author: GENOVESE, JUSTICE

text:
    Todd HUVAL and Chad Boyer v. STATE of Louisiana THROUGH the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, OFFICE OF STATE POLICE, Master Trooper Hal Hutchinson, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police, Lieutenant Rhett Trahan, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police, Investigator Buzzy Trahan, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police, Lieutenant Kevin Devall, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of The Office of State Police, Investigator Bart Morris, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of The Office of State Police, Investigator Hampton Guillory, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police, and Lt. Colonel Stanley Griffin, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as an Employee of the Office of State Police
    No. 2016-CC-1857
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    05/03/2017

      LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Hon. Jeffrey Martin Landry, Attorney General, Grant Lloyd Willis, for Appellant.
    Danny Joseph Louviere, for Respondent.
   GENOVESE, JUSTICE

hWe granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over tort claims stemming from a removal or disciplinary action over which the Louisiana State Police Commission (State Police Commission) presided. The lower courts concluded that subject matter jurisdiction is proper in district court. We agree with the decisions of the lower courts.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs, Todd Huval and Chad Boyer, are former Louisiana State Troopers employed by the State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of State Police (State Police). In 2007, they were terminated based on an | ¡Investigation which exposed alleged violations of employment policy and state law— both were accused of providing confidential information to a third party.

Plaintiffs appealed their terminations to the State Police Commission. On December 30, 2008, the State Police Commission overturned the terminations and ordered that Mr. Huval be suspended for eight weeks and that Mr. Boyer be suspended for two weeks. The State Police appealed.

The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reinstated Mr. Huval’s termination and affirmed Mr. Boyer’s two-week suspension. Huval v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corrs., Office of State Police, 09-699 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/23/09), 29 So.3d 522; Boyer v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corrs., Office of State Police, 09-700 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/23/09), 24 So.3d 1033 (unpub’d).

On November 3, 2008, plaintiffs filed an Original Petition for Damages in the 19th Judicial District Court. The petition asserted entitlement to damages for alleged wrongful termination, defamation, malicious prosecution, mental anguish, intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as all general and equitable relief. Chiefly, the petition alleged that the State Police twice took its “fabricated” investigative findings to the Lafayette Parish District Attorney and requested a grand jury heaidng on the matter.

|3In 2015, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants’ exception asserted plaintiffs’ lawsuit sought to have the district court review the correctness of the State Police’s terminations and sought damages pursuant to said terminations. They argued La.Const. art. X, § 50 vests the State Police Commission with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear any and all cases involving the terminations of employees by the State Police. Thus, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ wrongful termination claims, and likewise, it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to award any damages resulting from plaintiffs’ terminations including, but not limited to, past, present, future loss of earnings and earning capacity, benefits, and loss of employment.

Plaintiffs countered, asserting their claims involve more than their removals by the State Police and involve issues of due process, defamation, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs insisted their claims could not have been addressed by the State Police Commission because it lacks jurisdiction.

In an oral ruling, without giving reasons, the district court overruled defendants’ exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. There was no ruling issued on defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Defendants sought a supervisory writ, wherein they relied upon Reimer v. Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans, 95-2799 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/29/97), 688 So.2d 165, to argue that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims which are inextricably linked to an essentially employment-related dispute, such as removal or disciplinary proceedings. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, denied defendants’ request for supervisory review of the district court’s ruling without comment.

^Defendants applied for supervisory review to this court. We granted defendants’ writ and remanded the case to the court of appeal for briefing, argument, and full opinion. Huval v. State ex rel., Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corrs., Office of State Police, 15-2099 (La. 2/5/16), 186 So.3d 1170.

Refuting defendants’ supervisory writ, plaintiffs argued district courts have original jurisdiction over all civil matters pursuant to La.Const. art. V, § 16(A)(1). The State Police Commission does not have authority to grant a money judgment for tortious conduct.

On remand, the appellate court, in a 2-to-1 decision, affirmed the decision of the trial court which overruled defendants’ exception. Huval v. State ex rel., Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corrs., Office of State Police, 15-1151 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/21/16) (unpublished). The majority concluded plaintiffs’ claims for damages are claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction pursuant to La.Const. art. V, § 16(A)(1). The majority reasoned plaintiffs seek damages that sound in tort “ ‘as a result’ of the claims of defamation, malicious prosecution, [and] intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from the criminal proceeding, not the disciplinary action of the [State Police] Commission.” Id, at 7 (unpub’d). The ^majority found plaintiffs’ claims did not create a situation that would uphold or reverse the State Police Commission’s decision:

The dissent identified the action being challenged as the plaintiffs’ removal and perceived plaintiffs’ claims as inextricably interwoven with an- essentially employment-related dispute. Following the principle of Reimer, 688 So.2d 165, which rejected, the argument that the district court is the only proper forum because a money judgment was sought, Judge McClendon viewed La.Const. art. X, § 50 as plainly. confining jurisdiction to the State Police Commission.

Defendants subsequently applied for a writ to this court, asserting the same arguments brought before the court of appeal regarding subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants maintain exclusive jurisdiction lies -with the State Police Commission. Defendants argue plaintiffs’ action, couched in- tort terms, is a disciplinary case as that term is utilized in La,Const. art. X, § 50, and accordingly, the State-Police Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over all such- cases. Defendants contend plaintiffs’ petition is an attempt to circumvent the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Police Commission. They assert that the original subject matter jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters afforded to district courts by La.Const. art. V, § 16, is limited by La.Const. art. X, § 50, which affords the State Police Commission “the exclusive power and authority to hear and decide all removal and disciplinary cases[.]” Defendants urge that .district court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate claims which stem from plaintiffs’ terminations.

Plaintiffs did not appear to argue before this court. ‘ Before the appellate court, plaintiffs asserted that this case is not a removal and disciplinary action, rather it is a tort action. As such, the State Police Commission does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear tort claims and cannot award monetary damages for tortious behavior.

^DISCUSSION

“Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 2. “Except as otherwise authorized by this constitution ... a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters." La. Const. art. V, § 16(A)(1).

Article X, § 43 of the Louisiana Constitution established the State Police Commission on January 1, 1991. The constitutional provision pertaining to the duties of the State Police Commission is Article X, § 48, which grants it “broad and general rulemaking and subpoena powers for the administration and regulation of the classified state police service, including the power to adopt rules for ... removal[.j” The provision which grants decision-making authority to the State Police Commission is Article X, § 50 of the Constitution, which reads (emphasis added):

The State Police Commission shall have the exclusive power and authority to hear and decide all removal and disciplinary cases, with subpoena power and power to administer oaths. It may appoint a referee to take testimony, with subpoena power and power to administer oaths to witnesses. The decision of the commission shall be subject to review on any question of law or fact upon appeal to the court of appeal wherein the commission is located, upon application filed with the commission within thirty calendar days after its decision becomes final.

We granted defendants’ application for writ of certiorari to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction relative to tort claims stemming from a disciplinary action over which the State Police Commission presided. This is an undeveloped issue relative to La.Const. art. X, § 50. This is not, however, a novel question as it relates to La.Const. art. X, § 12, the constitutional provision which grants decision-bmaking authority to the State Civil Service Commission. “The State Police Commission’s power to ‘hear and decide’ cases is identical to that granted the State Civil Service Commission.” Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corrs., Office of State, Police v. Mensman, 95-1950, n. 1 (La. 4/8/96), 671 So.2d 319, 323. We, therefore, look to guidance which flows from jurisprudence addressing jurisdiction of the State Civil Service Commission.

