text:
    Goodman v. Goodman
    2D15-5079
    02/08/2016
   Den.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Grady v. State
    2D15-5591
    02/10/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. LeCroy
    2D15-956
    02/22/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Guyton v. State
    2D15-4109
    01/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Haizlip v. State
    2D15-4552
    01/26/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Hannon v. State
    2D15-5458
    01/20/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Harkleroad v. State
    2D15-3552
    01/12/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Harrell v. State
    2D15-5644
    02/10/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Harris v. State
    2D15-4879
    01/20/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Hart v. Secretary Dept. of Corrections
    2D15-5403
    02/09/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Head v. State
    2D15-1031
    01/22/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Henry v. State
    2D15-2524
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Hernandez v. State
    2D14-5417
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Manatee)


text:
    Hettel v. State
    2D15-4855
    01/07/2016
   Cert.den.


text:
    Hill v. State
    2D14-3649
    04/06/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Hobby v. State
    2D15-4764
    01/12/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Hodgins v. US Bank Trust, NA
    2D15-5155, 2D15-4758
    01/25/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hoffman v. U.S. Bank, Nat. Ass'n
    2D15-5093
    01/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Holder v. State
    2D15-3984
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Howard v. State
    2D15-5647
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hunter v. Amick
    2D15-5021
    02/01/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Hunter v. Department of Revenue ex rel. Francis
    2D15-4573
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Hunter v. State
    2D15-4738
    01/27/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    In re Estate of Scranton; Scranton v. Maston
    2D16-406
    11/23/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    In re K.A.D.; T.R. v. Department of Children and Families.
    2D15-4557
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Manatee)


text:
    In re K.A.D.; K.D. v. Department of Children and Families
    2D15-4895, 2D15-4896
    03/09/2016
   Aff,

Cir. Ct. (Manatee)


text:
    In re X.M.; A.M. v. Department of Children and Family Services
    2D15-2951
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Investor Trustee Services, LLC v. Bank of New York Mellon
    2D14-5801
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct, (Pinel-las)


text:
    Isenhower v. State
    2D15-3336
    01/27/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    J.C. v. State
    2D15-2805
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    J.O. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-5025
    02/10/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Jackson v. State
    2D15-3530
    02/12/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Jackson v. State
    2D16-143
    02/09/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Jarrett v. State
    2D15-1611
    11/12/2015
   Pet. den.


text:
    Jarrett v. State
    2D16-663
    11/16/2016
   Aff,

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Johnson v. Johnson
    2D15-5522
    02/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Johnson v. State
    2D15-4824
    01/20/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    Johnson v. State
    2D15-3000
    03/09/2016
   Aff,

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Johnson v. State
    2D15-475
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Jones v. State
    2D15-3788
    01/12/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Jostun v. State
    2D15-3005
    01/14/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    K.L. v. Department of Children and Families
    2D15-2016
    10/01/2015
   App.dism.


text:
    K.L.M. v. Department of Children and Families
    2D16-511
    02/12/2016
   Proh.den.


text:
    Kagan v. Executive Motoring, Inc.
    2D16-815
    03/02/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Kaiser v. State
    2D16-239
    02/24/2016
   Hab.Corp.dism.


text:
    Kelly v. State
    2D16-53
    02/10/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Kidder v. State
    2D15-4113
    01/15/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Koeth v. State
    2D15-2317
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    L. M. C. v. J. A. R.
    2D15-5162
    03/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lambert v. State
    2D15-4767
    03/04/2016
   App.dism,


text:
    Largo Medical Center v. Jackson’s Bistro & Bar, L.C.
    2D15-5475
    03/03/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Lawson v. Department of Revenue
    2D15-5217
    02/10/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lee v. State
    2D15-4069
    01/28/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Leyva-Rendon v. State
    2D15-1252
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    LeClair v. State.
    2D14-5353
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Lilly v. State
    2D15-4136
    01/12/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lipiczky v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC
    2D16-236
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Little v. State
    2D15-2136
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Lopez v. Creative Const. of Charlotte County, Inc.
    2D15-4537
    01/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Lowe v. State
    2D15-4988
    01/20/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Lundin v. Bass Law Office, P.A.
    2D15-3178
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Collier)


text:
    Mack v. State
    2D15-5452
    01/08/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Mack v. State
    2D15-3193
    01/22/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Madison v. State
    2D14-5347
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Maldonado v. State
    2D15-1358
    03/11/2016
   Aff,

Cir. Ct. (Har-dee)


text:
    Maldonado v. State
    2D15-4504
    03/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Maloy v. Judd
    2D15-5410
    12/30/2015
   Hab.Corp.gr.; Quashed


text:
    Marc v. State
    2D16-1114
    11/23/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Highlands)


text:
    Market Tampa Investments, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
    2D15-2256
    02/22/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Mathis v. State
    2D15-3477
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Manatee)


text:
    McArthur v. New Port Richey Hosp., Inc.
    2D15-5497
    02/23/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    McDougal v. State
    2D15-1647
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    McIntyre v. State
    2D15-2828
    01/27/2016
   Pet. den.


text:
    McKinnon v. State
    2D16-12
    03/02/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    McPherson v. State
    2D16-459
    03/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    McPherson v. State
    2D15-3570
    01/12/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Meek v. State
    2D15-2027
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Mendez v. State
    2D15-5002
    02/09/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Mireles v. State
    2D15-5480
    01/13/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Miroshnichenko v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass’n
    2D16-277
    03/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Mitchell v. State
    2D15-4297
    01/22/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Mullins v. State
    2D15-2364
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Munoz v. Munoz
    2D16-23
    02/18/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Murphy v. State
    2D14-2524
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Zulick
    2D16-805
    03/02/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Neff v. State
    2D15-3584
    03/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Highlands)


text:
    Nezius v. State
    2D15-5751, 2D16-210
    03/02/2016
   Certden.


text:
    Orcutt v. State
    2D15-4858
    01/13/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Palmera Pointe Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Aurora Loan Services, Inc.
    2D15-3189
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Park v. Wells Fargo Bank
    2D15-4614
    01/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Parker v. State
    2D15-153
    04/08/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Parkerson v. State
    2D15-4022
    01/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Parks v. State
    2D14-4325
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Parrish v. State
    2D 15-2908
    12/16/2015
   Pet.den.


text:
    Pate v. State
    2D14-5826
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Paz v. State
    2D16-620
    02/22/2016
   Hab.Corp.dism.


text:
    Peoples v. State
    2D15-4790
    01/20/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Perez-Perez v. State
    2D15-976
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Manatee)


text:
    Perry v. State
    2D15-2755
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Collier)


text:
    Prescribed Pediatric Extended Care Center v. Allen
    2D15-2465
    02/26/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Pringle v. State
    2D14-4370
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Proffitt v. Lapidus
    2D15-5309
    03/02/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Queensboro I, LLC v. Branch Bank & Trust Co.
    2D16-682
    03/08/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    R.C. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-388
    03/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rainey v. Roop
    2D15-736
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Ramprashad v. Lynch
    2D16-259
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Redding v. State
    2D16-457
    02/23/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Redfin v. State
    2D15-5525
    03/07/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Reed v. State
    2D15-3505
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Reed v. State
    2D15-1113
    03/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Reflections of Manatee, Inc. v. City of Bradenton
    2D15-426, 2D15-1179
    03/08/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Rice v. State
    2D15-4042
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Rios v. Department of Revenue
    2D15-2429
    01/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Ritter v. Charles Schwab Bank, N.A.
    2D16-475
    03/08/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rivera v. State
    2D15-4884
    01/13/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Rizk v. Sadik
    2D15-5435
    02/11/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Roberson v. State
    2D15-3700
    12/16/2015
   Pet. den.


text:
    Robinson v. State
    2D14-5679
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Rockridge Farmettes Property Owners Ass’n v. Ramer
    2D15-5640
    02/08/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rodrigues v. State
    2D14-4444
    03/23/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Rodriguez v. Meyer Distributing, Inc.
    2D15-5523
    01/26/2016
   App.dism,


text:
    Rodriguez v. State
    2D14-4046
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Collier)


text:
    Rogers v. Bank of America, N.A.
    2D15-4131
    02/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rogers v. State
    2D16-502
    02/10/2016
   Hab.Corp.den,


text:
    Rollins v. State
    2D15-3913
    02/10/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Roper v. Bank of America, N.A.
    2D16-213
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rosa v. State
    2D15-801
    01/27/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rosebrugh v. State
    2D14-5833, 2D14-5860
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Rushing v. State
    2D15-2031
    12/16/2015
   Pet.den.


text:
    S.D. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D15-5466
    01/12/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Sampson v. State
    2D15-538
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Sanchez-Linares v. State
    2D14-5103
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Santiago v. State
    2D16-1109
    03/30/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Schneider v. State
    2D15-5468
    03/16/2016
   Motion gr.


text:
    Schroeder v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n
    2D15-2688
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Scullock v. Holt
    2D15-527
    02/10/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Shannon v. Masterspas, Inc.
    2D15-1934
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Sheffield v. Smiley Homes Corp.
    2D15-5383
    01/26/2016
   Belated App. dism.


