author: PITTMAN, Judge.

text:
    Raleigh Levon HILL, Sr. v. Beverly Collier HILL.
    2130352.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Dec. 4, 2015.
    Certiorari Denied May 20, 2016
    Alabama Supreme Court 1150284.

      Brian M. White of White & Oakes, LLC, Decatur; and Jake Watson of Watson Graffeo, P.G., Huntsville, for appellant.
    Henri B. McDaniel and Marcus .Hel-stowski of McDaniel & McDaniel, L.L.C., Huntsville, for appellee.
   On Application for Rehearing

PITTMAN, Judge.

This court’s opinion of April 3, 2015, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.

Raleigh Levon Hill, Sr. (“the husband”), appeals from a judgment of the Madison Circuit Court (“the trial court”) divorcing him and Beverly Collier Hill (“the wife”) (1) insofar as that judgment awarded the wife a property settlement in the amount of $162,623.86, which, the trial court found, represented one-half of the husband’s net winnings from a lottery, and (2) insofar as it awarded the wife one-half of the value of the husband’s retirement account. We affirm.

Procedural History

In September 2011, approximately 23 years after the husband had left her and the parties’ three children on July 29, 1988, the wife sued the husband for (1) a divorce on the ground of abandonment and incompatibility, (2) a property settlement, and (3) a share of the husband’s retirement account. Also in September 2011, the trial court entered its standing penden-te lite order, which, among other things, ordered the parties to preserve their assets in the form in which they existed upon the entry of the pendente lite order. The husband was served with process on October 1, 2011. Answering, the husband asserted (1) that he had divorced the -wife in 2002 by means of a purported divorce judgment he had procured over the Internet from a Mexican court (“the purported Mexican divorce”), which, he said, deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the wife’s action, and (2) that the wife’s claims were barred by the doctrines of equitable estoppel and laches.

In June 2013, the trial court held a bench trial at which it received evidence ore tenus. The issues tried were (1) whether the purported Mexican divorce was valid, (2) whether the wife was entitled to a share of the assets accumulated by the husband after July 29,1988, and (3) whether the wife was entitled to a share of the husband’s retirement account.

After the trial, the parties submitted posttrial briefs. In her posttrial brief, the wife asserted that the purported Mexican divorce was void because, she said, the husband had procured it through fraud by misrepresenting to the Mexican court that he and the wife had resided in Mexico and because, she said, the husband had neither notified her that he was seeking that divorce nor served her with process. She also asserted that she was entitled to a share of the assets the husband had accumulated after July 29, 1988, and that she was entitled to a share of his retirement account. In his posttrial brief, the husband conceded that the purported Mexican divorce judgment was invalid, that the parties were still married, and that the trial court had jurisdiction over the wife’s action. However, he asserted that the wife was estopped from claiming any portion of the assets he had accumulated after July 29, 1988, and any portion of his retirement account because, he said, both parties had led separate lives since July 29, 1988, and the wife had indicated on her income-tax returns and other documents filed since July 29,1988, that she was single.

In September 2013, the trial court entered a judgment that determined that the purported Mexican divorce was void; determined that the trial court had jurisdiction over the wife’s action; divorced the parties on the ground of incompatibility; found that the money the husband had won in the North Carolina Educational Lottery (“the lottery”) in 2011 constituted marital property; awarded the wife a property settlement in the amount of “$162,623.86, representing one-half of [the husband’s] after-tax lottery winnings”; and awarded the wife one-half of the value of the husband’s retirement account. The husband timely filed a postjudgment motion. Among other things, his post-judgment motion asserted that the trial court had erred in awarding the wife a property settlement because, he said, the amount awarded the wife as a property settlement exceeded the value of his estate and because, he said, the property settlement awarded the wife was not equitable. His postjudgment motion also stated:

“13. [The husband] requests that the Court vacate the Order that the ‘[wife] is awarded one-half the value of [the husband’s] U.S. Airways Inc. Employee Savings Plan, as reflected on Plaintiffs Exhibit 6’ because [the wife] failed to provide evidence or any proof of the present value of the benefits. See Underwood v. Underwood, 100 So.3d 1115 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (reversing trial court’s award of 50% of retirement account because [the trial court] lacked jurisdiction to make award where wife failed to present evidence of present value at time of filing). Section 30-2-51(b), Ala.Code 1975[,] provides in pertinent part that ... ‘[t]he judge, at his or her discretion, may include in the estate of either spouse the present value of any future or current retirement benefits, that a spouse may have a vested interest in or may be receiving on the date the action for divorce is filed....’
“14. [The husband] requests that this Court vacate the Qualified Domestic Relations Order that it entered on October 3, 2013[,] based upon the same grounds as stated in Paragraph 13 of this motion where [the wife] failed to provide evidence or any proof of the present value of the benefits, thereby depriving this Court of jurisdiction to award the Wife his retirement benefits....”

(Emphasis altered.)

At the hearing regarding the husband’s postjudgment motion, the husband argued that the trial court had erred in awarding the wife one-half of the value of the husband’s retirement account because, he said, “[t]he value of the retirement account at the time of separation was never established. And that’s a jurisdictional issue according to case law that was cited in the motion to alter, amend, or vacate.” (Emphasis added.)

The trial court did not rule on the husband’s postjudgment motion within 90 days after it was filed; consequently, that motion was denied by operation of law pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., in January 2014. The husband then timely appealed to this court.

Factual Background

Because the trial court’s judgment was based on evidence the trial court received ore tenus at a bench trial, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, i.e., the wife. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Aldridge, 104 So.3d 208, 215 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (holding that, in reviewing a judgment based on evidence received ore tenus, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party). Viewed in that manner, the evidence tended to prove the following pertinent facts.

In November 1984, when she was 17 years old, the wife gave birth to the parties’ oldest child. The parties married in January 1985, while the wife was still 17 and the husband was 20. The parties had a second child in January 1987 and a third one in January 1988. On the morning of July 29,1988, the husband left the parties’ apartment and never returned. Before leaving, the husband had never told the wife that he was contemplating leaving. After the husband left, the wife did not hear from him until he telephoned her several weeks later and informed her that he had gone to Ohio to find a better job. The husband took the parties’ only automobile when he left. By 1991, the husband had moved to North Carolina, where he was still living when this action was tried. Although the husband paid child support after the State of Alabama brought a child-support action against him on behalf of the wife in 1991, he never paid the wife any spousal support after July 29, 1988.

After the husband left on July 29, 1988, the parties had very little contact, and they never lived together again. The husband never discussed the subject of a divorce with the wife and never served her with process in a divorce action commenced by him.

In 1999, the husband met a woman named Erin Cullen and told her that he was not married. The husband and Cullen began living together shortly after they met. The husband and Cullen subsequently became engaged, and, approximately two weeks before their wedding in 2002, the husband informed Cullen that he could not find any record of his divorce from the wife. The husband and Cullen then found a site on the Internet indicating that a divorce could be obtained in three days from a Mexican court. Although neither the husband nor the wife had ever lived in Mexico, Cullen and the husband sat in front of their computer while Cullen typed information supplied by the husband on an Internet application for a Mexican judgment divorcing the husband and the wife. The husband submitted the application on the Internet without ever notifying the wife that he was seeking a divorce or serving her with process. The husband received the purported Mexican divorce judgment in the mail approximately three days after he had submitted his application on the Internet. The wife did not learn of the purported Mexican divorce judgment until she commenced the present divorce action. After the husband received the purported Mexican divorce judgment, the husband and Cullen had a wedding ceremony.

Sometime before February 15, 2011, the husband purchased a ticket to participate in the lottery, and, on February 15, 2011, he won $1,000,000 in the lottery. The husband split the $1,000,000 with Cullen, and they each received a check for one-half of the net proceeds after deduction of taxes. The check the husband received was in the amount of $325,247.73. He deposited that check into his checking account in August 2011. Subsequently, on October 1, 2011, he was served with process in the present action. When he was served with process, the trial court had already entered its standing pendente lite order requiring the parties to preserve their assets in the form they were in when that order was entered. Despite that provision of the standing pendente lite order, the husband, on November 28, 2011, purchased a house (“the house”) with a purchase price of $299,405 using the proceeds of the $325,247.73 check he had received from the lottery.

After leaving the wife and the children on July 29, 1988, the husband obtained employment with U.S. Airways, Inc., and was still employed by U.S. Airways when this action was tried. He has a retirement account with U.S. Airways, and his interest in that account is 100% vested. According to his retirement account’s quarterly statement for the first quarter of 2013 (“the 2013 quarterly statement”), the last quarterly statement available when this action was tried, the value of his retirement account at the end of that quarter was $30,357.51.

