text:
    STIRLING HOMES, LLC, Appellant, v. The RESIDENCES ON HOLLYWOOD BEACH CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2552
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 19, 2018
    Michael Heidt of the Law Office of Gable & Heidt, Hollywood, for appellant.
    Carolina Sznajderman Sheir and Darrin Gursky of Gursky Ragan, P.A., Miami, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gerber, C.J., Damoorgian and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Veljo KURIK, Appellant, v. Aime SAABAS, Ilmar Saabas, Peeter Saabas and Helen Uurman, as successors in interest to Enn Saabas, deceased, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-2682
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 19, 2018
    Seth Wieder of Loan Lawyers, LLC, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Alan B. Gest of Alan B. Gest, P.A., Aventura, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Damoorgian, Ciklin and Levine, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael C. MARSH, Appellant, v. Latoyia MARSH, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2844
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 19, 2018]
    Michael C. Marsh, Vero Beach, pro se.
    No appearance for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gerber, C.J., May and Damoorgian, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ellie WRIGHT, Appellant, v. Lucien MCDONALD, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2181
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 19, 2018]
    Salvatore DiGiacomo of Law Office of Frank DiGiacomo, Stuart, for appellant.
    Kristian A. Bie of Law Office of Fetterman & Associates, North Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gerber, C.J., Damoorgian and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Dudley J.M. FERDINANDO, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3682
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 23, 2018
    Dudley J. M. Ferdinando, Jr., Bowling Green, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

BERGER, WALLIS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Arthur DUKES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1942
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 23, 2018
    Arthur Dukes, Crestview, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER, EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Bernardino DEJESUS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3007
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 13, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Nicole Joanne Martingano, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison L. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, EVANDER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ray CROSBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3015
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed February 13, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 20, 2018
    Ray Crosby, Lake City, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See § 934.03(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2015).

ORFINGER, WALLIS and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Daniel A. TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3131
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 13, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 26, 2018
    Daniel A. Taylor, Indiantown, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

PALMER, BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Frank ADAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2499
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 13, 2018 Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Denied March 22, 2018
    Frank Adams, Cross City, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

TORPY, BERGER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Scott Henry WHEELER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3013
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 27, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 27, 2018
    Thomas D. Sommerville, of Law Offices of Thomas D. Sommerville, P.A., Orlando, and Stuart I. Hyman, Orlando, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, TORPY and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Shawn Emmanuel RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2157
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 20, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 27, 2018
    Shawn Emmanuel Richardson, Perry, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock Mcguigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Robert R. KELLY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2355
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 13, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 22, 2018
    Robert R. Kelly, Sanford, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., and EVANDER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Elaine R. MORRIS, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee FOR CSAB MORTGAGE-BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-2, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1589
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 13, 2018 Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 23, 2018
    Kelley A. Bosecker, St Petersburg, for Appellant.
    Kimberly S. Mello, and Danielle M. Diaz, of Greenberg Traurig, PA, Tampa, and Michele L. Stocker, of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., TORPY and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Susan A. MORROW, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and State of Florida, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-3766
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018
    Susan A Morrow, Ocala, pro se.
    Sheron Wells, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Office of General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee, Department of Corrections.
    No Appearance for other Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER, EVANDER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    John D. SOUTER, Jr, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2087
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 6, 2018
    John D. Souter, Jr, Chipley, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., TORPY and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Marvin L. TURNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2999
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 27, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 28, 2018
    Marvin L. Turner, Arcadia, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER, EVANDER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kenneth E. GREENE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-555
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 27, 2018
    Kenneth E. Greene, Clermont, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., BERGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ben L. DORTCH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3737
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018
    Ben L. Dortch, Chipley, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

TORPY, EVANDER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Richard MCMILLIAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2865
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018
    Richard McMillian, Orlando, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

PALMER, EVANDER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Brittany MILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2395
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018
    Brittany Miles, Ocala, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., PALMER and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Syndia SAINT-CYR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1603
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Matthew Funderburk, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Syndia Saint-Cyr, Ocala, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

