author: WEIMER, Justice. JOHNSON, Chief Justice, HUGHES, J.,

text:
    Lee RAND, et al. v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
    NO. 2017-CA-0596
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    12/06/2017
   ON APPEAL FROM THE CIVIL JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS

WEIMER, Justice.

This matter arises from a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance whereby citations, which are based on traffic camera images, may be reviewed at an administrative, hearing.. The case is before us on direct appeal from a district court judgment declaring that the administrative review process, as it existed during 2008 through 2012, was unconstitutional. More particularly, the district .court declared the administrative review process violated the due process and access-to court provisions of the Louisiana Constitution.

After reviewing the record, we determine that this nase has been rendered moot. While the record reveals a convoluted development of this case, what emerges from the trial record is that this case resulted in a number of changes, both legislative and practical, to the administrative review process. Although this case is technically moot, the end result is that the plaintiffs have achieved vindication of the constitutional rights for which they advocated. Accordingly, and for the reasons ladiscussed herein, we vacate the judgment of the district court and dismiss the matter with prejudice.

PACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2007, the City of New Orleans (the “City”)' -enacted ordinances, codified as Sections 154-1701 through 154-1704 of-its Code of Ordinances, which created the Automated Traffic Enforcement System (“ATES”).-Pursuant to ATES, traffic cameras located at various points in the City gather images of vehicles when ■ certain violations, such as speeding or running red lights, allegedly occur. By its express terms, ATES declares it is not a criminal law-enforcement regime, as “[tjhe imposition of a civil penalty under [ATES] shall not- be considered a criminal conviction.” New Orleans, La., Code of Ordinances, § 154-1704(2017).

Plaintiffs Edmond Harris and Lee Rand received notices of alleged ATES violations from the City. In their July 1, 2011 petition, the plaintiffs claim the administrative review process violated their constitutional rights to due process under La. Const, art. I, § 2 and their access to, courts- under Article I, § 22. In their petition, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief directing the “City to terminate all attempts at hearings until the City corrects the process.”

Following a hearing, the district court granted a preliminary injunction “enjoining, prohibiting, and restraining” the City “from conducting any administrative hearings authorized by thé [ATES] ordinance.” .The district-court stayed.the injunction, however, pending review by the court of appeal. See Rand v. City of New Orleans, 2012-0348, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/13/12), 125 So.3d 476, 479. The Rcourt of appeal found no abuse of discretion by the trial court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction. The court of appeal explained: “The record demonstrates that the hearing officers occupy two inconsistent positions, one as the prosecutor and one as the adjudicator, which violates the right to due process.” Id., 2012-0348 at 8, 125 So.3d at 482.

The City sought this court’s discretionary review of the court of appeal’s decision, which was denied. Rand v. City of New Orleans, 13-0119 (La. 3/1/13), 108 So.3d 1178.

Seeking to capitalize on these determinations, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and.prayed for the issuance of a permanent injunction against the administrative review process. The district court agreed, “[djeclaring the process of hearing unconstitutional and violative of the State Constitution Declaration of Rights article,” and “[ordering the City to terminate all attempts at hearings until the City corrects the process.” The district court additionally declared “that all hearings held between February 2008 and [the date of its ruling were] in violation of the State Constitution.”

The City appealed the permanent injunction. Rand v. City of New Orleans, 14-2506 (La. 6/30/15), 173 So.3d 1148. On that occasion, this court agreed with the City, finding that a permanent injunction could not issue on the same evidence plaintiffs had submitted for the preliminary injunction, plaintiffs having supplied no further evidence. Id., 14-2506, pp. 4-5, 173 So.3d at 1151. Accordingly, this court reversed the permanent injunction, and “reinstate[d] the preliminary injunction prohibiting the City from undertaking any hearings based on this ordinance, and re-mandfed] the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.” Id., 14-2506 at 6, 173 So.3d at 1152.

On remand, plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Set for Trial on the Merits,” seeking to set the matter for a non-jury trial on the merits. The matter proceeded to a one-day bench trial on September 27, 2016. Four witnesses testified at the trial: Lee Rand (one of the plaintiffs), Elman Harris (another plaintiff), Richard Bozeman (adjudication administrator of the traffic camera program) and Thomas Lee (a hearing officer for the program).

At trial, the plaintiffs sought to establish that they had been denied meaningful access to a court for review of an adverse administrative hearing decision because the next level of review was to civil district court, where the filing fee exceeded $400. Although Mr. Bozeman, the ATES administrator, acknowledged that the appeal procedure to the district cost “more than the amount of the ticket,” he also testified that the appeals provision of the ATES ordinance had been amended. Pursuant to Code of Ordinances, § 154-1702(h)(l), as amended, appeals from adverse hearing decisions are no longer made to civil district court, but to traffic court. As provided by Code of Ordinances, § 154-1702(h)(2), “[t]he traffic court may require a reasonable fee not to exceed $50.00, from any person or persons lodging any such appeal with the traffic court.”

The plaintiffs also sought to establish that an intake form, ostensibly requiring a person desiring an administrative review hearing to acknowledge that the person was the owner or operator of a vehicle caught on camera, essentially operated as an admission of plaintiffs’ liability for a citation. On both direct and cross-examination, however, plaintiffs established that they had paid nothing for the citations, as the citations they had received were all dismissed by the City.

| ^Additionally, the plaintiffs attempted to show bias in favor of the City by the hearing officers who conduct administrative reviews. The crux of this effort was an attempt to show some connection between upholding citations and the hearing officers’ financial compensation. The uncontro-verted testimony, however, was that no relationship existed between the number of citations upheld and any hearing officer’s compensation.

The plaintiffs also contended that it was improper for the hearing officers to both obtain the camera evidence from the computer system and to then review the merits of the citation. According to the plaintiffs, this situation was akin to the hearing officer acting as a prosecutor on the City’s behalf. However, Mr. Bozeman testified that hearing procedures had been changed in 2012 after the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Mr. Bozeman described the 2012 change in hearing procedure, “where there then was a City Attorney who presented the City’s case relative to the photo safety citations, a prosecutor, if you will, so to speak.” Mr. Bozeman’s testimony on this point was uncontroverted.

