text:
    IN RE: Quenton I. WHITE
    NO. 2016-B-2101
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

11 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) has filed a petition seeking the imposition of reciprocal discipline against respondent, Quenton I. White, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana and Tennessee, based upon discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court of Tennessee issued an order immediately suspending respondent’s license to practice law pending a final determination of disciplinary proceedings against him. In its order, the Tennessee court concluded that respondent had engaged in professional misconduct demonstrating that he poses a significant threat of harm to the public, based upon evidence that he had misappropriated funds.

After receiving notice of the order of the Tennessee court, the ODC filed a petition to initiate reciprocal discipline in Louisiana. On May 13, 2016, we granted the petition and placed respondent on interim suspension. In re: White, 16-0392 (La. 5/13/16), 190 So.3d 1183.

|2On October 20, 2016, pursuant to a conditional guilty plea filed by respondent, the Supreme Court of Tennessee entered an order adjudging respondent guilty of misconduct as a result of violations of Rules 1.1 (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.16 (obligations upon termination of the representation), and 8.4 (misconduct) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. In re: Quenton I. White, BPR No. 15136, File No. M2016-02104-SC-BAR-BP. For this misconduct, the court ordered that respondent be disbarred, effective as of the date of the filing of the order.

After receiving notice of the Tennessee order of discipline, the ODC filed a motion to initiate reciprocal discipline proceedings in Louisiana, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21. A certified copy of the decision and order of the Supreme Court of Tennessee was attached to the motion. On December 1, 2016, this court rendered an order giving respondent thirty days to demonstrate why the imposition of identical discipline in this state would be unwarranted. Respondent failed to file any response in this court.

DISCUSSION

The standard for imposition of discipline on a reciprocal basis is set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D). That rule provides:

Discipline to be Imposed. Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph B, this court shall impose the identical discipline ... unless disciplinary counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or this court finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that:
(1) The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
(2) Based on the record created by the jurisdiction that imposed the discipline, there was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or
(3) The imposition of the same discipline by the court would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or
(4) The misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this state; ...
If this court determines that any of those elements exists, this court shall enter such other order as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate.

In the instant case, respondent has made no showing of infirmities in the Tennessee proceeding, nor do we discern any from our review of the record. Furthermore, we find there is no reason to deviate from the sanction imposed in Tennessee as only under extraordinary circumstances should there be a significant variance from the sanction imposed by. the other jurisdiction. In re: Aulston, 05-1546 (La. 1/13/06), 918 So.2d 461. See also In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 968-69 (D.C. 2003) (“there is merit in according deference, for its own sake, to the actions of other jurisdictions with respect to the attorneys over whom we share supervisory authority’’).

Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to defer to the Tennessee judgment imposing discipline upon respondent. Accordingly, we will impose reciprocal discipline in the form of disbarment, effective as of the finality of our judgment.

DECREE

Considering the Petition to Initiate Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the record filed herein, it is ordered that respondent, Quenton I. White, also known as Q. Irwin White, Louisiana Bar Roll number 17426, be and he hereby is disbarred, effective as of the finality of this judgment. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked.

      . Respondent has been the subject of a prior reciprocal discipline proceeding. In In re: White, 13-0439 (La. 04/19/13), 113 So.3d 1083, we publicly reprimanded respondent based upon discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    IN RE: Cynthia Ann STERNBERG
    NO. 2016-B-1824
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   ORDER

| ¶ Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and our February 3, 2017 order in 16-OB-1823 transferring respondent, Cynthia Ann Sternberg, to disability inactive status pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 22(C),

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for interim suspension be and hereby is denied.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE EX REL. William David POWELL v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-0518
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   PER CURIAM:

h Denied. Relator abandoned his pro-se pre-trial motions when he proceeded to trial without obtaining rulings on them, see La.C.Cr.P. art. 841, and therefore shows no error in the court’s failure to issue such rulings. Relator also fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), as a result of counsel’s failure to adopt and argue the pro-se motions or as a result of counsel’s trial strategy. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive ^application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The District Court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Mozine JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2045
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Johnson v. State, 15-0346 (La. 11/20/15), 179 So.3d 590.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Nicholas JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2043
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| jDenied. Relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Johnson v. State, 15-1704 (La. 10/17/16), 202 So.3d 493.


text:
    STATE EX REL. William David POWELL v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-1992
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator shows no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to deny his request to further supplement his application for post-conviction relief. See State ex rel. Duhon v. Whitley, 92-1740 (La. 9/2/94), 642 So.2d 1273 (district court has discretion to decide whether to allow a post-conviction petitioner to amend or supplement a timely-filed application for post-conviction relief).

HUGHES, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Glen Dale NELSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-1990
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   PER CURIAM:

h Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). By pleading guilty, relator also waived review of all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings prior to the plea. State v. McKinney, 406 So.2d 160, 161 (La. 1981).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The District Court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

CLARK, J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Brian THOMPSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-1988
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator shows no error in the ruling of the district court.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The District Court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Rodney Ian BARNES v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-1983
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to the remaining claims, relator fails to show any error in the district court’s ruling and fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the naiTow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The District Court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

GENOVESE, J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Blaise FERNANDEZ v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-1976
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   PER CURIAM:

11Denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated three applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions ^authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The District Court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Emanuel RANDALL v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-1974
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   PER CURIAM:

h Denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated two applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions ^authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The District Court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


author: WEIMER, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shawn BART
    NO. 2017-KK-0038
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/02/2017
   1! Writ granted in part and otherwise denied. The district court’s ruling granting issuance of a subpoena for the alleged victim to appear at a preliminary examination hearing is reversed. The defendant is charged with attempted first degree murder of a police officer and aggravated assault with a firearm upon a peace officer. The defendant requested a subpoena to compel the alleged victim’s attendance at a preliminary hearing and urged that “good cause” for subpoenaing the victim exists because the victim’s testimony would be relevant and not consist entirely of hearsay. The defendant also argues that since the alleged victim is a police officer, he is accustomed to testifying in court.

In State v. Harris, 2008-2117 (La. 12/19/08), 998 So.2d 55, this Court held:

Even though the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him[,]” the United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected confrontation clause claims in pre-trial proceedings. Similarly, although La. Const, Art. I, § 13 recognizes the right of a defendant to confront his accuser, the confrontation that this article secures is confrontation at the trial, not prior thereto.

