author: RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE,

text:
    In the MATTER OF the ESTATE OF C.W. WHITE, Deceased: Anita White, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of C.W. White v. Charles Tommy White
    NO. 2016-CA-00544-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    08/31/2017
    Rehearing Denied November 2, 2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JOHN THOMAS LAMAR, III, JOHN THOMAS LAMAR, JR.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ROBERT RYAN REVERE
    BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., KITCHENS AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
   RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Anita White appeals the Chancery Court of DeSoto County’s confirmation of title to certain real property located in Yalobusha County to Charles Thomas White (“Tommy”). Anita claimed the property through the residuary clause of Charles William White’s (“Bill’s”) will. Tommy claimed the property through an earlier conveyance from his father and long-time partner, Bill. The chancellor found the earlier conveyance valid. Anita appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. This case is before the Court following remand. The facts of this case are contained in the prior opinion from this Court:

Charles William White (“Bill”) and his son Charles Thomas White (“Tommy”), were partners in a business that owned and operated convenience stores. In 2000, during the course of the partnership, Bill married Anita White. In 2005, Tommy bought his father’s share of the partnership for [$21,318.10], but in dissolving the partnership, Bill and Tommy neglected to execute and file deeds transferring the partnership’s real property.
In early 2009, Bill’s health declined rapidly, and Anita and Tommy began to clash over Bill’s healthcare. Tommy wanted his father to receive life-sustaining treatment and Anita wanted her husband to die with dignity. During this time, Tommy realized that he and his father had failed to execute deeds transferring the partnership’s real-property assets. Tommy used a durable power of attorney his father had given him years before to execute quit-claim deeds transferring the partnership property to himself.
[Tommy] and Anita continued to clash over who had authority to make healthcare decisions for Bill, so Tommy filed a petition for a conservatorship for his father’s benefit and sought appointment as his father’s conservator. Anita filed a counterclaim that challenged Tommy’s fitness to serve as his father’s conservator and sought to have Tommy return all assets he had transferred to himself using his father’s power of attorney. The chancellor agreed that a conservatorship was appropriate, but he appointed a .third party as Bill’s conservator.
When Bill died in June 2009, the conservator filed a motion asking to be discharged from his duties and to be allowed to distribute the assets of the conservatorship to, Bill’s estate. The parties agreed to an order,discharging the conservator and to a distribution of funds held by the conservator to Bill’s estate, The order • noted “that W.E. Davis is discharged as Conservator for C.[W], White, and that formal accounting is waived,” and “this Conservator-ship is closed.” The chancellor’s order made no mention of Anita’s action to set aside the deed transfers.
In February 2010, Anita filed suit to set aside the quit-claim deeds and to redeem the real property Tommy had acquired using his father’s power of attorney. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. Tommy argued that the order discharging the conservator barred relitigation of the .conveyances 'because Anita sought to ■have the conveyances set.aside in the conservatorship. Anita argued that the transfers .were not in Bill’s best interests and that the transfers should ■ be set aside and the property returned to Bill’s estate. The chancellor held that Anita’s action was barred by res judicata, granted Tommy’s motion, and denied Anita’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
Anita appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that her action was not barred by res judicata and that the chancellor had erred by denying her motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor, finding that “all four identities of res judica-ta [were] present,” and that “the chancellor correctly held that the doctrine of res judicata precluded] Anita’s second lawsuit.” We granted Anita’s petition for a writ of certiorari.

Estate of White v. White, 152 So.3d 314, 315-16 (Miss. 2014). “Because there was no final judgment on the merits, we must reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the chancellor’s judgment dismissing Anita’s claims and remand the case to the DeSoto County Chancery Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Id. at 317.

¶3. On remand, the chancellor determined the properties at issue were partnership property and concluded that the 2005 instrument Bill used to dissolve the partnership contained all the requirements to effect the transfer of property. Because the property was' transferred to Tommy in 2005, it was not owned by Bill at the time of his death and therefore could not pass to Anita through the residuary clause of Bill’s will. The chancellor determined no confidential relationship existed between Bill and Tommy in 2005 and thus Tommy had exerted no undue influence over Bill in executing the dissolution and transfer instrument. Because the chancellor determined the 2005 instrument transferred the property, the court found the 2009 quitclaim deeds inconsequential and declined to analyze whether Tommy’s use of the power of attorney in 2009 breached a fiduciary duty to Bill. Anita appealed.

ISSUES

¶4. Anita raised four issues, which have been reordered and restated in two issues for clarity, as they are case-dispositive:

I. Whether the chancellor erred in considering and relying on the 2005 instrument.
II. Whether the 2005 instrument sufficed to transfer Bill’s partnership interest in real property.

ANALYSIS

¶5. This Court “review[s] a chancellor’s legal conclusions de novo,” but “accept[s] a chancellor’s factual findings unless — given the evidence in the record — [it] concluded] that the chancellor abused his or her discretion, and no reasonablé chancellor could have come to the same factual conclusions.” Kilpatrick v. Whitehall on MS River, LLC, 207 So.3d 1241, 1245 (Miss. 2016).

I. Whether the chancellor erred in considering and relying on the 2005 instrument.

' ¶6. Anita argues that Bill’s will was unambiguous, and therefore the 2005 instrument was inadmissible parol evidence of testamentary intent. See Estate of Blount v. Papps, 611 So.2d 862, 866 (Miss. 1992) (“ In determining the testator’s intent, in the absence of ambiguity, this Court is limited to the ‘four corners’ of the will itself.”). But Tommy did not seek to admit the 2005 instrument as evidence of testamentary intent:

[W]e are not using those documents to address any type of testamentary] intent. We’ve got a document from 2005 that we are using to establish that transfer — that the property was transferred before the date of Mr. [Bill] White’s death, and to rebut any arguments from the other side that ... Mr. Tommy violated any fiduciary duty or any und[ue] influence there.

Because the document was admitted to show that the property had been adeemed prior to the testator’s death, its admission did not violate the parol evidence rule.

II. Whether the 2005 instrument sufficed to transfer Bill’s partnership interest in real property.

¶7. Section 89-1-1 provides:

Any interest in or claim to land may be conveyed to vest immediately or in the future, by writing signed and delivered; and such writing shall have the effect to transfer, according to its terms, the title of the person signing and delivering it, with all its incidents, as fully and perfectly as if it were transferred by feoffment with livery of seizin, notwithstanding there may be an adverse possession thereof.

Miss. Code Ann. § 89 — 1—1 (Rev. 2011). Any interest in or claim to land may be conveyed “not only by deed or will but by any other instrument of writing signed , and delivered.” Ricks v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co. of Vicksburg, 191 Miss. 323, 2 So.2d 344, 346 (1941). An instrument of conveyance

will be construed to effectuate the manifest intention and purpose of the parties although .it is inartificially and untechni-cally drawn. Technical terms, however, need not be used; and if an intention to pass a title is disclosed, the court will give effect to such intention notwithstanding inaccuracy of expression, or inaptness of the words used.

Allen v. Boykin, 199 Miss. 417, 24 So.2d 748, 749 (1946) (internal citations omitted).

¶8. The 2005 instrument was typed on C.W. White Partnership letterhead, addressed to the partnership’s accountant, and dated April 28, 2005. It reads, “This is to verify and certify that I wish to dissolve C W White Partnership, Fed. ID # [redacted] effective December 31, 2004, and transfer all its property/assets to Charles Thomas White SSN, [redacted].” It was signed by C.W. “Bill” White, as General Partner/ and witnessed by Bill Finch Jr., whose signature also is dated April 28, 2005. Janet L. Dickey notarized that Bill had subscribed and sworn to the instrument before her on April 28, 2005.. Tommy testified that his father “signed it, had it witnessed, gave it back, to me, and I’ve kept it ever since.”

¶9. The 2005 instrument is a writing which was signed, .sealed, and- .delivered. The instrument evinces Bill’s intent to transfer title to “all [partnership] property to [Tommy].” Anita complains that the property description in the instrument is insufficient.

' ¶10. According to this Court’s precedent,

[generally speaking, a description of land in [an instrument] is not void if it contains sufficient indicia to indicate what was conveyed, so that, with the [instrument] and the information indicated by it, the land can be located with certainty; and a defect in the description may be cured by aid of parol evidence giving the identity of the premises intended to be conveyed.

Herod v. Robinson, 149 Miss. 354, 115 So. 40, 41 (1927). See also Moffett v. Int'l Paper Co., 243 Miss. 562, 139 So.2d 655, 656 (1962) (“[A] conveyance of all of the property of the grantor in a certain state is sufficient to pass the grantor’s title to real estate in that state, without a particular description. It can be made certain.”).

¶11. The deed in Moffett conveyed “all right and title owned by the grantor in lands, timber, minerals, and all other property and rights, real, personal or mixed, situated in the State of Mississippi.” Id. Similarly, the 2005 instrument purported to transfer “all [partnership] property.” While the 2005 instrument did not specify “in the state of Mississippi” as did the deed in Moffett, evidence was presented at trial that the partnership owned only land in Mississippi and that the Yalobusha properties were partnership properties.

¶12. “Property is partnership property if acquired in the name of the partnership.” Miss. Code Ann. § 79-13-204(a)(l) (Rev. 2013). The 1994 deed provides on its face that it was conveyed to “C. W. WHITE PARTNERSHIP, C. W. and C. T. WHITE, PARTNERS.”

Property is presumed to be partnership property if purchased with partnership assets, even if not acquired in the name of the partnership or of one or more partners with an indication in the instrument transferring title to the property of the person’s capacity as a partner or of the existence of a partnership.

