author: SALARIO, Judge.

text:
    PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; Lorillard Tobacco Company; and Lorillard, Inc., Appellants, v. Kevin DUIGNAN, as personal representative of the Estate of Douglas Clarence Duignan, deceased, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-5055
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 15, 2017
    Cathy A. Kamm, Terri L. Parker, Daniel F. Molony, and Razvan Axente of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Tampa; Geoffrey J. Michael and Daphne O'Connor of Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, District of Columbia; Gregory G. Katsas of Jones Day (withdrew after briefing), Washington, District of Columbia; and Charles R.A. Morse of Jones Day, New York, New York, for Appellants.
    David J. Sales, Daniel R. Hoffman of David J. Sales, P.A., Jupiter; Gary M. Paige, Robert E. Gordon of Gordon & Doner, P.A., Davie; James W. Gustafson, Jr. of Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   SALARIO, Judge.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. (PM) and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (Reynolds) appeal from a final judgment entered in favor of Kevin Duignan, the personal representative of the Estate of Douglas Clarence Duignan (the Estate). Douglas Duignan smoked cigarettes made by PM and Reynolds and later died of cancer, which led to the filing of this Engle progeny suit by the Estate. We reverse and remand for a new trial primarily because in responding to a note from the jury concerning the testimony of Dennis Duignan, the decedent's brother and an important witness for the defense, the trial court gave an answer improperly calculated to prevent the jury from requesting a readback of that testimony. With respect to the Estate's claims for fraud by concealment and conspiracy to commit fraud by concealment, we further conclude that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the element of detrimental reliance.

The Trial Of This Engle Progeny Case

Background. For the benefit of the reader unfamiliar with tobacco litigation in Florida, Engle progeny cases differ from ordinary product defect or wrongful death cases in that they go to trial with certain factual matters having been conclusively established as a result of the supreme court's decision in Engle v. Liggett Group, 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006). Engle was a class action brought against several tobacco companies-PM and Reynolds included-on behalf of Florida-resident smokers who developed smoking-related illnesses caused by addiction to cigarettes containing nicotine. Trial verdicts established liability, compensatory damages for the class representatives, and the entitlement to and the amount of punitive damages for the class. The tobacco companies appealed, and the case reached the Florida Supreme Court. The supreme court decertified the class and vacated the punitive damages award-with the result being that individual members of the Engle class must pursue individual damages actions in order to recover for smoking-related illnesses. Id. at 1254.

Although it decertified the class, the supreme court nonetheless held that certain liability findings-so-called Phase I findings-made by the Engle jury could stand and govern in individual actions by Engle class members. Id. at 1254-55. The retained Phase I findings include findings that smoking cigarettes causes certain diseases (including lung cancer ), that nicotine is addictive, that the tobacco companies placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous, that the tobacco companies were negligent, and that the tobacco companies concealed or omitted material information about the health effects and addictive nature of cigarettes and also conspired with one another to do so. Id. at 1257 n.4, 1276-77. To take advantage of these findings in an individual suit, a plaintiff must establish membership in the Engle class by proving that before November 21, 1996, the plaintiff had developed one of the illnesses found by the Engle jury to be caused by smoking and that the plaintiff's illness was caused by an addiction to cigarettes containing nicotine. Id. at 1256, 1277. If an individual plaintiff demonstrates class membership, the retained Phase I findings are taken as conclusively established for purposes of the individual's action. Id. at 1277.

This particular Engle progeny case proceeded to trial on an amended complaint which alleged that before November 21, 1996, Douglas Duignan developed lung cancer as a result of having been addicted to cigarettes containing nicotine. It asserted claims for strict liability, negligence, fraud by concealment, and conspiracy to commit fraud by concealment and sought compensatory and punitive damages. The Estate acknowledged that Douglas Duignan bore some responsibility for his smoking and asked for an apportionment of fault and damages on his nonintentional tort claims-i.e., the claims for strict liability and negligence.

The trial evidence. The trial court held a two-phase trial. The first phase was to determine the issues of Engle class membership, comparative fault, legal causation on the Estate's fraud and conspiracy claims, and the Estate's entitlement-if any-to punitive damages. The Estate presented evidence that Douglas Duignan began smoking at fourteen and had become a regular smoker by his midteens. It also presented evidence that he exhibited behaviors consistent with nicotine addiction, that he made several unsuccessful attempts to quit smoking, and that he smoked light and filtered cigarettes because he believed them to be safer alternatives. In 1992, when he was forty-two years old, doctors discovered a cancerous tumor in Douglas Duignan's lung and later found that there was cancer elsewhere in his body. He died thereafter.

As to the fraud and conspiracy claims, the Estate put on evidence that PM and Reynolds, together with many other tobacco companies, conspired over several decades to conceal what they knew about the addictive properties and health effects of smoking cigarettes. This included evidence of tobacco company advertising that depicted cigarette smoking as glamorous and even healthy, the tobacco companies' creation of a false controversy in the public debate designed to prolong doubt as to the addictive properties and health effects of cigarette smoking, the promotion of the idea that smoking light and filtered cigarettes reduced the risks associated with smoking, and internal tobacco company documents showing what the tobacco companies actually knew about nicotine addiction and smoking-related disease.

PM and Reynolds' defense, in contrast, focused substantially on a theory that Douglas Duignan smoked because he liked smoking rather than because he was addicted to nicotine or because he was misinformed about the risks. This theory put the following items at issue: (1) Engle class membership (Douglas Duignan's affinity for smoking, rather than his addiction to cigarettes, was the legal cause of his cancer ), (2) legal causation on the fraud and conspiracy claims (he knew the material health risks of smoking and did not rely on any concealed or omitted facts), and (3) comparative fault (his decision to keep smoking was his own).

PM and Reynolds put on evidence that significant information about the adverse consequences of cigarette smoking generally was known to the public and specifically was known to Douglas Duignan from the time he began smoking. They also offered the testimony of Dennis Duignan, who lived in Washington State. Although he did not appear in person at trial, portions of his deposition testimony were read to the jury as evidence by the parties, with the trial lawyers playing the parts of questioner and witness. Dennis Duignan testified that he and his brother referred to cigarettes using slang terms including "cancer sticks" and "coffin nails." He further testified about a conversation with his brother that occurred sometime in the 1970s, during which Douglas Duignan said that his doctor had told him "that if he didn't quit smoking, he'd be dead in five years." When Dennis Duignan asked his brother whether he planned to quit, Douglas Duignan replied that he did not plan to quit because he liked smoking. The Estate questioned both the veracity of this testimony and the timing of the conversation. Both sides addressed it in opening statements and closing arguments.

The instructions on fraud and concealment. At the close of the trial, the jury was instructed to determine whether Douglas Duignan was a member of the Engle class and, if he was, that it "must accept [certain] previously determined matters as true ... just as if you had determined them yourselves." A finding that Douglas Duignan was a member of the Engle class coupled with the preclusive effect of the retained Phase I findings on strict liability and negligence resolved the Estate's claims for strict liability and negligence, with the exception of the issues of comparative negligence and damages, as to which the jury was also instructed.

As relevant to the claims for fraud and conspiracy, the jury was instructed that the retained Phase I findings conclusively established both that PM and Reynolds each "concealed or omitted material information" about the adverse effects of smoking and also that they "entered into an agreement" with other tobacco companies "to conceal or omit information" regarding those matters. Those findings alone did not resolve the claims for fraud and conspiracy, however, and the jury was required to determine legal causation, which centered on the issue of detrimental reliance.

PM and Reynolds requested an instruction that required the jury to find that Douglas Duignan detrimentally and reasonably relied on "a statement" by each of them (with respect to the fraud claim) and by a member of the conspiracy (with respect to the conspiracy claim) and that such reliance was the cause of his cancer. The trial court rejected that instruction and gave the jury a different special instruction concerning the reliance element of the fraud claim:

The issue for your determination on Plaintiff's claims for concealment is whether the concealment or omission of material information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature by [PM and Reynolds] was a legal cause of Douglas Duignan's lung cancerbecause Mr. Duignan reasonably relied to his detriment that [PM and Reynolds] would not conceal or omit disclosure of such material information.

(Emphasis added.) The court gave a similar special instruction with respect to the conspiracy claim:

The next issue for your determination will be whether the agreement to conceal or omit material information previously described was a legal cause of Douglas Duignan's lung cancerbecause Mr. Duignan reasonably relied to his detriment that [PM and Reynolds] would not conceal or omit disclosure of such material information either alone or in conjunction with others....

(Emphasis added.)

The jury note. During its Phase I deliberations, the jury sent the court a note about how to locate specific portions of the evidence to review, asking as follows: "Is there a key for the evidence? We are having trouble finding things in the evidence boxes. If not, can we have the number for Dennis Duignan's deposition?" During a discussion with counsel over a potential response to this question, the parties and court considered whether and how to advise the jury about the possibility that the deposition testimony read to the jury during the trial could be read back to the jury upon request. The trial court expressed concern that allowing a readback of Dennis Duignan's testimony would open a "Pandora's box" and perhaps give "undue influence" to that testimony. The trial court proposed to instruct the jury that "[t]estimony is not generally read back to a jury. There is a possibility under some circumstances." PM and Reynolds objected to that instruction and proposed simply advising the jury that a readback was possible.