Id. at 55-56.

Further, La. R.S. 46:1844(C)(3) provides that: ... “Before any victim may be 12subpoenaed to testify on behalf of a defendant at any pretrial hearing, the defendant shall show good cause at a contradictory hearing with the district attorney why the subpoena should be issued. See also, La. Const. Art. I, § 25 (1974) which enshrined in the Louisiana Constitution certain rights of a victim of a crime, including the right to refuse to be inteiwiewed by the accused or a representative of the accused.

Police officers, who are victims of crime, are entitled to invoke the protections afforded by the Crime Victim Witness Protection Act, LSA-R.S. 46:1841 et seq. Further, hearsay testimony is explicitly permitted in preliminary examination hearings pursuant to LSA-C.E. Article 1101 B(4). Thus, the defendant has not demonstrated “good cause” to subpoena the alleged victim to appear at a preliminary examination hearing as required by La. Const. Art. I, § 25 and La. R.S. 46:1844(0(3). The state’s request for a stay and the state’s request that defendant be held in contempt of court for asking that the subpoena be issued, is denied. This matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

WEIMER, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

HUGHES, J., would deny the writ.

WEIMER, J.,

dissenting.

11 Respectfully, I would grant and docket this matter for analysis. Without mention of the standard of review or the deference afforded to a trial court’s determination of good cause under La. R.S. 46:1844(C)(3), or the constitutional right to a preliminary examination afforded by La. Const. Art. I, § 14, or the codal right of a defendant to subpoena witnesses to the preliminary examination recognized in La. C,Cr.P. Art. 294(A), the trial court’s ruling is summarily reversed.

Our constitution affords rights to victims and we must be fully cognizant of that constitutional protection. See La. Const. Art. I, § 25. Concerning the rights of victims, La. R.S. 46:1844(C)(3) further provides “[bjefore any victim may be subpoenaed to testify on behalf of a defendant at any pretrial hearing, the defendant shall show good cause at a contradictory hearing with the district attorney why the subpoena should be issued.”

While not insensitive to the rights of victims, including police officers, I would grant and docket this matter to examine and balance the competing constitutional and | gcodal interests so as to provide guidance to the lower courts. I also believe that this matter should be docketed for a determination of what is required under La. R.S. 46:1844(0(3) to establish good cause, and the deference owed-if any-by a reviewing court to the trial court’s good cause determination.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the grant with order.

Hughes, J., would deny the writ.

      . "The right to a preliminary examination shall not be denied in felony cases except when the accused is indicted by a grand jury.” La. Const. Art. I, § 14.

      . Article 294(A) affords a defendant the right to "produce witnesses [at the preliminary examination], who shall be examined in the presence of the defendant and shall be subject to cross-examination.”

      .Notably, this court in State v. Harris, 08-2117 (La. 12/19/08), 998 So.2d 55, which is cited in the per curiam, did not address La. Const. Art. I, § 14 and La. C.Cr.P. Art. 294(A), Further, under the analysis employed in the per curiam, the state would seemingly defeat any attempt to establish "good cause” by offering hearsay, thus, always preventing the defendant from presenting a defense using victim testimony at the preliminary examination.


author: CRICHTON, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leon SCOTT
    NO. 16-KK-2257
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    02/03/2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 529-861; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No, 2016-K-1156.

Writ denied.

GUIDRY, J,, would grant.

CLARK, J., would grant.

CRICHTON, J.

would grant and assigns reasons

hi would grant the State’s writ and reverse the trial court’s suppression of the defendant’s statement. In my view, police officers were justified in making an investigatory stop of the defendant; and upon his flight and apprehension, it was reasonable to place defendant in handcuffs pending investigation. See La. C.Cr.Pr. art. 215.1. Because the defendant’s choice to flee necessitated the detention and handcuffs, I do not deem the status to be custodial such that the Miranda advisement is required. State v. Boudoin, 2010-2868 (La. 3/4/11, 3), 56 So.3d 233, 235 (“[T]he officers’ use of handcuffs to detain the men as they questioned them briefly did not transform the stop into a de facto arrest.”) Therefore, in my view, defendant’s voluntary statement is admissible and should not have been suppressed by the trial court.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Duvander HURST.
    No. 2015-KP-455.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 18, 2015.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 23, 2015.
   PER CURIAM.

hWrit granted. Relator, whose conviction and sentence became final in 2002, filed an application for post-conviction relief in 2014 alleging that the primary witness against him had recanted. In support, he provided an affidavit from the witness in which he stated that he had falsely testified and alleged police and prosecutorial misconduct. The district court denied the application as procedurally barred and the court of appeal denied writs based on relator’s failure to allege that the facts upon which the claim was predicated were not known to his trial attorney. State v. Hurst, 14-1313, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/2/15) (unpub’d) (“Without even an assertion that his attorneys did not know of these facts, the trial court did not err by sustaining the State’s procedural objections as to timeliness of the claims under La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8.”).

The court of appeal and the district court erred. The affiant stated that he had not previously revealed the information to any investigator or attorney representing relator. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that trial counsel was unaware of the facts upon which the instant claim is based, although relator did not explicitly allege that trial counsel lacked the knowledge. Relator’s application and |2supporting materials sufficiently demonstrate that the facts upon which his claims are predicated were not known to relator or his prior attorney and therefore the exception to the post-conviction limitations period applies. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(1).

The matter is remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of relator’s claims. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959); see also State v. Pierre, 13-0873 (La.10/15/13), 125 So.3d 403; State v. Conway, 01-2808 (La.4/12/02), 816 So.2d 290.

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny the writ.

GUIDRY, J., would deny the writ.

