author: PER CURIAM. POLSTON, J., concurring. CANADY, J., dissenting.

text:
    Alexis CANTORE, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. WEST BOCA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., etc., et al., Respondents.
    No. SC15-1926
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [April 26, 2018]
    Philip M. Burlington and Andrew A. Harris of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; Scott Schlesinger and Linda A. Alley of Schlesinger Law Offices, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Petitioner
    Bruce M. Ramsey and Donna Krusbe of Billing, Cochran, Lyles, Mauro & Ramsey, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; Elliot H. Scherker, Julissa Rodriguez, and Stephanie L. Varela of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, Florida; Scott Solomon and Norman Waas of Falk, Waas, Hernandez, Cortina, Solomon & Bonner, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida, for Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

Because the treating physician's deposition testimony regarding how he would have treated Alexis Cantore had she arrived at Miami Children's Hospital earlier was inadmissible, we quash the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Cantore v. West Boca Medical Center, Inc. , 174 So.3d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

BACKGROUND

In July 2008, Alexis Cantore suffered permanent brain damage while being treated for hydrocephalus at West Boca Medical Center (WBMC) and Miami Children's Hospital (MCH). The Fourth District described the background of this case as follows:

In 2006, two years before the illness that gave rise to this case, when Alexis Cantore was twelve years old, she was diagnosed with hydrocephalus, a condition resulting from a build-up of excess cerebral spinal fluid within the cranium. Her condition resulted from a benign tumor which grew and blocked the outflow of the fluid which normally circulates around the brain. In 2006, she underwent a procedure, known as an Endoscopic Third Ventriculostomy ("ETV"), to remove the blockage. The procedure, which was performed at MCH, relieved the problem without causing Alexis any permanent injury.
However, scar tissue began to develop; a December 2007 CT scan at WBMC showed fluid starting to accumulate around her brain again. MRIs in March and June 2008 confirmed that a blockage was occurring again. A doctor at MCH scheduled Alexis for an ETV on July 28, 2008.
However, on July 3, 2008, at 2:30 p.m., Alexis began experiencing painful headaches and vomiting. Alexis's parents called MCH; a nurse told them to bring Alexis to the nearest hospital for a CT scan if they could not make it to MCH. Alexis was taken by ambulance to WBMC, arriving at 4:29 p.m. She was triaged and, on a three-tiered scale of categories (emergent, urgent and non-urgent), was listed in the middle category as "urgent." "Urgent" patients are those who are sick and require care, but are able to progress. In contrast, "emergent" patients may deteriorate quickly and need interventions, while "non-urgent" patients may have something like a laceration or a bite, which requires care but is not a medical emergency. The triage nurse on duty, in categorizing Alexis as "urgent," noted that she was awake and alert, moving all extremities, had a normal neurological exam, and a normal pupillary response, which was not indicative of an impending brain herniation.
Dr. Freyre-Cubano ("Dr. Freyre"), a pediatrician who was working in the WBMC emergency room, ordered a CT scan STAT at 4:47 p.m., before examining Alexis. Dr. Freyre first evaluated Alexis and noted that she had a normal pupillary exam. A nurse also noted no deficits to Alexis's eyes. Dr. Freyre performed another eye exam which showed that Alexis's pupils were equal and reactive to light. A radiologist read the new CT scan, compared it with the previous one from December 2007, and confirmed in a report that Alexis's condition was worsening, and that the ventricles were larger than they had been on the previous CT scan. The findings were "consistent with worsening hydrocephalus."
By 5:40 p.m., Dr. Freyre had reviewed the report on the CT scan and called Dr. Sandberg, the on-call pediatric neurosurgeon at MCH, regarding transferring Alexis to MCH. At that time, Dr. Freyre told Dr. Sandberg that Alexis was "stable." This became an important issue at trial and ... on appeal.
Dr. Freyre spoke with MCH's emergency department physicians regarding transferring Alexis via MCH's helicopter transportation service, known as "LifeFlight." About twenty minutes later, the MCH dispatcher for LifeFlight received the request for transport.
A WBMC nurse called the operations administrator at MCH, and apparently learned that the pilots on shift were approaching the maximum twelve hours of flight time and Alexis's transport would be completed by the on-coming pilots. LifeFlight's estimated arrival time was 7:00 p.m.
At 6:22 p.m., Alexis had an episode of vomiting, during which her heart rate briefly dropped to 55. A WBMC nurse then contacted a MCH Pediatric Intensive Care Unit ("PICU") nurse to update them. Dr. Freyre noted that she had called the MCH emergency department physician regarding Alexis's transfer and gave the necessary information.
Alexis was transferred to LifeFlight care at 7:25 p.m. She was examined by a LifeFlight nurse. The neurological assessment at that time was that Alexis was asleep, non-verbal and oriented as to person. When she was awakened, she was able to respond to her mother by nodding her head, and her pupils were equal, round and reactive to light. She had a Glasgow Coma Scale score of 13, with a perfect score being 15. She had a decrease in her speech. The helicopter lifted off at 8:09 p.m.
During the flight, Alexis suffered an acute decompensation. By the time she landed at MCH at 8:25 p.m., she had suffered a brain herniation. Accordingly, instead of taking Alexis to PICU, hospital personnel took her straight to the ER. Alexis arrived in very critical condition. Dr. Sandberg did an emergent ventriculostomy, in which he drilled a hole into her skull to insert a catheter, thereby relieving pressure on the brain. This procedure saved her life. However, Alexis suffered permanent brain damage; she has significant mental impairment and must be fed through a tube. She will never be able to work or live independently.

Id. at 1115-17.

In 2010, Alexis and her parents, Felix and Barbara Cantore, sued WBMC and MCH, alleging that they had not provided proper medical care for Alexis on July 3, 2008. The Cantores presented testimony from several expert witnesses regarding the timing of Alexis' transfer from WBMC to MCH and the care she received from the LifeFlight crew. One of the witnesses, Dr. William Loudon, a pediatric neurosurgeon, testified that, based on his understanding of Alexis' condition before she herniated, if she had come under his care prior to the herniation, he would have performed an emergency ventriculostomy. In Dr. Loudon's opinion, if Alexis had received earlier relief from the build-up of cerebrospinal fluid in her brain, the herniation could have been prevented.

Over the Cantores' objection, counsel for WBMC was permitted to publish to the jury the deposition of Dr. Sandberg, the pediatric neurosurgeon at MCH who operated on Alexis, in which Dr. Sandberg answered hypothetical questions as to how he would have treated Alexis had she arrived at MCH an hour or two earlier. The trial court also permitted Dr. Steven White, WBMC's expert on pediatric emergency medicine, to testify that Dr. Sandberg's statement as to what he would have done had Alexis arrived at MCH earlier was consistent with what other neurosurgeons would have done.

Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of WBMC and MCH. The Fourth District affirmed, concluding that this Court's decision in Saunders v. Dickens , 151 So.3d 434 (Fla. 2014), did not prevent the admission of Dr. Sandberg's deposition testimony. Cantore , 174 So.3d at 1117-21.

ANALYSIS

The Cantores argue that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Sandberg's deposition testimony about what he would have done had Alexis arrived at MCH earlier because such testimony is prohibited by this Court's decision in Saunders . We agree and quash the Fourth District's decision.