Before describing the details of the district court’s judgment, it should be noted that, in our earlier opinion, this court observed: “We note in passing that the District Court’s judgment granting the permanent injunction also granted plaintiffs declaratory relief even though declaratory relief was not specifically requested by the plaintiffs. On remand, the parties may amend their petition to seek declaratory relief, if appropriate.” Rand, 14-2506 at 6 n.10, 173 So.3d at 1152 n.10. However, without an amendment of the pleadings, after remand and a trial on the merits, the district court granted only declaratory relief. The court’s November 10, 2016 judgment provided:

J¿t is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that due to failure of the City of New Orleans to create a fair process by which traffic camera citation recipients could contest and defend against the tickets they received, the ATES Ordinance, and the processes created pursuant to the ordinance between February 2008 and 2012, constituted a violation of the Louisiana State constitution Article I Section 2, and Section 22, and the Home Rule Charter Chapter 2 Section 2-202 of the City of New Orleans.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all hearings held pursuant to the traffic camera citations from February of 2008 to November 2011 were conducted in violation of the Louisiana Constitution and the City of New Orleans’ Home Rule Charter.

The district court stated in written reasons for judgment:

An applicant is in effect denied an appeal due to the cost. Rather than selecting Traffic Court as the appellate court, the ordinance mandates an appeal to the Civil District Court. This appeal would cost the driver a $450.00 filing fee. If the driver were to prevail in Civil District Court, they would not be required to pay a ticket that typically costs between $40.00-$200.00. This Court finds that this prohibitive cost to appeal violates the driver’s access to courts as guaranteed in The Louisiana Constitution and the City’s Home Rule Charter.
This Court also finds that the City’s process requiring that the ticket holder admit that they were the driver or owner of the vehicle prior to the hearing violates all notion[s] of due process of law. So does the hearing officer acting in the dual role as prosecutor. Further, the video that the hearing officer/prosecutor enters into evidence have never been properly identified- or authenticated.

The City now directly appeals to this court.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

This court conducts de novo review of judgments declaring legislation to be unconstitutional. Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State, 14-0691, p. 13 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So.3d 835, 845. “[P]rinciples for the determination of , the ^constitutionality of a legislative enactment are equally applicable to the ordinance at issue here.” City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge v. Myers, 13-2011, 13-2036, p. 5 (La. 5/7/14), 145 So.3d 320, 327. Relatedly, “a court interprets a municipal or City ordinance using the same guidelines as those used in construing a statute.” Born v. City of Slidell, 15-0136, p. 13 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So.3d 1227, 1235. “An ordinance, like a state statute, is presumed to be constitutional.” Myers, 13-2011 at 4-5, 145 So.3d at 327. “[Wlhoever attacks the constitutionality of an ordinance bears the burden of proving his allegation.” Id., 13-2011 at 5, 145 So.2d at 327.

Our review of ¡this matter is also guided by the. long-settled principle, that “courts will not decide abstract, hypothetical or moot controversies, or -render advisory opinions with respect to such controversies.” LaPointe v. Vermilion Parish School, 15-0432, p. 9 (La. 6/30/15), 173 So.3d 1152, 1159. Indeed, whether a case is moot is both a “threshold issue,” (id.) and an issue which this court may, notice on its own. See La. C.C.P. art. 927 (“[T]he failure to disclose a cause of action or a right or interest in the plaintiff to institute the suit ,.. may be noticed by either the trial or appellate court on its own motion.”).

With those predicate principles in mind, we turn to the subject of this appeal, which is the district- court’s judgment. It is first necessary to ascertain the judgment’s effect. As mentioned earlier, this court previously reversed the district court’s imposition of a permanent injunction against the City’s administrative review process and reinstated a preliminary injunction. The present judgment, which is uhdisputedly a final judgment, describes no injunctive relief. However, the plaintiffs petition prayed for a permanent injunction, and there is no indication in the record that plaintiffs’ prayer for injunctive relief was ever retracted. Because the district court’s | ¿judgment is silent on the relief requested, i.e., a permanent injunction against the City conducting administrative review processes, that request for an injunction is deemed denied. See Sun Finance Co., Inc. v. Jackson, 525 So.2d 532, 533 (La. 1988) (“It is true as a general rule that where a judgment is silent with respect to any demand which was an issue in the case under the' pleadings such silence constitutes an absolute rejection of such demand.”).

Relatedly, because a preliminary injunction is an intermediate step in a procedure to secure a final injunction, the district court’s rendition of a final judgment that does not include a permanent injunction effectively vacates the earlier, preliminary injunction granted in plaintiffs’ favor. See La. C.C.P. art. 862 (“[A] final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and equitable relief.”); see also Rand, 14-2506 at 4, 173 So.3d at 1151 (quoting Mary Moe, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Bd. of Ethics, 03-2220, pp. 9-10 (La. 4/14/04), 875 So.2d 22, 29) (“The issuance of a permanent injunction takes place only after a trial on the merits in which the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, but a preliminary -injunction may be issued on merely a prima facie showing by the plaintiff that he is entitled to relief.”). ,

Although injunctive relief is absent, what the judgment' does purport to accomplish is to declare that the City’s administrative review procedure for ATES traffic camera violations is unconstitutional, and “that all hearings held pursuant to the traffic camera citations from February of 2008 to November 2011” are likewise unconstitutional.

The time frame addressed by the district court’s declaration is important. At the time this lawsuit was filed in 2011, Code of Ordinances, § 154-1702(h) provided: |fl“A person or persons aggrieved by the City’s decision may file a petition for judicial review in the Orleans Parish Civil District Court.” No mention was made in the version of § 154-1702(h) in effect in 2011 of the filing fees involved in filing an appeal in Orleans Parish Civil District-Court. Even so, testimony at trial established that, as a practical matter, the filing fees cost “more than the amount of the ticket.”

