text:
    IN RE: COMMITTEE ON BAR ADMISSIONS CFN-87565
    NO. 2017-BA-1702
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/17/2017
   BAR ADMISSIONS PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

|¡After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner is immediately eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to the following conditions:

1. Petitioner shall continue to comply with the terms of the monitoring agreement he signed with the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (“JLAP”) on January 17, 2017.

2. The period of this conditional admission shall coincide with the period of petitioner’s JLAP agreement, However, petitioner’s conditional admission status shall not be terminated until this court so orders.

3. Petitioner shall authorize the Executive Director of JLAP to report any violations of the JLAP agreement to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”).

4. Upon the expiration of the term of petitioner’s JLAP agreement, the Executive Director of JLAP shall forward to the ODC (a) a final report of petitioner’s progress and participation in JLAP, and (b) a recommendation regarding the need for petitioner’s continued participation in JLAP.

5. Following receipt of the report from JLAP, the ODC shall file a report in this court in which it shall recommend whether the conditional admission shall be allowed to terminate or shall be extended.

6. Petitioner shall cooperate with JLAP and the ODC, and shall comply with any and all requirements imposed upon him by JLAP and the ODC.

| ¡.Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM

license: Public Domain

text:
    IN RE: COMMITTEE ON BAR ADMISSIONS CFN-222456
    NO. 2017-BA-1688
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/17/2017
   BAR ADMISSIONS PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

11 After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner is immediately eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of eighteen months. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. During the probationary period, petitioner shall comply with all of the terms and conditions of the consent agreement executed by him with the Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, and such other conditions as may be imposed upon him by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Should petitioner fail to make a-good faith effort to satisfy these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.


author: PER CURIAM-

text:
    IN RE: COMMITTEE ON BAR ADMISSIONS CFN-473690
    NO. 2017-BA-1090
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/17/2017
   BAR ADMISSIONS PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM-

| TAfter reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner is eligible to be admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana.

ADMISSION GRANTED.


text:
    IN RE: Anthony T. MARSHALL
    NO. 2017-B-1752
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/18/2017
   ORDER

1 ¡Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat Of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Anthony T. Marshall, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24164, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate.


text:
    IN RE: Erica May LOTZ
    NO. 2017-B-1431
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/27/2017
   . ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

| ¡Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) has. filed a petition seeking the imposition of reciprocal discipline against respondent,. Erica May Lotz, an attorney licensed to practice law in-Louisiana and Tennessee, based upon discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. .

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In her representation of a client in a divorce action, respondent withdrew unearned client fees from her trust account and commingled those fees with her own personal funds. After being discharged by her client, respondent failed to promptly return any unearned fees. On July 11, 2017, the Supreme Court of Tennessee publicly censured respondent for violating Rules 1.15(a)(c) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons and 1.16(d)(6) (obligations upon termination of the representation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

After receiving notice of the Tennessee order of discipline, the ODC filed a motion to initiate reciprocal discipline proceedings in Louisiana, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21. A certified copy of the decision and order of the Supreme Court of Tennessee was attached to the motion. On August 18, 2017, we rendered an order giving respondent thirty days to demonstrate why the imposition of identical discipline in this state would be unwarranted. Respondent failed to file any response in this court.

| ¿DISCUSSION

The standard for imposition of discipline on a reciprocal basis is set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D). That rule provides:

Discipline to be Imposed. Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph B, this court shall impose the identical discipline ... unless disciplinary counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or this court finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that:
(1) The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
(2) Based on the record created by the jurisdiction that imposed the discipline, there was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or
(3) The imposition of the same discipline by the court would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public' policy of the jurisdiction; or
(4) The misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this state; ...
If this court determines that any of those elements exists, this court shall enter such other order as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate.

In the instant case, respondent has made no showing of infirmities in the Tennessee proceeding, nor do we discern any from our review of the record. Furthermore, we find there is no reason to deviate from the sanction imposed in Tennessee as only under extraordinary circumstances should there be a significant variance from the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction. In re: Aulston, 05-1546 (La. 1/13/06), 918 So.2d 461. See also In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 968-69 (D.C. 2003) (“there is merit in according defei’ence, for its own sake, to the actions of other jurisdictions with respect to the attorneys over whom we share supervisory authority”).

IsHere, there is little doubt that respondent’s conduct would warrant discipline in Louisiana. Under these circumstances, we agree that reciprocal discipline is warranted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21. Because our rules do not provide for a public censure in bar disciplinary cases, we will impose a public reprimand, which is the closest equivalent available under our rules.

DECREE

Considering the Petition to Initiate Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the record filed herein, it is ordered that respondent, Erica May Lotz, Louisiana Bar Roll number 31501, be publicly reprimanded.


text:
    IN RE: Everett H. MECHEM
    NO. 2017-B-1390
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/27/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

11 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) has filed a petition seeking the imposition of reciprocal discipline against respondent, Everett H. Mechem, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana and Tennessee, based upon discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 11, 2016, the Supreme Court of Tennessee issued an order immediately suspending respondent’s license to practice law pending a final determination of disciplinary proceedings against him. In its order, the Tennessee court concluded that respondent had engaged in professional misconduct demonstrating that he poses a significant threat of harm to the public, based on his conviction of a serious crime. After receiving notice of the order of the Tennessee court, the ODC filed a petition to initiate reciprocal discipline in Louisiana. On February 3, 2017, we granted the petition and placed respondent on interim suspension. In re: Mechem, 16-2115 (La. 2/3/17), 209 So.3d 690. .

On April 28, 2017, the Supreme Court of Tennessee ordered that respondent be disbarred for his felony conviction. After receiving notice of the Tennessee order |2of discipline, the ODC filed a motion to initiate reciprocal discipline proceedings in Louisiana, pursuant g to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21. A certified copy of the decision and order of the Supreme Court of Tennessee was attached to the motion. On August 16, 2017, we rendered an order giving respondent thirty days to demonstrate why the imposition of identical discipline in this state would be unwarranted. Respondent failed to file any response in this court,

DISCUSSION

' The standard for imposition of discipline on a reciprocal basis- is set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D). That rule provides:

Discipline to be Imposed. Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph B, this court shall impose the identical discipline .. unless disciplinary counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or this court finds that it clearly appears upon the' face of the record from which the discipline is' predicated, that:
(1) The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
(2) Based on the record created by the jurisdiction that imposed the discipline, there, was such infirmity of ■ proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on .that subject; or
(3) The imposition of the same discipline by the court would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or
(4) The misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this state; ...
If this court determines that any of those' elements exists, this court shall enter such other order 'as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate.

In the instant case, respondent has made no showing of infirmities in the Tennessee proceeding, nor do we discern any from our review of the record.

| ¡¡Furthermore, we find there is no reason to deviate from the sanction imposed in Tennessee as only under extraordinary circumstances should there be a significant variance from the sanction, imposed by the other jurisdiction. In re: Aulston, 05-1546 (La. 1/13/06), 918 So.2d 461. See also In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 968—69 (D.C. 2003) (“there is merit in according deference, for its own sake, to the actions of other jurisdictions with respect to the attorneys over whom we share supervisory authority”).

Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to defer to the Tennessee judgment imposing discipline upon respondent. Accordingly, we will impose reciprocal discipline in the form of disbarment. ■

DECREE

Considering the Petition to Initiate Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the record filed herein, it is ordered that respondent,, Everett H. Mechem, Louisiana Bar Roll number 14521, be and he hereby is disbarred. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked.

      . On June 13, 2016, a jury verdict was returned in United States v. Mechem, Case No. 2:15-CR-71, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, finding respondent guilty of twenty-eight counts of wire fraud, two counts of Supplemental Security Income fraud, one count of theft of public property, and two counts of making false statements.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Timothy THIBODEAUX
    No. 2016-KP-0994
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/27/2017
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF LAFOURCHE

PER CURIAM

11 Writ granted. Defendant, convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated incest, contended by application for post-conviction relief that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to cross-examine the victims, defendant’s daughters, whose videotaped statements were introduced at trial without live testimony (among other claims). The district court denied relief after conducting an evidentia-ry hearing at which trial counsel testified. The court of appeal granted writs in part because it found that defendant’s right to confrontation was violated because the state did not afford defendant an opportunity to exercise his right of cross-examination against the victims, who the court of appeal determined were unavailable, making their videotaped statements inadmissible under La.R.S. 15:440.5. Thus, the court concluded that defense counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the unavailability of these witnesses, resulting in prejudice “where [defendant’s] right of confrontation was violated.” State v. Thibodeaux, 15-1823 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/26/16) (unpub’d). Accordingly, the court of appeal ordered a new trial. The court of appeal erred.

|2Pefendant did not raise a standalone confrontation violation claim in his application for post-conviction relief and R.S. 15:440.5 is not unconstitutional on its face. Therefore, a reviewing court would generally refrain from addressing an issue not raised in the district court. See State v. Kennedy, 05-1981, p. 24 (La. 5/22/07), 957 So.2d 757, 775, rev’d on other grounds, 554 U.S. 407, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008); see also Segura v. Frank, 93-1271 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714, 725 (“[A]ppel-late courts will not consider issues raised for the first time” in appellate court). Regardless, defendant made no showing at the evidentiary hearing that the child victims were unavailable to testify at trial, see R.S. 15:440.5(A)(8), and he impermissibly sought to shift his post-conviction burden of proof to the state by asserting that the state failed to demonstrate these witnesses’ availability vel non to testify. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

The district court properly evaluated defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Finding that defense counsel’s failure to cross-examine the child victims constituted deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland, the district court correctly concluded that defendant failed to prove resultant prejudice because he made no showing that the children’s testimony would have been different if called to testify at trial. Defendant argues in opposition that prejudice can be presumed under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), for defense counsel’s failure to subject the state’s case to “meaningful adversarial testing.” However, defense counsel vigorously cross-examined the case detective and forensic interviewer while also highlighting in closing arguments the significant discrepancies in the victims’ 2007 and 2009 interviews. Given these specific facts and defendant’s failure to show how the victims might have testified differently at trial or responded to cross-] .¡examination, we grant the application, reverse the court of appeal in part, and reinstate the district court’s ruling denying the application for post-conviction relief.

WEIMER, J., recused.

HUGHES, J., concurs in the result.


author: PER CURIAM Weimer, J.,

text:
    Kimberly and Todd THIBODEAUX, Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Child, Gabrielle Thibodeaux v. James F. DONNELL, M.D.
    NO. 2017-C-0909
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/27/2017
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF TERREBONNE

PER CURIAM

hWe grant this writ application to determine whether the court of appeal on remand for de novo review abused its discretion in its award of general damages to the plaintiffs. The facts are thoroughly summarized in Thibodeaux v. Donnell, 16-0570 (La. 1/20/17), 219 So.3d 274. In our prior opinion, this court held that, because the court of appeal found manifest error in the jury’s factual findings, the court of appeal should have performed a de novo review of damages under Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La. 1987). On remand the court of appeal increased Kimberly Thibodeaux’s general damages from $50,000 to $60,000, increased Todd Thibodeaux’s loss of consortium damages from $15,000 to $20,000, and increased Gabriella Thibodeaux’s loss of consortium damages from $5,000 to $7,500.

In reviewing an award of damages, the initial inquiry is whether the award for the particular injuries and their effects under the particular circumstances on the particular injured person is a clear abuse of the “much discretion” of the trier of fact. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1260 (La. 1993) (citations omitted). After the reviewing court has determined that there has been an abuse of discretion, and only then, the court may resort to review of prior awards for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point that is reasonably within that discretion. Id. at 1260-61 (citations omitted). In reviewing the facts, the reviewing Rcourt should examine whether the present award is greatly disproportionate to past awards for similar injuries, though prior awards are only a guide. Bouquet v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 08-0309, p. 5 (La. 4/4/08), 979 So.2d 456, 459 (citations omitted).

With those standards in mind, we have reviewed the record to analyze the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the injuries incurred by the plaintiff and how these injuries specifically affected her, her husband, and her daughter. We And the court of appeal abused its discretion in the damages awarded on remand. After examining comparable awards in similar cases to determine the lowest amount that could have been reasonably awarded, we amend the awards as follows. First, we amend the award of general damages to Kimberly Thibodeaux to $150,000. See Seagers v. Pailet, 95-52, p. 20 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/10/95), 656 So.2d 700, 713, writ denied, 96-2730 (La. 1/6/97), 685 So.2d 117. We next amend the award of loss of consortium damages to Todd Thibodeaux to $50,000. See LeBlanc v. Western Heritage Ins. Co., 02-788 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/02), 837 So.2d 81, unit denied, 03-0320 (La. 4/4/03), 840 So.2d 1221; Seagers v. Pailet, supra, pp. 20-21, 656 So.2d at 713. Finally, we amend the award in loss of consortium damages to Gabrielle Thibodeaux to $25,000. See Accardo v. Cenac, 97-2320, p. 18 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/6/98), 722 So.3d 302, 312.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED

WEIMER, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

Weimer, J.,

dissenting.

11 Based on my previous dissent in this matter, I respectfully dissent from the per curiam.


text:
    IN RE: Richard C. TEISSIER
    NO. 2017-B-1559
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/27/2017
   . ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, accepted legal, fees from clients and failed to complete the legal matters which he had been retained to handle, and engaged in deceitful and dishonest conduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline seeking respondent’s disbarment. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Richard C. Teissier, Louisiana Bar Roll number 18461, be and he hereby is disbarred, retroactive to July 28, 2015, the date of his interim suspension. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

GENOVESE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

h GENOVESE, J., would reject consent discipline and impose permanent disbarment.


author: PER CURIAM JOHNSON, C.J., WEIMER, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ellis JONES
    No. 2017-KK-1571
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/27/2017
   PER CURIAM

|,Writ granted in part; Denied in part. Police officers had sufficient probable cause to arrest and search the defendant upon seeing him commit the violation of Section 154-1607(a) of the Municipal Code of the City , of New Orleans (‘Where a sidewalk is provided, it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent roadway.”), regardless of whether the officers had the actual intent to arrest the defendant for the violation. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 213(A)(1) (police officer may arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor offense committed in his presence); State v. Butler, 12-2359, p.5 (La. 5/17/13), 117 So.3d.87, 88-89 (“In the present case, we may assume that the police officers had no actual subjective intent to arrest defendant for ... violation of the dty ordinance because they were looking for ‘high profile criminals.’... [Pjurely as an objective matter, the officers ultimately did nothing more than what the law entitled them to do by detaining defendant after observing him commit a misdemeanor offense in their presence and searching him for weapons and evidence, without regard to whether they had an articulable and particularized concern for their safety and then arresting him, albeit not for the offense for which they initially had probable cause.” (Emphasis in original.)). We therefore find the trial court abused its discretion by granting the defendant’s motion to suppress the physical evidence seized during the search of defendant. We grant the ^state’s writ application in part and reverse as to the trial court’s suppression of the physical evidence.

