author: GREMILLION, Judge.

text:
    FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC v. William C. TAYLOR
    16-718
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    02/01/2017

      Mary K. Beaird, Wes Bailey, Attorneys at Law, 109 South 3rd Street, Leesville, LA 71446, (337) 718-3561, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: William C. Taylor
    Sandy E. Clause, Rogers, Carter & Payne, LLC, P. 0. Box 7235, Shreveport, LA 71137-7235, (318) 861-1111, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: First Tower Loan, LLC
    Jordan B. Bird, Attorney at Law, 4415 Thornhill Avenue, Shreveport, LA 71106, (318) 861-1111, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: First Tower Loan, LLC
    Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

h The plaintiff-appellant, First Tower Loan, LLC, d/b/a Tower Loan of Leesville (Tower Loan), appeals the judgment of the trial court entering a default judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee, William C. Taylor. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2012, Tower Loan filed a petition to collect sums due by Taylor on a note executed in May 2012, and secured by moveable property. On February 22, 2013, Tower Loan through its manager, Sumer Duplechain, allegedly entered into an oral contract for the repayment of funds due Tower Loan by Taylor, with the caveat that if Taylor made the payments as agreed no further action would be taken against him. Tower Loan then obtained a judgment against Taylor on March 14, 2013, for $8,253.04 with 28.47% interest and attorney fees. Taylor did not appeal the March 14, 2013 judgment. Taylor made payments of $150.00 in March, April, and May 2013. However, Tower Loan returned the May 2013 payment and instituted garnishment proceedings against Taylor. On October 4, 2013, the trial court signed an order for garnishment.

On November 20, 2013, Taylor filed a petition pro se to enforce the February 22, 2013 agreement with instructions to serve Tower Loan through its attorney, Sandy Clause. Taylor filed a motion for preliminary default in January 2016, which was granted on February 1, 2016, reinstating the payment plan of $150.00 per month with a balance due of $8,508.32. The judgment further dismissed the garnishment.

On February 11,'2016, Tower Loan filed a motion to set aside the judgment and for a new trial. Tower Loan claimed that it agreed to accept $161.00 per 12month and that Taylor’s $150.00 payment was insufficient, causing it to be returned to him in May 2013. On February 12, 2016, the trial court denied the motion. Tower Loan then filed a motion to reconsider the order denying its motion to set aside and for new trial and/or, in the alternative, to set the matter for hearing, arguing in part that it was not properly served as Clause is not the registered agent for service of process. The trial court denied the motion noting, “Service was made upon counsel of record.” In March 2016, Tower Loan requested written reasons for judgment pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. Art. 1917. Tower Loan now appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Tower Loan assigns as error:

1. The trial court erred when it granted judgment in favor of appellee.
2. The trial court erred when it did not set aside the judgment rendered in favor of appellee and grant a new trial.

At the conclusion of the preliminary default hearing the trial court stated:

[Tjhere is no answer filed to your petition by anyone, including the attorneys. You’ve entered your preliminary default and I’m going to find that the evidence supports—particularly, the documentary evidence supports [ ] an oral agreement of payment of this judgment in the fashion you’ve described. I’m going [to] order specific performance of that agreement and order that they accept those payments in accordance with that agreement at the rate of a hundred and fifty dollars per month.

A March 27, 2013 letter addressed to Taylor and sent by Tower Loan’s attorney stated, in part:

Dear Mr. Taylor:
In response to your call the other day.
| SI spoke with Tower Loan manager and she said she explained to you that a Judgment would be rendered against you, however no further action would be taken on the suit as long as you continued to pay as agreed.

Also in the record were copies of the payments of $150.00 in March and April 2013, which were negotiated by Tower Loan, and an affidavit by Taylor’s parents stating that Duplechain and a male associate came to their residence on February 22, 2013. Approximately thirty minutes after Duplechain and the male associate left, Taylor arrived at his parents’ house, at which time they gave him a $575.00 personal check to bring his account current and prevent further action from being taken on the judgment. They further attested that they heard their son’s conversation with Duplechain in which he told her that he would be in after lunch to pay the $575.00 and discuss the payment plan terms. The negotiated $575.00 check dated February 22, 2013, was admitted into evidence.

Service of Process

Tower Loan argues that it was not properly served as Clause was not an agent for service of process.

The proper method for contesting the sufficiency of service of process is by filing an exception. La.Code Civ.P. Art. 925 requires that a declinatory exception which challenges the sufficiency of service of process must be made prior to a general appearance or default judgment. Moity v. Guilliot, 466 So.2d 511 (La. App. 3 Cir.1985); McMickens v. McMickens, 386 So.2d 972 (La.App. 3 Cir.1980). Otherwise, the exception is waived and the defendant’s only recourse is to file a suit to annul the default judgment. See La.Code Civ.P. Art. 2002.

Guidry’s Seafood Distribs., Inc. v. Farmers Seafood Co., Inc. 99-1005, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/15/99), 759 So.2d 806, 807, writ denied, 00-837 (La. 5/12/00), 762 So.2d 15.

|/Tower Loan did not file a declinatory exception to service of process prior to or contemporaneously with its general appearance on the record. Accordingly, Tower Loan has waived any objection it has to service of process. This assignment of error is without merit.

