author: PARIENTE, J.

text:
    The NATIONAL DEAF ACADEMY, LLC, etc., Petitioner, v. Denise TOWNES, etc., et al., Respondents.
    No. SC16-1587
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [April 26, 2018]
    Mark Hicks and Mary Street of Hicks, Porter, Ebenfeld & Stein, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Julie W. Allison of Julie W. Allison, P.A., Miami, Florida, for Petitioner
    Nicholas A. Shannin of Shannin Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, Florida; and Sean C. Domnick of Domnick Cunningham & Whalen, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, for Respondents
   PARIENTE, J.

The issue in this case requires this Court to determine when a negligence claim arises out of the "rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services," as the Legislature's definition of medical malpractice provides, thereby subjecting a plaintiff to the onerous presuit requirements and restrictions of the medical malpractice statutory scheme. § 766.106(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). In the decision under review, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a claim arising out of the alleged negligence by employees of the National Deaf Academy in attempting to physically restrain one of its residents, which resulted in injury to the resident, sounded in ordinary negligence. Townes v. Nat'l Deaf Academy, LLC , 197 So.3d 1130, 1135 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). Reasoning that the employees' actions were "not for treatment or diagnosis of any condition," were not intended "to meet [the resident's] daily needs during care, and did not require medical skill or judgment," the Fifth District reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment for failure to timely comply with the medical malpractice presuit requirements. Id. at 1136.

The National Deaf Academy argues, and we agree, that the Fifth District's decision conflicts with the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc. v. Estate of Lawson , 175 So.3d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), holding that a claim arising out of a psychiatric hospital employee leaving her keys and badge unattended, which resulted in a patient's death, sounded in medical malpractice. Id. at 328. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

In accordance with the Legislature's definition of medical malpractice and this Court's relevant case law, we hold that for a claim to sound in medical malpractice, the act from which the claim arises must be directly related to medical care or services, which require the use of professional judgment or skill. Because we conclude that neither the claim in Townes nor the claim in Shands arose from an act directly related to medical care or services, which require the use of professional judgment or skill, we approve the Fifth District's decision in Townes and disapprove of the First District's decision in Shands .

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an action for damages brought by Denise Townes, on behalf of Cinnette Perry, and Cinnette Perry, individually, against the National Deaf Academy, by and through its employees, for injuries Perry sustained while she was a resident at the National Deaf Academy. As explained by the Fifth District:

[The National Deaf Academy] operates as both a school and a residential treatment facility, licensed pursuant to Chapter 394, Florida Statutes (2008), for deaf, hard of hearing, and autistic individuals suffering from psychiatric and behavioral disorders. [The National Deaf Academy] offers psychiatric, psychological, medical, speech therapy, and educational services to its residents. [The National Deaf Academy's] staff includes psychiatrists, nurses, teachers, therapists, and sign language interpreters.
Before going to [the National Deaf Academy], Perry was diagnosed with bipolar disorder-mixed, intermittent explosive disorder, impulse control disorder not otherwise specified, conduct disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. During her admission, a [National Deaf Academy] psychiatrist established a plan of care for Perry that included Therapeutic Aggression Control Techniques ("TACT"), which involves staff members physically restraining the resident. Prior to employing a TACT hold, the most senior employee on scene is required to make a determination as to whether the TACT hold is an appropriate method to control the resident.

Townes , 197 So.3d at 1133.

The Fifth District set forth the circumstances that led to Perry's injuries as follows:

On August 7, 2008, Danielle Warren, a nurse employed by [the National Deaf Academy], received notice that Ms. Perry "eloped off campus." When Perry voluntarily returned to [the National Deaf Academy's] campus, she began throwing rocks at [the National Deaf Academy] staff and its buildings, causing several windows to shatter. Perry also pulled on cables, wires, and lightning rods, trying to dislodge them.
After the staff removed the other residents from the area, four [National Deaf Academy] staff members attempted to verbally de-escalate the situation. Since Perry was not responding to the verbal de-escalation attempts, Nurse Warren made the decision to perform a TACT protective hold. After Nurse Warren called Dr. Karen Goldberg, [the National Deaf Academy's] Associate Medical Director, the staff attempted to employ a TACT hold. The attempt was unsuccessful as Perry was agitated. According to Nurse Warren, Perry positioned her toe down into where "the dirt meets the concrete" and then wrapped her leg around Nurse John Barclay, causing both to fall. As she fell, Perry sustained an injury to her leg, which the staff believed to be a dislocated knee.

Id. "[A]s a result of the injury sustained during the attempted TACT protective hold, Perry underwent an above-the-knee amputation of her left leg." Id.

Townes filed a two-count complaint, alleging claims of ordinary negligence against the National Deaf Academy, by and through its employees. Id. at 1133-34. The National Deaf Academy moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Townes's claims sounded in medical malpractice and Townes failed to timely comply with the presuit notice requirements for medical malpractice claims under chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2008), before the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. Townes , 197 So.3d at 1134. The trial court permitted Townes to conduct limited discovery on whether the TACT hold was administered by nonmedical as well as medical staff members of the National Deaf Academy. Townes , 197 So.3d at 1134.

Two registered nurses involved in the incident testified in deposition that a TACT hold is "a form or a style of physical intervention for the mentally ill." They explained that a TACT hold is administered "[t]o protect the resident from himself or herself, as well as protect the other residents from [the resident] if [the resident is] violent." The nurses testified that the purpose of a TACT hold is "[f]or safety of the resident and for safety of the other residents. For safety in general." While the inclusion of a TACT hold in a resident's plan of care is a decision made by a medical doctor, the nurses explained that the decision to administer a TACT hold need not be made by a medical doctor. Rather, a nurse, supervisor, or "the most senior person that is train[ed] and qualified in TACT," has the authority to decide that a TACT hold is necessary. Moreover, everyone employed by the National Deaf Academy, including mental health technicians and sign language interpreters, completes TACT training.

After the limited discovery period and the National Deaf Academy's renewed motion to dismiss, Townes amended her complaint. Townes , 197 So.3d at 1134. Consistent with the original complaint, Counts I and II alleged claims of ordinary negligence against the National Deaf Academy, by and through its employees. Id.

The National Deaf Academy moved for final summary judgment, arguing that Counts I and II alleged medical malpractice claims and were time-barred because the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims had expired prior to the filing of the original complaint. See Townes , 197 So.3d at 1134. The trial court agreed, reasoning that although Counts I and II were "styled as [ordinary] negligence claims," they "actually ar[o]se out of the rendering of medical care and services," and, therefore, alleged medical malpractice claims. Accordingly, the trial court granted the National Deaf Academy's motion for summary judgment.

Townes appealed and, upon review, the Fifth District reversed, concluding that Townes's claims alleged ordinary negligence. Id. at 1130. The Fifth District noted the nurses' deposition testimony that "the purpose of a TACT protective hold is to ensure the safety of the residents, and that non-medical personnel, such as sign language interpreters, also underwent TACT training." Id. at 1136. The Fifth District further reasoned that "[t]here was additional record evidence that the decision of whether to employ a TACT protective hold is to be made by the most senior person trained in TACT; however, that person does not necessarily have to be a medical professional." Id. Thus, the Fifth District concluded:

We find that on the record before this court, the use of the TACT protective hold on Perry was not for treatment or diagnosis of any condition, was not employed to meet Perry's daily needs during care, and did not require medical skill or judgment as non-medical staff were taught the procedure and were authorized to decide whether to employ it. We find that Counts I and II assert claims sounding in ordinary negligence, rather than medical malpractice. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment entered on Counts I and II.

Id. (emphasis added).

