author: KING, JUSTICE, COLEMAN, JUSTICE,

text:
    PASCAGOULA-GAUTIER SCHOOL DISTRICT, formerly known as Pascagoula School District and City of Pascagoula, Mississippi v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF JACKSON COUNTY, Mississippi
    NO. 2014-CA-01774-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    10/20/2016
    Rehearing Denied March 23, 2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: WILLIAM E. WHITFIELD, III, KIMBERLY DAWN SAUCIER ROSETTI EDDIE C. WILLIAMS
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JACK-YE C. BERTUCCI
    BEFORE DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS AND KING, JJ.
   KING, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶1. The Pascagoula-Gautier School District and the City of Pascagoula took issue with the Jackson County Board of Supervisors’ approval of the Tax Assessor’s methodology in assessing taxes on Chevron’s leasehold interest in property it leased from Jackson County. After several years of litigation, and after the trial court had denied two motions to dismiss for lack of standing, the trial court sua sponte reversed course and granted the second motion to dismiss for lack of standing. It reasoned that the School District and City lacked standing because Mississippi Code Section 11-51-77 does not specifically grant them standing. Because the School District and the City need not show a specific statute authorizing standing, and because they have otherwise demonstrated standing, we reverse the trial court judgment on this issue. As subsidiary matters, the School District and the City appeal the trial court’s orders granting the Board’s demand for jury trial under Section 11—51— 77 and denying the PGSD’s motion to join Chevron as a party. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant the Board’s demand for a jury trial and reverse the trial court’s order declining to join Chevron as a party.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In 1982, Jackson County and Chevron executed a lease allowing Chevron to lease property owned by Jackson County. Because the property itself was owned by Jackson County and was thus not taxable, Jackson County and Chevron entered into in lieu of tax agreements. The in lieu of tax agreements provided that, so long as the property or Chevron’s interest in the property were not subject to taxation, Chevron would pay an amount of money in lieu of taxes. Chevron was to pay

An amount equal to the aggregate of (1) an amount equal to the state and county ad valorem taxes which otherwise would be lawfully levied by the County, and which otherwise would be due by the Company, on property of like kind and character as the Pollution Control Project and the Additional Pollution Control Project [and the Port Project], and (2) an amount equal to the annual municipal separate school district ad valorem taxes which otherwise would be lawfully levied by the City of Pascagoula, and which otherwise would be due by the Company, on property of like kind and character as the Pollution Control Project and the Additional Pollution Control Project [and the Port Project][.]

The Chevron property is located in the Pascagoula-Gautier School District (formerly the Pascagoula School District). However, it is not located within the boundaries of the City of Pascagoula. Since the property is in the County, but the City is the taxing authority for the school district in which the property is located, the County assesses and collects the taxes for the City per interlocal agreement. The Board of Supervisors’ resolution on the in lieu of agreements provided that the monies received in lieu of the school district ad valorem taxes would “be divided by the County among all of the School Districts in Jackson County based upon the average daily attendance of the number of pupils attending the public schools in Jackson County.” Further, in 2007, the Legislature passed a law that provided that revenue from school district ad valorem taxes levied on properties such as Chevron’s property shall be distributed to all the public school districts in the county in which the property is located. See Pascagoula School Dist. v. Tucker, 91 So.3d 598, 600-01 (Miss. 2012). The Pascagoula School District filed suit, arguing that this statute was unconstitutional, as the constitution provides that a school district may levy a tax to maintain its schools, not its schools and several others. Id. at 602-03. This Court found the school district’s argument persuasive and declared the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 606-07. This mandated that all of the school district ad valorem funds from the Chevron property go to the Pascagoula School District. Id.

¶3. During the pendency of this litigation, the Pascagoula School District (which hereinafter will be referred to by its current name, the Pascagoula-Gautier School District, or PGSD) discovered that the Chevron property was still on the in lieu of tax rolls nearly twenty years after the lease was signed, instead of the regular tax rolls, as required by law. See Miss. Const. art. 7, § 182 (providing that certain tax exemptions may not exceed ten years). In 2010, the PGSD began requesting that Jackson County place the Chevron Leases on the tax rolls. Also in 2010, while the Chevron Leases were still on the in lieu of rolls, the property was assessed for the in lieu of rolls at a true value of $58,706,097, which gave an assessed value of $17,611,829, which, at the school district’s 48.3900 millage rate, led to $852,236.41 in taxes collected for the school district. Finally, in October 2011, Jackson County added the Chevron Leases to the tax rolls. The 2011 assessed value was determined to be $8,422,716, less than half of the assessed value during the prior year. During the time the appraisal was being done and was awaiting approval, the PGSD communicated with the Jackson County Board of Supervisors (hereinafter Board) and the Jackson County Tax Assessor in an attempt to understand how the assessment was calculated.

¶4. After the Board approved the assessment in October of 2011, the PGSD and City of Pascagoula (hereinafter City) filed notices of appeal and a bill of exceptions in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. The Bill of Exceptions alleged that Chevron signed an in lieu of agreement that Chevron would pay a fee equal to the ad valo-rem taxes it otherwise would owe on the leasehold value of the property, that the 2011 “50% rule” valuation was not based upon legal authority or an official appraisal publication, but was simply used as a “rule of thumb” by the tax assessor’s office, that the assessment did not take into account the factors generally used in assessing a leasehold interest, that the assessment is not based upon substantial evidence, that the assessment does not reflect the true value of the leasehold, that the assessment is arbitrary and capricious, and that the assessment is in violation of certain statutory and constitutional provisions. The City moved to consolidate the cases filed by itself and the PGSD, and the motion was granted. On January 30, 2012, the Board moved the Court to dismiss the case for lack of standing. On April 3, 2012, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The PGSD then moved for a trial de novo. The circuit court found that the motion “at this time” should be denied and the case remanded for the Board to conduct a hearing on the issue, so that a complete record could be submitted to the circuit court.

¶5. In the meantime, the situation was repeating itself with the 2012 assessment of the Chevron taxes, with the assessment being approximately half of what it was when the land was on the in lieu rolls. On August 27, 2012, the Board held a hearing on this 2012 assessment and objection, culminating with the Board denying the objection, finding that the PGSD and the City lacked standing, and that their claims also were without merit. Chevron participated in this hearing, arguing that it was entitled to notice, or at least should have been put on the pleadings. The PGSD and the City appealed this determination to the circuit court. The situation essentially repeated itself with the 2013 and 2014 assessments, and the appeals from each year’s assessment all were consolidated by the circuit court.

¶6. On September 18, 2012, the Board held a hearing on the 2011 objection. Chevron participated. The Board denied the objection, finding that the PGSD and the City failed to follow the proper procedures to object and that their arguments also were without merit. The case went back to circuit court, where, as mentioned, it eventually was consolidated with the 2012 ease, and subsequently, with the 2013 and 2014 cases.

¶7, On January 18, 2013, the circuit judges in the district all recused themselves and requested that this Court appoint a special judge to hear the matter. This Court appointed Judge Samac Richardson. On April 8, 2013, the Board filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of standing that was virtually identical to the motion filed in 2012. Chevron joined the motion to dismiss. On May 20, 2013, the circuit court denied the 2013 motion to dismiss for lack of standing. On the same day, the trial court granted the PGSD’s motion for a trial de novo pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-77. Both the Board and Chevron separately petitioned this Court for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of standing, and this Court denied both petitions.

¶8. During the continuation of the cases, Chevron fully participated in the case, filing pleadings and motions, making arguments, and never entering any sort of “special” appearance or limiting its participation, yet it never filed a motion to intervene, During this time, Chevron participated in the following ways:

1. Participating in the hearing on the 2012 objection, including a statement that it “should” be on the pleadings on the objection.
2. Participating in the hearing on the 2011 objection.
3. Filing a joinder in the Board’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal pursuant to Section 11-51-75.
4. Filing a joinder in the Board’s Objection to Motion to Consolidate Cases.
5. Filing a joinder in the Board’s Motion to Strike Exhibits.
6. Filing a joinder in the Board’s Certificate of Deficiencies in Amended and Supplemental Bill of Exceptions.
7. Filing a Motion to Affirm Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of Jackson County, Mississippi, Denying the Objection to Assessment Filed by City of Pas-cagoula and Pascagoula School District as to Certain Leasehold Interests Held by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. and Making Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Board ultimately filed a join-der in this motion.
8. Noticing a hearing for the above motion.
9. Filing a Reply to the PGSD’s Response to the above motion.
10. Filing a Response to Supplementation to Response to the above motion.
11. Filing a joinder in the Board’s 2013 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing.
12. Filing a Reply to Response in Opposition to the Board’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing.
13. Filing a joinder in the Board’s Reply to the Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing.
14. Filing a re-notice of hearing for its Motion to Affirm the Resolution of the Board.
15. Filing a second re-notice of hearing for the above motion.
16. Filing a joinder in the Board’s Response to Motion to Consolidate.
17. Participating in the May 6, 2013 hearing on standing. This included a statement that “Chevron is here because we kind of had to force ourselves into a case where people are trying to raise our taxes. And it’s the process that is objectionable, and not the fact that we’re paying taxes[.]”