The court declined. It brought the jury in, explained that no transcript was available, and told the jury as follows:

[T]here's sort of a magic that happens with the six of you putting your recollections together, it's called collective recollection, and you are urged, in regard to all testimony in the case, to use your collective recollection.
It is not impossible to read testimony back to a jury, but it is not generally done. And part of that is to-so that no witness's testimony gets a-more focus or attention than anybody's, gets undue emphasis that way.

The verdicts and judgment. The jury then returned a verdict that, in essence, determined that Douglas Duignan was a member of the Engle class and found in the Estate's favor on all claims. It awarded $6,000,000 in compensatory damages and found that the Estate was entitled to punitive damages. It apportioned fault as follows: 37% to PM, 30% to Reynolds, and 33% to Douglas Duignan. After the second phase of the trial, the jury awarded punitive damages of $3.5 million against PM and $2.5 million against Reynolds.

The trial court entered a judgment against PM and Reynolds finding them jointly and severally liable for the entire compensatory damage award, irrespective of the jury's comparative fault allocation, because the Estate had prevailed on its intentional tort claims and damages on such claims are not apportioned based on comparative fault. PM and Reynolds requested that the trial court apply a credit to the punitive damages award based on a "Guaranteed Sum Stipulation" entered into by the parties in the original Engle litigation regarding the punitive damage award in that case. The trial court denied that request, and its judgment included the punitive damages awards the jury made. PM and Reynolds timely appeal the judgment.

The Issues On Appeal

PM and Reynolds raise four issues. First, they assert that the trial court's response to the jury note concerning Dennis Duignan's testimony both improperly discouraged the jury from requesting a readback and, by advising the jury that a readback would give "undue influence" to the testimony, improperly commented on the evidence. Second, they argue that the trial court's instructions to the jury on the reliance element of the Estate's fraud-based claims were erroneous because they failed to require the jury to find that Douglas Duignan relied on "a statement" by one of the tobacco companies. Third, they claim that the trial court erred by failing to reduce the compensatory damages award based on the jury's comparative fault allocation because Engle progeny cases are grounded in negligence, not intentional torts, and principles of comparative fault therefore apply notwithstanding the Estate's assertion of claims for fraud by concealment and conspiracy. And fourth, they contend that they are entitled to a credit against the punitive damage award based on the Guaranteed Sum Stipulation between the tobacco companies and the Engle class in the original Engle litigation.

After oral argument in this case, this court issued an opinion in another case deciding the issues of whether comparative fault applies when an Engle defendant is found liable for intentional torts and whether the Guaranteed Sum Stipulation in the original Engle litigation requires application of a credit to a punitive damages award adversely to PM and Reynolds. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Boatright, 217 So.3d 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), appeal filed, No. SC17-894 (Fla. May 12, 2017). We therefore find no merit in PM and Reynolds' third and fourth issues. As to the third issue concerning comparative fault, we certify conflict, as we did in Boatright, with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Schoeff, 178 So.3d 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), review granted, No. SC15-2233, 2016 WL 3127698, *1 (Fla. May 26, 2016), and the line of cases relying on it. We further address PM and Reynolds' first two issues concerning the readback and the reliance instructions below.

The Trial Court's Readback Instruction

We review a trial court's decision regarding readbacks of trial testimony for abuse of discretion, State v. Barrow, 91 So.3d 826, 835 (Fla. 2012), and we also apply that standard to review a trial court's response to a jury question, Cannon v. State, 180 So.3d 1023, 1036 (Fla. 2015). The trial court's response in this case-that although a readback was "not impossible," it "is not generally done" and that the jury should rely on its "collective recollection"-was an abuse of discretion because it was calculated to prevent the jury from asking for a readback and thereby interfered with the jury's ability to discharge its duties as the finder of fact in this case.

The leading case on readbacks of trial testimony in Florida is Hazuri v. State, 91 So.3d 836 (Fla. 2012). In Hazuri, a jury in a criminal trial sent the judge a note asking to see trial transcripts. The defendant argued that the right response to the request was to tell the jury that transcripts were not available but that it could have read back to it whatever testimony it wanted. The trial court disagreed and told the jury only that transcripts were not available and that it should rely on its "collective recollection" of the evidence to decide the case. Id. at 839. The defendant appealed his subsequent conviction, arguing that the trial court erred when it refused to tell the jury that it could have parts of the transcript read back. After the Third District affirmed, Hazuri v. State, 23 So.3d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), the supreme court accepted jurisdiction.

The supreme court quashed the Third District's decision and held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to inform the jury of its right to request a readback. 91 So.3d at 846-47. It began by observing that the jury did not request a readback-it only requested transcripts-but decided that the trial court was required to inform the jury of the possibility of a readback nonetheless. Id. at 845. It tethered this holding to the core function of the jury, explaining that "the role of a jury as a factfinder is of utmost importance" and that "a jury cannot properly fulfill its constitutionally mandated role if it cannot recall or is confused about the testimony presented in a case." Id. Because "[a] jury is composed of laypersons often unfamiliar with legal terms of art," the court explained, "there should be no magic words required for a read-back request." Id."Failing to require further instruction concerning a read-back after a jury has requested transcripts leaves the jury without the means to refresh its memory of witness testimony-testimony that could be critical to the outcome of the verdict." Id.

The court thus adopted "the following two rules: (1) a trial court should not use any language that would mislead a jury into believing read-backs are prohibited, and (2) when a jury requests trial transcripts, the trial judge should deny the request, but inform the jury of the possibility of a read-back." Id. at 846 ; see also Barrow, 91 So.3d at 834 (restating rules announced in Hazuri ). "A trial judge can respond to a request for transcripts in the following manner: 'Transcripts are not available, but you can request to have any testimony read back to you, which may or may not be granted at the court's discretion.' " Hazuri, 91 So.3d at 846.

We recognize that Hazuri is a criminal case, as are the vast majority of published decisions on readbacks in Florida. We also recognize that readbacks in criminal cases are expressly regulated by rule 3.410 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Hazuri, 91 So.3d at 844, to which the civil rules contain no analog. At the time Hazuri was decided, rule 3.410 contained a one-sentence, discretion-conferring provision that a trial court "may" read back trial testimony to a jury. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.410 (2012); see also Avila v. State, 781 So.2d 413, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that rule 3.410 confers "wide latitude in the area of the reading of testimony to the jury"), approved by Hazuri, 91 So.3d at 847.

Those distinctions do not, however, mean that Hazuri should not apply in civil cases. Although no rule of procedure governs readbacks in the civil context, a trial judge in a civil case must, to carry out his or her responsibility to order and facilitate the jury's deliberations, enjoy a similar discretion about readbacks to that given a trial judge in a criminal case under rule 3.410. See Broward Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Ruiz, 493 So.2d 474, 479-80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (noting that no rule of civil procedure governs readbacks but analogizing to rule 3.410 ); see also Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 801.2, note 1 ("In civil cases, the decision to allow read-back of testimony lies within the sound discretion of the trial court."). As such, our analysis of a trial court's readback decisions in a civil case starts in the same place as it would in a criminal case: the trial court's ability to permit or reject a request for a readback in its discretion based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

Moreover, in deciding to regulate what a trial judge should and should not say about the jury's ability to ask the trial judge to allow a readback, Hazuri relied on considerations that are also present in the civil context. In particular, the court emphasized the jury's constitutional provenance and its centrality in determining facts when they are the subject of dispute. Hazuri, 91 So.3d at 845. Both considerations are implicated in civil cases as well. See amend. VIII, U.S. Const.; art. I, § 22, Fla. Const. A jury in a civil case is thus no more able to "properly fulfill its constitutionally mandated role if it cannot recall or is confused about the testimony presented," see Hazuri, 91 So.3d at 845, than a jury in a criminal case is. Because Hazuri's rules concerning the possibility of a readback when transcripts are requested seek to ameliorate that confusion and permit the jury to perform its core function as a trier of fact, we see no reason why those rules should not be applied in civil cases as well.

In this case, the trial court's response to the jury note seeking a transcript of Dennis Duignan's testimony, at a minimum, violated Hazuri's rule that a trial court should not use language that would mislead a jury into believing that a readback is prohibited. To be sure, the trial court did not explicitly say that a readback was prohibited; indeed, it acknowledged that a readback was "not impossible." But whether the trial court did or did not say that a readback was prohibited is not the question Hazuri asks. The question is whether what the trial court did say "would mislead" a jury into believing that a readback was prohibited. Hazuri, 91 So.3d at 846 ; see also Roper v. State, 608 So.2d 533, 535 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (finding error where "the trial judge's response to the jury's question may well have led the jury to conclude" that a readback was prohibited), approved by Hazuri, 91 So.3d at 847. The focus, then, is on what the likely effect of the trial court's statements on a reasonable jury might have been. Here, the answer is that a reasonable jury would have thought a readback prohibited.

Four facets of the trial court's response to the jury note inform that conclusion. First, the trial court advised the jury that readbacks, although "not impossible," are "not generally done." Second, it told the jury that the reason readbacks are "not generally done" is to prevent any witness's testimony from having undue influence by getting more attention than any other witness's testimony. Third, the trial court never told the jury that it had the option to ask for a readback; in other words, although the trial court said that readbacks are "not impossible," the jury was never told that it had the option to make that which was "not impossible" possible by asking for it. And finally, the court instructed the jury to rely on its "collective recollection" of all of the testimony in the case because of the "magic that happens" when a jury does so.

