text:
    Evans v. Advance Sounds and Performance, Inc.
    3D16-2546
    11/18/2016
   Pet.den,


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Faison v. Selene Finance
    3D16-2548
    11/30/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Field v. Citimortgage, Inc.
    3D16-2735
    12/07/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Findlay v. Leslie Estates Homeowners' Association No. 3, Inc.
    3D16-0709
    12/07/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Findlay v. Leslie Estates Homeowners' Association No. 3, Inc.
    3D16-0709
    12/16/2016
   Den.


text:
    Flanco Condominium Association, Inc. v. Goldszer
    3D15-906
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Florida Department of Children and Families v. I.G.R.
    3D16-2818
    01/19/2017
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, Inc. v. Lakechea
    3D16-2824
    12/16/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Fritz v. Fritz
    3D16-2334
    11/23/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    G.C. v. State
    3D16-1650
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Gaitor v. State
    3D16-2554
    12/05/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Gamez v. Royal South Beach Condominium Association, Inc.
    3D16-1437
    12/15/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Garrett v. Garrett
    3D16-2720
    12/05/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Gelin v. State
    3D16-2464
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Godhigh v. State
    3D17-0022
    01/20/2017
   App. transferred


text:
    Goldmax Realty, Inc., v. PNC Mortgage
    3D16-152
    12/07/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Gonzalez v. Department of Revenue ex rel. Gutierrez
    3D16-2346
    12/20/2016
   App.dism.

Dept. of Revenue


text:
    Grauman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
    3D15-2798
    12/05/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Guardian Ad Litem Program v. S.B.
    3D16-2656
    01/18/2017
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Guillaume v. Golfwood of the California Club Homeowners Association, Inc.
    3D16-2171
    12/15/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    GN Reciprocity, LLC v. Palm Court At 23rd Street, Ltd.
    3D16-0841
    11/30/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Hernandez v. Hernandez
    3D16-520
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Hernandez v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
    3D16-2581
    12/28/2016
   Den.


text:
    Hernandez v. State
    3D16-0144
    10/13/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Hernandez-Gonzalez v. State
    3D16-2610
    11/23/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Hessen, Schimmel & De Castro, P.A. v. Schimmel
    3D16-2545
    12/20/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Hillman v. Joseph
    3D16-2513
    12/06/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    House of Homes Realty, Inc. v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation
    3D16-2626
    01/12/2017
   Vol.dism.

DBPR


text:
    Huggins v. State
    3D16-2662
    01/09/2017
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Hughes v. Mid-Continent Casualty Company
    3D16-1597
    11/21/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Hughes v. Mid-Continent Casualty Company
    3D16-1597
    09/27/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Axis Surplus Insurance Co.
    3D16-2149
    12/22/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    J.T. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-2498
    12/09/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Jones v. Bank of America N.A.
    3D16-2324
    11/02/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Jones v. Bank of America N.A.
    3D16-2324
    12/09/2016
   Den.


text:
    Jones v. Bank of America, N.A.
    3D16-2499
    12/09/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    JM Land, LLC v. Miami-Dade County
    3D16-1033
    01/11/2017
   ' Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    K.M. v. Department of Children
    3D16-2354
    12/15/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Kendrick v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
    3D16-838
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Kheel v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
    3D16-0419
    12/22/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Kirkland v. State
    3D16-2644
    12/16/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    L.B. v. State
    3D16-948
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Landers v. Dalberiste
    3D16-1700
    12/05/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Langsam v. Osman
    3D16-2903
    01/05/2017
   App. transferred

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Levin v. Levin
    3D16-2411
    11/30/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Luli Building 17, LLC v. Rixell
    3D16-2470
    12/01/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Marin v. HSBC Bank USA, National Association
    3D16-1892
    11/30/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Martinez-Izquierdo v. Miami-Dade Circuit Court
    3D16-2557
    12/01/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    McCray v. State
    3D16-2788
    12/16/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Melanciano v. State
    3D16-2309
    01/06/2017
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct.(Miami-Dade)


text:
    Mercer v. Mercer
    3D16-2287
    01/05/2017
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Mitch v. DPR Inc.
    3D16-2385
    12/08/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Mogavero v. Townhomes of Bluewaters Property Owners Association, Inc.
    3D16-1590
    01/09/2017
   Cause transferred

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Monterrey v. Gulfside Supply
    3D16-2629
    01/06/2017
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Moss v. State
    3D16-2396
    11/01/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Murano At Portofino Condominium Association, Inc. v. La Piaggia, Inc.
    3D16-2467
    01/06/2017
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Murray v. Oganes
    3D16-771
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    MP, LLC v. Sterling Holding, LLC
    3D15-1062
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Nunez-Gary v. SCI Funeral Services of Florida, Inc.
    3D16-594
    12/07/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Pagani v. Pagani
    3D16-2219
    12/15/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Pimentel v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
    3D16-0921
    12/01/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Pirela v. State
    3D16-2580
    12/02/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Pirela v. State
    3D16-2365
    12/02/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Poag v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation
    3D16-2627
    01/12/2017
   Vol.dism.

DBPR


text:
    Prince v. State
    3D15-2695
    01/25/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Puig v. Space Re Partners, LLC
    3D16-2852
    01/06/2017
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    PNC Bank v. Rodriguez
    3D16-1712
    01/05/2017
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Rawls v. State
    3D16-1010
    10/28/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Reed v. Florida Asset Resolution Group, LLC
    3D17-0027
    01/10/2017
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Rehm v. State
    3D16-2731
    12/15/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Remington Lodging & Hospitality, LLC v. Southernmost House, Ltd.
    3D16-0427
    12/15/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Riviera Almeria, LLC v. Ortega
    3D16-0776
    12/16/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Rodriguez v. State
    3D16-2716
    12/15/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    S.F. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-1573
    11/10/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    S.F. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-1573
    12/15/2016
   Den.


text:
    S.K.L. Express, LLC v. Miami-GSM, LLC
    3D16-1481
    10/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Samuels v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.
    3D16-850
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Sanchez v. State
    3D16-2118
    12/21/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Sarfaty v. MS
    3D16-2519
    12/15/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Segal v. Douer
    3D16-2289
    01/12/2017
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Senese v. Sakkal Tahan
    3D16-1943
    12/06/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Soderlund v. Carvalho
    3D15-1833
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Brooks
    3D16-1620
    01/06/2017
   Vol.dism,

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Sunderman v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
    3D16-1988
    01/05/2017
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Monroe)


text:
    Sutton v. State
    3D16-1594
    09/19/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Thomas v. State
    3D16-559
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Toby Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Menedis
    3D16-0775
    01/24/2017
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Tomlinson v. State
    3D15-2007
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir, Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Toronto Antonio Flanders v. State
    3D16-2927
    01/24/2017
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Tudisco v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
    3D16-2424
    12/08/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    TRG-MH Venture, Ltd. v. The Vizcayans, Inc.
    3D16-1362
    12/12/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    University Health Care Westchester, Inc. v. University Shoppes Summit, LLC
    3D16-0599
    01/06/2017
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    University Shoppes Summit, LLC v. University Health Care Westchester, Inc.
    3D15-1838
    12/19/2016
   App.dism,

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Valdespino v. State
    3D16-2617
    11/30/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Velandia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    3D16-1760
    11/14/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Wainstock v. Frog Funding, LLC
    3D16-2713
    12/20/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Ward v. State
    3D16-2834
    12/22/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Watkins v. State
    3D16-2164
    11/30/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Watkins v. State
    3D16-2077
    12/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Weissman v. Sharon
    3D16-1623
    12/05/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Wesley v. State
    3D16-2645
    12/07/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    West Grove Development Corporation v. BankUnited, N.A.
    3D15-2279
    12/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Winton v. Saffer
    3D15-1391
    11/30/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Yamhill Finance Ltd. v. Southeast Aerospace Insurance
    3D16-2410
    01/06/2017
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Young v. State
    3D16-2398
    12/05/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Zanussi v. Casa Grande Condominium Association, Inc.
    3D16-1627
    01/19/2017
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    404-9763, LLC v. HSBC Bank USA, National Association
    3D16-0979
    01/17/2017
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Aristide v. State
    4D15-3373
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Attelus v. U.S. Bank National Association
    4D15-4588
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    B.J. v. State
    4D15-4236
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Bank of New York v. City Lien, LLC
    4D16-1896
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Berthole v. State
    4D16-3227
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Bitters v. Golden Lakes Master Corp., Inc.
    4D15-655
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Blivins v. State
    4D16-3038
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Bradley v. State
    4D16-3375
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Martin)


