plain ■ language of section 624.155(1)(d), the .fact ..that the appraisal process is ongoing does not render a CRN filed during that process a legal nullity. Once the appraisal process is complete, and a legally sufficient CRN had previously been provided, the conditions precedent to filing a statutory -bad-faith claim are met. Cf. Cammarata, 152 So.3d at 612.

In this case, Landers filed his CRN before the appraisal process was complete. State Farm did not cure the alleged violation within the sixty-day window in section 624.155(3)(d). Landers’s position is that had State Farm properly investigated his claim, it would have known that the subsurface repair plan was inadequate. Whether State Farm actually acted in bad faith in resolving his claim presents a question of fact that remains to be resolved. Yet, nothing in the statute or case law precludes the filing of a CRN while a dernand for appraisal is outstanding. We reverse the order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED arid REMANDED.

NICHOLS, D., Associate Judge,, concurs, and concurs specially with opinion.

BERGER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.

NICHOLS,'D., Associate Judge,

concurring specially, with opinion.

I concur with the opinion of the Court and write to specifically address the “Loss Payment” provision of the insurance contract.

It is undisputed that there is a provision in the insurance contract that provides in the event of a disagreement:

Moss will be payable: ... '60 days after [insurer] -receive[s] [insured’s] proof of loss and:
(1) there is an entry of a final judgment; or
(2) there is a filing on an appraisal award with us.

As stated by the majority, bad-faith claims are governed by section 624.155, Florida Statutes. Although State Farm paid the claim within sixty days of the appraisal award, section 624.165(b)(1) specifically provides:

(1) Any person may bring a civil action against an insurer when such person is damaged:
(b) By the commission of any of the following acts by the insurer:
1. - Not attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all the circumstances, it could and should.have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insured arid with due regard for her or his interests ....

§ 624.155(1)(b) 1., Fla. Stat. (2008).

State Farm argues that because it-paid the claim within sixty days ’of the completion of the appraisal process as set forth in the insurance contract, it is immune from the application of section .624.155. No language in the statute or the contract prohibited Landers from filing a civil remedy notice under the circumstances of this case.

State Farm’s position implies that an insurer could cause delays, or otherwise act in .bad faith, so long as payment was made within! the sixty-day time period of the appraisal award with impunity. State Farm’s-position would render the bad-faith statute meaningless.

No opinion is expressed on the merits of Lander’s bad-faith cause of action. As the majority aptly concludes, “[wjhether State Farm actually acted in bad faith in resolving the claim presents a question of fact that remains to be resolved.”

BERGER, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part, with opinion.

I agree with the majority that nothing precludes the filing of a CRN while a demand for appraisal is outstanding. However, because I also agree with the trial court that no bad faith claim can be maintained under the facts of this case, I would affirm the order granting summary judgment. Accordingly, in all other respects, I dissent.

      . Landers’s policy provided coverage in excess of $1,000,000.

      . The neutral evaluator’s cost of remediation was estimated at approximately $350,000. Reinhart's cost of remediation was closer to $1,000,000.

      . The appraisal clause of the insurance policy stated:
      If you and we fail to. agree on the amount of loss, either one can demand that the amount of the loss be set by appraisal. If either makes a written demand for appraisal, each shall select a competent,- disinterested appraiser. Each' shall notify the other of the appraiser’s identity within 20 days of receipt of the written demand. The two appraisers shall then select a competent, impartial umpire.... The- appraisers shall then set the amount of the loss. If the appraisers fail to agree within a reasonable time, they, shall submit their differences to the umpire. Written agreement signed by any two of these three shall set the amount of the loss.

      . The only reasoning provided by the court was at the summary judgment hearing, where the court appears to have adopted State Farm's theory that the CRN was void because it was filed before the appraisal was complete.

