text:
    EX PARTE Darrell WIMBERLY
    CR-15-0783
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/30/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Vincent Edward DAVIS v. STATE
    CR-15-0788
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/20/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Marlon A. MANSON
    CR-15-0792
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/27/2016
   Mand. pet. stricken.


text:
    EX PARTE SEALED CASE
    CR-15-0795
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    04/27/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Kenneth Lee TODD
    CR-15-0796
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/21/2016
   Habeas corpus pet. dismissed.


text:
    Brandon Marquis PUGH v. STATE
    CR-15-0800
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/21/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    Christina Marie THERIOT v. STATE
    CR-15-0801
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/27/2016
   Dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Corry AVERETT
    CR-15-0810
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/21/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Travis Donell WESLEY
    CR-15-0813
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/21/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Marc HOLLIDAY
    CR-15-0825
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/21/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Blake COFIELD
    CR-15-0831
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/21/2016
   Mand. pet. stricken.


text:
    EX PARTE Harold Scott BAGWELL
    CR-15-0855
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/21/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Johnny Ray COX
    CR-15-0864
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    05/25/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Vincent BURCH
    CR-15-0865
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Danny Ray TURNER
    CR-15-0872
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/21/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Milton HAMBRIGHT
    CR-15-0881
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Francisco CHACON
    CR-15-0883
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/20/2016
   Habeas corpus pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Stanley Lee WILLIAMS
    CR-15-0886
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    05/25/2016
   Transferred to Jefferson Cir. Ct.


text:
    EX PARTE Matthew Russell STAFFORD
    CR-15-0888
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/30/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Thomas Edward POWELL
    CR-15-0890
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    05/25/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Wesley S. COUEY
    CR-15-0902
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    05/25/2016
   Transferred to Calhoun Cir. Ct.


text:
    EX PARTE SEALED CASE
    CR-15-0906
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    05/10/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Joseph INGRAM
    CR-15-0909
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Transferred to St. Clair Cir. Ct.


text:
    EX PARTE Isaac R. BANKHEAD
    CR-15-0913
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Transferred to Jefferson Cir. Ct.


text:
    EX PARTE Blake COFIELD
    CR-15-0916
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Transferred to Etowah Cir. Ct.


text:
    EX PARTE Denorrious GARNER
    CR-15-0920
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Transferred to Shelby Cir. Ct.


text:
    EX PARTE Aaron Cody SMITH
    CR-15-0922
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/21/2016
   Habeas corpus pet. denied,


text:
    EX PARTE Randy Terrell PRESSLEY
    CR-15-0930
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Transferred to Elmore Cir. Ct.


text:
    EX PARTE Fernandez ROGERS
    CR-15-0939
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Richard K. FERRELL
    CR-15-0943
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Jessie James SCOTT
    CR-15-0944
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE James Edward BAGLEY
    CR-15-0947
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Transferred to Calhoun Cir. Ct.


text:
    EX PARTE Tommy Ray GANUS
    CR-15-0949
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Transferred to Jefferson Cir. Ct.


text:
    EX PARTE Jeffery HORTON
    CR-15-0951
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Transferred to Winston Cir. Ct.


text:
    Eddie Mitchell BROWN v. STATE
    CR-15-0957
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/17/2016
   Reh. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Theophylis PRIDE
    CR-15-0971
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/08/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE James R. DOWNES
    CR-45-0994
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/30/2016
   Mand. pet. dismissed.


text:
    EX PARTE Vincent Edward DAVIS
    CR-15-1002
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/30/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Robert D. KITCHEN, Jr.
    CR-15-1008
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/30/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Bobby Gene MILES
    CR-15-1029
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/30/2016
   Mand. pet. denied.


text:
    EX PARTE Carlos HERNANDEZ
    CR-15-1035
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    06/30/2016
   Transferred to Jefferson Cir. Ct.


author: WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

text:
    Santiago ALONSO v. STATE of Alabama
    CR-13-1546.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    February 12, 2016.
    Rehearing Denied May 27, 2016.
    Certiorari Denied February 10, 2017
    Alabama Supreme Court 1150954.

      Susan Graham James, Montgomery, for appellant.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Laura I. Cuthbert, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

Santiago Alonso appeals his convictions for first-degree human trafficking, see § 13A-6-152(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975; for selling, furnishing, or giving a controlled substance to a minor, see § 13A-12-215, Ala. Code 1975; and for first-degree unlawful possession of marijuana, see § 13A-12-213(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. On June 18, 2014, the circuit court sentenced Alonso to 40 years in prison for his conviction for human trafficking, 10 years in prison for his conviction for furnishing a controlled substance to a minor, and 12 months of hard labor in the Houston County jail for his conviction for possession of marijuana. Alonso’s sentences for the drug convictions were ordered to run concurrently with each other and consecutively with his sentence for the human-trafficking conviction. On July 16, 2014, Alonso filed a pleading styled as a motion to set aside the judgment, motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and motion for a new trial. On July 17, 2014, Alonso filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, as well as an amended motion for a new trial. Following a hearing, the circuit court denied Al-onso’s motions.

In June 2013, Alonso saw K.R., who was then 17 years old and a runaway, while she was walking down a road in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, and he stopped his vehicle to talk to her. Alonso asked K.R. if she liked to travel. K.R. responded that she did and got into the vehicle with Alonso. Al-onso then drove to a hotel where K.R. met Asia and Lady, who were also traveling with Alonso. Alonso, K.R., Asia, and Lady traveled to Memphis, Tennessee, where they stayed for several weeks.

While in Memphis, Alonso forced K.R. to prostitute herself for money and threatened her with a hammer he kept under the seat of his vehicle. On one- occasion, Alon-so struck K.R.' in the stomach after she refused to call him “[Djaddy” and refused to have unprotected sex with him. (R. 252.) After several weeks, Alonso, K.R., and Lady left Memphis and traveled to the Quality Inn hotel in Dothan, Alabama, where they stayed for approximately nine days.

Once they • arrived in Dothan, Alonso continued to threaten K.R. and to force her to have sexual intercourse with men for money, giving all the proceeds to Alon-so. Alonso solicited customers for K.R. and Lady by posting their photographs on Backpage.com, a Web site for advertising items and services for sale. When the women were not working, Alonso would watch them at all times and would not allow them to leave the hotel premises. Once, K.R. asked to leave the hotel to find more business. Alonso allowed KR. to leave but threatened to kill her if she did not return. Alonso provided K.R. with drugs, and they smoked marijuana together while they were in Dothan.

On the evening of August 7, 2013, K.R. left the Quality Inn because she feared for her life.. She did not have a cellular telephone or any money with her at the time. K.R. walked to the Guesthouse Inn on Ross Clark Circle, where she met Tabitha Williams and told Williams everything that had happened. The following morning, Williams contacted the police.

On August. 8, 2013, K,R. spoke with individuals at the Child Advocacy Center and the Dothan Police Department and told them that Alonso had forced her to have sex with men for money, had threatened her with a hammer he kept in his vehicle, and had forced her to use drugs. K.R. provided them with Alonso’s nickname, a detailed description of Alonso, and his vehicle, and his room numbers at the Quality Inn, Afterward, K,R. was taken to the hospital for an examination, where blood tests revealed the presence •• of cocaine and marijuana in her system. Based on the information obtained from K.R., law-enforcement officers conducted surveillance at the Quality Inn and applied, for search warrants for Alonso’s hotel rooms and his vehicle. After receiving confirmation that the search warrants had been obtained, Investigator Davis and Sgt, Martin observed Alonso walking down the stairs outside his hotel room. When the officers approached him, they saw Alonso drop something from his left hand. The item was later recovered and was determined to be marijuana. A search of Alon-so’s person led to the discovery and subsequent seizure .of . a cellular telephone and $2,000, which Alonso had concealed in his underwear.

