author: B.L. THOMAS, C.J. WOLF, J.,

text:
    CITIZENS FOR STRONG SCHOOLS, INC., Fund Education Now, Inc., Eunice Barnum, Janiyah Williams, Jacque Williams, Sheila Andrews, Rose Nogueras, and Alfredo Nogueras, Appellants, v. FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; Andy Gardiner, in his official capacity as the Florida Senate President; Steve Crisafulli, in his official capacity as the Florida Speaker of the House of Representatives; and Pam Stewart, in her official capacity as Florida Commissioner of Education, Appellees, and Celeste Johnson; Deaundrice Kitchen; Kenia Palacios; Margot Logan; Karen Tolbert; and Marian Klinger, Intervenors/Appellees.
    CASE NO. 1D16-2862
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed December 13, 2017

      Jodi Siegel and Kirsten Anderson of Southern Legal Counsel, Inc., Gainesville; Timothy McLendon, Gainesville; Deborah Cupples, Gainesville; Eric J. Lindstrom of Egan, Lev & Siwica, P.A., Gainesville; Neil Chonin, Gainesville, for Appellants.
    Robert M. Brochin and Clay M. Carlton of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Miami, for Amicus Curiae Certain Commissioners of 1998 Constitution Revision Commission.
    Dena H. Sokolow, ' Renee Méenach Decker and Angelica M. Fiorehtino of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Orlando, for Amicus Curiae National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, and Amicus Curiae Bassuk Center on Homeless and Vulnerable Children and Youth.
    Sarah R. Sullivan, Jacksonville, for Ami-cus Curiae Disability and Public Benefits Clinic, Florida Coastal School of Law.
    Kele Stewart, Coral Gables, for Amicus Curiae University of Miami School of Law Children Youth Law Clinic.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Jonathan A. Glogau, Chief, Compléx Litigation, Tallahassee; Dawn Roberts, General Counsel, and Christie M. Letafte, Deputy General Counsel, The Florida Senate, Tallahassee; Adam S. Tanenbaum, General Counsel; Florida House of Representatives," Tallahassee, for the Florida House of Representatives and Steve Orisa-fulli in his official capacity as the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives; Judy Bone; General Counsel, Matthew H. Mears and Mari M. Presley, Assistant General Counsels, Department of Education, Tallahassee; Rocco E. Testani, Stacey M. Mohr and Lee A. Peifer of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Atlanta, pro hac vice, for Appellees. :
    George N. Meros, Jr., of GrayRobinson, P.A., Tallahassee; Carl Nichols, Daniel P. Kearney, Jr. and Kevin Gallagher of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Foundation for Excellence in Education.
    Ari S. Bargil, Institute for Justice, Miar mi; Richard Komer, Institute for Justice, Arlington, VA, pro hac vice; and Timothy D. Keller, Institute for" Justice, Tempe, AZ, pro hac vice, for Intervenors/Appellees Institute'for Justice.
   B.L. THOMAS, C.J.

Eight years ago, Appellants initiated á legal challenge to Florida’s public: school system, asserting that the State’s entire K-12 public education system — -which includes 67 school districts, approximately 2.7 million students, 170,000 teachers, 150,-000 staff members, and 4,000 schools — is in violation of the Florida Constitution. Appellants sued the Florida State Board of Education, the President of the Florida Senate, the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives and the Florida Commissioner of Education seeking a declaration that the State violated its “paramount duty” to provide a “uniform, efficient .. and high quality system of free public schools' that allows students to obtain a high quality education,” as required by Article IX; section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. Appellants sought declaratory and supplemental relief below, including: a demand’ that the State submit a remedial plan for the alleged constitutional deficiencies; a demand that relevant'studies be conducted for necessary actions; and that the trial court retain jurisdiction to provide any further appropriate legal relief.

We affirm the trial court’s ruling denying relief on the basis that Appellants’ arguments regarding the' State’s duty to make adequate provision for an efficient and high quality education raise political questions .not subject to judicial review, because the relevant constitutional text does not contain judicially discoverable standards by which a court can decide whether the State has complied- with organic law. Furthermore, the strict separation of powers embedded in Florida’s organic law requires judicial deference to the legislative and executive branches to adopt and execute educational policies those branches deem necessary and appropriate to enable students to obtain a “high quality” education, as directed by the Florida Constitution. There is no language or authority in Article IX, section 1(a) that would empower judges to order the enactment of educational policies regarding teaching methods and accountability, the appropriate funding of public schools, the proper allowance of charter schools and school choice, the best methods of student accountability and school accountability, and related funding priorities.

The most effective manner in which to teach students science, mathematics, history, language, culture, classics, economics, trade skills, poetry, literature and civic virtue have been debated since at least the time of ancient Greece. Brilliant philosophers, thinkers, writers, poets and teachers over the past twenty-five centuries have dedicated their talents to identifying the best means of providing a proper education to help each child reach his or her highest potential in a just society. In a republican form of government foúnded on democratic rule, it must be the elected representatives and executives who make the difficult and profound decisions regarding how our children are to be educated. Absent specific and clear direction to the contrary in the supreme organic law, which does not exist in Article IX, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution, we, uphold the trial court’s correct ruling that such decisions are not subject to judicial oversight or interference.

We also affirm the trial court’s ruling rejecting Appellant’s arguments challenging the State’s constitutional compliance with its duty to provide a “uniform” education. We agree that the John M. McKay Scholarship Program for Students with Disabilities — which affects only 30,000 students and does not materially impact the K-12 public school system — provides a benefit to help disabled students obtain a high quality education. Thus, the McKay Scholarship Program does not violate Article.IX, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution.

