author: STONE, J.

text:
    RJAM, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. Leon MILETELLO d/b/a L.S.M. Amusement Company, L.S.M. Gaming, Inc. and Logansport Gaming, L.L.C., Defendant-appellee
    No. 50,983-CA
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    January 13, 2017

      CHARLES MORRIS RUSH, Counsel for Appellant
    KENNETH R. ANTEE, JR., Counsel for Appellee
    AYRES, SHELTON, WILLIAMS, BENSON & PAINE, LLC, By: Lee H. Ayres, By: Stacey A. Smith, Counsel for Appellee Jeremy Evans, In his Capacity as Clerk of Court for DeSoto Parish, Louisiana
    Before WILLIAMS, LOLLEY, and STONE, JJ.
   STONE, J.

|, The plaintiff, RJAM, Inc. (“RJAM”) appeals the ruling of, the 42nd Judicial District Court, Desoto Parish, in which the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Leon Miletello d/b/a L.S.M. Amusement Company, L.S.M. Gaming, Inc., and Logansport Gaming, L.L.C. (“Miletello”), finding RJAM cannot meet the suitability requirements in order to collect damages for the breach of a video gaming contract it entered into with Miletello. For the following reasons, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

FACTS

On September 24, 1998, RJAM sued Mi-letello for breach of contract. On April 25, 2011, the 42nd Judicial District Court (“42nd JDC” or “trial court”) granted a judgment awarding RJAM $184,681.00 in damages. In its judgment, the trial court made the following stipulation:

IT IS ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED that RJAM, INC., is not entitled to collect any damages until such time as the following conditions are met: RJAM, INC. is determined by the Gaming Division of the Louisiana State Police to have been suitable to be awarded damages under the contract for the time period awarded March 1998 to October 1999. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED that if RJAM satisfies the conditions stated above, or if such conditions precedent are overturned, the Court finds RJAM is entitled to receive damages ...

In RJAM, Inc. v. Miletello, 47,218 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/8/12), 103 So.3d 503, this Court amended the trial court’s ruling and found RJAM was entitled to a damage award of $194,598.52 (“monetary judgment”) against Miletello. We affirmed the trial court’s ruling that RJAM was not entitled to collect any damages until it is determined by the Gaming Division of the Louisiana State Police to have been suitable to be awarded damages under |2the contract for the time period awarded March 1998 to October 1999 (“condition precedent”).

On October 24, 2013, RJAM filed a petition with the State of Louisiana Gaming Control Board (“the Board”) requesting the Board find RJAM suitable so that it could collect on its monetary judgment. On December 10, 2013, the Board dismissed RJAM’s petition ex proprio motu, stating:

The Louisiana Gaming Control Board lacks jurisdiction to render a suitability determination under the circumstances presented. The Board may render a suitability determination only for the purpose of administering and enforcing gaming law in the regulation of gaming activities and operations and in connection with an existing video gaming license or license application.

On December 16, 2013, RJAM filed a motion and order to reinstate petition. On December 17, 2013, the Board denied RJAM’s request to reinstate. Thereafter, on March 16, 2015, RJAM filed a petition for mandamus and/or declaratory judgment in the 19th Judicial District Court, East Baton Parish (“19th JDC”) against the State of Louisiana through the Gaming Control Board. In its petition, RJAM requested the Board:

[Rjender a determination of suitability, conditional suitability, exemption from, or waiver of suitability for limited purpose of enforcing its judgment awarded by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, or alternatively that there be a declaratory judgment that the condition precedent requiring RJAM to be determined as suitable (“condition precedent”) to enforce the judgment is impossible making the obligation null and therefore there are no impediments to RJAM enforcing its judgment against Leon Miletello, Jr., LSM Gaming, Inc., and Logansport Gaming, Inc.

On May 20, 2015, the 19th JDC, pursuant to a stipulation between the Board and RJAM, issued a consent judgment holding RJAM could not be found suitable to be awarded damages for the time period of March 1998 to ROctober 1999, because such suitability determination is not provided by law. Specifically, in its ruling, the 19th JDC made the following observation:

There is no such thing as a stand-alone application for a suitability determination; no such thing as a video gaming application for any purpose other than participation in Louisiana’s video gaming industry; there is no statute or regulation which authorizes a suitability application for the limited purposes of enforcing a private money judgment; and there is no statute, regulation or policy which devotes limited state resources legislatively allocated to the Office of State Police and the Board for enforcement of a private money judgment ...

The 19th JDC judgment was made execu-tory in the 42nd JDC on October 12, 2015.

On October 22, 2015, Miletello filed a motion for summary judgment in the 42nd JDC seeking to declare RJAM’s judgment unenforceable. On December 23, 2015, RJAM filed a motion to enforce the 19th JDC judgment, a motion to dismiss Mile-tello’s motion for summary judgment as moot, a declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and a peremptory exception of no cause of action.

The trial court granted Miletello’s motion for summary judgment and denied all of RJAM’s exceptions and motions. RJAM now appeals the ruling of the trial court.

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment

The motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. Schultz v. Guoth, 2010-0343 (La. 1/19/11), 57 So.3d 1002, and citations therein. The motion shall be granted when the pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no |,(genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B). The procedure is favored and shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. La. C.C.P. art. 966 (A)(2).

The burden of proof is on the party moving for summary judgment. However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover is not required to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more such essential elements. Once the mover does this, the burden shifts to the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966 (D)(1); Jones v. Estate of Santiago, 2003-1424 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 1002.

A de novo standard of review is required when an appellate court considers rulings on summary judgment motions, and the appellate court uses the same criteria that governed the district court’s determination of whether summary judgment was appropriate. Bank of New York Mellon v. Smith, 2015-0530 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So.3d 1238, 1243.

RJAM argues the trial court erred in granting Miletello’s motion for summary judgment because the condition precedent that RJAM not collect any .damages until it is determined to have been suitable for the requisite time period is an impossible condition and is, therefore, null and void. RJAM argues the 19th JDC judgment that found the condition precedent impossible must be recognized and RJAM should be permitted to collect its monetary judgment. Alternatively, RJAM urges this Court to remand the |B case to the trial court so RJAM can introduce additional evidence of suitability in order to avoid a grave injustice to RJAM.