text:
    Briggs v. State
    4D16-2850
    12/01/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Bucherie v. State
    4D15-1725
    12/08/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Butterfield v. State
    4D15-3479
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Cadet v. State
    4D16-2780
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Capri Fidelity Group, LLC v. Mediterranea Maintenance Association, Inc.
    4D14-4608
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Caribe Construction, Inc. v. Malcolm
    4D16-3064
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Cerda v. Lopez
    4D15-2760
    12/08/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Chavez v. State
    4D15-4140
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Chirila v. Bank of America, N.A.
    4D15-208
    12/08/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Cisneros v. State
    4D15-1560
    12/08/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Cockroft v. State
    4D16-3050
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Cunningham v. State
    4D15-1724
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    D.W.M. v. State
    4D16-479
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Davis v. State
    4D13-4219
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Deoleo v. State
    4D16-2860
    12/01/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Dickerson v. State
    4D15-1736, 4D15-1738, 4D15-1742
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Doe v. Bank of America, N.A.
    4D15-4402
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Durrance v. State
    4D16-2989
    01/12/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Edmondson v. State
    4D14-1072
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Filsaime v. State
    4D16-3260
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Fishman v. OneWest Bank, FSB
    4D15-3454
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Flores v. State
    4D16-1860
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Flores v. State
    4D16-1485
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Florida Commissioner of Agriculture v. Mendez
    4D15-2396
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Forbes v. State
    4D16-490
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Foster v. Deutsche Bank National Trust
    4D15-4679
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Frangos Pioneiro Industria E Comercio, Ltda. v. Vision American International, LLC
    4D15-4006
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Frederick v. State
    4D15-940
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (St. Lucie)


text:
    Garrick v. State
    4D15-997
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Grace v. State
    4D16-2731
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Harry v. State
    4D16-2650
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Henderson v. State
    4D16-3014
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Jennings v. State
    4D16-1667
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Joaseus v. State
    4D16-3833
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Kevin F. Reilly, PKF P.C. v. Toll Bros., Inc.
    4D16-1962
    12/01/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Khan v. State
    4D15-606
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Kowallek v. Florida Power & Light Company
    4D16-1374
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (St. Lucie)


text:
    Kraft v. State
    4D14-4944
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Lake Success Hoa Management, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
    4D15-3012
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Leo v. Schuman
    4D14-4745
    12/01/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Lhamonie v. State
    4D15-3030
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Lloyd v. Mosely
    4D15-1247
    12/01/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Lynch v. Bank of America, N.A.
    4D14-4604
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Manning v. State
    4D16-2527
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Marcano v. State
    4D13-3941
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (St. Lucie)


text:
    Marrett v. State
    4D15-4596
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Marshall v. State
    4D15-3627
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Martin v. State
    4D15-854
    12/08/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct, (Okeechobee)


text:
    Martinez v. State
    4D15-2859
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Martinez v. State
    4D15-1272
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Medlin v. State
    4D13-4073
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Meyer v. Zoder
    4D15-4185
    12/01/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Mirabal v. HSBC Bank USA, National Association
    4D15-3999
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Montrose v. State
    4D16-3400
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Moore v. State
    4D16-2914
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Myrick v. State
    4D16-2414
    12/01/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    N.C. v. State
    4D15-880
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Nagell v. State
    4D16-2791
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Bradley
    4D15-4760
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (St. Lucie)


text:
    Navarrete v. State
    4D14-963
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Neptune v. Werbner
    4D15-4246
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Ocasio v. State
    4D16-3448
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Otis v. Otis
    4D16-1394
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Perez v. State
    4D15-3133
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Porter v. State
    4D15-2357
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Quintela v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
    4D15-2908
    01/05/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Quintero v. State
    4D16-1451
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    R.L.L. v. State
    4D16-549, 4D16-551
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    R.S. v. Florida Department of Children and Families
    4D16-3382
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

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text:
    Reid v. State
    4D16-2450
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

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text:
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    4D15-2826
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

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text:
    Rice v. State
    4D16-0544
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

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text:
    Riley v. State
    4D16-3549
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

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    Rivera v. State
    4D16-2895
    12/01/2016
   Aff.

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text:
    Ryan v. HSBC Bank USA
    4D15-3602
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

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text:
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    4D16-332
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

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    Samson v. State
    4D15-3474
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Sanchez v. State
    4D16-465
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

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text:
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    4D15-73
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Santisteban v. State
    4D16-3259
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
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    4D15-2085
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


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    4D16-1881
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

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    Shorter v. State
    4D15-2390
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
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    4D15-4450
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

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    Spencer v. State
    4D15-4355
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Okeechobee)


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    Sprint v. State
    4D16-2890
    12/01/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    State v. Johnson
    4D15-2117
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
    Strong v. State
    4D16-2457, 4D16-2493
    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Indian River)


text:
    Suggs v. State
    4D16-390
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Okeechobee)


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    T.K. v. State
    4D16-1324
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
    Tennis v. State
    4D16-2519
    12/01/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


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    4D15-3734
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


text:
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    4D16-3602
    12/22/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


text:
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    4D16-1198
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


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    12/29/2016
   Aff.

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    12/22/2016
   Aff.

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    12/22/2016
   Aff.

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    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


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    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Palm Beach)


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   Aff.

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    12/01/2016
   Aff.

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    12/22/2016
   Aff.

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    12/15/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Indian River)


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    12/01/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Okeechobee)


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    12/29/2016
   Aff.

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    4D16-130
    12/01/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Broward)


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    12/06/2016
   Aff.

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    01/26/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


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    12/20/2016
   Aff.

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    5D16-3522
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
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    5D16-2607
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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    5D16-223
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   Aff.

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text:
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    5D16-2387
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
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    5D16-1640
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

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    5D15-3386
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   Aff.

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   Aff.

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   Aff.

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   Aff.

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   Aff.

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   Aff.

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    5D16-84
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   Aff.

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    5D16-2825
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

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    12/20/2016
   Aff.

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    5D16-1793
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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    5D16-3546
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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    5D16-1684
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   Aff.

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   Aff.

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   Aff.

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    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Floyd v. State
    5D15-4484
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


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    5D16-510
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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    5D16-3135
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


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    Foster v. State
    5D15-4233
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Fulton v. State
    5D16-2468
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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    5D15-3615
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


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    5D16-899
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


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    Gillis v. State
    5D16-1365
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hernando)


text:
    Gonzalez v. State
    5D16-2970
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Osceola)


text:
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    5D16-3249
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


text:
    Green v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    5D16-2944
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Harding v. State
    5D16-2485
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Citrus)


text:
    Harris v. Harris
    5D16-2408
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Hastings v. Koepke
    5D15-4060
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Hayes v. State
    5D15-3868
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Heilman v. State
    5D15-4406
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Hernandez-Lopez v. State
    5D16-346
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Osceola)


text:
    Hipley v. State
    5D16-2120
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Hough v. State
    5D16-2989
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (St. Johns)


text:
    Hoyos v. GRP Loan, LLC
    5D15-3676
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Idoni v. Baldwin
    5D15-1970
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


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    J.P.B. v. State
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   Aff.

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text:
    Jackson v. State
    5D16-3160
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Jerry v. State
    5D16-2619
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

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    Kantor v. Kantor
    5D15-3125
    01/18/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (St. Johns)


text:
    King v. State
    5D16-2858
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   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Kohler v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC
    5D16-764
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Lander v. Department of Corrections
    5D16-3123
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hernando)


text:
    Larzelere v. State
    5D16-2132
    01/24/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Leasure v. State
    5D16-3102
    01/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Lee v. State
    5D16-1250
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Marion)


text:
    Lyles v. State
    5D16-2957
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Lynn v. State
    5D16-2248
    01/26/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


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    5D15-1130
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


text:
    Merlo v. State
    5D16-2580
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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text:
    Micko v. State
    5D16-3166
    02/10/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hernando)


text:
    Mulligan v. State
    5D16-557
    12/13/2016
   Aff.

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text:
    Murray v. State
    5D15-4095
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Orlando Utilities Commission v. Perez
    5D15-2501
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Patel v. U.S. Bank National Association
    5D15-1917
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Persaud v. State
    5D16-219
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    R.K. v. Department of Children and Families
    5D16-3161
    12/28/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Osceola)


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    Razzani v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
    5D15-4182
    01/24/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Rodriguez-Maldonado v. State
    5D16-104
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Rogers v. State
    5D15-4105
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hernando)


text:
    S.L. v. Department of Children and Families
    5D16-2174
    12/05/2016
   Aff.

