author:
PER CURIAM. BRYAN, Justice MOORE, Chief Justice
      SHAW, Justice

text:
    FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE et al. v. Robert Kyle MORRIS
    1121091.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    February 12, 2016.

      Bert S. Nettles and Brennan Ohme of Haskell Slaughter Young & Rediker, LLC, Birmingham, for appellants.
    David G. Wirtes, Jr., George M. Dent III, J. Brian Duncan, Jr., and Lucy E. Tufts of Cunningham Bounds, LLC, Mobile, for appellee.
    ■ Matthew C. McDonald of Jones Walker, Mobile, for amicus curiae Alabam'a Civil Justice Reform Committee, in support of the appellants.
    Drayton Nabers, Jr., and Scott S. Brown of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, for amicus curiae Business Council of Alabama, in support of the appellants.
   PER CURIAM.

The .remaining defendants below, Farm? ers Insurance Exchange; Fire Insurance Exchange; Truck Insurance Exchange; Mid-Century Insurance Company; Farmers New World Life Insurance Company; Farmers Group, Inc.; Farmers Financial Solutions, LLC; Bristol West Insurance Company; Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan; Foremost Property & Casualty Insurance Company; and Foremost Signature Insurance Company (all legally distinct insurance entities hereinafter- collectively referred to as “Farmers”) appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff,. Robert Kyle Morris.

Facts and Procedural History

-In 2006, Morris, a licensed insurance agent, was working for his father’s-independent insurance agency, the Morris Insurance Agency (“Morris Insurance”). At some point, Morris contacted one of 'the Farmers entities about becoming a Farmers agent. Morris first met with Heather Lowry, an employee of Michael A. Dewey Insurance Agency, Inc., which served as the district office for Farmers in Mobile and Baldwin Counties. Lowry testified that she showed Morris a presentation as an introduction to the opportunity to become a Farmers ageht. She also testified that Morris told her that he worked for his father’s insurance agency, and she admitted that she told Morris that being familiar with the insurance industry as a whole could possibly benefit him if he became a Farmers agent. Additionally, Lowry testified that, when she met with Morris, she was not aware that Farmers had a written policy that made Morris’s relationship with his father’s insurance agency unacceptable; that she did not have any documents available to her that would have made her aware that the relationship was unacceptable; that nothing in her training would have made her aware that a potential conflict of interest existed;1 and that the state office for Farmers did not ever tell her that she should not recruit Morris or that Morris was not a suitable candidate based on his relationship with his father’s agency.

Lowry further testified that, after that initial meeting with Morris, she gave Morris’s information to Michael Dewey, the district manager for Farmers, and to Steven Hunt, who was another of Dewey’s empjoyees. She testified that, in her discussion with Dewey, she would have mentioned the fact that Morris worked with his father’s independent agency. Finally, she testified that, from that point, Dewey and Hunj; took over Morris’s recruiting.'

Hunt testified that he worked in Fárm-ers’ district office and that he coached, managed; and helped train agents. He testified that, after Lowry met with Morris, Dewey wanted 'to meet with Morris and go over the reserve-agent package. Hunt testified that it' was' his understanding that Dewey said that it was okay to continue to recruit Morris;

Dewey testified that Hunt and Lowry both asked him if Morris’s relationship with his father’s agency was acceptable. He also testified that he talked to someone at the state office for Farmers; that he f made the Farmers’ state office aware of the proposed situation regarding Morris’s relationship with his father’s agency; and that the representative at Farmers’ .state office told him that the arrangement was acceptable, Dewey testified that he then told Hunt and Lowry that the arrangement was acceptable and that Hunt and Lowry then followed up with recruiting Morris to become a Farmers agent. Low-ry, Hunt, and Dewey all testified that, at that time, they did not know that Morris’s association with his father’s agency constituted a conflict of interest and they did not know that Farmers had a written policy that provided that Morris’s association with his father’s agency after Morris'became a Farmers agent constituted a conflict of interest.

Morris testified that he initially became interested in working as a Farmers agent because Farmers had a policy whereby a Farmers agent could place insurance with a different company if a customer was not eligible for insurance issued by Farmers or if Farmers refused to underwrite a policy for the customer. He further testified that he had not been looking to disaffiliate himself from his father’s insurance agency and that he had told Lowry that he' did not want to cut off the working relationship he had with his father. During direct examination of Morris, the following occurred:

“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] Did you specifically ask Farmers on multiple occasions before agreeing to become a Farmers agent if your association and continuing association with the Morris Insurance Agency was a problem in any way for Farmers?
“[MORRIS:] I asked them multiple times and always got the same answer.
“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] And what was that answer?
“[MORRIS:] The answer was [it] is in no way a problem and is actually a benefit to you. That is the way I believed it to be.
“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] A1 right. Did you rely on the representations made to you by Farmers ... before agreeing to become a ^Farmers agent?
“[MORRIS:] I relied on what they told me.
“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] Would you under any circumstances have agreed to become a Farmers agent if Farmers would have told you the association with your father and the Morris Insurance Agency was a problem?
“[MORRIS:] Absolutely not.”

Morris . also testified that, • when- he agreed to become a Farmers - agent, he signed several different agreements; that nothing in any of those agreements or documents indicated that his relationship with his father’s agency constituted a conflict of interest; that the documents given to him did not say anything contrary to what he had been told by Dewey, Hunt, and Lowry; and that there was nothing in the agreements that made him think that the representations made to him by the agents of Farmers were false.

Morris submitted a “Reserve Agent Program Application,” which was approved by Farmers’ state office. That application showed that Morris was then working for his father’s insurance agency. On January 15, 2007, Morris executed a “Reserve Agent Appointment Agreement” (“the reserve-agent agreement”) and a “Horizontal Marketing Agent Relationship Agreement” (“the horizontal-marketing agreement”), both of which 'became effective on February 8, 2007. The reserve-agent agreement-provided that it “may be terminated by either the Reserve Agent or the Companies on ninety (90) days written' notice.” After successfully completing ‘the reserve-agent requirements, Morris became an agent with Farmers.

On May 22, 2007, Morris executed the ‘Agent Appointment Agreement” (“the agent agreement”), which was effective August 1, 2007. The agent agreement provided that it “may be terminated by either [Morris] or [Farmers] on three (3) months’ written notice.” At this time, Morris maintained an office at his father’s insurance agency. Evidence was introduced indicating that.Hunt had talked to Morris about the need for getting his own separate office. However, Hunt testified that he told Morris that Morris needed a separate office so he could put a Farmers sign out front and .so that Morris and Farmers would have a presence in the community. He did not tell Morris that he needed to get a separate office because maintaining an office at his father’s agency constituted a conflict of interest.

Edward Stansel is the division marketing manager for Farmers Insurance Inc. He testified that, based on various documents, which were introduced at trial, Farmers was aware of Morris’s association with his father’s insurance agency. On August 7, 2009, Stansel sent a memorandum to Keith Gockel, a senior marketing consultant for Farmers, requesting that the agent agreement be terminated and setting forth various issues he had with Morris. In the memorandum, Stansel pointed out that Morris’s father owned an independent insurance agency in Mobile and stated that he had proof that Morris had placed insurance that was eligible to be written through Farmers with his father’s agency. That allegation arose.out.of .a situation where a customer of another Farmers agent canceled a Farmers policy and then obtained insurance through Morris’s father’s agency. The other Farmers agent complained to Farmers about the situation. Stansel admitted in his video deposition that was played at trial that he did not have any documentation to prove that Morris had caused the customer to cancel his Farmers policy and to place insurance with Morris’s father’s agency. Additionally, Stansel indicated that he had not interviewed anyone regarding the situation. Rather, Stansel testified that he believed that Morris had placed insurance that was eligible to be written through Farmers with his father’s agency. There was also an allegation that Morris’s telephone number appeared on a sign for Morris’s father’s insurance agency.

Additionally, Stansel testified that, in the memorandum he had sent to Gockel in which he recommended the termination of Morris’s employment with Farmers, he had indicated that Farmers had had multiple issues with Morris in which agent counseling had taken place. Those issues included three instances in which Morris had not met minimum production standards; several instances when Morris had not appropriately applied cash he had collected to policies he had written; issues with Morris transfemng policies from other agents without going through the proper procedure; an instance in which. Morris provided a quote for insurance to a prospect of another Farmers agent; and an instance in which Morris had also written a policy that included wind coverage even though such coverage was against Farmers’ underwriting guidelines. Stansel’s memorandum also mentioned an incident in which Morris had written a policy for an entity known as “Private Collections.” Stansel indicated that Morris had represented that Private Collections was a gift shop and that Farmers’ commercial-underwriting division had approved the risk. However, the underwriting division later determined that Private Collections was actually a jewelry store, and the policy Morris had written was then set up for nonrenewal.

Stansel also described another incident in which Morris had written a policy on a house in which the square footage was listed as 200 square feet less than the square footage shown on the Baldwin County Revenue Department Web site and the house was listed as one year newer than the year listed on the Baldwin County Revenue Department Web site. Stansel testified that Morris was wrong in that situation; that that was a serious offense; that writing a policy for the house without the proper square footage and without the proper year of construction was a material misrepresentation; and that that was actually cause for an agent’s immediate termination.

Further,' in his memorandum, Stansel stated:

“It is my recommendation, [after listing the exhibits], that we terminate the appointment of Kyle Morris based on the fact that business was stolen from another agent and placed with Morris Agency.”

Subsequently, Gockel approved the termination of the agent agreement. Gockel testified that Morris’s employment with Farmers was terminated pursuant to the three-month-notice provision of the agent agreement. He further testified that Morris’s employment was terminated for a number of reasons and that conflict of interest was one of those reasons. Additionally, internal documents from Farmers presented as evidence at trial showed that Morris’s employment was terminated based on a conflict of interest. , However, there was testimony indicating that conflict of interest was given as a reason because only one ground for termination could be entered into the computer system.