Miletello argues RJAM’s effort to overturn this Court’s ruling by bringing an action against a third party in a different district court is without merit and frivolous and RJAM cannot circumvent the trial court’s ruling by asking the 19th JDC to approve a stipulated order between it and the Board. Miletello claims RJAM has not and cannot establish it was entitled to receive revenue from video gaming for the relevant time period and therefore, the monetary judgment is unenforceable and without merit. After a thorough review of the record, we agree.

Louisiana R.S. 27:310(D) provides:

Every person who has or controls directly or indirectly more than a five percent ownership, income, or profit interest in an entity which has or applies for a license in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, or who receives more than five percent revenue interest in the form of a commission, finder’s fee, loan repayment, or any other business expense related to the gaming operation, or who has the ability, in the opinion of the division, to exercise a significant influence over the activities of a licensee authorized or to be authorized .by this Chapter, shall meet all suitability requirements and qualifications for licensees. For the purposes of this Chapter, all gaming related associations, outstanding loans, promissory notes, or other financial indebtedness of an applicant or licensee must be revealed to the division for the purposes of determining significant influence and suitability.

Louisiana R.S. 27:28(A) provides:

[N]o person shall be eligible to obtain a license or permit, enter into a casino operating contract with the state, or obtain any other approval pursuant to the provisions of this Title unless the applicant has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence to the board or division, where applicable, that he is suitable. For the purposes of this Title, ‘suitable’ means the applicant, licensee, casino gaming operator, permittee, or other person is:
(1) A person of good character, honesty, and integrity,
|b(2) A person whose prior activities, criminal record, if any, reputation, habits, and associations do not pose a threat to the public interest of this state or to the effective regulation and control of gaming, or create or enhance the dangers of unsuitable, unfair, or illegal practices, methods, and activities in the conduct of gaming or carrying on of the business and financial arrangements incidental thereto.
(3) Capable of and likely to conduct the activities for which the applicant, licensee, permittee, casino gaming operator, or licensed eligible facility is licensed, permitted, or approved pursuant to the provisions of this Title.
(4) Not disqualified pursuant to the provisions of Subsection B of this Section.

Simply stated, Louisiana law requires that “[ejvery person ... who receives more than five percent revenue interest in the form of a commission, finders’ fee, loan repayment, or any other business expense related to the gaming operation ... shall meet all suitability requirements and qualifications for licensees.” La. R.S. 27:310(D); see also BLPR, Inc. v. National Gaming, Inc., 2010-1221 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/6/11), 64 So.3d 779; RJAM, Inc. v. Miletello, supra at 514.

This Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the monetary judgment is not enforceable until RJAM has established it had met suitability at the time the contract was entered into or before it started receiving revenues from Miletello. RJAM has mischaracterized this condition precedent as a stipulation that required it to obtain a suitability determination retroactive to March of 1998. However, in actuality, the condition precedent was that RJAM provide proof that it had already met suitability requirements in accordance with the law, prior to March of 1998.

As the Board advised RJAM, it cannot go back and establish suitability as of 1998; the suitability needed to be established prior to or in 1998. The fact that RJAM has yet to provide proof of its suitability during 17that time period is indicative that it did not take the requisite steps to be deemed suitable. Had the necessary steps been taken before RJAM contracted with Miletello, RJAM would have evidence of its suitability and incidentally could satisfy the condition precedent in order to collect the money judgment. RJAM cannot claim the condition precedent is null and void simply because it is unable to fulfill the condition. If this were a legitimate argument, every condition precedent that could not be met would be deemed null and void and there would be no need for conditions.

Likewise, the fact that RJAM guilefully sought judgment in the 19th JDC to somehow deem the condition precedent impossible, bears no effect on this Court’s previous opinion. The 19th JDC judgment was rendered pursuant to a stipulation between RJAM and the Board stating the Board is not authorized to issue suitability determinations for the limited purposes of enforcing a private money judgment. However, as noted, the trial court’s prior ruling mandated a showing of suitability from March 1998 to October 1999, not an acquiring of new suitability. Incidentally, the 19th JDC judgment does not invalidate or any in other way alter the trial court’s prior ruling or this Court’s affirming of that ruling. RJAM had an obligation to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, suitability for licensing prior to attaining rights, title, and interest in the contract with Mi-letello. This obligation is not waived by the 19th JDC stipulated judgment. This assignment lacks merit.

Subjecih-Matter Jurisdiction

RJAM argues the trial court erred in denying its declinatory exception of subject-matter jurisdiction because the trial court was divested of jurisdiction over the matter sub judice. RJAM contends a trial court has no | jurisdiction to consider motions once the appellant has met the requirements to have an appeal ordered. RJAM claims since a final judgment and appeal were taken in' this matter, the trial court did not retain jurisdiction to hear Miletello’s motion for summary judgment.

The district courts are vested with original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters under La. Const. Art. V, § 16(A), unless otherwise authorized in the constitution. Central La. Elec. Co. v. La. Public Serv. Corn’n, 601 So.2d 1383 (La. 1992). Louisiana C.C. P. art. 2088 provides in pertinent part:

A. The jurisdiction of the trial court over all matters in the case reviewable under the appeal is divested, and that of the appellate court attaches, on the granting of the order of appeal and the timely filing of the appeal bond, in the case of a suspensive appeal or on the granting of the order of appeal, in the case of a devolutive appeal. Thereafter, the trial court has jurisdiction in the case only over those matters not reviewable under the appeal, including the right to:
⅜ ⅝ ⅝ ⅜ ⅜
(7) Execute or give effect to the judgment when its execution or effect is not suspended by the appeal;

(Emphasis Added)

The trial court rendered a decision awarding RJAM a monetary judgment against Miletello with the stipulation that RJAM provide proof of suitability before it could collect on the judgment. Miletello filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to have the monetary judgment deemed unenforceable on the grounds that RJAM cannot meet the suitability requirements. The execution of a judgment is ancillary to the judgment itself and the trial court had inherent authority to enforce its judgment in |B favor of RJAM or to deem it unenforceable. As a result, this assignment of error is without merit.

Mootness

RJAM contends the 19th JDC rendered the judgment of the trial court moot. In light of our finding that the 19th JDC judgment had no bearing on the trial court’s ruling, we find this assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s ruling granting Miletello’s motion for summary judgment. Costs of appeal are assessed to RJAM.