Taylor’s Failure to Appeal the March 2013 Judgment

Tower Loan argues that Taylor should have filed a reconventional demand to its original December 2012 petition. Taylor testified at the default hearing that he believed the judgment was no longer valid based on the oral agreement confected with Duplechain, as evidenced by the March 27, 2013 letter sent by Tower Loan’s attorney after the judgment was rendered. He was only aware that Tower Loan was not going to enforce its oral agreement to suspend the judgment as long as payments were made until, at the earliest, May 2013, when appeal delays from the March 2013 judgment had long expired. Taylor’s cause of action against Tower Loan did not arise until this time. Moreover, Taylor’s November 2013 petition pertained to the breach of the agreement he confected in February 2013, rather than the March 2013 judgment. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

Default Judgment Merits/Validity of Contract to Make Payments

La.Code Civ.P. Art. 1701(A)pro-vides that “[i]f a defendant in the princip[al] or incidental demand fails to answer within the time prescribed by law, judgment by default may be entered against him.” Under La.Code Civ. P. Art. 1702, a judgment of default must be confirmed by proof of the demand, sufficient to establish a prima facie case, as fully as though the Defendants denied each of the allegations in the petition. Sessions & Fishman v. Liquid Air Corp., 616 So.2d 1254 (La.1993). In other words, the plaintiff must present competent evidence that convinces the court that it is more probable than not that [he] would prevail in a trial on the merits.
|KIn reviewing default judgments, appellate courts are restricted to determining the sufficiency of. the evidence offered in support of judgment. Washington v. Grand Casinos of LA., Inc.-Coushatta, 97-1297 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/98), 715 So.2d 515. Although there is a presumption that the evidence presented supports a default judgment, this presumption does not attach when the record of the confirmation hearing is before the appellate court. Id. In such a case, the reviewing court is able to determine from the record whether the evidence upon which the judgment is based was sufficient and competent. Travis v. Commercial Union Ins., 569 So.2d 115 (LaApp. 1 Cir.1990). Thus, because we have the record of the hearing to confirm the default, the presumption does not attach. However, the trial court’s conclusion concerning the evidence’s sufficiency presents a factual issue which the manifest error rule governs. The manifest error standard of review obligates appellate courts to give great deference to the trial court’s findings of fact. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989). We will not reverse factual determinations, absent a finding of manifest error. Id.

Bordelon v. Sayer, 01-717, pp. 2-3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/13/02), 811 So.2d 1232, 1235, writ denied, 02-1009 (La. 6/21/02), 819 So.2d 340.

Tower Loan argues that Taylor did not submit sufficient evidence for the trial court to grant a default judgment and that the trial court manifestly erred in finding that a binding agreement existed between it and Taylor. First, we note that Tower Loan failed to answer the petition although it had over two years to do so. Second, there was sufficient evidence in the record for Taylor to establish a prima facie case as to the existence of an oral contract. Taylor established that he would be able to meet his burden of proving the existence of a contractual agreement for payment of $150.00 per month that suspended the enforcement of the judgment against him, based on the documentary evidence and testimony submitted to the trial court.

Further, based on our review of the evidence, we find the trial court did not err in finding that Taylor proved that an oral contract was confected between Lhimself and Duplechain as the manager for Tower Loan to pay $150.00 per month in lieu of it pursuing the judgment.

Pursuant to La.Civ.Code Art. 1927, “[a] contract is formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance.” Offer and acceptance can be oral or in writing unless otherwise specified in the law. Id.

Although the parties did not confect a written agreement for the $150.00 payment plan, the evidence overwhelmingly indicated that Duplechain agreed, as the manager of Tower Loan, to these terms on February 22, 2013. This is especially true in light of the documentary evidence that Tower Loan’s attorney sent to Taylor confirming Duplechain’s agreement that “no further action would be taken on the suit as long as you continued to pay as agreed.”

The existence of the oral contract between the parties is further supported by Tower Loan’s negotiation of the February 22, 2013 check in the amount of $575.00, the March and April 2013 payments in the amount of $150.00 that it accepted, the affidavit of Taylor’s parents, and Taylor’s testimony at the default hearing. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

The default judgment granted in favor of William C. Taylor to enforce the contract for payments entered into with Tower Loan in February 2013 is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against First Tower Loan, LLC.

AFFIRMED.

      . No written reasons for judgment appear in the record.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHATELAIN, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Brian K. DUPLICHAN, et ux. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO.
    16-689
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    02/01/2017

      J. Craig Jones, Jones & Hill, LLC, 131 Highway 165 South, Oakdale, LA 71463, (318) 335-1333, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: Brian K. Duplichan, as Natural Tutor of his Minor Child, Kadie Duplichan
    H. David Vaughan, II, Plauche, Smith, & Nieset, LLC, P. 0. Drawer 1705, Lake Charles, LA 70602-1705, (337) 436-0522, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPEL-LEE: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
    Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and David E. Chatelain, Judges.
   CHATELAIN, Judge.

liThe plaintiff, Brian Duplichan, the natural tutor of his minor child, Kadie E. Duplichan (Kadie), appeals the trial court’s judgment granting State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (State Farm) motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 29, 2007, Kadie and her mother, Sarah Spears (Spears), were passengers in a vehicle driven by Beverly B. Hooper (Hooper). Hooper drove her vehicle off the road into a ditch and struck a culvert, seriously injuring Spears and Ka-die. Spears survived for a short time after the accident but ultimately died from her injuries; Kadie, though injured, survived the accident.

At the time of the accident, Kadie and Spears lived with Mary Elizabeth Reeves (Reeves), Spears’s mother. When the accident occurred, Reeves had a State Farm insurance policy which provided under-insured motorist bodily injury (UMBI) coverage. The dispute in this case is over the amount of Reeves’s UMBI insurance coverage. State Farm asserts that Reeves’s UMBI policy was for $25,000, while the plaintiff claims Reeves’s UMBI policy was for $1,000,000.

The plaintiff sued State Farm, seeking the maximum payment of UMBI, After answering the lawsuit, State Farm tendered $25,000, what it considered the full amount of the policy, and then filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that its UMBI policy was exhausted.

On December 16, 2013 and April 17, 2014, the trial comí; heard State Farm’s motion for summary judgment. At the first hearing the trial court requested | ¾evidence about the premiums Reeves paid; this evidence was introduced at the second hearing. At the conclusion of the April 17 hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.