In September 2009, Stansel and Dewey went to Morris’s office and gave him written notice that the agent agreement would be terminated effective December 16, 2009. Morris testified that, when he asked why his employment with Farmers was being terminated, they told him that there was a conflict of interest because his father was in the insurance business. Morris subsequently sued Farmers, arguing that Farmers had fraudulently induced him to become a Farmers agent.

The trial took place February 4-8, 2018. Farmers filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the closé of Morris’s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence. On February 8, 2013, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Morris. The jury awarded Morris $600,000 in compensatory damages and $1,800,000 in punitive damages. On that same day, the trial court entered a judgment on the jury’s verdict.'

On March 8, 2013, Farmers filed a “Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial or for a Remittitur in the Verdicts”; that motion was denied by operation of law. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

“ ‘ “The standard of review applicable to a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict [now referred to as a preverdict and a postverdict motion for a judgment as a matter of law] is identical to the standard used by the trial court in granting or denying the motions initially. Thus, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on either motion, we determine whether there was sufficient evidence to produce a conflict warranting jury consideration. And, like the trial court, we must view any evidence most favorably to the non-movant.” ’ Glenlakes Realty Co. v. Norwood, 721 So.2d 174, 177 (Ala.1998) (quoting Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 863 (Ala.1988)).”

Parker v. Williams, 977 So.2d 476, 480 (Ala.2007).

“ ‘The standard of review applicable to whether an expert should be permitted to testify is- well settled. The matter is “largely discretionary with the trial court, and that court’s judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So.2d 839, 850 (Ala.2002). We now refer to that standard .as a trial court’s “exceeding its discretion.” . See, e.g., Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., Inc., 901 So.2d 84, 106 (Ala.2004) (“Our review of the record supports the conclusion that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in finding that Jones was properly qualified as an expert under Rule 702[, Ala. R. Evid.,] and in considering his testimony.”). However, the standard itself has not changed.’
“Kyser v. Harrison, 908 So.2d 914, 918 (Ala.2005).”

Robinson v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 24 So.3d 1119, 1125 (Ala.Civ.App.2009).

Discussion

Farmers’ arguments on appeal can be divided into two categories: (1) liability on the fraud claim itself and (2) damages. As to the issue of liability, Farmers’ arguments on appeal concern the element of reliance. The issue presented is whether the trial court should have determined, as a matter of law, that. Morris. could not reasonably have relied on the oral representation made to him that sharing an office with his father did not create, a problem and whether, therefore, the issue should have been submitted to the jury. The damages issue concerns the proper measure of damages if, in fact, the fraud claim—including the issue of reasonable reliance—was properly submitted to the jury-. .

I.

Farmers argues that the judgment in favor of Morris must be reversed, as a matter of law, because, it says, Morris eould not have, reasonably relied on the representation that his association with his father’s insurance agency would not constitute a conflict of interest.

“ ‘Fraud in the inducement consists of one party’s misrepresenting .a material fact concerning the subject matter of the underlying, transaction and the other party’s relying on the misrepresentation to his, her,, or its detriment in executing a document or taking a course of action.’
“Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Barger, 773 So.2d 454, 459 (Ala.2000).”

Johnson Mobile Homes of Alabama, Inc. v. Hathcock, 855 So.2d 1064, 1067 (Ala.2003) (emphasis omitted).

“The elements of actionable fraud' based upon misrepresentations are: 1) a duty to speak the truth; 2) a false representation of a material existing fact made intentionally,' recklessly, or innocently; 3) action upon the false representation by the plaintiff; and 4) loss, harm, or damage 'proximately resulting from the false representation.”

Kidder v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 639 So.2d 1361, 1362 (Ala.1994).

“This Court has stated that ‘fraudulent-inducement claim[s] [are] governed by the “reasonable-reliance” standard. Under that standard, a person cannot blindly rely on an agent’s oral representations to the exclusion of written disclosures in a contract.’ Harold Allen’s Mobile Home Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Early, 776 So.2d 777, 783-84 (Ala.2000) (citations omitted).”

Wright Therapy Equip., LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 991 So.2d 701, 706 (Ala.2008) (emphasis added).

The “reasonable-reliance” standard , for fraudulent-inducement claims repeated in Wright Therapy Equipment was declared by this Court in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Parham, 693 So.2d 409, 421 (Ala.1997). The Foremost Court rejected the “justifiable-reliance” standard this Court had adopted in Hickox v. Stover, 551 So.2d 259 (Ala.1989), and reiterated in Hicks v. Globe Life & Accident Insurance Co., 584 So.2d 458 (Ala. 1991), The problem with those earlier decisions was that they “per-mittted] a fraud case to go to the jury in all circumstances where all the plaintiff had to say was that he did not, in fact, know what the contract said.” Potter v. First Real Estate Co., 844 So.2d 540, 549 (Ala.2002). The Foremost Court, itself explained the effect of its rejection of this approach and its return to the “reasonable-reliance” standard:

“The concerns that have been expressed by at least four present members of this "Court as to the impact the Hickox standard has’ had on the law of fraud were best expressed by Justice Almon in his dissent in Hicks:
“ ‘The traditional standard of “reasonable reliance” provided a flexible concept adaptable to the circumstances of each case, including the relative sophistication and bargaining powers of the parties. The new standard of -“justifiable-reliance” gives to parties claiming fraud undue leeway to ignoré written contract terms and allows in some cases the automatic creation of a jury issue by a plaintiffs statement in contradiction of such written terms.’
“[Hicks v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co.,] 584 So.2d [458,] 469-70 [ (Ala.1991) ].
"After careful consideration, we conclude that the ‘justifiable reliance’ standard adopted in Hickox, which eliminated the general duty on the part of a person to read the documents received in connection with a particular transaction (consumer or commercial), should •be replaced with the ‘reasonable reliance’ standard most closely associated with Torres v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 438 So.2d 757 (Ala.1983). The ‘reasonable reliance’ standard is, in our view, a more practicable standard. that will allow the factfinder greater flexibility in .determining the issue of reliance based on all of the circumstances surrounding a transaction, including the me,ntal capacity, educational background, relative sophistication, and bargaining power of the parties. In addition, a return to the ‘reasonable reliance’ standard will once again provide a mechanism, which was available before Hickox, whereby the trial court can enter a judgment as a matter of law in a fraud ..case where the undisputed evidence.indicates that the party or parties claiming fraud in a particular transaction were fully capable of reading and understanding their documents, but nonetheless made a deliberate decision to ignore written contract terms.”

693 So.2d at 421 (emphasis added).

Farmers essentially argues that three aspects of Morris’s relationship with Farmers negate Morris’s fraud claim. The first two concern provisions of Morris’s written contracts with Farmers;. the third concerns information made available to . Morris outside those contracts. Consequently, Farniers’ first two arguments potentially implicate the Foremost reliance standard; the .third argument does not.

A.

Initially; Farmers contends that Morris could not have reasonably relied on the representations that sharing an office with his father would not constitute a conflict of interest because the reserve-agent agreement and the agent agreement provided that they were terminable at will by either party with three months’ written notice. However, Morris asserts that “a person fraudulently induced to leave employment may sue for fraud in the inducement even if the new employment is at will.”

The gravamen of Morris’s claim is that Farmers made representations that induced him to leave his existing, exclusive employment arrangement with his father’s insurance agency. In Kidder v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 639 So.2d 1361, 1363 (Ala.1994), a case involving similar fraud and employment-at-will issues, the plaintiff, Vicki Kidder, sued AmSouth Bank, N.A., alleging fraudulent inducement and breach of contract; the case was removed to a federal district court. The federal district court subsequently certified two questions to this Court regarding Kidder’s fraud-in-the-inducement claim. The first question was:

“ ‘Can Ms. Kidder, who was employed as an at-will employee subject to discharge by AmSouth at any time, maintain a cause of action based on fraud in the inducement of her employment based upon alleged misrepresentations • as to her working conditions?’ ”

639 So.2d at 1361-62. In addressing that question, this Court stated:

“It is well settled by our case law that ‘the showing of a loss of employment is legally inadequate to show the element of damage in a fraud claim by an at-will employee against his or her employer.’ See, Burrell v. Carraway Methodist Hospitals of Alabama, Inc., 607 So.2d 193, 196 (Ala.1992); Salter [v. Alfa Ins. Co., 561 So.2d 1050 (Ala.1990) ]. For example, in Salter, the plaintiff alleged that her employer represented that she did not have to be involved in investigating a particular insurance claim. The plaintiff alleged that she was then fired for failing to investigate the claim and that her termination caused her financial damage. The Court held that she suffered no legally recognized loss or damage as the result of any representation made by her employer because her contract was terminable by her employer at any time and for any, or for no reason.
“In Burrell the plaintiff alleged that his employer fraudulently misrepresented to him that certain conduct was permissible and that he was nevertheless discharged for participating in that eon-duct. This Court held that, even if the plaintiff proved those allegations, he had suffered no legally recognized damage because he was subject to termination at any time. 607 So.2d at 196.”

