author: WELCH, Judge.

text:
    T.B.P. v. STATE of Alabama
    CR-16-0270
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    April 28, 2017
    Justin Keith Forrester, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   WELCH, Judge.

T.B.P. appeals from his adjudication as a delinquent based on the offense of indecent exposure.

On December 29, 2014, a petition was filed in the juvenile court charging T.B.P. with delinquency based on the underlying offense of indecent exposure. A trial before a referee was conducted on July 23, 2015. The testimony at the hearing, though contested by T.B.P., was that T.B.P. exposed his genitals to his math teacher at his school during an after-school tutoring session. The trial ended with the referee pronouncing: "The charge is found true." (R. 50.) Also, on July 23, 2015, the referee entered a posttrial written order stating: "[C]harge found true. Disposition withheld. Case set for 7/30/15 @ 1:30 p.m." (C. 14.) On July 30, 2015, the referee entered his final order disposing of the case that stated: "Child is exempt from registering and notification. Case is closed." (C. 15.) On August 10, 2015, T.B.P. filed a postjudgment written "motion to alter, amend or vacate," alleging that the charging instrument was void because it did not assert what T.B.P. contends was a necessary element of the offense-the element of the victim's lack of consent. (C. 19.) On August 14, 2015, the referee denied that motion. Also, on August 14, 2015, T.B.P. filed a motion for a rehearing. The case was assigned to a juvenile judge. On October 25, 2016, the juvenile court, having listened to the July 23, 2015, recording from the trial, affirmed the referee's finding of delinquency in a written order, stating: "The Judgment of Referee is hereby affirmed." (C. 35.) On November 7, 2016, T.B.P. filed a written "motion for acquittal or for a new trial." (C. 31.) In this motion T.B.P. alleged that the charging instrument did not charge the element of the victim's lack of consent; that T.B.P. "[w]as not found to be in need of services of rehabilitation, and therefore, the court should dismiss the proceedings," see § 12-15-215(a), Ala. Code 1975; and, the court failed to consider the lesser-included offense of public lewdness, § 13A-12-130, Ala. Code 1975. (C. 33.) T.B.P. filed notice of appeal on November 29, 2016. On December 7, 2016, the circuit court entered a written denial of the November 7, 2016, motion.

I.

At the conclusion of the State's case and again at the conclusion of the defense case, T.B.P. moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that T.B.P.'s charging instrument was void because it did not assert what T.B.P. contends was a necessary element of the offense-the element of the victim's lack of consent. The State disputed the allegation and asserted that the claim should have been raised before the hearing started.

Section 13A-6-68, Ala. Code 1975, defines the crime of indecent exposure:

"A person commits the crime of indecent exposure if, with intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire of himself or of any person other than his spouse, he exposes his genitals under circumstances in which he knows his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm in any public place or on the private premises of another or so near thereto to be seen from such private premises."
The charging instrument asserted:
"On or about 12/08/2014 in the Birmingham Division of Jefferson County, [T.B.P.] did, with intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire of: (x) himself; or (x) a person not his, to-wit: Ms. [J.M.] (teacher), expose his genitals under circumstances in which he knew his conduct was likely to cause affront or alarm: (x) in a public place, to-wit: classroom of Shades Valley High School Room 214, in violation of section 13A-006-068 of the Code of Alabama 1975."

(C. 6.)

Initially, we note that pursuant to Rule 12, Ala. R. Juv. P., delinquency proceedings are commenced by the filing of a complaint followed by, where appropriate, the filing of a petition, i.e., the charging instrument, in the juvenile court. See generally, State v. Thomas, 550 So.2d 1067, 1072 (Ala. 1989) ("The jurisdiction of the juvenile court would attach only after a petition had been properly filed with the intake officer, and the court had conducted a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the child was within the jurisdiction of the court." (footnote omitted)). However, in Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536 (Ala. 2006), the Alabama Supreme Court held that the validity of a formal charging instrument is irrelevant to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction:

"[ Seymour ] ... requires that a claim resting on a challenge to an infirmity within the indictment be raised in the trial court in order to obtain appellate review. Seymour, states: 'The validity of Seymour's indictment is irrelevant to whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.' 946 So.2d at 539."

D.H. v. State, 24 So.3d 1166, 1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).

" 'Under our holding in Seymour, a defect in a criminal indictment no longer deprives the trial court of jurisdiction, as it had under the common law, but instead is a nonjurisdictional error that may be waived.' Ex parte Jenkins, 992 So.2d 1248, 1250 (Ala. 2007)."

Gargis v. State, 998 So.2d 1092, 1099 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Although the charging instrument here is a juvenile petition, the rationale in Seymour applies because the juvenile court had statutory authority to try the offense. See § 12-15-114(a), Ala. Code 1975 ("A juvenile court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction of juvenile court proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision."); Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d at 538 ("In deciding whether Seymour's claim properly challenges the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, we ask only whether the trial court had the constitutional and statutory authority to try the offense with which Seymour was charged and as to which he has filed his petition for certiorari review. ... [T]he State's prosecution of Seymour ... was within the circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and a defect in the indictment could not divest the circuit court of its power to hear the case."); see also Patton v. State, 964 So.2d 1247 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (noting that the holding in Ex parte Seymour applies to informations).

Therefore, T.B.P.'s challenge to the charging instrument is not a jurisdictional challenge and, thus, could be waived.

The Rules of Juvenile Procedure do not address defects in the commencement of the proceedings. If no procedure is specifically provided in the Alabama Rules of Juvenile Procedure or by statute, the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure shall be applicable to those matters that are considered criminal in nature. Rule 1, Ala. R. Juv. P. Rule 15.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides that "[o]bjections based on defects in the commencement of the proceeding or in the charge, other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to charge an offense, may be raised only by pretrial motions as provided in Rule 15.3." Pursuant to Rule 15.3(a)(1), Ala. R. Crim. P., a motion to dismiss an indictment must be filed "at or before arraignment or by such later date as may be set by the court" in circuit court or "at the time of or before entering a plea" in district court. T.B.P. did not raise this issue until after the State rested its case. Thus, because T.B.P. did not timely object, this issue was waived and, thus, is not properly before this Court for appellate review.

II.

T.B.P. contends that the juvenile court violated § 12-15-215(a), Ala. Code 1975, by "closing" his case instead of "dismissing" when the court did not determine that T.B.P. was in need of care or rehabilitation.

Section 12-15-215(a), Ala. Code 1975, states:

"If the juvenile court finds that the child is not in need of care or rehabilitation, it shall dismiss the proceedings and discharge the child from any detention or other temporary care theretofore ordered."

The record reflects that, after T.B.P.'s dispositional hearing, the referee found: "Child is exempt from registering and notification; Case is closed." (C. 15.) Thus, the referee's order clearly reflects that there was no finding that T.B.P. was in need of care or rehabilitation.

The State responded on appeal that this claim was waived for lack of preservation in the lower court. However, the referee's findings and recommendations became the final order of the juvenile court when ratified by the juvenile court judge on October 25, 2015. Following the order ratifying the referee's order, T.B.P. filed a postjudgment "motion for acquittal or new trial" in which he asserted that:

"Furthermore, the minor child was not found to be in need of services or rehabilitation, and therefore, the court should dismiss the proceedings. Ala. Code [1975,] § 12-15-215(a).... Under § 12-15-215(a), '(i)f the juvenile court finds that the child is not in need of care or rehabilitation, it shall dismiss the proceedings and discharge the child. ...' Id."

(C. 33.) This Court finds that T.B.P.'s challenge to the final disposition was timely raised at T.B.P.'s first opportunity-in his postjudgment motion.