      . State Farm argues alternatively that the CRN was invalid because it failed to comply with the bad-faith statute. Because we cannot determine whether the court ruled on this basis, we decline to address this issue for the first time on appeal. It also is not clear whether the trial court determined if State Farm’s handling of the claim constituted bad faith. Statutory bad-faith claims generally involve fact-intensive disputes that are resolved under a “totality of the circumstances" standard. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaForet, 658 So.2d 55, 62-63 (Fla. 1995); Menchise v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 932 So.2d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). It is the rare case where “the facts ... allow a court to rule on a bad faith claim as a matter of law at summary judgment.” Kearney v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 F.Supp.2d 1234, 1243 (M.D. Fla. 2009). Therefore, both of these issues may be addressed on remand.

      .In Talat Enterprises, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 753 So.2d 1278, 1284 (Fla. 2000), the Florida Supreme Court explained that, "in creating this statutory remedy for bad-faith actions, the Legislature provided this sixty day window as a last opportunity for insurers to comply with their claim-handling obligations when a good-faith decision by the insurer would indicate that contractual benefits are owed.” Furthermore, "[t]he purpose of the civil remedy notice is to give the insurer one last chance to settle a claim with its insured and avoid unnecessary bad faith litigation — not to give the insured a right of action to proceed against the insurer even after the insured’s claim has been paid or resolved.” Lane v. Westfield Ins. Co., 862 So.2d 774, 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
      In Talat, the insured obtained an appraisal award that was paid in full before the insured ever filed a CRN. 753 So.2d at 1283. Accordingly, the insured did not have a statutory bad-faith claim in that case because the insurer remedied the claim before the expiration of the sixty-day period following the CRN.Talat did not address and does not stand for the proposition that a CRN filed after appraisal has been demanded is a legal nullity as State Farm argues.

      . The trial court correctly relied on Cammar-ata for the proposition that a bad-faith claim is not ripe until the appraisal process is complete. However, a finding that an action is not . ripe does not mean that the CRN was not appropriately filed.

      . Federal courts that have addressed this1 issue likewise have reached the merits of bad-faith claims, even when the CRN was filed after the invocation of appraisal. See Fox Haven of Foxfire Condo. IV Ass’n v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:13-CV-399-FTM-29CM, 2015 WL 667935, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2015) (denying insurer's motion for summary judgment as facts did not demonstrate that insurer acted in good faith as a matter of law; insured demanded appraisal and then filed CRN while the appraisal process was ongoing); see also 316, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 625 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1193 (N.D. Fla. 2008).


author: WALLIS, J.

text:
    Kelly MATHIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D14-492
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 19, 2018
    Kelly Mathis, of Law Offices of Kelly B. Mathis, Jacksonville, pro se.
    Arthur I. Jacobs, of Jacobs Scholz & Associates, LLC, Fernandina Beach, Ami-cus Curiae for the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Diana K. Bock, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   ON MOTION FOR REVIEW

WALLIS, J.

Kelly Mathis moves this court to review the denial of his motion for costs, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a). Because Mathis prevailed on appeal and the State decided not to pursue further prosecution, we find that Mathis is entitled to costs pursuant to section 939.06, Florida Statutes (2016), and rule 9.400(a). We grant Mathis’s motion, reverse the trial court’s order denying costs, and remand with instructions to the trial court to, nunc pro tunc, tax costs pursuant to rule 9.400(a), plus prejudgment interest from the date of our mandate.

In October 2016, this court reversed Mathis’s multiple convictions and remanded for a new trial. Mathis v. State, 208 So.3d 158 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). In December 2016, we denied the State’s motion for rehearing. The State then pursued discretionary review in the Florida Supreme Court, and this court stayed its mandate pending the outcome. In January 2017, Mathis moved for appellate costs pursuant to rule 9.400(a). In February, the Florida Supreme Court denied the petition for review. This court then issued its mandate. In March, the State entered a nolle prose-qui on all charges.

Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for costs and found that Mathis was not entitled to appellate costs because he must have a statutory right to recover costs in order to claim them. The trial court noted that section 939.06, Florida Statutes, “authorizes the imposition of certain trial court costs against the county in favor of an acquitted or discharged defendant, but [Mathis] is not seeking costs under that provision.” The trial court further found that Mathis failed to establish an entitlement to costs under rule 9.400. This motion for review followed.