639 So.2d at 1362.

In contrast to Burrell v. Carraway Methodist Hospitals of Alabama, Inc., 607 So.2d 193 (Ala.1992), the gravamen of the claim in Kidder was that the allegedly fraudulent representation had induced the employee to leave her former job. This Court addressed Kidder’s claim as follows:

“In a similar case, this Court held that an employee could sue for a fraudulent misrepresentation that occurred before her employment. [In] Smith v. Reynolds Metals Co., 497 So.2d 93 (Ala.1986), the plaintiff contended that the employer misrepresented .to her-that she was qualified for summer employment. The Court allowed the plaintiff to proceed on her claim that she had relied upon this misrepresentation and that, in her reliance, she had turned down other employment and educational opportunities.
“AmSouth argues that Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So.2d 903 (Ala.1982), applies to this case and bars Kidder’s fraud claim. The plaintiff in Bates accepted a job offer by the defendant and quit her former job as a dental hygienist. Before she began her new job, the defendant had a hiring freeze and terminated the plaintiffs employment. The plaintiff sued, alleging breach of contract and claiming damages for the loss incurred by giving up her former job. The termination of the Bates plaintiff, an at will employee, occurred before her actual employment had begun; this Court held that the doctrine of at will employment barred her claim.
“However, there is a difference between Bates and this case. The Bates plaintiff alleged a breach of contract claim against the employer. Kidder claims that she was fraudulently induced to accept AmSouth’s job offer. The breach of contract alleged in Bates did not arise until some time after the plaintiff had accepted the defendant employer’s offer. In this present case, however, the elements of fraud were met when Kidder gave up her former employment, having agreed to work for AmSouth based on its alleged misrepresentations. Notably, in Smith v. Reynolds Metals Co., this Court held that the plaintiff, as an employee at will, had no breach of contract claim even though she was allowed to pursue a fraud claim.
“We hold that Kidder may maintain an action alleging fraud in the inducement of her employment based upon alleged misrepresentations as to her working conditions.”

639 So.2d at 1362-63.

In this case, Morris has not sued Farmers alleging a' breach of contract as to his relationship with Farmers. Rather, Morris has sued alleging that, among other things, Farmers fraudulently induced him to alter his prior business relationship with his father’s insurance agency and to instead begin placing insurance policies with Farmers. Morris argues that he' was harmed because .he lost the opportunity to sell policies and accumulate a “book of business” through his father’s insurance agency rather than through Farmers. Just as in Kidder, Morris’s status as an at-will employee for Farmers does not change the fact, as found by the jury, that Morris was fraudulently induced to leave his former employment. Morris’s claim is focused on that occurrence, not on whether his eventual termination by Farmers constituted a breach of the contract between him and Farmers.

Farmers’ attempt to avoid liability by relying upon the at-will nature of Morris’s employment contracts finds no logical boundary at contracts lacking express at-will clauses. Even in the absence of such a clause, Alabama law provides that contracts for an indefinite period generally are terminable at will (see, e.g., Webb Wheel Prods., Inc. v. Hanvey, 922 So.2d 865, 870 (Ala.2005)) and that parties to a contract are charged with knowledge of the law governing their contract (Burrell v. Carraway, 607 So.2d 193 (Ala.1992); Salter v. Alfa Ins. Co., 561 So.2d 1050 (Ala.1990)). As a result, embracing Farmers’ position would require not only an overruling of Kidder and the cases it relies upon, it logically would mean that the at-will nature of Alabama employment contracts generally would eliminate from our jurisprudence any claims alleging fraud of the'nature alleged here.

There is no difference between this case and Kidder in regard to the fact that the actions of the defendant necessary to support a cause of action based on fraud were completed before the new employment began. And in'both cases the plaintiff “ ‘seeks damages only with respect to what [he] gave up in taking the [new] job.’” 639 So.2d at 1362 (quoting trial court’s second certified question in Kidder). The holding in Kidder, which has not been overruled, applies here. When an employee leaves one job for another, based on a ’misrepresentation by the new employer regarding the new job that is not true at the time it is made, the new employer cannot hide behind the fact that Alabama law enforces or reads into the new employment contract an “at will” clause to avoid the consequences of its fraud. Therefore, the fact that the agent agreement was terminable at will by either party would not, as a matter of law, prevent Morris from reasonably relying on the representations made to him.

B.

Farmers also argues that Morris could not have reasonably relied on the representations made by Lowry, Hunt, and Dewey because the horizontal-marketing agreement contained a “merger” or “integration” clause that provided, in pertinent part:

'“The Agreement contains the entire agreement between [Morris] and [Farmers] except for the aforementioned and applicable [reserve-agent agreement].... Each party to this Agreement acknowledges that no representations, inducements, promises or - agreements orally or otherwise have been made by or behalf of any party except those covenants and agreements expressly noted above, or embodied in this Agreement. As of the effective ’date of this Agreement, this Agreement fully supersedes any and all prior negotiations, agreements or understanding between the parties -pertaining to the ■subject matter of this Agreement and there are no oral or written agreements, - understandings representations or statements relating to the subject matter of this Agreement other than the aforementioned and applicable [reserve-agent agreement].”

However,

“this Court has never held that an integration clause ... renders a party’s reliance on oral representations unjustifiable, or unreasonable, as a matter of law. To the contrary, this Court has consistently held that although a written contract stipulates that there were no oral understandings not incorporated therein, such a stipulation does not foreclose a party, as a matter of law, from establishing his reliance on fraudulent representations that induced him to enter the contract. See Harris v. M & S Toyota, 575 So.2d 74 (Ala.1991); Stanard Tilton Milling Co. v. Mixon, 243 Ala. 309, 312, 9 So.2d 911, 913 (1942); Standard Oil Co. v. Myers, 232 Ala. 662, 665, 169 So. 312, 314 (1936); Alabama Machinery & Supply Co. v. Caffey, 213 Ala. 260, 262, 104 So. 509, 511 (1925); J.A. Fay & Egan Co. v. Independent Lumber Co., 178 Ala. 166, 168, 59 So. 470, 471 (1912); see also Advanced Studios of Alabama, Inc. v. Advanced Hairpiece, Inc., 607 F.2d 1138, 1139 (5th Cir.1979) (applying Alabama law). Accord, AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 736 n. 6 (8th Cir.1987) (applying Iowa law); V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 757 F.2d 411, 418 (1st Cir.1985) (applying Massachusetts law); King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d 1313, 1318 (10th Cir.1983) (applying Colorado law); Arnold v. National Aniline & Chemical Co., 20 F.2d 364, 369-70 (2d Cir.1927) (applying New York law); RepublicBank Dallas v. First Wisconsin National Bank, 636 F.Supp. 1470, 1473 (E.D.Wis.1986) (applying Wisconsin law); Hall v. Crow, 240 Iowa 81, 34 N.W.2d 195, 199 (1948); Bates v. Southgate, 308 Mass. 170, 31 N.E.2d 551, 557-58 (1941); Burns v. Vesto Co., 295 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Mo.App.1956); Hector M. v. Commissioner of Social Services, 102 Misc.2d 676, 425 N.Y.S.2d 199, 205 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1980); Angerosa v. White Co., 248 A.D. 425, 290 N.Y.S. 204, 213 (1936); McInnis & Co. v. Western Tractor & Equip. Co., 63 Wash.2d 652, 388 P.2d 562, 565 (1964); Coson v. Roehl, 63 Wash.2d 384, 387 P.2d 541, 544 (1963); Anderson v. Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 459-60, 67 N.W.2d 853 (1955). This holding ensues from the, rule that when an agreement has been induced by deliberate fraud, the written document .reciting that agreement is void and is ‘of no more binding efficacy ... than if it. had no existence, or were a piece of waste paper.’ Drinkard v. Embalmers Supply Co., 244 Ala. 619, 621, 14 So.2d 585, 587 (1943); accord, Angerosa, 248 A.D. at -, 290 N.Y.S. at 213; Coson, 63 Wash.2d at 387, 387 P.2d at 544.
“The policy behind permitting a party to establish his reliance oh another’s fraudulent inducements despite an integration clause in the written agreement has been well stated by the Massachusetts Supreme Court:
“‘In the realm of fact it is entirely possible for. a party knowingly to agree that no representations have been made to him, while at the same time believing and relying upon representations which in fact have been made and in fact are false .but for which he would not have made the agreement. To deny this possibility is to' ignore the frequent instances in everyday experience where parties accept, often without critical ¿xamination, and act upon agreements containing somewhere within their four corners exculpatory clauses in one form' or another, but where they do so, nevertheless, in reliance upon the honesty of supposed friends, the plausible and disarming statements of salesmen, or the customary course of business. To refuse relief would result in a multitude of frauds and in thwarting the general policy of' the law.’
“Bates, 308 Mass. at 182, 31 N.E.2d at 558, cited in V.S.H. Realty, Inc., 757 F.2d at 418; King, 701 F.2d at 1318. Thus, although a party who in fact relies upon fraudulent inducements in the face of an integration clause may be negligent in so doing, his negligence 'will not prohibit him as a matter of law from recovering for injuries intentionally inflicted upon him.
“ Before Hickox v. Stover, 551 So.2d 259 (Ala.1989), ‘reasonable reliance’ was the standard in fraud actions.”

Downs v. Wallace, 622 So.2d 337, 341-42 (Ala.1993). Therefore, the presence of the merger/integration clause in the horizontal-marketing agreement would not, as a matter of law, preclude Morris from reasonably relying on the representations made to him.

C.

Finally, Farmers argues that Morris could not have reasonably relied on the representations made to him by Lowry, Hunt, and Dewey because, it says, the training materials Morris was supposed to have reviewed before becoming a full-time agent would have put him on notice that his continued association with his father’s insurance agency constituted a conflict of interest. Specifically, Farmers argues that a statement in an online training manual—the “Farmers Code of Business Ethics and Professional Standards” (“the Farmers ethics manual”)—rendered null any representations made by Farmers representatives to Moms concerning whether he could continue his association with his father’s insurance agency after he became a Farmers agent.