. Background and Procedural History

In 2009, Appellants filed suit challenging the State’s education policies as invalid under Article IX, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. Appellees moved to dismiss, asserting in part that the allegations raised political questions not subject to judicial review, and the motion was denied. Appellees then sought a writ of prohibition in' this court, asserting that the claims were not justiciable, as they raised political questions. Sitting en banc, this court voted 7-1-7 to deny the petition for writ of prohibition and allowed the litigation to continue in the trial court. Haridopolos v. Citizens for Strong Schools Inc., 81 So.3d 465, 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (en banc). The en banc c.ourt certified as an issue of great public importance the following question:

Does Article IX, section 1(a), Florida Constitution, set forth judicially ascertainable standards that can be used to determine the adequacy, efficiency, safety, security, and high quality of public education on a statewide basis, so as to permit a court to decide claims for declaratory judgment (and supplemental relief) alleging noncompliance with Article IX, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution?

Id. at 473. The dissenting judges would have granted the writ, based on the separation of powers requirement of Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and the political question doctrine. Id. at 480-81 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The Florida Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction to consider the certified question. Haridopolos v. Citizens for Strong Schools Inc., 103 So.3d 140 (Fla. 2012) (unpublished table decision).

Appellants then filed a second amended complaint, alleging that the State’s legislative and executive branches' had violated their “paramount duty” to provide a “uniform, efficient ... and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education” under Article IX, section 1(a), in several respects: (1) the State failed to make “adequate provision” for a system of, free public schools, because the overall level of funding for education is deficient; (2) the State failed to administer a “uniform” system of education, because two school choice programs, the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program and the John M. McKay Scholarship Program for Students with Disabilities (the McKay Scholarship Program), divert public funds to private schools not subject to the same requirements as public schools; (3) the State failed to provide an “efficient” education system, because the accountability methods utilized by the State are ineffective and because charter schools are mismanaged; (4) the State failed to provide a “high quality” education system because schools provide insufficient services and coursework and have ah insufficient number of highly qualified teachers and support staff; and (5) the public school system did not allow students to obtain a high quality education, based on various assessments.

After extensive pre-trial discovery, a four-week bench trial was conducted by the successor circuit judge, in which more than forty witnesses testified and over 5,30,0 exhibits were submitted. The court made comprehensive findings on a.broad range of subjects, including: the structure of Florida’s education, system; the various policies and programs implemented by the State to achieve its educational goals;, the funding allocated for these programs; and student performance — overall and by various demographics — under state and national assessments and other measures. Ultimately, however, the trial court found all of the issues raised by Appellants regarding educational adequacy, efficiency, and quality were properly considered “political questions best resolved in the political • arena,” as' the organic law did not provide judicially manageable standards by which to measure the State’s actions in enacting and implementing educational policies, as the dissenting judges on this court concluded in 2011.

The trial court nevertheless addressed Appellants’ arguments on the merits, concluding that the State had made significant efforts and advances in education, leading to sustained improvement on outcomes for Florida students:

[T]he State-has made education a top priority both in terms of implementation of research-based education policies and reforms, as well as education funding. The State has an accountability and assessment system that is rated among the best in the nation .... The State has also adopted rigorous teacher certification, training and evaluation standards, resulting in over 94% of courses being taught by teachers who are ‘highly qualified’ under federal standards.

In addition, the court found that in the last two decades, “K-12 education has been the single largest component of the state general revenue budget. ... [Education funding, has outpaced inflation.” The court further found that Florida’s high school graduation rate has dramatically improved, “with more students of all racial, ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds graduating than ever before,” and • that “Florida students have substantially improved their performance on the National Assessment of Education Progress ... a testing program required by federal and state law [and] ... Florida is now among the highest scoring states in the nation.” The trial court thus ruled that Appellants had failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the State’s education policies and ■ funding were not rationally, related to. fulfilling its constitutional duty under Article IX, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. As to Appellants’ challenge to the McKay Scholarship Program, the court concluded the evidence did not support their allegations that the program violated the uniformity requirements of Article IX, section 1(a).

Analysis

Appellants argue that the issues raised do not present a political question, and additionally, that the trial court applied the wrong standard to determine whether the State had complied with Article IX, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. Thus, Appellants would have the judicial branch determiner 1) Whether the other two branches of state -government have made adequate provision for the public school system; (2). whether the, system is uniform, efficient,- and of high quality; and (3) whether the 'system allows students to obtain a high .quality education. We agree with the trial court that the terms “adequate,” “efficient,” and “high quality” as used in Article IX, section 1(a) lack judicially discoverable or manageable standards that would allow for meaningful judicial interpretation, and that an attempt to evaluate the political branches’ compliance with the organic law would constitute a violation of Florida’s strict requirement of the separation- of powers. We therefore affirm the trial court’s determination that these issues are non-justiciable, as discussed below.

The concept of a political question as nonjusticiable was comprehensively 'defined by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), and adapted in Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996). In Baker, the United States Supreme Court discussed the political-question doctrine at length, including its jurisprudential foundation, logic, and analysis: “We have said that ‘In determining whether a question falls within (the political question) category, the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations’ 369 U.S. at 211, 82 S.Ct. 691 (emphasis addéíl) (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-455, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939)). There could be no more relevant standard applicable here than ‘the importance of finality, in a case consuming almost a decade of litigation and demonstrating the lack of finality inherent in an attempt to litigate such a complex political dispute. The demand for finality in complex public-policy questions is obvious, as legislative and executive decisions involving billions of dollars and multiple demographic, fiscal and logistical factors must be promptly implemented and then consistently reevaluated. Such a process is clearly not compatible with extensive civil litigation that consumes years in the court system, unlike political decisions, which in Florida are made in an annual 60-day legislative session, during and after which the governor can veto or acquiesce in those decisions and then execute them in the next fiscal year. Finality is inextricably intertwined with the perspective that such profound questions — such as those involved in adopting and executing education policies for millions of K-12 students— must necessarily be performed exclusively within the political branches,' which by their nature are far more responsive and prompt to address the needs of parents and students than the courts could ever be.