Miss. Code Ann. § 79-13-204(c) (Rev. 2013). The 1981 deed, which addresses four tracts of land, acknowledges that “the property is and has always been considered owned by Charles W. White and Charles Thomas White and was purchased and has been paid for from partnership funds.” The 1992 deed lists the grantees as Charles W. White and Charles T. White, as tenants in common. At trial, the testimony revealed that all of these properties were treated as partnership property, that they were purchased with partnership funds, that the property taxes were paid with partnership funds, and that the rent from the properties was collected by and paid to the partnership.

¶13. We find the evidence supports the chancellor’s determination that the property at issue was partnership property. Therefore, the “identity of the premises intended to be conveyed” was evidenced at trial and the property described in the 2005 instrument could be made sufficiently certain. The chancellor did not err in finding the 2005 instrument sufficient to transfer the property to Tommy.

CONCLUSION

¶14. For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the DeSoto County Chancery Court.

¶15. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR.

      . The real properties in question were acquired by Bill and Tommy in 1981, 1992, and 1994.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KITCHENS, JUSTICE, KING, JUSTICE,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Marilyn NEWSOME, Individually and as Conservator/Conservatrix of Victoria Newsome v. David SHOEMAKE and Joe Dale Walker
    NO. 2016-CA-00280-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    09/07/2017
    Rehearing Denied October 26, 2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: LAUREN CAVALIER STUBBS, W. TERRELL STUBBS
    •ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KRISSY CASEY NOBILE, HAROLD EDWARD PIZZETTA, III, ROBERT E. EVANS
    BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., KITCHENS AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
   KITCHENS, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. This civil action arises from the mishandling 'of the Conservatorship of Victoria Newsome. Victoria Newsome’s mother and conservator, Marilyn Newsome, filed the instant suit in the Chancery Court of Simpson County against former chancellor Joe Dale Walker, Chancellor David Shoemake, and other parties. The Chancery Court of Simpson County granted dismissal pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) to Walker and Judge Shoemake on the basis of judicial immunity. Marilyn Newsome appeals. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Joe Dale. Walker, who was at the time the senior chancellor for-the Thirteenth Chancery Court District, appointed Marilyn Newsome as conservator of the person and estate of her disabled adult daughter, Victoria Newsome, on July 13, 2010, and issued Letters of Conservator-ship, to her on July 21, 2010. Victoria’s severely infirm condition was the result of medical malpractice.

¶3. Marilyn Newsome’s counsel in her daughter’s medical malpractice case, Charles Merkel III, filed a “Petition for Authority to Compromise and Settle Disputed Claim, For Approval and Establishment of Trust, and For Other Relief’ on January 10, 2011. Marilyn Newsome asked that the settlement-proceeds be distributed as follows:

$1,239,633.11 Merkel & Cocke, P. A
$8,384.09 Medicaid for its lien;
$145,000.00 For purchase of home located at 657 Hwy 149,Magee, MS . ’
$25,000.00 To Marilyn [Newsome] for payment of taxes, insurance, utility deposits
$17,255.05 Marilyn [Newsome] for past services and expenses
$1,057.00 Keely McNulty, Esq,, for legal services rendered in custody matter
$1,000,000.00 To purchase structured settlement annuity
$563.670.75 To SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST
$3,000,000.00

¶4. On January 13, 2011, Walker authorized the distribution of the settlement proceeds as follows:

$1,238,005.61 . Merkel & Cocke, P.A.
$8,384.09 Medicaid '
$ 17,25 5,05 To Marilyn [Newsome] for past services and expenses
$5,000,00 Keely McNulty, Esq., for legal services in child custody matter
$1,000,000.00 To purchase annuity
$729.727.75 -_To Merkel & Cocke, P.A., Trust Account
$2,998,372.50

According to the complaint, Walker did not approve the purchase of the home as requested in the petition. The chancellor increased McNulty’s requested attorney fee from $1,057 to $5,000, and his disbursement of conservatorship funds failed to account for $1,627.50. Marilyn Newsome then opened a checking account at Peoples Bank for the conservatorship.

¶ 5. On March 21, 2011, Judge Walker allegedly entered an ex parte order in which he summarily denied a petition which had sought his approval for the purchase a home for Victoria Newsome and her family. In the same ex parte order, Judge Walker decreed that real property and a mobile home were to be purchased and that money was to be deposited into the conservatorship account to fund both purchases and to fund the construction and maintenance of a new home. In addition, Judge Walker ordere'd that Marilyn New-some be paid $1,450 for expenses and that McNulty be paid $5,800 for legal services. According to the complaint, no petition requesting any of the relief Walker ordered appeared in the conservatorship record.

¶ 6. Marilyn Newsome alleges in the complaint that McNulty prepared and Judge Walker signed other ex parte orders with no petitions having been filed and no findings or adjudications having been made on the record. The complaint states that these orders related to the purchase of real property, the purchase of a mobile home, and the construction of a “special needs home.” McNulty prepared and Judge Walker signed orders awarding attorney fees to McNulty in the absence of itemized statements of hours or an hourly rate.

¶ 7. Judge Walker assigned to McNulty the task of obtaining at least four construction bids. C.T. Construction, a construction company owned by Walker’s nephew, Chad Teater, submitted the lowest bid. Accordingly, on July 22, 2011, Walker transferred the case, by ex parte order, to Judge David Shoemake, the other chancellor for the Thirteenth Chancery Court District, “ ‘for the limited purpose of approving and acceptance of the bid(s) for the construction of the home for the ward. Upon approval and acceptance, the cause is to be transferred back to Honorable Joe Dale Walker, Post 2.’” Marilyn alleges that “[n]o pleading was filed requesting said transfer and the record does not reflect any findings that supported a transfer of the case.”

¶8. That same day, Judge Shoemake authorized Marilyn Newsome to accept the lowest bid of $273,075.14 from C.T. Construction and transferred the case back to Walker. According to Marilyn Newsome’s complaint, Judge Shoemake, on July 28, 2011, signed another ex parte order approving C.T. Construction’s “Construction Management Agreement” and authorizing Marilyn Newsome, as conservator, to make payments. The agreement, which allegedly had been prepared and presented by McNulty, required, in addition to the payment of $273,075.14, a flat fee of $30,000. Judge Shoemake then, on August 2, 2011, signed an order authorizing Merk-el & Cocke, P.A., to transfer $258,395.14 from the conservatorship escrow account for the construction of the ward’s new home. According to the complaint filed by the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance against Judge Shoemake, “[n]o petition requesting that relief was ever filed, and [Marilyn Newsome] never gave her permission nor had knowledge of that request for relief.”

¶ 9. Judge Walker, on January 20, 2012, entered an order, nunc pro tunc to January 12, 2011, in which he appointed McNulty guardian ad litem for Victoria Newsome in the absence of a petition or a hearing. Judge Walker, according to the complaint, merely found that appointing McNulty was in Victoria Newsome’s best interest. Allegedly at the request of Walker, on January 24, 2012, McNulty, as Victoria Newsome’s guardian ad litem, filed a Show Cause Petition requesting that Marilyn Newsome be ordered to show cause why she should not be held in contempt as conservator because certain facts and circumstances “adverse to the personal and financial health and well-being of Victoria” had come to McNulty’s attention.

¶ 10. That same day, McNulty filed a petition requesting an additional $23,000 from the ward’s funds to pay for materials belonging to C.T. Construction which allegedly had been stolen from the construction site. According to the complaint, the petition alleged that “the total home construction amount of $326,075.14 ($273,-075.14 + $30,000.00 + $23,000.00) still [would] be lower than any other bid submitted,” but “there were no bids filed in the court record.” On January 25, 2012, “in spite of having transferred the case back to Judge Walker, [Judge Shoemake] signed an order directing payment of $23,000 to C.T. Construction for the allegedly stolen materials.”

¶ 11. McNulty moved to withdraw as a counsel for the conservatorship on March 20, 2012. On April 17, 2012, McNulty moved to withdraw from her position as guardian ad litem for Victoria, allegedly attaching to the petition “an itemized statement of her legal services without any itemization of time or hourly rates.” McNulty again sought to withdraw,- on April 24, 2012, from both her position as guardian ad litem and as counsel for the conservator. Judge Walker signed an ex parte order allowing McNulty’s withdrawal on May 14,2012.

¶ 12. Judges Walker and Shoemake entered a joint order of recusal dated October 13, 2013, “at the direction of the Judicial Performance Commission.” Marilyn Newsome avers in her complaint that Judges Walker and Shoemake had; “instructed the Chancery Court to disregard the Order of Recusal and omit it from the court file.” Each thereafter executed separate orders of recusal.

¶ 13. The Commission on Judicial Performance filed a petition for interim suspension of Walker on January 2, 2014. This Court “suspended Judge Walker from the performance of his duties of his office, with pay, during the pendency of the Commission’s inquiry.” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Walker, 172 So.3d 1165, 1166 (Miss. 2015). Later, this Court determined that Judge Walker had resigned from his judicial office, “having pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi to the felony of obstruction of justice.” Id. Ultimately, this Court formally removed Judge Walker from office, “ ‘due to the seriousness of his admitted criminal acts and judicial misconduct.’” Id. at 1168 (quoting Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. DeLaughter, 29 So.3d 750, 755 (Miss. 2010)).

¶ 14. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance recommended Judge Shoemake’s removal from office. Miss: Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Shoemake, 191 So.3d 1211, 1212 (Miss. 2016). But this Court determined that, while “Judge Shoemake’s negligence and inattention while executing- ex parte orders resulted in the dissipation of assets from Victoria Newsome’s Conservatorship,” such did not warrant removal from, office. Id. at 1224. Instead, in addition to imposing a $2,500 fine and ordering that Judge Shoemake pay court costs, this Court ordered that Judge Shoemake receive a public reprimand and a thirty-day suspension from office without pay. Id.