We review a trial court’s decision on appellate costs “only to determine whether the trial court applied the correct law and whether it abused its discretion.” Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Polackwich, 705 So.2d 23, 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The prevailing party on appeal may move for appellate costs pursuant to rule 9.400(a), which provides:

Costs shall be taxed in favor of the prevailing party unless the court orders otherwise. Taxable costs shall include
(1) fees for filing and service of process;
(2) charges for preparation of the record and any hearing or trial transcripts necessary to determine the proceeding;
(3) bond premiums; and
(4) other costs permitted by law.

(emphasis added). Unlike appellate fees, appellate costs must be awarded to the prevailing party. See Perez v. Fay, 198 So.3d 681, 683 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“The circuit court does not have discretion to refuse to award appellate costs when the appellate court has not ordered that costs be denied, although the circuit court is charged with determining which party prevailed and does have discretion in determining the amount to be allowed based on the evidence in the record.”); C.f. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Phillips, 775 So.2d 921, 922 (Fla. 2000) (“It is simply insufficient for parties to only refer to rule 9.400 or to rely on another court’s order in support of a motion for attorney’s fees for services rendered in an appellate court.”).

The Florida Supreme Court has stated, “[C]ost provisions against the State must be expressly authorized.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, Pinellas Cty. v. Sawyer, 620 So.2d 757, 758 (Fla. 1993). Article 1, section 19, of the Florida Constitution provides, “No person charged with crime shall be compelled to pay costs before a judgment of conviction has become final.” Further, section 939.06, Florida Statutes, provides:

A defendant in a criminal prosecution who is acquitted or discharged is not liable for any costs or fees of- the court or any ministerial office, or for any charge of subsistence while detained in custody. If the defendant has paid any taxable costs, or fees required under s. 27.52(1)(b), in the case, the clerk or judge shall give him or her a certificate of the payment of such costs, with the items thereof, which, when audited and approved according to law, shall be refunded to the defendant.

Thus, article 1, section 19, and section 939.06 authorize the taxing of costs against the State for an acquitted or discharged defendant.

Section 939.06 applies to Mathis because the State entered a nolle prosequi. See Haines v. State, 80 So.3d 1144, 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“A nolle prosequi by the state amounts to a ’discharge’ entitling a defendant to a refund of costs under the statute.”). Additionally, this court has previously extended section 939.06 to appellate costs. See Evans v. State, 608 So.2d 944 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Mathis’s failure to refer to section 939.06 as a substantive basis is not fatal to his claim for costs because rule 9.400(a) does not expressly require that a movant for costs state the ground of recovery. Because Mathis prevailed on appeal and the State’s nolle pro-sequi discharged his case, Mathis is enti-tied to costs pursuant to section 939.06 and rule 9.400(a). Accordingly, we grant his motion for review, reverse the trial court’s order denying his motion for costs, and remand with instructions to enter an order, nunc pro tunc, taxing costs pursuant to rule 9.400(a), plus the appropriate interest from the date of our mandate.

MOTION GRANTED; REVERSED and REMANDED with Instructions.

ORFINGER and EDWARDS, JJ„ concur.

      . The language differences between sections (a) and (b) supports this conclusion. Section (a) states, "Costs shall be taxed in favor of the prevailing party unless the court orders otherwise.” Fla. R. App. P, 9.400(a). In contrast, section (b) states, "[A] motion for attorneys’ fees shall state the grounds on which recovery is sought.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b).


author: MORRIS, Judge.

text:
    Yvonne BLUE and Deborah Cooper, as Co-personal Representatives of the Estate of Ramona Leonard, deceased, Appellants, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY and Philip Morris USA Inc., Appellees.
    Case No. 2D16-3007
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 19, 2018

      ■Lorenzo Williams and Natasha- N. Harrison of Gary, Williams, Parenti, Watson & Gary, P.L., Stuart, for Appellants.
    Troy A. Fuhrman and Marie A. Borland of Hill, Ward & Hendersori, P.A.; and Jason T. Burriette of Jones Day, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.
    Geoffrey J. Michael of Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, D.C.,. for Appellee Philip Morris USA Inc.
   MORRIS, Judge.