It takes no feat of imagination to see how this response might lead reasonable lay jurors to think that asking for a readback would be a fool's errand. In substance, the trial court communicated to them that a readback was something extraordinary, that it was extraordinary because it gave the witness whose testimony was read back undue influence, and that the jurors instead should rely on their collective recollection of the testimony. The trial court's remarks, combined with its silence on the jury's right to at least ask for the testimony to be read back, in essence and effect, informed the jurors "that their only recourse was to rely upon their 'collective recollections and remembrances' as to" Dennis Duignan's testimony because transcripts were unavailable and a readback would not be forthcoming. See Roper, 608 So.2d at 535. That was error. See Avila, 781 So.2d at 416 (reversing where the trial judge's response to transcript request "may have confused the jury as to whether a readback of testimony was permissible"); Biscardi v. State, 511 So.2d 575, 581 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (reversing where "the judge's words may reasonably have conveyed to the jurors that to ask for ... rereading of testimony would be futile"), approved by Hazuri, 91 So.3d at 847. Based on the trial court's stated concern about reading back Dennis Duignan's testimony, this appears to have been the result its instruction was calculated to produce.

The Estate argues that a Hazuri-type analysis is inapplicable in this case because Hazuri deals with a trial court's response to a jury's request to see a transcript of trial testimony, and the jury here sought only a transcript of Dennis Duignan's deposition testimony. That distinction might be material in other cases-we need not discuss it-but it is not in this one. Here, Dennis Duignan's deposition testimony was his trial testimony. It was read by the lawyers to the jury as substantive evidence at the trial. When deposition testimony is presented in this way, it is presented "as though the witness was present and testifying" in person at the trial. Castaneda v. Redlands Christian Migrant Ass'n, 884 So.2d 1087, 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ; see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.330(a) (stating that, where authorized by this rule, a deposition may be used "so far as [it is] admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testifying").

Because Dennis Duignan's deposition testimony was presented to the jury as his trial testimony, the jury's request for his deposition transcript should have been interpreted as a request for the transcript of the deposition testimony that was read aloud at trial. See Hazuri, 91 So.3d at 845 (explaining that because jurors are laypersons, a court should liberally construe a request for transcripts, "especially when the intent of the jury[ ] ... is clear"). Indeed, the record in this case reflects that this is precisely how the trial court, the tobacco companies' counsel, and the Estate's counsel interpreted the request at the time it was made. The rules announced in Hazuri apply to this case.

The Estate also argues that even if the trial court was mistaken in its response to the jury note, any error was harmless. Trial court error is regarded as harmless when "the beneficiary of the error proves that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict." Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So.3d 1251, 1256-57 (Fla. 2014).

The inferences PM and Reynolds sought to draw from Dennis Duignan's testimony-inferences the testimony reasonably, although not exclusively, supports-were that Douglas Duignan knew early on that cigarettes caused cancer and other diseases and that he continued smoking notwithstanding this knowledge, not because he was addicted but because he did not intend to quit smoking. These inferences were significant in this case because they bore directly on PM and Reynolds' argument that Douglas Duignan was not a member of the Engle class because this cancer was not caused by addiction, on their argument that Douglas Duignan was comparatively negligent by continuing to smoke even when he was aware of the risk of cancer and other disease, and on their argument that Douglas Duignan did not rely on any information about addiction or the health effects of smoking that the tobacco companies fraudulently concealed. The Estate and PM and Reynolds addressed Dennis Duignan's testimony in opening statements and again in closing arguments. The fact that the jury asked for a transcript of his testimony suggests that it may have found it significant as well. Under these circumstances, there is at least a reasonable possibility that had the jury been permitted to ask for a readback of Dennis Duignan's testimony, it might have resolved one or more of the determinative issues in the case differently than it ultimately did. See, e.g., Barrow, 91 So.3d at 835 (concluding that trial court's use of language that may have misled the jury into believing readbacks were prohibited was harmful where the facts showed that "a review of the testimonies could have been most helpful to the jury"); Roper, 608 So.2d at 536 (holding that, where there were discrepancies between the testimony requested and other testimony in the case, "the trial court's refusal to even consider the reading of this crucial cross-examination" was not harmless).

The trial court abused its discretion in addressing the jury's request for Dennis Duignan's deposition, and the Estate has not met the burden to show that error was harmless. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for a new trial. In light of this result, we need not further address PM and Reynolds' argument that the trial court also improperly commented on the evidence in its response to the jury's note. We do, however, address one other issue raised on appeal because it relates to a matter that rests within the scope of our remand and therefore requires our consideration.

The Trial Court's Instruction on Reliance

PM and Reynolds also argue that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the reliance elements in the claims for fraud by concealment and conspiracy because it failed to tell the jury that Douglas Duignan was required to have relied on "a statement" by PM or Reynolds in order for the Estate to prevail. We review a trial court's decision to give or withhold a jury instruction for abuse of discretion, ITD Indus., Inc. v. Bus. Res. Grp., 779 So.2d 532, 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), but will find such an abuse of discretion and reverse when an instruction is misleading and may have caused the jury to reach a result it otherwise would not have reached, Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Salkey, 190 So.3d 1092, 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), quashed on other grounds, No. SC16-784, 2017 WL 2709776, at *1 (Fla. June 23, 2017). While we do not read the reliance requirement as narrowly as PM and Reynolds do-we do not think it categorically requires reliance on "a statement"-the instruction in this case was an abuse of discretion because it inaccurately told the jury to determine whether Douglas Duignan generally relied on PM and Reynolds to disclose material facts rather than telling the jury to determine whether he relied on a misapprehension concerning a material fact that PM and Reynolds concealed from him.

Our analysis begins with what the Engle Phase I findings conclusively established in this case. As concerns fraud by concealment, they established that PM and Reynolds "concealed or omitted material information not otherwise known or available knowing that the material was false or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes." See Engle, 945 So.2d at 1257 n.4, 1277. For the conspiracy claims, they established that PM and Reynolds "agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detriment." Id.

The fact that the concealment or omission of material information with the intention that it would be relied on was a given, however, does not mean that it caused Douglas Duignan any harm unless he is shown actually to have relied on it. In a claim founded in fraud, the link between a defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm is supplied in part by the requirement that the plaintiff detrimentally and reasonably relied on something the defendant said or failed to say. See Humana Inc. v. Castillo, 728 So.2d 261, 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ("If a plaintiff claims to be misled, but cannot demonstrate a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's misapprehension, the plaintiff cannot recover."); see also Calloway, 201 So.3d at 766 ("Florida's written opinions have consistently included detrimental reliance as an element in fraudulent concealment instructions."). Thus, it is settled that " Engle-progeny plaintiffs must ... prove detrimental reliance in order to prevail" on claims for fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to fraudulently conceal. Hess v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 175 So.3d 687, 698 (Fla. 2015).

PM and Reynolds say that an Engle progeny plaintiff must show his reliance on a direct statement by a defendant (in the case of fraudulent concealment) or a member of the conspiracy (in the case of conspiracy), but that understanding of reliance is artificially narrow. It is true that fraud claims are commonly based on an affirmative statement by the defendant and that in such circumstances the law speaks of reliance on a statement or a representation. See, e.g., Butler v. Yusem, 44 So.3d 102, 105 (Fla. 2010) (discussing reliance on such representations). But the cases' use of the formulation "detrimental reliance on a statement" or something similar should not obscure the nature of the inquiry: when we ask about detrimental reliance, we are asking whether the plaintiff would have behaved in the same way had he known the true facts. See, e.g., Lance v. Wade, 457 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 1984) (holding that individual issues of reliance generally preclude fraud class actions because "[w]hat one purchaser may rely on in entering into a contract may not be material to another purchaser"), distinguished on other grounds in KPMG Peat Marwick LLP v. Barner, 799 So.2d 308, 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Depending on the facts presented in a claim involving reliance, a statement is not the only way in which the claimant may prove it.

Consider a fraud claim based on an affirmative misrepresentation. A seller of a car tells a buyer that "this car has never been in an accident." In fact, the car has been in five of them. The seller's statement is false. Doubtless, a trial court would properly instruct a jury to determine whether the plaintiff relied on a statement in deciding to buy the car. See, e.g., Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 409.7. But it is the fact that statement conveys-that the car had never been in an accident-that really mattered to the buyer. An instruction that the buyer must prove reliance on a statement is correct because the statement conveys the fact the buyer misapprehended.

In cases involving concealment or omission, however, the link between a statement by the defendant and the plaintiff's misapprehension may be less direct. Suppose our car seller assured the buyer that "this car's transmission has always worked fine." Suppose also that the statement was literally true but failed to note that the seller had just discovered a defect in the transmission that will become a serious problem within a year. Although the seller's statement was true, the plaintiff might still claim fraud on the theory that having chosen to speak about the condition of the transmission, the seller had a duty to disclose the transmission defect that had not yet manifested itself to the buyer. See, e.g., ZC Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 847 So.2d 547, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ("Florida law recognizes that fraud can occur by omission[ ] and places a duty on one who undertakes to disclose material information to disclose that information fully."); Mukamal v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Palm Beach Fin. Partners, L.P.), 517 B.R. 310, 335 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2013) ("Fraudulent concealment is common law fraud by means of actively concealing a material fact in the fact [sic] of a duty to disclose that fact to the plaintiff."). In this circumstance, the statement itself only expressed the material fact that the transmission had worked fine in the past-a historical fact that may not have mattered to the buyer and, even if it did, cannot have operated to the buyer's detriment because it was true. The buyer here was not misled by the content of a statement; he was misled regarding an unstated truth the seller became obligated to disclose by virtue of having decided to speak. A jury instruction that the buyer must have detrimentally relied on the seller's statement would be appropriate in this circumstance because the seller's statement triggered his disclosure obligation. But it would be more precise to ask whether he relied on a misapprehension as to the fact concealed or omitted.

