author: CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

text:
    Marc B. DANIELS, Sandra Daniels, Crocker & Associates, Inc. f/k/a D & D Environmental, Inc. and Maxx Investments, LLC v. J. Dennis CROCKER, Gail Crocker, Crocker, Ltd., a South Carolina Corporation and Generational Equity, LLC
    NO. 2016-CA-00566-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    06/08/2017

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: ROY H. LIDDELL
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: ERIC F. HATTEN, CHRISTOPHER D. MEYER, RICHARD L. FARLEY, REBECCA K. LINDAHL
    BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., KITCHENS AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
   CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This appeal arises from a breaeh-of-contract action between Mare Daniels, Sandra Daniels, Crocker & Associates, Inc., and Maxx Investments, LLC (collectively, “the Danielses”) and Dennis Crock-er, Gail Crocker and Crocker, Ltd. (collectively, “the Crockers”). The Danielses entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement (the “Agreement”) with the Crock-ers to acquire Crocker & Associates, Inc. (“C & A”) on March 31, 2011. Within eighteen months of the sale, C & A lost a number of important contracts and its employees resigned.

¶ 2. The Danielses then sued the Crock-ers for failing to disclose all material information about C & A as required by the Agreement. The Crockers answered the suit and brought counterclaims against the Danielses. After extensive discovery, the trial court granted the Crockers’ motion for summary judgment on the Danielses’ claims against them. The Danielses now appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. After review of the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part the grant of summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. In 1969, Dennis Crocker cofounded Aqua Aerobic Systems (“Aqua”), an applied engineering business that provides solutions to municipal and industrial wastewater and water-treatment customers. In 1977, Dennis left Aqua and founded C & A in Rock Hill, South Carolina. Despite leaving Aqua, Dennis retained his minority shareholder’s interest in Aqua as well as a seat on Aqua’s board. C & A was a sales representative firm for manufacturers of water and wastewater-treatment equipment. It represented Aqua exclusively in several territories—Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and portions of Florida and Tennessee. Aqua guaranteed these territories to C & A by entering into contracts for each territory; the contracts were terminable with thirty days’ notice. Since its founding, C & A was regularly Aqua’s number one representative firm in sales. Aqua represented fifty to seventy percent of C <& A’s revenue, depending on the year.

¶ 4. C & A’s business model functioned on a long cycle. From the time it booked a project until it received the commission from the booking was, generally, twelve to eighteen months. Therefore, it was possible to look at a base year of bookings and project a picture of future revenue twelve to twenty-four months in the future,

¶ 5. Dennis retired from C & A' in 2003 and turned over the management of C & A to his wife Gail Crocker; later, in 2010, he gave Gail fifty percent of his interest in C & A. While Gail testified that she was “scared to death” that Aqua would cancel its contracts with C & A after Dennis retired, Aqua did not cancel its contracts with C & A until years later after C & A was sold.

¶ 6. In 2010, Marc Daniels, a certified public accountant (CPA), reviewed an offering memorandum for C & A. Generational Equity (“GE”), a business broker, had compiled the memorandum based on information it had received from the Crockers. After reviewing the offering memorandum, Marc and his brother Stephen Daniels, met the Crockers in South Carolina for an initial due-diligence meeting.

¶ 7. After the initial meeting, the Crock-ers provided the Danielses with financial disclosures of past revenue and present bookings at the request of the financial institution that was going to finance a portion of the transaction. Over a period of months, the Crockers and the Danielses exchanged financial information concerning C & A, negotiated, and settled on a purchase price of $4,000,000 for C & A. Of this figure, $2,800,000 was financed by a bank, and the remaining $1,200,000 was owner-financed by the Crockers.

¶ 8. On March 23, 2011⅞ eight days before the parties signed the Agreement, Dennis attended an Aqua board meeting at which the sale of Aqua was discussed. Dennis did not disclose'this to the Daniels-es.

¶ 9. The Danielses and the Crockers entered into the Agreement on March 31, 2011. On May 1, 2011, Marc—through Maxx Investments—agreed to pay $365,000 to the Crockers for Crocker, Ltd.’s goodwill.

¶ 10. In October 2011—seven months after the sale of C & A and after the possibility of selling Aqua had dissipated, Dennis requested that Aqua redeem his stock. Aqua redeemed the stock in December, and Dennis retired from Aqua’s board. In June 2012, Aqua canceled its representation contract with C & A for North and South Carolina. Soon after this, C & A’s sales representatives resigned, and C & A lost its remaining contracts with Aqua.

¶ 11. On October 11, 2012, the Danielses filed suit in Madison County circuit court against the Crockers, alleging that the Crockers had breached the Agreement by not disclosing “all material information relating to [(C & A)] or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.” The Crockers answered the complaint and alleged counterclaims against the Danielses. The parties took several depositions and conducted discovery. The Danielses also designated Robert Cunningham as an expert. Cunningham was deposed and prepared an expert report.

¶ 12. In December 2014, the Crockers filed a motion for summary judgment on the Danielses” claims against them. On May 5, 2015, the trial court granted the Crockers’ motion for summary judgment (the “May 5 order”). The Danielses filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to certify the May 5 order under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The trial court denied the motion, specifically denying both the reconsideration and the certification.

¶ 13. Next, the Danielses and the Crock-ers filed competing motions for summary judgment on the Crocker’s counterclaims. On January 8, ’ 2016, the trial court resolved the motions. On April 6, 2016, pursuant to the Danielses’ renewed motion, the trial court certified its earlier May 5 order. The trial court also stayed the proceedings “pending the appeal” of the May 5 order.

¶ 14. The Danielses now appeal a number of issues that each relate to the trial court’s grant of summary judgement in favor of the Crockers. We will first address where the trial court erred in granting summary judgment before addressing where the trial court properly granted summary judgment.

¶15. The Crockers also cross-appealed the trial court’s stay of their claims against C & A. By order filed March 2, 2017, this Court granted the Crockers’ unopposed motion to dismiss their cross-appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Due to the factually intensive nature of this appeal and the extensive record, additional facts and procedural history will be related throughout the analysis as necessary. •

STANDARD OP REVIEW

¶ 16. We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Mitchell v. Ridgewood E. Apartments, LLC, 205 So.3d 1069, 1073 (Miss. 2016) (citing Borries v. Grand Casino, Inc. 187 So.3d 1042, 1045 (Miss. 2016)). Under Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,,together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue,as.to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists is on the moving party and “the non-moving party should be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt” Borries, 187 So.3d at 1046. “The evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Mitchell, 205 So.3d at 1073 (citing Stribling Inv., LLC v. Mike Rozier Constr. Co., Inc., 189 So.3d 1216, 1219 (Miss. 2016)).

ANALYSIS

¶ 17. Due to the Crockers’ argument on the issue, we initially note that Cunningham’s expert testimony and report is properly before the Court. It was not challenged in the trial court, below other than argument of counsel at the summary judgment hearing. We consistently have held that we “will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.” Anderson v. LaVere, 136 So.3d 404, 410 (Miss. 2014) (citing Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Danos, 46 So.3d 298, 311 (Miss. 2010)); see Alexander v. Daniel, 904 So.2d 172, 183 (Miss. 2005) (recognizing “the practical ef-feet of depriving the trial court of the opportunity to first rule on the issue.”); see also Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Peacock, 972 So.2d 619, 626 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (noting the lack of any Daubert challenge at the trial level). The report and testimony is in the record before us. To exclude it would require us to make a determination as to its admissibility de novo. Our settled review for the admission or exclusion of expert witnesses, though, is a review for an abuse of discretion. See Patterson v. Tibbs, 60 So.3d 742, 748 (Miss. 2011).

¶ 18. “The law by which a contract is to be governed is that which parties intended or may fairly be presumed to have intended.” Cox v. Howard, Weil, La-bouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., 619 So.2d 9Q8, 911 (Miss. 1993). Here,, the Agreement’s choice-of-law provision reads:

(d) Law Governing. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of the State of South Carolina without regard to the choice of law principles of the State of South Carolina.

Given this provision, we will apply South Carolina law to the contract between the Danielses and the Crockers.

¶ 19. As a “[c]hoice of law analysis arises only when there is a true conflict between the laws of "two states,” we will apply Mississippi law to the remainder of the Danielses’ claims. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 920 So.2d 427, 432 (Miss. 2006). There is no “true conflict between the laws of’ Mississippi and South Carolina on any of the Danielses’ noncontrac-tual claims. Id.

I. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the Dan-ielses’ . contract, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, and punitive damages claims.

¶ 20, Because the record contains a genuine issue as to material fact concerning the Danielses’ contract claims and negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on these claims. Further, because we are remanding claims to be tried by a jury to determine if the Danielses aré entitled to compensation, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the punitive damages claim.

