author: WINDHORST, J.

text:
    UNITED PROFESSIONALS COMPANY, et al. v. Ramsey F. SKIPPER; R.E.A.L. Development, LLC; Go-Graphics, LLC, Go-Graphics Of New Orleans, LLC; and Go-Graphics of Shreveport, LLC
    NO. 17-CA-425
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    September 15, 2017

      COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, UNITED PROFESSIONALS COMPANY, LLC, SISUNG CAPITAL, LLC, AND LAWRENCE J. SISUNG, JR., William Peter Connick, Bryan C. Reu-ter, Elizabeth S. Horn
    Panel composed of Judges Robert M. Murphy, Stephen J. Windhorst, and Hans J. Liljeberg
   WINDHORST, J.

| Appellants, United Professionals Company, LLC (UPC), Sisung Capital, LLC (Sisung Capital), and Lawrence J. Sisung, Jr. (Sisung), appeal the trial court’s February 16, 2017 judgment denying their exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action as to defendant Go-Graphics of New Orleans’ (GG New Orleans) reconven-tional demand, and further denying in part and granting in part, an exception of no right of action to relators’ claims in the petition in favor of defendants, Ramsey F. Skipper (Skipper), Go-Graphics, L.L.C. (GG), R.E.A.L. Development, LLC (REAL), Go-Graphics of New Orleans (GG New Orleans), and Go-Graphics of Shreveport, LLC (GG Shreveport) (collectively Skipper defendants) For the reasons that follow, we find this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction because this is not a final, ap-pealable judgment. We dismiss this appeal without prejudice, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

Facts

On May 4, 2016, appellants filed a petition for dissolution, judgment on debts, damages, and declaratory relief against the Skipper defendants alleging the improper use of the assets of multiple limited liability companies by the indirect fifty-percent owner, Skipper. On June 16, 2016, the Skipper defendants filed an exception of no right of action, answer, and recon-ventional demand. In response to the re-conventional demand, appellants filed exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action. On February 16, 2017, the trial court denied appellants’ exceptions and denied in part and granted in part the Skipper defendants’ exception of no right of action.

On March 22, 2017, appellants filed a notice of intent to apply for supervisory writs from the February 16, 2017 judgment. Appellants filed their writ applieation |2with this Court on March 23, 2017. On May 2, 2017, appellants also filed a motion to appeal the February 16, 2017 judgment.

Discussion

The denial of an exception by the trial court is not appealable. La. C.C.P. art. 1915. The February 16, 2017 judgment denying the exceptions filed by appellants and the Skipper defendants is an interlocutory judgment not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction. However, interlocutory judgments are reviewable on appeal when a final judgment has been rendered. Trust for Melba Margaret Schwegmann v. Schwegmann Family Trust, 09-0968 (La. App. 5 Cir. 09/14/10), 51 So.3d 737, 742, writ denied, 07-1094 (La. 09/21/07), 964 So.2d 333. Here, the judgment on appeal also granted in part an exception of no right of action. Thus, it is necessary to determine if the partial grant of appellees’ exception of no right of action was a final judgment.

Before considering the merits in any appeal, appellate courts have the duty to determine sua sponte whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Input/Output Marine Sys. v. Wilson Greatbatch Techs., Inc., 10-477 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/10), 52 So.3d 909, 915. A valid final judgment must contain decretal language, and it must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the specific relief that is granted or denied. See La. C.C.P. art. 1981; Morraz-Blandon v. Voiron, 16-112 (La. App. 5 Cir. 08/25/16), 199 So.3d 1220, 1222; Claiborne Medical Corp. v. Siddiqui, 12-759 (La. App. 5 Cir. 02/28/13), 113 So.3d 1109, 1112. The specific relief granted or denied should be determinable from the judgment itself without reference to an extrinsic source such as pleadings or reasons for judgment. Input/Output Marine Sys., 52 So.3d at 916.

|Jn this case, the specific ■ relief granted in the February 16, 2017 judgment cannot be determined from the judgment itself. The judgment only references specific paragraphs of plaintiffs’ petition without specifying the specific relief.

Furthermore, a partial final judgment is not. appealable “unless it is designated as a final judgment by the 'court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” La. C.C.P. art. 1915 B(l), The written judgment contains no determination and designation by the trial court that this partial judgment was final for purposes of immediate appeal pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915 B(l).