ANALYSIS

The issue in this case requires this Court to determine when a negligence claim arises out of the "rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services," as the Legislature's definition of medical malpractice provides, thereby subjecting a plaintiff to the restrictions and requirements of the medical malpractice statutory scheme, as well as a shorter statute of limitations than for ordinary negligence claims. § 766.106(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). The specific facts of this case involve the alleged negligent administration of a method of physical restraint, which is performed for the safety of both the resident and others, and can be performed by nonmedical personnel. See Townes , 197 So.3d at 1133. The determination of whether a complaint alleges a claim for medical malpractice is a legal one and is, therefore, reviewed de novo. See Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc. , 210 So.3d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 2017) ; Pierrot v. Osceola Mental Health, Inc. , 106 So.3d 491, 492 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

Whether a claim arises from ordinary negligence or medical malpractice has significant implications. For example, as shown by the facts of this case, medical malpractice claims have a shorter statute of limitations than ordinary negligence claims-two years versus four years, respectively. See § 95.11(3)(a), (4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). Prospective medical malpractice plaintiffs must also comply with complex presuit requirements, as set forth in chapter 766, Florida Statutes, before filing a medical malpractice suit, which includes conducting "an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe" that medical malpractice occurred. Id. § 766.203(2); see generally id. § 766.201-.212. The restrictions that chapter 766 places on medical malpractice plaintiffs' ability to prove their cases persist even after a lawsuit is filed, such as providing specific qualifications for medical experts testifying as to the standard of care. See generally id. § 766.102. Just last year, we concluded that through chapter 766, the Legislature "has restricted plaintiffs'

ability to bring medical malpractice claims." Dockswell , 210 So.3d at 1205.

Because of the statutory restrictions and requirements that apply only to medical malpractice claims, any "doubt" as to whether a claim is for ordinary negligence or medical malpractice should be "generally resolved in favor of the claimant." J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola , 635 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla. 1994).

To resolve the issue in this case, we begin with the statutory definition of medical malpractice, enacted by the Legislature and interpreted by this Court and the district courts of appeal. We then examine how that statutory definition has been applied by courts tasked with determining whether a claim sounds in ordinary negligence or medical malpractice. Finally, we turn to address the conflict and facts presented in this case.

I. Medical Malpractice

The Legislature has defined a claim for medical negligence or medical malpractice as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). The Legislature has further provided that proving a medical malpractice claim requires establishing that the allegedly negligent act "represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care," as testified to by a qualified medical expert. Id. § 766.102(1); see id. § 766.102(5).

In Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc. , 601 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1992), we explained that the inquiry for determining whether a claim sounds in medical malpractice "is twofold: (1) whether the action arose out of 'medical ... diagnosis, treatment, or care,' and (2) whether such diagnosis, treatment, or care was rendered by a 'provider of health care.' " Id. at 1186 (alteration in original). Additionally, we determined that the words "diagnosis," "treatment," and "care" should be "accorded their plain and unambiguous meaning," explaining that, "[i]n ordinary, common parlance, the average person would understand 'diagnosis, treatment, or care' to mean ascertaining a patient's medical condition through examination and testing, prescribing and administering a course of action to effect a cure, and meeting the patient's daily needs during the illness." Id. at 1187. Moreover, "in order to determine whether the presuit requirements of chapter 766 apply, we look to whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102(1)." Integrated Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Lang-Redway , 840 So.2d 974, 980 (Fla. 2002).

At issue in Silva was whether blood banks were subject to the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions. 601 So.2d at 1186. We concluded that blood banks were not subject to the shortened statute of limitations because the allegations against the blood bank-including negligence and breach of its warranty regarding the representation that its blood was safe-did not arise "out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care." Id. at 1189 ; accord id. at 1187. We also rejected the blood bank's assertion that it was a health care provider, as defined by the Legislature, explaining:

We can find no indication that the legislature intended for blood banks to be considered "providers of health care" for purposes of the medical malpractice statute of limitations. Nor do we find it permissible generally to construe that term broadly. In the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, we are not at liberty to construe that term so as to deprive plaintiffs of their causes of action .

Id. at 1189 (emphasis added).

Consistent with our case law, the district courts have constructed additional principles for determining whether a claim sounds in ordinary negligence or medical malpractice. For example, the Fifth District has explained that the wrongful act from which the claim arises "must be directly related to the improper application of medical services and the use of professional judgment or skill." Joseph v. Univ. Behavioral LLC , 71 So.3d 913, 917 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Stated another way, "[t]he injury must be a direct result of receiving medical care or treatment by the healthcare provider." Quintanilla v. Coral Gables Hosp., Inc. , 941 So.2d 468, 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

In Joseph , relied on by the Fifth District in Townes , a psychiatric patient sued the psychiatric hospital for negligence after he was punched in the face by another patient. 71 So.3d at 915. This incident occurred after a previous altercation between the two patients, which led the patient who was ultimately injured to ask the hospital to separate him from the other patient. Id. The hospital did not. Id. The hospital argued that the decision to not separate the two patients "was a 'medical' decision" and that it "accordingly falls within the category of medical care and treatment for which compliance with the medical malpractice statute and statute of limitations were required." Id. at 919. The Fifth District properly rejected that argument, reasoning that nothing in the patients' deposition "suggest[ed] that any psychiatric treatment decisions resulted in his exposure to the injury he suffered." Id. at 919-20.

An additional principle discussed by the Fifth District in Joseph and other district courts of appeal is that merely because "a wrongful act occurs in a medical setting does not necessarily mean that it involves medical malpractice." Id. at 917 ; see Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Dumigan , 151 So.3d 1282, 1286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) ("It is axiomatic that the mere fact that a wrongful act occurs in a medical setting does not automatically transform the contested action into one that sounds in medical malpractice ...."); Lynn v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., Inc. , 692 So.2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) ("Merely because a wrongful act occurs in a medical setting does not necessarily mean that it involves medical malpractice."). This principle was highlighted in Quintanilla , where a patient, who was admitted to the hospital "complaining of a cough, shortness of breath, bronchitis and nasal congestion," brought a negligence action against the hospital after a nurse spilled scalding hot tea on him. 941 So.2d at 469. In support of its motion to dismiss the patient's complaint for failure to comply with the chapter 766 presuit requirements, the hospital filed the affidavit of a nurse practitioner who attested that "hot tea was a treatment modality for the cough associated with respiratory distress, and that the serving of food, fluids and other dietary and nutritional items, including hot tea, is part and parcel of medical care provided by the hospital staff to patients." Id.

On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal rejected the hospital's contention that "because the nurse used her medical judgment" in giving the patient hot tea, "the actual act of serving the hot tea amounts to a medical service," determining that this was "simply a claim that arises out of the act of serving a cup of hot tea." Id. at 470. In a common sense approach, the Third District cogently explained:

The process of serving tea did not involve medical skill or judgment. The injury is not a direct result of receiving medical care from the provider. Even though, arguably, the nurse may have used her medical judgment to agree with [the patient's] request for hot tea to help his condition, the process of serving the hot tea did not require medical skill or judgment. Not only was [the patient] not injured as a direct result of receiving medical care or treatment by the hospital employee, but in order to bring forth a claim of negligence, [the patient] would not have had to show that a hospital employee breached a prevailing professional standard of care which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by similar healthcare providers, and that such a breach was the cause of his injuries. There does not appear to be a medical standard of care for serving hot tea. Therefore, [the patient] was not required to comply with the medical malpractice pre-suit requirements.

Id. (citations omitted).