The trial court did not abuse it discretion in suppressing the statements made by the defendant in response to questions directed by police about evidence seized in connection with the search of the defendant. The statements were made after the defendant had been arrested and prior to him being advised of his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (The obligation to provide Miranda warnings attaches only when a person is questioned by law enforcement after he has been taken “into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”); State v. Hunt, 09-1589, p.11 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 754 (“[Bjefore a confession or inculpatory statement made during a custodial interrogation may be introduced into evidence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was first advised of his Miranda rights, that he voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights, and that the statement was made freely and voluntarily and not under the influence of fear, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducement, or promises.”). As such, the state’s writ application is denied in part as to the trial court’s ruling suppressing the defendant’s statements made following his custodial arrest and prior to being advised of his Miranda rights.

Accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

JOHNSON, C.J.,

would deny.

I,The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 215,1 provides that a law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably believes is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense. If the officer elects to conduct a stop pursuant to this article, he may frisk the suspect’s outer clothing for weapons only if he reasonably believes that he is in danger. Judge Derbigny considered the testimony of the arresting officer to conclude that the officer could not have reasonably believed that he was in danger. The officer testified that the defendant and his companions were not acting suspiciously, nor engaging in any illegal activity other than walking in the street where a sidewalk is provided. The officer and his partner elected to conduct the pat down despite the fact that defendant and his companions fully complied with the officers’ instructions. Without a reasonable belief that the officer was in danger, there is no justification for the frisk and the evidence was therefore properly suppressed.

WEIMER, J.,

dissenting. •

hi would grant and docket this matter.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE EX REL. Tre’Mal SCOTT v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1157
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/27/2017
   ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LIVINGSTON

PER CURIAM:

| /Writ not considered. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    IN RE: Kirk Anthony WILLIAMS
    NO. 2017-B-1568
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    10/27/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent mishandled his client trust account. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which the parties stipulated that respondent has violated Rule 1.15(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and that the misconduct was negligent. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Kirk Anthony Williams, Louisiana Bar Roll number 23372, be and he hereby is publicly reprimanded.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


author: M JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

text:
    IN RE: JUDICIARY COMMISSION, NO. 17-20
    NO. 2017-O-0585
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 31, 2017
   ORDER

Considering the Motion for Review filed by Judge John Doe,' and the opposition thereto filed by the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Review be and hereby is denied.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 31st day of May, 2017.

FOR THE COURT:

M JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kalgin GREEN, Marcus Ester, Kahlil Howard, and Tyrell Williams
    NO. 2017-KK-0626
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2017
   ORDER

11 Writ granted. La. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 717(B) provides “the district attorney shall also disclose any inducement offered by the district attorney to any state witness.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, “Brady [v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)] requires the disclosure of evidence concerning a promise of leniency or immunity to a material witness in exchange for his testimony at trial.” Giglio v. United States. 405 U.S. 150, 154-155, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (Emphasis added.). However, “Brady is not a rule of discovery designed to help defendants decide tactical questions. . .The purpose of the Brady rule is to insure that defendants receive their constitutional right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause, a trial in which the trier of fact has before it all available material exculpatory evidence.” State v. Bazile, 2012-2243, p. 18-19 (La. 5/7/13), 144 So.3d 719, 733 (Emphasis added.) “[EJvidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965, 970 (La. 1986), Thus, due process requires the prosecution disclose anything .that might undermine the outcome of a trial.

Applying the law, the record before us indicates that the codefendants to whom the state made plea offers have not accepted those offers. Contrary to the district court’s findings, the district attorney’s plea negotiations with the codefendants as prospective state witnesses are not material evidence as it does not establish bias. Thus, while the district court is correct that disclosure of any inducements made to a codefendant is appropriate, the disclosure is conditioned on the codefendant testifying for the prosecution.

Furthermore, La. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 717(C) provides the district attorney shall not be required to disclose any inducements made to a state witness prior to the commencement of trial, unless the witness is called to testify on rebuttal and then it shall be disclosed immediately prior to the witness being sworn in. Therefore, the district court erred ordering disclosure by the district attorney ten (10) days prior to trial.

Accordingly, the ruling of the district court is amended in accordance with this order. The case is remanded for further proceedings.


text:
    Carole BOUDREAUX, Individually, and Emmet Paul Boudreaux as the Administrator of the Estate of his unemancipated minor son, Joseph Boudreaux v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
    No. 2017-CC-1548
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 14, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 123927; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 1179;

11 Denied. There is no judgment from the district court for this court to review. Relator should first seek relief in the district court by filing a motion to reinstate the jury trial.


text:
    Carole BOUDREAUX, Individually, and Emmet Paul Boudreaux as the Administrator of the Estate of his Unemancipated Minor Son, Joseph Boudreaux v. STATE PARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
    No. 2017-CC-1548
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 15, 2017
   Applying For Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated on September 14, 2017, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 123927; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 1179

_Jj_Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    STATE EX REL. John ESTEEN v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-0949
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 98-6122; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-KH-158

I i Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Warren GONZALES
    NO. 2016-K-1274
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 15 CR4 127727; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0019

| T Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dominique DAVIS
    NO. 2015-KO-1492
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   IN RE: Dominique Davis; -Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 11-2986; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 15-KA-118; September 22, 2017

11 Denied.


text:
    IN RE: Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 17-PDB-018
    NO. 2017-OB-1137
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary of Board, No. 17-PDB-018;

|! Petition for leave to appeal denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Dwayne LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-0275
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated April 24, 2017, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 201,578; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KW 1162;

| Reconsideration denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.

HUGHES, J., would grant reconsideration.


text:
    Brittni CASTILLE v. ESTATE OF Trissy HARGRAVE, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0754
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2010-3865; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 16-1049,16-758

| denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Deke DURASO v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-0856
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 14-11526-09; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 15-01025;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jermain M. WORTHY, Sr.
    NO. 2016-K-1981
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 504-193; to the

Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-KA-0431;

| T Denied.


text:
    Ricky CARTHAN v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
    NO. 2016-CI-1032
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th judicial District Court Div. E, No. 628,906; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No* 2015 CA 0102

| denied.


text:
    Cheryl WELLS v. The TOWN OF DELHI and Chad Dee and Kristie H. Morgan
    NO. 2017-C-0753
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 43436-B; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-222-CA

| iDenied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Dolph FINLEY v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-0588
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated April 24, 2017, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 215,744; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 16-0051

| Reconsideration denied.


text:
    Judy Dove SWAGGART v. John DOE, Brett Munson, Regions Bank and ABC Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-CC-0758
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 15-2173; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,-739-CW

11 Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher GOODLEY a/k/a Christopher Bryant Goodley
    NO. 2017-KD-0147
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 102417-FB; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-512;

| ^Denied.


