author: WILLIAMS, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Anthony D. ROBERTSON, Appellant
    No. 51,225-KA
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Judgment rendered April 12, 2017
    LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT By: Chad Ikerd, Counsel for Appellant
    ANTHONY D. ROBERTSON, Pro Se
    JAMES E. PAXTON, District Attorney, ANITA T. MACK, MOLLY F. McEACH-ARN, EDWIN MOBERLEY, Assistant District Attorneys, Counsel for Appellee
    Before WILLIAMS, MOORE, and PITMAN, JJ.
   WILLIAMS, J.

liThe defendant, Anthony D. Robertson, was charged by amended bill of indictment with' second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, and armed robbery using a firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64 and 14:64.3(A). Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to serve life in prison, at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for the murder conviction; 50 years in prison, at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for the armed robbery conviction; and five years in prison, at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for the firearm enhancement. All sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. The defendant now appeals.

The defendant’s appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw, together with a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), alleging that there are no nonfrivo-lous issues upon which to base an appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences, and grant defense counsel’s motion to withdraw. However, we remand this matter to the trial court for the sole purpose of correcting the Uniform Order of Commitment to reflect that the sentences were ordered to be served consecutively,, rather than concurrently.

PACTS

On June 18, 2013, at approximately 9:00 p.m., officers from the Madison Parish Sheriffs Office were dispatched to the residence of Gregory Smith, Jr. in reference to a shooting. Upon their arrival, the officers discovered that Smith had been shot multiple times; Smith was pronounced dead at the scene. The police investigation revealed that Smith’s live-in | ¡^girlfriend, Ramona Smith, and their young children were present in the home at the time of the shooting.

When questioned by the police officers, Ramona made the following statements: she and Smith were watching a basketball game with their children when someone knocked on their front door; Smith told the person to go to the side door because the front door was difficult to open; when the person or persons entered the home, one of the young children saw a gun; she gathered the children in the living room of the home, instructed them to “be quiet” and called 9-1-1; she attempted to whisper to the 9-1-1 operator; the operator was unable to understand her; she sent text messages to her father and her brother, asking them to come to her residence and help her; she heard three gunshots; she took cover and waited for help; her father arrived with another man; her father entered the house, saw Smith’s body and called 9-1-1.

The following morning the investigating officers learned that Susie Robertson (“Robertson”) suspected that her brothers, the defendant, Anthony Robertson, and Marcus Robertson (“Marcus”), had been involved in a robbery the previous night. When Robertson was questioned by the police officers, she stated that she overheard the defendant’s cellphone conversation, during which he stated that he was going to make a “hit.” She also stated that the defendant and Marcus left her residence with their cousin, Fredrick Rone; and approximately one hour after they left, she heard that a murder had been committed.

IsFurther investigation led the police officers to suspect that the defendant, Marcus, Fredrick Rone, Wilson Bryant and Precious Johnson were involved in the robbery and murder of Smith. They were apprehended and transported to the police department for questioning. Marcus, Rone and Johnson confessed to their involvement in the robbery, but denied committing the murder.

Marcus made the following statements: Rone, Bryant and Johnson picked him and the defendant up at approximately 8:00 p.m.; Bryant was driving the vehicle; Johnson owned the vehicle; when he and the defendant got into the car, they discussed robbing Smith; they planned to take Smith’s money and drugs and leave the residence; he, the defendant and Bryant armed themselves with handguns and got out of the vehicle; he stayed outside of Smith’s residence, near the side entrance, while the defendant and Bryant went inside; Rone and Johnson remained in the car; he heard three gunshots from inside the residence; he, the defendant and Bryant ran back to the car; and they drove to a residence in Vicksburg, Mississippi, where they divided the money and drugs that had been taken from Smith during the robbery.

Rone made the following statements: the defendant called him and told him that he wanted to “set up a lick” on Smith; Bryant called Smith to arrange a drug transaction; Johnson (Bryant’s niece) drove him and Bryant from Vicksburg to Tallulah; when they arrived in Tallulah, they picked up the defendant and Marcus; the defendant, Bryant and Marcus were armed with handguns; he and Johnson dropped Marcus and Bryant off on a street near Smith’s residence; they dropped the defendant off in front of Smith’s residence; all three men were dressed in black; the defendant and Marcus Rwere wearing ski masks; a short time later, the three men ran back to the car and stated, “He’s done for”; they all took a portion of the money taken during the robbery; the drugs were divided between the defendant, Marcus and Bryant; and the defendant told him that he shot and killed Smith because Smith saw the defendant’s face.

Johnson made the following statements: she traveled from Vicksburg to Tallulah with Bryant and Rone; when they arrived in Tallulah, they picked up the defendant and Marcus; Bryant told the others of the plan to “put a gun to Smith’s head” and force him to show them the location of the money and drugs; Bryant instructed Rone to drive the car because he knew the area better than she did; Bryant and Marcus exited the car behind Smith’s house and the defendant was dropped off in front of the house; she and Rone drove away; a short time later, they saw the defendant, Bryant and Marcus running; the three men got back into the car and they drove to Vicksburg; they stole $700-800 dollars in cash and approximately one pound of marijuana; she was given $100 and the rest of the money was divided between the four men; and the defendant stated that he shot Smith because Smith saw his face.

The defendant and Bryant also gave statements to the police officers. However, they denied any involvement in the robbery and murder of Smith.

The defendant was charged by bill of indictment with first degree murder and armed robbery using a firearm. He pled not guilty. Subsequently, the charge of first degree murder was amended to second degree murder. Following pretrial motions and discovery, a jury trial commenced on November 16, 2015. The defendant was subsequently found guilty as charged. On January 13, 2016, the trial court sentenced the | ^defendant as follows: second degree murder—life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence; armed robbery—50 years’ imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence; and the firearm enhancement—5 years’ imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. All sentences were ordered to be served consecutively.

Subsequently, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for appeal and appointed the Louisiana Appellate Project to represent the defendant on appeal. This appeal followed, and the defendant’s appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw, alleging that he could find no nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal. See Anders v. California, supra; State v. Jyles, 1996-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241; State v. Mouton, 1995-0981 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1176; State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1990). The brief outlines the procedural history of the case and the relevant facts related to the offense. The brief also contains a “detailed and reviewable assessment for both the defendant and the appellate court of whether the appeal is worth pursuing in the first place.” Jyles, supra Further, defense counsel verified that he mailed copies of the motion to withdraw and his brief to the defendant, in accordance with Anders, Jyles, Mouton, and Benjamin, supra

On September 13, 2016, the defendant requested to review the appellate record and leave to file a pro se brief. The record was sent to the defendant on October 7, 2016, and on that date, this Court issued an order holding the motion to withdraw in abeyance and extended the pro se briefing | (¡deadline to November 7, 2016. The defendant did not file a pro se brief in this Court.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 920, this Court has conducted an error patent review of the appellate record. We have found one error patent in the sentencing proceedings.