A. Contract

¶21. In South Carolina, “[a]n action for breach of contract is an .action at law.” Lee v. Univ. of S.C., 407 S.C. 512, 757 S.E.2d 394, 397-(2014), “To recover for a breach , of- contract, the . plaintiff must prove:. (1) a binding contract; (2) a breach of contract; and (3) damages proximately resulting from .the breach.” Hennes v. Shaw, 397 S.C. 391, 725 S.E.2d 501, 506 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Fuller v. E. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 240 S.C. 75, 124 S.E.2d 602, 610 (1962)). Under South Carolina law, “[t]he primary concern of the court interpreting a contract is to give effect to the intent of the parties.” N. Am. Rescue Prods., Inc. v. Richardson, 411 S.C. 371, 769 S.E.2d 237, 240 (2015). “A contract is ambiguous when it is capable of more than one meaning or when its meaning is unclear.” '• Id. “If a contract’s language is unambiguous, the plain language will determine the. contract’s force and effect.” Id.

if 22. The warranty provision at issue here governed the Crockers’ duty to disclose material information to the Daniels-es. The warranty stated:

8. Representations and Warranties of the Seller. To induce the Buyer to enter into this Agreement, the Seller and the Crockers make the following representations and warranties:
(m) Material Fact. No representation or warranty by the seller contained in this Agreement, and no statement contained in the schedules or any other document, certificate or other instrument delivered or to be delivered by or on behalf of the Seller, pursuant to this Agreement, contains or will contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omits or will omit to state any material fact necessary, in light of the circumstances under which it was or will be made, in order to make the statements herein or therein not misleading. The Seller has disclosed to the Buyer all material information relating to the Business or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement....

(Emphasis added.) The terms “material fact” and “material information” are not defined within the Agreement. The Agreement, though, is not ambiguous.

¶23. Therefore, we look to the plain language of the words to interpret the Agreement. A “fact” is “[something that actually exists .... Facts include not just tangible things ... but also states of mind such as intentions .... ” Fact, Blacks Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). A “material fact” is one “that is significant or essential to the issue or matter at hand; esp., a fact that makes a difference in the result to be reached in a given case.” Id. “Material information” is “[ijnformation that would be important to a reasonable investor in making an investment decision.” Id.

1. 2010 Drop in Bookings

¶ 24. The Danielses claim the Crockers failed to disclose a forty-two-percent drop in C & A’s bookings in 2010. The Crockers claim that their disclosures to the Danielses were sufficient; they argue that the Danielses knew the number of projects that had been booked in 2010 and could extrapolate the amount of expected future revenue from those bookings. We find, though, that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Crockers disclosed “all material information” concerning C & A’s drop in bookings.

¶ 25. The offering memorandum—compiled from information GE received from the Crockers—discussed C & A, its financial history, and its industry. The memorandum also included past revenue numbers for C <& A as well as revenue predictions. The offering memorandum showed a 26.5 percent decrease in revenue for 2010 but predicted a 17.9 percent growth for 2011. In her deposition, Gail admitted that “the Offering Memorandum was prepared based primarily upon information that Dennis and I provided to Generational Equity. The Offering Memorandum contains historical income figures of [C & A] and also projected future performance. I provided the projected future performance numbers.” A genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the Danielses could have been aware of a drop in bookings in 2010 from the information in the offering memorandum.

¶ 26. Marc’s and Gail’s affidavits demonstrate multiple genuine issues of material fact as to whether Marc was aware of C & A’s drop in bookings in 2010. Marc denied that Gail and Dennis had told him about a drop in bookings at C & A. He claimed, “Neither Gail nor Dennis disclosed that bookings in 2010 had dropped precipitously—by over 40%—either at the [October 2010 due diligence] meeting in Rock Hill or at any other time before the sale of [C & A].” Gail claimed to have told Marc that bookings had dropped in 2010. In her affidavit, she alleged, “At this meeting, we also told Marc that 2010 sales or bookings were lower than usual, and I explained to him the reasons for that. Marc clearly understood that 2010 was a down year in sales for [C & A].”

¶ 27. As part of the documents requested by the lender, the Crockers sent an outstanding commissions report, dated November 30, 2010, that showed the number of bookings that were booked and uncollected by C & A. In his affidavit, Marc addressed the November 2010 report provided by the Crockers:

Th[e] report’ ... does not-and did not-convey to me' the decline in bookings from 2009 to 2010 or the alarming trajectory of [C & A’s] prospects, as it was only a snapshot of bookings as a point in November before year end and, in the absence of any disclosures[ ] of any history of orders in prior years, no context was provided even for the limited information that was provided. Nor was this raw November 2010 orders data supplied with any explanation that would have led me to look critically or more closely at 2010 bookings and their impact on revenues in the next two years.

¶28. Thus, it is undisputed that the Crockers did disclose some information concerning C & A’s actual bookings, in 2010. However, factual questions are evident in the record that must be resolved by a jury as to whether the disclosures revealed 2010’s actual drop in bookings and its severity.

¶29. Further, correspondence that Gail did not disclose to the Danielses, which she had sent to the C & A staff, evidences knowledge of both a drop in 2010 bookings and its severe-effect on the-business. On September 1, 2010, -to the C & A sales representatives, Gail -wrote,

I regret to have to inform you that Melissa is no longer with us. The decision was strictly an economic one and did not come easy. As a result of the slump in bookings this year, I found it necessary to start preparing for a potential cashflow problem next .year.

(Emphasis added.) The next day, on September 2, 2010, again, to the sales representatives, Gail wrote, “It’s not a secret that our 2010 year to date is very slim (understatement);” On January 19, 2011— months before the sale to the Danielses, Gail sent a year-end memorandum to the sales force. In the memorandum, Gail wrote, “As we are all aware, our 2010 bookings were pretty sad, however, without belaboring the point, let’s just all breathe a sigh of relief that 2010 is now over.”

¶ 30. Gail acknowledged that the drop in bookings from 2009 to 2010—more than forty percent—was “fairly dramatic.” When questioned about whether she told the Danielses about the effect that yearend 2010 bookings would have on revenues, she responded, “No, nor did he ask.”

¶ 31. The Danielses also offer evidence concerning the materiality of the failure to disclose the 2010 drop in bookings. Brandy Hefner, a credit analyst vidio assisted in underwriting the Danielsés’ loans to purchase C & A, testified that no one informed her that there had been a slump in bookings at C & A. She further testified that a decline in bookings would be the type of information that she would expect a seller to disclose, and if it had been disclosed, she would have disclosed it to the financial institution issuing the loan for its consideration.

¶32. Lastly, .Cunningham’s testimony and report demonstrated that (1) the Dan-ielses’ due diligence was sufficient and (2) the Danielses suffered damages due to the Crockers’ failure to disclose material information about the 2010 drop in bookings. Cunningham testified that the Crockers “could have been ..'. more forthcoming.” Overall, Cunningham felt that Marc had “performed reasonable due diligence.” Further, Cunningham’s report showed that the Danielses had paid $2,915,000 in ■excess of the estimated fair market value of C & A. .

¶ 33. The trial court’s reliance on Gardner v. Little, 755 So.2d 1273 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000), for the proposition that the Danielses had ample time “to investigate the financial status” of C & A was error. In Gardner, the addendum to the purchase agreement provided: “Sellers do not warrant the absolute accuracy of any financial statements, and Purchasers are not relying ■on any of same to consummate this transaction.” Id. at 1274. Here, though, “to induce the [Danielses] to enter into this Agreement,” the Crockers specifically warranted that “[n]o representation or warranty ... in this Agreement ... omits or will omit to state any material fact necessary, in light of the circumstances under which it was or will be made, in order to make the statements herein or therein not misleading.” The Crockers also warranted that , they had “disclosed to the Buyer all material information relating to the Business or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.” In Gardner, the sellers included a disclaimer concerning the accuracy of the information. Id. Gardner is distinguishable here where the Crockers claimed both that the information disclosed was accurate and that they had disclosed all material information.

¶ 34. Gail and Dennis assumed a contractual duty to disclose the 2010 drop in bookings. The evidence in the record demonstrates a- factual dispute for the jury to resolve as to whether the actual 2010 drop in bookings and Gail’s communication with the sales staff (or at least the substance of its contents) were material information under the agreement that should have been disclosed. We reverse the' trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue of whether or not the Crockers complied with their duty to disclose all' material information,

2. Aqua’s Decision to Solicit Purchase Offers

¶35. The Danielses claim., that the Crockers failed to disclose the fact that Aqua’s board had approved a valuation exercise eight days before C & A was sold. Dennis admits that he did not disclose the valuation but argues that it was not material information related to C & A’s value, especially since Aqua never sold. We find that the evidence in the record demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact both as to value and causation and as to C & A’s demise.

¶ 36. Dennis knew that Aqua was accepting purchase offers as a means of valuation and gauging the possibility of‘a future sale. Answering when he first became aware of an “ownership transition plan,” Dennis stated, “That was March 23rd, 2011, in the board meeting.” This was eight days before the Crockers sold C & A to the Daniels. Dennis described the meeting: “There was a discussion about ... go[ing] to five or six different companies ... to ascertain what value [Aqua] might have and based on the valuations as to whether or not [Aqua] might be interested in selling.” Aqua received board approval to proceed. The record does not indicate that any board member either abstained, or voted against the decision. It is undisputed that Dennis considered his obligations to the Danielses:

I did consider the position that it put me in, and I wondered what I could do about it, but I was in a fiduciary responsibility and a secrecy agreement with [Aqua] that I could not violate, and if. I did so, it would be at the risk of even ,a lawsuit from them back at me.