CLARK, J., would deny the writ.


author: GUIDRY, Justice. CLARK, J.,

text:
    Eddie HOFFMAN v. 21ST CENTURY NORTH AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY and Carolyn Elzy.
    No. 2014-C-2279.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 2, 2015.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 7, 2015.
   GUIDRY, Justice.

hWe are presented with a question of first impression as to whether a write-off from a medical provider, negotiated by the plaintiffs attorney, may be considered a collateral source from which the tortfeasor receives no set-off. Applying Louisiana law and the principles set forth in our Civil Code, we find that such a write-off does not fall within the scope of the collateral source rule. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the lower courts’ rulings.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Eddie Hoffman was injured in October 2010, when his vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Carolyn Elzy. The accident occurred at or near the intersection of Old Hammond Highway and Sharp Road in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Mr. Hoffman filed suit against Ms. Elzy and her insurer, 21st Century North America Insurance Company (“Century”), for damages allegedly resulting from the accident.

li>A bench trial was conducted in September 2012 on the issue of liability and damages. At trial, the only witnesses were Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Elzy. The evidence introduced at trial consisted of Mr. Hoffman’s medical records, the deposition transcript of the responding law enforcement officer, photographs of both vehicles involved, and Century’s insurance policy. At the conclusion of trial, the court ruled in favor of Mr. Hoffman as to the issue of liability. It found Ms. Elzy one-hundred percent (100%) at fault for the accident. The trial court awarded Mr. Hoffman $4,500.00 in general damages and $2,478.00 for special medical expenses for a total award of $6,978.00.

Mr. Hoffman appealed the verdict alleging inter alia that the award for special damages was erroneous. With regard to special damages, Mr. Hoffman asserted the trial court erred in awarding only $2,478.00 for past medical expenses even though Mr. Hoffman had presented evidence of $4,528.00 in past medical expenses. The appellate court affirmed the verdict of the trial court in all respects. On rehearing, the appellate court affirmed its previous decision, reasoning the trial court had been presented with two conflicting medical bills and its choice between them was not manifestly erroneous.

At issue before this court, therefore, is the award for past medical expenses of $2,478.00, even though Mr. Hoffman submitted bills totaling $4,528.00. Specifically, Mr. Hoffman argues the requested medical expenses included charges for two MRIs, each for $1,500.00 (a total of $3,000.00). At trial, Mr. Hoffman introduced a medical statement for $3,000.00 from the imaging center. However, Mr. Hoffman was awarded a total of $950.00 ($475.00 for each MRI) based upon a medical statement from the imaging center introduced by the defendant that showed charges totaling $3,000.00, $950.00 in payments from the attorney, and a|3bill “ajust [sic]” in the amount of $2050.00. The itemized portion of the statement indicated an “ATT W/O” of $1025.00 for each MRI. The trial court noted that plaintiffs attorney had “an arrangement” with the medical provider. Mr. Hoffman contends, under the collateral source rule, he is entitled to the total billed amount, including the portion of the bill that was “adjusted,” or “written-off,” and his recovery is not limited to merely the portion actually paid. We granted certiorari to determine the res nova issue of whether the collateral source rule applies to the “written-off’ portion of a medical bill when the plaintiffs attorney negotiated the discount.

LAW

Under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor may not benefit, and an injured plaintiffs tort recovery may not be reduced, because of monies received by the plaintiff from sources independent of the tortfeasor’s procuration or contribution. Louisiana Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 02-2349 p. 6 (La.5/20/03), 846 So.2d 734, 739. Under this doctrine, any payments received by the plaintiff from an independent source are not deducted from the award the injured party would otherwise receive from the wrongdoer. Id. In short, the tortfea-sor is not allowed to benefit from the victim’s foresight in purchasing insurance and other benefits. Bozeman v. State, 03-1016 p. 9 (La.7/2/04), 879 So.2d 692, 698.

The collateral source rule can be traced back to its common law roots. The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152, 15 L.Ed. 68 (1854). Two ships (the Propeller Monticello and Northwestern ) were involved in a wreck, causing the Northwestern to sink. The Northwestern, however, was insured and the insurance paid for the loss of the ship and its cargo. The Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether the owner of the other ship was released from | ¿liability because of the insurance payment. The court held the “contract with the insurer is in the nature of a wager between third parties, with which the trespasser has no concern. The insurer does not stand in the relation of a joint trespasser, so that satisfaction accepted from him shall be a release of others.” Id.

Even though originating as a common law doctrine, the collateral source rule has been recognized under the jurisprudence of this state. See Bozeman, pp. 8-11, 879 So.2d at 697-99. Though many other states have enacted legislation governing the application of the collateral source rule within those jurisdictions, the rule has not been altered statutorily in Louisiana. Kansas City. S. Ry., p. 7, 846 So.2d at 739. In Kansas City S. Ry., this court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A (1979), which states:

(1) A payment made by a tortfeasor or by a person acting for him to a person whom he has injured is credited against his tort liability, as are payments made by another who is, or believes he is, subject to the same tort liability.
(2) Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.

We have explained that the rule serves several public policy purposes. The most oft-cited reason is that the tortfeasor should not gain an advantage from outside benefits provided to the victim independently of any act of the tortfeasor. Kansas City S. Ry., p. 7, 846 So.2d at 739. We have also recognized the collateral source rule promotes tort deterrence and accident prevention. Id. Finally, absent such a rule, the reasoning goes, victims would be dissuaded from purchasing insurance or other forms of reimbursement available to them. Id.

While the collateral source rule has been applied in a variety of circumstances, it most typically has been applied in tort cases involving insurance payments and other benefits. Bozeman, 03-1016, p. 9, 879 So.2d at 698. As we explained in Bellard v. American Cent. Ins. Co, 07-1335, p. 19, 980 So.2d 654, 668, the courts have struggled with the question of double recovery or windfall that might arise as a consequence of the victim’s receipt of an outside payment. “Double recovery would be in the nature of exemplary or punitive damages, which are not allowable under Louisiana law unless expressly provided by statute.” Gagnard v. Baldridge, 612 So.2d 732, 736 (La.1993). The purpose of tort damages, we noted in Bellard, is to make the victim whole, and such a purpose is thwarted, and the law is violated, when the victim is allowed to recover the same element of damages twice. Id. This court in Bozeman resolved the question to find that no “windfall” or “double-dipping” will occur when “the injured party’s patrimony was diminished to the extent that he was forced to recover against outside sources and the diminution of patrimony was additional damage suffered by him.” Bellard, p. 19, 980 So.2d at 668 (quoting Bozeman, p. 10, 879 So.2d at 699)(emphasis in original).