Because the trial court rendered a partial judgment as to less than all of the claims of the parties, the judgment does not state the specific relief granted, and this partial judgment has not been designated as a final judgment by the trial court after an express determination that there is no. just reason for delay, the February 16, 2017 judgment is not a final judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1915, and is not appealable as one “... in which appeals are given by law” under La. C.C.P. art. 2083. Claiborne, 113 So.3d at 1112.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we dismiss appellants’ appeal without prejudice, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

APPEAL DISMISSED; REMANDED

      . A disposition on this writ application was rendered by this Court on September 1, 2017. United Professionals Company, LLC v. Skipper, 17-169 (La. App. 5 Cir. 09/01/17) (unpublished writ disposition).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE,

license: Public Domain

text:
    David JACKSON a/k/a David Donnell Jackson v. STATE of Mississippi
    NO. 2015-CT-00521-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    03/16/2017
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DAVID JACKSON (PRO SE)
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. David Jackson, pro se, appealed from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his Motion for Transcripts and Records. The Court of Appeals dismissed Jackson’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On certiorari review, we find the Court of Appeals correctly recognized the issue was lack of subject matter, jurisdiction. But it was the trial court that lacked jurisdiction, not the appellate court. So we modify the Court of Appeals’ disposition and affirm.

DISCUSSION

¶ 2. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Jackson’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and sentence, as a habitual offender, to thirty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Jackson v. State, 778 So.2d 786, 790 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

¶ 3. Jackson filed his motion for records and transcripts in the trial court on February 23, 2015. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that Jackson was not entitled to discovery. Jackson timely appealed the order, and the Court of Appeals, relying on Fleming v. State, 553 So.2d 505 (Miss. 1989), dismissed, the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Jackson v. State, 2016 WL 1738925 (Miss. Ct. App. May 3, 2016).

¶ 4. Fleming, however, is distinguishable insofar as Fleming was convicted by way of a guilty plea. As such, he was required to file his motion for post-conviction relief in the trial court. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2015). But instead of filing a motion for post-conviction relief, he filed an independent action in the trial court, seeking records and transcripts. Fleming, 553 So.2d at 505-06. The trial court denied the motion because “Fleming ‘failed to show a basis or need.’ ” Id. at 506.

¶ 5. On direct appeal, the Fleming Court stated that a prisoner who has filed a proper motion pursuant to the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, which has survived summary dismissal under Section 99-39-11(2) of the Mississippi Code, “may be entitled to trial transcripts or other relevant documents under the discovery provisions of [section] 99-39-15, upon good cause shown ....” Id. While a prisoner may appeal the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief, and therein include a claim for records and transcripts, the Fleming Court held:

[N]othing in the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act or elsewhere gives a prisoner the right to institute an independent, original action for a free transcript or other documents, and then if dissatisfied with the trial court’s ruling, to directly appeal that ruling to this court as a separate and independent action. Fleming did not file his request for free transcript and other documents as part of a motion under the Act for post-conviction collateral relief, nor is this claim raised as part of a direct appeal from conviction. Therefore, this appeal should be dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction.

Id. Stated otherwise, because appellate courts lack jurisdiction over post-conviction motions which derive from guilty pleas, and Fleming’s request for records and transcripts should have been part of such a motion, the Fleming Court dismissed that appeal for want of jurisdiction.

¶ 6. Unlike the defendant in Fleming, Jackson did not enter a guilty plea, and he appealed his conviction and sentence. See Jackson, 778 So.2d at 787. Therefore, Jackson must seek leave of this Court before filing a motion for post-conviction relief. Until he does so, the trial court is without jurisdiction to entertain such matters. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2015). Here, Jackson filed only a motion for records and transcripts in the trial court. The trial court should have dismissed Jackson’s motion for records and transcripts for want of jurisdiction rather than denying it on the merits. Further, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the trial court’s dismissal on that basis.

CONCLUSION

¶ 7. Accordingly, we find that the correct result was reached, as Jackson is not entitled to a free copy of the records and transcripts. But the trial court should have dismissed Jackson’s motion for records and transcripts and the Court of Appeals should have recognized its jurisdiction to affirm that ruling.

¶ 8. AFFIRMED.

DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Final judgments from which a timely notice of appeal is filed confer jurisdiction upon the appellate courts to consider the lawfulness of the trial court's disposition. M.R.A.P. 4. In this case, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court had entered a proper disposition on Jackson's motion.


author: GREENLEE, J.,

text:
    Belynthia ROSS, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi Appellee
    NO. 2016-KA-00321-COA
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    08/22/2017
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHRISTOPHER A. TABB
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LISA L. BLOUNT
    BEFORE IRVING, P.J., ISHEE AND GREENLEE, JJ.
   GREENLEE, J.,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Belynthia Ross appeals her conviction in Rankin County Circuit Court of simple assault of a vulnerable adult. She asserts that (1) her indictment was fatally defective because two headings that originally read “Madison” County were stricken and overwritten with “Rankin,” (2) the indictment erroneously lists the grand-jury foreman as that of the “Madison” County Grand Jury, not “Rankin,” and (3) simple assault of a vulnerable adult is not a felony. We affirm.

¶ 2. Ross was indicted on June 4, 2015. On November 16, 2015, Ross moved to quash the indictment because “it did not contain the notarized signature of the Foreman of the Rankin County, Mississippi Grand Jury.” On November 23, 2015, the circuit - court heard argument on the motion. The circuit court considered the references to “Madison” County and determined that they were a scrivener’s error. Trial counsel for .the State admitted that she noticed the error prior to filing the indictment with the circuit clerk. She corrected the error by striking out “Madison” and writing “Rankin” over it. She also placed her initials next to the changes. After conferring with the clerk and reviewing the court’s records, the circuit court confirmed that the foreman who signed the indictment was the actual foreman for the Rankin County Grand Jury during the January 2015 term .(the same term in which Ross was indicted). The circuit court then made a finding on the record that the signature was in fact that of the foreman for the Rankin County Grand Jury, and when asked if there was still “[a]ny dispute about that[,]” Ross’s counsel replied, “No, Judge.” The circuit court also determined that the indictment did give the county in which the indictment was brought with the scrivener’s error and correction by the State. At trial, Ross was found guilty of simple'assault of a vulnerable adult” and sentenced to five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.

¶ 3, Ross does not now dispute that the foreman who signed the indictment was the foreman for the Rankin County Grand Jury. Rather, she asserts that her indictment was “deficient on the face and does not meet the requirements as set forth” because the (1) incorrect county was listed in two headings of the indictment, (2) the incorrect county was listed for the grand-jury foreman, and (3) the circuit clerk listed was for the wrong county.

¶ 4. Although it was slipshod to use a form indictment listing Madison County for a proceeding in Rankin County, the circuit court under these facts was correct that listing the incorrect county is nothing more than a harmless scrivener’s error. See Barnes v. State, 51 So.3d 986, 989-90 (¶ 12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Secondly, listing the incorrect circuit clerk was also a harmless scrivener’s error, more precisely, a typographical error. The indictment is file-stamped and seal-stamped exclusively by the Rankin County Circuit Clerk, and the'' typo was stricken with' the correct circuit clerk’s name substituted.

¶ 5. Notwithstanding those harmless errors, the county in which, the indictment was brought must be included in the indictment. URCCC 7.06. But “[t]he major purpose of an indictment is to furnish the accused such a description of the charges against [her] as will enable [her] to adequately prepare [her] defense.” Campbell v. State, 749 So.2d 1208, 1210 (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). And “[s]o long as. a fair reading of the indictment, taken as a whole, clearly describes the nature and cause of the charge against the accused, the indictment is legally sufficient.” Farris v. State, 764 So.2d 411, 421 (¶ 20) (Mis?. 2000). Here, the body of the, indictment alleged the crime occurred in Rankin County, and Ross does not dispute that she was indicted in Rankin County. We find the circuit court was correct in finding that the indictment sufficiently stated the correct county in which the indictment was brought. We find this issue is without merit.

¶ 6, Lastly, Ross reasserts that the trial court erred in finding her guilty of “Felony Simple Assault of a Vulnerable Adult as charged in the indictment” in its written final order, because the crime she was charged with is not a felony. But it is. See State v. Hawkins, 145 So.3d 636, 641 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2014) (“[S]imple assault of a vulnerable person ... is in fact a felony.”). The issue is without merit.

¶ 7. Ross’s conviction of simple assault of a vulnerable adult and sentence of five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections are affirmed.

¶ 8. AFFIRMED.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.

