author: BOLIN, Justice.

text:
    JIM BISHOP CHEVROLET-BUICK-PONTIAC-GMC, INC. v. Michael Andy BURDEN and Tina Burden.
    1141231.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    May 6, 2016.

      John D. Gleissner of Williams & Associates, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Randy D. Whitten of Higginbotham & Whitten, Florence, for appellees.
   BOLIN, Justice.

Jim Bishop Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, Inc. (“Jim Bishop”), appeals from a judgment entered on jury verdicts in favor of Michael Andy Burden (“Burden”) and his wife Tina Burden in the amount of $132,500. '

Facts and Procedural History

On July 17, 2012, the Burdens sued General Motors, LLC, Jim Bishop, and Lynn Layton Chevrolet, Inc. (“Lynn Layton”), seeking to recover damages for injuries they allegedly sustained as the result of a fire that occurred in a truck they had purchased from an automobile dealership owned and operated by Jim Bishop (“the Jim Bishop dealership”). The Burdens asserted various claims against various defendants in their complaint, including a products-liability claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (“the AEMLD”); a claim asserting negligence and wantonness in the design and manufacture of the truck; breach of express and implied warranties; a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.; and a claim alleging that the defendants had negligently and wantonly failed to repair the truck and to warn of the inherent danger in operating the truck. Tina asserted a loss-of-consortium claim.

On August 21, 2012, General Motors filed its answer generally denying the alie-gations contained in the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses. On October 3, 2012, Lynn Layton filed its answer also generally denying the allegations contained in the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses. On November 11, 2012, Jim Bishop filed its answer also generally denying the allegations contained in the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses. Jim Bishop further asserted a cross-claim against General Motors pursuant to § 8-20-4(3)(o), Ala.Code 1975, alleging it had refused to indemnify Jim Bishop.

On August 20, 2013, General Motors moved the trial court for a summary judgment as to the AEMLD and negligent and wanton design and manufacture claims asserted against it by the Burdens. General Motors argued that the Burdens had failed to provide information regarding the expert witnesses who would be testifying in support of those claims before the expiration of the trial court’s scheduling deadline for providing that information. See Rule 26, Ala. R. Civ. P. Therefore, General Motors contended, the Burdens’ claims under the AEMLD and their negligent and wanton design and manufacture claim were not sustainable because those claims required the presentation of expert testimony. Both Jim Bishop and Lynn Layton moved the trial court for a summary judgment as to the AEMLD claim and the negligent and wqnton design and manufacture claim, adopting General Motors’ motion for a summary judgment.

On September 9, 2013, the Burdens filed a response to the defendants’ motions for a summary judgment as to the AEMLD and the negligent and wanton design and manufacture claims, stating that they did not “object to deleting the causes of action which require an expert finding of the specific cause and origin of the fire.” On September 11, 2013, the trial court entered an order dismissing both the AEMLD and negligent and wanton design and manufacture claims.

Thereafter, the Burdens entered into pro tanto settlements with General Motors, which agreed to pay them $20,000, and Lynn Layton, which agreed to pay them $32,000, as to the respective claims asserted by the Burdens against those defendants. The settlement with General Motors resolved the breach-of-warranty claims and the Magnuson-Moss claim. The trial court dismissed the Burdens’ claims against both General Motors and Lynn Layton pursuant to joint stipulations of dismissal filed by those parties.

On July 29, 2014, Jim Bishop moved the trial court for a summary judgment on the Burdens’ remaining claims against it, contending, among other things, that it was entitled to a summary judgment on the Burdens’ negligent-failure-to-repair and failure-to-warn claims, arguing that it had not undertaken a duty to repair the vehicle; that expert testimony was necessary to establish the cause of the fire that destroyed the truck; and that the Burdens had previously admitted that expert testimony establishing the cause of the fire is not available. On August 6,2014, the Burdens filed a response in opposition to Jim Bishop’s summary-judgment motion. On September 25, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying Jim Bishop’s summary-judgment motion.

On May 26, 2015, General Motors moved the trial court to sever, pursuant to Rule 21, Ala. R. Civ. P,, Jim Bishop’s cross-claim against it seeking indemnification. On May 27, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting General Motors’ motion to sever Jim Bishop’s cross-claim.

The case proceeded to trial on the Burdens’ claims against Jim Bishop alleging negligent repair and failure to warn of the hazardous condition of the truck and Tina’s loss-of-consortium claim. Jim Bishop moved the trial court for a preverdict judgment as a matter of law (“JML”) at the close of the Burdens’ evidence and then again at the close of all the evidence. The trial court denied both motions. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Burden for $100,000 and a verdict in favor of Tina for $32,500. On June 15, 2015, the trial court entered a judgment for $132,500 in favor of the Burdens based on the jury’s verdicts. On July 6, 2015, Jim Bishop moved the trial court for a postverdict JML or, in the alternative, for a new trial. On August 12, 2015, the trial court denied Jim Bishop’s postjudgment motion. Jim Bishop appeals.

The evidence presented at trial indicates the following. On September 11, 2009, Burden purchased a new Chevrolet Silver-ado 1500 pickup truck from Jim Bishop. Before that purchase, Burden had purchased a number of vehicles from Jim Bishop. After purchasing the truck, Burden began noticing a “distinct” smell in the cabin of the truck that would “come and go” when he was driving it. Burden, an experienced electrician employed at a local paper mill, described the smell as a “smoke-ish type burning” odor. He explained that there was never a consistent pattern to the odor and that it would just come and go, lasting in duration anywhere from a few seconds to 10 minutes. Burden stated that he experienced the burning odor approximately 100 times while he had the truck and had on occasion lifted the hood of the truck and inspected the engine compartment himself trying to find the source of the odor.

On January 6, 2010, Burden took the truck to the “quick lube lane” at the Jim Bishop dealership to have the oil in the truck changed. Burden testified that he asked the employee who changed his oil if he could see anything under the truck that might be causing the odor. The oil-change technician told Burden that he did not see anything under the truck that could be causing the odor.

Later, on that same date, Burden was traveling to Huntsville in the truck to visit his father when the “service engine light” came on and he again noticed the burning odor. Burden testified that at that time the odor was prominent and smelled like something was “hot” or was “going to burn.” Burden decided to have the truck inspected at a Chevrolet dealership operated by Lynn Layton, which was on the way to Burden’s Huntsville destination. Burden explained to the service-department employee at the Lynn Layton dealership that he smelled something “hot” or something “burning” in the truck. The service department reprogrammed the “power-train control module” and informed Burden that the technicians could not find anything causing the odor. Burden stated that an employee in the service department at the Lynn Layton dealership told him that he was “possibly smelling the new burning off the truck.”

On May 3, 2010, Burden brought his truck into the service department at the Jim Bishop dealership, again complaining of the burning odor and of a “popping” noise. Burden testified that he explained to the service-department employee that an employee in the service department at the Lynn Layton dealership had told him that the burning odor he was smelling was the “new burning off.” Burden stated that the Jim Bishop employee responded, “[Y]eah, it could be possible.” The service department at the Jim Bishop dealership eventually discovered that the rack and pinion steering was leaking fluid and determined that the rack and pinion steering needed to be replaced. At that time, the service department added rack and pinion steering fluid and ordered the parts necessary to replace the rack and pinion steering.

Burden testified that he continued to smell the burning odor intermittently when he would drive the truck. On May 19, 2010, Burden returned to the service department at the Jim Bishop dealership to have the new rack and pinion steering installed. Burden testified that he again complained to the service department about the burning odor. Burden stated that the service-department employee told him that “they would look into it.” After examining the truck for the cause of the odor, the service department informed Burden that it “did not find anything wrong with it.” The service department installed the rack and pinion steering on the truck at this time.

Burden testified that he subsequently returned to the service department at the Jim Bishop dealership complaining of the burning odor emanating from the truck. Burden stated that the service department examined the truck for the source of the burning odor and again informed him that it “could not find anything wrong.” Burden further testified that the service-department employee told him, if he could, to bring the truck back in while the burning odor was actively emanating from the truck.

Burden testified that on July 22, 2010, at approximately 1:00 p.m., he began smelling the burning odor. Burden proceeded immediately to the service department at the Jim Bishop dealership as he had been asked to do by the service-department employee. Burden stated that he telephoned the service department to notify it that he was coming in with the truck. Burden stated that when he arrived at the service department he left the truck running and informed the service-department employee that the burning odor was emanating from the truck. Burden stated that he was told by the service-department employee that “we don’t have time to look at it.” Burden testified that he could not wait for the service department to get to his truck because he had to be at work at 2:30 p.m. Burden stated that he offered to leave the truck if the service department could provide him with a “loaner” vehicle and that he was told by the service-department employee that the Jim Bishop dealership no longer provided “loaner” vehicles. Burden also testified that he inquired about renting a vehicle and that the service-department employee told him that he would schedule a service appointment for Burden. The service-department employee scheduled a service appointment for Burden for the following Monday, July 26, 2010. Burden stated that he did not inquire of the service-department employee if the truck was safe to drive.

