author: JOHNSON, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES in the Interest of E. R. and O. R. v. Kirk REDMANN
    NO. 17-CA-50
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    October 25, 2017

      COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPEL-LEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY, SERVICES IN THE INTEREST OF E. R. AND O. R., Paul D. Con-nick, Jr., Michael L. Ballero, Timothy P. O’Rourke
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, KIRK REDMANN, Michael A. Rosenblatt
    Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois, Marc E. Johnson, and Robert A. Chaisson
   JOHNSON, J.

11 This is a child support case in which Defendant appeals the juvenile court’s judgment finding that he owes $845.00 for child support expenses. In the judgment, the juvenile court granted Defendant a temporary reduction of his monthly child support obligations, but concluded he owed $1,345.00 for his proportionate share of extraordinary expenses minus a $250.00 credit for each of the two minor children. The juvenile court further determined that Defendant is not owed any reimbursement for any of the health insurance premiums he paid. For the following reasons, we vacate the juvenile court’s judgment and remand the matter for a new hearing.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

According to the record before us, the State of Louisiana Department of Social Services through the District Attorney for the Parish of Jefferson (“State”) began providing support enforcement services to Helen Redmann on January 11, 2006. As such, all child support issues between Helen Redmann and Kirk Redmann were transferred from the 24th Judicial District Court to Juvenile Court for the Parish of Jefferson.

This appeal arises from Kirk’s motion for reduction of child support and for future credit for amounts owed, which he filed in proper person on April 1, 2015. In his motion, he sought a reduction in the amount of monthly child support he owed for his two minor children on the basis he had been unemployed since January 31, 2015. He also sought.a credit for Helen’s proportionate share of health insurance premiums for the .children, that she allegedly had not paid. Kirk maintained that he had paid the totality of health insurance premiums for the children from September 2007 through March 2015 in the amount of $19,927, | adespite a court order dated December 16, 2002 in which Helen.was ordered to pay 46% of the premiums,

A hearing on the motion was held on July 9, 2015 before the hearing officer. The hearing officer recommended that Kirk’s motion to reduce child support be granted and that his child support obligation be reduced on an interim basis from $786 per month to $265.65 peí; month, retroactive to the filing date of April 1, 2015 once a permanent order was entered. The hearing officer also recommended that each parent be responsible for his or her percentage share of extraordinary medical expenses. The hearing officer did not address the issue of credits and instructed the parties to meet with the State to review the receipts submitted by each as they related to requested credits. Helen disagreed with the recommendation, specifically the interim reduction of child support, and a disagreement hearing before the juvenile court judge was set.

The parties appeared in proper person before Judge Barron Burmaster on August 10, 2015 for a disagreement hearing. Among the issues was who owéd whom what in terms of extraordinary medical expenses, school expenses, and other expenses incurred on behalf of the children over the past seven or eight years. Specifically, Kirk claimed Helen owed him over $9,000 for her proportionate share of health insurance premiums that he had paid for the children since 2007, and Helen claimed Kirk owed her approximately $9,000 for his proportionate share of other expenses she had paid on behalf of the children. Helen admitted that she had not paid Kirk her 46% proportionate share of health insurance,. but stated that she instead paid alb the additional necessary expenses for the . children which she Vindicated she documented by her canceled checks. Kirk challenged. Helen’s claimed expenses on the basis that either she had already been reimbursed for the expenses, the expenses Were ones covered by the basic monthly child support, or the expenses were not owed as child support.

During the hearing, Helen requested a continuance so she could retain counsel. The trial judge granted Helen’s requested continuance and set the interim child support owed by Kirk at $400 per month, as opposed to his prior obligation of $786 or the hearing officer’s recommendation of $265.65.

The parties again appeared in court on October 19, 2015 for the continuation of the disagreement hearing. Both parties again appeared in proper person, at which time, Helen advised the court that she .opted not to obtain counsel because of the cost. The parties discussed the documentation, namely spreadsheets, and lack of documentation provided by each to support his or her position and to controvert that of the opposing party. The trial judge noted that at that juncture, the only way for him to figure it all out was to bring -in a forensic, accountant, which he warned was very expensive. In an effort to avoid the expense of a forensic accountant, the trial judge instructed Helen to provide Kirk with “all her tax returns and everything,” including an itemized list of what • she claims Kirk owes her. He also instructed Kirk to show the court what'he has paid. Kirk again voiced his objection that some things included on Helen’s spi'eadsheet were non-covered ‘expenses and, therefore, not reimbursable.

. The court again continued the hearing on the issue- of credits pending further documentation by the parties relating to expenses incurred and paid. The court ordered Kirk to continue paying the reduced child support amount of $400 per month.