It is true that “where an alleged misrepresentation is explicitly addressed and negated in a written agreement signed by the parties, any reliance on a contrary oral assertion may be deemed unreasonable as a matter of law.” 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit § 255 (2013)(emphasis added). Foremost put it this way:

“[A] return to the ‘reasonable reliance’ standard will once again provide a mechanism ... whereby the trial court can enter a judgment as a matter of law in a fraud case where the undisputed evidence indicates that the party or parties claiming fraud in a particular transaction were fully capable of reading and understanding their documents, but nonetheless made a deliberate decision to ignore written contract terms.”

693 So.2d at 421 (emphasis added). The Court reiterated the standard in Massey Automotive, Inc. v. Norris, 895 So.2d 215, 218 (Ala.2004):

“Under the reasonable-reliance standard, a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant in a fraud case is appropriate where the party who claims fraud in the transaction was fully capable of reading and understanding the terms of the contract involved in the transaction, but instead blindly relied on the defendant’s oral representations to the exclusion of written disclosures in the contract to the contrary.”

(Emphasis added.)

Foremost refers to terms of a written contract that contradict oral representations; it does not address the question of under what circumstances reasonable reliance is precluded by statements in documents other than the contract between the parties, such as an online training manual. See also Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Bailey’s Constr. Co., 950 So.2d 280 (Ala.2006) (holding that representations in a noncon-tractual document could not be reasonably relied upon by a plaintiff precisely because only the written contract could be relied upon).

It was undisputed that the agent agreement did not include any provision regarding conflicts of interest. Even if it had contained some statement that should have provoked further inquiry by Morris regarding his association with his father’s insurance agency, Morris clearly and repeatedly made such inquiries regarding that association and repeatedly was told that Farmers had no policy against such an association.

The trial court framed the issue to the jury in this case consistently with the fact that the statement in the Farmers ethics manual regarding conflicts of interest was not part of the written contract between the parties. As Morris argues in his brief on appeal:

“There was nothing—zero—in the employment agreement that could or should have alerted [Morris] to investigate whether Farmers’ [representatives] really truly meant what they said when they repeatedly told him there was no problem with his continuing his affiliation with his father’s agency.... [Nothing in the documents that [Morris] signed to become an agent contradicted Farmers’ false statement that it had no policy making it a conflict of interest when a.Farmers agent ‘offices with an agent or broker of another insurance company.’
“... Farmers does not now contend-that anything in the documents [Morris] initially signed contradicted the misrepresentation that working with his father was not a' problem. Instead, Farmers on appeal argues only that one paragraph buried deep in online training materials provided to [Morris] months after the false representations were made to him, and after he agreed to become a Farmers agent, establish as a matter of law that he could not reasonably have relied on the misrepresentations made to him before he accepted employment.”

It also should be noted that one of the contracts in this case contains a merger clause. In essence, Farmers is contending that Morris could not have reasonably relied upon the representations made to him because of. a statement regarding conflicts of interest contained in a document that was not part of a contract that expressly stated that it was a complete expression of the r parties’. agreement. Perhaps it is a recognition of this contradiction that causes Farmers to stop short of arguing in its brief that the statement in the Farmers ethics manual constitutes an explicit contractual refutation of the oral representations, as would be required for Foremost to apply. In other words, Farmers does not argue that Foremost governs here. Instead, it contends that the statement in the Farmers ethics manual put Morris “on notice that he could not rely on the claimed representation” and that “[h]e did not inquire about any contradiction.”

Again, this argument is not a “Foremost reasonable-reliance argument.” It is simply an.argument that a plaintiff could not reasonably rely on one extracontractual statement by an employer (or, in this case, several statements) in light of a separate, conflicting extracontractual statement by the same employer. More specifically, Farmers must persuade us that, as a matter of law, Morris could not reasonably have relied upon t.he particular, direct, repeated, assurances he received from representatives of Farmers in response to his pointed inquiries when there was a conflicting statement to. be found in the Farmers ethics manual that Morris was supposed to have read as part of his orientation. Given the pai'ticular facts of this case, we are not so persuaded. We cannot say that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the issue whether Morris could have reasonably relied upon the repeated oral representations made to him in direct response to his repeated inquiries, as opposed to the statement at issue in the Farmers ethics manual, was a factual question for the jury.

Morris argues as follows as to the facts that supported the submission of the issue to the jury and the jury’s verdict:

“First, Mr. Morris testified that he never saw the materials Farmers now points to. Second, Mr. Hunt and Ms. Lowry, who completed the same training as [Morris], both testified that they had never seen this provision. Mike Dewey testified that he did not know such a provision existed. Steve Hunt testified not only that he did not know about it but also that he had not found it when he had taken the very same training. Mr. Hunt could not even find it in the materials when asked to do so on the witness stand.
“The evidence thus established that it was unreasonable to expect anyone to find the particular training materials Farmers cites as precluding, as a matter of law, reasonable reliance. The jury was shown a demonstrative aid that was consistent with [Morris’s] testimony and Steve Hunt’s testimony about how hard it was to find the ‘conflict of interest’ provision.”

The demonstrative aid referenced described the following steps to which Morris had to go to even find the conflict-of-interest'statement in the Farmer's ethics manual:

“‘1. Take the “Constructing Your Business” online module, which is one of dozens of online courses.
“ ‘2. Go to page 19, under “Duties and Responsibilities,” and find the second •paragraph.
“‘3. Go to the company server and click on “Agency Dashboard,” “Managing,” “My Operations,” and “Agent Guide.”
“ ‘4. Find Section 3 of 10 in the “Agent Guide.”
“‘5. Find the 7th of 13 categories listed in the table of contents for that section alone.
“‘6. Go to that category, titled “Responsibility,” and find subsection 1, .
“‘7. Look at the third paragraph. There it says: “Accordingly, an agent who offices with an agent or broker of another insurance company, will be considered as maintaining a conflict of interest.” ’ ”

Morris’s argument continues: “Under the circumstances, whether [Morris] reasonably relied on Farmers’ misrepresentation was patently a jury question,”

We agree with Morris. See also Potter v. First Real Estate Co., 844 So.2d 540 (Ala.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs were not barred by a difficult-to-read provision in a survey that contradicted the oral representations upon which they had relied regarding whether the house they had purchased was located in a flood • plain).

Morris entered into an employment relationship with Farmers only after receiving multiple assurances that his affiliation with his father’s insurance agency was not a problem. Likewise, Farmers accepted Morris’s services with full knowledge of Morris’s situation. Morris did not blindly rely on oral representations and ignore the terms of his contracts. The only information contrary to what Morris had been told was buried in a 200-page manual among dozens of other documents provided for training modules, and even longtime Farmers employees were not aware of the existence of the statement. Under these circumstances, a jury could find that it was reasonable for Morris to rely upon the representations made by- Farmers representatives and for him to be unaware of the single, noncontractual statement to- the contrary. Morris presented sufficient evidence of fraudulent inducement for the matter to be decided by the jury. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in denying Farmers’ post-judgment motion for a judgment as a matter of law.

II.

Having held that the judgment for Morris on the fraud claim is due to be affirmed, we consider Farmers’, arguments regarding the damages awards. Farmers argues that the jury’s compensatory-damages award was not supported by the evidence. Specifically, it contends that the calculation by Morris’s expert regarding Morris’s economic loss was based solely on what Morris would have earned had he continued as a Farmers agent and that Morris’s expert speculated as to the length of time Morris would have remained a Farmers agent, despite the fact that the agent agreement was terminable at will. Farmers is correct that Morris would not be entitled to damages based on a loss of income he would have received had the agent agreement not been terminated. However, Farmers has mischaracterized the evidence Morris presented regarding compensatory damages.

Morris was “entitled to damages for all injuries proximately caused by” Farmers’ misrepresentation. Kidder, 639 So.2d at 1363. At trial, Morris argued that the measure of damages would be the opportunities he had lost by becoming a Farmers agent. Specifically,' he asserted that, by becoming a Farmers agént, he lost the opportunity to write policies through his father’s insurance agency during the time the reserve-agent agreement and the agent agreement were in. effect.

Morris called as a witness Mark Palow-ski, a certified public accountant who had been hired' by Farmers as a business-valuation expert. Palowski testified that Morris had incurred business expenses in becoming a Farmers agent. He also testified that, in his opinion, Morris’s customers were loyal to Morris, not Farmers; that those individuals purchased policies from Morris 'based on their relationship with Morris and not based on Morris’s relationship with Farmers; and that, if Morris had recommended other products from companies other than Farmérs, the customers would have bought those products. He further agreed that, if Morris had remained with his father’s insurance agency, he would have been able to sell policies- to those same customers through his father’s insurance agency rather than through Farmers. He further testified that Morris gave up his ability to sell those policies out of his father’s agency when he agreed to become a Farmers agent. Palowski also testified that, in his opinion, the best evidence to determine what Morris would have sold if he had stayed at his father’s insurance agency was to look at what he sold with Farmers during that same period. He further testified that he believed that Morris would have had the same retention rate for policies at his father’s insurance agency as he had had at Farmers.

Morris’s father testified that insurance agents normally retain policies between 10 to 20 years. He also testified that he had personally retained policies for even longer periods.

Morris’s expert, Dr. Robert Herbert, used the commissions Morris had earned at Farmers and Morris’s retention rate at Farmers as a measure for determining the amount of commissions Morris could have earned if he had remained with his father’s insurance agency instead of going to work for Farmers. He also calculated the amount Morris could have expected to earn on such policies in the future and compiled a chart showing the commissions Morris could have earned on policies sold through his father’s agency if he" had retained those policies anywhere from 1 to 25 years. Thus, the evidence presented by Morris regarding his damages was based on commissions he could have earned if he had written policies through his father’s agency during the periods when the reserve-agent agreement and the agent agreement were in effect. Because the evidence Morris presented regarding his damages was not based on commissions he would have earned at Farmers if he had continued to work for Farmers, Farmers’ argument in this regard is without merit.