For these same reasons, the Fourth District Court of Appeal properly held that a claim arising out of an injury sustained by a dialysis patient when a hospital employee inadvertently kicked the patient's foot in an attempt to return the footrest of the patient's chair to the upright position sounded in ordinary negligence. Tenet St. Mary's Inc. v. Serratore , 869 So.2d 729, 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). The Fourth District explained that the claim did not "arise out of the receiving of medical care," nor did it require that the patient prove that the hospital employee's actions "deviated from an accepted standard of medical care" because "[t]here is clearly no professional standard of care involved in attempting to kick a footrest of the reclining chair to return it to its upright position." Id. at 731.

On the other hand, where a claim arose from injuries sustained while a patient was connected to physical therapy equipment, the Second District Court of Appeal properly concluded that the claim sounded in medical malpractice, since the injuries were "directly inflicted by the medical care-that is, physical therapy treatment" provided by the health care provider. Corbo v. Garcia , 949 So.2d 366, 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). The Second District reasoned that "[t]he medical negligence standard of care-that the alleged actions of the health care provider presented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care-must be proved in this case in order for [the patient] to obtain relief." Id. at 370.

In Goldman v. Halifax Medical Center, Inc. , 662 So.2d 367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), a similar case, relied on by the Second District in Corbo , the Fifth District held that a claim arising out of the application of excessive pressure while using mammographic equipment, which caused one of the plaintiff's breast implants to rupture, sounded in medical malpractice. Id. at 368. The Fifth District characterized the claim as "not unlike a claim that one was injured when a doctor used an unclean scalpel, a claim which would clearly fall within the realm of providing medical care." Id. at 370.

Our holding today flows naturally from these cases that faithfully construe the Legislature's definitions in chapter 766 and this Court's precedent. Accordingly, we hold that for a claim to sound in medical malpractice, the act from which the claim arises must be directly related to medical care or services, which require the use of professional judgment or skill. This inquiry involves determining whether proving the claim requires the plaintiff to establish that the allegedly negligent act "represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care," as testified to by a qualified medical expert. Our holding will allow ordinary negligence cases to proceed without requiring the plaintiff to obtain a presuit corroborating expert and follow the additional matrix of presuit procedures, while still advancing the Legislature's policy goals of encouraging the early settlement of meritorious and screening out frivolous medical malpractice claims. See Kukral v. Mekras , 679 So.2d 278, 284 (Fla. 1996).

We now turn to address the conflict in this case.

II. The Conflict

The National Deaf Academy argues that the Fifth District's decision in Townes , concluding that Townes's claim arising out of the TACT hold that led to Perry's injuries sounds in ordinary negligence, conflicts with Shands , where the First District held that a claim arising out of a psychiatric hospital employee leaving her badge and keys where a patient could access them, which led to that patient's death, sounded in medical malpractice. The National Deaf Academy asserts that, had the Fifth District followed the First District's reasoning in Shands , it would have properly determined that Townes's complaint set forth a claim for medical malpractice. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the First District applied an overly broad and attenuated standard for determining whether a claim sounds in medical malpractice.

In Shands , a patient was admitted to the locked unit at a psychiatric hospital. 175 So.3d at 328. After taking an employee's unattended badge and keys, the patient escaped from the hospital, eventually making her way onto a nearby highway where she was hit by a truck and killed. Id. at 329. The patient's estate sued the hospital, alleging that the hospital breached its "legal duty to confine [the patient] within the locked unit, where she had been admitted because her psychiatric condition demanded the safety and security of a 'locked unit.' " Id. at 331.

The First District framed the estate's claim as the failure to keep the patient "adequately confined within the locked unit as her condition required." Id. at 334. Framing the claim this way, the First District determined that "the proof required in this case will inevitably involve the medical negligence standard of care." Id. at 332. The First District reasoned that "[w]ithout the help of experts to establish what is acceptable, appropriate, and prudent in this psychiatric context, jurors cannot be expected to determine through common experience whether [the hospital] or its employee breached relevant standards."

Id. at 333. Thus, because the hospital failed to confine the patient to the hospital, "which was the very service that the locked unit existed to provide" and the service that the patient's condition required, the First District held that the estate's claim sounded in medical malpractice. Id. at 331.

We disagree with the First District's analysis in Shands . While it is true that the hospital failed to confine the patient to her locked unit, the estate's claim arose out of the hospital employee leaving her badge and keys unattended where the patient could access them, not out of any act directly related to medical care or services that required the use of professional judgment or skill. Thus, contrary to the First District's conclusion, medical expert testimony on the professional standard of care would not be necessary for the estate to prove its negligence claim. Id. at 332-33.

Construing what constitutes medical malpractice as broadly as the First District did in Shands would render essentially any claim arising out of a negligent act by a health care provider subject to the onerous presuit requirements in chapter 766 and the shortened statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims. As Judge Wolf observed dissenting in Shands , such a broad construction is inconsistent with the Legislature's clear purpose for instituting the presuit procedures:

The clear import of these extensive procedures [set forth in chapter 766] is to prevent frivolous second guessing of health care providers in their diagnosis of patients and their method of treatment of patients. The onerous procedures were not intended to provide unnecessary obstacles to injured parties attempting to institute claims against health care providers for simple carelessness. Indeed, requirements of extensive investigation and written medical expert opinions would make no sense in the context of simple careless acts, such as carelessly leaving one's keys where a patient can get them.

Id. at 343 (Wolf, J., dissenting).

Further, the Legislature chose to define medical malpractice as a claim arising out of the rendering of, or failure to render, "medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). The Legislature also made clear that proving a medical malpractice claim requires the testimony of a qualified medical expert that the alleged negligent act breached the prevailing professional standard of care. See id. § 766.102(1), (5). As we stated in Silva , "[i]n the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, we are not at liberty to construe" terms defined in chapter 766 "so as to deprive plaintiffs of their causes of action." 601 So.2d at 1189. Accordingly, only claims that arise out of an action or inaction directly related to medical care or services, which require the use of professional judgment or skill, sound in medical malpractice. We now turn to this case.

III. This Case

The National Deaf Academy argues that Townes's claim sounds in medical malpractice because the decision to include the use of TACT holds in Perry's plan of care was made by a medical doctor and medical expert testimony on the prevailing professional standard of care will be necessary to prove Townes's claim. We disagree.

Although it is undisputed that the decision to include the use of TACT holds in Perry's plan of care was made by a medical doctor, "the purpose of a TACT protective hold is to ensure the safety of the residents." Townes , 197 So.3d at 1136. Additionally, TACT training was not solely reserved for the National Deaf Academy's medical staff, as "non-medical personnel, such as sign language interpreters, also underwent TACT training." Id. Thus, the fact that a medical doctor made the decision to include TACT holds in Perry's care plan does not automatically transform the claim into one for medical malpractice because, as the Fifth District reasoned, administration of the TACT hold "did not require medical skill or judgment as non-medical staff were taught the procedure and were authorized to decide whether to employ it." Id.

Moreover, as one of the National Deaf Academy's nurses testified in deposition, a TACT hold is administered "to control an out-of-control resident" and "[t]o protect the resident from himself or herself, as well as protect the other residents from them if they are violent." Indeed, the TACT hold was only administered after Perry "eloped off campus," "began throwing rocks at [National Deaf Academy] staff and its buildings" upon her return, and "pulled on cables, wires, and lightning rods" in an attempt to dislodge them. Id. at 1133. Therefore, it cannot be said that when the National Deaf Academy staff administered the TACT hold on Perry in an attempt to stop her from throwing rocks at staff and pulling on lightning rods, they were "ascertaining [Perry's] medical condition through examination and testing, prescribing and administering a course of action to effect a cure, [or] meeting [Perry's] daily needs." Silva , 601 So.2d at 1187.

