author: SALARIO, Judge.

text:
    Edelmiro DUARTE, Appellant, v. SNAP-ON INCORPORATED, a foreign corporation, and Norman Mullins, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D15-1952
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 3, 2017.

      Stacy L. Sherman of Stacy L. Sherman, P.A., Cape Coral, for Appellant.
    Scott A. Cole and Daniel M. Schwarz of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Miami, for Appellee Snap-on Incorporated.
    Caryn L. Bellus and Bretton C. Albrecht of Kubicki Draper, P.A., Miami for Appel-lee Norman Mullins.
   BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

Upon consideration of the motion for clarification and rehearing of March 15, 2017, decision filed by Appellee Snap-on Incorporated on March 30, 2017 and motion for rehearing and/or clarification of March 15, 2017, decision filed by Appellee Norman Mullins on March 30,2017,

IT IS ORDERED that the motions for clarification are granted in part and denied in part. The opinion issued on March 15, 2017, is withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted therefor. The motions for rehearing are denied. No further motions will be considered.

SALARIO, Judge.

Edelmiro Duarte alleges that he was injured when a truck owned by Snap-on Incorporated and driven by Norman Mullins slammed into the back of his car while he was stopped in traffic. He challenges the trial court’s final order, rendered without an evidentiary hearing, dismissing his personal injury suit against Snap-on and Mr. Mullins as a sanction for a fraud upon the court. Because the limited record before the trial court was insufficient to establish that this case is among the hopefully rare ones involving an unconscionable scheme to interfere with a trial court’s ability to impartially resolve a dispute or a defendant’s ability to prepare a defense, we are constrained to reverse.

I.

On January 18, 2008, Mr. Duarte was sitting in traffic on 1-75 in a car he was driving and in which his girlfriend, her daughter, his son, and his grandson were passengers. At the same time, Mr. Mullins was on 1-75 driving a truck owned by Snap-on. He smashed into Mr. Duarte’s stopped car without hitting his brakes. The police report says he was driving sixty miles an hour. After being put through field sobriety tests, he was arrested for driving under the influence causing serious bodily injury.

At least some of the injuries caused by the accident were severe. Mr. Duarte’s girlfriend was rendered a paraplegic. He testified that she filed suit to recover for her injuries and settled her claims for many millions of dollars. Mr. Duarte’s son and grandson likewise sued to recover for their injuries and obtained much smaller, but still sizeable, settlements on their claims.

Mr. Duarte filed this suit against Mr. Mullins and Snap-on to recover for his own injuries on January 12, 2012. He claims to have suffered past, present, and future loss of earnings, medical expenses, and pain and suffering, much of which is claimed to be related to injuries to both his back and his arm. There is no dispute as to liability. The dispute is over causation and the extent of Mr. Duarte’s injuries.

That controversy takes on significance in this case because, after he filed suit, Mr. Duarte was in another car wreck. On March 8, 2012, Mr. Duarte was rear-ended at a stop sign: The parties dispute how severe this event was and whether and to what extent it, rather than the January 2008 accident involving Mr. Mullins, caused the injuries for which Mr. Duarte seeks to recover in this case.

The issues in this appeal concern the candor and completeness of Mr. Duarte’s discovery responses about the March 2012 accident. Shortly before that accident, Snap-on served Mr. Duarte with interrogatories asking for the names of the medical providers that treated him at any relevant time and the dates of those treatments. Mr. Duarte answered in April 2012 and identified eight providers and dates of treatment between January 2008 and April 2012. He amended his answers in April 2013 to disclose visits to several additional providers, including the Cleveland Radiology Center in March 2012 and First Chiropractic Center between March and June 2012.

Mr. Mullins served Mr. Duarte with his own interrogatories in November 2013, which asked the same questions as had Snap-on about medical providers and also asked whether Mr. Duarte had been in any accidents since the January 2008 accident. Although Mr. Duarte’s answer about the medical providers included several providers from whom he sought treatment for back pain after the March 2012 accident, it did not identify Cleveland Radiology and First Chiropractic Center. Mr. Duarte’s answer to the question about other accidents was “not that I remember.”

Mr. Duarte was deposed over two days in April 2013 and May 2014. During the May 2014 session, he was asked whether he had been involved in any type of accident after the January 2008 accident. He testified that he had not, “unless it was that one time that I was parked and someone hit me from behind and broke one of my lights, but I don’t know if that’s considered an accident.” This was a reference to the March 2012 accident. Mr. Duarte explained that he was at a stop sign and a pick-up truck “touched us and they took off quickly.” He declined to characterize the event as an accident, saying that the damage to his car “was just a few dollars” but also stating that as a result “[m]y back hurt even more, much more.” The record does not show whether this was the first time Snap-on and Mr. Mullins had heard of the March 2012 accident; we note, however, that they have not asserted that it was.

In October 2014—one month before the then-scheduled trial date—Snap-on filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice based on fraud upon the court. Mr. Mullins joined in the motion, which essentially argued that Mr. Duarte (1) testified falsely about the severity of the March 2012 accident during his deposition and (2) failed to disclose the March 2012 accident and the subsequent visits to Cleveland Radiology Center and First Chiropractic Center— related to back injury issues—in written answers to interrogatories.

The motion included attached interrogatory answers and deposition transcripts upon which the claim of fraud was based. It also included the transcript of an examination under oath that Mr. Duarte gave in May 2012 in connection with a claim he made on his automobile insurance for the March 2012 accident. During that examination, Mr. Duarte described the March 2012 accident in starker terms than during his deposition in this case, characterizing it as an “accident” and describing it as a “hard impact very fast.” He also said that “the car felt the impact,” that “[t]he trunk was all bent and the bumper was indented,” and that the accident severely aggravated his back injury from the January 2008 accident.

The trial court heard the motion without taking evidence. Mr. Duarte proffered, among other things, that he did not intend to mislead anyone, that he neither reads nor speaks English—as evidenced by his use of an interpreter for deposition—and that he suffers from memory deficiencies due to age and medications he takes. Relying solely on the attachments to the motion, the trial court concluded that Mr. Duarte told “repeated untruths” about the March 2012 accident and that his credibility was so damaged that his testimony could not be presented to a jury. It entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice from which Mr. Duarte took this timely appeal.

II.

A trial court has the inherent authority to dismiss a suit when the plaintiff commits a fraud on the court. Howard v. Risch, 959 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), distinguished on other grounds by Ramey v. Haverty Furniture Cos., 993 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Although our review in such cases is for abuse of discretion, the trial court’s discretion is narrower and our review is more stringent than it would be in other cases evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard because dismissal is regarded as an extreme remedy that should be reserved for extreme eases. Id. (“Because dismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions, however, it should be employed only in extreme circumstances.”); see also Jacob v. Henderson, 840 So.2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), distinguished on other grounds by Ramey, 993 So.2d 1014. Moreover, where the trial court makes a decision without hearing evidence, as it did here, we give that decision less deference than we would in a case where the trial court heard evidence because we can evaluate a cold trial court record as well as the trial court can. Jacob, 840 So.2d at 1170; see also Ruiz v. City of Orlando, 859 So.2d 574, 576 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (reversing dismissal for fraud on the court).

To obtain a dismissal for fraud on the court, the movant must prove his case by clear and convincing evidence. See Myrick v. Direct Gen, Ins. Co., 932 So.2d 392, 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Substantively, he must show that his opponent “sen-tiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense.” Jacob, 840 So.2d at 1169 (quoting Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)). This standard requires that a trial court “balance two important public policies of this state: our much preferred policy of adjudicating disputed civil cases on the merits and the policy of maintaining the integrity of this state’s judicial system.” Pena v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 88 So.3d 965, 967 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (citing Gilbert v. Eckerd Corp. of Fla., 34 So.3d 773, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)). “Generally, unless it appears that the process of trial has itself been subverted, factual inconsistencies or even false statements .are well .managed through the use of impeachment at trial or other traditional discovery sanctions, not through dismissal of a possibly meritorious claim.” Howard, 959 So.2d at 311.