text:
    Gustave J. LABARRE, Jr., et al. v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL COMPANY and Texas Brine Company, LLC
    NO. 2017-CC-0762
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 33796; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW1543

liDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Francis X. ROSS, Jr.
    NO. 2017-K-0118
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 512-141; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-KA-1113

| denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jonathan Jerome GUILLORY
    NO. 2016-KO-2186
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 12616-14; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-237;

|! Denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. David BEDOYA v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2011-KH-0829
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated March 23, 2012, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 06-3497; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-KH-105;

hNot considered. See La.S.Ct. Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Reginald A. VERNON
    NO. 2017-K-0137
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 510-364; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-KA-0692;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Stoney J. LAPOINT
    NO. 2016-KO-2087
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 79,031; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-187

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eugene GUIDRY
    NO. 2016-KO-2209
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 1302325; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KA 0465

|! Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Juan C. CANALES
    NO. 2017-K-0046
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson,'24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 13-0458; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-KA-272

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joshua Jerome BALL
    NO. 2017-K-0045
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Grant, 35th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 14-931; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-653;

| denied.


text:
    Sharon WILLIAMS, Alisha Wagner, Trenisha Thomas o/b/o Minor Children, Derrick Williams, Jr., Danetria Thomas, Na’Derricka Thomas, and Keona Grant o/b/o Minor Child, Dandria Grant o/b/o Deceased, Derrick Williams v. LASALLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER L.L.C. d/b/a Richwood Correctional Center and Its Unknown Insurer
    NO. 2017-CC-0759
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 16-0078; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-260-CW;

I, Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Mary Beth ANDERSEN, Individually and on behalf of Lone Oak Farm, L.L.C. v. SUCCESSION OF Ruffin Leon BERGERON, Jr. and in his Capacity as Secretary of State, The State of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-C-0760
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 45850; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0922;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Francis X. ROSS, Jr.
    NO. 2017-KO-0394
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 512-141; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No, 2015-KA-1113;

11 Denied. .


text:
    RED RIVER PARISH TAX AGENCY and Elaine Moore in her capacity as Tax Administrator of Red River Parish Tax Agency v. SWEPI, LP
    NO. 2017-C-0756
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Red River, 39th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 36432; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-244-CA; September 22, 2017

11 Denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA CHEMICAL ASSOCIATION v. STATE of Louisiana, THROUGH the LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; Hon. Tim Barfield, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Revenue; the Louisiana Legislature, Through Hon. John A. Alario, President of the Louisiana Senate and Hon. Charley E. “Chuck” Kleckley, Speaker of the Louisiana House of Representatives; the Louisiana Tourism Promotion District, Through the Chairman of its Board of Directors, Hon. Harrison Smith; and Hon. Bobby Jindal, in his official capacity as Governor of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-C-0761
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For .Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 640,501; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016CAÓ501; ' '

|, Denied,


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William LAMB
    NO. 2017-KK-0770
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory, and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 530-794; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-K-0210;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gerald Bernard WARD
    NO. 2017-KO-0164
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court-Div. C, No. 205,837; -to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,-872-KA;

| iDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Francis X. ROSS, Jr.
    NO. 2017-KO-0537
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 512-141; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-KA7III3

I iDenied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Roger TATES v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-0843
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    September 22, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court. Div. B, No. 248-553;

| tDenied.

HUGHES, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    DELOITTE TAX LLP v. AMEDISYS, INC., (a Delaware Corporation), et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0988
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 648,095; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW 1380

h Grant and remand to the court of appeal for briefing, argument, and full opinion.


text:
    Jimmy R. JONES v. Secretary: James J. LEBLANC/Records Analyst, La. Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections
    NO. 2016-CI-1229
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 635,127; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0292;

11 Denied.


text:
    IN RE: Appeal of the DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 15-PDB-008
    No. 2017-OB-1360
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Counsel, No. 15-PDB-008 11 Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    Nunzio MARCHIAFAVA, Individually and on Behalf of Carrie Marchiafava and the Estate of Carrie Marchiafava v. William J. SARRADET, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0788
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 732-565; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 17-C-15

| j Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Calvin FARRIS
    NO. 2017-K-0070
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 312,121; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-094-KA;

11 Denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Bruce ROBERTSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-1194
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 04-06-2011; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KW 0373

Denied.


text:
    Gustave J. LABARRE, Jr., et al. v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL COMPANY and Texas Brine Company, LLC
    NO. 2017-CC-1037
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 33796; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 CW 0184

| denied.


text:
    Vernon A. VALENTINO, M.D. v. HEART AND VASCULAR ASSOCIATES OP ACADIANA, P.C.
    NO. 2017-C-1019
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 16th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 20166019; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 17-63;

h Denied.


text:
    IN RE: APPEAL OF the DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL NO. 2015-INT-1975
    NO. 2017-OB-1508
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Counsel, No. 2015-INT-1975;

11 Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the matter to the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel for review by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.

See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(A).


text:
    Mack Buddy MAXWELL, Jr. v. Brooke Pauline Bennett MAXWELL
    NO. 2017-C-0958
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 136,538; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-335-CA;

| denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    JUSTISS OIL COMPANY, INC. v. OIL COUNTRY TUBULAR CORPORATION, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0747
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C-2009-1338; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 15-1148; •

| TDenied.

GENOVESE, J., would grant.


text:
    Elliott B. STONECIPHER v. CADDO PARISH, Louisiana, The Caddo Parish Commission, Caddo Parish Commissioners, Douglas Dominick, Lyndon B. Johnson, Michael Williams, Matthew Linn, Jerald Bowman, Lindora Baker, Stormy Gage-Watts, John Escude, Michael Thibodeaux, David Cox, Jim Smith, Kenneth Epperson, Sr., Caddo Parish Administrator Woodrow Wilson, Jr., and Caddo Parish Director of Finance and Human Resources, Erica Bryant
    NO. 2017-C-0972
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 583,388; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-148-CA

11 Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Charles GRAY, Jr. v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS THROUGH its OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS (LICENSE CONTROL AND DRIVER IMPROVEMENT DIVISION)
    NO. 2017-C-1013
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   IN RE: Charles Gray, Jr.; - Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 127,525; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0612; October 9,2017 Denied.

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael SPANO
    NO. 2017-KK-1050
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 518946; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2017 KW 0372

hDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shelley D. DAVIS
    NO. 2017-K-0176
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 515-970; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-KA-0078

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Augustus JACKSON
    NO. 2017-KK-1018
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 15-04429 C/W 15-04430; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 17-K-209;

|, Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    John GREGORY, et al. v. William D. QUINLAN, et al. Regions Insurance, Inc. v. John Gregory, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0956
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No, 2016-4255-H C/W 2016-4925-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW17-00224;

| denied.


text:
    JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 2, Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, d/b/a East Jefferson General Hospital v. HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 1 OF the PARISH OF ST. CHARLES d/b/a St. Charles Parish Hospital
    NO. 2017-C-0960
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 81251; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-702;

1 iDenied.


text:
    In re: John T. CULOTTA v. OCHSNER CLINIC FOUNDATION et al. Applying; for Medical Review Panel
    NO. 2017-CC-0964
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 746-213; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 17-C-257

I, Denied.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the SUCCESSION OF Evelyn Heloise Andrus CATHA
    NO. 2017-C-1009
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2015-0030414; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0654

11 Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest DAVIS
    NO. 2017-KK-1008
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 16-01724; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-K-0269

I, Denied.


text:
    QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES, INC., Michael X. St. Martin, and Virginia Rayne St. Martin v. IP PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., International Paper Company, Montgomery Barnett, L.L.P, and John Y. Pearce
    NO. 2017-00915
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 149973; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0230

| denied.


text:
    WHOLESALE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY, a Branch of Wholesale Electric Supply Co. of Houston, Inc. v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
    NO. 2017-C-0986
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div, E, No. 630349; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 1180;

L Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Danny SMITH v. Kenny HAVARD, Woody’s Access, LLC, First National Insurance Company of America and Garrison Property Casualty Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-C-0987
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 624140; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 1164;

|T Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.