In support of their position, Defendants cite Reimer, 688 So.2d 165, wherein the fourth circuit addressed a similar issue. In that case, a discharged civil service employee filed suit for retaliatory discharge and discrimination based upon a handicap or disability. The fourth circuit rejected the plaintiffs contention that subject matter jurisdiction existed in the district court because his action had statutory bases. The Reimer court recognized that the State Civil Service Commission could not award general tort damages, but found that it could award back pay, emoluments of office, costs, and attorney fees. However, the fourth circuit also conceded that if these amounts failed to fully compensate the discharged employee, “he could then assert his claim in Civil District Court.” Id. at 169.

IsBefore deciding Reimer, 688 So.2d 165, the fourth circuit concluded that an employment-based tort suit against a government body could be brought in district court in Landrum v. Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District, 95-1591 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/27/96), 685 So.2d 382. The plaintiff in Landrum, a police officer working for the levee board, was terminated for failing a drug test. He pursued his employment-based claims before the Civil Service Commission and ultimately reached a settlement on these claims with his employer, whereby he was reinstated with back pay and allowed to voluntarily resign. In his subsequent tort suit, the plaintiff in Landrum claimed that the levee board improperly divulged his drug tests to the public. The Landrum court, mindful that the constitutional provision that grants judicial authority to the State Civil Service Commission is narrowly construed since it is an exception to the general rule that district courts have jurisdiction over all civil matters, held that since the plaintiff had no claims arising from either suspension or removal, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendants also rely on Myers v. Ivey, 93-1166 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/94), 635 So.2d 632, wherein a police officer filed an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his supervisors in the police department and the City of Lake Charles after receiving a notice of disciplinary action that demoted and suspended him. The third circuit, on its own motion, held that the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the employee’s claim. Plaintiff was attempting to “circumvent the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Civil Service Commission by filing this tort action against his supervisors and the department alleging a conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional distress.” Id. at 633.

Conversely, in its writ denial in Westmoreland v. Louisiana Department of Health & Hospitals, 99-651 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/99), 735 So.2d 944, the third circuit declined to follow its own prior holding, stating in pertinent part:

[ i,Although we are aware of this court’s opinion in Myers v. Ivey, 93-1166 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/6/94); 635 So.2d 632, we choose not to follow Myers, supra. The plaintiff in this case is not attempting to circumvent the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil service commission as he has pursued his remedies with the commission. Although the allegedly tortious conduct of defendants is connected to the disciplinary action taken against plaintiff, the instant suit seeks damages for the tort of defamation which is not within the jurisdiction of the civil service commission.

Our opinion in Louisiana Department of Agriculture & Forestry v. Sumrall, 98-1587 (La. 3/2/99), 728 So.2d 1254, is instructive. The issue in Sumrall was whether the State Civil Service Commission had the authority to enact rules which would afford a classified employee a right of appeal to the State Civil Service Commission on claims of discrimination. In concluding the State Civil Service Commission did not have the authority to enact such rules, we explained:

[T]he constitution places within the Commission’s quasi-judicial power two categories of claims: (1) discrimination claims provided for in Section 8(B); and (2) removal or disciplinary claims provided for in Sections 12(A) and 8(A). We have already held the rules enacted by the Commission purporting to expand its appellate jurisdiction unconstitutional, and that includes the rule authorizing an appeal on claims of discrimination due to membership or non-membership in a private organization. Thus, the Commission does not have the power, either under the constitutional provisions or under their own rules, to entertain the pure 10(A)(3) claim, (unless the plaintiff is asserting that the discrimination was the basis for his removal or discipline under Section 12). Hence, we must look elsewhere for the Article X, Section 10(A)(3) plaintiffs forum.
As we stated above, district courts have jurisdiction over all civil claims not otherwise provided for in the constitution. Article X, Section 10(A)(3) claims are not included by the constitution in the Commission’s jurisdiction. Thus, Article V, Section 16(A), providing that district courts “shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters,” makes it clear that this plaintiff will bring his claim of discrimination based upon membership or non-membership in a private organization to the district court.
In sum, any classified employee asserting a discrimination claim based upon political or religious beliefs, race or sex, may bring their case to the Commission. Any individual asserting a cause of action based upon a form of discrimination not within the scope of the Commission’s quasi-judicial power expressed in Article X, Sections 8 and 12, may not bring his claim to the Commission[,] but has recourse in the district courts. Other laws, state statutes, and provisions of the constitution create assertable individual rights to | wbe free from many forms of discrimination. Plaintiffs seeking protection under any of these laws may take refuge in the district courts of this state.

Id. at 1264 (emphasis added).

The above-referenced cases provide useful guidance, but do not squarely address the issue presented in the instant matter. More pertinent than jurisprudence are the commands of our constitution.

The constitutional guarantee of access to the courts found in Article I, § 22, of the Constitution reads: “All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.” “Article 1 of the Constitution, the Declaration of Rights Article, ‘protects the rights of individuals against unwarrantable government action and does not shield state agencies from law passed by the people’s duly elected representatives.’ ” Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 04-882 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 746, 768 (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 496 So.2d 281, 287 (La.1986) (on rehearing)). “This provision, like the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, protects fundamental interest to a greater extent than interests that are not considered of fundamental constitutional importance.” Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1268 (La. 1978).

Certainly plaintiffs’ terminations from the State Police, even if due to alleged violations of employment policy and state law, are at the heart of their civil suit. This would seem to indicate that La.Const. art. X, § 50 provides for the State Police Commission to have jurisdiction over such a matter. The State Police Commission can hear claims related to removals based on alleged violations of employment policy and state law; however, it is powerless to award damages for the type of tort damages sought by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs specifically allege tortious | ^conduct occurred when the State Police twice took its “fabricated” investigative findings to the Lafayette Parish District Attorney and requested a grand jury hearing on the matter.

This is a civil matter pursuant to Article V, § 16(A)(1) involving an exercise of judicial power. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached in this matter by the lower courts finding subject matter jurisdiction is proper in district court. Therefore, the appellate court’s decision is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decisions of the lower courts overruling defendant’s exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED.

      . Mr. Boyer was terminated on November 28, 2007. Mr. Huval was terminated on December 10, 2007.

      . Both filed their petitions with the State Police Commission on December 14, 2007.

      . Defendants disclose that plaintiffs appeared at two hearings before the State Police Commission. The first hearing occurred sometime in April 2008. Before a ruling was issued, numerous members of the State Police Commission resigned, which necessitated a second hearing regarding plaintiffs. The second hearing occurred on December 16 & 17, 2008.

      . It was further ordered that both be reimbursed for lost wages, together with interest, from the end of their respective suspensions until paid, subject to offsets for earnings or unemployment benefits received by them until December 28, 2008, the date of the State Police Commission's decision.

      . Mr. Boyer voluntarily resigned in January 2008.

      . Defendants’ request for written reasons was denied.

