author: CRAIN, J.

text:
    SUCCESSION OF Geronimo Ji JAGA
    NO. 2016 CA 1291
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Judgment Rendered: SEPTEMBER 15, 2017

      Ronald E, Stutés, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorney for Defendants/Appellants, Shona Satomi Pratt, Hiroji Pratt, and Nikki Michaux
    ■ Joseph A, Prokop, Jr., Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, Jojuyounghi Cleaver
    M. Janice Villarrubia, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, Jojuyounghi Cleaver, as Administratrix and Natural Tutrix of Kayode Ji Jaga
    • Mark R. Callender, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, Glory William Minja on behalf of Tkumsah Gerónimo Jaga
    BEFORE: GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, AND CRAIN, JJ.
   CRAIN, J.

12AppeIlants in this succession proceeding appeal a judgment declaring, in part, that an annuity be included in the calculation of the active mass of the decedent’s estate, and that the decedent’s widow is entitled to a marital portion consisting of a usufruct over one-fifth (1/5) of the net estate. Recognizing our lack of appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

.This succession was .opened for the estate of Gerónimo Ji Jaga, formerly known as Elmer G. Pratt, who died on June 3, 2011. Jaga is survived by his widow, Joju-younghi Cleaver; one child from his marriage to Cleaver, Kayode Ji Jaga; two children from a prior marriage, Hiroji Pratt and Shona Pratt; and, allegedly, two children born out of wedlock, Nikki Michaux and Tkumsah Gerónimo Ji Jaga.

According to the designated record on appeal, the initial judgment of possession was annulled pursuant to a motion filed by Cleaver, the current administratrix. Cleaver also filed a petition and-several other motions in the proceeding, in which she sought to traverse the previously filed detailed descriptive list, submit a revised detailed descriptive list, and require that Nikki and Tkumsah prove paternity. Cleaver also asked to be put in possession of her alleged community property and alleged she should be awarded a marital portion based upon necessitous circumstances. Tkumsah also filed a petition to assert his rights as an alleged forced heir.

Some of these matters were resolved by the parties, and a trial was held to address whether Nikki established she is the decedent’s daughter, whether an annuity should be included in the active mass of the decedent’s estate, and whether Cleaver is entitled to a marital portion. The parties offered testimony from two | ¡¡witnesses, Cleaver and Nikki, and introduced exhibits. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court signed a judgment on December 7, 2015, finding (1) Tkumsah and Nikki are children of the decedent, (2) all of the decedent’s property and funds are separate property, (3) the annuity shall be included in the active mass calculation, and (4) Cleaver is entitled to a marital portion of one-fifth (1/5) of the decedent’s estate. In response to a motion for new trial, the judgment was amended on February 8, 2016, to more specifically identify the annuity, to define Cleaver’s marital portion as a usufruct for life of one-fifth (1/5) of the decedent’s net estate, and to require Cleaver to post a bond. Shona, Hiroji, and Nikki appeal.

DISCUSSION

This court’s appellate jurisdiction extends to final judgments that determine the merits in whole or in part. See La. Code Civ. Pro. arts. 1841 and 2083. Appellate courts have a duty to examine their subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even if the litigants do not raise the issue. Succession of Matthews, 16-0289 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/5/17), 212 So.3d 547, 551, writs denied, 17-0230 (La. 3/31/17), 217 So.3d 361.

Subject to certain exceptions, appeals from orders or judgments rendered in succession proceedings are governed by the same rules applicable to appeals in ordinary proceedings. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 2974. The Code of Civil Procedure grants the right to an immediate appeal of certain judgments rendered in succession proceedings; however, the present judgment is not among those identified by the Code. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 3308 (judgment homologating tableau of distribution may be suspensively appealed), La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 3337 (judgment homologating final account is a “final judgment”), La. Code Civ. Pro. arts. 2122 and 2974 (governing appeals of orders appointing or removing ^succession representative); see also In re Succession of LeBouef 13-0209 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/9/14), 153 So.3d 527, 533; Succession of McLean, 26,566 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/95), 651 So.2d 920, 926.