      . The Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court relative to criminal practice were recently replaced by the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective July 1, 2017, But because the former rules were in effect at the relevant time, Rule 7.06 applies to Ross’s case. .


author: LEE, C.J.,

text:
    Jasprell DILLARD, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
    NO. 2016-KA-01066-COA
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    9/12/2017
    OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: W. DANIEL HIN-CHCLIFF, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT.
    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE.
    BEFORE LEE, C.J., ISHEE AND FAIR, JJ.
   LEE, C.J.,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Jasprell Dillard, was convicted by a jury in the Bolivar County-Circuit Court, Second Judicial District, of aggravated assault with a firearm and sentenced to serve fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with an additional, consecutive five-year sentence for the firearm enhancement, and five years’ probation.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On April 12, 2014, a little after midnight, Joshua Hampton was driving slowly down Martin Luther King Drive in Shaw, Mississippi, when he was shot. Hampton was hit in the neck .and grazed on his arm. He crashed into a car on the side of the road, and a .passerby told him he had been shot and to not move. Hampton told the officers responding .to - the scene that it was Dillard who had shot him. Hampton .was then taken by helicopter to a hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, where he spent at least four months recovering.

¶ 3. Trial took place on June 8, 2016. Hampton testified, that earlier that evening, prior to the shooting, he had been with Raneisha Early. Early had a child with Dillard, and Hampton testified that Dillard did not know Early was involved with Hampton. Hampton stated that he was driving his cousin’s car that evening, and it had been parked outside of Early’s house. Hampton testified that after leaving Early’s house, he saw Marchello Gardner and Dillard on the street. Hampton testified that he knew both Gardner and Dillard. Gardner crossed the street, and Dillard remained on the left side of the street, on the driver’s side of Hampton’s car. Hampton stated that Dillard was standing under a streetlight, and when he turned and looked at Dillard, Dillard started shooting at him.

¶ 4. Investigator Michael Williams with the Bolivar County Sheriffs Department testified that he responded to the scene at the request of the Shaw Police Department. He took numerous photographs that depicted multiple bullet holes in the car. Investigator Williams testified that one of the police officers on the scene had given him Dillard’s name as the suspect. Additionally, Investigator Williams testified that he interviewed Hampton at the hospital and that Hampton stated that Dillard had shot him. During trial, Hampton showed the jury scars on his arm and neck from the shooting. Additionally, Hampton identified Dillard in court as the person who had shot him. The jury found Dillard guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a firearm. Dillard now appeals, and his appellate counsel has filed a brief-pursuant to Lindsey v. State, 939 So.2d 743 (Miss. 2005).

DISCUSSION

¶ 5. On appeal, where the appellant’s counsel does not find any arguable issues for review, the Mississippi Supreme Court has instructed that:

(1) Counsel must file and serve a brief in compliance with Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(l)-[ (5), (8) ].
(2) As part of the brief filed in compliance with Rule 28, counsel must certify that there are no arguable issues supporting the client’s appeal, and he or she has reached this conclusion after scouring the record thoroughly, specifically examining:
(a) the reason for the arrest and the circumstances surrounding arrest;
(b) any possible violations of the client’s right to counsel;
(c) the entire trial transcript;
(d) all rulings of the trial court;
(e) possible prosecutorial misconduct;
(f) all jury instructions; '
(g) all exhibits, whether admitted into evidence or not; and
(h) possible misapplication of the law in sentencing.
(3) Counsel must then send a copy of the appellate brief to the defendant, inform the client that counsel could find no arguable issues in the record, and advise the client of his or her right to file a pro se brief.
(4) Should the defendant then raise any arguable issue or should the appellate court discover any arguable issue in its review of the record, the court must, if circumstances warrant, require appellate counsel to submit supplemental briefing on the issue, regardless of the probability of the defendant’s success on appeal.
(5) Once briefing is complete, the appellate court must consider the case on its merits and render a decision.

Windless v. State, 167 So.3d 277, 278 (¶ 5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Lindsey, 939 So.2d at 748 (¶ 18)).

¶6. Here, Dillard’s appellate counsel complied with the requirements set forth in Lindsey. After examining the record, he found no arguable issues for appeal. Dillard’s counsel sent a copy of the Lindsey brief to Dillard, advising him that he found no arguable issues in the record and also informing Dillard that he had the right to file a pro se supplemental brief. This Court granted Dillard an additional forty days to file a pro se brief, which Dillard has failed to do. Our independent review of the record has not revealed any arguable issues that would require supplemental briefing. Accordingly, we affirm Dillard’s conviction and sentence.

¶ 7. AFFIRMED.

IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.


author: BARNES, J.,

text:
    PREMIER ENTERTAINMENT BILOXI, LLC d/b/a Hard Rock Hotel & Casino, Appellant v. P.T.E. SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Appellee
    NO. 2016-CA-01282-COA
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    09/12/2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JAMES JOSEPH CRONGEYER JR., MICHAEL W. ULMER
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: THOMAS LYNN CARPENTER'JR.
    BEFORE LEE, C.J., BARNES AND WESTBROOKS, JJ.
   BARNES, J.,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. After several post-tension cables failed during construction of- the Hard Rock Hotel and Casino, the general contractor, Roy Anderson Corporation (Anderson), submitted a. claim for costs associated with the cable failure to the insurance company for Premier Entertainment Biloxi LLC d/b/a/ Hard Rock Hotel & Casino (Premier). Having failed to receive reimbursement, Anderson filed an action for breach of contract against Premier in Harrison County Circuit Court, Second Judicial District. The action alleged that Premier was contractually required to purchase and maintain a, builder’s “all-risk” insurance and was liable for costs not covered by insurance. Anderson sought over a million dollars in damages and costs attributable to. the cable failure. Premier denied liability, and filed a third-party action against P.T.E. Systems International, LLC (PTE), the cable supplier, asserting claims of common-law indemnity, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness, products liability, -and breach of express warranty. PTE filed a motion to dismiss, which the circuit court granted, concluding there existed no “implied contractual indemnity” against PTE for Anderson’s claims. On appeal, we find the court erred in granting PTE’s motion to dismiss.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Premier and Anderson entered into a contract, which provided that materials for the Hard Rock construction project would be purchased under an “owner direct purchase program” that exempted Premier from a 3.5% contractor’s tax. Although Premier purchased the construction materials, Anderson selected, utilized, and installed the materials. Under the general provisions of the contract, Premier agreed to purchase and maintain a builder’s “all-risk” insurance policy and to be liable for losses “not fully compensated by insurance.” “Section 11.3.1—Property Insurance” provided:

The Owner shall purchase and maintain, in a company or companies lawfully authorized to do business in the jurisdiction in which the Project ,is located, property insurance written on a builder’s risk “all-risk” or equivalent policy form in the amount of the initial Contract Sum, plus value of subsequent Contract Modifications and cost of materials supplied or installed by others, comprising total value for the entire Project at the site on a replacement costs basis without optional deduetibles. .... It is understood and agreed that Owner is bearing all risk of loss to the property for which Owner has an insurable or financial interest during construction, and in the event of a loss during construction!,] Owner agrees to look solely to the proceeds of the Builder’s Risk Insurance which Owner has agreed to furnish. ... If Contractor is damaged by the failure or neglect of Owner to purchase or maintain insurance as described above, without so notifying Contractor in writing, then Owner shall bear all reasonable costs properly attributable thereto.
As regards any loss or damage which is of a type covered by insurance actually obtained by the Owner or which would have been covered by insurance that the Owner could have but failed to obtain, the Owner shall be liable to the Contractor to the extent such loss is not fully compensated by insurancé, whether as a result of policy deductibles, exclusions, lapse of coverage, gaps in coverage, coverage limits, inadequacy of coverage, or other reason which causes the loss to be uninsured, in whole or in part.

¶ 3. During construction in 2013, at least eighteen PTE 270.KSI post-tensioned cables failed below the rated and specified strength of the cables, resulting, in repair costs of $1,629,977. Anderson notified Premier of the cable-breaking incidents on August ‘23, 2013, and later provided a statement of property loss and damages. On January 30, 2015, Anderson sent Premier a letter asserting a claim on the builder’s risk insurance for “losses and damages related to the Broken Post Tension Cables!.]” On February 27, 2015, Anderson submitted a claim to Integro Insurance Brokers, requesting reimbursement of $1,629,977 for the “direct physical loss and damage to property” as a result of the failed post-tension cables. The insurance adjuster, Vericlaim, investigated the claim and, in a report dated November 10, 2015, acknowledged Anderson was a named insured under the builder’s risk policy, but also noted that “the adjustment team ha[d] yet to establish whether significant delay/impact claim was incurred by the Insured as a result of this event.” Premier was listed as the “Insured” in the letter. The report further stated: “At this stage, we are keeping an open mind as to whether subrogation will be a factor in the adjustment of the claim.”

