text:
    Surgret Urania DOSS, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as trustee under pooling and servicing agreement dated as of September 1, 2001, Securitized Asset-backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-HE2 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-HE2, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-373
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Raymond ADAMS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-465
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Johnathan Z. MYRICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-512
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Wayne JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-515
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Timothy MOOREHOUSE, DOC #362076, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1768
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jonathan J. SIMONELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2120
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert Anthony ROAKES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-256
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Henry Kevin MALONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-442
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    IN the INTEREST OF P.A.D., JR., a child.
    P.A.D., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-3837
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Eliut M. OJEDA-LEGRAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4869
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Terrell AGEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-502
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lee RHONEELLI, a/k/a Lee Raymond Rhoneelli, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5392
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Roland A. PRENATT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2378
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 17, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sharif S. MIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3129
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 17, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Nelson ROJAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-1809
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed December 13, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Emilio SUAREZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-557
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 8, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Erick PACHECO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2808
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jiviarus Lewis HUNT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2446
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Nathaniel PAYNE-COLLINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1174
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 03, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jose RIESGO, a/k/a Juan Jose Hernandez, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1806
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed December 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    N.F., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1867
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Wilbert Concepcion BASSETT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2600
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Cornelius WOODS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2278
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Peter Richard PEREIRA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1749
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ayman NEKHAILA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1530
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.V., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1370
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.S., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1204
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. J.E., a juvenile, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-450
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ernesto HERRADA-CORDOVA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2862
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Yadelin TRAVIESO, Appellant, v. STATE FARM FLORIDA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2413
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Francky LOUIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-660
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rodrigo JIMENEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-428
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Moise LAMOUR, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2507
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    MIAMI-DADE COUNTY EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY, etc., Appellant, v. MUNILLA CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2450
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ricardo Manuel MONTANEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2639
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kendall MAJOR, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2224
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed December 6, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael RIVERA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2621
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Howard Lee SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1905
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael GRIMACE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1038
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Janet RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. ALS COMMERCIAL FUNDING, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-383
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antoine HASTIE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3468
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 1, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Matthew DIXON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2599
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Omar BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-1914
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.L., The Father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3173
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 18, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Earnest BYRD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2801
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Wally JEAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3719
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Nakia SIMETON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3658
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John JOSEPH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3672
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Norman NEWMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3684
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lewis P. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3710
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Marvin SILVER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3720
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Perry FLETCHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3378
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Clinton BURNS, III Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3657
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    James E. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3668
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Emilio NUNEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3676
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    February 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Renardo FERGUSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3679
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    J. C., the Father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3114
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Charvon WARREN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3723
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Leroy JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3792
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 15, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Joseph CARRUBE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3834
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    February 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Demetrius L. SNELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3439
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Shawn KING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3586
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ricardo RANGEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3609
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jeffrey SAPP, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3610
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Carlos CONTRERAS-MAYAHUA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3628
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Daniel J. MATOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3645
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Norris CLEMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3656
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Clifford Lee SHELTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3680
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Paul S. LABINER, Appellant, v. Lesley WARD-KUHN and Cory Matthew Meltzer, Cory Meltzer LLC, a Florida limited liability Company a/k/a Law Office of Cory Meltzer, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-3420
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    FINE BUILT CONSTRUCTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Appellant, v. Daniel L. SMITH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of George Meyer, Jr., deceased, and Estate of George Meyer, Jr., Appellees.
    No. 4D17-2887
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    March 1, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jose DAVILA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3612
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    D.J. a/k/a D.M., the mother, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and Guardian Ad Litem, Appellees.
    Nos. 4D17-3267 4D17-3654
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    March 16, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    L.S., the father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3631
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 2, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert VELEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3208
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [January 25, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lindsay PEEPLES, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2392
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 31, 2017 Rehearing Denied December 18, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Sandra K. DAVIDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1712
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Matthew J. SHORTT, Individually and as Trustee of the Harry and Marilynne Revocable Family Trust, Appellant, v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION ("FANNIE MAE"), a Corporation Organized and Existing Under the Laws of the United States of America, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3096
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed November 14, 2017 Rehearing Denied December 21, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Dennis M. WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2250
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed November 14, 2017 Rehearing Denied December 15, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Calvin VENUTO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2399
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed November 7, 2017 Rehearing Denied December 18, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Dudley WHITFIELD, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3099
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    James Henry WISE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2961
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jesus O. GARCIA a/k/a Mantana Luis, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2641
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Paul R. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2501
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    B.B., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2483
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Walter FLOWERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2428
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jermal SHERRAIL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2262
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ariana Joyce BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2172
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Billy Joe SWEATT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2029
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Thomas BAKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2019
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Edwin A. TORRES-CRUZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1989
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Howard MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1963
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Tyheem BANKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1955
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Anthony C. HOGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1923
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Otisha THORNTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1896
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Timothy HENDERSON, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and State of Florida, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-1797
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Corey Eric JORDAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3159
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Waldemar A. TORRES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3058
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Wade Clifton HUFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2911
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Bryan A. SPELLERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2896
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Emmanuel VELAZQUEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2629
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Marco PIERCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2611
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    John Paul FISHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2302
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    James D. HUBBARD, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and State of Florida, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-2112
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    K.G., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1776
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Patrick BOMBARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1708
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Andre I. DUNBAR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1696
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Anthony JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1676
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Amy Rae CLESTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1582
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Alexander P. ATEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1148
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    John SCHENONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-832
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jamie CARREAU, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-772
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kevin Lamar HILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-507
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kevin Michael CLAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-378
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Thomas MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-296
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ricardo Alberto GARCIA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-104
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jessica SMITH, Appellant, v. Drew BRECHEEN, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1042
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 19, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Alicia AVOLA, Appellant, v. RAMESES, INC. d/b/a Cleo's Gentlemen's Club, Goldstar Management, LLC and R.L. Protective Services, LLC, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-854
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 19, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Tracy GREEN, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE O/B/O Ivette MACKROY, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-337
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 19, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Len Edward GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1398
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 12, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ashley N. MATTESON, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, et al., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-1880
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 19, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


author: Klingensmith, J.

text:
    Trilok DESAI, Appellant, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, etc., Appellee.
    No. 4D17-0890
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 7, 2018]
    Enrique Nieves III of King, Nieves & Zacks, PLLC, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Sarah T. Weitz of Weitz & Schwartz, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   Klingensmith, J.

Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company ("BNY") filed a foreclosure action against appellant Trilok Desai after he defaulted on his mortgage payments. Although its first suit was involuntarily dismissed, BNY filed a second one against Desai, and obtained a final judgment of foreclosure. Desai states that this second action was barred by the statute of limitations since it was based on defaults occurring before the dismissal of the prior foreclosure lawsuit. He also asserts that Florida law prohibited BNY from seeking any interest on the loan that accrued while the first foreclosure case was pending.