Farmers also contends that the evidence did not show that Morris actually lost income because Morris’s income increased after he went to work for Farmers and because the amount of income he earned from his father’s insurance agency after leaving Farmers’ employment was actually greater than the amount of income he had earned from his father’s insurance agency before he went to work' at Farmers. However, Morris presented evidence indicating that, if he had stayed at his father’s insurance agency, he could have sold policies in the same amount as the policies he sold while working at Farmers. He also presented evidence indicating that the projected net income on that amount of business would have been $76,310 in 2010 and $78,088 in 2011. However, it appears that Morris earned only $60,000, from his father’s insurance agency during 2010 and 2011. Therefore, Farmers’ argument in this regard is without merit. ■ • -

Farmers further contends that Morris’s claim for business expenses he had incurred by becoming a Farmers agent “should not have been a damage[s] component because they were more than offset by his Farmers commission income.” It also argues that Morris voluntarily undertook those expenses to become a Farmers agent. Farmers presented this argument in its postjudgment motion. However, it did not present this argument in either its oral or written motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence. Accordingly, it did not preserve this argument for appellate review. See Williford v. Emerton, 935 So.2d 1150, 1154 (Ala.2004) (holding that “ ‘ “[i]t is a procedural absolute that a [posttrial motion for a JML [judgment as a matter of law]], based on the ‘insufficiency of the evidence,’ is improper, if the party has not moved for a [JML] on the same ground at the close of all the evidence.” Barnes v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770, 776 (Ala.1988)’ ”).

Additionally, in its brief to this Court, Farmers did not cite any authority in support of its argument that the judgment should not have included an amount for business-operating expenses because Morris had voluntarily expended the money it took to become a Farmers agent and because the income Morris had received from Farmers exceeded the expenses he had incurred. Therefore, Farmers’ argument in this regard does not comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P. See Van Voorst v. Federal Express Corp., 16 So.3d 86 (Ala.2008). Accordingly, we will not consider this argument.

III.

Finally, Farmers argues that this case should be remanded for a hearing regarding whether the $1,800,000 punitive-damages award was excessive. In its post-judgment motion, Farmers argued that the punitive-damages award was excessive and asked for a remittitur of that award. It also requested a hearing on its post-judgment motion. The trial court did not conduct a hearing on the motion. Additionally, Farmers’ postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law, and the trial court did not make any findings regarding Farmers’ request for a remittitur of the punitive-damages award. This Court addressed a similar argument in Target Media Partners-Operating Co. v. Specialty Marketing Corp., 177 So.3d 843, 869-70 (Ala.2013), as follows:

“Section 6-11-23(b), Ala.Code 1975, states:
“Tn all cases wherein a verdict for punitive damages is awarded, the trial court shall, upon the motion of any party, either conduct hearings or receive additional evidence, or both, concerning the amount of punitive damages.’
“In their postjudgment motion, Target Media and Leader requested a Hammond[ v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986) ]/Green Oil[ Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989) ] hearing, but the trial court summarily denied their postjudgment motion without holding the requested hearing to consider Target Media and Leader’s argument that the punitive-damages awards were excessive.
“This Court has clearly held that a defendant is entitled to a Hammond/Green Oil hearing if the defendant requests such a hearing. In Southeast Environmental Infrastructure[, L.L.C. v. Rivers, 12 So.3d 32 (Ala.2008) ], this Court held: Tn its postjudgment motion for a remittitur, SEI timely requested a hearing on that motion. Therefore, SEI was entitled to such a hearing, and the trial court erred in not conducting a hearing on SEI’s remittitur motion, before it denied the motion. 12 So.3d at 50. In Lifestar Response of Alabama, Inc. v. Lemuel, 908 So.2d 207, 225 (Ala.2004), this Court held that Lifestar would have been entitled to a Hammond/Green Oil hearing if it had properly requested one. Here, the trial court did not hold the hearing Target Media and Leader requested in their post-judgment motion; instead, it denied that motion without explanation. When Specialty Marketing asked the trial court to enter an order explaining the reasons it had denied the postjudgment motion and Target Media and Leader again requested a Hammond/Green Oil hearing, the trial court responded by scheduling the requested hearing, but the scheduled date was outside the time in which Target Media and Leader were required to appeal from the judgment. Moreover, as we held in .Section III.A. of this opinion, the trial court lost jurisdiction to hold such a hearing after it denied Target Media and Leader’s postjudgment motion.
“‘This Court and the Legislature have established a constitutionally appropriate system for reviewing a contention that a punitive-damages award is excessive. See Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989); and § 6-11-23(b), Ala.Code 1975. Additionally, the United' States Supreme Court has established various “guideposts” and considerations for assessing whether punitive damages are excessive, in a series of cases including, most notably, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996).'
“Lifestar Response, 908 So.2d at 225.
“In Williford v. Emerton, 935 So.2d 1150, 1156 (Ala.2004), this Court explained the reasoning behind the requirement of a Hammond/Green Oil hearing, as well as the requirement that the trial court enter an order containing its findings as a result of that hearing.
“ ‘[Without a written statement of the reasons for that denial [of a defendant’s postjudgment motion challenging an award of punitive damages,] the requirements of Hammond have not been satisfied. As we explained in Love v. Johnson, 775 So.2d 127, 127-28 (Ala.2000), such a written statement is necessary before this Court can conduct a proper review on appeal:
“ “In Hammond [v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986) ], this Court required that a trial court ‘reflect in the record the -reasons for interfering with a jury verdict, or refusing to do so, on- the grounds of excessiveness of the damages.’ 493 So.2d at 1379; see also ALFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brewton, 554 So.2d 953 (Ala.1989). In Hammond, this Court stated the reason for the requirement:
“ ‘ “ ‘[T]he trial judge is better positioned to decide whether the verdict is ... flawed [as excessive]. He has the advantage of observing all of the parties to the trial—plaintiff and defendant and their respective attorneys, as well as the jury and its reaction to all of the others. There aré many facets of a trial that can never be captured’ in a record, so that the appellate courts are at a special disadvantage when they are called upon to review [a] trial [court’s] action in this sensitive area....’ .
“‘“493 So.2d at 1378-79.”
“‘When a trial court fails to put in writing its reasons for denying a motion to' review a punitive-damages award for excessiveness, this Court’s practice has been to remand the cause for the trial court to enter an order in compliance with Hammond. See, e.g., Love, 775 So.2d at 128; Spencer v. Lawson, 815 So.2d 502 (Ala.2001); Southern Pine Elec. Coop. v. Burch, 878 So.2d 1120 (Ala.2003). We therefore remand this -case to the trial court for the entry of an order that complies with' the requirements of Hammond. On return to remand, the Willifords will have the opportunity to renew their argument that the punitive-damages award is outside the constitutional parameters set forth in Gore and Hammond/Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989), should they still wish to do so.’
935 So.2d at 1156.”

Accordingly, we remand this case'to the trial court for that court to conduct a Hammond/Green Oil hearing regarding the jury’s punitive-damages award against Farmers. On return from that remand, Farmers can renew its argument that the punitive-damages award is excessive, if it chooses to do so. The trial court shall make a return to this Court within 90 days from the date this opinion is released.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the denial of Farmers’ motion for a judgment as matter of law and/or for a new trial as to Morris’s fraudulent-inducement claim. We also affirm the denial of Farmers’ request for a remittitur of the compensatory-damages award. However, we , remand, this case for the trial court, to conduct a Hammond/Green Oil hearing on the punitive-damages award and to make a return to this Court within 90 days from the date this opinion is released.,

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

PARKER, MURDOCK,-MAIN, and WISE, JJ., concur.

BRYAN, J., concurs in part and cdncurs in the result in part.

MOORE, C.J., and STUART, BOLIN, and SHAW, JJ., dissent.

BRYAN, Justice

(concurring in part and concurring in the result in part).

I concur in the result in Part I of the main opinion. I concur fully in Parts II and III.

MOORE, Chief Justice

(dissenting).

I believe that the at-will language in the employment contract between Robert Kyle Morris and Farmers defeats Morris’s fraud claim. “An at will employment contract is terminable by either party for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.” Hall v. Integon Life Ins. Co., 454 So.2d 1338, 1344 (Ala.1984). Although Alabama generally recognizes that an action based on alleged fraudulent inducement tenter employment is actionable even if the employment is at will, Kidder v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 639 So.2d 1361 (Ala.1994), I agree with Justice Houston’s dissent in Kidder that “if the employee knows that [he] will be an at-will employee, ... [he] could not justifiably rely on any-promise concerning the working conditions during [his] .at-will employment.” 639 So.2d at 1363. Because Morris was legally bound by the specific at-will language in the contract, he had- no basis to rely on oral assurances from Farmers’ employees that continuing to work for his father’s insurance agency would not be a cause for separation from employment with Farmers.

“[T]he trial court can enter a judgment as a matter of law in a fraud case where the undisputed evidence indicates that the party or parties claiming fraud in a particular transaction were fully capable of reading and understanding their documents, but nonetheless .made a deliberate decision to ignore written contract terms.”

Foremost Ins. Co. v. Parham, 693 So.2d 409, 421 (Ala.1997).

SHAW, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. Alabama law provides that one cannot reasonably rely on misrepresentations when facts and circumstances call those misrepresentations into doubt. Those facts and circumstances need only be “reasonably apparent”; they do not have to be written representations found in an executed contract.