AFFIRMED.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BROWN, CHIEF JUDGE.

license: Public Domain

text:
    POINT PROVEN, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CITY OF MONROE, Defendant-Appellee Point Proven, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Monroe City Council (d/b/a City of Monroe), Defendant-Appellee
    No. 51,074-CA, No. 51,075-CA
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    January 13, 2017

      NEAL LAW FIRM, By: Mark J. Neal, Counsel for Appellant
    NANCI S. SUMMERSGILL, Counsel for Appellee
    Before BROWN, MOORE, and CARAWAY (ad hoc), JJ.
   BROWN, CHIEF JUDGE.

| plaintiff, Point Proven, LLC, appeals from the trial court’s judgment that affirmed the City of Monroe’s denial of plaintiffs renewal application for an alcohol permit. We affirm.

Facts

In 1944, a bar was established at 1026 N. Sixth Street in Monroe, Louisiana, called Duffy’s Tavern, This is located in a residential/ commercial area. In the 1980’s, the business began to operate as a night club. In 2013, the club, now called Sixth Street Saloon (“the Saloon”), was sold to Point Proven, LLC. On May 23, 2013, the Monroe City Council (“the City”) held a meeting and one of the issues that they addressed was whether to grant Point Proven’s request for an alcohol permit. The City advised Point Proven that the previous owner had operated the club in a manner that upset local neighbors during the years of 2010 through 2012. The City admonished that Point Proven must take steps to clean up the club’s practices, or they would not renew the alcohol permit during the council’s next scheduled meeting in December 2013.

On December 23, 2013, the City had its scheduled hearing and voted not to renew Point Proven’s alcohol permit for 2014. At this hearing, the Monroe Chief of Police confirmed that a firearm had been discharged inside Sixth Street Saloon in July of 2013. Moreover, the City also reviewed a police report showing that a Monroe officer responded to a noise complaint 12against the Saloon. Subsequently, Point Proven filed a petition for damages and an appeal to the District Court.

Point Proven filed a motion for summary judgment. Point Proven argued that the City did not produce any evidence showing that Point Proven violated any of the provisions of the Louisiana Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. Therefore, Point Proven submitted that the City’s denial of its alcohol permit was arbitrary, capricious, improper and unlawful. The City responded that a de novo trial was necessary to complete discovery and to examine witnesses, specifically the local neighbors of the Saloon.

On June 12, 2014, Point Proven and the City reached an agreement. The City agreed to issue Point Proven an alcohol permit subject to the following terms:

For the next sixth months. In December, 2014 when liquor permits are again authorized, the City of Monroe will issue the same permit to Point Proven, LLC ... For the year 2015, unless during the re-permitting process for 2015, it is found by the Monroe Police Department that the owner of the premises is not Otherwise Qualifíed as per applicable law. (Emphasis added).

In exchange, Point Proven agreed to address the City’s concerns. These steps included installing “double doors or other appropriate doors” to ensure its entrance was insulated, as was reasonably possible, to reduce any loud music. Additionally, Point Proven was required to employ no fewer than two private security guards to ensure against the possibility of drunk or disorderly patrons urinating in parking lots and residential neighboring yards and to ensure its patrons did not engage in acts of nudity or sexual activity inside the bar or its parking lot. The judgment further required Point Proven to ensure, through use of security guards, that there would be no unlawful | sparking by its patrons in neighboring yards within close proximity to the bar. Finally, Point Proven agreed to undertake a two-block litter pick-up on Saturday and Sunday mornings.

On December 22, 2015, the City held a meeting for 2016 renewals. The City received the testimony of the neighbors complaining of the loud noises coming from the Saloon, actions of rowdy patrons of the Saloon, and evidence that Point Proven was cited for selling alcoholic beverages to underage persons on two separate occasions. Point Proven admitted to the violations and that it complied with all penalties imposed. It noted that despite the violations, the Louisiana Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control had granted the Saloon a state alcohol permit for 2016. After receiving evidence, the City voted against the renewal of the Saloon’s local alcohol permit. The following day, Point Proven filed a motion to enforce the consent agreement and for sanctions. Subsequently, Point Proven filed a petition for damages and devolutive appeal to the district court. By joint motion, these two cases were consolidated.

A de novo trial was held in the district court. Both the City and Point Proven called several witnesses to testify. After receiving all of the evidence, the trial court ruled in favor of the City. Point Proven has appealed from this adverse judgment.

Discussion

This matter is governed by La. R.S. 26:71, et seq.

Louisiana Revised Statute 26:76 provides that “Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, permits (alcoholic beverages) are valid for only one year, unless expired, suspended, or revoked.”

| Louisiana Revised Statute 26:87(A)(1) provides in pertinent part:

(A) The right to determine what persons shall or shall not be licensed under this Chapter shall be exercised in the following manner:
(1) Municipal authorities and parish governing authorities shall, independently of the commissioner, investigate all applications filed with them for local permits, and shall withhold the issuance of a permit where that action is justified under the provisions of this Chapter. ...

At issue in this case is the denial/withholding of Point Proven’s renewal application for 2016. La. R.S. 26:88(C) provides that renewal permits may be withheld or denied on the same grounds and in the same manner as an original permit.

An appellate court generally reviews the factual findings of a trial court according to the manifest error standard of review. Powell v. Regional Transit Authority, 96-0715 (La. 06/18/97), 695 So.2d 1326. When there is evidence before the trier of fact which, upon its reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnishes a reasonable factual basis for the trial court’s finding, on review the appellate court should not disturb this factual finding in the absence of manifest error. Id

Louisiana Revised Statute 26:94 states that no permit shall be withheld, suspended, or revoked except for causes specified in this Chapter.

Moreover, these provisions clearly envision a difference between the withholding and the suspension or revocation of a liquor permit. The City |5did not vote to suspend or revoke Point Proven’s liquor permit; here, the City voted to deny/withhold Point Proven’s liquor permit.

Louisiana Revised Statute 26:88(B) states:

[A]ny dealer whose application for renewal is filed before the date established by the commissioner may continue business until issuance of the new permit, under the previous permit if it has not been suspended or revoked or the new permit withheld or denied. (Emphasis added).