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text:
    Schlein v. United General Title Insurance Company
    5D15-2816
    02/14/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
    Schneider v. Kleinberger
    5D16-1576
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Seminole)


text:
    Shaver v. State
    5D16-1812
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hernando)


text:
    Sigui v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A.
    5D15-3552
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Simasek v. Simasek
    5D16-51
    12/06/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Smith v. State
    5D15-3173
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Smith v. State
    5D16-3079
    02/02/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Citrus)


text:
    Smith v. State
    5D16-2339
    12/29/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    State v. Liburdi
    5D15-4392
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Suber v. State
    5D16-1338
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Swetitsch v. U.S. Bank Trust National Association
    5D15-1611
    12/06/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Szy v. State
    5D16-2719
    01/30/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Brevard)


text:
    Tatro v. State
    5D16-3133
    02/01/2017
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volusia)


text:
    Taylor v. State
    5D16-1479
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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text:
    Thompson v. State
    5D16-2012
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lake)


text:
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    5D16-95
    12/20/2016
   Aff.

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text:
    Upshur v. City of Palm Coast
    5D15-2915
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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text:
    Vagvolgyi v. Nemeth
    5D16-1493
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

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text:
    Vanbrunt v. State
    5D16-1468
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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text:
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    5D16-1375
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Orange)


text:
    Venzen v. State
    5D15-3435
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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text:
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    5D16-3210
    12/30/2016
   Aff.

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text:
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    5D16-2706
    12/27/2016
   Aff.

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text:
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    5D16-741
    01/31/2017
   Aff.

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text:
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    01/30/2017
   Aff.

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text:
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    5D16-1509
    01/17/2017
   Aff.

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author: Forst, J,

text:
    William Paul DABBS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D15-1890
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 7, 2017]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Siobhan Helene Shea, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Assistant Attorney-General,'.West Palm-Beach, for appellee.
   Forst, J,

Appellant William Dabbs appeals his convictions for first-degree murder, fleeing or attempting to elude law enforcement, and aggravated assault with a firearm of a law enforcement officer. We affirm three of Appellant’s arguments without comment. However, we find merit in Appellant’s argument related to discovery violations at the beginning of the trial and hold that the trial court réversibly erred by not' granting a mistrial. We therefore reverse' for a new trial.

Background

■ Appellant was charged- with killing his co-worker, and for crimes ■stemming from his flight from the scene. Appellant did not dispute that he killed the victim, and in-' stead relied on a claim of self-defense. Part of - this theory of defense was that the firearm used to kill the victim was brought to the scene by the victim himself, which Appellant wrestled from the-victim after the latter had aimed it toward Appellant. In his -opening statement, Appellant’s at-' torriey implied that this gun was one of two or three guns known to be owned by the victim.

The' morning after opening statements and the first two witnesses’ testimony, Appellant brought to the court’s attention a possible discovery violation on the part of the State. Apparently, the State had been surprised by Appellant’s theory that the gun was one of the victim’s known guns and had, overnight, acquired various documents and secured a witness which would, together, establish the current location of all of victim’s known guns. This evidence was intended to conclusively show that the gun used in the crime—-which had been recovered by law enforcement—could not be one of the victim’s own.

Appellant argued that he was procedurally prejudiced by this new evidence because, had he known of it, he would have made a different opening Statement with a different theory of defense. The trial court held a Richardson hearing and determined that there was a discovery violation, but that the violation was not willful and that the violation was trivial. The court also1 indicated it l’ecognized that Appellant was procedurally prejudiced, and Appellant argued that the remedy should be a mistrial. However, after a brief recess, the court changed its mind and determined that there was no procedural prejudice based on the Second District’s holding in Stone v. State, 547 So.2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). As such, the documents were admitted into evidence and the witness was allowed to testify.

The jury convicted Appellant of all counts against him, and he appealed.

Analysis

Whether a Richardson hearing is properly conducted is reviewed de novo, but the rulings on each of the required prongs are reviewed for an abuse of' discretion. Goldsmith v. State, 182 So.3d 824, 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

When a possible discovery violation is raised to the trial court, “the court must conduct a Richardson hearing to inquire about the circumstances surrounding the state’s violation of the discovery rules and examine the possible prejudice to the defendant.” Jones v. State, 32 So.3d 706, 710 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Part of this analysis requires determining, whether .a violation “had a prejudicial effect on the opposing party’s trial preparation.”, Id. (quoting McDuffie v. State, 970 So.2d 312, 321 (Fla. 2007)). Prejudice exists “if there is a reasonable probability that the, defendant’s trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred.” Cox v. State, 819 So.2d 705, 712 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Pomeranz v. State, 703 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1997)). This Court has recognized that new discovery which requires a defendant to “back step” statements already made is prejudicial. Brown v. State, 640 So.2d 106, 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

Here, Appellant argued in his opening statement that the evidence would be consistent with a conclusion that the gun Appellant used to kill the victim was the victim’s own weapon, which he (the victim) had brought to the scene. At the time of opening statements, none of the State’s proffered evidence would have conclusively disproved this theory. The closest would have been testimony from the victim’s wife that the recovered gun was not like the ones owned by her husband, but the wife had previously described herself as “not a gun person” and was apparently unable to identify her husband’s weapons beyond the most superficial characteristics of general size and color. Appellant’s plan appears from his statements at the Richardson hearing to- have been to impeach the wife on this issue. Furthermore, although it is possible that Appellant and his counsel may have been aware that the weapon was not the victim’s, the argument that the evidence would be consistent with that possibility was a proper argument holding the State to its burden- of proof. See E.L.F. v. State, 33 So.3d 760, 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

The documents and additional witness, however, removed any possibility that the jury could reasonably conclude that the gun used was one of. the victim’s known guns. Had Appellant known that the State was planning on using this evidence and witness, there is a “reasonable probability” that Appellant’s strategy for opening statement would have been different.

The trial court’s reliance on Stone in concluding that there was no procedural prejudice is misplaced. Stone stands primarily as an example of when á Richardson hearing is adequately, although not perfectly, conducted. Importantly, the defendant in Stone “did not suggest that [the undisclosed evidence] had any significant effect upon his ability to properly prepare for trial.” Stone, 547 So.2d at 659, Here, in contrast, .that is exactly what Appellant argued below and argues on appeal.

We therefore hold that the trial court erred .in determining that Appellant was not procedurally prejudiced by the State’s failure to disclose certain evidence. The appropriate action below would have been to declare a mistrial and conduct a new trial with a jury that had not been, exposed to Appellant’s now-eviscerated theory of defense. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Conclusion

Appellant’s theory of the case was forced to change shortly after it had been presented to the jury .because of new evidence brought forward by the State after opening statements. Because there is a reasonable probability that his theory would have been different had he known of the evidence from the start, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

Warner and Levine, JJ., concur.

      . These arguments were related to possible hearsay regarding a stolen license plate, allegedly improper comments by the prosecution during closing argument, and the sufficiency of the evidence on the element of premeditation.

      . Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971).


author: Per Curiam. .

text:
    BAUTISTA REO U.S., LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Appellant, v. ARR INVESTMENTS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3658
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [July 19, 2017]

      Denise Dell-Powell and Christopher R. Thompson of Burr & Forman, LLP, Orlando, for appellant.
    Andrew C. Hill and John W. Zielinski of NeJame Law, P.A., Orlando, for appellee.
   Per Curiam. .

Bautista REO U.S., LLC (“Bautista REO”), appeals a non-final order granting ARR Investment, Inc.’s (“ARR”) motion for temporary injunction. Because ARR failed to establish irreparable harm with no adequate remedy at law, we reverse.

Factual Background

ARR is the owner and holding company of five daycare facilities in Florida. In April of 2003, ARR and Doral Bank, predecessor in interest to Bautista REO, entered into a loan transaction for $1,550,000. As evidence of the loan, ARR and Doral Bank executed a Loan and Security Agreement. Pursuant to the Loan and Security Agreement, and as security for the loan, ARR granted Doral Bank two mortgages: one mortgage on two parcels of ARR’s real property in Broward County (the “first mortgage”), and a collateral mortgage on real property in Pembroke Pines (the “collateral mortgage”). The Loan and Security Agreement provided that the collateral mortgage would secure a $250,000 demand note, plus 7:65% interest, executed by ARR. All of the notes and mortgages were executed on the same day as part of one transaction. The collateral mortgage is the subject of the underlying litigation.

In 2011, ARR refinancéd the loan documents with City National Bank of Florida (“City National”). ARR then defaulted on its payment obligations under the loan documents. City National filed a foreclosure complaint seeking to foreclose on its first mortgage interest in the Pembroke Pines property. In the complaint, City National named both ARR and Bautista REO as defendants with an interest in the property-

in order to pay off City National and avoid foreclosure, ARR entered into a purchase and sale agreement to sell the Pembroke Pines property to a third party. After several extensions, the closing was scheduled to occur on October 31, -2016. In the course of the transaction, a title search revealed that Doral Bank never released the collateral mortgage, as ARR claims it should have in the course of the 2011 refinance. Instead, the collateral mortgage was assigned to Bautista REO, along with •the $1,550,000 loan.