The Uniform Commitment Order, signed by the trial judge, does not accurately reflect the sentence imposed. The transcript of the defendant’s sentencing hearing and the court minutes reveal that the trial court ordered that the three sentences imposed were to be served consecutively. However, the Uniform Commitment Order reflects that the defendant’s sentences are to be served concurrently. Accordingly, we hereby remand this matter to the trial court for the sole purpose of correcting the Uniform Commitment Order to reflect that the sentences imposed are to be served consecutively, in conformity with the trial court’s order. See, State v. Davis, 15-118 (La.App. 5th Cir. 6/30/15), 171 So,3d 1223; State v. Turner, 13-836 (La.App. 5th Cir. 3/26/14), 138 So.3d 740.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences and grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw. We remand this matter to the trial court for the sole purpose of correcting the Uniform Commitment Order to reflect that the defendant’s sentences were ordered to be served consecutively.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES AFFIRMED; APPELLATE COUNSEL’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED;JjREMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF UNIFORM COMMITMENT ORDER.

      .In some parts of the record, Ramona Smith is referred to as the wife of Gregory Smith. However, they were not married. She testified that they lived together, and had children together.

      . Ramona Smith’s phone records indicate that she began calling 9-1-1 at 8:46 p.m.

      . "Hit a lick” is a street slang expression for committing a robbery.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DREW, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellant v. Paul Freeman LOGUE, Appellee
    No. 51,210-KA
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Judgment rendered April 12, 2017

      JOHN F.K. BELTON, District Attorney, TRACY W. HOUCK, LEWIS A. JONES, Assistant District Attorneys, Counsel for Appellant
    PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, By: James G. Buckley, Counsel for Appellee
    Before WILLIAMS, DREW, and GARRETT, JJ.
   DREW, J.

|, Paul Freeman Logue was charged by information with third offense possession of marijuana. La. R.S. 40:966(E). The trial court quashed the bill, applying retroactively a 2015 amendment to Subsection (E)(1). The state appeals, arguing that this retroactive application was error. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

On September 11, 2015, Logue was issued a summons for possession of marijuana. He was billed with possession of marijuana—third offense, a felony. The bill listed two predicate offenses.

The defendant moved to quash the bill of information, alleging that “changes in the law, embodied in House Bill 149, which amended [La. R.S. 40:966(E) ], do not indicate that the defendant committed the offense alleged.”

|gAt the hearing held on April 5, 2016, the defense counsel argued:

[W]e believe that based on the intent of the legislature in changing the law that Mr. Logue should indeed only be billed as a second offender at most.
.... Based on the 1994 charge and the great span of time between that and then the—the two more recent charges, it’s our belief that Mr. Logue should be charged only as a second offense which, under the new law is a misdemeanor and as such we should ask that his ... Bill of Information be quashed.

The state responded that the statute did not apply to the 1993 offense.

| sThe trial court took the matter under advisement. On May 17, 2017, the court provided written reasons for quashing the bill on four grounds:

• There is no clear legislative intent extant as to whether the amendments were intended to apply prospectively or retroactively;
• Statutory changes can be either substantive, procedural or interpretive;
State v. Boniface, 369 So.2d 115 (La. 1979), provides guidance here; and
• Finding the amendment to be procedural, retroactive application is required.

The state applied for supervisory review. We granted to docket as an appeal.

DISCUSSION

The Parties’ Contentions

By its first assignment of error, the state urges that the court erred, as a matter of law, by granting defendant’s motion to quash based upon an improper and unnecessary analysis of the retroactivity of laws rather than properly applying the amended portions of La. R.S, 40:966(E)(1) to those offenses clearly defined by the words of the statute. The state argues:

• a plain reading of La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(i)-(ii) refers to “certain offenses,” namely possession of marijuana on a first conviction, referencing a specified punishment for a specified offense;
• La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii) thus applies only to one specific situation;
14» since the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, the trial court erred in even discussing the second prong of the retroactivity analysis.

The defendant responds that the trial court properly:

• determined that the statute was ambiguous as to whether the legislature intended La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii) to apply retroactively or prospectively;
• proceeded to step two of the retroac-tivity analysis; and
• found that the new statute was procedural and thus retroactive.

By its second assignment of error, the state urges the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by extending the application of a criminal statute by analogy rather than strictly construing the plain meaning of the words. The state argues that the trial court:

• improperly extended La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii) as being applicable to more offenses than those covered by the clear language of the statute, ie., La. R.S. 40:966(E)(a)(i) and (ii); and
• improperly conflated the plain language of La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii), such as the phrases “the provisions” and “on the first conviction,” which clearly only apply to La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(i) and (ii).

The defendant responds:

• the trial court correctly analogized this situation to the Boniface rationale;
• no justification exists for not applying the cleansing period retroactively; and
|s* the trial court properly utilized Boniface as a tool to determine that La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii) related to operation of law, which meant that it was procedural and therefore retroactive.

By its third assignment, of error, the state urges the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by retroactively applying the “cleansing period” exception provided for in La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii) to the defendant’s first conviction for the violation of a separate provision of the statute, which was clearly not included under the exception. Here, the state argues:

• the trial court’s ruling lacks any discussion as to ambiguity;
• even if La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii) applies, it cannot be applied retroactively;
• the trial court erred in finding that the legislature did not express any intent as to whether the new law was to apply retroactively, ignoring the plain language of the statute that La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii) deals only with convictions under La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(i) and (ii); and
• since the defendant’s 1994 offense was not under La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(i) or,(ii), it is simply not covered by La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii).

Defendant replies that:

• the trial court was right that “the provisions” wording of La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii) related to all violations of first offense possession of marijuana and not just those listed in La. R.S. 40;966(E)(l)(a)(i) and (ii); .and
• since La. R.S, 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii) is procedural, it can be applied retroactively, as the 1994 crime cannot enhance the crime sub judice.

Applicable law

The interpretation of criminal statutes is well settled.

|fiIt is helpful to focus on relevant wording of La. R.S. 40:966 on three dates:

• At the time of the current offense;
|7« At the time of the 1993 offense; and
• At the time of the 2015 offense.

|sWe believe that the legislature intended La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii) to apply prospectively. The phrase “the conviction used as a predicate conviction for enhancement purposes” is particularly instructive. “The conviction” can logically apply only to a conviction and sentence under La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(i) or (ii); if the individual had a prior conviction, he necessarily could not be sentenced as a first offender under La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(i) or (ii) for his subsequent crime.

Lending further support to this interpretation are pertinent portions of the Ré-sumé Digest for Act 295 of the 2015 Regular Session.

At all relevant times, La. R.S. 40:966(C) has had the same elements. The fact that La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(i) and (ü) essentially encompass every | ¡¡“amount” of marijuana for possession purposes (subsection “F” notwithstanding) is of no consequence because subsection “E” refers to the sentence for the crime of possession in subsection “C.” At the time of the 1993 offense and the April 2015 offense, La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(i)-(iii) was not in effect.