The' disagreement ‘ hearing resumed on November 30, 2015. The trial judge noted that the parties had yet to come to any agreement about the expenses and| 4 continued the matter in order for the- parties to provide a listing of everything they had paid .and any supporting documents to the court within two weeks. The parties indicated they had already submitted various documentation and the trial judge seemed to agree, stating that “there is a lot of paperwork here,” and at one point, referring to “two thick volumes in this Record.” He advised the parties to submit whatever' they had at that time and told them they had two weeks to supplement it. The trial judge stated that he would review everything arid either render his judgment on December 28, 2015 or order a forensic accounting.

Finally, on December 28, 2015 the disagreement hearing concluded with the trial judge rendering judgment on the issue of reimbursements and credits. ■ The trial judge stated that he had reviewed all of the documents submitted and found that Kirk’s share of the expenses owed was $1,345, minus a $250 credit for each child, resulting in $845 owed to Helen.’ Kirk requested an opportunity to retain counsel. The trial judge indicated that he had rendered judgment but would give Kirk three months to obtain counsel to file a motion to reconsider or appeal.

Kirk obtained counsel who subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the December 28, 2015 judgment on March 11, 2016, which was within the three-month time period set by the trial judge. The trial judge denied the motion to reconsider on June 20, 2016, and Kirk filed a motion for appeal on July 6, 2016.

ISSUES

■ Kirk raises several issues in challenging the trial court’s December 28, 2015 ruling. First, he argues the trial court erred in failing to introduce evidence presented by both parties into the record. Second, he maintains the trial court erred in determining the expenses paid1 by Helen fully satisfied her obligation to reimburse him for 46% of the health insurance premiums he paid. As such, he contends the trial court erred in determining that he owed Helen $1,345. Third, Kirk asserts the trial court failed to follow La. R.S. 9:315.5 when it only gave a|s single $250 credit per child as opposed for $250 per child per year for extraordinary medical expenses. Fourth, Kirk avers the trial court erred in failing to adjust his proportionate share when it granted his request for the reduction of his monthly child support obligation. And, finally, he argues the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion to reconsider the judgment.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE

In its appellee brief, the State argued that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the appeal is untimely, having been filed outside the 15-day time delay set.forth in La. Ch.C. art, 332. In response, this Court issued a Rule to Show Cause as to why the appeal should not be dismissed for untimeliness, to which Appellant filed a response.

In State v. Bye, 16-102 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/12/16); 191 So.3d 1207, this Court held that the 15-day time delay for filing an appeal set forth in La. Ch.C. art. 332 applies to the exclusion of the 30-day time delay set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 3942 in cases originating from Juvenile Court. In this case, the judgment at issue was rendered on December 28, 2015, with the notice of the signing of judgment being issued on December 30, 2015. Thus, Appellant’s motion for appeal, filed on July 6, 2016 appears untimely.

However, a review of the record reveals an error by the trial judge that was so prejudicial to Appellant that fundamental fairness and justice dictate we address the merits of this appeal. Specifically,' during the December 28, 2015 hearing, the trial judge stated oh numerous occasions ’that he was giving Kirk three months to obtain an attorney to file a motion to reconsider and that he would, in fact, entertain the motion.

Initially, we note that the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for a motion to reconsider with respect. to any judgment, and that such a motion is generally treated as a motion for new trial. Jynes v. Diddon, 07-1660, *3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/26/08); 978 So.2d 1261, n.3; Chance v. Chance, 00-1658 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/2/01); 784 So.2d 817, 822. In this case, Kirk’s motion to reconsider was clearly a motion for new trial. Because it was.filed'more than three days.after the mailing of the notice of judgment, it was untimely and-without legal effect. The law is clear — the filing of an untimely motion for new trial does not extend the delay period for filing an appeal, even if the trial court does not recognize that it is untimely, conducts a hearing and considers the motion for new trial. Nelson v. Teachers’ Ret. System, of La., 10-1190 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/11/11); 57 So.3d 587, 589-90.

Although the trial judge attempted to extend the appeal delays by giving Kirk three months to file'his motion for new trial, the law is again clear — a trial judge possesses no discretion or equitable power to extend the delay within which to, apply for new trial. Madere v. St. John the Baptist Parish, 04-1036 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/1/05); 900 So.2d 73, 77; Roan v. Roan, 38,383 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/14/04); 870 So.2d 626, 642; Gottsabend v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 273 So.2d 637 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). While we recognize that the trial judge was only trying to help Kirk, who appeared in proper person, the law does not allow the action taken.