Standard of Review

Because the trial court received evidence ore tenus, our review is governed by the following principles:

“ ‘ “ ‘[W]hen a trial court hears ore tenus testimony, its findings on disputed facts are presumed correct and its judgment based on those findings will not be reversed unless the judgment is palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.”” Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd. v. Parks, 977 So.2d 440, 443 (Ala.2007) (quoting Fadalla v. Fadalla, 929 So.2d 429, 433 (Ala.2005), quoting in turn Phil pot v. State, 843 So.2d 122, 125 (Ala.2002)). ‘“The presumption of correctness, however, is rebuttable and may be overcome where there is insufficient evidence presented to the trial court to sustain its judgment.” ’ Wattman v. Rowell, 913 So.2d 1083, 1086 (Ala.2005) (quoting Dennis v. Dobbs, 474 So.2d 77, 79 (Ala.1985)). ‘Additionally, the ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak with a presumption of correctness a trial judge’s conclusions of law or the incorrect application of law to the facts.’ Wattman v. Rowell, 913 So.2d at 1086.”

Retail Developers of Alabama, LLC v. East Gadsden Golf Club, Inc., 985 So.2d 924, 929 (Ala.2007).

Analysis

In his principal appellate brief, the husband first argues:

“The trial court erred in awarding to the wife one-half of the value of the retirement savings account as reflected in Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, which is an account statement for the period of January 1, 2013 to March 31, 2013. This statement comes some eighteen (18) months after the divorce was filed. It necessarily shows accumulation and interest earned during the pendency of the divorce.
This provision of the divorce decree violates § 30 — 2—51 (b)[, Ala.Code 1975,] which states that the Court may award part of the vested balance of the party at the time of filing the divorce. See Clore v. Clore, 135 So.3d 264 (Ala.Civ.App.2013), citing Smith v. Smith, 964 So.2d 663, 669 (Ala.Civ.App.2005)[,] wherein this Court states that a trial court may not award any post-complaint additions to the account and the income and appreciation thereon. See also Underwood v. Underwood, 100 So.3d 1115 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (reversing trial court’s award of 50% of retirement account because [the trial court] lacked jurisdiction to make award where wife failed to present evidence of present value at time of filing).”

Section 30-2-51(b), Ala.Code 1975, provides:

“The judge, at his or her discretion, may include in the estate of either spouse the present value of any future or current retirement benefits, that a spouse may have a vested interest in or may be receiving on the date the action for divorce is filed, provided that the following conditions are met:
“(1) The parties have been married for a period of 10 years during which the retirement was being accumulated.
“(2) The court shall not include in the estate the value of any retirement benefits acquired prior to the marriage including any interest or appreciation of the benefits.
“(3) The total amount of the retirement benefits payable to the non-covered spouse shall not exceed 50 percent of the retirement benefits that may be considered by the court.”

(Emphasis added.)

In Robicheaux v. Robicheaux, 731 So.2d 1222 (Ala.Civ.App.1998), Mr. Robicheaux appealed from a judgment divorcing him and Mrs. Robicheaux and argued that “the [Tuscaloosa Circuit Court had] erred in valuing his retirement benefits on the date of the divorce judgment instead of on the date of the filing of the complaint for divorce” for purposes of awarding Mrs. Robicheaux a share of those benefits because, he said, “the language of § 30-2-51(b) [indicated] that the retirement benefits [were] to be valued at the time of the filing of the complaint.” 731 So.2d at 1224. Rejecting that argument, we stated:

“[In response to Mr. Robicheaux’s argument, Mrs. Robicheaux] argues that the [prepositional phrase ‘on the date the action for divorce is filed’ in] subsection (b) does not modify ‘present value,’ but instead modifies the phrases ‘may have a vested interest in’ and ‘may be receiving.’ We agree. Subsection (b) requires that, for a trial judge to consider including retirement benefits in the estate of a spouse, the spouse must, at the time the divorce was filed, either have been receiving those benefits or have had a vested interest in them. The statute does not indicate when the 'present value of the retirement benefits is to be determined. Therefore, the trial court did not err by valuing the husband’s retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce.”

Id. (emphasis added).

In Smith v. Smith, 964 So.2d 663 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), the Houston Circuit Court awarded Mrs. Smith one-half of Mr. Smith’s Snecma 401(k) Savings Plan, one-half of his Snecma Retirement Account Plan, and one-half of his TRW retirement account in the judgment divorcing them. This court reversed the judgment insofar as it had awarded Mrs. Smith a share of those retirement accounts, stating:

“[T]he record reflects that [Mr. Smith]’s Snecma 401k Savings Plan, his Snecma Retirement Account Plan, and his TRW account all contained some retirement benefits acquired before the parties’ marriage. Except for the Snecma 401k Savings Plan, which had a value of approximately $8,000 when the parties married, [Mrs. Smith] presented no evidence of the value of the retirement benefits in [Mr. Smith]’s retirement accounts when the parties[ ] married, i.e., the value of the retirement benefits acquired before the marriage. See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-51(b)(2). Also, as to the Snecma 401k Savings Plan, the Snecma Retirement Account Plan, and the TRW account, [Mrs. Smith] presented no evidence of the interest or appreciation on the premarriage benefits that accrued after the date of the parties[’] marriage. See id. Furthermore, as to the Snecma 401k Savings Plan and the Snecma Retirement Account Plan, which [Mr. Smith] and his employer continued to contribute to after the complaint for divorce was filed, [Mrs. Smith] presented no evidence of the value of the retirement benefits in those accounts in which [Mr. Smith] had a vested interest ‘on the date the action for divorce [was] filed’; as to those accounts the only evidence of the value that [Mr. Smith] had a vested interest in was the value at the time of trial or a few months before trial. In other words, the [Houston] [C]ircuit [C]ourt’s retirement-benefits award contains premarriage retirement benefits, and income and appreciation thereon, and postcomplaint retirement benefits, and income and appreciation thereon, in violation of § 30-2-51(b). See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-51(b)(2) (regarding retirement benefits accruing before marriage, and interest and appreciation thereon); see also Killingsworth v. Killingsworth, 925 So.2d 977, 982 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (Retirement benefits ‘earned after the filing of the divorce action ... do not constitute vested benefits subject to division under § 30-2-51.’); Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 905 So.2d 1, 5 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (Murdock, J., concurring specially) (‘If the judgment ... had simply awarded a percentage of whatever benefits were vested in the husband as of the date of the filing of the complaint for divorce (along with any subsequent interest on or appreciation in value of those vested benefits), the judgment would have been in compliance with the first sentence of § 30-2-51(b).’).”

964 So.2d at 669 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Clore v. Clore, 135 So.3d 264, 270 (AIa.Civ.App.2013), merely followed the holding in Smith v. Smith that, “under Ala.Code 1975, § 30-2-51(b), a retirement-benefits award incident to a divorce may not include ‘postcomplaint retirement benefits! ] and income and appreciation thereon.’ ”

Thus, an award of retirement benefits pursuant to § 30-2-51(b) may not include retirement benefits that were earned before the marriage or any interest or appreciation thereon, may not include any retirement benefits earned after the divorce complaint was filed or any interest or appreciation thereon, and may not include any benefits that were not vested on the date the divorce complaint was filed or any interest and appreciation thereon; however, such an award may include retirement benefits that were vested on the date the divorce complaint was filed and any subsequent interest or appreciation thereon. See Smith v. Smith, supra. Consequently, Smith v. Smith does not stand for the proposition that a spouse must prove the present value of the other spouse’s vested retirement benefits on the date the divorce complaint is filed in order to be awarded a share of those benefits under § 30-2-51(b). As we held in Robicheaux v. Robicheaux, § 30-2-51(b) “does not indicate when the present value of the retirement benefits is to be determined.” 731 So.2d at 1224. If all the retirement benefits are earned on or after the date the parties married and on or before the date the divorce complaint is filed and all the retirement benefits are vested on the date the divorce complaint is filed, those vested benefits are subject to division under § 30-2-51(b) based on evidence indicating the present value of those vested benefits on any date on or after the filing of the divorce complaint and on or before the entry of the divorce judgment. See Smith v. Smith, 964 So.2d at 669 (“ ‘If the judgment ... had simply awarded a percentage of whatever benefits were vested in the husband as of the date of the filing of the complaint for divorce (along with any subsequent interest on or appreciation in value of those vested benefits), the judgment would have been in compliance with the first sentence of § 30-2-51(b).’ ” (quoting Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 905 So.2d 1, 5 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (Murdock, J., concurring specially))); and Robicheaux v. Robicheaux, 731 So.2d at 1224 (“[Section 30-2-51(b) ] does not indicate when the present value of the retirement benefits is to be determined. Therefore, the trial court did not err by valuing the husband’s retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce.”).