The interpretative canon of lex specialis rebuts the trial court’s contention that the phrase “the provisions” in La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(iii) apply to any possession charge under La. R.S. 40:966(0), rather than only those convictions pursuant to La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(i)-(ii). La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(i)-(ii) is more specific than La. R.S. 40:966(0), La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(e), or both. Based on lex spe-cialis, “the provisions” must be interpreted as being limited to La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a)(i)-(ii). Hunter v. Jindal, supra. Thus we find that the amendments were to apply prospectively.

The trial court’s reliance upon Boniface, supra, is misplaced, as that case was based on La. R.S. 44:9 being “remedial” rather than “penal.”

The supreme court emphasized this distinction in State v. Blackwell, 377 So.2d 110 (La. 1979), where it held that “an offense which is subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor retains its felony status as of the time of commission.” Id. The Blackwell court distinguished that case from Boniface, noting that the habitual offender law at issue in Blackwell was penal, while the law at issue in Boniface was remedial. Id. The 20151 ^amendments do ease the penalties for possession of marijuana, but this fact does not make the statute “remedial.” Like the habitual offender law, an enhancement provision law is penal in purpose. Blackwell, supra. In short, Boniface, supra, does not apply here. Blackwell, supra, does.

Finally, we note that in State v. Mayeux, 2001-3195 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 526, the supreme court concluded that the defendant should have been sentenced under the DWI sentencing provisions at the time of conviction rather at the time of the offense. The new sentencing provisions significantly changed the way a DWI offender served his sentence, with the defendant, after facing less mandatory jail time, ordered to undergo inpatient treatment followed by in home incarceration. The supreme court recognized that the legislature clearly stated in the amended statute of its intention to embrace substance abuse treatment measures in preference to incarceration. Such an explicit policy statement is lacking from the amended statute in this instance.

DECREE

The granting of the motion to quash is VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED.

      . (1) "The 1993 Offense”
      On January 3, 1994, Logue was charged by bill of information with possession of marijuana on December 8, 1993, La. R.S. 40:966C. Logue pled guilty on June 17, 1994, and was sentenced to 15 days in parish prison.
      (2) "The April 2015 Offense”
      On June 5, 2015, Logue was charged by bill of information with possession of marijuana on April 24, 2015, La, R.S. 40:966. Logue pled guilty on September 9, 2015, and was sentenced to pay a $300.00 fine plus court costs and to serve 15 days in parish jail. Upon payment of the fine and costs, the jail sentence would be suspended and Logue would be on unsupervised probation for six months. Execution of sentence was deferred until October 14, 2015.

      . Applicable portions of R.S. 40:966(E), as amended by Act No. 295, effective June 29, 2015:
      (E)(1) Possession of marijuana.
      (a) Except as provided in Subsection F of this Section, on a conviction for violation of Subsection C of this Section with regard to marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol, or chemical derivatives thereof, the offender shall be punished as follows:
      (i) On a first conviction, wherein the offender possesses fourteen grams or less, the offender shall be fined not more than three hundred dollars, imprisoned in the parish jail for not more than fifteen days, or both.
      (ii) On a first conviction, wherein the offender possesses more than fourteen grams, the offender shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, imprisoned in the parish jail for not more than six months, or both.

        (iii) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of the provisions of Item (i) or (ii) of this Subparagraph and who has not been convicted of any other violation of a statute or ordinance prohibiting the possession of marijuana for a period of two years from the date of completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence shall not be eligible to have the conviction used as a predicate conviction for enhancement purposes. The provisions of this Subparagraph shall occur only once with respect to any person.
      (b) Except as provided in Subsection F of this Section, on a second conviction for violation of Subsection C of this Section with regard to marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol or chemical derivatives thereof, the offender shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, imprisoned in the parish jail for not more than six months, or both,
      (c)(i) Except as provided in Subsection F of this Section, on a third conviction for violation of Subsection C of this Section with regard to marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol or chemical derivatives thereof, the offender shall be sentenced to imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than two years, shall be fined not more than two thousand five hundred dollars, or both.

      (e) Except as provided in Item (a)(iii) of this Paragraph, a conviction for the violation of any other statute or ordinance with the same elements as Subsection C of this Section prohibiting the possession of marijuana, tetrahy-drocannabinol or chemical derivatives thereof, shall be considered as a prior conviction for the purposes of this Subsection relating to penalties for second, third, or subsequent offenders.

      . ADA; Mr. Logue, in 1994, was not convicted of "i" or "ii” because it didn't exist at the time. Mr. Logue was convicted of 40:966(C). If the legislature had intended to say that if you haven't been convicted of possession of marijuana for two years, it can’t be used against you, that's all they would’ve had to say—have said, but that's not what they said.
      .. .That does not apply to this defendant. This defendant’s only conviction under that provision occurred on September 9th of 2015. As I said, this arrest was two days later, it's well within the two years.
      DEFENSE: Your Honor .., we believe that the intent of the legislature reflects their intent to ... substantially alter the penal provisions of this statute and that there should be a retroactive application of this to Mr. Logue’s alleged offense.
      ADA: It only says if you’re convicted of these two provisions and then not convicted for two more years does the conviction not apply. You can’t get into [legislative] intent when the statute is clear.

      . Boniface was charged for possession of marijuana, then a felony, with the bill being dismissed. He later sought an expungement, after the crime became a misdemeanor. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the relief sought, in light of the change in social attitudes concerning the crime.

      . The referenced situation applies only to “any person convicted of a violation of the provisions of Item (i) or (ii) and who has not been convicted of the violation of another statute or ordinance concerning possession of marijuana for a period of two years.” The use of the conjunction "and” in this provision is significant and cannot be overlooked. The intentional use of "and” rather than "or” signifies that there must be a conviction under (i) or (ii) as well as no conviction under any other statute or ordinance. Both of these provisions are required in order for the cleansing period of two (2) years to apply. The provisions do not mention or reference prior convictions or past convictions for a violation of a Subsection of the statute itself. Had the legislature intended for the cleansing period to apply to a prior conviction, they would have certainly included that language rather than intentionally only mentioning (i) and (ii) and violations of other statutes and .ordinances.

      . La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(e) provides support for the state’s interpretation of the statute insofar as it suggests that La. R.S. 40:966(E)( 1 )(a) (i)—(iii), “clearly provide for and certainly do not prohibit the use of a past conviction under La. R.S. 40:966(C) to be considered a prior conviction for enhancement purposes.”

      . The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. State v. Johnson, 03-2993 (La. 10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568; State v. Tucker, 49,950 (La.App. 2 Cir. 7/8/15), 170 So.3d 394. The interpretation of the language of a criminal statute is governed by the rule that the articles of the criminal code "cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.” State v. Shaw, 06-2467 (La. 11/27/07), 969 So.2d 1233, quoting La. R.S. 14:3 and State v. Skipper, 04-2137 (La. 6/29/05), 906 So.2d 399. Criminal statutes are generally subject to strict construction under the rule of lenity. The principle of lenity is premised on the idea that a person should not be criminally punished unless the law provides a fair warning of what conduct will be considered criminal. The rule is based on principles of due process that no person should be forced to guess whether his conduct is prohibited. State v. Tucker, supra.