The second “dominant consideration” cited by the United States Supreme Court in deciding whether a case involves an inherently political question is the “lack of satisfactory criteria.” Id. This is linked to finality, because the lack of specificity in an operative legal text lends itself to endless litigation over the meaning of subjective and undefined phrases that might function to give guidance to political decision makers as laudable goals, but cannot guide judges in deciding whether a state or local government has in fact complied with the text. Without “satisfactory criteria” to channel discretion in judicial rulings, litigation involving a subjective advisory guideline invites arbitrary and capricious judicial actions which improperly invade the spheres of action of the political branches,

In Baker, the Supreme Court provided various “formulations” to be used in deciding whether a case raised a political question not subject to judicial review, stating that “each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function.of the separation of powers.”. Id. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691 (emphasis added). As analyzed below, Florida requires a strict separation of powers under Article II, section 8 of its organic law. The Court then repeated its view that the lack of objectively .ascertainable standards was “prominent” in finding a legal claim to be nonjusticiable, but -the court also ruled that “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department” would constitute strong evidence that the issue was not to be decided by the courts, but instead by another branch of -government. Id.

In Coalition, a case involving the previous iteration of Article IX, section 1, the Florida Supreme Court addressed arguments similar to those raised here, that “the State has failed to provide its'students [the] fundamental right” of an adequate education.” 680 So.2d at 402. In support ’of their ’ argument, the plaintiffs alleged that students were not receiving adequate programs “to permit them to gain proficiency in the English language,” that poor students were “not receiving adequate education for their greater educational needs,” that special-needs students and gifted students were “not receiving adequate special programs,” that students in “property-poor counties” were not receiving “an adequate education,” that the legislature had not provided adequate capital outlay funds for schools, and that local school districts were “unable to perform their constitutional duties because of the legislative imposition of noneducational and quasi-educational burdens.” Id. In. essence, the supreme court faced a blanket challenge to the adequacy of the education system under a prior version of Article IX, section l. Id. at 406.

Applying the criteria in Baker, the supreme court determined that “adequacy” was a non-justiciable political question, because the phrase “by law” suggested the issue was committed to the legislature and because — unlike “uniform” — “ ‘adequacy’ simply does not have such straightforward content.” Id, at 408. While the supreme court declined to hold that an adequacy challenge to the education system could never succeed, it concluded that the Coalition plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any manageable standards that could be applied without “a substantial risk of judicial intrusion into the powers and responsibilities assigned to the legislature.” Id.

Following that decision, the 1997-1998. Constitution Revision Commission proposed, and the voters adopted, an amendment to the education provision, which now states:

The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education ....

Art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const.

We agree with the trial court that the terms “efficient” and “high quality” are no more susceptible to judicial interpretation than “adequate” was under the prior version of the education provision, and to define these terms would require “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691; see also Coalition, 680 So.2d at 408. Our conclusion is further supported by Florida’s strict separation of powers doctrine and by the language of the amended constitutional article itself, which continues to commit the duty to achieve these aspirational goals to the legislative and executive branches of government.

Turning first to the separation of powers, the Florida Constitution imposes a “strict” separation of powers requirement that applies just as vigorously to the judicial branch as it does to the other two branches of government. State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 346 (Fla. 2000). In Cotton, the supreme court rejected the argument that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act violated the separation of powers provision of Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, holding that because substantive sentencing laws and prosecuto-rial discretion were vested in the legislative and executive branches respectively, the law imposing mandatory sentences based solely on prosecutorial discretion did not interfere with judicial power. Id. at 349-54. In explaining its rationale, the supreme court disagreed with the single dissenting opinion, which relied on New Jersey law that permitted judicial oversight of the executive function of prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 352-54. In rejecting the dissenting opinion’s view, the majority in Cotton noted that Florida’s organic law imposes a “strict” separation of powers between the branches of government:

This Court, on the other hand, in construing the Florida Constitution, has traditionally applied a strict separation of powers doctrine. Cf. Avatar Dev. Corp. v. State, 723 So.2d 199, 201 (Fla. 1998) (recognizing, in the context of a nondelegation analysis, that “[a]r-ticle II, section 3 declares a strict separation of the three branches of government and that: “No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other two branches”(emphasis supplied)). In applying a strict separation of powers doctrine (as the Florida Constitution requires), rather than a doctrine effecting the “dispersal of de-cisional responsibility in the exercise of each power” (as the New Jersey constitution apparently requires), this Court is compelled to reach a different result. If we were to apply the New Jersey “dispersal of decisional responsibility” concept here, we would be deviating from well-established principles of Florida law, which would have impact far beyond matters relating to prosecutorial decisions.

Id. at 353-54 (second emphasis added) (quoting State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992)).

A strict separation of powers supports the foundation and logic of the political-question doctrine, in that Florida’s organic law does not permit a “dispersal of decisional responsibility” which would allow the courts to dictate educational policy choices and their implementation to the other two branches of government, absent specific authorization by law. Id. Absent explicit constitutional authority to the contrary, the legislative and executive branches possess exclusive jurisdiction in such matters, as the legislative branch has sole power to appropriate and enact substantive policy, and the executive branch has the sole power to faithfully execute the substantive policies and budgetary appropriations enacted by the legislative branch. The judiciary cannot dictate the manner of executing legislative policies or appropriations in any particular way. See Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. (“No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.”); Art. V, § 14(d), Fla. Const. (“The judiciary shall have no power to fix appropriations.”).