BERGER, LAMBERT and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jessie DORSEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3801
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018
    Jessie Dorsey, Okeechobee, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, BERGER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jesse E. LARAMEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3725
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018
    Jesse E. Laramee, Blountstown, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, TORPY and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Erickson OCCEUS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3505
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018
    Erickson Occeus, Monticello, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Daniel Thomas SCHROTH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3425
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

BERGER, LAMBERT and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Frederick BLANDIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3189
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Edward J. Weiss, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., and SAWAYA and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Joel CORREA-ALICEA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3163
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    Rachael E. Reese, of O'Brien Hatfield, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER, BERGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jorge Luis MUNOZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3153
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018
    Jorge Luis Munoz, Bushnell, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

EVANDER, BERGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Todd S. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2963
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 13, 2018
    Todd S. Williams, Lawtey, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER, TORPY and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nicholas FURNELLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3115
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Ali L. Hansen, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nora Hutchinson Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

PALMER, TORPY and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Paris D. EVANS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2605
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    Paris D. Evans, Mayo, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LAMBERT, EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Demon K. FLOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2364
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    Ryan Thomas Truskoski, of Ryan Thomas Truskoski, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., WALLIS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jeffery SOBCZAK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2092
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Nicole J. Martingano, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison L. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., SAWAYA and PALMER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Wateka THOMASON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2086
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    Ryan Thomas Truskoski, of Ryan Thomas Truskoski, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison L. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LAMBERT, EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Leland M. INMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1975
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    Leland M. Inmon, Orlando, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., WALLIS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jonathan STEINBERG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1723
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    Lori D. Loftis, and Marc J. Antoine, of Office of Criminal Conflict & Civil Regional Counsel, Casselberry, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

EVANDER, WALLIS and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    E.A.R., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1631
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Glendon George Gordon, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

PALMER, ORFINGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lemonty THOMPKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1046
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Rocco J. Carbone, III, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lori N. Hagan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Anthony Joseph REED, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-455
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Andrew Mich, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WALLIS, EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Willy Fils MESIDOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-168
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Brittany N. O'Neil, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Andrea K. Totten, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, TORPY and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Harold MCKINNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-4044
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Thomas J Lukashow, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

TORPY, BERGER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jose Miguel Fortuno IRIZARRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3881
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Alexandra K. Galvin, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, PALMER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Cecil COOPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3607
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Susan A. Fagan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison L. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., SAWAYA and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Wesley LUCAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-372
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Kathryn Rollison Radtke, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Wesley B. Lucas, Panama City, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, ORFINGER and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Scott ROBERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-312
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Thomas J. Lukashow, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

PALMER, EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    John HUSSEY, Appellant, v. Guardianship of Elizabeth H. HUSSEY, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1399
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 27, 2018
    H. Kyle Fletcher, Jr., of Fletcher Law Firm, Oviedo, for Appellant.
    Nicholas A. Shannin and Carol B. Shannin, of Shannin Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

PALMER, BERGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    A.Z., Mother of K.V., K.V., and M.V., Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3392
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 26, 2018
    Edward Juan Lynum, of Lynum & Associates, PLLC, Leesburg, for Appellant.
    Stephanie C. Zimmerman, of Children's Legal Services, Bradenton, and Rachel Batten, of Children's Legal Services, Brooksville, for Appellee.
    Beth Kathryn Roland, of Friedman & Friedman, P.A., Lake Mary, and David P. Krupski, and Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Sanford, for Guardian ad Litem Program.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, BERGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


author: Warner, J.

text:
    Elliot YARO, Appellant, v. Scott J. ISRAEL, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Broward County, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-928
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 4, 2018]
    G. Ware Cornell, Jr. of Cornell & Associates, P.A., Weston, for appellant.
    Carmen Rodriguez of the Law Offices of Carmen Rodriguez, P.A., Palmetto Bay, for appellee.
    ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
   Warner, J.

The motion for rehearing is granted, and the prior opinion is vacated. The following opinion is substituted in its place.