However, as was established during trial, and is a matter of public record, the City significantly amended the ATES ordinance after the plaintiffs received their ATES citations and filed their petition. Pursuant to Code of Ordinances, § 154— 1702(h)(1), as amended, appeals from adverse hearing decisions are no longer made to civil district court, but to traffic court. -Moreover, under § 154-1702(h)(2), as amended, the filing , fees to appeal to traffic court are capped, as follows: “The traffic court, may require a reasonable fee not to exceed fifty dollars ($50), from any person or persons lodging any such appeal with the traffic court to defray the cost of record preparation, transcription of evidence, and other related - costs of the appeal.” The ATES appeal to- Orleans Parish Civil District Court, and the attending fee in that-court, formed the primary bases for •plaintiffs’ complaint that the ATES procedures violated the guarantee of-access to courts under Lá. Const, art. I, § 22. As just noted, however, those provisions of the ATES ordinance have been amended, arid favorably so as those provisions relate to the plaintiffs’ petition. The City essentially delivered the appeals procedures the plaintiffs sought. As we have previously ruled:

When the challenged article, statute, or ordinance has been amended or expired, mootness may result if the change corrects or cures the condition complained of or fully satisfies the claim. Further, if it is concluded, that the new legislation was specifically intended to resolve the questions raised by the controversy, a court may find that the case or controversy is moot. In such a case, there is no longer an actual I mcontroversy for the court to address, and any judicial adjudication on the matter Would be an impermissible advisory opinion.

Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, Dept. of Finance, 98-0601, p. 9 (La. 10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1194.

The fact of the City’s amendments to § 154-1702(h) does not, however, require that we find this case is moot. As we explained in Cat’s Meow, “the defendant must show with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur.” Cat’s Meow, 98-0601 at 9-10, 720 So.2d at 1194 (emphasis added). In' our review of the record, we find the defendant City has made such a showing. The amendments to § 154-1702 adding sections (h)(1) - (appeal to traffic court) and (h)(2) (filing fees not to exceed $50) have been left in place over five years. Additionally, the City made additional, subsequent amendments to the ATES ordinances, but left sections (h)(1) and (h)(2) untouched. Indeed, the amendments adding sections (h)(1) and (h)(2) have been the governing law longer than the original provisions of .which plaintiffs complained. Thus, we find that there is “no reasonable expectation” that the City would “reenact the previous scheme” in a way that would justify this court presently adjudicating the constitutionality of an appellate scheme which was replaced long ago. The “mere assertion” of the possibility “that the City could again, at any time, enact legislation” akin to the “previous scheme” was “not persuasive]” for this court in Cat’s Meow, nor is it persuasive under the ATES ordinance’s history found in this record. We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs’ attack on the appellate procedure as violating their constitutional right to access to the court is moot (and was moot when tried).

| uThe district court’s reasons for judgment also indicated: “This Court also finds that the City’s process requiring that the ticket holder admit that they were the driver or 'owner of the vehicle prior to the hearing violates all notion of due process of law.” However, an appeal lies from the judgment itself, and not from the reasons for judgment. The plaintiffs, moreover, made a single evidentiary offering regarding an alleged admission of liability. Specifically, a document captioned as an “Intake Form,” admitted into evidence as Joint Exhibit 8, purports to require a person seeking an administrative review hearing to acknowledge being the owner and/or driver of the vehicle caught - on camera. Even so, and recalling that our review is de novo, we note that Exhibit 8 cannot be a form applicable to the plaintiffs’ alleged violations. Exhibit 8 indicates, near the bottom, that “APPEALS MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DECISION DATE AT THE NEW ORLEANS TRAFFIC COURT.” The quoted language tracks the 2012 amendments we discussed earlier. Significantly, the plaintiffs admitted at trial that the citations of which they complained in the petition were dismissed prior to the 2012 amendments. Thus, under de novo review, we find plaintiffs no longer had any justiciable interest because of the dismissal of their citations, which meant plaintiffs were no longer subjected to any monetary risk. Furthermore, although our prior jurisprudence counsels for openness to an exception |12of mootness, plaintiffs’ introduction of an intake form applicable to some later time frame is not persuasive that we should find any exception to the mootness of their claims regarding the intake form. See Cat’s Meow, 98-0601 at 9-10, 720 So.2d at 1194.

Finally, we note that the district court’s declaration of unconstitutionality was based on a finding that hearing officers held dual roles (of representing the City and of being adjudicators), and that the evidence upon which the hearing officers relied was not authenticated. For the. reasons just discussed, it has been established that due to' the dismissal of their citations, this case is postured such that plaintiffs appear to lack a justiciable interest. The next analytical step is to ascertain whether an exception to mootness applies, such that we should nevertheless reach the merits of the issues of which plaintiffs complained. Under de novo review of the record, we have found that the City’s administrative review procedures have significantly changed, as reflected in amendments to § 154-1702, and we have noted that plaintiffs introduced an intake form for a time period that is irrelevant to their citations. Moreover, the City established at trial that it effected numerous changes to its review procedures following the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims, and these changes include the participation of a City attorney who advances the City’s case. Therefore, we find that to opine on the constitutionality of the present procedures would be an exercise in speculative analysis because present procedures differ so greatly from the procedures as they existed when plaintiffs’ citations were issued and that this is, thus, not a case where an exception to mootness may be found. See Cat’s Meow, 98-0601 at 8, 720 So.2d at 1193 (“An issue is moot when a judgment or decree on that issue has been deprived of practical significance • or made abstract or purely academic.”) (quotations omitted).

hJn Cat’s Meow, we also noted that curative changes to a challenged ordinance may offer an exception to mootness for “collateral consequences ... when damages or other monetary relief has been claimed on account of former provisions of a challenged ... ordinance.” Id., 98-0601 at 13, 720 So.2d at 1196. However, plaintiffs here did not seek and were not awarded monetary damages. What plaintiffs were awarded was a declaratory judgment, holding that the City’s review procedures were unconstitutional. However, as we have explained, “[a] person can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if the statute seriously affects his or her rights.” State v. Mercadel, 03-2015, p. 8 (La. 5/25/04); 874 So.2d 829, 834 (quoting Latour v. State, 00-1176, p. 5 (La. 1/29/01), 778 So.2d 557, 560). The fact plaintiffs here were subject to possible monetary penalr ties for traffic citations at the time they filed their lawsuit does not vest plaintiffs with an everlasting ability to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of the citation review procedures. As we have further explained: “it is not enough that the requirements of justicia-bility are satisfied when the suit is initially filed: the requirements must remain throughout the course of litigation up to the moment of final disposition.” Cat’s Meow, 98-0601 at 9, 720 So.2d at 1193.

