text:
    IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES—REPORT 17-01.
    No. SC17-451
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [November 16, 2017]
    Rebecca Mercier Vargas, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, West Palm Beach, Florida; and Laura K. Whitmore, Vice Chair and Subcommittee Chair, Filing Subcommittee of the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, Tampa, Florida, for Petitioner
   PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases (Committee) has submitted proposed changes to the standard jury instructions and asks that the Court authorize the amended standard instructions for publication and use. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

The Committee proposes amending instruction 201.2 (Introduction of Participants and Their Roles) and instruction 202.4 (Juror Questions). The Committee published its proposals in The Florida Bar News. No comments were received. The Court did not publish the Committee’s proposals.

Instruction 201.2 is amended to include the following language pertaining to the paragraph addressing communications ■with court personnel, including the judge: “This means, if you are outside the courtroom, any communication with me must be in writing, unsigned, and handed directly to the bailiff. Do not share the content of the writing with anyone, including other jurors.”

Instruction 202.4 is amended to clarify that jurors must ask questions of a witness before the witness leaves the witness stand, by adding the following language: “It is important to know that if you have a question you believe should be asked of a witness, you must raise your hand and request that I ask the witness the question before the witness leaves the witness stand. You will not have an opportunity to ask the witness a question once the witness leaves the courtroom.”

Having considered the Committee’s report, we authorize the Committee’s proposals for publication and use as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underlining, while deleted language is struck-through. In authorizing the publication and use of these instructions, we express no opinion on their correctness and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instructions. We further caution all interested parties that any comments associated with the instructions reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. The instructions as set forth in the appendix shall become effective when this opinion becomes final.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

201.2 INTRODUCTION OF PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR ROLES

Who are the people here and what do they do?

Judge/Court: I am the Judge. You may hear people occasionally refer to me as “The Court.” That is the formal name for my role. My job is to maintain order and decide how to apply the rules of the law to the trial. I will also explain various rules to you that you will need to know in order to do your job as the jury. It is my job to remain neutral on the issues of this lawsuit.

Parties: A party who files a lawsuit is called the Plaintiff. A party that is sued is called the Defendant.

Attorneys: The attorneys have the job of representing their clients. That means they speak for their client here at the trial. They have taken oaths as attorneys to do their best and to follow the rules for their profession.

Plaintiffs Counsel: The attorney on this side of the courtroom, (introduce by name), represents (client name) and is the person who filed the lawsuit here at the courthouse. [His] [Her] job is to present [his] [her] client’s side of things to you. [He] [She] and [his] [her] client will be referred to most of the time as “the plaintiff.” (Attorney name), will you please introduce who is sitting at the table with you?

[Plaintiff without Counsel: (Introduce claimant by name), on this side of the courtroom, is the person who filed the lawsuit at thé courthouse. (Claimant) is not represented by an attorney and will present [his] [her] side of things to you [himself] [herself].],

Defendant’s Counsel: The attorney on this side of the courtroom, (introduce by name), represents (client name), the one who has been sued. [His] [Her] job is to present [his] [her] client’s side of things to you. [He] [She] and [his] [her] client will usually be referred to here as “the defendant.” (Attorney name), will you please introduce who is sitting at the table with you?

[Defendant’s Counsel: The attorney on this side of the courtroom, (introduce by name), represents (client name), the one who has been sued. [His] [Her] job is to present [his] [her] client’s side of things to you. [He] [She] and [his] [her] client will usually be referred to here as “the defendant.” [His] [Her] client (defendant uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier) is (claimant’s name) motor vehicle insurance company and provided [him] [her] [uninsured] [underinsured] motorist coverage, which may be available to pay some or all of the damages that may be awarded.]*

*Use the bracketed, paragraph above when the case involves an uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier.

. [Defendant without Counsel: (Introduce defendant by name), on this side of the courtroom, is the one who has been sued. (Defendant) is not represented by an attorney and will present [his] [her] side of things to you [himself] [herself];],

Court Clerk: This person sitting in front of me, (name), is the court clerk. [He] [She] is here to assist me with some of the mechanics of the trial process, including the numbering and collection of the exhibits that are introduced in the course of the trial.

Court Reporter: The person sitting at the stenographic machine, (name), is the court reporter. [His] [Her] job is to keep an accurate legal record of everything we say and do during this trial.

Bailiff: The person over there, (name), is the bailiff. [His] [Her] job is to maintain order and security in the courtroom. The bailiff is also my representative to the jury. Anything you need or any problems that come up for you during the course of the trial should be brought to [him] [her]. However, the bailiff cannot answer any of your questions about the case. Only I can do that,

Jury: Last, but not least, is the jury, which we will begin to select in a few moments from among all of you. The jury’s job will be to decide what the facts are and what the facts mean. Jurors should be as neutral as possible at this point and have no fixed opinion about the lawsuit. .

In order to have a fair and lawful trial, there are rules that all jurors must follow. A basic rule is that jurors must decide the case only on the evidence presented in the courtroom. You must not communicate with anyone, including friends and family members, about this case, the people and places involved, or your jury service. You must not disclose your thoughts about this case or ask for advice on how to decide this case.

I want to stress that this rule means you must not use electronic devices or computers to communicate about this case, including tweeting, texting, blogging, e-mailing, posting information on a website or chat room, or any other means at all. Do not send or accept any messages to or from anyone about this case or your jury service.

You must not do any research or look up words, names, [maps,], or anything else that may have anything to do with this case. This includes reading newspapers, watching television or using a computer, cell phone, the Internet, any electronic device, or any other means at all, to get information related to this case or the people and places involved in this case. This applies whether you are in the courthouse, at home, or anywhere else.

Many of you may have cell phones, tablets, laptops, or other electronic devices with you here in the courtroom.**

**The trial judge should select one of the following two alternative instructions explaining the rules governing jurors’ use of electronic devices, as explained in Note on Use 1.

Alternative A: [All cell phones, computers, tablets, or other types of electronic devices must be turned off while you are in the courtroom. Turned off means that the phone or other electronic device is actually off and not in a silent or vibrating mode. You may use these devices during recesses, but even then you may not use your cell phone or electronic device to find out any information about the case or communicate with anyone about the case or the people involved in the case. Do not take photographs, video recordings, or audio recordings of the proceedings or of your fellow jurors. After each recess, please double check to make sure your cell phone or electronic device is turned off. At the end of the case, while you are deliberating, you must not communicate with anyone outside the jury room. You cannot have in the jury room any cell phones, computers, or other electronic devices. If someone needs to contact you in an emergency, the court can receive messages and deliver them to you without delay. A contact phone number will be provided to you.]

Alternative B: [You cannot have any cell phones, tablets, laptops, or other electronic devices in the courtroom. You may use these devices during recesses, but even then you may not use your cell phone or electronic device to find out any information about the case or communicate with anyone about the case or the people involved in the case. Do not take photographs, video recordings, or audio recordings of the proceedings or your fellow jurors. At the end of the case, while you are deliberating, you must not communicate with anyone outside the jury room. If someone needs to contact you in an emergency, the court can receive messages and deliver them to you without delay. A contact phone number will be provided to you.]