And then, of course, there can be concealment or omission with no statement at all, such as when the car's seller, knowing the trunk is severely rusted inside, parks the car so as to prevent the buyer from opening it fully and finding the damage. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 550, cmt. a (Am. Law. Inst. 2016) (providing similar example of fraudulent concealment); see also Joiner v. McCullers, 158 Fla. 562, 28 So.2d 823, 824-25 (1947) (explaining that "[t]he rule that fraud cannot be predicated of a failure to disclose facts ... does not apply where a party[,] in addition to non-disclosure[,] uses any artifice to throw the other party off his guard" or on "any ... act ... which tends affirmatively to a suppression of the truth" (quoting 12 Ruling Case Law, Fraud and Deceit § 80, 319-20 (William M. McKinney & Burdette A. Rich, eds. (1916), a now out-of-print legal treatise). Alternatively, the seller stands in a fiduciary relationship to the buyer and, although obligated by that relationship to make disclosure of the rusted trunk, fails to do so. See TransPetrol, Ltd. v. Radulovic, 764 So.2d 878, 880 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that a duty of disclosure exists where there is a fiduciary or other relationship of trust and confidence between plaintiff and defendant (quoting State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 654 So.2d 1184, 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) )). In either circumstance, it would be inaccurate to instruct a jury to look for reliance on a statement to fulfill the obligation of proof because no statement was made. The buyer's reliance, if any, was on the mistaken belief that there was nothing wrong with the trunk. In this circumstance, it would be incorrect to instruct the jury that it had to find reliance on a statement because there was not one on which the buyer could rely.

The point of these hypotheticals is not to catalog every variation of the facts upon which a reliance instruction might be given. It is to show that whether an instruction that a jury must find reliance on "a statement" is necessary or proper will depend on the nature of the claims presented and the evidence at trial. See Calloway, 201 So.3d at 766 (holding, in an Engle progeny case, that "[t]he instruction need not include reliance on 'a statement' unless the facts of the case warrant it"). It also is to show that when the facts involve concealment or omission, an instruction requiring detrimental reliance on a misapprehension as to the fact concealed or omitted will usually accurately inform the jury of what it must find with respect to the element of detrimental reliance essential to that claim. That is the case here.

PM and Reynolds argue, however, that reliance on "a statement" is necessary in an Engle progeny case because the concealment claim in the original Engle trial was predicated on statements by the tobacco company defendants in that case. They point to language in the Engle jury instructions showing that the concealment claim hinged on statements that the Engle plaintiffs contended required the tobacco companies to make complete disclosure of what they knew about the health consequences of smoking and to arguments made by Engle class counsel to similar effect. Assuming for argument's sake that PM and Reynolds have accurately construed the concealment claim litigated in the Engle trial-a matter we need not decide-that still would not command a hard-and-fast rule that an instruction in an Engle progeny case must include a requirement that the plaintiff detrimentally relied on "a statement."

The excerpts of the Engle trial to which PM and Reynolds point depict a theory of concealment based on circumstances in which a defendant has spoken on a subject-i.e., has made a statement about it-and thereby became obligated to make a fuller disclosure and, by failing to do so, concealed or omitted material facts. As described above, it is at least equally accurate to say that the plaintiff's reliance must be on a misapprehension as to the material facts or information concealed or omitted by the defendant, rather than on any specific statement it made.

This is consistent with the way Florida courts have evaluated the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence of reliance in the context of the fraudulent concealment and conspiracy claims in an Engle progeny case. An Engle plaintiff's proof in such cases typically includes, as it did in this case, extensive evidence of the tobacco company defendants' participation in a decades-long pervasive advertising campaign and creation of a false controversy about the addictive nature and health effects of cigarettes that operated to conceal the adverse consequences of smoking from cigarette consumers. In such circumstances, the courts have refused to hold that an Engle progeny plaintiff must identify specific statements that he read or heard and relied upon in making a decision regarding cigarette smoking in order to prevail. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Kayton, 104 So.3d 1145, 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), quashed on other grounds, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S113, 2016 WL 390261 (Fla. Feb. 1, 2016) (table decision); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin, 53 So.3d 1060, 1069-70 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). The reason is that the very pervasiveness of the advertising campaign and false controversy and uniqueness of the facts concealed or omitted permits an Engle progeny jury to infer reliance. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hallgren, 124 So.3d 350, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (discussing Martin, 53 So.3d at 1069-70 ). But see Berger v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 101 F.Supp.3d 1228, 1238-39 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (criticizing reasoning of these cases and predicting that the Florida Supreme Court will not follow them), appeal filed, 101 F.Supp.3d 1228 (11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2016). This is not to say that a tobacco company cannot show otherwise. Cf. Evers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 195 So.3d 1139, 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (reversing entry of a directed verdict and rejecting defendant's sufficiency challenge on reliance element where "the tobacco company has pointed to no evidence that Ms. Loyd was aware that the nicotine in cigarettes was addictive, nor has it conclusively demonstrated that despite some awareness on Ms. Loyd's part that smoking could cause health problems, that she was not reassured by the controversy the tobacco companies generated to keep people smoking"). But the cases do seem to establish that reliance on "a statement" is not required to prevail in an Engle progeny case.

PM and Reynolds also argue that without an instruction that requires the plaintiff to have relied on a statement, they risk being held liable for a pure nondisclosure unaccompanied by a misleading statement, misleading conduct, or duty to disclose. They correctly observe that silence, unaccompanied by a duty to disclose, is not actionable as fraud. See TransPetrol, 764 So.2d at 879-80. And it is logically true that if a jury were to look solely at the Engle Phase I finding of "omissions" and a reliance instruction that allowed it to find fraud if the plaintiff relied on the fact omitted, then there is at least a theoretical possibility that PM or Reynolds could be held liable in fraud for pure silence about the health effects or addictive properties of cigarettes. But to the extent this is a problem, it is not a problem for the element of reliance to solve.

The question of whether a defendant has a duty to make a disclosure is legally and factually distinct from the question of whether a plaintiff relied on a nondisclosure. The question of duty to disclose hinges on whether the defendant has done something toward the plaintiff or occupies a status with respect to the plaintiff that obligates the defendant to make a disclosure. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Johnson, 113 So.2d 864, 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959) ("Where persons sustain towards another a relation of trust and confidence, their silence when they ought to speak, or their failure to disclose what they ought to disclose, is as much a fraud in law as an actual affirmative false representation.").

The question of reliance, in contrast, asks whether a misapprehension as to the undisclosed fact took on significance in the mind of the plaintiff and influenced his decision-making with respect to the matter at issue to his detriment. See, e.g., Raymond, James & Assocs., Inc. v. Zumstorchen Inv., Ltd., 488 So.2d 843, 845-46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding that plaintiff satisfactorily alleged detrimental reliance where it alleged that it entered into the transaction based on its belief in the defendants' representations). In other words, reliance is not focused on the defendant's duty but rather on the plaintiff's reaction to a misstated, concealed, or omitted fact.

PM and Reynolds' concern about the absence of the words "a statement" from the jury instructions is actually linked to the question of duty, not the question of reliance. See, e.g., Marriott Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Bridge Bahamas, Ltd., 193 So.3d 902, 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) ("A duty to disclose may arise where a party undertakes to disclose certain facts, such that the party must then disclose the entire truth known to him. Such a claim, however, must be supported by some evidence of a statement that would trigger the further duty to disclose all known material facts." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). The risk of PM's or Reynolds' being held liable for an omission in the absence of a duty to disclose is thus not the result of a failure to require reliance on a statement but rather is the result of one of two possible conditions: (1) that the Phase I Engle findings necessarily embrace a disclosure obligation that cannot be relitigated in every Engle progeny case or (2) that a jury instruction directed to the question of an Engle defendant's disclosure obligations may be proper if requested and implicated by the evidence in the case. We express no opinion on either possibility because they are not before us. We hold only that the element of reliance cannot do the work that PM and Reynolds ask of it here.

Having determined that a special jury instruction demanding reliance on "a statement" was not required in this case, we consider the special instruction the trial court gave-namely, that the jury could find the reliance element satisfied if the evidence showed that Douglas Duignan "reasonably relied to his detriment that [PM and Reynolds] would not conceal or omit disclosure of such material information." This instruction was both inaccurate and misleading. It in essence told the jury that it could find reliance if it found that Douglas Duignan generally relied on the tobacco companies to disclose all material information, without requiring it to find that the material information the tobacco companies concealed or omitted was in fact important to his decisions to begin or continue smoking. Because the very purpose of the reliance requirement is to determine whether the plaintiff acted differently because of PM's or Reynolds' concealment or omission of facts, this instruction was misleading.