“This Court has held ... that to close one’s eyes to facts and circumstances reasonably apparent to the ordinary person does not relieve one of the responsibility of what the facts would have revealed if the inquiry they inspired had been made. For example, an automobile dealer may not ignore factory damage to an automobile and thereby avoid joint liability with the manufacturer for fraud (Chrysler Corp. v. Schiffer, 736 So.2d 538 (Ala.1999)); nor can a dealer, when purchasing a used car for resale, close its eyes to the true mileage and condition of a car and rely instead on an odometer reading that is patently incorrect in light of the obvious state of the car. See Hargrove v. Cantrell, 547 So.2d 488 (Ala.1989). An architect cannot avoid liability by closing his or her eyes to ‘construction defects that even the most perfunctory monitoring would have prevented’ (Watson, Watson, Rutland/Architects, Inc. v. Montgomery County Board of Educ., 559 So.2d 168, 173 (Ala.1990)); and ‘[a] purchaser simply cannot “[close] his eyes where ordinary diligence requires him to see,” and expect to recover in a fraudulent misrepresentation action.’ Hughes v. Cloud, 504 So.2d 734, 735 (Ala.1987).”

Redman v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 765 So.2d 630, 634-35 (Ala.1999). See also AmerUs Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 5 So.3d 1200, 1215-16 (Ala.2008) (“In light of the language of the documents surrounding the insureds’ purchase of the life-insurance policies at issue in this case and the conflict between [the agent’s] alleged misrepresentations and the documents presented to [the plaintiff], it cannot be said that [the plaintiff] reasonably relied on [the agent’s] representations.”), and Baker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 907 So.2d 419, 423 (Ala.2005) (holding that, because “language contained in the documents surrounding this transaction” called into question the alleged misrepresentation, the plaintiff had “not produced substantial evidence indicating ... his reliance, if any, on [the] alleged misrepresentation”).

As the above authorities show, the facts and circumstances that may call a misrepresentation into doubt do not have to be in a written contract. The decision in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Parham, 693 So.2d 409 (Ala.1997), discusses statements found in a written contract because, in that case, that is where those statements were found. I see no need to limit the “facts and circumstances” that can call into question one’s reliance on a misrepresentation to written representations found only in an executed contract. This, I believe, reflects a significant step back to the “justifiable-reliance” standard rejected almost 19 years ago and partially overrules Foremost sub silentio.

Here, some local Farmers agents told Robert Kyle Morris that his business arrangement with his father did not present an ethical problem. However, as part of the employment process, Farmers gave Morris, a new agent, a manual he was required to read. The “Code of Business Ethics and Professional Standards” portion of the manual, which dealt with business ethics, clearly stated that Morris’s arrangement with his father created a conflict of interest. In fact, the illustrations in the manual provided: “Accordingly, an agent who offices with an agent or broker of another insurance company, will be considered as maintaining a conflict of interest.” Morris acknowledged to Farmers that he had reviewed this material.

This is not a situation involving a minor point or seemingly inconsequential detail susceptible to being overlooked. If so, then at least an argument could be made that a jury question existed. Under the facts of this case, however, Morris’s arrangement with his father was clearly a concern to him, as evidenced by the numerous times he inquired about its propriety. He was not merely curious as to whether his arrangement with his father was permitted; instead, as both the main opinion and Morris stress, he repeatedly questioned the matter: “[Morris] clearly and unequivocally and repeatedly asked about whether it was a problem for him to continue working with his father’s independent agency.” Morris’s brief, at 7. The manual addressed the exact issue Morris was specifically concerned about. It seems inconceivable that he read the one part of the manual that directly addressed the issue that he was adamantly concerned about but that he would not, as a reasonable person, comprehend that it called into question the oral representations he received and then bring that provision of the manual to the attention of the local agents. Given Morris’s specific concern, and his vigorously professed interest in resolving that concern, I do not believe that a reasonable jury could properly conclude that the information that actually addressed Morris’s concern did not provide a reasonable basis for him to suspect that the representations he had received might be wrong. Of course, the manual does not “nullify” the agents’ misrepresentations, as the main opinion characterizes Farmers’ argument. Instead, it calls into question any reasonable reliance on those misrepresentations. I submit that, when an insurance agent is told by local representatives of his company that a business arrangement is ethical, he cannot “close his eyes” to an ethics manual'from the corporate office that defines what is ethical and shows the opposite.

Here, the local Farmers agents told Morris that his business relationship with his father presented no ethical problem. Farmers itself told Morris that the relationship did present an ethical problem. The main opinion holds that what Farmers said about its own policy would not reasonably alert Morris that what the local agents said might be wrong, and, thus, that Farmers is liable for fraud. This holding turns Foremost on its head; therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

STUART and BOLIN, JJ., concur.

      . In the record, the parties often refer to “Farmers,” with no indication as to which entity they are referring or whether they are referring to all the entities.

      . At the time of trial, Lowry had married and changed her name to "Heather Martin." However, we will refer to her as "Lowry.”

      . Evidence was presented indicating that a reserve agent is an agent who is undergoing sales, marketing, and prospecting training with Farmers; that the resejye-agent .agreement is a 12-month agreement that allows the reserve agent to see if he or she would be suited for .a career as a Farmers agent; and that the reserve-agent agreement also gives Farmers an opportunity to evaluate the potential agent.

      . Stansel testified that Farmers Insurance Inc. is a management company that manages the Farmers insurance exchanges and the employees who work for the exchanges.

      . Morris also named Farmers Insurance Group, Hunt, Lowry, Dewey, and Michael A. Dewey Insurance Agency, Inc., as defendants. The claims against them were dismissed without prejudice.

      . ■ Of course, until such time as the employee loses his or her new job, the fraud may not be manifest and the measure of the employee's injury as a result of having left his or her former job may not be fully and fairly discernible.

      , The situation might be different if the extra-contractual assurance received by Morris was promissory as to the specific, issue of the longevity of Morris's employment, at -least where if could not be proven that the employer had no present intent to perform it.
      "[Wjhen the employer hiring .fraud is- not promissory in nature and instead involves the misrepresentation of current or historical fact, there is no direct clash with the employment-at-will doctrine. As the cases demonstrate, allegations of employer fraud are extremely diverse and- include non-promissory allegations concerning the existence of a job, nature of the job duties, general terms and conditions of employment, financial 'strength and economic stability of’the firm, and other misleadihg assertions concerning the economic status.of the firm. In all of these widely diverse cases of nonpromissory fraud, the employer makes no promises concerning the future employment relationship during the prehire negotiations. The employer allegedly misrepresents current or past fact but makes no promise that relates to the longevity of future employment, In these types of cases, there is no resulting factual clash with the employment-at-will doctrine because that doctrine is forward looking and orders the future relationship between- the employer tjnd employee, not the behavior leading up to employment."
      Richard P. Perna, Deceitful Employers: Intentional Misrepresentation in Hiring and the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 54 U. Kan. L.Rev. 587, 630-33 (2006) (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). Compare Gardner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 822 So.2d 1201 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). In Gardner, a former sales agent for, State Farm alleged that at the time she executed an agreement to become a sales agent she was promised by a State Farm representative that her employment would be terminated in the future only if she cheated or misappropriated company funds. Her employment agreement, however, specifically stated that her employment was terminable at will. The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that, in this circumstance, Gardner could not have reasonably relied upon a promise of future employment when considered in light of what the contract itself specifically said about the same matter.

      . As previously noted, however, in Foremost, supra, this Court rejected the justifiable-reliance standard set forth in Hickox and reinstated the reasonable-reliance standard.

      . It is true that some of the universal-life-insurance cases decided by this Court, such as AmerUS Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 5 So.3d 1200 (Ala.2008), and Baker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 907 So.2d 419 (Ala.2005), appear to have involved a mixture of contratual documents and noncontractual disclosures or schedules that contradicted the oral representations at issue. It does not appear, however, that the Court was directly presented in those cases with an argument that the noncontractual documents should not be considered on the reliance issue because those documents were not contractual in nature and were therefore not binding on the parties.

      . Morris’s brief states that this witness’s name is correctly spelled "Pawlowski” and that it is incorrectly spelled in the transcript.

      . Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989).

       Note from the reporter of decisions; On December 16, 2016, on return to remand, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, without opinion. On February 24, 2017, that court denied rehearing, without opinion.

      . "Farmers” has the samé collective meaning here as it does in the main opinion.

      . Foremost criticized the “justifiable-reliance” standard as ‘‘eliminating] the general duty on the part of a person to read the documents received in connection with a particular transaction (consumer or commercial).” 693 So.2d at 421 (emphasis added).

      . I use "Farmers” in the collective sense identified in the main opinion.

      . It is argued that this portion was ''buried” in the document. However, Morris was required to read the document, and he told Farmers that he did so.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MURDOCK, Justice. SHAW, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    EX PARTE Jacquees Maurice BOONE (In re: Jacquees Maurice Boone v. State of Alabama)
    1150387
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    September 23, 2016

      Thomas M. Goggans, Montgomery; for petitioner. ;
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Andrew L. Brasher, deputy atty. gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, asst. atty. gen., for respondent,
   MURDOCK, Justice.

Jacquees Maurice Boone was convicted of attempted murder, see Ala. Code 1975, §§ 13A-6-2 and 13A-4-2; he was sentenced as an habitual felony offender to life imprisonment. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Boone argued that the Montgomery Circuit Court (“the trial court”) erred in admitting evidence that he was affiliated with a “gang.” The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Boone’s conviction and sentence in an unpublished memorandum, reasoning that the evidence was relevant under Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid., to prove motive. Boone v. State (No. CR-14-1091, Dec. 11, 2015), 222 So.3d 416 (Ala.Crim.App.2015) (table). This Court granted certiorari review; we now reverse and remand.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

The evidence at trial tended to show the following: On the night of March 29, 2014, Alondre Cooley, the victim, was walking down a neighborhood street in west Montgomery. Boone and his friend “Gerónimo” were in a vehicle being driven by Geróni-mo. Gerónimo drove onto the street and slowed down when they saw Cooley. Cooley recognized Boone in the passenger side of the vehicle because Cooley had known Boone since childhood. Boone fired one shot, which hit Cooley in the face. Cooley spent three to four months, in the hospital and suffered serious, permanent injuries.