text:
    Sheffield v. State
    2D15-4842
    02/10/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Shelley v. State
    2D15-5402
    03/03/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Shelton v. Bank of America, N.A.
    2D15-1415
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Shuler v. State
    2D15-3652
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Simmons v. Department of Revenue
    2D16-60
    02/19/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Simpkins v. State
    2D15-4691
    02/10/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Skipper v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.
    2D15-5186
    01/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Slater v. Gee
    2D16-158
    03/15/2016
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Smith v. Lane
    2D15-2293
    02/10/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Smith v. State
    2D15-4665
    02/11/2016
   Dism.


text:
    Smith v. State
    2D15-4010
    01/13/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Smith v. State
    2D15-3912
    12/16/2015
   Pet.den.


text:
    Solano v. State
    2D15-2063
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Solomon v. State
    2D14-4197
    03/30/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Sophlogic Global, LLC v. B3 Consulting, LLC
    2D15-4861
    02/24/2016
   App.dism,


text:
    Soto v. State
    2D15-436
    03/04/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    State v. Gonzalez
    2D14-4743, 2D14—4812, 2D14-40630, 2D14-4883
    03/07/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    State v. Jones
    2D16-6
    01/15/2016
   Cert.gr.


text:
    Sterlace v. State
    2D15-4800
    12/16/2015
   Pet.den.


text:
    Suarez v. Christiana Trust
    2D15-3397
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Suarez v. State
    2D15-33
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Swift v. State
    2D13-2364
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    T.A. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-463
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    T.L. v. Department of Children & Families
    2D16-530
    03/30/2016
   Cert. dism.


text:
    Thomas v. State
    2D15-4389
    01/22/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Thomas v. State
    2D15-2365
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Thomas v. State
    2D15-406
    03/24/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Trust No. 133sb v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC
    2D16-161
    03/30/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Turbi v. State
    2D15-5138
    02/10/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Vershay v. State
    2D15-2199
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Polk)


text:
    Von Goetzman v. Willy Schreiber Enterprises Inc.
    2D15-2541
    03/09/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Wadolowska v. Huck
    2D15-2878
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Walker v. Walker
    2D15-217
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Ward v. State
    2D14-586
    04/06/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Watkins v. State
    2D15-3721
    01/28/2016
   Mand.den.


text:
    Weeks v. State
    2D15-1193
    03/09/2016
   Aff,

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Weeks v. State
    2D15-3994
    01/15/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Weintraub v. Halifax Media Group, LLC
    2D14—5318
    03/18/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Weires v. State
    2D15-4390
    02/10/2016
   Belated App.gr.


text:
    Welborn v. State
    2D15-5108
    02/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sterling Oaks Community Ass’n and Club, Inc.
    2D15-2323
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Collier)


text:
    Wheeler v. State
    2D14—3972
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    White v. State
    2D15-800
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Lee)


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D15-4709
    01/15/2016
   Proh.dism.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D15-4883
    12/15/2015
   Hab.Corp.den.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D15-3599
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Pinel-las)


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D15-4050
    01/27/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D15-2821
    01/08/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Williams v. State
    2D14-1732
    03/16/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Hills-borough)


text:
    Wyttenbach v. Department of Health
    2D15-1314
    02/29/2016
   Den.


text:
    Y & T Ventures, Inc. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co.
    2D15-3813
    03/31/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Z.M. v. Department of Children and Families
    2D15-3949
    01/08/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Zamora v. State
    2D15-3916
    02/03/2016
   Belated App. den.


text:
    Zeigler v. State
    2D14-4955
    03/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Sarasota)


text:
    Air Temp Service, Inc. v. Progresso Const. & Associates, Inc.
    3D16-0334
    03/29/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Alexandre v. State
    3D16-0643
    04/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Alexandre v. State
    3D16-0742
    04/04/2016
   Proh.dism.


text:
    Allen v. State
    3D16-0304
    02/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Armstrong v. Putetti
    3D15-2217
    03/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Monroe)


text:
    ANJ of South Florida, LLC v. JDJ of Miami, Inc.
    3D15-2466
    01/19/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Bailey v. Guevara
    3D16-0394
    03/04/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Barberena v. Tuscany Village Homeowners
    3D15-0936
    02/26/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Barcelona v. State
    3D16-0607
    03/23/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Barnes v. State
    3D15-2586
    03/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Barron v. Tsiony-Barron
    3D16-0117
    03/29/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Baugher v. State
    3D15-2378
    04/01/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Bejerano v. State
    3D16-0260
    03/28/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Benayon v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
    3D15-2438
    03/17/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Blondal v. Akerman, LLP
    3D16-0477
    03/01/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Blue v. State
    3D15-2928
    03/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Brunvold v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County
    3D15-0542
    04/04/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miámi-Dade)


text:
    Burke v. State
    3D15-2318
    03/17/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Busby v. State
    3D16-0686
    04/05/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Calhoun v. State
    3D16-0703
    03/30/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Cardelle v. Wilmington Trust
    3D15-2370
    01/04/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    City of Miami v. Antunez
    3D16-0097
    03/30/2016
   Dism.


text:
    City of Miami v. 5th Street Marina, LLC
    3D15-2642
    04/07/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Colgan v. Shadow Point, LLC
    3D15-2499
    03/17/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Comabella v. Sanchez
    3D15-1864
    03/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Comcast of Miami, Inc. v. Florida Sol Systems, Inc.
    3D16-0579
    04/01/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Comer v. State
    3D16-0551
    03/14/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Conley v. Department of Revenue
    3D15-2767
    04/13/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Cortes v. Cortes
    3D15-1875
    03/10/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Cummings v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
    3D15-1408
    03/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    De Denaro v. De Denaro
    3D15-2678
    03/17/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    De Jesus v. State
    3D15-1811
    05/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Delerme v. Alonso
    3D15-2482
    11/03/2015
   Pet.den.


text:
    Delgado v. US Bank Nat. Ass’n
    3D15-2158
    03/29/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Diaz v. Edi Korta Music, Inc.
    3D15-1002
    03/14/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Dotres v. Efronson
    3D15-2903
    03/04/2016
   Cert.den.


text:
    Duran v. Abreu
    3D16-0309
    03/01/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    E.C. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-0727
    04/01/2016
   Cert.dism.


text:
    Edward v. State
    3D15-1751
    03/10/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Ferk Family, LP v. Frank
    3D16-0448
    03/23/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Fernandez v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
    3D16-0566
    04/05/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Flowers v. State
    3D15-2295
    03/17/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Floyd v. State
    3D15-2631
    03/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Fountain v. State
    3D15-1814
    03/21/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Fraga v. State
    3D16-0749
    04/05/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Frances v. State Farm Florida Ins. Co.
    3D15-2197
    03/15/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Francos v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families
    3D16-0466
    03/30/2016
   App.dism,

Dept, of Children and Families


text:
    G.A. v. State
    3D15-2399
    05/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Galanis v. Lodi
    3D16-0234
    03/11/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Garber v. McCormick 105, LLC
    3D15-1933
    03/28/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Garcia v. Bank of New York Mellon
    3D15-1988
    03/10/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Garcia v. Collazo
    3D15-2747
    03/17/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Garcia v. Department of Revenue
    3D15-1656
    03/21/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Revenue


text:
    Guimaraes v. Alfonso
    3D16-0736
    04/01/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Hanna-Mack v. Bank of America, N.A.
    3D15-2885
    03/30/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Harkleroad v. Harkleroad
    3D15-1214
    04/04/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Haye v. State
    3D16-0467
    03/01/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Hazan v. NLG, LLC
    3D16-0315
    04/05/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Henegar v. Lewis
    3D15-1904
    03/10/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Monroe)


text:
    Hernandez v. State
    3D15-2443
    03/04/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Hickey v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass'n
    3D15-2252
    02/25/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Higgins v. Safespace South
    3D15-2121
    04/04/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Huerta v. Global Rental E & P, LLC
    3D16-0595
    04/05/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Huggins v. State
    3D16-0413
    03/24/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Hutchins v. State
    3D16-0656
    03/28/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Jabbaar v. State
    3D16-0807
    04/14/2016
   Pet.transferred

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Jackson v. State
    3D15-1108
    04/18/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Jackson v. State
    3D15-1478
    04/25/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Jackson v. State
    3D15-2670
    03/09/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Jones v. Martin
    3D16-0237
    03/16/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Kalimi v. HomeAway, Inc.
    3D15-2823
    04/12/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Key Biscayne Gateway Partners, Ltd. v. Village of Key Biscayne, Fla.
    3D16-0592
    04/11/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Key West HMA v. Estes
    3D16-0353
    03/31/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Knauf Plasterboard (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. v. Robin
    3D16-0447
    03/03/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Latin Diva Enterprises, LLC v. Department of Revenue
    3D16-0563
    03/30/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Revenue


text:
    Leary v. Leiderman Shelomith, PA
    3D16-0571
    04/05/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Lee v. Jones
    3D16-0445
    04/19/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Loor v. State
    3D15-2027
    01/07/2016
   Hab.Corp.dism.