In September of 2016, ARR requested that Bautista REO provide an estoppel letter identifying the amount of indebtedness due under the collateral mortgage. Bautista REO, through Capital Crossing Servicing, Inc., the servicer for the loan, provided ARR with an estoppel letter which provided a total payoff amount of $478,534.72.

• Subsequently, ARR filed a verified four-count complaint against Bautista REO alleging: (1) violation of section 701.04(1), Florida Statutes (2016); (2) interference with a contractual relationship, including a request for injunctive relief to enjoin Bau-tista REO from interfering. with ARR’s purchase and sale contract for the subject property and to: compel Bautista REO to issue an estoppel letter in the amount of $260,000; (3) an action for .declaratory judgment to determine whether the collateral note and collateral mortgage entitle Bautista REO to recover any amounts over $250,000 (interest, fees, costs); and (4) an action for Bautista REO’s violations of Florida usury laws under sections 687.04 and 687.071, Florida Statutes (2016).

That same' day, ARR sought a temporary injunction enjoining Bautista REO from continuing to violate sections 687.04, 687.071, and 701.04, Florida Statutes, and from tortiously interfering in the real estate sales contract regarding the Pembroke Pines property, and requiring Bautista REO to immediately issue an estoppel letter in the amount of $250,000 without additional charges.

Bautista REO responded, arguing that ARR had not met its burden of demonstrating that it was entitled to injunctive relief. Bautista REO argued it timely provided the requested estoppel letter, in the amount which reflected properly accrued interest, as provided for in the collateral note. Bautista REO asserted that even if the trial court finds that it wrongfully included interest or included usurious interest, requiring it to issue an estoppel letter for $250,000'would permanently alter Bau-tista REO’s rights in the subject property. Bautista REÓ also argued ARR failed to establish irreparable harm because it can be adequately compensated by a monetary award and failed to establish its likelihood of success on the merits.

A hearing on ARR’s motion for temporary injunction was held on October 24, 2016.

Order Granting Temporary Injunction

On October 27, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting the temporary injunction. The order required Bautista REO to release the $250,000 collateral mortgage against the Pembroke Pines property. The order further required ARR to deposit $250,000 with the Broward County Circuit Court Clerk Registry within two business days of the closing-of the Pembroke Pines property.

Bautista REO filed an emergency motion in the' trial court to increase the bond amount, or, alternatively, to stay the injunction. The emergency motion was denied without a hearing. This Court granted Bautista REO’s motion for stay pending this appeal. .

Analysis

We employ a mixed standard of review. “To the extent the trial court’s order is based on factual findings, we will not reverse unless the trial court abused its discretion; however, any legal conclusions are subject to de novo review.” Foreclosure FreeSearch, Inc. v. Sullivan, 12 So.3d 771, 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Bassett, 947 So.2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)).

To be entitled to a temporary injunction, a party must prove that: “ ‘(1) irreparable harm will result if the temporary injunction is not entered; (2) an adequate remedy at law is unavailable; (3) there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and-(4) entry of the temporary injunction will serve the public interest.’” Minty v. Meister Fin. Grp., Inc., 97 So.3d 926, 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Burtoff v. Tauber, 85 So.3d 1182, 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). The party seeking the injunction has the .burden to provide competent substantial evidence, and the court’s order must contain “[cjlear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings” to support each of the four elements. Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v. Yacucci, 162 So.3d 68, 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Liberty Fin. Mortg. Corp. v. Clampitt, 667 So.2d 880, 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)).

“A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted sparingly.” Gooding v. Gooding, 602 So.2d 615, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). "The primary purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo while the merits of the underlying dispute are litigated.” Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So.3d 1196, 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (quoting Manatee Cty. v. 1187 Upper James of Fla., LLC, 104 So.3d 1118, 1121 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)); accord City of Miami Springs v. Steffen, 423 So.2d 930, 931 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In this case, ARR failed to establish irreparable harm and that there was no adequate remedy at law.

Irreparable Harm

“[A]n injury is irreparable where the damage is estimable only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard.” Hatfield v. AutoNation, Inc., 939 So.2d 155, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting JonJuan Salon, Inc. v. Acosta, 922 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). Irreparable harm is not established if the harm can be adequately compensated by a monetary award. B.G.H. Ins. Syndicate, Inc. v. Presidential Fire & Cas. Co., 549 So.2d 197, 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

The trial court erred in finding ARR established irreparable harm because of the potential that they would lose the property to foreclosure sale at a significantly reduced price than that under the purchase and sale agreement. The initiation of foreclosure proceedings does not constitute irreparable harm. See Reserve at Wedgefield Homeowners’ v. Dixon, 948 So.2d 65, 67-68 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that threat of foreclosure proceedings and potential loss of property does not constitute irreparable harm). The only potential loss is economic, which can be adequately remedied by monetary damages.

Adequate Remedy at Law

The trial court held that “[d]ue to the numerous changes in ownership, an adequate remedy at law is not present when the loan documents are subject to additional future assignments.” The trial court erred in finding there is no adequate remedy at law.

The harm alleged by ARR is that it would suffer the loss of the Pembroke Pines property at a foreclosure sale, which might result in a lower sale price than that in the purchase and sale agreement. However, such a loss could be remedied by monetary damages. See 3299 N. Fed. Highway, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Broward Cnty., 646 So.2d 215, 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

The fact that the damages may not be collectible is irrelevant. See Hiles v. Auto Bahn Fed’n, Inc., 498 So.2d 997, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (“The possibility that a money judgment, once obtained, will not be collectible is irrelevant under the test of inadequacy of remedy at law.”).

Because ARR failed to prove that it would incur irreparable harm with no adequate remedy on appeal, the court erred in granting the temporary injunction. We therefore reverse and direct the trial court to dissolve the injunction.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Warner, Damoorgian and Forst, JJ., concur.

      . The emergency motion was denied by a different judge,


author: Warner, J.

text:
    John GOODMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D14-4479
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [July 26, 2017]
    [Rehearing Denied October 25, 2017]

      Margaret Good-Earnest and Cherry Grant of Good-Earnest Law, P.A., Lake Worth, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm .Beach, for appellee.
   Warner, J.

In his appeal of his conviction and sentence for DUI manslaughter with failure to render aid, and vehicular homicide with failure to render aid, appellant raises thirteen issues. We affirm as to all and write to address three issues. First, appellant contends that the State prematurely released his vehicle after his first trial, thus violating his due process rights and requiring .dismissal under California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). We disagree, concluding that because of the prior testing on the vehicle and the State’s agreement not to introduce certain testing by its expert, the vehicle was not “constitutionally material” and any potential prejudice-was eliminated. Second, he contends that the jury instructions on the failure to render aid enhancements violated due process by failing to require that appellant knew that the accident resulted in injury or death. The statutes, however, merely require that the person “knew or should have known of the crash,” not the injury. The instructions read to the jury went beyond this and required that appellant “knew” of the crash. We therefore reject appellant’s challenge to the jury instructions. Third, appellant claims that his blood was drawn without a warrant, violating the Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure clause. However, the exigent circumstances exception applies, and the failure to obtain a warrant was not error. As to the sentence for the vehicular . homicide conviction, which the court held in abeyance, we reverse on double jeopardy grounds.

Following a late-night two-vehicle accident, in which the other driver died after his vehicle was submerged in a canal, appellant was charged with DUI manslaughter with failure to render aid (Count 1) and vehicular homicide with failure to render aid (Count 2). Appellant was convicted and sentenced following his first trial. After juror misconduct came to light, see DeMartin v. State, 188 So.3d 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), appellant’s first conviction, was vacated and he was granted a new trial.

Prior to his second trial, appellant moved to dismiss the charges against him after he discovered that the State had prematurely released the two vehicles involved in the crash. One of the vehicles, a Bentley driven by appellant, was eventually found in Texas, having been repaired and refurbished. Appellant argued that the Bentley was materially exculpatory based on his allegation that an issue with the throttle led to a brake malfunction. He admitted that the malfunction had been extensively discussed during his first trial, including codes from the Bentley’s electronic control module (“ECM”) indicating a throttle malfunction. However, appellant argued that his automotive engineer expert was not allowed to conduct the same physical manipulative inspections of the Bentley’s throttle as the State’s.-expert. Following a hearing, the court denied the motion to dismiss, determining that “the Bentley did not rise to the level of materially exculpatory evidence and instead was only potentially .useful evidence[.]” Therefore dismissal was “too harsh a sanction in the absence of bad faith on the part of the State.” As the State agreed hot to call its éxpert, “there remains no' prejudice to Defendant in his ability to present the expert testimony and findings he has collected.”