Dennis stated that he did not consult a lawyer about his obligation to the Daniels-es. He did state, however, that he spoke with Robert Wimmer, Aqua’s chief executive officer, about possibly informing the Danielses of Aqua’s valuation. Recounting his conversation with Wimmer, Dennis stated,

He told me I had a fiduciary responsibility to [Aqua] that superceded any other responsibility, that I was sworn to secrecy, and that if I divulged the information I had and that it ultimately damaged him with his rep force in the field, that I could expect legal action from him.

¶ 37. However, Wimmer did not remember the conversation that' Dennis claimed to have had’with him. Also, Wimmer testified that he was not sure when he found out that Dennis was selling C & A and did not believe that he “knew anything about it” on March 23, 2011. Wimmer testified in his deposition that “in[ ] executive session ... the shareholders and directors that were present [were told] that [Aqua] might entertain selling the business.” He acknowledged that Dennis was present at the meeting. He also testified that Dennis “[f]rom that day on” was privy to the discussion about ownership transition decisions.

¶38. We find a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Crockers’ failure to disclose Aqua’s valuation caused or contributed to the demise of C & A and subsequently damaged the Danielses. In his affidavit, Marc claims that he would not have gone through with the transaction had he known about Aqua’s marketing. He.ayers that,.news of Aqua’s marketing destabilized C & A’s sales representatives when they heard about it from a competitor. According to Marc, C & A’s sales representatives were worried about whether. Aqua would continue its contracts with C & A if it was bought by an investor with allegiances to other representative firms. Many of Marc’s claims are disputed, but, as with all disputes of fact, that is a determination for the jury.

¶ 39. A genuine issue of material fact also exists as to whether the failure to disclose Aqua’s decision to solicit purchase offers was material. Throughout the record, the parties agree that Aqua represented fifty to seventy percent of C & A’s annual revenue. Further, Cunningham testified that the actions of Aqua’s board at the March 23 meeting “change[d] everything” and “ehange[d] the valuation .substantially.” Also, he testified that thé decision .to sell- Aqua was a “material event.” He found the decision to sell Aqua “extremely relevant” and could not “see how anyone [could] argue that it was not a material fact that [Aqua] had been put up for sale.” Also, Hefner testified that the decision of Aqua’s board to market Aqua “would have been information that I would have needed to provide to the loan officer.”

¶ 40. Cunningham’s report and- testimony also demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the Danielses suffered damages. Cunningham’s report concluded that the Danielses paid $2,915,000 in excess of the estimated fair market value. Also, Cunningham’s testimony reaffirmed Marc’s claim that he would not have purchased C & A had he known Aqua’s leadership was considering selling.

¶ 41. We acknowledge that Dennis was in a difficult position within the bounds of corporate law, but it .was of his own making. He willingly warranted that he had disclosed all material information related to C & A to the Danielses despite not disclosing the information subject to the duty of confidentiality to Aqua he had assumed eight days earlier.

¶ 42. A director of a corporation owes duties to the corporation that he serves and, equitably, to its shareholders. Among these duties, a director owes a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. Derouen v. Murray, 604 So.2d 1086, 1092 (Miss. 1992); Omnibank of Mantee v. United S. Bank, 607 So.2d 76, 84, 90 (Miss. 1992). The duty of care is

a duty to perform the officer’s or director’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believe to be in the best interest of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.

Derouen, 604 So.2d at 1092.

¶ 43. The duty of loyalty—the duty at issue here—“arises in that the officer or director stands in a fiduciary relationship to his corporation and shareholders.” Id. Fiduciaries must be “held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). Further, the duty of loyalty “imports proscriptions on conflicts of interest.” Derouen, 604 So.2d at 1092. One such proscription is the duty to maintain the confidentiality of corporate information. See Brophy v. Cities Sen). Co., 31 Del.Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5, 7-8 (1949) (“A fiduciary is ... not to use on his own account information confidentially given him by the beneficiary or acquired by him during the course ... of the fiduciary relation or in violation of his duties as fiduciary ... unless the information is a matter of general knowledge.”); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 463 (Del. 1991) (“It is an act of disloyalty for a fiduciary to profit personally from the use of information secured in a confidential relationship.”).

¶44. Thus, Dennis was correct that he had a fiduciary duty to Aqua not to disclose the impending sale. Dennis assumed this duty to Aqua on March 23, 2011, at the board meeting. Eight days later, on March 31, 2011, he signed the Agreement with the Danielses that included the warranty that he had disclosed all material information relating to O & A.

¶ 45. There is enough evidence in the record to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dennis breached the Agreement by assuming a duty to Aqua and then warrantying to the Daniels-es that he had disclosed all material information to them. Dennis cannot use his duty to Aqua to shield himself from liability where he learned of material information due to his fiduciary relationship and eight days later warranted to a third party that he had disclosed all material information—despite withholding the confidential corporate information.

¶ 46. To be clear, the Danielses were not entitled—at any point—to Aqua’s confidential corporate information, but Dennis cannot now avoid all liability where he voluntarily assumed two conflicting duties. Indeed, per the Agreement, his warranty to the Danielses served to induce the Dan-ielses to purchase C & A. Dennis cannot mislead the Danielses, either affirmatively or through silence, and then attempt to avoid personal liability because of a preexisting obligation to Aqua not to disclose certain information. As a fiduciary, Dennis was obligated to Aqua before he voluntarily assumed a conflicting duty of disclosure to the Danielses.

¶47. This is not to say, though, that Dennis assumed any fiduciary duties to the Danielses; we merely hold Dennis-to his assumed contractual duty. Dennis’s testimony was clear that he weighed the threat of legal action by Aqua against not disclosing the information to the Danielses. In essence, Dennis chose his lawsuit. To be clear, he had options. He could have simply not warranted that he had disclosed all material information to the Danielses or warranted that he had disclosed only to the extent permitted by his fiduciary duties to Aqua. However, this obviously would have raised red flags and potentially affected the deal. This possibility does not relieve Dennis of his legal responsibility.

¶ 48. Dennis assumed a contractual duty to the Danielses to disclose all material information relating to C & A to the Dan-ielses. A genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether' or not Aqua’s decision to solicit purchase offers was material. Thus, the genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment here as well.

3. Dennis Crocker’s Intent to Sell His Stock

¶ 49. The Danielses also claim that the Crockers failed to disclose Dennis’s intent at the time of selling C & A to sell or redeem his stock in Aqua. The Crockers point out that Dennis did not seek to redeem his stock until seven months after the sale of C & A. Wimmer testified that the ownership transition decision, presented to Aqua’s board on March 23, 2010, included the sale of at least some of Aqua’s shares. Further, Dennis testified, “Heretofore, we had always presumed the only way that we would ever get the value for our stock would be to die- and our estate would get it.” He also testified that he had “really gotten anxious hoping that we would sell” Aqua because “[t]hat would represent quite a piece of money.” It is undisputed that Dennis did raise the issue of Aqua redeeming his stock once he was informed in October 2011 that Aqua was not going to be sold; Aqua redeemed Dennis’s stock in 2011. Thus, a genuine issue as of material fact exists in the record as to whether Dennis planned to sell his stock as part of the Aqua transaction or otherwise, before he sold C & A to the Daniels.

¶ 50. Further, Marc’s affidavit precludes summary judgment as to materiality. In his affidavit, Marc stated that, at the October meeting, “The Crockers touted the longstanding relationship Dennis had (and continued to have) with Aqua as founder, director and shareholder.” According to Stephen, Dennis represented that Aqua would not cancel its contracts as long as Dennis held his stock in Aqua. Stephen testified that Dennis, in response to a question as to whether or not Aqua would stop using C & A, said, “not as long as I own stock in it.” Regarding this representation, Cunningham testified that Dennis “implied ... that there was no inténtion of selling the company.” In his affidavit, Marc alleged that he would not have gone through with the purchase- of C & A had the sale of Dennis’s stock been discussed. Regarding the materiality of Dennis’s failure to disclose to C & A his plans to sell or redeem his stock, Marc claimed that “no other principal cancelled [C & A]. It was limited to Aqua. And the only thing that had changed was that there was no longer a Crocker connection.”

¶ 51. The Danielses assert that the Crockers’ words to the Danielses after the sale of C & A provided further evidence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether or not Dennis’s intent to sell his stock was material information under the Agreement. In a letter to Marc on January-26, 2012, after the sale of C <& A, Dennis wrote:

First, I have sold all of my stock in Aqua .... I no longer sit on the Board of directors .... I am no longer an asset for you there. The bond between [C & A] and [Aqua] no longer exists, I.e. [sic] C & Ais no longer a sacred cow. So you want to make sure that you are in their good grace. ... Without AQUA, YOU ARE DEAD !! Don’t ever lose sight of that.

(Emphasis added.) The fact that Dennis had viewed himself at Aqua as an asset to' the Danielses is some evidence of a genuine issue of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment.

¶ 52. Dennis must have had the intention to sell his stock before entering into the Agreement with the Danielses before signing the Agreement on March SI, 2011, for the Danielses to prevail on this issue. The evidence in the record demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact on this point. There is evidence that Dennis knew that the original transition plan- included the sale of his own stock. Once the transition plan fell through, Dennis pursued redemption of his stock, and Aqua redeemed his stock. There is also evidence that he communicated to the Danielses that his stock ownership in Aqua was significant to C & A’s success.