On May 1, 2014, the trial court granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment. In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court stated:

After a review of the evidence, the court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact to deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
State Farm has produced a certified copy of the policy issued to Mary Reeves, # 80 4927-D02-18C, which provided UMBI coverage of $25,000 per person and $50,000 total per accident. The agent’s notes show that the policy was prepared at the request of Mary Reeves, stating as the reason for the change: “Mary is not working at this time.” The new policy was subsequently issued to Mary Reeves and mailed to her home, based on the certificate filed by State Farm. The policy’s effective dates were February 22, 2007, to October 2, 2007. Additionally, the policy references that it replaces policy, #80 4927-D02-18B. State Farm also produced evidence that Mary Reeves received credit for the former higher premium that was previously paid for on February 22, 2007, which coincides with Reeves’[s] request to reduce the policy limit. Further, Mary Reeves accepted this credit on April 10, 2007, when she paid 50% of the new, reduced premium minus the credit given for changing from the more costly $1,000,000 UMBI premium to the 25,000/ $50,000 UMBI premium, as shown in the Premium History document.
Plaintiff has offered the affidavit of Mary Reeves and an uncertified Auto Renewal document for policy # 80 4927-D02-18A as evidence. Mary Reeves states in her affidavit that she never requested a change to her policy affecting the premiums and that she never received a new policy in the mail. Mary Reeves claims that the policy # 80 4927-D02-18A was the policy in place at the time of the accident which gave rise to this suit, as evidenced by her Auto Renewal document.
Mary Reeves’[s] affidavit does not present a genuine issue of material fact. Insurance policies are to be interpreted by the court under the contractual interpretation statutes in the [C]ivil [Cjode. Peterson v. Schimek, 729 So.2d 1024 (La. 1999). Where the policy is clear and unambiguous, the policy must be enforced as written. Id. “When a contract can be construed from the four corners of the instrument without looking to extrinsic evidence, the question of contractual interpretation is answered as a matter of law and summary judgment is appropriate.” Id. at 1029; citing Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 630 So.2d 741 (La. 1994). State Farm policy #80 4927-D02-18C is Isthe only certified copy of the auto insurance policy that has been presented to the court.
Further, plaintiff relies on Mary Reeves’[s] affidavit to raise the issue that that [sic] she never received a copy of policy # 80 4927-D02-18C. However, the insured’s testimony that she never received the insurance policy alone is insufficient to carry the plaintiffs burden of proving that the new policy was not mailed, according to the normal practices of the insurance company. See Vidrine v. Travelers Ins. Co., 488 So.2d 305, (La. App. 3 Cir. 1986). Thus, Mary Reeves’[s] affidavit offers no evidence to satisfy the shifting burden of persuasion placed on the plaintiff.

ISSUES PRESENTED

In his appeal, the plaintiff raised the following assignments of error: (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it found there were no genuine issues of material fact and granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment; and (2) the trial court committed reversible error when it found State Farm established a prima facie case that its normal practice demonstrated- that it mailed Reeves the allegedly amended policy in February 2007.

DISCUSSION

Reeves’s UMBI Policy History and the Parties’ Factual Contentions

On April 2, 2004, State Farm began insuring Reeves under policy number 80 4927-D02-18 for car insurance. This policy had a UMBI limit of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident. On May 5, 2006, Reeves changed the UMBI coverage to $1,000,000 per person and per accident.

On December 7, 2006, Reeves added an Isuzu to her insurance policy and removed a Kia that was on the policy. State Farm asserts that this change in vehicles resulted in the insurance policy number changing from 80 4927-D02-18 to 80 4927-D02-18B (policy B). Reeves did not change the UMBI coverage at this time. On December 26, 2006, Reeves removed the recently added Isuzu from her policy and added the previously removed Kia back onto the policy. The UMBI | ¿coverage did not change at this time.

On February 22, 2007, Reeves went to Melanie Perry’s State Farm Agency to pay the premiums on a separate insurance policy she had with State Farm. This is where the parties’ versions of events conflict and where the issue in this case arises. State Farm asserts that while in the office that day, Reeves changed her UMBI insurance policy from $1,000,000 per person and per accident to $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. Reeves claims that she did not request to have her UMBI policy changed.

State Farm argues that Reeves requested her UMBI policy be lowered because she was “not working at th[at] time.” State Farm asserts that Reeves’s UMBI policy was lowered and her policy, which was classified as a business policy, was also changed to a personal classification at that time. This change in classification resulted in the policy number changing to 80 4927-D02-18C (policy C), the policy at issue in this case.

Reeves had already paid the balance for her UMBI policy at that time she allegedly requested that it be lowered. Because of this, she was given a credit on her balance for the next policy period for the amount she overpaid as a result of the decrease in her policy from February 22, 2007 through April 2, 2007, when that policy period ended. State Farm argues that on April 10, 2007, Reeves paid the correct premium for the lower policy, which included the credit for the amount overpaid because of her reduction of the UMBI policy amount on February 22, 2007. State Farm essentially argues that Reeves paying the correct amount for policy C’s reduced UMBI coverage after the accident is proof that the policy was validly changed.

[KWhether Reeves requested the lowering of her UMBI policy is the issue in the motion for summary judgment. Reeves asserts that policy number 80 4927-D02-18A (policy A) is the applicable policy to the accident in this case, that she did not ask to lower her UMBI policy limits, and that she never received a copy of her “new” UMBI policy once it was allegedly lowered.

Summary Judgment: Overview

Appellate courts review a judgment granting or denying a motion for summary judgment de novo. Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp., 15-588 (La. 9/7/16), 200 So.3d 277. The appellate court asks the same questions as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate: “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B)(2), amended by 2015 La. Acts No. 422, § l. “The summary judgment procedure is favored” and “designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by Article 969.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2). As for the burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment, La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2) states:

The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mov-ant’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his | ^evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.