      Although criminal statutes are subject to strict construction under the rule of lenity, the rule is not to be applied with "such unreasonable technicality as to defeat the purpose of all rules of statutory construction, which purpose is to ascertain and enforce the true meaning and intent of the statute.” State v. Shaw, supra, and cases cited therein. What a legislature says in the text of .a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Therefore, where the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, they are not to be ignored under the pretext of pursuing their spirit. Id, If a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, it is to be applied as written by the legislature. La. C.C. art. 9. In interpreting a statute that may well be ambiguous, courts may consider legislative history and revision comments to shed light on the meaning and intent of the statute. State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799, 802 (La. 1975), Where it is possible, the courts have a duty in the interpretation of a statute to adopt a construction which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions. However, if there is a conflict, the interpretative canon of lex spe-cialis applies: the statute specifically directed 'to the matter at issue must prevail as an exception to the statute more general in character. Simply put, the specific controls the general. Hunter v. Jindal, 45,130 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/13/09), 20 So.3d 592, 597, writ denied, 09-2237 (La. 10/15/09), 18 So.3d 1292. The consideration of whether a law should be applied retroactively or prospectively starts with a determination of whether the legislature expressed its intent regarding the application. State v. Washington, 02-2196 (La. 9/13/02), 830 So.2d 288, 290. As stated above, the plain language of the statute controls. If there is no such intent expressed, then courts are directed to classify the enactment as either substantive, procedural or interpretive. Substantive laws are laws that impose new duties, obligations or responsibilities upon parties, or laws that establish new rules, rights and duties or change existing ones. Inteipretive laws are those which clarify the meaning of a statute and are deemed to relate back to the time that the law was originally enacted. Procedural laws prescribe a method for enforcing a substantive right and relate to the form of the proceeding or the operation of laws. Laws that are procedural or inteipretive may be applied retroactively. Id. It is well established that the law in effect at the time of commission of the offense is determinative of the penalty that is to be imposed upon the convicted accused. State v. Sugasti, 01-3407 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518; State v. Modi-sette, 50,846 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/28/16), 207 So.3d 1108. The fact that a statute is subsequently amended to lessen the possible penalty does not extinguish liability for the offense committed under the former statute. State v. Mayeux, 01-3408 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 524; State v. Day, 02-1039 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/03), 838 So.2d 74.

      . At the time o£ the instant offense, La. R.S. 40:966 provided, in pertinent part:
      E. (1) Possession of marijuana, (a) Except as provided in Subsection F of this Section, on a conviction for violation of Subsection C of this Section with regard to marijuana, tet-rahydrocannabinol, or chemical derivatives thereof, the offender shall be punished as follows:
      (i)On a first conviction, wherein the offender possesses fourteen grams or less, the offender shall be fined not more than three hundred dollars, imprisoned in the parish jail for not more than fifteen days, or both.
      (ii) On a first conviction, wherein the offender possesses more than fourteen grams, the offender shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, imprisoned in the parish jail for not more than six months, or both.
      (iii) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of the provisions of Item (i) or (ii) of this Subparagraph and who has not been convicted of any other violation of a statute or ordinance prohibiting the possession of marijuana for a period of two years from the date of completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence shall not be eligible to have the conviction used as a predicate conviction for enhancement purposes. The provisions of this Subparagraph shall occur only once with respect to any person.
      (b) Except as provided in Subsection F of this Section, on a second conviction for violation of Subsection C of this Section with regard to marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol or chemical derivatives thereof, the offender shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, imprisoned in the parish jail for not more than six months, or both.
      (c)(i) Except as provided in Subsection F of this Section, on a third conviction for violation of Subsection C of this Section with regard to marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol or chemical derivatives thereof, the offender shall be sentenced to imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than two years, shall be fined not more than two thousand five hundred dollars, or both.

      (e) Except as provided in Item (a)(iii) of this Paragraph, a conviction for the violation of any other statute or ordinance with the same elements as Subsection C of this Section prohibiting the possession of marijuana, tetrahy-drocannabinol or chemical derivatives thereof, shall be considered as a prior conviction for the purposes of this Subsection relating to penalties for second, third, or subsequent offenders.

      . At the time of the 1993 offense, La. R.S. 40:966 provided, in pertinent part:
      C. Possession. It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order, from a practitioner or as provided in R.S. 40:978, while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this Part.

      E. (1) Except as provided in Subsections E and F of this Section, on a first conviction for violation of Subsection C of this Section with regard to marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol or chemical derivatives thereof, the offender shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, imprisoned in the parish jail for not more than six months, or both.

      . At the time of the April 2015 offense, La. R.S. 40:966 stated in relevant part:
      C. Possession. It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order, from a practitioner or as provided in R.S. 40:978, while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this Part.

      E. Possession of marijuana, or synthetic can-nabinoids.
      (1) Except as provided in Subsections E and F of this Section, on a first conviction for violation of Subsection C of this Section with regard to marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol or chemical derivatives thereof, or synthetic can-nabinoids the offender shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, imprisoned in the parish jail for not more than six months, or both.
      (2)(a) Except as provided in Subsection F or G of this Section, on a second conviction for violation of Subsection C of this Section with regard to marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol or chemical derivatives thereof, or synthetic can-nabinoids, the offender shall be fined not less than two hundred fifty dollars, nor more than two thousand dollars, imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five years, or both.
      (b) If the court places the offender on probation, the probation shall provide for a minimum condition that he participate in a court-approved substance abuse program and perform four eight-hour days of court-approved community service activities. Any costs associated with probation shall be paid by the offender.

      . New law provides for the following penalties with regard to the crime of possession of marijuana ... as follows:
      (1) On a first conviction, for the possession of 14 grams or less, the offender is to be fined up to $300, imprisoned in parish jail for not more than 15 days, or both; and for the possession of more than 14 grams the offender is to be fined not more than $500, imprisoned in the parish jail for not more than six months, or both.
      (2) On a first conviction, any person who has been convicted of a violation of the provisions of new law and who has not been convicted of any other violation of a statute or ordinance prohibiting the possession of marijuana for a period of two years from the date of completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence shall not be eligible to have the conviction used as a predicate conviction for enhancement purposes. Id. at p. 1 (emphasis in original).
      Subsection "E” encompasses the sentencing for the crime of possession under subsection “C". It is well settled that modifications to sentencing provisions are not retroactive, and the sentencing range in effect at the time of commission of the crime applies. Modisette, supra.

      . The new law was in effect when Logue was charged with the instant crime, though the September 2015 crime was not within the ambit of La. R.S. 40:966(E)(l)(a).

      . In essence, the Louisiana Supreme Court found in Boniface, supra, that penal statutes are construed strictly, as these laws redress a wrong to the public. Remedial laws remedy wrongs to the individual, and are liberally construed.