B. Negligent and Fraudulent Misrepresentation

¶ 53. The elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim are:

(1) a misrepresentation or omission of a fact; (2) that the representation or omission is material or significant; (3) that the person/entity charged with the negligence failed to éxercise that degree of diligence and expertise the public is entitled to expect of such persons/entities; (4) that the plaintiff reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation or omission; and (5) that the plaintiff suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of such reasonable reliance. ■

Saucier v. Peoples Bank of Biloxi, 150 So.3d 719, 731 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Hazlehurst Lumber Co. v. Miss. Forestry Comm’n, 983 So.2d 309, 313 (Miss. 2008))..These “elements must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” Holland v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 3 So.3d 94, 101 (Miss. 2008).

-[21] ¶ 54. The elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim are:

(1) a'representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality, (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, (5) his intent that it should be acted on by the hearer and in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity, (7) his reliance on its truth, (8) his right to rely thereon, and (9) his consequent and proximate injury.

Virginia, Coll, LLC v. Blackmon, 109 So.3d 1050, 1054-55 (Miss. 2013) (quoting Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, 18 So.3d 814, 831 (Miss. 2009)). These elements “must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Levens v. Campbell, 733 So.2d 753, 761 (Miss. 1999).

¶ 55. We have long recognized the principle that a party is liable for its silence where its silence “reláte[s] to material fact or matter known to the party ánd ... it is [the party’s] legal duty to communicate to the other contracting party,” Guastella v. Wardell, 198 So.2d 227, 230 (Miss. 1967). Further, “the duty to disclose is based upon a theory of fraud that recognizes that the failure of a party to a business transaction to speak may amount to suppression of a material fact which should have been disclosed and is, in effect, fraud.” Green Realty Mgmt. Corp. v. Mississippi Transp. Comm’n, 4 So.3d 347, 350 (Miss. 2009). Also, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a “party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated ... matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(b) (1977).

¶56. The record contains no evidence that the alleged fraud by the Crockers was overt in nature. However, the record contains enough evidence to reverse the grant of summary judgment on the Danielses’ fraudulent-misrepresentation claims due to the factual question of whether or not the Crockers’ silence about material facts was fraudulent.

1. 2010 Drop in Bookings

¶ 57. As set forth supra, a factual dispute exists as to whether or not the Crockers disclosed the previous history of C & A’s bookings that would have allowed the Danielses to discover the drop in bookings in 2010 and whether the Crockers knew that 2010’s low bookings would affect C & A’s future.

¶ 58. Sufficient evidence exists to establish a genuine issue as to whether or not the Crockers knew the drop in bookings would affect C & A’s finances, whether they failed to disclose their knowledge of the impact and whether this silence amounted to fraud.

¶ 59. Under Mississippi law, silence concerning a material fact may amount to fraudulent suppression of that fact where the silent party knows that its silence will be relied on by the other party. See Green, 4 So.3d at 350. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to both negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation on this issue.

2. Aqua’s Decision to Solicit Purchase Offers and Dennis Crocker’s Intent to Sell His Stock

¶ 60. Sufficient evidence is present in the record to create a genuine issue, of material fact concerning whether or not the Crockers are liable for misrepresentation on the issues of Dennis’s knowledge, the materiality of Aqua’s.decision to solicit purchase offers, and Dennis’s intent to sell his stock. While the evidence on the issue does not indicate fraud of an overt nature, the record demonstrates enough evidence to create a question for a jury as to whether the Crockers’ silence was, in fact, fraudulent. Dennis knew that Aqua had decided to solicit purchase offers when he signed the Agreement with the Danielses. There also is evidence that he knew any potential sale of Aqua would include his stock in Aqua. While Wimmer testified that the board of directors was “very surprised” by the proposal to sell Aqua, surprise is not enough to relieve Dennis and the Crockers of their legal duty to disclose once they knew of the proposed sale of Aqua and Dennis’s stock in Aqua. The Crockers had a duty to disclose'“matters ... that [they] kn[ew] to be necessary to prevent [their] partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading.” Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to both negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation on this issue.

C. Punitive Damages

¶ 61. In their amended complaint, the Danielses plead a claim for punitive damages. We find that the trial court erred in -granting summary judgment on this claim. To prevail on a claim for punitive damages, “the plaintiff ‘must prove that the breach was the result of an intentional wrong or that a defendant acted maliciously or with reckless disregard of the plaintiffs rights.’” T.C.B. Constr. Co. v. W.C. Fore Trucking, Inc., 134 So.3d 701, 704 (Miss. 2013) (quoting Pursue Energy Corp. v. Abernathy, 77 So.3d 1094, 1101 (Miss. 2011)) (“An award of punitive damages is an extraordinary remedy, reserved for the most egregious cases, and designed to discourage similar misconduct.”); see also Miss. Code Ann. § ll-l-65(l)(a) (Rev. 2014) (recognizing that punitive damages are proper only in cases of “actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or ... actual fraud.”).

¶ 62. Section ll-l-65(l)(b) provides that “[i]n any action in which the claimant seeks an award of punitive damages, the trier of fact shall first determine whether compensatory damages are to be awarded and in what amount, before addressing any issues related to punitive damages.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (l)(b) (Rev. 2014). As we are remanding several of the Danielses’ claims to be tried, it is appropriate here to reverse the grant of summary judgment on punitive damages. The issue of punitive damages should be addressed by the trial judge in accordance with Section 11—1— 65(l)(b) after- it is determined whether or not the Danielses are entitled to an award for compensatory damages.

II. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on the Dan-ielses’ indemnity and rescission claims as well as Marc’s and Sandra Daniels’ claims, individually.

¶ 63. The trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Crockers on the Danielses’ indemnity and rescission claims. Further, Marc’s and' Sandra’s claims, as individuals, fail as a matter of law.

A. Indemnity

¶64. The Danielses claim that they are entitled to indemnification by the Crockers pursuant to the Agreement. As already discussed, we will apply South Carolina law to the issues governed by the Agreement. See Miller v. Fannin, 481 So.2d 261, 262 (Miss. 1985).

¶65. “Contractual indemnity involves a transfer of risk for consideration, and the contract itself establishes the relationship between the parties.” Rock Hill Tel. Co. v. Globe Commc’ns, Inc., 363 S.C. 385, 611 S.E.2d 235, 237 (2005). The provision at issue states:

(a) Indemnification by the Seller. ... The Seller and the Crockers, jointly and severally, shall indemnify, defend, and hold Buyer harmless from, and reimburse the Buyer for, any losses, fees, costs, expenses, damages, liabilities, or claims (including, without limitation reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs) arising out of, based upon, or resulting from ... misrepresentations or inaccuracy contained in any representation or warranty of the Seller in this Agreement. ...
(b) Notice of Claims. The Buyer shall promptly give written notice of its claim to the Seller and the Crock-ers (collectively, the “Indemnifying Party”) whenever the Buyer shall have determined that there are facts or circumstances which render the Indemnifying Party liable for indemnification under this Section .... Such notice ... shall set forth in reasonable detail the basis for the claim, the ■ nature of the liabilities and the amount thereof, to the extent known.

(Emphasis added.) In their amended complaint, the Danielses did not allege that they “promptly g[a]ve written notice” of their claim to the Crockers. After a review of the record, we are convinced that the Danielses did not comply with this condition in the Agreement. Thus, the trial court did . not err in granting summary judgment on the Danielses’ indemnity claims against the Crockers. ■

B. Rescission

¶ 66. The Danielses also asked the trial court to rescind the sale of C & A. “Rescission of a contract is allowed in cases of, fraud, mistake, or material breach.” Jackson Motor Speedway, Inc. v. Ford, 914 So.2d 779, 783 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Cenac v. Murry, 609 So.2d 1257, 1273 (Miss. 1992)). To prevail on a claim for rescission of a contract, a party must “pro[ve] ... fraud by clear and convincing evidence.’-’ Ezell v. Robbins, 533 So.2d 457, 461 (Miss. 1988). Further, “[u]pon discovery [ ]of [the fraud], the one defrauded must act promptly and finally to repudiate the agreement.” Turner v. Wakefield, 481 So.2d 846, 849 (Miss. 1985) (citing Stoner v. Marshall, 145 Colo. 352, 358 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (1961)); see also Gardner, 755 So.2d at 1276 (recognizing a party’s duty, upon discovery of fraud, “to either promptly rescind the contract or affirm the contract and maintain an action in damages.”).