To agree with Appellants would entangle 'courts in the details and execution of educational policies and related appropriations, involving millions of students and billions of dollars, in an arena in which the courts possess no special competence or specific constitutional authority. Further, the drafters of Article IX, section 1(a) declined to allocate such a role to the judiciary. Quite the opposite, the language of Article IX, section 1(a) assigns such matters to the legislative branch, stating that “adequate provision shall be made by law.” Art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const, (emphasis added). The fact that this language remains in the education amendment after Coalition demonstrates that the constitution continues to commit education policy determinations to the legislative and executive branches. See Coalition, 680 So.2d at 408.

Further, as the trial court recognized here, the lack of any definitive consensus regarding education policies and programs demonstrates the political nature of Appellants’ assertions. While “adequate,” “efficient,” and “high quality” represent worthy political aspirations, they fail to provide the courts with sufficiently objective criteria by which to measure the performance of our co-equal governmental branches. Rather, it is the political branches that must give meaning to these terms in accordance with the policy views of their constituents. For these reasons, Appellants failed to demonstrate any meaningful standards under which the courts could find that the State has violated its constitutional duties regarding the adequacy, efficiency and quality of the public school system.

Looking to a similar case in another state, we agree with the conclusion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that it would b.e • contrary to the very essence of our constitution’s educational aspirations for the courts to “‘bind future Legislatures ... to a present judicial view1 ” of adequacy, efficiency, and quality. Marrero ex rel. Tobalas v. Commonwealth of Penn., 559 Pa. 14, 739 A.2d 110, 112 (1999), (quoting Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa, 415, 399 A.2d 360, 366-67 (1979)); see also Bonner ex rel Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind. 2009) (denying declaratory relief because the determination of quality “is delegated to ... sound legislative discretion”), And although we recognize that courts in other states have sometimes purported to define “adequate,” “efficient,” “high quality,” and similar terms in response to challenges to their own public school systems,' see, e.g., Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Bell, 295 Conn. 240, 990 A.2d 206 (2010) (concluding the state did not provide “suitable” educational opportunities); Columbia Falls Elementary School District No. 6 v. State, 326 Mont. 304, 109 P.3d 257 (2005) (holding that funding for education was inadequate and that determination of “quality” education was justiciable, but deferring to state legislature to provide threshold definition of “quality”); Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (concluding that the legislative branch failed to comply with the constitutional requirement of providing an “efficient system of common schools”), we respectfully disagree with those decisions as insufficiently deferential to the fundamental principle of separation of powers imposed on Florida’s judiciary and the practical reality that educational policies and goals must evolve to meet ever changing public conditions, which is precisely why only the legislative and executive branches, are assigned such power. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, while concluding that the legislature failed to comply with its constitutional requirement of a “thorough and efficient” system of free public schools, ■ observed that “what a thorough and efficient education consists of is a continually changing concept.” Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359, 367 (1990) (emphasis added). That court further acknowledged the “radical interference with the legislative power” involved in determining that the educational system provided in New Jersey was constitutionally deficient. Id. at 376. As noted by our supreme court in Cotton, Florida law is much more protective of the separation of powers principle than is New Jersey law. Like the Florida Supreme Court noted in Coalition, although “the views of other courts are always helpful, we conclude that the dispute here must be resolved on the basis of .Florida constitutional law[.]” 680 So.2d at 404-05.

With respect.to a “uniform” system of public schools, Appellants alleged in their second amended complaint that two of Florida’s school choice programs, the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program and the McKay Scholarship Program, violate this requirement. Unlike the terms adequate, efficient and high quality, the Florida Supreme .Court has interpreted the term “uniform” under Article IX in the context of school choice programs. See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392 (Fla. 2006), As Appellants properly concede, however, the trial court’s ruling that they lack standing to challenge the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program is controlled by this court’s opinion in McCall v. Scott, 199 So.3d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (holding that appellant parents and teachers lacked taxpayer standing to challenge the Florida Tax Credit.Scholarship Program, because it did not violate a specific limitation on the legislature’s taxing and spending power, nor did it involve a disbursement from the public treasury). Therefore, the sole uniformity claim on appeal relates to the McKay Scholarship Program.

Appellants argue that the McKay Scholarship Program violates Article IX, because it diverts public funds to private schools, which are not subject to the same standards and oversight as public schools. They rely on Holmes, in which the Florida Supreme Court held that another school choice program, the Opportunity Scholarship Program, violated the constitutional requirement that education be provided through a uniform system of public schools. Holmes, 919 So.2d at 413. However, in disapproving the Opportunity Scholarship Program, which allowed any student attending a failing school to use a scholarship provided by the State to attend a private school, the Holmes court expressly disavowed that its decision would necessarily impact other more specialized educational programs, even if those programs used public funds to pay for a private school education:

We reject the suggestion by the State and amici that other publicly funded educational and welfare programs would necessarily be affected by our decision. Other educational programs, such as’the program for exceptional students at‘issue in' Scavella [v. School Board of Dade County, 363 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 1978)], are structurally different from the [Opportunity Scholarship Program], which provides a systematic private school alternative to the public school system mandated by our constitution.