A trial court's admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr. , 160 So.3d 1251, 1265 (Fla. 2014).

The elements of a medical malpractice claim are: "(1) a duty by the physician, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) causation." Saunders , 151 So.3d at 441 (citing Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc. , 445 So.2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984) ). To establish that a physician breached the duty of care owed to the patient, the plaintiff must prove that "the care provided by the physician was not that of a reasonably prudent physician ." Id. As to the element of causation, "Florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation and require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiff's injury." Gooding , 445 So.2d at 1018.

In Saunders , this Court addressed a plaintiff's burden of proof in medical malpractice cases. The patient in Saunders went to a neurologist complaining of back and leg pain, unsteadiness, cramps in his hands and feet, numbness in his hands, and tingling in his feet. Saunders , 151 So.3d at 436. The neurologist determined that the issues with the patient's hands were caused by peripheral neuropathy due to diabetes, but the neurologist did not perform a test to confirm the diagnosis. Id. The neurologist recommended that the patient be admitted to the hospital, and he ordered an MRI of the patient's brain and lumbar spine. Id. "[T]he MRI of the lumbar spine demonstrated severe stenosis (narrowing) of the spinal canal." Id. Based on these results, the neurologist referred the patient to a neurosurgeon for a consultation. Id. Unaware of any issues with the patient's upper extremities, the neurosurgeon performed a lumbar decompression procedure on the patient. Id. The patient's condition did not improve, so the neurosurgeon ordered additional MRIs, including a cervical MRI, which showed compression in both the lower back and neck. Id. The neurosurgeon recommended that cervical decompression surgery be performed, but the neurosurgeon did not schedule the surgery as planned. Id. A second neurosurgeon met with the patient and concluded that he "should undergo a second lumbar surgery and, at a later date, a cervical spine surgery." Id. at 437. "The [second] neurosurgeon performed the lumbar surgery, but the cervical spine surgery was never performed." Id. The patient's condition eventually degenerated into quadriplegia. Id.

In his medical malpractice claim against the neurologist, the patient in Saunders alleged that the neurologist had failed to timely diagnose his cervical compression. Id. The patient also filed a claim against the first neurosurgeon, but the parties settled before trial. Id. At trial, the patient presented expert testimony that the neurologist's failure to consider cervical cord compression as the cause of the patient's upper body symptoms was a breach of the standard of care. Id. The patient also presented expert testimony that, had a cervical decompression surgery been performed shortly after the time the patient first reported his symptoms, the patient "more likely than not would not have progressed to quadriplegia." Id. In rebuttal, the neurologist introduced depositions of the first neurosurgeon, which were taken before he settled with the patient. Id. at 438. In the depositions, the first neurosurgeon stated that, even if he had possessed the results of a cervical MRI when he initially met with the patient, "he would not have operated on the neck because [the patient] had not yet experienced problems with his upper extremities." Id. During closing argument, counsel for the neurologist "asserted that [the patient] had not established causation in light of [the first neurosurgeon's] testimony that he would not have changed the course of treatment even if [the neurologist] had ordered a cervical MRI." Id. at 439. The jury then returned a verdict in favor of the neurologist. Id.

However, this Court in Saunders stated, "[W]e hold that testimony that a subsequent treating physician would not have treated the patient plaintiff differently had the defendant physician acted within the applicable standard of care is irrelevant and inadmissible and will not insulate a defendant physician from liability for his or her own negligence." Id. at 443. We explained:

Because the central concern in medical malpractice actions is the reasonably prudent physician standard, the issue of whether a treating physician acted in a reasonably prudent manner must be determined for each individual physician who is a defendant in a medical malpractice action. A subsequent treating physician simply may not be present at the time a defendant physician makes an allegedly negligent decision or engages in a potentially negligent act. Further, it is not only the final physician, but rather each treating physician who must act in a reasonably prudent manner.... To [allow testimony from a subsequent treating physician like that of the first neurosurgeon], would alter the long-established reasonably prudent physician standard where the specific conduct of an individual doctor in a specific circumstance is evaluated. It would place a burden on the plaintiff to somehow prove causation by demonstrating that a subsequent treating physician would not have disregarded the correct diagnosis or testing, contrary to his or her testimony and irrespective of the standard of care for the defendant physician. To require the plaintiff to establish a negative inappropriately adds a burden of proof that simply is not required under the negligence law of this State.

Id. at 442. Accordingly, this Court held that the closing argument by counsel for the neurologist regarding the element of causation was "a misstatement of the law," and "the trial court erred when it permitted ... counsel to mislead the jury during closing statements." Id. We also determined that the error was harmful because counsel for the neurologist "repeatedly relied on [the first neurosurgeon's] testimony in his improper burden-shifting statements" and, because the plaintiff was unable to explain that the first neurosurgeon's deposition was taken before he settled out of the case, "the jury was unaware that [the first neurosurgeon] was motivated by a desire to deny wrongdoing and avoid liability." Id. at 442-43.

In this case, Dr. Sandberg's deposition testimony in response to the hypotheticals from all the parties can be summarized as follows: Regardless of whether Alexis had arrived at MCH an hour or two earlier, at some point he would have performed an emergency ventriculostomy to save her life, and she still would have suffered permanent brain damage. Dr. Sandberg explained that this would have been the result regardless of the condition Alexis was in when she arrived. If Alexis had arrived earlier and had been in stable condition, Dr. Sandberg would have scheduled a surgery for later in the day, but Alexis likely would have deteriorated prior to the scheduled surgery, requiring the same type of emergency intervention she actually received. And if Alexis had arrived earlier and was in a deteriorated state (as the Cantores posited would have been the case), Dr. Sandberg would have proceeded with the emergency procedure at that time, just as he actually did several hours later.

The substance of Dr. Sandberg's testimony about how he would have treated Alexis under circumstances other than those that actually occurred is no different from the testimony from the subsequent treating physician in Saunders . In the parties' hypotheticals, Dr. Sandberg was not asked to explain the standard of professional care for transferring patients with hydrocephalus who exhibit symptoms like the ones Alexis was exhibiting. Nor was he asked his opinion about whether any of the other healthcare providers involved in Alexis' care on July 3, 2008, failed to meet that standard. In the context of the entire trial record, it is clear that the purpose of introducing the challenged portions of Dr. Sandberg's deposition testimony was to break the chain of causation between the alleged negligent conduct of WBMC or MCH, or both, and Alexis' injuries-i.e., to establish that Alexis still would have suffered permanent brain damage even if the hospitals and their staffs had effectuated a faster transfer from WBMC to MCH. Therefore, Dr. Sandberg's testimony on that point was "irrelevant and inadmissible," Saunders , 151 So.3d at 443, and the trial court abused its discretion in allowing it to be read to the jury.

Contrary to the dissent's attempt to factually distinguish this case from Saunders, nothing in the four corners of Saunders provides that the admissibility of a subsequent treating physician's testimony about the causation element is affected by the subsequent treating physician also serving as an advisor to an initial treating physician or being referred to as a neutral and "hybrid" expert witness. Instead, in Saunders , this Court's focus was on the substance of the subsequent treating physician's testimony and its effect on the plaintiff's case. Similarly, here, the pertinent hypotheticals at issue concerned Dr. Sandberg's status as the subsequent treating physician and how his own subsequent treatment might have changed if any previous treating healthcare providers had acted differently (i.e., arranged a faster transfer).