¶9. Meanwhile, the proceedings were moving along with trial preparations. The PGSD served Chevron with discovery. Chevron responded by, for the first time, arguing that it was not required to respond to discovery because it was not a party to the appeal. The PGSD moved to compel Chevron’s discovery responses, and Chevron continued to respond that it was not a party. At the hearing on this issue, the court indicated that the proper procedures had not been followed, and that Chevron indeed was not a party. The PGSD then filed a Motion to Join Chevron U.S.A. Inc. as a party in the matter, pursuant to Rule 19 and/or Rule 20. The court denied PGSD’s motion.

¶10. Concurrently, the parties were arguing over whether to conduct a jury trial or a bench trial. The Board made a Demand for Jury Trial, which the PGSD and City opposed. After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court granted the Board’s demand for a jury trial.

¶11. On November 19, 2014, the circuit court sua sponte reconsidered its previous ruling(s) on standing. It granted the Board’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, finding that Section 11-51-77 “allows only the taxpayer who retains an ownership or possessory interest in the subject property to appeal the assessment.” It noted that “[ajlthough, not specifically prohibited by the statute, it just seems unfair to allow one person to contest the tax assessment of another. I would think that an aggrieved person would typically be one who was over assessed rather than one who was under assessed or a third party contesting the under assessment of another.” The instant appeal resulted. The PGSD and City appeal the motion to dismiss for lack of standing, as well as the order granting a jury trial and the order denying their motion to join Chevron as a party.

ANALYSIS

A. Standing

¶12. This Court applies a de novo standard of review to its review of standing. SASS Muni V, LLC v. DeSoto County, 170 So.3d 441, 445 (Miss. 2015).

¶13. Mississippi has “quite liberal” standing requirements, especially as compared to the standing requirements set out in Article III of the United States Constitution. Id. at 445—46. To have standing, a party must: 1) “assert a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation”; or 2) “experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant”; or 3) be “otherwise authorized by law” to sue. Id. at 446 (internal quotations omitted). “An interest is deemed colorable if it appears to be true, valid, or right[,]” and the entitlement to assert a claim must be grounded in some legal right recognized by either statute or common law. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, to establish standing based on experiencing an adverse effect, that adverse effect that is “experienced must be different from the adverse effect experienced by the general public.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, “this Court has been more permissive in granting standing to parties who seek review of governmental actions.” State v. Quitman County, 807 So.2d 401, 405 (Miss. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). Because PGSD clearly experienced an adverse impact different from the effect experienced by the general public, it has standing, and we decline to address whether a colorable interest exists or whether PGSD otherwise is authorized by law to sue.

¶14. The PGSD and the City argue that, as the direct recipient of the revenue from the taxes collected and the taxing authority, the PGSD and City experience an adverse effect different than that of the general public. They also note that the School District has a statutory duty to secure proper funding. The Board argues that the PGSD and City do not suffer any adverse effect that is different from that of the general public. It argues that any adverse effect is the same as experienced by any parent -with a child in the school district. It points to cases in other states in which those courts found that a third party did not have standing to challenge a tax assessment. It also argues that finding that the PGSD and the City experience an adverse effect would open the floodgates of litigation, because any taxpayer could challenge any other taxpayer’s assessment.

¶15. In City of Belmont v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, several municipalities sued the tax commission, arguing that the State was not following the law in its diversion of state sales tax funds to the municipalities. 860 So.2d 289 (Miss. 2003). The trial court in City of Belmont determined that no statute or constitutional provision specifically granted authority to the municipalities to sue, thus, the municipalities lacked standing. Id. at 296. The trial court also found that the State Auditor had the exclusive authority to bring the sort of action brought in the case. Id. Similarly in this case, the trial court found that Section 11-51-77 did not authorize the PGSD to bring suit, and that the district attorney, county attorney, and/or Attorney General had the exclusive authority to bring such a suit on behalf of the City under the statute. The trial court did not determine whether the PGSD and the City had a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experienced an adverse effect. The Court in City of Belmont found that “[t]he Municipalities clearly have a colorable interest in the subject matter of this litigation concerning statutorily prescribed sales tax diversions.” Id. at 297. The Municipalities had argued that their standing was based on their colorable interest deriving from their status as direct beneficiaries of the sales tax diversion statutes and as the ones experiencing the adverse effects of the State’s actions. Id. at 295. This Court also found that the trial court erred in finding that the State Auditor had the exclusive authority to bring these suits, as, while the statute gave the State Auditor the power to bring the suits, it did not give the Auditor exclusive authority. Id. at 297.

¶16. While City of Belmont found the issue of colorable interest dispositive, this case is similar to City of Belmont in that the PGSD is the direct beneficiary of the school district taxes assessed on the property. The City is the taxing authority for the school district taxes on the property. Moreover, both the PGSD and the City have statutory duties associated with the taxes. “Each school board shall submit to the levying authority for the school district a certified copy of an order adopted by the school board requesting an ad valo-rem tax effort in dollars for the support of the school district.” Miss. Code Ann. § 37-57-104(1) (Rev. 2014) (emphasis added). The copy of the order must be submitted at the same time as the copies of the school district’s budget are filed with the levying authority, pursuant to statutory law. Id. “Upon receipt of the school board’s order requesting the ad valorem tax effort in dollars, the levying authority shall determine the millage rate necessary to generate funds equal to the dollar amount requested by the school board.” Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, “[t]he governing authorities of the municipalities shall levy and collect all taxes for and behalf of all school districts which were designated as municipal separate school districts prior to July 1, 1986.” Miss. Code Ann. § 37-57-l(l)(a) (emphasis added).

¶17. The average taxpayer in the district, or the average parent of a child in the school district, is neither the direct beneficiary of ad valorem taxes, nor is he or she under any statutory or fiduciary duty to levy taxes or to budget and pay for the education of the students in the district. The PGSD and the City clearly experience an adverse effect that is different from that of the average parent of a child in the school district. Their funding is reduced by any allegedly improperly low tax assessment, the City must set a higher millage rate for the rest of its taxpayers in order to meet the budget; plus, the school district must incur certain costs encountered in raising millage rates. See Miss. Code Ann. § 37-57-104 (Rev. 2014). The PGSD and the City both experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the Board, and that adverse effect is different from that experienced by the general public. The PGSD and the Board consequently have standing to sue the Board in this matter.

B. Jury Trial

¶18. The PGSD and City argue that the trial court erred in granting the Board’s demand for a jury trial under Section 11-51-77, which provides that any appeal of a tax assessment shall be tried anew in circuit court. This Court affirms the decision of the trial court. See Riverboat Corp. of Mississippi v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 198 So.3d 289 (Miss. 2016).

C. Joinder of Chevron as a Party

¶19. This Court reviews issues of joinder for abuse of discretion. Riverbend Utils., Inc. v. Brennan, 68 So.3d 59, 61 (Miss. 2011).

¶20. The PGSD and the City argue that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to order Chevron’s joinder under Rules 19 and 20 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. They further argue that Chevron waived any right to object to being joined due to its unfettered participation in the case. The Board argues that the PGSD and the City have taken inconsistent positions with regard to Chevron, essentially admitting that Chevron should not be joined, and further arguing that the trial court’s decision was proper under Rules 19 and 20.

¶21. A majority of this Court agrees that Chevron should have been joined as a party, but the majority has differing views as to the reason Chevron should have been joined. Some members of the majority believe that Chevron should be joined as a party under Rule 19. Other members of the majority believe that Chevron, through its participation in the case, waived the right to object to its joinder as a party. Either way, a majority agrees that the trial court erred by failing to join Chevron as a party to the litigation. We therefore reverse the trial court on this issue.

CONCLUSION

¶22. The trial court erred when it determined that the PGSD and the City lacked standing because Section 11-51-77 does not authorize them to sue. A party need not be authorized by a specific statute to have standing, if that party has a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experiences an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant. The PGSD and the City certainly experienced an adverse effect different from the general public from the Board’s conduct. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss for lack of standing and remand the case for further proceedings.

¶23. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant the Board a jury trial, pursuant to Riverboat.

¶24. The trial court erred in denying the motion to join Chevron as a party. This Court reverses this decision of the trial court and remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶25. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P JJ., KITCHENS AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY LAMAR AND BEAM, JJ.; MAXWELL, J., JOINS IN PART.

COLEMAN, JUSTICE,

CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:

¶26. While I concur with the majority’s analysis of the first two issues, I respectfully dissent from its amorphous analyses of the issue of joinder. The majority holds that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to join Chevron but does not agree on a reason. Some members of the majority—we do not know which ones or how many—believe Chevron waived its right to object to joinder by its voluntary participation in the case. No legal basis—statutory, caselaw, or procedural rule—exists to support the majority’s premise that Chevron’s participation waived its right to object to its joinder. More troubling, the general law of waiver upon which some in the majority rely applies just as much—if not more so—to the school district than to Chevron. The school district sat by for months allowing Chevron to participate as a nonparty in the litigation and did not request joinder until the end. Indeed, as more fully set forth below, during a hearing in front of the trial judge early in the litigation, the school district expressly disavowed the need for Chevron to be a party.

¶27. Today, the Court acts in a wholly arbitrary fashion by choosing to apply the waiver doctrine to one party when the doctrine is equally—or even more—applicable to the other. We act on a whim.