919 So.2d at 412.

Here, like the program at issue in Scavella, the McKay Scholarship Program is a specialized scholarship limited to students with disabilities. See § 1002.39(2), Fla. Stat. (outlining eligibility requirements for the McKay Scholarship Program); Scavella, 363 So.2d at 1098 (describing a program through which exceptional students used public funds to attend private schools). The trial court correctly recognized that this opportunity for students with disabilities involved only approximately 30,000 of the total 2.7 million students in the public schools, and only a fraction of the statewide K-12 public school budget, such that it could not be reasonably argued that the McKay Scholarship Program had a “material affect” on the public K-12 education system. Rather, as the trial court observed, “evidence was presented that [this] school-choice programf] [is] reasonably likely to improve the quality and efficiency .of the entire system.”

The McKay Scholarship Program offers a beneficial option for disabled students to help ensure they can have a “high quality” education. As the trial court recognized, “research has shown that the McKay program has a positive effect on the public schools, both in terms of lessening the incentive to over-identify students and by increasing the quality of services of the students with disabilities in the public schools.” It is difficult to perceive how a modestly sized program designed to provide parents of disabled children with more educational opportunities to ensure access to a high quality education could possibly violate the text or spirit of a constitutional requirement of a uniform system of free public schools.

Conclusion

Thus, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Appellants’ claims must be rejected, as those claims either raise political questions not subject to judicial review or were correctly rejected on the merits.

AFFIRMED.

WINOKUR, J., CONCURS; WOLF, J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING WITH OPINION.

WOLF, J.,

specially concurring.

In Haridopolos v. Citizens for Strong Schools, Inc., 81 So.3d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (en banc), eight judges (a majority of the court) determined that article IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution did not contain adequate standards by which the judiciary could measure whether the Legislature complied with the terms of the constitutional provision. In my concurring opinion, I agreed with the majority that the case needed to be remanded to the trial court. However, I agreed with the seven dissenting judges that the amendment lacked measureable standards and stated:

Clearly, it was the intent of the Constitutional Revision Commission that drafted the 1998 amendment to article IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution to address the decision in Coalition, 680 So.2d 400, by adding language to further elucidate the public’s desires concerning the public education system. Unfortunately, this language still did not provide measurable goals by which the court could judge legislative performance and enforce the provision in any particular manner. This case is similar to Advisory Opinion to the Governor — 1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So.2d 278, 279-82 (Fla. 1997), where the public expressed its strong desire that polluters be “primarily responsible” for cleaning up the Everglades, yet the court held the amendment was not self-executing. Similarly, the public’s desires here are not sufficiently definite to allow for enforcement without some measurable standards.

Haridopolos, 81 So.3d at 474 (Wolf, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

The trial in this case demonstrated that without measureable standards, there is no way that a trial court can assess whether the Legislature has complied with article IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution. Both sides presented numerous statistics to support their position, with each side taking different views about which statistical categories best measured compliance with the amendment. The trial court did an admirable job of sorting through the mountain of evidence presented to it. The bottom line is that without measureable standards, the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the Legislature has violated constitutional standards.

As I expressed in my original concurring opinion in this case, a litigant may have a cause of action to require the Legislature to implement article IX, section 1 through the adoption of reasonable measurable standards to gauge compliance. The plaintiffs in this case chose not to pursue that remedy. I, therefore, concur.

      . The trial court allowed six parents interested in the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program and the McKay Scholarship Program to intervene in the proceedings. The trial court later granted their motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program, finding that Appellants lacked standing to challenge that program.

      . The second amended complaint also added a claim relating to the State’s, pre-kindergar-ten program. The trial court severed that claim, and it is not at issue in this appeal.

      .As to "safe” and "secure,” the trial court ruled that these terms are subject to judicially manageable standards, but that Appellants had withdrawn any challenge to the safety or security of the public school system before trial. The court found that these issues were nonetheless tried with regard to the adequacy of funding to meet repair and maintenance needs, but that the evidence submitted did not demonstrate insufficient funding for these needs. As we hold that the overarching question of adequacy is not justiciable, we do not opiné on the trial court’s conclusion in this regard.

      , At the time of the Coalition decision, Article IX, section 1, stated: “Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform system of free public schools and for the establishment, maintenance and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require.” Art. IX, § 1, Fla. Const. (1996).

      . As to the trial court’s additional finding that, even if the issue is not a political question assigned solely to the political branches, Appellants failed to meet their burden to ■prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the State’s education policies and funding system were not rationally related to the provision 'by law’ for a 'uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education,” Appellants contend the trial court applied an overly stringent standard. Appellants urge this court to hold that a lower burden of proof and standard for evaluating the constitutionality of the State’s- actions should apply in this case and in all cases challenging the State's compliance with ijts obligations under Article IX of the Florida Constitution. We decline to do so, based bn our holding that thesé claims are not justicia-ble.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    SECURITY FIRST INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Wayne KILE, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-450
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed December 19, 2017
    Rehearing Denied January 19, 2018
    Steven G. Schwartz, of Schwartz Law Group, Boca Raton, for Appellant.
    Matthew G. Struble and Christine M. Deis, of Struble, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Joyce v. Federated Nat’l Ins. Co., 228 So.3d 1122 (Fla. 2017).

EVANDER, EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


author: COHEN, C.J.

text:
    Richard M. BRUNSMAN, Appellant, v. Angela L. BRUNSMAN, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-2300
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed December 22, 2017

      Moses R. Dewitt -and Sherri K. Dewitt, of Dewitt Law Firm, PA, ■ Orlando, for Appellant.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   COHEN, C.J.