Burden left the service department and drove directly to his job. After working his shift at the paper mill, Burden clocked out at approximately 2:00 a.m. on the morning of July 23, 2010, and headed home. Burden testified that as he drove home he began to smell the burning odor in the truck. He stated that the odor became more intense and that smoke started coming from the dashboard. Burden testified that the hazard lights on the truck started blinking, that the horn started blowing, that he lost power steering, and that when he tried to stop the truck he realized that he had lost the function of the brakes. Burden testified that, as the smoke and heat became more intense in the cabin of the truck, he tried to open the truck door so that he could “bail out,” but that the doors of the truck would not open. Burden stated that he began to choke on the smoke and started to panic. He testified that he tried to break the driver’s side window by hitting it with his arm but was unsuccessful. Burden estimated his speed to be approximately 30 to 35 m.p.h. at that time. Burden testified that he finally put the transmission of the truck in park and the truck began to slow down. He stated that, when he put the transmission in park, the door locks opened, allowing him to open the door and “bail out” of the truck onto the road. Burden telephoned E-911 and his wife to notify them of the accident.

The first responders found Burden sitting on the ground approximately 100 feet behind the truck, which was now burning. Burden initially stated that he “felt fine” and that he did not want to be transported to the hospital. However, the paramedic on the scene noticed that Burden’s breathing was labored and that he was in a “state of shock.” Burden was transported to the hospital for treatment and was released approximately four hours later. Burden testified that his memory of the events occurring that morning after he bailed out of the truck was vague.

The truck was completely engulfed by fire and was a total loss. Both Jim Bishop and Cotton States Insurance Company, Burden’s insurer, had certified fire investigators examine the vehicle to determine the cause of the fire. Although it was determined that the fire started in the left side of the engine compartment, the actual cause of the fire was undeterminable because of the extensive damage to the truck. Cotton States indemnified Burden for the loss of the truck.

James E. Bishop testified on behalf of Jim Bishop. Bishop was the former owner of Jim Bishop and the Jim Bishop dealership, having sold both to his son in 2007. Bishop testified that the service department cannot diagnose every problem presented to it, that several things can cause a new vehicle to smell, and that electrical problems are among some of the more difficult issues to diagnose. Bishop stated that if a dealership is unable to diagnose a problem “then you get [General Motors] involved.” Bishop testified that, if a technician at the Jim Bishop dealership cannot identify a particular problem, then the Jim Bishop dealership would contact the technical representative at General Motors, who would work to diagnose the problem via a computer or actually come to the service department to address the issue. Bishop further stated that the customers are also able to contact General Motors directly concerning a problem. He stated that, if contacted by a customer, General Motors would diagnose the problem and then contact the dealership to give it a description of the problem. The dealership would then contact the customer and have the customer come in so that the dealership could make the necessary repairs.

On cross-examination, Bishop was asked by counsel for the Burdens whether the Jim Bishop dealership had in place a policy or procedure for dealing with vehicles that come into the service department that are too dangerous to drive. Bishop stated that he was unaware of any such policy or procedure the Jim Bishop dealership had in place and that in such a case he would think that the customer should “park” the vehicle and “put it in the shop.” He stated that if the service department could not identify a problem with the vehicle he would not think there was a problem with the vehicle and that it would be safe to drive. Counsel for the Burdens then asked Bishop whether it was reasonable for the service department to allow Burden to leave the service department with the truck after the service department had failed on several occasions to diagnose the source of the burning odor; had not contacted the General Motors technical-assistance representative for assistance in diagnosing the source of the burning odor; and had told Burden to bring the truck in the next time it was emanating the burning odor, which Burden had done. Bishop responded that if the service department was full the customer would either leave the vehicle at the Jim Bishop dealership or take the vehicle with him or her and that which course to take, based on safety concerns, would be the decision of the service-department representative.

Standard of Review

The standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a JML is as follows:

“ ‘When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court uses the same standard the trial court used initially in deciding whether to grant or deny the motion for a JML. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Cranford, 689 So.2d 3 (Ala.1997). Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to allow the case to be submitted to the jury for a factual resolution. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1992). The nonmov-ant must have presented substantial evidence in order to withstand a motion for a JML. See § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975; West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). A reviewing court must determine whether the party who bears the burden of proof has produced substantial evidence creating a factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury. Carter, 598 So.2d at 1353. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free to draw. Id. Regarding a question of law, however, this Court indulges no presumption of correctness as to the trial court’s ruling. Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.2d 1126 (Ala.1992).’
“Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875 So.2d 1143, 1152 (Ala.2003).”

CSX Transp., Inc. v. Miller, 46 So.3d 434, 450-51 (Ala.2010).

Discussion

Jim Bishop argues, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a JML and submitting the Burdens’ claims against it to the jury because, it says, the Burdens failed to establish that there was a breach of a duty owed them that proximately resulted in the fire. The Burdens contend that Jim Bishop breached the duty to discover and to repair a dangerous condition within the truck that proximately caused the fire. Specifically, the Burdens contend that Jim Bishop did not “seriously consider” Burden’s complaints regarding the burning odor emanating from the truck and did not adequately “undertake to discover and correct” a dangerous condition that existed within the truck.

In order to recover on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish the existence of (1) a duty; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) an injury. Alfa Life Ins. Corp. v. Colza, 159 So.3d 1240, 1248 (Ala.2014).

Jim Bishop relies upon Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 579 So.2d 1328 (Ala.1991), in support of its argument that the Burdens failed to establish, by expert testimony, a breach of duty. In Brooks, the Brookses purchased a vehicle from Colonial that was manufactured by General Motors. On January 14, 1987, as Ms. Brooks was driving the vehicle out of the driveway, the brakes failed, causing the vehicle to collide with a fence, injuring Ms. Brooks. The following day, the Brookses took the vehicle to Colonial, complaining that the brakes had failed and requesting that Colonial inspect and repair the brakes. At that time, Colonial inspected the brake system and its component parts by removing the front and rear wheels to see if there was something causing a sticking or binding with the brakes; inspecting the brake drums to verify that there was no overheating; sanding and cleaning the brake drums; and bleeding and flushing the brake system to be certain that there was no air in the system that could be causing a problem. Colonial’s service manager stated that, although the inspection revealed no problem with the brakes or the brake system, it undertook those steps as a precautionary measure to convince itself that there was no problem with the brakes or the brake system.

The Brookses continued to experience problems with the brakes as they drove the vehicle. On February 12, 1987, the Brookses returned to Colonial for inspection, maintenance, and repair of the brakes. Colonial again thoroughly tested and inspected the brakes and the brake system and concluded that there was no problem with the brake system. On February 16, 1987, the Brookses returned to Colonial, again complaining of brake problems. Colonial took the vehicle to an independent repair facility for a follow-up inspection to ascertain if there was a problem Colonial had not found, but those findings indicated that there was nothing wrong with the brakes or the brake system.

The Brookses continued to complain of problems with the brakes. On March 2, 1987, Colonial’s service manager, along with another employee from Colonial, picked up the vehicle from the Brookses’ house and drove it to the dealership. As the service manager drove the vehicle back to Colonial, he attempted to simulate the problems the Brookses had complained of, but the brakes worked perfectly. Even though the service manager had experienced no actual problem with the brakes, when the vehicle was in the repair shop, as a further precautionary measure and at the suggestion of a General Motors representative, Colonial replaced the master cylinder, a part of the braking system. Subsequently, on March 23, 1987, the brakes failed as the Brookses were driving down an incline. The Brookses suffered injuries when they jumped from the vehicle before it collided with an embankment and caught fire.

The Brookses sued General Motors asserting a claim under the AEMLD alleging defective design of the brakes. The Brookses also asserted a claim against Colonial alleging negligent repair of the brakes. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of General Motors and Colonial on the claims asserted against them by the Brookses.

On appeal, this Court determined that, as to the negligent-repair claim asserted against Colonial, there was no evidence presented to support that claim “other than the fact .of the accident itself,” Brooks, 579 So.2d at 1334. This Court stated:

“In order to present a prima .facie case of negligent repair on Colonial’s part, the Brookses had the burden of presenting substantial evidence that, taking into account all of the attendant circumstances, Colonial did something or failed to do something that would violate the proper standard of care one must observe in repairing a brake system. The Brookses presented no expert testimony; in fact, the Brookses presented no evidence whatever regarding the quality of the repair work performed by Colonial when it attempted to substantiate and to correct the problems the Brookses alleged they had experienced with the brakes.”

Brooks, 579 So.2d at 1334.

In this case, other than casually mentioning the burning odor to the oil-change technicians at the Jim Bishop dealership, who Burden acknowledged were not repair technicians, the evidence suggests that the Jim Bishop dealership actually retained the truck on three occasions in an attempt to diagnose the source of the burning odor. On May 3, 2010, Burden brought the truck into the service department complaining of the burning odor and of a “popping” noise. The service department determined at that time that the rack and pinion steering was leaking fluid and needed to be replaced. On May 19, 2010, Burden returned to the service department at the Jim Bishop dealership to have the new rack and pinion steering installed. Burden again complained to the service department at that time about the burning odor emanating from the truck and was told by the service-department employee that “they would look into it.” After examining the truck to determine the cause of the burning odor, the service department informed Burden that it “did not find anything wrong with it.” Additionally, Burden stated that at some subsequent point in time he returned to the service department at the Jim Bishop dealership again complaining of the burning order emanating from the truck. The service department examined the truck for the soui’ce of the burning odor and again informed Burden that it “could not And anything wrong.”

To the extent that the Burdens claim that Jim Bishop was negligent in failing to identify and repair the source of the burning odor, we note that the Burdens were required to present substantial evidence establishing that the Jim Bishop dealership either did something, or failed to do something, on the three occasions that the Jim Bishop dealership undertook to diagnose the source of the burning odor that would violate the standard of care a service department must adhere to in diagnosing an intermittent burning odor emanating from a mechanically complex and sophisticated vehicle. However, the Burdens failed to present any expert testimony, or any evidence whatsoever, of the appropriate standard of care to be adhered to when a service department undertakes to diagnose the cause of such an intermittent burning odor. No evidence, expert or otherwise, was presented indicating what procedures or techniques were undertaken by the Jim Bishop dealership on the occasions that it retained the truck to diagnose the cause of the intermittent burning odor and whether those procedures or techniques were sufficient or of the kind and quality reasonably necessary to diagnose the cause of the intermittent burning odor.