¶28. Other members of the majority— again, we do not know how many or which ones—believe the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to join Chevron as a compulsory party claiming an interest under Rule 20(a)(2). The majority does so despite the fact that Chevron opposes join-der and despite the fact that the party at risk of double litigation—the county—told the trial judge that it took no position on whether Chevron should be joined.

¶29.1 would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the joinder of Chevron under Rule 19 or Rule 20 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

¶30. Our standard of review for joinder issues is abuse of discretion. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Gregory, 912 So.2d 829, 833 (¶5) (Miss. 2005). “Abuse of discretion is the most deferential standard of review appellate courts employ.” Ashmore v. Miss. Auth. on Educ. Television, 148 So.3d 977, 982 (Miss. 2014). The abuse of discretion standard mandates that we “must affirm the decision, regardless of what any of us individually might have ruled had we been the judge, unless there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed clear error.” Ferguson v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 179 So.3d 1060, 1064 (Miss. 2015) (internal citations omitted). In light of the history of the case and arguments presented to the trial judge at the hearing on the joinder motion, discussed more fully below, I cannot reach the conclusion that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the school district’s motion to join Chevron in the appeal being pursued by the school district.

¶31. Rule 19(a) provides for compulsory joinder of a party if:

(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.

M.R.C.P. 19(a). Additionally, the Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 19 provides four main questions to consider: 1) “the plaintiffs interest in having a forum”; 2) “the defendant’s wish to avoid multiple litigation, inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for' a liability shared with another”; 3) “the interest of an outsider whom it would have been desirable to join”; and 4) “the interest of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies.”

¶32. Chevron is not an indispensable party under either prong of Rule 19(a). “[J]oinder of parties is only necessary if complete relief cannot be accorded among those who are already parties to the suit.” Craft v. Craft, 825 So.2d 605, 610 (¶20) (Miss. 2002). Under Rule 19(a)(1), the parties involved can receive complete relief without Chevron’s participation in the suit. Chevron is not involved with and has no say in determining the process by which its tax assessor evaluates the property or the appropriate methodology for assessing the taxes. Chevron’s absence would not prevent either party from obtaining complete relief regarding the proper methodology to evaluate the tax assessment.

¶33. Neither does Rule 19(a)(2), upon which some of the members of the majority rely, provide relief for the school district. First, though Chevron may have an interest in the correct methodology being used to assess the taxes it will pay, the school district has not articulated how Chevron’s absence would impede Chevron’s ability to protect its interest. Additionally, the school district has not explained how it would be subject to multiple obligations were Chevron not a party to the lawsuit. “It is the duty of counsel to make more than an assertion; they should state reasons for their propositions, and cite authorities in.their support.” Williams v. State, 708 So.2d 1358 (Miss. 1998). Also of note, Rule 19(a)(2) contemplates that the party to be joined “claims an interest relating to the subject matter” of the litigation, and—although Chevron is not a party to the appeal—the record clearly demonstrates that Chevron denied any interest in joinder.

¶34. The hearing on the school district’s motion to join Chevron took place on June 11, 2014. Present were attorneys for the school district, an attorney for Chevron, an attorney for the City of Pascagoula, and an attorney for Jackson County. As an initial matter, Jackson County, which would be the party at risk of double litigation should Chevron not be joined, took no position on the issue of joinder. Counsel for Jackson County stated, “... you may notice we did not file anything on this particular issue. So we are basically here to see what the Court decides.” It is worthy of note that, despite the possible threat of double litigation, the entity so-threatened did not argue for joinder before the trial court.

¶35. Furthermore, at the hearing on the motion to join Chevron, the school district contradicted its earlier position regarding the necessity of Chevron’s involvement as a party. As the majority opinion notes, the trial court denied two motions filed by Jackson County to dismiss the case, in which the county argued that the school district lacked standing. The parties argued the first motion to dismiss for lack of standing on March 16, 2012. In short, Jackson County argued that the right to bring the claims at issue belonged to Chevron, and not to the school district. The school district responded and argued to the trial court that it had a colorable interest and could proceed as a party challenging the tax assessment to Chevron without the involvement of Chevron. An attorney for Chevron appeared at and participated in the hearing on Jackson County’s second motion to dismiss, held on May 6, 2013. After counsel for Chevron addressed the Court, the attorney for the school district noted his presence and noted that Chevron had not interpleaded or otherwise joined as a party, but he did not object or ask the Court to exclude Chevron absent joinder. Later, counsel for the school district argued that the school district had standing to contest the tax appropriate to Chevron whether Chevron had notice or not arid whether Chevron participated or- not. Counsel for the City of Pascagoula, when given his turn to argue to the trial court, pointed out the unlikelihood of Chevron joining in litigation and contesting a tax assessment that “cuts their payments in half.” Both the school district and the city argued that Chevron need not even be notified of the action. When the Court later heard arguments on the motion to join Chevron, counsel for Chevron reminded the Court that the school district and the city had taken the position that the taxpayer need not be involved.

¶36. In addition, neither the majority nor the school district identifies the type of party Chevron would be if joined. The school district and the city, which are in the position of plaintiffs in the appeal of the county’s tax assessment below, wish to increase Chevron’s tax burden, so it would not make sense for Chevron to be joined as a compulsory plaintiff.

From our reading of the relevant authorities, we believe that this is not a proper case for joinder of the absent party as a Rule 19(a) “involuntary plaintiff.” The “proper case” is meant to cover only those instances where the absent party has either a duty to allow the plaintiff to use his name in the action or some sort of an obligation to join plaintiff in the action.

Eikel v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 473 F.2d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 1973). Chevron has no role in assessing the taxes levied by the county. Accordingly, no relief sought by the school district or city could be ordered against Chevron, which makes it unnecessary as a defendant.

¶37. Neither party that would be affected by duplicative litigation, Chevron or Jackson County, asked the trial court below to join Chevron as a party. Neither the school district nor the majority has shown that the school district will not be afforded complete relief absent Chevron’s joinder. In light of the above-described procedural history and the fact that Jackson County did not, when given clear opportunity to do so, join in the request to join Chevron as a party, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to join Chevron.

¶38. Rule 20 provides for permissive joinder as follows

All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if 'any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or seiies of transactions or occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.

M.R.C.P. 20(a). “Rule 20 gives trial courts broad discretion in determining when and how to try claims.” Hegwood v. Williamson, 949 So.2d 728, 730 (¶5) (Miss. 2007) (citing Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. v. Caldwell, 905 So.2d 1205, 1207 (¶6) (Miss. 2005)). Notwithstanding its prior participation, Chevron strongly expresses an interest in not being joined, has not filed a motion to be joined, and has not initiated a separate right to relief to be considered under Rule 20. Thus, the permissive language in Rule 20 appears to offer the school district no relief. Again, the issue in the present case is whether the tax assessor used the proper methodology in valuing the taxes owed. Chevron has no involvement in determining the methodology for the assessment; therefore, it is difficult to understand and certainly was not explained by the school district, what relief Chevron would offer by being joined as a party. Similarly to the lack of Rule 19 analysis, the school district’s brief does not contain any application of Rule 20 to the facts of the present case or cite to any relevant authority; therefore, I decline to analyze the issue further. See Grey v. Grey, 638 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss. 1994); Williams v. State, 708 So.2d 1358 (Miss. 1998).

¶39. In coming to the conclusion that Chevron should not be joined, the trial court reviewed the relevant documents and heard argument from Chevron and the school district and the City. Based on my review of the record, I cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the joinder of Chevron.

¶40. Finally, the majority does a disservice to the parties and the members of the bench and bar by issuing a majority opinion in its present form. The majority reaches an agreement on a result but not on the law governing the result. It may do so. See White’s Lumber Supply Co. v. Collins, 186 Miss. 659, 191 So. 105, 106 (1939). However, five justices in the instant case voted with the majority. One reading our opinions will not know how many justices agree in whole or in part with either of the two rationales advanced by the majority. I am unable to discern any reason to withhold the votes from the parties or from those who may seek to cite the opinion in the future. Certainly, no reader of the majority opinion should consider either the grounds of waiver or the Rule 19(a)(2) rationale to be the law in Mississippi and seek to apply one or both as binding authority to any future, similar case, as apparently neither received a majority vote of the Court. In any event, the purposes of issuing opinions to the public would be better served if the majority were to issue separate, plurality opinions on the issue of joinder. See White’s Lumber Supply Co., 191 So. at 106.

LAMAR AND BEAM, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION. MAXWELL, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.

      , Bonds were issued for two projects on this land—the parties sometimes refer to them as the Pollution Control Bonds and the Port Bonds. Each project had separate in lieu of tax agreements, but the in lieu of agreements were essentially the same and the parties appear to treat the two projects as one property in this case.

      . The school district’s name changed from the Pascagoula School District to the Pascagoula-Gautier School District on February 9, 2015.

      . The tax assessor asserts that it valued the leasehold at 50% of the land’s value in fee simple.

      . The Board filed a Petition for Permission for Interlocutory Appeal with this Court, which it then sought to have voluntarily dismissed. The petition was so dismissed.