¶ 15. In the instant case, Marilyn New-some filed a Complaint, Request for 'Full Accounting and Inventory, for Return of Funds, for Attorney Fees, and for Other Relief in the Chancery Court of Simpson County on February 9, 2015. She filed an Amended Complaint, Request for Full Accounting - and Inventory -for Return of Funds, for Attorney Fees, and for Other Relief in the Chancery Court of Simpson County on February 11, 2016. The defendants included Peoples Bank, its employee Chris Dunn, Keely McNulty, Judge David Shoemake, Joe Dale Walker, and Chad Teater; Marilyn Newsome alleged that defendants had misappropriated funds, committed malpractice, and committed civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She further alleged conspiracy, fraud, breach of contract, breach, of implied warranties and other warranties, breach of fiduciary duties, negligence, -negligence per se, gross negligence, and intentional infliction- of emotional distress. Marilyn New-some demanded “a full accounting and inventory of Plaintiff Victoria Newsome’s Conservatorship account.” For each of the other claims,. Marilyn Newsome sought a monetary sum “sufficient to fully compensate Plaintiffs for actual and ..punitive damages ..., together with prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest and all costs related to this civil action.”

■ ¶ 16. In the wake .-of the recusals of Judges Walker and Shoemake, Judge Hollis McGehee was assigned to oversee the conservatorship proceedings. Because the civil action had been filed in the conserva-torship proceedings, Judge McGehee sua sponte severed the civil action from the conservatorship. Because Judge McGehee subsequently recused, Judge Gerald Martin was.assigned-to hear the case, but he recused shortly thereafter. This Court then appointed Judge James D. Bell as special chancellor to hear the civil action.

¶ 17. Judge Shoemake filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, that “the Mississippi Tort Claims Act provides additional layers of immunity to” him, and that, “to the extent [he] is sued in his official capacity under § 1983, .such an attempted claim immediately fails because -neither the state nor its officials acting in their official ca~ pacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Alongside his motion to dismiss, Judge Shoemake- asked for a stay of discovery, arguing that “immunity must be considered and resolved before the significant expense of needless discovery is undertaken ... Joe Dale Walker filed a “Joinder in Judge Shoemake’s Motion to Stay and Motion to Dismiss.”

¶ 18. Marilyn Newsome then filed a Motion to Disqualify Jim Hood, Attorney General [of the] State of Mississippi!,] as Counsel for Defendant, David Shoemake.” She argued that “[i]nstead of referring the Complaint to the Vulnerable Adult Division and opening a criminal investigation and Tepresenting the victim in this matter, the Attorney - General’s- Office has chosen to enter its appearance on behalf of Defendant ] Shoemake and ignore the apparent conflicts of interest.” According to Marilyn Newsome, “[o]ne would assume that the Attorney General’s Office would be inclined to help those persons that cannot help themselves.” But “the Attorney General has chosen to ridicule the Plaintiff for seeking relief for damages her daughter, Victoria, has sustained at the' hands of the above-named defendants, including David Shoemake, a sitting Chancery Judge.”

¶ 19. The trial court stayed discovery as to Walker and Judge Shoemake. It also denied Marilyn Newsome’s motion to disqualify the Attorney General, finding that “it does not appear from the record that the Attorney General ever initiated an attorney-client relationship with the Plaintiff arid it does not appear from the record that the Plaintiff reasonably believed that the Attorney General was her attorney.” After a-'hearing, the trial court granted dismissal, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), both to Walker and Judge Shoemake on the .basis of the doc-, trine of judicial immunity. The trial court denied Marilyn Newsome’s “Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Order Granting Defendant Shoemake’s Motion to Stay Discovery and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Attorney General and for Record to be Made,” but ordered “that a record shall be made of all Motions and other matters in this case.”

¶20. Aggrieved, Marilyn Newsome has appealed. She argues that the trial court erred in granting dismissal pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) to Walker and Judge Shoemake on- the basis of judicial immunity, that the trial court erred in granting a stay of discovery to Walker and Judge Shoemake, that the trial court erred in denying her motion to disqualify the Attorney General, and that the chancellor erred in denying, her motion to vacate. We consider each argument in turn.

DISCUSSION

1. Whether the trial court properly applied the doctrine of judicial immunity in granting dismissal pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) to Walker and Judge Shoemake.

Standard ofRevieiv

¶21. Judge Shoemake filed his motion to dismiss pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Walker joined that motion. This Court reviews a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Crum v. City of Corinth, 183 So.3d 847, 850 (Miss. 2016). “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion ‘tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.’” Id. (quoting Little v. Miss. Dep’t of Transp., 129 So.3d 132, 135 (Miss. 2013)). “The allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and there must be no set-of facts that would allow the plaintiff to -prevail.” Rose v. Tullos, 994 So.2d 734, 737 (Miss. 2008) (citing Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher, 926 So.2d 890, 893 (Miss. 2006)).

Whether the trial court properly entered its order pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 5b(b).

' ¶22. The trial court dismissed Walker and Judge Shoemake pursuant to Mississippi Rule of - Civil Procedure 54(b), which directs that “the' court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of the judgment.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Marilyn Newsome first argues that the trial court’s dismissal pursuant1 to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) was erroneous because “[i]n this case there were multiple causes of action that arose from a single set of facts” and “[granting Rule 54(b) certification as a practical matter, would result in piecemeal litigation .... ”

¶ 23." “ ‘On appeal a 54(b) final judgment may be reviewed and reversed if this Court finds the trial judge abused his discretion ip entering the final judgment.’” Cox v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., 512 So.2d 897, 899 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Indiana Lumbermen’s Mutual Ins. Co. v. Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 456 So.2d 750, 753 (Miss. 1984)). In Cox, this Court observed that “Howard, Weil should have ... made a motion to dismiss the appeal rather than assigning it as error in its brief on direct appeal.” Cox, 512 So.2d at 899. Nevertheless, the Cox Court found “plain error in the improvident granting of this judgment” and dismissed the appeal. Id. The Court held that “Rule 54(b) judgments must be reserved for rare and special occasions” and that:

When there is a judgment dismissing one count of a complaint or counterclaim, a Rule 54(b) finality should never even be considered by the trial court unless the remainder of the case is going to be inordinately delayed, and it would be especially inequitable to require a party to wait until the entire case is tried before permitting him to appeal.

Id. at 900.

¶24. By contrast, this Court observed that, in another case in which the circuit court had “entered a Rule 54(b) final judgment dismissing the complaint against one of the parties,” on “appeal we held the entry of judgment was proper.” Cox, 512 So.2d at 899 (citing Indiana Lumbermen’s, 456 So.2d at 753). In Indiana Lumbermen’s, this Court stated that:

In cases involving multiple parties, a trial judge is authorized to enter a final judgment when it terminates the case as to one or more of the parties. When a trial judge makes an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and enters a final judgment, that judgment is released for appellate consideration. 10 Wright & Miller, § 2659, p. 97. This authority should be exercised cautiously in the interest of sound judicial administration in order to preserve the established judicial policy against piecemeal appeals. Curtiss-Wright Corporation v. General Electric Company, 446 U.S. 1, 8, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 1465, 64 L.Ed.2d 1, 11 (1980); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435, 438, 76 S.Ct. 895, 899, 901, 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 450, n.5, 76 S.Ct. 904, 907, n.5, 100 L.Ed. 1311 (1956).

Indiana Lumbermen’s, 456 So.2d at 752-53. In that case, this Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of dismissal to one of the defendants, finding that “[t]he charges of negligence against the two defendants are on different theories and are unrelated.” Id. at 753. Therefore, “there was no reason for [the defendant] to be kept in the case.” Id. at 753.

¶ 25. At the outset, we note that Marilyn Newsome has not asked this Court to dismiss the appeal. Instead, she raises the issue in her brief on direct appeal. This Court, therefore, must review the trial court’s Rule 54(b) certification for plain error. See Cox, 512 So.2d at 899. In this case, multiple causes of action were alleged against multiple parties. The trial court granted Rule 54(b) dismissal to Walker and Judge Shoemake because it determined that the doctrine of judicial immunity barred Marilyn Newsome’s claims against them. Accordingly, the trial court found “no just reason for delay” in entering a final, appealable judgment in favor of Walker and Judge Shoemake. No plain error appears on the face of the trial court’s decision; therefore, this Court should find that any objection to the certification, itself, is procedurally barred. Procedural bar notwithstanding, because application of judicial immunity is dispositive, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the judgment of dismissal as a final, appealable judgment under Rule 54(b). Moreover, if Walker and Judge Shoemake are entitled to immunity, “it would be especially inequitable to require [them] to wait until the entire case is tried before permitting [them] to appeal.” Cox, 512 So.2d at 900.

Whether the doctrine of judicial immunity operates to bar Marilyn Newsome’s claims against Walker and Judge Shoe-make.

¶26. Marilyn Newsome claims that the trial court erred in dismissing this case on the basis of judicial immunity. “Mississippi has long recognized the doctrine of judicial immunity.” Weill v. Bailey, 227 So.3d 931, 935-36, 2017 WL 1295370, *4 (Miss. Apr. 6, 2017) (citing Wheeler v. Stewart, 798 So.2d 386, 392 (Miss. 2001)). The rationale in support of application of the doctrine of judicial immunity has been referenced by this Court: “[p]ublic policy mandates that a judge should have the power to make decisions without having to worry about being held hable for his actions .... ” Loyacono v. Ellis, 571 So.2d 237, 238 [Miss. 1990).

¶ 27. This Court has analyzed precedent from the United States Supreme Court in considering whether the doctrine of judicial immunity applies. In Loyacono, the Court looked to Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), in which “an Indiana circuit court judge approved a mother’s petition to have her ‘somewhat retarded’ minor daughter sterilized.” Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 351, 98 S.Ct. 1099). “It.[w]as not until after she was married some two years later that the daughter learned the true nature of the operation, and upon discovery both she and her husband sued the judge, among others.” Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 353, 98 S.Ct. 1099). The United States Supreme Court applied the doctrine of judicial immunity:

As early as 1872, the Court recognized that it was “a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” ... For that reason the Court held that “judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.”

Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347, 352, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871)).

¶ 28. In Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 237, an attorney sued a circuit judge, claiming “that as a direct and proximate result of the willful, intentional, or negligent acts of [the judge], he was falsely .prosecuted, arrested, incarcerated and denied due process.” This Court, after considering the above-referenced precedent from the.United States Supreme Court, - observed .that “[t]here is a distinction between excess of jurisdiction and a complete, absence of jurisdiction.” Id. at 238 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351-52). “In order to determine the existence of judicial immunity one must look to ‘whether at the time [the judge] took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.’ ” Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099).

¶-29. Nevertheless, the Court noted 'the following: ■

In [Bradley] the’ [United States Supreme Court] went farther, and held that courts of general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, when such acts are in excess 'of their jurisdiction, and are charged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. We do not go that far in this case, because, as stated, there was no showing of either corruption or excess of jurisdiction.

Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238 (quoting De-Witt v. Thompson, 192 Miss. 615, 7 So.2d 529, 532 (1942)) (emphasis in Loyacono). According to the Loyacono Court, such language left “open the door as to whether judicial immunity applies in the, face, of malice ....” Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238. Ultimately, the Court found that judicial immunity applied and observed that “the best interests of the people and public order require that judges be immune from civil liability,” Id.

¶ 30. The distinction between lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction was explained further by the United States Supreme Court in Stump:

In Bradley, the Court illustrated the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction with the following examples: if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal' case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune.

Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n.7, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. at 352).

¶ 31. More recently, this Court considered a case in which a circuit court judge’s former court administrator sued the judge for libel after he had included a footnote in four separate orders in criminal cases which stated “that [the former court administrator] had been reprimanded by [the judge] for engaging in improper ex parte communications while she was his court administrator ..." Weill, 227 So.3d at 932, 2017 WL 1295370, at * 1.

¶ 32. The former court administrator argued that the judge’s actions “were taken in a complete absence of jurisdiction” and that the judge “had no jurisdictional authority over her individually when he entered the ... orders.” Id. at 936, 2017 WL 1295370, at *5. But the Court observed, “the question is not whether [the judge] had jurisdiction over [the former court administrator] individually,” but rather “ ‘whether at the time the judge took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.’ ” Id. (quoting Wheeler, 798 So.2d at 392) (emphasis in Weill). According .to the Court, “[j]udicial immunity exists in,the present case because at the time [the judge] entered ... orders, he had jurisdiction over the multiple criminal matters before him.” Weill, 227 So.3d at 936, 2017 WL 1295370, at *5.

¶ 33. Moreover,' the Court rejected the former court administrator’s argument that the judge’s “alleged defamation of her constituted á nonjudicial act made in the clear absence of all jurisdiction” because the Loyacono Court had “rejected the argument that allegations of malice remove the protection of judicial immunity.” Id.

¶34. Here, Marilyn Newsome alleges that Walker and" Judge Shoemake acted either in excess of jurisdiction or in the clear absence of jurisdiction by mishandling her disabled daughter’s conserva-torship: “[t]he actions taken by both Chancellors in the conservatorship ... were non-judicial in nature or such actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” As to Walker, she argues that “[i]t is clear from Joe Dale Walker’s agreement to plead guilty for improperly influencing a federal investigation into this case that he committed acts that are not considered ‘judicial’, in nature, therefore exposing him to civil liability.”

¶ 35. But while Walker’s agreement to plead guilty to obstruction of justice relates to his actions in the mishandling of the conservatorship, it bears no relationship to whether Walker acted in excess of jurisdiction or in the absence of jurisdiction. The conduct which is the subject of the civil action against Walker relates solely to his mishandling of the conserva-torship, all of which he did while acting in a judicial capacity. Walker’s “guilty plea related to a charge of attempting to corruptly influence a witness subpoenaed to appear before a Federal Grand Jury proceeding and attempting to impede the provision of documents, by the witness to the Federal Grand Jury with the intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding .... ” Walker, 172 So.3d at 1167.

¶ 36., The plaintiff in the present civil action does not allege that Walker lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter of the conservatorship. See Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238. And even if Walker did act corruptly in his handling of the conserva-torship, under this Court’s well-established precedent, he is immune from civil liability. See Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238; Weill, 227 So.3d at 936-37, 2017 WL 1295370, at *5. Indeed, Walker has experienced “‘[t]he primary remedy available to those who believe a judge has acted either contrary to or in excess of his/her authority,’ ” namely, a complaint filed with the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance. Weill, 227 So.3d at 936 n.4, 2017 WL 1295370, at *4 n.4 (quoting Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929).

¶-37. As to Judge Shoemake, the plaintiff claims that he “conspired with [then-judge] Joe Dale Walker to try to cover up the misappropriation of funds, in which he had no jurisdiction to act thereby exposing him to civil liability”- and that he “continued his attempt to cover up the misappropriation of funds by his non-judicial acts taken before the Commission on Judicial Performance, which charged him with committing perjury.”- But while the Commission on Judicial Performance had “recommended to'-the -Supreme Court that Judge Shoemake be removed from office, fined $2,500, 'and assessed costs in the amount of $5,882.67,” this Court held that the Commission had failed to “prove by clear and'convincing-evidence that Shoe-make gave testimony that he knew or should have known would be misleading.” Shoemake, 191 So.3d at 1213. Instead, the Court determined that “Judge Shoemake’s negligence and inattention While executing ex parte orders resulted in the dissipation of assets from Victoria Newsome’s Conser-vatorship.” Id. at 1224.

¶ 38. The plaintiff in the case at bar does not allege that Judge Shoemake lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter of the conservatorship. See Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238, And even if the Court accepts as true the plaintiffs allegation that judge Shoemake acted corruptly in his handling of the conservatorship,‘under"this Court’s precedent, he is immune from civil liability. See Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238; Weill, 227 So.3d at 936-37, 2017 WL 1295370, at *5, Judge Shoemake, like Walker, has experienced “ ‘[t]he primary remedy available to those who believe a judge has acted either contrary to or excess of his/her authority,’ ” a complaint filed with the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance. Weill, 227 So.3d at 936 n.4, 2017 WL 1295370, at *4 n.4 (quoting Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929, 947 (Miss. 1997)).

¶ 39. Further, Marilyn Newsome claims that immunity is inapplicable to Walker and Judge Shoemake because “[t]he actions of both Chancellors taken throughout the history of the conservatorship were actions not in the best interest of the Ward and conservatorship and it is clear that the Chancellors were not acting as the ‘ultimate guardian’ of the Ward in this matter.” Nevertheless, accepting Marilyn Newsome’s claims as true, as this Court is bound to do at the motion to dismiss stage, Walker and Judge Shoemake are immune because, at the time the alleged acts giving rise to Newsome’s claims occurred, both chancellors exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter of the conservatorship. See Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238.

¶40. Because the doctrine of judicial immunity bars Marilyn Newsome’s claims, we affirm dismissal of the claims as to Walker and Judge Shoemake.

Whether Walker and Judge Shoemake are entitled to immunity on the state law claims by virtue of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

¶ 41. Having found the doctrine of judicial immunity applicable, we need not address the argument advanced by Walker and Judge Shoemake that state law, specifically the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Mississippi Code Section ll-46-9(l)(a), confers additional immunity.

2. Whether the trial court erred in granting a stay of discovery to Walker and Judge Shoemake.

¶ 42. Marilyn Newsome avers that the trial court committed reversible error by granting Shoemake’s motion to stay discovery, which Walker joined.

¶ 43. “ ‘Trial Courts are afforded broad discretion in discovery matters, and this Court will not overturn a trial court’s decision unless there is an abuse of discretion.’ ” Ferguson v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 179 So.3d 1060, 1064 (Miss. 2015) (quoting Ashmore v. Miss. Auth. on Educ. Television, 148 So.3d 977, 981 (Miss. 2014)). ‘“[I]f the trial court applies the “correct legal standard,” we must affirm the decision, regardless of what any of us individually might have ruled had we been the judge, unless there is a “definite and firm conviction that the court below committed clear error.” ’ ” Ferguson, 179 So.3d at 1064 (quoting Pierce v. Heritage Props., Inc., 688 So.2d 1385, 1388 (Miss. 1997) (quoting City of Jackson v. Rhaly, 95 So.3d 602, 607 (Miss. 2012))).

¶ 44. The sole case upon which Marilyn Newsome relies in support of her argument is Stanley v. Scott Petroleum Corp., 184 So.3d 940 (Miss. 2016). But there, the issue was whether the trial court’s grant of summary judgment had been premature when only written discovery had been completed and the plaintiffs had sought, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) to “obtain affidavits, take depositions and complete discovery.” Stanley, 184 So.3d at 941. Specifically, the plaintiffs had “asked the court to refrain from determining foreseeability (and therefore whether Scott Petroleum owed the plaintiffs a duty) until ... the expert reports were in, and the plaintiffs had deposed Scott Petroleum.” Id. at 941-42. This Court found that “plaintiffs in this case complied with Rule 56(f) by presenting specific facts indicating why additional time for discovery would assist them in opposing the motion for summary judgment” and that the trial court had “ruled that Scott Petroleum owed no duty without first allowing the plaintiffs to conduct sufficient discovery to determine if a duty had arisen.” Id. at 943.

¶45. Here, due to the trial court’s grant of dismissal, Marilyn New-some claims that she “was not fully able to understand Shoemake’s involvement and civil liability .... ” But, unlike in Stanley, at issue here is a granted motion to dismiss. “A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure raises an issue of law .... ” Rose, 994 So.2d at 737 (citing Cook v. Brown, 909 So.2d 1075, 1077-78 (Miss. 2005)). “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Rose, 994 So.2d at 737 (citing Cook, 909 So.2d at 1078). And, as discussed above, judicial immunity is a question of law: “ ‘judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.’ ” Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099).

