text:
    Robert Glen HILL, II, Appellant, v. Julie L. JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1638
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2018
    Robert Glen Hill, II, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee; Kenneth Steely, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Appellant challenges the trial court's summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court denied the motion as successive in an order filed on February 2, 2017. However, at the time the trial court denied the motion, an appeal of a previously filed postconviction motion raising substantially similar claims was pending in this Court. That appeal did not become final until June 2017. Because the appeal of the earlier 3.850 motion was pending before this Court when the trial court ruled on the instant motion, the trial court was without jurisdiction, as both motions raised the same or related issues. See McFarland v. State , 808 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ("While an appeal of a prior postconviction motion is pending, the trial court has no jurisdiction to rule on a subsequent post-conviction motion when the issues in the two motions are related."). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to once again consider Appellant's motion when it has jurisdiction to do so.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Bilbrey and Jay, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Neal EVANS, Petitioner, v. Julie L. JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-3086
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2018
    Neal Evans, pro se, Petitioner.
    Kenneth S. Steely, General Counsel, and Beverly Brewster, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits.

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    William Samuel STAPLETON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-2846
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 23, 2018
    William Samuel Stapleton, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for belated appeal is denied. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(A).

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Zachariah STRICKLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3850
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 18, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

We affirm appellant's convictions and sentences in this Anders appeal, but remand for correction of the judgment to reflect that, in case number 16-CF-2598, count 4 is a first-degree felony. See § 893.135(1)(f)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2016). In case number 17-CF-501, counts 2 through 6 are third-degree felonies. See § 893.13(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017). See King v. State , 201 So.3d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (affirming an Anders appeal but remanding for correction of scrivener's errors in the written judgment); Washington v. State , 37 So.3d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (same).

AFFIRMED .

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.

      Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).


text:
    Thomas JOYNER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-3645
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 18, 2018
    Thomas Joyner, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for belated appeal is denied on the merits.

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    William PRIVETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2610
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 25, 2018
    William Privett, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The appellant appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and reverse in part for further proceedings.

In 2011, following a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of lewd and lascivious battery and contributing to the delinquency of a minor and sentenced to prison. The appellant filed a timely motion for postconviction relief alleging five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of grounds one, three, four, and five without further discussion. However, for the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand the denial of ground two for further proceedings.

In ground two, the appellant alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert to testify that the appellant did not write certain notes to the victim. The victim testified that she saw the appellant write the notes in which he allegedly professed his love for the victim and specified a certain sexual act he wanted to engage in with her. He alleges that he did not write the letters and that an expert would be able to confirm as much. He alleges that if an expert had established that he did not write the notes, the victim's credibility would have been harmed, and her testimony was the only evidence against him. There is nothing in the record before this Court that conclusively refutes the appellant's claims. Thus, we reverse and remand for the trial court to hold a hearing on the appellant's claim.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with directions.

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Larry C. GOODMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 1D16-5248 1D16-5249
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 25, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Justin F. Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Holly N. Simcox, Assistant Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED . See Sheppard v. State , 17 So.3d 275, 286-87 (Fla. 2009) (agreeing that a trial court may strike pro se rule 3.170(l ) motion as a nullity unless the motion "contains specific allegations that give rise to an adversarial relationship, such as misadvice, affirmative misrepresentations, or coercion that led to the entry of the plea"); Echeverria v. State , 33 So.3d 802, 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that a defendant's "broad, general allegations of ineffectiveness of his counsel do not indicate misadvice, coercion, or misrepresentation that would require a hearing under Sheppard .").

Wolf, Winokur, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    La Tissha M. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-3432
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 25, 2018
    La Tissha M. Johnson, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner seeks certiorari review of the trial court's denial of her motion to reduce or modify her sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). The trial court dismissed the motion as untimely. However, the motion was filed within sixty days of the date that this Court issued the mandates in her direct appeals. See Bailey v. State , 136 So.3d 615, 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("[A] rule 3.800(c) motion is considered filed when entrusted to prison officials for further delivery or processing."). As the State concedes, the motion was timely filed. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(c).

The trial court's failure to consider Petitioner's rule 3.800(c) motion on the merits was a departure from the essential requirements of law. See Bacchus v. State , 958 So.2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari, vacate the order dismissing Petitioner's rule 3.800(c) motion, and remand with directions to consider the motion on its merits.

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Khamron ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0085
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 25, 2018
    Khamron Robinson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The Appellant seeks review of an order denying a motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The State concedes error and we accept the concession.

When the trial court entered the order denying the motion, the Appellant's direct appeals from the convictions and sentences he was challenging in the postconviction motion were still pending in this Court. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion. See Burch v. State , 721 So.2d 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider postconviction motion because the direct appeal was pending). The Appellant's direct appeals have since become final. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider the motion after this opinion becomes final. See McDaniel v. State , 789 So.2d 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Amber DEJESUS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-37
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 25, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

We affirm this appeal in all regards, but remand for entry of a corrected order of revocation of probation. After granting the appellant's Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion, the lower court entered an amended order of revocation to conform to the court's oral pronouncement. The amended revocation order found the appellant had violated conditions (4) and (9) of her drug offender probation. The amended order also found a violation of condition (5), listing all of the new law violations as the six new law charges in case number 16-2301. This was in error as the court only orally found a violation of condition (5) for one of those charges: possession of marijuana. The amended revocation order is affirmed on conditions (4), (9), and (5) for possession of marijuana in case number 16-2301. To the extent the amended written revocation order still did not conform to the oral pronouncement and improperly included violations for the other offenses charged in case number 16-2301, the case is remanded for entry of a corrected order. See Leggs v. State , 27 So.3d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED .

Roberts, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    The FLORIDA LOTTERY, Appellant, v. SENECA ONE, LLC, and Rhonda Mortimer-Buckner, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-2836
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 4, 2018
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Rachel Nordby, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    W. Mason and Megan A. McNamara of Fox Rothschild, LLP, West Palm Beach, for Appellee Seneca One, LLC.
   Per Curiam.