During the execution of the search warrant, law-enforcement officers discovered additional marijuana and a second cellular telephone in the hotel room Alonso shared with Lady. Officers 'also found used condoms and lubricating gels in a second room that was used for “working.” Additionally, a hammer matching KR.’s description was found inside of Alonso’s vehicle. After the search concluded, Alonso was taken to the Dothan Police Department-, where he signed a waiver-of-rights form and gave a statement. ■

On appeal, Alonso argues: 1) that Alabama’s statute for first-degree human trafficking, § 13A-6-152, Ala.Code 1975, is unconstitutionally vague; 2) that the circuit court erred in admitting the electronic data seized from his cellular telephone; 3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for human trafficking; 4) that the'State’s evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for furnishing a controlled substance to a minor; and 5) that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel.

I.

Alonso first argues that Alabama’s statute for first-degree human trafficking, § 13A-6-152, Ala.Code 1975, is-unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Specifically, he contends that Alabama’s human-trafficking statute is unconstitutionally yague as applied to him because it fails to provide any material guidance to law-enforcement officers or prosecutors regarding their charging decisions. He argues that, because § 13A-6-152, does not provide any guiding principles or factors to be considered when determining whether an individual should be charged with human trafficking in lieu of a lesser criminal offense, a defendant is vulnerable to the “personal predilections” of,the charging officers and that defendants are exposed to radically different punishment ranges. (Alonso’s brief, p. 42 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)).

Alonso’s argument, however, was not preserved for appellate review. It is well settled that:

“‘Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial.’ Newsome v. State, 570 So.2d 703, 717 (Ala.Crim.App.1989). ‘An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to appellate review because it has not been properly preserved and presented.’ Pate v. State, 601 So.2d 210, 213 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). ‘“[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be presented to the trial court by a timely and specific motion setting out the specific grounds in support thereof.” ’ McKinney v. State, 654 So.2d 95, 99 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (citation omitted). ‘The statement of specific grounds of objection waives all grounds not specified, and the trial court will not be put in error on grounds not assigned at trial.’ Ex parte Frith, 526 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1987). ‘The purpose of requiring a specific objection to preserve an issue for appellate review is 'to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged error, giving an opportunity to correct it before the case is submitted to the jury.’ Ex parte Works, 640 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Ala.1994).”

Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So.2d 793, 794-95 (Ala.2003). See also Shouldis v. State, 953 So.2d 1275, 1284 (Ala.Crim.App.2006); Morgan v. State, 589 So.2d 1315, 1320 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (“A timely objection is a condition precedent to assigning the admission of an answer as grounds for error on appeal.” (citing C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 426.01(3) (3d ed.1977))).

. Alonso first asserted this claim in his motion for a new trial; however, he did not raise the specific arguments he now raises on appeal. Rather, in his motion for a new trial, Alonso cited general law regarding constitutional challenges to statutes on grounds of vagueness and over-breadth. Alonso then asserted only the following argument regarding why he believed § 13A-6-152 is unconstitutional:

“Application of the Alabama human trafficking statute is so broad in scope that it has the potential to infringe upon the First Amendment rights of others. For instance, the statute could criminalize acts like dating, flirting, driving a minor .the prom, other similar conduct by legally married minors, or such parental acts as allowing a child to play football.”

(C. 169.) At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Alonso reasserted his argument that § 13A-6-152 was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it criminalized some constitutionally protected activities. He, however, never argued that § 13A-6-152 was unconstitutionally vague because it fails to pr'ovide any material guidance to law-enforcement officers or prosecutors regarding their charging decisions. Trawick v. State, 431 So.2d 574, 578-79 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (“The grounds urged on a motion for a new trial must ordinarily be preserved at trial by timely and specific objections.” (citing Smith v. State, 393 So.2d 529 (Ala.Crim.App.1981))); see also Mayo v. City of Rainbow City, 642 So.2d 524, 526 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (recognizing that even constitutional issues must be preserved for appellate review). Alonso’s arguments were not first raised in the circuit court; accordingly, they are not preserved for this Court’s review. Hansen v. State, 598 So.2d 1, 2 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (“Even constitutional issues must first be correctly raised in the trial court before they will be considered on appeal.”). Therefore, this issue does hot entitle Alon-so to any relief.

Moreover, even if this issue were properly before this Court, it is without merit. This Court has explained:

“ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ,.. originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963).
“ ‘ “Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 811, 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954). A vague statute does not give adequate ‘notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties,’ Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S.Ct. 329, 330, 96 L.Ed. 367, 371 (1952), is not ‘sufficiently focused to forewarn of both its reach and coverage,’ United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. at 33, 83 S.Ct. at 598, 9 L.Ed.2d at 566, and ‘may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning,’ Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1972).
“‘“As the United States Supreme Court observed in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948):
“““There must be ascertainable standards of guilt. Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment. The vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard to persons within the scope of the act, or in regard to the applicable tests to ascertain guilt.’
“‘“333 U.S. at 515-16, 68 S.Ct. at 670, 92 [L.Ed. at] 849-50 [citations omitted].”
“‘McCrary v. State, 429 So.2d 1121, 1123-24 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 913, 104 S.Ct. 273, 78 L.Ed.2d 254 (1983).’
“McCall v. State, 565 So.2d 1163, 1165 (Ala.Crim.App.1990).
“““As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute defíne the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 [357], 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (citations omitted). A statute challenged for vagueness must therefore be scrutinized to determine whether it provides both fair notice to the public that certain conduct is proscribed and minimal guidelines to aid officials in the enforcement of that proscription. See Kolender, supra; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).”’
“Timmons v. City of Montgomery, 641 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), quoting McCorkle v. State, 446 So.2d 684, 685 (Ala.Crim.App.1983).
“The judicial power to declare a statute void for vagueness ‘should be exercised only when a statute is so incomplete, so irreconcilably conflicting, or so vague or indefinite, that it cannot be executed, and the court is unable, by. the application of known and accepted rules of construction, to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended.’ Jansen v. State ex rel. Downing, 273 Ala. 166, 170, 137 So.2d 47, 50 (1962).”

Vaughn v. State, 880 So.2d 1178, 1194-96 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). See also O’Callaghan v. State, 946 So.2d 467, 474-75 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) (same).

“‘[T]he essential purpose of the “void for vagueness” doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct,’ Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230, 71 S.Ct. 703, 707, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951), ‘[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness,’ Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2562, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974), ‘even though the statute may well be vague as applied to others,’ Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 623 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1980).”

Senf v. State, 622 So.2d 435, 437 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).

The indictment charging Alonso with first-degree human trafficking reads:

“The Grand Jury of Said county Charge that, before the finding of this indictment, SANTIAGO ALONSO A.K.A. SANTIAGITO ALONSO, did knowingly obtain, recruit, entice, solicit, induce, threaten, isolate, harbor, hold, restrain, transport, provide, or maintain a minor, to wit: [K.R.], for the purpose of causing such minor to engage in sexual servitude, to wit: GIVING HER ORDERS OF A SEXUAL NATURE, THREATENING HER WITH BODILY HARM, STRIKING HER, FORCING HER TO PERFORM SEXUAL ACTS, AND WITHHOLDING MONEY, in violation of Section' 13A-6-152 of the Code of Alabama Against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama.”