Appellant sued the Broward County Sheriff for disability and age discrimination after he was demoted from his position as a child protective investigator with the Sheriff's office. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff on both claims. We affirm the judgment in its entirety.

As to the disability discrimination claim, the trial court correctly disposed of this based upon the contradiction in appellant's deposition of the material allegations of his complaint. As to the claim of age discrimination, we affirm based on Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins , 507 U.S. 604, 611, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993), where the Supreme Court found that termination of an employee to prevent his pension benefits from vesting did not violate the ADEA because it was not related to age, but to his pension status; actions under the ADEA must be based on age discrimination, not solely on a motivating factor that is only correlated with age). See Broaddus v. Fla. Power Corp. , 145 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) ("The ADEA does not prohibit an employer from making an employment decision on the basis of higher salaries, increased benefits, pension status, or claims for medical expenses even though these characteristics are often correlated with an employee's age."). Here, based upon appellant's own testimony, a major in the department told him that he was being demoted to use his higher salary to employ more investigators. Thus, while his higher salary may be correlated to age, age was not the reason for his demotion. Appellant made his claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act, but we apply federal case law interpreting the ADEA to cases arising under the FCRA. See City of Hollywood v. Hogan , 986 So.2d 634, 641 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Affirmed.

Taylor and Damoorgian, JJ., concur.


author: KLINGENSMITH, J.

text:
    CITY OF BOCA RATON, Appellant, v. Claire L. BASSO, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D17-976 4D17-1465
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 4, 2018]
    Anne K. Reilly and Matthew H. Mandel of Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Adam M. Balkan of Balkan & Patterson, LLP, Boca Raton, for appellee.
   KLINGENSMITH, J.

After Claire Basso was arrested for driving under the influence ("DUI"), she filed a lawsuit against the City of Boca Raton ("the City") for false arrest and false imprisonment. She prevailed on the false imprisonment claim, and was awarded $32,000 in damages. Although she obtained this judgment against the City, the trial court nevertheless ordered Basso to pay $6,117.04 in court costs to the City. We affirm the trial court's $32,000 final judgment entered against the City, but reverse the court's final judgment on costs, and remand for the trial court to award Basso all of her taxable costs incurred in this case.

On the night of September 12, 2013, Basso was pulled over for an expired license tag. As the officer approached her vehicle, he saw a half-empty wine bottle, two unopened beer cans, and smelled alcohol on Basso's breath. After Basso underperformed on the roadside sobriety exercises, she was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.

Basso was transported to the Boca Raton Police Department just after midnight, where she was given a breathalyzer test that registered .000. Although the officer admitted he had "no proof" that she was under the influence of any drugs and she appeared "lucid" while answering questions, Basso was not released from police custody until approximately 10:00 a.m. that morning.

Basso initially sued the City for false arrest, but later amended her complaint to add a false imprisonment claim. After three days of trial, the jury found that while the City had probable cause for initially arresting Basso, it did not have probable cause for her continued restraint. In other words, the City prevailed on the false arrest claim, but Basso prevailed on the false imprisonment claim. The jury awarded her $32,000 in damages.

Thereafter, the City filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"), and argued Basso did not present sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that probable cause "evaporated" between her initial arrest and her continued detention. This motion was denied and the court entered final judgment in Basso's favor.

Both parties then filed post-trial motions for costs. The City alleged it was entitled to costs because it prevailed on the false arrest claim. Basso, on the other hand, contended that she was entitled to costs because she was awarded $32,000 after prevailing on the false imprisonment claim.

The trial court ordered, "[The City] is entitled to recover its claimed costs in their entirety on the false-arrest count and [Basso] is entitled to recover her claimed costs in their entirety on the false-imprisonment count." In pertinent part, the final judgment on costs provided:

1. Per the Court's Order on May 11, 2017, [Basso] is entitled to $2,494.83, which are her costs incurred in her claim for false imprisonment (Count II).
2. Per the Court's Order on May 11, 2017, [the City] is entitled to $8,611.87, which are its costs incurred in defense of [Basso]'s claim for false arrest (Count I).
3. Therefore, a net cost final judgment is entered in favor of [the City] and against [Basso] in the amount of $6,117.04, for which let execution be stayed pending the appeal.

