author: MOORE, Chief Justice. MURDOCK, Justice STUART, Justice

text:
    Ex parte W.F., W.L.C., and R.J.J. (In re W.F., W.L.C., and R.J.J. v. State of Alabama).
    1131472.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Oct. 30, 2015.

      Ben C. Hand of Hand & Associates, LLC, Opelika, for petitioners.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and William D. Dill, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
   MOORE, Chief Justice.

R.J.J., W.L.C., and W.F. (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the petitioners”) were convicted in the Lowndes Circuit Court of hunting after dark, hunting from a public road, and hunting with the aid of an automobile. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed them convictions by an unpublished memorandum. W.F. v. State (No. CR-13-1188, Aug. 22, 2014), 190 So.3d 588 (Ala.Crim.App.2014)(table). We granted their petition for a writ of certio-rari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On January 3, 2013, the petitioners, who were juveniles at the time, met at RJJ.’s house. They loaded groceries into a truck with the intent of taking the groceries to a hunting cabin in Lowndes County belonging to a relative of one of the petitioners. W.F. brought his new AR-15 rifle along and placed it in the backseat of the truck. According to R.J.J., he and the other two petitioners are “gun enthusiasts,” and W.F. brought the rifle along for “[sjafety and protection.” R.J.J., who has a permit to carry a concealed weapon in Alabama, testified that he carries a gun wherever he goes, including when he travels at night. He further testified that the magazine for W.F.’s rifle was on the truck’s front center console.

At approximately 6:30 or 6:45 p.m., the petitioners left RJ.J.’s house. R.J.J. drove, W.F. was in the front passenger seat, and W.L.C. was in the backseat. They intended to drop the groceries off at the cabin and then return immediately to R. J. J.’s house because R. J.J.’s parents had ordered pizza for them.

After the petitioners had driven for approximately 15 or 20 minutes, R.J.J. pulled up to a stop sign on Brown Hill Road at the intersection of Brown Hill Road and Highway 29. W.L.C. and R.J.J. testified that the truck came to a complete stop and that they waited at the stop sign to allow a car traveling south on Highway 29 to pass through the intersection before proceeding. W.L.C. testified that the windows of the truck were up at the time and that no shots were fired from the truck. Both R.J.J. and W.L.C. testified that W.F,’s rifle was not fired at any time that night.

Russell Morrow, a retired conservation and enforcement officer for the State of Alabama and a reserve deputy for the Lowndes County Sheriff’s Department, lives on Brown Hill Road. Morrow testified that the area is frequented by wildlife, including deer. After nightfall at approximately 7:00 p.m. on January 3, 2013, Morrow was standing next to his vehicle near his house. From that vantage point, he could see a truck stopped at the stop sign approximately 140 yards away. The left turn signal on the truck was engaged. Morrow could not see any individuals through the windows of the truck. Morrow testified, in contradiction to W.L.C. and R.J.J., that there was no southbound traffic on Highway 29 at the time.

Morrow testified that “the truck sat there and sat there. Then I heard two high powered rounds go off from the vehicle.” Morrow has 25 years of experience in law enforcement and testified that he was familiar with the sound of a firearm. Morrow believed, but did not know for sure, that the sounds came from the driver’s side of the truck. Morrow did not see a muzzle flash and could not see any intended target.

After he heard the shots, the truck turned left and headed south on Highway 29. Morrow got into his own vehicle and followed the truck as it traveled south on Highway 29 and then onto another road before stopping at a gate outside the hunting cabin. The petitioners got out of the truck to open the gate, and Morrow got out of his vehicle. Morrow and the petitioners provided different accounts of the conversation that ensued.

Morrow testified that he asked the petitioners “what they were shooting at” and that they denied shooting at anything. Morrow testified that one of the petitioners. “said that it was firecrackers” that Morrow had heard but that, when Morrow asked the petitioners to show him the firecrackers, the petitioners “said it wasn’t firecrackers” and acknowledged that they had a rifle in the truck.