Additionally, the error here was not harmless. See § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (providing that the harmless error test applies to the "improper admission or rejection of evidence"); Saunders , 151 So.3d at 442 (applying the harmless error test under these circumstances). "To test for harmless error [in civil appeals], the beneficiary of the error has the burden to prove that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict. Alternatively stated, the beneficiary of the error must prove that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict." Special , 160 So.3d at 1256.

Here, the Fourth District correctly pointed out that the Cantores were not "hindered or restricted" in expressing their theory of liability against WBMC and MCH. Cantore , 174 So.3d at 1121. Indeed, the Cantores presented multiple witnesses who testified that the actions of WBMC (including Dr. Freyre) and MCH fell below the applicable standard of care, causing Alexis to suffer permanent brain damage. However, counsel for WBMC and MCH relied on Dr. Sandberg's responses to the hypothetical questions to argue to the jury that the Cantores failed to meet their "promise" to show that the outcome in this case would have been different had Alexis arrived at MCH earlier than she did. In making this argument, counsel for WBMC and MCH each read directly from Dr. Sandberg's deposition, highlighting the erroneously admitted portions of his testimony. In Saunders , this Court expressly disapproved of this type of burden-shifting argument regarding the causation element of a medical malpractice claim. See 151 So.3d at 442. But for the erroneous admission of Dr. Sandberg's deposition testimony, counsel could not have made such an argument and put the Cantores in the position of needing to prove that Dr. Sandberg's testimony was false. Furthermore, the record reflects that during deliberations the jury twice asked to review Dr. Sandberg's deposition testimony. After a five-week long trial with 42 witnesses, this was one of only two witnesses the jury asked to hear from again. Finally, as the Cantores point out, Dr. Sandberg's testimony about how he would have treated Alexis if she had arrived at MCH earlier was bolstered by Dr. White's testimony that Dr. Sandberg's responses were "consistent" with his own experience with emergency ventriculostomies.

Accordingly, the erroneous admission of Dr. Sandberg's testimony was not harmless.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Sandberg's testimony about how he would have treated Alexis had she arrived at MCH earlier was inadmissible and cannot be considered harmless error. Accordingly, we quash the Fourth District's decision in Cantore , reverse the judgment in favor of WBMC and MCH, and remand for a new trial.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.

POLSTON, J., concurs with an opinion.

CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LAWSON, J., concurs.

LEWIS, J., recused.

POLSTON, J., concurring.

Although I believe there is jurisdiction as expressed in the majority opinion, I share Justice Canady's concern regarding the breadth of this Court's holding in Saunders v. Dickens , 151 So.3d 434 (Fla. 2014). However, no argument to recede from the holding in Saunders was raised here.

CANADY, J., dissenting.

The Fourth District's decision in Cantore v. West Boca Medical Center, Inc. , 174 So.3d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), does not expressly and directly conflict with this Court's decision in Saunders v. Dickens , 151 So.3d 434 (Fla. 2014), "on the same question of law." Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Cantore , I dissent.

My disagreement with the majority's determination of jurisdiction is twofold. First, Cantore and Saunders involve entirely different questions of law regarding medical malpractice actions. Cantore involves the admissibility of certain deposition testimony from a "subsequent" treating physician. In Saunders , this Court's majority couched its holding, in part, in terms of the relevance and admissibility of the subsequent treating physician's deposition testimony, but that language in Saunders is mere dicta. The actual question of law in Saunders involved not whether the testimony was admissible but rather whether the testimony could be given conclusive effect regarding the element of causation. Second, even if Saunders can properly be read to involve the issue of admissibility, jurisdiction is still lacking because Cantore and Saunders do not involve substantially similar controlling facts. Among other things, the nature of the testimony at issue in Cantore is significantly different from the specific type of testimony proscribed by Saunders .

The Actual Question of Law in Saunders

This Court's majority in Saunders chose to couch its holding, in part, in terms of the relevance and admissibility of the deposition testimony. Saunders , 151 So.3d at 443. Here, the majority's determination of jurisdiction rests squarely on the admissibility aspect of the "holding" in Saunders . See majority op. at 1033 (quashing the Fourth District's decision "[b]ecause the treating physician's deposition testimony ... was inadmissible"). But Saunders ' reference to relevance and admissibility cannot properly form the basis for jurisdiction. That reference is not only dicta, but it purports to constitute a holding on an issue of law that was never even presented to this Court.

In Saunders , the original treating physician (a neurologist) was the only remaining defendant in the case at the time of trial. Saunders , 151 So.3d at 436, 437. All of the other named defendants, including the subsequent treating physician (a neurosurgeon), settled with the plaintiffs prior to trial. Id. at 437. The subsequent treating physician was, however, later included as a Fabre defendant on the verdict form. Id. During the subsequent treating physician's deposition, which was taken prior to his reaching a settlement with the plaintiffs, the subsequent treating physician testified that he would not have done things differently even if the original treating physician had ordered a cervical MRI (which likely would have revealed the patient's cervical compression). Id. at 438. At trial, the defendant (the original treating physician) introduced the deposition testimony of the subsequent treating physician, and defense counsel argued to the jury during closing statements that given the deposition testimony, the plaintiffs could not prove the requisite element of causation. Id. Plaintiffs' counsel objected to defense counsel's closing argument "on the basis that this was a misstatement of the law," but the trial court overruled the objection. Id. at 438-39. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant physician. Id. at 439. On appeal, the Fourth District framed the issue regarding defense counsel's closing argument as one involving the burden of proof. Namely, the Fourth District "held that" the closing argument "was not improper" and that defense counsel "did not improperly shift the burden of proof." Id. There is nothing to indicate that the separate issue of the admissibility of the deposition testimony was in any way presented to the Fourth District.

On review of the Fourth District's decision, this Court in Saunders similarly framed the legal issue presented as one involving "the burden of proof in negligence actions." Id. at 440. Saunders concluded that defense counsel misleadingly misstated the law during closing statements when he claimed that the subsequent treating physician's deposition testimony rendered it impossible for the jury to conclude that any negligence by the defendant physician caused the injury. Id. at 442. Saunders then determined that the trial court committed harmful error by allowing defense counsel to mislead the jury, for the following two reasons: (1) defense counsel "repeatedly relied on [the deposition] testimony in his improper burden-shifting statements," and (2) the jury was not permitted to hear that the deposition was taken while the subsequent treating physician "was in an adversarial relationship with" the plaintiffs. Id. at 442-43. Without providing any framework for doing so, the majority in Saunders couched its holding, in part, in terms of the relevance and admissibility of the deposition testimony: "we hold that testimony that a subsequent treating physician would not have treated the patient plaintiff differently had the defendant physician acted within the applicable standard of care is irrelevant and inadmissible and will not insulate a defendant physician from liability for his or her own negligence." Id. at 443 (emphasis added). There is nothing to indicate that the issue of admissibility was in any way presented to this Court. None of the analysis in Saunders addresses the issue of admissibility.