Snap-on’s pitch to the trial court was that Mr. Duarte played the 2008 and 2012 accidents off each other to maximize his recovery in each—making the March 2012 accident sound serious for purposes of beefing up his insurance claim for that accident and minimizing it here because it would weaken his claim for damages based on the January 2008 accident. The paper record appended to Snap-on’s motion to dismiss is certainly susceptible of that characterization. But that record alone was not, under our court’s precedents, a sufficient basis to dismiss Mr. Duarte’s claims with prejudice instead of allowing him to be impeached at trial or imposing some lesser sanction, if warranted.

Our decision in Jacob speaks to the variances in Mr. Duarte’s testimony in his 2012 examination under oath and his deposition testimony in this case. Like this case, Jacob involved a dispute over the extent of a plaintiffs injuries in an automobile accident. The plaintiff testified at deposition that as a result of an injury to her arm, she was unable to close a car door with her right hand or to sweep her own driveway. The defendants later produced a surveillance video showing her doing what she said she could not. Based solely on the transcript and the video and without taking evidence, the trial court dismissed the action for fraud on the court. Holding that the trial court abused its discretion, we reversed. 840 So.2d at 1168. We reasoned as follows:

Viewing the facts before this court, Mrs. Jacob either knowingly perpetrated a fraud, exaggerated "her injuries, or unknowingly provided video evidence that her injuries are far less severe than she may believe. Only the first of these three possibilities would support the dismissal of all claims with prejudice,... ... This is not a case in which Mrs. Jacob suffered no injury. The question is the severity of her injuries. Certainly, the video evidence that she is capable of performing tasks which she has denied the ability to perform lessens her credibility ..., but the jury should evaluate this evidence. The power to resolve, disputes over the truth or falsity of claims belongs to a jury.
.,. [T]he trial court’s' ruling in this case resulted from a review of the same deposition and videotape that we reviewed. Trial court rulings are given less deference when they are based on the same cold document record that is before the reviewing court.

Id. at 1169-70 (emphasis added).

Like Jacob, this is not a case in which Mr. Duarte has no injuries. And there is evidence that the January 2008 accident, which was very severe and as to which Snap-on and Mr. Mullins have admitted liability, was in fact the cause of some injury. The dispute here is over the extent of those injuries and the extent to which the March 2012 accident caused or contributed to them. On that score, Mr. Duarte did not falsely deny that in March 2012 a pick-up truck hit his car while he was stopped. On the contrary, he identified the event as having happened but described it as being slight and not, in his opinion, rising to the level of an accident. Even then, he testified that the event made his back hurt “much more” than it did before—a fact that undercuts a theory that his back injuries were entirely attributable to the January 2008 accident. Mr. Duarte’s testimony with regard to his insurance claim on the March 2012 accident, like the video recording in Jacob, diminishes the credibility of his deposition testimony about the severity of the March 2012 accident. Without additional facts, however, the trial court record does not establish that Mr. Duarte sentiently set in motion an unconscionable scheme to defraud in this case against Snap-on and Mr. Mullins such that it would warrant a dismissal. And without additional evidence demonstrating a knowing fraud on the court in this case, the inconsistencies between his May 2012 examination under oath and his May 2014 deposition are regarded by our decisions as matters of fact and credibility for a jury to resolve, See Jacob, 840 So.2d at 1170; see also Kubel v. San Marco Floor & Wall, Inc., 967 So.2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that evidence that the plaintiffs husband asked the physician to revise a report to eliminate certain facts bearing on the plaintiffs injuries did not justify dismissal because those matters were suited for impeachment at trial).

Our decision in Howard, in turn, bears directly on the completeness of Mr. Duarte’s interrogatory answers. That case, like this one, involved a dispute over the extent of a plaintiffs back injuries after an automobile accident. The defendant sought a dismissal for fraud on the court because the plaintiff failed to disclose, in response to a question at deposition, several medical matters relevant to his claim of injury. The plaintiff did reveal some matters bearing on his injuries but not all of them. The plaintiff denied an intent to provide false information. After the trial court dismissed the action without taking evidence, we reversed because the limited record before the trial court was insufficient to warrant dismissal. 959 So.2d at 314. In particular, the trial court lacked evidence to find that the plaintiff affirmatively or intentionally misrepresented his medical conditions, and there was no evidence that the treatments the defendant later uncovered would have made any difference to the case. Id.

As in Howard, the record upon which the trial court based its decision in this case was insufficient to deem Mr. Duarte’s interrogatory disclosure a fraud on the court. Insofar as Mr. Duarte’s receipt of medical treatment subsequent to the March 2012 accident from Cleveland Radiology and First Chiropractic was concerned, those matters were disclosed in Mr. Duarte’s amended answers to Snap-on’s interrogatories. Snap-on failed to mention that fact in its dismissal motion, and the trial court failed to recognize it. Because these facts were disclosed by Mr. Duarte, the fact that they were not contained in either his initial answers to Snap-on’s interrogatories or his answers to Mr, Mullins’ interrogatories cannot be said to have operated as a fraud. Similarly, although Mr. Duarte’s December 2013 answers to Mr. Mullins’ interrogatories stated “I don’t remember” in response to a question about other accidents, Mr. Mullins was informed during Mr. Duarte’s deposition about the March 2012 collision and the fact that Mr. Duarte did not regard it as an accident. The essential facts were disclosed—there was a collision, and Mr. Duarte received treatment thereafter—but there is a dispute about the characterization of those facts. On this record, the evidence is insufficient to justify dismissal for fraud upon the court. See Howard, 959 So.2d at 314; see also Laschke v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 872 So.2d 344, 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (reversing dismissal order where the evidence was insufficient to show that plaintiffs attempt to have medical records altered “was one that, if she had been successful, would have interfered with the trier of fact’s ability to impartially adjudicate the issues ... nor would it have unfairly ’hampered’ the ap-pellees’ presentation of their defense”).

We note that unlike our decision today, our court affirmed dismissals for fraud on the court based on false or misleadingly incomplete discovery responses in both Ramey, 993 So.2d 1014, and Morgan v. Campbell, 816 So.2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Those cases have several differences from the case before us, but one key difference merits comment. In each, the trial court dismissed the case after an eviden-tiary hearing enabled it to find as facts that the plaintiff had done something false or misleading, that the plaintiffs nonculpa-ble explanations for his conduct were unconvincing, and that the conduct was of a kind sufficiently severe to warrant dismissal under our cases. See Ramey, 993 So,2d at 1020; Morgan, 816 So.2d at 253. Here, “the trial court failed to conduct an eviden-tiax-y healing and thus lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis for determining that fraud on the coux-t had occurred.” See Ramey, 993 So.2d at 1020 (distinguishing cases involving this circumstance).

III.

The limited documentary record before the trial court was not sufficient to justify a decision that dismissal, rather than impeachment at trial or a traditional discovery sanction, was the appropriate remedy for Mr. Duarte’s conduct. As such, the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action with prejudice. Its final order is reversed, and the case is remanded for fuxther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

LaROSE and SLEET, JJ., Concur.

      . Snap-on also suggests that Mr. Duarte aided his alleged fraud upon the court by failing to disclose a 1996 accident and failing to disclose the March 2012 accident during independent medical examinations. Based on this record, we conclude that these assertions lack merit.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Justin MANGES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D17-1076
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed May 5, 2017
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and George D.E. Burden, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Petitioner.
    No Appearance for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the August 16, 2016, judgment and sentence in Case No. 2015-CF-014670, in the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

TORPY and EDWARDS, JJ., and JACOBUS, B.W., Senior Judge, concur.


text:
    Duane JONES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D17-870
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth Distinct.
    Opinion filed May 5, 2017
    Duane Jones, Daytona Beach, Daytona Beach, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the August 22, 2016 order denying Petitioner’s pro se motion for postconviction relief filed in Case No. 05-2009-CF-22165-A, in the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

ORFINGER, BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Astor BENITEZ, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D17-867
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed May 5, 2017
    Astor Benitez, Jasper, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the January 12, 2017, order denying Petitioner’s pro se motion for post-conviction relief filed in Case No. 2010-CF-541-L, in the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

PALMER, LAMBERT, and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kandice DINGEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-669
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed May 5, 2017
    Kandice Dingey, Quincy, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah A. Chance, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Kandice Dingey filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion raising two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court summarily denied the motion. However, because the trial court’s order did not address Dingey’s second claim, we reversed in part and remanded. Dingey v. State, 210 So.3d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (“Because the trial court failed to address claim two, we reverse that part of the order summarily denying that claim and remand this case for attachment of the record that refutes the claim or for an evidentiary hearing.”)