      . In arguing whether the PGSD has standing because it otherwise is authorized by law to sue, the PGSD and the City argue that Section 11-51-77 allows them to appeal the tax assessment on the Chevron property, The Board argues that Section 11-51-77 does not authorize the PGSD to appeal the tax assessment, and that, while it allows the City to appeal, the City did not do so through the appropriate procedures. To be clear, we do not address whether the PGSD and the City followed the appropriate procedures. The Board does not argue simply that the suit should be dismissed for procedural defects. Rather, it argues that any alleged procedural defects strip the PGSD and the City of standing. But standing is a jurisdictional matter and cannot be eliminated by a mere failure to follow a procedure. Whether the case should be dismissed for procedural defects is an entirely different issue, not properly raised on appeal.

      . Those cases are distinguishable. See City of Richmond Heights v. Board of Equalization of St. Louis County, 586 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. 1979) (Missouri law provided that political subdivisions of the state may not appeal underassess-ments unless they have express statutory authorization; no such statutory authorization existed); Dallas County Bd. of Educ. v. Henry, 507 So.2d 911 (Ala. 1987) (this case did not examine standing at all, but rather the rules of civil procedure; taxpayers brought class action challenging the methodology used to value land for ad valorem tax purposes, and the Dallas County Bpard of Education moved to intervene as of right pursuant to the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure that provided that an applicant with an "interest relating to the property or transaction” that is the subject of the action and when the disposition of the action may impede the party’s ability to protect that interest; Board claimed that if the taxpayers prevailed, they may be required to refund taxes; Court held that the "interest” of the Board under the rules of civil procedure amounted to no more than a "concern” for the outcome of the litigation that was shared by all citizens of the county and all governmental agencies that received taxes).

      . The relevant portion of Section 11-51-77 referring to a municipality being aggrieved by a decision of the Board of Supervisors states;
      The county attorney, the district attorney, or the Attorney General, if the state, county or municipality be aggrieved by a decision of the board of supervisors or the municipal authorities of a city, town, or village as to the assessment of taxes, may, within twenty days after the adjournment of the meeting at which such decision is made, or within twenty days after the adjournment of the meeting at which the assessment rolls are corrected in accordance with the instructions of the state tax commission, or within twenty days after the adjournment of the meeting of the board of supervisors at which the approval of the roll by the state tax commission is entered, appeal to the circuit court of the county in like manner as in the case of any person aggrieved as here-inbefore provided, except no bond shall be required, and such appeal may be otherwise governed by the provisions of this section.
      Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-77 (Rev. 2012).

      . Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 19 states;
      (a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the court shall be joined as a party in the action if:
      (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or
      (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
      Subsection (2) requires Chevron’s joinder as a necessary party. Chevron has claimed an interest in the subject matter of this litigation, and the failure to join Chevron as a party would leave both the District and tax assessor at a substantial risk of facing .double litigation. The relief at issue here is the tax assessor’s valuation of Chevron's property, and the increased tax revenue the District believes it will receive with an appropriate valuation. Both before the board of supervisors and in the circuit court, Chevron has participated in this litigation, specifically arguing that, as the taxpayer who would be subjected to paying increased taxes if the District prevails, it was entitled to notice and an opportunity to protect its interest in this litigation. Though Chevron has never formally moved to intervene, certainly it has asserted “an interest in the subject matter of the litigation.”
      The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 19 explains that the rule is intended to avoid multiple litigation and provide complete relief through a single judicial proceeding:
      There is no precise formula for determining whether a particular nonparty must be joined under Rule 19(b). The decision has to be made in terms of the general policies of avoiding multiple litigation, providing the parties with complete and effective relief in a single action, and protecting the absent persons from the possible prejudicial effect of deciding the case without them.
      This case presents exactly that concern.
      Chevron's absence creates a substantial risk of double litigation. If the District prevails in this litigation, Chevron's tax burden for the subject property will be increased. It takes no crystal ball to discern a substantial risk that Chevron, if not a party to this litigation, will initiate its own litigation to challenge its increased tax burden.

      . "Waiver is voluntary surrender or relinquishment of some known right.” Sentinel Indus. Contracting Corp. v. Kimmins Indus. Serv. Corp., 743 So.2d 954, 964 (Miss. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). This includes "conduct which implies the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. B.J. Enters, of Miss., LLC, 156 So.3d 357, 361 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), Chevron clearly has waived the right to object to joinder due to its conduct: its substantive, extensive, voluntary, and unqualified participation in the matter, Indeed, by its conduct, Chevron unequivocally participated as if it was a party yet now attempts to resist its designation as a party,
      The dissent to this section attempts to equate PGSD’s failure to object to Chevron’s participation, and its reasonable statements allowing Chevron to be heard before the trial court (a result of Chevron’s affirmative actions acting as if it was a parly), as if it is equal to Chevron’s numerous affirmative actions participating as if it was a party to the litigation. Our waiver jurisprudence does not treat a failure to object as stringently as it does affirmative action. For example, a criminal defendant who fails to object to evidence introduced by the State may still have the issue reviewed on appeal for plain error. Lafayette v. State, 90 So.3d 1215, 1218 (Miss. 2012). However, a criminal defendant who affirmatively introduces evidence himself may not then complain on appeal that he introduced that evidence. Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 289 (Miss. 1992) ("It is axiomatic that a defendant cannot complain on appeal concerning evidence that he himself brought out at trial."). PGSD’s failure to object and attempt to be reasonable in a lengthy litigation is simply not the equivalent of Chevron’s multiple, pervasive affirmative actions acting as a party over a course of years.
      Moreover, the dissent notes that PGSD argued that it was not required under statutory law to give Chevron notice of its original challenge to the Board of Supervisors and somehow conflates this to the PGSD admitting that Chevron should not be joined under any circumstances. Such is simply not the case.

      . Riverboat Corp. of Miss. v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 198 So.3d 289 (Miss. 2016).

      . It is difficult to gather from the record and briefs whether the school district is attempting to join Chevron as a defendant or as an involuntary plaintiff who also is involuntarily challenging the methodology.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

license: Public Domain

text:
    ESTATE OF Richard B. DAVIS, BY AND THROUGH Its Executrix, Janice Y. DAVIS v. Darrell N. BLAYLOCK, MD d/b/a Blaylock Medical Clinic, LLC Estate of Richard B. Davis By and Through Its Executrix Janice Y. Davis v. Delta Regional Medical Center Estate of Richard B. Davis, By and Through Its Executrix, Janice Y. Davis v. Delta Regional Medical Center
    NO. 2015-CA-01423-SCT CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2015-CA-01425-SCT, CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2015-CA-01427-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    01/05/2017
    Rehearing Denied March 23, 2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: LEVI BOONE, III, KELVIN CEDELL PULLEY
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JACOB O. MALATESTA, L. CARL HAG-WOOD
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: P. SCOTT PHILLIPS, GREGORY WEATHERS VIRDEN, JR.
   MAXWELL, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This Court has held “that the first court to properly take jurisdiction of a wrongful death action in our state courts shall, so long as the action is pending, have exclusive jurisdiction, and any other subsequently-filed action for the same death shall be of no effect.” Despite this clear holding, Janice Y. Davis (Davis)—after filing an action for the wrongful death of her father, Richard B. Davis, and while that action was pending—filed three additional, separate wrongful-death actions, two of which were against the same defendant. Because these three subsequent actions were of “no effect,” they were properly dismissed. Thus, we affirm the judgments dismissing the three subsequently filed wrongful-death actions.

Background Facts and Procedural History

¶2. This appeal is a consolidation of three appeals, one from each of the subsequently filed wrongful-death lawsuits that was dismissed by the circuit court.

I. Davis’s Four Suits

A.Lawsuit 1 versus Dr. Barber

¶3. Davis filed her first wrongful-death suit against William H. Barber, M.D., on November 4, 2014, in the Washington County Circuit Court. Estate of Richard B. Davis v. William H. Barber, MD, Washington County Cause No. 2014-0134 (Lawsuit 1). She claimed Dr. Barber’s medical negligence caused her father Richard’s death on September 21, 2013. Lawsuit 1 is not part of this appeal.

B.Lawsuit 2 versus Dr. Blaylock

¶4. Fifteen days later, on November 19, 2014, she filed another suit based on her father’s wrongful death. Estate of Richard B. Davis v. Darrell N. Blaylock, MD d/b/a Blaylock Med. Clinic, Washington County Cause No. 2014-0139 (Lawsuit 2). This time she sued Darrell N. Blaylock, M.D., alleging his medical negligence caused her father’s death.

C. Latosuit 3 versus DRMC

¶5. The same day she filed Lawsuit 2, she filed a third wrongful-death lawsuit against Delta Regional Medical Center (DRMC) “based upon the separate negligence committed by Delta Regional Medical Center.” Estate of Richard B. Davis v. Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr., Washington County Cause No. 2014-0140 (Lawsuit 3).

D. Lawsuit 4 versus DRMC

¶6. Then on December 10, 2014, she filed a fourth wrongful-death suit, also against DRMC, “arising from alleged medical and nursing negligence relating to care provided to Richard B. Davis, Sr.[,] by Darrell N. Blaylock, M.D. and the nursing staff of Delta Regional Medical Center.” Estate of Richard B. Davis v. Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr., Washington County Cause No. 2014-0146 (Lawsuit 4).

II. Motions to Dismiss

¶7. Simultaneously with its answers, DRMC filed motions to dismiss both Lawsuit 3 and Lawsuit 4. Because Davis already had filed Lawsuit 1, which was still pending, DRMC argued Lawsuits 3 and 4 had to be dismissed.