In sum, given the. City’s numerous changes to its review procedures, when considered together and noting their'longstanding existence, we are persuaded that this is not a case where the City has “creat[ed] a technical mootness as a sham to | ^deprive the court- of jurisdiction.” Cat’s Meow, 98-0601 at 9, 720 So.2d at 1194. Moreover, the record does not support finding an exception to the mootness.

CONCLUSION

This litigation was brought as a challenge to the. City’s administrative review procedures, including the right to appeal an adverse administrative decision, arising from citations based on traffic camera images. The plaintiffs in this case have never challenged the initial justification for the City to impose liability based on the use of traffic cameras. Simply put, the plaintiffs did not seek to thwart the City’s .issuance of citations based .on traffic cameras, but rather sought to avoid liability for the citations based on plaintiffs’ theory that the administrative review process denied the plaintiffs due process and access to the courts. However, under de novo review of the record, we observed that the administrative review procedures of which plaintiffs complained were amended by the City. Moreover, the relevant citations were dismissed. Essentially having achieved what they set out to accomplish in their lawsuit, Plaintiffs had no justiciable interest in this matter, rendering their claims moot. Moreover, no exception to mootness applies. Consequently, we reverse the declaration of unconstitutionality issued by the district court and dismiss this matter with prejudice.

REVERSED; DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS MOOT.

JOHNSON, Chief Justice,

additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

|tI agree with the majority opinion that this- matter is moot. I write separately to highlight the importance of this litigation.

From the inception of the’ City using traffic cameras with the purported purpose of maintaining safety on the roads, many New Orleans citizens saw the entire operation as collection of revenue for the City. Ultimately, the plaintiffs raised legitimate constitutional issues in challenging the system set up by the city.

Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the Automated Traffic Enforcement Code of Ordinances, § 164-1701 through 1704, that required the citizen seeking review to complete a form admitting, that they either owned or were driving the vehicle. Also, the plaintiffs challenged .the role of the reviewing officer who acted as both adjudicator and city prosecutor. Lastly, they objected to the final option available to citizens to challenge a ticket—an appeal to the Civil District Court where filing fee was prohibitive, namely $400—an amount greater than that due for the ticket issued.

l2Today, the Code of Ordinances as amended in 2011 rectifies all of the plaintiffs’ grievances. The City has reformed the process to ensure citizens are granted the constitutional protections to which they are entitled. This challenge to the constitutionality of the administrative review process has resulted in a benefit for all citizens of New Orleans. Although we are dismissing this action as moot, the plaintiffs have essentially obtained the relief they sought when they initiated this litigation. . ■

HUGHES, J.,

dissents with reasons,

hi respectfully dissent. The intake form, which reflects the ordinance itself, provides .that the “owner or operator”, is responsible for a violation, as was acknowledged at oral argument. I would find this to be an unconstitutional scenario likely to be repeated and therefore not moot.

      . La. Const, art. I, § 2.provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law.” La. Const, art, I, § 22 provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.”

      . Other named plaintiffs did not appear for the trial, apparently having abandoned their claims. See La. C.C.P. art. 1672.

      . This court has jurisdiction over this appeal ' pursuant to La. Const, art. V, § 5(D) because the district court declared that the ATES review procedures violate the Louisiana Constitution. For completeness of analysis, although the district court also declared that the ÁTES review procedures violate the City’s Charter, Chapter 2 Section 2-202, we note that by its express terms, Section 2-202 "shall not create any enforceable rights, duties, obligations or causes of action under this Charter beyond those guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Louisiana.” Accordingly, our analysis in this case is confined to whether the plaintiffs carried their burden to prove the ATES review procedures violate the Louisiana Constitution.

      . This version of § 154-’1702(h) is recorded as Calendar No. 26,366 on the City Hall Calendar (February 1, 2007) (returned by the may- or as approved on February 22, 2007).

      . The versions of the relevant ATES ordinances discussed in this opinion were admitted into the trial record as Joint Exhibit 1.

      . See La. C.C.P, art. 2082; see also Greater New Orleans Expressway Com'n v. Olivier, 02-2795, p. 3 (La. 11/18/03), 860 So.2d 22, 24.

      . Mr. Rand's and Mr. Harris’ citations described in their petition were each dismissed by letters from the City dated September 13, 2011. At trial, Mr. Harris complained of additional citations not described in the petition. Mr. Harris testified, however, that he “believe[d] one or more of these tickets were administratively dismissed.” The City's manager of its hearing center testified that he sent “a bunch”, of dismissal letters at the direction of the City Attorney’s Office, including letters to Mr. Harris and to Mr. Rand. There is no evidence of record that the City attempted to enforce the relevant citations after these dismissal letters. Therefore, under de novo review, we find that the dismissal of all relevant citations is sufficiently established in the record. We additionally note that no argument has been made that the City dismissed the citations in an effort to shield the ATES procedures from judicial scrutiny, Relatedly, the record establishes that the dismissals occurred before the preliminary injunction was issued on November 14, 2011.

      . Because we have found that plaintiffs lacked a sufficiently justiciable interest by the time their claims were tried, we do not reach the merits of the City's argument that plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead unconstitutionality based on alleged problems with authenticating the camera evidence. Cf. Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co., Inc., 94-1238, p. 8 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 859, 864-65 (noting, as a "long-standing jurisprudential rule of law” that “the unconstitutionality of a statute must be specially pleaded and the grounds for the claim particularized'.''').


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM:

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin AMISON
    No. 2016-KP-2091
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| iDenied. Relator fails to show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during plea .negotiations under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In addition, on the showing made, relator is not entitled to an out-of-time appeal. See State v. Counterman, 475 So.2d 336 (La. 1985).

Relator has now fully litigated his application" for post-conviction relief in -state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or; successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C,Cr.P. art. 930,4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr,P. art. 930.8. Notably,-,the legislature in 2013 La, Acts 251 amended that article to -.make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state , collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam,


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    Blake and Courtney FREEMAN, individually and on behalf of their minor children v. FON’S PEST MANAGEMENT, INC. and ABC Insurance Co.
    No. 2017-C-1846
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF TERREBONNE

PER CURIAM

hWe grant plaintiffs’ writ application in part, finding the lower courts erred in granting defendant’s motions in limine and striking the expert opinion testimony of Dr. Robert Geller, Dr. Lawrence Guzzardi, Dr. Jason Richardson, and Mr. Laurence Durio. We also find the lower courts erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In all other respects, plaintiffs’ writ application is denied.