      .The supreme court also noted that the amended statute stated "upon conviction” instead of "upon committing the offense,” and it allowed home incarceration for those already convicted.


text:
    Michael R. SMITH v. MAGGIE MAE, LP
    2014-CT-00875-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 12/13/2016
    Closed: 06/26/2017
   Motion Desc: Petition for Writ of Cer-tiorari

Certiorari—Denied


text:
    Dale Patrick MILLER v. Jessica Dawn SMITH
    2015-CT-00330-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 02/08/2017
    Closed: 05/11/2017
   Motion Desc: Appellants Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Certiorari—Granted


text:
    Lacy DODD v. Dr. Randall HINES
    2015-CT-00334-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 02/17/2017
    Closed: 05/11/2017
   Motion Desc: Petition for Writ of Cer-tiorari of Dr. Paul Seago

Certiorari-Granted


text:
    Lacy DODD v. Dr. Randall HINES
    2015-CT-00334-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 02/21/2017
    Closed: 05/11/2017
   Motion Desc: Petition for Writ of Cer-tiorari of Dr. Randall Hines, et al.

Certiorari—Granted


text:
    Thomas PUSTAY v. STATE of Mississippi
    2013-CT-00977-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 02/23/2017
    Closed: 05/25/2017
   Motion Desc: Petition for Writ of Cer-tiorari

Certiorari—Denied


text:
    Andrew Acie ADAMS v. STATE of Mississippi
    2015-CT-00520-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 03/02/2017
    Closed: 05/04/2017
   Motion Desc: PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Certiorari—Denied


text:
    UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER v. Kim HAMPTON
    2014-CT-01079-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 03/07/2017
    Closed: 05/25/2017
   Motion Desc: Petition for Writ of Cer-tiorari

Certiorari—Granted


text:
    Mary J. ARCHER v. Mitchell J. CREEL
    2015-CT-01079-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 03/13/2017
    Closed: 05/11/2017
   Motion Desc: Petition for Writ of Cer-tiorari

Certiorari—Denied


text:
    Monica Ashbrook DARBY v. Harold COMBS
    2015-CT-00793-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 03/13/2017
    Closed: 05/18/2017
   Motion Desc: Petition for Review Upon Writ of Certiorari

Certiorari—Granted


text:
    Jessie T. BEAL v. STATE of Mississippi
    2015-CP-00498-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 03/14/2017
    Closed: 05/04/2017
   Motion Desc: Petition for Writ of Cer-tiorari

Certiorari—Dismissed


text:
    MISSISSIPPI VALLEY SILICA COMPANY, INC. v. Dorothy BARNETT
    2013-CT-01296-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 03/21/2017
    Closed: 05/18/2017
   Motion Desc: Petition for Writ of Cer-tiorari

Certiorari—Granted


text:
    C. D. PICKLE, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi; Clanton D. Pickle, Jr. v. State of Mississippi
    2015-CT-00298-COA; 2015-CT-00824-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 04/03/2017
    Closed: 05/25/2017
   Motion Desc: Petitioner’s Amended Writ of Certiorari

Certiorari—Denied


text:
    Glen PAYTON v. STATE of Mississippi
    2015-CT-00957-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: 04/07/2017
    Closed: 05/18/2017
   Motion Desc: Writ of Certiorari

Certiorari—Denied


author: RANDOLPH, Presiding Justice,

text:
    Marshall GRAVES a/k/a Marshall P. Graves a/k/a Marshall Phellix Graves v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 2014-KA-00464-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    April 14, 2016.

      Marshall P. Graves, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the State Public Defender by W. Daniel Hinchcliff, attorney for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by Ladonna C. Holland, attorney for appellee.
    Before RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR and KITCHENS, JJ.
   RANDOLPH, Presiding Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The motion for rehearing is granted. The previous opinion of this Court is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted therefor. Marshall Graves was convicted of fondling (two counts) and sexual battery (one count) and was sentenced to terms of fifteen years for each count of fondling and life as to one count of sexual battery, all to be served concurrently. Graves’s appellate counsel filed a brief in compliance with Lindsey v. State, 939 So.2d 743 (Miss.2005), certifying to this Court that the record presented no arguable issues for appeal. Graves has filed a pro se brief, asserting numerous errors.

¶ 2. After a thorough review of Graves’s pro se brief and the record, this Court finds that Graves’s appeal presents no arguable issues, and no supplemental briefing is necessary. Therefore, we affirm Graves’s convictions and sentences.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

¶3. Ten-year-old G.W. lived with her parents and younger brother in The Reserve Apartments in Hattiesburg. During the summer of 2010, Mr. W. invited his friend Marshall Graves to stay with them because Graves was “down on his luck.” One evening, Mr. and Mrs. W. went to dinner for their anniversary, and Graves agreed to watch G.W. and her younger brother. After her parents left, G.W. and her brother were playing video games in the living room when Graves called G.W. into her parents’ bedroom. G.W. testified that:

Marshall was playing on the computer in my mom and dad’s bedroom. He called me into the bedroom, and I walked in there and stood by the door. He told me come here, so I walked closer. And he told me that I was smart and I was beautiful and he loved me and he wanted to show me how much he loved me.... And he gave me a hug and started kissing me with his tongue in my mouth and started grabbing my butt and my boobs and then reached his hand down the front of my pants.... He told me that I couldn’t tell anybody or he would get in trouble and he would tell on my daddy ... [for] the bad things that he did.... I was shocked and scared.

G.W. testified that she did not tell her parents or her brother what had happened. Her brother testified that he did recall G.W. crying when she came back in the living room. G.W. testified that she tried to limit the time she spent around Marshall and started spending more time with her friends away from her home.

¶ 4. G.W. testified that the second time Graves sexually assaulted her was approximately one week later. G.W. testified that, one night when she was in bed, Marshall came in her room and “started kissing me again on the lips with his tongue. And then he told me to get into some looser pajamas.” G.W. testified that her brother was in the living room watching a movie, her father was sitting on the balcony, and her mother was asleep. G.W. testified that Graves then led her into her bathroom.

He started kissing me again and touching me. He was grabbing my butt and my boobs and then pulled my pants down and laid me onto the ground and pulled my underwear down and unbuckled his pants and started rubbing my private part with his private part.

G.W. testified that Graves promised to give her money and a cell phone as long as she kept quiet. G.W. further testified that, when she was interviewed by Cheryl Caldwell, a Child Advocacy Center counselor, she informed Caldwell that Graves had rubbed her vagina with his hand and had inserted his finger inside her.

¶ 5. The day after this second incident, G.W. told a friend of hers who lived in the same apartment complex that Graves was touching her in inappropriate ways. G.W.’s friend then told her mother, who contacted the authorities. G.W.’s parents were then contacted by the police and told of G.W.’s accusations against Graves.