On appeal, Boone’s sole argument was that the trial court erred by admitting 'the evidence indicating that Boone was affiliated with a “gang” because, he says, that evidence was “not relevant” and was “presumptively prejudicial.” The State contended that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) because it was relevant to show Boone’s motive and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. See Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid.

Boone points to two occasions during trial when the State referenced Boone’s alleged affiliation with a gang. During opening statements, the prosecutor stated that Boone was associated with a person named Richard Freeman and that Freeman was. a member in a gang called the “700 Group.” Defense counsel objected, arguing that “at this point there is no evidence of gang activity” and that “[i]t is an improper comment of association with this individual being in any gang.” The trial court overruled the objection, On the second .occasion, the State called as a witness Detective C.N. Delaney, who testified that she had taken a statement from Boone.and that Boone had admitted to being a member of the “700 Group” or the “700 Click.” Det. Delaney testified that, based on her knowledge and experience, the “700 Crew” had originally been formed as a music group and that she associated ihe group with gang activity. Defense counsel objected, arguing that Det. Delaney’s reference to “gang” was extremely prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objection.

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Boone’s conviction, holding that the evidence of gang membership was relevant under Rule 404(b) to prove motive.

II. Standard of Review

“The question of admissibility of evidence is generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and • the trial court’s determination on that question will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” Ex parte Loggins, 771 So.2d 1093, 1103 (Ala.2000).

III. Analysis

Boone asserts that the decision of the Court of' Criminal Appeals conflicts with Thomas v. State, 625 So.2d 1149 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), rev’d on other grounds, Ex parte Thomas, 625 So.2d 1156 (Ala.1993), and R.D.H. v. State, 775 So.2d 248 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), and he contends that evidence of his membership in an alleged “gang” was irrelevant because, he says, there was no evidence indicating that Cooley was in any rival gang and no evidence indicating that the shooting was gang-related. We agree.

In R.D.H., the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that “evidence of a defendant’s association with a ‘gang[]’ may properly be considered to be evidence of collateral bad acts.” 775 So.2d at 252. It held, therefore, that such evidence was inadmissible under the principles now incorporated in Rule 404(b), unless it is admissible for some purpose other than showing the defendant’s bad character and action in conformity therewith (e.g., as in this case, to show motive).

In Ex parte Thomas, this Court held that a trial court erred in refusing to a grant a motion for a mistrial where the State -had presented evidence indicating that the- defendant was a member in a gang. The defendant contended that “the testimony concerning his membership in a gang was irrelevant and so highly prejudicial as to require the trial court to grant his motion for a mistrial.” Ex parte Thomas, 625 So.2d at 1157. This Court quoted with approval the following passage from the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion:

“‘We equate the association of the defendant with a “gang” as evidence of a collateral criminal act that is presumptively prejudicial and that is admissible only when probative and under certain limited exceptions.’ ”

Id. (quoting Thomas v. State, 625 So.2d at 1153). This Court went on to conclude that the evidence was prejudicial and that a mistrial was warranted.

In this case, Boone contends (1) that evidence of his alleged gang affiliation was presumptively prejudicial, (2) that the evidence was not relevant to.motive, and (3) that, even if it was relevant, the evidence was due to be excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect.

The Court of Criminal Appeals stated the correct principles of law, but it erred in concluding that Boone’s alleged gang affiliation was relevant to his motive for shooting Cooley. Specifically, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not identify any link between Boone’s alleged affiliation with a gang and the asserted motive for the shooting. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated in its unpublished memorandum:

“Here, Boone admitted to police and testified at trial that he is a member of the ‘700 Group.’ The record established that this group is associated with gang activity. The record also established that Boone and Cooley, the victim, lived a street over from one another in the same neighborhood and that they had been involved in selling drugs. The record further established that members of Cooley’s family participated in controlled drug buys with Boone and his associates and that, as a result, the police executed a search warrant of Boone’s house. It was the State’s theory of the case that such activity caused animosity between Boone and Cooley and ultimately led to the shooting. Thus, we conclude that the evidence was relevant to show Boone’s motive for shooting Cooley .... ”

The foregoing quote does not indicate that gang affiliation was relevant to Boone’s motive for shooting Cooley. The record does not disclose any evidence indicating that Cooley or anyone in his family was a member of a gang. The motive advanced by the State at trial was that there was animosity between Boone ánd his friends, on the one hand, and Cooley’s family, on the other hand, arising from the participation of Cooley’s mother in police drug investigations that led to the arrest of Boone’s friends. The State does not explain how the evidence of “gang” affiliation is relevant to Boone’s motive for shooting Cooley. It appears that the asserted animosity arose out of a personal dispute between Boone and Cooley’s family, not out of a gang affiliation or a gang dispute.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Parker, J., concurs.

Stuart, Shaw, and Main,-JJ., concur specially. -

Bolin, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., dissent.

SHAW, Justice

(concurring specially).

I concur in the main opinion. I write specially to note, the following.

The evidence tends to show that the defendant, Jacquees Maurice Boone, and two of his longtime friends, Richard Freeman and an individual named “Geronimo,” were members of a group called “the 700,” the “700 Group,” the “700 Click,” or the “700 Crew.” The 700 Crew is largely described in the record as a musical group whose members reside on the 700 block of Early Street in. west Montgomery. The State’s witness, Det. C.N. Delaney of the Montgomery Police Department, testified that it was “some kind of gang.” At trial, she indicated:

“The 700 Crew, from just my knowledge as an officer from patrolling that area, from things and activity that I have seen them being involved in, it originally started as a music group. [Freeman], he raps, whatever the case may be. But then when you start feuding with another music group, now you are involved in gang activity. So that’s why I associate, them as a gang.”

Det. Delaney could not state whether every member of the 700.Crew was “a gangster.” Other than Det. Delaney’s testimony that the 700 Crew was “feuding” with “another music group,” there is no evidence in the record indicating that the group was involved in any potential criminal activity.

Testimony at trial also indicated that Boone and Freeman sold drugs. The evidence shows that, at some point, certain members of the victim’s family participated with law enforcement to sell or purchase drugs in “controlled buys.” It appears that charges were brought against Freeman as a result of the victim’s family’s participation with law enforcement in these controlled buys. It is undisputed that the result was animosity between- Freeman and members of the victim’s family. The victim, Alondre Cooley, testified that, before this incident, there had been no problems between him and Boone and Freeman.

On appeal in the Court of Criminal Appeals, Boone argued:

“[A] prosecution witness who had interrogated Boone related a' statement that Boone had made indicating that’he was associated with a click [sic] which the witness suggested was,a gang.
“The suggestion that Boone was in a gang was not relevant and, thus, improper and inadmissible. under Ala. R. Evid. 402. And, even if evidence suggesting that Boone was in a gang had been relevant—and was not—it was ... due to be excluded under Ala. R. Evid. 403.”

As the Court of Criminal Appeals has held:

“ ‘[I]n its modern usage, without qualification, [the word “gang”] denotes—in common intent and understanding-criminal action.’ Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 456, 59 S.Ct. 618, 620, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939). We equate the association of a defendant with a ‘gang’ as evidence of a collateral criminal act’that is presumptively prejudicial and that is admissible only when probative and under certain limited exceptions. See Bolden v. State, 595 So.2d 911 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), cert. denied, 595 So.2d 914 (Ala.1992). See Ex parte Dill, 600 So.2d 372, 373 (Ala.1992) (‘gratuitous references, even indirect ones, to past criminal activity have required the reversal of criminal convictions’). See also H. Schwab, ‘Of Gangs and - Guilt,’ 3 Los Angeles Lawyer 13 (1990) (evidence of organizational membership a? proof of crime). ‘[E]ven if the proffered evidence [of pri- or bad acts] fits within an exception to .the general exclusionary rule, its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect for the evidence to be admissible.’ Ex parte Smith, 581 So.2d 531, 535 (Ala.1991).”

Thomas v. State, 625 So.2d 1149, 1153 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), rev’d on other grounds, Ex parte Thomas, 625 So.2d 1156, 1156 (Ala.1993).

In analyzing this issue in its unpublished memorandum affirming Boone’s conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeals discussed its prior decision in Griffin v. State, 790 So.2d 267 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), rev’d on other grounds, 790 So.2d 351 (Ala.2000):

“ ‘Griffin relies on Ex parte Thomas, 625 So.2d 1156 (Ala.1993), in which the Alabama Supreme Court stated that allowing the state to comment on any possible gang affiliation is equal to allowing the- state- to introduce evidence of collateral criminal acts.
“ ‘Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid., states, in pertinent part:
“ ‘ “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however,, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive..,.”
“‘(Emphasis added.) This Court hqs previously held that a defendant’s involvement in gang activity may be relevant to prove motive in a particular case. Siler v. State, 705 So.2d 552 (Ala.Crim.App.1997); see also Knotts v. State, 686 So.2d 431, 469 (Ala.Crim.App.1995), aff'd, 686 So.2d 486 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1199, 117 S.Ct. 1559, 137 L.Ed.2d 706 (1997) (holding that “the appellant’s possible membership in an organization that espouses racial hatred is relevant to a possible motive for’the homicide”).
ti i \ '
“ ‘Moreover, Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid., states:
“ ‘ “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 'substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jüry, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
a i
“In R.D.H. v. State, 775 So.2d 248, 252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), we stated:
“ ‘ “ ‘Evidence of any offense other than that specifically charged is prima facie inadmissible. Nicks v. State, 521 So.2d 1018 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241, 108 S.Ct. 2916, 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988). However, evidence of collateral crimes or bad acts is admissible as part of the prosecutor’s case if the defendant’s collateral misconduct is relevant to show his guilt other than by suggesting that he is more likely to be guilty of the charged offense because of his past misdeeds. Nicks v. State; Brewer v. State, 440 So.2d 1155 (Ala.Crim.App.1983).
a i a t j
“... All of the exceptions relate to the relevancy of the evidence, which means that evidence of separate and distinct crimes is admissible only when the evidence is relevant to the crime charged. Mason v. State, 259 Ala. 438, 66 So.2d 557 (1953); Nicks v. State. If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or to not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the state’s case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Crim.App.1976).
«< u
“‘ “That being said, we are, however, also mindful of the well-settled principle that even where the prof-féred evidence of collateral bad acts is relevant, its'probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of undue and unfair prejudice for the evidence to be admissible. ... Before the probative value of evidence of: collateral bad acts, may be held to outweigh its potential prejudicial effect, the evidence must be ‘reasonably necessary’ -to the state’s case. Bush [v. State, 695 So.2d 70] at 85 [ (Ala.Crim.App.1995), aff'd, 695 So.2d 138 (Ala.1997) ]; Averette [v. State], 469 So.2d [1371] at 1374 [ (Ala.Crim.App.1985) ].”
(( i >
“Griffin, 790 So.2d at 297-99.”