The Burdens also contend that Jim Bishop breached the duty owed to them on the occasion that Burden was “turned away” by the Jim Bishop dealership less than 24 hours before the vehicle fire and was allowed to drive the truck—that they claim was in a dangerous condition—away from the service department after he had been asked by a service-department employee to bring the truck in when the burning odor was actively emanating from the truck. The circumstances attending that occasion were that the Jim Bishop dealership had failed on three prior occasions to diagnose the source of the burning odor; that the Jim Bishop dealership had not contacted the technical representative at General Motors; that Burden had driven the truck for approximately 10 months without an incident, other than the odor and “popping” noise; that Burden was asked to bring the truck to the service department when the burning odor was actively emanating from the truck; that the service department was backed up and could not “get to” Burden’s truck when he arrived at the Jim Bishop dealership; that he was asked to leave the truck but chose not to because he had to be at work; that Burden was allowed to drive the truck away when the Jim Bishop dealership was unable to provide Burden with a “loaner”; and that the Jim Bishop dealership scheduled a service appointment for Burden for the following Monday.

Again the Burdens failed to present any evidence, expert or otherwise, as to how the actions taken by Jim Bishop under the attendant circumstances constituted a breach of duty owed them that proximately resulted in the vehicle fire. The Burdens presented no expert testimony as to the appropriate standard of care owed by Jim Bishop under the attendant circumstances and how the actions taken, or not taken, by the service department of the Jim Bishop dealership on that occasion were unreasonable and proximately resulted in the mechanically complex and sophisticated vehicle catching fire the following day. Although counsel for the Burdens questioned Bishop, who was not qualified as an expert, on the topic of the reasonableness of the service department’s “turning [Burden] away,” he offered only that in such a situation the customer would have the opportunity to either leave the vehicle with the service department or leave the service department with the vehicle and that that determination was left to the service-department representative. Accordingly, we conclude that the Burdens failed to establish a breach of a duty owed them.

As to the Burdens’ claim that Jim Bishop breached a duty to warn of a hazardous condition within the truck and allowed Burden to drive the truck away from the Jim Bishop dealership on the day before the fire, we note that this contention presumes that a hazardous condition existed within the truck of which Jim Bishop was aware when Burden drove away from the Jim Bishop dealership. The lack of expert testimony as to the existence of a dangerous condition in the truck notwithstanding, the circumstances existing at the time Burden drove the truck away from the Jim Bishop dealership, as set forth above, indicate that Jim Bishop knew only of a previously undiagnosed intermittent burning odor emanating from the truck. The Burdens presented no expert testimony demonstrating how Jim Bishop breached its duty in failing to recognize that a hazardous condition existed within the truck and failed to warn Burden of the condition under the circumstances that existed when Burden left the Jim Bishop dealership in the truck. Accordingly, we conclude that the Burdens failed to establish a breach of a duty to warn owed to the Burdens.

In this case, as in Brooks, the only evidence presented to support the Burdens’ claims that Jim Bishop was negligent in failing to identify and repair the source of the burning odor and to warn of a hazardous condition is the fact that the Burdens had taken the truck to the Jim Bishop dealership on several occasions complaining of the burning odor, that the Jim Bishop dealership could not identify the source of the odor, and that the truck subsequently caught fire. The failure to identify and repair the source of the burning odor, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of negligent repair. Brooks, supra. Tina’s loss-of-consortium claim, which is dependent on Burden’s claims, likewise fails. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to grant Jim Bishop’s motion for a JML and in submitting the case to the jury. Therefore, we reverse the judgment entered in favor of the Burdens on the jury’s verdicts and render a judgment for Jim Bishop.

REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.

STUART, PARKER, MURDOCK, SHAW, MAIN, and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

MOORE, C.J., dissents. •

      . The Jim Bishop dealership has an express oil-change lane that serves to expedite oil changes and other similar vehicle servicing. The express oil-change lane is separate from the service department, which actually diagnoses and repairs any mechanical problems a vehicle may be experiencing. The Jim Bishop employees who work in the express oil-change lane are not mechanics.

        . The record indicates that the Jim Bishop dealership had indeed previously canceled its "loaner” program for financial reasons.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: STUART, Justice. SHAW, Justice MURDOCK, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    ST. UNION BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. v. James M. HOWARD, Sr. James M. Howard, Sr., individually, and as appointed representative of St. Union Baptist Church v. St. Union Baptist Church, Inc., et al.
    1141132 and 1141212.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    May 13, 2016.

      Philip ,G. Perkins, Jackson, for appellant/cross-appellee St. Union Baptist Church, Inc.
    Charles H. Jones, Jr., Mobile, for appel-lee/cross-appellant James M. Howard, Sr.
   STUART, Justice.

The Clarke Circuit Court dismissed both the claims asserted by St. Union Baptist Church, Inc. (“the corporation”), against Reverend James M. Howard, Sr., and the counterclaims asserted by Howard against the corporation and its directors after concluding that their dispute was ecclesiastical in nature and outside the jurisdiction of the court. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the corporation’s claims, but we reverse its dismissal of Howard’s counterclaims.

I.

St. Union Baptist Church (“the church”) has existed in Clarke County for over 100 years. Traditionally, its temporal affairs were administered through a board of deacons, and, in January 1992, five members of that board filed articles of incorporation with the Clarke County Probate Court creating St. Union Baptist Church, Inc., whose purpose was described as follows in those articles of incorporation:

“The purpose for which the corporation is organized is to administer the affairs of the congregation [and] to construct or cause to be constructed such buildings and structures that are necessary for proposed worship and church services, and the corporation shall have the right to buy, sell, hold, mortgage, and encumber real and personal property, to receive property by gift, will, or devise, holding such property in conformity with all lawful conditions imposed by the donor and may exercise such other powers as- are incident to private corporations, exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary and educational purposes.”

The articles of incorporation identified the five incorporating deacons as the initial members of the corporation’s board of directors; it appears that the deacons thereafter continued to oversee the temporal affairs of the church in the same manner as they had before the corporation was formed.

Minutes from an April 18,1995, business meeting of the church indicate that the deacons had decided at that time to hire Howard as the church’s new pastor. It appears that the church thereafter operated with Howard as its pastor for a number of years without conflict; by 2012, however, a rift had formed between Howard and the deacons. At a business meeting on April 28, 2012, Howard purported to “give the deacons back to the church,” which apparently encompassed relieving them of at least some of their duties. Nevertheless, the minutes of that meeting reflect that Howard continued to recognize their involvement in the financial governance of the church, because two deacons presented financial reports and Howard informed the members present that one of the deacons would continue handling the paying of bills. Those minutes also indicate that the deacons immediately expressed their disagreement with Howard’s unilateral decision regarding their roles; the deacons again expressed their displeasure in a June 27, 2012, letter sent to Howard in which they requested a private meeting to “settle this matter in a Godly manner.” No such meeting was held, however, and the deacons thereafter called a meeting of church members for August 13, 2012, “so that we may try to settle the on-going differences that have caused division.” At that meeting, the deacons decided to terminate Howard’s pastorate, and, on August 19, 2012, six deacons signed a letter to Howard informing him of that decision, stating:

“The listed deacons called the meeting for the purpose of informing the body of some of their concerns regarding the welfare of the church that need immediate attention. A few of the things that were discussed were the falling off of member attendance, the falling off of tithes and offerings, the incorporation of the church being ignored, your lack of spiritual and financial leadership, the $187,000 [of] steel that is lying in the parking lot, and your holding a grudge against us that has not been revealed to us. Your consistently refusing to meet with the board of deacons has brought us to where we are today.
“After discussing these topics and a few others, there was a motion from the floor for your termination, which was seconded. After putting this to a vote, the majority present voted for your termination. Regretfully, this is to inform you that your services to St. Union as pastor are no longer needed as of Monday, August 13, 2012. We hope you will accept the majority vote and move on pleasantly.”

Howard declined to leave his position, however, and, on October 13, 2012, he held another church meeting at which he asked those present to vote whether they wanted “the pastor to stay” or “for the deacons to remain.” The minutes of that meeting indicate that 37 members voted for Howard and 10 members voted for the deacons.

For approximately two years, it appears that this situation remained at a stalemate, with Howard continuing to serve as pastor and the deacons continuing to perform at least some of them traditional duties. The conflict between them continued, however, and, although the record does not fully explain the circumstances, it appears that the deacons, who continued to administer the church’s finances through the corporation, at some point stopped paying Howard’s salary. On August 26, 2014, a “charge” was prepared declaring that, on October 13, 2012, the deacons had been removed from office and that the church henceforth had no deacons. The charge further declared that “these brothers” nevertheless were continuing to come to church and acting as deacons and disturbing worship services despite the fact that they had “been excluded.” The charge concluded that, “according to the body of the church, on October 13, 2012, ... these brothers were relieved of their office of deacon along with any power to handle any business for or in the name of [the church].” The deacons apparently ignored this charge.