This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the non-final order under review did not explicitly determine, as a matter of law, that Appellant, The Florida Lottery, was not entitled to sovereign immunity, a point which Appellant concedes. See Fla. Highway Patrol, a Div. of the Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Jackson , 238 So.3d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (dismissing the appeal filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(xi) where the non-final order being challenged did not explicitly determine, as a matter of law, that the appellant was not entitled to sovereign immunity); see also Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. McClain , 1D16-474, --- So.3d ----, ----, 2018 WL 1833386, at *2 (Fla. 1st DCA Apr. 18, 2018) ("Because the court here did not explicitly indicate on the face of the order that it was denying sovereign immunity as a matter of law, the order is not appealable."). The trial court may enter an amended order explicitly stating on its face that Appellant is not entitled to sovereign immunity, if that was the substance of the trial court's determination. See id. at ----, 2018 WL 1833386 at *3.

DISMISSED .

Lewis, Makar, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tavares SPELLMAN-FOLMAR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3082
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 25, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

We affirm appellant's convictions and sentences, but remand for correction of a scrivener's error in the written judgment. Appellant pleaded guilty to all five counts charged in the information, and the trial court orally adjudicated him guilty of all five counts. Count five was included on the fourth page of the written judgment, but omitted from the first page. On remand, the lower tribunal shall enter a corrected written judgment that conforms to the court's oral pronouncement of guilt on all five counts. See King v. State , 201 So.3d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (affirming an Anders appeal but remanding for correction of scrivener's errors in the written judgment); Washington v. State , 37 So.3d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (same).

AFFIRMED and REMANDED with instructions.

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Qavontae Machell LANG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-2930
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 4, 2018
    Rocco J. Carbone, III, St. Augustine, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Appellant, Qavontae MacHell Lang, contends in part that we should reverse his convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel that is apparent on the face of the record. Except in rare cases, allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in a postconviction proceeding brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, not on direct appeal. See Barnett v. State , 181 So.3d 534, 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). We reject Appellant's argument that this case meets that rare standard. While Appellant also raises what he characterizes as a double jeopardy argument, he challenges his two fifteen-year sentences, not his convictions. See State v. Williams , 854 So.2d 215, 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (noting that a double jeopardy claim "constitutes, in reality, a challenge to [the appellee's] convictions rather [than] his sentence"). Because Appellant did not preserve this argument, we cannot address it. See Sims v. State , 998 So.2d 494, 504 (Fla. 2008) ("In Florida, a specific, contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve a sentencing error."). Our disposition does not preclude Appellant from challenging his sentences in a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). See Eason v. State , 932 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (noting that the appellant, who completed youthful offender boot camp, argued in his rule 3.800(a) motion that the trial court erred in sentencing him following his violation of probation). Finally, we have considered Appellant's remaining arguments, which we find to be meritless.

AFFIRMED .

LEWIS , KELSEY , and WINSOR , JJ., concur.


text:
    Deontra R. FRENCH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-2230
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 4, 2018
    Melissa J. Ford, Assistant Regional Conflict Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Deontra French beat a man to death at the Florida State Hospital. He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to ten years. This is his appeal.

French's appointed counsel originally filed an initial brief raising just one issue: that the trial court failed to enter a written order on competency. The same brief acknowledged that the trial court orally ruled French competent to proceed, and the brief did not challenge the correctness of that ruling. The brief did not seek a reversal; it asked only that we require the trial court to put its unchallenged oral ruling into writing.

Because the initial brief sought no relief that would have benefitted French, this court entered an order directing counsel to file an amended initial brief that complied with the obligations outlined in In re Anders Briefs , 581 So.2d 149, 151 (Fla. 1991). Counsel did so, asserting in the new brief that after a comprehensive review of the record, counsel was unable to make a good faith argument for reversal. We then conducted our own full review, see State v. Causey , 503 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla. 1987) ("[P]ursuant to Anders , in order to assure indigents fair and meaningful appellate review, the appellate court must examine the record to the extent necessary to discover any errors apparent on the face of the record."), which led to the discovery of an error regarding costs imposed at sentencing, see Nix v. State , 84 So.3d 424, 425-26 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (reversing fines imposed pursuant to sections 775.083 and 938.04 because the fines were not specifically pronounced at the sentencing hearing).

Having identified a sentencing error, we entered an order striking the Anders brief and directing counsel to file a rule 3.800 motion to correct the sentence in the lower court. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(g)(2)(B). Counsel did so, and the trial court modified the sentence by removing the costs at issue.

The case is now back before us. After completing our review, which turned up no other arguable bases for reversal, we affirm.

AFFIRMED .

Kelsey, Winokur, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM WEIMER, J., dissenting.

text:
    IN RE: Michael J. RILEY, Sr.
    NO. 2018-OB-0237
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON APPLICATION FOR READMISSION
   PER CURIAM

This proceeding arises out of an application for readmission to the practice of law filed by petitioner, Michael J. Riley, Sr., a disbarred attorney.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1987, petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for three years. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Riley , 500 So.2d 753 (La. 1987). He was disbarred in 1990. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Riley , 555 So.2d 984 (La. 1990).

In November 2016, petitioner filed the instant application for readmission with the disciplinary board, alleging he has complied with the readmission criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). The Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") filed an objection to petitioner's application. The matter was then referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee. Following the hearing, the committee recommended that petitioner be readmitted to the practice of law, subject to a period of probation with conditions.

Neither petitioner nor the ODC objected to the hearing committee's recommendation. However, on our own motion, we ordered the parties to file briefs addressing whether petitioner has the requisite competence, honesty, and integrity to be readmitted to the practice of law. Both parties submitted briefs in accordance with the court's order.

DISCUSSION

After considering the record in its entirety, we will adopt the committee's recommendation and readmit petitioner to the practice of law. Nevertheless, further precautions are warranted to insure that the public will be protected upon petitioner's return to practice. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(J).

Accordingly, we will order that petitioner be conditionally readmitted to the practice of law, subject to a two-year period of probation governed by the following conditions:

1. During the probationary period, petitioner shall pay restitution to his former client, Dallas Miller, in the amount of $10,000, plus legal interest. Petitioner shall provide evidence of such payments to the ODC on at least a quarterly basis.
2. During the probationary period, petitioner shall only be employed by a government agency or shall associate with an established group of practitioners. Petitioner shall have an affirmative obligation to notify the ODC within ten days should he change his employment.
3. Petitioner shall enroll in and successfully complete the Louisiana State Bar Association's Ethics School.
4. Petitioner shall participate in an approved law office management seminar.
5. Petitioner shall cooperate with the ODC, and shall comply with any and all requirements imposed upon him by the ODC.