¶4. On November 23, 2015, Anderson sued Premier for the breach of contract, claiming that under the contract’s general conditions Premier was responsible for the costs associated with the cable breakage because it was required “either (A) to obtain ‘all risk’ builder’s risk insurance or (B) to be liable to [Anderson] for any loss not fully compensated by such insurance.” The complaint alleged Premier had breached its contractual obligations as it “ha[d] neither (a) produced insurance coverage for the property loss suffered by [Anderson,] nor (b) compensated [Anderson] for its property loss.”

¶ 5. In its answer, Premier denied there was a breach of contract since it had obtained the required “all-risk” insurance and counterclaimed that Anderson was responsible for all workmanship and materials under the terms of the contract, entitling Premier to “indemnity for [Anderson’s] claim” arising from the cable work. On March 22, 2016, Premier filed an “Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint” under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 14 and, on March 31, 2016, Premier filed a third-party complaint against PTE, the cable supplier, alleging claims of common-law indemnity, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness, products liability, and breach of express warranty. Premier argued that its liability was “entirely derivative of the conduct of PTE [.] ”

¶ 6. PTE filed a motion to dismiss under Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 14, contending that because Anderson’s claim against Premier concerns its failure to act, i.e., “procure insurance to address this risk,” the action against PTE should be dismissed “for improper third party practice.” The circuit court granted PTE’s motion and entered a final judgment of dismissal in its favor, concluding:

[Anderson] has alleged a breach of contract by [Premier], The alleged breach is the failure to obtain adequate “all risk” builders insurance. ... Whether the insurance purchased covers this loss is not the question. Who was “negligent” is not the question. The question is whether the fact that [Anderson] has not been compensated for the loss is a breach of the contract between it and [Premier]. ... [Anderson] is not suing [Premier] for the failure of the cables, but for failing to insure the project. ... The simple breach of contract is not a tort and while the contract may impose the contractual duty to indemnify on a party, the contract does not give rise to an action for implied indemnity under the facts presented here.

On appeal, Premier submits that the circuit court erred in granted PTE’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

Whether the circuit court erred in granting PTE’s motion to dismiss.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 7. The circuit judge granted PTE’s motion to dismiss under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, noting that a 12(b)(6) motion “tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint” and, assuming Premier’s allegations are true, requires a determination “whether there is any set of facts pled that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” A circuit court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. Breeden v. Buchanan, 164 So.3d 1057, 1060 (¶ 13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Ralph Walker Inc. v. Gallagher, 926 So.2d 890, 893 (¶3) (Miss. 2006)). This Court is “not required to defer to the trial court’s judgment or ruling.” Id. (quoting Gallagher, 926 So.2d at 893 (¶ 4)). For this Court to affirm a grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it must be such that “no set of facts would entitle [the opposing party] to relief.” Lowe v. Lowndes Cty. Bldg. Inspection Dept., 760 So.2d 711, 712 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2000). Premier claims PTE failed to “meet this very high standard.”

¶ 8. Counsel for PTE argued at the motion hearing that it “filed [the motion] under Rule 12(b)(6) because that’s the procedural key to get the Court to discuss and to deal with the Rule 14 issue[.]” PTE argues on appeal, however, that the “appropriate standard of review would arise under Rule 14,” stating that it “is not whether Premier can assert a set of facts entitling them to relief [but] ... whether the [circuit] court abused its discretion in determining whether Premier’s allegations of common-law indemnity and warranty claims meet the requirements imposed under Rule 14 for valid third party claims.” Regardless of whether we review this appeal under the stricter de novo standard of Rule 12(b)(6) as Premier asserts, or the abuse-of-discretion standard argued by PTE, we find the circuit court’s dismissal of Premier’s third-party complaint was error.

B. Analysis of Premier’s Claims

¶ 9. Premier contends that its “indemnity claim and also separate warranty claims, along with other claims against PTE for the failed cables, .... are proper third party claims under Rule 14,” which provides:

After commencement of the action and upon being so authorized by the court in which the action is pending on motion and for good cause shown, a defending party may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to [it] for all or a part of the plaintiffs claim[.]”

M.R.C.P. 14(a) (emphasis added). The advisory-committee note to Rule 14 explains:

It is essential that the third-party claim be for some form of derivative or secondary liability of the third-party defendant to the third-party plaintiff. Im-pleader is not available for the assertion of an independent action by the defendant against a third party, even if the claim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the main claim. ... The requirement that the third-party claim be for derivative or secondary liability may be met by, for example, on allegation of a right of indemnity (contractual or otherwise), contribution, subrogation, or warranty. The rules do not, however, create any such rights. It merely provides a procedure for expedited consideration of these rights where they are available under substantive law.