The judgment on appeal determines only certain issues in the succession, namely, Tkumsah and Nikki are children of the decedent, the estate consists entirely of separate property, an annuity should be included in the decedent’s active mass, and Cleaver is entitled to a marital portion and the fractional amount thereof. The resolution of those issues, however, does not conclude the succession. The heirs have not been placed in possession of them respective portions of the estate nor has a judgment been rendered homologating a final account by the current administratrix. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 3337. To the contrary, the judgment before the court is limited to assorted issues that arose during the course of the succession, none of which are conclusive of the proceeding. Consequently, the judgment is a partial judgment that may be appealed only if authorized by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1915. See In re Succession of Morgan, 15-0335, 2016 WL 770192, at *2 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/24/16) (judgment, which declared ownership of disputed estate property but was not a judgment of possession and did not dismiss a party, was a partial judgment subject to appeal only as provided by Article 1915); In re Succession of Faget, 06-2159 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/19/07), 984 So.2d 7, 10 (judgment declaring surviving spouse to be co-owner of family home was partial judgment subject to appeal only under Article 1915).

|sThe judgment does not fall within any of the categories of partial judgments subject to immediate appeal under Article 1915 A. The appeal of the judgment is thus governed by Article 1915B, which provides that a partial judgment “shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” The trial court did not designate the judgment as final for purposes of immediate appeal nor did it make a determination that there was no just reason for delay. Therefore, the judgment is not a final judgment for purposes of immediate appeal. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 1915B(2). Consequently, this court lacks appellate jurisdiction to consider the present appeal.

CONCLUSION

This appeal is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Hiroji Pratt, Shona Pratt, and Nikki Michaux.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

      . Partial judgments immediately appealable under Article 1915A include (1) a judgment dismissing the suit as to less than all of the parties; (2) a judgment granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings; (3) a judgment granting a motion for summary judgment, except a summary judgment granted pursuant to Article 966(E); (4) a judgment on either the principal or incidental demand, when the two have been tried separately; (5) a judgment on the issue of liability when that issue has been tried separately, and (6) a judgment imposing sanctions or disciplinary action pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 191, 863, or 864, or Code of Evidence Article 510G,

      . Although this court has discretion to convert an appeal to an application for supervisory writs, it may only do so if the appeal would have been timely had it been filed as a supervisory writ application. Bosley v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 16-1112, 2017 WL 1423925, at *4 n.5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/20/17); Lake Villas No. II Homeowners’ Association, Inc. v. LaMartina, 15-0244, 2015 WL 9435193, at *3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/15), writ denied, 16-0149 (La. 3/14/16), 189 So.3d 1070. A party intending to apply to this court for a supervisory writ shall give notice of such intention by requesting a return date to be set by the trial court, which shall not exceed thirty days from the date of the notice of judgment. See Uniform Rules— Courts of Appeal, Rules 4-2 and 4-3. In this case, notice of the February 8, 2016 Amended Judgment was forwarded to the parties on February 18, 2016, and the motion for appeal was filed on April 18, 2016. Because the appeal was not filed within thirty days of the notice of judgment, the motion for appeal cannot be considered a timely filed application for supervisory writs under Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 4-3. Accordingly, we decline to convert the appeal to an application for supervisory writs.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: McCLENDON, J,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Maxine Queyrouze NICAUD v. Harvey Joseph NICAUD, Jr.
    2016 CA 1531
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    SEPTEMBER 15, 2017
    Philip C. Ciaccio, Jr., Gretna, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Charles Harold Creasy, Independent Testamentary Executor of the Succession of Maxine Queyrouze Nicaud
    Richard A. Richardson, Wesley J. Levesque, Covington, Louisiana and Jesse L. Wimberly, III, Jesee L. Wimberly, IV, Mandeville, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Harvey Joseph Nicaud, Jr.
    BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT, JJ. '
   McCLENDON, J,

IsMaxine Queyrouze. Nicaud, the holder of a promissory note, filed a “Petition on Note” on September 14,2012, against Harvey Joseph Nicaud, Jr., her nephew and the maker of the note. After Ms. Nicaud filed a motion for summary judgment, the parties reached an agreement modifying the terms of the promissory note. On Jan-, uary 23, 2013, the trial court signed a consent judgment reflecting the modifications. , Thereafter, on April 14, 2014, Ms. Nicaud filed a “Motion to Enforce Judgment.” The parties entered into a second consent judgment, which- was signed by the trial court on July 28, 2014, in which the motion to enforce the judgment was granted, Mr. Nicaud’s default, of the first consent judgment was acknowledged, and Mr. Nicaud was ordered to “immediately pay $54,718.66” to Ms. Nicaud.