W.L.C., however, testified that Morrow “yelled at us,” saying “that we shot something back at the stop sign or he said we shot the stop sign, shot a deer.” According to W.L.C., Morrow repeatedly stated that the petitioners had fired a weapon while the truck was stopped at the intersection, and the petitioners denied doing so. R.J.J. testified that Morrow first accused the petitioners of shooting a pistol at a stop sign, but that then Morrow “kind of changed it” and asked “where was the deer, and things of that nature.” R.J.J. testified that Morrow asked where the pistol was and that R. J.J. said that they had a rifle. W.L.C. testified that Morrow asked the petitioners if they had a gun in the vehicle and that the petitioners said that they did. Morrow told the petitioners that he was going to call the sheriffs department.

The petitioners unlocked the gate and drove up to the cabin. They locked the gate behind them to prevent Morrow from following them. From outside the gate, Morrow could see movement and “lights where they were going in and out” of the cabin, but he could not make out what the petitioners were doing. W.L.C. testified that he and the other petitioners were unloading the groceries from the truck and placing them inside the cabin. Morrow said that the petitioners remained in or around the cabin for 30 minutes.

While the petitioners were at the cabin, Morrow contacted Lowndes County Sheriff John Williams, who dispatched two deputies to the cabin. Before the deputies arrived, the petitioners pulled the truck up to the gate as if to leave. Morrow blocked the gate and told the petitioners that they could not leave until the sheriff deputies arrived. Deputy Reginald McKitt and Deputy Andrew Bryant were the deputies who responded to the scene. Deputy McKitt testified that approximately 30 minutes had passed from the time he was dispatched until he arrived at the cabin. Morrow told Deputy McKitt that he had heard gunshots coming from the petitioners’ truck when the truck was stopped on Brown Hill Road. Deputy McKitt asked the petitioners if there was a weapon in the truck, and they confirmed that there was. Deputy McKitt asked for permission to search the truck, and the petitioners consented to the search.

Deputy McKitt discovered W.F.’s unloaded rifle, with no magazine inserted, in the rear floorboard of the truck. Although Morrow testified that the rifle was equipped with a flash suppressor, R.J.J. said that the rifle did not have a flash suppressor but that it did have “a compensator that reduces kick.” The deputies testified that the rifle smelled as though it had been cleaned with cleaning fluid, and Morrow opined that the rifle had been “freshly wiped down with a solvent.” W.L.C. testified that the rifle was not cleaned that night.

Deputy McKitt testified that he could not determine if the weapon had been fired recently. He further testified that he did not find a magazine in the truck. However, R.J.J. and W.L.C. testified that the magazine was in the truck and that the magazine contained tracer rounds. According to W.L.C., “tracers are a phosphorous tip that, when shot from a gun, it glows. You can see it travel like a line through the sky—through the air, especially at night.” Morrow testified that he had not seen the alleged shots.

Morrow asked the deputies to perform a computer check of the serial number of the rifle, and he assisted them in locating the number. Deputy McKitt testified that “nothing came back in the system about the weapon.” The rifle was returned to the truck, and all parties left the scene. Morrow testified that, in his opinion, an AR-15 rifle firing ammunition out of the window of a vehicle would have thrown the shell casings back into the vehicle. Deputy McKitt did not find any shell casings in the truck. The next morning, Morrow searched for but found no shell casings in the area near the stop sign at the intersection of Brown Hill Road and Highway 29.

On January 7, 2013, Morrow signed out arrest warrants against the petitioners for hunting after dark, hunting from a public road, and hunting with the aid of an automobile. The Lowndes Circuit Court granted the petitioners’ request to be tried as youthful offenders and consolidated their cases for trial. The circuit court held a bench trial at which Morrow, the deputies, W.L.C., and R.J.J. testified. At the close of the State’s evidence, the petitioners moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State failed to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State opposed the petitioners’ motion on the ground that it had established a prima facie case of the petitioners’ guilt under Rogers v. State, 491 So.2d 987 (Ala.Crim.App.1985). The circuit court denied the petitioners’ motion. At the close of all the evidence, the petitioners again moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the court again denied.