Lacking any foundation in the Court's analysis, the language in Saunders regarding relevance and admissibility simply pops up from nowhere in the conclusion of the opinion. It is wholly unnecessary to the resolution of the case and is thus mere dicta. Under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, express and direct conflict cannot be established based on a purported conflict with a sua sponte statement from this Court-whether couched as a holding or otherwise-regarding some future issue that was never presented or analyzed in the case. Rather, that constitutional requirement must be grounded in a decision concerning an issue actually presented and considered by the Court. And in Saunders , the only "question of law" that was actually "deci[ded]" involved the burden of proof and whether certain testimony could be given conclusive effect regarding the element of causation. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

To further illustrate how untethered the issue of admissibility was to the decision in Saunders , one need only look to the other three cases examined by this Court's majority in Saunders -namely, Ewing v. Sellinger , 758 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and the two conflict cases of Goolsby v. Qazi , 847 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), and Munoz v. South Miami Hospital, Inc. , 764 So.2d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Not one of those three cases turned on the issue of admissibility. Rather, those cases involved whether certain what-if testimony-or the absence of such testimony-was dispositive regarding the element of causation.

In Munoz , the issue was whether summary judgment was properly granted in favor of certain defendants based on testimony from one of the defendant physicians regarding "what he would or would not have done in response to warnings which should have been but were never in fact given." Munoz , 764 So.2d at 856. In Goolsby , the issue was whether a directed verdict was properly granted in favor of a defendant physician based on the absence of evidence showing that any of the other physicians involved would have done anything differently even if the x-rays had been properly read. Goolsby , 847 So.2d at 1002-03. And in Ewing , the issue was whether a directed verdict was properly granted in favor of the defendant physician based on testimony from the subsequent treating physician that he would not have done anything differently even if the defendant physician had performed a risk evaluation. Ewing , 758 So.2d at 1196-97. These three district court cases all involve the conclusive effect of testimony as opposed to the admissibility of that testimony. And this Court's majority in Saunders , 151 So.3d at 443, unequivocally approved the conflict case of Munoz , in which the Third District specifically noted that, although the what-if statements at issue "surely cannot be given conclusive effect" to warrant summary judgment, the statements were indeed admissible , Munoz , 764 So.2d at 856.

The entire context of Saunders and the district court cases examined by Saunders makes clear that the question of law decided in Saunders involved causation and the burden of proof, not admissibility. The actual holding of Saunders is thus that testimony by a subsequent treating physician regarding what he or she would have done cannot be given conclusive effect regarding the element of causation. Although such testimony may create an inference of no causation, ultimately the case cannot be decided as a matter of law based on what a particular physician would have done as opposed to what a hypothetical physician operating under the professional standard of care would have done.

In short, because the decisions in Saunders and Cantore involve entirely different questions of law, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review Cantore .

The Differing Factual Nature of Saunders and Cantore

Even assuming that Saunders can properly be read to involve the issue of admissibility, conflict jurisdiction still does not exist. Although Saunders and Cantore both involve a "subsequent" treating physician's testimony, they do so in very different factual contexts, and the nature of the deposition testimony in Cantore is not the specific type of testimony proscribed by Saunders . Because the two cases do not "involve[e] substantially the same facts," this Court does not have jurisdiction. Nielsen v. City of Sarasota , 117 So.2d 731, 735 (Fla. 1960).

As an initial matter, Cantore is distinguishable from Saunders based on the underlying nature of the subsequent treating physicians in the two cases. For example, unlike Saunders -in which, unbeknownst to the jury, the subsequent treating physician had been an active defendant at the time of his deposition-the district court in Cantore described the subsequent treating physician as being "at all times a neutral third-party witness with no motivation to deny wrongdoing or avoid liability as he was never a defendant, unlike the testifying neurosurgeon in Saunders ." Cantore , 174 So.3d at 1121. Additionally, in Cantore , the district court made clear that the subsequent treating physician was also intimately involved in and "played such an influential role in the care at issue:" the original treating physician and other medical personnel at the original treating physician's hospital "continually followed [the subsequent treating physician's] instructions, heeded his recommendations, and noted his preferences." Id. at 1119. This "hybrid" role, id. , played by the subsequent treating physician is significantly different than that in Saunders . Finally, unlike Saunders , the district court in Cantore repeatedly referred to the subsequent treating physician as an "expert" witness. See id. at 1115, 1119, 1120. Saunders itself recognized that medical malpractice actions "often involve" expert witnesses testifying to hypotheticals involving "what a reasonably prudent physician would have done and the effect that such reasonable care would have had on the patient." Saunders , 151 So.3d at 442 (emphasis added). And that is exactly how the district court portrayed the subsequent treating physician in Cantore -as an expert witness testifying regarding hypotheticals. The majority here ignores the differences between the subsequent treating physicians in Saunders and Cantore .

Cantore is also distinguishable from Saunders based on the underlying nature of the deposition testimony in the two cases. In Saunders , this Court's majority proscribed (in dicta) certain specific testimony from a subsequent treating physician-namely, testimony "that adequate care by the defendant physician would not have altered the subsequent care." Saunders , 151 So.3d at 442. That proscribed testimony is missing here. In Cantore , the "true condition" of the child while under the physical care of the original treating physician was very much in dispute at trial and was the critical factual issue for the jury to decide. As the district court noted, the original treating physician's "action (or inaction) was the focus of the entire five-week trial," Cantore , 174 So.3d at 1121, and the plaintiffs' "strategy during the course of the litigation and at trial was to demonstrate that [the original treating physician] failed to appreciate [the child's] true condition and as a result provided inaccurate information to multiple healthcare providers at [Miami Children's Hospital], including, but not limited to, [the subsequent treating physician]," id. at 1120. What is clear from the district court's opinion is that the subsequent treating physician's deposition testimony regarding the likelihood of the same end result was based only on the underlying assumption that the child was "alert and oriented," as opposed to deteriorating neurologically. Id. at 1117. And that underlying assumption "was based on his understanding of [the child's] condition at that time." Id. at 1119. In fact, the district court specifically noted that the subsequent treating physician testified "that he would have made different recommendations to intubate and administer diuretics had he been told" that the child's condition was as the plaintiffs suggested-that is, deteriorating neurologically. Id. at 1120. In other words, the subsequent treating physician testified that he would have treated the child differently under the competing factual scenarios. The gist of his "expert" testimony thus was that the child's "true condition" was the "key point" that would have determined "the timing of intervention." Id. And he explained why, assuming that the child was in fact awake and oriented, it would not have mattered if the child had come under his physical care two hours earlier than she did. Id. at 1117. Nothing within the four corners of the Cantore opinion supports the conclusion that the subsequent treating physician testified that he would not have treated the child differently-and that the end result would have inevitably been the same-even if the child's "true condition" was as asserted by the plaintiffs at trial. The nature of the deposition testimony in Cantore -as described by the district court within the four corners of its opinion-is dramatically different than that in Saunders , in which the original treating physician did not correctly diagnose the patient, and in which the subsequent treating physician testified that a correct diagnosis would nevertheless not have affected the subsequent treatment of the patient.

Conclusion

The majority improperly bases its determination of jurisdiction in this case on its "disagreement with the result reached by a district court applying" Saunders , as opposed to on express and direct conflict with Saunders . Dorsey v. Reider , 139 So.3d 860, 867 (Fla. 2014) (Canady, J., dissenting). Because Saunders and Cantore involve entirely different questions of law, and because the controlling facts in the two cases are not substantially similar, this Court does not have jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, I dissent.