This appeal followed.

Denial of the City's Motion for JNOV

"A trial court's ruling on a motion for JNOV is reviewed de novo." Kogan v. Israel , 211 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). "A JNOV is appropriate only in situations where there is no evidence upon which a jury could rely in finding for the non-movant. A jury verdict must be sustained if it is supported by competent substantial evidence." Hancock v. Schorr , 941 So.2d 409, 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (internal citation omitted).

To prevail on a false imprisonment claim, the plaintiff must establish four elements: "1) the unlawful detention and deprivation of liberty of a person 2) against that person's will 3) without legal authority or 'color of authority' and 4) which is unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances." Montejo v. Martin Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. , 935 So.2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

"False arrest and false imprisonment are closely related, but false imprisonment is a broader common law tort; false arrest is only one of several methods of committing false imprisonment." Mathis v. Coats , 24 So.3d 1284, 1289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). "Indeed, a person improperly detained pursuant to a lawful arrest may have the right to bring an action for false imprisonment." Id.

Here, the City argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for JNOV because there was probable cause for the initial arrest and Basso failed to present sufficient evidence showing that this probable cause evaporated at some point while she was in custody. We disagree.

Basso's breathalyzer test showed a .000 reading. The officer admitted that Basso appeared lucid while answering questions at the police station. Although he arrested her for driving under the influence of alcohol, he testified he had no proof that she was under the influence of other substances.

Even though there may have been probable cause for the initial arrest, the issue of whether it was unreasonable and unwarranted to continue to detain Basso after the breathalyzer test was within the province of the trier of fact. See Mathis , 24 So.3d at 1290 (holding that after the plaintiff was arrested for DUI and sued the city for false arrest, the trial court erred by not allowing the plaintiff to amend her complaint to add false imprisonment as a claim because "[a]lthough probable cause existed at the time [the plaintiff] was arrested at the scene, she may be able to demonstrate that probable cause evaporated at some point after she was transported to CBT and jailed").

Therefore, we affirm the trial court's final judgment of $32,000 entered in favor of Basso.

Basso's Entitlement to Costs

"An appellate court reviews whether a trial court's award of costs is excessive for an abuse of discretion; however, whether a cost requested may be awarded, at all, is a question of law to be reviewed de novo." Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Reddick , 954 So.2d 723, 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (internal citation omitted).

Section 57.041(1), Florida Statutes (2016), provides that "[t]he party recovering judgment shall recover all his or her legal costs and charges which shall be included in the judgment." (Emphasis added). "The statute expressly demands that the party recovering judgment be awarded costs. This unambiguous language need not be construed." Hendry Tractor Co. v. Fernandez , 432 So.2d 1315, 1316 (Fla. 1983) ; see also Weitzer Oak Park Estate, Ltd. v. Petto , 573 So.2d 990, 991 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (stating that "every party who recovers a judgment in a legal proceeding is entitled as a matter of right to recover lawful court costs, and a trial judge has no discretion to deny costs to the parties recovering judgment").

Here, Basso is entitled to all of her court costs because she recovered a $32,000 judgment against the City. See Hendry Tractor Co. , 432 So.2d at 1316 (holding that "a plaintiff in a multicount personal injury action who recovers money judgment on at least one but not all counts in the cause of action, is the 'party recovering judgment' for purposes of section 57.041(1), Florida Statutes (1979), and therefore is entitled to recover costs"); see also Wanda Dipaola Stephen Rinko Gen. P'ship v. Beach Terrace Ass'n, Inc. , 173 So.3d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ; Bessey v. Difilippo , 951 So.2d 992, 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

The trial court erred by holding that Basso must pay the City $6,117.04 in court costs. We reverse that cost judgment and remand for the trial court to award Basso the taxable costs she incurred in this case.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Warner and Ciklin, JJ., concur.