The gravamen of Townes's claim is that the National Deaf Academy, by and through its employees, negligently administered the TACT hold that led to Perry's injuries. Proving that claim will not require testimony from a medical expert on the professional standard of care. Therefore, because Townes's claim does not arise out of an act that is directly related to medical care or services, which require the use of professional judgment or skill, the Fifth District properly concluded that her claim does not allege medical malpractice, but ordinary negligence.

CONCLUSION

Limiting medical malpractice claims to those that are directly related to medical care or services, which require the use of professional judgment or skill, ensures that plaintiffs bringing claims of ordinary negligence are not subjected to the complex presuit procedures for medical malpractice claims, while still advancing the Legislature's policy goals of encouraging early settlement and screening out frivolous medical malpractice claims. In this case, because the administration of a TACT hold was not directly related to medical care or services, which require the use of professional judgment or skill, Townes's claim does not arise from medical malpractice, and her lawsuit is not barred by the two-year statute of limitations or her failure to comply with the presuit requirements set forth in chapter 766. For the same reasons, a claim arising out of a hospital employee leaving her keys and badge where a patient can access them does not sound in medical malpractice. Shands , 175 So.3d 327. Accordingly, we approve the Fifth District's decision in Townes , and disapprove of the First District's decision in Shands .

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result.

LAWSON, J., recused.

      While the 2008 version of the Florida Statutes applies to this case, the current version of the Florida Statutes is materially the same.

      In Shands , the patient's estate petitioned this Court for review based on conflict. However, before we made a determination on jurisdiction, the parties resolved the case and we approved the dismissal. See Estate of Lawson v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. , No. SC15-1827, 2016 WL 7007923 (Fla. Nov. 30, 2016).

      Townes is Perry's adult aunt.

      It is undisputed that the National Deaf Academy is not a health care provider, as defined in section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes (2008). However, the National Deaf Academy employs health care providers, such as psychiatrists and nurses. See Townes , 197 So.3d at 1133. "[U]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer of a health care provider also may be a 'prospective defendant' in a medical negligence action, even if the employer does not fall within the statutory definition of health care provider." Weinstock v. Groth , 629 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993). Thus, an employer "may be vicariously liable under the professional medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1) when its agent or employee, who is a health care provider, negligently renders medical care or services." Id.

      Townes's amended complaint also added four new counts. Townes , 197 So.3d at 1134. Counts III and IV alleged "alternative" claims of medical malpractice. The trial court also entered summary judgment on these counts because they were untimely, which the Fifth District affirmed. Id. That ruling is not at issue in this appeal.
      Counts V and VI of the amended complaint alleged violations of chapter 394, Florida Statutes (2008) ("The Florida Mental Health Act" or "The Baker Act"). Townes , 197 So.3d at 1134. As an additional argument, the National Deaf Academy contends that the Fifth District erred in holding that Counts V and VI in the amended complaint relate back to the original complaint. We exercise our discretion and decline to address this issue that is outside the scope of our conflict jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(1)(A)(iv) ; Marsh v. Valyou , 977 So.2d 543, 545 n.1 (Fla. 2007) (declining to address issue beyond the scope of the Court's conflict jurisdiction); Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. , 842 So.2d 797, 803 n.6 (Fla. 2003) (declining to address issues beyond the scope of the certified question).

      The National Deaf Academy also asserts conflict with South Miami Hospital, Inc. v. Perez , 38 So.3d 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), and Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Browne , 44 So.3d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). The complaint in Perez alleged that the patient fell from his hospital bed "while left unrestrained and unattended" in the critical care unit and the hospital failed to properly monitor/supervise the patient. Perez , 38 So.3d at 811. Likewise, in Browne , the complaint alleged that the hospital "failed to follow hospital rules, policies, or procedures intended to protect patients from falling," failed to engage or properly secure the stretcher's side guardrails, and failed to adequately supervise the patient, given his disoriented and confused state upon arrival to the emergency room. Browne , 44 So.3d at 238. Perez and Browne fall into a gray area. Whether the kinds of claims presented in those cases sound in ordinary or medical negligence depends on both the specific circumstances under which the injury occurred and the allegations in the pleadings. Because we conclude that the facts of those cases are sufficiently distinguishable from this case and Shands , we neither approve nor disapprove them. However, we reiterate that the fact an injury occurs in a hospital does not automatically transform the claim into one for medical malpractice.

      This requirement does not apply to cases where a foreign body is discovered, because such a discovery "shall be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the health care provider." § 766.102(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; see Dockswell , 210 So.3d at 1205-06 ("The foreign-body presumption of negligence ... has survived throughout the legislative amendments restricting the ability of medical malpractice plaintiffs to bring claims.").


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Carlos L. WOODSON a/k/a Carlo L. Woodson, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC18-201
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [April 26, 2018]
    Carlos L. Woodson a/k/a Carlo L. Woodson, pro se, Bonifay, Florida, for Petitioner
    No appearance for Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

Carlos L. Woodson, an inmate in state custody, filed a pro se petition to invoke this Court's all writs jurisdiction. His petition in this case is the fourteenth extraordinary writ petition or notice he has filed with this Court since 1999. It is the sixth extraordinary writ petition he has filed in the last twelve months. We dismissed Woodson's petition in this case and, in doing so, expressly retained jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against him. Woodson v. State , No. SC18-201, 2018 WL 920005 (Fla. Feb. 16, 2018) (order dismissing all writs petition and directing Woodson to show cause why pro se filing restrictions should not be imposed); see Fla. R. App. P. 9.410(a) (Sanctions; Court's Motion).

Woodson was convicted in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, in case number 131996CF0051580001XX, of one count of burglary with an assault or battery therein while armed, and two counts of sexual battery committed with a deadly weapon or force. He was sentenced in January 1998 to forty-five years' imprisonment on each count. Woodson's convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Third District Court of Appeal on direct appeal. Woodson v. State , 739 So.2d 1210 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). All of Woodson's filings in this Court seeking to challenge these convictions and sentences have been frivolous, devoid of merit, or inappropriate for consideration by this Court. We have never granted Woodson the relief sought by him in any of his filings.

Woodson's all writs petition in this case is no exception. In it, Woodson challenged the Third District Court of Appeal's 1999 decision in his direct appeal, arguing that the court wrongfully failed to address his challenge to the validity of the charging information. Woodson requested that the Court compel the Third District Court of Appeal to rule on the merits of a claim it previously determined was not properly preserved for appellate review. Because Woodson failed to cite an independent basis that would allow the Court to exercise its all writs authority, we dismissed the petition pursuant to Williams v. State , 913 So.2d 541 (Fla. 2005), and St. Paul Title Insurance Corp. v. Davis , 392 So.2d 1304 (Fla. 1980), and in accordance with State v. Spencer , 751 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1999), we directed Woodson to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any future pro se requests for relief in this Court pertaining to case numbers 131996CF0051580001XX and 3D98-430. In his response to the show cause order, Woodson continued to raise the same arguments raised in his previous petitions before this Court concerning the Third District Court of Appeal's 1999 decision in his direct appeal. Upon due consideration of Woodson's response, we find that his arguments are without merit.

This Court has exercised its inherent authority to sanction litigants who abuse the judicial process and burden its limited resources with repeated requests for relief that are either frivolous or devoid of merit. E.g. , Hastings v. State , 79 So.3d 739, 742 (Fla. 2011) ; Johnson v. Rundle , 59 So.3d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 2011). Through his persistent filing of frivolous or meritless requests for relief, Woodson has abused the judicial process and burdened this Court's limited judicial resources. Woodson's response to this Court's order to show cause failed to offer any justification for his abuse or to express regret for his repeated misuse of this Court's resources. Woodson does not appreciate or respect the judicial process or this Court's limited judicial resources. See Pettway v. McNeil , 987 So.2d 20, 22 (Fla. 2008) (explaining that this Court has previously "exercised the inherent judicial authority to sanction an abusive litigant" and that "[o]ne justification for such a sanction lies in the protection of the rights of others to have the Court conduct timely reviews of their legitimate filings"). We are therefore convinced that, if not restrained, Woodson will continue to abuse the judicial process and burden this Court with frivolous and meritless filings pertaining to case numbers 131996CF0051580001XX and 3D98-430.

Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Carlos L. Woodson that pertain to case numbers 131996CF0051580001XX and 3D98-430, unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. Under the sanction herein imposed, Woodson may only petition this Court about case numbers 131996CF0051580001XX and 3D98-430 when such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar whenever such counsel determines that the proceeding may have merit and can be filed in good faith.

Additionally, we find that the petition filed by Carlos L. Woodson in this case is a frivolous proceeding brought before this Court by a state prisoner. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). Consistent with section 944.279(1), Florida Statutes (2017), we direct the Clerk of this Court to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the Department of Corrections' institution or facility where Woodson is incarcerated. See Steele v. State , 14 So.3d 221, 224 (Fla. 2009).

No motion for rehearing or clarification will be entertained by the Court.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. Const.

      See Woodson v. State , No. SC17-2144, 2018 WL 456159 (Fla. Jan. 17, 2018) (all writs petition dismissed); Woodson v. Jones , No. SC17-1702, 2017 WL 4876594 (Fla. Oct. 30, 2017) (habeas petition denied); Woodson v. State , No. SC17-1089, 2017 WL 3821282 (Fla. Sept. 1, 2017) (mandamus petition denied); Woodson v. Jones , No. SC17-643, 2017 WL 1788034 (Fla. May 5, 2017) (habeas petition dismissed); Woodson v. Jones , No. SC17-188, 2017 WL 822369 (Fla. Mar. 2, 2017) (habeas petition dismissed); Woodson v. State , No. SC16-1406, 2016 WL 6584675 (Fla. Oct. 5, 2016) (mandamus petition dismissed); Woodson v. State , No. SC16-1280, 2016 WL 3918606 (Fla. July 20, 2016) (mandamus petition dismissed); Woodson v. Jones , No. SC16-723, 2016 WL 2932002 (Fla. May 18, 2016) (habeas petition denied); Woodson v. Rundle-Fernandez , 19 So.3d 987 (Fla. 2009) (table) (quo warranto petition denied); Woodson v. State , No. SC08-2384, 2009 WL 427298 (Fla. Feb. 19, 2009) (mandamus petition denied); Woodson v. State , 977 So.2d 579 (Fla. 2008) (table) (petition for review dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Woodson v. State , 796 So.2d 539 (Fla. 2001) (table) (petition for review denied); Woodson v. State, 749 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1999) (table) (petition for review denied).


text:
    IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.220.
    No. SC17-2004
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [May 10, 2018]
    Judge Jon Berkley Morgan, Chair, Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, Kissimmee, Florida, Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, and Heather Savage Telfer, Staff Liaison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
   PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court for consideration of the out-of-cycle report of The Florida Bar's Criminal Procedure Rules Committee (Committee), proposing an amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 (Discovery). See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.140(e). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 pertains to discovery in criminal cases. Subdivision (d) addresses a defendant's obligation upon electing to participate in reciprocal discovery. The Committee proposes amending subdivision (d)(1)(B)(ii) of rule 3.220 to require that only reports or statements of experts that the defendant intends to use at a hearing or at trial must be disclosed to the prosecutor. The Committee explains that the amendment is necessary based on the decision in Kidder v. State , 117 So.3d 1166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), which held that the plain language of the rule "requires a defendant to disclose and permit the inspection and copying of 'reports or statements of experts made in connection with the particular case, including results of ... scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons.' " 117 So.3d at 1169-70. Thus, Kidder was required to disclose the results of a blood alcohol test, irrespective of the fact that she did not intend to use the report at trial.

After considering the Committee's proposal, we amend Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(d) as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring. The amendment shall become effective immediately upon the release of this opinion.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 3.220. DISCOVERY

(a)-(c) [No Change]

(d) Defendant's Obligation.

(1) If a defendant elects to participate in discovery, either through filing the appropriate notice or by participating in any discovery process, including the taking of a discovery deposition, the following disclosures shall be made:

(A) [No change]

(B) Within 15 days after receipt of the prosecutor's Discovery Exhibit the defendant shall serve a written Discovery Exhibit which shall disclose to and permit the prosecutor to inspect, copy, test, and photograph the following information and material that is in the defendant's possession or control:

(i) the statement of any person listed in subdivision (d)(1)(A), other than that of the defendant;

(ii) reports or statements of experts , that the defendant intends to use as a witness at a trial or hearing, made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons; and

(iii) any tangible papers or objects that the defendant intends to use in the hearing or trial.

(2)-(3) [No changes]

(e)-(o) [No changes]

Committee Notes
[No changes]

Court Commentary
[No changes]


text:
    FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: F.J.
    CASE NO.: SC16-830
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    MAY 7, 2018
    Upon consideration of F.J.'s petition for review and the briefs filed in this case, as well as F.J.'s response to the order to show cause, it is ordered that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners is approved. F.J.'s petition is hereby denied, and F.J. shall not be admitted to The Florida Bar at this time. However, the Court disapproves the Florida Board of Bar Examiners' recommendation that F.J. be disqualified from reapplying for admission for a period of two years from April 1, 2016. F.J. shall be disqualified from reapplying for admission for a period of five years from May 7, 2018.
    LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO CANON 6 OF the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.
    No. SC18-648
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [May 10, 2018]
   PER CURIAM.

The Court, on its own motion, amends the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code) to clarify the Canon 6A(3) public reporting requirement for the reimbursement or direct payment of expenses, and waiver of fees or charges associated with a judge's participation in quasi-judicial and extrajudicial activities permitted by the Code.

In a recent advisory opinion, the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee (JEAC) concluded that Canon 6A(3) requires a judge who attends a quasi-judicial activity, like one of the annual, statewide conferences of judges, to report the reimbursement or direct payment of the judge's travel expenses by the State of Florida, if the reimbursement or payment exceeds $100 individually or combined with other such reimbursements or direct payments in the same calendar year. See Fla. JEAC Op. 2018-7, at 4-5. In the same advisory opinion, the JEAC advised that Canon 6A(3) requires a judge, who is designated by a conference of judges to travel to Tallahassee concerning legislative matters, to report the reimbursement and direct payment of the judge's travel expenses, if they exceed $100 from the same source in the same calendar year. Id. at 5.

In 2017, when the Court amended Canon 6 to require a judge to report the reimbursement or direct payment of expenses, and the waiver of fees or charges associated with the judge's participation in quasi-judicial and extrajudicial activities permitted by the Code, the Court did not intend to require the reporting of the reimbursement or direct payment of expenses by the State or a judicial branch entity, such as one of conferences of judges recognized by this Court in Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.220 (Conferences of Judges). There is no need for such public reporting because in order for the State or a judicial branch entity to reimburse or pay the reasonable expenses associated with a judge's participation in a permitted quasi-judicial activity, the judge's participation in the event or activity must be among the responsibilities of that judicial office and promote the official business of the court system or the specific judicial branch entity. And, therefore, the reimbursement or payment of such expenses would be a public record under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420.