Elaborating on the shifting of the burden of proof, this court has stated:

On a motion for summary judgment, the court must first determine whether the supporting documents presented by the moving party are sufficient to i-e-solve all material fact issues. If they are not sufficient, summary judgment must be denied. Only if they are sufficient does the burden shift to the opposing party to present evidence that material facts are still at issue, and only at this point may he no longer rest on the allegations and denials contained in his pleadings.

Chargois v. Trip-L-Quik, 441 So.2d 45, 47 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1983); see also Doe v. Hawkins, 09-1184, p. 14 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/9/10), 42 So.3d 1000, 1010, writ denied, 10-1612 (La. 10/8/10), 46 So.3d 1270.

Lastly, there exists a “well-settled rule that in evaluating a summary judgment issue, the trial court is precluded from making credibility determinations and must evaluate inferences from undisputed facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Meyer & Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 14-1109, 14-1114, p. 28 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/27/16), 185 So.3d 222, 241, writ denied, 16-369 (La. 4/22/16), 191 So.3d 1048.

Summary Judgment Law Applied

The plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred when it found Reeves’s affidavit “testimony that she never received the insurance policy alone is insufficient to carry the plaintiffs burden of proving that the new policy was not mailed, according to the normal practices of the insurance company.” We agree with plaintiffs assertion, finding State Farm failed to carry its initial burden of proof on the issues of mailing and its normal company practice.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:867 (emphasis added) states:

|7A. No agreement in conflict with, modifying, or extending the coverage of any contract of insurance shall be valid unless it is in writing and physically made a part of the policy or other written evidence of insurance, or it is incorporated in the policy or other written evidence of insurance by specific reference to another policy or written evidence of insurance. This Section shall not apply to contracts as provided in Subpart C of Part IV of this Chapter.
B. The provisions of this Section shall apply where a policy or other written evidence of insurance is coupled by specific reference with another policy or written evidence of insurance in existence as of the effective date or issued thereafter.
C. Any written agreement in conflict with, modifying, or extending the coverage of any contract of insurance shall be deemed to be physically made a part of a policy or other written evidence of insurance, within the meaning of this Section, whenever such written agreement makes reference to such policy or evidence of insurance and is sent to the holder of such policy or evidence of insurance by United States mail, postage prepaid, at such holder’s last known address as shown on such policy or evidence of insurance, by electronic transaction in accordance with the Louisiana Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, R.S. 9:2601 et seq., or is personally delivered to such holder.

Whether an insurance policy change was mailed is an issue of fact. See Brown v. Permanent Gen. Ins. Co., 00-1514 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/14/01), 783 So.2d 467, writ denied, 01-1034 (La. 6/1/01), 793 So.2d 196; Ware v. Mumford, 05-204 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/26/05), 910 So.2d 467, writ denied, 05-2435 (La. 3/24/06), 925 So.2d 1227. Thus, in a motion for summary judgment, the insurance company bears the burden of proving that policy changes were mailed to the insured.

After carefully reviewing State Farm’s evidence presented in this case, we find it never established it mailed the policy changes to Reeves. The trial court erred when it held that policy C was “issued to Mary Reeves and mailed to her home, based on the certificate filed by State Farm.” No such certificate exists in the record of this case and none of the affidavits State Farm relied upon support [sthat the policy was mailed. Compare Rapp v. GEICO Indem. Co., 05-368 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/8/06), 925 So.2d 626, writ denied sub nom. Rapp v. Geico Indem. Co., 06-594 (La. 5/5/06), 927 So.2d 326 (holding that the insurer provided internal underwriting documents and an affidavit from an underwriter, stating the insurer mailed the original policy and the later policy renewal). The trial court further erred when it found State Farm entered evidence to establish what its “normal practices” are regarding the mailing of policy changes. State Farm entered no such evidence.

In summation, the trial court erred when it shifted the burden to the plaintiff to prove that Reeves was never mailed a copy of policy C, because State Farm never carried its initial burden of proof as required by La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2). Therefore, there remains a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether State Farm mailed policy C to Reeves, making summary judgment inappropriate.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court which granted State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

       Honorable David E. Chatelain participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.

      . The parties do no dispute the existence of the UMBI policy or that Kadie is entitled to recover under the policy. Likewise, we note that Safeway Insurance Company (Safeway) insured Hooper under a policy that provided the minimum amount of liability coverage. Safeway paid its policy limits to the plaintiff.

      . Neither the plaintiff nor Reeves disputes her presence at Melanie Perry’s State Farm Agency on February 22, 2007.

      . In 2015, the Louisiana Legislature significantly revised this state’s summary judgment law. 2015 La. Acts No. 422 provides: "The provisions of this Act shall not apply to any motion for summary judgment pending adjudication or appeal on the effective date [Jan. I, 2016] of this Act.” Because the present case was pending adjudication prior to January 1, 2016, the provisions of summary judgment law in existence at the time of the adjudication will be referenced.

      . Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:867 was renumbered from La.R.S. 22:628 by 2008 La. Acts No. 415, § 1, which was effective January 1, 2009.

      . State Farm introduced the certification of Kristin Mullins, and the affidavits of Monica Bass and Melanie Perry. None of this evidence attests that State Farm mailed or delivered policy C to Reeves.

      . Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 406 provides:
      Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. The evidence may consist of testimony in the form of an opinion or evidence of specific instances of conduct sufficient in number to warrant a finding that the habit existed or that the practice was routine.


author: DAVID E. CHATELAIN  JUDGE

text:
    In the MATTER OF the SUCCESSION OF John Robert BISCAMP
    16-673
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    02/01/2017

      E. Grey Burnes Talley, Burnes, Burnes & Talley, P. 0. Box 650, Alexandria, LA 71309-0650, (318) 442-5231, COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: Collis Wayne Lott, Winnie Fuller, Betty Biscamp, Robert Bis-camp
    James G. Theus, Theus Law Offices, P. O. Box 8432, Alexandria, LA 71301, (318) 769-9395, COUNSEL FOR APPEL-LEES: Tiffani Williams, Aleesha Kuhn
    Carmen T. Hebert, Carleton, Loraso & Hebert, LLC, 445 N. Blvd., Ste. 625, Baton Rouge, LA 70802, (225) 282-0602, COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: Tiffani Williams, Aleesha Kuhn
    Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and David E. Chatelain, Judges.
   DAVID E. CHATELAIN JUDGE

bin this succession case, the proponents of a notarial testament challenge the trial court’s ruling declaring the testament an absolute nullity. Because we find the purported testament fails to contain the requisite attestation clause signed by the notary as mandated under La.Civ.Code art. 1577, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

John Robert Biscamp (Biscamp) died on April 6, 2015, survived by two daughters— Alessha Biscamp Kuhn and Tiffiani Bis-camp Williams (plaintiffs). On May 28, 2015, plaintiffs filed their “Petition and Order to Be Appointed Independent Administrator,” alleging their father died intestate and requesting the appointment of Alessha Kuhn as independent administrator. Letters of Independent Administration were then issued to Aleesha Kuhn.

Not long thereafter, on June 8, 2015, Collis Wayne Lott (Lott) filed his “Recon-ventional Demand for Filing, Execution of Will, and for Possession,” attaching thereto a document entitled “Last Will and Testament of John Robert Biscamp” (testament) executed in notarial form on December 22, 2010. Therein, Biscamp left equal and undivided interests in his residuary estate to his siblings, Lott, Winnie Lee Fuller, Verna Inez Barnett, Robert Lee Biscamp, and Betty Ann Biscamp (legatees). Though acknowledging his two daughters, the provisions of the testament noted Biscamp’s failure to provide for any distribution to them was “intentional.” Biscamp also nominated Lott as executor. On June 18, 2015, Letters of Independent Administration were issued to Lott, confirming his independent executorship.

On February 28, 2016, plaintiffs filed their “Petition to Annul Testament,” alleging the testament was absolutely null because it did not conform with the formal requirements of La.Civ.Code art. 1577:

[2The alleged testament is absolutely null because it does not conform with the requirements of form prescribed under the Louisiana Civil Code article 1577. The attestation clause for the notary and two witnesses is not found in the Last Will and Testament, comprised of numbered pages 1-4, but in a separate document titled “Affidavit” comprised of numbered pages 1-2.
Further, the clauses in the “Affidavit” do not state that the testator signed in the presence of the witnesses and notary or that the witnesses signed in the presence of the notary.

Plaintiffs also noted the clause signed by the notary did not state that Biscamp declared the testament to be his testament to the notary in the presence of the witnesses.

In opposition, the legatees contended the nonconsecutive pagination did not give rise to an inference of two separate documents as a simple review of the margins, size, type, font, and other formatting was indicative of a single document with separate headings. Moreover, the legatees noted all the pages were executed by the signatories on the same date, December 22, 2010. The legatees further argued the affidavit was in fact an attestation, which provided that Biscamp signed in the presence of the witnesses and the notary and that the witnesses signed in the presence of the notary. To find otherwise, they cautioned, would place form over substance when it is more important that the required acts be done than that they be recited.

Trial was held on May 10, 2016. The only evidence admitted was a copy of the testament, which consists of a six-page document initialed “JRB” at the bottom of each page. The first four pages set forth the dispositive portion, whereas the |alast two pages contain an “Affidavit” signed by Biscanap, two witnesses, and a notary. Notably, the pages of the testament are not numbered sequentially 1-6. Rather the second, third, and fourth pages are paginated “2, 3, and 4,” respectively, with the sixth page numbered “2.” Both the first page and fifth page lack pagination, and the certification of the witnesses on page 3 states the testament “consists of _ pages[.]”

After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the testament “an absolute nullity for materially deviating from the form requirements of Louisiana Civil Code article 1577.” In its -written reasons, the trial court found:

In comparing the will with the provisions of La. C.C. art. 1577, the purported attestation clause by the notary fails to state that the testator (1) declared the will to be his Last Will and Testament to the notary, (2) in the presence of the witnesses.
Moreover, with respect to the statements by the witnesses set forth in the paragraph preceding the notary’s statement, while this paragraph indicates that the witnesses were “sworn,” that the “the Testator signs it willingly in our presence,” and that the witnesses sign “in the presence and hearing of the Testator ... and in the presence of each other, ... as witness to the Testator’s signing,” this clause likewise does not clearly state that the will and necessary signatures were signed in the presence of all persons, including the notary.
Thus, this paragraph likewise is defective.
Therefore, the will in question does not contain the required attestation clause which creates the issue: is the defective attestation clause in the Last Will and Testament a material deviation from the manner of execution prescribed by La. C.C. art. 1577 and therefore fatal to the validity of the will?
The jurisprudence has consistently held that where a will is merely notarized, but there is no declaration signed by the notary, such a clause is not in compliance with LSA-C.C. art. 1577. Further, such defects constitute a substantive defect fatal to the validity of the will and cannot be cured through the subsequent testimony of the witnesses and the notary....
14Mr, Biscamp’s will appears to be computer generated and prepared by a lay person. Regardless, the requisites of law still apply. Even though the result will be harsh, the Court is bound to follow the law applicable to and governing such instruments. The Court is a court of law and not of equity.

Accordingly, the trial court “regrettably” declared the testament an absolute nullity; recalled and set aside the order appointing Lott independent executor; recalled the letters of independent administration issued to Lott; recognized Aleesha Kuhn as the independent administrator of the succession; and declared the succession intestate. The legatees timely appealed the trial court’s judgment.

DISCUSSION

The legatees assign two errors to the trial court’s judgment. First, they contend the trial court erred in finding the “attestation clause by the notary fails to state that the testator (1) declared the will to be his Last Will and Testament to the notary, (2) in the presence of the witnesses.” Second, they assert the trial court erred in finding the testament contains a material deviation from the manner of execution prescribed by La.Civ.Code art. 1577.