Should petitioner fail to comply with these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated immediately, or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, as appropriate.

DECREE

Upon review of the recommendation of the hearing committee, and considering the record and the briefs of the parties, it is ordered that Michael J. Riley, Sr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 11274, be immediately readmitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a two-year period of unsupervised probation governed by the conditions set forth herein. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Should petitioner fail to comply with the conditions of probation, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated immediately, or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, as appropriate. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.

WEIMER, J., dissents and would deny readmission.

GUIDRY, J., dissents and would deny readmission.

CLARK, J., would deny readmission and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J., dissenting.

I would deny readmission

CLARK, JUSTICE

I would deny petitioner's application for readmission to the practice of law. Petitioner's unauthorized practice of law after his previous suspension and disbarment, along with his failure to make restitution, are acts that do not merit readmission to the bar.


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    IN RE: Edward Bissau MENDY
    NO. 2018-B-0384
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
   PER CURIAM

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") against respondent, Edward Bissau Mendy, a disbarred attorney.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review respondent's prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 1993. In 2001, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months, followed by six months of probation, for failing to competently represent clients, neglecting and failing to expedite legal matters, failing to communicate with clients, and failing to cooperate in the disciplinary proceedings. In re: Mendy , 01-1462 (La. 8/31/01), 793 So.2d 1225 (" Mendy I ").

In 2012, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for three years for neglecting legal matters, failing to communicate with clients, failing to account for or refund unearned fees, and failing to return client files. In re: Mendy , 11-2275 (La. 2/17/12), 81 So.3d 650 (" Mendy II ").

In 2016, we disbarred respondent for neglecting legal matters, failing to refund unearned fees, and failing to cooperate in the disciplinary proceedings. In re Mendy , 16-0456 (La. 10/19/16), 217 So.3d 260 (" Mendy III ").

Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at issue in the instant proceeding.

FORMAL CHARGES

In August 2009, Tyler Malejko retained respondent to prepare a patent application, to represent him as needed to perfect his patent, and to explore various beneficial strategies related to the patent. Under the terms of their written agreement, Mr. Malejko agreed to pay respondent a $7,000 flat fee, regardless of the actual time expended on the case, for up to thirty-five hours of legal services. In addition to that amount, Mr. Malejko agreed to pay legal fees at the rate of $250 per hour, up to a maximum additional fee of $5,500. Mr. Malejko paid respondent $7,000 towards the $12,500 fee. Mr. Malejko produced a Chase Bank receipt reflecting the $7,000 deposit into respondent's checking account. By e-mail dated January 7, 2010, respondent acknowledged receiving the payment. However, there is no evidence that respondent took any action in the matter.

In February 2015, Mr. Malejko filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to respond to the complaint.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In February 2016, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(c) (a lawyer is required to comply with all of the requirements of the Supreme Court's rules regarding annual registration), 1.3 (a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4(a) (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(a) (charging an unreasonable fee), 1.5(f)(5) (failure to refund an unearned fee), 1.15(a) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee's consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the ODC's deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee determined that the factual allegations in the formal charges were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. The committee also found no evidence that respondent cooperated with the ODC.

Based on these facts, the committee determined that respondent violated Rules 1.1(c), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a), 1.15(a), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, the committee found that respondent failed to properly notify the court of his address changes, in violation of Rule 1.1(c) ; failed to do anything for his client, in violation of Rule 1.3 ; failed to inform his client of the status of his legal matter, in violation of Rule 1.4 ; collected legal fees but failed to perform any work for his client, in violation of Rule 1.5(a) ; failed to hold client funds separate from his own, failed to deposit the funds into his trust account, and failed to return the funds to his client, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) ; failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation, in violation of Rule 8.1(c) ; knowingly violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, in violation of Rule 8.4(a); and through his acceptance of fees, misrepresenting the services he was to perform, and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit, he knowingly violated Rule 8.4(c). The committee did not address the violation of Rule 1.5(f)(5) alleged in the formal charges.

The committee determined that respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his client. His conduct caused actual harm inasmuch as he failed to perform any work for Mr. Malejko and did not return the deposit to Mr. Malejko. Based on the ABA's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined that the applicable baseline sanction is disbarment.

In aggravation, the committee found a prior disciplinary record, a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct "based on prior disciplines," bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1993). The committee found no mitigating factors present.

After further considering this court's prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the committee found permanent disbarment to be warranted. The committee then commented that since the time of his admission, respondent has collected fees from clients and taken no action in their cases. The committee added that he has been disciplined on multiple occasions for this type of misconduct. Considering the serious harm he has caused, his complete failure to make restitution, his failure to acknowledge wrongdoing, and his failure to cooperate with the ODC, the committee recommended respondent be permanently disbarred. The committee also recommended he be ordered to make $7,000 in restitution to Mr. Malejko.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee's report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee's factual findings in this deemed admitted matter are supported by the factual allegations in the formal charges and/or by the evidence submitted in support of those allegations. Based on these findings, the board determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges, including the violation of Rule 1.5(f)(5) which was not addressed in the committee's report.

The board determined respondent intentionally violated duties owed to his client and as a professional. Respondent received fees to perform work on a legal matter and then failed to perform the work as agreed. Mr. Malejko's numerous requests for a return of the unearned fees were to no avail. Respondent also failed to keep his attorney registration information current. After multiple attempts to serve respondent, the ODC obtained proof that he received the formal charges at an address he provided. Nevertheless, although respondent was served as required by Supreme Court Rule XIX, he refused to respond to the formal charge petition, which then proceeded as a deemed admitted matter. His failure to respond to the petition or otherwise participate in the disciplinary proceedings caused the unnecessary expenditure of the disciplinary agency's limited resources to investigate the complaint and bring formal charges.

In aggravation, the board found a prior disciplinary record, a dishonest or selfish motive, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law. The board found no mitigating factors present.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board determined that respondent's substantive misconduct occurred during the same time period as the misconduct subject of Mendy III . Accordingly, the board determined that the Chatelain approach is applicable to the substantive misconduct in this case. The board further determined that, taken as a whole, there is no doubt that the baseline sanction for the collective misconduct is disbarment.