LAWSON, J., concurs.

      We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

      We also agree with the Cantores that the trial court erred in entering a directed verdict in favor of WBMC and MCH on the application of section 768.13, Florida Statutes (2008), the Good Samaritan Act, which grants immunity from civil damages to any healthcare provider that provides "emergency services," unless the damages are the result of "reckless disregard." The threshold question in determining the applicability of the Good Samaritan Act is whether the healthcare provider was providing "emergency services" to the patient. But here there was conflicting evidence regarding whether Alexis was "stabilized and [was] capable of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient" at the times relevant to the Cantores' allegations of medical malpractice. § 768.13(2)(b) 2.a., Fla. Stat. For example, there was testimony that immediately upon her arrival at WBMC "her level of consciousness began to wax and wane"; however, another witness testified that she was stable "[u]p until the very end of the transport." Therefore, due to the conflicting evidence about Alexis' condition, the question of whether the Good Samaritan Act applied should have been left to the jury. See Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Stone ex rel. Stone , 92 So.3d 264, 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

      The dissent contends that we cannot base conflict jurisdiction on this statement because it is allegedly dicta rather than an issue of law this Court actually decided in Saunders . However, within the four corners of the Saunders decision, the majority of this Court expressly indicated that it was deciding this question of law, which is binding precedent.

      The Fourth District stated that Dr. Sandberg's responses regarding the timing of Alexis' transfer "had bearing on his own actions as well," and in them "he was explaining his medical decision-making process and how different decisions made by him would have impacted Alexis's neurological status and condition." Cantore , 174 So.3d at 1119. However, the Cantores never alleged that Dr. Sandberg or any other provider acted negligently after Alexis arrived at MCH.

      Because it was not preserved at trial, we do not address the Cantores' argument regarding the issue of agency and the inclusion of Dr. Freyre's name on the verdict form.

      Fabre v. Marin , 623 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).

      At the time of trial in Cantore , two defendants remained-(1) the hospital at which the original treating physician provided care, and (2) the hospital that provided the helicopter transportation service and at which the subsequent treating physician performed the emergency ventriculostomy that saved the child's life. Cantore , 174 So.3d at 1115-17, 1121.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Jeremy Cornell RAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5137
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 9, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 20, 2018
    Frederick J. Gant, Pensacola, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf, Osterhaus, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gerald L. KIMBROUGH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4923
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 9, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 20, 2018
    Gerald L. Kimbrough, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia C. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Osterhaus, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Randolph ROSS III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5017
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 9, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 20, 2018
    Randolph Ross III, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Romeo WARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4596
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 14, 2018
    Romeo Ward, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia C. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Rowe, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Warnell OWENS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5211
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    Warnell Owens, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Kelsey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Raymond Obrian TYSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4566
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Eric L. HATCHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1334
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; Eric L. Hatcher, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Marcial RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5212
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    Marcial Rodriguez, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael McDermott, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Lewis, Kelsey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Darrell PASCHAL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4789
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 9, 2018
    Darrell Paschal, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Holly N. Simcox, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Javontai THAMES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4579
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    Javontai Thames, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Richard L. BELL, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2947
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    Richard L. Bell, Sr., pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Kelsey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Richard Lee MELTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5267
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2018
    Richard Lee Melton, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Kelsey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    CITY OF GAINESVILLE and Underwriters Safety & Claims Inc., Appellants, v. Nicole S. MARSHALL, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3581
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2018
    Tracey J. Hyde of McConnaughhay, Coonrod, Pope, Weaver & Stern, P.A., Panama City; and Laura A. Buck of McConnaughhay, Coonrod, Pope, Weaver & Stern, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellants.
    Matthew Carrillo of Carrillo & Carrillo, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf and Wetherell, JJ., and Forst, Alan O., Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    John Daniel FRANCES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1449
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2018
    John Frances, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Osterhaus, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Margie Elaine SILCOX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4592
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 9, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Calvin JOPPY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-3500
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 9, 2018
    Calvin Joppy, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

DENIED .

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tyrone JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5198
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2018
    Tyrone Jackson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    S.J., as parent of A.C. and A.W., minor children, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Respondents.
    No. 1D17-4913
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2018
    S.J., pro se, Petitioner.
    Ward L. Metzger, Appellate Counsel, Jacksonville, for Respondent Department of Children and Families; Kelly A. Swartz, Appellate Counsel, Sanford, for Respondent Guardian ad Litem Program.
   Per Curiam.

DENIED.

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    MCCORMICK TRUCKING, INC., and Zurich American Ins. Co., Appellants, v. Paul BOJCZUK, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3550
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2018
    Joanne M. Prescott of Zimmerman, Kiser & Sutcliffe, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants.
    Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ronald WHEELER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida DEPT. OF HEALTH, BD. OF MEDICINE, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1661
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2018
    Stephen M. Slepin, of The Maddox Horne Law Firm, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Mari H. McCully, of the Florida Department of Health, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Lewis, Makar, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    John E. PUGH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-710
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Justin F. Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Makar, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Annastashia MORAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5364
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; Thomas H. Duffy and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Rowe, and Ray, JJ., concur.


text:
    Joseph Glenn SAVICKI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1696
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2018
    Joseph Glenn Savicki, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Kelsey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Michael J. LENTON, Appellant, v. Rhonda Michele PARKER, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-3256
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2018
    Michael J. Lenton, pro se, Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and MAKAR and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.


text:
    D.S., SR., Father of D.N.S. and A.A.S., minor children, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3832
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Robert Allen, Pensacola, for Appellant.
    Sarah J. Rumph, Appellate Counsel, Children's Legal Services, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Kelsey, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Steven MERCER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2155
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Steven Mercer, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Makar and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Quentin Karon MITCHELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-2720
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Victor Holder, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wetherell, Makar, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Garcia NICHOLSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-4155
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2018
    Rachael Elizabeth Bushey of O'Brien Hatfield, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Cash W. PAWLEY, Sr., Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-4694
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Cash W. Pawley, Sr., pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(c).

Wolf, Lewis, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Terrance ASHWOOD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4004
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Terrance Ashwood, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Holly N. Simcox, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Derrick Jerome ARNOLD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1962
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Pamela D. Presnell, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Ray, Bilbrey, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Manuel SANCHEZ, Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, and Sedgwick CMS, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-4590
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Toni L. Villaverde of Toni L. Villaverde, PLLC, Coral Gables, for Appellant.
    Michael A. Hernandez of Jones, Hurley & Hand, P.A., Miami, for Appellees.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jose ARIAS, Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES and Sedgwick/CMS, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-2037
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Toni L. Villaverde of Toni L. Villaverde, PLLC, Coral Gables, for Appellant.
    Derek V. James and Kimberly D. Proano of Jones, Hurley and Hand, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Ray, Osterhaus, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Timothy WALDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-0878
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 25, 2018
    Timothy Walden, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Lewis, Ray, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Valerie Sharonne OWENS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-4432
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and M. J. Lord, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Robert Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wetherell, Makar, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Marcus Earl GRAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-4133
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Victor Holder, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Kaitlin Weiss, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Ray, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Howard C. QUATTLEBAUM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4498
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Wayne Paul MANNING, Appellant, v. Julie L. JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2483
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 25, 2018
    Wayne Paul Manning, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Thomas H. Duffy and Kenneth S. Steely, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Roberts, Rowe, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Joseph FRANKLIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2252
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Joseph Franklin, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, RAY, and BILBREY, JJ., concur.