What are the reasons for these rules? These rules are imposed because jurors must decide the case without distraction and only on the evidence presented in the courtroom. If you investigate, research, or make inquiries on your own outside of the courtroom, the trial judge has no way to make sure that the information you obtain is proper for the case. The parties likewise have no opportunity to dispute or challenge the accuracy of what you find. That is contrary to our judicial system, which assures every party the right to ask questions about and challenge the evidence being considered against it and to present argument with respect to that evidence. Any independent investigation by a juror unfairly and improperly prevents the parties from having that opportunity our judicial system promises.

Any juror who violates these restrictions jeopardizes the fairness of these proceedings, and a mistrial could result that would require the entire trial process to start over. A mistrial is a tremendous expense and inconvenience to the parties, the court, and the taxpayers. If you violate these rules, you may be held in contempt of court, and face sanctions, such as serving time in jail, paying a fine or both.

All of your communications with courtroom personnel, or me, will be part of the record of these proceedings. That means those communications shall either be made in open court with the court reporter present or, if they are in writing, the writing will be filed with the court clerk. This means, if you are outside the courtroom, any communication with me must be in writing, unsigned, and handed directly to the bailiff. Do not share the content of the writing with anyone, including other jurors. I have instructed the courtroom personnel that any communications you have with them outside of my presence must be reported to me, and I will tell the parties [and their attorneys] about any communication from you that I believe may be of interest to the parties [and their attorneys].

However, you may communicate directly with courtroom personnel about matters concerning your comfort and safety, such as [juror parking] [location of break areas] [how and when to assemble for duty] [dress] [what personal items can be brought into the courthouse or jury room] [list any other typés of routine ex parte communications permitted].

If you become aware of any violation of these instructions or any other instruction I give in this case, you must tell me by giving a note, to the bailiff.

NOTES ON USE FOR 201.2

1. Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.451 directs trial judges to instruct jurors on the use of cell phones and other electronic devices. During the trial, the trial judge may remove the jurors’ cell phones or other electronic devices. The trial judge also has the option to allow the jurors to keep the cell phones and electronic devices during trial until the jurors begin deliberations. Rule 2.451 prohibits jurors from using the cell phones or electronic devices to find out information about the case, or to communicate with others about the case. The jurors also cannot use the electronic devices to record, photograph, or videotape the proceedings. In recognition of the discretion rule 2.451 gives trial judges, this instruction provides two alternatives: (A) requiring jurors to turn off electronic devices during court proceedings and removing their cell phones and electronic devices during deliberations; or (B) removing the cell phones and electronic devices during all proceedings and deliberations. These instructions may be modified to fit the practices of a trial judge in a particular courtroom. These instructions are not intended to limit the discretion of the trial court to control the proceedings. .

2. The portion of this instruction .dealing with communication with others and outside research may be modified to include other specified means of communication or research as technology develops.

Procedure 1.431(i)(2) requires the court, by pretrial order or statement on the record with opportunity for objection, to set forth the scope of routine, ex parte communications. Rule 1.431(i)(3) mandates an instruction during voir dire regarding the limitations on jurors’ communications with the court and courtroom personnel. The court should make sure that courtroom personnel are also aware of the limitations on their communications with jurors.

4. The introduction of the uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier is required because the plaintiffs are entitled to have the jury know that the joined carrier is the plaintiffs’ uninsured/underinsured carrier. Lamz v. Geico General Insurance Co., 803 So.2d 593 (Fla. 2001); Medina v. Peralta, 724 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1999).

202.4 JUROR QUESTIONS

Questions for the court or courtroom personnel:

During the trial, you may have a question about these proceedings. If so, please write it down and hand it to the bailiff, who will then hand it to me. I will review your question with the parties [and their attorneys] before responding.

Questions for witnesses:

You also may have a question you think should be asked of a witness. If so, there is a way for you to request that I ask the witness a question. After all the attorneys have completed their questioning of the witness, you should raise your hand if you have a question. I will then give you sufficient time to write the question on a piece of paper, fold it, and give it to the bailiff, who will pass it to me. Do not put your name on the question, show it to anyone or discuss it with anyone.

It is important to know that if you have a question you believe should be asked of a witness, you must raise your hand and request that I ask the witness the question before the witness leaves the witness stand. You will not have an opportunity to ask the witness a question once the witness leaves the courtroom. I will then review the question with the attorneys. Under our law, only certain evidence may be considered by a jury in determining a verdict. You are bound by the same rules of evidence that control the attorneys’ questions. If I decide that the question may not be asked under our rules of evidence, I will tell you. Otherwise, I will direct the question to the witness. The attorneys may then ask follow-up questions if they wish. If there are additional questions from jurors, we will follow the same procedure again.

By providing this procedure, I do not mean to suggest that you must or should submit written questions for witnesses. In most cases, the lawyers will have asked the necessary questions.

NOTES ON USE FOR 202.4

1. ■FlatR.Civ.PiFlorida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.431(i)(3) requires an instruction that jurors’ questions must be submitted in writing to the court, which will review them with the parties and counsel before responding. Rule 1,431 does not prevent jurors from asking the bailiff about routine matters affecting comfort and safety. The committee notes to rule 1.431 recognize that this instruction may need to be modified to reflect that individual trial judges may have reasonable differences regarding the type of communications considered routine.

2. Fia-R.Giv.-P,Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.452 mandates that jurors be permitted to submit written questions directed to witnesses or the court.

      . Minor, technical changes to the instructions are not elaborated upon.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. POLSTON, J., QUINCE, J., PARIENTE, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Christopher DEAN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC16-1314
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [August 31, 2017]

      Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Melanie Dale Surber, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Dean v. State, 199 So.3d 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). In its decision, the district court ruled upon the following question, which it subsequently certified to be of great public importance:

IS MANSLAUGHTER A CATEGORY ONE LESSER - INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SECOND-DEGREE FELONY MURDER?

Id. at 934-36; Dean v. State, 193 So.3d 1108, 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (granting motion for certification). For the reasons expressed below, we answer the certified question in the affirmative.

I. BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in February 2014, Christopher Dean was convicted as charged of second-degree felony murder and burglary. The- trial court designated Dean a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) and sentenced him to life for the murder and 15 years for the burglary. The murder victim in this case,'Eric Flint, committed the burglary along with Dean. Flint was killed by one of the burglary victims during á high-speed ear chase that ensued as Dean and Flint fled from the scene of the burglary. At trial, the State’s case against Dean was based on the following evidence.

Phillondra Thompson and Gregory Mar-low lived in a second-floor apartment just west of 1-95 in Palm Beach County. On January 12, 2005, they came home for lunch and saw an unfamiliar white Nissan Maxima in the parking lot with the engine running arid no one ihside. They discovered the door to their apartment open, so Marlow checked to see if someone was inside, and Thompson went downstairs to call 911. Marlow then went around to the back of the apartment building to see if someone was on their balcony. At that point, Thompson saw Dean coming down the- stairs from the apartment carrying a green plastic bin. Dean put the bin inside the Maximá and quickly drove away. Mar-low then jumped into his SUV and followed Dean. Shortly thereafter, Thompson saw Flint walk down the stairs from her apartment. Flint jumped over the fence separating the apartment complex from the road and walked through the hedges towards 1-95.