We disagree on both issues, and affirm.

The facts in this case are undisputed. In December 2009, BNY filed its initial foreclosure action and alleged, "There has been a default in the payment of the amounts due under the Note and Mortgage in that the payment due for March 1, 2009, and all subsequent payments have not been made." That suit was dismissed with prejudice in September 2013.

In June 2015, BNY filed the foreclosure action now on appeal, and included in its complaint the claim that "[Desai] has defaulted under the Note and Mortgage by failing to pay the August 01 [sic], 2010 payment, and all subsequent payments due thereafter."

At trial, Desai moved for involuntary dismissal on the grounds that Bartram v. U.S. Bank, N.A ., 211 So.3d 1009, 1019 (Fla. 2016), required that if a second foreclosure action is filed, then it must be based on a new default date accruing on a date after the dismissal of the prior action. Desai also claimed that Bartram prohibited BNY from seeking any interest on the loan that accrued while the first foreclosure action was pending.

BNY responded that it properly re-accelerated the debt and initiated a timely action when it filed its second complaint based on Desai's undisputed August 1, 2010 default, countering that Bartram did not require a subsequent action to be based on a default occurring after the dismissal of a prior suit, and did not preclude a mortgagee from recovering amounts that became due while the prior action was pending. The trial court entered final judgment in favor of BNY, and Desai appealed.

" 'A legal issue surrounding a statute of limitations question is an issue of law subject to de novo review.' " Med. Data Sys., Inc. v. Coastal Ins. Grp., Inc. , 139 So.3d 394, 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Fox v. Madsen , 12 So.3d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ).

Based on the allegations of the second complaint, the filing of the second action in June 2015 was timely. That complaint was limited in scope to defaults starting in August 2010, and not from the date of the initial default in March 2009. BNY pleaded and proved that Desai was in an ongoing state of default from August 2010 to the filing the second complaint. Thus, having limited its recovery only to those defaults occurring within five years of the second lawsuit, BNY's action was not barred by the statute of limitations. See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2015) ; § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2015) ; Depicciotto v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC , 225 So.3d 390, 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ("Nationstar's foreclosure action was not barred by the statute of limitations where it alleged and proved separate and continuing defaults that fell within the five years preceding the filing of this suit."); Desylvester v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon , 219 So.3d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (holding the same); Evergrene Partners, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A ., 143 So.3d 954, 956 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding the same).

Desai also suggests that the court's involuntary dismissal of BNY's initial foreclosure action with prejudice precluded the trial court from awarding any amounts that were in default while the initial foreclosure action was pending. We find this argument to be without merit.

The court in Bartram held that dismissal of a foreclosure action accelerating payment based on a default does not bar the filing of a subsequent foreclosure action. 211 So.3d at 1021. A mortgagee has "the right to file a subsequent foreclosure action-and to seek acceleration of all sums due under the note-so long as the foreclo sure action was based on a subsequent default, and the statute of limitations had not run on that particular default.

" Id. (emphasis added).

Likewise, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not prevent BNY from filing a second foreclosure complaint and relitigating those issues despite the involuntary dismissal with prejudice of its prior action where the case was not decided on the merits. See Singleton v. Greymar Assocs. , 882 So.2d 1004, 1007-08 (Fla. 2004) (concluding that "the doctrine of res judicata does not necessarily bar successive foreclosure suits," and explaining that while "a foreclosure action and an acceleration of the balance due based upon the same default may bar a subsequent action on that default, an acceleration and foreclosure predicated upon subsequent and different defaults present a separate and distinct issue"); Aronowitz v. Home Diagnostics, Inc ., 174 So.3d 1062, 1066 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (stating that for collateral estoppel to apply, the specific issue must have been actually litigated and decided in a prior suit).

BNY's second complaint alleged, and it was not contested, that Desai was in a continuing state of default. Therefore, the note and mortgage remained enforceable by a foreclosure based on any default occurring within the statute of limitations. See Bartram , 211 So.3d at 1012 ; Depicciotto , 225 So.3d at 391-92 ; Kebreau v. Bayview Loan Serv., LLC , 225 So.3d 255, 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding that a suit may proceed where alleged defaults fell within the five-year limitations period). Cf. Collazo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. , 213 So.3d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (reversing foreclosure judgment where plaintiff asserted the same payment default date and basis for acceleration in a prior and subsequent complaint, a date over five years preceding the commencement of the latter case); Hicks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 178 So.3d 957, 959 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (ruling the trial court erred by failing to dismiss a foreclosure action where counsel stipulated to a default date outside of the statute of limitations).

Other cases arising in our sister courts have held similarly. In Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. BH-NV Invs. 1, LLC , 230 So.3d 60, 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), a trustee filed a foreclosure action in June 2009 based on a borrower's default in December 2008 and on all subsequent payments. In April 2011, the trial court dismissed that foreclosure action. Id. More than four years later in July 2015, the trustee filed a second foreclosure action based on the borrower's default in August 2010 and all subsequent missed payments during the pendency of the prior suit. Id. The Third District reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the borrower, and held that, based on Bartram , the lender could properly file its later suit. Id. at 62 ; see also Bollettieri Resort Villas Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon , 198 So.3d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that a complaint alleging a continuing state of default "was sufficient to establish that foreclosure could be based on any of the missed payments since the initial breach"), rev. dismissed , 228 So.3d 72 (Fla. 2017).

We affirm the trial court's final judgment of foreclosure.

Affirmed.

Ciklin and Levine, JJ., concur.


author: Damoorgian, J.

text:
    NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellant, v. Joselito L. MARTINS a/k/a Joselito Martins; Martin's Crossing Homeowners Association, Inc.; and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as Nominee for CTX Mortgage Company, LLC, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-1140
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 7, 2018]
    Morgan W. Bates and Allison Morat of Pearson Bitman LLP, Maitland, for appellant.
    Jeffrey M. Clyman of Steele Law, Hobe Sound, for appellee Joselito L. Martins a/k/a Joselito Martins.
   Damoorgian, J.

After establishing that Nationstar Mortgage, LLC ("Nationstar") was not the holder of the note secured by his property at the time it filed a mortgage foreclosure suit and, therefore, lacked standing to maintain its suit, Joselito Martins sought and was awarded fees pursuant to the attorneys' fees clause in the mortgage and the reciprocal provision of section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2017). Because "[a] party that prevails on its argument that dismissal is required because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue upon the contract cannot recover fees based upon a provision in that same contract," we reverse and direct the trial court to vacate the final judgment awarding fees to Mr. Martins.

Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Glass , 219 So.3d 896, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ; see also Christiana Tr., a Div. of Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, FSB for Normandy Mortg. Loan Tr., Series 2013-18 v. Rushlow , 231 So.3d 558, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

Reversed and remanded.