In Bozeman, the issue before us was whether the collateral source rule applies to medical expenses “written off’ or contractually adjusted by healthcare providers pursuant to the federal Medicaid program, under which no consideration is provided by the recipient for the receipt of Medicaid benefits. Bellard, p. 20, 980 So.2d at 668-69. The Bozeman court held Medicaid recipients may not collect the Medicaid “write-offs” as damages, because no consideration was given for the benefit. 03-1016, p. 22, 879 So.2d at 705-06. Ultimately, “in holding the Medicaid recipient is unable to collect the Medicaid ‘write-off as damages, [in Bozeman ] we rejected a traditional application of the collateral source rule in favor |fiof a rule more narrowly tailored to better conform with the compensatory goal of tort recovery.” Id. That goal of Louisiana tort recovery is set forth in Louisiana Civil Code article 2315: “Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” Thus, in both Bozeman and Bellard, we emphasized a fundamental consideration for application of the collateral source rule, in addition to tort deterrence, is “whether the victim, by having a collateral source available as a source of recovery, either paid for such benefit or suffered some diminution in his or her patrimony because of the availability of the benefit, such that no actual windfall or double recovery would result from application of the rule.” Bellard, 07-1335, pp. 20-21, 980 So.2d at 669. See also Cutsinger v. Redfern, 08-2607 (La.5/22/09), 12 So.3d 945.

ANALYSIS

With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue of whether a plaintiff can invoke the collateral source rule to recover for medical expense write-offs negotiated by his attorney, without having first diminished his patrimony; an issue of first impression for this court. Here, the plaintiff contends his entire medical bill totaling $3,000.00 is recoverable under the collateral source rule, rather than only the amount actually paid and accepted by the provider. We disagree, as explained below, because we find the collateral source rule does not apply to attorney-negotiated write-offs or discounts for medical expenses obtained as a product of the litigation process.

On the record before us, there is no real dispute that Mr. Hoffman’s attorney negotiated the discount on the medical statement from the imaging center. Although there is no specific evidence or testimony in the record regarding the origin of the write-off, such as a contract or agreement, the notations on the medical statement speak for themselves. Furthermore, the trial court noted on two |7occasions without objection that the plaintiffs attorney had an “arrangement” with certain medical providers offering discounted medical services. Additionally, there is no indication the plaintiff, Mr. Hoffman, incurred any expenses for this discount. Indeed, he testified he was unaware of the write-off or whether he had paid or given up anything in exchange for the write-off. Nevertheless, the plaintiff seeks to extend the application of the collateral source rule beyond the typical situation involving receipt of private insurance benefits to attorney-negotiated discounts of medical bills under the theory that, pursuant to a contingency fee arrangement, the plaintiff pays an attorney fee out of his recovery and this attorney fee effects a diminution in the plaintiffs patrimony sufficient to support application of the collateral source rule.

We decline to extend the collateral source rule to attorney-negotiated medical discounts obtained through the litigation process. We hold that such a discount is not a payment or benefit that falls within the ambit of the collateral source rule. First, allowing the plaintiff to recover an amount for which he has not paid, and for which he has no obligation to pay, is at cross purposes with the basic principles of tort recovery in our Civil Code. The wrongdoer is responsible only for the damages he or she has caused. La. Civ.Code art. 2315. The plaintiff has suffered no diminution of his patrimony to obtain the write-off, and, therefore, the defendant in this case cannot be held responsible for any medical bills or services the plaintiff did not actually incur and which the plaintiff need not repay. Because the evidence before the trial court was that Mr. Hoffman paid $950.00 for the MRIs, he is not entitled to recover any additional amount. Any recovery above $950.00 for the MRIs would amount to a windfall and force the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for medical expenses the plaintiff has neither incurred nor is obligated to pay.

|sSecond, we reject plaintiffs argument that consideration for the benefit is given for attorney-negotiated medical discounts by virtue of the contractual obligation of the plaintiff to pay attorney fees, albeit only in the event of a recovery. This argument is based on the assumption that the payment of an attorney’s fee is additional damage suffered by the tort victim. However, “[i]t is ... well recognized in the jurisprudence of this state that as a general rule attorney fees are not allowed except when authorized by statute or contract.” Killebrew v. Abbott Laboratories, 359 So.2d 1275, 1278 (La.1978). Because the tortfeasor is not liable for, and the tort victim has no right to recover, attorney fees, the payment of an attorney fee is not additional damage to the plaintiffs patrimony so as to justify the “windfall” or “double recovery” represented by the attorney-negotiated discount.

Third, we adopt a bright-line rule that such attorney-negotiated discounts do not fall within the ambit of the collateral source rule because to do otherwise would invite a variety of evidentiary and ethical dilemmas for counsel. For example, an evidentiary hearing inquiring into the details of the attorney-client relationship to uncover a “diminution in patrimony” resulting from the attorney-negotiated medical discount might intrude upon the privilege surrounding the employment contract and communications as to fee arrangements. See La.Code Evid. Art. 506(B)(1). Additionally, a lawyer who negotiates a discount with a medical provider and then attempts to recover the undiscounted full “cost” from the defendant might run afoul of Rule 4.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled “Truthfulness in Statements to Others,” which provides in Subsection (a) that a lawyer in the course of representing a client shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact to a third person.

| nWhile state courts differ in their interpretation of when the collateral source rule applies, and many legislatures have adopted rules governing the application of the doctrine, we have not discovered, nor have the parties pointed to, any other jurisprudence that has directly addressed the issue of whether attorney-negotiated “write-offs” are recoverable under the collateral source rule. However, at least one court has thoroughly considered whether the collateral source rule applies to discounted medical bills and has concluded that it does not. In Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 52 Cal.4th 541, 548-49, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 325, 257 P.3d 1130 (2011), the court held the collateral source rule should not expand the scope of economic damages to include expenses the plaintiff never incurred. There, the plaintiffs health care providers, pursuant to an agreement with her insurer, waived $94,894 of the plaintiffs $122,841 medical bill. As such, the Howell court explained, the plaintiff did not incur, nor was she otherwise obligated to pay, the full charges presented on the medical bill, and therefore the collateral source rule did not apply. Id., 52 Cal.4th at 566, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 343, 257 P.3d at 1145 (“an injured plaintiff whose medical expenses are paid through private insurance may recover as economic damages no more than the amounts paid by the plaintiff or his or her insurer for the medical services received or still owing at the time of trial”).