At some point thereafter, Howard told the congregation that he would resign if he was paid the money he was owed; presumably, this claimed money consisted of the salary that had been withheld by the deacons. Howard and the deacons subsequently began negotiations, and, on November 30, 2014, Howard submitted his resignation. On December 1, 2014, Howard executed an agreement with the corporation in which he agreed to resign as pastor of the church in exchange for $16,600. Howard thereafter negotiated a check in that amount issued to him by the corporation.

On December 21, 2014, Howard rescinded his resignation, stating that he was doing so at the request of the members of the church who had, he stated, told him that they would not accept his resignation. Howard did not repay the $16,600 the corporation had paid him to resign, however. The next day, the corporation sent Howard a letter reminding him of the December 1 agreement and advising him that legal action would be taken if he did not honor the agreement. On December 23, 2014, the threatened legal action was commenced when the corporation, acting through the five deacons who were now serving as its officers and directors, sued Howard, alleging breach of contract and trespass and asking the trial court to issue an immediate temporary restraining order barring Howard from the church premises, to be followed by a similar permanent injunction after appropriate proceedings were completed. On December 24, 2014, the trial court entered the requested temporary restraining order barring Howard from the church premises.

Howard thereafter moved the trial court to dissolve the temporary restraining order, asserting that the five deacons purporting to act on behalf of the church in bringing the litigation were not currently leaders or even members of the church, having been expelled in October 2012. He further argued that when those deacons and/or their predecessors had incorporated the corporation through which they continued to control the finances of the church they had never consulted with the congregation or sought its approval. Howard also argued that the temporary restraining order was inappropriate because the corporation had not alleged that any harm would result from Howard attending church services and that, in any event, he had never been banished from the church or agreed to stay away from the church premises. Howard followed his motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order with his own complaint, naming as defendants the corporation and its five directors—Jessie J. Robinson, Asberry Dif-fin, Abraham Kimbell, Jr., James E. Todd, Tommy R. Briggs—and asserting claims of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, re-plevin, and conspiracy and seeking an accounting of church funds from 2005 to the present, a temporary restraining order enjoining the corporation and its directors from expending any church funds, and an order requiring the corporation to turn over all funds held on the church’s behalf to Howard. The corporation and its five directors subsequently moved the trial court to dismiss Howard’s counterclaims, and Howard filed a similar motion asking the trial court to dismiss the complaint that had initiated this action.

On March 20, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the pending motions, and, on March 23, 2015, the trial court entered an interlocutory order providing for the management of the church until the legal issues were fully resolved. That order provided, among other things, that a representative appointed by the State Baptist Board to which the church belonged would monitor church services each week and would supervise the handling of all offerings; that church finances would “remain under their present structure and control” but that only normal operating expenditures would be made; that Howard and a guest preacher selected by the deacons would preach on alternate weeks; that no party would conduct meetings on church premises other than the scheduled Sunday services; and that all parties and church members would refrain from discussing the litigation, disparaging one another, or soliciting support while on church premises. This order effectively dissolved the temporary restraining order entered against Howard in December 2014 but did not resolve the pending motions to dismiss.

The corporation and its directors thereafter again moved the trial court to dismiss Howard’s counterclaims, supporting their motion with documentary evidence; they also separately moved the trial court to enter an order requiring Howard to return the $16,600 he had received if it was determined that he was allowed to remain as pastor. Howard subsequently also supplemented his previously filed motion to dismiss with documentary evidence. On June 2, 2015, the trial court entered a final judgment dismissing all the claims asserted by the parties based either on their lack of standing or the court’s lack of jurisdiction. The trial court explained its judgment as follows:

“The heart of the dispute and litigation in the present case is whether Howard is or is not the pastor of St. Union Baptist Church. The choice of a pastor for a church is based wholly on Biblical principles for which a court eannot interfere without violating the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Alabama. All cases adjudicated by the Alabama Supreme Court throughout its history have respected this principle. The congregation of St. Union Baptist Church by majority vote (‘pure democracy’ per Blount [v. Sixteenth St. Baptist Church, 206 Ala. 423, 426, 90 So. 602, 604 (1921)]) must choose or terminate its pastor. This court nor the legislature through its business organization statutes nor any church member or minority group of members can alter this principle. The dispute over whether Howard resigned or not and if he did whether he may be rehired as pastor is for the majority of the congregation to decide. Regardless of the various causes of actions and names of the parties, the central, substantive dispute is whether Howard is or is not the pastor and such is wholly spiritual and ecclesiastical in nature and the court cannot interfere.”

On June 9, 2015, the corporation moved the trial court to reconsider its judgment, noting that the Sunday services at the church on June 7, 2015, had been “complete chaos” because Howard and his attorney had declared to the congregation that Howard was “back in charge” of the church and, the corporation asserted, Howard was also attempting to conduct another vote of the congregation to remove the deacons while resisting any attempt to have a vote conducted concerning his own position. The corporation accordingly requested that the trial court enter a finding of fact that Howard had resigned as pastor and appoint a mediator to oversee a fair election to determine the church’s future. On June 11, 2015, the trial court denied that motion, again noting that the choice of a pastor was a spiritual matter beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

Subsequently, on June 29, 2015, Howard moved the trial court to modify its judgment. Howard’s motion also described a chaotic atmosphere at the June 7, 2015, services of the church and further stated that, on Sunday, June 14, 2015, church members had arrived at the church to discover that the deacons had changed the locks and posted notices stating that there would be no church services until further notice and that any trespassers would be prosecuted. An altercation had occurred in which two church members suffered knife wounds, police were called, and criminal-trespassing warnings were issued to Howard and his wife. Howard further informed the court that the police had taken the position that the corporation .controlled the church premises and could control access to those premises however it wished to do so; accordingly, Howard asked the court to clarify that the corporation had no legal right to bar him from the church premises. Howard also asked the trial court to reconsider the dismissal of the counterclaims he had asserted against the corporation and its directors, arguing that those claims did not involve ecclesiastical or spiritual matters but concerned the financial affairs and property rights of the church.

On July 13, 2015, the corporation filed its notice of appeal to this Court, docketed as appeal no. 1141132, challenging the trial court’s June 2 order dismissing the corporation’s claims; however, because Howard’s postjudgment motion was still pending in the triai court, that notice of appeal was held in abeyance pursuant to Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. RApp. P. Howard thereafter filed an amended complaint, noting that he had, on July 11, 2015, presided over a conference of church members held outside the church building at which, he claimed, the members had unanimously voted to disassociate the church from the corporation, to expel the five directors of that corporation from the church, to elect three new deacons, and to empower Howard to take whatever action was necessary through the court system to restore the church to its members. He accordingly moved the trial court to enter an order barring the five directors of the corporation from church premises and requiring them to deliver to him all financial records of the church. He further asked the trial court to advise the police and other local government officials that the corporation did not control the church and that only he was authorized to act on behalf of the church.

On July 28, 2015, the trial court entered an order denying Howard’s motion to modify the June 2 judgment but setting forth temporary guidelines to govern the operation of the church pending the resolution of the corporation’s appeal. That order effectively provided that the two factions would alternate possession of the church on a weekly basis and that neither the deacons nor Howard would enter the church on the weeks assigned to the other. On August 10, 2015, Howard filed his notice of appeal of the trial court’s June 2 judgment, docketed as appeal no. 1141212. The corporation’s and Howard’s appeals have since been consolidated for the purpose of writing one opinion.

II.

Both the corporation and Howard are asking this Court to review the trial court’s June 2 order dismissing their respective claims based on either a lack of standing or a lack of jurisdiction. We have stated that both the issue of standing and issues of jurisdiction present pure questions of law; accordingly, we afford the trial court’s ruling no deference on appeal and consider those issues de novo. Lumpkin v. State, 171 So.3d 599, 600 (Ala. 2014), and Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski 899 So.2d 949, 953 (Ala.2004).

III.

We first consider the trial court’s dismissal of the claims asserted by the corporation against Howard stemming from Howard’s decision to continue acting as pastor of the church in spite of the fact that he accepted $16,600 from the corporation in exchange for his agreement to resign his pastorate. In dismissing the corporation’s complaint, the trial court concluded that the question at the heart of the corporation’s claims—whether Howard could continue as the pastor of the church—was a spiritual and ecclesiastical matter in which the court could not interfere -without violating both federal and state constitutional provisions. This conclusion is well founded in light of our prior caselaw on the topic.

In Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 66-67, 61 So.2d 101, 107-08 (1952), the trial court was asked to decide a dispute among members of the Twenty-Second Avenue Baptist Church in Birmingham regarding the continued employment of their pastor. Members on both sides of the dispute ultimately agreed that the trial court should supervise an election to settle that question; they further requested that the court appoint a special master to conduct the proceedings. The trial court thereafter acted in accordance with that agreement and, following the election, entered its judgment based on the report of the special master. However, after representatives of the losing faction appealed, this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the dispute was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and further stating that “[w]e have been unable to find any authority which even remotely tends to uphold the jurisdiction of the civil courts in a matter of this kind.” 258 Ala. at 67, 61 So.2d at 109.