Yvonne Blue and Deborah Cooper, as co-personal representatives of the estate of Ramona Leonard, appeal a final order dismissing their Engle progeny complaint against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and Phillip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (the tobacco companies). We hold that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint based on its conclusion that Blue and Cooper failed to timely move to substitute proper parties, and we therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Leonard, the deceased, initially brought a personal injury action against R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, Liggett Group LLC, Vector Group Ltd., and several other defendants in 2008. Ms. Leonard died in 2013 while-the suit was still pending. Thereafter, Blue and Cooper, Ms. Leonard’s daughters, were appointed by a probate court to serve as the .co-personal representatives of the estate.

In March 2014, Blue and Cooper, along with Liggett Group LLC (Liggett) and Vector Group Ltd. (Vector), filed a joint notice and stipulation with the trial court explaining that Liggett and Vector were being dropped as party defendants.. The stipulation included the following: “COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs, Yvonne Blue and Deborah Cooper, as Proposed PR[s] for the Estate of Ramona Leonard, deceased .... ” The tobacco companies remained in the case as party defendants, and the case proceeded. Initially, Blue and Cooper did-not move to substitute themselves as proper parties, and no formal suggestion of Ms. Leonard’s death was ever filed. Instead, Blue and Cooper and the tobacco companies continued to litigate the case for almost two years.

In September 2015,. Blue and Cooper filed a motion to substitute themselves as the proper parties.. The tobacco companies then filed their motion to dismiss, arguing in relevant part that because Ms. Leonard’s death had been suggested on the record, within the joint notice and stipulation of dropping defendants, Blue and Cooper were required to move to substitute themselves as proper parties within ninety days of filing that document. The tobacco companies further argued that because Blue and Cooper failed to do so, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.260(a)(1) required that the complaint be dismissed. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Blue and Cooper asserted that the ninety-day period did not begin to run until a specific pleading entitled “Suggestion of Death” was filed. However, the trial court rejected Blue and Cooper’s assertion. The trial court determined that for purposes of starting the ninety-day period, the rule did not require a formal document reciting a party’s death but instead required only that the party’s death be somehow suggested on the record. The trial court entered its order of dismissal and subsequently denied- Blue and Cooper’s motion for rehearing.

ANALYSIS

We conduct a de novo review of the order of dismissal. See Ruiz v. Brink’s Home Sec., Inc., 777 So.2d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

Rule 1.260(a)(1) provides in relevant part that

If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties. Unless the motion for substitution is made within 90 .days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of .the fact of the death in the manner provided for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party,,

While the rule only requires a statement “of the. fact of the death” of a party and does not otherwise require specific information such as the location or date of the death or the name of a person to be substituted, see King v. Tyree’s of Tampa, Inc., 315 So.2d 538, 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Martin v. Hacsi, 909 So.2d 935, 936 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Vera v. Adeland, 881 So.2d 707, 709-10 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), we are not persuaded that the joint notice and stipulation of dropping defendants was sufficient to constitute a suggestion of death that triggered the ninety-day period. A review of the docket would not reveal any document .having been filed that, on .its face, reflects that the original plaintiff died. Instead, that fact would only become apparent after reading the contents of each and every document filed, ' '

We do not construe the passing reference to Ms. Leonard’s death — which was made within a document that related to a settlement with other defendants — as a suggestion of death as contemplated in rule 1.260(a)(1). Rather, we construe rule 1.260 to require the filing of a document that is intended to notify all of the litigants of a party’s death. Cf. Wilson v. Clark, 414 So.2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (interpreting the words “upon the record” in rule 1.260 to mean that the time period set forth in the rule is triggered “by the recording or the filing of the suggestion of death” rather than by the service of the pleading).