In the present case, all the husband’s retirement benefits were earned after the parties married, but the husband continued working and continued to earn retirement benefits after the divorce complaint was filed. Consequently, the trial court’s basing the award to the wife of one-half of the value of the husband’s retirement account on the 2013 quarterly statement was erroneous not because the quarterly statement did not reflect the present value of the husband’s vested benefits in that account on the date the divorce complaint was filed but because it included retirement benefits earned after the filing of the divorce complaint and interest on, or appreciation of, those benefits. See Smith v. Smith, supra; and Ro-bicheaux v. Robicheaux, supra. Consequently, the assertion in the husband’s postjudgment motion that the award to the wife of one-half of the value of the husband’s retirement account based on the quarterly statement was erroneous “because [the wife] failed to provide evidence or any proof of the present value of the benefits” (emphasis added) did not correctly identify the inclusion of retirement benefits earned after the filing of the divorce complaint and interest on, or appreciation of, those benefits as the reason why the trial court had erred in relying on the quarterly statement as the basis for its retirement-benefits award. Likewise, the husband’s argument at the hearing on his postjudgment motion that “[t]he value of the retirement account at the time of separation was never established” (emphasis added) did not correctly identify the inclusion of retirement benefits earned after the filing of the divorce complaint and interest on, or appreciation of, those benefits as the reason why the trial court had erred in relying on the quarterly statement. Insofar as the husband’s principal appellate brief cites Smith v. Smith, supra, for the proposition “that a trial court may not award any post-complaint additions to the account and the income and appreciation thereon,” the husband correctly identifies the reason why the trial court’s reliance on the quarterly statement was erroneous; however, we cannot reverse a trial court’s judgment based on an argument that was not presented to the trial court. See Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So.2d 409, 410 (Ala.1992) (“[An appellate court] cannot consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal; rather, [an appellate court’s] review is restricted to the evidence and arguments considered by the trial court.”).

The husband next argues that the trial court erred in awarding the wife a property settlement in the amount of $162,623.86 because, he says, it was an award of alimony in gross that exceeded the value of his estate on the date it was awarded. The undisputed evidence established that, after the husband had been served with process in the present action and after the entry of the trial court’s standing pendente lite order requiring the parties to maintain their assets in the form in which they existed on the date that order was entered, the husband used the proceeds of the check he had received from the lottery in the amount of $325,247.73 to purchase the house, which had a value of $299,405. Although both the husband’s name and Cullen’s name are listed on the settlement statement, prepared for the closing of the purchase of the house, which implies that Cullen is listed as a grantee on the deed to the house, the record does not contain any direct evidence establishing whether the house is titled solely in the name of the husband or jointly in the names of both the husband and Cullen. However, even if the house is titled jointly in the names of both the husband and Cullen, the trial court could properly have treated the entire value of the house as a marital asset in dividing the parties’ marital property because the undisputed evidence indicated that the husband had paid the entire purchase price of the house using the proceeds of his lottery check, that any inclusion of Cullen on the title to the house was unsupported by any consideration, and that the use of the proceeds of the husband’s lottery check to purchase the house violated the provision of the standing pendente lite order requiring the parties to preserve their assets in the form in which they existed on the date that order was entered. See Pattillo v. Pattillo, 414 So.2d 915, 916 (Ala.1982) (holding that a trial court had erred in failing to treat certain property as marital property when the evidence indicated that one spouse had transferred it to the parties’ children for no consideration in order to defeat the other spouse’s marital rights in it); and Baggett v. Baggett, 870 So.2d 735, 740 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (“‘“In Alabama a transfer of ... property made to defeat a spouse’s marital right is voidable.” ’ ” (quoting earlier eases)). Thus, the trial court could properly have deemed the entire value of the house to be a part of the marital estate for purposes of awarding the wife a property settlement on the ground that any inclusion of Cullen’s name on the title to the house was done to defeat the wife’s marital interest in one-half of the value of the house. Id. Because the value of the house, i.e., $299,405, exceeds the value of the property settlement awarded the wife, i.e., $162,623.86, we reject the husband’s second argument.

Finally, the husband argues that the division of the parties’ property was not equitable.

“ ‘A division of marital property in a divorce case does not have to be equal, only equitable, and a determination of what is equitable rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. When dividing marital property, a trial court should consider several factors, including the length of the marriage; the age and health of the parties; the future prospects of the parties; the source, type, and value of the property; the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; and the fault of the parties contributing to the breakup of the marriage.’ ”

Yohey v. Yohey, 890 So.2d 160, 164-65 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (quoting Golden v. Golden, 681 So.2d 605, 608 (Ala.Civ.App.1996)).

In the present case, although the parties lived together for less than 4 years, they were legally married for over 25 years. When the action was tried, both parties were in their 40s and were in good health. The husband had worked for U.S. Airlines for over 20 years, while the wife had worked for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for 9 years. The parties’ only significant assets were the house, which the husband had purchased with his lottery winnings, and the husband’s retirement account. The trial court reasonably could have found that the husband’s leaving the wife and children without prior notice and his failure to return for over 20 years was the sole cause of the breakdown of the marriage.

As explained above, the trial court could properly have treated the entire $299,405 value of the house as marital property on the ground that any inclusion of Cullen’s name on the title to the house was intended to defeat the wife’s marital interest in one-half of the value of the house. With the value of the house treated in that manner, the trial court awarded the wife $162,623.86 of that value and awarded the husband $136,781.14 of it. The trial court awarded the wife one-half of the value of the husband’s retirement account. Taking into account the value of the marital property awarded each party and the other pertinent factors, we cannot hold that the trial court’s division of the marital property is inequitable. Therefore, we reject the husband’s third and final argument. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is due to be affirmed.

APPLICATION GRANTED; OPINION OF APRIL 3, 2015, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and THOMAS, MOORE, and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.

      . Although the parties had three children, they were all over the age of 19 when the wife filed her divorce complaint, and, therefore, she made no claim for custody or child support.

      2. The parties "separated” on July 29, 1988, before the husband obtained employment with U.S. Airways, Inc., which is the employer affiliated with his retirement account.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: THOMAS, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Leslie COOK v. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC.
    2140786.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    May 13, 2016.

      Rhonda Steadman Hood and Kenneth J. Lay of Hood & Lay, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
    Jason B. Tompkins and Chase T. Espy of Balch & Bingham LLP, Birmingham; and Richard Moxley III, Charles E. By-rom, and Brandy L. Chamblee of Holloway & Moxley, LLP, Montgomery, for appel-lee.
   On Application for Rehearing

THOMAS, Judge.

This court’s opinion of March 11, 2016, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.

This appeal arises from a summary-judgment in favor of Midland Funding, LLC (“Midland”), in an action against Leslie Cook in which Midland sought to recover $16,083.09 allegedly due on a credit account. The facts in the record on appeal indicate the following. Cook opened a credit-card account (“the account”) with Chase Bank, USA, N.A. (“Chase”), in 1995. The last purchase on the account was made in July 2008, and the last payment on the account was remitted on December 22, 2009. Thereafter, Cook allegedly failed to remit to Chase the balance due on the account ($16,083.09), Chase charged off the account, and Midland purchased from Chase a pool of charged-off accounts, which, according to Midland, included the account.

On October 17, 2013, Midland filed a complaint in the Etowah Circuit Court seeking to recover $16,083.09 from Cook. Midland asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and account stated. On November 20, 2013, Midland filed a motion seeking a default judgment in its favor, and Midland supported its motion with the affidavits of Erin Hale, an employee of Midland Credit Management, Inc. (“MCM”), the company that services Midland’s accounts, and Chiahua Mixon, an employee of Chase, and with certain redacted documents and billing statements, attached to the affidavits as exhibits, intended to demonstrate that Midland had purchased a number of accounts, including the account, from Chase in 2011. Among the documents filed in support of its motion, Midland included a generic credit-card application. The circuit court entered a default judgment in favor of Midland on November 20, 2013.

On December 17, 2013, Cook filed a motion seeking to set aside the default judgment in which he admitted that he had been served with the summons and complaint and that he had failed to file an answer in the circuit court, but, he asserted, he had served a timely answer on Midland. The circuit court entered an order setting aside the default judgment.

On February 18, 2014, Midland filed a motion seeking a summary judgment in which it argued that no issues of material fact existed. Cook filed an answer in which he denied Midland’s allegations and asserted various defenses. Thereafter Cook filed a summary-judgment motion. Among other things, Cook argued that Midland had failed to produce his credit-card application or any contract or agreement between Cook and Chase or between Cook and Midland; thus, according to Cook, Midland lacked “standing” to pursue its claims. Cook attached to his motion his own affidavit in which he testified that he had never entered into a contract with Midland and that he did not owe any debt to Midland. Cook also filed a motion to strike the affidavits of Hale and Mixon along with the redacted documents and billing statements submitted with their affidavits. According to Cook, the affidavit testimony was “meaningless” or “defective” because neither Hale nor Mixon had personal knowledge regarding the account.