Therefore, we amend Canon 6A(3) and Form 6A to clarify that a judge must only report expense reimbursements and direct payments, and waivers of fees or charges, as required by Canons 6A(3) and 6B(2), when the reimbursement, payment, or waiver is from a source other than the State or a judicial branch entity, as defined in Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420(b)(2). We also amend the Commentary to Canon 6A to explain that the Canon 6A(3) reporting requirement is similar to the reporting requirement in Rule 3.15(A)(3) of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2011), which requires a judge to report expense reimbursements and fee waivers associated with the judge's participation in permitted extrajudicial activities, from sources other than the judge's employing entity, when the amount received from same source in the same calendar year exceeds a specified amount. We further amend the Commentary to Canon 6A to emphasize that a judge does not have to report the amount of the reimbursement, payment, or waiver on Form 6A; only the dates, location, and purpose of the event or activity for which expenses were reimbursed or paid or fees were waived must be reported.

Accordingly, we amend the Code of Judicial Conduct, as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring and deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The amendments are effective immediately upon the release of this opinion. Because the amendments were not published for comment prior to their adoption, interested persons shall have sixty days from the date of this opinion in which to file comments with the Court. The Court encourages the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, the Conference of District Court of Appeal Judges, the Conference of Circuit Court Judges, and the Conference of County Court Judges to comment on the amendments.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

Appendix APPENDIX

Canon 6. Fiscal Matters of a Judge Shall be Conducted in a Manner That Does Not Give the Appearance of Influence or Impropriety; a Judge Shall Regularly File Public Reports as Required by Article II, Section 8, of the Constitution of Florida, and Shall Publicly Report Gifts, Expense Reimbursements and Payments, and Waivers of Fees or Charges; Additional Financial Information Shall be Filed With the Judicial Qualifications Commission to Ensure Full Financial Disclosure

A. Compensation for Quasi-Judicial and Extrajudicial Services, Reimbursement or Payment of Expenses, and Waiver of Fees or Charges.

A judge may accept compensation, reimbursement, or direct payment of expenses, and a waiver or partial waiver of fees or charges for registration, tuition, and similar items associated with the judge's participation in quasi-judicial and extrajudicial activities permitted by this Code, if the source of such payments, or waiver does not give the appearance of influencing the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety, subject to the following restrictions:

(1) Compensation. Compensation shall not exceed a reasonable amount nor shall it exceed what a person who is not a judge would receive for the same activity. Compensation is reportable as income under Canon 6B(1).

(2) Honoraria and Speaking Fees. A judge may accept honoraria and speaking fees that are reasonable and commensurate with the task performed. Honoraria and speaking fees are reportable as income under Canon 6B(1).

(3) Reimbursement or Payment of Expenses, and Waiver of Fees or Charges. Expense reimbursement shall be limited to the actual cost of travel, food, and lodging reasonably incurred by the judge and, where appropriate to the occasion, to the judge's spouse. Any payment in excess of such an amount is compensation and is reportable as income under Canon 6B(1). Reimbursement or direct payment of expenses, and waiver or partial waiver of fees or charges for the judge or the judge's spouse or guest,from sources other than the state or a judicial branch entity as defined in Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420(b)(2), the amount of which alone or in the aggregate with other reimbursements, payments, or waivers received from the same source in the same calendar year exceeds $100, shall be reported under Canon 6B(2).

B. - D. [No Change]

COMMENTARY

Canon 6A. See Section 5D(5)(a)-(h) regarding reporting of gifts, bequests and loans.

The Code does not prohibit a judge from accepting honoraria or speaking fees provided that the compensation is reasonable and commensurate with the task performed. A judge should ensure, however, that no conflicts are created by the arrangement. Judges must not appear to trade on the judicial position for personal advantage. Nor should a judge spend significant time away from court duties to meet speaking or writing commitments for compensation. In addition, the source of the payment must not raise any question of undue influence or the judge's ability or willingness to be impartial.

Canon 6A(3) requires a judge to report expense reimbursements or payments, and fee waivers from sources other than the state or a judicial branch entity, when the amount received alone or combined with other reimbursements, payments, or waivers received from the same source in the same calendar year exceeds $100. Cf. Model Code of Jud. Conduct rs. 3.14(A), 3.15(A)(3) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2011) (requiring the reporting of expense reimbursements and fee waivers from "sources other than the judge's employing entity," when the individual or combined amount received from the same source in a calendar year exceeds a specified amount). The Canon 6A(3) reporting requirementfor expense reimbursements and payments, and waivers of fees or charges is similar to the reporting requirement for expense reimbursements and waivers in Rule 3.15(A)(3) of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2011), in that reimbursements, payments, and waivers must be reported if the amount of reimbursement, payment, or waiver, alone or in the aggregate with other reimbursements, payments, or waivers received from the same source in the same calendar year, exceeds the specified amount of $100. However, unlike the model rule, the amount of a reportable reimbursement, payment, or waiver does not have to be reported on Form 6A, but. Unlike gifts, the amount of which must be reported on that form, only the dates, location, and purpose of the event or activity for which expenses, fees, or charges were reimbursed, paid, or waived must be reported.

Canons 6B and 6C. Subparagraph A prescribes guidelines for additional compensation, reimbursements, or direct payments of expenses, and waivers of fees or charges accepted by a judge.

Subparagraphs B and C prescribe the three types of financial disclosure reports required of each judicial officer. The filing of the disclosure reports required under Canon 6B is the only public disclosure of financial interests, compensation, gifts, expense reimbursements, or other benefits that a judge is required to make under this Code or the Florida Constitution. By filing the required disclosure reports, a judge fulfills all the expectations of conduct, and ethical and constitutional requirements related to such disclosure.

The first disclosure report is the Ethics Commission's constitutionally required form pursuant to Article II, Section 8, of the Constitution. It must be filed each year as prescribed by law. The financial reporting period is for the previous calendar year. A final disclosure statement generally is required when a judge leaves office. The filing of the income tax return is a permissible alternative.

The second is a report of gifts, reimbursements or direct payments of expenses, and waivers of fees or charges accepted during the preceding calendar year to be filed publicly with the Florida Commission on Ethics. The gifts to be reported are in accordance with Canons 5D(5)(a) and 5D(5)(h). The expense reimbursements and payments, and waivers to be reported are in accordance with Canon 6A(3). This reporting is in lieu of that prescribed by statute as stated in the Supreme Court's opinion rendered inIn re Code of Judicial Conduct, 281 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1973). The form for this report is as follows:

Form 6A. Disclosure of Gifts, Expense Reimbursements or Payments, and Waivers of Fees and Charges

All judicial officers must file with the Florida Commission on Ethics a list of all reportable gifts accepted,and reimbursements or direct payments of expenses, and waivers of fees or charges accepted from sources other than the state or a judicial branch entity as defined in Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420(b)(2), during the preceding calendar year as provided in Canons 5D(5)(a) and 5D(5)(h), Canon 6A(3), and Canon 6B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, by date received, description (including dates, location, and purpose of event or activity for which expenses, fees, or charges were reimbursed, paid, or waived), source's name, and amount for gifts only.

Name: ________________________ Work Telephone: ______________ Work Address: ________________ Judicial Office Held: ________

1. Please identify all reportable gifts, bequests, favors, or loans you received during the preceding calendar year, as required by Canons 5D(5)(a), 5D(5)(h), and 6B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

DATE DESCRIPTION SOURCE AMOUNT ________ ____________ ________ ________ ________ ____________ ________ ________ ________ ____________ ________ ________ ________ ____________ ________ ________ [] Check here if continued on separate sheet

2. Please identify all reportable reimbursements or direct payments of expenses, and waivers of fees or charges you received during the preceding calendar year, as required by Canons 6A(3) and 6B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

DATE DESCRIPTION SOURCE (Include dates, location, and purpose of event or activity for which expenses, fees, or charges were reimbursed, paid, or waived) ________ ______________________________________________ _______________ ________ ______________________________________________ _______________ ________ ______________________________________________ _______________ ________ ______________________________________________ _______________ ________ ______________________________________________ _______________ [] Check here if continued on separate sheet

OATH

State of Florida County of ________________ I, _________________, the public official filing this disclosure statement, being first duly sworn, do depose on oath and say that the facts set forth in the above statement are true, correct, and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. __________________________________________________________ (Signature of Reporting Official) __________________________________________________________ (Signature of Officer Authorized to Administer Oaths) My Commission expires _______________________ Sworn to and subscribed before me this _________________ day of ___________________, 20 _______

COMMENTARY

The third financial disclosure report is prescribed in subparagraph C. This provision ensures that there will be complete financial information for all judicial officers available with the Judicial Qualifications Commission by requiring that full disclosure be filed confidentially with the Judicial Qualifications Commission in the event the limited disclosure alternative is selected under the provisions of Article II, Section 8.