In considering the grounds for withholding or denying a permit, La. R.S. 26:88(C) states that renewal permits may be withheld or denied on the same grounds and in the same manner as an original permit. Therefore, this matter is specifically governed by La. R.S. 26:80, which deals with the qualifications of applicants for permits. See also La. R.S. 26:86, which provides that the commissioner with respect to state permits and municipal authorities and parish governing authorities with respect to local permits may withhold the issuance of permits in the manner and under the terms and conditions specified in this Chapter.

Point Proven, the City, and the trial court all failed to point out the statutorily provided differences between the renewal of a permit and the revocation and suspension thereof. A review of La. R.S. 26:80 shows that the City had grounds to withhold Point Proven’s liquor permit when it came, up for renewal.

| ^Louisiana Revised Statute 26:80 provides in pertinent part:

(A) Applicants for state and local permits of all kinds shall meet all of the following qualifications and conditions:
(1) Be "a person of good character and reputation and over eighteen years of age.
(8) Have not ... been convicted or had a judgment of court rendered against the applicant involving the sale or service of alcoholic beverages by this or any other state or by the United States for two years prior to the application.
(9) Have not been adjudged by the commissioner, or convicted by a court of violating any of the provisions of this Chapter.

The commissioner found plaintiff guilty of two separate violations of selling alcoholic beverages to underage persons. Accordingly, we find that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in upholding the decision of the City to deny Point Proven’s liquor permit.

Conclusion

The ruling of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against plaintiff, Point Proven, LLC.

AFFIRMED.

MOORE, J, concurs in the result only, finding that the record as a whole provided evidence sufficient to support the City Council’s action and the district court’s judgment.

      . A permit is personal and the LLC members individually are required to qualify.

      . This discharge was found to be accidental.

      . The City cites La. R.S. 26:90, titled “acts prohibited on licensed premises; suspension or revocation of permits,” in its argument that the ruling of the trial court should be affirmed. The City notes that Point Proven admitted to selling alcoholic beverages to underage patrons on two separate occasions in 2015, which is a violation of La. R.S. 26:90. The City argues that these two violations gave them the cause to not renew Point Proven’s liquor permit. However, the title of this provision indicates that it only concerns the suspension or revocation of a liquor permit, not the withholding thereof. Moreover, La. R.S. 26:90(1) states that “violation of this section is punishable as provided in R.S. 26:171 and is also sufficient cause for the revocation of a permit." Thus, the provisions of La. R.S. 26:90 are not applicable in this matter.

      . The text of La. R.S. 26:80(A) subsections (8) and (9) as shown above has been taken from the Louisiana Legislature’s official website. There are typographical and/or substantive errors in these subsections in Vol. 16D of West’s La. Rev. Stat. Ann. (2016 ed. and 2017 pocket part) and on Westlaw.


author: STONE, J. DREW, J.,

text:
    Helen Wathen Abell TUFT Plaintiff-Appellant v. Heber Cutler TUFT Defendant-Appellee
    No. 51,293-CA
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Judgment rendered January 18, 2017.

      DONALD L. KNEIPP, Counsel for Appellant
    ROBERT STEPHEN TEW, Counsel for Appellee
    Before DREW, LOLLEY, and STONE, JJ.
   STONE, J.

11 Helen Tuft (“Helen”) appeals the trial court’s judgment, awarding joint custody and fixing support for her minor children with Dr. Heber Tuft (“Dr. Tuft”), as well as the denial of her request for interim spousal support. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s decision not to appoint a parenting coordinator. In all other respects, we affirm. The case is remanded with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Helen and Dr. Tuft were married on August 5, 2003. They have four children together: D.T. (08/17/06), C.T.-l (11/10/08), C.T.-2 (06/16/11), and S.T. (10/24/13). Dr. Tuft is a pediatric dentist with his own practice in Monroe. Helen is a stay-at-home mom and primary caregiver to the children. Helen and Dr. Tuft separated on September 28, 2014, and Helen and the children moved in with her parents. During this time, Helen allowed Dr. Tuft visitation with the children at her parents’ home for one hour, three times a week.

On October 31, 2014, Helen filed a petition for divorce against Dr. Tuft. In her petition, Helen sought joint custody and designation as domiciliary parent with Dr. Tuft receiving supervised visitation. Helen sought awards of child and spousal support, as well as exclusive use of the former matrimonial domicile. Moreover, Helen requested Dr. Tuft provide her and the children with medical insurance, and all medical, drug, dental, and orthodontic expenses not covered by said insurance. Dr. Tuft responded with an answer and reconven-tional demand seeking joint custody 12and control over the children. Dr. Tuft also requested exclusive use of the former matrimonial domicile.

The parties subsequently stipulated to participation in The Wellspring Supervised Visitation and Safe Exchange Program (‘Wellspring”). The order, signed February 20, 2015, provided Helen would have domiciliary custody of the children with Dr. Tuft receiving supervised visitation twice a week and the option to visit the children at Helen’s residence. Dr. Tuft was also allowed to visit the children’s school for lunch and any special activities. To assist the trial court in a final custody and visitation determination, the trial court ordered the parties undergo a custody evaluation with Donna George (“George”), a licensed professional counselor with Wellspring. The custody evaluation required both parties to undergo psychological evaluations.

During the custody evaluation, Helen revealed her issues with Dr. Tuft began in 2011 when Dr. Tuft started displaying increasing anger and abusive behaviors towards her and the children. Helen claimed Dr. Tuft became increasingly agitated with the children and used disciplinary methods she believed were abusive. Helen feared Dr. Tuft’s behavior was a result of the emotional and physical abuse he suffered as a child at the hands of his father. She was also concerned about Dr. Tuft potentially suffering from sex addiction, which was possibly attributed to the sexual abuse he suffered at the age of five.

On June 10, 2015, a hearing officer issued the following recommendations, based on George’s custody evaluation:

(1) Helen be awarded primary domiciliary custody of the minor children, subject to supervised visitation for Dr. Tuft;
la(2) Dr. Tuft submit to a psychological evaluation by Helen’s expert, Dr. John Simoneaux, and continue therapy with his therapist, Dr. Shawn Jefferies;
(3) Dr. Tuft’s child support obligation be set at $10,000.00 per month and his spousal support obligation be set at $5,000.00 per month, retroactive to judicial demand;
(4) Child support arrears be fixed at $70,000.00 and spousal support arrears be fixed at $35,000.00;
(5) Helen retain exclusive use of the former matrimonial domicile during the pendency of the proceedings; and
(6) Dr. Tuft provide medical insurance for Helen and the children, and all medical, drug, dental, and orthodontic expenses not covered by said insurance.