Taylor and May, JJ., concur.


author: Conner, J.

text:
    VILLAGE OF TEQUESTA, Appellant, v. Tara LUSCAVICH, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D16-2432 4D16-4081
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 7, 2018]
    Jeffrey L. Hochman and Damian H. Albert of Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke, Piper & Hochman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Isidro M. Garcia of Garcia Law Firm, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Conner, J.

The Village of Tequesta ("the Village") appeals the final judgment after a jury found in favor of Tara Luscavich ("the Employee"), on her workplace retaliation claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act ("the FCRA"). The Village raises the analytically challenging question: Can an employee's rejection of one-event sexual advances by a supervisor at a non-work-sponsored party meet certain necessary elements of a claim for retaliation under the FCRA?

The Village contends the trial court erred in (1) denying its motion for directed verdict, (2) denying its requested jury instructions and verdict form and giving erroneous instructions, (3) denying its motion for new trial attacking evidentiary rulings and the Employee's closing arguments in violation of a pretrial order granting the Village's motion in limine , and (4) granting the Employee's motion for fees and costs. We affirm the denial of the motion for directed verdict and explain our reasoning. We reverse and remand for a new trial, finding error regarding the causation instruction. We affirm without discussion the denial of the motion for new trial. Because we are reversing for a new trial, we also reverse the award of attorney's fees and costs.

Background

At all times pertinent to this appeal, the Employee was a dispatcher in the Village's police department. During a good portion of the pertinent times, Gerald Pitocchelli ("the Chief") was the police chief of the Village. The initial event leading to the lawsuit below occurred at a private, non-work-sponsored party held at a Village police officer's private residence where members of the Village police department, including police dispatchers, were celebrating the homeowner's (not the Chief's) promotion. At the time of the party, the Chief was a lieutenant, but was expected to soon replace the outgoing chief, who was retiring. Shortly after the party, the Chief received the permanent appointment.

The operative complaint alleged counts under the FCRA for sexual harassment and retaliation. The Employee alleged that the Chief made unwelcomed sexual advances at the party, which she rebuffed, causing adverse employment actions against her based on this rejection. After summary judgment resolved the sexual harassment count in the Village's favor, the case proceeded to a jury trial on the retaliation count, resulting in a verdict against the Village. The particulars of the case most favorable to the verdict and pertinent to our analysis are as follows.

Events at the Party

At trial, the Employee testified that during the party, there was a point when eight people were sitting around a table, including the Employee and the Chief. At that time, a male officer exposed himself to the group, which "apparently he does this a lot." People started passing around a dollar bill, and the Employee grabbed it, put it down her shirt, and said "it's safe in here." The Chief, who was sitting next to the Employee, stood up, put his hand down her shirt, and started to "feel her" under her bra, back and forth, and said, in response to the Employee's comment about the dollar's safety, "no, it's not." The Employee testified that she was "shocked" and "embarrassed," and when someone asked how it felt "down there," she uncomfortably replied that she does not have much to feel, to which the Chief responded: "What I felt felt pretty nice." Continuing to be embarrassed, the Employee left the table.

A short time later, a male Village police officer offered the Employee a ride home, since she did not feel safe driving at that point. The Chief came out and discouraged the male officer from giving her a ride home, saying "[w]e'll make sure she gets home okay."

Because she had a headache, the Employee asked the host if she could lie down for a little while, and he pointed her to the master bedroom. Another female officer went into the room with her, and they were only in there a short time when they were moved to another bedroom. The Employee told the female officer that she wanted to sleep, so the female officer left the room. The room was dark and the Employee was laying on her stomach, thinking she was alone. But she then felt someone rubbing her back, and when the person said she had "a nice back and such smooth skin," she could tell it was the Chief, so she sat up. She testified he then offered to give her a back rub, which she declined. The Chief next told her that he had always been attracted to her and "I always wanted to make love to you. Exact words. I will never forget it." At that point, the Employee responded:

I said, listen, I know you're going through a hard time right now. You're separated from your wife. You're single. I understand that, but I am not. I am married. I have never cheated on my husband.

She testified that the Chief then grabbed her "hand and put my hand on his crotch to show me that he was-had an erection and said, this is what you do to me." She immediately left the room and "beelined it" to the female officer that had been with her earlier, they said goodbye, and left the party. She said she later told the female officer what happened. She also told the male officer who had offered to give her a ride home earlier.

The Adverse Employment Actions

The Employee then testified regarding some of the negative effects she felt in the aftermath of the party. She stated that at her next work day after the party, the Chief did not come into the dispatch office, which was unusual because coming to the dispatch office was his routine behavior. Three days after the party, the current chief of police took leave and made the Chief the acting chief of police. Shortly thereafter, the Chief was promoted to the position on a permanent basis.

The Employee testified that after the Chief was appointed, her immediate supervisor told her that she wanted to send her to a training course so that she could perform other functions in the police department. The Employee's attendance had to be approved by the Chief, but he denied the request. Attendance at the training course was significant to the Employee because on all of her evaluations prior to the most recent one, the Employee was given a "satisfactory" rating in all categories. In the most recent evaluation she was again given a "satisfactory" rating in all categories, except for two. She received a less than satisfactory rating for the two categories because she missed a training prior to the evaluation and did not learn a skill she was asked to learn. Thus, she needed to go to the training that the Chief would not approve to restore her status of "satisfactory" for all categories of her evaluation.

The Employee also testified that nine months after the party, there was a position open to assist the evidence custodian. She stated that she and two other employees applied, and although one of the other applicants was selected, the Employee's immediate supervisor told her that she (the Employee) was the most qualified for the position. The immediate supervisor also commented that after she told the selection panel, including the Chief, that the Employee was the most qualified, the immediate supervisor was told she was "no longer needed" for the interview process.

Three months after the rejection for the first position, a temporary position became available to fill the Employee's immediate supervisor's position while the supervisor was on leave. However, the position was never posted, and the other applicant who did not get the first position was selected to fill the temporary role. The Employee testified that, although the other applicant had been an employee of the Village a few months longer than she, the Employee had four more years of dispatcher experience, including in other cities. She also testified that her immediate supervisor made it known that officers had complaints about the other applicant, and she herself heard officers complain that the other applicant "had an attitude problem."

A year and a half after the party, there was an incident where the Employee and the male officer who offered her a ride home from the party (who was also one of the two people the employee told about the party incident) were talking in the dispatch office. Both were written up for violating a policy of not discussing non-official business in the dispatch office. After the write up, the Employee testified that other officers were afraid to come into the dispatch room when she was there, because the Chief and deputy chief were looking at the door cards to see who was coming into the room when she was there. Also, her immediate supervisor, who was directed to give the write-up, told her, "I have no idea why they [the Chief and his deputy chief] hate you."