      While the arresting officer testified that the police department required the detention of all DUI arrestees for at least eight hours after they were arrested, we need not determine for the purpose of deciding this case whether such a policy is contrary to Florida law. See § 316.193(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016) (holding that a suspect arrested for DUI may be released from custody once "the person's blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level is less than 0.05").


text:
    NATIONAL AMERICAN HOME, LLC, Appellant, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Indenture Trustee FOR AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUST 2006-1, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2614
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 4, 2018]
    Andrey Solonenko, Miramar, for appellant.
    W. Bard Brockman of Bryan Cave LLP, Atlanta, GA, and Zina Gabsi of Bryan Cave LLP, Miami, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

We affirm a final declaratory judgment, sought by appellant to determine the status of its title to property acquired after the filing of a mortgage foreclosure together with a notice of lis pendens. The foreclosure proceeding resulted in a final judgment and judicial sale of the property. Appellant claimed that its title to the property was unaffected by the mortgage foreclosure and sale, because the notice of lis pendens had expired, pursuant to section 48.23(2), Florida Statutes (2016). That statute, however, provides that a notice of lis pendens does not expire where the proceeding is based upon a duly recorded instrument. Appellant argued that a mortgage foreclosure proceeding did not fit within the exception.

In entering final judgment determining that the appellant's interest in the property was discharged, the trial court relied on Berkley Multi-Units, Inc. v. Linder , 464 So.2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), in which this court stated "An action to foreclose a mortgage on real property is an action 'founded on a duly recorded instrument.' " See also American Legion Community Club v. Diamond, 561 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Berkley with approval). Appellant correctly notes that this statement was dicta, as the case involved rescission based on fraud, and the court was simply giving examples of types of actions based upon duly recorded instruments.

This, on the other hand, is a case involving a mortgage foreclosure, and we adopt the dicta of Berkley as the holding of this case: An action to foreclose a mortgage on real property is an action "founded on a duly recorded instrument." Therefore, the notice of lis pendens filed in this proceeding did not expire. The appellant's interest was discharged upon the judicial sale of the property in the foreclosure proceeding.

We affirm as to all other issues raised.

Warner, Ciklin and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.

      48.23 Lis pendens.-
      (1)(a) An action in any of the state or federal courts in this state operates as a lis pendens on any real or personal property involved therein or to be affected thereby only if a notice of lis pendens is recorded in the official records of the county where the property is located and such notice has not expired pursuant to subsection (2) or been withdrawn or discharged.
      ....
      d) Except for the interest of persons in possession or easements of use, the recording of such notice of lis pendens, provided that during the pendency of the proceeding it has not expired pursuant to subsection (2) or been withdrawn or discharged, constitutes a bar to the enforcement against the property described in the notice of all interests and liens, including, but not limited to, federal tax liens and levies, unrecorded at the time of recording the notice unless the holder of any such unrecorded interest or lien intervenes in such proceedings within 30 days after the recording of the notice. If the holder of any such unrecorded interest or lien does not intervene in the proceedings and if such proceedings are prosecuted to a judicial sale of the property described in the notice, the property shall be forever discharged from all such unrecorded interests and liens. If the notice of lis pendens expires or is withdrawn or discharged, the expiration, withdrawal, or discharge of the notice does not affect the validity of any unrecorded interest or lien.
      (2) A notice of lis pendens is not effectual for any purpose beyond 1 year from the commencement of the action and will expire at that time, unless the relief sought is disclosed by the pending pleading to be founded on a duly recorded instrument or on a lien claimed under part I of chapter 713 against the property involved, except when the court extends the time of expiration on reasonable notice and for good cause. The court may impose such terms for the extension of time as justice requires.


author: Taylor, J.

text:
    Vanessa LEWIS, Appellant, v. Jason JULIANO, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2544
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 18, 2018]
    Vanessa A. Lewis, Melbourne, pro se.
    No appearance for appellee.
   Taylor, J.

The former wife appeals a post-dissolution order requiring her to "provide her physical address in order to have any timesharing with the minor child." We reverse, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by modifying the timesharing schedule as a sanction for the former wife's failure to provide her physical address.