The trial court signed an interim order adopting the recommendations of the hearing officer. Both parties objected to the order. Helen also filed a rule for contempt against Dr. Tuft and moved for the appointment of a parenting coordinator.

A trial on the matter proceeded over seven nonconsecutive days beginning on July 27, 2015, and ending on May 23, 2016. The majority of the testimony at trial was focused on Dr. Tuft’s disposition and the safety of the children in his custody. The trial court heard from several witnesses, including the parties, and countless experts. On November 23, 2015, the trial court heard George’s testimony regarding her custody evaluation of the parties. George testified Dr. Tuft’s supervised visitation with the children was going well, and that her assessment of the case did not suggest Dr. Tuft was a danger to his children. Based on George’s recommendation, the trial court lifted Dr. Tuft’s supervised visitation. The trial court awarded Dr. Tuft unsupervised visitation with the children, but only daytime visitation with S.T., every other weekend from Friday until Sunday.

I ¿On June 10, 2016, the trial court issued a final judgment on the matter. The trial court’s judgment provided the parties have joint custody of the children with Helen as domiciliary parent. Dr. Tuft was given unsupervised visitation with the children every other week from Thursday through Tuesday. The parties were to share holidays equally, and alternate weeks during the summer. As domiciliary parent, Helen was responsible for all medical decisions, except in emergencies. However, Dr. Tuft was responsible for all dental care decisions. Dr. Tuft was allowed out-of-state travel with the children, and both parties were allowed to take the children to the church of their choice. Moreover, the trial court ordered both parties to agree on extracurricular activities and share the costs equally. If the parties could not agree, one parent could unilaterally make the decision for the child to participate in the activity but pay the full cost.

The trial court ordered Dr. Tuft to pay child support in the amount of $10,000.00 per month. Dr. Tuft was to provide the children with health, dental, prescription drug, vision, and orthodontic insurance. All uninsured medical, dental, vision, and orthodontic expenses were to be shared by the parties equally. The trial court denied Helen’s request for interim spousal support and ordered her to pay the mortgage on the former matrimonial domicile as long as she enjoyed exclusive use of it. The trial court also denied Helen’s rule for contempt against Dr. Tuft and request for a parenting coordinator. Helen now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Child Custody

Helen argues the trial court abused its discretion in extending Dr. Tuft’s unsupervised visitation to Thursday through Tuesday every other | ¡weekend and alternating weeks in the summer. As it pertains to the best interest of the children, Helen claims the trial court inadequately weighed Dr. Tuft’s capacity and disposition as it affects the welfare of the children. Helen contends the trial court ignored the recommendations of various experts who testified regarding Dr. Tuft’s potential mental health issues that have yet to be treated.

Specifically, Helen states the trial court ignored testimony that Dr. Tuft needs counseling in anger management and disciplinary techniques, as well as parental coaching. Helen contends Dr. Jefferies has yet to rule out that Dr. Tuft suffers from Posh-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), panic attacks, and general anxiety disorder. Helen claims Dr. Tuft has displayed an increasing anger and aggressiveness toward her and the children, and until Dr. Tuft receives sufficient treatment for his issues, he should not have extended unsupervised visitation with the children.

It is well settled in our statutory and jurisprudential law that the paramount consideration in any determination of child custody is the best interest of the child. La. C.C. art. 131; Semmes v. Semmes, 45,006 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/16/09), 27 So.3d 1024, 1029; Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La. 02/06/98), 708 So.2d 731. The court is to consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child. La. C.C. art. 134.

|fiThe trial court is not bound to make a mechanical evaluation of all of the statutory factors listed in La. C.C. art. 134, but should decide each case on its own facts in light of those factors. Semmes, supra; Corral v. Corral, 47,294 (La.App. 2d Cir. 06/13/12), 93 So.3d 793, 796. These factors are not exclusive, but are provided as a guide to the court, and the relative weight given to each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court. Id.

La. R.S. 9:335(A)(2)(b) provides that to the extent feasible and in the best interest of the child, physical custody of the child should be shared equally. Yet, when the trial court finds that a decree of joint custody is in the best interest of the child, the statute does not necessarily require an equal sharing of physical custody. Jones v. Jones, 38,790 (La.App. 2d Cir. 06/25/04), 877 So.2d 1061, 1066; Semmes, supra; Corral, supra. Substantial time, rather than strict equality of time, is mandated by the legislative scheme providing for joint custody of children. Id.

After weighing and evaluating expert and lay testimony, the trial court may accept or reject the opinion expressed by any expert. The weight given expert testimony is dependent upon the expert’s professional qualifications and experience, and the facts upon which the opinion -is based. It is within the trial court’s discretion to substitute common sense and judgment when such a substitution appears warranted upon the record as a whole. Jones, supra; Manno v. Manno, 49,533 (La.App. 2d Cir. 11/19/14), 154 So.3d 655, 665.

The trial court has vast discretion in deciding matters of child custody and visitation. This discretion is based on the trial court’s opportunity to better evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Semmes, supra; Slaughter v. Slaughter, 44,056 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/30/08), 1 So.3d 788, 791. Therefore, the trial court’s determination will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. As long as the trial court’s factual findings are reasonable in light of the record when reviewed in its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse even though convinced it would have weighed the evidence differently if acting as the trier of fact. Id.

Helen alleged Dr. Tuft was suffering from a sex addiction. Dr. Tuft testified that he admitted to having a sex addiction only to appease Helen and save his marriage. During the trial, multiple experts confirmed Dr. Tuft was not suffering from sex addiction, but was potentially suffering from' other health issues. One of the experts, Dr. Shawn Jefferies (“Dr. Jeffer-ies”), concluded Dr. Tuft was not a sex addict, but had yet to eliminate the possibility that he was suffering from PTSD and general anxiety disorder. According to Dr. Jefferies, if Dr. Tuft was suffering from PTSD and general anxiety disorder, it was more than likely related to the loss of his marriage and the restricted access to his children.