We find support for our interpretation of the rule’s requirements in Toney v. Freeman, 600 So.2d 1099, 1101 n. 4 (Fla. 1992), receded from on different grounds by Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2005). There, the Florida Supreme Court explained that the parties did not argue that a statement noting the plaintiff’s death within a response to the trial court’s case status order was sufficient to constitute a suggestion of death. However, the court then went on to opine that it did “not construe [the] response as a formal suggestion of death as contemplated by ... rule [1.260].” 600 So.2d at 1101 n.4. While not the holding of the case, such language strongly implies that a passing reference to a party’s death in a document that was not filed for the purpose of notifying the litigants of the death is not sufficient to start the ninety-day time period set forth in rule 1.260(a)(1). Federal courts hold similarly. See, e.g., Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the ninety-day time period under the federal rule “is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party’s death” and that “[m]ere reference to a party’s death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution”); United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (10th Cir. 1974) (rejecting argument that formal suggestion of death was unnecessary in order to start the ninety-day time period for filing a motion to substitute); cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 45 F.R.D. 470, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (concluding that statement made in passing during a deposition regarding a defendant’s death is not a suggestion of death and explaining that “[w]hen the consequences to the client of a slightly delayed reaction may be severe and the burden of providing formal notice is slight, insistence on the observance of procedural ritual is justified”).

The case relied on by the trial court, Kush N’ Karry Food Stores, Inc. v. Smart, 814 So.2d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), in addition to all of the cases relied on by the tobacco companies in support of their argument for affirmance, are distinguishable because they all involved situations where motions for substitution were not made within ninety days after suggestions of death were filed. Cf. King, 315 So.2d at 539; Martin, 909 So.2d at 936; Vera, 881 So.2d at 710; Scutieri v. Miller, 584 So.2d 15, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); N.H. Ins. Co. v. Kimbrell, 343 So.2d 107, 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). That is not what happened here. There was no document entitled “Suggestion of Death” nor was there any other document filed that indicated its purpose was to alert the litigants that the original plaintiff had died.

Although the rule does not explicitly provide that a document be labeled a “Suggestion of Death,” we construe the rule to, at the very least, require that the document be filed for the purpose of alerting the litigants to a party’s death. Burying the fact of a party’s death in a document that is filed for another purpose cannot possibly comport with the intent of the rule since the opposing party could merely bury the statement in any document within the record and then wait out the ninety-day period to execute their “gotcha” move. The purpose of the rule is to “allow more flexibility in substitution” and “[t]he [ninety-]day period was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious actions.” Kimbrell, 343 So.2d at 109 (quoting Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and agreeing that the same liberal construction applied in Rende should be applied to rule 1.260).

We are cognizant of the fact that in this case, Blue and Cooper were obviously aware of Ms. Leonard’s death as they, along with Liggett and Vector, jointly filed the joint notice and stipulation of dropping defendants. But we reject the tobacco companies’ argument that personal knowledge of a party’s death is sufficient to trigger the ninety-day period. Instead, it is the filing of a document (i.e., a suggestion upon the record) for the purpose of alerting the litigants of the party’s death that triggers the time period set forth in rule 1.260(a)(1). If the tobacco companies wanted the ninety-day period to begin running, they had the ability to file a document for that purpose. But the tobacco companies are not entitled to a dismissal based on a passing reference to a party’s death in a document that was filed for a completely different purpose. Consequently, because the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint for failure to comply with rule 1.260(a)(1), we reverse and remand for proceedings in conformance with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.

      . Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).

      . Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 1.260 are similar as rule 1.260 was modeled after the federal rule. Wilson, 414 So.2d at 530 n.3. "Consequently, federal decisions relating to the construction and history of Rule 25 ... are instructive.” Id,

      . Indeed, dismissals are routinely granted in such circumstances. See generally Tucker v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 552 So.2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (acknowledging that no motion for substitution was made within ninety days of the suggestion of death, but reversing dismissal based on excusable neglect); Scott v. Morris, 989 So.2d 36, 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (reversing dismissal where motion for substitution was sufficient even though it did not state in the body of the motion that substitution was being requested); Stroh v. Dudley, 476 So.2d 230, 231 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (reversing dismissal where trial court erroneously believed dismissal was mandatory rather than discretionary and where dismissal with prejudice was not warranted because appellant did file a motion for substitution, though it was untimely); Canter v. Hyman, 363 So.2d 29, 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Lonnie R. MUNN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-4780
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 26, 2018
    Lonnie R. Munn, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See Munn v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 807 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Roberts, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Andres PENA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-5354
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 26, 2018
    Andres Pena, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied on the merits.