¶ 6. Graves ultimately was indicted for two counts of sexual battery and two counts of fondling. After a two-day trial, a Lamar County jury found Graves guilty of two counts of fondling and one count of sexual battery. Graves was sentenced as a habitual offender to concurrent, fifteen-year sentences for the fondling convictions and a concurrent life sentence for the sexual-battery conviction. Graves timely filed his appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

¶ 7. Graves raises the following issues in his pro se brief, which have been restated for clarity:

I. Whether Graves’s indictment was defective.
II. Whether Graves’s counsel, Shirlee Baldwin, provided ineffective assistance.
III. Whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of Graves’s prior bad acts to be admitted at trial.
IV. Whether the trial court erred in allowing G.W.’s father to testify at trial.
V. Whether the trial court erred in allowing statements to be introduced at trial pursuant to the “tender years” exception.
VI. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction.
VII. Whether the various witnesses’ statements were conflicting such that the jury’s verdict should be called into question.
VIII. Whether the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
IX. Whether Graves was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.
X. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Graves’s motion to sever the indictment.
XI. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Graves’s objection regarding the State’s reference to a jury instruction during closing arguments.
XII. Whether the cumulative errors warrant a reversal.

ANALYSIS

¶8. In Lindsey, this Court adopted a procedure “to govern cases where appellate counsel represents an indigent criminal defendant and does not believe his or her client’s case presents any arguable issues on appeal.” Lindsey, 939 So.2d at 748. Counsel is required to “file and serve a brief in compliance with Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(1)—(4),(7).” Id. In the brief,

counsel must certify that there are no arguable issues supporting the client’s appeal, and he or she has reached this conclusion after scouring the record thoroughly, specifically examining: (a) the reason for the arrest and the circumstances surrounding arrest; (b) any possible violations of the client’s right to counsel; (c) the entire trial transcript; (d) all rulings of the trial court; (e) possible prosecutorial misconduct; (f) all jury instructions; (g) all exhibits, whether admitted into evidence or not; and (h) possible misapplication of the law in sentencing.

Id. Counsel is then required to forward a copy of the brief to the client, informing the client that counsel was unable to discover any arguable issues in the record, and advising the client that he or she has a right to file a pro se brief. Id. If the pro se brief raises any arguable issue or the appellate court discovers any arguable issue in its review of the record, then “the court must, if circumstances warrant, require appellate counsel to submit supplemental briefing on the issue, regardless of the probability of the defendant’s success on appeal.” Id.

¶ 9. In this case, Graves’s appellate counsel has submitted a brief in compliance with Lindsey. Graves filed a pro se brief arguing numerous issues. We have reviewed the record and find that there are no arguable issues for appeal. We further find that Graves’s pro se brief raises no arguable issues and that no supplemental briefing is warranted. See Byrd v. State, 158 So.3d 1146, 1149-50 (Miss.2015); Havard v. State, 94 So.3d 229, 235 (Miss. 2012) (finding no need for supplemental briefing when the pro se brief raised no arguable issues). This Court will briefly address the issues raised by Graves’s pro se brief.

I. Defective Indictment

¶ 10. Graves alleges that his indictment was defective because the language was confusing and lacked specificity in the multiple counts. We find no error in the indictment. Graves was indicted for two counts of fondling pursuant to Section 97-5-23(1) of the Mississippi Code and two counts of sexual battery, one of which was later nolle prossed, pursuant to Section 97-3-95(l)(d).

¶ 11. An indictment is required to contain a “concise and clear statement of the elements of the crime charged.” Mixon v. State, 921 So.2d 275, 280 (Miss.2005) (quoting King v. State, 580 So.2d 1182, 1185 (Miss.1991); Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 804 (Miss.1984)). Graves’s amended indictment reads, in pertinent part:

COMMON SCHEME OR PLAN
This multi-count indictment is pursuant to Section 99-7-2 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended in that the individual counts are part of a Common Scheme or Plan, are similar or same acts, close in time and with the same primary witnesses.
COUNT ONE
Between the dates of July 23, 2010 and July 26, 2010, in Lamar County, Mississippi, the defendant, Marshall Graves, being then and there a male person above the age of eighteen (18) years, to-wit: forty-five (45) years, with the defendant’s date of birth being June 22, 1965, did willfully, unlawfully and felo-niously and for the purpose of gratifying his lust or indulging his depraved licentious sexual desires, handle, touch or rub with his hand the breasts of G.W., a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, to-wit: ten (10) years of age, whose date of birth is September 21, 1999, contrary to and in violation of Section 97-5-23(1) of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended; against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi, and,
COUNT THREE
Between the dates of July 30, 2010 and August 1, 2010, in Lamar County, Mississippi, the defendant, Marshall Graves, being then and there a male person above the age of eighteen (18) years, to-wit: forty-five (45) years, with the defendant’s date of birth being June 22, 1965, did willfully, unlawfully and felo-niously and for the purpose of gratifying his lust or indulging his depraved licentious sexual desires, handle, touch or rub with his penis the vagina of G.W., a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, to-wit: ten (10) years of age, whose date of birth is September 21, 1999, contrary to and in violation of Section 97-5-23(1) of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended; against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi, and,
COUNT POUR
Between the dates of July 30, 2010 and August 1, 2010, in Lamar County, Mississippi, the defendant, Marshall Graves, did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in the sexual penetration of one G.W., by placing his finger into the vagina of G.W., a child under the age of fourteen (14) years, to-wit, ten (10) years of age, her date of birth being September 21,1999, and who is twenty-four (24) or more months younger than Marshall Graves, being forty-five (45) years of age and the date of birth being June 22, 1965, and not the spouse of Marshall Graves, contrary to and in -violation of Section 97—3—95(l)(d) of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended; against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.

Graves’s indictment was amended to rename counts three and four as two and three for trial purposes, after count two was nolle prossed. Additionally, the indictment was amended to add the following language to each count:

That the defendant is a habitual offender under the provisions of Section 99-19-81 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, in that the defendant was convicted of Commercial Burglary in Cause No. 6199-1 of the Circuit Court of Lamar County, Mississippi, on December 14, 1988, and sentenced to serve a term of five (5) years in the custody of Mississippi Department of Corrections. That for a second offense he was convicted of two counts of Receiving Stolen Property in Cause No. 2007K-244H of the Circuit Court of Lamar County, Mississippi, on July 29, 2008, and sentenced to serve a term of five (5) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with two (2) months to serve and four (4) years and ten (10) months suspended on Post Release Supervision. The prior offenses were separately brought and arose out of separate incidents at different times and the Defendant was sentenced to separate terms of one year on each offense against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.

¶ 12. From the face of Graves’s indictment, he was charged with two counts of fondling G.W., a child under the age of sixteen, and sexually battering G.W., a child under the age of fourteen, all occurring when he was forty-five years old. As such, Graves’s indictment complied with Rule 7.06 of the Mississippi Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice, as each count tracks the language of the statutes. See Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1139 (Miss.1985) (Indictments that track the language of the Mississippi Code are sufficient to provide notice of the crime charged.). Therefore, the indictment provided a clear description of the charges from which Graves could prepare his defense. We find this issue is without merit.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 13. Graves next argues that one of the trial counsel appointed to his case, Shirlee Baldwin, was ineffective. Graves makes no claim that Robert Whitacre, his original counsel and first chair, was ineffective. In Wilcher v. State, 863 So.2d 776 (Miss.2003), this Court recognized that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims may be reviewed on direct appeal only if “(1) the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, or (2) the parties stipulate that the record is adequate to allow the appellate court to make the finding without consideration of the findings of fact of the trial judge.” Id. at 825. In its response, the State stipulates that the record is adequately developed for this Court to resolve the issue.