text:
    Mallor v. MacArthur Properties III, LLC
    3D15-2612
    03/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Maps v. State
    3D16-0568
    03/15/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Mariscal v. Diaz
    3D15-2296
    04/21/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Martinez v. Oceanview Bldg. B Condo Ass’n, Inc.
    3D15-2477
    03/14/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Masterson v. Bank of America, N.A.
    3D15-2689
    03/17/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    McMillan v. MRH Sub I, LLC
    3D15-2157
    03/24/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Menendez v. Concepcion
    3D16-0783
    04/12/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Merritt v. State
    3D15-1949
    02/24/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Miranda v. Pacheco Entertainment Production Enterprises, Inc.
    3D16-0608
    03/22/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Miranda v. Pacheco Entertainment Production Enterprises, Inc.
    3D16-0650
    04/01/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Moore v. State
    3D16-0591
    04/04/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Muho v. CEM Investments, LLC
    3D16-0574
    04/04/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Navigators Management (UK) Ltd. v. American S.S. Owners Mut. Premium
    3D15-2734
    02/23/2016
   Cert. den.


text:
    Navigators Management (UK) Ltd. v. American S.S. Owners Mut. Premium
    3D15-2734
    03/24/2016
   Motion den.


text:
    Newport, Ltd. v. City of Homestead
    3D15-2863
    03/01/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Nivia v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC
    3D15-2842
    03/29/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Nottage v. State
    3D15-2651
    03/16/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Odajuste v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n
    3D16-0464
    03/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Padilla v. State
    3D16-0692
    03/29/2016
   Pet.den,


text:
    Paris v. State
    3D16-0382
    04/05/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Paulson v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., LLC
    3D16-0057
    03/14/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Perez v. AFSCME Florida Council 79
    3D15-2000
    03/14/2016
   App.dism.

PERC


text:
    Pierre v. Tropical Financial Credit Union
    3D15-2004
    04/25/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Pirela v. State
    3D16-0577
    03/29/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Prestige Check Cashing Corp. v. Universal Risk Advisors, Inc.
    3D15-1630
    03/16/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Pulley v. Tower Hill Prime Ins. Co.
    3D15-0665
    05/11/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Rashotsky v. Rashotsky
    3D16-0064
    03/28/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Rising Sun Ventures, LLC v. Regalia Beach Developers LLC
    3D15-2062
    04/18/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Rodriguez v. MRS Financial Services, Inc.
    3D15-2165
    03/15/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Rojas v. State
    3D16-0227
    04/04/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. v. Gutierrez
    3D16-0405
    04/05/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Royes v. State
    3D16-0316
    03/10/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Ruiz v. State
    3D16-0527
    03/10/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Saintilmon v. Department of Revenue
    3D15-2071
    03/14/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Revenue


text:
    Sanchez v. State
    3D16-0700
    04/05/2016
   Pet.dism.


text:
    Sapp v. State
    3D15-1682
    03/30/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Sassman v. Flagstar Bank, FSB
    3D16-0301
    02/25/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Sawyer v. State
    3D16-0433
    02/29/2016
   Petden.


text:
    Silverman v. 16 SE 2nd Street, LLC
    3D15-2732
    03/29/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Silverthorne v. CitiMortgage, Inc.
    3D15-2240
    03/15/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Simonelli v. State
    3D15-2941
    04/06/2016
   Den.


text:
    Simonelli v. State
    3D15-2941
    01/28/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Smith v. Castro Morales
    3D15-2006
    03/24/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Smith v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families
    3D15-1167
    03/28/2016
   App.dism.

Dept, of Children and Families


text:
    Soler v. JPMorgan Chase Bank Nat. Ass'n
    3D16-0279
    02/23/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Solorio v. State
    3D16-0728
    04/01/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    St. Hilare v. State
    3D16-0108
    03/23/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Perez
    3D15-0873
    02/02/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Steven M. Berman, D.C., P.A. v. Windhaven Ins. Co.
    3D15-1503
    04/13/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Suarez v. Bank of America, N.A.
    3D15-2248
    03/15/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Tejera v. State
    3D16-0253
    03/11/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Terra’s Garden, LLC v. Elite Flower Services, Inc.
    3D16-0246
    03/31/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Tropical Financial Credit Union v. Mirassou Condominium Ass’n, Inc.
    3D16-0573
    04/05/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Turnberry, Ltd. v. Vollrath
    3D16-0329
    02/29/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Turner v. Homestead Police Dept.
    3D16-0618
    04/05/2016
   App.dism.

Florida Com’n on Human Relations


text:
    Vargas v. U.S. Century Bank
    3D15-2809
    02/24/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Vargas v. US Century Bank
    3D15-2809
    03/23/2016
   Den.


text:
    Vasquez v. CitiMortgage, Inc.
    3D15-2286
    03/15/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    W.S. v. Department of Children and Families
    3D16-165
    05/11/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Walker v. State
    3D16-0061
    01/21/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Walker v. State
    3D15-2668
    04/01/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Walker v. State
    3D16-0347
    04/22/2016
   Mand.dism.


text:
    Ward v. US Bank Nat. Ass’n
    3D16-0358
    03/03/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wexler v. Harvat
    3D16-0213
    03/18/2016
   App.dism.


text:
    Wilson v. Wilson
    3D15-1319
    02/29/2016
   Pet.den.


text:
    Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Santovenia
    3D16-0636
    04/19/2016
   Vol.dism.


text:
    Yanez-Aguilera v. Bank of New York Mellon
    3D15-2780
    03/29/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Zuniga v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    3D15-0343
    04/11/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir. Ct, (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Zweig v. Il Villaggio Condominium Ass’n, Inc.
    3D16-0572
    03/30/2016
   Pet.den,


text:
    3930 Designdistrict4, LLC v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC
    3D16-0526
    04/06/2016
   Vol.dism.

Cir, Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    4300 Biscayne Blvd. Condominium v. PRH 4300 Biscayne Blvd., LLC
    3D15-2108
    03/22/2016
   App.dism.

Cir. Ct. (Miami-Dade)


text:
    Childress v. State
    4D15-111
    01/14/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (St. Lu-cie)


text:
    Jackson v. State
    4D15-3346
    01/28/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Louis v. State
    4D14-1774
    01/21/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Bro-ward)


text:
    Reed v. Rosslow
    4D15-2094
    01/14/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (St. Lu-cie)


text:
    Swanger v. State
    5D14-2405
    02/16/2016
   Aff.

Cir. Ct. (Volu-sia)


author: THOMAS, J.

text:
    Michael A. CREWS, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellant, v. Samuel STROTHER, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-4714.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 11, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 31, 2014.
    Jennifer Parker, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee; Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Susan A. Maher, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Corrections Litigation, Lance Eric Neff and C. Ian Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Samuel Strother, pro se, Appellee.
   OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

THOMAS, J.

This cause is before us on Appellant’s Motion For Rehearing Or Clarification. We grant the motion and, accordingly, withdraw our former opinion filed on June 11, 2014, and substitute this opinion in its place.

Factual Background

Appellee initially filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Lafayette County Circuit Court. That mandamus petition asserted that section 57.085(5), Florida Statutes, allows DOC to withdraw money from an inmate’s trust account to pay a lien only when the balance of the trust account exceeds $10 and, because Appellee only had $10 in his account, DOC was without statutory authority when, on January 19, 2011, it removed $9.50 and imposed a 50$ processing fee. The Lafayette County Circuit Court denied Appellee’s mandamus petition, finding that Appellee misread section 57.085(5) and DOC was correct in its interpretation of the statute. Appellee sought review of this order by filing a petition for certiorari in this court in case number 1D11-2345, This court issued an order informing Appellee that the lower court’s denial of his mandamus petition was properly renewable .by appeal and providing Appellee the opportunity to file an initial brief, but noting that failure to file a brief could result in dismissal. Appellee failed to file an initial brief in case 1D11-2345 and, on August 12, 2011, this court dismissed the converted appeal without reaching the merits of the statute: ry interpretation issue.

Approximately six months later, Appel-lee filed another petition for writ of mandamus in Lafayette County, which was transferred to Leon County. This second mandamus petition, the basis for this appeal, again asserted that DOC violated section 57.085(5) by removing the $10 balance in Appellee’s inmate trust account after he received another $10 deposit on December 12, 2011. DOC asserted that Appellee misinterpreted the statute. DOC filed a motion for sanctions, asserting that Appel-lee had raised the same issue in its previous mandamus petition, and arguing thát Appellee’s current mandamus petition should be dismissed as frivolous and sanctions should be imposed for his attempt to re-litigate the issue. DOC’s motion did not reference the doctrine of res judicata, but argued that the petition should .be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to section 57,085(9)(c), (d).