It also may have made a difference to the outcome. As described above, the notion that Douglas Duignan started or continued smoking because he enjoyed smoking and not because of anything PM or Reynolds said or failed to say was a key element of their defense. A proper instruction-one that required reliance on either a statement or on a misapprehension as to a concealed or omitted fact-would have required the jury to consider that possibility and determine whether the tobacco companies were correct as to the reasons for Douglas Duignan's actions. The instruction the trial court gave, in contrast, allowed the jury to ignore this aspect of PM and Reynolds' defense because, if Douglas Duignan's general reliance on them to disclose everything is sufficient to prove reliance, there was no reason for the jury to consider whether any particular undisclosed fact would have made a difference to his decisions about smoking. Accordingly, the error in these instructions might reasonably have misled the jury and constitutes reversible error. See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. McCollum, 140 So.2d 569, 569 (Fla. 1962) (concluding that the proper "inquiry is whether the jury might reasonably have been misled" and concluding that such constitutes a miscarriage of justice under the civil harmless error statute in effect at the time); Gerard v. Kenegson, 151 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) ("In view of the fact that instruction ... was erroneous[,] and since the instruction can be reasonably calculated to confuse and mislead the jury, the giving of the instruction was error."); Veliz v. Am. Hosp., Inc., 414 So.2d 226, 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) ("An instruction which tends to confuse rather than enlighten the jury is cause for reversal if it may have misled the jury and caused them to arrive at a conclusion that otherwise they may not have reached."); see also § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (2015) (setting forth the civil harmless error standard for appellate review and containing the same miscarriage of justice language as that cited in Florida Power & Light ).

At oral argument, the Estate contended that this defect in the reliance instruction was harmless because the trial court, at PM and Reynolds' request, also instructed the jury on materiality, telling it that "material information is that which is of such importance that it would have made a difference in Douglas Duignan's actions if it had been disclosed." Thus, according to the Estate, the materiality instruction effectively required the jury to answer the question that the reliance instruction should have asked. We disagree. Neither the jury instructions nor the verdict form required the jury to determine materiality. On the contrary, the jury was instructed to take materiality as a given. It was told that the Engle Phase I findings conclusively established that PM and Reynolds concealed or omitted material information related to the health effects and addictive properties of cigarettes, and the trial court's specific instructions on the fraudulent concealment and conspiracy claims assumed materiality rather than putting it to the jury to decide. Simply put, because the jury was told both expressly and by implication to assume materiality rather than to decide it, the Estate cannot establish a reasonable probability that the instructional error did not affect the verdict on the fraud by concealment and conspiracy claims. See Special, 160 So.3d at 1256-57. The instructional error here was not harmless.

At a minimum, the error would require a new trial on the Estate's claims for fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to fraudulently conceal. The parties disagree, however, about whether it also requires a new trial with respect to punitive damages. While the error itself is one worthy of articulation so that it is not repeated in the second trial, we need not reach a determination on what the scope of that error alone would be on remand because we reverse and remand for a new trial on all issues based on the trial court's readback instruction.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the final judgment is reversed and this case is remanded for a new trial. We certify conflict with Schoeff, Calloway, McKeever, and Grossman with respect to the comparative fault issue in this case.

Reversed and remanded; conflict certified.

KELLY and BLACK, JJ., Concur.

      Lorillard Tobacco Company is also named as an appellant here. Lorillard, however, has been merged into Reynolds, and Reynolds' liability in this case includes liability as a successor-by-merger to Lorillard.

      Engle v. Liggett Grp., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).

      They also seek to preserve for review in the United States Supreme Court their arguments that it violates due process to allow an Engle progeny plaintiff to establish the conduct elements of his or her claims and that federal law impliedly preempts strict liability and negligence claims based on the Engle findings. The first of those arguments was rejected by the Florida Supreme Court in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So.3d 419, 430-36 (Fla. 2013), and the second was rejected by the Florida Supreme Court in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Marotta, 214 So.3d 590, 605 (Fla. 2017).

      Philip Morris USA Inc. v. McKeever, 207 So.3d 907 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Grossman, 211 So.3d 221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Calloway, 201 So.3d 753 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), review denied, No. SC16-1937, 2017 WL 1023712, *1 (Fla. Mar. 16, 2017), cert. denied, No. 16-1507, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 163, 199 L.Ed.2d 39, 2017 WL 2654373 (Oct. 2, 2017).

      To the extent the Estate contends that this error was either unpreserved or waived, the contention is, on our review of the record, without merit.

      The criminal rule has since been amended to regulate a trial court's communication with a jury concerning readbacks in more detail and in a manner consistent with Hazuri. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.410 (2017). Although adoption of a similar civil rule to address readbacks was contemplated, no changes to the civil rules were made; instead, a standard jury instruction in civil cases to govern the discretion afforded a trial court when a jury requests a readback was adopted. In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 967 So.2d 178, 183 (Fla. 2007). Following Hazuri, the standard civil readback instruction, Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 801.2, which contains an express statement for the trial court to use in addressing jury requests for readbacks, was amended to include a note to reflect some limits on the trial court's discretion similar to those in the criminal context. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases-Report No. 12 - 02, 115 So.3d 208, 209 (Fla. 2013). Although the trial court acknowledged that this standard instruction existed, it did not employ it in responding to the jury note in this case.

      The cases upon which the Estate relies are not applicable because none involved consideration of a jury's request to examine transcripts of deposition testimony read aloud to the jury during trial as substantive evidence. See Adams v. State, 122 So.3d 976, 978-80 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (holding, without discussing whether the depositions were read at trial or the distinction between deposition and trial testimony, that the trial court's failure to inform the jury of the possibility of a readback in response to a request for "all the depositions" and "transcripts of all the testimony" was not remediable on appeal in the absence of a contemporaneous objection in the trial court); Bannister v. State, 132 So.3d 267, 278-80 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding that where a jury requested the depositions in a case where trial witnesses read from them during parts of their live testimony, "the jury was not requesting a read-back of the witness's testimony, but rather hard copies of the depositions" themselves); Delestre v. State, 103 So.3d 1026, 1027-28 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (holding that the trial court's failure to inform the jury of the possibility of a readback in response to a request for "all the testimony" was not fundamental error); see also Armstrong v. Dwyer, 155 F.3d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 1998) (involving circumstances where it was clear that "the jury sought transcripts of depositions, rather than transcripts of the deposition testimony read during trial or a readback of such testimony").

      Whether this logical possibility extends beyond theory to a real-world application is an open question that we need not address. The Estate argues that this possibility is wholly theoretical because the proof in this case includes evidence of decades-long advertising campaigns and the creation of a false controversy over the effect of smoking that by its nature included statements rendered misleading by the concealment or omission of material facts.

      This instruction appears to be based on a standard instruction in civil cases. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 409.5 ("A material fact is one that is of such importance that (claimant) would not have [entered into the transaction] [acted], but for the false statement."). There may be reason to question whether this standard instruction is legally correct. Materiality is generally evaluated under an objective test-inquiring whether a misrepresented or omitted fact would have taken on significance in the mind of a reasonable person. See Moustafa v. Omega Ins. Co., 201 So.3d 710, 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that materiality, as used in statute regarding false representations in an insurance policy application, is to be determined under an objective test); Silverman v. Pitterman, 574 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) ("A material fact is generally defined as one to which a reasonable person would attach importance in determining a choice of action."); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988) (holding, under federal securities fraud statute, that "materiality depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information"); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 476 at 1363 (West 2001) ("Representations are material if a reasonable person would want to consider the fact represented in determining whether to enter the transaction in question, and also if a reasonable person would not care about the fact represented but the plaintiff attaches her own idiosyncratic importance to it and the defendant knows it."). But see Atl. Nat'l Bank of Fla. v. Vest, 480 So.2d 1328, 1332 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) ("A fact is material if, but for the alleged nondisclosure or misrepresentation, the complaining party would not have entered into the transaction.").


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Roosevelt Jean LOUIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1425
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 15, 2017
    Roosevelt Jean Louis, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SALTER, EMAS and LOGUE, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Maxwell v. State, 69 So.3d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) ; Wesley v. State, 126 So.3d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ; Ross v. State, 82 So.3d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ; Harricharan v. State, 59 So.3d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). See also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(2) (no motion filed under this rule shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment and sentence become final unless the motion alleges, inter alia, that "the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for herein and has been held to apply retroactively, and the claim is made within 2 years of the date of the mandate of the decision announcing the retroactivity").


text:
    Sean WELLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1257
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 26, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Sean Kevin Gravel, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Sean Wells, appeals the trial court's order revoking his probation and sentencing him to thirty months in prison. We affirm, but remand for a corrected order.

The trial court orally found Appellant guilty of violating Condition 1 of his probation for failing to report in December 2016 and January 2017. At sentencing, defense counsel conceded that Appellant qualified as a violent felony offender of special concern, and the trial court made the oral pronouncement that Appellant's release posed a danger to the community pursuant to section 948.06(8)(e), Florida Statutes (2016).

On appeal, Appellant argues (1) the finding that he violated his probation was not supported by competent, substantial evidence, and (2) the trial court erred by failing to include its reasons for finding that he posed a danger to the community in its written order.