¶8. Davis responded by filing a “Motion to Combine and Amend Complaint” in both Lawsuit 3 and Lawsuit 4. In her motions, Davis acknowledged she had filed four separate wrongful-death lawsuits. And she attached to her motions a proposed First Amended Complaint that named Dr. Barber, Dr. Blaylock, and DRMC as defendants.

¶9. While DRMC’s and Davis’s motions were pending, Dr. Blaylock moved to dismiss Lawsuit 2. Like DRMC, Dr. Blaylock cited the still-pending Lawsuit 1. WMe Davis filed a response, she did not file a motion to combine and amend in Lawsuit 2. Nor, apparently, did she file a motion to combine and amend in Lawsuit 1—the first-filed suit.

¶10. The motions to dismiss for all three actions were heard on June 23, 2015. On August 12, 2015, the trial court entered three separate orders dismissing Lawsuit 2, 3, and 4. Each order gave the same reason for dismissal—

Based on the decision in Long, this Court finds that the first wrongful death action filed for the death of Mr. Davis, Davis v. Barber, Washington County cause no. 2014-0134 [(Lawsuit 1)], is the only valid wrongful death case filed. The remaining three cases that were subsequently filed have no effect and shall be dismissed.

See Long v. McKinney, 897 So.2d 160, 173 (Miss. 2004).

¶11. Within ten days of the orders, Davis filed a Motion to Modify Orders and/or for Reconsideration in all three dismissed actions, tolling the time to appeal. See M.R.C.P. 59, M.R.A.P. 4(d). In each motion, Davis cited her motions to combine and amend. While she acknowledged these motions had been denied implicitly when the three actions were dismissed, she asked the court to deny them expressly, so she could appeal the denials. Alternatively, she asked the court to reconsider granting her motions to combine the lawsuits instead of dismissing them.

¶12. The trial court entered a second order in each case on August 31, 2015. The orders in Lawsuits 3 and 4 expressly denied the motions to combine and amend as moot. The orders further stated that, because Long held all subsequently filed wrongful-death suits were of “no effect,” the motions filed in these subsequently filed wrongful-death suits also were of no effect. See Long, 897 So.2d at 173. In Lawsuit 2, the court pointed out that no motion to combine and amend had been filed, so there was no pending motion to deny expressly.

III. Notices of Appeal

¶13. Davis timely appealed the final orders in all three eases. We consolidated the three appeals. In each, Davis the raises the same two issues—

I. Whether the trial court erred by failing to grant Plaintiffs Motion to Combine four separate wrongful death lawsuits that were filed by the same Plaintiffs against different Defendants at different times due to the different noticing requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 and Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1.
II. Whether the trial court erred in its August 31, 2015 order in ruling that Plaintiffs Motion to Combine and Amend Complaint was moot.

Discussion

I. The circuit court followed this Court’s clear directive in Long when it dismissed the subsequently filed wrongful-death suits.

¶14. We begin with Davis’s second issue. She claims the trial court erred when it found in its August 31 orders that Davis’s Motion to Combine and Amend Complaint was moot,

1Í15. To be “moot” is to “hav[e] no practical significance.” Moot, Black’s Law Dictionary 1099 (9th ed. 2009). And here, Davis’s motions to combine and amend had no practical significance because they were filed only in subsequently filed wrongful-death suits that were “of no effect.” Long, 897 So.2d at 173, 174.

A. Under Long, any subsequently filed lorongful-death lawsuit “shall be of no effect” while the first action is pending.

¶16. Long also dealt with multiple wrongful-death suits. There, two sets of wrongful-death beneficiaries filed two different lawsuits based on the death of the same decedent. Id. at 164. The second set of beneficiaries moved to consolidate their subsequently filed action with the first. Id. at 165. When their motion was denied, this Court granted an interlocutory appeal. Id. at 167-68.

¶17. On appeal, we applied “the general rule of priority jurisdiction” to uphold the “one-suit” rule expressed in Mississippi’s wrongful-death statute. Id. at 172; see Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2016). Under the rule of priority jurisdiction, “[i]t is fundamental that a plaintiff is not authorized simply to ignore a prior action and bring a second, independent action on the same state of facts while the original action is pending.” Id. at 172. Stated differently, “the principle of priority jurisdiction is that where two suits between the same parties over the same controversy are brought in courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction retains jurisdiction over the whole controversy to the exclusion or abatement of the second suit.” Id.

¶18. We found “that a logical extension of the principle of priority jurisdiction requires that all claims for the wrongful death of a person be litigated in the same suit and in the same court.” Id. at 172. Thus, we held “that the first court to properly take jurisdiction of a wrongful death action in our state courts shall, so long as the action is pending, have exclusive jurisdiction, and any other subsequently-filed action for the same death shall be of no effect.” Id. at 173.

¶19. In this case, the trial court took jurisdiction over Lawsuit 1—to the exclusion of Lawsuits 2, 3, and 4. Thus, we find the trial court properly applied Long’s principle to hold those three subsequently filed actions were “of no effect.”

¶20. On appeal, Davis tries to distinguish Long by pointing out that Long dealt with multiple plaintiffs, while here the same plaintiff brought lawsuits against multiple defendants. But we have made no such distinction, enforcing Long’s one-suit rule when the same plaintiff has multiple wrongful-death suits pending. Sauvage v. Meadowcrest Living Ctr., LLC, 28 So.3d 589 (Miss. 2010) (dismissing second-filed wrongful-death suit because same plaintiff had another action pending in Louisiana involving the same death); Rose v. Bologna, 942 So.2d 1287 (Miss. 2006) (reversing the trial court’s decision to sever plaintiff’s wrongful-death suit against multiple care providers into three lawsuits); cf. also Briere v. S. Cent. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 3 So.3d 126 (Miss. 2009) (holding second wrongful-death lawsuit filed by the same plaintiff did not have to be dismissed because her first wrongful-death action against a different defendant was not currently pending).

1121. In fact, in Rose, we reversed the trial court for splitting the wrongful-death action into three suits. Rose, 942 So.2d at 1290. In that case, the administratrix had filed only one wrongful-death suit against multiple healthcare providers. But the trial court granted two of the defendant doctors’ motions to sever and transfer venue, creating three wrongful-death actions. On interlocutory appeal, we reversed. In doing so, we found Long controlled. “Adhering to the precedent of Long and determining that Section 11-7-13 applies,” this Court “conclude[d] that there cannot be three separate lawsuits for the wrongful death of Kimberly Rose.” Rose, 942 So.2d at 1290 (emphasis added). And if there could not be three lawsuits in Rose, there cannot be four lawsuits here.

¶22. So long as Lawsuit 1 was pending— which Davis conceded it was—Davis’s “subsequently filed action[s] for the same death shall be of no effect.” Long, 897 So.2d at 173; see also Briere, 3 So.3d at 129 (clarifying that Long requires subsequent suits be dismissed when the first suit is still pending).

B. Under Long, there was nothing to combine.

¶23. Still, Davis contends the proper course was to consolidate her multiple actions. But when faced with a similar request to consolidate in Long, we clearly held that, because any subsequently filed actions are “of no effect and should be dismissed,” they cannot be consolidated with the first action. Id. at 174. “Consolidation of suits presupposes that there are two suits to consolidate.” Id. And because a wrongful-death claim “must be brought in a single suit, there cannot be two suits to consolidate.” Id.

¶24. In Long, this meant the second set of beneficiaries could not consolidate their action with the first-filed. But they could join the first action. See id. Here, this means Davis could not “combine” all four lawsuits, for that would presuppose there were four suits to combine. But as the trial court correctly found, Lawsuits 2, 3, and 4 were “of no effect and [had to] be dismissed.” Id. So there was nothing to combine. See id.

¶25. Instead, any claims against Dr. Blaylock and DRMC had to be brought in Lawsuit 1, which Davis’s counsel acknowledged was still pending. But Lawsuit 1 is not part of this appeal. So the issue of whether Davis could amend her complaint in Lawsuit 1 to add her claims against Blaylock and DRMC is not before this Court.

¶26. All that is before us in this consolidated appeal is the decision by the trial court to dismiss Lawsuits 2, 3, and 4. Because the trial court properly relied on Long, we find no error in that decision.

II. Despite the different notice requirements in Section 15-1-36 and Section 11-46-11, Davis did not have to file different lawsuits at different times.

¶27. Alternatively, Davis tries to get around Long’s clear holding by asserting she was “legally obligated to file four separate lawsuits.” This obligation to file multiple suits, she claims, was due to the fact her claims against DRMC, a community hospital, were subject to a different statute of limitations and presuit-notice requirement than her claims against private physicians Dr. Barber and Dr. Blaylock.