The amendment to this Canon requires in 6B(2) a separate gift report to be filed with the Florida Commission on Ethics on or before July 1 of each year. The form to be used for that report is included in the commentary to Canon 6. It should be noted that Canon 5, as it presently exists, restricts and prohibits the acceptance of certain gifts. This provision is not applicable to other public officials.

With reference to financial disclosure, if the judge chooses the limited disclosure alternative available under the provision of Article II, Section 8, of the Constitution of Florida, without the inclusion of the judge's Federal Income Tax Return, then the judge must file with the Commission a list of the names of corporations or other business entities in which the judge has a financial interest even though the amount is less than $1,000. This information remains confidential until a request is made by a party to a cause before the judge. This latter provision continues to ensure that complete financial information for all judicial officers is available with the Judicial Qualifications Commission and that parties who are concerned about a judge's possible financial interest have a means of obtaining that information as it pertains to a particular cause before the judge.

Canon 6D. [No Change]

      We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

      In In re Amendments to the Code of Judicial Conduct , 218 So.3d 432, 436-39 (Fla. 2017), the Court amended Canons 6A(3) (retitled "Reimbursement or Payment of Expenses, and Waiver of Fees or Charges") and 6B(2) (retitled "Gifts, Reimbursements or Payments of Expenses, and Waivers of Fees or Charges"), and Form 6A (retitled "Disclosure of Gifts, Expense Reimbursements or Payments, and Waivers of Fees and Charges") to require a judge to report the reimbursement or direct payment of expenses, and the waiver of fees or charges associated with the judge's participation in quasi-judicial and extrajudicial activities permitted by the Code, when the amount of the reimbursement, payment, or waiver alone or in the aggregate with other reimbursements, payments, or waivers received from the same source in the same calendar year exceeds $100.

      Under rule 2.420(b)(2), the judicial branch of government "includes the state courts system, the clerk of court when acting as an arm of the court, The Florida Bar, the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, the Judicial Qualifications Commission, and all other entities established by or operating under the authority of the supreme court or the chief justice."

      All comments must be filed with the Court on or before July 9, 2018, with a separate request for oral argument if the person filing the comment wishes to participate in oral argument, which may be scheduled in this case. If filed by an attorney in good standing with The Florida Bar, the comment must be electronically filed via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal (Portal) in accordance with In re Electronic Filing in the Supreme Court of Florida via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal , Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC13-7 (Feb. 18, 2013). If filed by a nonlawyer or a lawyer not licensed to practice in Florida, the comment may be, but is not required to be, filed via the Portal. Comments filed via the Portal must be submitted in Microsoft Word 97 or higher. See In re Electronic Filing in the Florida Supreme Court , Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC17-27 (May 9, 2017). Any person unable to submit a comment electronically must mail or hand-deliver the originally signed comment to the Florida Supreme Court, Office of the Clerk, 500 South Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1927; no additional copies are required or will be accepted.


text:
    IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES-REPORT 2016-07.
    No. SC16-1430
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [May 10, 2018]
    Judge F. Rand Wallis, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Bart Schneider, Staff Liaison, Office of the State Courts Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
   PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee) has submitted a proposed change to standard jury instruction 29.25 (Human Trafficking by a [Parent] [Legal Guardian] [Person with Custody or Control] of a Minor), and asks that the Court authorize the amended standard instruction for publication and use. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

The Committee submitted its report in this case, proposing amendments to a number of the standard criminal jury instructions. On August 10, 2016, the Clerk's Office issued an order directing that the proposal pertaining to instruction 29.24 (Human Trafficking), be severed from the remaining proposals, to be considered under the Court's fast-track procedures because the statute that prompted amendments to instruction 29.24 would become effective October 1, 2016. See § 787.06(8), Fla. Stat. (2016).

In addition, the Committee brought to the Court's attention that there were two cases pending review in the Court that involved issues pertinent to the Committee's report. Accordingly, we issued a stay in this case, pending resolution of those other cases. The Committee later sought to have the stay lifted, and to withdraw instructions 11.7, 11.10, 11.10(a)-11.10(g), 11.11, 11.12, 11.18, and 29.13(c). We granted that motion on February 26, 2018. We now proceed with our consideration of the Committee's proposal to amend instruction 29.25.

The Committee proposes adding a section to instruction 29.25 including a definition for "Lack of Chastity," which is based upon chapter 2016-199, section 4, Laws of Florida, creating section 787.06(10), Florida Statutes (now section 787.06(11), Florida Statutes (2017) ). Having considered the Committee's report and the applicable legislative amendment, we authorize instruction 29.25 for publication and use as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underlining. In authorizing the publication and use of instruction 29.25, we express no opinion on its correctness and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instruction. We further caution all interested parties that any comment associated with the instruction reflects only the opinion of the Committee and is not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to its correctness or applicability. The instruction as set forth in the appendix shall become effective when this opinion becomes final.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

Attachment

APPENDIX

29.25 HUMAN TRAFFICKING BY A [PARENT] [LEGAL GUARDIAN] [PERSON WITH CUSTODY OR CONTROL] OF A MINOR § 787.06(4), Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Human Trafficking By a [Parent] [Legal Guardian] [Person With Custody or Control] of a Minor, the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant) [was a parent] [was a legal guardian] [had custody or control] of (victim).
2. (Defendant) [sold or otherwise transferred custody or control of (victim)] [offered to sell or offered to otherwise transfer custody of (victim)].
3. (Defendant) did so [knowing] [or] [in reckless disregard of the fact] that as a consequence of the sale or transfer, (victim) would be subjected to human trafficking.
4. At the time, (victim) was under the age of 18 years.

Definitions.

Give in all cases.

§ 787.06(2)(d), Fla. Stat.

"Human trafficking" means [transporting] [soliciting] [recruiting] [harboring] [providing] [enticing] [maintaining] [or] [obtaining] another person for the purpose of exploitation of that person.

§ 787.06(2)(f), Fla. Stat.

"Maintain" means in relation to labor or services, to secure or make possible continued performance thereof, regardless of any initial agreement on the part of a victim to perform such type service.

§ 787.06(2)(g), Fla. Stat.

"Obtain" means, in relation to labor or services, to secure performance thereof.

Give if requested. § 787.06(11), Fla. Stat.

(Victim's) lack of chastity or the willingness or consent of (victim) is not a defense if [he] [she] was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense.

Lesser Included Offenses

No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense.

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 2013 [131 So.3d 692] and amended in 2015 [176 So.3d 938], and 2018.

      The Court subsequently released its opinion in that case, authorizing instruction 29.24 for publication and use as proposed. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Instruction 29.24 , 200 So.3d 754 (Fla. 2016).