This Court notes that the difference between "closing" a case and "dismissing" is one of semantics. To "close" a case is to bring it to an end in the sense that it is concluded. See Black's Law Dictionary 310 (10th ed. 2014). To "dismiss" a case is to terminate a case without further proceedings. See Black's Law Dictionary 569 (10th ed. 2014).

On appeal, T.B.P. asserts that there is no Alabama caselaw on this issue. T.B.P. cites as persuasive authority a case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota- In re M.H.P., 830 N.W.2d 216, 220 (N.D. 2013). M.H.P. was charged with being a delinquent based on his alleged commission of a felony sexual offense. The judicial referee found the charge to be true. Nevertheless, at the dispositional hearing, the referee found that M.H.P. was not in need of treatment or rehabilitation as a delinquent child.

"Based on these findings, the judicial referee dismissed the petition. The juvenile court adopted the judicial referee's findings and order, dismissed the proceeding and concluded the issue of M.H.P. registering as a sexual offender did not need to be addressed."

In re M.H.P., 830 N.W.2d at 217.

The State appealed, arguing that the "juvenile court erred by finding M.H.P. was not in need of treatment or rehabilitation" and "the juvenile court erred in dismissing the State's petition and in not requiring M.H.P. to register as a sexual offender." In re M.H.P., 830 N.W.2d at 218. M.H.P. responded arguing that the double jeopardy clause barred review. The applicability of double-jeopardy principles was addressed by the appellate court. This Court finds the analysis of the M.H.P. Court applicable to T.B.P.'s appeal.

The relevant North Dakota statute is almost identical to § 12-15-215(a), Ala. Code 1975. Section 12-15-215(a) states:

"If the juvenile court finds on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon competent, material, and relevant evidence, that a child committed the acts by reason of which the child is alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision, it may proceed immediately to hear evidence as to whether the child is in need of care or rehabilitation and to file its findings thereon. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a finding that the child has committed an act which constitutes a felony is sufficient to sustain a finding that the child is in need of care or rehabilitation. If the juvenile court finds that the child is not in need of care or rehabilitation, it shall dismiss the proceedings and discharge the child from any detention or other temporary care theretofore ordered...."

North Dakota's Uniform Juvenile Court Act includes the following:

"If the court finds on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the acts by reason of which the child is alleged to be delinquent or unruly, it shall proceed immediately or at a postponed hearing to hear evidence as to whether the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation and to make and file its findings thereon. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, evidence of the commission of acts which constitute a felony is sufficient to sustain a finding that the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation. If the court finds that the child is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation, it shall dismiss the proceeding and discharge the child from any detention or other restriction previously ordered."

North Dakota Century Code Annotated ("N.D.C.C."), § 27-20-29(2) (2017).

M.H.P. stated:

"A delinquent child is defined as 'a child who has committed a delinquent act and is in need of treatment or rehabilitation.' N.D.C.C. § 27-20-02(7) (emphasis added). Thus, for M.H.P. to be found a delinquent child, the juvenile court must find that M.H.P. committed a delinquent act and that M.H.P. was in need of treatment or rehabilitation.
"... The judicial referee found M.H.P. committed the delinquent act of gross sexual imposition and reserved the issue of whether M.H.P. was in need of treatment or rehabilitation for the dispositional hearing. The statute controlling this procedure provides:
" 'If the court finds on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the acts by reason of which the child is alleged to be delinquent or unruly, it shall proceed immediately or at a postponed hearing to hear evidence as to whether the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation and to make and file its findings thereon.'
" N.D.C.C. § 27-20-29(2).
"Under the statute, a child is not delinquent for committing a delinquent act. In re R.Y., 189 N.W.2d 644, 649 (N.D. 1971). In addition to finding the child committed a delinquent act, a separate finding is required that the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation. N.D.C.C. § 27-20-29(2). 'In the absence of evidence to the contrary, evidence of the commission of acts which constitute a felony is sufficient to sustain a finding that the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation.' Id."

In re M.H.P., 830 N.W.2d at 218-19. In M.H.P. evidence was presented at the dispositional hearing that persuaded the referee that M.H.P. did not need treatment or rehabilitation. Thus, M.H.P. was not found to be a delinquent child and the proceedings were dismissed. The M.H.P. court further stated:

"A proceeding refers not only to an individual hearing before the court but also to the entire set of events surrounding a petition. Our interpretation is supported by the commentary to the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, which is the basis of our juvenile delinquency statutes. 'Under this section, when delinquency or unruly conduct is alleged, the court must find further that the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation before the dispositions authorized by the Act can be resorted to. Otherwise the case must be dismissed.' Model Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 29 cmt. (emphasis added).
"The judicial referee concluded M.H.P. was not in need of treatment or rehabilitation. Based on that finding, the judicial referee properly dismissed the proceeding, which included the State's petition. The issue of sexual registration was not and cannot be reached by the juvenile court because the proceeding was dismissed as required by N.D.C.C. § 27-20-29(2)."

830 N.W.2d at 218-21.

In Alabama, a "delinquent child" is also defined as "[a] child who has been adjudicated for a delinquent act and is in need of care or rehabilitation." § 12-15-102(7), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). T.B.P. was found to have committed a delinquent act. See § 12-15-102(6), Ala. Code 1975 (definition of "delinquent act"). Therefore, for the same reasons set forth in M.H.P., because there was no finding that T.B.P. was in need of care or rehabilitation, the proceedings were due to be dismissed, not merely "closed."

For the reasons set forth above, this cause must be remanded to the juvenile court with directions to set aside its October 25, 2016, ruling and enter a new ruling dismissing the proceedings.

Accordingly, this case is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to set aside it October 16, 2016, order affirming the referee's closure of the case and to enter a new order dismissing the case in accordance with § 12-15-215(a), Ala. Code 1975. The juvenile court shall take necessary action to see that the circuit clerk makes due return to this court at the earliest possible time and within 28 days of the release of this opinion. The return to remand shall include a supplemental record that includes the new order.

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Kellum, Burke, and Joiner, JJ., concur. Windom, P.J., concurs in the result.

      The referee's July 23 and 30, 2015, written orders were filed in the family court clerk's office on August 4, 2015.