A two-day motion hearing was held on August 13, 2014, and February 2, 2015, at which the circuit court heard arguments of counsel. On February 13, 2015, the circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of Midland and denied Cook’s motion for a summary judgment. It awarded Midland damages in the amount of $16,083.09, and it denied Cook’s motion to strike. Cook filed a timely postjudgment motion, which the circuit court denied on May 15, 2015, after a hearing. Cook filed a timely notice of appeal on June 26, 2015.

“ ‘In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, we use the same standard the trial court used in determining whether the evidence before it presented a genuine issue of material fact and whether the movant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988); Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmov-ant to present substantial evidence creating an issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794 (Ala.1989). Evidence is “substantial” if it is of “such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.” West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). This Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412 (Ala.1990).’
“Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So.2d 638, 643 (Ala.2006).”

Stacey v. Peed, 142 So.3d 529, 530-31 (Ala.2013).

Cook complains that the circuit court erred by failing to strike the affidavits of Hale and Mixon, that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for a summary judgment regarding one of Midland’s claims based upon his argument that the applicable statute-of-limitations period had expired, and that the circuit court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of Midland on its breach-of-contract claim or its account-stated claim.

Cook contends that the affidavits of Hale and Mixon, which were submitted in support of Midland’s motion for a summary judgment, were insufficient and, thus, due to be struck. According to Cook, the affidavits failed to comply with the mandates of Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., which requires, in pertinent part, the following:

“Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”

Specifically, according to Cook, the affidavits were not based upon personal knowledge. The affidavit of Hale is as follows:

“1. I am employed as a Legal Specialist and have access to pertinent account records for [MCM], servicer of this account on behalf of [Midland]. I am a competent person over eighteen years of age, and make the statements herein based upon personal knowledge of those account records maintained on [Midland^ behalf. [Midland] is the current owner of, and/or successor to, the obligation sued upon, and was assigned all the rights, title and interest to [the account]. I have access to and have reviewed the records pertaining to the account and am authorized to make this affidavit on [Midland]’s behalf.
“2. I am familiar with and trained on the manner and method by which MCM creates and maintains its business records pertaining to this account. The records are kept in the regular course of business. It was in the regular course of business for a person with knowledge of the act or event recorded to make the record or data compilation, or for a person with knowledge to transmit information thereof to be included in such record. In the regular course of business, the record or compilation is made at or near the time of the act or event. The relevant financial information concerning the account includes the following:
“3. MCM’s records show that [Cook] owed a balance of $16,083.09 as of 2013-10-18.
“4. If called to testify as a witness thereon, I could and would competently testify as to all the facts stated herein.”

The affidavit of Mixon, the employee of Chase, is as follows:

“I am over 18 and not a party to this action. I am authorized by [Chase] to execute this affidavit. In my position, I am aware of the process of the sale and assignment of electronically stored business records.
“On or about 3/9/2011, [Chase] sold a pool of charged-off accounts (the ‘Accounts’) to [Midland] under a Purchase and Sale Agreement and a Bill of Sale between [Midland] and Chase. As part of such sale, electronic records and other records on individual accounts included in the Accounts were transferred to [Midland]. These records were kept in the ordinary course of business of Chase.
“I am not aware of any errors in the Accounts. The above statements are true to the best of my knowledge.”

Hale and Mixon each asserted that they had personal knowledge of certain admissible facts to which they were competent to testify, and they attached to their affidavits exhibits intended to support their testimony.

“In [real Coal, Inc. v. Thompson Tractor Co., 379 So.2d 1249 (Ala.1980),] the plaintiff sued to recover money owed on open account and on equipment rental agreements. The plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was supported by the affidavit of its vice president for finance. In his affidavit, the vice president referred to certain exhibits (invoice dates, invoice numbers, invoice amounts, and copies of guaranties executed by one of the individual defendants for the corporate defendants’ debts) and then ‘vouched for’ these documents as reflecting the sums owed by the defendants. The Real Coal Court held:
“ ‘[The vice president] himself verified the exhibits as accurately reflecting the sums owed: “I have personally reviewed the books and records of the company with respect to the obligations of the defendants to the plaintiff and have caused the attached exhibits to be prepared to reflect the items which comprise each account.” Rule 56(e) was satisfied, in that the affidavit set forth facts “as would be admissible in evidence” and showed that [the vice president] was “competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” ’
“Real Coal, supra, 379 So.2d 1250.
“The Real Coal Court went on to hold that although the exhibits in support of the vice president’s affidavit were not of the ‘self proving’ type (see, e.g., Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-111), ‘nevertheless, on motion for summary judgment they could be considered together with [the vice president’s] sworn statement to determine them admissibility.’ Id.”

Ex parte Head, 572 So.2d 1276, 1280-81 (Ala.1990).

In this case, we similarly conclude that the affidavits of Hale and Mixon complied with Rule 56(e). Hale and Mixon each testified, generally, that they had personal knowledge of and the authority to maintain the business records attached to their respective affidavits; thus, the sworn statements of Hale and Mixon and the exhibits attached to their affidavits were properly considered by the circuit court.

Next, Cook contends that one of Midland’s claims should be considered to be a claim on an open account subject to the three-year statute of limitations provided by § 6-2-37, Ala.Code 1975, rather than on an account stated subject to the six-year statute of limitations provided by § 6-2-34, Ala.Code 1975. However, Cook does not have the ability to recast Midland’s account-stated claim as an open-account claim so as to benefit from the shorter statute-of-limitations period applicable to such a claim because, generally, “[e]ach plaintiff is the ‘ “master of [its own] complaint.” ’ ” Ex parte Sundy, 164 So.3d 1089, 1093 (Ala.2014)(quoting Ex parte J.E. Estes Wood Co., 42 So.3d 104, 111 (Ala.2010), quoting in turn Noland Health Servs., Inc. v. Wright, 971 So.2d 681, 693 (Ala.2007)(See, J., dissenting)).

A six-year statute of limitations is applied to claims on an account stated and for actions based on a contract. See § 6-2-34(5) and (9), AIa.Code 1975. Thus, Cook has not demonstrated that the circuit court erred by declining to enter a summary judgment in Cook’s favor based upon its apparent conclusion that the applicable statute of limitations had not expired before Midland filed its complaint.

Finally, Cook contends that the circuit court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of Midland on its breach-of-contract claim or on its account-stated claim. The circuit court did not indicate whether it had entered the summary judgment based upon its determination that Cook was liable for damages for breach of contract, account stated, or both; thus, in order to determine the propriety of a summary judgment on each cause of action, we must review the summary-judgment evidence to see whether it establishes genuine issues of material fact.

A summary judgment in favor of Midland on the breach-of-contract claim would be appropriate if there existed no genuine issues of material fact regarding the basic elements of a contract, which are: “‘an offer and an acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to the essential terms of the agreement.’ ” Stacey, 142 So.3d at 531 (quoting Hargrove v. Tree of Life Christian Day Care Ctr., 699 So.2d 1242, 1247 (Ala.1997)). As evidence indicating the existence of a contract, Midland filed the affidavit of Hale with certain documents attached. In his answer and summary-judgment motion, Cook asserted that Midland had failed to present a valid contract because, according to Cook, no contract existed. Cook also filed his own affidavit in which he testified that he had not entered into a contract with Midland. A review of the record demonstrates that Midland failed to present a valid contract; therefore, assuming that it did so, the circuit court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of Midland on its breach-of-contract claim.

A summary judgment in favor of Midland on Midland’s account-stated claim would be appropriate if there existed no genuine issues of material fact regarding the elements of an account-stated claim. An account stated is a running account between parties of a kind described in Ayers v. Cavalry SVP I, LLC, 876 So.2d 474, 477 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). To establish an account stated, at a certain point the creditor renders to the debtor a statement of an account of the outstanding balance and the debtor admits the correctness of the statement regarding the debt. The rendering of the account statement and the acceptance by the debtor of the correctness of the statement rendered forms a new contract. Ayers, 876 So.2d at 477 (quoting University of South Alabama v. Bracy, 466 So.2d 148, 150 (Ala.Civ.App.1985))(“ ‘An account stated is a post-transaction agreement. It is not founded on the original liability, but is a new agreement between parties to an original account that the statement of the account with the balance struck is correct and that the debtor will pay that amount. It is as if a promissory note had been given for the balance due.’ ”).

Midland claimed that no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding its account-stated claim. Cook, in his answer and in his summary-judgment motion, asserted that Midland had failed to provide evidence demonstrating “balancing and rendering,” a meeting of the minds, or Cook’s admission of liability to Midland in a “new contract.” In his affidavit, Cook testified that he did not owe $16,083.09 to Midland. Midland denied the assertions made in Cook’s affidavit; however, Midland neither provided a copy of a new agreement to the circuit court nor claimed, as it has on appeal, that it was not required to so. Midland argues in its brief:

“[T]he ‘meeting of the minds’ as to the stated account is implied by Cook’s failure to object to the final statement of the account, as rendered [by Chase]. Hence, that constitutes a ‘new post-transaction agreement,’ and Midland was not required to put forth as evidence of some other agreement.”