(C. 35.) Section 13A-6-152(a)(2), the subsection under which Alonso was changed and convicted, provides that “[a] person commits the crime of human trafficking in the first degree if ... [h]e or she knowingly obtains, recruits, entices, solicits, induces, threatens, isolates, harbors, holds, restrains, transports, 'provides, or maintains any minor for the purpose of causing a minor to engage in sexual servitude.” Section 13A-6-151(7)a., Ala.Oode 1975, provides the definition of sexual servitude that is relevant to Alonso’s charge as: “Any sexual conduct as defined in subdivision (3) of Section 14-11-30, for which anything of value is directly or indirectly given, promised to, or received by any person, which conduct is induced or obtained by coercion of deception from a person.” (Emphasis added.) Section 14-11-30(3), Ala.Code 1975, defines sexual conduct as:

“a. Sexual intercourse. This term shall have its ordinary meaning and occurs upon a penetration, however slight; emission is not required.
. “b. .Sexual contact. Any known touching for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse of the following:
“1. The sexual or other intimate parts of the victim by the actor.
“2. The sexual or other intimate parts of the actor by the victim.”

Finally, § 13A-6-151(1)(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides the definition of “coercion” applicable to Aonso’s charge as:

“Causing or threatening to cause physical injury or mental suffering to any person, physically restraining or confining any person, or threatening to physically restrain or confine any person or otherwise causing the person performing or providing labor or services to believe that the person or.another person will suffer physical injury or mental suffering.”

Thus, the statutory provisions applicable to' Aonso’s conduct and his charge prohibited him from “knowingly obtain[ing], recruit[ing], entic[ing], soliciting],. inducting], threatening], isolat[ing], harboring], holding], restraining], trans-portpng], providing], or maintain[ing] any minor for the purpose. of’ coercing that minor by “causing or threatening to cause physical, injury or mental suffering to any person, physically restraining or confining any person, or threatening -to physically restrain or confine any person” to perform “[a]ny sexual conduct •... for which anything of value is directly or indirectly given, promised to, or received by any person.” §§ 13A-6-152(a)(2), 13A-6-161(1)(a), and 13A-6-151(7)(a).

' Cóátrary to Alonso’s ‘ assertions on appeal, the statutory provisions under which he was charged and convicted are not unconstitutionally vague. Rather, the provisions provide “both fair notice to the public [as to what] conduct is proscribed and minimal guidelines to aid officials in the enforcement of that proscription.” Vaughn, 880 So.2d at 1195 (additional citations omitted.) ’ Further, the human-trafficking statute 'clearly applies to Alonso’s conduct, i.e., harboring, restraining, and transporting K.R. and coercing her through threats and acts of violence to perform sex acts with individu als in exchange for money. Because Alon-so’s conduct was clearly proscribed under § 13A-6-152(a)(2), his argument that § 13A-6-152(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague .-is without merit. See Senf, 622 So.2d at 437. Accordingly, this issue does not entitle Alonso any relief,

II.

Alonso next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his cellular telephone following his arrest. Specifically, Alonso contends .that the circuit court erroneously admitted electronic data from a cellular telephone seized during a warrantless search of the telephone in violation of Riley v. California, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482-83, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014).

This argument was not preserved for this Court’s review. Alonso filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his person, his hotel room, and his car. However, he did not challenge the search of the telephone on the ground that a warrant was required. Further, the record indicates that there was a warrant for the search of the telephone. The warrant, however, was not admitted into evidence at trial, presumably because Alonso did not object to the admission of the telephone or its contents.

As noted earlier, “[r]eview on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial [and] [a]n issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to appellate review because it has not been properly preserved and presented.” Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So.2d at 794-95 (citations and quotations omitted). Below, Alonso did not argue that law-enforcement officers violated his Fourth Amendment right when they searched the contents of the telephone. Therefore, this issue was not preserved for this Court’s review and . does not entitle Alonso to. any relief.

III.

Alonso next argues that the. State’s evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for human trafficking. Specifically, Alonso argues that the State failed to prove that a commercial-sex act occurred in Alabama. According to Alonso, the Stati failed to present any evidence indicating that he, “the victim, or any third party was promised or received anything of value in exchange for any sexual act involving the victim in Alabama.” (Alon-so’s brief, at 50.) Alonso then surmises that, because the State failed to prove that KR.’s sexual servitude occurred or continued in Alabama, his conviction must be reversed.

Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court has held:

“In deciding whether there is sufficient evidence to support .the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court, the evidence must be reviewed in. the light most favorable to the prosecution. Cumbo v. State, 368 So.2d 871 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 877 (Ala.1979), Conflicting evidence presents a jury question not subject to review on appeal, provided the state’s evidence establishes a prima facie case. Gunn v. State, 387 So.2d 280 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 387 So.2d 283 (Ala.1980). The trial court’s denial of a motion' for a judgment of acquittal must be reviewed by determining whether there existed legal evidence before the jury, at .the time the motion was made, from which the jury by fair inference could have found the appellant guilty. Thomas v. State, 363 So.2d 1020 (Ala.Cr.App.1978). In applying this standard, the appellate court will determine only if legal evidence was presented from which the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Willis v. State, 447 So.2d 199 (Ala.Cr.App.1983); Thomas v. State. When the evidence raises questions of fact for the jury and such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to sustain a conviction, the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal by the trial court does not constitute error. Young v. State, 283 Ala. 676, 220 So.2d 843 (1969); Willis v. State.”

Breckenridge v. State, 628 So.2d 1012, 1018 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).

The indictment against Alonso alleged that he .

“did knowingly obtain,., recruit, entice, solicit, induce, threaten, isolate, harbor, hold, restrain, transport, provide or maintain a minor, to wit: [K.R.], for the purpose of causing such minor to engage in sexual servitude, to wit: giving her orders, ¡of ■ a sexual nature,.threatening her with Rodily harm, striking her, forcing her to perform sexual acts, and withholding money, in violation of Section 13A-6-152 - of the Code of Alabama against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama.” - ..

(C. 36.)

As discussed in Part I of this opinion, the State was required to prove that Alon-so knowingly obtained, ■ recruited, enticed, solicited, induced, threatened, isolated, harbored, held, restrained, transported, provided, or maintained K.R. for the purpose of coercing her by “causing or threatening to cause physical injury or mental suffering to [her], physically restraining or confining, [her], or threatening to physically restrain, or confine [her]” to perform “[a]ny sexual conduct . , for which anything of value [was] directly or indirectly given, promised to, or received by any person.” §§ 13A-6-152(a)(2), 13A-6-151(1)(a), and 13A-6-151(7)(a), Ala.Code 1975. Under § 14-11-30(3), Ala.Code 1975, sexual conduct includes:

“a. -Sexual intercourse. .This term shall have its ordinary meaning, and occurs upon a penetration, however slight; emission is not required.
“b. .Sexual contact. Any-, known touching for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse of. the following: - ■
“1. The sexual or, other intimate parts of the victim by the actor.
. “2. The sexual or other intimate parts of the actor by the victim.”

The State presented evidence indicating that Alonso enticed K.R., who was a minor, into his vehicle in Mississippi and then drove her to Tennessee. In Tennessee, .Alonso used physical abuse and threats of physical abuse to force K.R. to perform sexual acts with other men in exchange for money. Later, Alonso transported K.R. from Tennessee to a hotel in Dothan where he took photographs of her and posted those photographs on Back-Page.com, a Web site he used to solicit men to engage in sex acts with K.R. for money. (R. 253-56.) The State’s evidence established that, while in Dothan,'Alonso used threats of physical harm to prevent her from escaping and to force her to have sexual intercourse with other men in exchange for money. The State’s evidence further established that Alonso kept all the money K.R. earned from her sexual activities in Alabama. .

Based on the foregoing, the State presented evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that Alonso, while in Houston County, committed the crime of first-degree human trafficking. Consequently, Alonso’s argument is without merit and does not entitle him to any relief.

IV.