However, the trial judge’s error in this matter is so egregious that it results in the miscarriage of justice. As such, we cannot, in good conscience, impute the trial judge’s error to Appellant. Under La. C.C.P. art. 2164, “[t]he appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal and proper upon the record on appeal.” Based on the circumstances-presented in the record, we find that fundamental| 7 fairness and the proper administration of justice dictate that we consider the merits of this appeal.

DISCUSSION

Upon review of the record, we find that we cannot address the propriety of the December 28, 2015 judgment because we cannot ascertain what evidence the trial court considered in reaching its decision. Evidence must be properly and officially introduced and accepted into evidence during a hearing before being considered by the trial court in deciding the merits of a case. See Touzet v. Mobley, 612 So.2d 890, 893 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993), writ denied, 614 So.2d 1263 (La. 1993). Courts of appeal are courts of trial record. This Means, for purposes of our review, the record consists of the testimony, exhibits and other evidence introduced during trial. Lewis v. Borne, 625 So.2d 273, 275 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).

While we recognize that evidentiary standards can be relaxed in certain juvenile court matters under La. C.E. art. 1101, child support is not listed among them. Additionally, there is no exception to the general rule that evidence must still be offered and accepted before being considered.

The record is replete with statements from the parties that they submitted various documentation. The trial judge further noted several times that the record was very thick with documentation. However, he also noted that the District Attorney’s file was different from the court’s file. There was apparent confusion among the parties as to how to submit the evidence, as demonstrated by Kirk’s statements on several occasions that he submitted certain documents to the clerk of court. Even Helen seemed uncertain as to the procedure noting, in response to the trial judge’s statement that he was giving them two more weeks to submit all documentation, that she had already submitted everything. The record shows that | sthe parties did not understand the trial court’s desire for additional documentation when they believed they had submitted everything.

The only exhibits in this appeal are certain documents submitted to the hearing officer on July 9, 2015. There is absolutely no indication of what exhibits, if any, were admitted during the August 10th, October 19th, and November 28th hearings and during the two-week period .the- trial court gave after the November 28th hearing.

When rendering its judgment, the trial court stated that it considered all the documents submitted during all the hearings and the subsequent two-week period, but it never identified any of the documents. Based on the record before us, it is unclear what documents, if any, were actually admitted into evidence. Thus, it is impossible for us to ascertain from the record before us how the trial court reached its determination that Kirk owed Helen- $1,345 and for what. Accordingly, we find it necessary to vacate that portion of the December 28, 2015 judgment and remand the matter for a new hearing. We caution the trial court during the hearing on remand to make clear what documents are accepted into evidence and which of the submitted incurred expenses, if any, it determines fall outside the basic child support obligation and are owed as necessary and/or extraordinary, taking into consideration each parties’ proportionate share.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate that portion of the juvenile court’s December 28, 2015 judgment finding Kirk Red-mann owes Helen Redmann $845 and remand the matter for a new hearing, on Kirk Redmann’s motion for credits.

JUDGMENT VACATED IN PART; MATTER REMANDED FOR NEW HEARING

      . The hearing officer noted that the current support order of $786 per month was entered on December 16, 2002. A copy of that judgment, which is repeatedly referred to throughout the record as a consent judgment, is not included in the appellate record despite a notation on the July 9, 2015 family support order recommendation indicating that Kirk provided the consent judgment as exhibit D-2.

      . Again, the 2002 judgment that purportedly set forth each parties’ proportionate share is not included in the appellate record; however, the parties do not appear to dispute that the 2002 judgment set Kirk's proportionate share at 54% and Helen’s proportionate share at 46%.

      . Courts should look through the caption of pleadings in order to ascertain their substance and to recognize the true nature of the pleadings. 9029 Jefferson Highway, LLC v. S & D Roofing, LLC, 13-588 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/14); 136 So.3d 313, 316.

      . See La. Ch.C. art. 332, "The delay for applying for a -new trial is three days, exclusive of holidays, and shall commence to run from the mailing of notice of judgment. A motion for new trial shall -be decided expeditiously and within seven days from the date of submission for decision.” Compare La. C.C.P. art. 1974 which provides for a seven-day time delay for applying for a new trial, which commences to run the day after the notice of judgment is mailed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHEHARDY, C.J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Alden CHAUVIN, Anyce Chauvin Lambert and Melvin A. Cannon v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, Valero Refining-New Orleans, L.L.C., Shell Pipeline Company, LP, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C., Parkway Pipeline & St. Charles Parish Sewerage District No. 1 Through the St. Charles Parish Council
    NO. 16-CA-609
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    October 25, 2017

      COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, ALDEN 'CHAUVIN, ANYCE CHAUVIN LAMBERT AND MELVIN Á; CANNON, Patrick W. Pendley, Jessica A. Perez '
    COUNSEL FOR. DEFENDANT/AP-PELLEE, SHELL OIL COMPANY AND SHELL PIPELINE COMPANY, L.P., Troy J. Charpentier, Jennifer J. Thomas
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/AP-PELLEE, AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS, INC., W. Scott Keaty, Joshua G. McDiarmid
    Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and Hans J. Liljeberg
   CHEHARDY, C.J.

liWe consider this appeal on remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court, and for the reasons that follow, we affirm the March 24, 2016 judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND

This appeal stems from a March 24, 2016 judgment in which the 29th Judicial District Court granted motions .for summary judgment filed by defendants-appel-lees, Shell Oil Company (“Shell Oil”), Shell Pipeline Company, LP (“Shell Pipeline”), Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (“Air Products”), Valero Refining-New Orleans, LLC (“Valero”), and Bengal Pipeline Company, LLC (“Bengal”), and- dismissed with prejudice the claims .■of plaintiffs-appellants, Alden Chauvin, Anyce Chauvin Lambert,, and Melvin Cannon. Plaintiffs appealed this judgment, but this Court dismissed their appeal as untimely. See Chauvin v. Shell Oil Co., 16-609 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/16/16), 204 So.3d 1100. We reached that conclusion based on the following.

The designated record before us reflects that the notice of judgment was mailed on March 30, 2016. Thus, in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1974, plaintiffs had until April 8, 2016 to file a motion for new trial, but did not file their motion until April 14, 2016. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2087(A)(1), a motion for devolutive appeal must be filed within sixty days of the expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial, if no application has been filed timely. Because we found plaintiffs’ motion for new trial had not been filed timely, plaintiffs had sixty days from April 8, 2016 to file a motion for appeal. We concluded plaintiffs’ motion for appeal, filed June 22, 2016, was untimely and dismissed the appeal.

Plaintiffs sought • certiorari review. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review and issued a per curiam finding that plaintiffs’ motion for new trial wads timely because it had been filed within seven days after the sheriff had served notice of the judgment in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1974. See Chauvin v. Shell Oil Co., 17-43 (La. 3/31/17), 214 So.3d 855. As a result, the court found plaintiffs’ devolutive appeal was timely, reinstated the appeal, and remanded the matter to this Court for consideration of the merits. Id.

As we did upon our original review of the record, and now again on remand, we find nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiffs were served by the sheriff with notice of judgment. Consequently, upon the designated record before us, we are still of the opinion that plaintiffs’ appeal is untimely. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has ruled on. this issue and we are bound by that ruling. Accordingly, we now turn to the merits of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal arises out of a property dispute. Plaintiffs, who claim to own a certain tract of land in St. Charles Parish, filed suit in 2013 alleging trespass and seeking damages caused by oil and gas pipelines that had been installed on the land by defendants. Defendants dispute plaintiffs’ claims of ownership. Defendant Shell Oil claims that it purchased the property in question from plaintiffs’ ancestors-in-title in 1971 and granted servitudes to other defendant pipeline companies over the ensuing years. On this basis, Shell Oil and other defendants moved fór summáry judgment, arguing that plaintiffs cannot prove they owti the property and, thus, cannot succeed on their trespass action. The district court’ agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of defendants and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs appealed that ruling.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The property at issue was once a portion of a larger tract acquired by plaintiffs’ancestors-in-title in 1927, when Lorenza Toussa sold a portion of Lot G)a and all of Lot H of the original Goodhope Plantation in St. Charles Parish to Frank Szubinski. In 1929, Frank Szubinski sold half of his interest in this property to his brother, Theodore Szubinski.

On March 21, 1930, the Szubinksi brothers granted a 275-foot-wide right .of way over the property to the State of Louisiana for the construction and maintenance of Airline Highway. Defendant Shell Oil first acquired an interest in the property in 1948 when the Szubinskis sold to Shell Oil a 25-foot-wide strip of land on the north end of the property.

Between 1950 and 1953, the Szubinskis subdivided; the property south of Airline Highway and sold off the lots. After Frank Szubinksi’s death in 1959, his wife, Bertha Miller Szubinski, inherited his estate, including his one-half interest in the property. In 1961, Theodore and Bertha sold a 20-foot-wide strip of the property north of Airline Highway to Gravity Drainage District No. 2 of St. Charles Parish (“Gravity”).