Marlow continued to pursue Dean at a high rate of speed, eventually following him onto 1-95. Dean was speeding and weaving in and out of traffic, and Marlow tried to keep up. As Marlow was driving, he called 911, and the operator advised him to stop pm-suing Dean, but he did not. When Dean abruptly pulled off onto the right side of the interstate, Marlow continued following fast behind him. At that point, Marlow saw Flint come through the hedges and run towards the Maxima. Flint also saw Marlow and then he reached for something in his waistband. Believing that Flint was reaching for a gun,. Marlow ducked inside his vehicle, which continued moving forward, striking and killing Flint.

After this evidence was presented to the jury, defense counsel requested that, in addition to the charged offense of second-degree felony murder, the jury be instructed on manslaughter as a lesser included offense. The State opposed the request, arguing that manslaughter was not a lesser included offense of second-degree felony murder. The trial court agreed and denied defense counsel’s request. The jury was then given the standard instruction for second-degree felony murder.

On appeal to the Fourth District, Dean argued that the trial court erred in denying his request for the manslaughter instruction because it is a necessarily lesser included offense of second-degree felony murder and, therefore, the trial court was required to give the instruction. Dean, 199 So.3d at 935. The Fourth District affirmed the trial court’s ruling, citing its decision in Avila v. State, 745 So.2d 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), in which it stated that “ ‘manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense’ of ‘second-degree felony murder.’ ” Id. (quoting Avila, 745 So.2d at 984). The Fourth District concluded that Avila had been correctly decided based on the following reasoning:

Reduced to its essence, manslaughter requires the commission of an act that directly causes the death of another. Second-degree felony murder, on the other hand, requires the commission of an enumerated felony, with the death occurring “during the perpetration of’ the felony, caused by a person not engaged in the perpetration of the felony. Unlike manslaughter, for second-degree felony murder there is no direct casual [sic] connection between the death of the victim and an act of the defendant. Manslaughter is thus not “always subsumed” within second-degree felony murder, because the act that caused death is by definition committed by a person who had nothing to do with the commission of the underlying felony.

Id. (citations omitted). Thereafter, the Fourth District granted Dean’s motion to certify the question of whether manslaughter is a necessarily lesser included offense of second-degree felony murder. Dean, 193 So.3d at 1108.

On appeal to this Court, Dean raises three issues in addition to the certified question: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the defense’s cross-examination of a key witness; (2) whether the trial court properly controlled the content of both the State’s and the defense’s closing arguments; and (3) whether his PRR sentences are supported by the evidence in the record and whether they are unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. Below, we address the certified question and whether Dean’s PRR sentences are supported by the record. We reject the remaining issues without further comment.

II. CERTIFIED QUESTION

Dean argués that we should answer the certified question in the affirmative because the elements of manslaughter are subsumed within the elements of second-degree felony murder. We agree.

The second-degree felony murder statute provides:

When a person is killed in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any [enumerated felony] by a person other than the person engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate such felony, the person perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate such felony is guilty of murder in the second degree ....

§ 782.04(3), Fla. Stat. (2004). Pursuant to the statute, to be guilty of second-degree felony murder the following elements must be present: (1) the victim is dead; (2) the defendant was not the person who actually killed the victim, but he or she did commit or did knowingly aid, abet, counsel, hire, or otherwise procure the commission of a felony; (3) the victim’s death was caused during and was the consequence of the commission, or the escape from the immediate scene, of the felony; and (4) the person who actually killed the victim was not involved in the commission of the felony. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.5.

Manslaughter is defined as:

[t]he killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without lawful justification according to the provisions of chapter 776 and in cases in which such killing shall not be excusable homicide or murder, according to the provisions of [chapter 782] ....

§ 782.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). Based on the statute, the two elements of manslaughter are the unjustified or inexcusable killing of the victim and “a causative link between the death and the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of the defendant.” Tyus v. State, 845 So.2d 318, 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

“Necessarily lesser included offenses are those offenses in which the statutory elements of the lesser included offense are always subsumed within those of the charged offense.” Walton v. State, 208 So.3d 60, 64 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Sanders v. State, 944 So.2d 203, 206 (Fla. 2006)).

The elements of manslaughter are always subsumed within the elements of second-degree felony murder because both offenses require some action by the defendant that ultimately causes the victim’s death. Under the second-degree felony murder statute, the action by the defendant is the commission of the underlying felony. And the statutory requirement that the victim be killed “in the perpetration of’ the underlying felony creates an element of causation between the defendant’s act of committing the felony and the death of the victim. See Parker v. State, 570 So.2d 1048, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (recognizing there must be a “nexus between the [felony] and the death” to support a conviction for second-degree felony murder); see also Parker v. State, 641 So.2d 369, 376 (Fla. 1994) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of the felony-murder statute ‘is to protect the public from inherently dangerous situations caused by the commission of the felony.’” (quoting State v. Hacker, 510 So.2d 304, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986))).

Contrary to the State’s argument and the Fourth District’s reasoning in Dean, the distinguishing factor between manslaughter and second-degree felony murder is not whether the victim’s death was actually caused by the defendant or by someone else. Just as with second-degree felony murder, a defendant may be guilty of manslaughter when he or she sets in motion a course of events that leads to the death of the victim as the result of a third party’s actions. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 782 So.2d 426, 428-30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that evidence was sufficient to support manslaughter convictions where victims were killed by a third party in a traffic accident after the defendant stole a stop sign from the intersection where the accident occurred); see also Reyes v. State, 783 So.2d 1129, 1132-83 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that a defendant could properly be convicted of manslaughter for the death of a victim he did .not actually shoot because “each participant in a mutually-agreed-to-gun battle in a public place may be held accountable for any death or injury to an innocent person which results from that confrontation”). Instead, the difference between the two offenses is that to be guilty of second-degree felony murder the defendant must have committed one of the felonies enumerated in section 782.04(3), Florida Statutes, (as opposed to another crime or act) and the victim must always have been killed by someone not involved in the commission of the underly-tag felony. Cf. Miller, 782 So.2d at 428 (underlying act by defendant leading to victims’ death was grand theft, which is not a qualifying offense in the second-degree felony murder statute).

Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold' that manslaughter is a necessarily lesser included offense of second-degree felony murder.

III. PRR SENTENCES

We quash the Fourth District’s holding regarding Dean’s PRR sentences and remand for resentencing because his designation as a PRR is not supported by the evidence in the record in this case. See Davenport v. State, 971 So.2d 293, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“It is permissible for a trial court to take judicial notice of its own files, but the trial judge has to put such evidence, in the record of each case when sentencing a defendant as an HFO and PRR.”), rev. denied, 993 So.2d 511 (Fla. 2008). On remand, the State may present evidence to prove that Dean meets the statutory requirements to be sentenced as a PRR. See Ward v. State, 11 So.3d 459, 459 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); see also State v. Collins, 985 So.2d 985, 990 (Fla. 2008) (“[B]ecause a resentencing is a new proceeding, the State may present additional evidence on remand to prove the defendant qualifies for habitual felony offender sentencing.”)

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, we answer the certified question-in the affirmative. For the reasons expressed in Justice Polston’s concurring opinion and Justice Quince’s- concurring in result only opinion, we approve the result of the Fourth District’s decision to affirm Dean’s convictions. However, we quash the Fourth District’s holding regarding Dean’s PER sentences and remand for resentenc-ing.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, CANADY, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

POLSTON, J., concurs with an opinion, in which CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

QUINCE, J., concurs in result only with ah opinion.

. PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and. dissents in part with an opinion..

LABARGA, C.J., recused.