Appellant also sought to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test, arguing that the test constituted a warrantless search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The court held a hearing, during which the testimony indicated that the crash occurred around 1:00 a,m,, but appellant left the scene and called 911 about an hour later. He returned to the scene shortly after 2:00 a.m. At 2:26 a.m., he was transported to the hospital. At 2:31 a.m., the victim’s body was discovered. The homicide investigator was called and arrived at the crash site at 3:18 a.mi At '3:33 a.m;, the investigator met appellant at the hospital, where he observed signs of intoxication. After appellant refused a voluntary blood draw, a forced blood draw was conducted at 4:00 a.m. The investigator testified that it would have taken two-and-a-half hours that night to obtain a warrant. On these facts, the court denied the motion to suppress the blood test results, finding that the exigent circumstances exception applied.

At the second trial, the evidence showed that appellant ran a stop sign without braking and “t-boned” the victim. Appellant was going sixty-three miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone. The force of the impact pushed the victim’s Hyundai through the intersection and into a nearby canal, where it came to rest upside down. Appellant did .not remain on the scene or assist the victim, who ultimately drowned. The victim did not sustain fatal injuries in the collision itself. Earlier in the evening, appellant had- consumed alcohol at several venues, the amount of which was a contested issue at trial.

After the accident, appellant quickly left the scene on foot. He resurfaced a half hour later at a woman’s trailer, seeking a phone. He used the woman’s phone to call his girlfriend. The woman testified that appellant acted slow and “out of it.” He was mumbling and repeating himself, and told her that he was in a really bad accident arid hoped no one was hurt. He ad: mitted he had a few drinks. After appellant spoke with his girlfriend, he asked the woman what to do. When she suggested he call 911, appellant asked whether he should call his lawyer first and turn himself in. Appellant never mentioned stopping elsewhere betweeri the crash and arriving at her toiler.

Appellant called 911 at 1:56 a.m. He told the 911 operator that he stopped at a stop sign, looked, did not see anything, pulled out, and hit something. He did not say his car malfunctioned. He said he walked down the road- to a barn, hopped over, the gate, and came to the woman’s house to get a phone.

A deputy picked up appellant to bring him back to the crash site. When the deputy asked appellant if he was injured, he only mentioned pain in his wrist. He claimed that he stopped at the stop sign, went through the stop sign, hit something, was unaware of what he hit, and left to make a phone call. Appellant was emanating the odor of alcohol and his speech was slurred. Upon returning to the crash site, the deputy escorted appellant to paramedics.

The paramedics who treated appellant at the scene also noted that his speech was a little slurred and he 'smelled of alcohol. He did not, however, appear to have consumed a large amount of alcohol within the hour prior. Appellant was not dizzy, his head did not hurt, and he denied losing consciousness. Once at the hospital, appellant was alert and did not complain of head pain, dizziness, or nausea. The doctor’s notes indicated that he denied losing consciousness.

Appellant refused a blood test, but had blood drawn at 3:59 a.m., which revealed that his blood alcohol level was 0.177 and 0.178. A toxicologist calculated that appellant’s blood alcohol level at the time of the crash was between 0.207 and 0.237, the equivalent of twelve to thirteen drinks.

Appellant’s forensic engineer testified that the Bentley did not stop at the stop sign. He opined that the vehicle was going between forty-nine and fifty-eight miles per hour at the time of the crash.

Appellant’s automotive engineer testified that he had inspected the Bentley prior to the first trial, before it was released. The ECM report registered a fault code at some point prior to the crash. The code indicated that the vehicle’s two throttle valves were unsynchronized due to a mechanical malfunction. One of the two throttles in the vehicle was lagging behind the other, but the expert was unable to determine whether the lag was in engaging or releasing the accelerator pedal, and he was-unable to determine how long the lag was. Regardless, the throttle issue did not affect the braking system, and, due to the vehicle’s multiple override systems, upon applying the brakes, “[i]n a worst«case scenario, the driver might féel a delay in response[.]” The expert speculated that there could have been some computer malfunction as well, but he had no data reflecting such. He had been unable to conduct certain tests because-of the vehicle’s release and refurbishment. He admitted he had previously testified during a deposition that further testing would not tell him anything beyond what he already knew based on the vehicle’s diagnostic stored data.

The State’s electrical engineer also inspected the Bentley after it was found in Texas and opined that the braking system functioned until damaged in the crash. The State’s vehicle expert from the first trial did not testify at the second trial.

Appellant testified in his defense and claimed that he was not intoxicated at the time of the accident, but rather that-the brakes on his Bentley malfunctioned when he attempted to stop - at the stop sign. He said that he lost consciousness in the crash. After he awoke, he looked around the crash site, which was very dark, but did not see any vehicles. He did not look in the canal. His phone wasn’t working, so he decided to go look for a phone to call -911.

Significantly, appellant testified that after he left the crash site to find a phone, he came upon a “man cave” belonging to a member of the polo team he owned. The “man cave” did not have a telephone, but was stocked with liquor. Appellant testified that he drank an unknown quantity of alcohol from a bottle, then headed toward the woman’s trailer. Appellant testified that he. told one of the deputies that he went into the “man cave” and consumed alcohol after the crash.

Several motions and hearings were held prior- to and during trial regarding the jury instructions for the failure to render aid enhancement on both charges. The standard jury instruction for the enhancement on the DUI manslaughter charge provides:

If you find the defendant guilty of Driving under the Influence Manslaughter, you must further determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that:- ■■■■•• . ■
4. (Defendant), at the timé of the crash,
a. knew or should have known that the crash occurred and
b. failed to give information as required by law and
c. failed to render aid as required by law.

Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.8 (emphasis added). The corresponding instruction for the vehicular homicide charge provides:

If you find the defendant guilty of [vehicular] [vessel] homicide, you must then determine whether the State has further proved beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. At the time of the accident, (defendant) knew, or should have known, that the accident occurred; and
2. (Defendant) failed to give information and render aid as required by law. (Read applicable portion of § 316.062, Fla. ¿tat., as charged in information or indictment.)
However, the State is not required to prove (defendant) knew that the accident resulted in injury or death.

Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.9 (emphasis added).

Appellant proposed adding a' requirement that he “knew that the accident resulted in death or injury[,]” rather than mere knowledge of the accident. The State agreed to include an element regarding knowledge of injury or death, but argued for the lesser “knew or should have known” knowledge requirement. The court agreed with the State. With the State’s agreement, the court deleted the last sentence of Instruction 7.9.

During trial, the parties and the court again reviewed the jury instructions, and appellant renewed his request to include actual knowledge of injury or death as an element of Instruction 7.8. The court declined to add a “knew of death” requirement, ruling that the standard should be “knew or should have known.” As to knowledge of the accident, the court denied the State’s requested inclusion of “should have known,” instead requiring actual knowledge. The court granted appellant’s request to include a definition of “willfully.”

As to Instruction 7.9, appellant did not submit another proposed version. The State objected to deletion of the “should haye known” of accident language. There was no specific discussion of the inclusion of a “knew of death” requirement in Instruction 7.9. The court granted appellant’s request to include actual knowledge of accident. Notably,, the court, ruled that it would include the last sentence in Instruction 7.9 (“However, the State is not required to prove (defendant) knew that the accident resulted in injury or death”), contrary to its previous ruling; ■

After another conference, a final version of the instructions was submitted. This version of Instructions 7.8 and 7.9 included a willfulness requirement and required actual knowledge of the accident, but did not require any knowledge of injury or death. Instruction 7.9 included the sentence specifying that actual knowledge of injury or death was not required. Appellant stated that he had no new or additional objections to this version of the instructions.

Instruction 7.8, as read to the jury, provided as follows: "

If you find the defendant guilty of driving under the influence manslaughter, you must further determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that John Goodman at the time of the crash A, knew that the crash had occurred. And B, willfully failed to give information as required by law. And C, willfully.,failed to render aid as required by law. Willfully means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely. Florida requires that a driver of any vehicle involved in a crash resulting in injury or death- of any person- or damage to any vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person must supply his name, address, and the registration number, of the vehicle he, is driving, to any person injured in the crash, or to the other driver or occupant or other .person attending any vehicle or other property damaged in the crash ....