After Theodore’s death, his wife, Annie Glover Szubinski, and daughter, Josephine Szubinski Chauvin, inherited his estate, including his one-half interest in the property. In 1966, by act of partition, Annie, Josephine, and Bertha, as owpers in indivi-sión, partitioned the remaining portion of the property north of Airline Highway into Parcels A and B as depicted on a survey prepared by S.P. Landry and dated June 12, 1966. Annie and Josephine received title to Parcel A, while Bertha received title to Parcel B.

Following Annie’s death, in November 1971, Josephine, as Annie’s sole heir, and Bertha sold their respective parcels to Shell Oil. Josephine sold Parcel A to Shell Oil on November 18, 1971; and Bertha sold Parcel B to Shell Oil on November 23, 1971. The November 18, 1971 sale described Parcel A as follows:

3.71 acres of land, more or less, situated in the Parish of St. Charles, State of Louisiana, designated Parcel A, and being a portion of Lots G and H of original Goodhope Plantation as per survey S.P. LandryJ 4 Civil Engineer, dated June 12, 1966, a copy of which is on file in the office of the Clerk of Court and Register of Conveyance for the Parish of St. Charles for reference.

The November 23, 1971 sale described Parcel B as follows:

3.70 acres of land, more or less, situated in the Parish of St. Charles, State of Louisiana, designated Parcel B, and being a portion of Lots G and H of original Goodhope Plantation as per survey by S.P. Landry, Civil Engineer, dated June 12, 1966, a copy of which is on filed in the office of the Clerk of Court and Register of Conveyance for the Parish of St. Charles for reference.

Years later, on May 2, 1980, Shell Oil granted a servitude to Shell Pipeline to construct a pipeline over this property. Over the ensuing years, Shell Oil granted several more servitudes over this property to other defendant pipeline companies. Numerous pipelines now cross the property.

In 2012, plaintiffs, descendants of the Szubinski brothers, learned of their possible ownership of the property when they were contacted by pipeline companies seeking servitudes over the property the companies believed to be owned by plaintiffs. Believing they still owned the property, on June 3, 2013, plaintiffs filed suit seeking damages for trespass on the property. Named as defendants were: Shell Oil, Shell Pipeline, Valero, Air Products, Bengal, Gravity, Parkway Pipeline, LLC (“Parkway”) and Colonial Pipeline Company (“Colonial”).

Shell Oil and Shell Pipeline responded with a motion for summary judgment. Defendants Gravity, Air Products, Valero, and Bengal likewise filed motions for summary judgment adopting Shell’s arguments. Defendant Parkway did not move for summary judgment because it reached a settlement agreement with plaintiffs in September of 2015, whereby Parkway entered into a pipeline servitude agreement with plaintiffs in exchange for settlement of the lawsuit.

| ^Following a motion hearing on February 24, 2016, the district court found there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding Shell Oil’s ownership of the disputed property and concluded that Shell Oil had purchased the property in 1971. In its judgment issued on March 24, 2016, the court granted summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs’ claims against Shell Oil, Shell Pipeline, Air Products, Valero, Bengal, and Parkway. The court denied Gravity’s motion for summary judgment due to its non-appearance at the motion hearing.

DISCUSSION

In plaintiffs’ sole assignment of error bn appeal, they argue that the district court erred in granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remain as to the extent of the property sold in 1971.

We conduct a de novo review of a judgment granting a motion for summary judgment. Richthofen v. Medina, 14-294 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/14), 164 So.3d 231, 234, writ denied, 14-2514 (La. 3/13/15), 161 So.3d 639. Under this standard of review, we use the same criteria as the trial court in determining if summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is a genuine issue as to material fact and whether the mover is entitled to' judgment as a matter of law. Id.

“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). “[I]f the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim,' action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for- one or more elements essential to the adverse party’⅜ B claim, action, or defense.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). “The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

Here, defendants are. the movers who will not bear the burden of proof at trial. Accordingly, in their motions for summary judgment, defendants sought to point out the absence of factual support for one of the essential elements of plaintiffs’ trespass action: ownership.

A civil trespass is defined as the unlawful physical invasion of the property or possession of another. Pepper v. Triplet, 03-0619 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.2d 181, 197. In an action for trespass, title to the land is the pivotal issue. Bennett v. La. Pac. Corp., 29,598 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/9/97), 693 So.2d 1319, 1321. Thus, a plaintiff who brings á trespass action bears the burden of proving his ownership. Id.

In their motions for summary judgment, defendants alleged that plaintiffs could not succeed on their trespass .action because they could not prove ownership of the property since it had been sold to Shell Oil in' 1971. Plaintiffs do not dispute that their ancestors-in-title sold property to Shell Oil in" 1971, but they base their trespass action on their contention that the property sold did not include the land over which defendants’ pipelines now extend.