      Note from the reporter of decisions: On August 4, 2017, on return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, without opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
    Re: S.R.M.
    CASE NO.: SC18-850
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    JUNE 6, 2018
    Upon consideration of the Report and Recommendation filed by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, it is ordered that the Board's recommendation is approved by the Court and S.R.M. shall be admitted to The Florida Bar subject to the following conditions:
    1. The applicant's license to practice law shall be placed on probation for a period of two years.
    2. During the period of probation, the applicant shall:
    (a) continue to consult with Rani Abraham, M.D., or other licensed mental health provider, at least, quarterly or more frequently as her mental health provider deems necessary;
    (b) follow promptly, diligently and completely all instructions by her mental health provider including the taking of any medication in the recommended manner as may be prescribed by her mental health provider;
    (c) have her mental health provider submit quarterly reports to The Florida Bar during the entire probationary period. These reports shall confirm the applicant's consultations for the preceding quarter and shall advise The Florida Bar of the applicant's continuing ability to engage in the active practice of law;
    (d) obtain an agreement from her mental health provider stating that the mental health provider will immediately notify The Florida Bar if the applicant misses a scheduled appointment without prior rescheduling; and
    (e) submit quarterly sworn statements to The Florida Bar by March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31 during the probationary period attesting to his compliance with the conditions set forth in 2 (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.
    3. The Florida Bar shall monitor the conditions set forth in the Consent Agreement pursuant to Rule 1-3.2(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, and the costs thereof shall be paid by the applicant to The Florida Bar or its designated monitoring agency.
    4. To monitor effectively the provisions in this agreement, the applicant shall reside within the State of Florida during the entire period of probation. Any business or pleasure trips outside Florida that exceed ten days shall occur only with the advance approval of The Florida Bar. If the applicant relocates outside the State of Florida during the probationary period for any reason, the applicant shall surrender his license to practice law in Florida and if the applicant fails to do so, the Supreme Court of Florida shall terminate his license.
    5. If the applicant's license is surrendered or terminated during the probationary period, the applicant shall resume the practice of law in the State of Florida only upon full compliance with the rules and regulations governing admission to The Florida Bar.
    6. A failure to observe the conditions of the probation or a finding of probable cause as to conduct of the applicant committed during the period of probation may terminate the probation and subject the applicant to all available grievance procedures and disciplinary sanctions including disbarment under the Rules of Discipline. Upon receiving notice of a violation of the Court's order of conditional admission, The Florida Bar may immediately petition the Court for an order of suspension. The applicant shall have ten days to file a response. If no response is timely filed by the applicant, then the Court shall issue an order suspending the applicant. If a response is filed, the matter shall be disposed of as the Court directs. Unless terminated by the Court, an order of suspension shall remain in effect until final disposition of the grievance procedures commenced by The Florida Bar against the applicant.
    7. The applicant shall immediately inform The Florida Bar of any criminal arrest or prosecution or the filing of any grievance or complaint related to the Applicant's practice of law.
    8. If circumstances so warrant it, the applicant and The Florida Bar may stipulate to an extension of the period of probation or The Florida Bar may petition the Court for such an extension with a final decision to be made by the Court.
    9. By executing this Agreement, the applicant specifically consents to and authorizes the release of any and all materials in the applicant's file to The Florida Bar that the Bar may request from the Board to enable the Bar to fulfill its responsibilities under this Consent Agreement.
    A True Copy
    Test:
    John A. Tomasino
    Clerk, Supreme Court


text:
    FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
    RE: L.S.K.
    CASE NO.: SC18-839
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    JUNE 6, 2018
    Upon consideration of the Report and Recommendation filed by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, it is ordered that the Board's recommendation is approved by the Court and L.S.K. shall be admitted to The Florida Bar subject to the following conditions:
    1. The applicant's license to practice law shall be placed on probation for a period of two years.
    2. During the period of probation, the applicant shall:
    (a) continue to consult with Daniel E. Chervoney, M.D., or other licensed mental health provider, at least, quarterly or more frequently as her mental health provider deems necessary;
    (b) follow promptly, diligently and completely all instructions by her mental health provider including the taking of any medication in the recommended manner as may be prescribed by her mental health provider;
    (c) have her mental health provider submit quarterly reports to The Florida Bar during the entire probationary period. These reports shall confirm the applicant's consultations for the preceding quarter and shall advise The Florida Bar of the applicant's continuing ability to engage in the active practice of law;
    (d) obtain an agreement from her mental health provider stating that the mental health provider will immediately notify The Florida Bar if the applicant misses a scheduled appointment without prior rescheduling; and
    (e) submit quarterly sworn statements to The Florida Bar by March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31 during the probationary period attesting to her compliance with the conditions set forth in 2 (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.
    3. The Florida Bar shall monitor the conditions set forth in the Consent Agreement pursuant to Rule 1-3.2(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, and the costs thereof shall be paid by the applicant to The Florida Bar or its designated monitoring agency.
    4. To monitor effectively the provisions in this agreement, the applicant shall reside within the State of Florida during the entire period of probation. Any business or pleasure trips outside Florida that exceed ten days shall occur only with the advance approval of The Florida Bar. If the applicant relocates outside the State of Florida during the probationary period for any reason, the applicant shall surrender his license to practice law in Florida and if the applicant fails to do so, the Supreme Court of Florida shall terminate his license.
    5. If the applicant's license is surrendered or terminated during the probationary period, the applicant shall resume the practice of law in the State of Florida only upon full compliance with the rules and regulations governing admission to The Florida Bar.
    6. A failure to observe the conditions of the probation or a finding of probable cause as to conduct of the applicant committed during the period of probation may terminate the probation and subject the applicant to all available grievance procedures and disciplinary sanctions including disbarment under the Rules of Discipline. Upon receiving notice of a violation of the Court's order of conditional admission, The Florida Bar may immediately petition the Court for an order of suspension. The applicant shall have ten days to file a response. If no response is timely filed by the applicant, then the Court shall issue an order suspending the applicant. If a response is filed, the matter shall be disposed of as the Court directs. Unless terminated by the Court, an order of suspension shall remain in effect until final disposition of the grievance procedures commenced by The Florida Bar against the applicant.
    7. The applicant shall immediately inform The Florida Bar of any criminal arrest or prosecution and the filing of any grievance or complaint related to the applicant's practice of law.
    8. If circumstances so warrant it, the applicant and The Florida Bar may stipulate to an extension of the period of probation or The Florida Bar may petition the Court for such an extension with a final decision to be made by the Court.
    9. By executing this Agreement, the applicant specifically consents to and authorizes the release of any and all materials in the applicant's file to The Florida Bar that the Bar may request from the Board to enable the Bar to fulfill its responsibilities under this Consent Agreement.
    A True Copy
    Test:
    John A. Tomasino
    Clerk, Supreme Court


text:
    FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: R.G.F.
    CASE NO.: SC18-834
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    JUNE 6, 2018
    The Joint Stipulation to Extend Probation is approved and the probationary period imposed against R.G.F. in Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: R.G.F. , Case No. SC17-2126, is extended until June 6, 2023, under the existing terms and conditions with the added conditions that R.G.F.
    increase his meeting attendance to two abstinence-based groups per week, either AA or SMART Recovery in addition to his attorney support meetings, effective immediately.
    The filing of a motion for rehearing shall not alter the effective date of this probation.
    A True Copy
    Test:
    John A. Tomasino
    Clerk, Supreme Court


author: LABARGA, C.J. PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. QUINCE, J., dissenting.

text:
    Michael LEVANDOSKI, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC17-962
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [June 7, 2018]
    Joshua LeRoy of LeRoy Law, PA, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Petitioner
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia A. Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Allen R. Geesey, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Respondent
   LABARGA, C.J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Levandoski v. State , 217 So.3d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), which certified conflict with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Snow v. State (Snow I ), 157 So.3d 559 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), quashed on other grounds , No. SC15-536, 2016 WL 1696462 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2016), clarified on remand , 193 So.3d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), on the issue of whether a trial court is required to orally pronounce each condition of "sex offender probation" contained in section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2010), when the defendant is not convicted of one of the section's enumerated offenses. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we approve the decision of the Fourth District and disapprove of Snow to the extent it holds each special condition of sex offender probation must be orally pronounced.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 2009, Petitioner Michael Levandoski was arrested and charged with two offenses: (Count I) lewd computer solicitation of a child under section 847.0135(3), Florida Statutes (2010), and (Count II) traveling to meet a minor for unlawful sexual activity under section 847.0135(4), Florida Statutes (2010). In August 2010, Levandoski pleaded no contest to both charges. Levandoski moved for a downward departure sentence and requested that he be sentenced to "sex offender probation with house arrest," rather than a prison term. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced him to forty-eight months' incarceration followed by one year of "sex offender probation" for Count I. Levandoski , 217 So.3d at 217. For Count II, the court imposed fifteen years of "sex offender probation" to run consecutively to Count I. Id. The court stated during the sentencing hearing:

I will make it a special condition of his probation that he is prohibited from-this is part of the sex offender probation anyway, but just to make the record clear, should there be any change in the law as of the time of his release, he's prohibited from accessing the internet, possessing a computer or any electronic device that can access the internet, and he's prohibited from having an email address or other similar type of address that allows him to participate in conversations with anyone over the internet by whatever name that may be known here or in the future until his probation is concluded.