Richard Brunsman (“Former Husband”) appeals a final judgment dissolving his marriage to Angela Brunsman (“Former Wife”). He argues that the trial court abused its discretion' in awarding Former Wife alimony; the court failed to make the requisite findings in imposing a life insurance requirement; and the court abused its discretion in awarding Former Wife, attorney’s fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The parties were married for fourteen years and had one child. Former Wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage in 2010. A central issue at trial was Former Wife’s need and Former Husband’s ability to pay alimony. Former Wife testified that she was earning slightly over $3100 per month ($37,464 annually) and had a monthly household deficit of $682. Former Husband testified that his annual salary was $44,400, although his 2014 payroll records reflected an annual income of $51,540 once commission and bonuses were included.

Former Wife claimed an ownership interest in the home where the former couple resided during the marriage. She testified that Former Husband had told her that she was on the deed and as a result, the parties put a substantial amount of money into the property. However, Former Husband’s father actually owned the home; Former Husband- had executed a fraudulent quitclaim deed .making it appear that Former Wife had been placed on the deed.

At the time of trial, Former Wife was in bankruptcy. This was partially because after temporary support was .awarded, Former Husband lost his job and stopped making alimony payments. Former Husband never resumed paying alimony, despite having obtained a new job. At the conclusion of trial, the court found that Former Husband had almost $700 in child sqpport arrears and over $48,000 in alimony arrears. The court ordered Former Husband to pay $500 per month in non-modifiable durational alimony for five years. The court rejected the representations in Former Husband’s updated financial affidavit, finding it could not “accept [the affidavit] as being truthful based upon his prior untruthful statements under sworn affidavits and documents.”

In the ■ portion of the final judgment related to child support, the court found that Former Husband’s gross monthly income was $4250, while Former Wife’s gross monthly income was $3122, but did not majke any. findings regarding the parties’ respective net incomes. Consistent with its oral pronouncement at trial, the court ordered Former Husband to pay non-modifiable durational alimony and made findings pursuant to section 61.08, Florida Statutes (2010). The court also ordered that the alimony arrearages be paid once the durational alimony obligation was paid in full. The court required Former Husband to maintain a $70,000 life insurance policy to secure the alimony award. The court found that Former Wife was entitled to attorney’s fees, reserving on the amount. No order on the amount of attorney’s fees appears in the record on appeal.

Former Husband moved for rehearing. He argued that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay alimony by using his gross income rather than -net income in calculating the award, ordering that alimo'ny was non-modifiable, and failing to make the appropriate findings regarding arrear-ages. He also challenged the life insurance requirement, arguing that he was uninsurable and could not afford a policy. The court denied Former Husband’s motion without a hearing. This appeal followed.

We affirm the final judgment, except as it relates to certain aspects of the durational alimony award. We affirm the imposition of alimony and find no abuse of discretion in the determination of arrear-ages. However, section 61.08(7) specifically provides that durational alimony awards are modifiable. § 61.08(7), Fla. Stat. (2010). Absent agreement bétween' the parties or findings of exceptional circumstances, neither of which are implicated in this case, imposing a non-modifiable alimony requirement is error. Cf. Smith v. Smith, 689 So.2d 1312, 1312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (“[T]here is no provision in the law for ‘non-modifiable permanent alimony5 .... ”). On remand, the court must strike the language in the alimony award that precludes the possibility of future modification.

Former Husband also correctly notes that the trial court utilized gross rather than net income in' determining the appropriate amount of the award. See, e.g., Brady v. Brady, 229 So.3d 892, 894, 2017 WL 5180738, at *1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (“[T]he trial court erred in basing the alimony award on the parties’ respective gross incomes and not their net incomes.”); see also Topel v. Topel, 152 So.3d 863 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (reversing alimony award in part because trial court erred in using gross income instead of net income); Clore v. Clore, 115 So.3d 1100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (vacating alimony award and remanding for redetermination of husband’s income based on net rather than gross figures). We reverse and remand for the court to make the relevant findings as to the parties’ net incomes and to use those figures in recalculating the amount of the durational alimony award.

We also reverse the portion of the final judgment ordering Former Husband to secure the alimony áward with life insurance. Section 61.08(3), Florida Statutes (2010), governs imposition of a life insurance policy as security for alimony:

To the extent necessary to protect an award of alimony, the court may order any party who is ordered to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure such alimony award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose.

The record evidence must support the insurance requirement, and the trial court must make findings as to the cost of insurance, the amount being required, and any special circumstances justifying the need for a former spouse to maintain the policy. Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So.2d 1023, 1033-34 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Besides Former Wife’s request in her initial dissolution petition, the record lacks any testimony or evidence regarding the cost of an insurance policy or any special circumstances justifying its imposition. Therefore, we reverse the requirement that Former Husband maintain an insurance policy to secure the payment of alimony. On remand, the trial court shall either make specific findings justifying its imposition or strike the benefit from the final judgment.

As to the trial court’s determination that Former Wife is entitled to attorney’s fees, the record is devoid of an actual award or a determination of the amount of fees. Therefore, the attorney’s fee issue is not ripe for this Court’s review, and we decline to address Former Husband’s argument at this time. See Holmes v. Holmes, 100 So.3d 745, 745-46 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

While we are compelled to reverse portions of the final judgment, we note that many of the issues resulted from Former Husband’s lack of veracity and the parties’ failure to provide the court with the information necessary to make a sound decision. This was a lengthy, contentious case that was presided over by numerous different trial judges. Overall, the tidal court did the best it could with the information provided.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED.

SAWAYA and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.

      . The child was almost an adult at the conclusion of trial.

      . Former Wife did not file an answer brief in this appeal. No issue is raised as to the disposition of the property or the impact of the monies spent improving the property in terms of equitable distribution. However, Former Husband's, preparation of a fraudulent quitclaim deed is relevant to the trial court's determination of his credibility.

      .The record is unclear as to the exact length of Former Husband’s unemployment.