Alonso next argues that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for furnishing a controlled substance to a minor. See § 13A-12-215, Ala.Code 1975. Specifically, Alonso contends that the State failed to present any evidence, aside from the victim’s own testimony, that he provided K.R. with the marijuana. He further argues that only KR.’s testimony indicated that the marijuana found in her system was given to her by Alonso. Alonso also argues that the State failed to present any evidence indicating that he provided K.R. marijuana while in Alabama. Thus, Alonso asserts, the State failed to prove an essential element of furnishing controlled substances to a minor under § 13A-12-215, Ala.Code 1975.

Under § 13A-12-215, Ala.Code 1975, a person is guilty of furnishing illegal drugs to a minor “if the offender is over the age of 18 and the offense consists of selling, furnishing or giving such controlled substances as enumerated in Schedules I, II, III, IV and V to a person who has not attained the age of 18 years....” Schedule I defines marijuana as a controlled substance. § 20-2-23(b)(3)(j), Ala.Code 1975. At trial, the State presented evidence indicating that while in Houston County, Alon-so was 27 years old and K.R. was 17 years old. K.R. testified that, while in Houston County, Alonso furnished her with marijuana. Further, drug testing performed on KR.’s blood after she was freed from Alonso indicated that marijuana and cocaine were present in K.R.’s system.

Based on the foregoing, the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Alonso, an adult, furnished drugs to K.R.; a minor. Accordingly, this issue is without merit and does not entitle Alonso any relief.

To the extent Alonso challenges the weight of the State’s evidence, his argument is likewise without merit. Regarding the weight of the evidence, this Court has held:

“Once a prima facie case has been submitted to the jury, this Court will not upset the jury’s' verdict except in extreme situations in which it is clear from the record that the evidence against the accused was so lacking as to make the verdict wrong and unjust. Deutcsh v. State, 610 So.2d 1212, 1234-35 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). This Court will not substitute itself for the jury in determining the weight and probative force of the evidence. Benton v. State, 536 So.2d 162, 165 (Ala.Cr.App.1988).”

May v. State, 710 So.2d 1362, 1372 (Ala.Crim.App.1997).

K.R. testified that, while she was a minor, Alonso furnished her marijuana and subsequent drug testing established that KR. had marijuana in her system. KR.’s testimony was sufficient to establish a pri-ma facie case of furnishing drugs to a minor. See Shelton v. State, 382 So.2d 1175, 1177 (Ala.Crim.App.1980) (“A fact may be established as firmly by the testimony of one witness as by the testimorfy of an entire community.” (citations omitted)); Yancey v. State. 65 So.3d 452, 473-74 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (“‘“[A] jury may believe or disbelieve all or.any part of the testimony presented by either side, and even when all of the evidence against an accused comes from the victim[s], the jury may believe such uncorroborated testimony beyond a reasonable doubt and convict the accused.”’” (quoting Acklin v. State, 790 So.2d 975, 1009 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), quoting in turn Jeffers v. State, 455 So.2d 201, 203 (Ala.Crim.App.1984))).

Further, this case does not present one of the “extreme situations in which it is clear from the record that the evidence against the accused was so lacking as to make the verdict wrong and unjust.” May, 710 So.2d at 1372 (citing Deutcsh, 610 So.2d at 1234-35). Consequently, any argument that Alonso’s conviction was contrary to the great weight of the evidence is without merit.

V.

Finally, Alonso argues that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, he alleges that trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel: a) failed to investigate facts and witnesses; b) failed to preserve and to secure the testimony of Jessica Henderson and Tabitha Williams; c) failed to seek to bifürcate the human-trafficking charge and the drug-related charges; d) failed to call Petra Ürieta Turrevio, Alonso’s mother, as a witness to testify regarding the source of money Alonso possessed and to testify regarding K.R.’s.demeanor; e) failed to secure and to present testimony from J.R., the victim’s brother; f) failed to call Jasmine Gooden, Alonso’s sister-in-law, who would have testified regarding K.R.’s demeanor and physical attributes and Alon-so’s credibility; g) failed to* move to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Alabama’s human-trafficking statute is void for vagueness; and h) failed to “vigorously challenge the cell phone ‘dump.’” (Alonso’s brief, at 61.) This Court disagrees.

To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Alonso must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), test. First, he must identify the specific acts or omissions that he alleges were not'the result of reasonable professional judgment on counsel’s part and show that those acts or omissions fall “outside the wide range' of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance “must be highly deferential.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). “[B]ecause counsel’s conduct is presumed reasonable, for a petitioner to show that the conduct was unreasonable, [he] must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Id. at 1315. If he meets this burden, Alonso must then show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome:” Id. Because both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied in order to show a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a court need not address the performance prong if the defendant cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice versa. Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir.2000).

During the hearing on Alonso’s motion for a new trial,.Alonso admitted into evidence affidavits from Turrevio and Goo-den. Alonso also admitted a transcript of a recorded conversation between his post-trial counsel and someone claiming to be KR.’s brother—a conversation that took place in a car in the parking lot of the Outback Steakhouse restaurant in Meridian, Mississippi. Alonso also admitted a transcript of the testimony presented at his bond hearing.

The State objected to. the affidavits, and the transcript of Alonso's counsel’s conversation on the ground that they constituted hearsay. The State also objected to the transcript of the conversation of Alonso’s counsel on the ground that counsel could not establish that the individual with whom she was speaking was K.R.’s brother. The State objected to the admission of the transcript of the bond-hearing testimony on the ground that the State did not have the incentive to cross-examine witnesses at a bond hearing in the same manner it would have had at trial.

The circuit court overruled the State’s objections and allowed Alonso to admit the affidavits and transcripts into evidence. The circuit court, also ruled that, although it allowed the evidence to be admitted, it would not give the out-of-court statements any weight. .

After admitting the affidavits and transcripts, Alonso informed the circuit court that he would not call his trial counsel to testify. , The State, on the other hand, called trial counsel as a witness. Trial counsel testified that he did not hire an investigator because he and Alonso were able find the witnesses they needed to support their defense. Trial counsel testified that Alonso contacted Jessica Henderson and that she informed him that she did not want to testify. Trial counsel stated that he did not admit her testimony from the bond hearing because it would have opened the" door to the admission of harmful testimony. Trial counsel stated that he did-not call Tabitha Williams to testify because she could not provide any helpful information and because her testimony could have been harmful. He also ■testified that he thought it would be better for the defense to question why the State had not presented Williams rather than to call Williams as a defense witness. Trial counsel said that Alonso made the decision not to present his mother’s testimony because he did not want to put his mother through the ordeal’ of testifying. Trial counsel stated that he had never heard of J.R., K.R,’s brother, and that J.R. had not contacted him or his office. According to trial counsel, there were approximately 10 witnesses prepared to testify regarding KR.’s demeanor and ..actions before and after her coming to Alabama; trial counsel and Alonso strategically chose which of those witnesses to present. ■

Trial counsel also-testified that he made the strategic ’decision not to attempt to bifurcate the drug-related charges and the human-trafficking charge because the drug-related charges were part of the human-trafficking charge and evidence of the drugs would have been admissible at the human-trafficking trial. Further, because the charges Alonso faced depended on K.R.’s credibility, trial counsel did not want the State to prosecute the drug-related charges first and then use a possible conviction to bolster K,R.’s credibility. Rather, trial counsel wanted all the charges to fall upon K.R..’s credibility.

Next, Alonso testified at the hearing. Alonso’s testimony, for. the most part, contradicted trial counsel’s testimony. After the hearing, the circuit court issued an order denying Alonso’S motion for a new trial.

A.

Alonso argues in his brief to this Court that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investígate facts and witnesses. According to Alonso, trial counsel failed to hire a private investigator. Alonso asserts that a private investigator could have located Jessica Henderson and Tabitha Williams, who, Alonso argues, had vital information regarding whether K.R. engaged in any sex act for money while in Alabama. Alonso also argues that an investigator could have located witnesses in Mississippi who knew K.R. and who could have located J.R., K.R.’s brother.