The written Order of Sex Offender Probation included the standard conditions of Levandoski's probation, the special conditions orally pronounced during sentencing, and all of the conditions contained in section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2010). Levandoski's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Levandoski v. State , 96 So.3d 907 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

In 2015, after serving his prison term, Levandoski moved to strike the section 948.30 conditions of probation on the ground that they constituted an illegal sentence because the conditions were neither mandatory under the statute, nor orally pronounced at sentencing. Alternatively, he moved to modify certain conditions of his probation if the court was unwilling to strike them in their entirety.

During a hearing on the motion to strike, the trial court acknowledged that it did not review with Levandoski the conditions found in section 948.30 during the plea colloquy. It also determined that the Florida Department of Corrections was supervising Levandoski "as if he had been put on sex offender probation for [ section] 847.0135(5)." In other words, Levandoski was being supervised for every condition of sex offender probation contained in section 948.30 that is applicable to violators of section 847.0135(5), even though he was convicted of violations of section 847.0135(3) and (4). The court ultimately denied Levandoski's motion to the extent he requested the section 948.30 conditions be struck.

On appeal to the Fourth District, Levandoski argued that the trial court erred in denying the motion to correct sentence. Levandoski , 217 So.3d at 217. He asserted that "his written sentence was illegal because it included 'sex offender probation' even though the individual components of sex offender probation were not orally pronounced at sentencing." Id. at 217. The district court disagreed and determined that, "[w]hen a court clearly imposes sex offender probation as a special condition of probation, it need not individually specify each item contained within the umbrella of sex offender probation conditions." Id. at 219. The district court concluded "the court's oral pronouncement that Levandoski would be subject to 'sex offender probation' was sufficient to impose each of the components" contained in section 948.30. Id. at 217.

The Fourth District certified conflict with the decision of the First District in Snow I , which held that only those conditions of sex offender probation that are specifically stated can be imposed, and "conditions not orally pronounced at sentencing must be stricken" and may not be imposed at resentencing pursuant to double jeopardy principles. 157 So.3d at 562. This review follows.

ANALYSIS

The issue presented is a pure question of law subject to de novo review. See Norvil v. State , 191 So.3d 406, 408 (Fla. 2016).

Section 948.30 delineates the standard conditions of probation for those who commit certain enumerated sex offenses: those convicted of a violation of chapter 794, or sections 800.04, 827.071, 847.0135(5), or 847.0145, Florida Statutes (2010). Pursuant to the specific language of section 948.30, if a defendant is convicted of one of these offenses, the trial court is not required to orally pronounce each standard condition at sentencing. § 948.30, Fla. Stat. (2010). While the conditions within section 948.30 are only mandatory for violations of the enumerated offenses, they can nevertheless be imposed, in whole or in part, on violators of other offenses as special conditions of probation if they reasonably relate to rehabilitation. Villanueva v. State , 200 So.3d 47, 53 (Fla. 2016).

Historically, trial courts have orally pronounced special conditions of probation during sentencing. See Lawson v. State , 969 So.2d 222, 227 n.3 (Fla. 2007). In 1999, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) was amended to allow a defendant to file a motion to correct sentencing error in the trial court at any time until the first appellate brief is filed. Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.111(e) & 3.800 & Fla. Rules of App. Pro. 9.020(h), 9.140, & 9.600 , 761 So.2d 1015 (Fla. 1999), modified , 761 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 2000). It was anticipated that the extended time to file a rule 3.800(b) motion would "eliminate the problem of unpreserved sentencing errors raised on direct appeal." Maddox v. State , 760 So. 2d 89, 94 (Fla. 2000). In Maddox , this Court explained how the amendments to rule 3.800(b) satisfied due process concerns related to unpronounced special conditions of probation:

Prior to the [Criminal Appeal Reform Act of 1996], we differentiated between "general conditions of probation" and "special conditions of probation." See [ State v. ] Williams , 712 So.2d [762] at 764 [ (Fla. 1998) ] ; Justice [v. State ], 674 So.2d [123] at 125 [ (Fla. 1996) ]. We found that defendants are given constructive notice of the imposition of general conditions of probation that are mandated or authorized by statute. See State v. Hart , 668 So.2d 589, 592 (Fla. 1996) ; see also Brock v. State , 688 So.2d 909, 910 n. 1 (Fla. 1997). Likewise, defendants are given constructive notice of the general conditions of probation published in conditions (1)-(11) of the standard probation form found in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.986(e). See Hart , 668 So.2d at 592. Thus, general conditions of probation do not have to be orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing and due process is satisfied as long as the conditions are included in the written sentencing order. See id. at 592-93.
However, we distinguished special conditions of probation, which are not statutorily authorized or mandated or found among the first eleven general conditions of probation listed in the rules of criminal procedure. See Williams , 712 So.2d at 764 ; Hart , 668 So.2d at 593. We found that if the defendant had not been given notice of the imposition of these sanctions during the oral pronouncement of sentence, the special condition of probation must be struck and could not be reimposed on remand. See Justice , 674 So.2d at 125.
Because we allowed courts to impose general conditions of probation that have not been orally pronounced, it is clear that our primary concern in correcting unannounced special conditions of probation is the due process violation occurring when a person does not have notice and an opportunity to object to the condition of probation. However, following our promulgation of rule 3.800(b), defendants have been given a procedural mechanism to object to the imposition of special conditions of probation that have not been orally pronounced. This procedural mechanism satisfies due process concerns because the defendant has an opportunity to object following the imposition of the special condition of probation.

Id. at 105 (emphasis added).

In other words, if the written sentencing order contains special conditions of probation that a defendant alleges were not orally pronounced at sentencing, substantive objections to those conditions may be raised in a rule 3.800(b) motion upon receiving the written order after the conclusion of the sentencing hearing (but before the first appellate brief is filed). Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b). Therefore, the defendant cannot raise a due process claim asserting he was not afforded an opportunity to object to the unpronounced conditions because the rule 3.800(b) motion afforded him that opportunity. However, if the written order is not provided in time to file a rule 3.800(b) motion, the defendant would have a viable due process argument because he did not have an opportunity to object to the unpronounced conditions.

Accordingly, in order to raise a due process claim related to unpronounced special conditions of probation, a defendant must show that he was not provided with the written sentencing order in time to file a rule 3.800(b) motion. Here, Levandoski has not established or alleged that he did not receive the written order in time, and the record is unclear on this point. Therefore, Levandoski is not entitled to relief.

Nevertheless, even if Levandoski did not receive the written sentencing order in time to file a rule 3.800(b) motion, we conclude he was adequately placed on notice of the conditions of his probation during sentencing. Levandoski argues that the trial court was required to orally pronounce each applicable "sex offender probation" condition found in section 948.30 during sentencing. The Fourth District disagreed and concluded that "[w]hen a court clearly imposes sex offender probation as a special condition of probation, it need not individually specify each item contained within the umbrella of sex offender probation conditions." Id. at 219. The district court determined that orally pronouncing "sex offender probation" was sufficient to satisfy due process and put Levandoski on notice, particularly since "Levandoski acknowledge[d] that the court orally imposed 'all standard conditions of sex offender probation at sentencing.' " Id. at 218.

We agree with the conclusion of the Fourth District. Not only did Levandoski acknowledge that he was placed on "sex offender probation," but he also specifically requested it. Prior to sentencing, Levandoski moved for a downward departure sentence consisting of "sex offender probation" with house arrest, rather than a prison term:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We're asking the court to give him sex offender probation with house arrest. If he goes to prison, Judge-we're asking for sex offender probation , Judge, and we think that's appropriate.

(Emphasis added.) During a subsequent hearing on Levandoski's motion to strike, the trial court determined "it was the intent of all the parties, even defense counsel at the time, that sex offender probation would be imposed." Levandoski's request for sex offender probation is indicative of an understanding of what probationary conditions he would be subjected to if the court granted his request.