On remand, but prior to the issuance of the mandate, the trial court entered an order summarily denying Dingey’s second claim. Although the trial court was correct on the merits, we reverse because the trial court lacked jurisdiction when it entered its order. See Martin v. State, 159 So.3d 382 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its order before issuance of mandate on original rule 3.850 appeal).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reenter the order.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., and JACOBUS, B.W., Senior Judge, concur.


text:
    Gary David NERO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-4038
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed May 5, 2017
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Brittany N. O’Neil, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah A. Chance, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this postconviction proceeding, Appellant challenges the order denying his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion on three grounds, only one of which merits discussion. In his third claim, Appellant argued that the trial court’s “ORDER OF SEX OFFENDER PROBATION” was illegal because he was not convicted of any of the enumerated felonies listed in section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2012).

The postconviction court agreed with Appellant on the merits, but nevertheless denied relief, concluding that although labeled as an “ORDER OF SEX OFFENDER PROBATION,” the actual substance of the order indicated that the only conditions applicable to Appellant were those “generic” conditions contained in the first fourteen paragraphs that “cover all [probationary] circumstances.” As for the remaining eighteen paragraphs of sex offender conditions contained within the order, the postconviction court reasoned that, with the exception of two of these sex offender conditions, the order made clear that the remaining sixteen sex offender conditions were applicable to sex offenses other than those for which Appellant was convicted.

We conclude that the postconviction court erred in not granting relief. Although we appreciate the need for efficiency in trial court proceedings, the one-size-fits-all probation order at use here imper-missibly required Appellant to decipher which of the conditions apply by, among other things, researching particular statutes to determine if they apply to his circumstances. This does not give fair notice of what is expected of Appellant. See Lawson v. State, 941 So.2d 485, 489 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (probation order should give fair notice of conduct that might result in violation). On remand, the trial court shall enter a new order that clearly delineates the conditions applicable to Appellant.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

PALMER and TORPY, JJ., and JACOBUS, B.W., Senior Judge, concur.


text:
    D.R., a Child, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D17-1114
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed May 5, 2017
    Robert Wesley, Public Defender, and Derreck Quarles, Assistant Public Defender, Orlando, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nora Hutchinson Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

D.R. petitions this court for habeas relief, challenging his detention for indirect contempt of court. For the reasons set forth in F.P. v. State, 216 So.3d 762, 762-63, 2017 WL 1423578 (Fla. 5th DCA Apr. 21, 2017), and J.H. v. State, 216 So.3d 761, 761-62, 2017 WL 1423577 (Fla. 5th DCA Apr. 21, 2017), we grant the petition and quash the trial court’s order of detention.

PETITION GRANTED.

TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., and JACOBUS, B.W., Senior Judge, concur.


author: KHOUZAM, Judge.

text:
    Eric D. COLEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3084
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 5, 2017.
   KHOUZAM, Judge.

Eric D. Coleman appeals the orders denying his motions to correct illegal sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Coleman filed motions to correct illegal sentence on June 27, 2014, and March 14, 2016. The postconviction court rendered separate orders denying Coleman’s motions on June 7, 2016. Coleman filed a motion for rehearing, which only challenged the denial of his motion filed in March 2016, on June 16, 2016. The rehearing motion did not challenge the order denying his motion filed in June 2014. The postconviction court rendered an order denying the motion for rehearing on June 23, 2016. Coleman filed a notice of appeal on July 11, 2016. The notice of appeal did not specify which June 7, 2016, order Coleman sought to appeal.

Coleman’s notice of appeal was timely with respect to the order denying his March 2016 motion because rendition of that oi'der was tolled by Coleman’s motion for rehearing. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(1)(B) (providing for motions for rehearing on orders entered on motions filed under rule 3.800(a)); Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(f) (providing that timely and authorized motions for rehearing toll rendition of final orders). We affirm that order without further comment.

However, because Coleman did not move for rehearing of the order denying his June 2014 motion, rendition was not tolled. Accordingly, his notice of appeal was untimely as to that order. We dismiss this appeal insofar as Coleman is seeking review of the order denying his June 2014 motion.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part.

SALARIO and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    James Deerfield COOK II, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-5744
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed May 5, 2017.
    James Deerfield Cook II, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of appellant’s response to the Court’s order of December 22, 2016, the Court has determined that appellant failed to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction in a timely manner. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

KELSEY, WINOKUR, and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    Jameel TUCKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-5058
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed May 5, 2017
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender; Steven L. Seliger and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Williams v. State, 202 So.3d 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that absconding from supervision is an independent basis for tolling probation).

ROWE, OSTERHAUS, and WINOKUR, JJ., CONCUR.


text:
    MARKET TAMPA INVESTMENTS, LLC, Appellant, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as trustee FOR NOVASTAR MORTGAGE FUNDING TRUST, SERIES 2007-I Novastar Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-I; Engelique D. Dupree-Ferguson; Charles B. Ferguson; Country Hills Homeowners Association, Inc.; Unknown Tenant #1; Unknown Tenant #2, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D15-5683
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 5, 2017.
    Heather S. DeGrave of Walters Levine, P.A., Tampa (withdrew after briefing); Lee Segal of Florida Foreclosure & Credit Defense Firm, P.L., Clearwater, for Appellant.
    Zina Gabsi and Adwoa Ghartey-Tagoe Seymour of Bryan Cave, LLP, Miami; and W. Bard Brockman and Christian J. Brom-ley of Bryan Cave, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia (substituted as counsels of record), for Ap-pellee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2007-1 Novastar Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-1.
    No appearance for remaining Appellees.
   KHOUZAM, Judge.

Market Tampa Investments, LLC, appeals the final foreclosure judgment entered in favor of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee. On Deutsche Bank’s concession of error, we reverse the attorney’s fee award in the foreclosure judgment without remand because the award is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Michel v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 191 So.3d 981, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“Because the bank did not present any evidence of attorney’s fees at trial, we reverse the fee award without remand on that issue.”). We otherwise affirm the foreclosure judgment without comment.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

CASANUEVA and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Theodore WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Not in Its Individual Capacity but Solely as Trustee FOR the RMAC TRUST, SERIES 2016-CTT, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-31
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed May 12, 2017

      Theodore Washington, Orlando, pro se.
    Gary I, Gassel of the Law Office of Gary Gassel, P.A., Sarasota, and Susan J. Silver-man, Sarasota, for Appellee.
   ON CONCESSION OF ERROR

PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the concession of error filed by Appellee, we reverse the trial court’s December 14, 2016, “Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss” and remand the matter for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SAWAYA, PALMER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


author: BADALAMENTI, Judge.

text:
    Rose Lynn BLACKBURN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2926
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 12, 2017.
    Rose Lynn Blackburn, pro se.
   BADALAMENTI, Judge.

Rose Lynn Blackburn appeals the summary denial of her motion for correction of jail credit, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801. We affirm the trial court’s summary denial of Ms. Blackburn’s motion to the extent that the trial court correctly determined Ms. Blackburn waived 266 days of her jail credit, pursuant to the trial court’s Order of Revocation of Drug Order Probation.

However, because Ms. Blackburn’s motion claimed entitlement to an additional 59 days beyond the 266 days which she waived, and because her entitlement to these 59 days is not conclusively refuted by the documents attached to trial court’s summary denial of her motion, we must reverse the summary denial in part and remand for additional consideration. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(5) (“If the denial is based on the records in the case, a copy of that portion of the files and records that conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief shall be attached to the final order.”); Cole v. State, 146 So.3d 1259, 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with instructions.