The Leon County Circuit Court entered an order granting mandamus relief, agreeing with Appellee’s interpretation of section 57.085(5). DOC filed a motion for rehearing, asserting that the court failed to address why res judicata did not bar Ap-pellee from re-litigating the same issue from his previous case, which was adversely decided against him and in favor of the opposing party. In response, the lower court entered an amended order granting mandamus relief, but did not address DOC’s res judicata argument and only amended its original order to reflect that Appellee should be refunded $9.50 from the clerk of court and the 50$ processing fee from DOC.

Analysis

Before addressing the statutory interpretation issue, this court will address DOC’s argument that the lower court erred in interpreting section 57.085, as the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellee from re-litigating the issue after being denied relief in another court. Whether the application of res judicata was proper is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1259 (Fla.2006).

“Res judicata bars a subsequent lawsuit when there is: (1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties; and (4) identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made.” AMEC Civil, LLC v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 41 So.3d 235, 239-40 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Here, because DOC has failed to establish that all four elements have been met, we find that res judicata does not apply. In particular, the identity of the thing sued for has not been established, as Appellee’s second mandamus petition was not based upon DOC’s removal of the same $10 from his inmate trust account as in the previous proceeding. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 94 So.3d 677 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (holding that a second petition to authorize treatment and administration of psychotropic medication was for a different 90-day period and was therefore not the same thing sued for previously and res judicata did not apply).

Merits

“Matters of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.” State v. Joseph, 94 So.3d 672, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citing State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.2004)).

Here, we have reconsidered our prior interpretation of section 57.085(5) and find that the lower court’s interpretation of the statute is erroneous. Section 57.085, Florida Statutes (2012), states in pertinent part:

(5) When the clerk has found the prisoner to be indigent, the court shall order the prisoner to make monthly payments of no less than 20 percent of the balance of the prisoner’s trust account as payment of court costs and fees. When a court orders such payment, the Department of Corrections or the local detention facility shall place a lien on the inmate’s trust account for the full amount of the court costs and fees, and shall withdraw money maintained in that trust account and forward the money, when the balance exceeds $10, to the appropriate clerk of the court until the prisoner’s court costs and fees are paid in full.

DOC’s original briefing of this issue asserted that the clause “when the balance exceeds $10” gave effect to when DOC shall forward to the appropriate clerk of court the money “already mthdraim” from an inmate’s account, and did not, as interpreted by the lower court, give effect to when DOC shall withdraw funds from an inmate’s trust account. We originally held that this argument ignores the plain language of the statute, and that the only mention of a “balance” or an “account” is in reference to the inmate’s trust account, and not some unreferenced account that DOC has created for holding up to $10 in funds that have been removed from the inmate’s trust account, to be held until the balance is more than $10 and then forwarded to the appropriate clerk of court. DOC’s motion for rehearing, however, asserted that this Court’s opinion was founded upon a misapprehension of how the inmate trust fund operates. Based upon DOC’s clarification of its argument in its motion for rehearing, we find that our previous opinion was based upon a misunderstanding regarding how DOC interpreted the applicable statute, and we are now persuaded by DOC’s interpretation. In particular, although throughout its briefs DOC referenced funds “already withdrawn,” it has clarified that it does not withdraw funds from an inmate’s trust account when the balance is under $10 and hold the funds in a separate location before forwarding to the applicable clerk of court once it exceeds $10. Instead, DOC has made clear that it simply places a hold on the account and, once there is $10 in the account, the funds are withdrawn and forwarded to the appropriate clerk of court.

DOC also bolstered its interpretation of the meaning of the phrase “when the balance exceeds $10” by directing this Court’s attention to- the first sentence of section 57.085(5), which provides -that a court, in assessing court costs and fees, enters an order for DOC to place a lien for the “prisoner to make monthly payment of no less than 20 percent of the balance of the prisoner’s trust account as payment of the court costs and fees.” . We agree with DOC that this language does not provide a maximum that DOC may remove from an inmate’s account, nor does it provide that an inmate may retain $10 in the account that may not be collected for payment against the inmate’s lien. As such, we conclude that the full balance of an inmate’s trust account may be withdrawn by DOC and forwarded to the applicable clerk of court when the balance exceeds $10.

With these clarifications of DOC’s argument in mind, we agree with DOC’s argument from its briefs that when section 57.085(5) is read in pari materia with section 945.215(l)(f), Florida Statutes, that the legislature authorized DOC to prevent an inmate from accessing his or her trust account to spend personal funds on items from the prison canteens when that inmate still has a lien against his individual account. Specifically, section 945.215(l)(f), provides:

(f) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, inmates with sufficient balances in their individual inmate bank trust fund accounts, after all debts against the account are satisfied, shall be allowed to request a weekly draw of up to an amount set by the Secretary of Corrections, not to exceed $100, to be expended for personal use on canteen and vending machine items.

§ 945.215(l)(f), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to section 945.215(l)(f), DOC may prevent an inmate from requesting a weekly draw for personal use on canteen and vending machine items when all debts against the inmate’s account are not satisfied by placing a hold on the balance of the inmate’s account.

Here, as Appellee still has an unsatisfied debt, i.e. a lien on his account pursuant to section 57.085, DOC may place a hold on his inmate trust account. Read in accordance with section 57.085(5), DOC may hold the funds in Appellee’s account, withdrawing and forwarding to the applicable clerk of court the balance of Appellee’s inmate trust account when it exceeds $10. Accordingly, we reverse the lower court’s order granting mandamus relief.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

BENTON and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.


author: SCALES, J.

text:
    Juan Andres PUIGBO, Appellant, v. MEDEX TRADING, LLC, et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D13-3047.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 1, 2014.

      Genovese Joblove & Battista, P.A., and W. Barry Blum and Aaron S. Blynn, for appellant.
    Holland & Knight, LLP, and Alex M. Gonzalez, Israel J. Encinosa, Monica Vila, and Michael E. Rothenberg, for appellees.
    Before WELLS, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.
   SCALES, J.

On Motion for Rehearing

We treat Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing En Banc as including a Motion for Rehearing. We grant Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing, withdraw the previous opinion, and issue the following opinion in its stead:

Juan Andres Puigbo (Puigbo), Defendant below, appeals from a non-final order denying his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, or in the alternative, Motion to Quash Service of Process or Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens (Motion to Dismiss). Puigbo argues that, although he may have been validly served pursuant to Article 223 of the Civil Procedure Code of Venezuela, such service was insufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction under Florida law.

Because we conclude that service was made in compliance with the Hague Service Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, November 15, 1965 [1969], 20 U.S.T. 361 (the Hague Service Convention) and satisfied constitutional due process, we affirm.

I. Relevant Background

On July 15, 2011, Medex Trading, LLC (Medex) filed suit against Puigbo and others seeking a money judgment. Medex alleged that the defendants schemed to defraud Medex. In an attempt to serve Puigbo, Medex sent service documents to the Venezuelan Central Authority in conformity with the Hague Service Convention. Following three unsuccessful attempts to personally serve Puigbo, the Venezuelan Central Authority served Pu-igbo pursuant to Article 223 of the Civil Procedure Code of Venezuela by publishing notice of the lawsuit in two Venezuelan newspapers on April 1, 2013, and April 5, 2013, and posting a copy of the service documents (which included the complaint) on Puigbo’s door on May 6, 2013. On June 3, 2013, that service was confirmed by a Venezuelan court order.

Puigbo filed his Motion to Dismiss essentially arguing that, notwithstanding any provision of the Hague Service Convention, Florida law requires Medex to effect personal service on Puigbo since Medex is seeking a money judgment from Puigbo.

II. Analysis

a. Standard of Review

The standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is de novo. Am. Express Ins. Servs. Europe Ltd. v. Duvall, 972 So.2d 1035, 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Likewise, the denial of a motion to quash service is subject to de novo review. Robles-Martinez v. Diaz, Reus & Targ, LLP, 88 So.3d 177, 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

b. General Statutory Scheme

We begin our analysis by reviewing the relevant provisions of Florida’s general statutory scheme governing service of process, Specifically, section 48.198(3), Florida Statutes (2013), states that persons outside of Florida who are subject to the jurisdiction of Florida’s courts may be served “as provided in s. 48.194.” The relevant provision of section 48.194, Florida Statutes (2013), is subsection (1), which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “Service of process on persons outside the United States may be required to conform to the provisions of the Hague [Service] Convention.... ”

c. The Hague Service Convention

The Hague Service Convention applies in all civil or commercial matters “where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699, 108 S.Ct. 2104, 100 L.Ed.2d 722 (1988) (citing the Hague Service Convention, art. 1). Florida law generally requires personal service to confer in personam jurisdiction in actions for personal money judgments. See Bedford Computer Corp. v. Graphic Press, Inc., 484 So.2d 1225, 1227 (Fla.1986); see also Zieman v. Cosio, 578 So.2d 332, 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Because personal service is contemplated under Florida law, serving a defendant in another country necessarily requires “the transmittal of documents abroad” as contemplated by the Hague Service Convention. See Vega Glen v. Club Meditarranee S.A., 359 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1356 (S.D.Fla. 2005). Thus, the Hague Service Convention applies to the instant case.

d. Interplay Betioeen Statutes and Hague Service Convention

Puigbo contends that, even though the Hague Service Convention applies, and he was served in conformity with it, personal service is nonetheless required for a Florida court to have jurisdiction to render a money judgment against him.