The parties were divorced in 2014 by way of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. They have one minor child.

In March 2016, the trial court entered an order modifying the final judgment. In light of the former wife's relocation to another state, the trial court adopted an out-of-state Parenting Plan and gave the former husband majority timesharing in Florida. The Parenting Plan required each parent "to provide a residential, mailing, or contact address" to the other parent, and to "notify the other parent in writing within 24 hours of any changes."

The former husband later filed a motion to hold the former wife in contempt for her "failure to allow the child appropriate communication with the Former Husband as well as her failure to provide an address."

In July 2016, the trial court granted the former husband's motion for contempt "insofar as the Former Wife shall provide her current address to the Clerk of Court."

In May 2017, the former husband filed a motion for status of summer timesharing, alleging that the former wife had failed to provide her current address to the Clerk of Court and that the former husband had no idea where the child would be staying during the summer. The former husband thus argued that "[t]he child should not travel or go with the Former Wife without an address being disclosed where the child would be staying" and that "the Former Wife should be required to disclose her address to the Former Husband and the Clerk of Court."

Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the former husband's motion for status of summer timesharing. The order states, in relevant part, that the former wife "shall provide her physical address in order to have any timesharing with the minor child." This appeal ensued.

On appeal, the former wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her any timesharing with the minor child unless she divulges her current address to the former husband. The former wife admits that she did not give the former husband her current address as required by the July 2016 order. However, the former wife asserts that the trial court gave no consideration to the best interests of the minor child or to Florida's public policy that each minor child should have frequent and continuing contact with both parents.

A trial court's ruling on a timesharing issue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Witt-Bahls v. Bahls , 193 So.3d 35, 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Discretion is abused "when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable," meaning that no reasonable person "would take the view adopted by the trial court." Canakaris v. Canakaris , 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (quoting Delno v. Mkt. St. Ry. Co. , 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942) ).

"It is the public policy of this state that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of childrearing." § 61.13(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2017).

Consistent with this public policy, a trial court must determine all matters relating to parenting and timesharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child. § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017). Furthermore, "modification of a parenting plan and timesharing schedule requires a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change of circumstances." Id.

"A court cannot modify timesharing as a sanction for a parent's contempt of a custody order." Duncan v. Brickman , 233 So.3d 477, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). "The sanction of changing custody does not coerce compliance; rather, it may, in the absence of a finding that such a change is in the best interest of the children, penalize the children for the parent's contumacious conduct." LaLoggia-VonHegel v. VonHegel , 732 So.2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

Modification of timesharing in the context of a contempt proceeding is permissible only if: (1) the moving party has affirmatively alleged and proven a substantial change in circumstances; (2) the minor child's best interests require the modification; and (3) sufficient notice of the proposed modification was afforded to the nonmoving party. Duncan , 233 So.3d at 480 n.4.

Here, the trial court abused its discretion by modifying the timesharing schedule as a sanction for the former wife's failure to provide her physical address. The trial court's order had the effect of temporarily modifying the timesharing schedule until the former wife provided her address. Although the former husband's motion provided sufficient notice of the proposed suspension of the former wife's timesharing until she provided her address, the other two requirements for a modification were not met. The trial court did not find that a substantial change in circumstances occurred. Nor did the trial court find that the child's best interests required the modification. The trial court's order was therefore improper.

We note that the record suggests that the former wife might be refusing to disclose her address for an improper purpose-namely, to avoid service of process. Nevertheless, while the order on appeal was intended to obtain the former wife's compliance with the Parenting Plan and a prior court order requiring her to "provide her current address to the Clerk of Court," the trial court should not have modified the timesharing schedule in the absence of findings that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred and that the modification was in the child's best interests.

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the order on appeal. On remand, if the trial court finds the former wife in contempt of the prior order requiring her to "provide her current address to the Clerk of Court," the trial court may impose sanctions other than a modification of timesharing.

Reversed and Remanded.

Gross and Kuntz, JJ., concur.