The parties agree that the pipelines at issue extend over a strip of property situated between Airline Highway itself and the northern boundary of the Airline Highway right of way. Plaintiffs contend that they still own this strip of property because the property sold to Shell Oil in 1971 did not extend south of the northern right-of-way boundary and so did not include the property over which the pipelines now extend. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the property sold to Shell Oil in 1971 extended south of the northern right-of-way boundary and so does^ include the property over which the pipelines now extend. In other words, plaintiffs claim that in the 1971 sales, the southern" boundaries of Parcels A and B were coterminous with the northern right-of-way boundary, while defendants claim that in the 1971 sales, the southern boundaries of Parcels A and B were southward of the" northern right-of-way boundary.

Accordingly, this is a boundary dispute.-And because this dispute centers on the. boundaries as reflected in the 1971 acts of sale, this boundary dispute is also an issue of contract interpretation. “Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties.” La. C.C. art. 2045. “When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.” La. C.C. art. 2046. Likewise, in resolving boundary disputes, the principal judicial duty and objective is to determine and implement the intention of the parties. In re St. James Methodist Church, 95-410 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/95), 666 So.2d 1206, 1209 (citing Hurst v. Ricard, 514 So.2d 14, 17 (La. 1987)). The object in all boundary questions is to And some certain evidence of what particular land was intended to be conveyed. Id. (citing City of New Orleans v. Joseph Rathborne Land Co., 209 La. 93, 24 So.2d 275, 281 (1945)).

Like any other issue of contract interpretation, we begin our analysis with the contract itself. .Both 1971 acts of sale describe the property sold by specified acreage and by reference to the 1966 Landry survey. This Landry survey does not depict the Airline right of way, but depicts Airline Highway itself with a “borrow pit” (i.e., ditch/canal) running parallel along its north side. The southern boundaries of both Parcels A and B are depicted north of this borrow pit, which Shell Oil acknowledged in its motion for summary judgment: “The 1966 Landry, plat, does show the southern boundary of Parcels A and B to be north of a borrow pit which is parallel to Airline Highway.”

|sThe pertinent question here is: Where did the parties intend the southern boundaries of Parcels A and B to'be relative to thé northern right-of-way boundary in the 1971 sales? Because this question is not resolved on the face'of the acts of sale or by reference to the' Landry survey, we must look beyond the contract to determine the parties’ intent.

Parol or extrinsic evidence .is generally inadmissible to vary the terms of a written contract unless the written expression of the common intention of the parties is ambiguous. Campbell v. Melton, 01-2578 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So.2d 69, 75. A contract is considered ambiguous, on the issue of intent when either it lacks a provision bearing on that issue, the terms of a written contract are susceptible to more than one interpretation, there is uncertainty or ambiguity as to its provisions, or the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained from the language employed. Id.

First, we look to the testimony of the parties’ respective surveyors. Plaintiffs’ surveyor, M. Gregory Breaux of Sigma Consulting Group, Inc., expressed doubts about the accuracy of the Landry survey. Mr. Breaux opined that S.P. Landry, the surveyor who created the 1966 survey, may not have actually performed an on-the-ground survey of Parcels A and B in 1966, but merely created' his survey map by adopting the dimensions from two prior surveys performed by E.M. Collier in March 1953 and on March 3, 1961. This, Mr. Breaux explained, may account for the discrepancies he found in the Landry survey. On the basis of these discrepancies, Mr. Breaux testified that he could not reach a conclusion regarding the location of the southern boundaries of Parcels A and B from the Landry survey: “In this case, I’ll be honest, I was not able to come to a conclusion. There’s conflicting information, and I personally did not feel it was in my purview to determine what that property line is.” Despite this testimony, Mr. Breaux ultimately did reach a conclusion when, based on his own . survey of the property, he created a survey map that depicted the southern boundaries of Parcels A and B 13south of the northern right-of-way boundary in the middle of the borrow pit. Similarly, Shell Oil’s surveyor, J.'F, Ruello of Landmark Surveying, Inc., surveyed the property and also created a survey map depicting the southern boundaries south of the northern right-of-way boundary in the middle of the borrow pit. Notably, both Breaux’s and Ruello’s surveys depict the pipelines traversing the portions of Parcels A and B that extend into the right of way. Thus, both parties’ surveyors reached the same conclusion that Parcels A and B as sold in 1971 included the property encumbered by the Airline Highway right of way and over which defendants’ pipelines now, extend.