Subsequently, in In re Galilee Baptist Church, 279 Ala. 393, 394, 186 So.2d 102, 103 (1966), this Court was called upon to “bring order out of a chaotic condition” inside Galilee Baptist Church in Birmingham as a result of a rift in the congregation regarding the pastor and claims by those on one side of the dispute that the pastor refused to leave his pastorate notwithstanding the fact that he had been properly relieved of his duties. After representatives of both factions petitioned the trial court for an injunction seeking to exclude the other faction from the church, the trial court held that the pastor was legally entitled to continue to “occupy the pulpit,” provided he agreed to schedule a meeting for a congregational vote to decide his future and the future of other church officers. 279 Ala. at 396, 186 So.2d at 105. After both factions appealed, this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, stating:

“[T]he court was without authority to grant to [the pastor] the right to occupy the pulpit of the church subject to the condition that he call a congregational meeting on the date specified in the decree. Such action would in effect amount to the court taking over and running the affairs of the Galilee Baptist Church. This is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 61 So.2d 101 [ (1952) ]. Spiritual-ities are beyond the reach of temporal courts, and a pastor may be deposed by a majority of the members at a congregational meeting at any time, so far as the civil courts are concerned, subject only to inquiry by the courts as to whether the church, or its appointed tribunal has proceeded according to the law of the church. Barton v. Fitzpatrick, [187 Ala. 273, 65 So. 390 (1914) ].”

279 Ala. at 397, 186 So.2d at 106. See also Odoms v. Woodall, 246 Ala. 427, 429, 20 So.2d 849, 851 (1945) (“The civil courts will not take jurisdiction of a controversy arising out of the removal of a minister if the right to the position is merely spiritual or ecclesiastical.”), and McGlathery v. Richardson, 944 So.2d 968, 977 (Ala.Civ.App.2006) (Murdock, J., concurring specially) (“[T]he underlying dispute in the present case arises out of a minority of the church members’ interests in voicing them disapproval of the pastor to the majority of the church. Such a dispute is a spiritual or ecclesiastical matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of a civil court.”).

The corporation nevertheless argues that the instant case is distinguishable from the cited cases inasmuch as Howard executed a contract formalizing his resignation. That fact, the corporation argues, makes this a civil and/or a contractual dispute as opposed to an ecclesiastical one. We disagree. As the trial court implicitly recognized in its order dismissing the corporation’s claims, even if Howard had resigned, there is still the question whether he could rescind his resignation or be rehired as pastor if that was the desire of the majority of the church’s members. Ultimately, only the congregation, not this Court, can answer that question. See, e.g., Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So.2d 746, 748 (Ala. 1976) (“This court takes cognizance of the well established case law of this State pertaining to the Baptist Church and the limited nature of this State’s courts’ jurisdiction over the business transacted within the Baptist Church. In a Baptist Church, the congregation rules. The majority of the members of the church control the business of the church, and the minority must submit to the will of the majority.”). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the corporation’s complaint.

IV.

We next consider the trial court’s dismissal of Howard’s claims asserting conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, re-plevin, and conspiracy and seeking an accounting of church funds from 2005 to the present, a temporary restraining order enjoining the corporation and its directors from expending any church funds, and an order requiring the corporation to turn over to Howard all funds held on behalf of the church. The gravamen of Howard’s claims is that the corporation and its directors have wrongfully refused him access to financial records of the church and to church funds, and he also makes vague allegations that the corporation and its directors have misused church funds. The corporation denies that Howard has been refused access to any records, denies any misuse of church funds, and maintains that it is the proper party to control the church’s finances. Unlike the selection of a pastor, these are not ecclesiastical issues that a court lacks jurisdiction to consider.

In McClendon v. Pugh, 49 So.3d 1238, 1239 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), the Court of Civil Appeals considered an appeal stemming from similar facts: A Baptist church’s board of deacons acted to discharge the church’s pastor, and, instead of leaving his pastorate, the pastor then called a meeting at which he presided over the election of a new board of deacons amenable to his continued employment. The original deacons then sued the pastor, alleging that he had mismanaged church property and misused church funds and requesting, among other things, that the trial court enjoin the pastor from using any other church assets, order an accounting of church bank accounts from the time the pastor gained access to them, and compel the pastor to resign. After the pastor complied with the trial court’s subsequent order to conduct a new election of deacons—at which the pastor’s favored candidates again were elected—the pastor moved for a summary judgment, arguing that the deacons’ remaining claims dealt with internal church matters outside the jurisdiction of the court; the deacons countered by arguing that the issues they had raised “related solely to financial and property rights, not ecclesiastical or religious differences.” 49 So.3d at 1239. The trial court agreed with the pastor and entered a summary judgment in his favor; however, on appeal the Court of Civil Appeals reversed that part of the trial court’s judgment, stating:

“We are limited in our authority to interfere with the internal matters of a church. McKinney v. Twenty-fifth Avenue Baptist Church, 514 So.2d 837, 839 (Ala.1987). ‘As in the case with all churches, the courts will not assume jurisdiction, in fact has none, to resolve disputes regarding their spiritual or ecclesiastical affairs. However, there is jurisdiction to resolve questions of civil or property rights.’ Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So.2d 746, 748 (Ala.1976) (citing Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 61 So.2d 101 (1952)). The contestants argue that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the relief requested in them complaint because, the contestants argue, the underlying dispute in this case concerns the financial affairs and property interests of the Church and does not involve any spiritual or ecclesiastical concerns.
“The contestants rely on Yates v. El Bethel Primitive Baptist Church, 847 So.2d 331 (Ala.2002), in which the Alabama Supreme Court considered the question whether the courts had jurisdiction over a dispute between rival factions of a church. In holding that the courts had jurisdiction in that case, our supreme court noted that ‘“the civil courts of this state have taken jurisdiction of disputes between factions of Baptist churches or of churches similarly governed on the ground that property or civil rights were involved.”’ Yates, 847 So.2d at 336 (quoting Williams, 258 Ala. at 62, 61 So.2d at 104). Our supreme court went on to note that case ‘began as one involving the finances, financial assets, and business of the Church, not any of its purely ecclesiastical or spiritual features, and those financial and business aspects of the Church have remained center stage throughout.’ Id. at 336. Thus, the question whether the trial court had jurisdiction in this case to consider the contestants’ claims for relief is dependent on whether this case involves matters of spiritual or ecclesiastical concerns or if it involves matters of financial and property rights.
“In this case, the contestants alleged that [the pastor] mismanaged the financial assets and the property of the Church. The contestants’ allegations that [the pastor] had used Church funds for personal gain, that he had mismanaged Church property, that he had destroyed church records, and that he had refused to comply with a subpoena duces tecum do not involve any ecclesiastical or spiritual matters. As in Yates, ‘neither side ... seeks to raise [theological] questions. They argue no issues of differences in religious faith or creed, and argue no spiritual conflicts, or ecclesiastical doctrine. Rather, the underlying dispute revolves around the property of the Church—control over its financial assets and affairs—and not God.’ Id. at 346' Because this case does not involve any ecclesiastical or spiritual issues and is instead focused solely on issues involving the financial affairs and property rights of the Church, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the contestants’ complaint.”

49 So.3d at 1240-41. The claims asserted by Howard similarly concern the church’s financial assets and affairs, which are not theological questions or ecclesiastical or spiritual issues. Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Howard’s claims, and its judgment in that regard is due to be reversed.

V.

The trial court dismissed both the claims asserted by the corporation against Howard and the counterclaims asserted by Howard against the corporation and its directors. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the corporation’s claims in appeal no. 1141312 because the trial court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve the ecclesiastical issue presented in that appeal. However, we reverse the dismissal of Howard’s claims in appeal no. 1141212 because the issues underlying that appeal involve only the financial affairs and property rights of the church, not ecclesiastical matters, and we remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1141132—AFFIRMED.

BOLIN, PARKER, MAIN, WISE, and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

SHAW, J., concurs specially.

MURDOCK, J., dissents.

1141212—REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BOLIN, SHAW, MAIN, and WISE, JJ., concur.

MURDOCK, J., concurs specially.

BRYAN, J., concurs in the result.

PARKER, J., dissents.

SHAW, Justice

(concurring specially in appeal no. 1141132).

It does not appear that St. Union Baptist Church, Inc. (“the corporation”), has filed a claim seeking damages based on a breach of the contract in which James M. Howard, Sr., agreed to resign as pastor of St. Union Baptist Church and accept the sum of $16,600. Nor has it alleged a claim that it is currently entitled to recover that sum from Howard. In my opinion, such claims over those funds would arguably involve the financial affairs and property rights of the church, claims over which the trial court would have jurisdiction. We are not, however, called upon in either of these appeals to address whether the trial court can determine the ownership of those funds.

MURDOCK, Justice

(concurring specially in appeal no. 1141212 and dissenting in appeal no. 1141132).

It appears that the appeal and the cross-appeal are two sides of the same coin. I would reverse the trial court’s judgment in both cases.

As this Court reiterated in Foster v. St. John’s Baptist Church, Inc., 406 So.2d 389, 391 (Ala.1981): “Alabama follows the general rule expressed in Odoms v. Woodall, 246 Ala. 427, 429, 20 So.2d 849, 851 (1946): ‘The civil courts will not take jurisdiction of a controversy arising out of the removal of a minister if the right to the position is merely spiritual or ecclesiastical....’” And in Odoms v. Woodall, 246 Ala. 427, 429, 20 So.2d 849, 851 (1945), the Court also said that a man’s status as a pastor of a church is left to the appropriate church tribunal “if there is no violation of contractual right.”

But the claims asserted by St. Union Baptist Church, Inc., and its directors at issue in appeal no. 1141132 are not “merely spiritual or ecclesiastical.” Here, there is a civil contract and an alleged “violation of contractual right.” Under the apparent terms of that contract, one party to the contract, the corporation, paid the other party, James M. Howard, Sr., $16,600 in return for that other party’s agreement that he would no longer serve as the pastor of St. Union Baptist Church. The corporation now seeks to enforce that contract.