Despite Helen’s expert, Dr. John Simo-neaux’s (“Dr. Simoneaux”), reservations about the abuse Dr. Tuft suffered as' a child, he made it clear that the only person equipped to make a custody recommendation in the instant case was the- custody evaluator. In her custody evaluation report, dated May 22, 2015, George recommended Dr. Tuft’s supervised visitation | ^continue for two more months. Six months after her recommendation, George testified that Dr. Tuft’s supervised visitation with the children was going well, and that her assessment of the case did not suggest Dr. Tuft was a danger to the children. George stated she reviewed the expert testimony of Dr. Simoneaux and Dr. Jefferies, and neither doctor gave Dr. Tuft a firm diagnosis of anything that affected the safety of the children. George recommended Dr. Tuft have unsupervised visitation with the children immediately. Thereafter, the trial court issued an interim order granting Dr. Tuft unsupervised visitation with the children every other weekend from Friday until Sunday.

In its final judgment on June 10, 2016, the trial court relied on George’s testimony that it was important for the children to be with them father during their formative years. The trial court did not believe equal time was appropriate for this case, but did believe Dr. Tuft needed more than two nights out of every 14 nights with the children. Accordingly, the trial court extended Dr. Tuft’s unsupervised visitation to every other week, from Thursday at 5:00 p.m. until Tuesday morning when Dr. Tuft returned the children to school. This would allow Dr. Tuft to attend “Family Night” with the children, which is held every Monday night at his church. The trial court also provided that Helen and Dr. Tuft would have the children for alternating weeks during the summer.

Based on our review of the record, there was a factual basis for the trial court’s decision. The trial court had discretion to accept or reject any part of the testimony presented at trial. The trial court elected to rely largely on the testimony of George, whose duty as the custody evaluator is to protect the best interest of the children. Helen’s main issue with the trial ^court’s ruling was the safety of the children. George found nothing in her evaluation suggesting Dr. Tuft was a danger to the children. Notably, George testified Dr. Tuft needed to be given the responsibilities of a father in every sense of the word to build trust with the children. As a result, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in extending Dr. Tuft’s unsupervised visitation with the children.

Helen’s Rights as Domiciliary Parent

Helen argues the trial court appointed her primary domiciliary parent, but stripped her of authority customarily exercised by a domiciliary parent, specifically as it relates to the children’s dental care and participation in extracurricular activities. Helen further argues the trial court erred in allowing the parties to take the children to the church of their choice.

First, we address Helen’s right to make choices as it relates to the children’s dental care. The trial court’s judgment states that Helen, as the domiciliary parent, is responsible for all medical decisions for the minor children. However, the trial court found this to be a special case in that Dr. Tuft was a pediatric dentist. The trial court was concerned with Helen taking the minor children to other dental providers, without consulting with Dr. Tuft. The trial court concluded Dr. Tuft was in the best position to provide dental care for the children, and that making him responsible for dental care decisions was in the children's best interest.

La. R.S. 9:335 provides that “the domiciliary parent shall have authority to make all decisions affecting the child unless an implementation order provides otherwise.” As such, the trial court is allowed to tailor the authority of the domiciliary parent on a case-by-case basis. It is more than | ¶plogical to assume Dr. Tuft, a successful pediatric dentist, is in the best position to provide dental care to the children. Thus, the trial court was well within its discretion in making Dr. Tuft responsible for the children’s dental care.

As it pertains to the children’s extracurricular activities, we find no error in the trial court ordering the parties to agree on extracurricular activities. The trial court found it was important for both parties to engage in the health, athletic, social, and cultural development of the children. If the parties fail to agree on an extracurricular activity, a party may unilaterally choose for the child to participate in the activity but solely pay the costs. As stated below, neither party has shown a financial inability to engage the children in extracurricular activities. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Lastly, Helen argues the trial court erred by allowing the parties to take the children to the church of their choice. Helen asserts the children should exclusively attend her church, the church they have attended their entire lives. There is nothing in the record to indicate it is not in the best interest of the children for Dr. Tuft to take the children to his church. As noted by the trial court, the father’s role is important in the children’s religion, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and it is important for the children to see Dr. Tuft in his role at the church he currently attends. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Child Support

Helen contends the trial court abused its discretion by only awarding her $10,000.00 per month in child support and ordering her to pay half of the children’s noncovered health-related expenses, extracurricular activity In expenses, and all other expenses incurred for the benefit of the children. Helen claims her annual income was incorrectly set at $282,145.00 because her 2015 income included a rare capital gain of $150,000.00. Helen further argues the trial court failed to address Dr. Tuft’s child support arrears, despite his refusal to pay child support throughout the proceedings.

La. R.S. 9:315.19 provides a schedule to be used to determine basic child support. The highest level specified in the schedule is a combined adjusted gross monthly income of $40,000.00. At that level, for four children, the basic support amount is $6,289.00. However, La. R.S. 9:315.13(B) provides that if the combined adjusted gross income of the parties exceeds the highest level specified in the schedule contained in La. R.S. 9:315.19, the court shall use its discretion in setting the amount of the basic child support obligation in accordance with the best interest of the child and the circumstances of each parent, but in no event shall it be less than the highest amount set forth in the schedule.

The overriding factor in determining the amount of support is the best interest of the children. The amount of support should be determined on a case-by-case basis. A parent’s ability to pay and the lifestyle that the children would have enjoyed if the parents had not separated are important considerations. Jones, supra; Earle v. Earle, 43,925 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/03/08), 998 So.2d 828, 834, writ denied, 09-0117 (La. 02/13/09), 999 So.2d 1151. Pursuant to the express language of La. R.S. 9:315.13, the district court must use its discretion in setting the amount of the basic child support obligation when the parties’ monthly income exceeds the highest figure provided in the schedule, and its judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Jones, supra; Earle, supra.

|1?The parties’ income far exceeds the highest level specified in the schedule of La. R.S. 9:315.19, so the trial court had discretion in setting the amount of child support in accordance with the best interest of the children and the circumstance of each parent. The trial court used the spreadsheet prepared by Helen to determine the monthly expenses of her and the children. Helen totaled her and the children’s monthly expenses at $28,377.08. After eliminating expenses from Helen’s spreadsheet that it felt were not for the benefit of the children, the trial court totaled Helen and the children’s monthly expenses at $13,769.71. The trial court subtracted Helen’s one-fifth portion and then added the children’s annual tuition in the amount of $23,956.00 and $1,000.00 for uniforms to total the children’s monthly expenses at $13,095.44.