      . Louisiana Constitution Article V, § 16 provides:
      (A) Original Jurisdiction. (1) Except as otherwise authorized by this constitution or except as heretofore or hereafter provided by law for administrative agency determinations in worker’s compensation matters, a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters. (2) It shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of felony cases and of cases involving title to immovable property, except as provided in (3) below; the right to office or other public position; civil or political right; probate and succession matters; except for administrative agency determination provided for in (1) above, the state, a political corporation, or political subdivisions, or a succession, as a defendant; and the appointment of receivers or liquidators for corporations or partnerships. (3) The legislature may provide by law that a family court has jurisdiction of cases involving title to movable and immovable property when those cases relate to the partition of community property and the settlement of claims arising from matrimonial regimes when such action arises as a result of divorce or annulment of marriage.

        (B) 'Appellate Jurisdiction. A district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by law,

      . Louisiana Constitution Article X, § 12(A) provides, in pertinent part (emphasis added):

        The State Civil Service Commission shall have the exclusive power and authority to hear and decide all removal and disciplinary cases, with subpoena power and power to administer oaths. It may .appoint a referee, with subpoena power and power to administer oaths, to take testimony, heár, and decide removal and disciplinary cases. The decision of a referee is subject to review by the commission on any question of law or fact upon the filing of an application for review with the commission within fifteen calendar days after the decision of the- referee is rendered. If an application for review is not timely filed with the commission, the decision of the referee becomes the final decision of the commission as of the date the decision was rendered. If an application for review is timely filed with the commission and, after a review of the application by the commission, the application is denied, the decision of the referee becomes the final decision of the commission as of the date the application is denied. The final decision of the commission shall be subject to review on any question of law or.fact upon appeal to the court of appeal wherein the commission is located, upon application filed with the commission within thirty calendar days after its decision becomes final.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CRICHTON, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Eric BORCIK v. CROSBY TUGS, L.L.C.
    No. 2016-CQ-1372
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    05/03/2017

      Elizabeth Tarver Landry; JAMES L. ARRUEBARRENA, ATTORNEY AT LAW, LLC, James L. Arruebarrena; ROBERT B. LANDRY III, PLC, Robert Broussard Landry, III; for Appellant.
    Miles Paul Clements, Joseph Edward Lee., Ill, Heather McArthur; for Appellee.
   CRICHTON, J.

I,Invoking Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified to this Court the following question of law: “What is the meaning of ‘good faith’ as that term is used in the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act, Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:2027?” Borcik v. Crosby Tugs, L.L.C., 656 Fed.Appx. 681, 685 (5th Cir. 2016). We accepted certification and, for the reasons set forth below, answer the question as follows: The term “good faith,” as used in R.S. 30:2027, means an employee is acting with an honest belief that a violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation occurred.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

We decide certified questions on the facts as presented to us by the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., MCI Commc’ns Servs., Inc. v. Hagan, 2011-1039, p.2 (La. 10/25/11), 74 So.3d 1148, 1149. Beginning in 2008, Eric Borcik was employed by Crosby Tugs, L.L.C. (Crosby) as a deckhand. In July 2010, he was transferred to the M/V NELDA FAYE. Borcik claims that the lead captain of the NELDA FAYE ordered him to dump waste oil into navigable waters and otherwise violate environmental laws over a period of three years. He further claims that he followed these orders.

In May 2013, Borcik emailed Crosby’s Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). His email communicated that he had “concerns” that he stated “have all fallen on deaf ears” and expressed “fear [of] some form of retaliation.” He later met with the CAO in person. According to the Court of Appeals, the parties and witnesses dispute what took place at this meeting—specifically, whether Borcik discussed his safety and environmental concerns with the CAO or whether he was “just complaining” while “vaguely mentioning]” his concerns. After this meeting, Borcik was transferred to another boat and later fired. As noted by the Court of Appeals, “Borcik contends he was fired in retaliation for his complaints; Crosby contends that Borcik was fired for insubordination.” 656 Fed.Appx. at 682.

Borcik sued Crosby in October 2013, alleging retaliatory termination in violation of Louisiana Environmental Quality Act (“LEQA”), R.S. 30:2001, et seq. He specifically claimed that Crosby violated the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Act, R.S. 30:2027, which provides, in pertinent part:

A. No ... business ... shall act in a retaliatory manner against an employee, acting in good faith, who does any of the following:
(1) Discloses, or threatens to disclose, to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy, practice of the employer .., that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation.

Id. (emphasis added). Borcik sought triple damages, including three years of lost wages, as well as damages for mental anguish and depression, humiliation and ^embarrassment, loss of enjoyment of life, medical expenses, and attorney’s fees and costs.

At trial in the federal district court, upon agreement of the parties and based on the elements of the whistleblower statute, the judge instructed the jury that, among the requirements of R.S. 30:2027, the statute requires that the “employee acts in good faith” and “reasonably believes this activity, policy, or practice of the boat captain is in violation of an environmental law.” 656 Fed.Appx. at 682-83 (emphasis by Court of Appeals). The dispute presented to this Court centers around the parties’ disagreement about how “good faith” was defined by the federal district court in the jury instructions, and how “good faith” should be interpreted under R.S. 30:2027. Crosby proposed the definition: “Good faith means that Plaintiff had no intent to seek an unfair advantage or harm another party in making his report of an environmental violation.” Borcik objected and proposed his own definition: “A finding of good faith means that the Plaintiff had an honest belief that an environmental violation occurred.”

The federal district court adopted a jury instruction that incorporated language from both proposed definitions, instructing the jury: “‘[G]ood faith’ means that the plaintiff had an honest belief that an environmental violation occurred and that he did not report it either to seek an unfair advantage or to try to harm his employer or another employee.” Borcik objected, arguing that this misstated Louisiana law by incorporating language regarding “unfair advantage” or “ham.” The district court overruled Borcik’s objection. In its closing argument, Crosby emphasized this definition of “good faith,” arguing that Borcik “wanted to get [the Captain] in trouble” and that “if you conclude that’s why he made this complaint, to get an unfair advantage, or to ham [the Captain] or anyone else, then you’ve got to dismiss this case.” In rendering its verdict, the jury first found that|4 Borcik “reasonably believed the activity which he reported was in violation of an environmental law.” The jury then found that Borcik did not “make his report in good faith.” These findings resulted in a defense verdict, and the federal district court entered a judgment for Crosby.

Borcik appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reviewed the existing law and jurisprudence, observing that the LEQA does not define “good faith” and finding only “limited guidance” elsewhere in the law. 656 Fed.Appx. at 684. The Court of Appeals cited to the case Overton v. Shell Oil Co., 05-1001 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/19/06), 937 So.2d 404, writ denied, 06-2093 (La. 11/3/06), 940 So.2d 674, as the only Louisiana case addressing the “good faith” element, but noted that Overton did not actually adopt any specific definition of “good faith.” 656 Fed.Appx. at 683-84. In invoking the certification privilege granted by Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII, the Court of Appeals stated that it was “not prepared to speculate about how the Louisiana Supreme Court would define ‘good faith’ as used in the whistleblower statute.” Id.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Legislation is the solemn expression of the legislative will; thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. See, e.g., Dunn v. City of Kenner, 15-1175, p.4 (La. 1/27/16), 187 So.3d 404, 409-10. See also R.S. 24:177(B)(1) (“The text of a law is the best evidence of legislative intent.”). When a law is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written, with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative intent. R.S. 1:4. The starting point for interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. See, e.g., Dunn, 15-1175, p.4, 187 So.3d at 410. When, on the other hand, a statute is not clear and|B unambiguous, or its application leads to absurd consequences, we rely on secondary rules of statutory interpretation to discern the meaning of the statute at issue. See Red Stick Studio Dev., L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 10-0193, p. 10 (La. 1/19/11), 56 So.3d 181, 187-88 (quotation omitted). In such cases, the statute “must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. Moreover, when the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole.” Id.