Moreover, during sentencing, the trial court implicitly referenced section 948.30 by specifically imposing a condition found exclusively within the statute:

I will make it a special condition of his probation that he is prohibited from-this is part of the sex offender probation anyway , but just to make the record clear, should there be any change in the law as of the time of his release, he's prohibited from accessing the internet , possessing a computer or any electronic device that can access the internet, and he's prohibited from having an email address or other similar type of address that allows him to participate in conversations with anyone over the internet by whatever name that may be known here or in the future until his probation is concluded.

(Emphasis added.) The prohibition against accessing the internet as a condition of probation appears only in section 948.30(1)(h) (prohibiting a probationer from "accessing the Internet or other computer services"). No other provision within chapter 948 (Probation and Community Control) includes such a prohibition. The trial court's pronouncement, when read in context, orally imposed all of the conditions of sex offender probation, including and in particular the prohibition against accessing the internet.

Levandoski contends that, because the statutory definition of "sex offender probation" makes no reference to section 948.30, he could not have known that by imposing "sex offender probation," the trial court was referring to the conditions within section 948.30. However, as the district court observed, "sex offender probation" is a term of art commonly used to refer to the conditions found in section 948.30. Levandoski , 217 So.3d at 219. Numerous cases have used the term this way, and Levandoski does not assert that it has been used to refer to any other statute. Therefore, we conclude the trial court's reference to section 948.30 during sentencing, in conjunction with Levandoski's prior request for sex offender probation, adequately put Levandoski on notice of the conditions of his probation.

CONCLUSION

Levandoski has failed to establish that he was not provided with the written sentencing order in time to file a rule 3.800(b) motion and, therefore, is not entitled to relief. Further, because Levandoski specifically requested sex offender probation, and the trial court implicitly referenced section 948.30 by imposing a condition of probation that is only located in that statute, we conclude due process was satisfied here. Accordingly, we approve the decision of the Fourth District and disapprove of Snow to the extent it holds each special condition of sex offender probation must be orally pronounced.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.

QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.

PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree that Levandoski should have raised the claim regarding the special conditions of sex offender probation through a rule 3.800(b) motion. Thus, I would approve the result reached by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, not on the merits, but because Levandoski's claim is procedurally barred. See majority op. at 648. Additionally, for that reason, the majority's discussion of why the special conditions of probation need not have been orally pronounced is unnecessary in this case.

Nevertheless, because the majority has chosen to address the merits of a claim that they assert is procedurally barred, I discuss the majority's suggestion that there should be an "implicit reference" exception to the requirement that special conditions of probation be orally pronounced. Lawson v. State , 969 So.2d 222, 227 n.3 (Fla. 2007) ; see majority op. at 648-49. Instead, I would continue to adhere to our precedent, consistent with the First District Court of Appeal in Snow v. State (Snow I ), 157 So.3d 559 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), quashed on other grounds , No. SC15-536, 2016 WL 1696462 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2016), clarified on remand , 193 So.3d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ( Snow II ), that trial courts are required to orally pronounce, with specificity, all special conditions of probation. And, had Levandoski properly raised this challenge to his sentence through a rule 3.800(b) motion, I would conclude that those special conditions not orally pronounced should be stricken from his probation. Thus, if the matter were properly before this Court, I would also quash the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Levandoski v. State , 217 So.3d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), which addressed the merits of Levandoski's challenge, and approve of the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Snow I .

ANALYSIS

In Snow I , addressing the same issue presented in this case, the First District properly concluded:

[T]he trial court could selectively impose special conditions of sex offender probation, which were reasonably related to appellant's conviction for traveling to meet a minor to engage in unlawful acts that were sexual in nature. However, the law requires that each special condition of probation be pronounced orally at sentencing before it can be included in the written probation order. Lawson v. State , 969 So.2d 222, 227 n.3 (Fla. 2007) ; State v. Hart , 668 So.2d 589, 592 (Fla. 1996) ; Newton v. State , 31 So.3d 892, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). The trial court's written order contains all of the conditions of sex offender probation listed in the statute, but not all of these conditions were orally pronounced at sentencing. Those conditions not orally pronounced at sentencing must be stricken because double jeopardy principles prevent them from being imposed at resentencing.
Justice v. State , 674 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1996) ; Clussman v. State , 89 So.3d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

Snow I , 157 So.3d at 561-62.

Beyond Snow I , this Court has made clear that "special conditions, which are those not specifically authorized by statute, must be orally pronounced at sentencing before they can be placed in the probation order." Lawson , 969 So.2d at 227 n.3. This requirement is a safeguard to protect the criminal defendant's right to due process. "Because a defendant is not on notice of special conditions of probation, these conditions must be pronounced orally at sentencing in order to be included in the written probation order." State v. Williams , 712 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1998).

Despite this Court's clear pronouncement in Lawson , the majority today indicates that in the future it would adopt the reasoning of the Fourth District below, which held that "[w]hen a court clearly imposes sex offender probation as a special condition of probation, it need not individually specify each item contained within the umbrella of sex offender probation conditions." Levandoski , 217 So.3d at 219. The decision is problematic for several reasons.

First, the definition of the term "sex offender probation" does not reference section 948.30 :

"Sex offender probation" or "sex offender community control" means a form of intensive supervision, with or without electronic monitoring, which emphasizes treatment and supervision of a sex offender in accordance with an individualized treatment plan administered by an officer who has a restricted caseload and specialized training. An officer who supervises an offender placed on sex offender probation or sex offender community control must meet as necessary with a treatment provider and polygraph examiner to develop and implement the supervision and treatment plan, if a treatment provider and polygraph examiner specially trained in the treatment and monitoring of sex offenders are reasonably available.

§ 948.001(13), Fla. Stat. (2010). A plain reading of the definition of "sex offender probation" would in no way indicate that Levandoski was required to follow the conditions within section 948.30.

Second, there is no statute titled "Sex offender probation" or "Conditions of sex offender probation." Section 948.30 is titled "Additional terms and conditions of probation or community control for certain sex offenses" and provides that those conditions "shall be considered standard conditions of probation or community control for offenders specified in this section." § 948.30, Fla. Stat. (2010). Levandoski was not charged with any of the sex offenses enumerated in section 948.30 but, instead, was charged with two offenses: (Count I) lewd computer solicitation of a child under section 847.0135(3), Florida Statutes (2010), and (Count II) traveling to meet a minor for unlawful sexual activity under section 847.0135(4), Florida Statutes (2010). Majority op. at 644-45.

Thus, even if defendants understand that the term "sex offender probation" refers to section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2010), a plain reading of the statute would not indicate that the conditions imposed within the statute applied to them. Indeed, none of the conditions in section 948.30 apply to violations of section 847.0135(3) and (4). Additionally, section 948.30(4) applies only to probationers whose crimes were committed on or after May 26, 2010. Id. § 948.30(4). Indeed, defendants like Levandoski, whose crimes occurred in 2009 and whose crimes are not referenced within section 948.30, would have no reason to believe that the conditions listed within section 948.30 actually applied to them.

Further, even if defendants were to review the sex offender probation conditions described in section 948.30, the conditions themselves are unclear as to which would be applicable in any particular case. For example, Levandoski was convicted under section 847.0135, subsections (3) and (4), which punish conduct where the offender believes the victim to be a child, even if the "victim" is actually an undercover police officer, as was the case here. However, section 948.30, subsections (1), (3), and (4) have conditions that apply only where the victim was actually under the age of eighteen or fifteen. For instance, if the victim was under the age of eighteen, section 948.30(1)(b) prohibits the probationer from "living within 1,000 feet of a school, child care facility, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate." § 948.30(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010). While the fact that Levandoski's "victim" was an undercover officer-and not a fifteen-year-old girl, as Levandoski believed-does not negate his guilt, it is unclear whether this fact prevents these age-specific conditions of probation from applying to him. A reasonable reading of these subsections arguably could lead Levandoski, or any defendant, to conclude that they do not.