Midland does not point this court to any authority for its assertion; however, our research has revealed the following guidance on implied agreements on an account stated.

In University of South Alabama v. Bracy, 466 So.2d 148, 150 (Ala.Civ.App.1985), we concluded that a “debtor’s admission to the correctness of the statement and to his liability thereon can be express or implied.” See also In re Templeton, 538 B.R. 578, 583 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.2015)(“An account rendered, and not objected to within reasonable time becomes an account stated, and failure to object will be regarded as an admission of correctness of the account.”). The plaintiff in Bracy had presented evidence indicating that Bracy had incurred a debt and that he had made payments on that debt for four years without objection. 466 So.2d at 150. We concluded that Bra-cks payments on the account amounted to an implied admission of liability. Id.

Although the facts of Bracy are distinguishable from the facts of this case, we conclude that a summary judgment on Midland’s account-stated claim is not appropriate because genuine issues of material fact regarding the elements of an account-stated claim exist. Therefore, assuming it did so, the circuit court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of Midland on the account-stated claim.

In conclusion, the circuit court did not err by failing to grant Cook’s motion to strike the affidavits of Hale and Mixon, and the circuit court properly denied Cook’s motion for a summary judgment in his favor based upon his argument that the applicable statute of limitations had expired before Midland filed its complaint. The summary judgment entered in favor of Midland on Midland’s motion is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

APPLICATION GRANTED; OPINION OF MARCH 11, 2016, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, MOORE, and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.

      . Cook’s argument was actually that Midland had failed to present sufficient evidence to support each essential element of its claims.

      . Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P., provides for appellate review of adverse rulings, including tile denial of a summary-judgment motion, in an appeal from a pretrial final judgment disposing of all claims in the case, see Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. City of Fairfield Healthcare Auth., 837 So.2d 253, 263 (Ala.2002); thus, we may review the denial of Cook's motion for a summary judgment.

      . Arguably, the breach-of-contract claim was either rejected by the circuit court or abandoned by Midland on the second day of the motion hearing during a discussion regarding the appropriate statute-of-limitations period:
      “THE COURT: Do you have the initial contract or not? Other than you have got a duplicate?
      "Midland’s Attorney: It would be a duplicate, Your Honor.
      "THE COURT: So the only thing you are relying upon then for me is the account stated?
      "Midland’s Attorney: It would be account stated, but the account stated is showing the amount that is due.
      "THE COURT: I understand.
      "Midland's Attorney: So yes. Your Honor. With the balance that’s being claimed.”


author: WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

text:
    Joshua WESSON v. STATE of Alabama.
    CR-13-0960.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    July 2, 2015.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 16, 2015,
    Certiorari Denied May 20, 2016
    Alabama Supreme Court 1150097.

      John W. Beck, Fairhope, for appellant.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Michael A. Nunnelley, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

Joshua Wesson appeals his conviction for sexual misconduct, see § 13A-6-65(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975, entered following a guilty plea, and his resulting sentence of 12 months in prison. Wesson’s sentence was suspended and he was ordered to serve 24 months of unsupervised probation.

Wesson was indicted for first-degree sodomy, see 13A-6-63, Ala. Code 1975, for engaging in deviate sexual intercourse with a woman by forcible compulsion, and for sexual misconduct, see § 13A-6-65(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975, for engaging in deviate sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances other than those covered by Alabama’s sodomy statutes. On April 1, 2014, Wesson moved the circuit court to dismiss the count charging him with sexual misconduct. In his motion, Wesson asserted that, under the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), sexual misconduct as defined in § 13A-6-65(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975, is unconstitutional as applied to him. Wesson did not argue in his motion to dismiss that § 13A-6-65(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975, is unconstitutional on its face.

On April 2, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing on Wesson’s motion to dismiss. During the hearing, Wesson reasserted the argument raised in his motion. He did not, however, present any evidence indicating that his conduct was protected under the Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence. After hearing Wesson’s argument, the circuit court denied his motion.

Thereafter, Wesson, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to nolle pros the first-degree-sodomy charge. Further, Wesson reserved the right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the sexual-misconduct charge.

On appeal, Wesson argues that, under Lawrence v. Texas, § 13A-6-65(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him. According to Wesson, § 13A-6-65(a)(3) criminalizes deviate sexual intercourse between consenting adults; therefore, it is both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him. Wesson then argues that, because § 13A-6-65(a)(3) is unconstitutional, his conviction must be reversed. This Court disagrees.

To the extent Wesson argues that § 13A-6-65(a)(3) is unconstitutional on its face, his argument is not preserved for appellate review. It is well settled that

“ ‘[rjeview on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial.’ Newsome v. State, 570 So.2d 703, 717 (Ala.Crim.App.1989). ‘An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to appellate review because it has not been properly preserved and presented.’ Pate v. State, 601 So.2d 210, 213 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). ‘“[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be presented to the trial court by a timely and specific motion setting out the specific grounds in support thereof.’” McKinney v. State, 654 So.2d 95, 99 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (citation omitted). ‘The statement of specific grounds of objection waives all grounds not specified, and the trial court will not be put in error on grounds not assigned at trial.’ Ex parte Frith, 526 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala.1987). ‘The purpose of requiring a specific objection to preserve an issue for appellate review is to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged error, giving an opportunity to correct it before the case is submitted to the jury.’ Ex parte Works, 640 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Ala.1994).”

Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So.2d 793, 794-95 (Ala.2003).

In his motion to dismiss and at the hearing on that motion, Wesson asserted that § 13A-6-65(a)(3) was unconstitutional as applied to him. He did not, however, challenge § 13A-6-65(a)(3) as facially unconstitutional. Consequently, Wesson’s argument that § 13A-6-65(a)(3) is unconstitutional on its face is not preserved for this Court’s review and does not entitle him to any relief.

Further, Wesson failed to meet his burden of establishing that § 13A-6-65(a)(3) is unconstitutional as applied to him. In his brief, Wesson argues: “The Sexual Misconduct statute is a clear violation of Mr. Wesson’s right to privacy and Due Process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, to engage in private consensual sexual relations with another consenting adult.” (Wesson’s brief, at 8; emphasis added.)

It is well settled that a person challenging the constitutionality of a statute as applied to him “bears the burden of proving that [the statute] is unconstitutional as applied to his conduct.” Powell v. State, 72 So.3d 1268, 1278 (Ala.Crim.App.2011). The Texas Court of Appeals has explained:

“A statute may be found unconstitutional ‘as applied’ to a specific set of facts or ‘on its face.’ See Scott v. State, 322 S.W.3d 662, 665 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.2010); Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Generally, a defendant must show that a statute is unconstitutional ‘as applied’ to the conduct for which he was charged. See id. at 774. A claim that a statute is unconstitutional ‘as applied’ is a claim that the statute operates unconstitutionally with respect to the claimant because of his particular circumstances. Gillenwaters v. State, 205 S.W.3d 534, 536 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).”

State v. Johnson, 425 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex.App.2014). Accordingly, this Court has held that, without evidence or some factual basis in the record, it cannot hold that an appellant has met his burden to establish that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. State v. Woodruff, 460 So.2d 325, 330 (Ala.Crim.App.1984).

Wesson pleaded guilty to violating § 13A-6-65(a)(3), which provides: “A person commits the crime of sexual misconduct if ... [h]e or she engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person under circumstances other than those covered by Sections 13A-6-63 and 13A-6-64. Consent is no defense to a prosecution under this subdivision.” Section 13A-6-60(2), Ala.Code 1975, defines “deviate sexual intercourse” as “[a]ny act of sexual gratification between persons not married to each other involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.”

“In Lawrence[ v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)], ... the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Texas statute that provided: ‘A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.’ Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003). Another Texas statute defined ‘deviate sexual intercourse’ as ‘any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.’ Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.01(1)(A). The Supreme Court concluded that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that it ‘further[ed] no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.’ Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579, 123 S.Ct. 2472.”

Williams v. State, 184 So.3d 1064, 1069 (Ala.Crim.App.2015). The Supreme Court in Lawrence, however, held only that “ ‘statutory prohibitions on consensual sodomy ... are unconstitutional because they infringe upon the rights of “adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” ’ ” Williams, 184 So.3d at 1070 (emphasis added) (quoting Doe v. Pryor, 344 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir.2003), quoting in turn Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. Section 13A-6-65(a)(3) criminalizes not only consensual deviate sexual intercourse, but also criminalizes other circumstances in which a person engages in deviate sexual intercourse, such as when the act results from fraud, artifice, or extortion. Thus, in an as-applied challenge to § 13A-6-65(a)(3) the defendant must establish that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to his conduct, i.e., he must establish that he engaged in consensual deviate sexual intercourse. Cf. Woodruff, 460 So.2d at 330-31.