In July of 2010, on two separate occasions, defendant Foris Pest Management, Inc. spot treated the Freeman’s home for termites using Termidor-SC, a termiticide containing fipronil. Fipronil is an odorless and colorless neurotoxin that has been widely used since 1996. Foris treated the termite damage areas by drilling holes through the concrete slab and injecting termiticide into the soil under the slab. Following the treatments, the plaintiffs allegedly experienced headaches, nausea, dizziness, and confusion. Subsequently, the Freemans filed the underlying suit against Foris and its insurer alleging that they suffered personal injuries and property damages due to-exposure to fipronil that was contained in the termiticide

The Freemans retained several experts in this matter, including Robert Geller, MD (medical toxicologist), Lawrence Guz-zardi, MD (medical toxicologist), Jason Richardson, Ph.D. (toxicologist) and Laurence Durio (Certified Industrial 12Hygienist). Foris filed several pre-trial motions including motions to exclude the expert testimonies of Drs. Geller, Guzzardi and Richardson, and Mr. Durio, asserting the proposed testimony did not meet the requirements for admissibility under La. C.E. art. 702, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) and Cheairs v. DOTD, 03-0680 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 536. Defendant also filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the case.

Following a Daubert hearing, the district court granted defendants’ motion in limine striking these experts’ testimony. The court of appeal affirmed, finding no error in that ruling:

After reviewing the record, this Court finds no abuse of the district court’s discretion in ruling that the plaintiffs’ three toxicologist experts (Dr. Geller, Dr. Guzzardi, and Dr. Richardson) and Mr. Durio, the industrial hygienist, opinions and testimonies fail to satisfy the admissibility requirements of Daubert. After conducting a Daubert hearing, the district court determined that the experts testimonies should be excluded because: 1) none of the experts are experts regarding fipronil, the termiticide that allegedly caused the plaintiffs’ injuries 2) none of the experts wrote or contributed to any peer-reviewed articles concerning the effects of pesticides in humans ór the effects of fipronil in humans 3) none of the experts attempted a dose reconstruction to determine the amount of fipronil to which the plaintiffs; either collectively or individually, were allegedly exposed 4) none of the experts had access to any biological data or air quality data that conclusively establishes that the plaintiffs were exposed to an appreciable level of fipronil; and 5) no articles or studies reviewed by the experts proves a causal connection between fipronil and the plaihtiffs’ claims.
Moreover, the plaintiffs’ experts had conflicting testimonies. Dr. Geller suggested that the fipronil exposure was through inhalation while Mr. Durio believes that fipronil cannot be inhaled. Dr. Richardson alleges that-the fipronil exposure was.dermal .(skin) exposure. Dr. Geller states that, while there is- no data to support his opinion, dermal exposure would not have caused the symptoms . the plaintiffs allege, but.Dr. Richardson disagrees. Additionally, the experts have conflicting testimonies on the effects of the exposure of the fipronil. Dr. Richardson suggests that fipronil caused neuropsychiatric conditions in Bláke Freeman, but admits that there is no scientific data to support his opinion. However, Dr. Guzzardi disagrees that Blake Freeman has psychiatric conditions.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Dr. Geller, Dr. Guzzardi, Dr, Richardson, and Mr. Durio’s opinions and testimonies fail to satisfy the requirements ofJjLa. Code of Evid. art. 702 as interpreted in Cheairs and Dau-bert, as the experts’ opinions are unreliable because there is no scientific evidence to support their opinions and the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury as to their opinions’ scientific validity. See Lá. Code of Evid. arts. 104,403.

Freeman v. Fon’s Pest Mgmt., Inc., 2016-0208 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/2/17, 9-10).

The standard for determining the admissibility of expert testimony was established by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert. This Court further specified the admissibility of expert testimony in Cheairs v. DOTD, 2003-0680, (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 536. Daubert is now codified in Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony as follows:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(1) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(2) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(3) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(4) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Daubert primarily concerns the methodology employed by the experts. Based on what has been presented to this court, we find defendants’ motions in limine and the district court’s rulings thereon, was based on objections to the conclusions reached by the experts on causation, rather than objections to the methodology applied by the experts. Plaintiffs presented evidence at the hearing to establish the experts’ methodology and no contradictory evidence was offered by defendants to suggest their methodology was improper to formulate an opinion on causation.

In granting the defendants’ motions to exclude the experts, the district court focused on the fact that none had written peer-reviewed articles concerning fipronil. However, Daubert imposes no such requirement. Instead, Daubert considers whether the methodology employed by the expert has been subject to peer review or | ¿publication. Likewise, Daubert does not require an expert provide a quantitative assessment to prove causation. The lower courts failed to recognize the plaintiffs could meet their burden of proving causation through either a quantitative or a qualitative assessment of fipronil exposure. See generally Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 2010-2605 (La. 3/13/12), 89 So.3d 307, 321-322. Indeed, the experts conducted a qualitative assessment of the plaintiffs’ exposure and determined that these exposures caused the plaintiffs injuries.

Additionally, the district court found it relevant that the experts’ gave conflicting testimony concerning the means by which the plaintiffs’ were exposed to fipronil and the effects of their exposure. However, such inconsistency is more properly considered an issue of credibility of the experts and does not address the admissibility of experts’ opinions.

After rendering judgment on Fon’s motions in limine, the district court considered the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which alleged that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proof because the plaintiffs had failed to present admissible, competent, relevant, and reliable evidence that satisfied the requirements of Daubert for reliability. Because the district court had excluded plaintiffs’ experts relative to causation, the district court essentially found plaintiffs could not prove causation. Because we find the district court’s rulings on the motions in li-mine to be in error, we also reverse the ruling granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

For the reasons stated above, we find the district court abused its discretion in granting the defendants’ motions in limine relative to Robert J. Geller, M.D., Lawrence Guzzardi, M.D., Jason Richardson, PhD., and Laurence Durio, and erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse these rulings of the district court and. remand this matter for further proceedings.

REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    IN RE: Erich Webb BAILEY
    NO. 2017-B-2065
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

| pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) has filed a petition seeking the imposition of reciprocal disability inactive status against respondent, Erich Webb Bailey, an attorney licensed to practice law in the States of Louisiana and Tennessee, based upon his transfer to disability inactive status by the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 27, 2017, the Supreme Court of Tennessee issued an order transferring respondent to disability inactive status because his medical records show he is “currently incapacitated from continuing the practice of law.” This order established that respondent “shall be transferred to disability inactive status for an indefinite period of time and until further orders of the Supreme Court [of Tennessee].”

After receiving notice of the order transferring respondent to disability inactive status in Tennessee, the ODC filed a motion to initiate reciprocal disability inactive status proceedings in Louisiana, pursuant to1 Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21. A certified copy of the decision and order of the Supreme Court of Tennessee |gwas attached to the motion. On December 15, 2017, this court rendered an order giving respondent thirty days to demonstrate why transferring him to disability inactive status in this state would be unwarranted. Respondent failed to file any response in this court.

DISCUSSION

The standard for transferring an attorney to disability inactive status on a reciprocal basis is set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D). That rule provides, in pertinent part:

Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph B, this court shall impose ... disability inactive status unless disciplinary counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or this court finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that:
... (5) the reason for the original transfer to disability inactive status no longer exists.
■If this court determines that any of ' those elements exists, this court shall enter such other order as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate , that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate.

According to the record, respondent provided the Supreme Court of Tennessee with medical records indicating he is unable to practice law. After considering those medical records, the Supreme Court of Tennessee' transferred respondent to disability inactive status. The imposition of reciprocal disability inactive status in Louisiana is clearly appropriate, and there is no suggestion otherwise upon the face of the record. Accordingly, we will transfer respondent to disability inactive status as was imposed in Tennessee.

| «DECREE

Considering the Petition for Reciprocal Disability Inactive Status filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the record filed herein, it is ordered that respondent, Erich Webb Bailey, Louisiana Bar Roll number 32822, be and he hereby is transferred to disability inactive status.

      . Respondent is currently On interim suspénsion in Louisiana pursuant to a petition for reciprocal discipline. In re: Bailey, 17-1693 (La. 12/15/17), 231 So.3d 606.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Glenn METZ
    No. 2016-KP-1930
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| ^Denied. Relator fails to show that the district court erred in resolving his claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 929(A); State ex rel. Tassin v. Whitley, 602 So.2d 721, 722 (La. 1992); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances' provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jerry Anthony BRANDON a/k/a Jerry L. Brandon v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1817
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE THIRTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ALLEN

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator’s sentencing claims are not cognizable on collateral review. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030; State v. Thomas, 08-2912 (La. 10/16/09), 19 So.3d 466.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only un-' der the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Eddie JARRELL v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 16-KH-2070
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court; and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated at least one application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances- provided in La. C.Cr.P. .art. .930.4 and within the limitations period .as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. ■ 930.8, Notably, the . legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural .bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. G,Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    IN RE: Lewis Burdette BLANCHE
    NO. 2018-OB-0022
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/09/2018
   ON APPLICATION FOR . ■ REINSTATEMENT

PER CURIAM

I iThis proceeding arises out of an application for reinstatement filed by petitioner, Lewis Burdette Blanche, an attorney currently suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2010, petitioner pleaded guilty to three felony drug offenses. He was also convicted of first offense DWI, and he neglected a legal matter and failed to communicate with a client. This misconduct was directly related to the opiate dependence and cocaine abuse from which petitioner suffered. He successfully completed a' twénty-eight day inpatient program and a halfway house program at a treatment facility in Maryland, where he was then living. On June 22, 2012, we suspended petitioner from the practice of law for three years, retroactive to- November 9; 2010, the date of his interim suspension, and ordered him to execute a recovery agreement with the Judges and- Lawyers Assistance Program (“JLAP”). In re: Blanche, 12-0552 (La. 6/22/12), 90 So.3d 1034.

On February 6, 2013, after returning to Louisiana from Maryland, petitioner executed a five-year recovery agreement with JLAP. On September 27, 2017, petitioner voluntarily extended his JLAP agreement for five years, or .until February 6, 2022.

| ^Petitioner subsequently filed' an application for reinstatement with the disciplinary board, alleging he has complied with the reinstatement criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule'XIX, § 24(E). The Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a notice concurring in petitioner’s reinstatement. Accordingly, the matter was referred to the disciplinary board’s adjudicative committee chair, who"approved petitioner’s petition for reinstatement and recommended the'petition be granted. '

After considering the record in its entirety, we will adopt the adjudicative committee chair’s recommendation and reinstate petitioner to the practice of law, subject to a two-year period of supervised probation during which petitioner will only practice under the supervision of another lawyer.

DECREE

Upon .review of the recommendation of the disciplinary board’s adjudicative committee chair, and considering the record, it is ordered that Lewis Burdette Blanche,. Louisiana Bar Roll number 27383, be immediately reinstated to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to the conditions set forth in this opinion. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.


text:
    IN RE: Kenneth James CULOTTA
    NO. 2018-OB-0190
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/09/2018
   ORDER

h Considering the Joint Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status,

IT IS ORDERED that Kenneth James Culotta, Louisiana Bar Roll number 36166, be and he hereby is transferred to disability inactive status pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 22(B). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order shall be effective immediately.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Kendale SCOTT v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-2007
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST FELICIANA

PER CURIAM:

| ] Denied. Relator fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

‘ Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244,; Louisiana post-conviction! procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limita^-tions period as set -out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably* the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against succéssive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La; C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam. ■


text:
    Scott LOWE and Beth Lowe v. NOBLE, L.L.C., et al.
    2017-C-1948

      Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF WEST FELICI-ANA

PER CURIAM

|,The trial court found that the zero-visibility-event at issue resulted from an Act of God, the defendants’ only duty was to contact the NOFD, and the defendants had no affirmative duty to conduct controlled burns. As such, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants, with prejudice.