KHOUZAM and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Sarah L. SWANSON, Appellant, v. Lolita M. BEILMAN, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D15-2901
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed May 12, 2017

      Charles W. Hall, DeeAnn J. McLemore and Mark D. Tinker, of Banker Lopez Gassier P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
    Marjorie Gadarian Graham, of Marjorie Gadarian Graham, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens and Douglas R. Beam, Melbourne, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Sarah L. Swanson appeals the trial court’s order granting a new trial on damages after she rejected an additur in a personal injury lawsuit arising from an automobile accident. We affirm. However, because the jury found the plaintiff below, Lolita M. Beilman, did not sustain a permanent injury, the new trial shall be limited to economic damages only. See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (2010).

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER, TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Cody HUGGINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-5608
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 12, 2017
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew D. Bernstein, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this Anders appeal, we affirm Cody Huggins’ judgments and sentences and the revocation of his probation. However, the order of revocation of probation entered on December 4, 2016, does not identify the conditions found to have been violated. We remand solely for entry of a corrected revocation order specifying the condition(s) of probation that Mr. Huggins violated. See Greene v. State, 919 So.2d 684, 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“A proper order of revocation will identify the specific conditions of probation violated by the defendant.”).

Affirmed; remanded with directions.

NORTHCUTT, CASANUEVA, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.

      . Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).


text:
    STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ON BEHALF OF Maria MURILLO, Appellant, v. Saul MURILLO, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-4435
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed May 16, 2017

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this appeal, the Department of Revenue argues that the Administrative Law Judge erred by concluding that the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to establish Appellee’s child support obligation because a dissolution action addressing child support was pending between the parents in circuit court. The Department is correct. Because there was no court order of support in effect, and Appellee had not timely opted out of the administrative proceeding, DOAH had concurrent jurisdiction to establish Appellee’s child support obligation and a support order should have been entered. See § 409.2563(2)(a), (c), Fla. Stat. (2016); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Van Edwards, 214 So.3d 800, 2017 WL 1372663 (Fla. 1st DCA Apr. 13, 2017); Dep’t of Revenue v. Graczyk, 206 So.3d 157, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.

WOLF, RAY, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.


author: PER CURIAM CRICHTON, J., Clark, J.,

text:
    IN RE: June A. PLACER
    No. 2016-B-1590
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    11/07/2016
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

_JjThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, June A, Placer, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension based upon her conviction of a serious crime. In re: Placer, 15-0463 (La. 3/25/15), 164 So.3d 169.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The ODC filed two sets of formal charges against respondent under disciplinary board docket numbers 14-DB-010 and 15-DB-009. Respondent answered the first set of formal charges, and the matter proceeded to a formal hearing. Respondent did not answer the second set of formal charges, and the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted. In September 2015, the matters were consolidated by order of the disciplinary board. The disciplinary board then filed in this court a single recommendation of discipline encompassing both sets of formal charges.

14-DB-010

The Divorce Matter

By way of background, respondent and David Molaison were married and had one child together. In May 2011, David filed a petition for divorce. ^Subsequent to the filing of the petition, but prior to the entry of a judgment of divorce, respondent entered into a sexual relationship with Bryan Pfleeger. In response to David’s discovery requests, respondent admitted to her adulterous relationship. Respondent provided copies of e-mails between her and Mr. Pfleeger, and a greeting card purportedly from Mr. Pfleeger as documentary proof of the relationship. Respondent signed a sworn affidavit attesting to the truthfulness of her responses to the discovery requests.

In July 2011, David filed a supplemental petition for divorce based on respondent’s adultery. The e-mails and greeting card were presented to the court as support for obtaining a divorce based on adultery.

The matter went to trial in August 2011. Respondent testified under oath that she committed adultery with Mr. Pfleeger. She also testified to the authenticity of both her e-mails to and from Mr. Pfleeger and to the greeting card she allegedly received from Mr. Pfleeger, Ml documents were admitted into evidence and the divorce was granted based on adultery.

The ODC has since confirmed respondent’s post-filing adultery with Mr. Pfleeger, and has authenticated the emails between respondent and Mr. Pfleeger regarding same. However, the greeting card that respondent attributed to Mr. Pfleeger and that she submitted to the opposing party and to counsel during discovery was found to be fabricated by respondent without Mr. Pfleeger’s knowledge or consent. Respondent allowed this false evidence to be submitted to the court during the underlying proceedings.

In September 2011, respondent e-mailed David and claimed her testimony regarding adultery with Mr. Pfleeger was false. Respondent confirmed to David that the greeting card attributed to Mr. Pfleeger was also false. In November 2011, David informed his lawyer, Barbara Ziv, of respondent’s claim of false testimony and of the fake greeting card.

| sIn December 2011, Ms. Ziv informed Mr. Pfleeger of respondent’s recent statements to David. Mr. Pfleeger confirmed his adulterous relationship with respondent and confirmed the authenticity of his e-mails to and from respondent; however, Mr. Pfleeger denied any involvement with the greeting card in question. Ms. Ziv then informed Mr. Pfleeger that, under the circumstances, she was obligated to file a disciplinary complaint against respondent.

During this time, respondent and David were litigating custody issues. Mr. Pfleeger informed respondent that Ms. Ziv planned to file a disciplinary complaint against her. In response, respondent instructed Mr. Pfleeger to inform Ms. Ziv that she would concede custody of the minor child to David if Ms. Ziv refrained from filing the complaint. Mr. Pfleeger, who is an attorney, was not representing respondent in the domestic litigation and was hesitant to relay this message to Ms. Ziv, but ultimately did so at respondent’s request. Ms. Ziv rejected this “offer” and filed the complaint against respondent.

In March 2012, respondent responded to the complaint filed against her by Ms. Ziv. In doing so, respondent made the following statements to the ODC:

Ms. Ziv tailored her discovery in order that a quick adultery divorce might be obtained. In these responses, I falsely claimed to have had an affair with a friend of long duration. A card was created as corroborating evidence in order to obtain the divorce quickly. This was a mistake that I do regret ...

The ODC alleged respondent’s misconduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 3.3(a)(1) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal), 3.3(a)(3) (a lawyer shall not offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false), 3.4(b) (a lawyer shall not falsify evidence), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

| ¿The Shoplifting Matter

In June 2005 in Honolulu, Hawaii, respondent shoplifted merchandise from Macy’s valued in excess of $300. Respondent was charged with second degree theft, pleaded no contest to the charge, and moved to defer acceptance of the plea. In September 2008, an order was signed granting respondent’s motion. During the five-year period of deferral, respondent was placed on supervised probation with specific conditions, which she completed.

The ODC alleged respondent’s misconduct violated Rule 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer) of the Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct.

In response to the formal charges in 14-DB-010, respondent admitted her misconduct and explained the context in which her actions occurred. Beginning in 2005, she suffered from severe depression, for which she sought treatment with a psychiatrist. During this time, she lost a sister to suicide, another sister suffered a drug overdose, and her parents suffered from serious medical problems, including brain disease and cancer. Thereafter, her husband filed for divorce, which turned bitter, and a contentious child custody battle ensued. Respondent’s concern over the emotional health of her son caused her much stress and anxiety. She continued treatment for her own mental health and was prescribed several anti-depressants, which, in her opinion, adversely affected her judgment and decision-making ability.

| ^Following the filing of respondent’s answer, this matter proceeded to a hearing before the hearing committee in March 2015. Respondent failed to appear at the hearing and was not represented.

15-DB-009

The DWI Matter

In December 2012, respondent was involved in an automobile accident. When the police arrived, respondent was found to be under the influence of alcohol, and she was arrested for multiple traffic violations, including driving while intoxicated.