¶ 67. The Danielses’ claim for rescission fails as a matter of law. The Dan-ielses did not “act promptly and finally to repudiate the agreement” when they discovered the actions .that they believed were fraudulent. By January 26 2012, the Danielses knew about the 2010 drop in bookings, Aqua’s decision to solicit purchase offers and Dennis’s selling of his stock. However, the Danielses waited until October 2012 to attempt a rescission of the Agreement. While the delay does not affect their other claims, a claim of rescission requires “prompt” action. Therefore, the trial court did not 'err in granting summary judgment to the Crockers on the Danielses’ rescission claim because there was no genuine issue as to material fact as a matter of law.

c. Marc and Sandra Daniels’s Claims, Individually

¶ 68. Lastly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on Marc and Sandra Daniels’s claims as individuals. In Mississippi, % corporation is a separate, distinct entity from its stockholders.” Durham v. Univ. of Miss., 966 So.2d 832, 835 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Further, “an individual shareholder of [a company] does not have standing to pursue [a] claim for damages from an alleged breach” of contract. Id. These governing principles hold true in cases of fraud as well. See Schiff v. Mao, Inc., 31 So.3d 650, 652 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (“[Plaintiff] was never a party to the agreement that forms the basis of his fraud claim.”). Therefore, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was proper.

CONCLUSION

¶ 69. Because the record demonstrates genuine issues of material fact as to the Danielses’ contract, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, and punitive damages claims, we reverse in part the grant of summary judgment. Since the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the Daniels’s rescission and indemnity claims as well as Marc and Sandra Daniels’s claims as individuals, we also affirm in part the grant of summary judgment. We remand this ease to the trial court1 for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 70. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ„ CONCUR. DICKINSON, P.J., NOT . PARTICIPATING.

      . In early 2011, Marc formed D & D Environmental, Inc., to acquire the assets of C & A. At the time of the sale, D & D changed its name to C & A, and the original C & A changed its name to Crocker, Ltd, Where these legal distinctions are not relevant, we will refer to C & A throughout the opinion.

      . While Generational Equity is listed as an appellee in this appeal, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Generational Equity was not appealed and is unaffected by our decision.

      . There was no substantive motion to exclude Cunningham’s expert report or any of his testimony or opinions; there was also no ruling from the trial judge on the issue. We ■ cannot determine whether the trial judge, in granting summary judgment, considered his testimony and report insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact or simply did not consider the testimony and report at all.

      . Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phams., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed. 2d 469 (1993).

      . It is well-known that “one cannot serve two masters.” As the pioneering rock group AC/DC recognized, “He’s double dealing with your best friend / That’s when the tear drops start.”

      . The facts relevant to this issue that were discussed under the Contract- analysis, in (I)(A) abové, are incorporated by reference into this analysis.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: COLEMAN, JUSTICE,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Arlin George HATFIELD, III v. The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF MADISON COUNTY, Mississippi
    NO. 2016-CP-00616-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    08/10/2017

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: AR-LIN GEORGE HATFIELD, III (PRO SE)
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: KATHERINE BRYANT SNELL
    BEFORE WALLER, C.J., KING AND MAXWELL, JJ.
   MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. “ ‘[I]n construing a zioning ordinance, unless manifestly unreasonable, great weight should be given to the construction placed upon the words by the local authorities.’ ” And if the ordinance’s application is “fairly debatable,” the decision of the Board of Supervisors must be affirmed. Here, the Madison County Board of - Supervisors (the; Board) found Arlin George - Hatfield, III—who raised “chickens, guineafowl, and ducks”—violated a Madison County Zoning Ordinance (the Ordinance) section, which did not expressly permit raising and keeping fowl in residential neighborhoods. The Board’s decision was consistent with an earlier interpretation and application of the Ordinance section.

¶ 2. After review, based on the Board’s prior treatment of a similar matter and its construction of the applicable zoning law, we find the Board’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. And the interpretation was certainly not “manifestly unreasonable.” This Court also finds that, in light of the entire Ordinance, Hatfield had sufficient notice that keeping or raising fowl on residential property was prohibited. We therefore affirm the Madison County Circuit Court’s ruling, which affirmed the Board’s interpretation and decision.

Background Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3. In July 2012, Hatfield purchased Lot 1 in Phase 1 of Deer Haven subdivision in Madison, Mississippi. At some point after purchasing the lot, Hatfield began raising chickens, guineafowl, and ducks on the property.

¶4. According to Hatfield, in October 2013, he was sued by the Deer Haven Owners Association (DHOA). The claim stemmed from his supposed violation of subdivision covenants that prohibited keeping or raising fowl and constructing structures—such as pens and coops—without DHOA approval. Hatfield alleges that while this lawsuit was pending, DHOA contacted and involved Scott Weeks, an administrator with the Madison County Planning and Zoning Department. Weeks inspected Hatfield’s property on February 18, 2015, and found Hatfield was violating the “R-l Residential District” section of the Madison County Zoning Ordinance. The violation was based on Hatfield “keeping or raising poultry,” which is neither a permitted nor a conditional use under R-l zoning. Weeks followed up his inspection with a letter, dated March 13, 2015. The letter detailed the violation and advised Hatfield to remove the “chickens, guinea-fowl, and ducks.”

¶ 5. Weeks inspected Hatfield’s property twice more. His April 1 and April 13 visits revealed Hatfield had not removed the fowl. Again, Weeks sent a followup letter, this one dated April 13, 2015. The letter explained that, because Hatfield had failed to correct the violation, the matter would be presented to the Madison County Board of Supervisors (the Board).

¶6. On June 1, 2015, the Board heard presentations and recommendations from Weeks, County Attorney Mike Espy, Hatfield’s counsel, and DHOA’s lawyer. After considering the arguments, the Board voted unanimously to accept Weeks’s and E spy’s findings and recommendations. The Board found Hatfield had violated R-l zoning by keeping or raising around sixty “ducks, geese and other fowl” on his Deer Haven lot. The Board found these acts were neither a permitted nor a conditional use under R-l zoning. The Board also denied Hatfield’s request to continue to keep or raise fowl on the property.

¶ 7. Hatfield filed a Notice of Appeal and Intent to File Bill of Exceptions on June 10, 2015. He filed his Bill of Exceptions on August 19, 2015. In it, he argued the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, and was based on an unconstitutionally vague Ordinance section. The Board responded through its counsel, insisting its decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The Board urged its decision mirrored a previous similar ruling in another matter— that keeping or raising fowl was not a permitted or conditional use under R-l zoning. And the Ordinance section dealing with R-l zoning clearly listed the permitted uses, particularly when viewed in light of other sections. Sitting as an appellate court, the circuit judge found the Board’s decision was “fairly debatable,” supported by substantial evidence, and not arbitrary or capricious.

¶ 8. Hatfield now appeals to this Court. He argues: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence, and (2) Section 601 of the Madison County Zoning Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and therefore void.

Discussion

¶ 9. Zoning issues are “legislative in nature.” Thomas v. Bd. of Supervisors of Panola Cty., 45 So.3d 1173, 1180 (Miss. 2010) (citing Luter v. Hammon, 529 So.2d 625, 628 (Miss. 1988)). And “[z]oning ordinances should be given a fair and reasonable construction, in the light of their terminology, the objects sought to be obtained, the natural import of the words used in common and accepted usage, the setting in which they are employed, and the general structure of the zoning ordinance as a whole.” City of Gulfport v. Daniels, 231 Miss. 599, 604-05, 97 So.2d 218, 220 (1957). A key function of a county board, city council, or board of aldermen is to interpret its zoning ordinances. And “[t]he cardinal rule in construction of- zoning ordinances is to give effect to the intent of the lawmaking body.” Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Scales, 578 So.2d 275, 279 (Miss. 1991) (citations omitted). Local boards are in the most, advantageous position to interpret and apply local ordinances. That is why “[i]n construing a zoning ordinance ... great weight should be given to the construction placed upon the words by the local authorities.” Id. (citations omitted). But our courts are certainly not bound by a board’s interpretation of a local ordinance if it is “manifestly unreasonable.” Id. And we will reverse in such instances. . .

¶ 10. As to the ordinance’s application, this Court will affirm a board’s zoning decision unless it is clearly “arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, illegal, or without [a] substantial evidentiary basis.” Drews v. City of Hattiesburg, 904 So.2d 138. 140 (Miss. 2005) (citing Perez v. Garden Isle Cmty. Ass’n, 882 So.2d 217, 219 (Miss. 2004); Carpenter v. City of Petal, 699 So.2d 928, 932 (Miss. 1997)). If aboard’s zoning decision is “fairly debatable!,]” we will not reverse it. Id.

¶ 11. Justice Coleman recognizes this Court’s precedent but advocates we change the law and pursue a new approach. What he prefers is a purely de novo review, giving absolutely no deference to interpretations by local governing boards. We disagree with the wisdom of this suggestion. We also see no constitutional infirmity in our present law.

¶ 12. The first problem with this suggested change is that it overlooks the practical reality that, to resolve zoning issues, local governing boards must interpret ordinances to apply them. If we were to accept this logic to its ultimate conclusion, local boards would have to stop and run to the courthouse for guidance every time an ordinance-interpretation question arises.

. ¶ 13. Second, Mississippi’s law does not run afoul of Sections 1 and 2 of our Constitution. The Board is not overstepping its bounds into the judiciary’s role by interpreting local ordinances. The Board is simply acting within its own established role as creator and enforcer of local law. Similarly, by giving deference to a local board’s interpretation, we are not ceding our judicial power. In the cases that have applied a deferential standard of review, this Court has never suggested we lack authority to reverse a board’s decision. Instead, what we have recognized is the obvious—that a local board is in the best position to interpret its own local ordinances. Thus, by giving great weight to the Board’s interpretation, we ensure we stick to our constitutional role as the judiciary. And we restrain our branch from becoming a super-municipal board—a role that would certainly usurp the powers of the local governing body.