CONCLUSION

In the present case, Mr. Hoffman did not incur any additional expense in order to receive the attorney-negotiated “write-off,” nor has he suffered any diminution in his patrimony. Therefore, he cannot re? ceive the advantage of the collateral source rule. Bozeman, supra. Additionally, allowing the plaintiff to recover expenses he has not actually incurred himself, and for which he has no obligation to pay, is contrary to Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. Because Mr. Hoffman did not actually incur the “written-off’ portion of the charges, the collateral source rule does not apply. We thus find the appellate court did not err in determining that Mr. Hoffman was entitled to reimbursement of $950.00, the actual amount paid to and accepted by the medical provider, as, op? posed to the. initial charged amount of $3,000.00.

DECREE

For the reasons set forth above, we hold that an attorney-negotiated medical' discount or “write-off’ is not a payment or benefit that falls within the ambit of thé collateral source rule. Accordingly,- we affirm the judgments of the lower courts.

AFFIRMED

CLARK, J.,

concurring.

hBased on the bare-bones record before us, I concur in the result.

      . We explained in Mosing v. Domas, 02-0012, pp. 8-9 (La. 10/15/02), 830 So.2d 967, 973:
      “Exemplary damages in Louisiana reflect ‘a principle that has been borrowed from the common law, and, though tacitly and sometimes expressly recognized in our decisions, it is really an exotic in our system.’ Dirmeyer v. O‘Hern, 39 La.Ann. 961, 964, 3 So. 132 (1887) (vacated on other grounds). Under Louisiana law, exemplary or other 'penalty' damages are not allowable unless expressly authorized by statute. International Harvester Credit v. Seale, 518 So.2d 1039, 1041 (La.1988).”


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Skye MYLES, et al.
    No. 2015-KK-2185.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2015.
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 526-041; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-K-1245.

h Granted. See per curiam.

Stay denied; writ granted. The District Court erred in finding that the war-rantless search of the vehicle was impermissible under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) because the officer had no reason to believe any additional evidence beyond that already observed in plain view would be found in the vehicle. Pursuant to Gant, “[pjolice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arres-tee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id., 556 U.S. at 351, 129 S.Ct. at 1723 (emphasis added). There is no requirement, post-Gant, that an officer must assume that the evidence in plain view is the only evidence the vehicle will contain of the offense of arrest. Here, the officer smelled marijuana during the lawful traffic stop, saw what might constitute a source of the smell, and an unsolicited admission was volunteered that the occupants were smoking illegal synthetic cannabinoids. As the dissent correctly noted in the court below, the officer could then reasonably conclude additional evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 569 F.3d 813, 817 n. 5 (8th Cir.2009) (‘‘We also note that the discovery of marijuana in Davis’s pocket combined with the smell of recently burned marijuana made it ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”) |g(quoting Gant); see also United States v. Lightbourn, 357 Fed.Appx. 259, 265 (11th Cir.2009) (“Because Lightbourn was arrested for possession of marijuana, and because Wever had already observed suspected marijuana on the passenger seat, it would be reasonable to believe that additional marijuana or other drug paraphernalia would be found inside the vehicle.”). Therefore, the District Court’s ruling granting the motion to suppress is reversed. The State’s motion for stay is hereby denied, and the defendants’ motion to suppress is denied. This case is remanded for further proceedings.

JOHNSON, C.J., dissents and would deny stay and deny writ.

WEIMER, J., dissents and would grant and docket.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher J. WELLS.
    No. 2014-K-1701.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2015.

      Louisiana Department of Justice, James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Donna R. Andrieu, Assistant District Attorney, Matthew Culver Kirkham, Assistant District Attorney.
    Law Office of William M. Sothern, William Martin Sothern, William Martin Soth-ern, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

| defendant Christopher J. Wells shot and killed Brandon McCue on May 4, 2008. Defendant shot the victim four times at close range in front of eyewitnesses in the parking area of the trailer park on Chef Menteur Highway where McCue lived. Defendant was charged with second degree murder. He admitted he shot the victim but claimed he did so in self-defense.

At trial, the state’s witnesses testified defendant came to the parking area to purchase marijuana from the victim but drove away when the victim told him he had none to sell. Defendant then returned after a short time and began goading the victim, who had a handgun but never brandished it or threatened defendant with it. The victim exited his vehicle and defendant returned to his own, retrieved a handgun, and shot the victim. Defendant also testified he came to the parking area hoping to purchase marijuana from the victim. He said they argued when the victim claimed he had none to sell. According to defendant, the victim then pointed a handgun at him and instructed him to leave. Defendant returned to his own vehicle, retrieved a | ¡.handgun, and shot the victim because he saw him “messing with the slide” of his weapon.

The jury found defendant guilty of manslaughter and the trial court sentenced him to serve 25 years imprisonment at hard labor. Defendant appealed contending, among other claims, that the jury was incorrectly instructed as to what constitutes justifiable homicide, which is governed by La.R.S. 14:20 and at the time of this homicide provided:

A. A homicide is justifiable:

(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.
(2) When committed for the purpose of preventing a violent or forcible felony involving danger to life or of great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is about to be committed and that such action is necessary for its prevention. The circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fear of a reasonable person that there would be serious danger to his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the felony without the killing.
(8) When committed against a person whom one reasonably believes to be likely to use any unlawful force against a person present in a dwelling or a place of business, or when committed against a person whom one reasonably believes is attempting to use any unlawful force against a person present in a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40), while committing or attempting to commit a burglary or robbery of such dwelling, business, or motor vehicle.
(4)(a) When committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling, a place of business, or a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40), against a person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, and the person committing the homicide reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to leave the premises or motor vehicle.
(b) The provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply when the person committing the homicide is engaged, at the time of the homicide, in the acquisition of, the distribution of, or possession of, with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation |sof the provisions of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.
B.For the purposes of this Section, there shall be a presumption that a person lawfully inside a dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle held a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent unlawful entry thereto, or to compel an unlawful intruder to leave the premises or motor vehicle, if both of the following occur:
(1) The person against whom deadly force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.
(2) The person who used deadly force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had occurred.
C. A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force as provided for in this Section, and may stand his or her ground and meet force with force.
D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used deadly force had a reasonable belief that deadly force was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent a violent or forcible felony involving life or great bodily harm or to prevent the unlawful entry.