The record in this case fails to show that Wesson’s conduct falls within the conduct protected under Lawrence. Specifically, there is no evidence in the record indicating that Wesson engaged in consensual deviate sexual intercourse. Because there is no indication in the record that the Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence prohibits prosecution for Wesson’s conduct, Wesson failed to meet his burden of establishing that § 13A-6-65(a)(3) is unconstitutional as applied to him.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

WELCH, BURKE, and JOINER, JJ., concur.

KELLUM, J., concurs in the result.


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   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Darrell Peebles, Inc. v. Division of Workers’ Compensation
    2D15-5530
    01/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Davis v. State
    2D15-3126
    11/17/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    Davis v. State
    2D15-4822
    12/18/2015
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Davis v. State
    2D15-5000
    12/16/2015
   Pet.dism.


text:
    De Palma v. State
    2D15-3022
    12/15/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    De Vine v. State
    2D15-2914
    12/16/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    Dennis v. State
    2D15-4536
    01/13/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Deraedt v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat. Ass’n
    2D15-4695
    01/19/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Khleif
    2D15-3780
    02/16/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Devita v. Department of Children & Families
    2D14-4895
    12/23/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Dorsey v. State
    2D15-4283
    02/17/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Dory v. Fannie Mae
    2D15-2923
    01/13/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Dudley v. State
    2D15-2553
    01/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Easterwood v. Onewest Bank, F S B
    2D15-5032
    02/16/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ellett v. Protech Coating Services, Inc.
    2D14-2744
    01/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Feld v. Wiseberg
    2D15-5536
    01/07/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Felice v. Felice
    2D15-3376
    02/02/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Fisher v. State
    2D15-4810
    11/20/2015
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Flo-Ronke, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin.
    2D15-5356
    02/17/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ford v. State
    2D15-4302
    01/12/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Fredrick v. State
    2D15-5329
    02/10/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Fusco v. State
    2D15-5023
    11/24/2015
   Proh.den.


text:
    Garcia v. Matos
    2D15-3898.
    01/06/2016
   Pet.gr.


text:
    Gaudioso v. Cornell-Cataldo
    2D16-242
    02/16/2016
   Proh.dism.


text:
    Gaynor v. State
    2D15-2826
    11/17/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    Genovese v. State
    2D15-4910
    01/12/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Gerhart v. Wells Fargo Bank
    2D15-4479
    12/14/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Gholson v. State
    2D15-2566
    01/20/2016
   Aff,

Cir, Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Gonzalez-Ines v. State
    2D15-3207
    01/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Goraya v. State
    2D15-5120
    01/13/2016
   Proh.den,


text:
    Greene v. State
    2D15-2082
    08/31/2015
   Pet.den.


text:
    Grosz v. Peyton
    2D14-64
    02/19/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pasco)


text:
    Gutowski v. State
    2D15-4309
    01/04/2016
   Pet.den,


text:
    H.L. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-3669
    01/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    H.M. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-4405
    02/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hall v. State
    2D15-5272
    01/13/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Hammond v. State
    2D15-4545
    01/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Harmon v. Whitehurst
    2D15-4948
    02/22/2016
   Den.


text:
    Harrod v. Africano La Shay Black
    2D16-4
    01/26/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Hartlove v. State
    2D15-2912
    12/16/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    Haskins v. Haskins
    2D15-1829
    02/25/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Hawks Holdings, LLC v. Kalinowski
    2D15-5028
    01/25/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hempstead v. State
    2D15-5014
    02/03/2016
   App.dism,


text:
    Henderson v. State
    2D15-4312
    12/16/2015
   Pet.den.


text:
    Henriquez v. Henriquez
    2D15-2253
    02/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Henriquez v. State
    2D15-4067
    12/16/2015
   Pet.den,


text:
    Herrick v. State
    2D15-5526
    01/29/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Hett v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-5511
    01/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hoffman v. State
    2D15-5224
    01/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Horn v. Lee
    2D14-5220
    01/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Howard v. Jones
    2D15-5020
    01/13/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Howard v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn.
    2D15-4888
    01/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hubbard v. Gee
    2D15-5575
    02/05/2016
   Hab.Corp.gr.


text:
    Huber v. Department of Revenue
    2D15-4890
    01/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hudgins v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n
    2D15-5222
    01/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hughes v. State
    2D15-4092
    02/03/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Hunt v. Appleton
    2D15-5069
    01/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hunter v. State
    2D15-4812
    01/26/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    J.W. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-4723
    01/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Jackson v. State
    2D15-4608
    11/19/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Jackson v. State
    2D15-5159
    01/11/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    James v. Jones
    2D15-4186
    02/17/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Har-dee)


text:
    Jefferson v. State
    2D15-1919
    01/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Highlands)


text:
    Johnson v. State
    2D15-4036
    02/03/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Collier)


text:
    Kalifa v. Greene
    2D15-4797
    12/28/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Kalifa v. McKinnley
    2D15-4786
    01/06/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Kalifa v. Miller
    2D15-4798
    12/22/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Kane v. Gorilla Capital Loan Solutions, Inc.
    2D15-2797
    02/16/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Keene v. State
    2D15-3838
    01/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Kidder v. State
    2D15-4155, 2D15-4113
    10/12/2015
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Knight v. State
    2D15-4551
    12/16/2015
   Motion den.


text:
    Knize v. Guenther
    2D15-3588
    10/29/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Kutz v. State
    2D15-4922
    01/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lana v. Estate of Assimakopoulos
    2D13-5538
    01/08/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lana v. Estate of Assimakopoulos
    2D15-1969
    01/08/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Landsberg v. Mumford
    2D15-5578
    01/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lazzell v. State
    2D15-4167
    10/12/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Learner-Gilli v. Gilli
    2D15-2186
    01/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lipscomb v. Bank of America
    2D14-4670
    01/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    London v. Brusoe
    2D15-3946
    11/02/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Love v. State
    2D15-5269
    12/15/2015
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Lynch v. Lynch
    2D15-5203
    02/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    M.B. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-2381
    01/08/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    M.L. v. Department of Children and Families
    2D15-4257
    01/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Mai v. Pham
    2D15-1488
    02/09/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Makki v. Makki
    2D15-4554
    02/08/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Market Tampa Investments, LLC v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.
    2D15-4666
    01/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Marsh v. State
    2D15-1944
    01/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Manatee)


text:
    Marshall v. State
    2D15-5167
    12/15/2015
   Hab.Corp.dism.


text:
    Martin v. State
    2D15-4048
    02/03/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Collier)


text:
    Martin v. State
    2D13-4765
    02/05/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Martin v. State
    2D15-3314
    02/05/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Martinez-Perez v. State
    2D15-3465
    02/03/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Mastrilli v. Mastrilli
    2D15-5094
    02/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Mateos v. State
    2D15-2872
    11/17/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    Mathews v. State
    2D15-3144
    12/16/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    Mathis v. State
    2D15-5317
    02/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Matos v. State
    2D15-4443
    12/10/2015
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Maturo v. State
    2D15-1253
    01/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    McAfee v. State
    2D15-2297
    01/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    McCall v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
    2D15-4269
    02/01/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    McCarthur v. State
    2D15-1758
    01/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    McDonald v. State
    2D15-2727
    02/10/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    McGinnis v. Smith
    2D14-3635
    02/24/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    McHugh v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
    2D15-4251
    02/01/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    McLaughlin v. Hillsborough County
    2D15-3264
    02/10/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    McLaughlin v. State
    2D15-5285
    02/01/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    McWatt v. Knight
    2D15-4728
    11/25/2015
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Mejia-Rojo v. State
    2D15-5074
    02/08/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Mellquist v. State
    2D15-4009
    11/05/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Mikhalyov v. US Bank, Nat. Assn.
    2D15-2624
    02/10/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Millette v. State
    2D15-5215
    01/08/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Morales v. State
    2D15-4856
    12/04/2015
   Proh.den.


text:
    Moultry v. State
    2D15-5507
    01/27/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Mujkic v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.
    2D16-165
    02/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Murphy v. State
    2D15-2904
    10/14/2015
   Pet. den.


text:
    Murray v. State
    2D15-5363
    02/02/2016
   .App.dism.


text:
    Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Garcia
    2D16-402
    02/09/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Neloms v. State
    2D15-4515
    01/28/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Newton v. State
    2D15-3240
    01/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Nezius v. State
    2D15-5751
    01/25/2016
   Den.