We affirm the trial court's revocation of Appellant's probation without further discussion. However, the State concedes that remand is appropriate for the trial court to reduce its orally pronounced reasons for finding that Appellant presents a danger to the community to writing. See Bell v. State , 150 So.3d 1214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) ; see also Arnone v. State , 204 So.3d 556, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("[W]here a court orally pronounces a reason, consistent with one or more of the factors listed under section 948.06(8)(e) 1., for its finding that the defendant, as a violent felony offender of special concern, poses a danger to the community, but fails to provide written reasons for its finding, the proper remedy is to affirm the revocation of the defendant's probation, but remand for entry of a written order conforming to the court's oral pronouncement."). Similarly, we note that although the trial court orally pronounced its finding that Appellant violated probation, the written order revoking probation does not specify which condition Appellant violated. See Brown v. State , 225 So.3d 399, 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). Thus, on remand, the trial court should enter a corrected order with appropriate written findings.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

PALMER, WALLIS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Susan EINSPAR a/k/a Susan Ellyn Einspar-Wayne, Appellant, v. Matthew WAYNE, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-690
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 30, 2018
    Mark S. Peters, of Eisenmenger, Blaue & Peters, P.A., Viera, for Appellant.
    Richard J. Feinberg, of Law Office of Richard J. Feinberg, Indialantic, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. Serbousek v. Lucas , 191 So.3d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ; Morris v. Morris , 743 So.2d 81 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), rev. denied , 767 So.2d 459 (Fla. 2000).

PALMER, WALLIS AND EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Amy SARGENT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3992
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed January 26, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Robert Jackson Pearce III, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Amy Sargent, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of criminal mischief (a third-degree felony) pursuant to a plea agreement. She was represented by counsel at the time of the plea. She was sentenced to three years' probation. A few days later, Sargent filed a facially insufficient, pro se motion to withdraw her plea. At the time the motion was filed, Sargent was still represented by counsel. See Escobar v. State, 126 So.3d 277, 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) ("[C]ounsel's obligation of representation to his client does not end upon the rendition of a judgment of conviction and sentence, but continues thereafter until either a notice of appeal is filed ... the time for filing the notice has passed, or good cause is shown upon written motion."). The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion. Sargent's counsel did not attend the hearing.

Sargent appeals, contending that her constitutional right to counsel was violated when the hearing was held without her counsel being present. We conclude that the trial court should have stricken the motion because Sargent was represented by counsel and the motion did not allege an adversarial relationship with her counsel. Moreover, the motion did not contain specific allegations that bring it within the ambit of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii). See Escobar, 126 So.3d at 279. Accordingly, we reverse the order under review and remand this case to the trial court to enter an order striking the motion.

REVERSED; REMANDED with instructions.

SAWAYA, EVANDER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


author: LAMBERT, J.

text:
    Ann BOREN f/k/a Ann Boren Carney, Petitioner, v. Thomas ROGERS, Esquire, as Purported Trustee of the Elaine Mullins Living Trust, Evelyn Vega Rivera and Estate of Elaine Mullins, Respondents.
    Case No. 5D17-3004
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed February 2, 2018
    Jordan R. Hammer, Anya M. Van Veen and Jeffrey H. Skatoff, of Clark Skatoff PA, Palm Beach Gardens, for Petitioner.
    J. Stephen Pullum, of Pullum & Pullum, P.A., Lake Mary, and Denise VanNess, of VanNess & VanNess, P.A., Crystal River, for Respondent, Thomas Rogers, Esquire.
    No Appearance for Other Respondents.
   LAMBERT, J.

Petitioner, Ann Boren, seeks a writ of certiorari to quash a protective order that precluded production of all documents requested by Boren in her initial discovery request. For the following reasons, we grant the writ.

Boren filed an amended complaint seeking to void a 2014 trust and a 2013 trust executed by Elaine Mullins. Boren alleged that for many years prior to Mullins' death in December 2014, Mullins had maintained a longstanding estate plan whereby her assets would pass to certain family members, including Boren, upon her death. Boren further alleged that the respondent, Evelyn Rivera, who is not a family member, befriended Mullins late in her life, when Mullins was in failing health and suffering from cognitive deficits, and unduly influenced Mullins to execute these two trusts at a time Mullins lacked the capacity to do so. As a result, Boren alleged, Rivera became the substantial beneficiary under these two trusts, and but for these trusts, Boren would be a trust beneficiary under Mullins' earlier trusts.

Co-Respondent, Thomas Rogers, the named trustee of the 2014 and 2013 trusts and also the attorney who prepared the trust documents, answered the amended complaint. In addition to denying the material allegations of the complaint, Rogers defended that Boren also lacked standing to void the trusts under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation because the trust was initially created in 1992 and "was amended and/or restated in 1996, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2013, and 2014," and Rogers therefore asserted that Boren must first show that she would have been a beneficiary under an earlier trust before she would be entitled to receive a copy of the most recent trust documents.

Boren then filed a first request for production of documents pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.350. Boren requested that Rogers produce copies of all trust documents prepared by Rogers, his law firm, or by anyone else for Mullins' signature from January 1, 1992, to date, together with copies of all notes, memoranda, or other documents created or maintained by Rogers relative to both the trust documents and communications to and from Mullins regarding the preparation or execution of the trust documents and other estate planning documents. Boren also asked for copies of any and all communications between Rivera and Rogers or his law firm regarding Mullins. Finally, Boren requested copies of any and all documents related to payment of legal fees to Rogers for services rendered on behalf of Mullins.

Rogers moved for a protective order as to all requested documents on four grounds. Rogers first argued that before obtaining production of the documents, Boren must overcome the presumption that Mullins' 1988 will that Boren seeks to administer in a separate probate proceeding is lost or destroyed. Second, Rogers asserted that Boren's request was overbroad because it asked for documents from a period of twenty-two to thirty years. Third, Rogers contended that the requested documents are irrelevant to the amended complaint and, thus, he should not have to produce them because: (1) Boren does not allege the specific trust for which she claims that she is a beneficiary and, (2) without having possession of the original 1988 will, Boren must first overcome the presumption that this will was destroyed by Mullins. Fourth, Rogers stated that to the extent that the requested documents contain Mullins' "private financial information," those documents are protected by the constitutional right of privacy. See Art. I, § 23, Fla. Const.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion for protective order and, in its first order, directed that Rogers provide the trust instruments from 1992-2007 to the court for an in-camera review. The documents were submitted to the court under seal. Following its review, the court entered a subsequent order finding that Boren was "not entitled to a review of those documents" and granted the motion in its entirety as to all requested documents without further explanation. Boren seeks certiorari relief from this second order.

"Certiorari is the appropriate remedy when a discovery order departs from the essential requirements of law, causing material injury to the petitioner throughout the remainder of the proceedings in the trial court, effectively leaving no adequate remedy on appeal." Anderson v. Vander Meiden ex. rel Duggan , 56 So.3d 830, 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (citing Allstate Ins. v. Boecher , 733 So.2d 993, 999 (Fla. 1999) ). However, "[c]ertiorari is rarely available to review orders denying discovery because in most cases the harm can be corrected on appeal." Id. (quoting Giacalone v. Helen Ellis Mem'l Hosp. Found., Inc. , 8 So.3d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ). Nevertheless, in those rare circumstances when the discovery is relevant or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and the order effectively eviscerates a party's claim, defense, or counterclaim, relief by writ of certiorari is appropriate. Id. (quoting Giacalone , 8 So.3d at 1234 ).

Rule 1.280(b)(1) permits a party to obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged information that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action and that would be admissible at trial or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subsection (c) of this rule does, however, provide that a court, upon a showing of good cause, may order that discovery not be had. In the instant case, the trial court made no finding of good cause, provided no explanation in its order for denying the motion, nor did it separately analyze the individual requests contained in the respective paragraphs of Boren's discovery request. This is insufficient when, as here, Boren's document request is directed at items that, based on the allegations in the amended complaint, would appear to be admissible at trial or otherwise reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Moreover, because Boren would need the trust documents at trial to establish that she has standing as a prior interested beneficiary in the trust to bring this suit, the order effectively eviscerates her claim, which cannot be remedied on direct appeal because, at the very least, with no access to these documents, Boren lacks the ability to explain or demonstrate on direct appeal how the trust documents would have established her standing.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the present protective order. We remand with instructions that the trial court permit discovery of the requested trust documents or, alternatively, make the requisite finding of good cause as to why these trust documents must be protected from production. Additionally, the trial court is directed to reconsider and specifically address whether good cause exists as to Rogers' objections to the production of the remaining categories of documents requested, including his claim of privilege regarding the documents allegedly containing Mullins' private financial information.

PETITION GRANTED, ORDER QUASHED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

ORFINGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.

      Rivera has not filed an appearance in this proceeding.

      The doctrine of dependent relative revocation "means that where [a] testator makes a new will revoking a former valid one, and it later appears that the new one is invalid, the old will may be re-established on the ground that the revocation was dependent upon the validity of the new one, [the] testator preferring the old will to intestacy." Stewart v. Johnson , 142 Fla. 425, 194 So. 869, 870 (1940).

      Rogers indicated in his answer to the amended complaint that he represented Mullins and her late husband for over thirty years.