Alonso failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by that performance. At the hearing, Alonso presented his own self-serving testimony, two affidavits, and two transcripts. The circuit court informed Alonso that the affidavits and transcripts would be given no weight and that- they were insufficient to prove his claims. Alonso has not challenged that ruling on appeal." Further, Alonso failed to present any evidence from Tabitha Williams. Based on the evidence that Alonso presented at the hearing, or the lack thereof, this Court cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that Alonso failed to meet his burden to prove that counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Further, trial counsel testified, for the State, that he did not hire a private investigator because he did not have trouble locating any witnesses except for Jessica Henderson. Trial counsel stated that Al-onso had located Henderson and had informed Alonso that she did not want to testify. Trial counsel stated that they had other witnesses to testify regarding KR.’s actions and demeanor before and after her arrival in Alabama. Thus, Henderson’s testimony would have been cumulative and was not necessary. See Washington v. State, 95 So.3d 26, 52 (Ala.Crim.App.2012) (recognizing that trial counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to present cumulative evidence). Further, trial counsel testified that he made the strategic decision not to seek Tabitha Williams, the woman whom K.R. encountered when she escaped, because she would not have provided beneficial testimony and because trial counsel wanted to argue that the State should have but did not produce her at trial. Alonso has “failed to show that counsel’s decision[s] ... w[ere] anything other than ,., strategic decisions],’’ Perkins v. State, 144 So.3d 457, 475 (Ala.Crim.App.2012); therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief.

' Finally, to the extent Alonso argues that counsel should have located K.R.’s brother, J.R., Alonso failed to present any credible evidence indicating that K.R. had a brother named J.R; who would have testified on Alonso’s behalf. In support of his claim that counsel should have presented testimony from J.R., Alonso admitted a transcript of an unsworn conversation his attorney had with a man claiming to be KR.’s brother. The conversation took place in the parking lot of an Outback Steakhouse restaurant in Mississippi. Al-onso presented no evidence—other the transcript of the unsworn statement—indicating that the individual with' whom counsel' spoke was, in fact, K.R.’s brother. Because Alonso failed to present any credible evidence in support of this claim, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief. Bryant v. State, 181 So.3d 1087, 1143 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (recognizing that the appellant has the burden of establishing ineffectiveness).

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief on this claim. Consequently, Alonso’s argument to the contrary is without merit.

B.

Alonso next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek to bifurcate the human-trafficking charge and drug-related charges. This section of Alonso’s brief does not comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P.

Alonso’s entire argument reads:

“Trial counsel testified that the State had moved to consolidate the cases. He consented to the consolidation. (R4-63) He admits that when drugs are involved it can be very prejudicial. (R8-1062, 1063, 1080, 1081) Having consented to the consolidation was prejudicial to the case, trial counsel invited that prejudice into the case and encumbered Alonso’s defense of the human trafficking and drug charges.”

(Alonso’s brief, at 59.)

This Court has held:

“Rule 28(a)(10) requires that an argument contain ‘the contentions of the appellant/petitioner with respect to .the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts of the record relied on.’ (Emphasis added.) Recitation of allegations without citation to any legal authority and without adequate recitation of the facts relied upon has been deemed a waiver of the arguments' listed. Hamm v. State, 913 So.2d 460, 486 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). ‘Authority supporting only “general propositions of law” does not constitute a sufficient argument for reversal.’ Beachcroft Props., LLP v. City of Alabaster, 901 So.2d 703, 708 (Ala.2004) (quoting Geisenhoff v. Geisenhoff, 693 So.2d 489, 491 (Ala.Civ.App.1997)). The Alabama Supreme Court has explained:
“ ‘[I]t is not the function of this court to do a party’s legal research. See Henderson[ v. Alabama A & M University], 483 So.2d [392,] 392 [ (Ala. 1986) ]. Similarly, we cannot create legal arguments. for a party based on undelineated general propositions unsupported by authority or argument. Ala. R.App. P. 28(a)(5) [now Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P.]; Brittain v. Ingram, 282 Ala. 158, 209 So.2d 653 (1968) (analyzing the predecessor to Ala. R.App. P. 28); Ex parte Riley, 464 So.2d 92 (Ala.1985).’
“Spradlin v. Spradlin, 601 So.2d 76, 78-79 (Ala.1992). To obtain review of an argument on appeal, an appellant must provide citations to relevant cases or other legal authorities and an analysis of why those cases or other authorities support an argument that an error occurred and that the alleged error should result in reversal.”

White v. State, 179 So.3d 170, 227 (Ala.Crim.App.2013).

‘ In this portion of his brief, Alonso fails to provide any law to support his argument that trial counsel could have legitimately moved to sever the charges, much less that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. Further, Alonso has not addressed trial counsel’s testimony that he made a strategic decision to consent to joinder of the offenses. Finally, Alonso has failed to offer any argument regarding why, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the circuit court’s rejection of this claim was erroneous! Consequently, this portion of Alonso’s brief fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., and his argument is not properly before this Court.

C.

Alonso next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony from his mother. This portion of Alonso’s brief fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P.

In his brief, Alonso fails to cite any law in support of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for faffing to present his mother’s testimony. White, 179 So.3d at 227. Further, Alonso has completely failed to address trial counsel’s testimony that Alonso directed trial counsel not to call his mother to testify because Alonso did not want to put his mother through the ordeal of testifying. See Adkins v. State, 930 So.2d 524, 540 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (holding that, under the invited-error doctrine, the court cannot fault trial counsel for failing to call witnesses at the defendant’s instruction). Finally, Alonso has failed to offer any argument regarding why, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the circuit court’s rejection of this claim was erroneous. Consequently, this portion of Alonso’s brief fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., and his argument is not properly before .this Court.

D.

Alonso next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for faffing to secure and to present testimony from J.R., K.R.’s brother. This portion of Alonso’s brief fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P.

In his brief, Alonso fails to cite any law in support of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure and to present J.R.’s testimony. White, 179 So.3d at 227. He has failed to provide any argument regarding how trial counsel performed deficiently with respect to J.R. More importantly, Alonso has failed to offer any argument regarding why, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the circuit court’s rejection of this claim was erroneous. Consequently, this portion of Alonso’s brief fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., and his argument is not properly before this Court.

E.

Alonso next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Jasmine Gooden, Alonso’s sister-in-law, to testify regarding KR.’s demeanor and actions before coming to Alabama. This portion of Alonso’s brief fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P. :

Again, Alonso fails to cite any law in support of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony from Gooden. White, 179 So.3d at 227. Additionally, he has failed to provide any argument regarding how trial' counsel performed deficiently with respect to Gooden. Alonso does not explain how Gooden’s alleged testimony might have altered the outcome of the trial. More importantly, Alonso has failed to offer any argument regarding why, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the circuit court’s rejection of this claim was erroneous. Consequently, this portion of Alonso’s brief fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., and his argument is not properly before this Court.

F.

Alonso next argues that, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Alabama’s human-trafficking statute is void for vagueness. ■ This portion of Alonso’s brief fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P.

Alonso’s entire argument in this portion of his brief is as follows:

“An argument should have been made on these grounds which could have re-suited in the dismissal of the trafficking charge. Trial counsel argued about the indictment but did not challenge it as void for vagueness or as overly broad. (R8-1067; R4-99-139,184).”

(Alonso’s brief, at 61.)

In ¿is brief, Alonso again fails to cite any law in support of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Alabama’s human-trafficking statute is void for vagueness. White, 179 So.3d at 227. His brief lacks any facts indicating that no reasonable attorney would have forgone arguing vagueness, of the statute as a ground for dismissal. Finally, Alonso has failed to offer any argument regarding why, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the circuit court’s rejection of this claim was erroneous. Consequently, this portion of Alonso’s brief fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., and his argument is not properly before this Court.