The board then considered whether respondent's conduct, taken as a whole, is so egregious that he should be permanently prohibited from reapplying for admission to the practice of law. The board found that consideration of the instant misconduct with respondent's nearly identical misconduct in Mendy III reveals a pattern of serious misconduct. In Mendy III , the court found that respondent accepted legal fees from clients, abandoned their legal matters without doing any work, and failed to refund more than $4,800. Here, he has failed to refund $7,000, which he plainly admitted in his e-mail messages to Mr. Malejko. In total, he has effectively converted to his own use $11,800 of his clients' funds. In addition, respondent was suspended on two prior occasions for similar misconduct. In Mendy II , respondent failed to make restitution to one client for over six years, even though the obligation in the amount of $10,500 had been reduced to judgment.

Considering respondent's consistent pattern of serious misconduct, now including his unethical handling of Mr. Malejko's legal matter and fees, his continuing failure to address the obligations he owes as a professional, and the additional harm sustained by Mr. Malejko and the disciplinary system, the board recommended respondent be permanently disbarred. The board also recommended he be ordered to make $7,000 in restitution to Mr. Malejko. The board further recommended respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board's recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5 (B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

In re: Banks , 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan , 01-3058 (La. 1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

The record in this deemed admitted matter supports the rule violations found by the disciplinary board. Essentially, respondent neglected his client's patent matter, failed to communicate with him, and failed to refund any portion of the unearned fee he was paid. He then failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent's actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Reis , 513 So.2d 1173 (La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Whittington , 459 So.2d 520 (La. 1984).

Respondent intentionally violated duties owed to his client, the legal system, and the legal profession, causing actual harm. Several significant aggravating factors are present in the instant case, most notably respondent's prior disciplinary matters which involved misconduct identical to that at issue in this proceeding. In addition to the aggravating factors found by the disciplinary board, the record supports the aggravating factor of indifference to making restitution. No mitigating factors are present.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we agree with the disciplinary board's finding that the misconduct in both Mendy III and the current matter occurred during the same time frame and involved the same type of misconduct. The substantive misconduct forming the basis of Mendy III commenced in November 2009, when respondent accepted a fee from a client and then neglected the client's legal matter. In March 2010, he accepted fees from another client and neglected that client matter resulting in the dismissal with prejudice of the case. Respondent failed to refund the unearned fees to both clients. In October 2010, he issued an NSF check on his client trust account in the amount of $108,333.33 to the Clerk of the United States District Court. Respondent was disbarred in Mendy III on October 19, 2016. Here, the substantive misconduct commenced when respondent was retained to represent Mr. Malejko on August 31, 2009, and continued through February 2015, when Mr. Malejko submitted his complaint asserting that respondent had performed no work and refused to refund any fees. Accordingly, the discipline to be imposed should be determined as if both proceedings are being considered simultaneously, pursuant to the approach established in Chatelain , supra.

Had Mr. Malejko's complaint been added to the proceedings in Mendy III , we would have permanently disbarred respondent. Respondent did no work for Mr. Malejko and essentially converted the legal fee he was paid in that matter. Taken together with the misconduct in Mendy III , it is obvious that respondent does not possess the moral fitness to practice law in this state. Rather, his consistent pattern of misconduct and failure to attend to his professional obligations indicates that he should not be allowed the opportunity to return to the practice of law in the future.

Based on this reasoning, we find permanent disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case. Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board's recommendation and permanently disbar respondent.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Edward Bissau Mendy, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22117, be and he hereby is permanently disbarred. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. It is further ordered that respondent pay restitution of $7,000 plus legal interest to Tyler Malejko and/or to the Louisiana State Bar Association's Client Assistance Fund, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court's judgment until paid.

      The committee noted that in March 2016, the formal charges were mailed via certified mail to respondent's primary registration address and four other known addresses. The mailing to the primary registration address was returned marked "unclaimed." At the ODC's request, the formal charges were then sent by certified mail to an address provided by respondent to the board's staff. This mailing was received on July 12, 2016; nevertheless, respondent failed to file an answer to the charges. As a result, the ODC filed a motion to deem the factual allegations admitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3).

      In a 2010 e-mail, respondent asked the client to allow him to perform the work or he would "have to eat the loss personally (which I cannot afford at this time as I am currently over-extended)." In a 2011 e-mail, respondent again refused to refund the unearned fees and urged his client to let him perform the work so he would "not have to get into my pockets for money I spent long ago."

      In Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Chatelain , 573 So.2d 470 (La. 1991), the court observed that when a second attorney disciplinary proceeding involves conduct that occurred during the same time period as the first proceeding, the overall discipline to be imposed should be determined as if both proceedings were before the court simultaneously.


text:
    FIE, LLC v. NEW JAX CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC. and Earl Weber
    FIE, LLC v. New Jax Condo Association, Inc. and Earl Weber
    No. 2018-C-449
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
    Writ denied.
    CRICHTON, J., would grant and assigns reasons:
   I would grant and docket this writ application to examine the res nova issue of whether loss of use damages may be awarded to a juridical person, the importance of which is heightened here by the substantial judgment awarded to plaintiff.


author: WEIMER, J., would grant.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick WILLIAMS
    No. 2018-KP-0427
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF TANGIPAHOA
    Writ denied.
   WEIMER, J., would grant.

GENOVESE, J., would grant.

Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons

After defendant is resentenced pursuant to Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) and Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), that judgment is included by statute among those which defendant may appeal. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 912(C)(1) ; see, e.g., also State ex rel. Braud v. State , 15-0701 (La. 3/2/18), 237 So.3d 504. I additionally concur in the denial of defendant's writ application because the parties agree the question presented is res nova, and I believe the issue merits careful scrutiny, which can be better accomplished with the benefit of a fully developed record on appeal.


text:
    FIE, LLC v. NEW JAX CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC. and Earl Weber
    FIE, LLC v. New Jax Condo Association, Inc. and Earl Weber
    No. 2018-C-446
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
    Writ denied.
    CRICHTON, J., would grant and assigns reasons:
   I would grant and docket this writ application to examine the res nova issue of whether loss of use damages may be awarded to a juridical person, the importance of which is heightened here by the substantial judgment awarded to plaintiff.


author: Hughes, J., would grant the writ.

text:
    Raymond SCHULTZ v. COX OPERATING, LLC and Terry Vincent
    NO. 2018-C-0397
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    WEIMER, J., additionally concurs in the denial and assigns reasons.
    The appellate court errantly made explicit findings that Timothy Hassinger, counsel for Greene's Energy, LLC failed to respond to communications from plaintiff's counsel regarding discovery. Plaintiff's counsel does not dispute the representations to this court by Mr. Hassinger that the relevant communications were sent by plaintiff's counsel to an email address that was not Mr. Hassinger's email address. Mr. Hassinger supports his representations to this court with printed copies of the emails from the record on appeal. Accordingly, I conclude that the appellate court's findings regarding Mr. Hassinger failing to respond to those emails are incorrect.
   Hughes, J., would grant the writ.