GENOVESE, J., would grant.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Theodule NOEL, et al. v. Catherine NOEL, Executrix, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-1034
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 16th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2016-102492; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW17-00342

Not considered; not timely filed. See State v. Crandell, 05-1060 (La. 3/10/06), 924 So.2d 122; Morris v. Stueben, 01-0137 (La. 3/16/01), 781 So.2d 1220.


text:
    Rot F. DUSSOUY, Jr. v. Lisanne Alack DUSSOUY
    NO. 2017-CC-0971
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 2014-7612; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-C-1316

11 Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Scott & Sheryl DONLEY v. The CITY OF BOSSIER CITY & Bossier Parish School Board
    NO. 2017-CD-1569
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 128,376; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-932-CW;

| ¶ Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    Travis EDWARDS, ON BEHALF OF and as Curator for William T. EDWARDS v. SUCCESSION OF Johnny Carl PARKERSON, Fortune Drive Investments, LLC, William H. Hallack, Jr., J. Michael Rabun, Jack Fluke Realty Company, and Kalil Properties VI, LLC
    NO. 2017-C-0984
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2014-3147; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 61,357-GA

11 Denied.


text:
    Kim A. GUILLORY v. CHRISTUS HEALTH CENTRAL LOUISIANA, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0953
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   IN RE: Christas Health Central Louisiana d/b/a/ Christas St. Frances Cabrini Hospital; - Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 226,541; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-841; October 9, 2017

| t Denied.


text:
    Kelly M. RICHARDSON v. Kenneth BREASSEAUX and National Automotive Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-CC-1039
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 36245; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 17-C-5;

| TPenied.


text:
    R.L. LUCIEN TILE CO. v. SOLID ROCK CO., Stallings Construction Co. and Children’s Hospital
    NO. 2017-C-1041
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 00-8416; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-0690

| denied.


text:
    William WEEMS, et al. v. HOUSTON SPECIALTY INS. CO., et al.
    NO. 2017-C-1038
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 85,164; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 17-14

liDemed.


text:
    Salvador RANDAZZO v. ST. BERNARD PARISH GOVERNMENT and Global Risk Solutions
    NO. 2017-C-1020
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 119-078; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-1116;

h Denied.


text:
    Bridget Arlie GREENE v. Mark Gerard LOVISA, the Southern Association of State Departments of Agriculture, Inc. the State of Louisiana and the Department of Agriculture Ivan and Desiree Huerta v. Mark Gerard Lovisa and State of Louisiana through the Department of Agriculture and Forestry
    NO. 2017-C-1017
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 726-691 C/W 727-529; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-660 C/W 16-CA-661

| iDenied.


text:
    Mary FISHER, et al. v. The TOWN OF BOYCE, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-1051
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 255,497; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-960;

11 Denied.


text:
    DUNCAN OIL, INC. v. STATE OF LOUISIANA MINERAL AND ENERGY BOARD, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-1036
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2014-4513; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-988

|, Denied.


author: McClendon, j.

text:
    CAPITAL MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, INC., Laura Lee Guarisco, Victor Guarisco, Maria Cedes Guarisco, Elizabeth Mercedes Guarisco and Leah K. McGriff v. Karen DUHON, Donna Peveto, Nelson Tucker, Ltd., Armond A. Duhon, Jamie Elizabeth Tucker Kocher Trustee of JS Tucker Revocable Trust, Marcie Ann Tucker Green Trustee of Men Tucker Revocable Trust, Jamie Elizabeth Tucker Kocher, Individually, Jamie Elizabeth Tucker Kocher co-administratrix of the Succession of James Scott Tucker, Marcie Ann Tucker Green, Individually, Marcie Ann Tucker Green co-administratrix of the Succession of James Scott Tucker and ABC Siding Company of Morgan City, Inc. Capital Management Consultants, Inc. v. Michael Aloise, Jr.
    2016 CA 0703, 2016 CA 0704
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Judgment Rendered: APRIL 18, 2017
    Rehearing Denied July 13, 2017

      Barbara Lane Irwin, Timothy E. Pujol, Gonzales, Louisiana, Henry C. Perret, Jr., Lafayette, Louisiana And Esther Margriet Langenberg (pro hac vice), Farifax, Virginia, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Capital Management Consultants, Inc., Laura Lea Guarisco, Leah K. McGriff, Victor Guarisco, Elizabeth Mercedes Guarisco and Maria Cedes Guarisco
    Robert J. Burvant, J. Grant Coleman, Diana J. Masters, New Orleans, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Marcie Ann Tucker Green and Jamie Elizabeth Kocher, as Administrator Of the Succession of James Scott Tucker, Nelson Tucker, LTD
    David M. Thorguson, Morgan City, Louisiana, Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Nelson Tucker, LTD
    BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUIDRY, and McClendon, jj.
   McClendon, j.

| ¡¡Plaintiffs appeal a judgment that held LSA-R.S. 12:1502 to be the controlling prescriptive/peremptive period as to one of the co-defendants, thereby limiting claims against that co-defendant to a period of three years. For the following reasons, we conclude that the trial court improperly certified the judgment as final under LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1915B and dismiss the appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Capital Management Consultants, Inc. (“CMC”) is a Louisiana corporation incorporated in 1982 by Peter Guarisco and James Scott Tucker, who served as the initial officers and directors and continued serving in those capacities until their deaths. Mr. Guarisco died in 2005, and Mr. Tucker died in January 2014.

In 1982, Karen Duhon was hired by CMC to work as a part-time bookkeeper. Also, since the 1980s, Donnasue Peveto was employed by Guarisco-related companies as an inventory clerk, secretary, and receptionist.

In December 2014, CMC, along with the heirs of Mr. Guarisco, who are also shareholders in CMC, filed a petition for damages, naming, among others, Karen Duhon, Donnasue Peveto, and the co-administrators of the Succession of James Scott Tucker as defendants. Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that throughout their employment until Mr. Tucker’s death, Tucker, Duhon, and Peveto “engaged in an array of schemes ... to defraud, fraudulently convert, steal[,] and embezzle mon[ie]s and property from Petitioners and to manipulate the corporate and personal ledgers of the Petitioners herein.” Plaintiffs also allege that “[b]y working in concert [defendants] were able to steal vast sums of money from the Petitioners and to hide the theft because they were the ‘controls, checks and balances.’ ” For instance, plaintiffs allege that “Karen Duhon and Donnasue Peveto, among other things, and with James Scott Tucker’s assistance and approval, submitted false requests for reimbursement of Uexpenses, submitted the requests for reimbursement of an actual expense^] ... add[ed] $9,000.00 or more to the check total, [and] created loans for themselves that James Scott Tucker would write off at a later date against land, art, costs or other transactions or expenses.”