In addressing this claim, the court of appeal reproduced the pertinent jury instructions as follows:

Justifiable homicide. A homicide is justifiable, one, when committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm, and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger; two, when committed for the purpose of preventing a violent or forcible felony involving danger to life or of great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is about to be committed, and that such action is necessary for its prevention.
The circumstances must be sufficient to excite fear of a reasonable person that there would be serious danger to his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the felony without the killing.
Three, a person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force as provided for in this section, and may stand his or her ground and meet force with force.
14Four, no finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used deadly force was reasonable and apparently reasonable to prevent a violent or forcible felony involving life or great bodily harm to prevent the unlawful — the lawful entry. Burden of proof, justification defense. If you find that the defendant has raised the defense that his conduct was justified, the State must prove that the defendant’s conduct was not justified. Remember, the State bears the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
Self-defense. A homicide is justifiable if committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm, and that the killing was necessary to save himself from that danger. The danger need not have been real, as long as the defendant reasonably believed that he was in actual danger.
Some factors that you should consider in determining whether the defendant had a reasonable belief that the killing was necessary, number one, the possibility of avoiding the necessity of taking human life by retreat; number two, the excitement and confusion of the occasion; number three, the possibility of avoiding of preventing the danger to himself by using force less than killing; and four, that the defendant’s knowledge of his assailant’s dangerous character.
Thus, if you find, number one, that the defendant killed in self-defense; and two, that the defendant believed that he was in danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm; and three, that the defendant believed the killing was necessary to save himself from the danger; and four, that the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable in light of the circumstances, then you must find the defendant not guilty.
Burden of proof, self-defense. A defendant who raises the defense that he acted in self-defense does not have the burden of proof on that issue. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense.
Aggressor doctrine. A person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense, unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows, or should know, that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict.
In determining whether or not the defendant was the aggressor, you must consider the nature of the confrontation and whether the victim’s actions were a reasonable response.
| ¿Thus, if you find that the defendant was the aggressor or that he brought on the difficulty, you must reject his claim of self-defense unless you find, number one, that he withdrew from the conflict and two, that his withdrawal was in good faith; and three, that he withdrew in a manner that put his adversary on notice that he wished to withdraw and discontinue the conflict.

State v. Wells, 11-0744, pp. 19-20 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/11/14), 156 So.3d 150, 162-63 (emphasis and italics omitted).

The court of appeal noted that La.R.S. 14:20 was amended by 2006 La. Acts 141 to add Section D above, which prohibits the finder of fact from considering the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether the use of deadly force was reasonable and necessary. The court of appeal found the instructions were internally contradictory and confusing because “[o]n the one hand, the trial judge instructs the jury that they are specifically prohibited from considering the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used deadly force was reasonable and the actions apparently reasonable to prevent a violent or forcible felony, ... [but] on the other hand, not much later she counters that instruction with the instruction that the jurors may consider the possibility of avoiding the necessity of taking human life by retreat when evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant’s beliefs at the time of the killing....” Wells, 11-0744, pp. 21-22, 156 So.3d at 164. Citing this Court’s determination in State v. Wilkins, 13-2539, p. 1 (La.1/15/14), 131 So.3d 839, 839-40, that the effect of the 2006 amendment was to supplant “Louisiana’s long-standing jurisprudential rule that a person has no absolute duty to retreat from a life-threatening situation, but that the possibility of retreat is a factor in determining whether the use of deadly force in response was justified under all of the circumstances of the lethal encounter,” the |ficourt of appeal found the trial court erred in instructing jurors — in a homicide committed after the 2006 amendment — that they could consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether the use of deadly force was reasonable:

Thus, in light of the clarity of the Legislature’s adoption of Article 20 D and now in light of Wilkins as well as the unanimity among the Mahler panel members as to the scope of the prohibition set forth in the article, we discern no basis to deviate from their expression of the import and application of Article 20 D in a killing which occurred after its effective date. Thus, the trial court’s jury instructions comport neither with the directive of Article 20 D or controlling precedent.
Accordingly, we find that the jury instructions which directed or authorized the jurors to consider the possibility of the defendant’s retreat in determining whether the killing was necessary were not merely confusing but also legally erroneous.

Wells, 11-0744, p. 23-24, 156 So.3d at 165 (footnote omitted).

Correctly recognizing that “harmless-error analysis applies to instructional errors so long as the error at issue does not categorically ‘vitiat[e] all the jury’s findings’ ”, Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61, 129 S.Ct. 530, 532, 172 L.Ed.2d 388 (2008) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 11, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1834, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) and quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993)), the court of appeal found it could not declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in providing conflicting instructions on the duty to retreat was harmless. Specifically, the court of appeal found, in light of the prosecutor’s repeated references to the possibility of retreat, that any confusion experienced by jurors as a result of the conflicting instructions was likely resolved in favor of believing the possibility of retreat was a consideration in determining whether the use of deadly force was reasonable. See Wells, 11-0744, p. 31, 156 So.3d at 169. Based on factual ^discrepancies in the testimony regarding whether the victim brandished his handgun or not, the court of appeal found if the jury had not been instructed, contrary to La.R.S. 14:20(D), that they could consider the possibility defendant could retreat rather than use deadly force, then they might have found defendant acted reasonably in shooting the victim. See Wells, 11-0744, p. 32, 156 So.3d at 169-70.

One member of the panel (Landrieu, J.) dissented on the basis that defendant was engaged in the unlawful act of attempting to buy marijuana when he shot the victim, and the 2006 amendment to La.R.S. 14:20 clearly distinguishes between persons who are engaged in lawful and unlawful activities. The dissent noted that the legislature in La.R.S. 14:20(C) declared that a person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat before using deadly force. Likewise, in the closely related provision of La.R.S. 14:20(D), the legislature prohibited a finder of fact from considering the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether the person who used deadly force in accordance with Section C acted reasonably. See Wells, 11-0744, p. 1-2, 156 So.3d at 170 (Landrieu, J., dissenting) (“Because these individuals do not have a duty to retreat, it makes sense that the legislature also included in the 2006 amendment a provision prohibiting a jury and/or judge from considering the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether the use of deadly force by such an individual was reasonable and therefore justifiable as self-defense.”). Thus, the dissent would find in the present case, in which defendant admitted he was engaged in an unlawful act, that La.R.S. 14:20(D) did not prohibit jurors from considering whether defendant could have retreated in determining whether he acted reasonably in resorting |sto deadly force, and therefore the trial court did not err in instructing the jury.