Respectfully, I would grant the writ and provide some relief to counsel for Greene's Energy Group, LLC. He is criticized for failing to respond to emails that were sent to the wrong address (gtbs.com rather than gjtbs.com). This discrepancy is not contested. The court of appeal should have granted rehearing to amend its opinion in order to delete any implication that counsel for Greene's "failed to cooperate."


author: GENOVESE, J., concurs in the result.

text:
    Sherry Moore COLLINS v. David James COLLINS
    No. 2018-CC-0382
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRIT TO THE THIRTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF TERREBONNE
    Writ granted in part.
   GENOVESE, J., concurs in the result.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Curtis WILLIAMS
    No. 2017-KP-0965
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
   Hughes, J., would grant the writ in part.

I would grant the writ in part to order an evidentiary hearing on two issues, the failure to allow an alibi instruction and improper back-strikes limited to each panel rather than the entire venire.


text:
    IN RE: Bruce C. ASHLEY
    NO. 2018-B-0408
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
   PER CURIAM

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") against respondent, Bruce C. Ashley, II, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

The following facts are not in dispute, having been stipulated to by the parties:

On February 19, 2015, respondent was involved in an automobile accident, totaling his vehicle. On February 24, 2015, he was admitted to East Jefferson General Hospital ("EJGH") for severe abdominal pain on his left side, dehydration, and alcohol abuse. Following a two-day stay, he was discharged from EJGH.

On April 27, 2015, respondent was admitted to Beacon Behavioral Hospital ("Beacon") for threat of suicide, pursuant to a coroner's commitment. He was discharged from Beacon on April 29, 2015.

On May 7, 2015, as a result of being highly intoxicated, respondent suffered a serious fall. He was involved in a single car accident the same day, which totaled his wife's car. The following day, he was admitted to the ICU at EJGH, where he was intubated for eleven days and diagnosed with three broken ribs, a punctured and collapsed lung, and pneumonia. He was discharged from EJGH on May 22, 2015.

On May 29, 2015, respondent was admitted to a ninety-day inpatient treatment program for alcohol abuse at Pine Grove Behavioral Health and Addiction Services. He was discharged from Pine Grove on August 26, 2015. On September 17, 2015, respondent entered into a recovery agreement with the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program ("JLAP"). The following month, respondent voluntarily appeared before the ODC for a sworn statement, at which time he disclosed that he suffered from chemical dependency and severe depression.

Count I

The following facts are not in dispute, having been stipulated to by the parties: Clothilda Joseph retained respondent to represent her brother in a criminal matter. Respondent was paid at least $11,935 for his services. Respondent then failed to appear in court for seven out of thirteen court dates. He also failed to advise his client that he had relocated his practice. After receiving notice of Ms. Joseph's disciplinary complaint on July 7, 2015, respondent requested an extension of time to submit his response. On October 21, 2016, respondent submitted his written substantive response to the complaint.

The ODC alleged that respondent's conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), and 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct).

Count II

The following facts are not in dispute, having been stipulated to by the parties:

In June 2014, respondent was retained to represent Jeremiah Washington in a criminal matter. Respondent charged $5,000 and was paid at least $3,400 for the representation. Thereafter, he failed to respond to or return telephone calls and correspondence from Mr. Washington or Mr. Washington's family members. On September 20, 2015, Judge Robin Pittman contacted the ODC to advise that respondent had missed several court dates in Mr. Washington's case. She contacted respondent by telephone in open court on at least two occasions about his absences. Mr. Washington, his father (Clifford Washington), and Judge Pittman filed disciplinary complaints against respondent. Although he was served with notices of each complaint, respondent failed to provide any written substantive response.

The ODC alleged that respondent's conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (fee arrangements), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a).

Count III

The following facts are not in dispute, having been stipulated to by the parties:

In December 2014, respondent was retained to represent John Spellman in a criminal matter. Respondent was paid $2,500 for the representation. After enrolling as counsel of record and making one court appearance, respondent was involved in an accident and never returned back to court. He failed to return any money and failed to provide a written substantive response to the disciplinary complaint filed by Mr. Spellman.

The ODC alleged that respondent's conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1(c), and 8.4(a).

Count IV

The following facts are not in dispute, having been stipulated to by the parties:

In March 2015, Craig Ulmer retained respondent to represent his daughter in a traffic matter. A $2,500 check was sent to respondent and negotiated soon thereafter. Respondent then failed to appear in court due to illness and an attachment was issued for his client. The matter was continued and the case remained dormant, with no further effort from respondent. Attorney Jacque Touzet completed the representation of Ms. Ulmer.

On October 27, 2015, respondent addressed these allegations while appearing at the ODC for a sworn statement in a separate investigation. On December 9, 2015, the ODC received correspondence from respondent advising that he had provided an accounting and refunded $1,500 in unearned fees to Mr. Ulmer. Thereafter, the ODC received correspondence from Mr. Touzet stating that Mr. Ulmer had not received a refund from respondent.

The ODC alleged that respondent's conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1(a) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In August 2016, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. In his answer, respondent noted his prior medical and substance abuse problems, as well as his subsequent treatment for those problems. Prior to a formal hearing, respondent and the ODC filed a joint stipulation of facts. In this document, respondent admitted to the facts as set forth above and admitted that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged, except he did not stipulate to a violation of Rule 1.5 in Count II, Rule 8.1(a) in Count IV, or Rule 8.4(a) in all counts. The matter then proceeded to a hearing in mitigation, which was conducted by the hearing committee on June 12, 2017.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing committee accepted the joint stipulations agreed to by the parties. The committee found the stipulated facts to be supported by the other evidence in the record. The committee also made additional factual findings as follows:

Respondent suffers from alcoholism, which is in remission. The pivotal factor resulting in the remission of respondent's alcoholism is his adherence to the recommendations of JLAP and the clinical experts treating him. At the time of the hearing, he was compliant with his current JLAP recovery agreement. While his compliance was less than perfect, he was compliant in essential areas of his agreement. His alcoholism was arrested and remained in remission through the date of the hearing. To remain in remission, it is essential that he closely follow the requisites of a newly executed JLAP recovery agreement. Periodic reports should be provided to the ODC to assure his close adherence to these requisites.