The Verdict and Subsequent Proceedings

After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Employee, awarding her $1,500 for lost wages and lost benefits damages, and $400,000 in damages for pain and suffering. The Village filed a combined motion to set aside the verdict, a renewed motion for directed verdict, and a motion for new trial, which was denied. After the trial court entered final judgment awarding the sums in the verdict, the Village gave notice of appeal. Thereafter, the Employee filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs, as the prevailing party in the FCRA action. The Village moved for an order rejecting the Employee's entitlement to attorney's fees, arguing that the final judgment entered against the Village already exceeded the statutory cap on liability for the Village ($200,000), and therefore, no additional fees or costs could be added. The trial court denied the Village's motion and entered a final judgment for attorney's fees and costs in favor of the Employee. The Village again gave notice of appeal. We subsequently consolidated the appeals.

Analysis

As discussed in the introductory paragraphs, we first analyze the denial of the directed verdict, explaining our affirmance. We then address the jury instructions, explaining our reversal and remand for a new trial.

Denial of Directed Verdict

"The standard of review of an order denying a motion for directed verdict is de novo ." Hollywood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Alfred , 82 So.3d 122, 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). "A motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the non-moving party." Etheredge v. Walt Disney World Co. , 999 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (quoting St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Fernberg Geological Servs. , 784 So.2d 500, 504 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ).

The Employee's retaliation claim was brought pursuant to the FCRA, more specifically, section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes (2016), which states:

(7) It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer, an employment agency, a joint labor-management committee, or a labor organization to discriminate against any person because that person has opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section, or because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this section.

§ 760.10(7), Fla. Stat. (2016). To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation under section 760.10(7), a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he or she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal relation between the two events. See Donovan v. Broward Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs , 974 So.2d 458, 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

As we recently stated in Palm Beach Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Wright , 217 So.3d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), "[w]e and other Florida districts have recognized that '[t]he FCRA is patterned after Title VII' and that 'federal case law on Title VII applies to FCRA claims.' " Id. at 165 (quoting Guess v. City of Miramar , 889 So.2d 840, 846 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ). Thus, in analyzing the directed verdict issue, we look to federal case law as well as Florida case law.

As can be seen from the statute, there are two categories of protected activity: activities that fit under the "opposition clause" and activities that fit under the "participation clause." Recognition of the two types of protected activity is also discussed in federal case law. See , e.g. , Bourne v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty. , 508 Fed.Appx. 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2013) ("Under Title VII and the FCRA there are two categories of protected activity: those activities that fit under the 'opposition clause' of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and those activities that fit under the 'participation clause.' "). The instant case involves the opposition clause.

In its initial brief, the Village summarized its contention that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict as follows:

The [Employee] refused a one-time sexual advance by (1) communicating that she was married, (2) by communicating she had never cheated on her husband, and (3) by leaving the bedroom. Given the location of the conduct, the isolated nature of the incident, and the absence of any connection back to the Village, the evidence admitted during trial did not amount to "opposition" under the FCRA.

In weaving its argument for reversal, the Village asserts the denial of a directed verdict was error on two fronts: (1) the Chief's one-event sexual advances at a private party did not constitute an unlawful employment practice ; and (2) the Employee's declination of the Chief's sexual advances was not protected activity under the FCRA because it did not qualify as opposition and provided no notice to the Village (emphasis indicates terms of art).

We discuss each argument in turn.

a. The Chief's one-event sexual advances at a private party did not constitute an unlawful employment practice.

This argument has two subparts: (1) one-event sexual advances do not constitute an unlawful employment practice; and (2) sexual advances at a private non-work-sponsored party do not constitute an unlawful employment practice. There are no Florida state-court opinions discussing either sub-argument.

One-Event Sexual Advances

Our research reveals that most federal cases addressing sexual harassment and retaliation in the context of Title VII discuss fact patterns involving multiple instances of verbal or physical sexual behavior by a supervisor. We could find no federal appellate opinions explicitly opining that one-event sexual conduct cannot constitute sexual harassment or core facts for a retaliation claim under Title VII. However, it appears to us that the language of both the FCRA and Title VII is broad enough to encompass one-event physical sexual contact as an unlawful employment practice. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. , 523 U.S. 75, 79-80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1002, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) ("[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits 'discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex' in the 'terms' or 'conditions' of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements." (first alteration added) ).

"Sexual harassment is without question an 'unlawful employment practice.' "

E.E.O.C. v. New Breed Logistics , 783 F.3d 1057, 1067 (6th Cir. 2015) ; Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Servs., Inc. , 57 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (" 'Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII[,]' and the FCRA.") (alteration in original) (quoting Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp. , 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) ). "Sexual harassment" has been defined by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the federal regulatory agency charged with enforcing Title VII, as follows:

Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual , or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment ....

29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1999) (emphases added) (footnote omitted). As the federal courts do, we give deference to the definition of "sexual harassment" by the EEOC. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. , 414 U.S. 86, 92, 94 S.Ct. 334, 339, 38 L.Ed.2d 287 (1973) (explaining that EEOC's interpretation of Title VII should be given "great deference"); Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424, 433-34, 91 S.Ct. 849, 854-55, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) ("The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having enforcement responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting [a provision of Title VII]. The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference." (footnote omitted) ).

The Supreme Court has made it clear, in the context of sexual harassment claims under Title VII, that "[w]hen a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII." Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742, 753-54, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2265, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). The Court qualified that statement explaining that "[f]or any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive." Id. at 754, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (emphasis added). If a one-event sexual advance can support a sexual harassment claim under Title VII because it is severe, the same would hold true in the context of a retaliation claim.

In the instant case, the Employee contends she was treated differently by the Chief in the workplace and denied promotions by the Chief because she declined his sexual advances. The Chief not only groped the Employee's breast in front of others, he also sexually touched her by taking her hand and placing it on his erect penis, commenting on how arousing she was. We determine that it was for a jury to decide whether the Chief's sexual conduct constituted "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" within the EEOC guidelines and whether the conduct was "severe" enough to impose liability on the retaliation claim. Burlington Indus. , 524 U.S. at 753-54, 118 S.Ct. at 2265. We also hold that a one-event sexual conduct involving sexual organs can qualify as a prima facie showing to support a retaliation claim if it is severe enough. In other words, even setting aside the sexual touching that occurred around the table in front of others (because, arguably, the Employee did not explicitly oppose the Chief's conduct), the sexual events that occurred in the bedroom were sufficient to allow the jury to resolve the issue.

Location and Non-Work-Sponsored Event Context of Sexual Behavior

The sexual behavior underlying the retaliation claim occurred at a private party that was not sponsored by the Village or its police department. However, it is clear from the evidence that many of the attendees were co-workers at the police department. Notably, the breast groping incident clearly occurred in front of several employees of the police department. We also note that, although not a work-sponsored event, the private party was to celebrate a fellow officer's promotion.