Lewis, Osterhaus, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nicholas MENO, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-4233
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 26, 2018
    Nicholas Meno, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for belated appeal is denied on the merits.

Lewis, Osterhaus, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jason Bradley SIMS, Petitioner, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; Steve H. Sims, et al., Respondents.
    No. 1D17-5055
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 26, 2018
    Jason Bradley Sims, pro se, Petitioner.

      David Rosenberg of Robertson, An-schutz & Schneid, P.L., Boca Raton, for Respondent U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.
    No appearance for Respondents Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. or Steve H. Sims.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of prohibition is denied on the merits.

Wetherell, Makar, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ivan Gregory WEBB, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-0129
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 26, 2018
    Ivan Gregory Webb, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance on appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

Wetherell, Makar, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Damon DICKERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2511
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed February 2, 2018
    Damon Dickerson, Lake City, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   WALLIS, J.

Damon Dickerson appeals the summary denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, where he alleged two grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Dickerson’s motion was legally insufficient and it is not apparent that Dickerson cannot correct the defect, Dickerson is entitled to at least one opportunity to amend. See Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754, 761 (Fla. 2007); Lamb v. State, 202 So.3d 118, 120 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to strike Dickerson’s motion with leave to amend within a reasonable time.

REVERSE and REMAND with Instructions.

SAWAYA and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    James VILSAINT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D18-42
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed February 2, 2018
    Robert Wesley, Public Defender, Orlando, and Steven S. Graves, Assistant Public Defender, Orlando, for Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the November 30, 2017 judgments and sentences in Case No. 2016-CF-l 1551-0, in the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

TORPY, BERGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Horace YOUNG, Petitioner, v. The FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Julie L. Jones, Secretary, Respondents.
    No. 1D17-5413
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 5, 2018
    Horace Young, pro se, Petitioner.
    Kenneth S. Steely, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Respondents.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied as premature.

Lewis, Osterhaus, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    David CHALLENDER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-5033
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 5, 2018

      David Challender, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied as premature.

Lewis, Osterhaus, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Dwight DOBSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-5209
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 6, 2018
    Dwight Dobson, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of prohibition is denied on the merits.

Jay, Winsor, and M.K, Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Terry A. GAINES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-87
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 6, 2018
    Terry A. Gaines, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

Dismissed. See Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 2004).

Jay, Winsor, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee FOR CSFB HEAT 2006-7, Appellant, v. Jason TRANUMN and D’Honour Tranumn, Appellees.
    No. 1D16-2577
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 9, 2018
    Dean A. Morande and Michael K. Winston of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellant.

      Brian Lee of Schuler <& Lee, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellees.
   Per Curiam.

U.S. Bank appeals the trial court’s award of prevailing party attorney’s fees to the Tranumns in this foreclosure action. Separately, this Court quashed the final judgment of foreclosure in 1D16-4911. As such, because the award of attorney’s fees in this case was based on the now-defunct final judgment, the trial court’s award of fees based on that judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with instruction to vacate the order awarding the attorney’s fees. See Marty v. Bainter, 727 So.2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(“Onee a final judgment is reversed and remanded by an appellate court, there can be no prevailing party for purposes of an award of prevailing party attorney’s fees. Consequently, an award of attorney’s fees and costs predicated on a reversed or vacated final judgment also must be reversed.”).

Reversed and Remanded with instruction to vacate award of attorney’s fees.