Prior to the instituting the current action, on August 4, 2014, plaintiffs also filed an intervention in Mr. Tucker’s succession proceeding, seeking to recover for the alleged wrongful acts of Mr. Tucker.

In May 2015, two of the co-administrators for Mr. Tucker’s succession filed a “Peremptory Exception of Prescription” in the proceedings before us on appeal. Therein, they asserted that because Mr. Tucker was an officer and director of CMC, the three-year peremptive period found in LSA-R.S. 12:1502 relative to corporate officers applies to the exclusion of all other prescriptive periods. The co-administrators asserted that any claims arising from acts that occurred before August 4, 2011 (three years prior to plaintiffs raising these claims in Mr. Tucker’s succession proceeding) were time barred.

The plaintiffs opposed the co-administrators’ motion, asserting among other things, that the two-year prescriptive period from discovery found in former LSA-R.S. 12:96, the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions set forth in LSA-C.C, Art. 3492, and/or the ten-year prescriptive period for personal actions set forth in LSA-C.C. Art. 3499, applied to Mr. Tucker’s acts.

Following a hearing on the co-administrators’ motion, the trial court concluded that LSA-R.S. 12:1502 covering corporate officers provided the applicable preserip-tive period for Mr. Tucker’s acts because “[a]U alleged actions were taken as an officer, director, manager, or shareholder of [CMC],” and that plaintiffs could not recover for any alleged acts occurring pri- or to August 4, 2011. On August 17, 2015, the trial court signed a judgment that granted the co-administrators’ peremptory exception of prescription, and dismissed plaintiffs' claims against the co-administrators of Mr. Tucker’s succession, with prejudice, for acts arising prior to August 4, 2011.' However, Rail claims for Mr. Tucker’s actions arising after August 4, 2011, are still pending. Further, the claims against the other co-defendants remain outstanding and have not been limited by the prescriptive period set forth in LSA-R.S. 12:1502. Nevertheless, the trial court designated- the August-17, 2015 judgment as a final- judgment “after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” Plaintiffs filed, a motion for new trial, which was subsequently denied by the trial court.

Plaintiffs have now appealed, assigning the following as error:

The [Trial] Court improperly applied the peremptive period found in La. R.S. 12:1502 to Plaintiffs claims, despite the clear and unambiguous language of La. R.S.. 15:1356(H) and the provisions of. La. R.S. 12:96, La. C.C. Art. 2030 and La, C.C. Art. 2032.
The [Trial] Court’s ruling improperly rendered La. R.S'. 16:1356’s language meaningless in violation of La. C.C. Art. 2030.
The [Trial] Court improperly found that James Scott Tucker’s intentional act of theft, conversion and racketeering was done in his capacity as an officer of Capital Management Consultants, Inc. and not done for his own personal benefit.' .

DISCUSSION

’ The judgment before us was certified as a final judgment in accordance with LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1915B. Before we consider the merits of the appeal, we must determine whether the judgment is properly certified. The August 17, 2015 judgment at issue merely limited, the claims that could, be asserted' against Mr. Tucker’s succession and is not a final judgment under LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1841, Nor is .it a final judgment for. purposes of an immediate appeal under the provisions of Article. 1915A. Therefore, this court’s jurisdiction depends upon whether the judgment was properly designated and certified as a final judgment pursuant to Article 1915B(1), See also LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1911B and 2083. Although the trial court designated the judgment as. being final and appealable under Article 1915B, .that designation is not determinative of -this court’s jurisdiction. Van ex rel. White v. Davis, 00-0206 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/16/01), 808 So.2d 478, 480. Appellate courts have the duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Motorola, Inc. v. Associated Indemnity Corporation, 02-0716 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/30/03), 867 So.2d 715, 717. If no reasons for the certification are given but some justification is apparent from the record, the appellate court should make a de novo determination of whether the certification was proper. R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 04-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, 1122.

Historically, our courts have had a policy against multiple appeals and piecemeal litigation. Article 1915B attempts to strike a balance between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the need for making review available at a time that best serves the needs of the parties. Thus, in considering whether a judgment has been properly designated as final and appealable pursuant to Article 1915B, a trial court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved. Id.; Templet v. State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 05-1903 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/06), 951 So.2d 182, 185. Some of the factors a trial court should take into account in making an Article 1915B certification are the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the trial court; the possibility the reviewing court' might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; and miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. R.J. Messinger, Inc., 894 So.2d at 1122. However, the overriding inquiry, for the trial court is whether there is no just reason for delay. Id. at 1122-23.

Here, many of the claims asserted by plaintiffs against Mr. Tucker for acts occurring prior to August 4, 2011, are also being raised as part of a larger scheme against other co-defendants, who plaintiffs claim were co-conspirators. Specifically, plaintiffs allege, in part, that “[b]y working in concert [the defendants] were able to steal vast sums of money from the [plaintiffs] and to hide the theft because they were the ‘controls, checks, and balances.’ ” Many of the claims extending beyond the three-year period raised against the co-defendants are related to many claims asserted against Mr. Tucker. We also note that the trial court has denied a similar exception of prescription, raised by Ms. Duhon, wherein she asserted that LSA-R.S. 12:1502 applied |7to limit the claims against her to a three-year .peremptive period because she began acting as “Secretary-Treasurer” in 2007. In denying the motion, the trial court stated:

The basis,of the Exception [o]f Prescription is that she acted as an officer of the corporation; therefore she is entitled to the protection of 1502. At this time I’m going to find that defendant has not proven she is an officer; therefore she is not entitled to 1502. That does not preclude her from, at a later date, proving that she was the Secretary; that she was an officer, and re-urging the Exception [o]f Prescription, which can be done any time before Judgment.

As such, even were this court to affirm or reverse the trial court’s ruling, this court may have to consider the applicability of the prescription under LSA-R.S. 12:1502 again in the context of the claims asserted against the co-defendants. Further, the trial would not be significantly shortened nor would these issues be entirely, resolved in light of the claims asserted against the co-defendants, which have not been so restricted.

Moreover, the trial court may determine that a shorter prescriptive period could apply. We note that Ms. Duhon has also asserted that the claims against her were subject to a one-year prescriptive period because the allegations against her all concerned “theft” or “conversion.” In denying relief, the trial court made the following pertinent observations:

there hasn’t been sufficient evidence to establish whether the alleged activity falls under racketeering, or under conversion, or some other prescriptive period. That doesn’t mean that prescription hasn’t—I am not making a finding that prescription has not run. I am making a • finding that 'there is not sufficient evidence to determine if prescription has run. That issue can still-.be litigated as more evidence is developed.

Given the nature of the claims and the procedural posture of this case, we are constrained to find that addressing the issues at this time would promote piecemeal appeals. Accordingly, on our de novo review, we cannot conclude that there is no just reason for delay. Therefore, the certification does not meet the R J. Messinger, Inc. requirements, and we dismiss the appeal.

[«CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal without prejudice. We also lift the stay issued by this court on February 10, 2017. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellants, Capital Management Consultants, Inc., Laura Lea Guarisco, Leah K. McGriff, Victor Guaris-co, Elizabeth Mercedes Guarisco, and Maria Cedes Guarisco.