text:
    Nockengost v. Nockengost
    2D14-3426
    01/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Oberwise v. State
    2D15-5297
    12/15/2015
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Ogle v. State
    2D15-4090
    02/03/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Owners Ins. Co. v. Dahm
    2D15-2728, 2D15-4542
    01/05/2016
   Gr.


text:
    Paddock Sunrise2, LLC v. Christiana Trust
    2D15-2787
    02/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Paris v. State
    2D15-4230
    02/17/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Partlow v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles
    2D15-3136
    02/18/2016
   App.dism,


text:
    Pate v. State
    2D15-3266
    02/03/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Peoples v. State
    2D15-3757
    10/28/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    Perez v. Fedex Ground Package System, Inc.
    2D15-5184
    01/15/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Perez v. State
    2D15-4814
    12/16/2015
   Motion den.


text:
    Perlmutter v. Beirne
    2D15-4538
    12/16/2015
   Proh.den.


text:
    Pierce v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-5011
    01/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Pritt v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-4425
    01/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Quade v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co.
    2D15-212, 2D15-251
    02/19/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    R.A. v. Department of Children and Families
    2D15-3503
    01/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Raia v. State
    2D15-3358
    01/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Ramirez v. State
    2D15-4049
    01/19/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rawls v. State
    2D15-4700
    12/18/2015
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Reilly v. State
    2D15-3554
    01/26/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Resto v. State
    2D15-5097
    12/15/2015
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Rettman v. State
    2D15-546
    11/03/2015
   Motion den.


text:
    Reynolds v. Reynolds
    2D15-2190
    02/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Reynolds v. State
    2D16-148
    02/01/2016
   Hab.Corp.dism.


text:
    Rice v. State
    2D15-2494
    01/29/2016
   Cert.dism,

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Ricketts v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.
    2D15-3389
    02/25/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Riddle v. Bank of America, N.A.
    2D15-858
    02/05/2016
   App.dism,


text:
    Rivera v. State
    2D15-4533
    12/15/2015
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Rivera v. State
    2D15-4057
    02/03/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Rizk v. Sadik
    2D14-5001
    02/17/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pasco)


text:
    Roberson v. State
    2D15-4305
    01/26/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Roberts v. State
    2D15-3381
    02/24/2016
   Aff.

Cir, Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Robertson v. State
    2D15-1694
    12/15/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    Robinson v. Knickerbocker
    2D15-3868
    02/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Robinson v. Section 23 Property Owners Assn., Inc.
    2D15-5569
    01/11/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Rosado v. State
    2D15-4457
    11/12/2015
   Pet. den.


text:
    Rosemellia v. State
    2D14-1938, 2D14-3347
    01/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Collier)


text:
    Rosier v. State
    2D15-5264
    12/18/2015
   Cert.den.


text:
    Rossborough v. Rossborough
    2D16-222
    01/26/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Rowland v. Nationstar Mortg.
    2D15-2268
    01/15/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    RLN Inv. Holdings, LLC v. Markides
    2D15-4921
    01/25/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Salazar v. Department of Health
    2D15-5016
    12/17/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Sanchez v. State
    2D15-5443
    01/26/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Schuelke v. Figler
    2D16-138
    01/20/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Scott v. State
    2D15-3311
    10/14/2015
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Scott v. State
    2D15-5251
    01/28/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Scott v. State
    2D15-5254
    01/26/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Shadow Ridge Properties, LLC v. Lasalle Bank Nat. Ass'n
    2D14-1317
    01/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Shadow Ridge Properties, LLC v. U.S. Bank, Nat. Ass'n
    2D15-5400
    03/01/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Simms v. State
    2D15-5169
    01/13/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Simonette v. State
    2D14-4510
    02/26/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Sloan v. Department of Revenue Child Support
    2D15-5066
    01/21/2016
   Cert. den.


text:
    Sloan v. Department of Revenue Child Support ex rel. Booker
    2D15-4945
    01/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Sloan v. Forfeiture of Silver 2004 Nissan Pathfinder Armada Suv
    2D15-5052
    01/06/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Smith v. Smith
    2D15-5624
    02/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Smith v. State
    2D15-4414
    12/16/2015
   Pet.den.


text:
    Smith v. State
    2D15-3630
    02/03/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Smith v. State
    2D15-3618
    02/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Snouffer v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.
    2D15-4705
    01/15/2016
   Certdism.


text:
    Soto v. State
    2D15-4801, 2D15-4693
    01/12/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Soto v. State
    2D15-4693
    12/16/2015
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Staley v. Evie’s Family Golf Center Inc.
    2D15-1524
    02/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    State v. Commander
    2D16-7
    01/15/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    State v. Johnson
    2D15-5707
    01/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Stringer v. Reemployment Assistance Appeal
    2D15-5013
    01/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    T.L.S. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-3036
    01/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Tanner v. State
    2D15-4721
    01/15/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Tejedor v. Guardianship of Nguyen
    2D15-5476
    01/19/2016
   Proh.dism.


text:
    Temple v. State
    2D15-460
    11/18/2015
   Pet.den.


text:
    Tewis v. Tewis
    2D15-5408
    02/03/2016
   App.dism,


text:
    Thomas v. State
    2D15-3094
    12/16/2015
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Thomas v. State
    2D15-3470
    11/12/2015
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Thornton v. State
    2D15-4217
    02/17/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Torres v. Unknown Party
    2D15-4032
    01/15/2016
   Cert. dism.


text:
    Trust No. 1902e1 dated 05/15/2015 v. Bank of New York Mellon
    2D15-4778
    02/02/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Tyson-Oliver v. State
    2D15-4418
    12/10/2015
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    U.S. Bank Nat. Assoc. v. University Park Community Ass’n, Inc.
    2D15-4727
    02/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Vasquez-Torres v. State
    2D15-4957
    10/05/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Venegas v. State
    2D15-5124
    02/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Volpe v. State Farm Florida Ins. Co.
    2D14-4519
    01/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Waggerby v. State
    2D15-4417
    12/10/2015
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Wall v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n
    2D15-1925
    12/22/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Wallace v. State
    2D15-2491
    01/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Wallace v. State
    2D15-5340, 2D15-5316
    12/16/2015
   Dism.


text:
    Wallace v. State
    2D15-2048
    02/03/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Walton v. State
    2D16-137
    02/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wane v. Bankunited, N.A.
    2D15-1228
    02/05/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Wanser v. State
    2D15-5117
    12/15/2015
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Wells v. Pinellas County Const. Licensing Bd.
    2D15-4427
    01/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wells v. State
    2D15-3098
    12/15/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Adams
    2D14-569
    02/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wesley v. State
    2D15-751
    12/30/2015
   Motion den.


text:
    Wheeler v. Legacy Components, L L C
    2D15-1249
    02/17/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Whitburn LLC v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
    2D14-4625, 2D15-3162
    02/19/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Whitburn, LLC v. JMC Ventures, LLC
    2D15-2866
    02/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Whitburn, LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n
    2D14-4692
    02/17/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Whitburn, LLC v. US Bank Nat. Ass'n
    2D15-1128, 2D15-1346
    02/19/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    White v. State
    2D15-3120
    12/15/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    Whittington v. State
    2D15-2521
    01/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Wicker v. State
    2D15-1450
    11/10/2015
   Mand.den.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D15-3927
    10/08/2015
   Proh.den.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D15-3999
    10/08/2015
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D15-2530
    02/05/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D15-5147
    01/08/2016
   Belated App. den,


text:
    Wilson v. State
    2D15-4119
    02/17/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Winland v. State
    2D15-4745
    12/16/2015
   Pet. dism.


text:
    Wolfe v. State
    2D15-3368
    11/12/2015
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Wright v. State
    2D15-5042
    01/12/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Yoder v. State
    2D15-2764
    01/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir.' Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Z.C. v. Seeber
    2D16-33
    01/13/2016
   Hab.Cotp.gr.


text:
    385 Dover Place Trust v. Bank of New York Mellon
    2D14-5458
    01/26/2016
   App.dism,


text:
    5590 Island, L L C v. U.S. Bank Nat.
    2D15-2113
    02/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    THIRD DISTRICT
    A.R. v. Agency for Health Care Admin.
    3D15-2757
    12/22/2015
   App.dism.

Health Care Admin,


text:
    Anicet v. State
    3D16-0373
    02/24/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Antar v. De La Rosa
    3D16-0642
    05/02/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Arrieta v. State
    3D14-2869
    02/18/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Belizaire v. State
    3D16-474
    04/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Brown v. State
    3D16-0442
    04/06/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Brown v. State
    3D16-241
    04/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Browning v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC
    3D15-620
    03/23/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Monroe)


text:
    Bure v. State
    3D16-0219
    02/24/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Chirinos v. State
    3D16-0211
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Christopher Q. Wintter, P.A. v. Mallarino-Bras
    3D16-0354
    03/14/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Clarke v. State
    3D15-2098
    02/24/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Class Shareholders v. U.S. Century Bank
    3D15-1399
    03/15/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Compte v. Compte
    3D15-1977
    10/26/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    Compte v. Compte
    3D15-1977
    04/14/2016
   Motion dism.


text:
    Damabian Assisted Living Facility Center, Inc. v. State
    3D15-2364
    02/23/2016
   App.dism.