¶46. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery when Judge Shoemake raised judicial immunity in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying Marilyn Newsome’s motion to disqualify the Attorney General.

¶ 47. Marilyn Newsome asserts on appeal that “[t]he Chancellor’s factual findings in not disqualifying the Attorney General from representing David Shoemake in this matter is [sic] clearly erroneous because the court’s factual findings are against the weight of all the evidence

¶48. She claims that, after the instant civil lawsuit had been filed, “[i]nstead of referring the Complaint to the Vulnerable Adult Division and opening a criminal investigation and representing the victim in this matter, the Attorney General’s Office chose to enter its appearance on behalf of Appellee.” Marilyn Newsome claims that, because the Attorney General had a duty to investigate the possible criminal conduct of Judge Shoemake, he “has failed Victoria in this matter by ignoring apparent criminal conduct.”' She continues: “If the Office of Attorney General has conducted an investigation into this matter, then the office is disqualified under Rule 3.7 as a potential witness for Plaintiff and Rule 1.9(b) of the Miss. Rules of Professional Conduct .... ” She also claims-that, because “the Attorney General’s Office works closely with the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office investigating crimes and other matters in the State of Mississippi,” and because the “FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office were involved in the investigation, prosecution and convictions of Walker and Teater,” the Attorney General is disqualified from representing Judge Shoemake in this matter.”

¶ 49. “Little case law exists in Mississippi with regard to the standard of review of a trial court’s decision' of a motion to disqualify an attorney.” Byrd v. Bowie, 933 So.2d 899, 906 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Colson v. Johnson, 764 So.2d 438, 439 (Miss. 2000)). “ ‘In Quick Change Oil & Lubrication Co. v. County Line Place, Inc., 571 So.2d 968, 970 (Miss. 1990), we held that the manifest error standard applies to review of findings of fact and that the [trial] court has broad discretion.’ ” Williams v. Bell, 793 So.2d 609, 611 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Colson, 764 So.2d at 439). This Court has held that “one seeking to disqualify an attorney must show that[:] (1) there was an actual attorney-client relationship' between the movant and the attorney; and, (2) there was a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the prior and- current representation.” Williams, 793 So.2d at 612 (citing Pearson v. Singing River Med. Ctr., Inc., 757 F.Supp. 768, 771 (S.D. Miss. 1991)) (emphasis added).

¶ 50. The trial court, in denying the motion to disqualify, ruled, that “it does not appear from the'record that the Attorney General ever initiated' an attorney-client relationship with the Plaintiff and it does not appear -from the record that the Plaintiff reasonably believed that the Attorney General was her attorney.” '

¶ 51.- In her brief before this Court and in her motion to disqualify, Marilyn New-some states that “[i]f the Attorney General has not opened a criminal investigation, then Marilyn respectfully-requests that the Attorney General open an investigation immediately.” In support of her argument on appeal, Marilyn Newsome, citing only the Attorney General’s website, argues that the “Attorney General is tasked by the people of the State of Mississippi to investigate and prosecute persons who abuse, neglect or exploit vulnerable persons.” She further cites Rules 3.7 and 1.9(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.7(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is .likely to be a necessary witness Miss. R. Profl Conduct 3.7(a). Rule 1.9(b) prohibits a lawyer from using “information relating to the repre- ' sentation to the disadvantage of a former client ....” Miss. R. Profl Conduct 1.9(b).

¶52. In response, Judge Shoemake argues that “[t]he Attorney General is not- a party to the, Newsome lawsuit against Judge Shoemake, was not involved in .the conservatorship proceedings from which the lawsuit stems, and certainly will not be a necessary witness — or a witness at all— in the instant litigation.” According to Judge Shoemake, the same is true of the assistant attorneys general in the Civil Litigation Division of the Office of the Attorney General. Judge Shoemake further avers that Rule 1.9(b) is not implicated by this case at all, since the Attorney General never “formerly represented a client” in this matter, other than Judge Shoemake: “[t]he Attorney General’s representation is only of Judge Shoemake, and has only been of Judge Shoemake.” Shoemake states that “the Attorney General — like all government lawyers — is often in situations that have no analog in the private practice of law.”

¶53. The Attorney General has “the powers of the Attorney General at common law, and, except as otherwise provided by law, is given the sole power to bring or defend a lawsuit on behalf of a state agency, the subject matter of which is of statewide interest.” Miss. Code -Ann. § 7-5-1 (Rev. 2014). The legislature further has provided, in pertinent part, that:

In addition to all power and authority vested in the attorney general of the state of Mississippi by its constitution and statutes and all common law power and authority which may be invested in or exercised by such attorney general as such, the attorney general of the state of Mississippi and his assistants and representatives are hereby authorized upon request made of him to, in his discretion, render such services as the attorney general may deem necessary to assist in advising and in representing, either or both, all officers or employees ... of the state of Mississippi, ... should they or any of them ... be sued in an action at law or in equity, ... under the constitu-tiori and other laws of the state of Mississippi, or growing'out of such official action or nonaction, as the case may be.

Miss. Code Ann. § 7-5-43 (Rev. 2014). And the Mississippi Constitution provides that “all prosecutions shall be carried on in the name and by authority of the ‘State of Mississippi’ ....” Miss. Const, art. 6, § 169.

¶ 54. Representation of Judge Shoemake as a public official was within the authority of the Attorney General. Victoria New-some was never and could never be a “client” of the Attorney General as contemplated by the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, since prosecution of cases is solely in the name of the State of Mississippi. The trial court did not commit manifest error in finding that no evidence existed in the record to demonstrate either the existence of an actual attorney-client relationship between the Newsomes and the Attorney General or that a substantial relationship existed between the mishandling of Victoria Newsome’s conservator-ship and the Attorney General’s defense of Judge Shoemake, a current public official, in the present civil lawsuit. See Williams, 793 So.2d at 612.

4. Whether the trial court erred in denying Marilyn Newsome’s “Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Order Granting Defendant Shoe-make’s Motion to Stay Discovery and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Attorney General....”

¶ 55. Marilyn Newsome claims that the trial court ruled on Judge Shoemake’s motion to stay discovery and on her motion to disqualify the Attorney General “without notice” to her and she further claims that “[n]o formal hearing was held and therefore Marilyn was not able to put on any evidence in support of her Motions.” As such, she argues that the trial court erred in denying her Motion to Set Aside and Vacate.

¶ 56. Judge Shoemake filed his motion to stay discovery on March 19, 2015, and the Special Assistant Attorney General certified that notice had been provided on March 18, 2015, to Marilyn Newsome’s counsel, Terrell Stubbs, Esq. Newsome responded to that motion on April 1, 2015. Marilyn Newsome filed her motion to disqualify the Attorney General on March 31, 2015. The trial court denied both motions on September 2, 2015, and the orders were entered by the Simpson County . Chancery Clerk on September 4, 2015. That same day, Marilyn Newsome filed her Motion to Set Aside and Vacate. The trial court heard arguments on the Motion to Set Aside and Vacate on January 8, 2016. Consequently, Marilyn’s claim that she lacked notice is totally unsupported by the record on appeal. Her claim 'that no hearing was held is équally unavailing, because the trial court did hold a hearing on her Motion to Vacate and Set Aside.

¶ 57. Further, Marilyn Newsome’s reliance on Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 78 is unavailing. That Rule provides:

Each court shall establish procedures for the prompt dispatch of business,. at which motions requiring notice and hearing may be heard and disposed of; but the judge at any time or place and on such notice, if any, as he considers reasonable may make orders for the advancement, conduct, and hearing of actions,
To expedite its business, the court may make provision by rule or order for the submission and determination of motions without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition.

Miss. R. Civ. P. 78. Marilyn argues that the trial court “erred in not providing any written statement of reasons in support and opposition of. said Motions in the Order Denying Motion to Set Aside And Vacate .... ”

¶ 68. But the trial court’s order on Marilyn’s motion to disqualify .the Attorney General specified that she had failed to present evidence that an attorney-client relationship existed between the New-somes and the Attorney General- and that the record did not support that “Plaintiff reasonably believed that the Attorney General was her attorney.” And, as is discussed above, the trial court correctly stayed discovery when Judge Shoemake, joined by Walker, raised judicial immunity in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

¶ 59. We discern no error in the trial court’s denial of Marilyn Newsome’s Motion to Set Aside and Vacate.

. RULING: MOTION TO STRIKE ALLEGATION

¶ 60. Keely McNulty filed a Motion to Strike Allegation on August 17, 2016. She asks this Court to strike the following language from the second paragraph of page 3 of the Brief of Appellant: “Keely McNulty, the previous attorney for the conservator, also agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor involving her conduct while counsel of record for the conservatorship.” On September 20, 2016, this Court passed the motion for consideration with the merits of the appeal.

¶ 61. It is true, as McNulty avers, that “Mississippi appellate courts may not consider information that is outside of the record.” Shumake v. Shumake, 147 So.3d 352, 354 n.1 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Hardy v. Brock, 826 So.2d 71, 76 (Miss. 2002)).

¶ 62. Marilyn Newsome responds that “said allegation is in the Record before this Court, [sic] in fact, said allegation is a direct quote from Marilyn’s Amended Complaint .... ” And Marilyn correctly observes that, when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he allegations in the complaint must be taken as true .... ” Rose, 994 So.2d at 737 (citing Gallagher, 926 So.2d at 893). Nevertheless, Marilyn Newsome fails to provide a specific citation from the record and we, having scoured the Amended Complaint and other parts of the record, are unable to locate the allegation.

¶ 63. Accordingly, this Court strikes the following language from the second paragraph of page 3 of the Brief of Appellant: “Keely McNulty, the previous attorney for the conservator, also agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor involving her conduct while counsel of record for the con-servatorship.”