      The appendix filed by Boren does not contain a copy of this 1988 will, but based upon Rogers' motion, it appears that Boren would be a beneficiary under this will that predates the trust first executed by Mullins in 1992.


author: WALLIS, J.

text:
    Stephen CURTIS, Appellant, v. Taylor REINHARDT O/B/O R.B.C., Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1024
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed February 2, 2018
    Douglas D. Marks, of Boyd & Marks, L.L.C., Melbourne, for Appellant.
    Elizabeth Siano Harris, of Harris Appellate Law Office, Mims, for Appellee.
   WALLIS, J.

Stephen Curtis appeals the final judgment of injunction for protection against sexual violence entered against him and in favor of appellee, Taylor Reinhardt, on behalf of R.B.C., a minor child. Curtis asserts three grounds for reversal on appeal. We affirm on all grounds except for the challenge that the order for Curtis to undergo a psychosexual evaluation was overbroad. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to enter a compliant order.

We share the trial court's concerns that there is a "motive to fabricate" facts due to the dynamic playing out in this domestic dispute and that the "child is very young and susceptible to manipulation." However, we recognize that the trial judge serves as the fact-finder with regard to the injunction and, in this case, found the testimony of the child credible and consistent concerning the occurrence of the sexual act. Thus, competent, substantial evidence supports the injunction. Instead, we write to address the ambiguity present in the order for the psychosexual evaluation.

The trial court order states that Curtis "shall submit himself for a psychosexual evaluation to be performed by a licensed provider" to determine: (1) the risks of reoffending generally; (2) the nature of the relationship between Curtis and R.B.C.; (3) recommendations on how the relationship can continue in a safe manner; and (4) how the relationship can be reinstituted and with what safeguards. The trial court stressed that the evaluation was to include a polygraph component. When asked for further elaboration, the trial court verbally confirmed that the psychosexual evaluation to be performed should comport with the type of evaluation conducted on sex offenders, in compliance with American Academy procedure. The trial court left it up to the parties to agree on a licensed provider. The type of psychological testing to be performed was also noticeably absent from the order.

Our court has previously addressed the specificity required when ordering psychological examinations pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360, in the context of a child's safety while in a parent's care. When a trial court's order does not specify the manner, conditions, or scope of the evaluation, it effectively gives "the psychologist 'carte blanche' to perform any type, and all manner, of psychological inquiry, testing, and analysis," which "violates clearly established principles of law, resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Maddox v. Bullard, 141 So.3d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) ; see also Jordan v. Jordan, 187 So.3d 312, 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (holding order for psychosexual evaluation was overbroad when it did not specify what examination would entail, such as "the length of the examination, the type of testing, or whether the testing is limited to 'methods routine to the profession'"); Barry v. Barry, 159 So.3d 306, 308 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (same).

Accordingly, we reverse the entry of the subject order for a psychological evaluation and remand for the trial court to enter an order that complies with rule 1.360 by specifying the time, place, and physician's name, as well as the manner, conditions, and scope of the evaluation. See Jordan, 187 So.3d at 313 ; Barry, 159 So.3d at 308 ; Maddox, 141 So.3d at 1266.

AFFIRMED in Part; REVERSED in PART; and REMANDED with Instructions.

COHEN, C.J. and ORFINGER, J., concur.


author: EDWARDS, J.

text:
    Adele ISPASS, Appellant, v. Alan B. ISPASS, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-425
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed February 2, 2018
    Clifton H. Gorenflo, of Gray, Gorenflo & Partlow, P.A., Sanford, for Appellant.
    Kristin J. Coffey, of Green Family Law, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
   EDWARDS, J.

Adele Ispass ("Former Wife") appeals the trial court's order dismissing her supplemental petition to modify the amount and duration of alimony to be paid by Alan Ispass ("Former Husband"). The trial court based the dismissal with prejudice on its determination that it lacked jurisdiction to modify the duration of alimony. We agree with Former Wife that the trial court had jurisdiction; thus, we remand for further proceedings.

The parties married in 1975, had two children together, and divorced in 2000. They entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement ("MSA") in 2000 that was incorporated into the final judgment dissolving their marriage. The MSA provided that Former Husband would pay Former Wife $2250 per month in alimony unless he became permanently disabled or retired after age sixty-two, in which case she would receive her share of Former Husband's pension. The MSA stated that Former Husband would cease alimony payments immediately upon Former Wife's death, remarriage, or cohabitation.

In 2003, Former Wife filed a petition to increase child support. In response, Former Husband counter-petitioned to cease alimony payments based on Former Wife's cohabitation. The parties entered into a Mediation Agreement ("MA") that provided for child support and modified the alimony payments. Under the MA, Former Husband would continue paying $2250 per month in alimony until July 2006 when the monthly payments would be reduced to $1800, and then the payments would stop completely when Former Wife reached the age of sixty-two. As part of the MA, Former Husband agreed to waive his right to reduce or terminate alimony based on Former Wife's cohabitation. The MA incorporated the MSA except as to provisions amended by the MA. The trial court incorporated the MA into a final judgment of modification.

Two months before her sixty-second birthday, Former Wife filed a supplemental petition to modify alimony, seeking to increase the monthly amount above $1800 and extend the duration beyond her birthday. She based her request for modification on changed circumstances as a result of a cancer diagnosis that required her to stop working, as well as the death of her paramour. She requested the trial court to recalculate the monthly payments based on the parties' current financial needs and abilities. She filed an amended petition several months after her sixty-second birthday. The amended petition contained the same requests but added a demand for attorney's fees. Former Husband responded with a motion to dismiss, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend the duration of payments because the previously agreed upon time period for alimony payments had expired.

The trial court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that section 61.14, Florida Statutes (2003), allows the court to confirm or change the amount of support but does not empower the court to change the duration. As an additional reason for dismissing her petition with prejudice, the trial court ruled that Former Wife waived any right to extend alimony payments beyond her sixty-second birthday by entering into the MA.

Whether a court has jurisdiction over a case is a question of law reviewed de novo. Sanchez v. Fernandez , 915 So.2d 192, 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). "A court has subject matter jurisdiction when it has the authority to hear and decide the case." In re Adoption of D.P.P , 158 So.3d 633, 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (citing The Fla. Star v. B.J.F. , 530 So.2d 286, 288 (Fla. 1988) ). Section 61.14(1)(a) specifically grants circuit courts the authority to hear modification of alimony cases in the circuit in which the agreement was executed. § 61.14(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003).

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Here, the Final Judgment Dissolving Marriage and the Final Judgment of Modification were both executed in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court, and Former Wife filed her supplemental petition with the same court. Although the trial court stated in its order granting the motion to dismiss that "there is no specific reservation of Subject Matter Jurisdiction to modify alimony," such reservation is not required. See Walker v. Walker , 80 So.3d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Because the statute grants the court the power to hear the case and because Former Wife filed the supplemental petition in the same court where the final judgments were executed, the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction and erred in dismissing the petition based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Expiration of Agreed Upon Alimony Period

The trial court also found that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Former Wife's petition for modification because the agreed-upon time period for alimony had expired by the time of its ruling. However, after awarding alimony, "the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the award and to consider modification at any time during the period provided for support." Kelsey v. Kelsey , 636 So.2d 77, 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Although Former Wife waited until two months before her sixty-second birthday, her petition was filed during the alimony payment period, making it timely. See § 61.14(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) ; Paulk v. Paulk , 504 So.2d 790, 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Although the payment period expired before the court ruled, we reverse and remand for further proceedings because the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain and rule on the petition.

Authority to Extend Duration of Alimony

The trial court ruled that section 61.14, Florida Statutes (2003), allows for a party to petition the court only for an increase or decrease in the amount of alimony upon a showing of changed circumstances or financial ability. The court stated that it did not have jurisdiction to modify "the duration of the alimony, simply the amount." Although section 61.14 does not explicitly provide for an extension in the duration of an alimony award, courts have nevertheless done so. When alimony is set by an agreement between parties, courts can, upon a showing of changed circumstances, modify the duration of agreed-upon alimony payments. See, e.g. , Powell v. Powell , 527 So.2d 260, 261 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) ; Brooks v. Brooks , 423 So.2d 995, 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The trial court pointed out that, until July 1, 2010, there was no statutory provision for durational alimony, which is essentially the form of support that these parties had agreed upon. However, now that durational alimony is statutorily recognized, section 61.08(7), Florida Statutes (2011), allows for an extension on the length of an award upon a showing of exceptional circumstances as long as the award does not exceed the length of the marriage. § 61.08(7), Fla. Stat. (2011). Thus, courts can extend alimony payments depending on the type of alimony and a proper showing of changed circumstances.

Waiver of the Right to Petition for Modification

Former Wife argues that the court erred in finding that she waived the right to modify alimony when she agreed that the alimony payments would cease on her sixty-second birthday. "In Florida, the statutory right to modification, unless specifically waived, is incorporated as a matter of law in any agreement or judgment providing for alimony." Harmon v. Harmon , 629 So.2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). "The right to modify awarded alimony may be waived by either party, and this waiver may be implied; however, an implied waiver must be clear and unambiguous." Rosenthal v. Rosenthal , 199 So.3d 541, 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Here, the MA specifically states that the parties retained the right to modify the agreement according to Florida law. Thus, it was error to dismiss Former Wife's petition for modification with prejudice at that stage of the proceedings. Because we are remanding the case, the trial court may consider the waiver issue if the parties properly present it.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SAWAYA and BERGER, JJ., concur.