Regarding this sub-argument, our research shows that most of the federal cases addressing Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation claims discuss fact patterns involving instances of verbal or physical sexual behavior by a supervisor at a jobsite or off-premises work event. None of the federal opinions specifically address an argument about how the location or event context of the sexual behavior impacts the analysis. However, we are satisfied, in the instant case, the issue of location or event context of the sexual behavior makes no difference. That is because such characteristics are unimportant, for purposes of directed verdict, where the issue is whether "a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands." Id. at 753, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (emphasis added). Instead, in the instant case, such factors would have a bearing on the "severity-of-sexual-harassment" determination for the jury.

For the same reason (irrelevancy of the characteristics when deciding a directed verdict on retaliation claim), we reject the argument by the Village that the Employee herself did not view the Chief's conduct as sexual harassment at the time and therefore cannot prevail on her retaliation claim. The Village essentially argues that because the Employee did not even have a subjective belief at the time that the Chief's sexual conduct was an "employment practice," then her claim must fail. The crux of this argument revolves around the deposition testimony of the Employee that she did not "think" or "believe" that the Chief's sexual behavior around the party table or in the bedroom was an "employment practice." As the Supreme Court observed in Meritor Savings Bank , "[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.' " Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 68, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2406, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). We are satisfied that the Employee made it evident to the Chief that she considered his sexual advances were wrongful conduct and "unwelcome." Moreover, it is inappropriate to deny a claim based on a witness's opinion regarding a legal term of art. Cf. Cliff Berry, Inc. v. State , 116 So.3d 394, 403 n.6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) ("[T]he lay witness may not ... testify as to a legal conclusion." (quoting United States v. Crawford , 239 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001) ) ). The bare assertion that it was not an "employment practice" (even assuming the witness understood the phrase was shorthand for "unlawful employment practice") is a legal conclusion as to an element of a cause of action and should be left for the finder of fact to conclude based on the evidence.

Thus, we disagree with the Village's first argument regarding the denial of its motion for directed verdict.

b. The Employee's declination of the Chief's sexual advances was not protected activity under the FCRA because it did not qualify as "opposition" and provided no notice to the Village.

The Village first contends that saying "no" to a supervisor's sexual advance is not protected activity contemplated by FCRA or Title VII. It argues that the Employee's communication, "I am married, I have never cheated on my husband," in response to a one-time sexual advance cannot be equated with the clear opposition required by the FCRA. The Village further argues that the Employee's willingness to have accepted a "private apology" is inconsistent with the opposition conduct discussed in the case law. The crux of the Village's argument is that the Employee's expressed desire to remain faithful to her husband and willingness to accept an apology demonstrates "an avoidance technique" to an "uncomfortable situation," rather than opposition to an unlawful employment practice.

There is a split among the federal appellate courts on the issue of "whether a person who rejects a supervisor's sexual advances has engaged in protected activity." Tate v. Exec. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. , 546 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (comparing LeMaire v. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. , 480 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a single, express rejection of sexual advances does not constitute "protected activity" for purposes of a retaliation claim), with Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc. , 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000) (concluding that when the plaintiff told her supervisor to stop harassing her, she engaged in the most "basic form of protected conduct") ). The Eleventh Circuit has not weighed in on this issue and, as mentioned above, no Florida appellate court opinion addresses the issue. However, in addition to the Fifth Circuit LeMaire and Eighth Circuit Ogden opinions, the Sixth Circuit and the Middle District of Florida have addressed the issue. After reviewing the limited case law on the issue, on the facts of this case, we agree with those courts which have concluded that a person who rejects a supervisor's sexual advances has engaged in protected activity.

We reject the position of the Fifth Circuit because in LeMaire , and the earlier unpublished opinion it cited, Frank v. Harris County , 118 Fed.Appx. 799 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished), there was little legal reasoning offered to support the conclusion. In LeMaire , the issue was addressed with the simple statement; "LeMaire, however, provides no authority for the proposition that rejecting sexual advances constitutes a protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim under Title VII," followed by a citation to Frank . LeMaire , 480 F.3d at 389. Likewise, in Frank , the Fifth Circuit, after identifying the employee's assertion on appeal, dismissed the argument with: "But Frank provides no authority for the proposition that a single 'express rejection' to [her supervisor's sexual advances] constitutes as a matter of law a protected activity for purposes of retaliation." Frank , 118 Fed.Appx. at 804. Additionally, at the end of the single paragraph discussing the issue, the Frank court shifted to a causation analysis, faulting Frank for not reporting the behavior to the county or EEOC. Id.

The Eighth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to address the issue. In Ogden , the employee asserted sexual harassment and retaliation claims for her supervisor's sexual behavior. Ogden , 214 F.3d at 1002. The employer appealed the jury award on both claims, contending in part that the retaliation award should be reversed because Ogden did not engage in protected activity. Id. at 1007. According to the discussion of facts, Ogden experienced three occasions of unwanted sexual advances. On the first occasion, Ogden's intoxicated supervisor grabbed her by the waist and asked her to go to his motel room as the two were leaving a restaurant. Id. at 1003. She refused the invitation, pushed him away, and told him not to touch her. Id. On two other separate occasions, the supervisor was again intoxicated and put his arm around her at a bar, with a group of fellow employees present. Id. Each time, she pushed the supervisor away and told him to leave her alone. Id. In addition to these physical advances, the supervisor propositioned her incessantly. Id. It does not appear from the discussion of facts that Ogden complained about the behavior to fellow employees, other members of management, or the company's human relations department.

On appeal, Ogden maintained that she engaged in "the most basic form of protected activity" when she told her supervisor to stop his offensive conduct. Id. at 1007. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the retaliation award saying:

We agree with Ogden. Employers may not retaliate against employees who "oppose discriminatory conduct," see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and the jury reasonably concluded Ogden did so when she told [the supervisor] to stop his offensive behavior.

Id. (citing E.E.O.C. v. HBE Corp. , 135 F.3d 543, 554 (8th Cir. 1998) ).

The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue in New Breed Logistics . There, the EEOC brought a claim against the employer, asserting a supervisor sexually harassed two employees and retaliated against them after they objected to his sexual advances. New Breed , 783 F.3d at 1061. The supervisor repeatedly made sexually suggestive comments to the employees. Id. at 1062. One employee testified she told the supervisor to "leave [her] alone" daily. Id. The other employee testified that in addition to the verbal conduct, the supervisor "pressed his stomach and private parts to her backside." Id. The other employee told the supervisor to stop touching her and on another occasion asked him to "stop talking dirty to [her]." Id. It does not appear from the discussion of facts that either employee complained about the behavior to fellow employees, other members of management, or the human relations department. Evidence was also adduced that the supervisor was directly or indirectly involved in each employee's termination. Id. at 1063. The employer moved for a directed verdict, contending the evidence was insufficient to prove the employees engaged in protected activity. Id. at 1067. The district court rejected this argument, concluding that protected activity "can be as simple as telling a supervisor to stop." Id.