APPEAL DISMISSED; STAY LIFTED.

      . The named plaintiffs are Laura Lea Guaris-co, Victor Guarisco, Maria Cedes Guarisco, Elizabeth Mercedes Guarisco, are Leah McGriff.

      . Donnasue Peveto died on March 27, 2016.

      . Plaintiffs also named Karen Duhon's husband, Armond A. Duhon, and ABC Siding Company of Morgan City, Inc., which is owned and operated by the Duhons, as defendants.

      .Pursuant to Acts 2014, No. 328, § 5, LSA-R.S. 12:96 was repealed effective January 1, 2015.

      . Karen Duhon also filed an exception of prescription urging that the period found in LSA-R.S. Í 2:1502 applied to her acts as "Secretary-Treasurer,” but the trial court denied her exception.

      . While plaintiffs are concerned that discovery for claims against Mr. Tucker beyond the three-year period may be limited, we recognize that the information may still be discoverable if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1422. Given the allegations of a conspiracy to defraud, fraudulently convert, steal, and embezzle monies and property among the co-defendants, discovery against Mr. Tucker may not necessarily be limited to the three-year time frame if such discovery could potentially lead to admissible evidence. See Lehmann v. American Southern Home Ins. Co., 615 So.2d 923, 925 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 617 So.2d 913 (La. 1993).

      . Appellees filed a motion to rescind the stay on March 7, 2017. Because we lift the stay in connection with our resolution, we deny the appellees’ motion as moot.


author: THERIOT, J. HIGGINBOTHAM, J.,

text:
    Seanice Etienne TAYLOR v. Seneca Leonard TAYLOR
    NO. 2016 CA 1682
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Judgment Rendered: SEPTEMBER 15, 2017

      Scott M. Hawkins, R. Chris Oetjens, Baton Rouge Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, Seneca Leonard Taylor
    Seanice Etienne, New Iberia, Louisiana, Plaintiff/Appellee, pro se
    Charlotte Bordenave, New Iberia, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee, Sean-ice Etienne
    BEFORE: McCLENDON, HIGGINBOTHAM, CRAIN, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
   THERIOT, J.

|2The defendant-appellant, Seneca Leonard Taylor, appeals a judgment rendered by the Family Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge (“the Family Court”) in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, Seanice Etienne, granting Ms. Etienne’s rule for spousal support arrearages and finding Mr. Taylor in arrears for unpaid spousal support in the sum of $25,280.00. For the following reasons, we vacate and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Taylor and Ms. Etienne were married in September of 2002. On March 17, 2011, Ms. Etienne filed a petition for divorce against Mr. Taylor in accordance with La. C.C. art. 103(1). Ms. Etienne was granted an absolute divorce from Mr. Taylor by judgment signed on March 31, 2011. Ms. Etienne did not make a claim for spousal support in her petition for divorce, and the judgment of divorce does not contain any order pertaining to spousal support. On June 15, 2016, Ms. Etienne filed a rule for spousal support arrearages against Mr. Taylor. Ms. Etienne claimed she and Mr. Taylor had entered into a post-nuptial contractual agreement settling all matters incidental to their divorce (“the marital settlement agreement”). Ms. Eti-enne alleged that Mr. Taylor was thereby contractually obligated to pay spousal support to her in the amount of $1,000.00 per month or 33% of his net pay per month, whichever is greater. Ms. Etienne claimed Mr. Taylor failed to satisfy his support obligation and was in arrears, as of the date of the filing, in the sum of $47,280.00. Ms. Etienne prayed, inter alia, that the Family Court find Mr. Taylor in arrears and order him to pay her the past-due amount, plus legal interest.

Ms. Etienne’s rule for spousal support arrearages came before the Family Court for a hearing on July 5, 2016. Ms. Etienne was the only | ¡¡person to appear before the Family Court at the hearing. In open court, the Family Court found that, based upon the arrearage worksheet compiled by Ms. Etienne and the terms of the marital settlement agreement, the total amount payable to Ms. Etienne was $36,000.00. The Family Court further found -that Mr. Taylor had already paid $10,720.00 of this sum. The Family Court thus ruled that spousal support arrearages be set in the total amount of $25,280.00, plus legal interest. That same day, on July 5, 2016, the Family Court signed a written judgment ordering that spousal support arrearages be set in the amount of $25,280.00, together with legal interest on each payment on the date due until paid; ordering that the spousal support arrearage be made execu-tory; ordering that an income assignment order be issued immediately for the payment of-spousal support arrearages; and ordering that Mr. Taylor be cast with court costs. Mr. Taylor now appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Mr. Taylor raises the following assignments of error;

■' 1. The Family Court erred in granting ' spousal support when no demand for spousal support was made.
2. The Family Court erred in granting an order of arrearages when no judgment of spousal. support had been issued.
3. The Family Court erred in granting spousal support arrearages based upon a post-nuptial agreement which was not in proper form.
4. The Family Court erred in granting a judgment of arrears as no evidence was properly introduced at the hearing.
5. The Family Court erred in issuing an income assignment order as no order of support had been issued.
6. • The Family Court erred in granting an income assignment order as the law does not provide for such relief in cases of spousal support.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Initially, before considering any questions pertaining to the law governing income assignment orders or the. validity, interpretation, or ^enforceability of the post-nuptial marital settlement agreement entered between Mr. Taylor and Ms. Eti-enne, we must first consider whether the Family Court erred in- granting Ms. Eti-enne’s rule for spousal support arrearages on evidentiary grounds. This question is raised by Mr. Taylor on appeal in his fourth assignment of error, wherein he argues that the Family Court erred in granting Ms. Etienne’s ■ rule for spousal support arrearages against-him, reasoning there' was no evidence introduced at the hearing on the rule for spousal support arrearages. We agree.

Louisiana jurisprudence holds that when an obligation is based on a writing, prima facie proof of the obligation requires introduction of the writing into evidence. See Arias v. Stolthaven New Orleans, LLC, 08-1111 (La. 5/5/09), 9 So.3d 815, 822 (citing Ascension Builders, Inc. v. Jumonville, 262 La. 519, 263 So.2d 875, 878 (1972)). It has been held that “a plaintiff who knows of a writing which is the principal basis for his claims must produce it when it is the best evidence of the facts at issue.” Id.

Ms. Etienne clearly relies upon the terms of the marital settlement agreement in support of her rule for spousal support arrearages. However, our review of the record reveals that although Ms. Etienne attached a copy of the martial settlement agreement to her rule for spousal support arrearages, she did not offer -or introduce the agreement into evidence at the hearing on the rule for spousal support - arrearages. It is well-settled that “[ejvidence not properly and officially offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if it is- physically placed in the record.” Denoux v. Vessel Management Services, Inc., 07-2143 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88. Thus, although the marital support agreement was physically placed in the record, we lack authority to consider the agreement as evidence, and we have no choice but to vacate the Family Court’s judgment and remand this] R matter for further- proceedings. See and compare Milburn v. Emanuele, 12-0235 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/12), 96 So.3d 638, 640, (wherein the appellate court vacated a ruling on a dilatory exception of prematurity premised upon the terms of a contract attached to the pleadings but not offered into evidence at the hearing on the exception). Mr. Taylor’s fourth assignment of error has merit,

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Family Court’s July 5, 2016 judgment and remand this matter to the Family Court for. further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff-appellee, Seanice Etienne.