CONCLUSION

¶ 64. The doctrine of judicial immunity applies to bar Marilyn Newsome’s claims, made on behalf of the Victoria Newsome Conservatorship, against former chancellor Joe Dale Walker and Chancellor David Shoemake. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court of Simpson County granting a Rule 54(b) dismissal. In addition, we grant Keely McNulty’s Motion to Strike Allegation.

¶ 65. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., COLEMAN, MAXWELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. KING, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. BEAM, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

KING, JUSTICE,

SPECIALLY CONCURRING:

¶ 66. I agree that judicial immunity applies in this case. I write separately to express my concern over the notion repeated by the majority in our recent judicial immunity cases that the primary remedy available to those who believe a judge has acted either contrary to or in excess of his authority is to file a complaint with the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance. See Maj. Op. ¶ 38; Weill v. Bailey, 2017 WL 1295370, 227 So.3d 931 (Miss. April 6, 2017).

¶ 67. If this Court is going to dismiss cases based on judicial immunity, offering the alternative remedy of a complaint with the Commission, we need to actually provide a such a remedy in judicial performance cases. In this case, we did not. See Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Shoemake, 191 So.3d 1211 (Miss. 2016); Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Walker, 172 So.3d 1165 (Miss. 2015) (Walker was removed from office after pleading guilty to a federal crime. The Formal Complaint before the Commission “con-tainted] various allegations regarding [Walker’s] mismanagement of [Newsome’s] conservatorship.” Nothing was done to make Newsome whole in that case.). A “remedy” includes redressing a wrong, when appropriate. Remedy, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). We leave Newsome without any mechanism to redress the wrong done.

¶ 68. In Shoemake, we addressed what sanctions to impose upon Judge Shoemake for the complaint filed regarding this very situation. Shoemake, 191 So.3d at 1213-14. This Court found that a suspension, a public reprimand,, a fine of $2,500, and the assessment of costs was an appropriate sanction. Id. at 1224. I dissented in part, arguing that this Court should impose an additional sanction that Judge Shoemake must make Newsome’s estate whole. Id. at 1225 (King, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority disagreed, and concluded that it “leave[s] the decision of whether or not to pursue those or similar damages with Victoria and her wardship[,]” essentially maintaining that New-some’s remedy was a civil lawsuit. Id. at 1223. Now that Newsome is pursuing those damages, this Court tells her that her remedy lies with the Commission. We appear to be providing an impossible catch-22 to those members of the public actually financially harmed by egregious actions of the judiciary. The “remedy” we offer before the Commission should live up to its definition and be able to redress the wrong, should that be appropriate, and I encourage this Court to consider that in future cases such as this one.

      . The Thirteenth Chancery' Court District is comprised of Covington, Jefferson Davis, Lawrence, Simpson, and Smith Counties.

      . The record of the conservatorship is not included in the present record.

      . McNulty served as attorney for the conser-vatorship, as guardian ad litem for Victoria Newsome, and as "the law clerk for both Walker and Shoemake ....” Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Perfomance v. Shoemake, 191 So.3d 1211, 1213 n.1 (Miss. 2016).

      .' Both Walker and Teater pled guilty in federal court to obstruction of justice and were sentenced to five months’ imprisonment, five months’ home confinement, and two-year terms of supervised release.

      . Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides:
      (b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims ór Involving Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of -the claims or parties only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of the judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision/however designated which adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at anj( time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and thé rights and liabilities of all the parties.'
      Miss. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

      . Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides:
      (f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such order as is just.
      Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(f).

      . Marilyn Newsome does not claim on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error by staying discovery as to ex-Chancellor Walker.


author: WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE,

text:
    Kevin BOSTON, a/k/a Kevin E. Boston, a/k/a Kevin Earl Boston v. STATE of Mississippi
    NO. 2016-KA-00047-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    DISPOSITION: 09/07/2017

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: BRANDON ISAAC DORSEY
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE
    BEFORE WALLER, C.J., KING AND MAXWELL, JJ.
   WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Kevin Boston was convicted of capital murder in the Washington County Circuit Court for the killing of Willie Dean. Boston raises five issues on appeal, one of which is raised by Boston himself in a pro se supplemental brief. In that supplemental brief, Boston argues that the trial court erred by granting the State’s “pre-arming instruction.” Finding that the granting of the pre-arming-instruction was reversible error, we reverse Boston’s conviction and sentence and remand the case for a new trial.- - ■ -

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On May 13, 2014, Barbara Boston called her estranged husband, Kevin Boston, the defendant, to come fix the flat tire on her car parked at her place of employment, Trigg Elementary. Because the school was administering state testing, Barbara could not go outside to meet Boston, so she left the keys inside the car. When Boston arrived at Trigg. Elementary, he was unable to fix the tire because the jack was bent. While walking to the main school"office to'inform Barbara he could not change her tire, Boston met the victim, Willie -Dean.

¶3. Deán was a contract maintenance worker who reported for a work order at Trigg Elementary on the day in question.' Additionally relevant, Dean and Barbara had a romantic relationship while Barbara was separated from Boston. However, Dean and Barbara previously had ended their relationship.

¶4. How the contact between Boston and Dean initiated and what happened during their confrontation are points of sharp dispute in the record. Boston contends he acted in self-defense; whereas, the State claims Boston attacked Dean. State’s witness Abbie Allen, a bus driver for Greenville Public Schools, testified that Boston approached Dean first. However, Boston claimed Dean first approached him. Boston testified that Dean was upset because he was in Barbara’s car, possibly indicating to Dean that Boston and Barbara might have reconciled. Boston further testified that Dean yelled he was going to kill Boston and then attacked him with a pair of pliers, hitting Boston on his wrist. The State attempted to discredit Boston’s testimony by offering into evidence a picture of Boston’s wrist taken after his arrest, which showed no visible injuries. Moreover, no pliers ever were recovered from the scene.

¶ 5. Boston continued his testimony, explaining that after he pushed Dean off, Dean came running back toward him, at which point he fatally stabbed Dean once with a pocket knife. Boston testified he had purchased the pocket knife from Auto Zone a month before the incident. While the State did not present any'direct evidence of what had caused the altercation between the parties, Abbie Allen testified that she saw Boston and Dean talking, and then they “got a little loud.” No one saw the stabbing, though. After Dean was stabbed, the parties walked away from each other. The immediate aftermath of the stabbing was caught on the school’s surveillance camera, but the footage does not show any physical or verbal altercation between the parties. After- the incident, Rita Mobley, another employee of Trigg Elementary, testified that she found Dean standing in a doorway at the school, holding his chest and asking for someone , to take him to the .hospital. According to Mobley, Dean said, “[Kevin Boston] stabbed me for no reason.” An ambulance took Dean to the hospital, where he died.

¶ 6. On March 11, 2015, a grand jury indicted Boston in the Circuit Court of Washington County for capital murder on educational property grounds. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(g) (Supp. 2016) (“The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall, be capital murder in the following, .cases: ... Murder, which is perpetrated on educational property as defined in Section 97-37-17[.]”). The case was tried on July 21-24, 2015, at the close of which the jury found Boston guilty. In Boston’s appeal, his attorney raised issues concerning the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the denial of a proposed self-defense jury instruction. Boston in his pro se supplemental brief asserted his objection to the issuance of the State’s “pre-arming instruction.” Because the issue of the “pre-arming instruction” is dispositive, we decline to discuss the other assignments of error.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

' ¶ 7: “Jury instructions’ are generally within the discretion of the trial court[,] and the settled standard of review is abuse of discretion.” Moody v. State, 202 So.3d 1235, 1236-37 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2016) (quoting Bailey v. State, 78 So.3d 308, 315 (¶ 20) (Miss. 2012)). “Jury instructions must fairly announce the law of the case and not create an' injustice against the defendant.” Davis v. State, 18 So.3d 842, 847 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2009) (citing Milano v. State, 790 So.2d 179, 184 (Miss. 2001)). For example, .in homicide cases, the jury should be instructed “about a defendant’s theories of defense, justification, or excuse that are supported by the evidence, no matter how meager or. unlikely.” Evans v. State, 797 So.2d 811, 815 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2000) (quoting Manuel v. State, 667 So.2d 590, 593 (Miss. 1995)).

DISCUSSION

¶8. Boston asserts in his pro se brief that the grant of Instruction No. 7 “is contrary to and condemned by 140 years of Mississippi case law .... ” The “pre-arming” jury instruction, offered by the State -as S-4A, was granted by the trial court as Instruction No. 7, over the objection of Boston. The instruction reads as follows:

The Court instructs the Jury that if a person provokes a difficulty, arming himself in advance, and intending, if necessary, to use his weapon and overcome his adversary, he becomes the aggressor and cannot claim the right of self-defense.

Boston argued that no evidence was presented that he had armed himself in advance intending to harm someone. The State argued only that Boston had retrieved the weapon from his pocket, and the trial court granted the instruction on that basis.

¶ 9. While instructions like Instruction No. 7 have appeared in different forms throughout this Court’s history, they first received the name “pre-arming instruction” in 1999. See Dew v. State, 748 So.2d 751, 754 (¶ 18) (Miss. 1999). Essentially, a pre-arming instruction is “a peremptory instruction for the prosecution, impairing or precluding the defendant’s right to self-defense.” Id. at 754 (¶ 19). This Court has used the term “pre-arming instruction” to describe substantially similar language as used in Instruction No. 7 above, and its issuance was found to be reversible error. Johnson v. State, 908 So.2d 758, 762 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2005).