G.

Alonso finally contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress a cellular telephone. This portion of Alonso’s brief fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P.

Alonso’s argument in this portion of his brief states in its entirety:

“While a motion to suppress this evidence was heard on the day of trial May 12, 2014 (R4-95-234) the only search warrant was for the hotel rooms and Alonso’s Tahoe [sport-utility vehicle]. The cell phone they recovered from Al-onso was incident to his arrest, There was no search warrant presented to cover that particular phone. The suppression of this evidence would have been very beneficial to the defense of the case and kept some very harmful evidence "from being considered by the- jury. (R8-1014,1015)” •

(Alonso’s brief, at 61.)

Alonso again fails to cite any law supporting his claim that trial counsel was inéffective for failing to move to' suppress the cellular telephone and information stored in the cellular telephone. White, 179 So.3d at 227. He has failed to prove any facts indicating that no reasonable attorney would have forgone' attempting to suppress the telephone. Alonso does not state whether theré was a search warrant for the' telephone. Rather, he merely alleges that “[t]here was no search warrant presented to cover that particular phone” (Alonso’s brief, at 61), an unremarkable fact in light of the lack of a motion to suppress. In any event, Alonso has failed to present this Court with any legal or factual argument that would indicate that trial counsel could have raised a legitimate ground for the suppression of the telephone. Consequently, this portion of Alonso’s brief fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., and his argument is not properly before "this Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

WELCH, KELLUM, BURKE, and’ JOINER, JJ., concur.

      . K.R. later learned that Lady’s actual name was Jessica. (R. 244.). .

      . Asia did not travel with the group beyond Memphis.

      . Alonso does not raise a facial challenge'to Alabama’s human-trafficking statute.

      . Alonso was represented by new counsel during the hearing on his motion for a new trial.

      . "In section V.A. of his brief, Alonso argues . that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain and present testimony from Jessica Henderson and Tabitha Williams. In section V.B. of his brief, Alonso again argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to secure testimony from Jessica Henderson and Tabitha Williams. Because sections V.A. and V.B. involve the same subject matter, the Court will address those claims together in this part of the opinion.


author: POLSTON, J.

text:
    GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Alysia M. MACEDO, et al., Respondent.
    No. SC16-935
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [July 13, 2017]

      B. Richard Young and Joshua J. Hartley of Young, Bill, Boles, Palmer & Duke, P.A., Pensacola, Florida, for Petitioner
    David A. Simpson and Jonathan D. Simpson of Simpson Law Firm, Fort Walton Beach, Florida, for Respondent Alysia M. Macedo
    Dale Swope, Darrell Hinson, and Stephanie Miles of Swope, Rodante P.A., Tampa, Florida; and Elizabeth Munro. of Florida Vanguard Attorneys, LLC, Tampa, Florida, for Respondent Zackery R. Lombardo
    Jack R. Reiter, Jordan S. Kosches, and Veronica A. Meza of GrayRobinson, P.A., Miami, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
   POLSTON, J.

Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) seeks review of the decision of the First Distinct Court of Appeal in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Macedo, 190 So.3d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). As explained below, we approve the First District’s decision and hold that the ambiguous Additional Payments section of the insurance policy must be construed in favor of coverage for the costs and attorneys’ fees awarded against the insured pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, the offer of judgment statute.

I. BACKGROUND

Zackery R, Lombardo’s automobile insurance with GEICO provided bodily injury liability coverage for up to $100,000 per person and $300,000 per incident. The policy also gave GEICO the sole authority to settle any claim or suit.

Alysia M. Macedo sued Lombardo for damages resulting from bodily injuries she sustained in an April 2012 automobile collision with Lombardo. On May 1, 2014, Ma-cedo served Lombardo with a proposal for settlement for $50,000, which was not accepted. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Macedo in the amount of $243,954.55. “Macedo then joined GEICO to the judgment, see § 627.4136(4), Fla. Stat., and sought taxable fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79, which the trial court awarded against GEICO jointly and severally with its insured.” Macedo, 190 So.3d at 1156.

On appeal, the First District affirmed the trial court’s judgment based upon its prior decision in New Hampshire Indemnity Co. v. Gray, 177 So.3d 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), which had held “that the insurer’s policy provision stating that it would cover ‘other reasonable expenses incurred at our request’ included costs associated with choosing to litigate a case instead of settling it.” Macedo, 190 So.3d at 1156 (explaining its decision in Gray and quoting the policy at issue in Gray). The First District explained that “GEICO’s policy with Mr. Lombardo gave it the sole right to litigate and settle claims, and contractually obligated it to pay for ‘all investigative and legal .costs incurred by us’ and .‘all reasonable costs incurred by an insured at our request.’ ” Id. (quoting the Additional Payments section of the policy). The First District reasoned that “[a]ny such expression, or request [to litigate rather than settle], necessarily encompasses incurring litigation costs, which may mean not only the insurer’s litigation costs, but also those incurred by the opposing party should that party prevail.” Id. at 1157 (quoting Gray, 177 So.3d at 63). Finally, the First District certified that its decision in Macedo conflicts with the Second Districts decision in Steele v. Kinsey, 801 So.2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Id.

II. ANALYSIS

Insurance policy construction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So.3d 943, 948 (Fla. 2013). Courts construe insurance contracts according to their plain language. Fayad v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 899 So.2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 2005). However, “any ambiguity which remains after reading each policy as a whole and endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect must be liberally construed in favor of coverage and strictly against the insurer.” Ruderman, 117 So.3d at 949-50. A provision is ambiguous if it is “susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one providing coverage and the other excluding coverage.” Fayad, 899 So.2d at 1086. The ambiguity must be genuine, and the lack of a definition for an operative term “does not,- by itself, create an ambiguity.” Botee v. S. Fid. Ins. Co., 162 So.3d 183, 186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). “When a term in an insurance policy is undefined, it should be given its plain- and ordinary meaning, and courts may look to legal and non-legal dictionary definitions to determine such a meaning.” Id.

Here, the relevant portion of the Additional Payments section of Lombardo’s policy with GEICO states:

ADDITIONAL PAYMENTS WE WILL MAKE UNDER THE LIABILITY COVERAGES
1. All investigative' and legal costs incurred by us.
4. We will upon request by an insured, provide reimbursement for the following items:
(c) All reasonable costs incurred by an insured at our request.

Additionally, the index of the policy lists “Legal Expenses And Court Costs” as items that are covered under the Additional Payments section.

A.-

First, GEICO contends that -the policy does not cover the awarded attorneys’ fees because the Additional Payments section refers only to costs, which generally do not include attorneys’ fees. However, because the section is ambiguous, we disagree.

Contrary to GEICO’s argument, the section does not only reference costs. As just mentioned, the policy index indicates that GEICO will make additional payments under the liability coverages for “[l]egal [e]xpenses [a]nd [c]ourt [c]osts.” Then, subsection (1) of the Additional Pay-, ments provision states that GEICO will cover “[a]ll investigative and legal costs,” while subsection (4)(c) of. the same provision discusses “[a]ll reasonable costs.” These phrases are not defined. Although the absence of a definition does not render these phrases ambiguous, in this case, the use of the term “costs” along with “legal expenses” creates an ambiguity regarding whether attorneys’ fees are included or excluded. Referring to “legal expenses” in conjunction with “court costs” signifies that there are “legal expenses” aside from costs that are also covered; otherwise, the language would be superfluous.