      . In the final judgment, the only findings regarding the parties’ incomes are found under the portion addressing child support, and those findings only relate to gross income.


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    ASCENSION BENEFITS & INSURANCE SOLUTIONS OF FLORIDA and City of Orlando, Appellants, v. Russell ROBINSON, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-5853
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017

      Richard B. Robbins and Theodore N. Goldstein of Rissman, Barrett, Hurt, Donahue, McLain & Mangan, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants.
    Charles H. Leo of Law Offices of Charles H. Leo, P.A., Orlando, and Richard W. Ervin, III, of Fox & Loquasto, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) raise two issues on appeal and Claimant raises three on cross-appeal. We affirm all issues with the exception of the award of surgery challenged by the E/C, which we reverse as discussed below.

Background

Claimant’s compensable injuries came about as a result of repetitive trauma involving both hands and both elbows. In 2016 a disagreement arose between Claimant’s authorized treating physician and Claimant’s independent medical examiner (IME) as to the nature of the treatment needed to address Claimant’s compensable injuries. Claimant filed a motion outlining that disagreement, which resulted in the appointment of an expert medical examiner (EMA). Among other questions posed-to the EMA, the JCC asked that he opine as to what reasonable and medically necessary treatment was needed for Claimant’s compensable hand and upper extremity injuries.

' The JCC, in the order under review, found that Dr. Rayhack, ' the EMA, “agreed that surgery on the residual lateral epicondylitis and for release of the'trigger fingers would be reasonable,” and “that there is no clear and convincing evidence to reject the medical opinions of Dr. Rayhack with" regards to the reasonableness of the .requested surgeries being awarded.” Alternatively, the JCC' found that Dr. Rayhack’s opinion regarding surgical releases, when considered in its totality, was inconclusive. Nevertheless, the JCC found, based on the opinions of both Dr. Rayhack and Claimant’s IME, that the surgical releases of the elbow and trigger fingers were reasonable and medically necessary. The E/C maintain on appeal that, in awarding the surgeries, the JCC misinterpreted the EMA’s opinion. Rather, argue the E/C, the EMA’s opinion was that the surgeries were not necessary nor recommended.

Analysis

Where the JCC’s findings are called into question as not consistent with the evidence, this court reviews for abuse of discretion. See Ullman v. City of Tampa Parks Dep’t, 625 So.2d 868, 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (“The role of this court must be to guard against fanciful or arbitrary abuse of discretion in- workers’ compensation cases, and we will continue to do so by scrutinizing JCC findings, under the lift of the basic rule requiring [CSE] in support of such findings.”). See. also Lemmer v. Urban Elec., Inc., 947 So.2d 1196, 1199 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (reversing JCC’s denial of benefits based on findings not consistent with record). “A court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person could reach the same conclusion.” Verkruysse v. Fla. Carpenters Reg’l Council, 27 So.3d 157, 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

■Under paragraph 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), an injured employee is entitled to “such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require.” Under paragraph 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), an EMA must be appointed when “there is a disagreement in the opinion of the health care providers.” Further, “[t]he opinion of the [EMA] is. presumed to be correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary as determined by the [JCC].” Id.

-Here, the JCC found that Dr. Rayhack testified that surgery for the residual lateral epicondylitis and for release of trigger, .fingers would be “reasonable.” .Reasonableness is not, however, the only standard to apply when awarding medical treatment. As noted above, paragraph 440.13(2)(a) specifically requires that the treatment be “medically necessary.” .Thus, it is not enough that the treatment be “reasonable,” it must be “medically necessary,” and it was Claimant’s burden to prove medical necessity. See Morrow v. Sam’s Club, 17 So.3d 763, 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (explaining that entitlement to all medical treatment is governed by paragraph 440.13(2)(a), “which requires a showing of medical necessity”). See also Trevino v. Dep’t of Revenue, 82 So.3d 930, 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“Generally, it is the claimant’s1 burden to prove entitlement to any requested benefit.”).

Importantly; Dr. Rayhack did not opine that the surgeries were medically necessary. To the contrary, he made it clear that he was not recommending them. In his report, he "stated thát he “would not recommend additional upper extremity surgery as I feel it is unlikely that this patient would benefit from additional hand, wrist, or elbow surgery.” On direct examination during his deposition he explained his concern with trigger finger surgery; specifically, it had the possibility to make Claimant worse and was unlikely to offer Claimant any relief. He had similar concerns about the elbow surgery, éxplaining that surgery, is rarely- done and only for refractory cases; rather, it is almost always treated conservatively. On cross-examination, Dr. Rayhack opined that no further surgeries on the relevant nerves were recommended, although he did agree that the trigger finger releases were “reasonable” if some other physician wanted to do them.

The JCC’s error in relying on '“reasonableness,” and ignoring medical necessity, both in his primary analysis and in his alternative analysis,.is that the JCC failed to accord the EMA’s opinion its due — that it is presumptively correct. Further, the JCC failed to articulate clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The doctor was asked whether there was any treatment he would recommend. He responded that he did not recommend further upper extremity surgeries. His acknowledgement that another physician might perform such a surgery is not clear and convincing evidence so as to call his opinion into question. See Travelers Ins. v. Armstrong, 118 So.3d 865, 866 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (reversing JCC’s rejection of EMA’s opinion for failure to articulate clear and convincing reasons for doing so where. one reason given was that “JCC found that it was ‘notable’ that the EMA avoided answering a question about whether Claimant was a surgical candidate. However, the record shows that the EMA stated in his report that he would not recommend surgery for Claimant and he reaffirmed this statement during this deposition”). , _,

Because the JCC failed to apply the correct standard in assessing Dr. Ray-hack’s opinion, and further failed to clearly articulate a reason for rejecting the EMA’s opinion, he abused his discretion in awarding the surgeries, and this issue is reversed.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM in apart, and REVERSE in part, and REMAND for proceedings consistent. with this opinion.