The ODC alleged respondent’s misconduct violated Rule 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The CDS Matter

In March 2018, respondent was stopped by police in Tangipahoa Parish after she was observed driving in an erratic fashion. A clear plastic bag with seven rocks of crack cocaine was found in her possession. Respondent was arrested for careless operation of a motor vehicle as well as possession of a Schedule II narcotic. Upon presentation the District Attorney of Tan-gipahoa Parish charged respondent with a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2), possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, to wit: cocaine. On November 12, 2013, respondent pleaded guilty to the drug charge and was sentenced to serve three years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The jail term was deferred and respondent was placed on supervised probation through the Probation and Parole Board. On August 7, 2014, respondent failed to appear for felony | ^monitoring, resulting in the issuance of a bench warrant for her arrest and a hold without bond. To date, respondent remains a fugitive.

The ODC alleged respondent’s misconduct violated Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

As previously noted, respondent failed to answer the formal charges in 15-DB-009. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee ■written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the evidence presented at the hearing in 14-DB-010, the hearing committee found that respondent admitted to the substantive factual allegations of the formal charges. After considering the ODC’s submission in 15-DB-009, the hearing committee determined the factual allegations of the formal charges were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. The committee also determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in both sets of formal charges.

The committee then determined that respondent violated duties owed to the public and the legal system. Her conduct was both knowing and intentional. Respondent engaged in multiple criminal activities, including felony activities. In addition, and importantly, she engaged in acts of misconduct involving a knowing act of dishonesty and fraud within a pending domestic matter. This conduct spans over a period of a decade and suggests that her activity is not an isolated or remote event. Her behavior reflects adversely on her character and fitness to practice law |7in Louisiana. Respondent also chose to ignore and not participate in this disciplinary proceeding. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the applicable baseline sanction ranges from suspension to disbarment.

In aggravation, the committee found a prior disciplinary record, a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and “failure to participate in the disciplinary process.” Other than those contained in her answer to the formal charges in 14-DB-010, the committee found no mitigating factors are present.

The committee struggled with determining an appropriate sanction, finding disbarment or permanent disbarment to be the only two appropriate choices available. After considering all the aforementioned factors and collective misconduct, as well as the recommendation of the ODC, the committee recommended respondent be disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing these consolidated matters, the disciplinary board determined that the committee’s findings with regard to 14-DB-010 are supported by the evidence submitted by the ODC, and that with regard to 15-DB-009, the factual allegations of the formal charges are deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. The board also determined that the legal conclusions of the hearing committee are supported by the factual allegations asserted in the formal charges and/or by the evidence submitted in support of the allegations. The board further determined that the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct.

|sThe board then determined that respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to the public and the legal system. Her falsification of evidence caused actual harm to her divorce proceeding. Her criminal conduct had the potential to cause significant harm (driving while intoxicated) and caused actual harm (shoplifting). After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined that the baseline sanction is disbarment.

In aggravation, the board found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1997), and illegal conduct. In mitigation, the board found the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

After also considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the board recommended that respondent be disbarred. The board further recommended that respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s report and recommendation,

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed 13admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La. 1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

The evidence in the record supports a finding that respondent presented fabricated evidence to a tribunal in her own divorce proceeding, shoplifted merchandise valued in excess of $300, was arrested for multiple traffic violations including DWI, and was charged with possession of cocaine. This conduct amounts to a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in both sets of formal charges.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La. 1984).

The record also supports a finding that respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to the public and the legal system, causing potential and actual harm. The aggravating and mitigating factors found by the disciplinary board are supported by the record.

ImStanding alone, the misconduct involving respondent’s intentional misrepresentation of facts to a court warrants a baseline sanction of disbarment under Standard 6.11 of the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Laivyer Sanctions:

Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false document, or improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

Respondent admitted to presenting fabricated evidence to a tribunal in her divorce proceeding to bolster her case for a more expeditious divorce. With full knowledge that the evidence was false, she introduced the evidence to the court. ■

As to the remaining misconduct, which is criminal in nature and rooted in substance abuse, we note that in In re: Baer, 09-1795 (La. 11/20/09), 21 So.3d 941, we suspended an attorney from the practice of law for one year and one day for driving while intoxicated on two occasions. In discussing an appropriate sanction, we noted that actual suspensions are imposed in cases in which the DWI stems from an unresolved substance abuse problem.

Although respondent does not have multiple DWI offenses, her DWI offense and drug conviction strongly suggest the existence of a substance abuse problem. Since respondent allowed the formal charges to be deemed admitted, we have no way of knowing whether she has since sought treatment for this problem. Had this misconduct occurred in isolation, a period of actual suspension might have been appropriate. When considered in conjunction with the additional misconduct, however, disbarment is warranted.

Considering the totality of the misconduct in light of the aforementioned jui-is-prudence, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and disbar respondent,

InDECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that June A. Placer, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24858, be and she hereby is disbarred, retroactive to March 25, 2015, the date of her interim suspension. Her name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and her license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

CLARK, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

CRICHTON, J.,

additionally concurs and assigns reasons:

hi concur in the majority’s decision to disbar the respondent. I write separately, howevei', to make note of respondent’s representations that she suffers from depression, which she alleges was a major factor in her conduct that is the subject of these disciplinary proceedings. Respondent asserts in her initial response to the formal charges that she saw several doctors over the course of previous mental health treatment (which was part of her probationary conditions for previous misconduct), yet she fails to provide any evidence of treatment, other than her own self-serving statement. Moreover, respondent lists a host of drugs which she was prescribed, but provides no pharmacy l-ecords, medical documentation, or any testimony whatsoever of any therapist or doctor who prescribed these medications or provided treatment for her alléged depression. Thus, other than respondent’s self-serving statements, the record before us is devoid of any specific medical evidence that might seiwe as mitigation.

This Court is mindful of the debilitating nature of clinical depression. However, in this case, due to respondent’s failure to provide any specific medical evidence to corroborate what could be only a self-diagnosis, in addition to respondent’s complete disregard for and absence from these disciplinary proceedings, we are bound to remove respondent from the practice of law.

Clark, J.,

dissents.

|tI dissent as I find the sanction of disbarment inappropriately lenient. Accordingly, I would impose permanent disbarment.

      . Rule 8.5(a) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a lawyer admitted to practice in Louisiana "is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs.” As to the choice of which jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct are to be applied in such circumstances, Rule 8.5(b)(2) states that the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred shall apply "[i]n any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction.”
      In this case, respondent is admitted to practice in Louisiana, while her misconduct occurred in Hawaii. Therefore, respondent is subject to the disciplinary authority of this court, but the Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct apply. In any event, the distinction is largely academic, as the Hawaii rules in question are substantially identical to the Louisiana rules.


author: Hughes, J.,

text:
    Carl FOSTER v. Ronald BIAS
    NO. 2017-CC-0181
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/24/2017
    JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.
    HUGHES, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
    CRICHTON J., would grant.
   Hughes, J.,

dissents and would grant the writ.

hi would reverse the court of appeal writ grant and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. Col. Bias abuses two laws designed to prevent abuse. He used the False Claims Act to attack Sgt. Foster, and now uses the special motion to strike to avoid responsibility for his actions, which were clearly made in bad faith.

In any event, as noted by the federal courts, which seem to have a better understanding of this matter, Sgt. Foster’s reputation is unblemished and cannot be harmed by the unworthy acts of others.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. J.D. THOMPSON, III
    2016-K-762
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    04/13/2017
   Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No 14 CRB 124266; to the Court of Appeal First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 1618

| Writ denied.

HUGHES, J. would grant for the reasons assigned by Guidry, J., of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit,


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christian DEGREGORY
    2017-KK-553
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    04/13/2017
    HUGHES, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
   Hughes, J.,

additionally concurs.