(Emphasis added). In Instruction 7.9, the court instructed -as follows: -

If you find the defendant guilty of vehicular homicide you must then determine whether the State has further proved .beyond a reasonable doubt that l, at the time of the accident John Goodman knew that an accident occurred. And two, .John Goodman willfully failed to give information and render aid as required by law. Willfully means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely. However the State is not required to prove that John Goodman knew that the accident resulted ip injury or death.

(Emphasis added). Instruction 7.9 followed with-the. same explanation of the duty to render aid as was given in Instruction 7.8.

The jury found appellant guilty - as charged. Appellant was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to sixteen years in prison on Count 1 (DUI manslaughter with failure to render aid). The court took no action on the jury verdict on Count 2 (vehicular homicide with failure to render aid). Although appellant objected and argued that Count 2 should be dismissed, the court agreed with the State’s request to hold Count 2 in-abeyance, so that if appellant prevailed on Count 1 on appeal, the court could still adjudicate.and sentence him on Count 2. From this conviction and sentence, appellant has brought this, appeal.

Release of the Bentley Was Not a Due Process Violation

In his first issue on appeal, appellant contends that his due process rights were violated when the State prematurely released the Bentley prior to the second trial, despite knowing that it was significant and material to his defense. The State disagrees that the Bentley was constitutionally material. We agree with the State and hold that the court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss due to the loss of the Bentley. Whether a defendant’s due process rights have been violated by the State’s destruction of or failure to preserve evidence is a legal question and is therefore reviewed de novo, Patterson v. State, 199 So.3d 253, 256 n.2 (Fla. 2016).

When dealing with potentially exculpatory or uséful evidence that has been permanently lost, “courts face the treacherous task of divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 486-87, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984).

Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to -evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, evidence must both possess an exculpatory value- that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.

Id. at 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).

“Lost or unpreserved evidence is ‘material’ in this sense ‘if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.’” State v. Davis, 14 So.3d 1130, 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting State v. Sobel, 363 So.2d 324, 327 (Fla. 1978)). “Where lost or unpreserved evidence is ‘material exculpatory evidence,’ the loss of such evidence ... the good or bad faith of the State -is irrelevant.” Id. However, in cases where the destroyed evidence is merely potentially useful, as opposed to constitutionally-material, failure to preserve the evidence does not constitute a due process violation unless there is a showing of bad faith .on the part of the state. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). In Youngblood, the court further explained the difference between the due process implications .of the destruction of materially exculpatory evidence and that which is only potentially useful:.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as. interpreted in Brady, makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence. But we think the Due Process Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentia-ry material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant. Part of the reason for the difference in treatment is found in the observation made by the Court in Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S., at 486, 104 S.Ct. at 2532, that “[w]henever potentially exculpatory evidence is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of divining the import of - materials whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed.” Part of it stems from our unwillingness to read 'the “fundamental fairness” requirement of the Due Process Clause, see Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 289, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941), as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confínes it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant. We therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.

Id. at 57-8, 109 S.Ct. 333 (emphasis added).

The trial court found, and we agree, that the State did not act in bad faith in releasing the Bentley. Therefore, we must determine whether the Bentley constituted materially exculpatory or only potentially useful evidence. Trombetta is instructive. It requires that “[t]o meet th[e] standard of constitutional materiality, evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that wás apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528. In Trombetta, the Court considered drunk driving breath test samples (as opposed to the test results themselves) and found that neither condition of materiality was met. Id. As to exculpatory value, the Court considered the testing machine’s well-established accuracy, which meant that “preserved breath samples would simply confirm the Intoxilyzer’s determination that the defendant had a high level of blood-alcohol concentration at the time of the test. ... [Bjreath samples were much more likely to provide inculpatory than exculpatory evidence.” Id. As to comparable evidence, the Court held .that the respondents were not without alternative means of demonstrating their innocence. Id. at 490, 104 S.Ct. 2528. The Court .noted that they could address Intoxilyzer malfunction using the machine’s weekly calibration results and by inspecting the machine. Id. Respondents could address the possible effect of external factors such as radio waves and operator error through cross-examination. Id. The Court therefore found that due process does not require law enforcement to preserve breath samples, and therefore the Intoxilyzer results should not have been suppressed. Id. at 491, 104 S.Ct. 2528.

In this case, the trial court held a full hearing on the issue of the exculpatory nature of the Bentley and concluded that it was merely potentially exculpatory. In doing so, it analyzed the evidence and the expert’s opinions with regard to Trombetta and Youngblood:

[Appellant’s expert], by his own former testimony, has already formed an opinion of the malfunction and that his opinion on the state of the Bentley as the time of the crash is complete. The “mere possibility of helping the defense” by conducting even more testing on the Bentley which was already subjected to extensive, testing by three different experts does not rise to the level of constitutional materiality ....
Therefore, any additional evidence which the vehicle[] may have • revealed only rises to the level of “potentially useful” evidence ....

As to the appropriate remedy, the court held:

This Court’s finding that the Bentley did not rise to the level of materially exeul-patory evidence and instead was only potentially useful evidence renders: dismissal too harsh a sanction in the absence of bad faith on the part of the State. The Court finds that since the State has conceded it will not call [the expert retained by Bentley] as an expert in the retrial, there, remains no prejudice to Defendant in his ability to present the expert testimony and findings he has collected. ... Furthermore, the Court notes that Defendant is not precluded from sharing with the jury the fact that the Bentley .... [is] no longer available for inspection since [it was] prematurely released by'the State.

Based on this, the court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss.

Subsequently, during his second trial, appellant claimed that his brakes malfunctioned. His expert testified that there was a throttle malfunction that could have, momentarily affected appellant’s ability to brake and “may have contributed to the crash.” The expert admitted that prior to the release of the Bentley, he had stated that further testing would not tell- him anything beyond what he already knew based upon the car’s diagnostic stored data, the ECMs.

On appeal, appellant essentially argues that had his expert been able to further examine the Bentley, he would have been able to complete additional testing that might have lent additional support to the expert’s testimony that the brakes malfunctioned before the accident. However, the mere possibility that .the testimony would have bolstered the expert’s opinion does not rise to the level of “constitutional materiality.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528. An ECM readout indicating that the car was experiencing a throttle malfunction might have qualified as such, but experts on both sides had already tested the vehicle and obtained that readout. The fact that the car had a malfunction is not the evidence at issue. The expert could, and did, opine that a malfunction existed and that it affected braking. In contrast, the evidence sought to be obtained, if it- existed, would have merely fleshed out and bolstered this opinion.

Further, like Trombetta, appellant had alternate sources available to elicit testimony to suggest that the throttle malfunctioned. The ECM report specified the malfunction, .and his experts could (and did) testify as to-, some of the mechanics and timing of the malfunction. This also supports a finding that the Bentley was not materially exculpatory .under Trombetta.

Finally, the State did not use its expert who performed the additional testing on-the vehicle. -Thus, appellant’s expert was on the same footing as the State’s expert concerning the vehicle.

This case is most similar to Patterson v. State, 199 So.3d 253 (Fla. 2016). There, the defendant was charged with arson after a fíré in his house and garage, which contained his truck.' Id. at 254-55. After his insurance company paid him the proceeds of his policy on his truck, the insurer destroyed the truck. Id. The defendant was later arrested and charged with arson. Id. at 255. The State’s expert was able to inspect the truck before it was destroyed. Id. The defendant’s fire investigation expert had to rely on photographs of the burned truck (although he was able to inspect the house). Id. The defendant’s expert was able to argue deficiencies in the.State’s expert’s analysis, and he testified that there should have been examination of several electrical components, which the State , had failed to eliminate as a an accidental cause of the fire. Id. at- 256. The Florida Supreme Court held that the truck

clearly is not material exculpatory evidence. The most that could be said is that, if the components that Patterson’s-expert identified as potential, causes .of-the fire had been subjected to additional examination, and testing, they might have supplied evidence to further support Patterson’s theory that the fire was ■ electrical and therefore accidental.

Id. at 257-58. The court then found no due process violation under Youngblood. Id. at 259

Similarly, in the present case,-we-agree with the trial court- that the Additional testing that was precluded by the release of the Bentley was merely potentially exculpatory.

Appellant contends, in the alternative,that the trial court should have given the jury an instruction on spoliation of evidence. However, the court offered to give a curative instruction if the defense proposed one, but the defense maintained that it could not propose one which would not impinge on the appellant’s due process rights. Thus, appellant did not preserve this claim. Moreover, defense counsel extensively questioned its expert regarding the fact that he was not able to retest the. vehicle after it was located in Texas and regarding what an inspection might reveal. No further request for an instruction was made. We thus find no abuse of discretion in failing to give an instruction on spoliation of evidence.