WOLF, WINOKUR, and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.


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    Edward Robert INGLETON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D17-3645
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 5, 2018
    Edward Robert Ingleton, Cross City, pro se. ' ’
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and, Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the July 26, 2016 order denying Petitioner’s pro se motion for post-conviction relief, filed in Case Nos. 1993-CF-14914-A and 1994-CF-14408-A, in the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

PALMER, WALLIS and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


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    Travis Jermaine ASH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-1314
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 5, 2018
    Anthony M. Candela, of Candela Law Firm, P.A., Riverview, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm Appellant’s conviction without comment but remand for correction of a scrivener’s error in the judgment. On remand, the trial court is directed to correct the judgment to properly cite Appellant’s conviction under section 893.13(l)(c)l., Florida Statutes (2014).

AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF SCRIVENER’S ERROR.

BERGER, EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


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    Eddiel ROSADO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-529
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 5, 2018
    Eddiel Rosado, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed without prejudice to Rosado filing a facially sufficient motion if he can do so in good faith. See Rosa v. State, 147 So.3d 583, 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

SILBERMAN, VILLANTI, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


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    J.F., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D18-0082
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 11, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Wilber L. Cooke, II, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Caroline Johnson Levine, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

J.F. petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he is entitled to immediate release from involuntary inpatient placement at Stewart-Marchman-Act in Daytona Beach, Florida, because the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to himself or others. The State properly concedes error and agrees that the wiit of habeas corpus should be granted. Accordingly, we grant the petition and order his immediate release. See § 394.467(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017); C.W. v. State, 214 So.3d 796, 797 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (citing In re Lehrke, 12 So.3d 307, 308-09 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)). No motion for rehearing will be entertained.

PETITION GRANTED.

PALMER, BERGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


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    K.M.W., A Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1735
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 12, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Kristen D. Dukes, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison L. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See D.R. v. State, 178 So.3d 478, 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (holding that explaining trial court’s reasons for departure from DJJ recommendation is not required for court’s initial decision of whether to commit juvenile even when DJJ recommends probation; findings are required only when court departs from recommended restrictiveness level of commitment); see also D.G. v. State, 170 So.3d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); J.B.S. v. State, 90 So.3d 961, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

EVANDER, BERGER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


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    Michael FULGHAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3178
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 12, 2018
    Michael Fulgham, Sneads, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Michael Fulgham appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion for additional jail credit. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.801. He argues that in the absence of any evidence showing he specifically waived credit for jail time, the trial court erred in relying on his written plea form to deny his motion. We agree and reverse. See Pippins v. State, 147 So.3d 665, 665-66 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

The facts of this case are virtually identical to Pippins, where we reversed an order summarily denying the appellant’s motion for additional jail credit because the written plea form did not expressly provide that the appellant waived additional jail credit, and the appellant specifically alleged that she had not waived the additional credit. Jd. at 665. Here, despite the notation on the plea form that Fulgham would receive fifty-one days credit for time served, he insists that he did not waive any additional credit for the time he served in jail. As such, a factual dispute exists regarding waiver that may require a hearing. See id.; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.801(e). We, therefore, reverse the order under review and remand for attachment of additional portions of the record, such as the plea colloquy, specifically refuting Fulg-ham’s claim'br, in the absence of such records, for an evidentiary hearing.. See Pippins, 147 So.3d at 666; Louis v. State, 143 So.3d 452, 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“When, -as in this case, -a factual dispute exists, and the files and records do not conclusively show appellant is entitled to no relief, an evidentiary hearing is generally required.").

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions, . ■

TORPY, BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


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    Boyd Gene WILEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3659
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    January 12, 2018
    John N. Bogdanoff, of The Carlyle Appellate Law Firm, The Villages, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo-Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Boyd Gene Wiley appeals his convictions and sentences following a jury trial arguing, in part, ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm without prejudice to Wiley filing a timely, facially sufficient motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We express no opinion on the merits of any postconviction motion filed.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., BERGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.'

text:
    Patrick J. BENWAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3077
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 19, 2018
    Patrick J. Benway, Quincy, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.'

AFFIRMED. See Brooks v. State, 969 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2007) (holding that proper test for motion to correct illegal sentence is whether same sentence could haye been imposed with corrected scoresheet).

ORFINGER, EVANDER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


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    SOLARBLUE, LLC, Solarblue Canada, Inc. and Lee Maher, Appellants, v. BENNETT JONES, LLP and Ernest W. Belyea, Esq., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D16-4374
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 19, 2018
    Jennifer K Birmingham, The Birmingham Law Firm, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellants.
    Michael M. Brownlee, of Fisher Rush-mer, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1779-81, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017) (explaining that in determining whether personal jurisdiction is present, primary concern is burden on defendant of litigating in forum because to do otherwise would offend due process).

ORFINGER, EVANDER'and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


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    Lea Michelle MCGINNIS, Appellant, v. Matthew IRWIN, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-4192
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 19, 2018
    Richard J. Feinberg, of Law Office of Richard J., Feinberg, Indialantic, for Appellant.
    Jonathan R,. Simon, of The Orlando Family Firm, Orlando, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm in all respects except the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for attorney’s fees. On remand, the lower court shall make findings of fact regarding Appellant’s need and Appellee’s ability to pay fees and award such' fees as are warranted based on those findings. See Henderson v. Henderson, 162 So.3d 203, 207 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

COHEN, C.J., TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.