_JjI concur in the denial of the writ. See State v. Taylor, 16-1124 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So.3d 283, 2016 WL 7030750.


author: PER CURIAM WEIMER, J., 11 GUIDRY, J.,

text:
    Carolyn CORRERO v. Dr. Jose L. FERRER, Lammico Insurance Agency, Inc., Iasys Glenwood Regional Medical Center, L.P., and XYZ Insurance Company
    NO. 2016-C-0861
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    October 28, 2016
   PER CURIAM

| jThis medical malpractice action concerns whether a timely filed amendment to a medical review panel (“MRP”) complaint can be converted into a new complaint (“MRP-2”) by the Department of Administration (“DOA”), which would end suspension on the initial complaint (“MRP-1”) causing plaintiffs claims against the first named healthcai'e providers to prescribe while the second complaint is still pending against alleged joint and solidary obligors. In accord with the strict construction required, we find, in this circumstance where an administrative decision directly affected the tolling period to the detriment of plaintiffs tort rights, prescription on plaintiffs claims remained suspended as to all joint and solidary obligors while the MRP-2 proceeding was still pending against alleged joint and solidary obligors.

The following is a brief summation of the relevant facts:

• Apr. 23, 2011—Plaintiff underwent surgery performed by Dr. Jose Ferrer at Glenwood Regional Medical Center (“Glenwood”) after fracturing her left hip. Due to incorrect positioning and misverification of the surgical site, Dr. Ferrer began surgery on plaintiffs right hip, making a 10-inch incision through her skin, | ¡¡subcutaneous tissue, and her deep fascia. Two minutes into the surgery, the error was discovered by an attending RN who noticed the x-ray images were of a left hip fracture although consent was for a right hip fracture. Plaintiffs right side was sutured and her skin stapled. After verifying and confirming the x-rays, Dr. Ferrer then proceeded with surgery on her left hip without further incident.
• Apr. 12, 2012—Plaintiff mailed, via U.S. Certified Mail, a letter to DOA requesting the formation of a MRP against Dr. Ferrer and Glenwood (MRP-1) and specifically alleging the medical negligence of Glenwood’s employees and/or Dr. Ferrer.
• Aug. 22, 2013—Dr. Ferrer was dismissed from MRP-1 after Dr. Ferrer acknowledged his liability and breach of the standard of care and waived the proceeding in the initial panel.
• Nov. 1, 2013—MRP-l’s attorney chairman informed the parties the matter would proceed to the panel for a hearing and decision on November 19, 2013.
• Nov. 15, 2013—Plaintiff’s counsel, via email, requested a postponement of the panel hearing, explaining: “The hospital’s position paper has revealed for the first time that the physician assistant, the anesthesia team and the CRNA were not employees of the hospital. Plaintiff wishes to amend her complaint to add these additional independent parties, which will be forthcoming shortly.”
• Nov. 18, 2013—MRP-l’s attorney chairman indicated he was not willing to postpone the hearing, stating: “What you are requesting me to do is cancel a panel conference in a proceeding that has been pending for almost a year so you can start over by adding new defendants, which would entail new defense attorneys, re-selection of the panelists, a new schedule for discovery and submissions, et al. I am not willing to do this. You can file a new complaint in a new proceeding against whatever additional parties you need to proceed against and have a panel against those new parties. The panel conference set for tomorrow evening will go forward as scheduled.”
• Nov. 19, 2013—Plaintiff filed an amendment to her complaint, adding Bernie Caldwell and Cathy Greer as newly-discovered, additional defendants. The amendment specifically referenced her initial complaint: |s‘Tn the above referenced panel proceeding, the hospital’s position paper submitted on September 25, 2013, revealed for the first time that the physician assistant, Bernie Caldwell, and the CRNA, Cathy Greer, were not employees of the hospital. Plaintiff wishes to amend her complaint to add these additional independent defendants. Pursuant to La. R.S. 9:5628, this amendment is timely made within three years of the alleged injury.”
• Dec. 27, 2013—MRP-1 issued and mailed, via U.S. Certified Mail, its opinion finding Glenwood failed to meet the applicable standard of care, specifically reasoning: “Standard of care calls for both the surgeon and the operation room nurses/personnel to confirm the correct surgical sight [sic] before surgery begins. While this panel is aware that the surgical consent form identifies the right hip instead of the left hip, the emergency room records and radiology reports clearly show that Ms. Correro had sustained a left hip fracture. It is the responsibility of both the physician and the operation room nurse to verify the correct surgical sight [sic] when there is a discrepancy between the surgical consent form and the hospital records .... This panel recognizes that there is a material issue of fact as to whether Ms. Correro told the operation room nurse she was having surgery on her right hip; but even assuming that is true it does not relieve the operating room nurse/personnel and the physician from verifying the correct surgical site. As a result of the aforementioned deviation below the standard of care Ms. Cor-rero incurred a right hip incision that should not have been made.”
• Jan. 31, 2014—The POP informed plaintiff it had converted the amended complaint against Caldwell and Greer into a separate request for a MRP (MRP-2), stating: “Unknowing to the [PCF] an opinion was rendered on the above referenced panel request when the recently submitted amendment dated November 19, 2013 was filed. Therefore, the amendment will be processed as a new request for a medical review panel.”
• Apr. 23, 2014—Caldwell and Greer filed an exception of prescription in response to MRP-2. The trial court granted the exception, but the court of appeal reversed, holding: “the timely filed claim with the initial panel against Dr. Ferrer and Glenwood served to suspend prescription with regard to the unnamed joint tortfeasors (Caldwell and Greer) to the same extent that suspension transpires as to those named in the request for review. Likewise, the timely filed claim against Caldwell and LGreer served to suspend prescription against the remaining alleged joint tortfeasor, Glenwood.” Correro v. Caldwell, 49,778 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/3/15), 166 So.3d 442, 447-48 writ denied, 15-1536 (La. 10/23/15), 179 So.3d 607 (“Correro I”).
• Aug. 27, 2014—Plaintiff filed the instant medical malpractice suit against Dr. Ferrer, Glenwood, XYZ Insurance Company, and LAMMICO.

In response to plaintiffs suit, Dr. Ferrer and Glenwood filed separate exceptions of prescription. Citing La. Rev. Stat. § 9:5628(A), they argued plaintiffs claim prescribed ninety days after the MRP-1 opinion was issued and mailed on December 27, 2013. Plaintiff opposed the exception, arguing MRP-2, which remained pending against Caldwell and Greer, suspended prescription against all joint and solidary obligors, including Dr. Ferrer and Glenwood.

After a hearing, the trial court granted defendants’ exception of prescription and dismissed plaintiffs suit against Dr. Ferrer and Glenwood. The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed in a 2-1 decision, with one judge concurring in part and dissenting in part. Correro v. Ferrer, 50,-476 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/2/16), 188 So.3d 316.

As we have long held, prescriptive statutes are strictly construed in favor of maintaining a plaintiffs cause of action. Williams v. Jackson Parish Hospital, 00-3170, p. 13 (La. 10/16/01), 798 So.2d 921, 930. Absent clear, contrary legislative intent, “prescriptive statutes which can be given more than one reasonable interpretation should be construed against the party claiming prescription.” Maltby |5,v. Gauthier, 506 So.2d 1190, 1193 n. 5 (La. 1987). Thus, if there are two possible constructions, the one which favors maintaining an action, as opposed to barring, should be adopted. Carter v. Haygood, 04-0646, p. 10 (La. 1/19/05), 892 So.2d 1261,1268.

This Court has also repeatedly cautioned that parties cannot make prescription more onerous. Taranto v. La. Citizens, 10-105, p. 16 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 721, 732-33. And as we recently reaffirmed in In re Tillman, 15-1114, p. 16 (La. 3/15/16), 187 So.3d 445, 455, administrative agencies likewise cannot adopt rules that shorten the prescriptive period.

The Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act specially controls prescription, and the suspension of prescription, in medical malpractice cases. La. Rev. Stat. §§ 9: 5628 and 40:1299.41(G). Relevant herein, La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) specifically provides:

The filing of the request for a review of a claim shall suspend the time within which suit must be instituted, in accordance with this Part, until ninety days following notification, by certified mail, as provided in Subsection J of this Section, to the claimant or his attorney of the issuance of the opinion by the medical review panel, in the case of those health care providers covered by this Part, or in the case of a health care provider against whom a claim has been filed under the provisions of this Part, but who has not qualified under this Part, until ninety days following notification by certified mail to the claimant or his attorney by the board that the health care provider is not covered by this Part. The ñling of a request for review of a claim shall suspend the running of prescription against all joint and solidary obligors, and all joint tortfeasors, including but not limited to health care providers, both qualified and not qualified, to the same extent that prescription is suspended against the party or parties that are the subject of the request for review. Filing a request for review of a malpractice claim as required by this Section with any agency or entity other than the division of administration shall not suspend or interrupt the running of prescription. All requests for | r,review of a malpractice claim identifying additional health care providers shall also be filed with the division of administration. (Emphasis added).