If 14. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Graves must show that his counsel’s performance was defective and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Taylor v. State, 167 So.3d 1143, 1146 (Miss.2015) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L,Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Graves’s ineffective-assistance argument is based on Baldwin being appointed, as second chair, the week prior to trial and thus not having sufficient time to prepare for his trial. “An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to properly prepare must state whether any additional investigation, such as interviewing witnesses or investigating facts, would have significantly aided or altered the outcome of the defendant’s case at trial.” Benson v. State, 821 So.2d 823, 827 (Miss. 2002) (citing Brown v. State, 798 So.2d 481, 494, 496 (Miss.2001); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991)). Graves fails to show any deficient performance by Baldwin. Graves claims that Baldwin wanted to keep a medical appointment, which was scheduled for the second day of trial. However, Baldwin agreed to reschedule this appointment after Graves made it known that he wanted her to be present for trial. This issue is without merit.

III. Evidence of Prior Bad Acts

¶ 15. Graves argues that the trial court improperly admitted the video of G.W. being interviewed by Cheryl Caldwell, a counselor with the Child Advocacy Center. However, the transcript reveals that defense counsel offered the video into evidence to impeach G.W. with what defense counsel stated was a prior inconsistent statement. During the interview, G.W. informed Caldwell that at some point in time Graves was on house arrest and had fought with his girlfriend. “A defendant cannot complain on appeal of alleged errors invited or induced by himself.” Galloway v. State, 122 So.3d 614, 645 (Miss.2013) (quoting Caston v. State, 823 So.2d 473, 502 (Miss.2002); Singleton v. State, 518 So.2d 653, 655 (Miss.1988)). Therefore, any alleged error cannot be attributed to the trial court.

¶ 16. Additionally, Graves argues that he should have been allowed to play only portions of the video and not the entire video. However, this Court has held:

If a party wishes to cross-examine a witness as to a prior out-of-court statement (usually made by the witness himself), he will not be permitted to pick out the part favorable to himself and leave it there. The opposing party is then permitted to offer the entire statement into evidence in order to give the jury a complete picture. Davis v. State, 230 Miss. 183, 92 So.2d 359 (1957); Sanders v. State, 237 Miss. 772, 115 So.2d 145 (1959). See, Comment to Rule 106: “Such a rule attempts to prevent misleading the jury by taking evidence out of context.”

Welch v. State, 566 So.2d 680, 689-90 (Miss.1990). Therefore, this issue is without merit.

TV. Testimony of G. W. Father

¶ 17. During its case-in-chief, the State called G.W.’s father to testify. Defense counsel objected because Mr, W. was not on the State’s original witness list. The State informed both the trial judge and defense counsel that the witness list had been supplemented. Additionally, Mr. W’s statement was included in the original discovery provided to defense counsel; therefore, defense counsel was on notice that Mr. W. could be called as a witness and what his testimony would be if he were called. Defense counsel argued that he never received the supplemental witness list, even though one was filed with the trial court. The trial court allowed defense counsel additional time to prepare its cross-examination after Mr. W. testified on direct.

¶ 18. While we find no discovery violation occurred, this Court considers discovery violations to be harmless “unless it affirmatively appears from the entire record that the violation caused a miscarriage of justice.” Payton v. State, 897 So.2d 921, 942 (Miss.2003). During cross-examination, it also was revealed that defense counsel and Mr. W. had spoken previously. Mr. W. did not offer testimony that inculpated Graves in the crimes charged. Moreover, Mr. W. testified that he did not speak with G.W. regarding the specifics of her allegations against Graves. As such, this issue is without merit.

V. Tender-Years Exception

¶ 19. Graves argues the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements under the tender-years exception. However, the record reflects that defense counsel did not object to the State eliciting tender-years hearsay.

MS. HARLIN: Our next witness is going to be [friend of G.W.].
THE COURT: The little girl?
MS. HARLIN: We’re going to tender her. Her mother has to testify as well. They are both here. So if we think we’re only going to get to one today, I ask that we they wait until tomorrow, so they don’t have to—
MR. WHITACRE: She’s going to miss school.
MS. HARLIN: Your Honor, both of those are going to be—we’re seeking to elicit tender-years hearsay from them.
THE COURT: We need to boot everyone out.
MS, HARLIN: We would need to do a hearing outside the presence of the jury, for the mother and the child.
THE COURT: That will take [a] few minutes.
MR. WHITACRE: That’s only if I object.
MS. HARLIN: You don’t object to the tender-years hearsay coming in?
MR. WHITACRE: No.
MS. HARLIN: As long as we have that on the record then.

¶ 20. “This Court has consistently held that failure to make a contemporaneous objection constitutes waiver of an issue on appeal.” Redmond v. State, 66 So.3d 107, 110-11 (Miss.2011) (holding that Redmond was procedurally barred from arguing that the trial court had erred in publishing victim’s forensic interview to the jury after Redmond had agreed that the jury could view the video) (quoting Derouen v. State, 994 So.2d 748, 751 (Miss. 2008)). Therefore, we find that Graves’s arguments are procedurally barred.

VI. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 21. Graves argues that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support his fondling and sexual-battery convictions because G.W.’s testimony was inconsistent. When considering a sufficiency-of-the-evidenee argument, this Court must consider “whether the evidence shows ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction.’ ” Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss.2005) (quoting Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss.1968)). This Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Kirk v. State, 160 So.3d 685, 695-96 (Miss.2015). Additionally, it is well-established that a person may be found guilty based on nothing more than the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness. See Ferguson v. State, 137 So.3d 240, 244 (Miss.2014); Brown v. State, 42 So.3d 540, 543 (Miss. 2010); Doby v. State, 532 So.2d 584, 591 (Miss.1988),

¶22. G.W. testified in detail regarding the two times that Graves fondled and sexually assaulted her. Although Graves attempted to impeach G.W.’s testimony through her interview with Caldwell, G.W.’s testimony was not substantially contradicted. Additionally, the State offered the testimony of four other witnesses, G.W.’s mother, brother, friend, and friend’s mother, who all corroborated G.W.’s testimony. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial sufficiently supported a finding that Graves sexually assaulted and fondled G.W., and this issue is without merit.

VIL and VIII. Weight of the Evidence

¶ 23. Graves argues that his convictions should be reversed because the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Graves again argues that G.W. provided inconsistent testimony and that other various witnesses provided various versions of the events.