Respondent's minor but notable compliance issues with the JLAP recovery agreement reveal overall organizational challenges. Clearly, he is a highly gifted practitioner with decades of experience representing criminal defendants. He has provided substantial and valuable services for free or at reduced rates to underserved and under-resourced persons in the context of an underfunded and under-resourced criminal justice system. Having gifted practitioners willing to offer the services that respondent has and can provide yields great benefits to the court, the legal profession, the justice system, and society as a whole. As he embarks upon his relatively young and new journey in sobriety, independent monitoring of administrative and organizational aspects of his practice would offer an important measure of protection to his clients and assurances to the court and legal system that he has made needed organizational adjustments.

Respondent has not made full restitution to those to whom restitution is owed. He accepted fee payments either from or on behalf of those identified in the formal charges but failed to fully perform services for each of the clients. He was proud to discuss his active and successful participation in a twelve-step program of recovery from alcoholism; however, a principal pillar of any such program is making amends to persons harmed. Thus, it is recommended that respondent faithfully follow through with this critical recovery tenet and take steps to make amends to the clients from whom he accepted legal fees but failed to fully perform legal services.

Based on the stipulations of the parties, the documentary evidence, and the testimony at the hearing, the committee determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The committee determined that respondent violated duties owed to clients, the public, and the legal system. He acted negligently and knowingly. His misconduct caused actual harm to several past clients and the harm has yet to be rectified. After considering the ABA's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined that the baseline sanction is suspension.

In aggravation, the committee found a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1974). In mitigation, the committee found personal or emotional problems, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse, and remorse.

After further considering this court's prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of law for eighteen months, fully deferred, subject to the condition that he enter into a new JLAP contract for a period of five years, or as otherwise recommended by JLAP, and that he remain in compliance with its terms, with periodic reports to be provided to the ODC. The committee also recommended a practice monitor be appointed to monitor the administrative and organizational aspects of respondent's law practice for a period of one year of active practice. The committee further recommended that respondent make restitution to Clothilda Joseph, Jeremiah Washington, John Spellman, and Craig Ulmer, and that the maximum time frame for making full restitution run concurrently with respondent's new JLAP contract.

The ODC objected to the leniency of the sanction recommended by the committee.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee's findings of fact based on the joint stipulation of the parties are supported by the record, and that the additional findings of fact made by the committee are also supported by the record. The board found the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct and the legal conclusions of the committee are supported by clear and convincing evidence with the exception of the committee's finding of a violation of Rule 8.1(a) in connection with Count IV. Respondent stipulated to all of the charged violations except violation of Rule 1.5 in Count II, violation of Rule 8.1(a) in Count IV, and violation of Rule 8.4(a) in all four counts. These stipulations as to rule violations must be given effect unless they are withdrawn. In re: Torry , 10-0837 (La. 10/19/10), 48 So.3d 1038.

The written stipulations between the parties does not include a stipulation that respondent failed to return an unearned fee in violation of Rule 1.5, as charged in Count II. The committee did not expressly acknowledge that respondent had not stipulated to this charge and did not discuss the rule violation on this count. However, the board found that respondent violated the rule, as supported by his testimony at the hearing that while he performed significant work on Mr. Washington's case, he believed he owed some money to his client from the $3,400 which he was paid.

Respondent also did not stipulate to a violation of Rule 8.4(a), which was alleged in all four counts. The board agreed with the committee that this is a "derivative violation" which is supported by the multiple other rule violations.

Finally, respondent did not stipulate to a violation of Rule 8.1(a), which is charged in Count IV. Here again, the committee did not expressly acknowledge that respondent had not stipulated to this charge and did not discuss the rule violation on this count. Rule 8.1(a) provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly make a false statement of material fact" in connection with a disciplinary matter. The committee's finding that respondent violated this rule is apparently based on respondent's representation to the ODC that he had reimbursed a portion of the fee paid to him by Mr. Ulmer. In connection with the investigation of the Ulmer matter, respondent sent an undated letter to the ODC enclosing various documents regarding his representation of Mr. Ulmer's daughter. This letter was received by the ODC on December 9, 2015. Included with the letter was an unsigned copy of a letter to Mr. Ulmer providing a listing of the work he had performed on the case and enclosing a $1,500 reimbursement check, representing a portion of the $2,500 paid by Mr. Ulmer. Several months later, the ODC was advised that Mr. Ulmer had never received the letter or the check.

At the hearing before the hearing committee, after the stipulations were introduced into evidence, disciplinary counsel advised that the hearing was a hearing in mitigation as far as the ODC was concerned. Respondent was questioned briefly about the letter to Mr. Ulmer referenced in the letter received by the ODC on December 9, 2015. He did not dispute that Mr. Ulmer did not receive the letter and check if Mr. Ulmer says he did not receive them. However, respondent affirmatively testified that he mailed the letter and the check to Mr. Ulmer on the same day that he mailed the letter to the ODC which was received on December 9, 2015. There is no evidence to dispute this testimony. It is also significant that respondent has cooperated, shown remorse, and stipulated to other rule violations. The board therefore found the evidence was insufficient to meet the clear and convincing burden of proving a violation of Rule 8.1(a).

The board determined that respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the public, and the legal system. He acted negligently and knowingly. His misconduct caused actual harm to several past clients, which has yet to be rectified. The board noted that during some of the time period in question, respondent was not working and facing mounting expenses due to medical treatment for his serious physical injuries and lengthy inpatient rehabilitation for his alcoholism. After considering the ABA's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the board determined that the applicable baseline sanction is suspension.

In aggravation, the board found a prior disciplinary record, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law. In mitigation, the board found personal or emotional problems, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse, and remorse.