¶ 10. This Court has used strong language condemning the use of pre-arming instructions, as that type of instruction prohibits the defendant from being able to assert his theory of the case. Id.; Dew, 748 So.2d at 754 (¶ 18); Keys v. State, 635 So.2d 845, 849 (Miss. 1994). The Johnson Court held that the “pre-arming instruction cut off the jury’s consideration of self-defense.” Id. at 763 (¶ 19). In other words:

“A criminal defendant is entitled to present his defense to the finder of fact. This Court has condemned outright the granting of any instruction that precludes a defendant from asserting a claim of self-defense.” Keys v. State, 635 So.2d 845, 848 (Miss. [1994] 1984) (citations omitted). This type of pre-arming instruction has repeatedly been denounced by this Court. Id. at 849.

Johnson, 908 So.2d at 762 (¶ 15). Moreover, the Johnson Court explained that “this Court has stated numerous times that ‘when the State seeks this instruction, it does so at its own peril.’ ” Johnson, 908 So.2d at 763 (¶ 19) (quoting Dew, 748 So.2d at 754 (¶20) (internal citations omitted)).

¶ 11. This Court also fdund the issuance of a pre-arming instruction to be reversible error in Dew, explaining, “[t]o allow the instruction would result in manifest injustice.” Dew, 748 So.2d at 754 (¶ 20). The Dew Court based its conclusion on the principle that “[e]ven if the great weight of evidence against [the defendant] supports a contrary view, [the defendant] is still entitled to present his defense to the jury unimpaired by instructions ... [that] preclude his right to self-defense.” Id. at 754 (¶ 19) (citations omitted). The Dew Court relied in part on Keys v. State, which also found reversible error in the issuance of a pre-arming instruction. Keys v. State, 635 So.2d 845, 849 (Miss. 1994). The Court in Keys emphasized, “our decision today should clearly indicate that we look with disfavor on instructions such as S-10[, which is a pre-arming instruction].” Id.

¶ 12. We have held that pre-arming instructions “should be given only in ... exceedingly rare circumstances .... ” Thompson v. State, 602 So.2d 1185, 1189 (Miss. 1992). Based on that standard, the granting of a “pre-arming instruction” has been affirmed in only three cases: Hart v. State, 637 So.2d 1329 (Miss. 1994); Hall v. State, 420 So.2d 1381 (Miss.1982); Reid v. State, 301 So.2d 561 (Miss. 1974). In each case, the record was uncontradicted that the defendants armed themselves with the intent to initiate a confrontation. Hart, 637 So.2d at 1334; Hall, 420 So.2d at 1385; Reid, 301 So.2d at 563.

¶ 13. In Hart, the defendant testified he armed himself and went to the victim’s house because it was his “only chance to settle [a dispute between the parties].” Hart, 637 So.2d at 1334. The Hart Court’s holding turned on the defendant’s own testimony as to his initial aggression: “the proof is uncontradicted that, while in no physical danger from [the victim], [the defendant] armed himself in advance with the intent of provoking or bringing on a difficulty and shooting [the victim].” Id. at 1337. Similarly, in Hall — a case involving aggravated assault instead of homicide-the defendant’s own testimony was that he armed himself and deliberately drove to the victim’s house to engage in a confrontation. Hall, 420 So.2d at 1384. The Hall Court observed:

The record is uncontradicted that Hall left his employment, armed himself with a shotgun, went to the Bradleys [sic] home after having been warned by his wife that they had threatened to “mess him up” if he came to the house, and after his wife reported to him that Willie Bradley had cursed her and threatened her earlier during the evening.

Id. at 1385. The same reasoning applied in Reid, where this Court noted that, by the defendant’s own testimony, he “deliberately armed himself with his pistol,” drove to a trailer where the victim was located, and “immediately challenged [the victim].” Reid, 301 So.2d at 564.

¶ 14. Here, the record is in conflict as to who initiated the fight in a chance confrontation, which the Johnson Court found reversible. Johnson, 908 So.2d at 762 (¶ 13). The only evidence concerning the knife was that Boston bought the knife from Auto Zone about a month before the incident and was carrying it in his pocket. No evidence exists that Boston placed the knife in his pocket with the intent to provoke an altercation with Dean, with similar facts resulting in reversible error in Johnson. Id.

CONCLUSION

¶ 15. Because there is no evidentiary-support for the granting of the pre-arming instruction, we reverse Boston’s conviction and sentence and- remand this case for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

¶ 16. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR.

      . While Abbie Allen testified on direct examination she saw Boston‘first approach Dean, she contradicted herself on. cross-examination: Q. “Did you ever see Mr. Boston approach Mr. Dean?” A. “No, I didn't —I just saw them talking.”

      . Boston’s attorney raised the following issues:
      (1) Whether the trial court erred when it failed to grant one of Boston's proposed self-defense instructions;
      (2) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict'Boston;
      (3) Whether Boston’s. conviction was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence;
      (4) Whether the trial court erred in denying Boston’s motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief.

      . The instruction at issue in Johnson v. State stated:
      The Court instructs the jury that if a person provokes a difficulty, arming himself in advance and intending, if necessary, to use his weapon and overcome his adversary, he becomes the aggressor and deprives himself of the right of self-defense.

        Johnson, 908 So.2d at 762 (¶ 13).

      . Keys collected citations for prior cases in which the use of pre-arming instructions had been "denounced”: Thompson v. State, 602 So.2d 1185 (Miss. 1992); Williams v. State, 482 So.2d 1136 (Miss. 1986); Barnes v. State, 457 So.2d 1347 (Miss. 1984); McMullen v. State, 291 So.2d 537 (Miss. 1974); Patrick v. State, 285 So.2d 165 (Miss. 1973); Craft v. State, 271 So.2d 735 (Miss. 1973); Ellis v. State, 208 So.2d 49 (Miss. 1968); Tate v. State, 192 So.2d 923 (Miss. 1966). See also Thompson v. State, 190 Miss. 639, 200 So. 715 (1941); Brown v. State, 186 Miss. 734, 191 So. 818 (1939); Vance v. State, 182 Miss. 840, 183 So. 280 (1938); Coleman v. State, 179 Miss. 661, 176 So. 714 (1937); Lee v. State, 138 Miss. 474, 103 So. 233 (1925); Adams v. State, 136 Miss. 298, 101 So. 437 (1924); Garner v. State, 93 Miss. 843, 47 So. 500 (1908); Pulpus v. State, 82 Miss. 548, 34 So. 2 (1903); and Lofton v. State, 79 Miss. 723, 31 So. 420 (1902).


author: CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE,

text:
    MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL AND CITY OF COLUMBUS v. The COMMERCIAL DISPATCH
    NO. 2016-CC-00897-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    09/07/2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: MICHAEL D. CHASE, JEFFREY J. TÚRNAGE
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: D. MICHAEL HURST, JR„ CLAY B. BALDWIN
    BEFORE DICKINSON, P.J., KING AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
   CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. The Mayor and the City Council members for the City of Columbus held four pairs of prearranged, nonsocial and subquorum gatherings, over the course of two months. The gatherings were on the topics of economic development and maintenance of a public building. For each pair of gatherings, the Mayor first met with three Council members, and then later the same day, he met with the remaining three Council members on the same topic. Because all of the gatherings were just shy of a quorum — four Council members would have constituted a quorum — the gatherings were not open to the public.

¶ 2. A reporter for The Commercial Dispatch received notice of the meetings, and he filed an Open Meetings Act Complaint against the Mayor and the City of Columbus. The Ethics Commission found that the Mayor and the City of Columbus had violated the Open Meetings Act. The May- or and the City of Columbus appealed to the chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the Commission’s judgment on de novo review. The Mayor and the City of Columbus appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 8. The City of Columbus’s governing body consists of six City Council members and the Mayor. The Mayor does not always vote; he votes only when the quorum’s vote results in a-tie. The Mayor and the Council members held four pairs of gatherings over the course of two months that were not open to the public. All of the gatherings were prearranged and took place in the Mayor’s conference room.

¶ 4. The first three pairs of gatherings occurred on January 23, 2014, February 3, 2014 and February 24, 2014. The gatherings ' covered the subject of economic development, specifically, retail development in Columbus. At each of the gatherings; the Council members met in two subquorum groups of three, and each subquorum group met with the Mayor and representatives from the Golden Triangle Development Link (the Link). After the gatherings, the Link ahnoünced that it had “decided to renew their retail development partnership” with the City of Columbus. ,

¶ 5. The last pair of gatherings occurred on February 27, 2014, covering the subject of renovations to a public building. Once again, the Council members split info two subquorum groups of three to meet with the Mayor. After the gatherings, City officials issued a press release announcing how the project would be managed.

¶ 6. A reporter for The Commercial Dispatch (The Dispatch), Robert Nathan Gregory, requested to “sit in on” the gatherings that took place- on February 27, 2014: He was denied entry; After speaking to the chief operations officer for the City of Columbus, Gregory learned that' similar gatherings had occurred on January 23, 2014, February 3, 2014 and February 24, 2014. Gregory filed an Open Meetings Act Complaint with the Mississippi Ethics Commission detailing the four pairs of gatherings.

¶ 7. The Ethics Commission .issued its Final Order on December 5, 2014. The Final Order found that the subject gatherings had circumvented the Open Meetings Act (the Act), and by circumventing the Act, the Mayor and City Council had violated it, specifically citing Mississippi Code Section 25-41-1, Mississippi Code Section 25^41-3 and Mississippi Code Section 25-41-5. The Commission ordered the Mayor and the City Council to “refrain from further violations” and “comply strictly with [the Act].”

¶8. The Mayor and the City Council appealed to the Chancery Court of Lowndes County. On appeal, The Dispatch stepped in as the petitioner in place of Gregory. On May 24, 2016, after a de novo review, the trial court issued its Opinion and Judgment. The trial court upheld the Commission’s ruling that the subject gatherings had violated the Act. The Mayor and the City Council (the City) appealed. We affirm.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

¶ 9. On appeal, the City raised one general issue in its statement of the issue: “Whether the chancery court erred in affirming the Final Order of the Mississippi Ethics Commission in MEC cáse M-14-002.” In its brief, the City then restyled the issue into seven interrelated issues, and in response, The Dispatch argued three issues. The Court has consolidated the interrelated issues to one concise issue with two subparts. The Court holds that the one issue with two subparts is disposi-tive, and the additional arguments of the City are without merit.