With these fundamental principles in mind, we turn to the specific language at issue here, looking first to the language of the statute itself. As explained above, the whistleblower statute prohibits retaliation by an employer against an employee “acting in good faith” who “[discloses, or threatens to disclose, to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy, practice of the employer ... that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation.” R.S. 30:2027(A) (emphasis added). In other words, the LEQA sets forth both a subjective requirement—“good faith”—and an objective requirement—“reasonable belief.” See, e.g., State v. Guinn, 319 So.2d 407, 408-09 (La. 1975) (noting that “reasonable belief’ is an objective standard).

We are called upon to interpret the meaning of “good faith” as used in R.S. 30:2027. The legislature has not defined “good faith” in the statute. And, as made clear by the conflicting views of the parties, the Court of Appeals’ per curiam, and the Court of Appeals’ certification of the question to this Court, it is apparent that the term “good faith” as used in this statute is not “clear and unambiguous.” R.S. 1:4. We must therefore apply the secondary principles of statutory interpretation by looking to the purpose of the statute, the context of the term “good faith" withr inln the statute, and the text of the law as a whole. Red Stick Studio, 10-0193, p. 10, 50 So.3d at 187-88.

Relevant to the statute at issue in this case, the Louisiana Constitution provides:

The natural resources the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.

La. Const. art. IX, § 1. This Court previously recognized that the LEQA is a. legislative -response to this constitutional imperative. Cheramie v. J. Wayne Plaisance, Inc., 595 So.2d 619, 622 (La. 1992). In enacting the LEQA, the legislature declared that “[t]he maintenance of a healthful and safe environment for the people of Louisiana .is a matter of critical state concern.” R.S. 30:2002(1) (emphasis added). Further, the legislature set forth ,the purpose of LEQA in the statute itself: “The maintenance of a healthful and,safe environment in Louisiana requires governmental regulation and control over the areas. of water quality, air quality, solid-and hazardous waste, scenic rivers and streams, and radiation.” R.S. 30:2003(A).

In order to promote these goals, the LEQA provides for “comprehensive policies on a.statewide basis to unify, coordinate, and implement programs to, provide for the most advantageous use of the, resources: of the state and to preserve, protect, and: enhance the quality of the environment- in -Louisiana.” R.S. 30:2003(B). More specifically, the whistleblower statute, R.S. 30:2027, furthers the constitutional directive and statutory purpose of the LEQA by protecting employees from retaliation or other adverse employment action for reporting ^possible environmental violations. See Rick J. Norman, La. Prac. Series: La. Employ. Law § 7:132 (same).

. The employee in this case, Borcik, urges that this -Court adopt a broad definition of “good faith,” specifically proposing the definition: “A finding of-good faith means that the Plaintiff had an honest belief that an environmental violation occurred.” According to Borcik, this broad definition would encourage whistleblowing and promote the constitutional, directive that the environment “shall be protected,” In an amicus curiae brief supporting Borcik, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) agreed that a broad, definition is necessary to uphold the purpose of the Act. On the other hand, the employer, Crosby, asks that the Court adopt a standard that requires the plaintiff to act without malice, harm, or. otherwise seeking an unfair advantage (hereinafter referred to as the “absence of malice standard”). Crosby’s definition looks beyond the employee’s belief in the violation to the motivations of the employee in making the report, Crosby argues that this definition does not conflict with the statute’s policy goals, but instead promotes those goals by shielding employees who act solely to protect the environment versus those who have the motivation to harm their employers. Crosby’s proposed definition therefore includes a requirement related to the employee’s motivation: “Good faith means that Plaintiff had no intent to seek an unfair advantage or harm another party in making his report of an environmental violation.”

UWe find that a broad definition of “good faith” is necessary to uphold the purpose of the LEQA and the Louisiana Constitution’s mandate. This construction promotes the purpose of the LEQA and balances competing interests of the State and the environment, employers and industry, and employees, by encouraging reporting of environmental violations and protecting employers from potential whis-tleblowers who are not operating in good faith. It likewise comports with the text of the law as a whole, which we have previously held is broadly intended to protect the environment. We therefore hold that the term “good faith,” as used in R.S. 30:2027, means an employee is acting with an honest belief that a violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation occurred.

We have previously interpreted the LEQA whistleblower statute broadly. In Cheramie v. J. Wayne Plaisance, Inc., 595 So.2d 619 (La. 1992), this Court’s sole decision interpreting the whistleblower provisions of the LEQA, the whistleblower was an instrument man working on a barrier island stabilization project. He complained to regulatory officials that his employer was damaging brown pelican nests and eggs in the course of the work. The employee was reluctant to return to the island, telling his crew chief that the work was illegal and asking for alternate work; the employer responded that he. “had no choice, go or be fired.” Id. at 621-22. After being fired, the employee sued under R.S. 30:2027. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the court of appeal affirmed, holding that wildlife protection was not the type of “environmental statute, ordinance, or regulation” contemplated by the whistleblower statute. Id. at 622.

This Court reversed the court of appeal, making two separate broad interpretations of the statute. Explaining the overarching statutory purpose, we found that the statute was not limited to protection of air and water,, but could more broadly apply to provide for protection of endangered species of wildlife. Id. at 623. We also held that the employee’s refusal to participate in illegal and environmentally damaging work could constitute “complaining” under R.S. 30:2027 and that he was entitled to damages under the Act. Id. at 624. The Chemmie holding therefore supports a broad interpretation of the whistleblower statute.

A broad definition,of “good faith” in R.S. 30:2027 is also supported by the definition of “good faith” in the whistleblower context in our neighboring state. In Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1996), the Texas Supreme Court analyzed the Texas Whistleblower’ Act. The court held that the term “good faith,” as used in the act, means: “(1) the employee believed that the conduct reported was a violation of law and (2) the employee’s belief was reasonable in light of the employee’s training and experience.” Id. at 784. The court explained that the first part of the definition “embodies the ‘honesty in fact’ ” standard, specifically that “employees seeking a remedy under the Whistleblower Act must have believed that they were reporting an actual violation of law.” Id. at 785 (emphasis added). The second part of the definition ensures that an employer only violates the whistleblower act if “a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed that the facts as reported were a violation of law.” Id.