VACATED; REMANDED.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS WRITTEN REASONS.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J.,

dissenting.

IT respectfully disagree with the majority because Ms. Etienne, who was representing herself, provided comprehensive testimony during the hearing regarding the post-nuptial agreement, and Mr. Taylor’s failure to pay the agreed upon spousal support payments. Ms. Etienne’s testimony was sufficient to meet her burden of proving entitlement to spousal support ar-rearages without the introduction of the post-nuptial agreement into evidence. See Savoy v. Harris, 09-0221 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/12/09), 20 So.3d 1075, 1080 n.6, writs denied, 09-1611 (La. 10/9/09), 18 So.3d 1290.

      . In light of our findings on this point, we pretermit consideration of all remaining assignments of error.'


author: CRAIN, J.

text:
    Nolan BENSON d/b/a Borrel’s EZ Shop v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, THROUGH its OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO CONTROL
    NO. 2017 CA 0081
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    SEPTEMBER 15, 2017

      Douglas L. Bryan, Marksville, Louisiana, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant, Nolan J. Benson d/b/a Borrel’s EZ Shop
    Jeff Landry, Attorney General Margaret A. Collier, Assistant Attorney General Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee, State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue, through its Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control
    BEFORE: GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, AND CRAIN, JJ.
   CRAIN, J.

|2The plaintiff, Nolan Benson, doing business as Borrel’s EZ Shop, appeals a judgment sustaining an exception of prescription and dismissing his claims against the State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue, through the Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Benson seeks damages against the state based on the state’s denial of his applications for a Class B liquor license for his business. The denial was premised upon Benson’s business being less than 300 feet from a church, school, playground, synagogue, or library, and therefore prohibited from licensure by Louisiana Revised Statute 26:281. Benson contends the state misapplied the relevant statutory provision and argues licenses were granted to other businesses located closer to churches. He claims the state was discriminating against him because he is a minority business owner. Benson alleged he was finally granted a license in December 2014, after the relevant statutory provision was correctly applied.

Benson filed this suit for damages on May 19, 2015, in the 12th Judicial District Court, located in Avoyelles Parish, where Benson resides. The state filed exceptions of improper venue and prescription, which the trial court denied. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal granted the state’s application for writ of supervisory review and granted the exception of improper venue upon determining that Benson’s suit was required to be brought in East Baton Rouge Parish. Because the third circuit determined that venue was not proper in Avoyelles Parish, it also reversed the trial court’s ruling denying the exception of prescription, and referred the exception to the court of proper venue.

After this suit was transferred to the 19th Judicial District Court in East Baton Rouge Parish, the state again urged its exception of prescription. The state Uargued that Benson’s claims were subject to a liberative prescription of one year, which began, at the latest, on July 22, 2010, the date Benson alleged his application for a liquor license was denied The state argued this suit, filed in 2015, was untimely and should be dismissed, Benson opposed the exception, claiming he alleged a continuing tort that persisted through December 2014, the date he finally obtained a liquor license. The trial court sustained the exception and dismissed Benson’s suit. Benson appeals.

DISCUSSION

Liberative prescription is a mode of barring actions as a result of inaction for a period of time. La. Civ. Code art. 3447. Statutes regulating prescription are strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished. Mallett v. McNeal, 05-2289 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1254, 1258. Generally, the burden of proving a cause of action has prescribed rests with the party pleading prescription; however, when the face of the plaintiffs petition shows the prescriptive period has run, and the plaintiff is contending there is a suspension or interruption of prescription, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove suspension or interruption. Thompson v. Town of Jonesboro, 16-1224 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/17), 222 So.3d 770.

Evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the exception of prescription when the grounds thereof do not appear from, the petition. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 931; Kelley v. General Insurance Company of America, 14-0180 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/14), 168 So.3d 528, 533, writs denied, 15-0157, 15-0165 (La. 4/10/15), 163 So.3d 816, 816, In the absence of evidence, the exception must be decided on the facts alleged -in the petition, which are accepted as true. Duckworth v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 11-2835 (La. 11/2/12), 125 So.3d 1057, 1072. When, as here, evidence is received at'the trial of 14the exception, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s factual findings under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard. Thompson, 222 So.3d at 772.

Benson does not dispute that hte 'claims are subject to the one-year prescriptive period applicable to delictual actions, which commences to run from the date the injury or damage is sustained. See La. Civ. Code art. 3492. Rather, he argues his claims constitute a continuing tort, and therefore have not prescribed. In support of his position, he introduced into' evidence his own affidavit, wherein he pertinently attested that he “consistently and repeatedly applied for a Class B liquor license ... beginning in 2004 until December 2014, when a license was finally issued.”

The continuing tort doctriné is an exception to the general rule of prescription. Alexander v. La. State Board of Private Investigator Examiners, 15-0537 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/17/17), 211 So.3d 544, 557, writs denied, 17-0571 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d 855 and 17-0607 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d 857. The doctrine is rooted in property damage cases and operates to prevent the commencement of the prescriptive period until the conduct causing the damage is abated. South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 418 So.2d 531, 532-33 (La. 1982). Application of the doctrine requires, the operating cause of the injury to be a continuous one resulting in continuous damage. Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 98-2326 (La. 6/29/99), 737 So.2d 720, 726. In other words, where the cause of injury is a continuous one giving rise to successive damages, prescription does, not begin to run until the conduct causing, the damage is abated. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 418 So.2d at 533. But if the operating cause of the injury is discontinuous (not a continuous one of daily occurrence), there are a multiplicity of causes of action and of corresponding prescriptive periods. Crump, 737 So.2d at 726. The focus of the continuing tort inquiry is a conduct-based one, asking |swhether the tortfeasor perpetuates the injury through overt, persistent, and ongoing acts. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 991, 1003.

The facts alleged by Benson do not support a finding of a continuing tort. Benson seeks damages based upon.the state’s refusal to grant him a liquor license. The operating cause of the claimed injury (the damage-causing conduct) was each denial of the licensure application. These were discrete or discontinuous occurrences, not continuous or systematic acts. Any damages Benson suffered were: apparent immediately upon the denial of the application. Benson claims the state’s repeated denial of the licensure applications resulted in damages that, continued until a license was granted in 2014. However, even if Benson continued to suffer ill effects or damages from the repeated denials of the applications, the continuing tort doctrine is inapplicable to these facts. Compare Hogg, 45 So.3d at 1005-07; Crump, 737 So.2d at 729. Further, though Benson contends each denial was premised upon erroneous grounds, it is well-settled the breach of the duty to right a wrong and make the plaintiff whole cannot be a continuing wrong that suspends the running of prescription^ as that is the purpose of any lawsuit and the obligation of every tortfeasor. See Hogg, 45 So.3d at 1007.

The trial court did not err in rejecting Benson’s argument that the continuing tort -doctrine , prevented the commencement of the one-year prescriptive period, Each denial of an application commenced a new prescriptive period. The last denial identified by Benson occurred in 2010, Consequently, the trial court did not err in finding this suit, filed in 2015, untimely.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court sustaining the exception of prescription and dismissing Benson’s suit against the state is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Nolan Benson.

AFFIRMED.