¶28. For wrongful-death actions, the statute of limitations for the alleged cause of death applies—in this case medical negligence. See Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust, Inc., 933 So.2d 923, 926 (Miss. 2006), as modified by Said ex rel. Heirs of Cook v. S. Cent. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 25 So.3d 1037 (Miss. 2010). Mississippi Code Section 16-1-36 governs medical negligence claims. It provides a two-year statute of limitations but requires written notice of the intent to sue at least sixty days in advance. Miss. Code Ann. § 15—1— 36(2), (16) (Rev. 2012). But medical-negligence claims against a state-sponsored hospital like DRMC are governed by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). And the MTCA has a shorter, one-year statute of limitations and requires presuit notice to be given at least ninety days before filing suit. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3)(a), (b) (Rev. 2012). So Davis’s claims against private physicians Dr. Barber and Dr. Blay-lock had a longer, two-year statute of limitations but a shorter, sixty-day presuit-notice period. And Davis’s claims against DRMC had a shorter, one-year statute of limitations—subject to tolling under Section 11-46-11(3) (a) and (b)—but a longer, ninety-day presuit-notice period.

¶29. While the application of two different statutes of limitations and presuit-no-tice periods made calculating the window in which to file her lawsuit more complicated, it did not prevent Davis from filing all her claims at the same time in one wrongful-death lawsuit. And by no means was she “obligated” to file four separate suit for the same alleged wrongful death. Instead, based on when Richard died and when Davis filed her presuit-notice letters, Davis had a three-and-a-half-month period—from December 10, 2014, to March 25, 2016—in which she could have filed all her claims in one lawsuit.

¶30. Davis did not wait for this window to open. Instead, Davis chose to go ahead and file Lawsuit 1 on November 4, 2014— the day after the notice period for her claims against Dr. Barber had ended— even though the presuit-notices period had not expired for Dr. Blaylock or DRMC. But contrary to Davis’s contention, nothing in Section 15-1-36 obligated her to file her complaint against Dr. Barber as soon as the sixty-day notice period ended. Instead, the statute required her to give “at least sixty (60) days’ notice.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15) (emphasis added). So Davis could have waited until December 10, 2014—the earliest she could have filed all her claims—and still have been in compliance with both Section 15—1—36(15)’s pre-suit-notice requirement and Section 15-1-36(l)’s two-year statute of limitations.

¶31. The same is true for Lawsuit 2. While the earliest she could file was on November 18, 2014, she was not obligated under Section 15-1-36 to file her second lawsuit the next day, on November 19, 2014. Nor did Section 15-1-36 prevent her from amending her complaint in Lawsuit I—an issue outside the scope of this appeal.

¶32. Neither did Section 11-46-11 compel Davis to file Lawsuit 3 on November 19, 2014, the same day she filed Lawsuit 2. Like Section 15-1-36, notice under Section II-46-11 must be given “at lead ninety (90) days before initiating suit.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11—46—11(1) (emphasis added). But Davis’s notice served to toll the statute of limitations ninety-five days—or until December 25, 2014. Miss. Code Ann. § ll-46-ll(3)(a). And then, by operation of Section ll-46-ll(3)(b), she had an additional ninety days—or until March 25, 2015—to file suit. See Buckner, 61 So.3d at 169. So Davis could have waited to file all her claims on December 10, 2014, and fully complied with both statutes.

¶33. In other words, there is no conflict between Long’s clear holding that Davis could have only one pending wrongful-death lawsuit and Sections 15-1-36’s and 11-46-11’s differing statute of limitations and presuit-notice requirements.

Conclusion

¶34. Because Long clearly holds that Lawsuits 2, 3, and 4 were “of no effect” while Lawsuit 1 was still pending, the trial court did not err in dismissing each of these subsequently filed wrongful-death suits. Nor did it err in finding Davis’s motion to amend and combine was moot, as it had been filed in the ineffective Lawsuits 3 and 4. Thus, we affirm the judgments of the trial courts, which dismissed the three subsequently filed wrongful-death suits.

¶35. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS, COLEMAN AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, P.J., KING AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . Long v. McKinney, 897 So.2d 160, 173 (Miss. 2004).

      . Davis filed a copy of her proposed First Amended Complaint in Lawsuit 2, But this filing was not accompanied by any motion to amend or combine.

      . Technically, this issue arises only in Davis’s appeal in Lawsuits 3 and 4. The trial court did not deny the motion to combine and amend as moot in Lawsuit 2 because, as the court rightly acknowledged, Davis never filed such motion in the action against Dr. Blay-lock. But as this issue goes to the trial court’s underlying August 12, 2015 orders dismissing all three suits based on Long, the resolution of this issue also affects Davis’s appeal of the dismissal of Lawsuit 2.

      . See Copiah Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Buckner, 61 So.3d 162, 169 (Miss. 2011) (citing Page v. Univ. of S. Miss., 878 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 2004) (explaining how to calculate MTCA’s statute of limitations based on Section 11-46-11(3)'s tolling provisions).

      . Richard’s death on September 21, 2013, triggered both Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year statute of limitations and Section 15—1—36(2)’s two-year statute of limitations. See Saul, 25 So.3d at 1046 (holding that "the statute of limitations for the single cause of action that may be brought pursuant to the wrongful death statute cannot begin to run until the date of death”).
      The first presuit notice Davis sent was to DRMC on August 18, 2014. Because she had to wait at least ninety days to tile an action based on the claims in her presuit notice letter, the earliest she could sue DRMC was November 18, 2014. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1). Davis filed Lawsuit 3 the next day, on November 19, 2014. But due to the tolling provisions of Section 11—46—11(3)(a) and(b), the statute of limitations for these claims did not ran until March 25, 2015. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3); see also Buckner, 61 So.3d at 169 (explaining how tolling provisions apply).
      Davis next sent a presuit-notice letter to Dr. Barber on September 2, 2014. Because under Section 15-1-36 she had to wait at least sixty days before filing suit, the earliest she could sue him was November 3, 2014. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15). Davis filed Lawsuit 1 against Dr. Barber on November 4, 2014-even though the two-year statute of limitations would not run until September 21, 2015. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(2).
      Davis then sent another presuit-notice letter to DRMC on September 11, 2014. To the extent this letter made different allegations than her first, she had to wait until December 10, 2014, to tile these claims. Davis filed Lawsuit 4 on December 10, 2014. But as with her other claims against DRMC, the statute of limitations would not run until March 24, 2015.
      Finally, Davis sent her fourth presuit-notice letter to Dr. Blaylock on September 19, 2014, This meant she had between November 18, 2014, and September 21, 2015, to file her claims against him. Davis filed Lawsuit 2 on November 19, 2014—the same day she filed Lawsuit 3.

      . The only time a plaintiff bringing a medical-negligence claim must file her suit as soon as the sixty-day presuit notice window closes is when “the notice is served within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15) (emphasis added). That is because, in such a scenario, the statute of limitations is tolled only for sixty days. Id. But here, Davis filed her presuit notice more than a year before the two-year statute of limitations expired, so Section 15—1—36(15)’s tolling provision did not come into play.


author: KITCHENS, JUSTICE,

text:
    Justin CROCKETT a/k/a Justin Randle Crockett a/k/a Justin R. Crockett v. STATE of Mississippi
    NO. 2015-KM-00828-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    01/12/2017
    Rehearing Denied March 9, 2017
    B. BRENNAN HORAN, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    BEFORE DICKINSON, P.J., . KITCHENS AND KING, JJ.
   KITCHENS, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Justin Crockett pled guilty in Panola County Justice Court to headlight-ing a deer in violation of Mississippi Code Section 49-7-95 (Rev. 2012). Crockett appealed his conviction to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Panola County. After a bench trial de novo, that court found Crockett guilty. Crockett timely appealed to this Court, arguing solely that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We find sufficient evidence in the record to sustain Crockett’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2. On January 30, 2014, at approximately 8:45 p.m., Lieutenant Marion Pearson received a call about a truck that had been stopped by authorities in Panola County. Pearson, a warden with the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks, was told that the truck was carrying three deer (a mature doe, a small doe, and a spike buck) in its bed and that the deer appeared to have been “freshly killed.” Pearson arrived at the scene and questioned the three individuals who were in the truck: John Kyle Gordon, Michael Chad Lanier, and Seth Allen Wooten.

¶ 3. All three men admitted that they had been headlighting deer and informed Pearson that they had been doing so with Crockett. The three individuals further stated that Crockett had shot two of the deer and that they all had put them in the bed of the truck. One of them, Gordon, was working six weeks on and ten days off in North Dakota at the time of trial, and the State was not successful in securing his presence. Crockett raised no hearsay objection to Pearson’s testimony about what Gordon, Lanier, and Wooten had told him. According to Pearson’s testimony, Crockett later admitted having shot the spike deer, though Crockett claimed to have shot the deer during legal hunting hours.

¶ 4. The State responded with forensic evidence showing that the spike was shot well after legal hunting hours. The trial court accepted Pearson as an expert witness in the field of “forensic investigation of the death of a deer.” Pearson testified that at approximately 3:00 a.m. on January 31, 2014, he returned to his house with the deer and performed standard procedures to determine the time of death. Crockett did not object to the trial court’s acceptance of Pearson as an expert witness. Following the standard procedures, Pearson took the spike’s temperature in various parts of its anatomy. Pearson then plugged the temperature readings into a computer program along with the ambient air temperature for the night of January 30, 2014. In addition, Pearson checked for rigor mortis in various parts of the deer’s body. Finally, Pearson measured the diameter of the deer’s pupils. After factoring in all of the above, Pearson and his supervisor Bruce Jenkins concluded—rightly or wrongly, and without objection—that the spike buck (the only deer for which Crockett was charged) had been killed between approximately 8 p.m. and 10 p.m. on January 30, 2014.