An appellate court must accord the factual findings of a trial court great weight in a will contest and cannot disturb such findings in the absence of manifest error. In re Succession of Hebert, 12-281 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/3/12), 101 So.3d 131. However, the trial court’s interpretation and application of legal principles and statutory provisions are legal findings subject to de novo review, “ ‘without the great deference ... we attach to credibility determinations.’” Kevin Assocs., L.L.C. v. Crawford, 03-211, p. 15 (La. 1/30/04), 865 So.2d 34, 43 (quoting State v. Payne, 01-3196, p. 6 (La. 12/4/02), 833 So.2d 927, 933). As evident in its reasoning and the trial transcript, the trial court’s judgment herein rests upon its interpretation and [ ¿application of the form requirements set forth in La.Civ.Code art. 1577 to the four corners of the testament. Moreover, given that the facts are not in dispute, the issues presented for our review are clearly legal ones. Accordingly, our review begins with the law itself—our Civil Code articles governing the testamentary formalities for donations mortis causa.

Our Civil Code defines such a donation as “an act to take effect at the death of the donor by which he disposes of the whole or a part of his property.” La.Civ.Code art. 1469. prescribed therein, a person may only dispose of his property in this manner upon the proper execution of a last will or testament in a form “authorized by law”: “A disposition mortis causa may be made only in the form of a testament authorized by law.” La.Civ.Code art. 1570. The “[tjes-tamentary formalities serve as evidence of the requisite intent necessary to confect” a proper donation mortis causa. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, 10 La.Civ.Law Treatise, Successions and Donations, § 12.1 (2d ed. 2016). These formal requirements were “designed to provide a simplified means for a testator to express his testamentary intent and to assure ... that the instrument was intended to be his last will.” Succession of Porche, 288 So.2d 27, 30 (La.1978).

“The purpose of prescribing formalities for the execution of wills is to guard against mistake, imposition, undue influence, fraud or deception, to afford a means of determining the will’s authenticity, and to prevent substitution of some other writing in its place.” Succession of Hebert, 101 So.3d at 135. Nevertheless, the “formalities prescribed for the execution of a testament must be observed or the testament is absolutely null[.]” La.Civ.Code art. 1573. This is true even when testamentary intent is clearly apparent and there are no allegations of fraud. See Succession of Roussel, 373 So.2d 155 (La.1979). As the Louisiana Supreme Court explains, courts in interpreting testaments

^recognize the cardinal rule of construction and interpretation of wills, long applied in this State and generally in other jurisdictions, that the intention of the testator as expressed in the will must govern. But we are equally cognizant of the proposition that the intention to make a will, although clearly stated or proved, will be ineffectual unless the execution thereof complies with the statutory requirement.
A material deviation from the manner of execution prescribed by statute will be fatal to the validity of the will. The fact that there is no fraud, or even suggestion or intimation of it, will not justify the courts in departing from the statutory requirements, even to bring about justice in the particular instance, since any material relaxation of the statutory or codal rule will open up a fruitful field for fraud, substitution, and imposition.

Succession of Roussel, 373 So.2d at 157.

Presently, our Civil Code prescribes two testamentary forms: “olographic and notarial.” La.Civ.Code art. 1574. An olo-graphic testament is one “entirely written, dated, and signed in the handwriting of the testator.” La.Civ.Code art. 1575. Relevant herein, pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 1576, a notarial testament is “one that is executed in accordance with the formalities of Article[] 1577[,]” which require that the testament be written and dated as well as executed in the presence of a notary and two competent witnesses:

The notarial testament shall be prepared in writing and dated and shall be executed in the following manner. If the testator knows how to sign his name and to read and is physically able to do both, then:
(1) In the presence of a notary and two competent witnesses, the testator shall declare or signify to them |7that the instrument is his testament and shall sign his name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page.
(2) In the presence of the testator and each other, the notary and the witnesses shall sign the following declaration, or one substantially similar: “In our presence the testator has declared or signified that this instrument is his testament and has signed it at the end and on each other separate page, and in the presence of the testator and each other we have hereunto subscribed our names this_ day of_,_.”

La.Civ.Code art. 1577.

Therefore, to properly confect a notarial testament, a testator “shall,” “in the presence of a notary and two competent witnesses,” (1) “declare or signify” that the written and dated “instrument is his testament,” and (2) “sign his name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page.” La.Civ.Code art. 1577(1). The notary and witnesses “shall” likewise, “in the presence of the testator and each other,” sign a declaration in the exact words provided in the code or ones “substantially similar” thereto, attesting that (1) in their presence the testator had “declared or signified” that the instrument was his testament and had “signed it at the end and on each other separate page,” and (2) they “subscribed” their names “in the presence of the testator and each other.” La.Civ. Code art. 1577(2). These declarations are known as an attestation clause because in them the notary and the witnesses “are attesting to the observance of the formalities,” i.e., to the testator’s declaration and his signature made and executed in the presence of all signing parties. See La.Civ. Code art. 1577, Revision Comments—1997, comment (b). As |ssuch, the attestation clause has acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, and it is construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.