Whether the Open Meetings Act requires prearranged, nonsocial and subquorum sized gatherings regarding economic development and maintenance of a public building to be open to the public.
(A) Section 25-41-1 of the Open Meetings Act is clear and unambiguous.
(B) Under the instant facts, the gatherings should have been open to the public.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10. The Open Meetings Act states that the chancery court should consider an appeal from the Ethics Commission de novo. Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-15 (Supp. 2016) (“Any party may petition the chancery court of the county in which the public body is located to enforce or appeal any order of the Ethics Commission issued pursuant to this chapter. In any such appeal,] the chancery court shall conduct a de novo review.”). However, contrary to the City’s argument, the statute does not explicitly state the standard of review for the Supreme Court; therefore, the Court applies the customary standard of review. When reviewing findings of fact, the Court “will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless the Court can say with reasonable certainty that the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Gannett River States Publ’g Corp. v. City of Jackson, 866 So.2d 462, 465 (Miss. 2004) (citing Morgan v. West, 812 So.2d 987, 990 (Miss. 2002)). “When reviewing questions of law, this Court employs a de novo standard of review and will only reverse for an erroneous interpretation or application of the law.” Gannett River States Publ’g Corp., 866 So.2d at 465.

ANALYSIS

Whether the Open Meetings Act prohibits subquorum sized gatherings that entail the discussion and deliberation of economic development and maintenance of a public building to be closed to the public.

¶ 11. The analysis of this issue begins with a de novo determination of whether Section 25-41-1 of the Act is plain and unambiguous. The Court holds that it is plain and unambiguous. Next, considering Section 25-41-1 as plain and unambiguous, the Court determines whether the findings of fact of the trial court were an abuse of discretion. Lastly, based on the findings of fact and legal analysis, the Court concludes that the gatherings held by the City should have been open to the public.

(A) Section 25-41-1 of the Open Meetings Act is clear and unambiguous.

¶ 12. In determining whether a statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court has stated:

No principle is more firmly established, or rests on more secure foundations, than the rule which declares when a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, that the Legislature shall be deemed to have intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and, consequently, no room is left for construction in the application of such a law.

Conway v. Mississippi State Bd. of Health, 252 Miss. 315, 173 So.2d 412, 415 (1965) (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 192 Miss. 424, 6 So.2d 313, 314 (1942)). Further, the Court has stated that “courts are without the right to substitute their judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom and policy of the act and must enforce it, unless it appears beyond all reasonable doubt to violate the Constitution.” 5K Farms, Inc. v. Mississippi Dep’t of Revenue, 94 So.3d 221, 227 (Miss. 2012).

¶ 13. In whole, Section 25-41-1 of the Mississippi Code states:

It being essential to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of representative government and to the maintenance of a democratic society - that public business be performed in an- open ■ and public manner, and that citizens -be advised of and be aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Mississippi that the formation and determination of public policy is public- business and shall be conducted at open meetings except as otherwise provided herein.

Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-1 (Rev. 2010). The City takes the position that Section 25-41-1 “is a general statement of legislative policy and purpose.” The Dispatch argues' that “the Legislature specifically and unequivocally enacted clear language in the very first opening section of the Open Meetings Act[,] itself expressing the indisputable philosophy and spirit of the' Act,” and the Act should be construed considering the “Philosophy and Spirit of [the] Act.”

¶ 14. As stated by The Dispatch, the. Court has determined that Section 25-41-1 sets forth the spirit of the Act. Hinds Cty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Common Cause of Mississippi, 551 So.2d 107 (Miss. 1989). “The philosophy of the Open Meetings Act is that all deliberations, decisions and business of all governmental boards and commissions, unless specifically excluded by statute, shall-be open to the public.” Id. at 110 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-1). Further,

Every member of every public board and commission in this state should always bear in mind that the spirit of the Act is -that a citizen spectator, including any representative of the press, has just as much right to attend the meeting and see. and hear everything that is going on as has any member of the board or commission.

Id. Although not requiring meetings to be open could allow for more frank conversation or be preferable for the Council, it is of “far greater importance ,.. that, all public business be open to the public.” Id., see also Gannett River. States Publ’g Corp., 866 So.2d at 468. The Act also provides the specific reason why public business should be performed at public meeting; it states that it is “essential to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of representative government and to the maintenance of a democratic society.” Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-1. Thus, where the Act states “the wisdom and policy of the [A]ct,” the Court “must enforce It, unless it appears beyond all reasonable doubt to violate the Constitution.” 5K Farms, Inc., 94 So.3d at 227.

¶ 15. Aside from philosophy and spirit of the Act, Section 25-41-1 also explicitly details what constitutes "public business. It lists “deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy” and then states, “[I]t is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Mississippi that the formation and determination of public policy is public business and shall be conducted at open meetings except as otherwise ’ provided herein ....” Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-1 (emphasis added): Under the- emphasized language above, “deliberations ... that go into the making of’ public policy are to be open to the public. Id. Further, the Court has interpreted the emphasized sections of the statute, holding that “the deliberative stages of the decision-making process that lead to ‘formation and determination of public policy* are required to be open to the public.” Bd. of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 478 So.2d 269, 278 (Miss. 1985) (emphasis added).

¶ 16. Although the City argues that Section 25-41-1 is merely a “general statement of policy and purpose,” to ignore Section 25-41-1 simply because the City claims it is a general policy would be to ignore the plain language of the Act. Section 26-41-1 avers the philosophy and spirit of. the Act, and it defines what is required to be open to the public. See Mississippi Publishers, 478 So.2d at 278; see also Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-1. If deliberations that “go into making” or “lead to” public policy occur at a gathering of board members, the Act unequivocally states that those gatherings are “public business and shall be conducted at open meetings.” Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-1. The Act carves out exceptions for only “chance meetings or social gatherings of members of a public body” or executive sessions. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 25-41-7, 25-41-17.

. ¶ 17. Thus, the Court holds under de novo review that Section 25-41-1 is clear and unambiguous. Section 25-41-1 asserts the philosophy and spirit of the Act. Additionally, Section 25-41-1 also addresses when a gathering must be open to the public, and determining when a gathering must be open to the public is a fact-intensive analysis focusing on the subject matter of the gathering and the circumstances surrounding the gathering.

(B) Under the instant, facts, the gatherings should have been open to the public.

¶ 18. As stated above, the gatherings all were prearranged and took place in the Mayor’s conference room. The City Council split.into two subquorum groups of three people, for each gathering. One group met in the morning, and the other group met in the afternoon on the same topic. The subject of the gatherings is not in dispute: The first three days of -gatherings on January 22, 2014, February 3, 2014 and February 24, 2014, covered the topic of economic development in Columbus, specifically retail development. After these gatherings, the Link announced that it had decided to renew its retail development partnership. The last pair of gatherings, on February 27, 2014, involved renovations of a public building. After these gatherings, City officials issued a press release announcing how the project would be managed.

¶ 19. The trial court correctly noted the nature of the gatherings in its Opinion and Judgment. It stated, “The meetings held by Columbus in this case were specifically held with a sub-quorum present to avoid the consequences of the Open Meetings Act.” The trial court’s finding is supported by the record, and it does not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion. The trial court also noted the importance of the philosophy and spirit of the Act. Further, the gatherings were not by chance or a product of a social gathering. Thus, as the trial court found, it is clear from the: record that the gatherings were targeted at avoiding or circumventing the Act.

¶20. The trial court also found “[t]he discussions not open to the public led to official action by the Columbus quorum when they met.” The record is clear that, although a quorum was never present in the same room at the same time, public business was discussed at all of the gatherings. Thus, this factual conclusion also does not rise to the level of an abuse- of discretion.

¶ 21. The four pairs of subquorum gatherings, along with the fact that they were prearranged, nonsocial, and on the topic of public business, illustrated the City’s intent to circumvent or avoid the requiré-ments of the Act. The philosophy and spirit, of the Act prohibit the City -from intending and attempting to circumvent or avoid the requirements of the Act. Additionally, the plain language of Section 25-41-1 requires the subject gatherings to be open to the public. Thus, the City’s failure to hold open gatherings violated the Act.

¶22. To be clear, this holding is fact-specific. In the case sub judice, the City acted with the express intent of circumventing the Act. The gatherings were preplanned. The attendees invited purposely constitutéd less than a quorum. The 'gatherings were for the express goal of discussing City business. Further, the facts support that City business was conducted and policy formulated at the gatherings. Finally, the gatherings did not fall under any of the exceptions specified in the Act. For these, and other reasons contained in the record, the holding of the trial court is supported by the evidence.

¶ 23. Further, the additional arguments brought by the City do not affect the requirement, that the subject gatherings must be open to the public. Therefore, they are without merit, and we refrain from addressing them.

CONCLUSION

¶24. Prearranged, nonsocial gatherings on public business that are held in subquo-rum groups with the intent to circumvent the Act are required to be open to the public under Section 25-41-1 of the Open Meetings Act. Thus, the trial court correctly found that the City violated the Open Meetings Act.

¶ 25. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Although The Dispatch picked up the case on the trial-court level, the trial court never ruled on the Motion to Substitute the Petitioners. However, a Motion was made before this Court, and this Court issued an Order allowing the substitution on October 25, 2016.

      . The City admits in its, brief that “discussion between council members regarding ... the topic at hand” “possibly” occurred. In its reply brief, the City concludes that "there is no evidence that any council ■ member discussed the matters at issue with more than two other members directly or by proxy,” thus, the City admits that public business was discussed, but it asserts that because a quorum was not present, the discussions did not fall under the Act.