The LEQA already contains this second part of the definition, because the Louisiana legislature chose to include the reasonable belief standard within the statute itself. In other words, as noted above, R.S. 30:2027 already has the objective belief standard incorporated within the plain language. “Good faith” must therefore mean something different than an objective “reasonable belief,” because the term would otherwise be duplicative and unnecessary, and we interpret statutes! in to avoid unnecessary verbiage. See, e.g., Guillory v. Pelican Real Estate, Inc., 14-1539, p.3 (La. 3/17/15), 165 So.3d 875, 877 (“It is presumed that every word, sentence, or provision in a law was intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed.”). Consequently, the definition of “good faith” under R.S. 30:2027 we set forth here encompasses only the “honesty” standard outlined in Texas’s two-part standard.

The standard proposed by Crosby—the absence of malice standard—would lead to absurd consequences in this context given the statute’s goal of protecting environmental whistleblowers and the Act’s broader goal of protecting the environment. For instance, an employee who likes his employer and an employee who does not like his employer would be treated differently for reporting an identical violation. Only an employee who honestly and reasonably believes a violation occurred and does not harbor “ill will,” malice, or intent to harm his employer would be protected. Crosby’s definition therefore effectively adds an element to the statute that would lead to an examination of the employee’s motives rather than of the employer’s actions. Additionally, employees required to have noj ;1 malice or intent to harm would fall outside of the ambit of the Act’s protections, leading them to fear retaliation from reporting and resulting in a chilling effect on report-mg violations—exactly the problem the whistleblower statute was designed to ameliorate. Indeed, as the state points out in its amicus brief, Crosby’s proposed definition would make it burdensome for an employee to ever make out a prima facie case under the statute. This is because harm to an employer would result from nearly every conceivable instance of reporting, and an employee would therefore be seen as having an “intent to harm” in every case. We agree with the state that the statute should not be construed to contravene its purpose or to provide a disincentive for reporting violations. See, e.g., Wichita, 917 S.W.2d at 785-86 (“The fact that an employee harbors malice toward an individual should not negate the Whistleblower Act’s protection if the employee’s report of a violation of law was honestly believed and objectively reasonable given the employee’s training and experience.”).

In closing, we note that this definition protects employers and does not, as Crosby contends, protect an employee who a factfinder determines fabricates the existence of an environmental violation in order to spite his or her employer. Nor does it in any way condone pollution or other prohibited environmental activities carried out solely by the employee claiming protection of the whistleblower statute. The LEQA ensures this in two ways. As an initial matter, R.S. 30:2027(C) expressly provides that the whistleblower protections “shall have no application to any employee who, acting without direction from his employer ..., deliberately violates any provision of this Subtitle. ...” (emphasis added). See also Norman, supra, La. Employ. Law § 7:132 (same). This protects employers from self-motivated individual polluters.

112Further, as explained above, R.S. 30:2027(A)(1) contains an objective reasonableness standard for a whistleblower to receive the protection of the Act. If a jury finds that a plaintiff did not “reasonably believe” that an “activity, policy, [or] practice of the employer” is a violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation, the employee cannot receive the benefits of the act—irrespective of whether the report was made in accordance with the “good faith” standard. The definition of “good faith” set forth herein also requires that the employee act with an “honest belief that a violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation occurred.” These provisions of R.S. 30:2027(A)(1) therefore serve as additional safeguards against fabricated claims, because an employee is not protected unless the belief in the environmental violation directed by the employer is honest and reasonable.

DECREE

We answer the certified question as set forth in this opinion. Pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII, the judgment rendered by this Court upon the question certified shall be sent by the clerk of this Court under its seal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and to the parties.

CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED.

      . Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII provides, in relevant part:
      When it appears to ... any circuit court of appeal of the United States, that there are involved in any proceedings before it questions or propositions of law of this state which are determinative of said cause independently of any other questions involved in said case and that there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this state, such federal court before rendering a decision may certify such questions or propositions of law of this state to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for rendition of a judgment or opinion concerning such questions or propositions of Louisiana law. This court may, in its discretion, decline to answer the questions certified to it.

      . Borcik v. Crosby Tugs, L.L.C., 2016-CQ-1372 (La. 11/7/16), 213 So.3d 391, 2016 WL 6777396.

      . State courts of appeal have made similar statements in examining the purpose of the LEQA whistleblower statute. See, Collins v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 12-1031 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/30/13), 118 So.3d 43 (“The purpose of the Louisiana Environmental. Whistle-blower Statute, La. R.S. 30:2027, is to protect employees from retaliatory action or other adverse employment action by employers for reporting possible ' environmental violations.”); Bear v. Pellerin Constr., Inc., 01-984 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/30/02), 806 So.2d 984 (same), writ denied, 02-0943 (La. 6/7/02), 818 So.2d 777; Chiro v. Harmony, 99-0453 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/5/99), 745 So.2d 1198, 1200, writ denied, 99-3346 (La. 1/28/00), 753 So.2d 840 (same).

      . We agree with the Court of Appeals that Overton v. Shell Oil Co., 05-1001 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/19/06), 937 So.2d 404, writ denied, 06-2093 (La. 11/3/06), 940 So.2d 674, does not provide a generalized "definition of “good faith” under Louisiana law and is limited to its facts.

      .Other whistleblower statutes have similar structures. For example, numerous federal appellate courts have remarked that the whistleblower provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, which were "intended to include all good faith and reasonable reporting of fraud,” rely on establishing that the complainant has both a "subjective belief that the complained-of conduct constitutes a violation of relevant law, and also that the belief is objectively reasonable in light of the factual circumstances.” Rhinehimer v. U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc., 787 F.3d 797, 810-11 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). See also, e.g., Van Asdale v. Int'l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The plain language of this section, as well as the statute's legislative history and case law interpreting it, suggest that to trigger the protections of the Act, an employee must also have (1) a subjective belief that the conduct being reported violated a listed law, and (2) this belief must be objectively reasonable.”).

      . The parties disagree as to whether the standard that Crosby proposes, i.e., an exclusion from the statute’s protections where the employee seeks an "unfair advantage” or "intends to harm” his employer, is equivalent to a situation where the employee exhibits "ill will” or “malice” towards the employer. Because we decline to include any such element in the definition of "good faith,” this dispute is not relevant to our holding.

      . We recognize that whistleblowers may often have mixed motives in reporting violations. Crosby’s standard would mean a whistleblower is unprotected under the statute even with mixed motives.


author: CRICHTON, J. Hughes, J.,

text:
    NEW ORLEANS BULLDOG SOCIETY v. LOUISIANA SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, et al.
    No. 2016-C-1809
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    05/03/2017

      ADAMS AND REESE, LLP, Martin A. Stern, Christopher James Kane, Jaimme’ A. Collins, Timothy Michael Brinks; for Applicant.
    BOOTH & BOOTH, Vincent James Booth, Ben Berman; for Respondent.
   CRICHTON, J.