' Next, we consider evidence of the parties’ actions after 1971 to help determine the parties’ intentions in the' acts of sale. Tellingly, neither the 1984 -succession of Bertha Miller Szubinski nor the 1994 succession of Josephine Szubinski ‘Chauvin included any of the Airline Highway property. These successions do, however, include other real property, suggesting that if Josephine and Bertha had not intended to convey all of the Airline Highway property to Shell Oil in 1971, it stands to reason that they would have believed they still owned some of the property after 1971 and would have bequeathed it to their heirs. They did not, and the subsequent actions of their heirs with respect to the property furthér support the inference that Josephine and Bertha intended to convey all of their Airline Highway property to Shell Oil in 1971. ' '

Plaintiff Alden Chauvin, son of Josephine Szubinski Chauvin, testified that prior to 2012, he was unaware of the property and had never set foot on it. Similarly, plaintiff Melvin Cannon, the great-nephew of Frank Szubinski, explained that he had no inkling about the property before 2012 and first set foot on it in 2013. Mr. Cannon also added that he was unfamiliar with the other plaintiffs prior to this lawsuit. Harry Lambert, husband of plaintiff Anyce Chau-vin Lambert, testified that his wife, the daughter of Josephine Szubinski ‘Chauvin andl |p sister of plaintiff Alden Chauvin, did not believe she owned an interest in the property. Nor did he believe she owned an interest. Mr. Lambert also stated that his wife believed her mother had sold all of the property she owned north of Airline Highway. Mr. Lambert added that he never set foot on the property between 1967 and 2012.

On the other hand, Shell Oil has taken numerous actions on the property since 1971. As mentioned above, in 1980, Shell Oil granted a servitude to Shell Pipeline to install a 24-inch pipeline over the property. Shell Pipeline has maintained this pipeline, removing brush and vegetation at least twice a year and maintaining posted signage. The record also reflects that Shell Oil granted servitudes to Southern States, Inc. (now Valero) in 1981, to Entergy Louisiana, Inc. in 1997, and to Air Products in 1996 and 2012.

The actions taken by Shell Oh on the property and the non-actions by plaintiffs and their ancestors-in-title suggest that in 1971 the parties intended for Shell Oil to acquire ownership of the property now in dispute. This, in conjunction with the opinions of both parties’ surveyors, leads us to conclude that in the sale of November 18, 1971, Josephine Szubinski Chauvin intended to sell and Shell Oil Company intended to buy all of Parcel A, which included the property encumbered by the Airline Highway right of way and over which the pipelines now extend. We likewise conclude that in the sale of November 28, 1971, Bertha Miller Szubinski intended to sell and Shell Oil Company intended to buy all of Parcel B, which included the property encumbered by the Airline Highway right of way and over which the pipelines now extend. Accordingly, upon our de novo review, we find there are no genuine issues of material fact as to what the parties intended in the sales of November 18,1971 and November 23,1971.

In any event, Shell Oil’s ownership of the disputed property is further established via acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive prescription is the “acquiring] n of ownership or other real rights by possession for a period of time.” La. C.C. art. 3446. Ownership of immovable property by acquisitive prescription may be acquired by either ten years of possession, La. C.C. art. 3473, or thirty years of possession, La. C.C. art. 3486. To acquire ownership with ten years of possession, there must be possession for ten years, good faith, just title, and a thing susceptible of acquisition by prescription. La. C.C. art. 3476. To acquire ownership with thirty years of possession, the thing must be susceptible of acquisition by prescription, and there must be continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal corporeal possession for thirty years. La. C.C. art. 3476; La. C.C. art. 3486; Grieshaber Family Props., LLC v. Impatiens, Inc., 10-1216 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/11), 63 So.3d 189, 195.

Here, the record establishes that Shell Oil satisfies the requirements for ownership via thirty-year acquisitive prescription. First, the immovable property at issue, as a private thing, is susceptible of acquisition by prescription. La. C.C. art. 3485 (“All private things are susceptible of prescription unless prescription is excluded by legislation.”); La. C.C. art. 453 (“Private things are owned by individuals, other private persons, and by the state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as private persons.”).

Second, Shell Oil has possessed the property for a period of more than thirty years, when it first granted a pipeline servitude over the property in 1980 and continued to grant several others over the next thirty-two years before its title to the property was challenged in 2012. Shell Oil’s possession of the property ha£j12 been exercised through the precarious possession of the servitude grantees. Precarious possession is the exercise of possession over a thing with the permission of or on behalf of the owner or possessor. La. C.C. art. 3437. Though acquisitive prescription does not run in favor of a precarious possessor, La. C.C. art. 3477, it can run in favor of the owner or possessor on whose behalf the precarious possessor possesses, see 1982 Official Revision Comment (b) of La. C.C. art. 3428 (“[0]ne who has taken possession of a servitude has the quasi-possession of the servitude for himself and the possession of the land for the owner.”).