I. The Board’s Decision

¶ 14. With this standard in mind, the Ordinance clearly defines the permitted uses for each of the two relevant sections—A-l zoning under Section 501 and R-l zoning under Section 601. A-l zoning covers “Agricultural Districts,” while R-l zoning applies to “Residential Estate Districts.”

A.. Agricultural Districts

¶ 15. Article V, Section 501, of the Ordinance defines the . “LAND USES PER; MITTED” for A-l zoning. Section 501(F) permits A-l, zoned land to be used for “Breeding, raising, and feeding of livestock (i.e. horses, cattle, sheep, goats, mules, pigs, etc.), provided that each such animal hérein defined as ‘livestock’ shall be kept on a tract of land or lot of one (1) acre or land or greater.” And subsection (G) permits the “Breeding, raising and feeding of chickens, ducks, turkeys, geese, or other fowl!.]” '

¶ 16. So in Agricultural Districts, breeding, raising, and feeding fowl is an expressly permitted use,

B. Residential Estate Districts

¶ 17. The problem Hatfield-faces is that he lives in Deer Haven subdivision—which is not' zoned as an Agricultural District. Thus, the permitted uses under A-l zoning do not apply to his neighborhood. Instead, Deer Haven subdivision is zoned as a Residential Estate District. Thus, it is subject to the express permitted uses allowed under R-l zoning.

¶ 18. Article VI, Section 601 defines the “LAND USES PERMITTED” for R-l zoning. Section 601(D) states:

Breeding, raising, and feeding of grazing livestock (i.e. horses, cattle, sheep, goats’, mules, etc.), provided that each such animal herein defined as “grazing livestock” shall be kept on a tract of land or • lot of one (1) acre of land or greater. Barns, pens, corrals, and other buildings or enclosures for the keeping of livestock are permitted accessory uses, provided that such buildings or-enclosures (excluding open pastures) are located no closer than 50 feet from any adjoining property lines or existing street right-of-way line. ■ „

But unlike A-l zoning, R-l does not include breeding, raising, and feeding chickens, ducks, or other fowl as a permitted use.

¶ 19. The Board noted this obvious distinction and found Hatfield was in violation of Section 601, since keeping or raising fowl is not listed as a permitted use in R-l zoned areas like Deer Haven subdivision.

¶ 20. In construing R-l zoning’s permitted uses, the Board concluded “livestock” and “grazing livestock” did not include fowl. Hatfield claims this decision was arbitrary and capricious. As support, Hatfield points to deposition testimony .from the separate DHOA lawsuit. In that action, Weeks supposedly testified that he was uncertain what the phrase “grazing livestock” encompasses. Hatfield couples this deposition testimony—which is not a part of this record—with the Ordinance’s lack of exclusive definitions for “livestock” or “grazing livestock.” We find this interpretation is not “manifestly unreasonable.” .

¶ 21. In applying an ordinance, an arbitrary decision is one “not done according to reason or judgment, but depending on the will alone.” Thomas, 45 So.3d at 1181 (quoting Gentry v. City of Baldwyn, 821 So.2d 870, 873 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). A capricious decision is one “implying either a lack of understanding of or a disregard for the surrounding facts and controlling principles.” Id.

¶22. We find the Board’s decision to deny Hatfield’s request to continue keeping or raising fowl was not arbitrary, especially when viewed in light of Section 501. Weeks’s testimony in the DHOA lawsuit is not properly a part of this record. Nor does Hatfield provide authority to show Weeks’s interpretations of the Ordinance, in his DHOA lawsuit deposition, are binding. And the Board noted that, in addition to livestock, A-l zoned land expressly lists keeping or raising fowl as a separate, specific permitted use. But R-l zoned land— like Deer Haven subdivision—does not. So the Board’s decision that “chickens, gui-neafowl, and ducks” were not permitted on Hatfield’s residential property was not based on its. mere will, but was reasoned.

¶ 23. Nor was the Board’s decision capricious. The Board considered its past actions in interpreting and applying Section 601, which were consistent with this decision. The minutes specifically reference a previous distinct matter, Nancy Field v. Madison County Board of Supervisors, Civil Act. No. CI-2014-0140. There, the Board took the same position on Section 601—that keeping or raising fowl was not permitted on R-l zoned land.

¶ 24. Still, even if this Court had some uncertainty with the Board’s decision, where the issue is “ ‘[fjairly debatable’ [it] is the antithesis of arbitrary and capricious.” Fondren N. Renaissance v. Mayor & City Council of the City of Jackson, 749 So.2d 974, 977 (Miss. 1999) (citing Saunders v. City of Jackson, 511 So.2d 902, 906 (Miss. 1987)). And we find the Board’s decision is, at a minimum, fairly debatable.

¶25, We therefore find the Board’s decision was-supported by substantial evidence, was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and was unquestionably fairly debatable.

II. Constitutionality of Section 601 '

¶26. Hatfield also insists that, by not exclusively defining “livestock” or “grazing livestock,” Section 601 could be interpreted to include poultry, fowl, and/or birds. Thus, he suggests, Section 601 is unconstitutionally vague and lacks “clear notice and sufficiently definite warning of. that which is prohibited.” Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton v. Welch, 888 So.2d 416, 421 (Miss. 2004). We disagree.

¶ 27. Section 601 gives, the following examples, of permitted “livestock”—“(i.e. horses, cattle, sheep, goats, mules, etc.).” But Hatfield says these examples are not enough. He argues that because “livestock” and “grazing livestock” are used interchangeably, and the parenthetical contains the phrase “et cetera,” Section 601 gives no clear notice of what is considered “livestock.” This position is unreasonable. The listed examples are obviously limited to large, four-legged, hoofed animals—not “chickens, ducks, turkeys, geese, or other fowl[.]” And there is no reasonable interpretation to the contrary.

¶ 28. Still, Hatfield argues the Board’s decision and application of Section 601 is analogous to the circumstances faced in Welch and Nichols v. City of Gulfport, 589 So.2d 1280 (Miss. 1991).

¶29. In Welch, the City of Clinton’s Building and Zoning Inspector gave property owners verbal permission to build a tree house in their front yard. Welch, 888 So.2d at 425. But after giving permission, the City backtracked and sought to enforce a prohibition against accessory structures and uses in front yards. Id. at 419-20. In the midst of that municipal squabble, the City altered certain definitions— omitting the terms “accessory building or use” and replacing them with “accessory structure or use.” This ultimately led to confusion over the vague, unclear, and before then, never-used definitions for a “detached structure” and “use” thereof. Id. So this Court found “accessory building or use” to be vague and unclear. Id. at 427-28. Furthermore, the City was equitably estopped from initially granting permission to build the tree house, then changing its interpretation midstream. Id. at 426-27.

¶ 30. In Nichols, this Court found a City of Gulfport noise ordinance unconstitutionally vague. We found the decision whether a particular noise was “ ‘unnecessary,’ ‘unusual,’ or ‘annoying* ” involved a subjective standard—something that depended entirely on the ears of each complainant. Nichols, 589 So.2d at 1284.

¶ 31. Both cases are easily distinguished from this one. The question here is far simpler: Are the terms “grazing livestock” and “livestock,” along with the express examples, sufficient to notify Hatfield that keeping or raising fowl on his property was prohibited? Based on the Ordinance’s listed examples and the differing permitted uses for Agricultural and Residential Districts, the answer is yes.

¶ 32. And Hatfield’s situation differs from Welch, as the Board has consistently interpreted its Ordinance, and Hatfield was never given permission to keep or raise fowl. Nor is it similar to Nichols, since the Ordinance’s definition of “livestock” or “grazing livestock” is not unique to each property owner, resulting in a purely subjective definition.

¶ 33. Also important is the requirement that this Court not read zoning ordinance sections in isolation. See City of Gulfport v. Daniels, 231 Miss. 599, 608, 97 So.2d 218, 222 (1957) (zoning ordinances must be read in pari materia). Here, Article V sections, which control Agricultural Districts, immediately precede the Article VI sections dealing with Residential Districts. And Article V, Section 501(G), lists as a specific permitted use the “[bjreeding, raising and feeding of chickens, ducks, turkeys, geese, or other fowl[.]” But this specific permitted use is notably absent from those uses found in Section 601 for Residential Estate Districts.

¶ 34. Not only do the listed examples make clear that “livestock” or “grazing livestock” does not include fowl, but the differing express permitted uses of the two districts—A-l and R-l—put Hatfield on notice that keeping or raising fowl was not allowed on R-l zoned land.

¶ 35. We find the Ordinance is sufficiently clear that keeping or raising fowl, while expressly permitted in A-l zoned districts, is not permitted in R-l zoned districts. And the Board’s interpretation to this effect is not manifestly unreasonable.

Conclusion

¶ 36. The Board’s interpretation and decision, .finding that Hatfield violated Section 601 by keeping or raising fowl on his R-l zoned property, was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. Its decision was also, at a minimum, fairly debatable. Likewise, Section 601, when read in light of the entire Madison County Zoning Ordinance, gave Hatfield sufficient notice that keeping or raising fowl on his property was prohibited. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s decision.