      The amendments as reflected in the appendix are to the Criminal Jury Instructions as they appear on the Court's website at www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/instructions.shtml. We recognize that there may be minor discrepancies between the instructions as they appear on the website and the published versions of the instructions. Any discrepancies as to instructions authorized for publication and use after October 25, 2007, should be resolved by reference to the published opinion of this Court authorizing the instruction.


text:
    FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: K.V.B.
    CASE NO.: SC18-679
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    MAY 9, 2018
    The Joint Stipulation to Extend Probation is approved and the probationary period imposed against K.V.B. in Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: K.V.B. , 177 So.3d 607 (Fla. 2015), is extended until May 9, 2023, under the existing terms and conditions with the added conditions that K.V.B. immediately obtain an AA sponsor and do the step work involved in the AA program, effective immediately.
    The filing of a motion for rehearing shall not alter the effective date of this probation.
    A True Copy
    Test:
    John A. Tomasino
    Clerk, Supreme Court


text:
    Brianna ARMOUR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4710
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Eddie WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4733
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 22, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 29, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Elliot Demon SHEFFIELD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5227
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 19, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Edwin WINFORD, Appellant, v. Stephanie ANDERSON, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5631
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 29, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Christopher K. TALBERT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4045
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kenneth BARBER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3765
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Willie Ray MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1856
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Harold N. FAUST, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-947
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Darlene MITCHEM, owner of All My Children Day Care Center, All My Children Day Care Center 2, and All My Children Learning Center, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-4633
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   DENIED.


text:
    Michael Anthony HAYES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-932
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    John K. WEBB, Appellant, v. REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION and Air Force Personnel Center, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-205
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Christopher Lynn CORMIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5787
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Normond L. HALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-604
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Christopher Joseph Wayne BEASLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5223
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kimberly CANNON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4720
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    M.H.S., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-966
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Walter P. JENKINS, Appellant, v. John POWER, as Tax Collector for Alachua County, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-515
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Andre Renard DOYLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-4626
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jakari Okalawon CLARK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2168
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Darrell B. WESLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5668
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Clayton AUSTIN, Appellant, v. Cynthia M. AUSTIN n/k/a Cynthia M. Wardlaw, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1557
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    WINBAR LLC, Appellant, v. Rabia Ardan MORRIS, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2246
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Alejandro Ramos RIOS, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D16-4783
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   DENIED.


text:
    Andre FULLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-2832
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.B., father of M.M.B., minor child, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5042
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Bobby L. MAGWOOD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4644
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David Earl GORDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4225
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    ORANGE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS and Johns Eastern Company, Inc., Appellant, v. Gina YAEGER, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2399
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 2, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 4, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Steven DONEHOO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1048
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 2, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Charles E. CANNON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-0840
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    James HUNT, Appellant, v. HEALTH FIRST HRMC and USIS, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-665
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ronnie Fay STOOKEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5510
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Troy MANN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5051
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Johnnie Anthony GETTIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4709
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Edith RENFROE, Appellant, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, et al., Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3038
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ronnie Fay STOOKEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5509
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jonathon JACOBS, Appellant, v. Joseph Michael NACKASHI, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2978
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Janice Lynn UNWIN, Former Wife, Appellant, v. John McClendon CARVER, Former Husband, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2601
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Rolando ANDRADE, Appellant, v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, and Shell Oil Company/ESIS WC Claims, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-2221
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Darrius WORTHEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-655
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John Carlton CHERRY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4855
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Joseph Glenn SAVICKI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3484
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 9, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ross D. EMERY, Appellant, v. TYCO INTEGRATED SECURITY, LLC and Sedgwick CMS, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-3408
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Darrius WORTHEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-653
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony Maurice CREWS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0014
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 3, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 16, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kesario Leonard JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-245
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 3, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 16, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.D., mother of J. M., a child, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3326
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 14, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Everett BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-0386
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 9, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    John GAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4938
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 16, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John GAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4935
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 16, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David V. MURPHY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-402
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Steven O. SCOTT, DOC #529583 Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4213
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 14, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    SUTHERLAND HOLDINGS II, LLC ; Old Tampa Bay Seafood Company, LLC ; and Brian Storman, Appellants, v. PINELLAS COUNTY, Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1295
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    M & T BANK, Appellant, v. Carlos MONGIELLO; Beatriz Mesa a/k/a Beatriz Cecilia Mesa; and Tara Cay III Homeowner's Association Inc., Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-2180
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 28, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Joshua Ray CANTRILL and Leray Cantrill, Petitioners, v. Kristopher Scott FERRIS, Respondent.
    Case No. 2D17-2417
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 23, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    E.J.L., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4259
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 16, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    FLORIDA FIRST FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Appellant, v. BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2431
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 28, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.Z.B., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2522
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Stuart ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. James F. ALLEN and Hertel Park Associates I, LLC, a New York limited liability company, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-2654
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.M.B., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2665
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Stuart ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. James F. ALLEN and Hertel Park Associates I, LLC, a New York limited liability company, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-406
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sanford Benjamin GLOSTER, DC# D07542, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2961
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Charles W. BURNSED, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2966
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Glenn Wade HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3004
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    James PALMER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2484
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Benedict MOHIT, individually and as trustee for Gita Nagassar Mohit Family Trust, Appellant, v. CITY OF HAINES CITY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5384
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Eric WORTHY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3177
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Carmen A. ZAMMIELLO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3561
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Louis FERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-874
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Richard R. MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-102
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gregory Germonty MCCLURE, DOC# C06645, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case Nos. 2D17-1453
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Shamel THOMAS, DOC# E07855, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2366
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Roland PRENATT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2382
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kenneth Roy BALDWIN, DOC# Y01245, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case Nos. 2D17-2498
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David Keith WAGNER, DOC# R80101, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case Nos. 2D17-2520
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Christopher Valentine HIBBERT, DOC #H38940, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2535
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.C.P.-H., Appellant, v. I.R.-M., Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1039
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Johnnie ADDERLY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2423
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Carlton D. HOLLIMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3013
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Willie J. CLARK, DOC #472050, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3547
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rosel Falcon HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4032
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    TAM HOAI TRUONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-148
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Itiba DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2537
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Joseph Gerard JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-212
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 26, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Stephanie MEACHAM, Appellant, v. Linh M. TRAN, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1800
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Odell HALL, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3300
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael COLLINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3394
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018. Rehearing Denied March 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Andrew PANZO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3406
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    James JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3454
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Charles Angus FERGUSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2240
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert Lee HOWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case Nos. 2D16-3952 2D16-3953
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Wesley BOOKER, a/k/a Wesley K. Booker, Jr., a/k/a Wesley Keith Booker, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5242
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    NATIONAL AUTO PROPERTIES, INC., a Florida corporation; Carol J. Levin, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Leonard D. Levin, deceased; Durant Holdings, LLC ; and Bedford Investments, LLC, Appellants, v. F/R 550, LLC, a Florida limited liability company and F/R 3329, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D16-5638
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antoine D. JELKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2547
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brian M. CHIPMAN, DOC #R16382, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2742
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Billy Joe ACOSTA, DOC #Y52258, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3184
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Darnell James WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3306
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Paul G. MEAD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3317
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David W. PRICE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3591
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Leroy JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3609
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Henry SCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3949
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lwane MANSELL, a/k/a Lwane A. Mansell, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4131
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    GULF COAST MEDICAL PARK, LLC, a Florida limited liability company and Magnus Karlstedt, individually, Appellants, v. GULF COAST LORAIN PARTNERS, LLC, a limited liability company and LOROH, LP, an Ohio limited partnership, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D16-4786
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.A., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5231
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brandon Dakota WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1910
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Thomas L. MANUEL, a/k/a Thomas L. Manuel, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2538
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael PARENT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2590
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Walter E. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3330
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Phillip Craig DESMUKE, DOC #18788, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1102
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Christopher BARTSCH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3396
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Timothy J. DAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3484
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018. Rehearing Denied March 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antoine D. JELKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3565
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.