And third, Shell Oil’s possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, unequivocal, and corporeal. Shell Oil’s possession has been continuous since it has exercised possession at various times throughout the thirty-two year period by granting servitudes for pipelines that have been maintained over the years. See La. C.C. art. 3443 (“One who proves that he had possession at different times is presumed to have possessed during the intermediate period.”); La. C.C. art. 3436 (“[Possession is not continuous] when it is not exercised at regular intervals.”); Bd. of Comm’rs v. S. D. Hunter Found., 354 So.2d 156, 166 (La. 1977) (“[A]n intention by the owner to exercise possession over the whole of his tract is manifested by his grant of a pipeline servitude across it, when accompanied by the physical construction of the pipeline and continuous acts by the grantee thereafter maintaining the right of way over part of the tract.”).

Shell Oil’s possession has been uninterrupted as there is no evidence indicating that it or its grantees ever lost possession. La. C.C. art. 3465 (“Acquisitive prescription is interrupted when possession is lost.”); Liner v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 319 So.2d 766, 780 (La. 1975) (“Possession is not interrupted when it is merely disturbed. Possession is interrupted when possession is lost.”). Its possession has been peaceable since there is no evidence to suggest that it | ^acquired possession with or has maintained it with violence. See La. C.C. art. 3436 (“[Possession is not peaceable] when it is acquired or maintained by violent acts.”). Its possession has been public having been made conspicuous with visible pipelines, routine maintenance, and posted signage. Its possession has been unequivocal due to the clarity of its intent to own the property by granting servitudes to various pipeline companies. See La. C.C. art. 3436 (“[Possession is] equivocal when there is ambiguity as to the intent of the possessor to own the thing.”). And, lastly, Shell Oil’s possession has been corporeal by virtue of the construction and maintenance of the pipelines. See La. C.C. art. 3425 (“Corporeal possession is the exercise of physical acts of use, detention, or enjoyment over a thing.”); S. D. Hunter Found., supra.

“When a party proves acquisitive prescription, the boundary shall be fixed according to limits established by prescription rather than titles.” La. C.C. art. 794. “If a party and his ancestors in title possessed for thirty years without interruption, within visible bounds, more land than their title called for, the boundary shall be fixed along these bounds.” Id.

Thus, even if the pipeline servitudes granted by Shell Oil extend over property that is beyond the limits of its title acquired in 1971, Shell Oil’s ownership of this property has been established via thirty-year acquisitive prescription. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in its March 24, 2016 judgment granting summary judgment and dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ claims against defendants.

This assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the March 24, 2016 judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

      . The factual and procedural history available to this Court is limited to the designated record before us.

      . The designated record before us is devoid of any pleadings filed by or any other participation in these proceedings by Colonial Pipeline Company. The only reference to Colonial in the record is that Bengal Pipeline Company, LLC is a joint venture of Colonial Pipeline Company and Shell Pipeline Company, LP.

      . The pertinent part of that agreement provided: "In contemplation of [plaintiffs] settling and dismissing the Lawstdt against [Parkway], [Parkway] desires to acquire the Servitude (defined later herein) from [plaintiffs], solely as a protective measure, but otherwise not- as an acknowledgment or admission by [Parkway] of [plaintiffs’] ownership of the Property.”

      . This ruling is not before us on appeal.

      . The vagueness of the 1966 Landry survey precludes application of ten-year acquisitive prescription. See Hooper v. Hero Lands Co., 15-0929 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/16), 216 So.3d 965, 975-76:
      A title is just when the deed is written, in valid form, and sufficient to transfer ownership on its face. See La. C.C. art. 3483; see also Barrois v. Panepinto, 13-0577 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/8/14), 133 So.3d 36, 37. Moreover, the title must sufficiently describe the property so that it can be identified and located from the description. See Barrois, 133 So.3d at 37. As a general rule, the description must fully appear within the four corners of the deed, or the deed should refer to a map or plat so that the location of the property is clear. See Quality Environmental Processes, Inc. v. I.P. Petroleum Co., Inc., 13-1582, 13-1588, 13-1703, (La. 5/7/14), 144 So.3d 1011, 1020. If the property is not sufficiently described within the title, one cannot acquire it by ten-year acquisitive prescription. See Barrois, 133 So.3d at 37-38.