POLSTON, J.,

concurring.

I concur with the majority’s opinion in all respects, 'including its decision to approve the Fourth District’s affirmance of Dean’s convictions. I acknowledge that under this Court’s precedent the trial court’s failure to givé a requested jüry instruction on a necessarily lesser included offense one step removed from the charged offense is per se reversible error. See State v. Abreau, 363 So.2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 1978). However, this rule, and the requirement that a trial'judge always give such a requested instruction, “is bottomed upon a recognition of the jury’s right to exercise its ‘pardon power.’” State v. Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929, 932 (Fla. 1986); see also Abreau, 363 So.2d at 1064 (holding that the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense one step removed “cannot be harmless because it is impossible to determine whether the jury, if given the opportunity, would have ‘pardoned’, the - defendant”). “This ‘pardon power’ allows the jury to acquit a defendant of a greater offense and convict him or her of a lesser one even though the evidence supports both crimes.” Sanders v. State, 946 So.2d 953, 957 (Fla. 2006).

As Justice Canady stated in his dissent in Haygood v. State, 109 So.3d 735, 749 (Fla. 2013) (Canady," J.; dissenting), “[njothing in the Florida Constitution, the Florida Statutes, or the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure supports our recognition of such a right of áccess to a partial jury nullification.” In Sanders, a majority of this Court called into question the legal foundation of the jury pardon doctrine, recognizing that a jury pardon is “essentially ■ ‘a not guilty verdict rendered contrary to the jaw and evidence’ and .is an aberration.” 946 So.2d at 958 (quoting Willis v. State, 840 So.2d 1135, 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (Klein, J., concurring specially) )

As this Court explained in Sanders, “[b]y definition, jury pardons violate the oath jurors must take before trial, as well as the instructions the 'trial court gives thém,” Id. “Jurors'in a criminal trial are required to swear or affirm that they ‘will well and truly try the issues between the State of Florida and the defendant and render a true Verdict according to the law and the evidence.’ ” Haygood, 109 So.3d at 750 (Canady, J., dissenting) (quoting Fla. R. Cfim. P. 3.360). When instructions are given for the charged offense as well as any lesser included offenses, the jury is further-instructed that “.[i]f you return a verdict of guilty, it should be for the highest offense'which has beén proven'beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.12) (emphasis added).

In cases such as this one, where the evidence supports the charged offense as well as the requested instruction on a necessarily lesser included offense, any error in failing to give the requested instruction is harmless because the defendant is not entitled to an opportunity for a jury pardon. Here, the jury’s verdict as to Dean’s guilt establishes that the State proved the elements of second-degree felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, even if the trial court had given an instruction on manslaughter as Dean requested, the jury would still have been required to find Dean guilty of second-degree felony murder. Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to give the manslaughter instruction was harmless, and the Fourth District properly affirmed Dean’s convictions.

CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

QUINCE, J.,

concurring in result only.

I agree with the majority’s decision to approve the result of the Fourth District’s decision affirming Dean’s convictions. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that manslaughter is a category one lesser included offense 'of second-degree felony murder. Because second- . degree felony murder. requires that the victim’s death occur at the hands of “a person other than the person engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate [an enumerated] felony,” and manslaughter by act can occur when a defendant has directly or indirectly caused the death of another, I would find that manslaughter by act is a category two lesser offense. Accordingly, I agree that Dean’s convictions should be affirmed. Because I would conclude that manslaughter is not a necessarily lesser included offense of second-degree felony murder, I would answer the certified question in the negative and approve the Fourth District’s decision below.

First, the definition of second-degree felony murder provided in the statutes is as follows:

When a human being is killed during the perpetration of, or during the attempt to perpetrate, any [enumerated felony] by a person other than the person engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate such felony, the person perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate such felony commits murder in the second degree .... ”

§ 782.04(3), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added). We must be clear on the purpose of the felony murder statute'. As a society, we have decided that the desire to protect the public from the dangers associated with the commission of felony offenses permits the State to consider a defendant to be criminally liable for the acts of others as a consequence of the felony murder rule and the law of principals. See Adams v. State, 341 So.2d 765, 767-68 (Fla. 1976), superseded by statute, State v. Dene, 533 So.2d 265, 267 (Fla. 1988) (noting that the statutes were revised to distinguish between degrees of murder); Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 So. 865, 869 (1922) (“ ‘The principle is well established that when several persons combine together to commit an unlawful act, each is criminally responsible for the acts of his associates committed in furtherance or prosecution of the common design, and if several persons combine to do an unlawful act and in prosecution of the common object a culpable homicide results, all are alike criminally responsible for the probable consequences that may arise from the perpetration of the unlawful act they set out to accomplish,’” (quoting Henry v. State, 81 Fla. 763, 89 So. 136, 138 (1921))). In other words, our precedent provides that where the defendant is a principal in the commission or attempt to commit one of the felonies enumerated in either the first-degree or second-degree felony murder statute, and the murder is a natural and foreseeable consequence of the motivations involved in such felony, the defendant may be charged and convicted as a principal in the homicide. We do not extend this reasoning when there is an intervening and independent act—the lethal act must be in furtherance of the unlawful act the parties set out to accomplish; there must be some causal connection between the homicide and the felony. See Bryant v. State, 412 So.2d 347, 350 (Fla. 1982) (reversing the conviction for first-degree murder, explaining that “[s]ince it is the commission of a homicide in conjunction with intent to commit the felony which supplants the requirement of premeditation for first-degree murder, Fleming v. State, 374 So.2d 954 (Fla. 1979), there must be some causal connection between the homicide and the felony”). The purpose of this rule is to enhance punishment to deter the inherently dangerous situations caused by the commission of a felony that causes the death of another. See Parker v. State, 641 So.2d 369, 376 (Fla. 1994).

To be sure, the facts of this case support the application of the felony murder statute. Dean and Flint were in flight from the burglary they committed when Flint was struck by the burglary victim’s car. The flight from the burglary is part of the res gestae of that felony. See Campbell v. State, 227 So.2d 873, 878 (Fla. 1969); Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132, 137 (Fla. 1961). This is just the sort of behavior the felony murder rule seeks to deter. However, manslaughter by act requires the direct act of the defendant, which in this case did not occur.

In Montgomery, we concluded that manslaughter by act did not require an intent to kill the victim, only the intent to perform the act that led to the victim’s -death; participation in the robbery was not the act that led to the participant’s death in this case. The majority reasons that “[t]he elements of manslaughter are always subsumed within the elements of second-degree felony murder because both offenses require some action by the defendant that ultimately causes the victim’s death.” Majority op. at 423. This reasoning is a misstatement of second-degree felony murder, which requires the action of a third party not engaged in the felony. The majority then reasons that the commission of the underlying felony is the requisite action causing the victim’s death to qualify as manslaughter by act. Such reasoning reads the requirements of the felony murder statute into the manslaughter statute and cannot be supported. To find that manslaughter is a category one lesser included offense, the elements of manslaughter must be present without relying on the language of another statute.

The majority, and the Fourth District below, have extended our decision in Montgomery to exclude all direct action or proximate .cause by . a defendant in manslaughter, by act. While manslaughter by act. does not require intent to .kill, it still requires intent to have done the act that directly or proximately causes the death of the victim. The removal of the stop sign in Miller directly led to the death.of the victim, in this case. But for the removal, the accident would not have occurred. Here, the robbery was not a direct cause of death. The robbery may have placed the parties in closer proximity, but the robbery did not cause the burglary victim to strike Flint. The burglary is only related because flight from the burglary and the actions of the third non-principal party qualifies the death for second-degree felony murder.