Puigbo’s contention, however, misapprehends the interplay between the relevant provisions of sections 48.193(3), 48.194(1), and the Hague Service Convention, and discounts the effect of the Supremacy Clause contained in Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution.

When process is served and return of process is completed by an official of a country that is a signatory to the Hague Service Convention in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention, as it was here, that service is sufficient, and any additional requirement which may be imposed by Florida law is pre-empted. MacIvor v. Volvo Penta of Am., Inc., 471 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 699, 108 S.Ct. 2104 (stating that by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the Hague Convention “pre-empts inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state law in all cases to which it applies”). Such preemption is contemplated by the relevant Florida statutes cited above, which expressly reference that the Hague Service Convention may be applicable for service of process on persons outside of the United States.

e.Constitutional Due Process

In addition to complying with the Hague Service Convention, service of process also must satisfy constitutional due process. See Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838 (2d Cir.1986). Constitutional notions of due process require that any means of service be “reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). Here, Medex demonstrated that service via Article 223 of the Civil Procedure Code of Venezuela was likely to come to Puig-bo’s attention. Moreover, Medex has submitted evidence that Puigbo had actual knowledge of the case. Accordingly, we conclude that the service effectuated on Puigbo was reasonably calculated to apprise Puigbo of the pendency of the action.

III. Conclusion

Therefore, because the Venezuelan Central Authority served Puigbo in accordance with the Hague Service Convention, and because such service comported with constitutional notions of due process, his Motion to Dismiss was properly denied.

Affirmed.

      . We have jurisdiction to review this non-final order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).

      . Service of Puigbo in this manner meets the requisites of the Hague Service Convention. See the Hague Service Convention, art. 6.

      . Cases cited by Puigbo that address service on defendants who reside in the United States and who were served by publication under Chapter 49, Florida Statutes, are inapposite because the Hague Service Convention was not implicated in those cases.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Tavoris SIMMONS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    CASE NO. 1D16-4609
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed December 6, 2016.
    Rehearing Denied February 15, 2017
    Tavoris Simmons, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

ROBERTS, C.J., MAKAR and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.


author: NORTHCUTT, J.

text:
    Lawrence GUDMESTAD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D14-3140
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 7, 2016
    Rehearing Denied February 13, 2017

      Andrea Flynn Mogensen of Law Office of Andrea Flynn Mogensen, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.
   NORTHCUTT, J.

Convicted by a jury of-fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer and of aggravated assault 'on a -law enforcement officer, Lawrence Gudmestad raises five issues on appeal. We conclude that the trial court erred by allowing the State to “rebut” Gudmestad’s nonhearsay statements with his prior convictions,, Accordingly, we reverse Gudmestad’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

On the evening of the events giving rise to the charges, Sarasota sheriffs deputies observed a vehicle driving at a high rate of speed. They were able to momentarily stop the vehicle, but the driver sped away. Deputies proceeded to the address of the car’s registered owner, Mary Belicki, and discovered the car parked a few blocks away. They found Gudmestad’s driver’s license lying on the ground next to the driver’s door, and they made contact with Belicki, Gudmestad’s fiancée. Belicki was surprised that her car was gone, and she told the deputies that she had not given anyone permission to borrow it. After Belicki gave deputies permission to search the home, they discovered Gudmestad hiding in a shower holding a military-style rifle. The deputies quickly exited the housé and took up defensive positions.

Gudmestad went into the backyard with the rifle. Deputies heard Gudmestad yelling at Belicki. He called her an “alien bitch” and pushed her toward police telling her to “go join the other aliens and leave me alone.” Gudmestad also threatened the deputies, calling them “green aliens” and “green parasites.” Gudmestad appeared at the front gate where deputies shot but did not seriously injure him. While paramedics treated Gudmestad, he fought with them, trying to free himself from his restraints and jump off the stretcher. Gudmestad seemed disoriented, and he repeatedly asserted that the paramedics looked like aliens and that he did not want to go into the ambulance, which he thought looked like an alien spacecraft.

. A toxicology screen later revealed that, though he had a .03 blood-alcohol level, Gudmestad was not under the effect of any narcotics or psychotropic medications at the time of his arrest. Prior to trial, Gud-mestad’s counsel filed a notice that he would present an insanity defense. Also, on the motion of defense counsel, experts were appointed to determine Gudmestad’s competence to stand trial. Both experts concluded that Gudmestad suffered from a schizoaffective disorder that preexisted the events of this case. This disorder manifested in a fixed delusion that aliens had infiltrated Earth and disguised themselves among the human population. Gudmestad believed the judge, prosecutor, and jury were aliens. Both experts opined that Gud-mestad was not malingering. Nonetheless, one expert ventured that Gudmestad had an adequate understanding of the adversarial nature of trial and the roles of the parties at trial and therefore was competent to proceed. The trial court determined that Gudmestad was competent to stand trial.

The State moved in limine to introduce Gudmestad’s prior convictions if the defense elicited any statements regarding aliens. Relying on section 90,806(1), Florida Statutes (2013), the trial court granted the motion, reasoning that because such statements tended to excuse Gudmestad from blame, they were subject to impeachment. The court ruled that if Gudmestad elicited any testimony in which he said, “people are aliens, green aliens, alien machines, bald green aliens, and that Obama has been invaded by aliens,” such “exculpatory statements” would open the door to Gudmestad’s prior convictions.

During the State’s case in chief, it called the deputies and paramedics who had encountered Gudmestad on the night of the offenses. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony regarding Gud-mestad’s statements about aliens. The trial court, at the State’s request, read Gudmes-tad’s prior convictions for twelve felonies and one crime of dishonesty into the record. In the defense case, both of the experts who had examined Gudmestad and testified at the pretrial competency hearing opined that, at the time of the offenses, Gudmestad met the legal test of insanity.

Turning first to the State’s “impeachment” of Gudmestad with his prior convictions, we review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. See McDuffie v. State, 970 So.2d 312, 326 (Fla. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its ruling “on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Mohler v. State, 165 So.3d 773, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (quoting Masaka v. State, 4 So.3d 1274, 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)).

Section 90.806(1) provides: “When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.” Thus, under this section, “a hearsay declarant is treated as a ’witness’ and his or her credibility may be attacked in the same manner as any other witness’s credibility.” Huggins v. State, 889 So.2d 743, 756 (Fla. 2004). “A party may attack the credibility of any witness ... by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year .... ” § 90.610(1), Fla. Stat. (2013); see also 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 806.04(2)(b) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002) (“A defendant who chooses not to testify but who succeeds in getting his or her own exculpatory statements into evidence runs the risk of having those statements impeached by felony convictions.”).

In this case, the trial court’s rulings evinced a mistaken understanding of the law. The threshold inquiry was not whether Gudmestad’s statements were exculpatory in nature but whether they were hearsay. Hearsay is any statement by a nontestifying declarant which is being “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Defense counsel clearly did not elicit Gud-mestad’s out-of-court statements in order to prove that the police were aliens. Because defense counsel elicited no hearsay statements, the trial court erred by allowing the State to attack Gudmestad’s credibility under section 90.806(1).

When a trial court erroneously admits evidence, we apply a harmless error test to determine whether the error necessitates reversal. “The harmless error test places ... the burden on the state ... to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” Cooper v. State, 68 So.3d 263, 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)).

Here, Gudmestad’s credibility was plainly at issue. Gudmestad never contested his involvement in the events leading to his arrest, but given his extensive history of mental illness, there is a possibility that the jury would have acquitted by reason of insanity. We cannot say that the verdict in this case was not affected by the erroneous admission of Gudmestad’s convictions. See Foster v. State, 182 So.3d 3, 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (finding harmful error where case turned on credibility and State improperly impeached with prior convictions).

The trial court committed harmful error by allowing the State to rebut Gudmes-tad’s nonhearsay statements with his prior convictions. We accordingly reverse Gud-mestad’s convictions and remand for a new trial. Prior thereto, however, the trial court must again assess Gudmestad’s competence to proceed. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b); Bracero v. State, 10 So.3d 664, 666 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (observing that court has independent duty to inquire into defendant’s competence if it has reasonable ground to believe defendant is not competent to proceed).

Because of this disposition, we need not determine whether the trial court erred by finding Gudmestad competent to proceed in the first place. However, we note that competence to proceed in a criminal prosecution requires more than an ability to consult with counsel and understand the adversary nature of the process. The test for whether a defendant is competent to stand trial is “whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (emphasis added); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.211(a)(1). Neither party has pointed us to any authority that would help us determine the parameters of what is “rational” for these purposes. Nonetheless, we are skeptical that a defendant who — according to court-appointed mental-health experts — honestly believes that he is being tried by extraterrestrials can be said to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. On remand, the trial court must delve into this aspect of the experts’ opinions more deeply and give this factor due consideration when assessing Gudmestad’s competence to proceed.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

CRENSHAW and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


author: SALARIO, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Damien Tremaine ROSS, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-3682
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 9, 2016.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Johnny T. Salgado, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Brett D. McIntosh of McIntosh Law, Sarasota, for Appellee.
   SALARIO, Judge.