After further considering this court's prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the board recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of law for eighteen months, fully deferred, subject to the following conditions:

1. Respondent shall enter into a new JLAP contract for a period of five years, or as otherwise recommended by JLAP, and shall remain in compliance with its terms, with periodic reports to be provided to the ODC.
2. Respondent shall provide a detailed accounting to each of the clients in all four counts and to any person who paid any part of respondent's fee on behalf of any of those clients; shall participate in the Louisiana State Bar Association's fee arbitration program with respect to all clients referenced in the four counts and any person who paid respondent's fee on behalf of any of those clients; and shall pay any restitution which is determined to be owed as a result of the arbitration procedure no later than the expiration of the term of respondent's recommended new JLAP contract.
3. A practice monitor shall be appointed to monitor the administrative and organizational aspects of respondent's law practice for a period of one year of active practice.

The board further recommended respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board's recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5 (B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks , 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee's factual findings. See In re: Caulfield , 96-1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714 ; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La. 3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record of this matter supports a finding that respondent neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients, failed to refund unearned fees, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigations. This misconduct amounts to a violation of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1(c), and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent's actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Reis , 513 So.2d 1173 (La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Whittington , 459 So.2d 520 (La. 1984).

Respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. His misconduct was at least grossly negligent, if not knowing, and caused actual harm to several past clients, which has yet to be rectified. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is suspension. The record supports the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the disciplinary board.

In instances in which an attorney is found to have committed ethical misconduct stemming from an alcohol or substance abuse problem, we have imposed fully deferred suspensions so long as the attorney has demonstrated that he or she has addressed the problem. See, e.g., In re: Finckbeiner , 16-0654 (La. 5/20/16), 192 So.3d 111 (fully deferred one year and one day suspension imposed upon an attorney who was twice arrested for DWI, where the attorney successfully completed a thirty-day inpatient treatment program and entered into a one-year diagnostic monitoring agreement with JLAP); In re: Tallon , 08-0179 (La. 2/22/08), 974 So.2d 1290 (fully deferred one year and one day suspension imposed upon an attorney who was convicted of two DWI's, but who had taken steps to address her alcoholism); In re: Labourdette , 07-1653 (La. 9/19/07), 964 So.2d 927 (fully deferred one year and one day suspension imposed upon an attorney convicted of possession of controlled substances, where the attorney entered into a JLAP contract and demonstrated he had been sober for a significant period of time).

The evidence supports a finding that respondent is affected by a chemical dependency and that the chemical dependency caused the misconduct. The evidence also reflects that he has sought treatment and has demonstrated a meaningful period of recovery. According to respondent, he has been sober for more than two years. He has also completed an inpatient treatment program at Pine Grove in August 2015. Furthermore, respondent has been subject to a JLAP agreement since September 2015, and the director of the program reports that he has no reason to believe that respondent is "using substances or is a risk." By all accounts, respondent's recovery has made a recurrence of his misconduct unlikely. The proposed sanction will encourage his commitment towards recovery, and at the same time protect the public by providing a mechanism to remove respondent from practice if he relapses into substance abuse in the future.

Based on this reasoning, as well as the absence of any objection by the ODC to the disciplinary board's report, we will adopt the board's recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for eighteen months, fully deferred, subject to the conditions set forth in the board's report, as follows:

1. Respondent shall enter into a new JLAP contract for a period of five years, or as otherwise recommended by JLAP, and shall remain in compliance with its terms, with periodic reports to be provided to the ODC.
2. Respondent shall provide a detailed accounting to each of the clients in all four counts and to any person who paid any part of respondent's fee on behalf of any of those clients; shall participate in the Louisiana State Bar Association's fee arbitration program with respect to all clients referenced in the four counts and any person who paid respondent's fee on behalf of any of those clients; and shall pay any restitution which is determined to be owed as a result of the arbitration procedure no later than the expiration of the term of respondent's recommended new JLAP contract.
3. A practice monitor shall be appointed to monitor the administrative and organizational aspects of respondent's law practice for a period of one year of active practice.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Bruce C. Ashley, II, Louisiana Bar Roll number 2577, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of eighteen months. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to the conditions set forth in this opinion. Any failure of respondent to comply with these conditions, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court's judgment until paid.

      Buddy Stockwell, the executive director of JLAP, testified that all of respondent's drug tests had been negative, but he had been late in submitting his reports, paying his fees, and performing his daily check-ins. Notwithstanding these "administrative challenges," as Mr. Stockwell called them, he testified that he had no reason to believe that respondent is using substances.

      The ODC had urged as an aggravating factor that respondent is indifferent to making restitution; however, the committee specifically rejected this factor, stating, "Respondent expresses genuine remorse, yet he is unclear on when and to the extent he intends to engage in the action of actually making restitution. We find that Respondent is willing to make restitution, but guidance in the form of an unequivocal restitution order would be helpful." [Emphasis in original.]

      In 2013, we accepted a petition for consent discipline and suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months, fully deferred, subject to the condition that he attend Ethics School. In re: Ashley , 13-1512 (La. 9/20/13), 126 So.3d 452. In the petition, respondent acknowledged that he had neglected a legal matter and failed to communicate with a client. In 2008, respondent was admonished for maintaining personal funds in his trust account. In 2004, respondent was admonished for failing to communicate with a client. In 1986, respondent received a formal reprimand, but the nature of the misconduct is not included in the record.


text:
    IN RE: Roy Joseph RICHARD, Jr.
    NO. 2018-B-0803
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ORDER
   Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Roy Joseph Richard, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 28981, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect the interests of respondent's clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mark HALL
    No. 2017-KP-0832
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator has failed to show the state withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. David Wayne POYDRAS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0718
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LAFAYETTE
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator has previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Poydras v. State , 17-0611 (La.), --- So.3d ----.


text:
    STATE EX REL. David Wayne POYDRAS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0611
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LAFAYETTE
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker , 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator's application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 ; State ex rel. Glover v. State , 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated several applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Peter MERCADEL v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0593
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. With the enactment of Acts 2017, No. 280, § 3, relator's eligibility for parole consideration is no longer dependent upon a commutation of his life sentence to a fixed term of years, but is instead governed by the criteria set forth in La.R.S. 15:574.4.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Walter C. GIBSON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0590
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF TANGIPAHOA
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 ; State ex rel. Glover v. State , 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated his second application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Rashan WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0303
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF WASHINGTON
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Larry W. SIMS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 17-KH-0295
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to his remaining claims, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Hughes, J., would grant the writ in part.

CRICHTON, J., recused.


text:
    IN RE: Michael A. BETTS
    NO. 2018-OB-0409
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
   PER CURIAM

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") seeks review of the disciplinary board's ruling waiving the assessment of certain expenses against respondent pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1(F).