La. Rev. Stat. § La, Rev. Stat. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a). Thus, pursuant to the “clear, express, and unambiguous” language of this provision, the filing of a claim with the DOA suspends prescription with regard to unnamed joint and solidary obligors to the same extent as to those named in the request for review. See Milbert v. Answering Bureau, Inc,, 13-0022 (La. 6/28/13), 120 So.3d 678.

When plaintiff herein timely amended her complaint to include Caldwell and Greer, MRP-1 was still pending, and according to statutory law and our jurisprudence, prescription of her claims against all joint and solidary obligors, even unnamed ones, was suspended. See Milbert, 120 So.3d at 686. It logically follows had her timely filed amended complaint been treated as an amendment, it would have merely continued the suspension commenced with her initial MRP request. Significantly, we note, however, it was an administrative decision of the DOA to convert her timely filed amendment into a new MRP request. Consequently, if we interpret the provisions of La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) in accordance with the holdings of the lower courts, i.e., finding notification of the MRP-1 opinion served to end suspension of prescription against Dr. Ferrer and Glenwood, the DOA’s administrative decision would effectively have shorten the suspensive period, and in turn the prescriptive period, contrary to our holding in Tillman. Thus, our rules of strict construction require us to find the timely filed amendment, adding Caldwell and Greer, likewise suspended, or rather maintained the suspension of, prescription against all joint and solidary, including Dr. Ferrer and Glenwood.

| ./Accordingly we reverse the grant of the defendants’ exception of prescription and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WEIMER, J., concurs in the result.

GUIDRY, J., dissents and would deny the writ.

WEIMER, J.,

concurring.

IT concur in the result.

11 GUIDRY, J.,

dissents and would deny the writ application.

      . La. Rev. Stat. § 9:5628 provides in part:
      No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, ..,, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.

      . La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1299.41 was redesignat-ed to La. Rev, Stat. § 40:1231.1 by House Concurrent Resolution No, 84 of the 2015 Regular Session. For consistency, we will refer to this provision by its prior designation.

      . La. Rev. Stat, § 40:1299.47 was redesignat-ed to La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1231.8 by House Concurrent Resolution No. 84 of the 2015 Regular Session. For consistency, we will refer to this provision by its prior designation.


author: CRICHTON, J.,

text:
    Gustave J. LABARRE, Jr. v. TEXAS BRINE COMPANY, LLC and Georgia Gulf Chemical & Vinyls, LLC
    NO. 2017-CC-0358
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 2017
    CRICHTON, J., would grant and assign reasons.
   CRICHTON, J.,

would grant and assigns reasons:

|,I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to deny this writ application, as I believe the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court’s ruling granting the motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendant Texas Brine Company, LLC. Specifically, I find there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the waiver of the right to rescind the insurance contract. Accordingly, I would grant the writ application filed by Texas Brine Company, LLC, reverse the court of appeal, and reinstate the trial court’s ruling.


text:
    Thomas H. HAYDEN and Jacqueline S. Hayden v. 3M COMPANY, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0384
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 3, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 2015-03732; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-C-1030;

11 Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Thomas H. HAYDEN and Jacqueline S. Hayden v. 3M COMPANY, et al,
    NO. 2017-CC-0383
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 3, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 2015-03732; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-C-1030

| ¶ Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kendrick TAYLOR
    NO. 2016-K-0457
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 13 CR4 123032; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 1144;

[ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eric ABSHIRE
    NO. 2016-KO-0401
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. CR-135356; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 15-691;

| tDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Melvin Oliver JAMES, Jr.
    NO. 2016-KO-0539
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial Distinct Court Div. F, No. 829299-1; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 0961.

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dwane Edward FOX
    NO. 2016-KO-0404
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No, 7277-13; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 15-692

[ tDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leslie REED
    NO. 2016-KO-0359
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, No, 13,795; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 15-KA-550

h Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin PORTER
    NO. 2016-K-0294
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 307,909; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. KA 15 50380.

| tDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jamal FLETCHER
    No. 2017-KK-135
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated January 25, 2017; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 530-168; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-K-0017;

h Rehearing denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth D. MODIQUE
    NO. 2016-KO-0464
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caldwell, 37th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 90,159; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,-413-KA;

|, Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jacques Patrick WILLIAMS
    NO. 2016-KO-0541
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 63790; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,-468-KA;

|, Denied.


text:
    Ramona PIERRE v. STAR AFFORDABLE HOUSING ALPIC, Max Speciality Insurance Company, Smith Square Homes and Summit Apartment Management
    NO. 2017-OC-0156
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2011-0000810; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CW 1700

It Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Vijayendra JALIGAM
    NO. 2017-KK-0151
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, New Orleans Municipal Court, No. 1166314; Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 529-350; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-1079

I, Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    The STATE of Louisiana v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC., et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0149
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 624,522; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1854 AND 2015 CW 1626;

| iDenied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Michael PITRE and Nancy Pitre Desalvo, individually and on behalf of their Decedent, Verna R. Pitre v. JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 2, Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana d/b/a East Jefferson General Hospital and DCI Door Controls, Inc. d/b/a Door Controls, Inc.
    NO. 2017-C-0150
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 741-062; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-361;

| denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Brittainey HUNTLEY v. 21ST CENTURY PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0148
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 98,440; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-514

| denied.


text:
    Cynthia BENNETT v. Samantha BROWN, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0146
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2014-3111; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 16-622

| denied.


text:
    STATE IN the INTEREST OF K.B.
    NO. 2017-CJ-0177
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. J-12972; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW 1523;

hDenied.

WEIMER, J., i-ecused.


text:
    Vijayendra JALIGAM v. Radhika POCHAMPALLY
    NO. 2017-CJ-0255
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2008-00724 C/W 2008-05342; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-0249

| denied.


text:
    Donald and Rebekah GREENE v. Succession of Alex ALBARADO (a/k/a Alex Amador, a/k/a Alex Flores) Richardo Flores and Celia Alvarado v. Donald Greene, Progressive Security Insurance Company, and State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development
    NO. 2017-C-0175
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 14457 C/W 147083; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No.2015 CA 1960 C/W 2015 CA 1961

| denied.


text:
    Damion COMEAUX v. Austin J. ROMERO, et al.
    NO. 2017-CO0161
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 98,981; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW16-00847;

h Denied.


text:
    Kathleen HAMPTON v. LSU HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER d/b/a Bogalusa Medical Center and John Gallaspy, M.D.
    NO. 2017-CC-0169
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 107585; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW 1308

| denied.


text:
    Damion COMEAUX v. Austin J. ROMERO, et al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0160
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 98,981; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 16-00840;

| TDenied.


text:
    Tilinda GROTE and Karl Grote v. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and SMG General Partnership
    NO. 2017-00153
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 563, 737; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0474;

h Denied.

GENOVESE, J., would grant.


text:
    Dione W. DAVID v. Richard G. DAVID
    NO. 2017-C-0145
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No, 00113919; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-236;

|: Denied.

GENOVESE, J., recused.


text:
    Remijio LEIJA v. John Larry GATHRIGHT and Wendi Smith Gathright
    NO. 2017-C-0144
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 09-2355; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-049--CA;

L Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Lyle Joseph LUQUETTE v. GREAT LAKES REINSURANCE (UK) PLC and Ron Keller
    NO. 2017-C-0136
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 739-747; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-422;

| t Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.