Flint was struck and killed by a car not driven by Dean. Dean did not lure Flint onto 1-95 and place him in the path of the vehicle that struck him, Dean’s high-speed driving did not push another car into a victim, causing his or her death. Dean did not remove a guardrail that would have protected Flint from, injury. There is no action performed by Dean that but for said action Flint would be alive. Dean’s actions did not directly or indirectly cause the death of Eric Flint. Accordingly, the reasoning in Montgomery does not apply.

Second, if manslaughter by act is a nec-. essarily included offense, the .appropriate remedy is to remand for a new trial. As we stated in Montgomery, a “ ‘necessarily lesser included offense’ is ... a lesser offense that'is always included in the major offense. The trial judge has no discretion in whether to instruct the jury on a necessarily lesser included offense. Once the judge determines that the offense is a necessarily lesser included offense, an instruction must be given.”. Montgomery, 39 So.3d at 259 (quoting Wimberly, 498 So.2d at 932) (emphasis added). My colleague argues that there is no inherent error in failure to instruct on an immediate lesser-included offense because there is no right for the jury to exercise its pardon power. Concurring op. at 425 (Polston, J., concurring). This Court has recognized the opposite for as long as there has been a Florida Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 31 Fla. 207, 12 So. 640, 642 (1893) (“The offense of which there has been a conviction is included within or may be carved' out of that major offense charged in the indictment, and the indictment is sufficient to sustain the conviction.,.. And that fact that the evidence is more than sufficient to support the conviction does not render it insufficient to do so, and the prisoner is in nowise hurt by that excess of its probative force which the jury has ignored.”); Hayes v. State, 564 So.2d 161, 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (“Failure to so instruct on the next immediate lesser-included offense of the crime charged is reversible error because it has the effect of removing from the jury an opportunity to exercise its inherent pardon power.” (citing State v. Abreau, 363 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 1978))); Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377, 384 (Fla. 1968) (“Necessarily included offenses should always be covered by an instruction, even though the trial judge is satisfied that the major crime charged -has also been proved. If the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury on the major crime then the necessarily included offense -instruction should [b]e given.”); Jimenez v. State, 158 Fla. 719, 30 So.2d 292, 295 (Fla. 1947). To hold otherwise, as the majority currently does, is to recede from centuries of caselaw without an explanation.

Because I would find that one cannot read the requirements of felony murder into the manslaughter statutes to find culpability and because the facts of this case do not support a finding of manslaughter by act, I would find that manslaughter by act is not a necessarily included offense. To the extent the majority holds otherwise, I cannot agree. However, because I would find that manslaughter by act is a permissive included offense—category two—and that there was no error in failing to read the instruction here, where the facts did not support a finding of manslaughter by act, I concur in the result to approve the Fourth District’s affirmance of Dean’s conviction.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in answering the certified question in the affirmative by concluding that manslaughter is a lesser included offense of second-degree murder. I dissent, however, from the decision to approve “the result of the Fourth District’s decision to affirm Dean’s convictions.” Majority op. at 425. Under our case law, the trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on manslaughter, a category one lesser included offense of second-degree felony murder, is per se reversible. Accordingly, I would quash the Fourth District’s decision in Dean v. State, 199 So.3d 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), and remand for a new trial.

In State v. Montgomery, 39 So.3d 252, 259 (Fla. 2010), this .Court unanimously held that, “[a]t trial, the jury must be instructed on category one lesser included offenses.” See Haygood v. State, 109 So.3d 735, 742 (Fla. 2013). Indeed, Justice Pol-ston’s concurring opinion recognizes this Court’s long-standing precedent that a “trial court’s failure to give a requested jury instruction on a necessarily lesser included offense one step removed from the charged offense is per se reversible error.” Concurring op. at 425 (Polston, J., concurring) (citing State v. Abreau, 363 So.2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 1978)). As this Court explained in Abreau:

Only the failure to instruct on the next immediate lesser-included offense (one step removed) constitutes error that is per se reversible. Where the' omitted instruction relates to an offense two or more steps removed, ... reviewing courts may properly find such error to be harmless.

363 So.2d at 1064. Therefore, because the majority answers thé certified question in the affirmative, a harmless error analysis is unnecessary, and our precedent compels us to reverse Dean’s conviction and remand for a new trial. See Haygood, 109 So.3d at 743; Montgomery, 39 So.3d at 260.

Notwithstanding our precedent directing that this error is per se reversible, Justice Lawson would now adopt Justice Canady’s dissenting opinion in Haygood, which Justice Polston joined, concluding that the unreasonableness of Florida’s jury pardon power directs that harmless error is the proper analysis in this context. 109 So.3d at 746 (Canady, J., dissenting). Justice Quince, who concurs in the result of affirming the conviction because she would not find manslaughter to be a lesser included offense, recognizes that “if manslaughter by act is a necessarily included offense, the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new trial” based on well-established and recently affirmed precedent. See concurring in result only op. at 428 (Quince, J., concurring in result only).

Further, not only is the error per se reversible but, under the facts of this case, it is not “beyond any doubt that no rational juror, acting on the basis of the facts and a correct understanding of the law, could determine the defendant to be guilty of the lesser offense and innocent of the charged offense.” Haygood, 109 So.3d at 746 (Canady, J., dissenting). This is not a jury pardon case, as Justice Polston’s concurring opinion suggests. Concurring op. at 425 (Polston, J., concurring). Dean left the scene of the burglary and drove away before his codefendant, Flint, was killed by the victim, Marlow, who disregarded the 911 operator’s instructions to stop following Dean and Flint onto 1-95. Majority op. at 422. Thus, a reasonable jury could have convicted Dean of manslaughter, a second-degree felony with a fifteen-year sentence, rather than second-degree felony murder, a first-degree felony with a maximum sentence of life. See § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2004); majority op. at 423-24.

So, Dean wins a pyrrhic victory. He receives a favorable answer on manslaughter being a lesser included offense of second-degree felony murder, but he does not receive a new trial with a proper jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. In my view, there would be a real possibility that the jury would have found him guilty of the lesser included offense, not as a result of the jurors disregarding their oath, but because the facts of this case could fit into manslaughter. Accordingly, I dissent from the decision to affirm Dean’s convictions. I concur, however, that Dean is entitled to resen-tencing after striking the PRR sentence.

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

      . Because the certified question is a pure question of law our review is de novo. Haygood v. State, 109 So.3d 735, 739 (Fla. 2013).

      . After the jury rendered its verdicts finding Dean guilty of second-degree felony murder and burglary, the trial court immediately proceeded to . sentencing. The State requested that Dean be sentenced as a PRR on both counts, however,' the State did not introduce any evidence to support a finding that Dean committed the crimes in this case within three years of being released from a state correctional facility, See § 775.082(9)(a), Fla. Stat. Instead, the State relied on a copy of its notice of intent to seek a PRR sentence and the sentencing transcript from Dean's first trial in 2008.' The 2008 sentencing transcript reflects that in that proceeding the State introduced certified nopies of DOC records regarding Dean's release date and his latent fingerprints, and that, based on those records, Dean was sentenced as a PRR, However, the actual document evidence supporting Dean’s initial PRR sentences was not presented to the trial court when Dean was sentenced in 2014,

      . Indeed, the majority’s decision to answer the question in the affirmative belies its decision to affirm Dean’s convictions. This Court has repeatedly held that failure to instruct the jury on a category one lesser included offense is reversible error requiring a new trial. Haygood v. State, 109 So.3d 735, 741-43 (Fla. 2013).