¶ 37. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., KING, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY DICKINSON, P.J., AND KITCHENS, J.

COLEMAN, JUSTICE,

CONCURRING IN PART AND IN RESULT:

¶ 38. I concur with the majority’s analysis of today’s case with the exception that I am of the opinion that our standard of review when interpreting an existing zoning ordinance should be de novo. However, even under a de novo standard of review, I agree with the result reached by the majority, that is, that the ordinance in question does not authorize Hatfield to keep fowl on his property.

I. The Court’s standard of review as to the interpretation of the pertinent zoning ordinance should be de novo.

¶ 39. Hatfield contends that -the interpretation of the Madison County Ordinance 601 is a question of law and should be subject to a rife novo standard of review. Although we have held, in cases discussed moré fully below, that the courts should grant deference to local legislative bodies in their interpretations of ordinances, I disagree for two reasons. First, an overwhelming majority of our sistér states have held that reviews of interpretations of zoning ordinances are questions of law, and we consistently have maintained— even in zoning cases—that the standard of review for questions of law is de novo. Second, because the interpretation of ordinances is a question of law, .sharing the authority to interpret statutes and ordinances with another branch of government violates Article I, Section 2 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, which forbids the sharing of power between the three branches of state government. Because our cases in which we hold that deference should be afforded to the local' legislative body in interpreting ordinances create conflict with the usual de novo standard of review applicable to questions of law and, further, indicate that the Courts have ceded judicial power to other branches of government in violation of Section 2 of the Constitution of 1890, I would hold that henceforth we will review the interpretation of zoning ordinances rife novo. Of necessity, I would further overrule cases that indicate that the courts should give deference to the local zoning authorities when it comes to interpreting existing zoning ordinances.

A. The interpretation of zoning ordinances is a question of law.

¶ 40. I agree with the majority when it writes that, even in zoning cases, questions of law are reviewed de novo. (Maj. Op. at ¶ 9) (citing, inter alia, Drews v. City of Hattiesburg, 904 So.2d 138, 140 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2005)). However, I depart here from the majority, because the interpretation of ordinances presents a question of law. I am persuaded by authority from nearly half of our states—and one commonwealth—that have so described it. See, e.g,, Flat Rock Wind, LLC v. Rush Cty. Area Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 70 N.E.3d 848, 857 (¶23) (Ind. App. 2017) (“[A] review of the interpretation of a zoning ordinance is a question of law.”); River’s Edge Funeral Chapel and Crematory, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Tullytawn Borough, 150 A.3d 132, 139 (Pa. Commw. Ct, 2016) (“Whether a proposed use falls within a given zoning ordinance categorization is a question of law.”); Kobyluck Bros., LLC v. Planning and Zoning Comm’n of Town of Waterford, 167 Conm.App. 383, 391, 142 A.3d 1236, 1241 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016) (“Although the position of the municipal land use agency is entitled to some deference .,., the interpretation of provisions in the ordinance is nevertheless a question of law for the court....”); City of Dunwoody v. Discovery Practice Mgmt., Inc., 338 Ga. App. 135, 139, 789 S.E.2d 386, 390 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“The construction of a zoning ordinance is a question of law for the courts.”); RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. 2015) (acknowledging that the interpretation of an existing ordinance is a question of law subject to de novo review); Drummey v. Town of Falmouth, 87 Mass.App.Ct. 127, 128, 25 N.E.3d 907, 908 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (“Interpretation of the town’s by-law raises a question of law.”); Columbro v. Lebanon Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 424 N.J.Super. 501, 508, 38 A.3d 675, 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (“[T]he the interpretation of an ordinance is primarily a question of law.”); Sutton v. Town of Gilford, 160 N.H. 43, 57, 992 A.2d 709, 721 (2010) (“The construction of the terms of a zoning ordinance is a question of law, which we review de novo.”);- Aydelott v. City of Portland, 990. A.2d 1024, 1026 (¶ 10) (Me. 2010) (“The interpretation of a local ordinance is a question of law, and we review that determination de novo.”);' City of Mosier v. Hood River Sand, Gravel and Ready-Mix, Inc., 206 Or.App. 292, 302, 136 P.3d 1160, 1167 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (acknowledging that Oregon appellate courts review the construction of ordinances as a matter of law); Williams v. Dep’t of Bldg. Dev. Serv. of City of Springfield, 192 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (“Although the interpretation of a city ordinance is a question of law, the interpretation given to the language by the body in charge of its enactment and application is also entitled to great weight.”); Smith v. Bernalillo Cty., 137 N.M. 280, 285, 110 P.3d 496, 501 (2005) (“Interpretation of a zoning ordinance is a matter of law that we review de novo using the same rules of construction that apply to statutes.”); Heilker v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals for City of Beaufort, 346 S.C. 401, 552 S.E.2d 42 (2001), Brandon Charter Twp. v. Tippett, 241 Mich.App. 417, 421, 616 N.W.2d 243, 245 (2000) (stating that because party asked the appellate court to interpret a zoning ordinance, he presented the court “with a question of law subject to review de novo.”); Kirkpatrick v. Vill. Council for Vill. of Pinehurst, 138 N.C.App. 79, 85, 530 S.E.2d 338, 342 (2000) (“[Pjroper interpretation of a zoning ordinance is a question of law.”); Larsen v. Town of Colton, 94 Wash.App. 383, 394, 973 P.2d 1066, 1072 (1999) (“Interpretation of a zoning ordinance is a question of law.”); Schrank v. Pennington Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 584 N.W.2d 680, 683 (S.D. 1998) (“The meaning of terms in a zoning regulation is a matter of law for the court.”); Lauridsen v. City of Okoboji Bd. of Adjustment, 554 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Iowa 1996) (“Although we give deference to the board of adjustment’s interpretation of its city’s zoning ordinances, final construction and interpretation of zoning ordinances is a question of law for us to decide.”); Warren v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Fairfield, 255 Ill.App.3d 482, 486, 625 N.E.2d 1213, 1216, 193 Ill.Dec. 92, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“The construction of a zoning ordinance is a question of law, and the reviewing court may make an independent determination of questions of law.”); Ex parte Norwood, 615 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (“Construction of a zoning ordinance is a question of law....”); Kaiser v. Western R/C Flyers, Inc., 239 Neb. 624, 628, 477 N.W.2d 557, 560 (1991) (“The interpretation of a zoning ordinance presents a question of law.... ”); Hambleton v. Friedmann, 117 Wis. 2d 460, 461, 344 N.W.2d 212, 213 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (“The meaning of an ordinance is a question of law that we independently decide.”); Dampman v. City of Baltimore, 231 Md. 280, 284, 189 A.2d 631, 633 (1963) (“It thus appears that this case presents substantially no conflict as to fact but merely a question of law involving the construction of the zoning ordinance with reference to special exceptions.”); City of Norwalk v. Auction City, Inc., 186 Cal. App.2d 287, 290, 8 Cal.Rptr. 781, 783 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (“The question of the construction of the ordinance is one of law.”); Mills v. Brown, 159 Tex. 110, 114, 316 S.W.2d 720, 723 (1958) (“The same rules apply to the construction of municipal ordinances as to the construction of statutes.”).

¶ 41. To be clear, some of the courts listed above give varying degrees of deference in interpreting zoning ordinances despite categorizing the interpretation as a matter of law. However, Mississippi courts should review them de novo. Again, in cases involving the interpretation of zoning ordinances, questions of law are reviewed de novo. The interpretation of an existing ordinance is a question of law, therefore the Court should review it de novo rather than with deference.

B. The interpretation of the law is a constitutional function of the courts, and sharing the power with other branches by giving deference to another branch’s interpretation of the law violates the separation of powers under the Mississippi .Constitution of 1890.

¶42. I agree with Hatfield when he urges the Court to examine the ordinance at issue de novo for an additional reason. The Mississippi Constitution of 1890 draws stark lines between the powers of the three branches of government. Section 1 reads, “The powers of the government of the State of Mississippi shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to-wit: 'those which are legislative to one, those which are judicial to another, and those which are executive to another.” (Emphasis added.) Following closely on its heels, Section 2 provides as follows:

No person or collection of persons, being one or belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others. The acceptance of an office in either of said departments shall, of itself, and at once, vacate any and all offices held by the person so accepting in either of the other departments.

To be sure, we have held that in certain limited situations, we have no authority under the Mississippi Constitution to interpret laws when the Constitution authorizes another branch to interpret those laws. See, e.g., Gunn v. Hughes, 210 So.3d 969 (Miss. 2017) (holding that the courts lack the constitutional authority to intervene in internal legislative procedure even when the procedures in question are prescribed by the Constitution);- In re Hooker, 87 So.3d 401 (Miss. 2012) (holding that a fa--cially valid pardon would not be set aside by .the courts on a claim that a constitutional procedural requirement had not been met). However, the existence of the exceptions does not change the general reality that it is the function of the courts to interpret the law.