¶ 24. This Court will disturb a verdict only when “it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush, 895 So.2d at 844. “The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the evidence must preponderate heavily against the verdict.” Brown v. State, 152 So.3d 1146, 1165 (Miss.2014) (citing Cotton v. State, 144 So.3d 137 (Miss. 2014)). For the reasons stated in the sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis, we find that Graves’s conviction was not an “unconscionable injustice,” and this issue also is without merit.

IX. and XI. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 25. Graves alleges that he was denied a fair trial due to misconduct by the prosecutor. Graves argues that, during closing arguments, the district attorney made references to Graves being a “pedophile” and that he had the propensity to harm other children. Additionally, Graves argues that the district attorney referenced a specific jury instruction during closing arguments.

¶ 26. Grave’s defense counsel did not object to any of the district attorney’s references to' Graves being a pedophile. This Court repeatedly has held that failure to object contemporaneously at trial waives any claim of error on appeal. Howell v. State, 860 So.2d 704, 756 (Miss. 2003) (Court held issue to be procedurally barred due to defendant’s failure to object at trial.); Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179, 1203 (Miss.1996) (A contemporaneous objection to the allegedly prejudicial remarks in a prosecutor’s closing argument is required.); Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 597 (Miss.1995) (Court has held “[i]f no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived.”); Lock-ett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1333 (Miss. 1987) (“This Court on numerous occasions has refused to consider the issue of prose-cutorial misconduct where the defendant did not raise it at trial and we so refuse to do so today.”). Therefore, Graves waived the right to raise this instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. See Gillett v. State, 56 So.3d 469, 520-21 (Miss. 2010).

¶ 27. Graves’s defense counsel did object during the State’s closing argument when the district attorney referenced a single jury instruction. However, when the prosecutor began to reference the jury instruction, the only statement made by Graves’s counsel was “[ojbject.” He offered no grounds for the objection, and Graves fails to cite any legal authority in his argument for rehearing. This Court repeatedly has held that “failure to cite legal authority in support of an argument eliminates our obligation to review the issue.” Glasper v. State, 914 So.2d 708, 726 (Miss.2005) (citing Byrom v. State, 863 So.2d 836, 863 (Miss.2003) (“Failure to cite legal authority obviates the appellate court’s obligation to review such issues.”)). Procedural bar notwithstanding, this assignment is without error.

X. Severance of Indictment

¶ 28. Graves argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever count one from counts three and four in his indictment. Count one referenced a fondling that took place between July 23, 2010, and July 26, 2010, while counts three and four referenced a sexual battery and fondling that occurred between July 30, 2010, and August 1, 2010. Graves claims that his counsel was unable to defend him properly against these “indistinguishable charges.”

¶ 29. At the hearing on Graves’s Motion to Sever, defense counsel argued that Graves was charged with two different acts during two different, two-day time periods. Defense counsel further argued that the indictment referenced six separate days, and it would be impossible to provide an alibi for six separate time periods.

¶ 30. The State responded that, under Section 99-7-2, it was allowed to “charge and prosecute two or more acts or transactions that are connected together as part of a common scheme or common plan.” See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-7-2 (Rev.2015). The State further alleged that “we have the same victim, the same witnesses, a time frame close in span to one another, and they’re in the same manner and same types of acts that were committed.” Additionally, the State argued that:

[the Supreme Court has] held that when dealing with child sexual assault cases, it is appropriate to get within a 30-day window on a time and date frame in regards to an alibi, in date and time of allegations happening. We certainly tried to—and they encouraged the prosecution to alert with specificity where the allegations occurred, what the specific allegations were. And I think we’ve done a good job of placing Mr. Graves on notice as to what acts he’s actually being charged with, because they are separate and distinct acts that are being alleged. As I said before and read into the record, we’ve specified within each count of the indictment the specific acts that are alleged, to place him on notice of what he’s looking at. So we do believe that the three-day time window is within restraint set by the Supreme Court.

Defense counsel offered no rebuttal argument.

¶ 31. The trial court determined that the State had presented a prima facie case satisfying its duty to provide Graves with specific acts and dates. The trial court also found that the time span provided in the indictment was not so broad as to fail to put Graves on notice of the specific acts alleged. The trial court denied Graves’s motion to sever.

¶ 32. This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to sever multiple counts of an indictment for abuse of discretion. Rushing v. State, 911 So.2d 526, 532 (Miss.2005) (citing Brawner v. State, 872 So.2d 1, 6-7 (Miss.2004)). “In trials concerning multi-count indictments, severance is unnecessary in Mississippi if the acts or transactions are connected together as part of a common scheme or plan and if the indictment was otherwise proper.” Richardson v. State, 74 So.3d 317, 323 (Miss.2011) (quoting Rushing, 911 So.2d at 532). This Court finds that the trial court’s denial of Graves’s motion to sever was not an abuse of discretion because the State presented a prima facie case that the crimes were part of a common scheme or plan. Graves made no showing that the crimes were separate and distinct transactions. Therefore, this issue is without merit.

XII. Cumulative Error

¶ 33. Finally, Graves argues that the cumulative effect of the various errors alleged require his convictions to be reversed. “It is well settled that the cumulative effect of errors, which independently would not require reversal, may necessitate reversal in some cases. However, when no error is found as to any individual assignment, there are no errors to cumu-late.” Watkins v. State, 101 So.3d 628, 637 (Miss.2012). Because we find that none of Graves’s assignments of error has merit, we further find that there are no errors to cumulate, and this assignment of error also is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶ 34. We find that Graves’s appellate counsel’s brief complies with the requirements of Lindsey. After reviewing Graves’s pro se brief and the record, we further find that there are no arguable issues that warrant supplemental briefing. Graves’s assignments of error are without merit, and his convictions and sentences are affirmed.

¶ 35, COUNT I: CONVICTION OF FONDLING AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN (15) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. COUNT II: CONVICTION OF FONDLING AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN (15) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. COUNT III: CONVICTION OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. SENTENCES IN COUNTS I, II, AND III SHALL RUN CONCURRENTLY UNDER § 99-19-81, WITH CONDITIONS. APPELLANT SHALL PAY A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,500, PAY AN ASSESSMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF $3,500 TO LAMAR COUNTY FOR THE PUBLIC DEFENDERS FUND, PAY ALL COURT COSTS, AND PAY $1,660 TO ADAPTS ELECTRONIC MONITORING. APPELLANT IS TO HAVE NO CONTACT WITH THE VICTIM OR HER FAMILY, AND SHOULD THE APPELLANT BE RELEASED HE IS REQUIRED TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER. APPELLANT SHALL BE GIVEN CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED IN THE COUNTY JAIL, IF APPLICABLE, AS ALLOWED BY LAW.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Count 2 of the indictment, which was the second count of sexual battery, was nolle

        prossed (retired to the files) without prejudice. The indictment was amended and renumbered for trial purposes.

      . The trial court found that Graves previously had been convicted of commercial burglaiy and two counts of receiving stolen property, and he had been sentenced to serve five years for each count.

      . Appellate counsel is Daniel Hinchcliff from the Office of the State Public Defender; trial counsel were Robert Whitacre and Shirlee Baldwin.