      . See § 782.04(3), Fla. Stat (2016).

      . A felony that serves as a predicate to finding felony murder is not inherently an act that causes the death of another.

      . For example, if Dean engaged in a high-speed chase with Flint as a passenger during the flight from the burglary and a third party, such as the burglary victim in this case, struck the car leading to Flint’s death, a jury could reasonably find either second-degree felony murder or manslaughter by act. The act in this example would be that Dean led a high speed chase, but the fact that Flint’s death was caused by a third parly during the flight from the burglary would also qualify his death as second-degree felony murder.


text:
    John M. MURRAY, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-4172
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017
    Rehearing Denied April 4, 2017
   Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.


text:
    Phyllis M. WENDELL, Appellant, v. ENTERPRISE and York Risk Services Group, Appellees.
    CASE NO. 1D16-3587
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017.
   An appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims. Jack Adam Weiss, Judge.

Date of Accident: June 2, 2015.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jordan GADSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-3327
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017
    Rehearing Denied April 10, 2017
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Mark J. Borello, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Carly Elizabeth PALUCCI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-3112
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017.
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County. Michael Flowers, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Roger TROOST, Appellant, v. CARRIAGE FUNERAL HOLDINGS, INC. d/b/a Emerald Coast Funeral Home, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-3078
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017.
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County. William F. Stone, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Willie James PETERSON, a/k/a, Oscar Peterson, Jr., Petitioner, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-2896
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017.
   Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

Denied.


text:
    Willie MCCUNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-1311
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017.
   An appeal, from an order of the Leon County Circuit Court. John C. Cooper, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Brian PRESTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-0551
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017
    Rehearing Denied April 11, 2017
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Mallory D. Cooper, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Catherine A. BUTLER, Appellant, v. Deborah BUTLER, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-168
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. Victor L. Hulslander, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Zaron Vonshea BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-0088
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. David P. Kreider, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Zaron Vonshea BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NOS. 1D16-0087 & 1D16-0089
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017.
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. David P. Kreider, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Shannon COPELAND, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-0062
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017
   Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

Denied.


text:
    Charles Leon DORSEY, Appellant, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-2867
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2017
   .An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. Angela C. Dempsey, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Leshawn JAMES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-5241
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017
   Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus-Original Jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.


text:
    Anthony Jerome COOPER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-4768
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017.
   Petition for Writ of Mandamus—Original Jurisdiction.

Denied.


text:
    Reco Fancwa ALEXANDER-FERBA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-4578
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017
    Rehearing Denied April 10, 2017
   Petition for Writ of Habeas Córpus-Original Jurisdiction. ■

Dismissed.


text:
    Ellis Stanley MCHALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-4433
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017.
    Rehearing Denied March 31, 2017
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Steven B. Whittington, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jimmie MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-4395
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Steven Whittington, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Tony B. MYRICK, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-3918
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017
   Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

Denied.


text:
    Ryan TOLER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-3888
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017
    Rehearing Denied June 21, 2017
   Petition Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel—Original Jurisdiction.

Denied.


text:
    Tanya M. BLAKE, and James C. Blake, Appellant, v. Cody W. CRAGO, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-833
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County. John F. Simon, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Clinton Lee POWERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D15-5126
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017.
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County. Christopher N. Patterson, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    William WITHERSPOON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D15-4968
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017.
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. James 0. Shelter, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Benjamin F. GRAHAM, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D15-4219
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017.
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Wakulla County. Dawn Caloca-Johnson, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Romerio L. WALKER, Petitioner, v. John PALMER, et al., Respondents.
    CASE NO. 1D16-3356
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017
   Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

Denied.


text:
    Lionel ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-3304
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017.
    Rehearing Denied March 31, 2017
   An appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. Mark W. Moseley, Judge,

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Charles Edward SHISLER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-0404
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017
   Petition for Belated Appeal—Original Jurisdiction.

Denied.


text:
    Todd AKERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D14-3454
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County; James R. Shenko, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Richard Anthony MCTEAR, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D14-4113
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hills-borough County; William Fuente, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Anzio DALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-1824
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Philip J. Federico, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Wilson SILVA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-3694
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Reinaldo Ojeda, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    John Henry KNIGHTEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-4118
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Glenn T. Shelby, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    H.A.B., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-4279
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinel-las County; Patrice Moore, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Michael Antonio ALLEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-4739
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hills-borough County; Gregory P. Holder, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Chris Allen SOULE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-4955
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; John K. Stargel, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, Successor in Interest to Bank of America, National Association, as Trustee, Successor by Merger to LaSalle Bank, National Association, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-13ARX, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-13ARX, Appellant, v. BLACK POINT ASSETS, INC., Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-5352
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Linda H. Babb, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    B.R., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-5366
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Charlotte County; Paul Alessandroni, Acting Circuit Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    L. C. Anthony FLOYD, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-S666
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Susan G. Barthle, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Winfield WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-5729
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Keith Spoto, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Elizabeth Ann SEAGRO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1306
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hills-borough County; Daniel L. Perry, Judge.

Affirmed,


text:
    Larry Jerome DURHAM, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1445
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hills-borough County; Kimberly K. Fernandez, Judge.

Affirmed.,


text:
    Gwyndolyn MCCLELLAN, Appellant, v. Harold Paul WILEN, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1622
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Stephen L. Daken, - Senior Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    FLORIDA WILDLIFE FEDERATION, and Collier County Audubon Society, Inc., Appellants, v. Francis D. HUSSEY, Jr., and Mary P. Hussey, Husband and Wife; Winchester Lakes Corporation, a Florida Corporation, Collier County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, the Honorable Rick Scott, Governor of the State of Florida; and the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D16-1714
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County;. Cynthia A. Pivacek, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    FLORIDA WILDLIFE FEDERATION, and Collier County Audubon Society, Inc., Appellants, v. Sean HUSSEY, Successor Trustee to Jose Lombillo, Trustee and Eduardo, Trustee; Collier, County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, The Honorable Rick Scott, Governor of the State of Florida; and the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D16-1869
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County; Cynthia A. Pivacek, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Joyce M. PEREZ, Appellant, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY as Trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-R6, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2175
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Sandra Taylor, Senior Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Curtiss SHEELY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2287
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pi-nellas County; Michael F. Andrews, Judge.

Affirmed.-


text:
    Michael E. TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2445
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pas-co County; Susan G. Barthle, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Kristina E. MELVIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2454
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pi-nellas County; Thane B. Covert, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Stephen Ischay JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2616
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from .the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Debra Johnes Riva, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Sharrod HOLMES, DC# R30496, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2627
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal pursuant' to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pi-nellas County; Philip J. Federico, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Robert A. LASSITER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2697
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Kelly P. Butz, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Otis James WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3020
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App, P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pi-nellas County; Nancy Moate Ley, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Benwayne L. MORRISON, Respondent.
    Case No. 2D16-3053
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Deno Economou, Judge.