At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court found the petitioners guilty of hunting at night in violation of § 9-11-235, Ala.Code 1975, hunting from a public road in violation of § 9-11-257, Ala.Code 1975, and hunting with the aid of an automobile in violation of Rule 220-2-.ll(l), Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Conservation and Natural Resources). The circuit court ordered each of the petitioners to pay $4,000 in fines plus court costs, revoked their hunting privileges for 3 years, and sentenced them to 6 months in the Lowndes County jail for the night-hunting conviction, 30 days for the hunting-with-the-aid-of-an-automobile conviction, and 30 days for the hunting-from-a-public-road conviction, the sentences to be served concurrently. The circuit court suspended the petitioners’ jail sentences and placed them on unsupervised probation for two years. The petitioners moved for an arrest of judgment and a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. That motion was denied by operation of law.

The petitioners appealed their convictions and the denial of their postjudgment motion to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in an unpublished memorandum and denied the petitioners’ application for rehearing. The petitioners then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We granted the petition to consider the argument that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming their convictions conflicts with Alabama precedent requiring the State to prove (1) every element of an offense and (2) that the accused acted with a culpable mental state.

II, Standard of Review

“A motion for a judgment of acquittal tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Grantland, 709 So.2d 1310, 1311 (Ala.Crim.App.1997).

“ ‘In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Faircloth v. State, 471 So.2d 485 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), aff'd, 471 So.2d 493 (Ala.1985).’ Powe v. State, 597 So.2d 721, 724 (Ala.1991). It is not the function of this Court to decide whether the evidence is believable beyond a reasonable doubt, Pennington v. State, 421 So.2d 1361 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); rather, the function of this Court is to determine whether there is legal evidence from which a rational finder of fact could have, by fair inference, found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis v. State, 598 So.2d 1054 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). Thus, ‘[t]he role of appellate courts is not to say what the facts are. [Their role] is to judge whether the evidence is legally sufficient to allow submission of an issue for decision [by] the [fact-finder].’ Ex parte Bankston, 358 So.2d 1040, 1042 (Ala.1978) (emphasis original).”

Ex parte Woodall, 730 So.2d 652, 658 (Ala.1998). “ ‘ “This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal cases de novo.” ’ ” Ex parte Knox, 201 So.3d 1213, 1216 (Ala.2015) (quoting Ex parte Morrow, 915 So.2d 539, 541 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Ex parte Key, 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.2003)).

III. Discussion

The petitioners challenge the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. They contend that the State produced no evidence indicating that the petitioners had in their possession an artificial light suitable for night hunting and that the State produced tenuous evidence indicating that the petitioners were in an area frequented by protected wildlife. The petitioners also contend that the State’s circumstantial evidence failed to link the petitioners to the shots allegedly fired and that evidence of two shots fired could not support three hunting convictions. Finally, the petitioners contend that the State failed to prove that the petitioners had the intent to hunt.

The State suggests that the petitioners are improperly challenging the weight of the evidence on appeal. According to the State, the circuit court was ■ in the best position to make the findings that the headlights on the truck were suitable for night hunting and that the area where the shots were allegedly fired was frequented by wildlife. The State also argues that the determination of the petitioners’ intent was best left to the circuit court as the finder of fact.

In opposing the petitioners’ motion for a judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s evidence, counsel for the State argued:

“And, Judge, under Rogers v. State[, 491 So.2d 987 (Ala.Crim.App.1985)], a prima facie case for night hunting is established when the State demonstrates that the accused is in an area where ... deer or other protected animals are thought to frequent, has in their possession a weapon or other device suitable for taking, capturing, or killing an animal protected by State law at night and where the appella[nt] was discovered after dark in an area inh[a]bited by deer having in his possession a rifle suitable for taking deer, that the evidence of guilty intent is sufficient under Rogers v. State for that.
“The other charges were hunting from a public road, which he has testified as to and the Court can take judicial notice as to Highway 29 and Brown Hill Road being a public road here in Lowndes County.
“Also, hunting from a vehicle, he has testified as to the vehicle. So the actual taking is not required, Judge, to show a prima facie case. Just the frequented area that has protected animals, the possession of a weapon, in this case, also a vehicle, and it being after dark. And he’s testified to the shots being fired from the vehicle.”