      Although we do not have a transcript of the hearing, the language in the order suggests that the hearing was non-evidentiary.


author: Conner, J.

text:
    Mark Joseph SAUNDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-643
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 18, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R. Napodano, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Conner, J.

Appellant, Mark Joseph Saunders, appeals his convictions and sentences for eight crimes after a jury found him guilty as charged. Appellant argues the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to sever offenses; (2) denying his motion to strike the entire jury venire; (3) overruling his objections during the State's closing argument; and (4) failing to determine his competence to stand trial. We affirm without discussion the trial court's rulings on all of the arguments raised by Appellant except the last argument. Because we determine the record does not show the trial court made an independent determination of Appellant's competence to stand trial after appointing an expert to evaluate his competence, we reverse Appellant's convictions and sentences if a nunc pro tunc determination of competence that comports with due process cannot be made by the trial court. Thus, we remand for further proceedings.

Appellant was charged by amended information with eight offenses: (1) home invasion robbery with a firearm; (2) grand theft of a motor vehicle; (3) fleeing or eluding; (4) aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon; (5) unlawful possession of a bulletproof vest; (6) possession of a firearm or ammunition by a convicted felon; (7) burglary of a dwelling while armed; and (8) third degree grand theft. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on all counts with the possession of a firearm charge tried in a bifurcated trial. Appellant was found guilty as charged as to all eight counts.

Prior to trial, defense counsel moved for a competency determination pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b). The trial court granted the motion and appointed an expert to examine Appellant. However, the record does not indicate that any competency hearing was held, nor does the record contain any competency evaluation or a stipulation that the trial court could determine competency by reviewing an evaluation that is not in the record.

Appellant was sentenced as a prison release reoffender to life in prison on two of the counts and given lengthy prison sentences on the remaining counts, all to run concurrently with credit for time served. Appellant gave notice of appeal.

The State correctly concedes that the trial court fundamentally erred in failing to conduct a competency hearing and to make a competency determination. See Dougherty v. State , 149 So.3d 672, 677-78 (Fla. 2014) ; Deferrell v. State , 199 So.3d 1056, 1060-61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). The remedy for such error depends on the circumstances of each case. See Dougherty , 149 So.3d at 679.

This case is similar to the situations we addressed in Baker v. State , 221 So.3d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), and Silver v. State , 193 So.3d 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), where the defendants proceeded to a jury trial after the trial courts appointed experts for competency evaluation, but the trial courts did not make an independent determination regarding the defendants' competence. Baker , 221 So.3d at 639 ; Silver , 193 So.3d at 992-93. As we noted in Silver , our "supreme court has recognized that 'a nunc pro tunc competency evaluation' is possible if 'a sufficient number of expert and lay witnesses who have examined or observed the defendant contemporaneous with trial' are available." Silver , 193 So.3d at 993-94 (quoting Dougherty , 149 So.3d at 679 ).

Therefore, we affirm the trial court's rulings on Appellant's motion to sever charges, motion to strike the entire jury venire, and objections to the State's closing arguments. However, we reverse all of Appellant's convictions and sentences if a nunc pro tunc determination of his competence at the time of trial that comports with due process cannot be made by the trial court. Thus, we remand for further proceedings with the same instructions we gave in Baker :

[O]n remand, if the court can make a nunc pro tunc finding as to [A]ppellant's competency based upon the existence of evaluations performed contemporaneous with trial and without relying solely on a cold record, and can do so in a manner which abides by due process guarantees, then it should do so and enter a corresponding written order. Presley [v. State] , 199 So.3d [1014,] 1019 [ (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ] [additional citation omitted]. However, if the [trial] court finds, for any reason, that an evaluation of [A]ppellant's competency at the time of trial cannot proceed in a way that ensures [A]ppellant's due process rights, then the court should adjudicate h[is] current competency and, if [he] is competent, conduct a new trial on all counts. A.L.Y. [v. State] , 212 So.3d [399,] 404 [ (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ].

Baker , 221 So.3d at 641-42.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Gerber, C.J., and Taylor, J., concur.