Recently, in interpreting an attestation clause, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained:

All of the formal requisites for the composition of our statutory will must be observed; otherwise the instrument is null and void. There must be an attestation clause, or clause of declaration. However, its form is not sacrosanct: It may follow the form suggested in the statute or use a form substantially similar thereto. The attestation clause is designed to evince that the facts and circumstances of the confection and execution of the 19in strument conform to the statutory requirements. In construing the attestation clause of this type of will, this court has been most liberal in its determination of whether the clause complies in form and whether it evidences the requisites to supply validity to the instrument. See Succession of Eck, 233 La. 764, 98 So.2d 181 [ (1957) ]; Succession of Nourse, 234 La. 691, 101 So.2d 204 [ (1958) ]. In Succession of Thibodeaux, 238 La. 791, 116 So.2d 525 [ (1959) ], we reiterated a basic principle of construction of wills, that the validity of a will is to be maintained if possible. In construing an attestation clause we will not require strict, technical, and pedantic compliance in form or in language. Rather, we will examine the clause to see whether there is substantial adherence to form and whether it shows facts and circumstances which evidence compliance with the formal requirements for testamentary validity.
Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 386, 242 So.2d 551, 552-53 (1970). See also Kathryn Yenturatos Lorio, [10] La. Civ. L. Treatise, Successions and Donations § 12:2 (2nd ed.) (“The statutes [former La.Rev.Stat. 9:2442] provided a sample attestation clause, but the form was not ‘sacrosanct.’ ”).
Louisiana courts have held that the complete absence of an attestation clause will be fatal to the validity of a notarial will. See In re Succession of Richardson, 05-0552 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/06), 934 So.2d 749, writ denied, 06-0896 (La. 6/2/06), 929 So.2d 1265; Succession of English, 508 So.2d 631, 633 (La.App. 2 Cir.1987). However, courts have also held the attestation clause itself must only be “substantially similar” to the attestation clause in Art. 1577, such that minor deviations in form with regard to the date in the attestation clause do not render the testament invalid in the absence of any indication of fraud. See In re Succession of Hebert, 12-281 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/12), 101 So.3d 131; Succession of Armstrong, 93-2385 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/28/94), 636 So.2d 1109, writ denied, 94-1370 (La. 9/16/94), 642 So.2d 196; cf. Succession of Bel, 377 So.2d 1380 (La.App. 4th Cir.1979)(statutory will that contained a date in the attestation clause but not in the will itself was nevertheless valid).

In re Succession of Holbrook, 13-1181, pp. 9-10 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d 845, 851-52.

Though clearly the wording of the codal attestation clause is not sacrosanct, the provisions of La.Civ.Code art. 1577, along with the jurisprudence interpreting those provisions, still require substantial similarity between the form employed by the notary and witnesses in their attestations and the form prescribed in the article. La.Civ.Code art. 1577; Succession of Holbrook, 144 So.3d 845. Therefore, when an attestation clause is challenged, a court must first examine its form to determine whether it is the same or “substantially similar” to that contained in La.Civ.Code art. 1577. Lack of substantial similarity to the codal form constitutes a substantive defect or material deviation fatal to the testament’s validity. See Succession of Toney, 195 So.3d 672.

After examining the notary’s attestation clause herein, the trial court found it lacked the substantial similarity required. Our study of the language employed by the notary likewise reveals a dissimilarity fatal to the overall validity of the testament.

The clause at issue appears as follows:

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COUNTY OF RAPIDES
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by John Robert Biscamp, the Testator; and subscribed and sworn to before me by Lynette Poag [handwritten] and Arlis W. Poag [handwritten] witnesses, this 22nd [handwritten] day of December, 2010 [handwritten].
Nita F. James #18281 [handwritten]
Notary public, or other officer authorized to take and certify ac-knowledgements and administer oaths

Comparing the above language with that prescribed in La.Civ.Code art. 1577, the trial court found error in the failure of the attestation clause to expressly state that Biscamp declared the testament to be his Last Will and Testament to the notary in the presence of the witnesses. We agree as this purported attestation clause, apart from acknowledging the testator and witnesses by name, makes no mention of the testament and, most importantly, contains no statement attesting to InBiscamp’s declaration or signification, made in the presence of both the notary and the witnesses, that the instrument was his testament.

Rather than an attestation, the clause containing the standard legalese—“subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged”—is merely a “general notarization of the will,” nearly identical, with the exception of the names of the testators and witnesses, to those contained in wills recently nullified by the first circuit in Succession of Toney, 195 So.3d at 675. As the trial court herein and the first circuit have noted, “[w]here a will is merely notarized, without a declaration signed by the notary, the requirements of Article 1577 are not met.” Id. Simply put, the formal requirements of La.Civ.Code art. 1577 require more than simple notarization; they require the notary’s express declaration—either verbatim or in “substantially similar” language to that supplied by the article itself—'attesting to the testator’s declaration and signification of his testament made in the presence of the notary and two competent witnesses.

While we acknowledge there have been no allegations of fraud and the testament undeniably does express the intent of the testator, the provisions of La.Civ.Code art. 1573 nevertheless bind us. It is well documented that Article 1573 has required, since the enactment of its predecessor in 1870, adherence to the formalities prescribed for the execution of a testament under penalty of nullification. See La.Civ. Code art. 1595 (1870) (“The formalities, to which testaments are subject by the provisions of the present section, must be observed; otherwise the testaments are null and void.”) Moreover, despite the legatees’ assertion that the Louisiana Supreme Court has, as a matter of public policy, advanced a liberal construction and application of the article so to maintain the validity of the testament if at all possible, that same court still requires “ ‘substantial adherence to form and ... compliance with the formal requirements |12for testamentary validity.’” Succession of Holbrook, 144 So.3d at 852 (quoting Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 386, 242 So.2d 551, 552-53 (1970)). In accord therewith, our courts have strived to maintain a testament’s validity “as long as it is in substantial compliance with the statute.” Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So.2d 366, 368 (La.1987).

Further, though the notarial testament form was only added to the Civil Code in the Revision of 1997 through the enactment of La.Civ.Code art. 1577, see 1997 La. Acts No. 1421, § 1, the comments to the article clearly provide it merely “reproduces the substance” of former La.R.S. 9:2442, which, in turn, set forth the form requirements for a statutory testament, ie., a writing executed in the presence of a notary and two witnesses. Since its enactment in 1952, La.R.S. 9:2442 required “a declaration” in the “form [provided] or a form substantially similar thereto” signed by the notary and both witnesses attesting that the testator “signed ... and declared ..., in [their] presence [the testament] to be his last will and testament.” Historically, this testamentary form, which originated from the 11sEnglish Statute of Frauds of 1677, was adopted from the common-law states to purposefully “evade the strict standards of form required of civil law testaments.” See Succession of Hebert, 101 So.3d at 135. The legislature nonetheless has consistently maintained the attestation requirement of both the notary and the witnesses since 1952 and throughout its various amendments to the statutory requirements. Similarly, our courts have long required that an attestation clause, to survive an attack on form, must contain some type of acknowledgement that the instrument was executed by the testator in the presence of the notary and witnesses “after some word or act which impelled their understanding that it was ‘to be’ [his] testament.” See Succession of Morgan, 242 So.2d at 553. A simple notarization, without some express acknowledgment of the testator’s declaration to all the signatories that it was, in fact, his testament, has not, and therefore will not, suffice as an attestation clause.