As demonstrated by counsel’s argument, the State pursued a theory of liability based on Rogers v. State, 491 So.2d 987 (Ala.Crim.App.1985), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

“We find, based upon the language of § 9-11-285, Code of Alabama 1975, that a prima facie ease for night hunting is established when the state demonstrates that the accused (1) is in an area which deer or other protected animals are thought to frequent, (2) has in his possession a light, and (3) has in his possession a weapon or other device suitable for taking, capturing, or killing an animal protected by state law, (4) at night.”

491 So.2d at 990 (opinion on return to remand). The State introduced evidence to show that, at night and in an area frequented by “protected animals,” the petitioners had in their “possession” “a light,” i,e., the headlights or left turn signal on the truck and that they had in their “possession” W.F.’s rifle. Under Rogers, the State is not required to show that an accused fired a weapon: mere possession of a weapon and a light at night in an area frequented by wildlife constitutes sufficient proof of night hunting. Therefore, evidence indicating that shots were fired from the truck in which the petitioners were traveling, though referenced by the State on appeal, is not necessary to support the State’s theory of culpability under Rogers.

Although only § 9-11-235 (night hunting) was before the Court of Criminal Appeals in Rogers, the State in this case relied on Rogers as support for the charges that the petitioners violated § 9-11-257 (hunting from a public road) and Rule 220-2-.11(1) (hunting with the aid of an automobile). Having offered evidence under Rogers to establish that the petitioners were hunting after dark, the State sought to establish prima facie cases of the other charges by introducing evidence of an additional fact to support each respective charge: Specifically, the State produced evidence indicating that the petitioners were in an automobile and on a public road at the time they “possessed” the rifle and light at night in an area frequented by wildlife. The State thereby invoked Rogers to suppoi"t all three hunting charges.

However, the State argues to this Court, as it argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals, that the evidence also supported a finding that each of the petitioners was guilty of aiding and abetting the others in the commission of the charged offenses. “A person is legally accountable for the behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense ... [h]e aids or abets such other person in committing the offense § 13A-2-23(2), Ala.Code 1975. “For one to be convicted as an aider or abettor, evidence showing an offense to have been committed by a principal is necessary, although it is not required that the principal be convicted or even his identity established.” Evans v. State, 508 So.2d 1205, 1207 (Ala.Crim.App.1987).

“Complicity is a theory for imposing criminal culpability, for which aiding and abetting may be an element.” Ex parte Farrell, 591 So.2d 444, 447 (Ala.1991). In the circuit court, however, the State did not pursue a complicity theory by attempting to prove that each of the petitioners rendered assistance to the others in the commission of hunting offenses. Rather, the State pursued a theory under Rogers by seeking to prove that each petitioner was in possession of a weapon and a light at night in an area frequented by wildlife. The State may not advance a new legal theory on appeal that it failed to argue below. Ex parte Knox, supra. Thus, evidence that one of the petitioners contrived a story about firecrackers when questioned by Morrow, while potentially relevant to an aiding-and-abetting theory, is not relevant to the theory the State pursued in the circuit court. The sufficiency of the State’s evidence in this case stands or falls on Rogers.

In evaluating the State’s reliance on Rogers, we must consider whether the elements of a prima facie case of night hunting as stated in Rogers are consistent with the night-hunting statute. The night-hunting statute, § 9-11-285, makes it a class B misdemeanor to “take, capture, or kill, or attempt to take, capture, or kill any bird or animal protected by the laws of this state between sunset and daylight of the following day.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, under the statute, attempting to hunt after dark is equivalent to the completed offense of night hunting. Clearly, under the facts here, where there is no evidence indicating that a protected bird or animal was taken, captured, or killed, the State could prove only an attempt.