ItWe granted the writ in this matter to determine whether the Louisiana Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“LSPCA”) is subject to the Louisiana Public Records Law. New Orleans Bulldog Society v. Louisiana Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al., 16-1809 (La. 1/9/17), 214 So.3d 859. More specifically, we must determine whether the LSPCA, by virtue of its Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (“CEA”) with the City of New Orleans to provide animal control services as mandated by the New Orleans Municipal Code, is an instrumentality of a municipal corporation such that it must comply with La. R.S. 44:1 et seq. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the court of appeal, and find that the LSPCA, through its function of providing animal control services for the City oí New Orleans, is an instrumentality of the City of New Orleans and must comply with the Public Records Law as set forth herein.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The New Orleans Bulldog Society (“Bulldog”) is a nonprofit corporation operating under Louisiana law, and founded in order to advocate for the welfare of dogs in New Orleans and elsewhere. The Louisiana' Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“LSPCA”), first chartered in 1888, is a private non-profit ^corporation recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as a private charitable 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation. According to the affidavit of Ms; Ana Zorilla, the Chief Executive Officer of the LSPCA, the LSPCA’s mission is to “advocate for the animals of Louisiana by advancing their welfare, promoting their interests, and fostering the human-animal bond through innovative programs, education, and services.” The LSPCA also provides animal control services for the City of New Orleans (“the City”), as required by Chapter 18 of the City of New Orleans Code of Ordinances. In order to facilitate those services, the LSPCA maintains a “Cooperative Endeavor Agreement” with the City, which states that “[t]he Society shall provide the following service to the City.... [f]ield and shelter services for the City in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement and, except as otherwise provided herein, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 18 of the Code of Municipal Ordinances for the City,.,. relating to animal control and shelter services.” The CEA specifically sets forth the duties of the LSPCA to include, among others, continuous patrols with radio contact throughout the City; responding to emergency calls involving animals or threat to human life; investigating reports of violations of the provisions of Chapter 18; maintaining veterinary services; spaying and neutering, rabies vaccinations, and reviewing animal related ordinances with the City.

On May 29, 2015, Bulldog sent a public records request to the City of New Orleans, pursuant to La. R.S. 44:1 et seq. In the request, Bulldog set forth several inquiries regarding LSPCA’s standard operating procedures for evaluating surrendered and stray dogs in terms of determining eligibility for adoption, ladocuments related to those dogs and cats considered “adoptable” and “una-doptable,” specific documents regarding euthanized cats and dogs in certain years, and documents and information relating to LSPCA’s participation in court proceedings in Orleans Parish. The request also sought information related to the transfer or euthanasia of a specific animal named Leatrice. The City responded on June 4, 2015, informing Bulldog that it is not the custodian of the records Bulldog sought to obtain, and that the request should be forwarded to the LSPCA.

Bulldog forwarded its request to the LSPCA on Juné 5, 2015, to which the LSPCA responded that it is not a “public body” under the Public Records Law, and is therefore exempt from the statute. Although the LSPCA acknowledged its CEA with the City, it stated that the City maintains all information related to the reporting requirements of the CEA.

On July 22, 2015, Bulldog filed a petition for damages and a writ of mandamus, asserting that, through its agreement with the City, the LSPCA performs a variety of governmental functions that the City is required to discharge as a matter of law. As such, Bulldog asserted the LSPCA is subject to the Louisiana Public Records Law. In response, the LSPCA filed exceptions of unauthorized use of a summary proceeding and no cause of action. The LSPCA attached the affidavit of Ms. Ana Zorilla, who asserted it is a private nonprofit organization, not formed by any public body or pursuant to any legislative or statutory authority. Ms. Zorilla further stated that the LSPCA is not obligated to perform any governmental function beyond what is set forth in the CEA, and the monthly sum of $153,870, paid by the City to the LSPCA, comprises only a ^portion of the LSPCA’s total budget. The LSPCA also emphasized that even if it the court found that a public record request may be directed to it, the scope of that request should be limited to those documents that are prepared and maintained pursuant to the CEA.

Following a hearing on September 17, 2015, the trial court dismissed Bülldog’s writ of mandamus and request for preliminary injunction, and granted the LSPCA’s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal. In her written reasons for judgment, the trial court found the LSPCA is not a “quasi-public” entity subject to the Public Records Law, as the LSPCA is a private nonprofit entity with a private board whose mission is independent from the mission of any governmental entity. Furthermore, the trial court concluded the LSPCA was formed as a private non-profit organization and only 12% of its income is derived from its CEA with the City. The trial court also ruled that by virtue of its reporting requirement to the City under the CEA, the LSPCA had complied with all reporting requirements as set forth therein.

The court of appeal reversed, finding that the record establishes the LSPCA was acting as an instrumentality of the City in rendering mandated municipal services such as investigating municipal code violations, seizing animals and serving citations in the course of its investigations, euthanizing animals, using vehicles maintained and fueled by the municipality, and employing uniformed officers who appear in court to testify regarding these violations. Therefore, by virtue of its function in complying with the CEA, the court of appeal concluded the LSPCA is a quasi-public entity subject to the Public Records Law. New Orleans Bulldog Society v. Louisiana Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al., 15-1351 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/7/16), 200 So.3d 996.

|KThe appellate court also found the trial court erred in ruling that even assuming the LSPCA is subject to the Public Records Law, its reporting obligations were met by compliance with the CEA reporting requirements. The appellate court concluded that the Public Records Law “cannot be circumscribed by contract,” as the Public Records statute, La. R.S. 44:1 et seq., is intended to be all inclusive, and not limited to certain contractual reporting requirements. Consequently, the court of appeal ruled that the LSPCA failed to meet its burden (as custodian of the records sought) of proving the documents sought by Bulldog are not subject to inspection under the Louisiana Public Records Law. For the reasons that follow, we agree.

DISCUSSION

Article XII, § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution provides: “No person shall be denied the right to observe the deliberations of public bodies and examine public documents, except in cases established by law.” Moreover, “[t]he right of access to public records is a fundamental right guaranteed by La. Const, art. XII, § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution, and whenever there is any doubt as to whether the public has the right of access to certain records, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the public’s right of access.” Landis v. Moreau, 00-1157, p. 4 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 691, 694, citing Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So.2d 933 (La. 1984). The Louisiana Public Records Law, La. R.S. 44:1 et seq., provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1) As used in this Chapter, the phrase “public body” means any branch, department, office, agency, board, commission, district, governing authority, political subdivision, or any committee, subcommittee, advisory board, or task force thereof, any other instrumentality of state, parish, or municipal government, including a public or quasi-public nonprofit corporation designated as an entity to perform a governmental or proprietary function, or an affiliate of a housing authority.
|fi(2)(a) All books, records, writings, accounts, letters and letter books, maps, drawings, photographs, cards, tapes, recordings, memoranda, and papers, and all copies, duplicates, photographs, including microfilm, or other reproductions thereof, or any other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, including information contained in electronic data processing equipment, having been used, being in use, or prepared, possessed, or retained for use in the conduct, transaction, or performance of any business, transaction, work, duty, or function which was conducted, transacted, or performed by or under the authority of the constitution or laws of this state, or by or under the authority of any ordinance, regulation, mandate, or order of any public body or concerning the receipt or payment of any money received or paid by or under the authority of the constitution or the laws of this state, are “public records”, except as otherwise provided in this Chapter or the Constitution of Louisiana.
(b) Notwithstanding Subparagraph (a), any documentary material of a security feature of a public body’s electronic data processing system, information technology system, telecommunications network, or electronic security system; including hardware or software security, password, or security procedure, process, configuration, software, and code is not a “public record”.
(3) As used in this Chapter, the word “custodian” means the public official or head of any public body having custody or control of a public record, or a representative specifically authorized by him to respond to requests to inspect any such public records.
* * *

It is well established that legislation is the solemn expression of the legislative will; thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. See, e.g., Dunn v. City of Kenner, 15-1176, p.4 (La. 1/27/16), 187 So.3d 404, 409-10. See also La. R.S. 24:177(B)(1) (“The text of a law is the best evidence of legislative intent.”). When a law is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written, with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative intent. La. R.S. 1:4. The starting point for .interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. See, e.g., Dunn, 15-1175, p.4, 187 So.3d at 410. When, on the other hand, a statute is not clear and unambiguous, or its, application leads to absurd consequences, we rely on secondary rules of statutory interpretation to discern the meaning of the statute at issue. See Red Stick Studio Dev., L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 10-0193, p. 10 (La. 1/19/11), 56 So.3d 181, 187-88 (quotation omitted). In such cases, the statute “must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. Moreover, when the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole.” Id.