Having reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record of these proceedings, we find no error in the board's ruling. Accordingly, it is the judgment of this court that the ruling of the disciplinary board be affirmed.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Chonquaro GREEN v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0609
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. LANDRY
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Rickey Lionel LAURANT v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0584
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Rodney WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0547
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker , 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator's application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 ; State ex rel. Glover v. State , 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. The application is also repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

CRICHTON, J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Delis PIERRE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0385
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF TANGIPAHOA
   PER CURIAM:

Writ denied. Relator fails to show recusal was required under the standard of Rippo v. Baker , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 905, 197 L.Ed.2d 167 (2017). Relator also fails to show the state withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In addition, relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Finally, relator's remaining claims were not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 ; State ex rel. Glover v. State , 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Fredrick Dewayne GIPSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-0280
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator fails to show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations under the standard of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dennis JOHNSON
    No. 2017-KP-0514
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 11, 2018
    ON WRIT OF CERTIOARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY
   PER CURIAM:

Granted. The court of appeal ruling that granted defendant an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reversed for the reasons assigned by Judge Crain in his dissent. Relator's allegation that counsel's performance was deficient when conveying the 15-year plea deal offered to him by the state, which relator rejected, is conclusory and unsupported. The district court did not err in rejecting it summarily. La.C.Cr.P. art. 929. As noted by Judge Crain,

The courts cannot bear the burden of an evidentiary hearing every time a plea offer is rejected, so that counsel can explain his rationale. Here, counsel did not fail to present a plea offer to the defendant. Contrast Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012). Nor does relator allege that counsel advised him to reject the plea offer based upon an erroneous legal principle. Contrast Lafter [Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) ]. By ordering an evidentiary hearing, the majority extends both Frye and Lafler beyond their respective fact situations, which I would not do. The 15-year plea offer expired the same day relator rejected it. Later, facting the possibility of a fourth offense habitual offender bill of information, relator accepted a harsher plea agreement and was sentenced as a second-felony habitual offender to tweny years imprisonment. The later plea was voluntarily and intelligently made following a textbook Boykin exchange between relator, his attorney, and the trial court, during which relator voiced no complaint regarding the earlier rejected plea offer.

State v. Johnson , 16-1471 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/21/17), 2017 WL 700484 (unpub'd) (Crain, J., dissenting). Therefore, the district court's ruling denying relator's application for post-conviction relief is reinstated.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

REVERSED

JOHNSON, C.J. would deny the writ and affirm.

Hughes, J., would deny the writ and affirm the court of appeal.

GENOVESE, Justice, would deny the writ and affirm the Court of Appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Antonio M. JACKSON
    NO. 2017-KO-1540
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cameron Kinte MAYS
    NO. 2017-KO-1640
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Graylin ROLLINS
    NO. 2017-K-1747
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


author: GENOVESE, J., recused.

text:
    Brandi BILLEAUDEAU, et al. v. OPELOUSAS GENERAL HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, et al.
    NO. 2018-C-0388
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.
    HUGHES, J., would grant and docket.
   GENOVESE, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles LANDRUM
    NO. 2017-KO-1783
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana May 25, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeremy C. JULIEN
    NO. 2017-KO-1791
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


author: WEIMER, J., recused.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Trot Michael JACKSON, Jr.
    NO. 2017-KO-1944
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.
   WEIMER, J., recused.


author: CRICHTON, J., recused.

text:
    RED SOX INVESTMENTS, LLC., et al., on behalf of Itself and a Class of Similarly Situated Property Owners v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, Louisiana, and Caddo Parish, Louisiana
    NO. 2018-C-0503
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.
   CRICHTON, J., recused.


text:
    Thomas CORRINGTON, et al. v. Gino ASCANI
    NO. 2018-CC-0537
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joel BATISTA
    NO. 2018-KK-0539
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


author: HUGHES, J., would grant.

text:
    Effie M. CHAISSON v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS THROUGH the REGISTRAR OF VITAL RECORDS
    NO- 2018-00540
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.
   HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas RICHARDSON
    NO. 2018-KK-0543
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    CROSSTEX ENERGY SERVICES, L.P., Crosstex Lig, L.L.C., and Crosstex Processing Services, LLC v. TEXAS BRINE COMPANY, LLC, et al.
    NO. 2018-CC-0545
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


author: GENOVESE, J., would grant.

text:
    Timothy L. JARQUIN v. Danny R. BLANKS, Individually and in his Capactiy as a Member and Manager of Pontchartrain Partners, L.L.C.; Barlow J. Cook, Individually and in his Capacity as a Member of Pont Chartrain Partners, L.L.C; James R. Washington, III, Individually and in his Capacity as a Member of Pontchartrain Partners, L.L.C.; Mary LeBlanc, Individually and in her Capacity as Director of Human Resources of Pontchartrain Partners, L.L.C.
    NO. 2018-CC-0548
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.
   GENOVESE, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana IN the INTEREST OF N.B.,
    I.B., and P.B.
    NO. 2018-CJ-0617
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Elaine T. MARSHALL, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Marshall Legacy Foundation and the Marshall Heritage Foundation, et al. v. Preston L. MARSHALL
    NO. 2018-CC-0550
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.
   HUGHES, J., would grant.

GENOVESE, J., recused.


text:
    Shirlene BRITT, et al. v. RICELAND PETROLEUM COMPANY, et al.
    NO. 2018-C-0551
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Marvin ACEVEDO
    NO. 2018-KK-0619
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Sarah BARBER, et al. v. LOUISIANA MUNICIPAL RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY
    NO. 2018-00552
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Michael Neal ROLLINS v. STATE of Louisiana THROUGH the DEFT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, et al.
    NO. 2018-C-0553
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph COLLINS
    NO. 2018-KK-0556
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.
    CLARK, J., would grant for reasons assigned by Judge Crain.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald Javon ROSS
    NO. 2017-K-1785
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2018
    Denied.
   WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    Joseph Harvey GAUTREAUX, et al. v. LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INS. CO.
    NO. 2018-CC-0576
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana June 1, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leon MCDONALD
    NO. 2017-KO-1574
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bryant R. MCCLENDON
    NO. 2017-K-1836
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2018
    Denied.
   WEIMER, J., would grant.