Based upon the parties’ 2015 tax returns, Dr. Tuft earned $882,427.00, which accounted for 76% of the parties’ combined income. Helen earned $282,145.00, which accounted for 24% of the'parties’ combined income. Accordingly, Dr. Tuft was responsible for 76% of the children’s monthly expenses or $9,952.53 a month. The trial court rounded this number up to $10,000.00 to reach Dr. Tuft’s monthly child support obligation.

First, Helen’s argument that the trial court erred in including her $150,000.00 capital gain in her gross income for child support purposes is without merit. Under La. R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(a), gross income includes capital gains, and Helen fails to show how including her capital gain would be inequitable. La. R.S. 9:315.1.

Next, Helen argues the trial court erred in determining the children’s monthly expenses. In coming to a determination that' the children’s monthly |^expenses were $13,095.44, the trial court deducted the following expenses that it felt were not for the benefit of the children: the mortgage for the former matrimonial domicile, because Helen was granted exclusive use; the amount listed for diapers and wipes, because S.T. is now potty-trained; the amount for health insurance, because Dr. Tuft is providing the children with health insurance; church gifts, because they were Helen’s personal tithes; and, the amounts listed .for holiday gifts and vacations, because both parties could gift and take the children on vacations at their cost. We find all these deductions were within the trial court’s discretion.

As for the child care expenses, the trial court stated in its written reasons that it deducted the expenses because child care is more of a benefit to Helen than the children. The trial court is not required to include child care expenses in the parties’ basic child support obligation. Since the parties’ income exceeded the highest level specified in the schedule, the trial court is only required to set the children’s support obligation in accordance with the best interest of the children and the circumstances of each parent. Helen is a stay-at-home mother and has not indicated she is seeking employment in the near future. Thus, the trial court was within its discretion in excluding child care costs from the parties’ basic child support obligation.

Last, Helen argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to pay half of the children’s noncovered health-related expenses, extracurricular activity expenses, and all other expenses incurred for the benefit of the. children. To the extent that the parties agree or the court so [^orders, extraordinary medical expenses, expenses related to private school attendance, and other expenses “intended to enhance the health, athletic, social, or cultural development of a child” may be added to the basic child support obligation. These expenses then become a part of the total child support obligation owed by the parents. See La. R.S. 9:315.5 and 315.6.

In light of the facts and circumstances of this case, and considering Helen is receiving $10,000.00 per month in basic child support from Dr. Tuft, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Helen to pay half of the noncovered health-related expenses, extracurricular activity expenses, and all other expenses incurred for the benefit of the children. As ■will be stated below, Helen has not shown she is financially incapable of equally splitting these expenses with Dr. Tuft.

We note the trial court failed to address and fix the child support arrears of Dr. Tuft. Thus, the issue of child support arrears is remanded to the trial court to set the amount owed by Dr. Tuft.

Interim Spousal Support

Helen argues the trial court erred in failing to award her interim spousal support. First, she asserts the trial court erred in considering the fact she could sell or lease the property she inherited from her grandmother. Secondly, she contends the trial court failed to consider her legitimate expenses, which included a $2,959.37 mortgage payment, child care, church tithes, vacations and holidays with the children, as well as half of the children’s non-covered medical expenses, counseling, and extracurricular activities.

Á spouse may be awarded an interim allowancé based on the needs of that spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the standard of living |1sof the spouses during the marriage. La. C.C. art. 113; Jones, supra; Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 41,851 (La.App. 2d Cir. 01/24/07), 948 So.2d 390, 393. A spouse’s right to claim interim periodic support is based on the statutorily imposed duty of the spouses to support each other during their marriage Jones, supra; Kirkpatrick, supra; McAlpine v. McAlpine, 94-1594 (La. 09/05/96), 679 So.2d 85. The needs of the wife have been defined as the total amount sufficient to maintain her in a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed by her prior to the separation, limited only by the husband’s ability to pay. Kirkpatrick, supra.

In order to demonstrate the need for interim periodic spousal support, the claimant has the burden of proving that she lacks sufficient income or the ability to earn a sufficient income to maintain the standard of living that she enjoyed during the parties’ marriage. Jones, supra-, Kirkpatrick, supra. The trial court is afforded much discretion in determining an award of interim spousal support. Such a finding will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id.

The trial court used Helen’s expenses spreadsheét to determine her personal expenses totaled $2,753.94 a month. Additionally, the trial court factored in a $1,000.00 health insurance policy, her portion of 'the children’s monthly expenses, and her $2,959.37 mortgage. Déspité these expenses, the trial court concluded Helen failed to show a need for interim spousal support.

The trial court improperly considered the property Helen inherited from her grandmother in determining Helen’s need for spousal support. Patton v. Patton, 37,401 (La.App. 2d Cir. 09/24/03), 856 So.2d 56, 60 (“A spouse claiming alimony is not required to sell her non-liquid assets to |1fisupport herself.”). Nonetheless, Helen still fails to show she lacks sufficient income to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed during her marriage. Jones, supra. Andrew Parker, the Tuft family’s certified public accountant, testified that Helen’s net income in 2015 was $189,455.00, which gave her a monthly income of almost $16,000.00. Thus, after subtracting Helen’s monthly personal expenses, health insurance policy, a portion of the children’s expenses, and mortgage payment, Helen still has approximately $5,000.00 a month to live on. Moreover, she is receiving $10,000.00 a month from Dr. Tuft in child support.

After considering Helen’s net income in 2015 and the money she receives from Dr. Tuft in child support, we find Helen should have no issues paying any of her legitimate expenses. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award Helen interim spousal support.

In an interim order filed on July 7, 2015, the trial court adopted the recommendations of the hearing officer that Helen receive $5,000.00 a month in interim spousal support. The hearing officer also set the spousal support arrears at $35,000.00. The trial court failed to address and fix the amount of back-due interim spousal support owed by Dr. Tuft. Thus, the issue of interim spousal support arrears is remanded to the trial court to set the amount owed by Dr. Tuft.