Attempts to collect on the debt were unsuccessful, and Ms. Nicaud died on September 19, ,2015. On .May 16, 2016, Mr. Nicaud filed a “Rule to Show Cause Why Judgment Should Not Be Declared Satisfied,” in' which he asserted that a provision in the promissory note deemed the indebtedness satisfied upon the death of either party to the note. The independent testamentary executor of the Succession of Maxine Queyrouze (the Succession) filed an opposition to the rule. On August 17, 2016, following a hearing, the trial court signed a judgment denying Mr. Nicaud’s rule to show cause. Mr. Nicaud filed an appeal from that judgment. The Succession filed an answer to the appeal, seeking damages, attorney fees, and costs.

This Court, ex propño motu, entered a Rule to Show Cause Order, requesting the parties to show cause by briefs why the appeal should or should not be dismissed as it appeared that the judgment was a non-appealable ruling.- On February 23, 2017, a panel of this Court dismissed the appeal finding it to be an interlocutory judgment.

Appellate courts have the duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue; Rush v. Rush, 12-1502 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/25/13), 115 So.3d 508, 510, writ denied, 13-0911 (La. 5/31/13), 118 So.3d 398. The appellate jurisdiction of this court extends to “final judgments.” See LSA-C.C.P. arts. 1911,1915, 2083. Under LSA-C.C.P. art. 2133, an answer to an appeal is in the character of a cross appeal in which the appellee takes advantage of an appeal entered Land perfected by an appellant, in the hope of procuring an alteration or amendment of the judgment rendered in a manner beneficial to the appellee. J. Patrick, Inc. v. Patrick, 13-2017 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/9/15), 2015 WL 4200131 (unpublished), writ denied, 15-1663 (La. 10/30/15), 180 So.3d 302 (citing Francois v. Ybarzabal, 483 So.2d 602, 606 (La. 1986)).

In this matter, another panel of the Court has dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because the answer to the appeal is based on the same interlocutory non-appealable ruling of the trial court, we lack jurisdiction over said answer. Accordingly, we dismiss the Succession’s answer to the appeal. All costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to Harvey Joseph Ni-caud, Jr. and one-half to the Succession, of Maxine Joseph Nicaud.

ANSWER TO APPEAL DISMISSED.


author: WHIPPLE, C.J.

text:
    Doy E. COTHERN v. Kalyn BARBER; John Barber, Individually and as the Father and Administrator of the Estate of the Unemancipated Minor, Kalyn Barber; Bridgette Barber, Individually and as the Mother of the Unemancipated Minor, Kalyn Barber; GEICO Insurance Company; James Jordan; State Farm Fire and Casualty Company; and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
    NUMBER 2016 CA 1288
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Judgment Rendered: SEPTEMBER 15, 2017

      Thomas Huval, Stefini W. Salles, Cov-ington, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, Doy E. Cothern
    Ashley E. Sandage, Hammond, LA, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, Kalyn Barber (Jordan) and James Jordan
    Stephen R. Barry, Daphne McNutt, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, John Barber and Bridgette Barber
    Kathleen Simon, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Geico Insurance Company
    BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McDonald, and chutz, jj.
   WHIPPLE, C.J.