Although the court of appeal found no evidence to support the plaintiffs’ claims regarding a duty of the defendants to extinguish and control the fire beyond notifying and cooperating with the NOFD, the court of appeal found that disputed issues of fact did remain regarding the negligence of the defendants under LSA-C.C. art. 2317.1. Specifically, the court of appeal found that there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether an over-accumulation of “scrub shrub” amounted to a defect in the property, and whether, by failing to conduct controlled burns, the defendants breached their duty to exercise reasonable care to cure that defect. On that basis, the court of appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment, in part. The court of appeal denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment insofar as the negligence of the defendants, pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 2317.1.

There is no duty on the part of the defendants to conduct controlled burning. Absent a duty, there can be no breach of duty. Consequently, the court of appeal 12erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment, and denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the trial court be reinstated, and that the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Little Pine Island Corp., Little Pine Island, LP, and John J. Cummings, III, be granted, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims against them, with prejudice.

Weimer, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Donaven D. ROACH v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-2065
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

PER CURIAM:

| iDenied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jamal WESTLEY v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1733
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art, 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. John A. DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1789
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FORTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF DE-SOTO

PER CURIAM:

| denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies, La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr,P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 20Í3 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C,Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


author: • PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE EX REL. Eric PAYTON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1795
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF OUACHITA

• PER CURIAM:

|, Denied. On the showing made, relator is not entitled to an out-of-time appeal. See State v. Counterman, 475 So.2d 336 (La. 1985). By pleading guilty unconditionally, he waived all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading to his conviction, State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584, 586 (La. 1976), and relator cannot appeal or seek review of a sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement. La.C.Cr.P, art. 881.2(A)(2).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application [^applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Derrick TOMLINSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1874
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

PER CURIAM:

| denied. The application is repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4.

Relator has now fully litigated at least four application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in-2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


author: ' PER CURIAM: -

text:
    STATE EX REL. Andrew WEARY v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1907
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF WASHINGTON ,

' PER CURIAM: -

h Denied. Relator does not’ identify any claim cognizable- on collateral review. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3.

Relator has exhausted his right to obtain post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art; 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory.. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeff V. FAIRCHILD
    No. 2016-KP-1926
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF AVOYELLES

PER CURIAM:

| ¶Denied; untimely filed. La.S.Ct.R. X, § 5(a); see also State v. Crandell, 05-1060 (La. 3/10/06), 924 So.2d 122.


text:
    IN RE: CONFIDENTIAL PARTY
    NO. 2017-OB-2053
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ORDER

| Considering the Petition for Transfer to Active Status filed by respondent, the supplements thereto, and the response filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for transfer to active status be and hereby is denied. Pending further orders of this court, respondent shall remain on disability inactive status pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 22(D).


text:
    IN RE: Elaine APPLEBERRY
    NO. 2018-B-0025
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

| The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent mismanaged her client trust account, which resulted in the negligent commingling and conversion of funds. Following the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Elaine Appleberry, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22923, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to a one-year period of supervised probation. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the probation monitor, and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jaron BIBBINS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-1582
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in' state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    IN RE: CONFIDENTIAL PARTY
    NO. 2017-B-2092
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ORDER

| ⅞ Considering the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline filed by respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline be and hereby is rejected pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be remanded for consideration of the previously filed formal charges.

WEIMER, J., would accept the joint petition for consent discipline,

GUIDRY, J., would accept the joint petition for consent discipline. •

Hughes, J., would accept the joint petition for consent discipline.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Malcolm WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2016-KH-2068
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    2/9/2018
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

| jDenied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is'Subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he-fails to carry his burden to.show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. In addition, relator’s sentencing claim is not cognizable on collateral-review. La.C.Cr.P, art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see •28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against ^successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art, 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district, court is ordered .to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam;

Hughes, J., would grant for an evidentiary hearing.


text:
    Ronald L. COURTNEY and Rebecca L. Morris v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, National Automotive Insurance Company, and Amanda V. Fagane
    NO. 2017-CC-1989
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 592509; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 0809;

11 Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald Ray JOHNSON
    NO. 2017-KK-2100
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 11-17-0540; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 1684

| iDenied. Moot.


text:
    Keith HUDSON v. ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY, US-Agencies Direct Insurance, Wendle Harrell and TSD Logistics, Inc.
    NO. 2018-CC-0081
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 42,255; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 1721

LDenied.


text:
    Keith HUDSON v. ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY, Us-agencies Direct Insurance, Wendle Harrell and TSD Logistics, Inc.
    NO. 2018-CC-0082
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying. For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 42,255; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW1680;

| ; Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gary RODGERS
    NO. 2016-K-2093
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018.
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 11-5791; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-KA-14;

| iDenied.

HUGHES, J., would grant in part.


text:
    Clinton BOE and Lori Boe v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Elbert L. Clemens, and USAgencies Casualty Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-C-1998
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 82,359; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA1387

| ¶ Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Danial Lewayne LAFLEUR -aka-Daniel Lafleur -aka- Daniel Lee Lafleur -aka- Danial Lafleur
    NO. 2017-KO-0808
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. CR-702-13; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 16-467

| t Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John GILMORE
    NO. 2017-KK-1803
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 14-WFLN-436; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 KW 0715

| denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.

GENOVESE, J., would grant.


text:
    WARWICK CORPORATION v. BLACKHAWK PROTECTION SERVICE, LLC, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-1991
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 10-11931; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-C-0694;

1 iDenied.


text:
    Lorna MANISCALCO and Michael Maniscalco v. RALPH BRENNAN RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC, and KPK Metairie, LLC Lorna Maniscalco and Michael Maniscalco v. Ralph Brennan Restaurant Group, LLC, and KPK Metairie, LLC
    NO. 2017-CC-1992
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2016-1264; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2G17-C-0631 C/W 2017-C-0654;

hDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jovan MURPHY
    No. 2016-K-0936
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated May 12, 2017; Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 31,006; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA1326

| Reconsideration denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    IN RE: Appeal of the DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD
    NO. 17-PDB-053
    NO. 2017-OB-1829
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, No. 17-PDB-053