Nevertheless, the majority would conclude that "because Levandoski specifically requested sex offender probation, and the trial court implicitly referenced section 948.30 by imposing a condition of probation that is only located in that statute ... due process was satisfied here." Majority op. at 649. However, the majority fails to explain how a defendant's request for "sex offender probation" equates to notice of which conditions, specifically, within section 948.30 Levandoski was required to follow. The issue is not whether the defendant knew he was on sex offender probation, but whether the defendant received sufficient notice of the specific conditions he was required to follow to ensure he did not violate his probation. As this Court has stated, only "when a trial court sufficiently apprises the defendant of the 'substance of each special condition' so that the defendant has the opportunity to object 'to any condition which the defendant believes is inappropriate,' [are] the minimum requirements of due process ... satisfied." State v. Hart , 668 So.2d 589, 592 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Olvey v. State , 609 So.2d 640, 643 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) ).

THIS CASE

As the majority states in footnote 7 of its opinion, Levandoski was sentenced on October 15, 2010. The written sentencing order is dated November 1, 2010, but it is unclear when Levandoski actually received it. Levandoski did not file a rule 3.800(b) motion or raise a due process claim on direct appeal. This claim was first raised in a postconviction motion to strike which was ultimately treated as a rule 3.800(a) motion. See Levandoski , 217 So.3d at 218. I agree with the majority that this claim should have been raised in a rule 3.800(b) motion. Majority op. at 647-48. Accordingly, I would also agree with the majority's conclusion that Levandoski's claim is procedurally barred, unless he can show good cause why it has not been previously raised.

However, had the claim been properly raised, I would conclude that the special conditions of probation should be stricken from Levandoski's sentence. Levandoski was not convicted of any of the offenses enumerated in section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2010), to which sex offender probation would clearly apply. Thus, sex offender probation was a special condition of Levandoski's probation, which, based on our precedent, the trial court was obligated to orally pronounce at his sentencing.

Levandoski's request for "sex offender probation" does not negate the trial court's obligation to apprise Levandoski of the substance of each special condition. Saying the words "sex offender probation" without any further explanation would not have put Levandoski on notice of the specific requirements of section 948.30, some of which may not even apply to him. See, e.g. , § 948.30(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010) (requiring probationer to submit to an HIV test when "there was sexual contact" between probationer and victim).

Additionally, because I would conclude that the trial court violated Levandoski's right to due process, I would further conclude that the appropriate remedy is to strike the improperly imposed special conditions of Levandoski's probation. As we stated in Justice v. State , 674 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1996), "where a sentence is reversed because the trial court failed to orally pronounce certain special conditions of probation which later appeared in the written sentence, the court must strike the unannounced conditions and cannot reimpose them upon resentencing." Id. at 126.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, I would first conclude that Levandoski's claim is procedurally barred, and therefore, there is no need for the majority's additional discussion in this case. If this claim were properly before the Court, however, I would continue to adhere to our precedent requiring the trial court to orally pronounce each of the special conditions of probation imposed at sentencing. Thus, if this claim had been timely raised as a rule 3.800(b) motion to correct sentence, I would agree with the First District that the conditions should have been stricken. Because Levandoski did not, however, I concur in part.

QUINCE, J., dissenting.

I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that a trial court may dispense with orally pronouncing the specific conditions of sex offender probation when a defendant is not convicted of one of the section's enumerated offenses. Because I would conclude that the failure to orally pronounce the specific conditions of Levandoski's probation violated his right to due process under these circumstances, I respectfully dissent.

We have held that special conditions of probation must be orally pronounced to properly place a defendant on notice of the special condition so that the defendant has the opportunity to object to any condition he or she believes to be inappropriate. See Lawson v. State , 969 So.2d 222, 227 (Fla. 2007) ; State v. Williams , 712 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1998). Indeed, in the present case, the trial court was careful to indicate, for the record, certain conditions: "[J]ust to make the record clear, should there be any change in the law as of the time of his release, [Levandoski is] prohibited from accessing the internet, possessing a computer or any electronic device that can access the internet, and he's prohibited from having an email address or other similar type of address that allows him to participate in conversations with anyone over the internet ...."

The majority acknowledges that the conditions of section 948.30 may be imposed only if they reasonably relate to rehabilitation, see majority op. at 646-47, nevertheless the majority sidesteps this requirement by finding Levandoski's claim procedurally barred, noting that the record is unclear whether Levandoski received a written order in time to raise his due process claim via a rule 3.800(b) motion. See Majority op. at 647-48. In other words, the majority is barring a due process claim even though the record does not clearly refute the claim. I would find that the trial court's failure to orally pronounce the specific conditions of Levandoski's special probation violated his constitutional right to due process.

There are provisions of section 948.30 that Levandoski could have reasonably inferred did not apply to him. I agree with Justice Pariente that Levandoski did not receive sufficient notice of the specific conditions he was required to follow to ensure he did not violate his probation. See concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion at 652-53. Accordingly, I would strike those provisions that were not orally pronounced and approve of the decision in Snow v. State , 157 So.3d 559 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), quashed on other grounds , No. SC15-536, 2016 WL 1696462 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2016), clarified on remand , 193 So.3d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

      The "child" in this case was actually an undercover detective posing as a fifteen-year-old in an online chat room.

      The Fourth District's decision states Levandoski pleaded guilty to both charges. Levandoski , 217 So.3d at 217. However, the plea form and the written sentencing order reflect that he entered a plea of nolo contendere.

      However, the trial court did modify Levandoski's probation to allow him to travel for work, with certain restrictions.

      The district court treated the case "as an appeal of an order denying a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Williams v. State , 957 So.2d 600, 601 (Fla. 2007) ('[A]sserting a discrepancy between an oral and written sentence is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) proceeding for correction of an illegal sentence')." Levandoski , 217 So.3d at 218.

      On review, this Court quashed Snow I and remanded for reconsideration in light of State v. Shelley , 176 So.3d 914 (Fla. 2015) (holding double jeopardy principles prohibit separate convictions for conduct that constitutes both solicitation under section 847.0135(3)(b) and traveling after solicitation under subsection (4)(b) ). Snow v. State , No. SC15-536, 2016 WL 1696462, at *1 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2016). On remand, the district court reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate Snow's conviction and sentence for the lesser offense of solicitation pursuant to Shelley . Snow v. State (Snow II ), 193 So.3d 1091, 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). In addition, and consistent with Snow I , the district court directed the trial court to "strike those special conditions of sex offender probation not orally pronounced at sentencing." Id.

      This does not leave a defendant without remedy if the written order contains conditions more severe than orally pronounced: the defendant may raise this issue as a double jeopardy claim at any time in a rule 3.800(a) motion. See Williams v. State , 957 So.2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007) ("When the written document results in a sentence that is more severe than the sentence announced in court, this Court has considered it a potential violation of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy."). Put differently, a defendant can at any time assert a claim in a 3.800(a) motion that the written sentencing order was more severe than the oral sentence, but not that he was not afforded an opportunity to object-unless the written order was not received in time to file a rule 3.800(b) motion.

      Levandoski was sentenced on October 15, 2010. The written sentencing order is dated November 1, 2010, but it is unclear when Levandoski actually received it. Levandoski did not file a rule 3.800(b) motion or raise a due process claim on direct appeal. This claim was first raised in a postconviction motion to strike which was ultimately treated as a rule 3.800(a) motion. See Levandoski , 217 So.3d at 218.