      Former Husband asserted that he was also diagnosed with cancer and retired early as a result.

      Although these are older cases, the relevant statutory language of section 61.14 remains the same. See Muss v. Muss , 390 So.2d 415, 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (" '[T]he court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires, with due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial ability of the parties ..., decreasing, increasing, or confirming the amount of separate support, maintenance, or alimony provided for in the agreement ....' " (quoting § 61.14(1), Fla. Stat. (1979) ).


text:
    PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. MDTR, LLC as Trustee under 13232 Sugarbluff Land Trust and Gary C. Flagg, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D16-2887
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed February 2, 2018
    William L. Grimsley, N. Mark New ll, and Derek K. Mountford, of McGlinchey Stafford, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    Gregory K. Mausser, of The Law Office of Gregory K. Mausser, P.A., Sanford, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this foreclosure suit, PNC Bank, National Association ("PNC") appeals a final judgment awarding attorney's fees to MDTR, LLC as Trustee under 13232 Sugarbluff Land Trust ("MDTR") and applying a contingent risk multiplier to that award. Because MDTR was not a party to the mortgage and therefore was not entitled to prevailing party attorney's fees, we reverse.

PNC initiated the foreclosure suit against Gary and Lori Flagg, who defaulted on the subject note in March 2012. In 2013, MDTR was substituted in the proceedings. The Flaggs had filed for bankruptcy and were granted a discharge; MDTR purchased the subject property from the bankruptcy trustee. PNC proceeded against MDTR, ultimately dropping the Flaggs as parties to the foreclosure proceeding before trial. In 2015, PNC voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure complaint, and MDTR subsequently moved for prevailing party attorney's fees pursuant to the mortgage.

At the hearing on the motion for attorney's fees, MDTR argued that as a substituted party in interest, and based on the reciprocity provisions of section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2015), it was entitled to attorney's fees due to PNC's voluntary dismissal of the foreclosure action. PNC countered that MDTR was not a party to the mortgage contract and therefore not entitled to prevailing party fees. The trial court agreed with MDTR, finding that it was entitled to fees pursuant to the mortgage and section 57.105(7).

Paragraph 22 of the mortgage at issue provides, "Lender shall be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence." Section 57.105(7) dictates that this provision would equally apply to the borrower. See § 57.105(7), Fla. Stat. Nonetheless, "a stranger to the contract cannot recover attorney's fees based on the contract." Sand Lake Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Busch, 210 So.3d 706, 709 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (citing HFC Collection Ctr., Inc. v. Alexander, 190 So.3d 1114, 1116-17 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ); see also Fla. Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Red Rd. Residential, LLC, 197 So.3d 1112, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) ("Only the parties to a contract may avail themselves of section 57.105(7)'s entitlement to attorney's fees."). MDTR bore the burden of demonstrating that it was a party to the mortgage in order to be entitled to prevailing party attorney's fees. See Fla. Cmty. Bank, N.A., 197 So.3d at 1116.

MDTR's argument that it became a party to the mortgage because it purchased the subject property from the bankruptcy trustee and was substituted in the foreclosure proceedings is unpersuasive. MDTR received the trustee's deed and was substituted as a party after PNC filed the foreclosure complaint and recorded the lis pendens in this case. Thus, MDTR was not even entitled to intervene or be substituted in the proceedings. Moreover, the status of prevailing party does not equate to the status of a mortgagor under the mortgage "so as to trigger section 57.105(7)'s reciprocity provision." Id."Only a mortgagor under the subject mortgage is due such reciprocity." Id. Here, MDTR was not the mortgagor or otherwise a party to the contract.

In addition, MDTR did not assume the mortgage; rather, it took the property subject to PNC's mortgage. Thus, MDTR did not have a "legally cognizable interest" in the foreclosure proceeding. See Whitburn, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 190 So.3d 1087, 1091-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (finding that a subsequent purchaser's "interest in [the] foreclosure proceeding is not a legally cognizable interest because even though it now holds legal title to the property, it purchased the property subject to [the bank's] foreclosure proceeding and superior interest in the property").

MDTR's reliance on the trustee's deed as an assignment that gave it contractual rights against PNC is unavailing. The deed provided:

This conveyance is subject to all accrued and accruing taxes and assessments, and all liens, encumbrances, covenants, conditions, restrictions and actions of record or otherwise, except nothing herein shall operate to re-impose same. The Grantee and its successors, and/or assigns shall have the benefit of any defense available to the Grantor, debtor or to the debtor's bankruptcy estate as against any entity other than the estate, including statutes of limitation, statutes of frauds, usury, and other personal defenses.

While the deed purported to assign MDTR the right to defend against foreclosure proceedings, nothing in the deed assigned MDTR an interest in the note or mortgage. Instead, the transfer was subject to all existing liens against the property, including PNC's mortgage. Thus, again, because MDTR took the property subject to the mortgage, it did not become a party to the mortgage, and it was not entitled to attorney's fees under the contractual provisions in the mortgage. See, e.g., Novastar Mortg., Inc. v. Strassburger, 855 So.2d 130, 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (concluding that defendants who purchased property subject to foreclosure proceeding at a different foreclosure proceeding on the same property were not parties to the mortgage, thus they were not entitled to recover prevailing party attorney's fees under the mortgage); see also Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n for Morgan Stanley ABS Capital, MSAC 2007-HE3 v. Bird, No. 5D16-669, 234 So.3d 833, 834-35 n.1, 2018 WL 300655, at *1 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA Jan. 5, 2018) (noting that awarding contractual attorney's fees to and against non-parties to a contract "is clearly not permissible").

Accordingly, we reverse the order granting attorney's fees to MDTR.

REVERSED.

COHEN, C.J., ORFINGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.

      We do not address the parties' arguments regarding the propriety of a contingent risk multiplier because the reversal of the attorney's fee award renders the application of a multiplier to that award moot.

      See § 57.105(7), Fla. Stat. ("If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney's fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney's fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract."). Alternatively, MDTR moved for fees as a sanction under section 57.105(1), based on PNC's alleged failure to respond to a request for admissions. However, the trial court found that the only basis for MDTR's entitlement to attorney's fees was section 57.105(7), and MDTR does not challenge that ruling on appeal.

      The purchaser of property subject to foreclosure proceedings where the bank has already filed a lis pendens is a "purchaser pendente lite." Tr. No. 602W0 Dated 7/16/15, Dema Invs., LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 207 So.3d 977, 978 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). "The law is well settled that a purchaser pendente lite is not entitled to intervene or otherwise be made a party to the ongoing lawsuit." Id. (citations omitted). However, PNC did not raise this issue below, and it does not challenge MDTR's right to intervene on appeal. Thus, PNC has waived any claim that MDTR should not have been made a party to the lawsuit. See, e.g., Pealer v. Wilmington Tr. Nat'l Ass'n for MFRA Tr., 212 So.3d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (Sleet, J., concurring) (citing Corrigan v. Bank of Am., N.A., 189 So.3d 187, 192 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ).


text:
    Penny HITCHCOCK, Appellant, v. Patricia MAHAFFEY, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-533
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed February 2, 2018
    Michael C. Clarke and Betsy E. Gallagher, of Kubicki Draper, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Nicholas A. Shannin, B.C.S., Shannin Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, and Margaret E. Kozan, of Margaret E. Kozan, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Penny Hitchcock appeals the final judgment entered in favor of Patricia Mahaffey following a jury verdict. Mahaffey was seriously injured when she was struck by a motor vehicle that was being negligently operated by Hitchcock. The jury awarded Mahaffey significant sums of money for certain intangible damages and for "medical expenses, household goods or services, or other economic losses," both in the past and in the future. We affirm, without further discussion, on all but one of the several issues that Hitchcock raised. We do, however, agree with Hitchcock that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial or remittitur regarding the award of $250,000 for future economic damages and reverse on this issue.

"Florida law restricts recovery of future medical expenses to those expenses 'reasonably certain' to be incurred." Auto Club Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Babin , 204 So.3d 561, 563 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (quoting Volusia Cty. v. Joynt , 179 So.3d 448, 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) ). As plaintiff, Mahaffey had the burden at trial "to establish, through competent, substantial evidence, that [her] future medical expenses will more probably than not be incurred." Id. (quoting Joynt , 179 So.3d at 452 ). Here, other than the sum of $5365 for future surgery, which Hitchcock does not contest, the award for the balance of the future economic damages is based on Mahaffey's testimony as to the amount that she has paid for her past medical expenses and for past household goods and services subsequent to the motor vehicle accident. However, "the amount of past medical expenses incurred does not-at least by itself-provide a reasonable basis for a jury to compute future medical expenses." Id. (quoting Joynt , 179 So.3d at 452 ).

Accordingly, based upon the lack of competent substantial evidence, we reverse the jury award and that part of the final judgment for damages for the future loss of "medical expenses, household goods or services or other economic losses." We remand for the trial court to either enter a remittitur under section 768.043, Florida Statutes (2013), in the amount of $5365 or, if the parties cannot agree to the remittitur, to grant a new trial solely on the issue of the loss of these future economic damages. See Truelove v. Blount , 954 So.2d 1284, 1289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). As to all other matters, we affirm.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

SAWAYA, ORFINGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.

      The parties agreed to use this specific language to describe this element of damages on the verdict form.