We granted the state’s application to review the correctness of the ruling of the court of appeal. Finding the court of appeal erred for the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for consideration of defendant’s remaining assignments of error.

The 2006 amendment originated as H.B. 89, which, according to its digest, proposed amending La.R.S. 14:19 (pertaining to use of force or violence in defense) and La.R.S. 14:20 (pertaining to justifiable homicide) to make three changes to the law. First, the bill would establish “a presumption that a person lawfully inside a dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle held a reasonable belief that the use of force or violence or deadly force was necessary to prevent unlawful entry thereto, or to compel an unlawful intruder to leave the premises or motor vehicle”, when two conditions are met:

(1) The person against whom the force or violence was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.
(2) The person who used force or violence knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had occurred.

Second, according to the digest, the bill would create a right to stand one’s ground by providing that “a person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall have no duty to retreat before using force, violence, or deadly force and may stand his or her ground and meet force with force.” Third, the bill would provide “immunity from criminal prosecution for use of force or justifiable homicide when force is used pursuant to proposed law.” The bill was amended in the House | flCommittee on the Administration of Criminal Justice to replace immunity from prosecution with provisions prohibiting a finder of fact from considering the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether the person who used force or violence or deadly force did so reasonably.

A National Rifle Association spokesperson addressed the House Committee on April 19, 2006, in support of the bill. In response to questioning, the spokesperson clarified that, although the proposed presumption would apply only when a person who is lawfully inside his or her dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, is threatened by an intruder, a person would be relieved of the duty to retreat under the proposed law (by the provision that would prohibit a finder of fact from considering the possibility of retreat) wherever he or she may be threatened, provided the person threatened is lawfully present there and not engaged in unlawful | inactivity. In response to questioning whether this latter aspect of the law would be too broad an extension of the traditional “castle doctrine” beyond the confines of the home that would result in a “Wild West” scenario, both the spokesperson and the bill’s sponsor emphasized that the scope of the proposed law is substantially restricted by the requirement that a person be engaged in lawful activity and be in a place where he or she has a right to be. The spokesperson and the bill’s sponsor each reiterated that, under the proposed law, the use of force must 'still be reasonable and apparently necessary. The spokesperson emphasized that a woman who is engaged in lawful activity and present where she has the right to be, whether inside her home or on the street, should not have to engage in a different mental calculation, depending on where she is assaulted, in deciding to defend herself.

This legislative history lends support to this Court’s previous determination in State v. Wilkins, 13-2539, pp. 1-2 (La.1/15/14), 131 So.3d 839-40, that:

[T]he effect of the 2006 La. Acts 141, amending La.R.S. 14:20 and adding subsections C and D to the statute, was two-fold: a person may choose to defend himself or herself with deadly force under the circumstances defined in R.S. 14:20(A), without considering whether retreat or escape is possible, i.e., a person “may stand his or her ground and meet force with force” (C); and he or she may do so without fear that, if it came to it, a jury may nevertheless second guess the decision not to flee from the encounter in assessing whether the use of deadly force was justified (D). The overall effect of the 2006 amendments was thus to supplant a jurisprudential rule so deeply entrenched in Louisiana law that some decisions continue to adhere to it to this day. See, e.g., State v. Vedol, 12-0376, p. 7 (La.App. 6 Cir. 3/13/13), 113 So.3d 1119, 1124 (“[T]his Court has continued to 11 recognize that while there is no unqualified duty to retreat from an altercation, the possibility of escape is a recognized factor in determining whether or not a defendant had a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to avoid the danger/’) (citation omitted).

This Court also found in Wilkins, 13-2539, p. 2, 131 So.3d at 840, that Section D’s provision that “[n]o finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used deadly force had a reasonable belief that deadly force was reasonable and apparently necessary,” cannot be detached from Section C, which permits only those persons “who [are] not engaged in unlawful activity and who [are] in a place where [they have] a right to be” to stand their ground (which finding is also consistent with the legislative history described above). Thus, this Court found that “[t]o the extent that subsection D effectuates the right conferred by Subsection C on an individual to ‘stand his or her ground’ without weighing the possibility of escape or retreat before responding with deadly force, an unqualified right that did not exist previously in Louisiana, the two subsections work in tandem, not separately, to make a substantive change in the law because they directly impact not only how trials are conducted, and how juries may be instructed, but also how individuals may conduct themselves when confronted with situations that they perceive, reasonably or not, to present an imminent threat to their own lives.” Wilkins, 13-2539, p. 2-3, 131 So.3d at 840. Thus, the dissent in the present case suggests the majority erred in considering in isolation rather than in tandem the prohibition against a jury considering the possibility of retreat, established in Section D, from the restrictions on the right to stand one’s ground, provided in Section C. See Wells, 11-0744, p. 3, 156 So.3d at 172 (“In essence, the majority finds that subsection D ‘stands alone,’ such 112that it is not qualified by subsection C ... or by any of the preceding subsections of the statute.”). In light of the legislative history and Wilkins, the dissent is correct in that assessment.

Given that several versions of the shooting were presented through the testimonies of eyewitnesses, it is difficult to conclude that the jury instruction described above is in error. Various witnesses claimed: defendant was the aggressor; he was not the aggressor; the victim brandished a weapon; the victim did not brandish a weapon; defendant briefly left after attempting unsuccessfully to purchase marijuana; and defendant did not leave after attempting unsuccessfully to purchase marijuana. The trial court, obligated by La.C.Cr.P. art. 802(1) to charge the jury on the law applicable to the case, including “every phase of the case supported by the evidence whether or not accepted by [her] as true”, State v. Marse, 365 So.2d 1319, 1323 (1978), provided a lengthy instruction that was likely intended to cover each of these different versions of the incident. The instruction was not ideal, however, and, as noted by the court of appeal contained apparently contradictory elements. It might have been better tailored to guide the jury |13in determining what portions of the instruction applied to the different scenarios presented at trial. Nonetheless, because defendant admitted he shot the victim while engaged in the unlawful activity of an attempted narcotics purchase, the court of appeal erred in finding the instruction was erroneous on the basis that La.R.S. 14:20(D) prohibits jurors from considering the possibility of retreat in evaluating the reasonableness of defendant’s violent response.