Knowledge of Injury or Death Was Not an Element of the Failure to Render. Aid Enhancement

Appellant argues that the court erred in instructing the jury 'that an element of the' failure to render aid enhancement was that the defendant- “knew or should have known that the accident resulted in injury or death.” He argues that actual knowledge -is required. The State counters that such knowledge is not required. As noted above, the record does not show that the jury was instructed at all on knowledge of the injury or death. Instead, the court instructed the -jury that it must find that appellant “knew that -the crash had occurred" (Count I) or “knew that an accident occurred” (Count II), and failed - to give information or aid as required-by law. Thus, the jury instructions neither- tracked- the - standard instructions, both of which used “knew or should have known” standard, nor did it track the parties’ proposed instructions, which added as an element whether the defendant knew or should have known that the accident resulted in an injury or death.

In this unusual circumstance, although it does not appear that appellant objected to the instructions as given, we nevertheless address whether the instructions were required to include a provision regarding knowledge of an injury or death. If this were an element of the crime, its exclusión would constitute, fundamental error..We hold, however, that knowledge of injury or death is not required for the failure to render aid enhancement to either DUI manslaughter or vehicular manslaughter.

Section 816.193(3), Florida Statutes (2010), provides for the penalty when a person who was driving under the influence fails to render aid:

Any person:
(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1) [Driving while Intoxicated];
(b) Who operates a vehicle; and
(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes -or' contributes to causing
3. The death of any human being or unborn child commits DUI manslaughter, and commits ....
b. A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if:
(I) At the time of the crash, the person knew, or should have known, that the crash occurred; and
(II) The person failed to give information and render aid as required by s. 316.062. ■

(Emphasis added).' Similarly, section 782.071(1), Florida Statutes (2010), provides for vehicular homicide penalties for a failure to render aid:

Vehicular homicide is:
(b) A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if:
1. At the time of the accident, the person knew, or should have known, that the accident occurred; and
2. The person failed to give information and render aid as required by s. 316.062.
This paragraph does not require that the person knew that the accident resulted in injury or death.

(Emphasis, added). Section 316.062(1), Florida Statutes (2010), as referenced in both statutes, sets forth when a person must give information and aid:

The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person shall give his or her name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving, ... and shall render to any person injured in the crash reasonable assistance[.]

(Emphasis added). Thus, to enhance the penalty for failing' to render aid or give information, these statutes require knowledge only of the crash, not knowledge of any injury or death. As section 316.062(1), Florida Statutes, requires a person to stop and give information even for property damage, the occurrence of the crash itself, which would at least result in damage to property, would, by itself, require a person to stop and give information (and, if there is an injured person, give. aid). There is no requirement that a person know ,of .an injury or death, nor is there even a “should have known” element.

The'Florida Legislature enacts criminal laws and can specify the knowledge requirement for criminal acts. Our supreme court most recently addressed this legislative power in State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412 (Fla. 2012):

“Enacting laws—and especially criminal .laws—is quintessential a legislative function.” Fla. Home of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So.2d 601, 615 (Fla. 2008). “[T]he Legislature generally has, broad authority to determine any requirement for intent or knowledge'in the definition of a crime.” State v. Ciorgetti, 868 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla. 2004). We thus have recognized that- generally “[i]t is within, the power of the Legislature to declare an act a crime regardless of the intent or knowledge of the violation thereof.” Coleman v. State ex rel. Jackson, 140 Fla. 772, 193 So. 84, 86 (1939). “The doing of the act inhibited by the statute makes the crimé[,] and moral turpitude or purity of motive and the knowledge or ignorance of its criminal character are . immaterial f,circumstances on the question of guilt.” Id.
Given the broad authority of the legislative branch tb define the eleínénts of crimes, the requirements of due'process ordinarily do not preclude the creation - of offenses which lack a guilty knowledge element.

Id. at 417.

In a limited number of situations, “the omission of a mens rea element from the definition of a criminal offense has been held to violate due process.” Id. at 419. For instance, Adkins looked to Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957), involving a Los Ange-les code provision requiring felons to register within five days of entering the city. Adkins, 96 So.3d at 419. In Lambert, the Supreme Court held it to be a violation of due process when applied to a person who had no knowledge of a duty to register. 355 U.S. at 228, 78 S.Ct. 240. The Supreme Court explained that such innocent passive conduct could not be penalized unless the defendant had actual knowledge of the requirement. Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court noted the narrowness of its ruling:

There is wide latitude in the lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements • of knowledge and diligence from its definition. But we deal here with conduct that is wholly passive— mere failure to register. It is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer .to the consequences of his deed. The rule that “ignorance of the law will not excuse” is deep in our law, as is the principle that of all the powers of local government, the police power is “one of the least limitable.”

Id. (emphasis supplied; citations omitted). Our supreme court followed Lambert in Giorgetti and held that a failure to register as a sex offender required a mens rea component, invalidating statutes which excluded knowledge of the duty to register as an element of the crime. Giorgetti, 868 So.2d at 517.

Adkins also noted that the lack of a scienter requirement violated due process “if a criminal statute’s means is not rationally related to its purposes and, as a result, it criminalizes innocuous conduct.” Adkins, 96 So.3d at 420 (quoting Schmitt v. State, 590 So.2d 404, 413 (Fla. 1991) (holding that a statute which criminalized possession of photos depicting a child’s clothed or unclothed genitals would have criminalized entirely innocent conduct such as family photos)).

In sections 316.193 and 782.071, Florida Statutes, the Legislature did not omit a scienter requirement; it specifically provided that a person who drove under the influence and was involved in a crash must have either known or should have known of the crash to receive the enhancement. The Legislature did not require any knowledge of death. It is the Legislature’s prerogative to establish the scienter requirement.

The limited categories of statutes in which courts have required a knowledge requirement to satisfy due process are not applicable here. Unlike Lambert, where the prohibited conduct was “wholly passive,” here, a person must actively fail to render aid by leaving the scene of the crash. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228, 78 S.Ct. 240. And clearly, failing to render aid or give information is not “innocent conduct,” but is most definitely rationally related to the Legislative purpose. Adkins, 96 So.3d at 420 (quoting Giorgetti, 868 So.2d at 517). “One of the main purposes of the statute is to ensure that accident victims receive medical assistance as soon as possible.” State v. Dumas, 700 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 1997). A person should stop, if he or she knows that she has been involved in a crash, for no other reason than to ascertain whether any injury or damage has occurred. To require a person involved in an accident to know of an injury before he or she is required to stop would frustrate the very purpose of sections 316.193 and 782.071, Florida Statutes. There is no due process violation in the statutes’ failure to include a requirement that a defendant knew (or should have known) of an injury or death before being required to stop and render aid.

Appellant relies on a series of cases that have required a knowledge -of injury element under Florida’s hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2010). We, however, conclude that the statutes are sufficiently different that these eases do not apply here.

Section 316.027(2), Florida Statutes, provides that a driver involved in a crash resulting in injury or death must immediately stop and remain at the scene and comply with the duties in section 316.062, Florida Statutes. A person who willfully violates this requirement commits a felony varying degree, depending on the resulting injury or death. § 316.027(2)(a)-(c), Fla. Stat. There is no specific scienter requirement. In contrast, both sections 316.193 and 782.071, Florida Statutes, have specific knowledge elements, requiring that the person committing DUI manslaughter or vehicular homicide knew or should have known of the crash. In fact, the Legislature specifically excluded knowledge of injury or death as an element in section 782.071(1), Florida Statutes.

As it is within the Legislative prerogative to dispense with such a requirement, see Adkins, 96 So.3d at 417, it is not our function to rewrite the statute to require knowledge of death as an element of the crime. Although section 316.193(3)(c), Florida Statutes, does not have specific language eliminating knowledge of injury or death as an element, it only requires a failure to comply the duties in section 316.062, Florida Statutes, which apply even for damage to property. Knowledge of a vehicular crash would signify at least some damage to property, regardless of whether death occurred.

In State v. Mancuso, 652 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1995), the Florida Supreme Court held that the hit-and-run statute requires that the defendant either knew or should have known of the resulting injury or death. Id at 372. The cburt based its decision on the weight of the majority of jurisdictions with similarly worded statutes which required actual or constructive knowledge of injury in order to find criminal liability under hit and run statutes. Id Those similarly-worded statutes did not include a knowledge element. Where, however, a knowledge element has been included in hit-and-run statutes, courts have construed the statutes in accordance with their terms. For instance, where the statute- provided “[ejach person operating a motor vehicle who is knowingly involved in an accident which causes .... injury or damage to property shall-at once stop[,]” the state was required to prove only knowledge of the accident and not the injury. See State v. Johnson, 227 Conn. 534, 630 A.2d 1059, 1063 (1993); see also N. Olmsted v. Gallagher, 2 Ohio App. 3d 414, 416, 442 N.E.2d 470 (8th Dist.1981); State v. Sabetta, 672 A.2d 451, 452-53 (R.I. 1996). Similarly, as sections 316.193(3)(c) and 782.071(1), Florida Statutes, both have knowledge requirements, cases, such as Mdncuso, involving statutes with no knowledge requirement, are not dispositive of this issue.