As the corporation argues, then, this case is about the enforcement of a civil contract. That fact, among others discussed below, distinguishes the corporation’s initial action from other cases in which courts have declined to involve themselves. The main opinion disagrees with this contention on the ground that “there is still the question whether [Howard] could rescind his resignation or be rehired as pastor if that was the desire of the majority of the church’s members.” 211 So.3d at 811. But it is this very “rescission” that the corporation contends constitutes the violation of the contract that, by this action, it seeks to enforce. As for the possibility of the majority of the church members voting to rehire Howard as pastor, Howard claims that, in essence, that already has happened. But the directors of the corporation deny the efficacy of any such vote.

At this point, in fact, I believe there are issues common to both the original action of the deacons of the church and the counterclaim filed by Howard that go beyond the efficacy and the remedy, if any, of the contract itself. Based on the entirety of the pleadings and the record evidence already presented, I conclude that there are contract and property rights at stake that require the courts to address the following questions: (a) whether Howard is in fact the current pastor of the church, (b) if so, whether Howard has been duly authorized to file this action on behalf of the church, and (c) whether the deacons are still the deacons of the church and, if they are, whether they, acting as such or as the directors of the corporation, have authority over the church property at issue.

This Court’s opinion in Odoms is instructive:

“So that the controversy seems to narrow to one of whether the officers of the church have the control of the use of the church house and can direct its preaching and teaching, especially when approved by a majority of its members, or whether Woodall claiming to be its pastor can control the use of the property with the approval of a minority not acting as a church congregation.
“If the complainants can sustain by due proof taken according to equity rules the matter set forth in the sworn bill and affidavits, relief would be due them in respect to the right to hold and use the property of the church.
“If no property rights are involved, there is no jurisdiction of the court to interfere. 45 Amer. Jur. 755, section 45; Caples v. Nazareth Church, 245 Ala. 656, 18 So.2d 388 [(1944)].... The civil courts will not interfere in its internal affairs, except to protect property rights....
“The complainants in the instant case tender a justiciable question when they allege that a tribunal of the church having authority has withdrawn from Woo-dall his rights as an elder and to preach in its house of worship, but that he refuses to abide by that action and holds properties of the church, and contends that he has the right to preach in it and use its properties contrary to the direction and authority of such church tribunal. Woodall’s denial of that claim, set out in his affidavit, shows the propriety of its trial in civil courts to determine the right to the control and use of the church property.”

246 Ala. at 429-30, 20 So.2d at 850-51.

In Gewin v. Mt. Pilgrim Baptist Church, 166 Ala. 345, 51 So. 947 (1909), this Court concluded that the question before it was not one of religious doctrine, but which of two factions stood for the “true Mt. Pilgrim Church” and, therefore, had title to the church property and the right of possession of that property:

“It must be conceded that the courts have no power to revise ordinary acts of church discipline or pass upon controverted rights of membership. Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234, 32 So. 575, 90 Am. St. Rep. 33 [ (1902) ]. But such considerations are attended to when they form the basis upon which civil rights and rights of property depend. While the courts cannot decide who ought to be members, they may inquire whether any disputed act of the church affecting property rights was the act of the church, or of persons having no authority. Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131, 21 L.Ed. 69 [ (1872) ].”

166 Ala. at 349, 51 So. at 948.

In Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So.2d 746 (Ala.1977), this Court said:

“A more accurate reflection of present Alabama law on this subject is found in In re Galilee Baptist Church, 279 Ala. 393, 186 So.2d 102 (1966); also involving a dispute between two opposing factions, and the alleged expulsion of the pastor at a congregational meeting. This court demonstrated it is proper for the courts to inquire whether a congregational meeting, at which church business is to be transacted, was preceded by adequate notice to the full membership, and whether, once called, the meeting was conducted in an orderly manner and the expulsion was the act of the authority within the church having the power to order it.
“Once the court is presented with sufficient evidence regarding the regularity of the meeting, it will then generally refuse to inquire further as to the fruits of the meeting. As was stated in Galilee:
“ ‘Spiritualities are beyond the reach of temporal courts, and a pastor may be deposed by a majority of the members at a congregational meeting at any time, so far as the civil courts are concerned, subject only to inquiry by the courts as to whether the church, or its appointed tribunal has proceeded according to the law of the church.’ ”

340 So.2d at 748. See also Yates v. El Bethel Primitive Baptist Church, 847 So.2d 331, 336 (Ala.2002) (noting that, “[i]n Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 62, 61 So.2d 101, 104 (1952), we cited several of our cases in which, ‘the civil courts of this state have taken jurisdiction of disputes between factions of Baptist churches or of churches similarly governed on the ground that property or civil rights were involved’ ” and that “[tjhis case began as one involving the finances, financial assets, and business of the Church, not any of its purely ecclesiastical or spiritual features, and those financial and business aspects of the Church have remained center stage throughout”).

Based on the entirety of the pleadings and the evidence before us, it appears to me that, in the present case, civil and property rights are at stake that require the courts to decide a number of issues, including, but not necessarily limited to, the following: (1) whether the action taken to remove the deacons over two years ago was taken in accordance with the law of the church, (2) whether the congregation or Howard would be estopped or otherwise prevented from relying on that action as a result of the passage of time and/or subsequent acts or omissions of the parties, and (3) whether there have in fact been more recent, efficacious votes by the congregation to remove the deacons and/or to rehire Howard following his resignation.

That said, in the event that it is determined that Howard does not in fact have the capacity (and I submit that the issue would be one of capacity, not standing) to represent the interests of the church in this litigation, then the counterclaims may be due to be dismissed for lack of such capacity and/or the absence of necessary and indispensable parties. At this juncture, however, I believe the tidal court’s disposition of the parties’ claims was not proper; therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court in the appeal as well as the cross-appeal.

      . St. Union Baptist Church is at times identified in the record and by the parties as St. Union Missionary Baptist Church.

      . The church’s board of deacons has at least sometimes consisted of more than five deacons, and it is not always clear if the entity making administrative decisions is the entire board of deacons or just those also serving as directors of the corporation. For clarity, we will refer to the board of deacons as “the board of deacohs" or simply “the deacons” and will refer to the corporation only when it is clear that the deacons serving as directors of the corporation were acting in their corporate capacity.

      . It is not clear from the face of the charge who prepared it.

      . Three of the five deacons serving as directors of the corporation at the time this litigation began were also original incorpo-rators. We further note that one of those three deacons subsequently stated in a deposition that the body of the church did in fact give the deacons authority to form the corporation.

      . No party challenged the trial court's authority to enter the March 23 order, and there is some indication that the order merely reflects an agreement reached by the parties.

      . Howard asserts that the police and local government leaders are biased against him and in favor of the deacons.

      . The trial court also stated that it was dismissing the claims asserted by Howard because he lacked standing. On appeal, the parties have not addressed the issue of Howard’s standing; however, we think it evident that Howard, a member of the church and the presumed pastor, has standing to pursue his claims. See, e.g., Walters v. Stewart, 838 So.2d 1047, 1051 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) ("Although [the pastor] challenges the standing of [the appellees] based on what, he says, is their current nonattendance at church services, our supreme court has held that even former church members have standing to sue when the issues are their alleged wrongful expulsion and the claimed misappropriation of church funds by the minister. See Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So.2d 746 (Ala. 1976).”).

      , It appears that the corporation has cited the contract as a defense to Howard's counterclaim and third-party complaint. In its responses to the counterclaim and third-party complaint, the corporation argues that the $16,600 must be returned if the trial court holds that the contract is invalid. However, it does not appear that a claim for the funds constitutes part of the action over which this Court holds that the trial court had no jurisdiction.

      . As the Court likewise stated in Odoms: ''[I]f [a pastor] has a civil or property right in his position, the civil courts will protect that right.” 246 Ala. at 429, 20 So.2d at 851. The converse—civil court protection of a contract right to exclude someone as pastor—would also be true.

      . Applicable principles of law governing available remedies for breach of contract may or may not allow for the injunctive relief or specific performance sought by the corporation. That issue goes to the legal merits of the case, not what this Court has referred to as "jurisdiction” to decide those merits. See generally, e.g., Odoms, 246 Ala. at 429, 20 So.2d at 851 (referring to the issue as whether the courts should "take jurisdiction” over a dispute involving church affairs).


author: DONALDSON, Judge.

text:
    ALABAMA BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS v. Chad BOSTICK.
    2130919.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    July 10, 2015.

      Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Andy S. Poole, asst. atty. gen., for appellant.
    Frank M. Wilson, Montgomery, for ap-pellee.
   DONALDSON, Judge.

The Alabama Board of Examiners of Landscape Architects (“the Board”) appeals the judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court (“the trial court”) reversing an administrative order and sanctions imposed by the Board on its licensee, Chad Bostick. Judicial review of administrative-agency decisions is limited, and the scope of the review is narrow. The judiciary is not authorized to substitute its judgment for the administrative agency, to reweigh evidence that the agency relied upon in making its decision, or to resolve disputed issues of fact. See, e.g., Colonial Mgmt. Grp., L.P. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 853 So.2d 972, 977-75 (Ala.Civ.App.2002); Alabama Bd. of Nursing v. Williams, 941 So.2d 990, 999 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). Because the trial court exceeded the permissible scope of review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

The Board was created by the legislature to regulate the practice of landscape architecture in Alabama, pursuant to § 34-17-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (“the Act”). The Act specifies certain grounds upon which the Board is authorized to bring a disciplinary action against a licensee of the Board and authorizes the Board to impose specified sanctions for violations of the Act. Specifically, § 34-17-5, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) Each of the following facts shall constitute a ground for disciplinary action:
“(5) That, in the practice of landscape architecture, the holder of a cer-tifícate has been guilty of fraud or deceit; [or]
“(6) That, in the practice of landscape architecture, the holder of a certificate has been guilty of negligence or -willful misconduct;
“(b) For violations of the preceding subsection, or for violations of the provisions of this chapter, or for violations of board rules and regulations, the board shall have the following disciplinary powers:
“(1) To reprimand a board licensee;
“(2) To levy an administrative fine against a licensee of the board not to exceed $250 per violation;
“(3) To refuse to issue a certificate to an applicant of the board;
“(4) To suspend a licensee’s certificate for a definite period of time; or
“(5) To revoke the certificate of a licensee. The board shall by rule and regulation adopt a disciplinary code.”