text:
    M & M MAINTENANCE OF TAMPA BAY INC., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-424
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Robert E. Biasotti of Biasotti Law, St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
    Jonathan Anthony Martin, Senior Attorney, of the Department of Financial Services, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf and Wetherell, JJ., and Forst, Alan O., Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    John O. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-997
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 21, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 27, 2018
    John O. Williams, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Osterhaus, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Darren Edward STINESPRING, Appellant, v. DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-696
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 21, 2018
    Mitch Dever, Panama City, for Appellant.
    Michael T. Ruff of Padgett Law Group, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Wetherell and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Thomas J. BALDWIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-3457
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 21, 2018
    Mark V. Murray, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Jay, Winsor, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ethan L. ANDERSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-2844
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2018
    Ethan L. Anderson, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Kaitlin Weiss, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition is denied on the merits.

Wetherell, Rowe, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Heather L. ROMINGER, f/k/a Heather L. Campbell, Appellant, v. Johnny R. CAMPBELL, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1649
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 21, 2018
    Mark Lee Smith, Pensacola, for Appellant.
    William F. Duane, Mill Valley, CA, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J. and, Bilbrey, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Sharon PALACIOS, Appellant, v. April FLEMING, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-986
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 21, 2018
    Eric S. Block, Fraz Ahmed, and Caitlin E. O'Donnell of the Law Offices of Eric S. Block, PLLC, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    Rhonda B. Boggess of Taylor, Day, Grimm & Boyd, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Ray, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gregory HARRIS, a/k/a Jerome K. Lockhart, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3201
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Carbajal v. State, 75 So. 3d 258 (Fla. 2011) ; State v. King, 426 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982) ; Santos v. State, 380 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1980) ; McDonald v. State, 133 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ; Hughes v. State, 22 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ; Shortridge v. State, 884 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ; Brown v. State, 827 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; Mosely v. State, 688 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ; Desmond v. State, 576 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) ; Budd v. State, 477 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) ; Hinson v. State, 57 So. 3d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ; McCutcheon v. State, 44 So. 3d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ; Brown v. State, 10 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) ; Foss v. State, 834 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ; McMillan v. State, 832 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ; Hart v. State, 761 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Willie HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3799
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
    Willie Harris, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Johnson v. State, 60 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. 2011) ; Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2007) ; Moore v. State, 882 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2004) ; Williams v. State, 51 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ; McNeil v. State, 993 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ; Nielson v. State, 984 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ; Owens v. State, 41 So. 3d 372 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ; Paul v. State, 830 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Steve LEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3835
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
    Steve Lee, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and NORTHCUTT and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Daniel LYTLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3906
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
    Daniel Lytle, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Ratliff v. State, 914 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2005) ; Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2005) ; Hanf v. State, 182 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ; Enriquez v. State, 885 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    William C. ROUTENBERG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3907
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.801(b) ; Stovall v. Cooper, 860 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (en banc); Stokes v. State, 851 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ; Brown v. State, 793 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ; Brito v. State, 194 So. 3d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ned HANNER, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3922
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Hanner v. State, No. 2D17-789, 2017 WL 3270928 (Fla. 2d DCA Aug. 2, 2017) (table decision); Harris v. State, 777 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Theron SPEIGHTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3955
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Speights v. State, 202 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (table decision); McDonald v. State, 133 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ; Doby v. State, 25 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ; Hughes v. State, 22 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ; Speights v. State, 11 So. 3d 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (table decision); Valdez-Garcia v. State, 965 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ; Henry v. State, 933 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ; Steward v. State, 931 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ; Shortridge v. State, 884 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ; Speights v. State, 875 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (table decision); Brown v. State, 827 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; Harris v. State, 777 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ; Harris v. State, 789 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Sadar Sadatt HUTCHINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4743
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
    Howard L Dimmig, II, Public Defender and Jean-Jacques A. Darius, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Katherine Coombs Cline, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, KHOUZAM, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.


text:
    LANDRY'S SEAFOOD HOUSE-FLORIDA, INC., Appellant, v. CHESAPEAKE BAY HOLDING CO., INC., Richard Calderoni, Simon Canasi, Frank De La Grana, and St. Pete Iguana, Inc., Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-1139
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
    Murray B. Silverstein, and Brian R. Cummings of Greenspoon Marder, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Kenneth G. Turkel, Shane B. Vogt, and Anthony Severino, of Bajo, Cuva, Cohen & Turkel, P.A., Tampa, and David M. Caldevilla of de la Parte & Gilbert, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees Simon Canasi and Frank de la Grana.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, CRENSHAW, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ryan Jay CONNELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2793
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, KHOUZAM, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ralph Monroe HAIR, DOC #484707, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3108
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
    Ralph Monroe Hair, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ronnie Trey ATMORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3686
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See §§ 775.082(9)(a)(3)(d), .084(4)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2014); Martin v. State, 888 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Karl KERR, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3761
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
    Karl Kerr, Jr., pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Toomer v. State, 895 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) ; Teart v. State, 866 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ; Sherwood v. State, 745 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Giovanni CRUZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3948
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Nicholas Joseph BORSELLINO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3268
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 23, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Timothy J. Ferreri, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SILBERMAN, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Patrick LOVE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3715
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 23, 2018
    Patrick Love, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, SLEET, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Benjamin LIGERI, Appellant, v. INFINITY OF TAMPA and Ashland, Inc., Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-707
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
    Benjamin Ligeri, pro se.
    Marie A. Borland and Christopher S. Branton of Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee Infiniti of Tampa.
    Peter P. Murnaghan and Jill K. Schmidt of Murnaghan & Ferguson, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee Ashland Inc.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, KHOUZAM, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Richard W. HOWELL, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as trustee FOR HOMEBANC MORTGAGE TRUST 2005-5 MORTGAGE BACKED NOTES, SERIES 2005-5, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5225
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
    Lee Segal of Florida Foreclosure & Credit Defense Firm, P.L., Clearwater, for Appellant.
    Allison Morat of Pearson Bitman LLP, Maitland, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, SLEET, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    James VICE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3725
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 23, 2018
    James Vice, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and NORTHCUTT and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Brian WHATLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3800
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 23, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, KHOUZAM, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Souhail Steve KMED, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-295
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 23, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ronald B. HAIMOWITZ, DC#H07976, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3199
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 23, 2018
    Ronald B. Haimowitz, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, VILLANTI, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Shameka Lashay JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2631
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 23, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and KHOUZAM and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Maryanne KEENE, et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. SELENE FINANCE, LP, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-0717
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Pursuant to the notice of voluntary dismissal filed herein, this appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Charles H. LOONEY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. FANNIE MAE (Federal National Mortgage Association), et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-3171
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Pursuant to the notice of voluntary dismissal filed herein, this appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Timothy WETHERINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3823
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 21, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See § 948.06(8)(b)(1), (c)(3), Fla. Stat. (2015) ; Jeffers v. State, 106 So. 3d 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jerry R. COURTNEY & Deborah S. Courtney, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-3829
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Pursuant to the notice of voluntary dismissal filed herein, this appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Kenneth Robert BOEHM, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Marie STEPHENSON, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0184
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The parties' stipulation for dismissal filed February 20, 2018, is treated as a notice of voluntary dismissal and is granted. This appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Lancet INDEMNITY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Dixie KAVAL, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0597
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Pursuant to the notice of voluntary dismissal filed herein, this appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Thomas W. CUTLER and Ann Cutler, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-4086
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Appellants' motion for rehearing en bane is stricken as insufficient, in that it fails to identify an issue of great public importance or explain how en bane consideration of the case is necessary to maintain consistency with this court's decisions. Appellants' motion for rehearing, for written opinion, or for certification is denied.