Accordingly, it logically follows that the notarial testament herein, with its generalized notarization clause, fails to contain an attestation by the notary identical or substantially similar to the codal form in contravention of the mandates of La.Civ.Code art. 1577. Because the notarial testament at issue herein does not substantially comply with the formal requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577, namely due to its lack of a statutorily acceptable attestation clause, the testament is, by operation of La.Civ.Code art. 1573, “absolutely null.”

luDECREE

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, which nullified the notarial testament.

AFFIRMED.

       Honorable David E. Chatelain participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.

      . Although not an issue in this case, for completeness we note that the jurisprudence has held that although the testator only placed his initials on the bottom of each page, as opposed to a more formal signature, the testator's initials suffice for his signature. Succession of Squires, 93-1589 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/94), 640 So.2d 813, writ denied, 94-1660
        (La. 9/16/94), 642 So.2d 199; Succession of Armstrong, 93-2385 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/28/94), 636 So.2d 1109, writ denied, 94-1370 (La. 9/16/94), 642 So.2d 196.

        . The legatees filed their motion for appeal in this court on July 18, 2016. Although their brief was due on September 12, 2016, we granted their request of an extension until September 22, 2016, which they timely met.

      . The Revision Comments explain:
      A notarial testament may be made in one of four ways. The notarial testament described in Article 1577 may be made only by a person who knows how to sign his name and how to read the testament as written, and is physically able to do both. If the testator lacks the physical ability to sign his name, the testament must be made in the manner described in Article 1578. If the testator’s sight is impaired to the extent that he cannot read or if he is a person who does not know how to read, the testament must be made in the manner described in Article 1579. If the testator knows how to and is physically able to read braille, the testament may be made in the manner described in Article 1580. It is envisioned that most testators will use the basic notarial testament described in Article 1577.
      La.Civ.Code art. 1574, Revision Comments— 1997, comment (f).

      . As provided in La.R.S. 1:3, “The word ‘shall’ is mandatory and the word ‘may’ is permissive.”

      . The following is a sample form for a notarial testament:
      STATE OF LOUISIANA
      PARISH OF ORLEANS
      BE IT KNOWN that I,, Notary Public duly commissioned and qualified in and for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, have prepared the following testament of (TESTATOR) by his direction, he wishing to take advantage of the provisions of La. Civ. Code art. 1577:
      I, (TESTATOR), do make this my last will and testament, revoking all previous wills and codicils.

        [dispositive provisions]

      IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, the said (TESTATOR) signs his name hereto and on each page hereof in the presence of the undersigned notary public and the undersigned witnesses on this_day of_, Two-thousand.
      signed (TESTATOR)
      WITNESSES:
      In our presence, the testator has declared or signified that this instrument is his testament and has signed it at the end and on each other separate page, and in the presence of the testator and each other we have hereunto subscribed our names this _ day of___
      signed (WITNESS ONE)
      signed (WITNESS TWO)
      signed(NOTARY PUBLIC)
      Lorio, Id. at § 12.4. Given the reliance on what the trial court described as computer-generated testaments, we strongly feel the public would benefit from the form provided by the treatise author, a noted member of the Louisiana State Law Institute Successions and Donations Committee upon whose recommendation La.Civ. Code art. 1577 was enacted in our Civil Code Revision of 1997, see 1997 La. Acts No. 1421, § 1 (enacted “On Recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute”). See e.g., Succession of Toney, 15-1928 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 195 So.3d 672, and In re Succession of Seal, 10-351 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/10/10), 2010 WL 3527597, writ denied, 10-2294 (La. 1/28/11), 56 So.3d 964 (unpublished opinion).

      . By order dated December 16, 2016, the Louisiana Supreme Court has granted writ in this matter for summary disposition. See Succession of Toney, 16-1534 (La. 12/16/16), 212 So.3d 1168, 2016 WL 7638405.

      . In. its entirety, 1952 La. Acts No. 66, § 1 provided:

        In addition to the methods provided in the Louisiana Civil Code, a will shall be valid if in writing (whether typewritten, printed, mimeographed, or written in any other manner), and signed by the testator in the presence of a notary public and two witnesses in the following manner:
      (1) Testator. In the presence of the notary and both witnesses the testator shall signify to them that the instrument is his will and shall sign each separate sheet of the instrument.
      (2) Notary public and witnesses. The notary and both witnesses must sign at the end of the will.
      (a) In the presence of the testator, and
      (b) In the presence of each other.
      (3) The foregoing facts shall be evidenced in writing above the signatures of the notary public and witnesses and the testator at the end of the will. Such declaration may be in the following form or a form substantially similar thereto:
      (a) Signed (on each page) and declared by testator above named, in our presence to be his last will and testament, and in the presence of the testator and each other we have hereunto subscribed our names on this ... day of.19...

        See Succession of Thibodeaux, 238 La. 791, 793, n.1, 116 So.2d 525, 525, n. 1 (1959).

      . See 1964 La. Acts No. 123, § 1; 1974 La. Acts No. 264, § 1; 1976 La. Acts No. 333, § 1; 1980 La. Acts No. 744, § 1; 1997 La. Acts No. 1421, § 1 (repealed and reproduced in La.Civ.Code art. 1577).