On appeal, the employer asserted, among other things, that the evidence did not support the jury's retaliation verdict because neither employee engaged in protected activity constituting opposition. Id. at 1066. More specifically, the employer argued that "telling [the supervisor] to cease his harassment does not constitute protected activity under Title VII." Id. at 1067. In response, the EEOC argued that the district court's conclusion that protected activity can be as simple as telling a supervisor to stop was supported by the language of the opposition clause of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, as well as Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent. Id. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the EEOC that a complaint to a harassing supervisor qualifies as protected activity. Id.

After examining the language of the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee , 555 U.S. 271, 276, 129 S.Ct. 846, 172 L.Ed.2d 650 (2009), discussing the term "oppose" and its own prior precedence discussing an expansive definition of "opposing" conduct under the EEOC regulations, the Sixth Circuit reasoned:

Applying these broad definitions, we conclude that a demand that a supervisor cease his/her harassing conduct constitutes protected activity covered by Title VII. Sexual harassment is without question an "unlawful employment practice." If an employee demands that his/her supervisor stop engaging in this unlawful practice-i.e., resists or confronts the supervisor's unlawful harassment-the opposition clause's broad language confers protection to this conduct. Importantly, the language of the opposition clause does not specify to whom protected activity must be directed. Warren v. Ohio Dept. of Public Safety , 24 Fed.Appx. 259, 265 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Under the opposition clause, ... [t]here is no qualification on who the individual doing the complaining may be or on who the party to whom the complaint is made."). Therefore, it would be unfair to read into the provision a requirement that a complainant only engages in protected activity when s/he opposes the harassment to a "particular official designated by the employer." See Ross v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Ed. , No. 06-0275, 2008 WL 820573, at *6 (S.D.Ala. Mar. 24, 2008) ("It would be anomalous, and would undermine the fundamental purpose of the statute, if Title's VII's protections from retaliation were triggered only if the employee complained to some particular official designated by the employer.").

New Breed Logistics , 783 F.3d at 1067-68 (alterations in original)(footnote omitted).

We also note that the Middle District Court of Florida has also adopted the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in New Breed Logistics . See Charest v. Sunny-Aakash, LLC , 2017 WL 4169701, *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2017).

We are satisfied that the evidence in this case supported the denial of the Village's motion for directed verdict. The Employee clearly opposed the Chief's physical sexual advances in the bedroom by saying that she thought it was wrong to engage in sex with him and by exiting the room immediately after the Chief grabbed her hand and put it on his erection.

The Village's second contention is that the Employee's opposition was insufficient to provide the Village with notice of the sexual harassment. The Village essentially argues that the Employee's failure to tell some other authority in the Village structure about the Chief's conduct is fatal to her retaliation claim. The argument would have merit, perhaps, if the Chief's sexual behavior was of the type of conduct that had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. However, in the instant case, the Chief's behavior did not adversely affect the Employee in the retaliation context until it resulted in adverse employment consequences. In the situation presented in this case, where vicarious liability is imposed because the employment decision by the supervisor itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII, the notice issue is irrelevant. Burlington Indus. , 524 U.S. at 760, 118 S.Ct. 2257 ("Every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the question has found vicarious liability when a discriminatory act results in a tangible employment action.").

Having addressed the various arguments asserted by the Village, we affirm the trial court's denial of its motion for directed verdict.

The Jury Instruction Arguments

The Village also challenges the jury instructions given.

To demonstrate that the trial court erred in failing to give a requested jury instruction, a party must show "the requested instruction contained an accurate statement of the law, the facts in the case supported a giving of the instruction, and the instruction was necessary for the jury to properly resolve the issues in the case."

Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp. , 177 So.3d 489, 517 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Barkett v. Gomez , 908 So.2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) ).

The Village makes general arguments on appeal that the trial court's jury instructions were misleading because they (1) improperly characterized the Chief as an "employer"; (2) failed to address a variety of sub-issues related to the Village's defenses; (3) improperly used the terms "protected activity" and "unlawful employment practice;" (4) improperly used the phrase "a right to demand sex from her,"; and (5) gave no guidance as to what constitutes "opposition" under the FCRA. However, the Village's arguments fail to provide sufficient detail to demonstrate trial court error. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee , 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) ("In appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error."). Thus, we decline to address or find error as to those arguments.

The Village additionally argues on appeal that the trial court erred in its causation instructions for the retaliation claim. The instruction given by the trial court allowed the Employee to prevail by showing that her declination of the Chief's sexual advances at the party were "not completely unrelated" to the adverse employment actions she suffered. The causation instruction in the instant case is similar, if not exactly the same, as the instruction we recently determined to be erroneous in Wright .

In Wright we followed the long-standing rule of statutory construction that if a state law is patterned after a federal law on the same subject, the Florida law will be accorded the same construction as given to the federal act in the federal courts. Wright , 217 So.3d at 164-65. Thus, because the Supreme Court changed the causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar , 570 U.S. 338, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013), to but-for causation, we receded from the "wholly unrelated" standard used in the Eleventh Circuit and this District. Id. at 165.

We see no material difference between the "not completely related" standard used by the trial court to instruct the jury in the instant case and the "wholly unrelated" standard we receded from in Wright . Although it is understandable why the trial court erred in instructing the jury, based on our previous case law, reversal and a new trial on the retaliation claim is required.

Because we reverse for a new trial, we also reverse the judgment for attorney's fees and costs. See City of Hollywood v. Witt , 939 So.2d 315, 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("[O]ur reversal of the underlying judgment in this appeal required reversal of the fee award.").

The trial court's denial of the Village's motion for directed verdict is affirmed. Because the trial court erred in instructing the jury on causation, we reverse the final judgment against the Village and remand the case for a new trial. Because we are remanding for a new trial, we also reverse the judgment for attorney's fees and costs.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial.

Forst and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.

      We note that the Village's argument misses the mark, in that the questions posed during the deposition were framed in terms of the Chief's conduct being "an employment practice," rather than "an unlawful employment practice." The pertinent question for the jury was whether the Chief's conduct was an "unlawful employment practice," instead of whether the conduct was something that the Village repeatedly engaged in or condoned.


author: WARNER, J.

text:
    Keith LONDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2211
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 7, 2018]
    Cullin O'Brien of Cullin O'Brien Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mitchell A. Egber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   WARNER, J.

Appellant, who was convicted of multiple charges related to an armed burglary, raises nine issues in his brief, seeking reversal of his convictions and sentences. Taken in context of the proceedings, we conclude that any errors established by appellant were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm.

The state charged appellant with multiple counts related to a burglary which he committed with a co-defendant, including: armed burglary with a mask; burglary with a battery on the victim husband; attempted robbery with a firearm and mask on the victim wife; armed false imprisonment with a mask of the victim wife; aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and mask on the victim wife; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; attempted strong arm robbery of the victim husband; and burglary of a conveyance owned by the victim husband. We briefly set forth the salient facts of the incident reflected in the trial testimony.