text:
    Geoffrey STILLWELL & Lori T. Stillwell, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f/k/a The Bank of New York, as Trustee, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1567
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Appellants have filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. Appellee previously filed a motion for attorney's fees which prevents this court from closing this appeal until it has been decided. Appellee shall advise this court within ten days whether a ruling on the motion for attorney's fees is sought, failing which the motion will be denied and the appeal will be dismissed.


text:
    Richard B. FLANZER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Eric KAPLAN, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-3258
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The parties' stipulation for dismissal filed January 22, 2018, is treated as a notice of voluntary dismissal and is granted. This appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Anthony M. GRANT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1076
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 18, 2017
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The petition for belated appeal of the denial of petitioner's postconviction motion after evidentiary hearing, order dated October 5, 2016, is granted in circuit court case number 96-11235. This order shall serve as a notice of appeal for purposes of calculating the time standards of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Within twenty days the trial court shall consider appellant's eligibility for appointment of appellate counsel, provided appellant files within ten days a motion in the circuit court requesting same accompanied by a financial affidavit, and shall enter an order thereupon, with a copy to appellant and a copy to this court. This ten-day time limit hall not limit the trial court's authority to provide counsel to appellant.

The circuit court clerk shall treat this order as a notice of appeal, promptly certify same and return it to this court as with any notice of appeal, and a new appellate case number will be assigned to this appeal and an acknowledgment letter will issue at that time.

VILLANTI, WALLACE, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jerry CHIARELLA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2740
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 16, 2017
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner Jerry Chiarella's petition for writ of mandamus is treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and that petition is granted. See Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000) ("In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus ... the petitioner must have no other adequate remedy available."). Section 903.035(2), Florida Statues (2017), states that "[a]n application for modification of bail on any felony charge must be heard by a court in person, at a hearing with the defendant present, and with at least 3 hours' notice to the state attorney." (Emphasis added.) The court's denial of Mr. Chiarella's motion following the inadequate June 22, 2017, hearing renders Mr. Chiarella's detention unlawful, as he was not given an adequate opportunity to contest the reasonableness of his bail. We therefore grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus and order that the trial court hold a new hearing on Mr. Chiarella's motion to reduce bail, with Mr. Chiarella present, within five days of the date of this order.

NORTHCUTT, CRENSHAW, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jose R. RODRIGUEZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2791
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 01, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed for failure of appellant to comply with this court's order of December 21, 2017, requiring the filing of an initial brief.

LaROSE, C.J., and SILBERMAN and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Roger Peter MORRISON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. OLIVE GARDEN RESTAURANT, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-2792
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 25, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Appellee's motion to dismiss is granted. This appeal is hereby dismissed.

NORTHCUTT, MORRIS, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Richard OUELLETTE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. In re: ESTATE OF Sarah Hester EDWARDS, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4036
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 25, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed because of the appellant's failure to satisfy this court's October 11, 2017, fee order.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Theodore GRAYBILL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4942
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed as duplicative of the petition filed in case 2D17-4944.

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Mary ST. GERMAIN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4569
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 01, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The appellee's motion to dismiss is granted. This appeal is dismissed as from a nonappealable nonfinal order. See Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc., 609 So. 2d 14, 20 (Fla. 1992) ; cf. Floridian Cmty. Bank, Inc. v. Bloom, 25 So. 3d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

LaROSE, C.J., and VILLANTI and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Kenneth MADDEN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Mary HITCHMAN, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4813
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 01, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed for failure of the Appellant to comply with this court's January 3, 2018, order.

LaROSE, C.J., and SILBERMAN and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jose ALVAREZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4100
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 25, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed for failure of the Appellant to comply with this court's two October 18, 2017, orders.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Emile George WISDOM, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4758
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 25, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed because of the appellant's failure to satisfy this court's December 5, 2017, fee order.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    PINELLAS COUNTY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Thomas M. WALSH, Jr., et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4891
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 01, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Appellees' motion to dismiss appeal is granted. This appeal is dismissed as from a nonappealable nonfinal order.

LaROSE, C.J., and VILLANTI and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Janice L. ROBINSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. BDZ FITNESS, LLC, d/b/a Orange Theory Fitness, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-5166
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 1, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed because of the appellant's failure to satisfy this court's January 2, 2018 filing fee order.

LaROSE, C.J., and SILBERMAN and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    RESIDENTS FOR A BETTER COMMUNITY & Barbara Hinkson Craig, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. WCI COMMUNITIES, INC., et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-5005
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 26, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Appellees' motion to dismiss is granted, and this appeal is dismissed as from a nonfinal, nonappealable order. See Mcllveen v. Mcllveen, 644 So. 2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA1994).

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Johnathan Paul WEBER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, O/B/O Kirstie Lee HORNE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4820
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 25, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed for failure of the Appellant to comply with this court's December 8, 2017 order to show cause and December 8, 2017 fee order.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    NORTH PINELLAS CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Delores G. Razman, M.D., and Janet Black, M.D., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. A.H. THROUGH her Parents, Dana M. JODON-HOOTEN and Damon Hooten, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0374
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 02, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

CASANUEVA, CRENSHAW, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Larry WELENC, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Sandra Jean PENNIPEDE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0312
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 01, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied.

LaROSE, C.J., and CASANUEVA and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Danny J. WILLIAMS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4734
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   As it appears that the proceedings in the circuit court relative to the petitioner's motion for postconviction relief are progressing, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied. Cf. Munn v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 807 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA2002). This denial is without prejudice to the petitioner to file a new petition for writ of mandamus if the postconviction court has not entered a final order on the motion within 90 days of the date of this order, provided that the petitioner is unrepresented by counsel in the postconviction proceeding.

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Howard Leroy CARTER, III, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4681
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 09, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus is denied without prejudice. Petitioner is required to make an express and distinct demand for performance before mandamus will be considered. See Al-Hakim v. State, 783 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

CASANUEVA, VILLANTI, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jeffrey LE CLAIR, Appellant/petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4853
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus is denied without prejudice. Petitioner is required to make an express and distinct demand for performance before mandamus will be considered. See Al-Hakim v. State, 783 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Timothy Justin TACY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4918
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Theodore GRAYBILL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4944
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus is denied without prejudice to his right to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court for the county in which he is incarcerated. See Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207, 1210(Fla. 2006) (explaining that when a prisoner challenges a sentence-reducing credit determination by the Department of Corrections and alleges an entitlement to immediate release the proper remedy is a petition for writ of habeas corpus); Vierra v. State, 980 So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ; Stovall v. Cooper, 860 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    David I. EPPS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-5118
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed as duplicative of the petition filed in case 2D17-5096.