This Court has consistently held that the Public Records Law should be construed liberally in favor of. free and unrestricted access to public documents. As stated above, whenever there is doubt as to whether the public has the right of access to certain records, the doubt must be resolved, in favor of the public’s right to see; to allow otherwise would be an improper and. arbitrary restriction on the public’s constitutional rights. Shane v. The Parish of Jefferson, 14-2225, p. 9-10 (La. 12/8/15), 209 So.3d 726; In re Matter Under Investigation, 07-1853 (La. 7/1/09), 15 So.3d 972, 989; Capital City Press v. East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council, 96-1979 (La. 7/1/97), 696 So.2d 562, 564; Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So.2d 933, 937 (La. 1984). Furthermore, throughout the public records statutes, “[t]here was no intent -on the part of .the legislature to qualify, in any way, the right of access.” Shane v. The Parish of Jefferson, 14-2225, p. 9 (La. 12/8/15), 209 So.3d 726, 734, citing Landis v. Moreau, 00-1157, p. 4-5 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 691, 694-5 (citing Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So.2d 933, 937 (La. 1984)).

| sIn addressing the issue we are presented with today, namely, whether La. R.S. 44:1 applies to the LSPCA under these circumstances, we find the court of appeal correctly focused on the function the LSPCA serves as an “instrumentality” of the City of New Orleans, through its CEA to provide animal control services. As La. R.S. 44:1 states, a public body subject to the Public Records Law includes .any other instrumentality of state, parish, or municipal government/1 including a public or quasi-public nonprofit corporation designated as an entity to perform a governmental or proprietary function.... ” (emphasis added). As set forth in the CEA, and correctly noted by the court of appeal, the LSPCA performs certain functions as an instrumentality of the City of the New Orleans. In other woi’ds, the LSPCA’s duties (as well as privileges it enjoys) in providing animal control services for the City are at the behest of the municipality and arising out of their outlined agreement to do so. The LSPCA acts under color of City authority through its enforcement of Chapter 18 infractions, issuance of citations, and appearance in court on related matters of animal control. More specifically, the evidence in the record establishes that, by virtue of the CEA, the LSPCA is vested with authority to investigate compliance with municipal code violations related to animals and to take appropriate action. According to the CEA, the LSPCA must provide “shelter services for the City” which include “receiving unwanted animals^ and impounding, housing, feeding, redemption, adoption, human euthanasia and disposal of animals”; responding to emergency calls involving animals; investigating reports of violations of Chapter 18 of the Municipal Code, and issuing citations to any person who is in violation of any provision. According to the CEA, the LSPCA must also require all animals adopted through it to be spayed and neutered. The CEA further states that the City has provided vehicles to the LSPCA under prior agreements, and those vehicles will “remain with the Society.” There is also a provision in the CEA providing that the City shall continue to provide the LSPCA with fuel, repairs, and necessary maintenance for those vehicles. There is no dispute the LSPCA has performed, and continues to perform, these functions (and enjoyed the benefit of City vehicles and fuel) on behalf of the City of New Orleans. For these reasons, the court of appeal correctly found the LSPCA to be an instrumentality of the municipality through its execution of the CEA, and is therefore subject to the Public Records Law as it relates to its specific functions and duties under the CEA.

This court has previously examined the function of an entity to determine whether it is subject to the Public Records Law. In State of Louisiana, et al. v. Nicholls College Foundation and Donald L. Peltier, 564 So.2d 682 (La. 1990), this Court was tasked to determine whether the Nicholls College Foundation, a nonprofit corporation, was a “public body” subject to the Public Records Law. In that case, the Inspector General sought to examine its financial records when the Foundation had received a “donation” of “public funds” from the Nicholls State University Alumni Federation, also a non-profit corporation. The Court ultimately determined through various factors of function (and some economic) that the Alumni Federation is a public body under the Public Records Law. Specifically, the Nicholls Court found that the Federation enjoyed a “close affiliation withlm Nicholls State University,” as demonstrated by its location on campus in a public building for which it pays nominal rent, and by its use of state civil service employees to run its office. Id. at 687. Furthermore, the “Alumni Office” is a line-item in the budget for the University, through which the Federation’s employees are paid. The Federation states in its Articles of Incorporation that its purpose is to promote the University, which was created for the purpose of providing public education, which is a governmental function. Thus, because of this relationship with the University, and adhering to our settled notion that that the Public Records Law favors a liberal construction of the public records law so as to enlarge, rather than restrict, public access to public records, the Court determined the Federation is a “quasi-public” nonprofit corporation “designated as an entity to perform a governmental or proprietary function,” which therefore made it subject to the Public Records Law.

Inin addition to the LSPCA serving as an instrumentality of the City through its functions performed through the CEA, we also take note of the public money paid by the City to the LSPCA. As discussed above, the LSPCA, in exchange for the assumption of the City’s municipal animal control obligations, receives from the City a monthly amount of $153,870, which totals an annual payment of $1,846,440. The court of appeal noted that while this amount is only a percentage of the LSPCA budget, it is still a substantial sum of money derived from public funds. We agree. As mentioned, Louisiana courts have held that the Public Records law must be liberally interpreted so as to extend rather than restrict access to public records by the public. C.B. Dutton v. William J. Chiste, Jr., 395 So.2d 683, 685 (La. 3/2/81). In keeping with that statutory interpretation, and contrary to the defendant’s assertion that it is not primarily funded by public funds, we find that the use of public money in this context triggers the Public Records Law. More specifically, it is not the amount of money which is of concern, it is only that the money provided by the City to the LSPCA in exchange for its animal control services under the CEA is derived from the taxpayers. Therefore, the public has a fundamental right to know how that money is spent by the LSPCA through its animal control services outlined in the CEA. Any finding otherwise would be in contravention to the well-established principles of liberal construction of the Public Records Law.