¶5. The trial court, acting as both the judge and trier of fact, found Crockett guilty of killing a deer at night by head-lighting in violation of Mississippi Code Section 49-7-95 (Rev. 2012).

ANALYSIS

¶ 6. Crockett’s only argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction under Mississippi Code Section 49-7-95 (Rev. 2012).

¶ 7. Section 49-7-95 provides:
Any person who hunts or takes or kills any deer at night by headlighting, by any lighting device or light amplifying device shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a Class I violation and shall be punished as provided in Section 49-7-141.
For any person to be charged with a violation of this subsection, that person must have been observed committing an overt act consistent with the hunting of deer at night with the aid of a light, lighting device or light amplifying device. Such observation of an overt act may include, but shall not be limited to, witnessing the discharge of a weapon capable of killing a deer, hearing the report of a firearm being fired, seeing the person in possession of a recently killed deer which could not have been killed during legal hunting hours, or witnessing the person committing any acts consistent with headlighting deer in violation of this subsection.

Miss. Code Ann. § 49-7-95(1)(a), (b) (Rev. 2012) (emphasis added).

¶ 8. This Court has affirmed a conviction under this statute when the State relied upon circumstantial evidence to prove its case. See Pharr v. State, 465 So.2d 294 (Miss. 1984). The Pharr court noted that “spotting and killing a deer [at night] would have been next to impossible without the aid of power lighting.” Id. at 300. In Pharr, an officer observed a truck from which a spotlight was shining in a field. Id. at 296. The officer pursued the truck and ultimately forced it off the road. Id. The officer found the following in the truck: “(1) four men, including Milton V. Pharr, the Defendant below and Appellant here; (2) two dead deer, both still warm and with blood running from their bodies; (3) a Q-beam spotlight; (4) a seven millimeter Magnum rifle, three spent shell casings and other ammunition; and (5) one hand flashlight.” Id. at 297. This Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for headlighting the two deer even though the officer had not actually observed the defendant killing either deer. Id. at 304.

¶ 9. Crockett’s only argument on appeal is that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he committed an “overt act” within the meaning of Mississippi Code Section 49-7-95(l)(b) (Rev. 2012).

¶ 10. “[W]hen a trial judge sits without a jury, this Court will not disturb his factual determinations where there is substantial evidence in the record to support those findings.” Transocean Enter., Inc. v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 33 So.3d 459, 462 (Miss. 2010) (citing Ezell v. Williams, 724 So.2d 396, 397 (Miss. 1998)). This standard of review “affords deferential treatment to the trial judge’s findings.” Id. (citing City of Greenville v. Jones, 925 So.2d 106, 109 (Miss. 2006)). “[T]his Court ought and generally will affirm a trial court sitting without a jury on a question of fact unless, based upon substantial evidence, the court must be manifestly wrong.” Id. (citing Yarbrough v. Camphor, 645 So.2d 867, 869 (Miss. 1994)).

¶ 11. Here, the trial judge heard testimony from Pearson and Jenkins to the effect that three individuals were found at night with three recently killed deer in their possession. These three men admitted that they had been headlighting deer. They further stated that they had been acting in concert with Crockett and that Crockett had shot two of the deer, including the spike. In addition, Crockett admitted to Lieutenant Pearson that Crockett had shot the spike, though Crockett claimed he had shot it during legal hunting hours.

¶ 12. Legal hunting hours end thirty minutes after sunset. Miss. Code Ann. § 49-7-59(1) (Rev, 2012). Pearson testified that sunset on January 30, 2014, occurred at 5:27 p.m., so legal hunting hours ended at 5:57 p.m. The State presented unchallenged forensic evidence through the testimony of Pearson and Jenkins showing that the spike could not have been killed during legal hunting hours. The time of death was calculated to have been between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., well after legal hunting hours.

¶ 13. Applying the deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the trial court was manifestly wrong. It is true, as Crockett urges, that the statute requires that the defendant must be “observed committing an overt act consistent with the hunting of deer at night with the aid of a light.” Miss. Code Ann. § 49—7—95(l)(b). However, the statute further provides that “[s]uch observation may include, but shall not be limited to ... seeing the person in possession of a recently killed deer which could not have been killed during legal hunting hours.” Miss. Code Ann. § 49-7-95(l)(b) (emphasis added). The State presented evidence tending to show: (1) possession of a recently killed deer; (2) the deer could not have been killed during legal hunting hours; and (3) Crockett shot the deer. Furthermore, as the Pharr court noted, “spotting and killing a deer would have been next to impossible without the aid of power lighting.” Pharr, 465 So.2d at 300. Finally, the men admitted that they had been headlighting deer.

¶ 14. While Pearson’s testimony regarding the statements of Gordon, Lanier, and Wooten is hearsay, Crockett did not object to its admission at trial. “The law is well settled in Mississippi that appellate courts will not put trial courts in error for issues not first presented to the trial court for resolution, and that issues not presented in the trial court cannot be first argued on appeal.” Purvis v. Barnes, 791 So.2d 199, 202 (Miss. 2001) (internal citations omitted). In failing to object to hearsay at trial, the party waives the right to present the issue on appeal. Cross v. State, 759 So.2d 354, 357 (Miss. 1999). “ ‘It is elementary that a party seeking reversal of the judgment of a trial court must present this Court with a record adequate to show that an error of reversible proportions has been committed and that the point has been procedurally preserved.’” Id. (quoting Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 127 (Miss. 1991)).

¶ 15. The trial judge was not manifestly in error in finding Crockett guilty of violating Mississippi Code Section 49-7-95.

CONCLUSION

¶ 16. We affirm Crockett’s conviction of headlighting a deer in violation of Mississippi Code Section 49-7-95.

¶ 17. CONVICTION OF HEADLIGHT-ING DEER AND SENTENCE OF FIVE (5) DAYS IN THE PANOLA COUNTY JAIL, WITH FIVE (5) DAYS SUSPENDED, AFFIRMED. APPELLANT’S HUNTING, FISHING, AND TRAPPING PRIVILEGES ARE REVOKED FOR A PERIOD OF THREE (3) YEARS. IN ADDITION, A FEE OF $500 SHALL BE PAID PRIOR TO REINSTATEMENT OF PRIVILEGES. APPELLANT SHALL PAY A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,120, PAYABLE TO THE CIRCUIT CLERK OF PANOLA COUNTY.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KING, COLEMAN, MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR. CHAMBERLIN, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . "[A]ny defendant who has been convicted of a criminal offense in a justice court may appeal even though he or she pleaded guilty.” Jones v. State, 972 So.2d 579, 580 (Miss. 2008) (citing Neblett v. State, 75 Miss. 105, 21 So. 799 (1897)).


author: COLEMAN, JUSTICE, KING, JUSTICE,

text:
    Kimberlee DAVENPORT v. HANSAWORLD, USA, INC.
    NO. 2015-CA-01164-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    01/19/2017
    Rehearing Denied March 23, 2017
    DANIEL MYERS WAIDE, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

      RICHARD MONTAGUE, W. THOMAS SILER, JR., JASON THOMAS MARSH, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., COLEMAN AND MAXWELL, JJ.
   COLEMAN, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. HansaWorld USA, Inc. (Hansa-World) enrolled a foreign judgment in the Forrest County Circuit Court against Kim-berlee Davenport from an award ordered by a court in Florida on claims of conversion and extortion. Davenport, a former employee of HansaWorld, also maintained claims against HansaWorld in a separate action before a federal district court in Mississippi alleging several violations of state and federal law, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for sexual harassment and discrimination (Employment Action).

¶ 2. HansaWorld sought to collect on its foreign judgment by petitioning the circuit court to sell Davenport’s Employment Action, so the circuit court entered a Writ of Execution. With the Employment Action set to be auctioned off by the Forrest County sheriff, Davenport filed an Emergency Motion to Quash Writ of Execution mere days before the scheduled sale. At a hearing on the motion, the circuit court granted Davenport’s motion to quash on the condition that she post a $100,000 bond by that afternoon, the day of the scheduled sheriffs sale. Davenport failed to post the conditional bond, and as a result, the sheriff sold her Employment Action to the highest bidder, HansaWorld, for $1,000. Following sale of her Employment Action, Davenport appealed to the Court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. On January 13, 2015, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in Miami-Dade, Florida, entered a judgment against Kimberlee Davenport in favor of her former employer HansaWorld USA, Inc., on claims of conversion and extortion. In total, Davenport was ordered to pay HansaWorld $265,719.45. At the same time as the preceding litigation, Davenport maintained claims against HansaWorld in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi alleging several violations of state and federal law, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for sexual harassment and discrimination (Employment Action). To further collection of the enrolled judgment, HansaWorld petitioned the Forrest County Circuit Clerk to enter a Writ of Execution of Enrolled Judgment, and the circuit clerk issued the writ, notifying the Forrest County sheriff to auction off Davenport’s Employment Action in a sheriffs sale.

¶ 4. Before the sheriffs sale could commence, Davenport filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief in Texas, which placed an automatic stay on collection by all of her creditors, including HansaWorld. However, Davenport failed to appear at several bankruptcy proceedings, so the court dismissed her claim. Following the dismissal, the circuit clerk entered an Alias Writ of Execution of Enrolled Judgment in a second attempt to auction off Davenport’s Employment Action in a sheriffs sale scheduled for July 13,2015.