12This matter is before us on appeal by plaintiff, Doy E. Cothern, from a judgment of the trial court granting a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action and dismissing, with prejudice, plaintiffs claims against defendants, John Barber and Bridgette Barber. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about July 30, 2104, plaintiff Doy E, Cothern was involved in an automobile accident with defendant Kalyn Barber in Bogalasa, Louisiana, resulting in injuries to Cothern. At the time of the accident, Kalyn Barber was eighteen years old and was driving a vehicle owned by James Jordan. Cothern filed a lawsuit on June 25, 2015, seeking damages for injuries sustained as a result of the automobile accident. Named as defendants in Cothem’s lawsuit were: Kalyn Barber; James Jordan; State Farm as the automobile liability insurer of Jordan; State Farm as the underinsured motorist insurer of Cothern; Kalyn’s parents, John and Bridgette Barber (“the Barbers”); Geico Insurance Company as the automobile insurer of the Barbers; and an unnamed insurer as the Barbers’ homeowners insurer.

In pertinent part, the petition alleged that Kalyn was a Mississippi-licensed motorist, who was living outside of her parents’ residence in Mississippi. The petition further alleged that Kalyn’s parent(s) had signed her application for a driver’s license as an unemancipated minor prior to her seventeenth birthday and, thus, were vicariously liable for her negligence in causing the automobile accident ^pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 63-1-25 and LSA-C.C. art, 221.

A curator ad hoc was appointed to represent the interest of the Barbers. Thereafter, the curator filed a peremptory exception raising, the objection of no cause of action on behalf of the Barbers, contending that: (1) Kalyn was eighteen at the time of the accident and, thus, Mississippi Code Section 63-1-25 is inapplicable; and (2) LSA-C.C, art. 221 is likewise inapplicable because the father’s administration of his minor’s estate terminates at the time of majority of the child, which, pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 29, is attained upon reaching the age of eighteen.

Prior to a hearing on the Barbers’ exception of no cause of action, Cothern filed a second amended and supplemental petition, deleting any reference to Mississippi Code Section 63-1-25, but still naming the Barbers as defendants in the lawsuit on the basis that Kalyn was subject to the tort laws of Louisiana, including LLSA-C.C. art. 2318, as well as the Louisiana Civil Code articles governing conflict of laws. Cothern attached to the amended petition a copy of Mississippi Code Section 1-3-27, which states that the term “minor” includes any person under twenty-one years of age.

Accordingly, in his opposition to the exceptions raised by the Barbers, Cothern argued that because Kalyn was a domiciliary of Mississippi, her status as a minor should be determined by the law of Mississippi, in particular Miss. Code Arm. 1-3-27, and Kalyn (age eighteen at the time of the accident) would be a minor under Mississippi law.

On February 12, 2016, the trial court held a hearing, on exceptions filed on behalf of the Barbers, including the exception of no cause of action After hearing argument of counsel, the trial court sustained the exception of no cause of action, noting that: (1) the negligence of the Barbers is entirely predicated on the negligent acts of their daughter; (2) pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 3615, Louisiana had the greater intérest in the litigation; (3) under Louisiana law, Kalyn' is an adult for purposes of tort liability; and (4) thus, the provisions of LSA-C.C. art. '2318 regarding liability of parents for their minor children are not applicable. A final judgment was signed..on March 15, 2016, granting the peremptory exception of no cause, of action and dismissing, with prejudice, Cothern’s claims against the Barbers.

|fiCothern then filed the instant appeal, seeking review of the March 15, 2016 judgment of the trial court.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Cothern does' not dispute that the rights and liabilities of the parties in this tort action are governed by Louisiana law, as that is where the tort was committed. Rather, Cothern contends that there is a conflict of laws only in regard to whether Louisiana or Mississippi law should be applied to determine the defendant-driver’s status as a minor for purposes of establishing the vicarious liability of her parents, citing Watkins v. Cupit, 130 So.2d 720 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961). Nonetheless, Cothern contends that Mississippi law-should apply to determine the minority status of the defendant-driver because, as recognized in Succession of Goss, 304 So.2d 704 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1974), writ denied, 309 So.2d 339 (La. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 869, 96 S.Ct. 133, 46 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), the law of the domicile, the lex domidllil governs and controls the status of an individual. Therefore, he argues, under Mississippi law, the defendant-driver would be a minor, and her parents, i.e., the Barbers, could accordingly be vicariously liable for her negligent acts pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 2318.