This is an appeal by the State of an order suppressing evidence on grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Damien Ross is charged with possession of more than twenty-eight and less than 200 grams of cocaine, fleeing and eluding an officer, and reckless driving. The cocaine was discovered during warrantless searches of the home where Mr. Ross was arrested and the car he was driving on the night of his arrest. We affirm without comment as to the search of the home. We reverse as to the search of the car, however, because a warrantless search became authorized when the police saw cocaine in plain view in the vehicle.

The police encountered Mr. Ross while investigating a noise complaint at an apartment complex in the middle of the night. Two police officers saw him asleep in the driver’s seat of his car while music was blasting from the car’s speakers. An officer attempted to wake him by rapping on the window and identifying himself. After several minutes of this, Mr. Ross finally woke up. He rolled the window down slightly, told the officers “fuck that,” and then drove off. The officers followed him as he drove with no headlights at speeds in excess of eighty miles an hour. The officers turned on the lights and sirens, but he refused to stop. Apparently instructed not to continue the chase, they lost sight of Mr. Ross when he made a left turn against a red light.

The officers went to an address matching the car’s registration but then got a radio call reporting that a man who looked like Mr. Ross had run into another home nearby. When they arrived at that address, they found Mr. Ross’s car parked on the grass lawn of the home. The officers went to the front and side doors of the house to look for Mr. Ross when two residents, a woman and her uncle, opened the doors. The officers went through the house, knocking on doors and calling for people to come out of the rooms. Mr. Ross answered a knock on a bedroom door and was arrested on the spot.

During the investigation following the arrest, Sergeant Shannon Seymour arrived at the scene. In anticipation of having Mr. Ross’s car towed, Sergeant Seymour approached the vehicle to see if it had been damaged. He looked through a window and saw a half of a crack cocaine cookie — a circular piece of crack cocaine — on the floor by the front passenger’s seat. Without obtaining a warrant, the police thereafter conducted a search of the inside of the car. That search uncovered a full crack cocaine cookie and some powder cocaine in addition to the half-cookie of crack cocaine Sergeant Seymour viewed through the window.

Mr. Ross moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, asserting that the warrantless search of the car violated the Fourth Amendment. The State argued that Sergeant Seymour’s observation of crack cocaine from outside the vehicle justified a warrantless search. The trial court rejected that contention and granted the motion to suppress. We review that decision under a mixed standard: the trial court’s findings of historical facts are reviewed for competent substantial evidence, and its conclusions of law and application of the law to the facts are reviewed de novo. See State v. K.S., 28 So.3d 985, 987 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Cillo v. State, 849 So.2d 353, 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

Applying the law to the historical facts, we conclude that the search of Mr. Ross’s car was authorized under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Generally speaking, that exception permits a warrantless search of a readily mobile vehicle when the police have probable cause to believe that it contains contraband. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985)). In State v. Green, 943 So.2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), our court held that the exception applies where, as here, police observe drugs in plain view in a parked car after having arrested the owner.

The defendant in Green was arrested for gambling at an apartment complex, and a search incident to the arrest turned up keys to a Ford Taurus, which the police seized. Id. at 1005. The police then found the car, shined a flashlight into the windows, and observed a razor blade with white residue on the center console. Id. The police used the keys they seized to open the vehicle, which they then searched. The search resulted in the seizure of drugs and paraphernalia. Id. Upon the defendant’s motion, the trial court suppressed the evidence because the police searched the car without a warrant. Id.

Reversing the suppression order, we held that the automobile exception authorized the warrantless search. Id. at 1006-07. We rejected the defendant’s contention that the exception applied only when exigent circumstances were present — a finding that would have been unlikely when at the time of the search the car was parked, the owner arrested, and the keys in the possession of police — and explained that the warrantless search was authorized once the police developed probable cause. Id. at 1006 (“[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized.” (quoting Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261, 102 S.Ct. 3079, 73 L.Ed.2d 750 (1982))). Because the police had the requisite probable cause when they observed drug paraphernalia in the car, the subsequent warrantless search of the automobile did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 1005-06.

This case is not different from Green in any respect that matters. Mr. Ross was arrested after fleeing and eluding police officers and hiding in a home. After his arrest, a police officer looked through the window of his car and saw crack cocaine in plain view. Sergeant Seymour’s lawful observation of illegal drugs in the car gave the police probable cause to believe that the car contained evidence of a crime. The warrantless search of the car was thus authorized by the automobile exception. Green, 943 So.2d at 1006-07; see also State v. Gardner, 72 So.3d 218, 220-21 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing order suppressing evidence and finding probable cause to conduct warrantless search of a parked automobile for evidence of a shooting where police had lawfully arrested the vehicle’s owner for the shooting two hours earlier); State v. Fischer, 987 So.2d 708, 711-13 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that warrantless search of car was authorized where police observed white powder that appeared to be cocaine in open view therein).

The trial court nonetheless suppressed the evidence obtained during the search based, at least in part, on a belief that “something more” must have happened between the time Mr. Ross was arrested and the time Sergeant Seymour saw the crack cookie in the car. That belief appears to have been founded on testimony from the arresting officers that the car windows were closed at the time of the arrest and testimony from Sergeant Seymour that at least some of the windows may have been open when he arrived at the scene. The trial court, however, made no findings (1) that described what the “something more” was or could have been; (2) that were at odds with Sergeant Seymour’s testimony that a half-cookie of crack cocaine was in plain view; or (3) that the testimony of Sergeant Seymour or any of the officers involved lacked credibility.

We are left, therefore, with a mere suspicion that “something” happened between the time of the arrest and the time when Sergeant Seymour saw the crack cookie. That suspicion cannot support the suppression order for two reasons.

First, the trial court credited Sergeant Seymour’s testimony that he saw the half-cookie of crack cocaine in plain view on the front passenger-side floor of the car. Although it might be possible that an unidentified person rolled the windows down between the initial arrest and Sergeant Seymour’s observation of the drugs on the car floor, that unestablished possibility is not determinative at a suppression hearing because no competent substantial evidence to that effect was presented. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(g)(3) (“If the court hears the motion [to suppress] on its merits, the defendant shall present evidence supporting the defendant’s position and the State may offer rebuttal evidence.”). Nor was such a fact alleged in the motion to suppress such that the State was required to rebut it. The only evidence presented was that the officer saw the cocaine from outside the car. Taking the evidence in that way, the crack cookie was openly visible, and, as a result, the police had probable cause to believe that they would find contraband inside Mr. Ross’s car.

Second, the officer who had the initial encounter with Ross at the apartment complex testified without contradiction that he could see into the car through the rolled-up windows. Thus, under the undisputed facts of this case, whether the windows were up or down when Sergeant Seymour saw the cocaine has no direct bearing on any factual question regarding whether he saw it. See generally State v. Navarro, 464 So.2d 137, 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (en banc) (“A trial court’s findings must be accepted by the appellate court if there is evidence to support the findings. This rule is, by definition, applicable only to a case in which the evidence supports the trial court’s findings and is not applicable to a case in which the evidence does not support the findings.”). The trial court’s reliance on its suspicion that the windows were opened between the time of the arrest and the time of Sergeant Seymour’s observation was not a basis upon which it could deviate from its conclusions that the officer’s testimony was credible and that the crack cocaine was in plain view. That gave the police probable cause to conduct a warrantless search under the automobile exception.

For these reasons, although we affirm that portion of the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence found inside the home, we reverse that portion of the order suppressing the evidence found inside the car. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.

KELLY and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.

      . The quantities of cocaine found in the car and the house appear to be the sole basis of the possession charge. The trial court did not make any findings as to whether the quantity of cocaine found only in the car was sufficient to support the total quantify of cocaine charged. We make no determination on that issue either, other than to note that it is a question that may need to be resolved on remand.

      . Although the lawfulness under the Fourth Amendment of Sergeant Seymour’s observation of the drugs was treated by the trial court — and is treated by the State on appeal— under the plain view doctrine, it is at least possible on these facts that the open view doctrine actually applies here. See State v. Rickard, 420 So.2d 303, 304-06 (Fla. 1982) (distinguishing between plain view and open view based on whether observation occurred from a constitutionally protected area, based on the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy). Assuming that the plain view doctrine applies, Sergeant Seymour’s observation of the interior of the car from the yard was constitutionally permissible because it was undisputed that he was legitimately in the yard as part of an investigation, the crack cocaine cookie was in plain view, and its illegal character was, on the testimony presented, immediately apparent. See Young v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D2352, 207 So.3d 267, 2016 WL 6036827 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 14, 2016). Assuming instead that the constitutionally protected area was limited to the car itself rather than the property on which the officer stood, the same -result would obtain under the open view doctrine. See Adoue v. State, 408 So.2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1981) (”[W]hen the officers looked through the window of the airplane and saw marijuana, they stood in a nonconstitutionally protected area where they had a lawful right to be.”)


text:
    BONAFIDE PROPERTIES, LLC, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-389
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 9, 2016.
    Heather A. DeGrave of Walters Levine, P.A., Tampa ("withdrew after briefing); Ivan D. Ivanov of Ivanow Law Firm, P.A., Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellant.
    Kimberly S. Mello and Robert Schneider, Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tampa; Michele L. Stocker, Greenberg Traurig, Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, MORRIS, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


author: B.L. THOMAS, J.

text:
    John ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-2572
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed December 12, 2016.
    Rehearing Denied February 15, 2017
    John Anderson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Angela R. Hensel, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   B.L. THOMAS, J.