11 Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    Lorna MANISCALCO and Michael Maniscalco v. RALPH BRENNAN RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC, and KPK Metairie, LLC Lorna Maniscalco and Michael Maniscalco v. Ralph Brennan Restaurant Group, LLC, and KPK Metairie, LLC
    NO. 2017-CC-2001
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2016-1264; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-C-0631 C/W 2017-C-0654

|2Penied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jimmie SPRATT
    NO. 2016-KP-1659
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 29, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 502-077; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-0302

| denied.


text:
    429 BOURBON STREET, LLC v. RMDR INVESTMENTS, INC. 429 Bourbon Street, LLC v. RMDR Investments, Inc.
    NO. 2017-02054
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2015-7064; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-0800 C/W 2C17-C-0845;

|! Denied.


text:
    ENGLISH TURN PROPERTY OWNER’S ASSOCIATION, INC. v. MARILYN CUTRONE CONTOGOURIS
    NO. 2017-C-2059
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans,- Second City Court for the City of New Orleans, No. 2014-00936-S; to the Court' of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-1284 ,

| denied,

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Roger D. MITCHELL and Laurie S. Mitchell v. Stephen C. NORTON, Norton Realty Group, LLC, Ashley M. Woods and Harris Manor Realty, LLC d/b/a RE/MAX Preferred Choice
    NO. 2017-CC-2064
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 647974; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 0729;

I j Denied.


text:
    Demetris HAYNIE and Curtis Young, Sr. v. TWIN OAKS NURSING HOME, INC. and Annie Alford
    NO. 2017-C-2062
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of . St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No; 64636; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No.- 17-CA-192;

h Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Gustave J. LABARRE, Jr., et al. v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL COMPANY and Texas Brine Company, LLC
    NO. 2017-CC-2089
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Assumption, 23rd, Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 33796; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 0825

11 Denied.


text:
    Gustave J. LABARRE, Jr., et al. v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL COMPANY and Texas Brine Company, LLC
    NO. 2017-CC-2006
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 33796; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 0825;

|! Stay recalled. Writ denied.


text:
    Gustave J. LABARRE, Jr., et al. v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION and Texas Brine Company, LLC, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-2088
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 33796; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 0720;

h Denied.


text:
    Danell BRICE v. Timothy BRAGGS, Shifa Health Associates, L.L.C., Shifa Medical Transportation, L.L.C., Serenity Community Mental Health Center, L.L.C., Hope Village, Inc., Hope Village Properties, L.L.C., Neemwood Village, Psychcare of Louisiana, L.L.C., Psychcare Solutions, L.L.C., Psych Management, L.L.C., Zahid Imran, M.D., Vasanthi Vinayagam, M.D. and Jane Doe
    NO. 2017-C-2014
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No, 589145; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CA 0382

| jDenied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Charles POOLE, Jr. v. GOT HOPKINS CONSTRUCTION CO. and Luba Workers’ Compensation
    NO. 2017-C-2023
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Louisiana Workforce Commission Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 5, No. 15-03789; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 1450

| í Denied.


text:
    Gustave J. LABARRE, Jr., et al. v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION and Texas Brine Company, LLC
    NO. 2017-CC-2056
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 33796; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 0720;

| denied.


text:
    Jan E. SEGURA v. Karl Ray COMEAUX
    NO. 2017-02027
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 69188-H; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 17-285;

h Denied.


text:
    Zachary ADDISON and Andree Addison v. AFFIRMATIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Phara Martin
    NO. 2017-C-2061
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2014-4168; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-CA-0378;

|, Denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Arthur RHODES v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1534
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   ■ Applying for Reconsideration .of - this Court’s action dated October 16,2017; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 94-1357; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 17-KH-371;

| i Reconsideration denied;


text:
    Gregory CASTAIN v. AMERICAN SUMMIT INSURANCE COMPANY
    NO. 2017-CC-2037
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, City Court of Opelousas, No. 36065; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW17-375

| iDenied.


text:
    Gordon FRANK, et al. v. FLOWERS BAKING COMPANY OF NEW ORLEANS, LLC
    NO. 2017-CC-2040
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2015-1813; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-C-0784;

| iDenied.


text:
    CAMBRIE CELESTE LLC and Cambrie Celeste Commercial Tenant, LLC v. STARBOARD MANAGEMENT, LLC, F.I.N.S. Construction LLC, Cambrie Celeste Developer, LLC, Robert Armbruster, and Nicole Armbruster
    NO. 2017-C-2041
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2012-1997; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-1318

| denied.


text:
    Eugene BAKER v. LOUISIANA MEDICAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and A. Kenison Roy, III, M.D.
    NO. 2017-CC-2047
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish- of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court- Div. I, -No. 590-415; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 17-C-597

| denied.


text:
    Gustave J. LABARRE, Jr., et al. v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL COMPANY and Texas Brine Company, LLC
    NO. 2017-CC-2055
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 33796; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 0825

h Denied.


text:
    DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee FOR MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL I INC. TRUST 2004-WMC2 v. Sandra C. MCNAMARA, James P. McNamara, Honorable Dale N. Atkins, Clerk Op Court and Ex-officio Recorder, and Sugarcane Park, LLC
    No. 2017-C-1918
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2016-1143; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-CA-0173;

hDenied.

CLARK, J., would grant.

CRICHTON, J., would grant.


text:
    Kevin HARRELL v. Cynthia HARRELL
    NO. 2018-CJ-0018
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 105,791; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CU 0561;

h Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Arthur NICHOLAS v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-1233
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated September 15, 2017, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 23,209; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 KW 0519

| j Reconsideration denied.


text:
    Alice Landry BOYER v. Cheryl L. KOKKINIS, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-2058
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 2, 2018
   Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 142191; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-598-CA

11 Denied.


text:
    Mary Sue MARIONEAUX, the Lela Mae Johnson Marioneaux Trust f/b/o Mary Sue Marioneaux v. Lucien Harry MARIONEAUX, Sr., Individually, and as Former Trustee of the Lela Mae Johnson Marioneaux Trust, Lucien Harry Marioneaux, Jr., Marioneaux Properties L.P., HBM Interests, L.L.C., Eighty Acres, L.L.C. and Wallace Lake Marioneaux, L.L.C.
    NO. 2018-CC-0230
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 5, 2018
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 588,685; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 52,-136-CW;

[] Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick DABON
    NO. 2018-KK-0240
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 8, 2018
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 533-088; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2018-K-0088;

h Denied.