Denied.


text:
    Shaun RICKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3060
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pas-co County; Susan G. Barthle, Judge,

Affirmed.


text:
    Howard Leroy CARTER, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3068
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Samantha L, Ward, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Kenneth GUZMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3076
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pi-nellas County; Philip J. Federico, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Jose A. HEREDIA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3102
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Reinaldo Ojeda, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Osvaldo Javier TORRES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3129
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Frances M, Perrone and Lisa D. Campbell, Judges.

Affirmed.


text:
    Alphonso HARDIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3137
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Har-dee County; Marcus J. Ezelle, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Otis James WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-8593
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pi-nellas County; Nancy Moate Ley, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony Lee MANSFIELD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-539
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hills-borough County; William Fuente, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    John DESYLVESTER, Appellant, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-717
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Thomas P. Gallen, Senior Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Regina Ann DAVIS, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1383
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Department of Financial Services.

Affirmed.


text:
    Melvin BLOUGH, Appellant, v. Marie B. BLOUGH, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3146
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hills-borough County; Nick Nazaretian, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Willie P. HUNTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3176
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Lee County; Joseph C. Fuller, Jr., Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Barry Joseph JOHNSON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3222
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Christopher C. Sa-bella, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    Otis James WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3564
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pi-nellas County; Nancy Moate Ley, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    In the INTEREST OF M.D. and L.D., Jr., children. L.D., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D16-3454
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017.
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hills-borough County; Caroline Tesche Arkin, Judge.

Affirmed.


text:
    David Randolph BLUE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-0066
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 1, 2017
   An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141 (b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Wayne M. Miller, Judge. Lower Tribunal No. 05-1086-A-K

Affirmed.


text:
    Bart K. GERSHENBAUM, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Erez COHEN and Andrea Carrasco Cohen, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2695
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 11, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 16-8898

Denied.


text:
    Douglas Taron EDWARDS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT CLERK OF COURT, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2700
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 6, 2017
   Denied.'


text:
    Steve GERMAIN, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2714
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 91-1922

Denied.


text:
    Lacce Earl WRIGHT, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2732
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 16-428

Denied.


text:
    James BETHEL, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. ONEWEST BANK, FSB, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2749
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 5, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 11-3793

Dismissed.


text:
    Gina PENA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2767
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 11-8871

Dismissed.


text:
    Joseph PIRELA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2773
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 98-27353

Denied.

Dismissed.


text:
    Joseph PIRELA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. WELLS FARGO BANK, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2789
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 07-17508

Denied.

Dismissed.


text:
    Joseph PIRELA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2792
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 07-8135

Dismissed.


text:
    Joseph PIRELA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2809
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 08-71725

Denied.

Dismissed.


text:
    JOSEPH PIRELA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2810
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 09-11679

Dismissed.


text:
    Joseph PIRELA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2820
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 12-38424

Denied.

Dismissed.


text:
    Joseph PIRELA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2821
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 5, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 13-5146

Dismissed.


text:
    Anthony MARTINEZ and Teresa Martinez, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Wilfredo SALAS and David Mota, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2833
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 15-15564

Denied.


text:
    Christian LABOY, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Tiffany R. WILLIX, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2839
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 10-223

Dismissed.


text:
    Joseph PIRELA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2853
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 02-20775

Dismissed.


text:
    Joseph PIRELA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2854
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 15-2578

Dismissed.


text:
    Lee Robert ROHE and Susan Rohe, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2865
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 13-1346

Denied.


text:
    David Randolph BLUE, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0056
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 05-1086

Denied.


text:
    ANGLER’S REEF PROPERTY OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. GUIRM INVESTMENT, LLC, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D15-2244
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 26, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 10-293

Dismissed.


text:
    CDR CREANCES , S.A.S., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. 7213 FISHER, LLC, etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0093
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 01, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 10-43000

Dismissed.


text:
    Jorge DAMBAKLI, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. George ROD and DMG Group Inc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-0523
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 26, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 07-38892

Dismissed.


text:
    LONG KEY TOWNHOUSE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Jane VANDENBERG, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-0902
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 06, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 10-613

Ordered.


text:
    WAB INTERNATIONAL INC., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. E.R. TROIKA, LTD, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-0967
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 15-3786

Dismissed.


text:
    Martin Jay WALTERS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-1203
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 02-23944

Denied.


text:
    Claudio NARANJO and Raquel Naranjo, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. US BANK TRUST NA (TR), Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-1415
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 09-88763

Dismissed.


text:
    Corey EDWARDS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-1822
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 04-27920

Denied.


text:
    WASHINGTONGREEN FINE ART PUBLISHING COMPANY, LTD., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. SHOOK HARDY & BACON, LLP, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-1915
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 11, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 08-27528

Denied.


text:
    Jorge L. NARANJO, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2150
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 06, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 13-162

Dismissed.


text:
    Candice WOLFSON, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Howard WOLFSON, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2168
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    DECEMBER 28, 2016
   L.T. NO.: 11-28790,16-16096

Denied.


text:
    Candice WOLFSON, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Howard WOLFSON, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2168
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    DECEMBER 16, 2016
   L.T. NO.: 11-28790,16-15096

Denied.


text:
    Joseph COLLINS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2251
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 15-12989

Dismissed.


text:
    SOLO AERO CORP., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. AMERICA-CV NETWORK, LLC and America-CV Station Group, Inc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2297
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 13-5284

Denied.


text:
    James L. JACKSON, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2301
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 06-34443

Ordered.


text:
    Jack KACHKAR, Appellant(s)/petitioner(s), v. BARKERVILLE GOLD MINES, LTD. Etc., et al., Appellee(s)/respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2308
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 06, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 15-27567

Dismissed.


text:
    UV CITE III, LLC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. 21ST MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2380
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 27, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 15-4499

Dismissed.


text:
    ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. ALL STATE READING AND INTERPRETATION, INC., A/S/O Ruby Golden And Kevin Ross, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2390
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 13-283, 13-419, 14-119, 14-171,14-51

Denied.


text:
    V.L., The Mother, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2430
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 12, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 13-15305

Dismissed.


text:
    Craig Steven JOHNSON, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2531
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 11, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 99-36513

Denied.


text:
    Regia HERRERA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. U.S. CENTURY BANK, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2600
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 11-37126

Dismissed.


text:
    CORPORATION MIXPRODUCTS, LLC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. MVR EXPORT SERVICES, INC. and Luis A. Rueda, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2643
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 14-24223

Denied.


text:
    Joseph PIRELA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2683
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 05, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 16-21138

Dismissed.


text:
    Joseph PIRELA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. GUARDIANSHIP, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2774
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 06, 2017
   L.T. NO.: 09-4359

Denied.

Dismissed.


text:
    Theodore BEVERLY, Jr., Appellant, v. Monaterra BETHEL, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2026
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Thomas M. Lynch, IV, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE-13-007516.

Affirmed.


text:
    Dorothy HALIBURTON, as personal representative of the Estate of Andrew Haliburton, Appellant, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-1819
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Meenu Sasser, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502008CA000703XXXXMBAI.

Affirmed.


text:
    Ramiro M. PENA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-937
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Okeechobee County; Dan L. Vaughn, Judge; L.T. Case No. 472010CF000280A.