Health Care Admin.


text:
    De La Rosa v. State
    3D16-451
    03/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Delp v. Rodriguez
    3D15-1584
    02/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Desauguste v. Citizens Property Ins. Corp.
    3D15-2933
    03/03/2016
   App.dism,

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Desire v. Russell Mace & Associates, P.A.
    3D16-0528
    03/11/2016
   Pet. transferred

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Durham v. State
    3D16-582
    04/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Faison v. Citimortgage, Inc.
    3D15-2215
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Ferguson v. Miami Parking Authority
    3D15-2599
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Ferrer v. State
    3D16-654
    04/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Forero v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n
    3D15-1633
    02/16/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Frazier v. State
    3D16-217
    03/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Garcia v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
    3D16-0003
    02/15/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Gebrael v. State
    3D13-3132
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Monroe)


text:
    Gonzalez v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Div. of Real Estate
    3D15-2832
    03/08/2016
   Vol.dism.

DBPR


text:
    Goodison v. Jackson Health Systems
    3D15-1688
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Groman v. State
    3D15-2405
    12/22/2015
   Pet.den.


text:
    Guimaraes v. Residential Credit Solutions, Inc.
    3D15-1934
    04/06/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Helen Homes of South Dade, LLC v. Lorenzo
    3D15-2498
    02/18/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Hernandez v. Agency for Health Care Admin.
    3D16-0426
    03/15/2016
   App.dism.

Health Care Admin.


text:
    Horvitz v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.
    3D16-0099
    02/16/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Jagielski v. AFA Protective Systems, Inc.
    3D16-0345
    02/12/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Jupiter House, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A.
    3D15-1247
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    JRGC, LLC v. Rosenfeld
    3D16-0045
    02/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Kuiken v. State
    3D15-2608
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lacayo v. State Street Bank and Trust Co.
    3D15-2737
    04/06/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Leary v. Leiderman Shelomith, P.A.
    3D16-0258
    02/23/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Lemorin v. State
    3D16-0473
    04/06/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Lemorin v. State
    3D16-0475
    04/06/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Lopez v. State
    3D15-2384
    03/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Louissaint v. State
    3D16-0421
    04/11/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Mallor v. MacArthur Properties III, LLC
    3D15-2361
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Margarita Assisted Living Facility Home Corp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin.
    3D15-2365
    02/23/2016
   App.dism.

Health Care Admin.


text:
    Marimon v. State
    3D16-494
    04/06/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Martinez v. State
    3D15-2688
    04/11/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Medical Solutions, S.A. v. Lans Medicals, LLC
    3D15-2923
    03/08/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Melo Contractors Corp. v. Villaro
    3D15-2487
    01/26/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Merchant v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
    3D16-0151
    02/16/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Meyer v. Oakley
    3D16-0460
    03/11/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Minel v. State
    3D16-458
    03/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Morales v. State
    3D16-0341
    03/16/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Morris v. Lezama
    3D15-2565
    03/15/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Munilla Const. Management, LLC v. Miami-Dade County Expressway
    3D15-2066
    03/23/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Munoz v. State
    3D16-0290
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Munoz v. State
    3D16-667
    04/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    My Future Home Assisted Living Facility v. Agency for Health Care Admin.
    3D15-2362
    02/23/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Netherlands 7985, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
    3D16-0042
    02/04/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Okeechobee Television Corp. v. Rumbaut & Co., Inc.
    3D14-0857, 3D14-0881
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Ortega v. American Exp. Bank, FSB
    3D15-2265
    03/07/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Owens v. State
    3D16-0491
    03/08/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Padilla v. Department of Financial Services
    3D15-1643
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Financial Services


text:
    Parks v. State
    3D15-0762
    03/03/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Paul v. State
    3D15-1279
    04/11/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Perez v. Seidensticker
    3D15-2663
    03/14/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Perez v. State
    3D15-2947
    03/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Perez v. State
    3D15-2673
    02/24/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v. Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Plan Trust
    3D15-2857
    02/24/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Quian v. Cabrera
    3D16-0124
    02/15/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Quiroz v. PNS Stores, Inc.
    3D16-0199
    02/23/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    R.D.L.V. v. Department of Children
    3D15-2681
    02/01/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Rashid v. Shores Ins., Inc.
    3D16-0593
    03/15/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Redero v. State
    3D16-0631
    04/12/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Rice v. Rice
    3D16-0651
    04/13/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Rodriguez v. Carmona
    3D15-2558
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Rodriguez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    3D15-1592
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    S.K. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-0132
    02/23/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Sea Air Land, LLC v. Advanced Aircraft Center, Inc.
    3D16-0374
    02/24/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Sejour v. Paul-Noel
    3D15-1609
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    State v. Garcia
    3D15-2760
    01/29/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Stimson v. Claughton Inv. Fund III, LLC
    3D15-1169, 3D14-2923
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    T.M. v. Department of Children
    3D16-0012
    04/13/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. Dade) (Miami-


text:
    Toro v. State
    3D16-0172
    03/15/2016
   Proh.dism.


text:
    Torres v. State
    3D16-0702
    04/13/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Vargas v. Delemos
    3D16-0230
    02/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Vela v. State
    3D16-457
    03/16/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct, (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Welch v. State
    3D16-444
    03/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct, (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Williams v. State
    3D16-0364
    03/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir, Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Wright v. State
    3D16-0212
    02/18/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Wright v. State
    3D16-704
    04/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Zadeh v. Perez
    3D15-1157
    03/07/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    90 CWELT-2008 LLC v. Snyder
    3D15-1667
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    Caruthers v. State
    4D15-574
    12/23/2015
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    E.G.H. v. Department of Children and Families
    4D15-1699
    12/23/2015
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Martin)


text:
    Hernandez v. State
    4D15-2835
    01/07/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Kwateng v. Kwateng
    4D15-712
    12/23/2015
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Manzaro v. Wells
    4D15-1419
    12/30/2015
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Mazon v. U.S. Bank, Nat. Ass'n
    4D15-613
    12/23/2015
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Sangineto v. International Longshoremen’s Ass'n
    4D15-179
    01/07/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Walden v. State
    4D15-3065
    01/07/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Martin)


text:
    FIFTH DISTRICT
    Ayers v. State
    5D16-1481
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Putnam)


text:
    Broady v. State
    5D16-1137
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volu-sia)


text:
    Castro-Maysonet v. State
    5D15-4162
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


text:
    D.D. v. State
    5D16-378
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Fla-gler)


text:
    Dean v. State
    5D16-1511
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Dorsey v. State
    5D16-1577
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bre-vard)


text:
    Edwards v. State
    5D16-1435
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bre-vard)


text:
    Godwin v. State
    5D16-1141
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Hicks v. State
    5D16-127
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Citrus)


text:
    Hood v. Department of Corrections
    5D15-3609
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


text:
    Johnson v. State
    5D16-535
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Johnson v. State
    5D16-572
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Fla-gler)


text:
    Kennedy v. State
    5D15-2715
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volu-sia)


text:
    L.C.D. v. State
    5D16-1197
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Putnam)


text:
    Patterson v. State
    5D16-1581
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Potillo v. State
    5D15-4315
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Quiros v. State
    5D15-4535
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Osceola)


text:
    Rodgers v. State
    5D15-2639
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct, (Orange)


text:
    Rogers v. State
    5D16-2095
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bre-vard)


text:
    Salgado v. State
    5D15-3470
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Sanford v. State
    5D16-1347
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Whitney v. State
    5D16-1546
    08/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Justo Manuel GARCIA, Appellant, v. Lirda L. RIVERA, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2074
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2017
    Lucia C. Pineiro; Greene Smith, P.A., and Cynthia L. Greene, for appellant.
    Abramowitz and Associates, and Evan L. Abramowitz, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant Justo Manuel Garcia appeals the trial court’s “Order Granting Mother’s Petition for Relocation with Minor Child,” granting relocation pursuant to section 61.13001 of the Florida Statutes. We affirm because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Essex v. Davis, 116 So.3d 445, 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

Dr. Garcia raises the issue on appeal— and Appellee Lirda L. Rivera concedes— that the trial court should receive evidence of Garcia’s financial ability to pay costs associated with both his son’s school tuition and transportation to and from New York, as part of the broader issue of child support. The trial court did not order Dr. Garcia to pay such tuition or transportation costs, but merely discussed his capacity to do so. Accordingly, we remand this portion of the case to the trial court for additional financial findings.

Affirmed; remanded with instructions.