At the outset, we note that if Louisiana law applied to: all aspects of this lawsuit, the Barbers could not be held vicariously liable for the actions of Kalyn, as she was eighteen at the time of the accident and, thus, no longer a minor under Louisiana law. See LSA-C.C. art. 29. Likewise, if Mississippi law: applied to all aspects of this lawsuit, the Barbers could not be vicariously liable for the actions of | fiKalyn, ás under the laws of Mississippi, there is no common-law liability against the parent for the torts of their minor child. See Watkins, 130 So.2d at 722.

Additionally, we note that Succession of Goss, as cited by Cothern, is factually distinguishable from the instant case. Succession of Goss, 304 So.2d at 705, involved a will contest brought by a California minor seeking a forced portion-of .his alleged deceased father’s estate in Louisiana. The issue was which state’s law (California or Louisiana) would control plaintiffs status relating to his birth rights. Succession of Goss, 304 So.2d at 706. More importantly, Succession of Goss was decided prior to the enactment of Louisiana’s Civil Code articles governing conflict of laws and determinations of status. See Acts 1091, No. 923, .§ 1 enacting LSA-C.C. art. 19, currently LSA-C.C. art. 3519.

Louisiana Civil Code article 3519 specifically addresses conflict of laws pertaining to the “status of natural persons” and provides:

The status of a natural person and the incidents and effects of that status are governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue.
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of the involved states in the light of: (1) the relationship of each state, at any pertinent time, to the dispute, the parties, and the person whose status is at issue; (2) the policies referred to in Article 3515; and (3) the policies of sustaining the validity of obligations voluntarily undertaken, of protecting children, minors, and others in need of protection, and of preserving family values and stability.

The comments to this article provide that- the article is applicable not only in proceedings seeking a direct determination of status, such as a filiation or disavowal action or an, action to annul a marriage, but also in proceedings where, the issue of status is merely incidental to the resolution of another issue. LSA-C.C. art. 3519, Rev. Comments (a) 1991. In the instant appeal, the issue of Kalyn’s status as a minor is incidental to the issue of whether her parents, the Barbers, are vicariously liable to Cothern for Kalyn’s alleged-negligence resulting in the subject automobile accident.

Louisiana Civil Code article 3519 lists several nonexclusive factors to be considered in determining, choice-of-law questions. A trial court is not. required to expressly, analyze each statutorily listed factor in its oral or written reasons, and the court’s failure to do so does not constitute an error of law justifying de novo review. See Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 2010-2605 (La. 3/13/12), 89 So.3d 307, 316.

In considering the propriety of the trial court’s grant of the exception finding the plaintiff has.no cause of action against the Barbers, the first factor to consider is each state’s relationship to the dispute, the parties, and the person whose status is at issue. LSA-C.C. art. 3519. Here, plaintiff was a resident :of Louisiana, the accident giving rise to this dispute occurred in Louisiana, and the injuries- were all sustained in Louisiana. Mississippi’s only relationship to this dispute is that the defendant-driver was a resident of Mississippi at the time of the accident, according to the facts alleged in the petition. This factor clearly favors the imposition of Louisiana law. .

Second, LSA-C.C, art. 3519 references the policies referred to in LSA-C.C. 3515, which is the general conflict-of-laws article and instructs that the courts should look at the policies and needs of the interstate and international - system, to foster the goal of upholding justified expectations and minimizing the consequences of subjecting parties to the laws of more than one state. Here, we are unable to articulate a Mississippi policy that would be advanced by applying its statutory definition of a minor under the facts of the case. Moreover, there is no | ¿justified expectation in Louisiana that the parents of an eighteen-year-old would be vicariously liable for the acts of their child, and there is no justified expectation in Mississippi that parents of an eighteen-year-old involved in an automobile accident would be vicariously liable. To apply the law as Cothern urges would subject the parties to a nonuniform application of the law simply by virtue of the fact that the subject automobile accident involved individuals from different states. This would be contrary to the “polices and needs of the interstate and international system.” Thus, we find that the policies set forth in article 3515, as referenced in LSA-C.C. art. 3519, also support and favor the application of Louisiana law.