The co-defendant, Eric Mobley, was an employee of the victims, who were husband and wife. The victims lived in a concrete, house-like structure in a high-end RV park. They parked their RV in their driveway. At trial, the victims testified that on the night of the burglary, the wife was accosted outside her RV by two men, one of whom she recognized as Mobley. She did not recognize the second man. The second man hit her a few times in the head with a gun and demanded to know where her money and jewelry were hidden. The victim wife told the men that the valuables were in the RV. She walked with them towards the RV, unlocked the door, and then ran away towards the community's entrance. The second man caught her and made her lie on the ground. He then instructed Mobley to go back for the jewelry.

Mobley went back to the victims' property, and he attacked the victim husband inside his house. They fought, and the husband chased Mobley to the gate of the community. There, he saw his wife covered in blood. Both men fled the scene. While the RV was ransacked, no jewelry was taken. Mobley was arrested the same night.

Surveillance cameras on the property showed Mobley and a second man attacking the wife. The wife assumed that another fired employee named Robert was involved in the crime. However, she testified at trial that the man with the gun who accosted her was not Robert. She could not identify the second man on the video. The husband testified that he never saw the second man at the scene. He only saw the second person involved when he viewed the surveillance video.

After he entered a plea to his own charges from the burglary, Mobley testified at appellant's trial. He explained that he went to the victims' residence with appellant thinking he was going to steal their Segway. He did not know that appellant had a gun until appellant pulled it out and told Mobley that they were going to take the victims' jewelry and money. He then testified about appellant's actions, including appellant's pistol-whipping of the wife. He made an in-court identification of appellant as his accomplice.

Following this testimony, the State introduced a video recording of a conversation between the appellant and a confidential informant (CI). According to the probable cause affidavit, the CI had met appellant and Mobley while they were in the county jail on other charges. The CI was not placed in the jail to work in his capacity as a CI. After learning that appellant was a suspect in the burglary, the CI approached the police about appellant. The police arranged to install a video in the CI's vehicle. While both appellant and the CI were sitting in the car using drugs and being videotaped, appellant described many of the specific details of the crime which were identical to the testimony of the victims and Mobley. The jury viewed the video.

After the State rested, appellant unsuccessfully moved for judgment of acquittal on all counts. The appellant chose not to testify, and he renewed all of his prior motions. During closing argument, the State made a number of comments which the appellant now argues amounted to cumulative, fundamental error. The jury found the appellant guilty of all counts, except for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, which was nolle prossed. Appellant, a habitual felony offender, was sentenced to life in prison. He now appeals.

Appellant claims that the court should have suppressed the video of his statement to the CI, arguing that his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because the CI neither told him that he worked for law enforcement nor read him his Miranda rights. In particular, appellant claims he was deprived of his right to counsel prior to his statement to the CI. He relies on Malone v. State , 390 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1980), in which the supreme court held that statements made by a defendant in the absence of counsel to a cellmate informant, while the defendant was in custody on the charges and where law enforcement directly orchestrated the conditions leading to the statement, should have been suppressed. However, Malone is inapplicable, because in this case, appellant was not in custody nor had he even been arrested for the charges when he confessed. He was not entitled to Sixth Amendment protection under these circumstances. See Illinois v. Perkins , 496 U.S. 292, 298-99, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (holding admission of appellant's statements did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, where officer posed as appellant's cellmate and asked him questions designed to elicit an incriminating response, because suspect was not yet charged with the crime at issue); see also Jones v. State , 756 So.2d 243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding appellant's due process rights and right to counsel were not violated by the admission of his incriminating statements to his fiancé, who was wearing a police wire, because he was in jail on unrelated charges).

Appellant also contends that the court erred in denying his motion to disclose the identity of the CI. He cites no case law to support his position. Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(G), the State must disclose "any material or information that has been provided by a confidential informant." Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(g)(2) provides that the State does not have to disclose a CI's identity unless the "informant is to be produced at a hearing or trial or a failure to disclose the informant's identity will infringe the constitutional rights of the defendant." The State correctly notes that the appellant had the burden to show that an exception to the rule of nondisclosure applied, and here the appellant has provided none. The CI did not witness the burglary, and appellant did not establish why the CI's testimony would support a defense of mistaken identity. See State v. Mashke , 577 So.2d 610, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (finding bare allegations that appellant cannot prepare his case without disclosure are insufficient); see Harris v. State , 939 So.2d 338, 340-42 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (finding appellant made insufficient showing that CI could testify in support of an asserted defense). Thus, the court did not err in denying the motion to disclose.

During trial, Mobley identified appellant as the second burglar on the surveillance video. Appellant objected on the ground that Mobley had testified in deposition that he had not identified appellant in any crime scene videos or photos. However, the State had not shown Mobley the surveillance video at the time of his deposition. But he testified at his deposition as well as at trial that appellant was his accomplice, and he described appellant's participation in the crimes. His testimony did not directly contradict his deposition. If there was any error by the state failing to notify appellant that Mobley would identify appellant on the surveillance video at trial, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given Mobley's testimony at his deposition identifying appellant as his accomplice. See State v. Schopp , 653 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 1995).

Appellant also contends that the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial because the husband ostensibly identified him, after viewing the surveillance tape, as the man who accompanied Mobley during the commission of the crimes. Appellant argues this was improper and not disclosed prior to trial. However, the trial court concluded that the husband never said that it was appellant on the video; rather, the husband clearly testified that he never saw appellant on the night of the burglary. The court found that the husband was responding to questions by appellant's counsel in cross-examination, in which appellant was trying to impeach the husband with his prior testimony that he had not seen his wife's attacker at the scene. At trial, the husband responded to the impeachment questions that the "only way" that he saw someone else with Mobley that night was by viewing the videotape. Although defense counsel suggested to the court that the husband had pointed to appellant when stating that he had seen the second man only on the video, the trial court (who was in a far better position than we are to understand what occurred at trial) concluded that the husband had not made any identification of appellant as the person with Mobley. Thus, the court denied the motion for mistrial. A court's ruling on a motion for mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and granted only when necessary to ensure a fair trial. Salazar v. State , 991 So.2d 364, 371-72 (Fla. 2008). We cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

Appellant makes several attacks on the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments, none of which merit reversal. As to those which were preserved, we agree with the trial court that the prosecutor's arguments, when read in context, were not improper. As to those which were not preserved, no fundamental error occurred.

Finally, appellant challenges his multiple sentences on double jeopardy grounds. Appellant contends that his sentences for crimes against the victim wife violated double jeopardy because the acts occurred during one criminal episode. These charges included armed burglary with a mask, attempted robbery with a firearm and a mask, armed false imprisonment with a mask, and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and a mask. Appellant further argues that his sentences for crimes against the victim husband violated double jeopardy. These counts included burglary with a battery, attempted strong arm robbery, and burglary of a conveyance.