¶ 5. On July 7, 2015, Davenport filed an Emergency Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. In her motion to quash, Davenport argued that, due to the nature of the claims she was making, the court should not allow her Employment Action to be sold because doing so would violate her constitutional rights. Davenport also argued that her Title VII claim should not be sold because the statute did not allow it, and the court would be going against pub-lie policy by selling a person’s civil actions. The circuit court scheduled a hearing on the motion to quash for July 13, 2015, the intended day of the sheriffs sale.

¶6. In response to Davenport’s Emergency Motion, HansaWorld argued in brief and at the hearing that the employment action was Davenport’s property right, not a civil right, so it could be sold at a sheriffs sale. HansaWorld supported its argument by stating that her claims were under Title VII, which confers statutory rights, not constitutional rights. Hansa-World also requested that the circuit court require Davenport to pay a bond if it granted the motion to quash because allowing a stay of the sheriffs sale essentially was a temporary injunction.

¶7. At the hearing, the court granted the motion to quash but conditioned the grant on Davenport posting a $100,000 bond by two o’clock that afternoon or else the sheriffs sale would proceed as scheduled. Davenport’s counsel did not object to the conditional bond at the hearing. On the same day, the circuit court issued its Order Granting Emergency Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution Conditioned On Posting of $100,000 Bond and within it stated:

After considering the pleadings and the arguments and representations of counsel, the court finds that the emergency motion to quash the alias writ of execution shall be and hereby is granted, conditioned on the posting of a bond by Davenport in the amount of $100,000. IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED that if Davenport posts with the Clerk of this Court a bond in the amount of $100,000, the alias writ of execution will be quashed and the sheriffs sale of Davenport’s chose in action against Hansaworld scheduled for 2:00 p.m. July 13, 2015, shah be stayed.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that if Davenport fails to post with the Clerk of this Court a bond in the amount of $100,000, before 2:00 p.m. July 13, 2015, the alias writ of execution will not be quashed and the sheriffs sale of Davenport’s chose in action against Hansaworld scheduled for 2:00 p.m. July 13, 2015 shall proceed as scheduled.

¶ 8. After Davenport failed to post the conditional bond, the circuit court allowed the sheriffs sale to proceed, and the sheriff sold Davenport’s Employment Action to the highest bidder, HansaWorld, for $1,000. Davenport filed a Notice of Appeal on July 31, 2015.

ANALYSIS

I. Whether the circuit court’s order granting the motion to quash was a final judgment.

¶ 9. In its brief, HansaWorld raised the issue of the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the present appeal because, according to HansaWorld, there has not been a final judgment in the matter. Regardless of whether the appellant, appellee, or neither raises a jurisdictional issue, the Court is required to consider its own jurisdiction. Smith v. Parkerson Lumber, Inc., 890 So.2d 832, 834 (¶ 12) (Miss. 2003) (citing Michael v. Michael, 650 So.2d 469, 471 (Miss. 1995)).

¶ 10. “Whether the circuit court had proper jurisdiction to hear a particular matter is a question of law” so “this Court must apply a de novo standard of review.” Burch v. Land Partners, L.P., 784 So.2d 925, 927 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2001). In consideration of jurisdiction, the Court may question only a final, appealable judgment or that which “adjudicates the merits of the controversy and settles all issues as to all the parties and requires no further action by the trial court.” Brown v. Collections, Inc., 188 So.3d 1171, 1174 (¶11) (Miss. 2016). Based upon the facts of the present case, we hold that the circuit court’s order granting Davenport’s motion to quash the writ of execution is a final, appealable judgment. We can discern no other actions for the circuit court to take in the case and the parties have not identified any other issues that were not settled by the circuit court’s order.

II, Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in conditioning the grant of the motion to quash on Davenport posting a $100,000 bond.

¶ 11. Davenport argues that circuit court abused its discretion in ordering the conditional bond because it serves no purpose. HansaWorld disagrees and asserts that Davenport did not object to the bond at the hearing, so she cannot raise the present issue for the first time on appeal. Also, HansaWorld argues that the circuit court was well within its discretion to condition the quashing on a bond because the bond was security for a request of injunc-tive relief pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). The order as well as the transcript are silent as to the court’s reasoning for conditioning the quash on the posting of a $100,000 bond.

¶ 12. “The well-recognized rule is that a trial court will not be put in error on appeal for a matter not presented to it for decision.” Harrington v. Office of Mississippi Secretary of State, 129 So.3d 153, 169 ( ¶41) (Miss. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, if the Court finds that Davenport did not present the present matter in the circuit court, then “the [present] issue is not properly before the Court,” and the case should be dismissed as a result. Id.

¶ 13. HansaWorld correctly asserts that it asked the court, both in brief and at the hearing, to condition any - relief given to Davenport on the posting of a bond, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). Davenport neither wrote a response brief to HansaWorld’s objection to the motion to quash nor did she object at the hearing when the judge stated he was going to grant the motion to quash but require that she post a $100,000 bond. Davenport urges that she had no reason to respond to the requirement that she post a bond because she was requesting permanent relief—that the writ be quashed forever—negating the need for the bond. However, we are not convinced that Davenport properly preserved her right to raise the argument on appeal solely because the circuit court did or did not grant the type of relief she requested. Since Davenport never challenged the imposition of the bond below, the circuit court has never had an opportunity to address the appropriateness of the bond.

¶ 14. Davenport did not preserve the argument at the circuit court, and we hold her failure to do so waives her right to challenge the bond on appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶ 15. Having determined that the circuit court’s order is a final, appealable judgment and that the Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, we conclude that Davenport waived her right to challenge the circuit court’s imposition of the bond on appeal because she failed to challenge the bond before the circuit court. We affirm.

¶ 16. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., MAXWELL, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. KING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS, J.

KING, JUSTICE,

DISSENTING:

¶ 17. The majority argues that Davenport did not object to the bond set on the condition of granting her motion to quash, and that she thus waived any objection to the same on appeal. Because I believe that the Court should address the issue, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 18. It is true that when a party fails to object at the trial court level, “the point of error is not preserved on appeal.” State Highway Comm’n of Mississippi v. Hyman, 592 So.2d 952, 957 (Miss. 1991). However, “[t]his Court retains the power to notice plain error.” Id. “The plain error doctrine reflects a policy to administer the law fairly and justly. A party is protected by the plain error rule when (1) he has failed to perfect his appeal and (2) when a substantial right is affected.” Id. In this case, a substantial right is affected, as Davenport had her entire Title VII lawsuit stripped from her control—purchased by the defendant in that suit itself. Moreover, the trial court committed plain error by conditioning the grant of a motion to quash on the posting of a bond, something that was not within its power to do under Rule 65.

¶ 19. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides that

No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs, damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained[.]

M.R.C.P. 65(c). The trial court did not issue a restraining order or preliminary injunction, thus Rule 65 does not apply. And Hansaworld does not point this Court to any other authority for granting a bond in this case. Hansaworld-argues that the trial court’s order granting a motion to quash is tantamount to a preliminary injunction. But it is not. First, the order in no way enjoins or restrains Hansaworld, so the purpose of requiring a bond is unclear. Second, granting a motion to quash offers permanent relief, while granting a preliminary injunction offers temporary relief. An order granting a motion to quash determines that the instrument to be quashed is irretrievably improper and should be eliminated.

¶ 20. To “quash” means “[t]o annul or make void; to terminate.” Quash, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). A “motion to quash” is therefore “[a] party’s request that the court nullify process or an act instituted by the other party, as in seeking to nullify a subpoena.” Motion to Quash, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The trial court in this case found that, after considering the pleadings and arguments, “the emergency motion to quash the alias writ of execution shall be and hereby is granted, conditioned on the posting of a bond by Davenport in the amount of $100,000.” Thus, the trial court found that the alias writ of execution should be completely nullified, as it apparently found that such alias writ was improper. To condition the complete nullification of an improper instrument on the posting of security is problematic and outside the scope of the rules. Either the writ of execution is improper and should be quashed regardless of ability to pay, or it is proper and should be allowed. Moreover, quashing an instrument, nullifying it forever, in no way threatens to improperly enjoin or restrain Hansaworld. Thus, the trial court was without the authority to condition the grant of the motion to quash on the posting of a bond. For this reason, I believe that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.

KITCHENS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

      . After both parties made their arguments, the following exchange occurred:
      THE COURT: So this action in federal court [ (Employment Action) ] is set for August?
      DAVENPORT: Yes, Your Honor.
      THE COURT: And if there is recovery in
      that, you’ll get your money out of it, right?
      HANSAWORLD: Theoretically, yes, sir.
      THE COURT: I am going to grant his [sic] motion, but I’m going to require that he [sic] post a $100,000 bond. Okay. Anything further?
      HANSAWORLD: Well, Your Honor, if the sale is scheduled at two o'clock this afternoon, so will the sale be allowed to proceed—•
      THE COURT: No.
      HANSAWORLD: —if the bond is not posted by then?
      THE COURT: If the bond is not posted, yes.

        . The plain error doctrine is consistent with the judicial oath of office. Miss. Const, art. 6, § 155 ("I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich[.]”).