CRICHTON, J, would grant.


text:
    Kelly DOUCET, et. al. v. HORNET SERVICE COMPANY, LLC, et. al.
    NO. 2017-CC-0143
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. C-010714; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW16-00815; March 13, 2017

It Denied.


text:
    Rosemary JENKINS and all others similarly situated v. BOH BROS. CONSTRUCTION CO., L.L.C. and XYZ Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-CC-0130
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2011-2420; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-C-1173;

| denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS in the MATTER OF Donald VILLERE
    NO. 2017-00128
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Ethics Adjudicatory Board, No. 2011-6158-ETHICS-A; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1939

| denied.


text:
    Deatrice Sartain GASTON, individually and as the succession Representative of the Estate of Albert Ha Sartain, Darryl Sartain and Johnel Sartain v. PRESTIGE CARE, LLC d/b/a Ferncrest Manor Living Center, Jane Doe and XYZ Insurance Co.
    NO. 2017-CC-0112
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   IN RE: Prestige Care, LLC d/b/a Fern-crest Manor Living Center, et al.;—Defen-dant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 2016-03837; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-C-1110

|, Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Gregory CROW v. ST. TAMMANY PARISH GOVERNMENT
    NO. 2017-C-0122
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 6, No. 12-07960; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0200

h Denied.


text:
    The STATE of Louisiana v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC., et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0125
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 624,522; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1854 AND 2015 CW1626;

|! Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Mary E. ROPER v. John Chandler LOUPE and the consolidated Governing Body of the City of Baton Rouge and the Parish of East Baton Rouge
    NO. 2017-C-0090
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 638786; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1956;

| jDenied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., recused.

GENOVESE, J., would grant.


text:
    Isaac ROBINSON v. Wayne and Beverly PAPANIA and Pyrenees Investments, LLC
    NO. 2016-C-2113
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2005-11367; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1354

| T Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeffrey Steven DOISE
    NO. 2016-K-0546
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   IN RE: Jeffrey Steven Doise;—Defen-dant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 39465-11; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 15-713

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cornelius BARTHELEMY
    NO. 2017-KK-0439
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 523-097; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-K-0219;

1 iWrit granted. The district court’s ruling sustaining the defendant’s objection to the introduction of other crimes evidence is reversed. Because the two shootings were so closely connected in time and place-merely minutes apart and only a few blocks separating the locations, we find the prior shooting constitutes an integral part of the transaction of events that culminated in the attempted shooting of the police officer. See La. Code Evid. art. 404(B)(1); State v. Taylor, 01-1638, pp. 10-11 (La. 1/14/03), 838 So.2d 729, 741. Consequently, the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the prior shooting. See State v. Mosby, 595 So.2d 1135 (La, 1992).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alireza SADEGHI
    NO. 2017-KK-0441
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 529-944; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2017-K-0220;

11 Stay denied. Writ denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Derrick A. DOTSON
    NO. 2016-K-0473
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 514-318; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-KA-191

It Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donna Lynn LEDINGTON
    NO. 2016-OK-0206
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 294,268; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 15-00863

It Writ granted. The District Court erred in finding that the nonpayment of restitution is matter solely within the purview of the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Parole. The application is granted to vacate the district court’s ruling and remand for reconsideration in accordance with La. C.CrJP. art. 886.

GENOVESE, J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Charles ALLEN v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-0418
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 03-06803

| tApplication not considered. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(b).


text:
    Timothy BERNARD, Sr., et al. v. LAFAYETTE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.
    No. 2016-C-2253
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated February 3, 2017; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. C-20150951; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-361 C/W16-362

JjNot considered. See Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    Joseph E. DICKERSON, III v. Newell NORMAND, Sheriff of Jefferson Parish, et al.
    NO. 2015-KH-1379
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 730-953; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 15-C-288;

| denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Patrick LEVIER v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2015-KH-2071
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 15-CR-154; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CW 0830

| iDenied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Eric GROSS a/k/a Luqman Shabazz v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2015-KH-2072
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 10-WCR-055; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CW 1063

| denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Tacarus Laclarence DREW v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2015-KH-2073
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 177,290; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50543-KH

_JjDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Asa BENTLEY a/k/a Asa N. Bentley
    NO. 2016-K-0210
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 176957; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 15-597;

| iDenied.

GENOVESE, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jermaine L. RUMLEY and Glenn Elliott
    NO. 2016-KO-0036
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 510-755; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-KA-1077;

| iDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ahmon Javon FABRE
    NO. 2016-K-0365
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 533612; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 0897;

| iDenied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant for reasons assigned by Judge Holdridge, First Circuit Court of Appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James Hunter WELLS
    NO. 2016-K-0491
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 11-13-0088; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 1513;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joan Faye HARTMAN
    NO. 2016-KO-0588
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court, Div. G, No. 527240; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 1023

11Denied.


text:
    GLOBAL MARKETING SOLUTIONS, LLC v. BLUE MILL FARMS, INC., et al.
    NO. 2016-CC-1963
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 35373; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2016 CW 0887, 2016 CW 0888, 2016 CW 0911.

| i Denied.

GENOVESE, J., would grant.


text:
    AGRI-SOUTH GROUP, LLC, et al. v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, et al.
    NO. 2016-CC-1856
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div., No. 2012-8260; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 16-00417

| TPenied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    XXI OIL & GAS, LLC v. HILCORP ENERGY COMPANY
    NO. 2016-02181
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 16th Judicial District Court, Div. J, No. 2011-5292-J; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 16-269

|, Denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Tommy D. CARSON, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-2238
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 13-190699; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KW 1587;

h Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darrell GEORGE
    NO. 2016-KO-2242
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 516-218; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-KA-1189;

|, Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lloyd RICHARDSON
    NO. 2016-KO-2248
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 13-K-5762-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-143

11 Denied.

GENOVESE, J., recused.


text:
    Jose Abel Cruz ROMERO v. ASPLUNDH TREE EXPERT, CO., Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
    NO. 2017-CC-0017
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District 1W, No. 15-03325; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-311-WCW

h Denied.


text:
    Steven TRAHAN, et al. v. BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0022
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 10-18837 C/W 10-18837A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-267

| denied.


text:
    Rubiela KADLEC v. LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY and/or State of Louisiana, Through the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System and/or Board of Trustees State Colleges and University
    NO. 2017-C-0062
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 56,187; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,-841-CA

| denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.

CLARK, J., would grant.

CRICHTON, J., would grant.


text:
    IN RE: Appeal of the DECISION OF THE DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
    NO. 2017-INT-0099
    NO. 2017-OB-0317
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Counsel Office of Disciplinary Counsel, No. 2017-INT-0099

| ]Appeal not considered. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(A).


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Charles B. FANZ, Jr.
    NO. 2017-C-0084
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. D, No, 118-442; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-0180; March 24, 2017

11 Denied.


text:
    Hector L. ALONSO Husband of/and Maria D. Alonso v. TULANE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, Columbia/HCA of New Orleans, Inc. doing business as Tulane University Medical Center, Franklin Rawlings, M.D. and Shehab A. Ebrahim, M.D.
    NO. 2017-C-018 4
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 722-645; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-420;

|, Denied.

GUIDRY, J„ recused.


text:
    GULF ENGINEERING COMPANY, LLC v. Allison KUHN
    NO. 2017-C-0129
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div., No. 80,164; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-425

| iDenied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Dwight BRIDGES v. Antoinette ANDERSON
    NO. 2017-C-0194
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, First City Court of the City of New Orleans, No. 2016-00914-F; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-0432

11Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nicholas E. VAUGHN
    NO. 2017-KK-0196
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 13-37 C/W 13-38; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 KW 1474;

h Denied.


text:
    Richard R. SCHULZE v. Succession of Michael A. RUSSO, Tammy Faulk Gorman, Tammy Faulk, Kaegen Michael Faulk, Michael A. Russo, Trust 1, Samatha Ronquille-Green, Samantha Ronquille, and Kimberly R. Lentz
    NO. 2017-CC-0189
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 762-681; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-C-618

I denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STERLING TIMBER ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. v. UNION GAS OPERATING COMPANY, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-0198
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Allen, 33rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C-2013-431A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-433

[ 1 Denied.


text:
    Renea FANGUY v. LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY and Michael Graham, M.D.
    NO. 2017-C-0195
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 700-027; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 15-CA-450

| jDenied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.