Evidence indicating that Boone was a member of a gang is inadmissible under Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid. However, it can be relevant, as the State argues'here, ..to prove his motive in shooting Cooley. Such evidence is admissible only when it is relevant to .the crime charged and is not so remote as to lose its relevancy. Further, even where it is relevant, .its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of undue and unfair prejudice. In order for the probative value of the evidence to outweigh its potential prejudicial effect, it must be “reasonably necessary” to the State’s case.

After reviewing the record, I cannot find any evidence of a connection between the 700 Crew and the shooting of Cooley. Although Boone, Freeman, and “Geronimo" were all members of the group, the impetus for the attack—Cooley’s family’s cooperation with the police—was not connected to the group. Specifically, there is no evidence indicating that the 700 Crew engaged in drug sales, and there is no evidence indicating that the Cooley family’s cooperation impacted the 700 Crew as a gang. As the main opinion notes: “It appears that the asserted animosity arose out of a personal dispute between Boone and Cooley’s family, not out of a gang affiliation or a gang dispute.” 228 So.3d at 997. Simply put, there is no evidence indicating that Boone was motivated to retaliate against the Cooleys on behalf of the group. Because of this, there is insufficient evidence to show that Boone’s membership in the 700 Crew was “relevant to the crime charged.” Further, even if it were relevant, this “presumptively prejudicial” evidence was not “reasonably necessary” to the State’s case so that the probative value substantially outweighed the danger of undue and unfair prejudice.

The State contends that the evidence was also “necessary for a full and complete (whole picture) explanation of the underlying motives that precipitated” the shooting. I take this as an argument that the evidence was part of the res gestae, which can be a permissible exception under Rule 404(b). See Doster v. State, 72 So.3d 50, 87-89 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). Again, however, there is no evidence tending to show that Boone’s membership in the 700 Crew, as a gang, explains what occurred in this case. Further, there is nothing suggesting that the evidence was reasonably necessary to the State’s case.

Finally, I note that the circumstances surrounding the shooting were contested and that the identity of the shooter was disputed. Given that certain credibility determinations were for the jury, I cannot conclude that the admission of the evidence indicating that Boone was a member of a gang could be harmless error. See Wiggins v. State, 193 So.3d 765, 795 (Ala.Crim.App.2014) (“The harmless-error rule applies to the admission of Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid., evidence.”).

Stuart and Main, JJ., concur.

      . Rule 404(b) provides, in pertinent part:
      "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissble for other purposes, such as proof of motive .... ”

      . Rule 403 provides, in pertinent part, that, "[although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice

      ,The terms “700 Group,” "700 Click,” and "700 Crew” apparently refer to the same loosely defined group of individuals. The "700’-' is derived from the block number in a west Montgomery neighborhood. Boone admits that he is affiliated with the group, but he objects to the characterization of the group as a “gang." Other than Det. Delaney’s unsupported opinion, the State's brief does not point to any evidence indicating that the 700 Group was, in fact, a “gang.”

      . In R.D.H., this Court stated that evidence of the defendant's membership in the Ku Klux Klan, ."an organization 'which espouses white supremacy and racial hatred,’ ” 775 So.2d at 252, was arguably relevant to the issue of the credibility of a witness. Nonetheless, the Court held that this evidence should have been excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

      . There is evidence in the record indicating that Cooley’s mother was charged with drug offenses and sought to reduce her punishment by participating in controlled drug buys from some of Boone’s friends, leading to the arrest of those friends. Various witnesses at trial referred to Cooley’s family “snitching on” Boone’s friends.

      . There is some testimony by Boone that he was framed for the shooting because, he said, the Cooley family was attempting to get “the rest” of the 700 Crew, but this testimony does not support the motive theory set forth by the State.


author: JOINER, Judge.

text:
    Jacquees Maurice BOONE v. STATE of Alabama
    CR-14-1091
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    February 10, 2017
    Thomas M. Goggans, Montgomery, for appellant.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   On Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court

JOINER, Judge.

Jacquees Maurice Boone was convicted of attempted murder, see §§ 13A-6-2 and 13A-4-2, Ala. Code 1975, and was sentenced, as a habitual offender, to life imprisonment. Boone appealed.

On appeal, this Court, in an unpublished memorandum, affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. See Boone v. State (No. CR-14-1091, Dec. 11, 2015), 222 So. 3d 416 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) (table). Boone then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review. On September 23, 2016, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed this Court’s judgment. Ex parte Boone, 222 So.3d 993 (Ala. 2016).

In accordance with the direction of the Alabama Supreme Court, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and we remand the case to that court for proceedings consistent with the Alabama Supreme court’s opinion in Ex parte Boone, supra.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Windom, P.J., and Welch, Kellum, arid Burke, JJ., concur.


author: THOMPSON, Presiding; Judge.

text:
    ALABAMA MEDICAID AGENCY v. Alexander MARSHALL, by and through his conservator, Nathan Johnson
    2150903
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    January 20, 2017
    Luther Strange, atty., gen., and Christopher L. Richard, asst. atty. gen., Alabama Medicaid Agency, for appellant.
    Submitted on appellant’s brief only.
   THOMPSON, Presiding; Judge.

Alexander Marshall, by and through his conservator, Nathan Johnson, filed a petition, pursuant to § 41-22-20, Ala. Code 1975, a portion of the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act (“the AAPA”), § 41-22-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, in the Montgomery Circuit Court (“the trial court”) seeking judicial review of the denial by the Alabama Medicaid Agency (“the Agency”), following an administrative hearing, of three separate requests for Medicaid nursing-home benefits; . the three requests were consolidated at the administrative level. On March 1, 2016, the trial court entered an order stating: “Final hearing. [The Agency’s] decision reversed as being arbitrary and capricious.” The Agency filed a postjudgment motion in which it argued, among other things, that, the judgment did not contain required factual findings. The Agency’s -.postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. The Agency timely appealed.

The dispositive issue on appeal is the sufficiency of the March 1, 2016, judgment. Under the AAPA, a trial court may reverse a decision of the Agency if the Agency’s action is found to be:

“(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
“(2) In excess of the statutory authori-of the agency;
“(3) In violation of any pertinent agency rule;
“(4) Made upon unlawful procedure;
“(5) Affected by other error of law;
“(6) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
“(7) Unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”

§ 41-22-20(k), Ala. Code 1975.

The AAPA further requires that, “[u]n-less the [trial] court affirms the decision of the agency, the court shall set out in writing, which writing shall become a part of the record, the reasons for its decision.” § 41-22-20(1), Ala. Code 1975. “Under that provision, ‘an explanatory writing must become a part of the record whenever any appropriate, relief is granted, not just a reversal or modification of the agency decision, Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-20, Commentary (emphasis added).” State Pers. Bd. v. Carson, 939 So.2d 49, 50 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).

This court has explained:

“Judicial review of an' agency’s administrative decision is limited to determining whether the decision is' supported by substantial evidence, whether the agency’s actions were reasonable, and whether its 'actions were "within its statutory and constitutional powers. Ferlisi v. Alabama Medicaid Agency, 481 So.2d 400 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985). Judicial review is also limited, by the presumption of correctness which attaches to a decision by an administrative agency. Benton v. Alabama Board of Medical Examiners, 467 So.2d 234 (Ala. 1985). In view of the judicial deference granted an agency’s decision, the trial court cannot merely recite the statutory grounds for reversal or modification set forth in § 41-22-20(k) when setting aside an agency’s findings. In addition to the statutory grounds for reversal, the trial court must provide, pursuant to § 41-22-20(l), specific reasons in its order to support its conclusions. Alabama Medicaid Agency v. Beverly Enterprises, 504 So.2d 1211 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).”

Alabama Medicaid Agency v. Peoples, 549 So.2d 504, 506 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (emphasis added). See also State Home Builders Licensure Bd. v. Butler, 706 So.2d 1267, 1268 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (“In reviewing an agency decision, the trial court ‘shall set out in writing, which writing shall become a part of the record, the reasons for its decision.’ § 41-22-20(1), Ala. Code 1975. A trial court cannot merely recite the statutory grounds for reversal, but must give in its order specific reasons to support its conclusions.”).

The trial court’s March 1, 2016, judgment reversed the Agency’s decision without explaining the reason for that reversal, as is required by § 41-22-20(1). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for the entry of a judgment in compliance with § 41-22-20(1) and this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Pittman, Thomas, Moore, and Donaldson, JJ., concur.