      Section 948.001(13), Florida Statutes (2010), defines "sex offender probation" as
      a form of intensive supervision, with or without electronic monitoring, which emphasizes treatment and supervision of a sex offender in accordance with an individualized treatment plan administered by an officer who has a restricted caseload and specialized training.

      See State v. Coleman , 44 So.3d 1198, 1200-01 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("[I]n addition to defining sex offender probation as involving 'intensive supervision,' chapter 948 provides that a trial court sentencing a defendant to sex offender probation must impose an extensive list of conditions for those ... convicted of certain enumerated sex crimes. See § 948.30(1) -(3), Fla. Stat. (2010)." (emphasis omitted) ); see also Staples v. State , 202 So.3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2016) (using the term "sex offender probation" to refer to the conditions in section 948.30 ); Adams v. State , 979 So.2d 921, 926 (Fla. 2008) (same); Dorsey v. State , 169 So.3d 1286 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (same); Harroll v. State , 960 So.2d 797 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (same); State v. Springer , 965 So.2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (same).

      We nevertheless encourage trial courts to be as specific as possible during sentencing in order to avoid any misunderstanding regarding whether all, or only some, conditions of sex offender probation are to be imposed.

      In State v. Snow , No. SC15-536, 2016 WL 1696462 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2016), this Court quashed the First District's decision in Snow I and remanded for consideration in light of our opinion in State v. Shelley , 176 So.3d 914 (Fla. 2015), which held that double jeopardy principles prohibit separate convictions for solicitation under section 847.0135(3)(b) and traveling to meet a minor after solicitation pursuant to section 847.0135(4)(b) if the charges were based on the same conduct. Id. at 919. On remand in Snow II , 193 So.3d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), the First District reaffirmed its holding with respect to the special conditions of probation, stating: "In addition, as explained in our original opinion, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court strike those special conditions of sex offender probation not orally pronounced at sentencing. In all other respects, we affirm." Id. at 1091.

      Section 948.30 (b), for example, prohibits living within 1000 feet of a location where children congregate if the victim was under the age of 18. Here, the "victim" was an undercover officer and not actually a child under the age of 18. Levandoski could reasonably have concluded this provision did not apply to him.


text:
    FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: B.N.W.
    CASE NO.: SC18-854
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    JUNE 6, 2018
    Upon consideration of the Report and Recommendation filed by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, it is ordered that the Board's recommendation is approved by the Court and B.N.W. shall be admitted to The Florida Bar subject to the following conditions:
    1. The applicant's license to practice law shall be placed on probation for a period of five years from March 21, 2017.
   2. During the period of probation, the applicant shall:

(a) abstain from the consumption of alcoholic beverages;
(b) abstain from the use of controlled substances except as prescribed by a duly licensed medical physician and approved by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.;
(c) participate actively in the program offered by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. during the entire probationary period by complying with the rehabilitation contract with that organization executed on March 21, 2017, and by extending the contract to cover the entire period of probation if necessary;
(d) participate actively in Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous by attending, at least, weekly meetings or such greater frequency as required by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.; practice AA/NA principles in all of her affairs and carry the AA/NA message to other individuals with a substance use disorder;
(e) attend attorney support meetings at least monthly, or at such greater frequency as required by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.;
(f) submit to and pay for a minimum of eight (8) random urine drug/alcohol screens annually, as well as any other hair, blood, sweat, or other substance screening tests determined to be appropriate by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.; and
(g) submit quarterly sworn statements to The Florida Bar by March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31 during the probationary period attesting to her compliance with the conditions set forth in 2 (a), (b), (c), (d) (e) and (f) above.

3. The Florida Bar shall monitor the conditions set forth in the Consent Agreement pursuant to Rule 1-3.2(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, and the costs thereof shall be paid by the applicant to The Florida Bar or its designated monitoring agency.

4. To monitor effectively the provisions in this agreement, the applicant shall reside within the State of Florida during the entire period of probation. Any business or pleasure trips outside Florida that exceed ten days shall occur only with the advance approval of The Florida Bar. If the applicant relocates outside the State of Florida during the probationary period for any reason, the applicant shall surrender her license to practice law in Florida and if the applicant fails to do so, the Supreme Court of Florida shall terminate her license.

5. The applicant shall immediately inform The Florida Bar of any criminal arrest or prosecution and the filing of any grievance or complaint related to the applicant's practice of law.

6. If the applicant's license is surrendered or terminated during the probationary period, the applicant shall resume the practice of law in the State of Florida only upon full compliance with the rules and regulations governing admission to The Florida Bar.

7. A failure to observe the conditions of the probation or a finding of probable cause as to conduct of the applicant committed during the period of probation may terminate the probation and subject the applicant to all available grievance procedures and disciplinary sanctions including disbarment under the Rules of Discipline. Upon receiving notice of a violation of the Court's order of conditional admission, The Florida Bar may immediately petition the Court for an order of suspension. The applicant shall have ten days to file a response. If no response is timely filed by the applicant, then the Court shall issue an order suspending the applicant. If a response is filed, the matter shall be disposed of as the Court directs. Unless terminated by the Court, an order of suspension shall remain in effect until final disposition of the grievance procedures commenced by The Florida Bar against the applicant.

8. If circumstances so warrant it, the applicant and The Florida Bar may stipulate to an extension of the period of probation or The Florida Bar may petition the Court for such an extension with a final decision to be made by the Court.

9. The Applicant acknowledges that an uninterrupted period of documented sobriety for a minimum period of time must be established prior to admission to The Florida Bar on an unconditional basis. Should the period of probation be extended pursuant to either paragraph 7 or 8 above, the Applicant, therefore, further agrees that such extension shall be for a minimum of three up to five years.

10. The Applicant specifically consents to and authorizes the release of any and all materials in the Applicant's file to The Florida Bar that the Bar may request from the Board to enable the Bar to fulfill its responsibilities under this Consent Agreement.

A True Copy

Test:

John A. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Christopher Lee PERKINS, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-2314
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 23, 2018
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Jay and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Anthony Cornelius JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2940
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Anthony Cornelius Jackson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Bilbrey and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    ICHETUCKNEE ALLIANCE, INC., Appellant, v. SUWANNEE RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2275
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 23, 2018
    John Ross Thomas of the Law Office of John R. Thomas, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
    Mark A. Emanuele and Sheryl S. Natelson of Lydecker Diaz, Miami, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Rowe, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    ICHETUCKNEE ALLIANCE, INC., Appellant, v. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2273
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 23, 2018
    John Ross Thomas of the Law Office of John R. Thomas, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
    Thomas I. Mayton, Jr. and Erin H. Preston of St. Johns River Water Management District, Palatka, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Rowe, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    B.Z.D., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5057
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 30, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Justin Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jerome HAYES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3223
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 30, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Jasmine Russell, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Barbara Debelius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Glen M. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. WARDEN, RECEPTION AND MEDICAL CENTER OF the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.
    No. 1D15-1048
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 30, 2018
    Glen M. Williams, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee; Kenneth S. Steely, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Wolf and Ray, JJ., concur.


text:
    Paul STILL, Appellant, v. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1938
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 23, 2018
    Paul Still, pro se, Appellant.
    Thomas I. Mayton, Jr. and Erin H. Preston of St. Johns River Water Management District, Palatka, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Rowe, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    John A. TENNANT, Appellant, v. Thomas William SHEFFIELD, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0839
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 30, 2018
    John A. Tennant, pro se, Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED .

Wetherell, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    SANTA ROSA PROFESSIONAL EDUCATORS, Appellant, v. Carol POTEREK, Melanie Peters, and Catherine Wilson, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-1820
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 30, 2018
    Archibald J. Thomas, III, of the Law Offices of Archibald J. Thomas, III, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    Peter Caldwell and Maria Kazouris of the Florida Education Association, Tallahassee, for Appellees.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    B.B., Mother of L.T., Minor Child, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-143
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 30, 2018
    Lucas J. Taylor of Sellers, Taylor & Morrison, P.A., Live Oak, for Appellant.
    Ward L. Metzger, Appellate Counsel, Department of Children and Families, Jacksonville; Thomasina Moore, Statewide Director of Appeals, Sara Goldfarb, and Rocco J. Carbone, III, of Guardian ad Litem Program, Sanford, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Serena GALEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5068
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 30, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Justin Foster Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Marie Rives, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Moses HALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2748
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Moses Hall, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Kaitlin Weiss, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH and Corvel Corporation, Appellants, v. Richard HALSEY, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2362
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Micheal A. Edwards, West Palm Beach, for Appellants.
    Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Darren L. BLACK, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-3121
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 30, 2018
    Darren L. Black, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

DENIED.

Lewis, Kelsey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    AMERICAN RESIDUALS AND TALENT, INC., d/b/a Art Payroll, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA WORKERS' COMPENSATION JOINT UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.
    No. 1D17-4578
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 30, 2018
    Fred F. Harris, Jr., David C. Ashburn, and M. Hope Keating of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
    Thomas J. Maida, James A. McKee, Benjamin J. Grossman, Nicholas R. Paquette, and Nicholas J. Meros of Foley & Lardner LLP, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

DENIED .

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Barry CARRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1848
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Nicole DiPrima of The DiPrima Law Firm, LLC, Coral Springs, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    ALLIED RECYCLING, INC. and Bridgefield Employers Ins. Co./Claims Center, Appellants, v. Jackson A. ROBERTSON, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2651
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Michael E. McCabe and David H. Roos of Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellants.
    Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Rebekah Samir SIDDIQUI, Appellant, v. Brian Stewart NEWTON and Carolyn Newton, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-1805
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    S. A. Siddiqui, St. Augustine, for Appellant.
    Jonathan J. Luca of Jonathan J. Luca, P.A., St. Augustine, for Appellee Brian Stewart Newton, and Dale G. Westling, Sr., of Dale G. Westling, Sr., P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee Carolyn Newton.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Makar, Winokur, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Mikecal SIMMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1614
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Mikecal Simmons, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Handy D. WALKER, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1285
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Daniel Tibbitt of the Law Office of Daniel J. Tibbitt, Miami, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Raymond BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1046
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender; Jennifer M. Painter and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf, Roberts, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.


text:
    Brian BURGGRAF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4909
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Brian Burggraf, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Mario Lamar FOSTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1584
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Mario Lamar Foster, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Robert Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    John Ellis HARTLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5202
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    John Ellis Hartley, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael BOYINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1542
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Patrick Michael Megaro and Joseph Easton of Halscott Megaro, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Robert Lee, Assistant Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Kelsey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Daniel Lee LIEDTKA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1306
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; Daniel Lee Liedtka, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Henry Powell DENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-262
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and M. J. Lord, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Amanda D. Stokes, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Javarious THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-4689
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Carrie McMullen, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee; Kevin Robert Alvarez of Law Office of Kevin Alvarez, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael Lee SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0163
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Michael Lee Smith, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Justin GANDER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5040
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Justin Gander, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Beatriz MUNOZ, Appellant, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH/CORVEL CORPORATION, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-4946
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    William F. Souza of Law Offices of William F. Souza, P.A., North Miami Beach, for Appellant.
    Luis F. Estrada of Angones, McClure & Garcia, P.A., Miami, for Appellees.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Alexander G. MOODY, former husband, Petitioner, v. Laura Grippa MOODY, former wife, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-5143
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Alexander G. Moody, pro se, Petitioner.
    Ashley W. Cox of Bedell, Dittmar, DeVault, Pillans & Coxe, Jacksonville, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of prohibition is denied on the merits.

Wetherell, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Eddie J. ANGLIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4723
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Eddie J. Anglin, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael T. HUNT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4385
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Michael T. Hunt, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kevin Frederick MCDANIEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4144
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Austin LEAVITT, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-4101
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    David M. Robbins and Susan Z. Cohen of Epstein & Robbins, Jacksonville, for Petitioner.
    Christie S. Utt, General Counsel, and Brandi Y. Thompson, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

DENIED.

Wolf, Roberts, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.


text:
    Leon J. NICELY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4044
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Leon J. Nicely, Jr., pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Omri W. HENTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3965
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Omri W. Henton, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Daniel Reese CRUTCHFIELD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3951
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jacob M. VEAL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3927
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

RAY, BILBREY, and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jonathan Chase GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3878
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Jonathan Chase Green, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Thomas Ricardo AVILA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3856
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; Thomas Ricardo Avila, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Horace Evan HOLLIE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3763
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, concur.


text:
    Deshawn GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-2148
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Deshawn Green, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kenneth S. FOUTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4573
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Ray, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Deshawn GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3400
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    Deshawn Green, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel R. Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    John E. CROSBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3793
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018
    John E. Crosby, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Fred CLEVELAND Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0811
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 22, 2018
    Fred Cleveland Jr., pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Brandon HAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1822
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 25, 2018
    Brandon Hand, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel R. Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Robert COLLIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0214
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    William Mallory Kent of Kent & McFarland, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ronald N. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0673
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    Ronald N. Johnson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Leon BRUNSON Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0083
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 25, 2018
    Leon Brunson Jr., pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Edward D. FARSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1246
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Maura J. Kiefer, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SILBERMAN, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jeremy HENRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2585
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018.
    Richard J. D'Amico, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and C. Todd Chapman, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, SLEET, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Todd KOZEL, Appellant, v. Ashley KOZEL, Inga Kozel, Gokana Trust, 3601 Setai LLC, and 212 West 18 LLC, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D16-4853
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 4, 2018.
    John G. Crabtree, Charles M. Auslander, and Brian C. Tackenberg of Crabtree & Auslander, Key Biscayne, for Appellant.
    Jeffrey D. Fisher and Zachary R. Potter of Fisher Potter Hodas, P.L., West Palm Beach; Steven L. Brannock, Philip J. Padovano, and Joseph T. Eagleton of Brannock & Humphries, Tampa, for Appellee Ashley Kozel.
    No appearance for remaining Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, LUCAS, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Daniel BRUNER, DOC# Y13297, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4181
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and William L. Sharwell, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Elba Caridad Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Raymond WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3827
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SILBERMAN, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Dwight ROSS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2589
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wendy Buffington, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jevon GIBSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4383
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Raymon Leroy MYERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5081
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and J.L. "Ray" LeGrande, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Brandon R. Christian, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SILBERMAN, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Sergio V. BENCOMO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5122
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018.
    Patrick B. Calcutt of Calcutt & Calcutt P.A., Americus, Georgia, and Dana A. Friedlander, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Linsey Sims-Bohnenstiehl, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, SLEET, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Nichole Cherie GOFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1571
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Robert D. Rosen, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KHOUZAM, LUCAS, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Corey Joshua ROCKER, DOC# C04890, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1951
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018
    J. Jervis Wise and Bjorn E. Brunvand of Brunvand Wise, P.A., Clearwater; Michael P. Maddux of Michael P. Maddox, P.A., Tampa; and Jennifer Salter of Michael P. Maddox, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katelyn B. Wright, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa; and Anne F. McDonough, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Richard CAHOON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2861
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Johnny T. Salgado, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    T.M., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-323
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew Overpeck, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, SLEET, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ricky Joe DOUGLAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3232
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Clark E. Green, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SILBERMAN, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Carroll Lee DEMOSS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3538
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 27, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and BLACK and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Marquis Eric WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5190
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 9, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew D. Bernstein, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laurie Benoit-Knox, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and BLACK and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Abrion M. WITCHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2891
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 9, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, CRENSHAW, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.