The Board licensed Bostick as a landscape architect in 2009. At that time, Bostick was employed by GRC Design Group, Inc. (“GRC”), a landscaping business owned and operated by Greg R. Curl. A dispute between Bostick and GRC arose, and Bos-tick resigned from his employment with GRC on January 15, 2010. Bostick then started his own landscaping firm. In February 2010, Curl filed a written complaint with the Board alleging that Bostick had, while employed with GRC, “misrepresented himself to clients as part owner in [GRC] and as a result had clients write checks payable to him which he cashed for his own personal use.” Curl claimed that Bostick “admitted to stealing these design fees and eventually to several more acts of fraud.” Bostick responded to the complaint by a letter in which he denied that he had violated the Board’s Code of Conduct and stated that “[t]he clients in question paid me directly for the intellectual property that I provided for them, and were completely satisfied with the work that they received. Them payment was not directed by me, nor was it based upon any misrepresentation or fraudulent act whatsoever.”

On December 14, 2011, the Board brought an administrative complaint against Bostick, alleging three counts as a basis for disciplinary action: that Bostick’s “actions indicate fraud or deceit by [Bos-tick] and are therefore a violation of [§] 34-17-5(a)(5),” that his “actions indicate negligence or willful misconduct and are therefore a violation of [§] 34-17-5(a)(6),” and that his “actions indicate conduct involving fraud or wanton disregard of the rights of others and are therefore a violation of the Board ... Code of Conduct Section 5(c).” On February 15, 2013, a hearing was held before a hearing officer appointed by the Board. The hearing officer received testimony from Curl, Bostick, and GRC employee Brad Johnson. Bos-tick was represented by counsel. The hearing officer also accepted two affidavits from clients of GRC who had written checks to Bostick for work he had performed while he was employed by GRC. After the hearing was concluded, the hearing officer filed a recommended order with the Board, which contained the following findings of fact:

“Curl is the sole owner of GRC. He has been in business for eighteen years after receiving his degree in landscape contracting from Mississippi State. Curl met and hired Bostick in the late 1990’s.... Bostick was a subcontract employee for GRC for about six months, but then ... Curl allowed Bostick to become a full-time employee. Bostick’s job consisted of design and sales and eventually a Landscape Architect position when he was licensed on September 23, 2009.
“GRC paid Bostick a salary plus quarterly bonuses if GRC had a good quarter, based on Bostick’s work and the company as a whole. Curl testified that he did not have an agreement with Bos-tick that he could do outside design work....
“In 2009, ... Curl examined client files. Curl mentioned to Johnson that the Berry clients had not paid for their installation work, and Johnson said he saw one of the Berrys give Bostick a check. Johnson testified that Bostick did the design work on the project and would come on site occasionally. Johnson testified that one day in December 2009 when Bostick was on the site, one of the Berrys said, ‘Wait, I have a check to give you,’ and gave Bostick a check.
“Curl called the Berrys, who said they gave Bostick a $300.00 cheek and provided Curl with a copy of the check made out to and deposited by Bostick. Board Exhibit C.
“Curl then checked the file of clients named Borden. The file contained a project proposal letter to the Bordens from Bostick on GRC letterhead dated June 10, 2009, in which Bostick refers to himself as a partner. Board Exhibit J. Curl testified that Bostick was not authorized to represent himself as a partner and does not remember having any discussion with Bostick about Bostick becoming a partner or representing himself to clients as a partner. Bostick testified that he asked Curl if Bostick could use the term partner so that his proposals would have more credentials and Curl said yes.
“Curl then called the Bordens who said they paid Bostick several times, and they provided copies of three checks made out to and deposited by Bostick: one dated October 25, 2009, for $1094.30, another dated August 20, 2009, for $1305.80, and another dated December 7, 2009, for $802.60. Board Exhibits E, G, and I. All of the checks were for invoices submitted by Bostick to the Bordens on GRC letterhead. Board Exhibits D, F, and H. The design for the Bordens has Bostick’s initials and GRC in the title block. Board Exhibit P.
“Curl confronted Bostick about the checks, and Bostick finally admitted to taking the checks and resigned from GRC. Bostick Exhibit 2. On the advice of Curl’s CPA, Curl filed a 1099 for the checks paid directly to Bostick so that Curl would not have to pay payroll taxes on those amounts. Bostick Exhibit 1. Bostick testified that he reported the checks paid to him from the Bordens and the Berrys to the IRS using the 1099 form.
“Bostick does not deny receiving the checks from clients, and testified he has no idea why they made the checks out to him directly. He testified he felt he was right to deposit the checks because he would have been paid a performance bonus at the end of the quarter. His position is that the payments from the clients would have been part of his bonus for that quarter. He was not stealing, in his belief, because of the loose agreement he had with Curl. But in previous years he had never taken payment from clients as part of his bonus. Bostick did not receive a bonus from GRC for the last quarter of 2009, and Curl testified that the money paid to Bostick from the clients could have become money in his performance bonus.
“Also, one invoice Bostick submitted to the Bordens included $360.00 for engineering work. Board Exhibit H. Bos-tick did not perform any engineering work but cashed the check for the invoice that included engineering work and did not pay that money back to GRC.”

The recommended order concluded:

“In the present case, the Board presented substantial evidence warranting disciplinary action against Bostick. The Board proved, and Bostick admitted in writing and at the hearing, that he deposited checks from clients totaling $2196.90 and did not submit the money to GRC, while he was working as a Landscape Architect for GRC. The total amount does not include a payment he received before he was a licensed Landscape Architect.
“No grounds for mitigation exist in this case.
“Accordingly, the undersigned finds the totality of the evidence warrants a suspension of Bostick’s license for no less than six months. Therefore, the undersigned recommends [that the] Board ... SUSPEND Bostick’s license for no less than six months.”

The Board adopted the majority of the hearing officer’s recommended order in a separate written order on April 24, 2013, but it imposed a suspension of Bostick’s license for one year and a $250 fine. The Board summarized its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:

“FINDINGS OF FACT
“The Board finds that Chad Bostick received checks from clients of GRC Design Group made payable to Bostick. The payments received by Bostick from clients of GRC Design Group were not submitted by him to GRC Design Group.
“The Board finds that Bostick was not authorized to receive payment directly from clients of GRC for his services made payable to Bostick.
“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“The Board finds that Bostick’s actions are in violation of Alabama Code Section 34—17—5(a)(5) because they show fraud or deceit.
“The Board finds that Bostick’s actions are in violation of Alabama Code Section 34-17-5(a)(6) because they show negligence or willful misconduct.
“The Board finds that Bostick’s actions are in violation of the Board of Examiners of Landscape Architects Code of Conduct Section 5(c) because they show conduct involving fraud or wanton disregard of the rights of others.”

Bostick appealed the Board’s order to the trial court pursuant to § 41-22-20, Ala. Code 1975.

The trial court held a hearing on Bos-tick’s appeal on May 12, 2014, and entered the judgment on May 22, 2014, reversing the Board’s administrative order and sanctions against Bostick. The trial court found:

“The section of the [Board’s] Order labeled: ‘Findings of Fact’ contains no findings of fact on any significant disputed issues. It simply recited undisputed testimony and recited, but did not resolve, conflicting testimony on several relatively minor points.
The only ‘finding* made to support the charge of fraud in the [hearing officer’s] Recommended Order is a legal conclusion followed by a recitation of the undisputed facts regarding the deposit of .., three checks. The following is found in the ‘Conclusion of Law’ section:
“ ‘In the present case, the Board presented substantial evidence warranting disciplinary action against Bostick. The Board proved, and Bostick admitted in writing and at the hearing, that he deposited checks from clients totaling $2196.90 and did not submit the money to GRC, while he was working as a Landscape Architect for GRC.’
“Neither the [hearing officer’s] Recommended Order nor the Board’s Order adopting it cited any evidence or made any specific finding that these deposits were made with fraudulent intent. The Board’s Order appears to equate the making of the deposit with fraud.
“Neither order addresses in any significant manner, the undisputed hearing testimony of Mr. Bostick and Mr. Curl that for the fourth quarter of 2009, GRC owed commissions to Mr. Bostick that exceeded the total of these three checks; and that under Mr. Bostick’s interpretation of his ‘very loose’ oral employment agreement with GRC, Mr. Bostick was entitled to deposit these checks to his bank account in payment of those commissions ....
“The Board’s April 24th Order is even less clear about the basis for the Board’s conclusion that Mr. Bostick acted with fraudulent intent or was guilty of fraud, deceit, or willful misconduct, etc., in depositing these three checks. The Board’s Order states only in conclusory form that ‘the charges against Mr. Bos-tick have been substantially proved,’ ... and that Mr. Bostick’s actions ‘showed’ fraud or deceit, negligence or willful misconduct, and fraud or wanton disregard of the rights of others....
“Thus, the Board’s finding that Mr. Bostick was guilty of intentional fraud was based solely upon Mr. Bostick’s admitted act of depositing into his bank account three checks made payable to him by GRC’s clients and not immediately remitting their proceeds to his employer, GRC. No other actions taken by Mr. Bostick were cited or found by the Board to support its finding of fraud or its suspension of Mr. Bostick’s landscape architect’s license.”