In sum, we hold that under the DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide statutes, the enhancements for failure to render aid and provide information require that the person knew or should have known of the crash or accident, but do not require the State to prove that the defendant knew or should have known of the death or injury of the victim. To require such proof would defeat the purpose as noted in Dumas: , .

This, result-driven sanction implicitly recognizes the. possibility that a fleeing driver’s failure to stop and render aid may be the reason .that an injured person dies. Moreover, requiring proof that a driver had knowledge of death would lead to an absurd result: a driver who callously leaves the scene of a serious accident can avoid a [firstj-degree felony conyietion by disavowing knowledge of death.

Dumas, 700 So.2d at 1226. Additionally, to the extent that the jury instruction, as given, deviated from the standard instruction in stating that appellant had to “know” that the accident occurred, the instruction was erroneous. But as the state was held to a higher level of proof, there is no error. Moreover, there is no dispute in the record that appellant clearly knew that he had just hit a vehicle and was in a “bad” accident. Thus, the knowledge of the accident component was uncontested at trial. No reversible error occurred.

The Blood Draw Was Not an Unlawful Search and Seizure, Based on Exigent Circumstances .

Appellant argues that the blood draw obtained from him in the early morning hours after the accident was made without a warrant and violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The State counters that exigent circumstances permitted the warrantless blood draw. We agree with the State.

Warrantless searches are “per se” unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). A blood draw conducted under police direction is considered a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). However, an exception to. the warrant requirement exists “when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under'the Fourth Amendment.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011)).

A variety of circumstances may give rise , to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless search .... As is relevant here, we have also recognized that in some circumstances law enforcement officers may conduct a search without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. While these contexts do not necessarily involve equivalent dangers, in each a warrantless search is potentially reasonable because “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.”

Id. at 1558-59 (citations omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978)). Thus, “[t]o determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of circumstances.” Id. at 1559.

In McNeely, the defendant was stopped for speeding, declined a breath test, and was taken to a nearby hospital for blood testing. Id. at 1556-57. The defendant did not .consent, and the officer never attempted to secure a warrant. Id. at 1557, The United States Supreme Court held that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment, as the-test was a routine intoxicated driver case where no factors, apart from the natural dissipation of blood alcohol, suggested an emergency. Id. at . 1568. The Court held that “the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.” Id. However, “the practical problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the opportunity to obtain reliable evidence” are relevant in determining whether a warrantless search is reasonable. Id.

McNeely discussed Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), as fitting within the type of cases in which exigent circumstances would allow a warrantless search. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1559-60. In Schmerber, a driver who had suffered injuries in a car crash was taken to the hospital. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758, 86 S.Ct. 1826. While at the hospital receiving treatment, police arrested him for driving while under the influence and, over his objection, ordered' a blood test. Id. at 758-59, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The Court held that the warrantless blood test was permissible because the police “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of evidence,’ ” Id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964)). In addition to the natural dissipation of blood alcohol, “time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and .to investigate the scene of the accident,” and thus “there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.” Id. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826.

In this case, the court found that, based upon the timeline, exigent circumstances were present. Appellant absented.himself from the scene for over an hour and then returned but went to the hospital for treatment of his own injuries before the investigators found the vehicle and body. By the time the homicide investigator arrived and then wqnt to the hospital,., nearly four hours had passed since the time of the crash, but less than two hours from the time the body was discovered. The investigator testified that it would have taken an additional two hours to obtain a search warrant. Although a local police -officer testified on behalf of appellant that it would not -have taken much time to get a warrant, it was for the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

This was not a “routine DUI” once the victim’s body was discovered. 'Although the Supreme Court' noted that “the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute ah exigency in every case” McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1554 (emphasis added), the Court clearly signaled that in some cases the destruction of evidence by the natural dissipation of alcohol could constitute an exigent circumstance. If the circumstances in Schmerber constituted exigent circumstances to justify a warrant-less blood draw, then the circumstances of this case present a far more compelling reason to obtain a blood draw as soon as possible so as to prevent the dissipation of alcohol in appellant’s system. We thus find no Fourth Amendment violation. The court correctly denied the motion to suppress.

As to the remaining issues, we affirm without further discussion. Wé note, however, that appellant challenges the admission of his blood draw results on the basis that FDLE rules are insufficient to ensure scientific reliability. We decided this issue adverse to appellant’s position in a .prior appeal. Goodman v. Fla. Dep’t of Law Enf't, 203 So.3d 909, 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). We certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court, which has taken jurisdiction. Goodman v. Fla. Dep’t of Law Enf't, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1247b (Fla. Oct. 14, 2016). We therefore do not address this issue in this appeal.

Sentencing

Finally, appellant contends that double jeopardy precludes his conviction for both DUI manslaughter with failure to render aid and vehicular homicide with failure to render aid. Although the court withheld adjudication on the vehicular homicide charge, we have held that the withholding of adjudication on an offense constitutes a “conviction” for double jeopardy purposes. Griffin v. State, 69 So.3d 344, 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (adopting the reasoning of Bolding v. State, 28 So.3d 956, 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)). A conviction for DUI manslaughter and for vehicular homicide involving a single victim violates double jeopardy. See Ivey v. State, 47 So.3d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). Therefore, we direct that the trial court vacate the conviction for vehicular homicide on remand.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence for DUI manslaughter with failure to render aid but remand to vacate his conviction for vehicular homicide.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

In his motion for rehearing, appellant contends that we did not apply the analysis of California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), correctly. He contends the Bentley should have been considered as “pos-sessfing] an exculpatory value that was apparent before [the evidence] was destroyed,” in that his expert had already developed opinions regarding the malfunction of the vehicle to which he testified in the first trial. Id. at 489. Instead, he asserts that we addressed the Bentley as only potentially exculpatory evidence if subject to additional tests which could exonerate the defendant. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988).

Addressing appellant’s contention that the Bentley had exculpatory value when it was destroyed, we. still do not find that it meets the Trombetta test. Even if the Bentley had exculpatory value before it was destroyed, it was not of “such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. The useful evidence from the Bentley had already been obtained from the vehicle and used by the expert as the foundation of his opinion regarding the malfunction of the vehicle. He was able to give his opinion in the second trial, just as he did in the first trial. Thus, it was the expert’s opinion, not the presence of the Bentley, which furnished the materially exculpatory evidence.

Although the initial brief focused' exclusively on the malfunction of the Bentley in addressing its exculpatory value, in the last paragraph of the reply brief appellant also maintained that the physical condition of the vehicle was exculpatory and thus required the presence of the vehicle in the second trial. In the motion for rehearing, appellant makes this a feature of his argument. However, there were a multitude of photos of the vehicle used by witnesses and experts. Appellant has not shown that the vehicle was of such a nature that the defendant would be “unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Id. Therefore, we still find that Trombetta does not compel dismissal of the charge.

We deny the motion for rehearing on all issues, although we note that in discussing the motion to suppress the blood, draw we did erroneously state that four hours, rather than three, passed between the accident and the blood draw. That factual error does not change our analysis or conclusions.

Taylor and Levine, JJ., concur.

      . However, the failure to render aid enhancements under the DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide statutes by definition only apply where a death occurs.

      . This distinction is further underlined by the . legislative history of section 782.071, Florida Statutes. The specification that knowledge of injury or death is not required was initially added in the 1996 session, shortly after Mancuso was decided. See 1996 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 96-330- (West). Section 316.193, Florida Statutes, which does not contain a similar provision, was initially enacted in 1999.

      . We recognize that the trial court withheld adjudication and sentencing on vehicular homicide at the State's request to hold it in abeyance pending the results of the appeal of appellant’s conviction and sentence on DUI manslaughter. We recognize the dilemma both the court and the State face in such a circumstance. Resolving a double jeopardy issue on appeal where there are substantial issues as to thé other conviction may be a reasonable solution.

      . One could question whether the Bentley had exculpatory value, as the jüry found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at the first trial when all of the expert’s testimony and the Bentley were presented. No other case has this unique circumstance of having a first trial at which the defendant was convicted even with the presentation of the evidence now alleged to be materially exculpatory.

      . The record shows that the court admitted at least fifty-four pictures of the Bentley and its parts,