Accordingly, because there are multiple reasonable interpretations regarding whether attorneys’ fees are included by the terms “expenses” and “costs,” the Additional Payments section is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of coverage. See Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hollingsworth, 157 So.3d 365, 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (stating that “[i]n light of the case law ... combined with the principle that an ambiguous policy must be interpreted against the insurer and in favor of coverage, we are compelled to” hold that the attorneys’ fees granted pursuant to the offer of judgement statute must be considered a “court cost” under the additional payments provision); see also Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 155 So.3d 1163, 1171-72 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (holding that attorneys’ fee sanction was covered as a “court cost” under the additional payments provision of the insurance policy); Tri-State Ins. Co. of Minn. v. Fitzgerald, 593 So.2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that attorneys’ fees sanction fell within the coverage provided by the policy’s language of “all costs taxed against the Insured, in any suit defended by the Insurer(s)”).

B.

Further, GEICO contends that Additional Payments subsection 4(c), “[a]ll reasonable costs incurred by an insured at our request,” does not cover the costs and attorneys’ fees awarded against Lombardo under the offer of judgment statute because they were not “incurred by an insured at [GEICO’s] request.” We disagree because GEICO had control over settling the case. See Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, Inc. v. Johnson, 654 So.2d 239, 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (finding coverage when the insurance policy stated that the insurer would pay for “[ojther reasonable expenses incurred at our request,” because the -expenses incurred by the insured “as a result of the insurance company’s choice not to settle ... were incurred at the- insurer’s request”); Gray, 177 So.3d at 63 (explaining that “choosing to litigate is no different than a request or ‘expressing a desire’ to do so”).

In contrast to our interpretation, the Second District in Steele, 801 Só.2d at 299, determined that a policy provision that the insurer would pay “expenses incurred at our request” did not provide coverage for plaintiffs attorneys’ fees awarded against the insured under the offer of judgment statute. The Second District reasoned as follows:

The common meaning of “request” is “the act of asking, or expressing a desire, for something; solicitation or petition.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary 1218 (4th ed. 2001). The legal meaning of the word is “[a]n asking or petition. The expression of a desire to some person for something, to be granted or done, particularly for the payment of a debt or performance of a contract.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1172 (5th ed. 1979). Both of these, commonly understood definitions reinforce the clear use of the term within, the context of the policy—that the insurer intended to pay .for .expenses that it had authorized and over which it had control, such as the selection of a service or product of known valué and cost,

Id.

. But the-Second District’s interpretation in Steele does not account for the provision of a policy that gives the insurer discretion to settle: the case.and the obligation of the insured to cooperate with the insurer. See Ruderman, 117 So.3d at 948 (explaining that when construing' insurance contracts courts should “read each policy as a whole”). Here, because GEICO was authorized to settle the case, and could have settled in this case for half of the policy limit, it did not have to ask Lombardo to accept or reject settlement offers. Further, if such request were made, it would not fit the generally understood meaning of “request” because under the terms of the policy, Lombardo would not truly have an option whether to grant such request,.

Moreover, the definition of the term “request” on which the Second District reliéd in Steele can also be used to conclude that the insurer did “request” the costs and attorneys’ fees incurred under the offer of judgment statute. Specifically, the Second District in Steele stated that to “request” something means that “the insurer intended to pay for expenses that it had authorized arid over which it had control.” Steele, 801 So.2d at 299 (emphasis added). Here, GEICO could have authorized a settlement, and in essence GEICO controlled the litigation. It follows that any cost or fee incurred as a result of GEICO exercising its authority and control is something that it intended- to pay. The fact that the language the Second' District in Steele used to exclude coverage can also be interpreted to provide coverage highlights the ambiguity..

Accordingly, because there are multiple reasonable interpretations, the provision is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of coverage. See. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29, 35 (Fla. 2000) (construing ambiguity, which arose when a clause was read in conjunction with the entire policy, in favor of coverage).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the ambiguous Additional Payments section of the GEICO insurance policy must be construed to provide coverage for the costs and attorneys’ fees awarded against Lombardo pursuant to the offer of judgment statute. Therefore, we approve the First District’s decision, in Macedo and disapprove the Second District’s decision in Steele to the extent it is-' inconsistent ■with our decision. -

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE-, CANADY, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. ■

LEWIS, J., concurs in result.

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), (4), Fla. Const.

      . In the final judgment, the trial court ordered Lombardo to pay Macedo $172,965.91 because the jury found Macedo 25% responsible for her injuries and Macedo had received $10,000 in personal injury protection benefits.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO RULE 4-44 OF the RULES OF the SUPREME COURT RELATING TO ADMISSIONS TO THE FLORIDA BAR.
    No. SC17-1543
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [October 19, 2017]
    Scott N. Richardson, Chair, Michele A. Gavagni, Executive Director, and James T. Almon, General Counsel Designate, Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
   PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court for consideration of proposed amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.

The Florida Board of Bar Examiners (Board) has filed a petition seeking to amend rule 4-44 (Computer Option) of the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar. The proposed amendments pertain to the use of laptop computers on the essay portion of the General Bar Examination. Rule 4-44 permits the use of a laptop computer for the essay portion of the General Bar Examination. Under the current rule, an applicant must complete a form available on the Board’s website and pay a fee of $125. At present, the rule itself does not expressly include a deadline for the applicant to notify the Board of his or her intent to use a laptop and pay the fee. The application to take the examination is available online and states the deadlines for notifying the Board of the applicant’s election to use a laptop and to pay the fee, that coincide with the final deadlines for registering for the examination under rule 4-43.2—Janu-ary 15 for the February examination and June 15 for the July examination. The application itself also gives the applicant an opportunity to elect to use a laptop. If the applicant chooses this option, an onscreen prompt indicates that the laptop fee is due when the application is submitted.

Upon consideration of the Board’s petition, we amend rule 4-44, as proposed by the Board, to state that applicants are required to indicate their intention to use a laptop for the examination on the application, or otherwise notify the Board in writing of their intent, and pay the laptop fee at the time they register to take the exam. The rule is also amended to explicitly state the deadlines applicable to laptop use. In addition, language in the rule requiring an applicant to complete a separate form on the Board’s website is deleted. As noted, the examination application itself already allows an applicant to make this election.

Accordingly, rule 4-44 of the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar is amended as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The amendments shall become effective immediately upon release of this opinion. Because the amendments were not published for comment prior to their adoption, interested persons shall have sixty days from the date of this opinion in which to file comments with the Court.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. . ,

APPENDIX

RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT RELATING TO ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR

4-44 Computer Option. Applicants are permitted the use of a laptop computer with software designated by the board to complete answers to the essay portion of the General Bar Examination. Applicants seeking to use a laptop computer must complete-a-form-available ■ on- -the-board-s website indicate on the examination application' or otherwise provide written notice of the intent to participate in the laptop program and pay a fee of $125 at the time of filing. The written notice and fee must be received by the board not later than January 15 for the February examination or June 15 for the July examination.