Rowe, Makar, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF STATE GROUP INSURANCE, Petitioner, v. Emily FERRON, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-4434
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 9, 2018
    Anita J. Patel, Timothy L. Newhall, and J. Andrew Atkinson, Department of Management Services, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
    Richard M. Benrubi of the Law Office of Richard M. Benrubi, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner Division of State Group Insurance seeks a writ of prohibition, arguing that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction over Respondent’s suit alleging wrongful denial of insurance claims. Because the circuit court has indicated it has left open the issue of whether Respondent has exhausted her administrative remedies and intends to rule on the issue later in the lower tribunal proceedings, Petitioner is not entitled to prohibition. The petition is therefore denied.

Roberts, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    James D. GROCE, Appellant, v. REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION and Allegiance Staffing, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-4345
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 9, 2018
    James D. Groce, pro se, Appellant.

      Norman A. Blessing; General Counsel, and Amanda L. Neff, Deputy General Counsel, Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission, Tallahassee, for Appel-lees.
   Per Curiam.

Upon consideration of Appellee’s conces- ■ sion of error, we reverse the order on appeal and- remand for further proceedings.

Roberts, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ,, concur.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE EX REL. Perry CORNER v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1723
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

PER CURIAM:

I/Writ granted in part, denied in part. The district court is ordered to appoint counsel and conduct an evidentiary hearing to address the claims raised in relator’s pro se memorandum filed on or around May 22, 2014. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930(A). Writ denied in all other respects.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thayer HAMDALLA
    No. 2016-KP-1387
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

[ denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    IN RE: Ivory BATISTE
    NO. 2018-B-0098
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ORDER

h Considering the Petition for Revocation of Conditional Admission filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent’s conditional admission to the practice of law in the State of Louisiana be revoked, effective immediately. Respondent may not reapply for admission until he can demonstrate at least a one-year period of sobriety and compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract with the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program. Should respondent thereafter choose to submit an application for readmission, he shall comply with all requirements of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall pay all costs associated with these proceedings.


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    IN RE: Kevin Douglas MCCLEARY
    NO. 2017-B-2158
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

_JjThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent converted client and third-party funds. Respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline seeking respondent’s disbarment. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Kevin Douglas McCleary, Louisiana Bar Roll number 25167, be and he hereby is disbarred, retroactive to May 28, 2015, the date of his interim suspension. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Patrick LEVIER v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1710
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LAFAYETTE

PER CURIAM:

| Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 434; cf. State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La. 10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488. Moreover, relator has previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. State ex rel. Levier v. State, 15-2019 (La. 2/17/17), 211 So.3d 379.

GENOVESE, J., recused


text:
    STATE EX REL. Raymond MITCHELL v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1730
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

h Denied. Relator’s convictions and sentences became final in 2012, and he does not provide a copy of the application for post-conviction relief filed in the district court. He fails to offer proof that his application was timely filed in the district court or that an exception to the time limitation applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Marshall WHITLEY v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1851
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 6/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court,«and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. The application is also repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4.

Relator has now fully litigated several applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one' of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator |ahas exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam. .


text:
    STATE EX REL. Louis WHITE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1865
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator, does not identify an illegal term in his sentences, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So,2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. The application is also repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4.

Relator has now fully litigated several applications ■ for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period'as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural'bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator Lhas exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute'entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Johnny Ray LUNA v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1893
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. In addition, relator’s sentencing claim is not cognizable on collateral review. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.

Relator has now fully litigated five applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings ^mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    IN RE: Louella P. GIVENS-HARDING
    NO. 2018-B-0055
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ORDER

11 Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Louella P. Givens-Harding, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19920, be and she hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that necessary disciplinary proceedings be instituted in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, §§ 11 and 19.


text:
    IN RE: Chester Quinton BELL
    NO. 2017-B-2137
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM

hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent was arrested multiple times and engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during a period of ineligibility. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in which respondent admitted that his conduct violated Rules 5.5, 8.4(a), and 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Chester Quinton Bell, Louisiana Bar Roll number 34379, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of eighteen months, retroactive to June 15, 2016, the .date of his interim suspension.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Michael James KELLY v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1699
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

PER CURIAM:

1 ^Denied. Relator fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and-within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent' with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Kenny DOMINO v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 16-KH-1712
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| ] Denied. Relator’s sentencing élaims are not cognizable on collateral review. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. As to his remaining claims, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his- right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Kevin Roch JONES v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1717
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF RAPIDES

PER CURIAM:

Denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated an application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application oiily under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Marcus Lamont DOTIE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1796
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO

PER CURIAM:

| Denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, _ it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district'court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. In addition, relator’s sentencing claims are not cognizable on collateral review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.