Parenting Coordinator

Helen argues the trial court erred by failing to appoint a parenting coordinator. We agree. On motion of a party or on its own motion, the court may appoint a parenting coordinator in a child custody case for good cause shown if the court has previously entered a judgment establishing child custody. La. R.S. 9:358.1(A). “Good cause” as defined by the statute 1^includes “a determination by the court that either or both parties have demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to collaboratively make parenting decisions without the assistance of others or insistence of the court.” Revision Comment (c) of Revised Statute 9:358.1. Good cause may include an inability or unwillingness to comply with parenting agreements and orders by the trial court, the parties demonstrating an ongoing pattern of unnecessary litigation, and the parties refusing to communicate or having difficulty communicating about the care of the children. Id.

The record clearly indicates the parties have an unwillingness to communicate and cooperate with each other as to the care of the children. For example, Helen points to Dr. Tuft’s failure to use Our Family Wizard, a tool used to promote co-parenting by facilitating communication between separated or divorced parents in relation to their children. The parties’ participation in Our Family Wizard was instituted by court order because Dr. Tuft refused to voluntarily participate.

George testified she believed Dr. Tuft’s unwillingness to participate in Our Family Wizard was due to his belief that he was being controlled and had to have permission from others to be a father to his children. George believed Dr. Tuft’s frustration began, prior to court involvement, when Helen limited his visitation with the children at her parents’ house to one hour, three times a week. George testified that Dr. Tuft was restricted in what he could do with the children and would rebel against those restrictions to get privacy with the children.

Both parties have spent excessive money and energy in litigation trying to determine what is in the best interest of the children, but the parties’ opinions of each other are preventing them from working together | lsfor the best interest of the children. Helen undoubtedly has reservations about the children’s safety while in Dr. Tuft’s custody. Dr. Simoneaux professed the parties’ reservations about each are often expressly or implicitly communicated to the children, which is damaging to them over a long period of time.

The records reveal that both parties have issues with how the other communicates regarding the children. The parties need to learn how to co-parent post-divorce, and a parenting coordinator would help the children’s well-being in the process. The instant case is a perfect example of why our legislature granted the trial court authority to appoint a parenting coordinator. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to appoint a parenting coordinator, pursuant to La. R.S. 9:358.1. A parenting coordinator is clearly in the best interest of not only the parties but, more importantly, the children.

Rule for Contempt

Helen contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find Dr. Tuft in contempt for disobeying the trial court’s interim order. Specifically, Dr. Tuft failed to take the children to Helen’s church on January 17, 2016. When Helen contacted Dr. Tuft as to the children’s whereabouts that Sunday, Helen asserts it took Dr. Tuft seven hours to l19respond. Helen claims Dr. Tuft’s actions were intentional and totally without justification.

The trial court’s interim order stated Dr. Tuft “shall attend church with the minor children at the church [Helen] traditionally attends,” which is at the Monroe Ward. Dr. Tuft admitted to taking the children to his church at the West Monroe Ward on January 17, 2016. Dr. Tuft testified that both wards were satellite broadcast that Sunday, and thus, both churches had the same service. The trial court ruled that Dr. Tuft and the children were not required to be present at Helen’s church every Sunday, and found Dr. Tuft’s failure to attend Helen’s church on one Sunday was not the product of contemptuous behavior.

La. C.C.P. art. 224 provides that constructive contempt includes “willful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of the court.” Willful disobedience of a court order requires a consciousness of the duty to obey the order and an intent to disregard that duty. Swan v. Swan, 35,393 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/07/01), 803 So.2d 372, 375. A trial court is afforded great discretion in determining whether a party should be held in contempt for disobeying the court’s order, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. J.M. v. Brooks, 42,846 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/05/07), 972 So.2d 1197, 1200.

This court finds Dr. Tuft’s failure to notify Helen of his intention to take the children to his church and leaving her in limbo for seven hours as to the children’s whereabouts is strong evidence of Dr. Tuft’s intent to consciously disobey the trial court’s interim order. Nevertheless, Dr. Tuft testified that the services at both churches were the same that Sunday and the interim order did not state Dr. Tuft had to take the children to Helen’s | ^church “every” Sunday the children were in his custody. As a result, there is a factual basis for the trial court not finding Dr. Tuft in contempt, and we find no abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the trial court’s decision not to appoint a parenting coordinator. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to appoint a parenting coordinator and issue a determination on the amount of Dr. Tuft’s child support and interim spousal support arrears. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the parties equally.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

DREW, J., concurs with written reasons.

DREW, J.,

concurring.

11 With two concerns, I respectfully concur in this excellent opinion, which is amply supported by the record.

• Extracurricular Activities. Because the parties have had trouble agreeing on what day it is, or anything else, the record predicts that this discord will continue, unless the parenting coordinator mandates that the parties make all future decisions about extracurricular activities in good faith and without hidden agendas. Dr. Tuft’s superior financial position and history of manipulative behavior makes it foreseeable that he might seek to diminish Mrs. Tuft’s authority as domiciliary parent, and this must be avoided.

• Mrs. Tuft’s 2015 Income. A one-time (or rare) capital gain of $150,000 has the potential to distort the relative financial situation of the parties. Hopefully, this is not the case here. The parties will have opportunities to assess relative finances in the future, should conditions warrant.

Lastly, any delay in the rendering of this opinion is the total responsibility of the judge writing this concurrence,

I respectfully concur.

      . The children are referred to by their initials to preserve their anonymity in this confidential proceeding.

      . La. C.C. art. 134 provides that:
      The court shall consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child. Such factors may include:
      (1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child.
      (2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.
      (3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
      (4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.
      (5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.
      (6) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child,
      (7) The mental and physical health of each party.
      (8) The home, school, and community history of the child.
      (9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.
      (10) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party.
      (11) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
      (12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.

      . While La. R.S. 9:315.3 requires the trial court to add net child care costs to the basic child support obligation, net child care costs are "reasonable costs of child care incurred by a party due to employment or job search.” Thus, La. R.S. 9:315.3 would be inapplicable in Helen's case, because she is currently staying at home with the children.

      . Revision Comment (a) of Revised Statute 9:358.1 provides that:
      Parenting coordination is a child-focused alternate dispute resolution process in which a duly qualified parenting coordinator assists parents or persons exercising parental authority to implement a parenting plan by facilitating the resolution of their disputes in a timely manner and by reducing their child-related conflict so that the children may be protected from the impact of that conflict. The parenting coordinator assists the parties in promoting the best interests of the children by reducing or eliminating child-related conflict through the use of the parenting coordination process.