(Emphasis added).

i. Commonr-Law Indemnity Claim

¶ 10. Premier asserts that PTE “may be liable” for “all or part of [the] plaintiffs claims against” it; thus, it has a “textbook common law indemnity” claim. A claim for common-law indemnity has “[t]wo critical prerequisites[:] ... (1) [t]he damages which the claimant seeks to shift are imposed upon him as a result of some legal obligation to the injured person; and (2) it must appear that the claimant did not actively or affirmatively participate in the wrong.” J.B. Hunt Transp. Inc. v. Forrest Gen. Hosp., 34 So.3d 1171, 1173-74 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2010) (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Atlas Tank Mfg. Co., 230 So.2d 549, 551 (Miss.1970)). In Celotex Corporation v. Becknell Construction Inc., 325 So.2d 566 (Miss. 1976), Becknell, the general contractor, was found liable for. damages that arose after a subcontractor, Campbell Roofing, installed a new roof at an airport using materials supplied by Celotex. Id. at 567. Becknell filed a third-party action against Campbell and Celotex, and the trial court awarded a judgment in favor of Becknell. Id. at 566. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding:

Becknell was required to pay money because of the defective workmanship of Campbell and defective materials furnished Campell by Celotex. Becknell’s liability arose because it was a prime contractor and warranted all materials and workmanship. Becknell paid the Airport Authority the cost of placing a new roof on the buildings and, in all fairness, this expense should be borne by Campbell and Celotex. We therefore hold that Becknell is entitled to recover on the theory of indemnity.

Id, at 568.

¶ 11. In Bush v. City of Laurel, 215 So.2d 256, 257 (Miss. 1968), which was cited by the court in Becknell, the City of Laurel was sued by a woman who had fallen into a ditch. The plaintiff obtained a verdict against the city, and the city’s liability was based on a “non-delegable duty to maintain its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition.” Id. at 257. The city then sued Bush (the construction company) for indemnity. On appeal, the supreme court upheld the city’s right of indemnity even though it was sued in tort and was found liable in the underlying action:

An obligation to indemnify may arise from a contractual relation, from an implied contractual relation or out of liability imposed by law.. When one person is required to pay money which another person in all fairness • should pay, then the former may recover indemnity from the later in the amount he paid, provided he has not conducted himself in a wrongful manner so as to bar his recovery. .. .The rule is-... : “[I]n Mississippi, as generally elsewhere, a right of indemnity arises in favor of one not actively at fault against an active wrongdoer.” -

Id. at 259-60 (internal citations omitted) (quoting St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. United States, 187 F.2d 925, 927 (5th Cir. 1951)).

¶ 12. Here, the circuit court concluded: “Any right of recovery for any loss or damages [Premier] might have .against PTE- arises from either a completely separate contract, the sale of the material, the products liability statute, or warranties implied by law or provided by contract or statute. [Premier] has no indemnity claim against PTE.” Under the terms of Premier’s contract with Anderson, we disagree. What the circuit court (and to some extent, the parties) disregard is that section 11.3.1 of the contract’s General Conditions did not provide that Premier either provide the required insurance or assume liability for any loss not covered by insurance; rather, Premier was contractually required to provide the “all-risk” insurance and “be liable to the Contractor to the extent such loss is not fully compensated by insurance[.]” Therefore, this is not an “either/or” situation, but a “both/and” situation. If Anderson had merely brought suit to enforce the first part of section 11.3.1 (the* requirement to purchase the insurance), we would find no error in the court’s holding. But the contract’s general conditions imposed a legal obligation on Premier not only to “purchase or maintain” builder’s “all-risk” insurance, but also to compensate Anderson for any loss attributable to the failure to obtain the insurance and any loss not covered by the builder’s insurance. We find this distinction important—Premier’s liability is broadened by this language; in effect, Premier has agreed to serve as a secondary insurer.

¶ 13. Thus, we find the claim for common-law indemnity is not an independent cause of action and is a proper third-party claim under Rule 14. As Premier notes in its brief, if Anderson is successful • in its suit against Premier, “and it is judicially determined that [Premier] has contractual liability for the damages associated with the PTE cable breaks, ’[Premier] will have to pay [Anderson] significant damages under legal compulsion.” Moreover, Premier “did not actively or affirmatively participate in the wrong.” There is no allegation that Premier was negligent or at fault for the loss.