We previously affirmed the summary denial of the appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court correctly treated as a postconviction motion brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We also retained jurisdiction for consideration of the imposition of sanctions.

The appellant has failed to obtain relief in at least three previous postconviction cases he filed in this court challenging this judgment and sentence. All three prior postconviction motions were procedurally barred and meritless, as is the instant motion. Accordingly, we ordered the appellant to show cause why he should not be prohibited from future pro-se filings challenging this judgment and sentence. See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999). The appellant’s response to the show cause order does not provide a legal basis to prohibit the imposition of sanctions.

Therefore, because the appellant’s repeated attacks on his judgment and sentence have become an abuse of the legal process, we hold that he is barred from future pro-se filings in this court concerning Escambia County Circuit Court case number 2004-CF-5067. See Johnson v. State, 44 So.3d 198, 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (concluding that sanctions are warranted regardless of a pro se defendant’s filing history where he appeals from the denial of frivolous, abusive, or untimely claims). The clerk of this court is hereby directed not to accept any future filings concerning this case unless the pleadings are filed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar.

SANCTIONS IMPOSED.

RAY and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.


author: KHOUZAM, Judge.

text:
    Anthony NEWTON, Appellant, v. CATERPILLAR FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION; Joshua Cram, an individual; Charles Cram, an individual; and C&J Bobcat and Hauling, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D15-2927
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 14, 2016

      Thomas J. Seider and Steven L. Bran-nock of Brannock & Humphries, Tampa; and T. Patton Youngblood, Jr., of Young-blood Law Firm, St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
    Sarah Lahlou-Amine of Buchanan, In-gersoll & Rooney PC, Tampa; Hala A. Sandridge of Buchanan, Ingersoll & Rooney PC, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record); and Blake J. Delaney and Sun-deep B. Nath of Buchanan, Ingersoll & Rooney PC, Tampa, for Appellee Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation.
    No appearance for remaining Appellees.
   KHOUZAM, Judge.

Anthony Newton appeals the final summary judgment entered in favor of Caterpillar Financial Services. Because the piece of machinery that caused injuries to Newton is not a dangerous instrumentality, we affirm.

Newton was hired as an independent contractor by C&J Bobcat and Hauling, LLC, to assist its agent, Charles Cram, in clearing debris off a private lot in a residential area. Cram and Newton used a Bobcat model 257B3 loader to assist in clearing the lot. C&J did not own the Bobcat 257B3 loader; rather, it leased it from Caterpillar Financial Services. The loader was transported in a box trailer to the residential property by Cram. Once he arrived on the lot, Cram disencumbered the trailer and briefly drove the loader on the street before driving it onto the private lot. Cram and Newton used the loader to dump the debris they cleared from the lot into a box trailer for disposal. At one point, the two were trying to move a tree stump into the box trailer. Cram was driving the loader, carrying the tree stump in its bucket. He asked Newton to get inside the trailer to pack down the debris that filled the trailer. While Newton was inside the trailer, making room for additional debris, Cram released the tree stump. Newton tried to warn Cram that he was still in the trailer, but his voice could not be heard. He tried to climb over the wall of the box trailer, but the tree stump dropped from the loader’s bucket and rolled back onto Newton’s hand, severing his middle finger.

Newton filed suit against Caterpillar, alleging that it was liable for the injuries he sustained from Cram’s negligent operation of the loader because the loader was a dangerous instrumentality. Newton and Caterpillar filed motions for summary judgment disputing whether the loader was a dangerous instrumentality. The motions were each accompanied by expert affidavits. The trial court heard legal arguments from both parties and found that the loader was not a dangerous instrumentality. It entered judgment in favor of Caterpillar.

Whether the loader in this case is a dangerous instrumentality presents a pure question of law that this court reviews de novo. See Rippy v. Shepard, 80 So.3d 305, 306 (Fla. 2012). The doctrine imposes vicarious liability on the owner of an “‘instrumentality of known qualities [that] is so peculiarly dangerous in its operation’ as to justify application” of the doctrine. Id. (quoting S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 638 (Fla. 1920) (on petition for rehearing)). In deciding whether something is a dangerous instrumentality, courts consider a number of factors. “A primary factor in determining whether an object is a dangerous instrumentality is whether the object at issue is a motor vehicle.” Id. at 308. Courts also evaluate the extent to which an object is regulated because legislative regulation is a recognition of the danger posed by the use of the evaluated instrumentality. See S. Cotton Oil Co., 86 So. at 634 (“It is idle to say that the Legislature imposed all these restraints, regulations, and restrictions upon the use of automobiles, if they were not dangerous agencies which the Legislature felt it was its duty to regulate and restrain for the protection of the public.”). Another factor is the relative danger posed by the instrumentality. See id. at 633; Festival Fun Parks, LLC v. Gooch, 904 So.2d 542, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (noting that accidents involving go-karts causing serious injury were “pretty rare”). The physical characteristics of the object are also pertinent to the dangerous instrumentality inquiry. See Rippy, 80 So.3d at 309; Harding v. Allen-Laux, Inc., 559 So.2d 107, 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (describing a forklift as a “large[ ], four-wheel vehicle with protruding steel tusks”). Courts also consider whether the instrumentality at issue is operated in close proximity to the public. Compare Harding, 559 So.2d at 108 (considering forklift involved in accident with a motor vehicle on public highway), with Canull v. Hodges, 584 So.2d 1095, 1097 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“The road grader we are asked to classify as a dangerous instrumentality was not licensed or regulated and was operating on an airport construction site and its operator was apparently a fellow employee of the plaintiff.” (emphasis added)). No single factor is determinative of the inquiry, and this list of factors is not exhaustive. Rather, these factors exist to assist courts in determining whether an application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is justified. See Harding, 559 So.2d at 108.

With this framework in mind, we return to the evidence reviewed by the trial court. Caterpillar’s expert, Ron Reinholdt, provided an affidavit in support of Caterpillar’s summary judgment motion. He noted that the loader was equipped with a continuous rubber track which was designed for use off road or on unimproved surfaces. He emphasized that the loader was not designed to be primarily operated on roads and that the loader was not routinely operated on public highways, rights-of-way, golf courses, or other improved surfaces. Additionally, Reinholdt’s affidavit provided that Caterpillar maintained databases containing information about reported accidents and litigation. The databases revealed that there were seventeen total accidents reported to Caterpillar involving the 13,326 model 257 loaders sold or leased by Caterpillar. Ten of those accidents involved injury to the operator of the Caterpillar, three involved injury to a technician servicing the loader, and four involved injury to third parties. Only two of the incidents involving third parties resulted in serious injury. Based on these statistics, Reinholdt concluded that the general rate of incident was one in every 783 units and that the rate of incident to third parties was one in every 3331 units. He calculated that one third party is injured for every 1102 years of continuous loader operation.

Newton’s expert, George Kremer, focused on the physical characteristics of the loader and its potential to cause harm. He opined that the loader was a dangerous instrumentality based on the following: The loader weighed 8000 pounds and had a maximum speed of 7.1 miles per hour. The loader was also capable of lifting 2300 pounds to heights of approximately 9.5 feet. The design of the loader, according to Kremer, also restricted the operator’s visibility. Finally, the loader’s rotational speed was such that it posed a danger to bystanders in its vicinity. Kremer conducted an analysis of other instrumentalities held to be “dangerous,” comparing the momentum of those instrumentalities to the loader. He found that the loader’s potential momentum placed it within a range of momentums associated with other dangerous instrumentalities.

During argument on the summary judgment motions, Newton’s counsel reiterated the findings of plaintiffs expert, compared the loader to other machinery previously held to be dangerous instrumentalities, and cited warnings in the loader’s manual to emphasize its potential for danger. Newton also suggested that the loader was classified as special mobile equipment under section 316.003(48), Florida Statutes (2013). He argued, based on common knowledge and experience, that loaders of this type are frequently used in proximity to the public. Caterpillar’s trial counsel relied on the affidavit furnished from its expert and distinguished the cases cited by Newton. He went on to argue that considering all of the factors identified by case law, the loader was not a dangerous instrumentality.