Affirmed.


text:
    S.J., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-900
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Carlos E. Rebollo, Judge; L.T. Case No. 15004324DLA.

Affirmed.


text:
    Elias MARCHELOS, derivatively on behalf of Fisherman’s Pier, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. FISHERMAN’S PIER, INC., a Florida corporation, Spiro Marchelos, individually, and Suntrust Bank, Appellees.
    No. 4D16-0595
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Jack Tuter, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 14-017994 CACE (07) and 15-018317 CACE (07).

Affirmed.


text:
    Julien CROTEAU, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Florida Building Commission, Appellees.
    No. 4D16-517
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Florida Building Commission, L.T. Case No. DS 2015-136.

Affirmed.


text:
    Steven NERVIL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-0512
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Dennis D. Bailey, Judge; L.T. Case No. 15002175CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    The FOUNTAINS COUNTRY CLUB, INC., Appellant, v. The FOUNTAINS OF PALM BEACH CONDOMINIUM, INC. NO. 1, The Fountains of Palm Beach Condominium, et al., Appellees.
    Nos. 4D16-483 and 4D16-1301
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Edward L. Artau, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2013CA005683XXXXMB,

Affirmed.


text:
    Willie F. SIMMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-433
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County; Elizabeth A. Metzger, Judge; L.T. Case No. 432009CF001590.

Affirmed.


text:
    J.D., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-0392
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Rosemarie Scher, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502015CJ001923A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Francisco GONZALEZ, Appellant, v. Adriana Sanchez GONZALEZ, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-349
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Martin H. Colin, Judge; Case No. 502105DR003592XXXSB. L.T.

Affirmed.


text:
    Matthew BUCHANAN, Appellant, v. Laura BUCHANAN, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-264
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Arthur M. Birken, Judge; L.T. Case No. FMCE14013201 (35)(93).

Affirmed.


text:
    Jeffrey REININGER, Appellant, v. US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION As Trustee for CMALT REMIC 2005-1A-REMIC Pass Through Certificates Series 2005-A1 and H.O.A. Financial Services, L.L.C., Appellees.
    No. 4D15-4880
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Joel T. Lazarus, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE14004427 (11).

Affirmed.


text:
    Ricardo RANGEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-4864
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    February 23, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Glenn D. Kelley, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502013CF009706A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Ingrid MCCALL, Appellant, v. VENTURE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-4683
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    February 23, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Janet Croom, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562012CA000497.

Affirmed.


text:
    Gary Michael GAPINSKI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-4216
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Robert E. Belanger, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562014CF002661A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Tracey RIGGINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-3903
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Barbara McCarthy, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13005620 CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Chitomany MARSHALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-3649
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Matthew Isaac Destry, Judge; L.T. Case No. 14006342CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Brian Jeremiah SHEPARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-3621
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Dan L. Vaughn, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562012CF001942A.

Affirmed,


text:
    Malcom Lee PERRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-3575
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St, Lucie County; James W. McCann, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562014CF000964AXXXXX.

Affirmed,


text:
    Gavin LEIGH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D15-3438 & 4D15-3439
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Elizabeth A. Scherer, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 11-012525CF10A and 11-009827CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Levoris BRELAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-2530
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County; Darren Steele, Judge; L.T. Case No. 432014CF000559A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Tamisha KATES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-1920
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Barbara McCarthy, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13-007632 CF10A.

Affirmed,


text:
    Edmund KEAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-601
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13009736CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Robert RUMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D14-4794
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Geoffrey Cohen, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13-10676 CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Alan RUFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4165
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Ilona M. Holmes, Judge; L.T. Case No. 02-21551 CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Dale WEBSTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3926
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Michael I. Rothschild, Judge; L.T. Case No. 99-17499 CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Paul W. MERRITT, Appellant, v. Julie JONES, Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3712
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County; Barbara W. Bronis, Judge; L.T. Case No. 16-897-CA.

Affirmed.


text:
    Simonis FORGUE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D14-4138
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Michael Rothschild, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13002085 CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Keith SARJEANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D14-3036
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Matthew Isaac Destry, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13005463 CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Paul W. MERRITT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4116
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    February 23, 2017
   Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; James W. McCann, Judge; L.T. Case No. . 56-1979-CF-000728-A,

Affirmed.


text:
    James FORNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4050
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Ilona Maxine Holmes, Judge; L.T. Case No. 04-990CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Hamilton CLARINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-361
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the .Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Lisa M. Porter, Judge; L.T. Case No. 14-11856 CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Ricky Bernard YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4035
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Okeechobee County; Dan L. Vaughn, Judge; L.T. Case No. 47-2005-CF-000533-B.

Affirmed.


text:
    Luther BRADDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3792
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal of order denying rule 3.860 motion from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Jack Schramm Cox, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2005CF014164AXXXMB.

Affirmed,


text:
    Shawn MOHAMMED, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3749
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    February 23, 2017
   Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Edward H. Merrigan, Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No. 13-11135 CF10A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Ralph TORRES, Appellant, v. Andre HALVORSEN and TLUSA Holdings, LLC., et al., Appellees.
    No. 4D16-3674
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal of non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Carlos A. Rodriguez, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE15-012164.

Affirmed.


text:
    Antonio SANCHEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3553
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County; Lawrence M. Mirman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 432006CF0937A.

Affirmed.


text:
    Alan HEDRICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2601
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County; Lawrence Michael Mirman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 432000CF000814B.

Affirmed.


text:
    Lisa KALLAI-HARGROVE, Appellant, v. VALLEY NATIONAL BANK, N.A., Seminole Palms Homeowners Association, Inc., a Florida corporation, Allen Borza, Sterling Jean and Theodore Matz, Appellees.
    No. 4D16-2569
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal of a non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Catherine M. Brunson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502015CA004175XXXXMB.

Affirmed.


text:
    Curtis JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-1723
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    February 23, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Catherine M. Brunson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2016-CA-005061-XXXX-MB.

Affirmed.


text:
    Howard Fitzgerald ORR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-1085
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Jack Schramm Cox, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502009CF011153AXXXMB.

Affirmed.


text:
    H.O.A. FINANCIAL SERVICES, L.L.C., Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for CMALT REMIC 2015-1A-REMIC Pass Through Certificates Series 2005-A1, Jeffrey Reininger, Hui Fen Jia, The Woodlands at Carolina Homeowners Association, Inc., Carolina Maintenance Association, Inc., Citibank, N.A., as Successor by merger to Citibank, F.S.B., Unknown Tenant(s), Appellees.
    No. 4D16-1019
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 23, 2017]
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Joel T. Lazarus, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE14004427.

Affirmed.


text:
    Robert A. WEST, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-997
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed July 18, 2017
    Rehearing Denied August 21, 2017
   3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Dan Traver, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Omar MUNROE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-851
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed July 18, 2017
    Rehearing Denied September 14, 2017
   3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Alan S. Apte, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Randy Lee FLETCHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-237
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed July 25, 2017
   3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Citrus County, Richard A. Howard, Judge.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Donna Brown KLINKA, Appellant, v. Diane LUDWIG, James B. Chaplin, Peter Wood as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of John E. Brown, Dr. K’s Finest, Inc., Jeffrey Kampel and Little Brownie Properties, Inc., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-1
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed August 1, 2017
   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Alice Blackwell, Judge.

AFFIRMED.