Relator has now fully litigated two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings |2mandatory. Relator’s,- claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La, C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator-has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Felton Wayne DUKES v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1821
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO

PER CURIAM:

|denied. Relator fails to show-he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant the writ application.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Bryan A. STEVENS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1825
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FORTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST

PER CURIAM:

|, Denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Talandis COTTON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1895
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ASCENSION

PER CURIAM:

| ¶ Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In addition, relator’s claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4. As to the remaining claims, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relief.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive ^application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

| «APPENDIX


text:
    STATE EX REL. Michael THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-2027
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRIT TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| xDenied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. The application is also repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4.

Relator has now fully litigated several applications .for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jasmond OSBORNE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1580
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO

PER CURIAM:

b Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Hughes, J., would grant for an evidentiary hearing.


author: CLARK, J.?

text:
    IN RE: Richmond C. ODOM
    NO. 2017-OB-2151
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/2/2018
   ORDER

h Considering the Petition for Transfer to Active Status filed by respondent, and the response thereto filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Richmond C. Odom, Louisiana Bar Roll number 17339, be and he hereby is reinstated to active status pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 22(G). This order shall be effective immediately.

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny respondent’s request to be reinstated to active status.

CLARK, J., would deny.

Hughes, J., would deny reinstatement to active status.

CLARK, J.?

dissenting.

IJ would deny.


text:
    IN RE: Michael David COX
    NO. 2018-B-0059
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 24, 2018
   ORDER

^.Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the response thereto filed by respondent,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Michael David Cox, Louisiana Bar Roll number 20453, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders .of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate. FOR THE COURT:

(bL

JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA


text:
    IN RE: L.M.M., JR., a Minor
    NO. 2017-CJ-1988
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 9, 2018
    See Order Attached.
   Attachment

| .SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2017-CJ-1988

IN RE: L.M.M., JR., A MINOR

On Writ of Certiorari and/or Review

Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson,

No. 748-178, Division C;

Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 17-CA-345.

And, whereas, the Court has this date, pursuant to Article 5, Section 5, of the Constitution of Louisiana, made and issued the following order, to wit — “It is ordered that the writ of review issue;. that the District Court and the Court of Appeal send up the record in Duplicate of the case; and that counsel for all parties be notified.”

Now, therefore, the said District Court and the Court of Appeal is hereby commanded, in the name of the State of Louisiana and of this Honorable Court, to send up forthwith to this Court, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 1, at the City of New Orleans, the record in duplicate of the above-entitled case.

Witness the Honorable Justices of the

Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, on

this 9th day of February, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand-Seventeen.

'/§/

John Tarlton Olivier Clerk of Court

/§/

Deputy Clerk of Court


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin Dale DAIGLE
    NO. 2017-KK-2048
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 9, 2018
    See Order Attached.
   Attachment

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2017-KK-2048

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

KEVIN DALE DAIGLE

On Writ of Certiorari and/or Review

Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu,

No. 21813-15, Division C;

Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 17-00718.

And, whereas, the Court has this date, pursuant to Article 5, Section 5, of the Constitution of Louisiana', made and issued the following order, to wit — “It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the District Court and the Court of- Appeal send up the record in- Duplicate of the case; and that counsel for all parties be notified.”

Now, therefore, the said District Court and the Court of Appeal is hereby commanded, in the name of the State of Louisiana and of this Honorable Court, to send up forthwith to this Court, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 1, at .the City of New Orleans, the record in duplicate of the above-entitled case.

Witness the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, on

this 9th day of February, in the, year of our Lord, Two Thousand-Seventeen.

M

John Tarlton Olivier Clerk of Court

M

Deputy Clerk of Court