      . All comments must be filed with the Court on or before December 18, 2017, with a certificate of service verifying that a copy has been served on the Executive Director of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Michele A. Gavagni, 1891 Eider Court, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1750, gavagnim@flcourts.org, and on the General Counsel Designate, James T. Almon, 1891 Eider Court, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1750, almonjt@flcourts.org, as well as a separate request for oral argument if the person filing the comment wishes to partid-pate in oral argument, which may be scheduled in this case. The Board has until January 8, 2018, to file a response to any comments filed with the Court. If filed by an attorney in good standing with The Florida Bar, the comment must be electronically filed via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal (Portal) in accordance with In re Electronic Filing in the Supreme Court of Florida via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC13-7 (Feb. 18, 2013). If filed by a non-lawyer or a lawyer not licensed to practice in Florida, the comment may be, but is not required to be, filed via the Portal. Comments filed via the Portal must be submitted in Microsoft Word 97 or higher. See In re Electronic Filing in the Florida Supreme Court, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC17-27 (May 9, 2017). Any person unable to submit a comment electronically must mail or hand-deliver the originally signed comment to the Florida Supreme Court, Office of the Clerk, 500 South Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1927; no additional copies are required or will be accepted.


text:
    IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO the RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR—RULES 4-1.2 AND 4-6.6.
    No. SC17-458
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [October 19, 2017]
    John F. Harkness,. Jr., Executive Director, William J. Schifmo, Jr., President, Michael J. Higer, President-elect, Lori S. Holcomb, Director, Division of Ethics and Consumer Protection, Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Ethics Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner'
    Linda Harradine, President, Project Directors Association, Sarasota, Florida, Responding with Comments
   PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court on the petition of The Florida Bar (Bar) proposing amendments to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar Rules). See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 1-12.1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.

The Bar proposes amendments to Bar Rule 4-1.2 (Objectives and Scope of Representation) and proposes the adoption of new Bar Rule 4-6.6 (Short>-Term Limited Legal Services Programs). The proposals were approved by the Board of Governors, and formal notice of the proposed amendments was published in The Florida Bar News. The Court received one comment in support of the proposals from the Florida Project Directors Association. The Bar did not file a response to the comment.

After considering the Bar’s petition and the Florida Project Directors Association’s comment, we adopt new rule 4-6.6 and the amendments to rule 4-1.2, as proposed by the Bar. New Bar Rule 4-6,6' relaxes application of the conflicts rules 4-1.7 (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients), 4-1.9(a) (Conflict of Interest; Former Client), and 4-1.10 (Imputation of Conflicts of Interest; General Rule) when a lawyer provides limited representation through a nonprofit organization, court, government agency, bar association, or American Bar Association-accredited law school, We amend Rule 4-1.2 to add language exempting a lawyer who gives advice in a short-term limited legal services program under new Bar Rule 4-6.6 from the requirement that a client’s informed consent to representation limited in objectives or scope must be in writing. These rules are intended to encourage lawyers to engage in these limited representations, which will increase access to justice at a time when legal aid funding and staff cannot accommodate all individuals who.need legal representation.,

Accordingly, the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar are amended as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The comments are offered for explanation only and are not adopted as an official part of the rules. The. amendments shall become effective November 20,2017.

It is só ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 4-1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE of Representation

(a) Lawyer to Abide by Client’s Decisions. Subject to subdivisions (c) and (d), a lawyer sha&nust abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation, and, as required by'rule 4-1.4, sha&nust reasonably consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized, to carry out the representation.. A lawyer sha&nust abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer sha&nust abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify.

(b) [No Change]

(c) Limitation of Objectives and Scope of Representation. If not prohibited by law or rule,'a lawyer and client may agree to limit the objectives or scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent in writing, except that a lawyer giving advice in a shorl-term limited legal services program under rule 4-6.6 is not required to obtain the consent in writing. If the attorneylaw-yer and client agree to limit the scope of the representation, the lawyer sha&nust advise the client regarding applicability of the rule prohibiting communication with a represented person.

. (d) Criminal, or Fraudulent Conduct. A lawyer sha&nust not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is criminal or fraudulent. However, a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.

Comment

Allocation of authority between client and lawyer

Subdivision (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, -within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer’s professional obligations. Within those limits, a client also has a right to consult with the lawyer about the meansto be used in pursuing those objectives. At the, same time, a lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or employ means simply because a client may wish that the lawyer do so. A clear distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, and in many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint undertaking. In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues but should defer'to the client' regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Law defining the lawyer’s scope of authority in litigation varies among jurisdictions. The decisions specified in subdivision (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See rule 4-1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer’s duty to communicate ■. with the client about suehthese decisions. • With respect to'the means by which the client’s objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shaümust consult with the client as required by rule 4-1.4(a)(2) and may take such.action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.

On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. The lawyer should consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. .If suehthese efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with, the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See rule 4-1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement -by discharging the lawyer. See . rule 4-1.16(a)(3).

. At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client’s behalf without- further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and- subject to rule 4-1.4, a lawyer may rely on suehthe an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke suefethis authority at any time.

In a.case in which the client appears ⅛ be suffering mental disability, the lawyer’s duty to abide by the client’s decisions is to be guided by reference to rule 4-1.14.

Independence from client’s views or activities .

[No Change]

Agreements limiting scope of representation

The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer’s services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance, coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. Sueh lánitationsLimitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent, or which the client regards as financially impractical.

Although this rule affords the lawyer and client substantial latitude to limit the representation if not prohibited by law or rule, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client’s objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs -in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer’s services will be limited to a brief consultation. Such-aThis limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. In addition, a lawyer and client may agree that the representation will be limited to providing assistance out of court, including providing advice on the operation of the court system and drafting pleadings and responses. If the 'lawyer assists a pro se litigant by drafting any document to be submitted to a court, the lawyer is not obligated to sign the document. However, the lawyer must indicate “Prepared with the assistance of counsel” on the document to avoid misleading the court which, otherwise might be under the impression that the person, who appears to be proceeding pro se, has received no assistance from a lawyer. If not prohibited by law or rule, a lawyer and client may agree that any in-court representation in a family law proceeding be limited as provided for in Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.040. For example, a lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer will represent the client at a hearing regarding child support and not at the final hearing or in any other hearings. For limited in-court representation in family law proceedings, the attorney-shalllaw-yer must communicate to the client the specific boundaries and limitations of the representation so that the client is able to give informed consent to the representation.

Regardless of the circumstances, a lawyer providing limited representation forms an-.attor-ney-a client-lawyer relationship with the litigant, and owes the client all attendant ethical obligations and duties imposed by the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, including, but not limited to, duties of competence, communication, confidentiality and avoidance of conflicts of interest/ Although an agreement for limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See rule 4-1.1.

An agreement concerning the scope of representation must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and law. For example, the client may not be asked to agree to representation so limited in scope as. to violate rule 4-1.1 or to surrender the right to terminate the lawyer’s services or the right to settle litigation that the lawyer might wish to continue.

Criminal, fraudulent, and prohibited transactions

[No Change]

RULE 4-6.6 SHORT-TERM LIMITED LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS

(a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization, court, government agency, bar association or an American Bar Association-accredited law school, provides short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter:

(1) is subject to rules 4-1.7 and 4-1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and
(2) is subject to rule 4-1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by rule 4-1.7 or 4-1.9(a) with respect to the matter.

(b) Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2), rule 4-1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this rule.

Comment

Legal services organizations, courts, government agencies, local and voluntary bar associations, law schools and,various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services, such as advice or the completion of legal forms, that will assist persons to address their legal problems without-further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer’s representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. These programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., rules 4-1.7, 4-1.9 and 4-1,10.

A lawyer who provides short-term limited legal services under this rule must obtain the client’s informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See rule 4-1.2(c). However, a lawyer is not required to obtain the consent in writing. Id. If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including rules 4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) and (c), are applicable to the limited representation.

Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, subdivision (a) requires compliance with rules 4-1.7 or 4~1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with rule 4-1.10 only if the lawyer knows that, another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is -disqualified by rules 4-1.7 or 4-1.9(a) in- the matter.

Because the limited nature of the Services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer’s firm, subdivision (b) provides that rule 4-1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this rule except as provided by subdivision (a)(2). Subdivision (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with rule 4-1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer’s firm is disqualified by rules 4-1.7 or 4-1.9(a). Because of subdivision (b), however, a lawyer’s participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not, preclude the lawyer’s firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program’s auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program.

If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, rules 4-1.7, 4-1.9(a) and 4-1.10 become applicable.