As noted above, harmless-error analysis applies to instructional errors so long as the error at issue does not categorically vitiate all the jury’s findings. For example, in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-10, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1833-34, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), the Supreme Court determined that “an instruction that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence”, and therefore such error is subject to harmless-error analysis. Earlier, that court had determined that when a jury was incorrectly instructed to presume malice in violation of the rule of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) the error is subject to harmless-error analysis. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 581-83, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3107-09, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). Citing Rose v. Clark, the Supreme Court in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1922-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987), found that the error in instructing a jury to use a state community standard in considering whether magazines were utterly without redeeming social value (and therefore obscene) was subject to harmless-error analysis. If harmless-error analysis applies in those instances, then a forti-ori it applies here.

Under the harmless-error test of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the question is whether it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828; see also State v. Gibson, 391 So.2d 421, 426-27 (La.1980). In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), the Supreme Court clarified that the inquiry “is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Id., 508 U.S. at 279, 113 S.Ct. at 2081; see also State v.Code, 627 So.2d 1373, 1384 (La.1993).

In the present case, although the jury instruction had room for improvement and there was some potential for confusion, the confusion was to defendant’s benefit. Notably, he, as a person who admitted he was engaged in an attempted narcotics transaction, received the benefit of an instruction informing the jury they could not consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether he had a reasonable belief that deadly force was reasonable and apparently necessary, in accordance with La.R.S. 14:20(D), although he was not entitled to that instruction by operation of La.R.S. 14:20(C) because he was engaged in unlawful activity. Cf. United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 832-33 (10th Cir.2008) (“Even if 11 stile instruction were erroneous, however, Mr. Pinson’s claim still must fail. Even if the instructions did delve into his subjective intent to carry out the threat, this was an added burden placed on the government. It required the government to prove an additional element, namely, Mr. Pinson’s actual intention when he made the threats. An incorrect instruction that is beneficial to the defendant is generally not considered prejudicial.”) (citing Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 82 S.Ct. 302, 7 L.Ed.2d 256 (1961)); United States v. White, 972 F.2d 590, 596 (5th Cir.1992) (“The fact that the district court gave the lesser included instruction on Count 1 does not change our opinion. The defendants were not entitled to that instruction. The defendants therefore got a more generous instruction than they were entitled to on the first Count of the indictment. That did not require the trial court to grant them an overly generous instruction on Count 2. Admittedly, the inconsistency in instructing on the lesser included verdict on Count One and declining that instruction on Count 2 created some confusion. But if that confusion had any effect on the verdict it was beneficial to the defendants.”); Coleman v. United States, 367 F.2d 388, 388 (9th Cir.1966) (“Similarly, his cautionary instruction concerning testimony of an accomplice was proper, for the jury might have considered the government’s witness Hunter, who wrote the holdup note, a participant in the crime. But even if abstract, the instruction was beneficial rather than harmful to defendants.”). Thus, we agree with the dissent’s determination that the verdict of guilty of manslaughter was surely not attributable to the disputed portion of the jury instruction and the jury charge as a whole was not prejudicial to defendant. See Wells, 11-0744, pp. 10-11, 156 So.3d at 175-76 (Landrieu, J., dissenting).

11fiAccordingly, the ruling of the court of appeal is reversed and the matter is remanded for consideration of defendant’s remaining assignments of error.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

      . The original Sections D of La.R.S. 14:19 and 14:20 proposed in the bill were identical:
      A person who uses force or violence as provided for by this Section is immune from criminal prosecution for the use of force or violence.
      The amendments replaced those Sections D with the following:
      AMENDMENT NO. 1
      On page 2, delete lines 10 through 14 in their entirety and insert in lieu thereof the following:
      ‘‘[La.R.S. 14:19] D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used force or violence in defense of his person or property had a reasonable belief that force or violence was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent a forcible offense or to prevent the unlawful entry.”
      AMENDMENT NO. 2
      On page 4, delete lines 3 through 8 in their entirety and insert in lieu thereof the following:
      “[La.R.S. 14:20] D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used deadly force had a reasonable belief that deadly force was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent a violent or forcible felony involving life or great bodily harm or to prevent the unlawful entry.”

      . Thus, a distinction was drawn by the bill’s sponsor between a situation in which an attacker ceases the attack, surrenders, and places his gun on the floor (implying a violent response may no longer be reasonable or necessary) from that in which a person is threatened with a gun and has to gamble (under pre-amendment law) on whether escape will be judged in hindsight to have been a viable option.

      . The Supreme Court in Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 82 S.Ct. 302, 7 L.Ed.2d 256 (1961), in a case involving a defendant charged with making a false statement regarding his Communist Party affiliation, rejected a defendant's claim that the jury instruction defining affiliation was fatally flawed because of its contradictory and confusing nature:
      Petitioner argues that because the first paragraph of the instruction stated that affiliation ‘means a relationship short of and less than membership in the Communist Party, but more than that of mere sympathy for the aims and objectives of the Communist Party,' and the third paragraph of the instruction stated that 'affiliation ... means a relationship which is equivalent or equal to that of membership in all but name,’ it was contradictory and confusing. We agree that the third paragraph appears inconsistent with the first. However, it is evident that the erroneous third paragraph could not have prejudiced petitioner for it, though inconsistent with the correct first paragraph, exacted a higher standard of proof of affiliation than the law required.
      Petitioner, quite understandably, would require instructions as specific as mathematical formulas. But such specificity often is impossible, The phrases 'member of' and 'affiliated with,’ especially when applied to the relationship between persons and organizations that conceal their connection, cannot be defined in absolute terms. The most that is possible, and hence all that can be expected, is that the trial court shall give the juty a fair statement of the issues — i.e,, whether petitioner was a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party on the date of his affidavit — give a reasonable definition of the terms and outline the various criteria, shown in the evidence, which the jury may consider in determining the ultimate issues. We believe that the instructions in this case, which are consistent with all the judicial precedents under § 9(h), adequately met those tests.

        Killian, 368 U.S. at 257-58, 82 S.Ct. at 317.