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Marvin WILLIAMS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2365
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 29, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed for appellant's failure to comply with this court's December 4, 2017, order.

MORRIS, CRENSHAW, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Marcus B. HARRIS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. William F. CRENSHAW, CEO of Publix Supermarkets, Inc., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-5081
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 26, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari and supplemental petition for writ of certiorari are denied.

NORTHCUTT, MORRIS, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


text:
    David I. EPPS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-5096
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Because Petitioner has an adequate remedy by appeal, Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus is denied. This denial is without prejudice to any right Petitioner might have to petition for belated appeal of the denial of his postconviction motion.

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    J.S., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Joseph SEEBER, Superintendent, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0056
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 16, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. Within twenty-four hours, the trial court shall hold a second hearing pursuant to section 985.255(3)(a), Florida Statutes, "to determine the existence of probable cause that the child has committed the delinquent act or violation of law that he or she is charged with." § 985.255(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017). Should the trial court find probable cause that the petitioner committed one or more of the crimes charged, the trial court shall then determine the need for continued detention and shall use an amended Risk Assessment Instrument to determine the petitioner's placement into detention care. See P.P. v. State, 8 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) ("Because the firearm possession was already factored into the initial scoring often points [for the charge of carrying a concealed firearm], it could not be used again without impermissibly double scoring the same conduct already accounted for in the RAI.").

NORTHCUTT, CASANUEVA, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    J.A., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-3983
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 08, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Because J.A. has failed to serve an initial brief as provided by this court's order of December 28, 2017, this appeal is dismissed for failure to prosecute.

VILLANTI, BADALAMENTI, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    William SHROYER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-3861
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 09, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This petition for writ of mandamus is denied as moot.

CASANUEVA, VILLANTI, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Scott A. HUMINSKI, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. TOWN OF GILBERT, Arizona, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4740
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    December 20, 2017
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition and supplement to petition are denied.

Petitioner's motion to stay is denied.

Petitioner's motion and supplement to motion to enjoin orders are denied.

Petitioner's motion and second motion for assistance of counsel are denied.

VILLANTI, KHOUZAM, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    David C. KATAMAY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4310
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    December 05, 2017
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied.

NORTHCUTT, SLEET, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    PRESCIENT INVESTMENTS, LLC, et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DJ-9, INC., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2182
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 15, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Pursuant to the notice of voluntary dismissal filed herein, this appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Shirley NELLE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-0823
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 15, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Pursuant to the notice of voluntary dismissal filed herein, this appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Kevin NELSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Candace DELEONARDIS, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4913
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 15, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Pursuant to the notice of voluntary dismissal filed herein, this appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Dale PATE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0211
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 25, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Keith B. HAMILTON & Sharon Hamilton, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-0004
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 15, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The parties' stipulation for dismissal filed February 14, 2018, is treated as a notice of voluntary dismissal and is granted. This appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Kathleen J. RUIZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Donald E. WILLEY, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4039
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 15, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Pursuant to the notice of voluntary dismissal filed herein, this appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Scott Dominic PALMATEER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Nicole Jean PALMATEER, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0054
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 15, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Nicole Jean Palmateer's notice of voluntary dismissal of cross-appeal is granted, and the cross-appeal is dismissed. The appeal remains pending.


text:
    Brenton M. DUNCAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-5278
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 15, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Appellant's motion to withdraw pleadings and the dismissal of this appeal filed on January 25, 2018 is granted. This appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Yitzak MOR, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. U.S. BANK, N.A., as Trustee, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-3280
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 25, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Appellee's motion to dismiss is granted, and this appeal is dismissed for failure to prosecute. Appellee's motion for appellate attorney's fees is denied.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jacob HARRIS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Rick WELLS, Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4600
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    December 13, 2017
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. See Rogers v. State, 966 So. 2d 490, 491 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). This denial is without prejudice to Petitioner's right to file a motion for bond reduction. See Good v. Wille, 382 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (citing Stansel v. State, 297 So. 2d 63, 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) ).

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Michael Richard LONG, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-3084
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    November 14, 2017
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied.

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Tyrik L. LEWIS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Thomas M. KNIGHT, Sheriff Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4279
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    November 13, 2017
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. As the petitioner testified that he could post a bond with assistance from his mother, the bond is not excessive and tantamount to no bail. See Henley v. Jenne, 796 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("By agreeing to become financially responsible for a defendant's bail these family members and friends have a very personal stake in seeing the defendant appear in court when scheduled. With that stake and their close relationship with the defendant comes their peculiar ability to use their power and influences to make certain that he will meet his obligation to appear. Hence in fixing the amount of bail, while the financial resources of the defendant himself are important, ... so too is the defendant's access to family and friends for the benefit of bail and, necessarily, their financial burdens and risks standing behind the posting of bail."). This denial is without prejudice to the petitioner's right to file a motion to modify bail should the circumstances presented to the trial court change.

LaROSE, C.J., and MORRIS and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    LE SCAMPI CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. CN INDIAN SHORES, LLC, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-5108
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 25, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed because of the appellant's failure to satisfy this court's December 28, 2017, fee order.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Michael LEASE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4741
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The record on appeal is still on file in this court and was reviewed in addressing petitioner's petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Petitioner's petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied.

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Daniel Paul KERSEY, Sr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Sheila P. BUCK, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-3885
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 23, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Because it appears that the proceedings in the circuit court relative to the petitioner's motion for summary judgment are progressing, as the court has scheduled a hearing on the motion, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied without prejudice.

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Souhail Steve KMED, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4174
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 09, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus is denied without prejudice. Petitioner is required to make an express and distinct demand for performance before mandamus will be considered. See Al-Hakim v. State, 783 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 5th DCA2001).

CASANUEVA, VILLANTI, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    C.J., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4785
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 26, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied.

NORTHCUTT, VILLANTI, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Abram J. JORDAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-3862
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 24, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Tyree JENKINS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-3859
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    December 12, 2017
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This petition for writ of mandamus is denied as moot.

LaROSE, C.J., and CRENSHAWand SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Madel JULIEN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2877
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    September 01, 2017
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The petition for belated appeal of the summary denial of petitioner's postconviction motion in the trial court is granted in circuit court case number 11-CF-736-A for review of the trial court's order of January 30, 2017.

The circuit court clerk shall treat this order as a notice of appeal, promptly certify same and return it to this court as with any notice of appeal, and a new appellate case number will be assigned to this appeal and an acknowledgment letter will issue at that time. The summary record shall be transmitted to this court when the certified copy of this order is returned by the trial court clerk.

After a new appellate case number is assigned and an acknowledgment letter has issued, this court will issue an order advising the appellant of the due date of the optional initial brief.

SILBERMAN, VILLANTI, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jean JAMISON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2953
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 25, 2018
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The appellant's petition for all writs, treated within this appeal as a motion to compel, is denied. This appeal is dismissed for the appellant's failure to provide an appealable final order. This dismissal is without prejudice to the appellant to seek the issuance of a final order by filing a petition for writ of mandamus in this court.

NORTHCUTT, MORRIS, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.