¶ 14. We hold that the circuit court’s finding—that there is no basis for common law indemnity for Premier’s failure to perform under the terms of the contract between Anderson and Premier—was in error.

ii Warranty Claims

¶ 15. As we have already noted, the comments to Rule 14 expressly state that “[t]he requirement that the third-party claim be for derivative or secondary liability may be met by ... allegation of a right of indemnity (contractual or otherwise), contribution, subrogation, or warranty.” (Emphasis added). Premier also asserted claims of breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness, and breach of express warranty. The circuit court determined “any loss or damages [Premier] might have against PTE arise[] from either a completely separate contract, the sale of material, the products liability statute, or warranties implied by law[.]” ,

¶ 16. Our supreme court has held: .

The purpose of Rule 14, according to the comments,' is to avoid the problem of circuitous or duplicative actions, which occur when a defendant, held liable in the first action, is required to bring a second action against another party he alleges is derivatively or secondarily liable to him for all or part of the judgment. Impleader, under the Federal Rules, should only be used, where the third party’s liability is in some way derivative of the outcome of the main claim. It is clear that impleader under Rule 14 requires that the liability of the third party be dependent upon the outcome of the main claim.

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Wells, 593 So.2d 1010, 1013 (Miss. 1992) (emphasis added) (citations and quotations omitted). The “main claim” concerns Premier’s contractual obligation with Anderson not only to provide “all-risk insurance,” but to cover any loss or damage not “fully compensated” by the insurance policy and, therefore, is potentially liable for the loss suffered by Anderson due to the allegedly defective material supplied by PTE. Premier’s claim against PTE arose “out of the same transaction or occurrence” as Anderson’s suit against Premier, and any breach of warranty by PTE caused the loss in this instance. We find whether Premier is entitled to any relief on its claims is “derivative of the outcome” of Anderson’s claim.

¶ 17. Premier’s product-liability claims were also properly brought as an additional claim. See M.R.C.P. 14 cmt. (“Once a third-party claim is properly asserted, however, the third-party plaintiff may assert whatever additional claims the third-party plaintiff has against the third-party defendant under Rule 18(a).”)

¶ 18. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of Premier’s third-party complaint and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 19. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE, CARLTON, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR. FAIR AND WILSON, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . Financing for materials was provided by the Mississippi Development Finance. Corporation Industrial Development Revenue Bonds, which is customary when a project would have "significant economic impact.”

      . According to Premier, the cables "were rat- . ed for and supposed to withstand up to 80% of 270,000 pounds per square inch of load when stretched or elongated.” The cables "failed during or after stressing at loads'at or below 80% (33,000) of the 41,300 breaking strength.” The costs attributed to the cable failure included: (1) costs to repair the cables; (2) damages incurred by delays caused by cables breaking; (3) extended general conditions; (4) cle'an-up costs; (5) increase in punch-list work; and (6) additional painting and work costs.

      . The claim noted that the cause of the cable failure was "undetermined.”

      . Anderson also alleged other claims not relevant to the appeal in this case.

      . "A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Breeden, 164 So.3d at 1160-61 (¶ 13) (quoting Rose v. Tullos, 994 So.2d 734, 737 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2008)). "The allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond reasonable doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of her claim.” Id. at 1161 (quoting State v. Bayer Corp., 32 So.3d 496, 502 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2010)).

      . Rule 14 provides that “[a]ny party may move to strike the third-party claim, or for its severance or separate trial.” While PTE could have filed a motion to strike Premier’s third-party complaint, or for its severance or a separate trial under Rule 14(a), it was not improper for PTE to move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). As noted in Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 6 Federal Practice and Procedure: § 1460, p. 543-44 (3d ed. 2010), "not only is the third-party plaintiff's claim subject to dismissal directly under Rule 14(a), but it also may be challenged by the impleaded party on one of the grounds set forth in Rule 12 or by a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.” (Emphasis added).

      . We express no opinion as to whether Premier is liable to Anderson.

      . Under the contract terras, uncompensated losses may include "policy deductibles, exclusions, lapse of coverage, gaps in coverage, coverage limits, inadequacy of coverage, or other reason which causes the loss to be uninsured, in whole or in part.”