|iaWe must also address the defendant’s assertion that if it is found to be subject to the Public Records Law, it has satisfied all reporting obligations by producing documents related to its CEA with the City. The court of appeal declined to accept this argument, finding the trial court was in error. We agree. The CEA states that the LSPCA must submit monthly invoices, program reports, and monthly budgets to the City. The LSPCA, under the CEA, must also maintain records and report the monthly number of animals, including descriptions of each animal, date and manner of disposal, treatment received (including spaying and neutering),' and various fees and charges related to those animals. The CEA also requires that the LSPCA maintain records and provide a statement of actual expenses involved under the CEA. Although the LSPCA asserts these reporting requirements satisfy the Public Records Law, we agree with the court of appeal’s finding that the Public Records Law cannot be circumscribed by contract. As the court of appeal correctly notes, the Public Records Law is purposefully broad and “all inclusive,” Bulldog, 15-1351, p. 11, 200 So.3d at 1002, whereas the reporting requirements in the CEA are narrowly delineated. La. R.S. 44:1(A)(2)(a) defines a “public record” as follows:

(2)(a) All books, records, writings, accounts, letters and letter books, maps, drawings, photographs, cards, tapes, recordings, memoranda, and papers, and all copies, duplicates, photographs, including microfilm, or other reproductions thereof, or any other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, including information contained in electronic data processing equipment, having been used, being in use, or prepared, possessed, or retained for use in the conduct, transaction, or performance of any business, transaction, work, duty, or function which was conducted, transacted, or performed by or under the authority of the constitution or laws of this state, or by or under the authority of any ordinance, regulation, mandate, or order of any public body or concerning the receipt or payment of any money received or paid |13by or under the authority of the constitution or the laws of this state, are “public records”, except as otherwise provided in this .Chapter or the Constitution of .Louisiana, (emphasis added)

We do not find that the limited contractual reporting requirements in the CEA between the LSPCA and the City constitute compliance with the Louisiana Public Records Law, and affirm the court of appeal in this regard. As discussed above, the Public Records Law was enacted to avoid “arbitrary restriction on the public’s constitutional right” to “see,” and there should never be any qualification on that right of access. See Shane v. The Parish of Jefferson, 14-2225 (La. 12/8/15), 209 So.3d 726. However, in terms of documents to be released under the Public Records Law in this case, we also limit this holding to only those documents which pertain to the LSPCA’s functions, duties, and responsibilities to enforce Chapter 18 of the Municipal Code, as outlined in the CEA with the City of New Orleans. We therefore remand this matter to the district court to determine which documents within' the LSPCA’s possession qualify as such.

CONCLUSION

Through the discharge of its duties and responsibilities set forth in the CEA with the 'City of New Orleans, as well as the receipt of public money as remuneration for such services, we find the LSPCA is functioning as an instrumentality of a municipal corporation, and is therefore subject to the Louisiana Public Records Law, La. R.S. 44:1 et seq. We therefore affirm the .court of appeal in that regard. We further find that the reporting requirements contained] u m the CEA do not satisfy the Public Records Law, as the requirement for access to public' records cannot be circumscribed by contract. The LSPCA is required to disclose all documents specifically related to the discharge of its duties and responsibilities outlined in the CEA with the City of New Orleans, and we remand to the district court to determine which documents satisfy that description.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Hughes, J.,

dissenting in part.

| t Respectfully, While I agree that the LSPCA has a duty to comply with, the public records law, I believe that the scope of its response should be limited to those documents prepared and maintained pursuant to the Cooperative Endeavor Agreement.

      . Chapter 18 of the Code of Ordinances, entitled "Animals,” sets forth numerous provisions related to animal control, which .include impoundment of animals, licensing of ani-máis, spaying and neutering of dogs, rabies control, as well as the various fines and penalties which can be imposed for violations of the Code.

      . The LSPCA also provided the affidavit of Ms. Charlotte Parent, who serves as the Director of Health for the City of New Orleans. She stated the LSPCA has complied with all reporting requirements set forth in the CEA from 2013 to the present, as Bulldog had been provided with the LSPCA’s monthly operational reports related to animal control services, which are required pursuant to the CEA. Moreover, Ms. Parent asserted that the referenced operations reports are the only public records which exist related to the animal control services provided to the City by the LSPCA.

      . See also, La. R.S. 44:4.1, which provides in pertinent part:
      A. The legislature recognizes that it is essential to the operation of a democratic government that the people be made aware of all exceptions, exemptions, and limitations to the laws pertaining to public records. In order to foster the people’s awareness, the legislature declares that all exceptions, exemptions, and limitations to the laws pertaining to public records shall be provided for in this Chapter or the Constitution of Louisiana. Any exception, exemption, and limitation to the laws pertaining to public records not provided for in this Chapter or in the Constitution of Louisiana shall have no effect.

      (emphasis added)

      . Article 6, 44 of the Louisiana constitution defines "municipality” as “an incorporated city, town, or village.”

      . It is important to note the distinction of this case from this Court’s opinion in Property Insurance Association of Louisiana v. Theriot, 09-1152 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 1012, wherein the Court concluded that the Property Insurance Association of Louisiana was a private entity, finding it fit under four factors previously iterated in State v. Smith, 357 So.2d 505 (La. 1978), which were created to determine an entity’s public or private character:
      (1) Whether the entity was created by the legislature;
      (2) Whether its powers were specifically defined by the legislature;
      (3) Whether the property of the entity belongs to the public; and
      (4) Whether the entity’s functions are exclusively of the public character and performed solely for the public benefit.
      The Theriot court noted that while the Smith case did not specify that all four factors must be met in order to find that an entity was public, they did so by “implication.” Id., 09-1152, p. 3, 31 So.3d at 1015. In Theriot, however, the Court concluded that "all four factors must be present in order for a court to determine that an entity is public.” Id.

      The Theriot case has not been cited often since its publication, but this Court has as recently as 2013 applied the factors set forth in Theriot and Smith, to find that the Louisiana High School Athletic Association (“LHSAA”) is a private entity, created by a group of high school principals who wanted to better regulate and develop the high school interscholastic athletic program in Louisiana. In Louisiana High School Athletics Ass'n Inc. v. State, 12-1471 (La. 1/29/13), 107 So.3d 583, this Court ruled that not only was the LHSAA not created by the Legislature, its powers are specified in its articles of incorporation, as filed with the Secretary of State. Finding that the LHSAA already had not met two of the four Smith factors, the Court concluded it was a private entity, not subject to the Open Meetings Law.
      We find, however, both Theriot and the LHSAA opinions are distinguishable, as they did not involve the Public Records Law, nor did they involve a contract with a municipality specifying that the entity perform a public purpose on behalf of a municipality, such as the LSPCA did in this instance. Moreover, it is undisputed from the record that the LSPCA is a private entity for purposes other than this Court's holding herein.

      . In so holding, however, we specifically note that the consideration of public money in this type of inquiry will be on a case-by-case basis, and we decline to set a specific sum which would require application of the Public Records Law in this context.

      . We emphasize that the applicability of the Public Records Law to groups similarly situated as the LSPCA will be fact-specific. The nature of whether any entity is an instrumentality as set forth in this analysis should be specifically tailored to the facts at hand. Indeed, the LSPCA may not be deemed a quasi-public body or instrumentality under different facts in a different case for purposes of La. R.S. 44:1.

      . Amici curiae briefs submitted to this Court assert that such a holding will have a chilling effect on private entities contracting with municipalities to provide certain services. This Court is not unaware of the necessity of governmental entities contracting put services with private groups, but we must also be ever cognizant of the public’s well-established constitutional right to access information associated with public money.