We have reviewed the various charges and conclude that his sentences do not violate double jeopardy. Here, there were two victims and essentially two separate criminal episodes: 1) the wife was attacked and detained outside the RV; and 2) the husband was attacked inside the victims' home after the wife attempted to flee and Mobley returned to the scene. As to the charges involving the victim wife, the supreme court has held that a defendant's convictions for burglary of a dwelling, robbery with a weapon, and false imprisonment do not violate double jeopardy, even when those offenses were committed during one criminal episode. See State v. Smith , 840 So.2d 987 (Fla. 2003). Also, the burglary with a battery and attempted robbery charges involving the husband did not violate double jeopardy. McCloud v. State , 208 So.3d 668 (Fla. 2016) (noting "burglary and robbery both require proof of an element unique to each offense"); see also McAllister v. State , 718 So.2d 917, 918-19 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (conviction for robbery was not subsumed for double jeopardy purposes within conviction for burglary with battery). Furthermore, as to the charge of burglary with a battery on the husband, appellant was charged as a principal in the first degree to Mobley's battery of the husband inside the victims' home. See §§ 777.011, 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). Thus, the charge of burglary of a conveyance contained an element that the other burglary charges did not, namely entry into the unoccupied RV. § 810.02(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015).

We affirm as to any other issues not specifically addressed in this opinion. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm both the convictions and sentences.

Affirmed.

MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.


author: May, J.

text:
    Julian Brook DESANTIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4260
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 21, 2018]
    Gregory Salnick of Law Offices of Salnick & Fuchs, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   May, J.

This appeal arises from a tragic accident resulting in the defendant's conviction and sentence for manslaughter, improper exhibition of a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a minor. He argues the trial court made multiple errors in admitting evidence, instructing the jury, and sentencing the defendant. We agree with him only on the sentencing issue. We reverse and remand the case for resentencing before a different judge.

Law enforcement responded to the defendant's 911 call claiming a shooting had occurred. When the officers arrived, the victim was deceased. The defendant, who was 17 at the time, ultimately admitted that he accidentally shot the victim.

At the police station, the defendant told the police that he and his friends were at his apartment playing with a 9mm handgun when he accidentally shot his friend. He confirmed that they had been drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. He appeared visibly shocked and shaken.

The State charged the defendant by amended information with manslaughter with a firearm, aggravated assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a minor. Prior to trial, the defendant moved for the court to consider sentencing him as a juvenile; the trial court denied the motion.

The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter, possession of a firearm by a minor, and the lesser included offense of improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon. The defendant then moved for a downward departure. The State asked for 20 years in prison.

The trial court found there were reasons to depart from the guidelines, but chose not to exercise its discretion in departing. The court stated that a 20-year sentence was inappropriate as well. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 124.8 months in accordance with the sentencing guidelines.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court fundamentally erred in failing to consider a youthful offender sentence based on its stated policy of not imposing youthful offender sanctions in death cases. The State responds that the trial court properly considered the facts and exercised its discretion in imposing an appropriate sentence.

We apply a mixed two-part review when analyzing a downward departure sentence. Kovalsky v. State , 220 So.3d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). In the first step, the trial court must determine whether it can depart, i.e., whether there is a valid legal ground and adequate factual support for that ground in the case pending before it. Id. In reviewing the first step, we must determine whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court's ruling. Id.

In the second step, the trial court must decide whether to depart, i.e., whether departure is indeed the best sentencing option. Id. This requires the trial court to weigh the totality of the circumstances, including aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. We review this decision for an abuse of discretion, which occurs where no reasonable person would agree with the trial court's decision. Id. at 1194-95.

Here, the defendant moved for a downward departure, and requested a youthful offender sentence. He argued that he suffered from a depressive disorder and has dependent, antisocial, and self-defeating personality traits. He argued the court should downwardly depart based upon his cooperation with law enforcement. He was seventeen at the time of the incident, and it was isolated and committed in an unsophisticated manner.

Though the State and trial court agreed there was a legal basis for departure based on the defendant's remorse and the crime being unsophisticated and isolated, it chose not to depart. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 124.8 months in accordance with the sentencing guidelines. In doing so, the trial court stated:

This is criminal conduct because the law defines culpable negligence as criminal conduct. It's not a justifiable killing and therefore it is criminal. But it is a very, very difficult type of case to deal with.
But that's my job and that's what I'm going to do at this time. I have told you from the beginning, the loss of a life, the taking of a life, I do not view as a youthful offender sentence. I do believe that [the defendant] is remorseful. I believe that and I believe that if he could do anything to prevent what has now happened, if he could go back in time, he would. But there are consequences to taking a life, and those consequences do not involve a youthful offender sentence.
On the other hand I do have to take into account his age, his immaturity, and those types of factors, including those things that I've heard from everybody here in passing sentence.
Candidly, I believe this is a case where probably the guidelines got it right. I do not believe it's a twenty year sentence. I do not believe it's a six year sentence. I believe the guidelines are the appropriate sentence in this case.

(Emphasis added).

On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court's policy of not allowing youthful offender sentences in cases involving death is arbitrary and a denial of due process. He cites to Pressley v. State , 73 So.3d 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), and Fraser v. State , 201 So.3d 847 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

In Pressley , the First District held "the trial court's stated policy of not considering 'boot camp,' which is a type of youthful offender sentence, without any reflection on the individual merits of this particular defendant's case is arbitrary and, consequently, a denial of due process." 73 So.3d at 838.

In Fraser , the trial court expressed deep concern over mental health being considered as a basis for a downward departure. 201 So.3d at 849. The court expressed its view that almost every person who commits a crime has some sort of mental aberration. Id. We reversed and held the trial court erred in implying that, as a policy matter, it would not consider a defendant's mental health as the downward departure statute expressly lists a mental disorder as a mitigating circumstance. Id. at 849-50.

Here, the defendant argues the trial court's statement that it does not consider youthful offender sentences in cases involving a death indicates an express policy-a refusal to use its discretion. The trial court expressed how difficult the sentencing decision was in this case, and specifically noted that it was considering the defendant's age, immaturity, and remorse. After explaining its thought-process and analysis, the court determined that neither a 6-year nor a 20-year sentence was appropriate. Rather, the sentencing guidelines "got it right."

The problem comes with the court's statement that it had told the defendant "from the beginning, the loss of a life, the taking of a life, I do not view as a youthful offender sentence." Despite the trial court's evaluation of the required factors during the sentencing hearing, the statement reveals that prior to hearing the case, the trial court had determined it would not use its discretion to impose a youthful offender sentence. This predetermined policy requires us to reverse.

This is especially true in evaluating the sentencing of someone who was a juvenile at the time of the offense. In recent years, we have adhered to our supreme court's liberal application of Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), to long-term prison sentences imposed on juveniles. See , e.g. , Andrevil v. State , 226 So.3d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

We therefore reverse and remand the case for sentencing before a different judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Warner and Damoorgian, JJ., concur.