Third, LSA-C.C. art. 3519 instructs the courts to consider the policies of sustaining the validity of obligations voluntarily undertaken, of protecting children, minors, and others in need of protection, and of preserving family values and stability. Here, the application of Mississippi law as urged by plaintiff would in no way advance the protection of a child, minor, or other in need of protection, nor advance the preservation of family values.

For these reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Cothern has no cause of action against the Barbers herein under the allegations set forth in the petitions. We also find no legal support for his contention that the defendant-driver’s status as a minor should be determined pursuant to Mississippi law. There is no Mississippi policy advanced by the application of its law as urged by plaintiff. Moreover, there is no reasonable expectation by any of the parties involved that the parents of an eighteen-year-old driver would be vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of their child in an automobile accident. Therefore, the trial court did not err in sustaining the exception of no cause of action and ^dismissing Cothern’s claims against the Barbers. Moreover, it is unnecessary to permit Cothern the opportunity to amend his petition, as there are no additional facts that can be pleaded to provide him with a cause of action against the Barbers.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the March 15, 2016 judgment of the trial court, sustaining the objection of no cause of action and dismissing with prejudice Doy E. Cothern’s claims against John and Bridgette Barber, is hereby affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against plaintiff, Doy E. Cothern.

AFFIRMED.

      . This Mississippi code section provides that any negligence or willful misconduct of a minor under the age of seventeen years when driving a motor vehicle shall be imputed to the person who has signed the application of such minor for a permit or license.

      . Louisiana Civil Code article 221 (prior to its amendment by La, Acts 2015, No. 260, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2016) provides:
      The father is, during the marriage, administrator of the estate bf his minor children and the mother in case of his interdiction or absence during said interdiction or absence.
      He or she shall be accountable both for the property and revenues of the estates the use of which he or she is not entitled to by law and for the property only of the estate the usufruct of which the law gives him or her. This administration ceases at the time of the majority or emancipation of the children, and also ceases upon judicial separation from bed and board either of the father from the mother or of the mother from the father.

      . Subsequent to the filing of the exception, the curator withdrew, and Kalyn’s parents obtained private counsel to defend them in the lawsuit. •

      . In the first amended and supplemental petition, plaintiff amended the allegations in the petition to state that at the time of the accident, Kalyn was a resident of her parents' household, or living in a structure on their property in Mississippi.

      . Louisiana Ciyil Code article 2318 provides:
      The father and the mother are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor child, who resides with them or who has been placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons. However, the father and mother are not responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor child who has been emancipated by marriage, by judgment of full emancipation, or by judgment of limited emancipation that expressly . relieves the parents of liability for damages occasioned by their minor child.

      . This ruling rendered the other exceptions moot.

      . However, the instant appeal is distinguishable front Watkins v. Cupit. Unlike the instant case, in Watkins, it was undisputed that the defendant-motorist was a minor under both Louisiana and Mississippi law. Thus, there was not an issue as to which state’s law should be applied and used to determine only the "minority status” of the defendant-motorist, unlike the issue raised by Cothern in the instant appeal.

      .AS noted in footnote 1 supra, there is a Mississippi statutory exception for parental liability for automobile accidents, when a parent has signed on the child’s driver’s license application. However, this liability ceases upon the child reaching the age of seventeen, and Kalyn was eighteen at the time of the subject automobile accident. See Mississippi Code Section 63-1-25.

      . Even if we were to find that Mississippi law should apply, the trial court was still correct in sustaining the exception of no cause of action and dismissing Cothem's claims against the Barbers. Pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 3519, Mississippi law would not only govern the "status” of Kalyn as a minor, but also the "incidents and effects” of this minority status. As stated above, under Mississippi law, the "incidents and effects” of minority status exclude vicarious liability on the part of parents of a minor driver who causes a vehicular accident when the minor is seventeen years old or older. See Mississippi Code Section 63-1-25, Accordingly, there would be no legal basis for the Barbers’ vicarious liability.