¶ 43. Our cases make it clear. “The ultimate authority and responsibility to interpret the law, including statutes, rests with this Court.” Queen City Nursing Ctr., Inc, v. Miss. State Dep’t of Health, 80 So.3d 73, 84 (¶ 28) (Miss. 2011); see also Miss. State and Sch. Em/p. Life and Health Plan v. KCC, Inc., 108 So.3d 932, 939 (¶20) (Miss. 2013). Courts have the duty to determine what statutes provide. Lawson v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 75 So.3d 1024, 1027 (¶7) (Miss. 2011). Mississippi’s Constitution requires a “strict separation of powers.” Gunn, 210 So.3d at 972 (¶-13). If, as we held in cases such as Gunn, Hooker, and Hunt v. Wright, 70 Miss. 298, 11 So. 608 (1892), we must wholly refrain from exercising powers granted only to another branch of government, then surely we must embrace the inverse proposition and wholly exercise those powers and responsibilities conferred upon the courts. We cannot do so while we also defer the interpretation of statutes—or ordinances—to other branches of government. Accordingly, I would hold that the interpretation of positive pronouncements of law, such as statutes and ordinances, is a question to be reviewed de novo.

C. Because our cases in which we hold that deference should be afforded to the local legislative body in interpreting ordinances create a conflict with our continued claim that issues of law are review de novo in zoning cases and conflict with the separation of powers under Mississippi’s Constitution, we should overrule the cases affording deference in interpretation of questions of law.

¶ 44. The majority cites, inter alia, Drews v. City of Hattiesburg, 904 So.2d 138 (Miss. 2005), to establish a deferential standard of review for the interpretation of the ordinance at issue. (Maj. Op. at ¶ 10). In Drews, the question presented was not one of interpreting an ordinance to determine whether a proposed use of land was allowed or not, but whether the Hatties-burg Board of Adjustments acted properly when granting zoning variances. Id. at 139-140 (¶ 1). It is worth noting, however, that the Drews Court acknowledged that questions of law would be reviewed de novo. Thomas v. Board of Supervisors of Panola County, 45 So.3d 1173 (Miss. 2010), which the majority cites for the proposition that zoning issue are of a legislative nature, likewise concerned a decision by a zoning authority to zone land for one use over another. I take no issue whatsoever with affording deference to local authorities when making such decisions.

¶45. However, another line of cases affords deference to the local zoning agencies in the interpretation of zoning ordinances. For example, the Board of Supervisors relies on Roundstone Development, LLC v. City of Natchez, 105 So.3d 317 (Miss. 2013), in which one of the issues before the -court was whether an affordable-housing subdivision could be developed under then-existing zoning ordinances. Id. at 320 (¶ 11). Relying on Hall v. City of Ridgeland, 37 So.3d 25 (Miss. 2010), cited by the majority, the Roundstone Court reviewed the City of Natchez’s interpretation of its own zoning ordinance by giving it “great weight” and considering whether the city’s interpretation was “manifestly unreasonable.”

¶ 46. The Hall Court, in turn, relied on Columbus & Greenville Railway Company v. Scales, 578 So.2d 275 (Miss. 1991), in which can be found the genesis of our deferential review of the zoning authority’s interpretation of a zoning ordinance. At issue in Scales was whether a local zoning ordinance affected a railroad’s attempts to build additional tracks. The Scales Court relied on three cases from other jurisdictions in writing that courts should defer to local authorities’ interpretation of zoning ordinances: Drennen v. Mason, 222 Ala. 652, 133 So. 689, 691 (1931); Kordick Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Sarcone, 190 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 1971); and Daniel D. Rappa, Inc. v. Engelhardt, 256 A.2d 744, 746 (Del. 1969). Interestingly, the Scales Court’s adoption of the deferential standard was dicta-, in the very next paragraph the Court noted that “the board of supervisors of Leflore County has never been called upon to interpret this zoning ordinance and officially declare whether or not it applies to railroads.” Scales, 578 So.2d at 279. Nevertheless, the Court has in fact given deference to zoning authorities’ interpretation in later cases such as Roundstone and Hall. In doing so, the Court has at the least created a conflict within our caseslaw with the de novo standard of review for questions of law and, at most, ceded judicial powers to other branches of government in violation of Section 2 of the Mississippi Constitution. Accordingly, I would hold that the standard of review when interpreting existing zoning ordinances is de novo, and I would overrule cases that hold otherwise.

II. The plain language of the zoning ordinance does not authorize the keeping of fowl.

¶ 47. Reviewing the residential zoning ordinance de novo, rather than for arbitrariness, I nevertheless agree with the result reached by the majority and the lower court. Section 601(D) of Article VI of the Zoning Ordinance of Madison County, Mississippi, which' is applicable to Hatfield’s property, allows the “[bjreeding, raising, and feeding of grazing livestock (i.e., horses, cattle, sheep, goats, mules, etc.), provided that each such animal herein defined as “grazing livestock” shall be kept on a trad or lot of one ■ (1) acre of land or greater....”

¶ 48. Although the majority employs a different standard of review, I agree with its reasoning regarding the meaning of the words used in the ordinance. Although Hatfield cites a dictionary definition of the word livestock that includes poultry as an example, not all definitions do. For example, one dictionary defines the term livestock as “the horses, cattle, sheep, and other useful animals kept or raised on a farm or ranch.” Livestock, Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001). While the quoted definition does not explicitly exclude fowl, the focus matches that of the examples listed in the ordinance in that the examples are of four-legged, grass-eating mammals commonly thought of as pastured animals. The definition of the word grazing continues the theme. Grazing is defined as “to feed on growing grass and pasturage, as do cattle, sheep, etc.” Grazing, Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001). Also, the Board of Supervisors chose to preface its list of examples with “ie.,” which means “that is.” I.e., Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001). It is a more restrictive choice than the common alternative, e.g., which means “for example.” E.g., Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001). In choosing it, and then listing—as the majority points out—four-legged mammals, the Board evidenced the intent not to include fowl. Finally, Hatfield argues that the use of “etc.” at the end of the list of animals opens the definition of grazing livestock to fowl. While he is correct that the use of et cetera indicates the list is not exhaustive, the phrase denotes “more of the same sort, or class.... ” Et cetera, Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001). I agree with the majority that fowl are not of the same sort of class .as the animals listed in the Board’s definition of grazing livestock.

¶ 49. Pursuant to the foregoing, I concur with the majority as to every issue except, the standard of review for interpreting ordinances. However, even if viewed de novo, I am of the opinion that the ordinance in question does not authorize Hatfield to keep fowl on his property in Madison County. Accordingly and with respect I concur in part and in the result.

DICKINSON, P.J., AND KITCHENS, J., JOIN THIS OPINION. .

      . Hall v. City of Ridgeland, 37 So.3d 25, 40 (Miss. 2010) (quoting Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Scales, 578 So.2d 275, 279 (Miss. 1991)).

      . Saunders v. City of Jackson, 511 So.2d 902, 906 (Miss. 1987).

      .DHOA’s lawsuit is not part of this record. Insteád, Hatfield reférences the DHOA lawsuit in his Bill of Exceptions, and in his "Optional Record Excerpts” on appeal, as “Civil Action. No. 2013-1076, Madison County Chancery Court.”

      . The term "fowl” is used to refer collectively to “chickens, ducks, turkeys, geese, or other fowl ..as described in Article V, Section 501(G) of the Madison County Zoning Ordinance.

      . The same logic would apply to any administrative agency .that interprets its own regulations. Under the dissent’s view, we must also give no deference to agency interpretations. This would require we overrule other established precedent. E.g., Equifax, Inc. v. Mississippi Dep't of Rev., 125 So.3d 36, 41 (Miss. 2013).

      . Article VI, Section 602 defines the “CONDITIONAL USES AND STRUCTURES AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 2605” for R-l zoning. These conditional uses allow for expanded uses of R-l zoned land, subject to a conditional use permit. However, the keeping or raising of fowl is not a specified conditional use for R-l zoned land. And Hatfield makes . no argument on appeal to suggest otherwise.

      . Hatfield provides voluminous "Optional Record Excerpts” that include documents not in the record before tins Court. Throughout his arguments, Hatfield continually refers to other depositions, litigation, transcripts, and other material not properly part of this appeal. Hatfield also asserts the Board’s June 1, 2015, minutes do not correspond with his court reporter’s transcript. Yet Hatfield provides no specific discrepancies between his transcript and the Board’s minutes to show the Board “failed to adopt the recommendation of their Zoning Administrator or of their attorney.’’ So this argument is unsupported. Moreover, a Board can act only through its minutes. See Miss. Code Ann. § 19-3-27 (Rev. 2012); see also Butler v. Bd. of Supervisors for Hinds Cty., 659 So.2d 578 (Miss. 1995). And the record shows the Board’s signed minutes adopted the recommendations of Planning and Zoning Administrator Scott Weeks and County Attorney Mike Espy, who both asserted Hatfield was in violation of Section 601.

      . Hatfield suggests the Board's decision lacks substantial support, though he does not contest that he was keeping or raising fowl on his property. What Hatfield disputes is the number of fowl, claiming it was twelve to fifteen, not sixty, So his complaint really deals more with the supposed arbitrariness and capri- . ciousness of the. Board’s decision, not a lack of substantial evidence supporting it.