We hold that the Bobcat model 257B3 loader that caused Newton’s injury is not a dangerous instrumentality. A primary factor in our inquiry is whether the loader is an automobile. See Rippy, 80 So.3d at 308. The loader is not an automobile under Florida law. Rather, it is best classified as “[sjpecial mobile equipment,” which is defined as “[a]ny vehicle not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property and only incidentally operated or moved over a highway, including, but not limited to ... bucket loaders.” § 316.003(48). Applied here, the loader’s ability to transport persons or property is incidental to its primary construction and industrial functions. See § 320.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013) (excluding special mobile equipment from the definition of motor vehicle); M.J.S. v. State, 453 So.2d 870, 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (“[T]he legislature does not consider vehicles for construction use to be ‘motor vehicles’ as they have assigned such vehicles to a ‘special’ category.”). The loader does not “transport persons or property” on “the roads of this state.” See § 320.01(1)(a) (defining motor vehicle). Rather, the loader itself is transported from job site to job site by C&J because the loader was not designed to be primarily operated on public highways.

Newton argues that this court’s decision in Harding requires this court to find that the loader is an automobile and a dangerous instrumentality. We reject this argument. In Harding, the plaintiffs were operating their car when they were involved in a collision with a forklift on a public highway. 559 So.2d at 108. The trial court determined that the forklift was not a dangerous instrumentality but this court reversed. Id. This court reasoned that if a golf cart is a dangerous instrumentality, then surely the “larger, four-wheel[ed] vehicle with protruding steel tusks is liable under this doctrine for its operation on a public highway.” Id. (emphasis added). This court further reasoned that while the forklift may be “special mobile equipment” for the purposes of chapter 316, the forklift was “still unquestionably a large vehicle powered by a motor and requiring skilled operation.” Id. This court concluded that in determining whether something is a dangerous instrumentality

the various definitions of “motor vehicle” within the Florida Statutes are not dis-positive. The doctrine is not necessarily invoked by any statutory definition of motor vehicle. Instead, it is invoked by a judicial decision that “an instrumentality of known qualities is so peculiarly dangerous in its operation as to” justify the doctrine.

Id. (quoting S. Cotton Oil Co., 86 So. at 638).

Harding does not control this case, nor does it mandate that we find that the loader is an automobile. The Harding court did not hold that the forklift was a motor vehicle. Rather, Harding stands for the proposition that the “various definitions of ‘motor vehicle’ within the Florida Statutes are not dispositive” as to whether something is a dangerous instrumentality. Id. The court in Harding was presented with a different situation than present here. In Harding, the forklift was operated on a public highway and collided with an automobile driven by a member of the public. Id. Here, the accident occurred on a private lot, and the injured party was not a member of the unsuspecting public.

Next, we consider the extent to which the loader is regulated. Newton cites several statutes in arguing that the loader is heavily regulated. However, we do not find that these statutes apply to the loader. As special mobile equipment, the loader is exempt from some regulations designed for motor vehicles operating on highways. See, e.g., § 316.261(1), (3)(e). Additionally, many of the statutes would only apply to the loader if it were operated on a public highway. See §§ 316.217(1) (imposing headlight requirements for “[ejvery vehicle operated upon a highway within this state” (emphasis added)); .535(1) (“The gross weight imposed on the highway by the wheels of any one axle of a vehicle shall not exceed 20,000 pounds.” (emphasis added)); .614(3)(a) (defining “motor vehicle” for purpose of seat belt regulation as a “vehicle as defined in s. 316.003 which is operated on the roadways, streets, and highways of this state” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the loader is not substantially regulated.

Further, we consider the relative danger posed by the loader. According to Caterpillar’s expert, Ron Reinholdt, accidents involving injury are exceedingly rare — accidents involving injury to third parties only occur once every 1102 years of continuous loader operation. There is no record evidence to otherwise suggest that the loader has a high accident rate. Additionally, the type of injury in this case favors a finding that the loader is not a dangerous instrumentality. According to Caterpillar’s databases, most incidents involved injury to the operator of the loader. Accidents involving third parties were even rarer than injuries to service technicians. The accident occurring in this case and the evidence of other accidents are not akin to the type of accidents caused by the operation of motor vehicles. See Meister v. Fisher, 462 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1984) (“[A] golf cart when negligently operated on a golf course, has the same ability to cause serious injury as does any motor vehicle operated on a public highway.”); Harding, 559 So.2d at 108 (holding that a forklift is a dangerous instrumentality where it was involved in a collision with an automobile). Thus, the relative danger posed by the instrumentality is low.

It is true that an instrumentality such as a crane that lifts heavy objects can be considered a dangerous instrumentality. See Scott & Jobalia Const. Co. v. Halifax Paving, Inc. ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 538 So.2d 76, 79 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), opinion approved of sub nom. Halifax Paving, Inc. v. Scott & Jobalia Const. Co., 565 So.2d 1346 (Fla. 1990). And it has been argued in this case that the loader is inherently dangerous due to its ability to lift heavy loads. However, the loader’s nine-foot lifting capacity is far shy of that of a crane. See Scott & Jobalia Const. Co., 538 So.2d at 78 (“[F]rom twenty-five feet up, a forty-foot section of pipe fell out of the sling.” (emphasis,added)). Simply that an instrumentality may have the potential to cause severe harm by dropping a load it has lifted is insufficient to find it is a dangerous instrumentality — all the factors must be considered. See N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A. v. Constr. Equip. Int’l, Inc., 587 So.2d 502, 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (“The crane in this case does not fall within the dangerous instrumentality doctrine because the crane was in use for construction, did not pose a sufficient danger to the public, was generally fenced and not exposed to the general public, and was not used as a motor vehicle or commonly found on the highways at the time of the accident.”).

Finally, there is no evidence in the record establishing that the loader was operated in close proximity to the public routinely or at the time of the accident. While Newton’s counsel argued that similar loaders are “everywhere,” the arguments of counsel are not evidence. See Collins Fruit Co. v. Giglio, 184 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the arguments of counsel are not evidence.”). There was no evidence presented that these loaders were routinely operated in close proximity to the public. Additionally, the facts of this case do not show that this loader was operated in proximity to the public. The accident occurred on a private lot, and the injured party was an independent contractor hired to assist with the job. See Canull, 584 So.2d at 1097 (affirming trial court’s determination that road grader was not a dangerous instrumentality where a fellow employee was injured on an airport construction site); N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A., 587 So.2d at 504. Thus, there is no evidence that the public is sufficiently exposed to loaders of this type as to justify application of vicarious liability-

We do recognize that based on its physical characteristics the loader has the potential to cause serious injury. It weighs over 8000 pounds and can lift a one-ton load nine feet into the air. Although it has a low rate of speed, its sheer size and weight give it the ability to generate a substantial amount of momentum. It is beyond question that the loader is a serious piece of machinery with the capacity to do great harm. However, the physical characteristics of the loader constitute only one of the factors to consider in determining whether a piece of machinery is a dangerous instrumentality.

Accordingly, after thorough consideration of the pertinent factors, we affirm the trial court’s determination that the loader is not a dangerous instrumentality.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA and SLEET, JJ., Concur.

      . Newton did not name Cram or C&J as defendants in his complaint. However, Caterpillar filed a third-party complaint against Cram, his brother, and C&J, seeking indemnification and alleging breach of contract. The third-party complaint alleged that Cram and his brother owned C&J.

      . Citing a section of the loader's manual on "roading” the loader, Newton argues that the loader should be considered a motor vehicle. The manual provides that the loader may be equipped with tires and modified to drive on the road. We reject this argument because our analysis should focus on the loader as equipped, not as it could be modified. See Foster v. Lee, 226 So.2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) (holding that a trailer by itself is not a dangerous instrumentality and reasoning that modifying the trailer by attaching a tractor to pull it created a "new vehicle”).


text:
    Randy L. FOX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-1482
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed December 30, 2016
    Randy L. Fox, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Donna A. Geraee, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. This Court retains jurisdiction to address the imposition of sanctions.

B.L. THOMAS, RAY, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Reji SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D15-3566
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed December 30, 2016
    Rehearing Denied February 9, 2017
    Reji Smith, Cross City, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Reji Smith appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm as to Grounds One, Four, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine. The record, however, does not conclusively refute Grounds Two and Three, alleging that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the detective’s testimony identifying Smith in the surveillance video and the still photographs and his testimony indicating that he had seen Smith, on a prior occasion, at the residence where the drug deal occurred, and Ground Five, alleging that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, depose, and/or call Patricia Roka Cleveland to testify. Accordingly, we reverse the summary denial of Grounds Two, Three and Five and remand for attachment of portions of the record conclusively refuting those claims or for an evi-dentiary hearing. See Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.” (citing Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1996))).

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

SAWAYA, TORPY and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    I.Q., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-563
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 13, 2017
    Rehearing Denied February 6, 2017
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Brittany N. O’Neil, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah A. Chance, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the appealed order except that we strike from the order the language that requires Appellant “to get a job within 30 days” and to “provide proof of job search at status hearing.” We remand for the entry of an amended order.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED with directions.

SAWAYA, EVANDER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.