(Footnotes omitted.) Based on those findings, the trial court ruled

“that the Board’s April 24, 2013, Order was (a) ‘affected by error of law,’ (b) ‘clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record,’ and (c) ‘unreasonable’ in view of the evidence presented; and that the substantial rights of the petitioner, Mr. Bostick, were prejudiced by these errors.
“The only point of disagreement between Mr. Bostick and Mr. Curl was whether under their very loose, oral employment agreement, Mr. Bostick was entitled to deposit those three checks several weeks prior to the end of the fourth quarter of 2009 or was required to wait until the end of the quarter to be paid those sums and more as his fourth quarter commission.
“Mr. Bostick thought that he was entitled to deposit these checks in partial payment of the sums owed to him; Mr. Curl believed he was not. That difference of opinion in the interpretation of Mr. Bostick’s very loose oral employment agreement with Mr. Curl is what the Board’s charge of fraud rests upon.
“While contracting parties’ differing interpretations of their agreement may be the basis for a contract claim between the parties, those differing opinions not only do not constitute fraud, but are ‘not evidence of fraud,’ and therefore cannot ... support the fraud charge herein...,
“The Board exceeded the authority granted it by statute by purporting to sanction Mr. Bostick in the total absence of evidence to support the charges against him. There was no evidence to support a finding of fraud. The reliable probative, and substantial evidence from the record as a whole shows—at the very least—that Mr. Bostick had a good faith claim for the funds he deposited. Any sanction against Mr. Bostick based on the evidence presented would be unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
“The Board is directed to enter an order finding Mr. Bostick not guilty of fraud or any other willful misconduct; to restore Mr. Bostick’s license to practice landscape architecture; and to dismiss the Complaint and all charges against Mr. Bostick.”

The Board filed a postjudgment motion seeking relief from the trial court’s judgment on June 20, 2014, which the trial court denied on July 1, 2014, and the Board filed a timely notice of appeal on August 8, 2014. The Board raises two issues on appeal: whether the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standards for review of an administrative decision, and whether the trial court erred in relying on inapplicable legal authority.

“This court reviews a trial court’s judgment regarding the decision of an administrative agency ‘without any presumption of its correctness, since [the trial] court was in no better position to review the [agency’s decision] than’ this court. State Health Planning & Res. Dev. Admin. v. Rivendell of Alabama, Inc., 469 So.2d 613, 614 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). Under the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act (‘AAPA’), § 41-22-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, which governs judicial review of agency decisions,
“ ‘[e]xcept where judicial review is by trial de novo, the agency order shall be taken as prima facie just and reasonable and the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, except where otherwise authorized by statute. The court may affirm the agency action or remand the case to the agency for taking additional testimony and evidence or for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision or grant other appropriate relief from the agency action, equitable or legal, including declaratory relief, if the court finds that the agency action is due to be set aside or modified under standards set forth in appeal or review statutes applicable to that agency or if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the agency action is any one or more of the following:
“ ‘(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
“ ‘(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
“‘(3) In violation of any pertinent agency rule;
“‘(4) Made upon unlawful procedure;
“ ‘(5) Affected by other error of law;
‘“(6) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
‘“(7) Unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.’
“§ 41-22-20(k), Ala.Code 1975.... In reviewing the decision of a state administrative agency, ‘[t]he special competence of the agency lends great weight to its decision, and that decision must be affirmed, unless it is arbitrary and capricious or not made in compliance with applicable law.’ Alabama Renal Stone Inst., Inc. v. Alabama Statewide Health Coordinating Council, 628 So.2d 821, 823 (Ala.Civ.App.1993).... Neither this court nor the trial court may substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. Alabama Renal Stone Inst., Inc. v. Alabama Statewide Health Coordinating Council, 628 So.2d 821, 823 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). ‘This holds true even in cases where the testimony is generalized, the evidence is meager, and reasonable minds might differ as to the correct result.’ Health Care Auth. of Huntsville v. State Health Planning Agency, 549 So.2d 973, 975 (Ala.Civ.App.1989).”

Colonial Mgmt. Grp., 853 So.2d at 974-75 (emphasis omitted).

The Board first argues that the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standards for review of an administrative decision. Specifically, the Board argues that

“the Board’s decision was supported by the evidence; the sanctions imposed were rational and reasonable and within the authority legislatively granted the Board. On his appeal before the [trial court], Bostick failed to show any entitlement to relief under the provisions of Alabama Code Section 41-22-20(k). See Ferlisi v. Alabama Medicaid Agency, 481 So.2d 400, 402 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). The Board’s decision appropriately applied its legislative authority and was rational and justified. See Select Specialty Hospital, Inc. v. Alabama State Health Planning and Development Agency, 112 So.3d 475, 485 (Ala.Civ.App.2012). Accordingly, the [trial court] should have affirmed the Board’s decision.”

The trial court’s judgment noted that “Mr. Bostick thought that he was entitled to deposit these checks in partial payment of the sums owed to him; Mr. Curl believed he was not.” Thus, the trial court reasoned, the Board’s finding of fraud was based on the determination of which party was credible. Whether Bostick had a “good faith” belief that he was entitled to deposit the checks was a disputed fact largely dependent upon findings of credibility. That factual issue was resolved against Bostick by the Board following an administrative hearing based on testimony from the witnesses and documents submitted.

“[O]ur review, just like that of the circuit court, is limited to ascertaining whether the Board’s order is supported by ‘substantial evidence,’ i.e., ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989); accord, Ex parte Williamson, 907 So.2d 407, 414-15 (Ala.2004) (applying West definition in administrative setting). In no event is a reviewing court ‘authorized to reweigh the evidence or to substitute its decisions as to the weight and credibility of the evidence for those of the agency.’ Ex parte Williamson, 907 So.2d at 416-17.”

Alabama Bd. of Nursing v. Williams, 941 So.2d at 999. Accordingly, the factual finding that Bostick acted in “good faith” could not be made by the trial court in the judicial-review process.

Bostick testified before the hearing officer that he never instructed a client to pay him directly, and when asked why GRC’s clients would have made checks out to him personally, he claimed: “I have no earthly idea.” However, it is undisputed that, when Bostick received those checks from clients of GRC made payable to him, he deposited those checks in his personal bank account with the intent to retain those funds as payment for services provided to those clients in connection with Bostick’s employment with GRC and that he did not inform GRC that he had done so. Curl testified that Bostick was not authorized to receive payment directly to him or in his name for work done for GRC. Bostick testified that he had never previously been paid a “bonus” by receiving payment directly from a client of GRC. Further, the hearing officer heard testimony from Curl, which, if believed, would indicate that, when he was confronted by Curl, Bostick denied receiving those checks or billing those clients and continued in his denial until he was confronted with copies of the checks he had received and deposited into his personal bank account.

Considering the deference due the Board’s findings of fact, see § 41—22—20(k), there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings as well as the Board’s conclusion that Bostick engaged in acts of deceit and willful misconduct while in the practice of landscape architecture—specifically, that he accepted and kept for himself payments from clients that should have been delivered to GRC and that he denied having done so once his actions were discovered. The Act does not define the terms fraud, deceit, negligence, or willful misconduct as they are used in § 34-17-5(a)(5) and (a)(6), and the parties do not dispute the meaning of those terms as an issue in this case. We note that “[w]ords used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says.” IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992). Although Bostick argues that his actions merely amounted to “ ‘poor judgment’ or ‘questionable ethics,’ ” rather than behavior sanetionable pursuant to § 34-17-5(a)(5) and (a)(6), this court has stated that “ ‘an agency’s interpretation of its own rule or regulation must stand if it is reasonable, even though it may not appear as reasonable as some other interpretation.’ Sylacauga Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Alabama State Health Planning Agency, 662 So.2d 265, 268 (Ala.Civ.App.1994).” Colonial Mgmt. Grp., 853 So.2d at 975. Although the trial court found no evidence of fraud and reversed the Board’s order on the ground that the Board had committed an error of law, see § 41-22-20(k)(5), our review of the trial court’s judgment is without any presumption of its correctness. Regardless of whether the Board received evidence as to all the elements of fraud, the record contains substantial evidence, which if believed by the Board, would support the Board’s findings and conclusion that Bostick engaged in acts of deceit and willful misconduct while in the practice of landscape architecture. We accordingly pretermit discussion of whether the trial court relied on inapplicable legal authority in reaching its judgment. See Dennis v. Holmes Oil Co., 757 So.2d 479, 482 (Ala.Civ.App.2000).

Applying the deferential standard of judicial review of an administrative-agency decision, we hold that there were no grounds to set aside the Board’s administrative order and sanctions imposed against its licensee, Bostick. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment, and we remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, THOMAS, and MOORE, JJ., concur.

      . The motion asked the trial court to "reconsider” the judgment. We will treat the motion as having been filed pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P. See Evans v. Waddell, 689 So.2d 23, 26-27 (Ala.1997) ("While the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure do not speak of a 'motion to reconsider,’ this Court has repeatedly construed motions so styled, when they have been filed within 30 days after the entry of a final judgment, to be Rule 59(e) motions.”).