“A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, with the intent to commit a specific offense, he does any overt act towards the commission of such offense.” § 13A-4-2(a), Ala.Code 1975. “An attempt to commit a crime consists of three elements: First, the intent to commit the crime; second, the performance of some oveit act towards the committing of the crime; and, third, the failure to consummate the crime.” Ard v. State, 358 So.2d 792, 793 (Ala.Crim.App.1978). The elements of night hunting as set out in Rogers do not include the taking, capturing, or killing of a protected bird or animal. Consequently, the theory of liability advanced in Rogers, if valid, requires only a showing that the accused attempted to take, capture, or kill a protected bird or animal at night.

Therefore, the dispositive issue before us is whether merely possessing a weapon and a light at night in an area frequented by wildlife, without any other attendant circumstances, constitutes at tempted, hunting at night, a violation of § 9-11-235. Although one guilty of criminal attempt must intend to commit the crime, the elements of night hunting as set out in Rogers do not include a culpable mental state. Thus, the validity of Rogers depends on whether the elements set out in that case establish both (1) an overt act toward the commission of night hunting and (2) specific intent to hunt at night.

We consider whether possessing a light and a weapon suitable for hunting, at night and in an area frequented by wildlife, is an overt act toward the commission of hunting after dark. In Minshew v. State, 594 So.2d 703 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a defendant’s conviction for attempted murder. After repeatedly threatening to kill the victim, the defendant was later discovered hiding behind a truck in the driveway of the victim’s residence with a loaded .357 magnum derringer. The court referenced both the defendant’s pri- or threats and his possession of a loaded firearm as sufficient indicia of his intent to kill. Also, because of the defendant’s prior threats, “[t]he jury was therefore warranted in drawing the conclusion that his intent was to kill, and by lying in wait, armed, at [the victim’s] residence, he had performed an overt act towards the effec-tuation of that intent.” 594 So.2d at 712.

Minshew considered evidence indicating that the defendant possessed a firearm in a place that might yield the opportunity to commit a crime in light of all the attendant circumstances; Rogers, however, authorizes trial courts to consider similar evidence in a vacuum. Whereas the defendant’s prior threats in Minshew helped make his subsequent conduct an overt act toward the commission of a criminal offense, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Rogers determined that certain conduct always qualifies as an overt act, regardless of the attendant circumstances. We must determine whether the conduct specified in Rogers, taken by itself, satisfies Alabama’s criterion of an overt act toward the commission of a criminal offense necessary to constitute an attempt in every conceivable situation.

“An ‘overt act’ is more than ‘mere intention’ or ‘preparation’ to commit a specific crime. Whiddon v. State, 53 Ala.App. 280, 283, 299 So.2d 326, 329-30 (1973). ‘The attempt is complete and punishable, when an act is done with intent to commit the crime, which is adapted to the perpetration of it, whether the purpose fails by reason of interruption, or for other extrinsic cause. The act must reach far enough towards the accomplishment of the desired result to amount to the commencement of consummation.’ Id. (Emphasis added.)”

Ex parte A.T.M., 804 So.2d 171, 174 (Ala.2000). ‘“Preparation alone is not sufficient. Something more is required than mere menace, preparation, or planning.’” Minshew, 594 So.2d at 709 (quoting Whiddon v. State, 53 Ala.App. 280, 283, 299 So.2d 326, 329-30 (1973)). To prove an attempt, the State must show that the defendant “made any move” to perform activity constituting the core of the underlying offense. A.T.M., 804 So.2d at 174.

In Ex parte James, 468 So.2d 889 (Ala.1984), this Court considered whether a defendant convicted of first-degree robbery had committed an overt act toward the commission of attempted theft. Attempted theft requires “some overt act in furtherance of a completed taking away or carrying away of the personal property of another.” 468 So.2d at 891. Like attempted night hunting and completed night hunting, attempted theft and completed theft are one and the same offense. See § 13A-8-40, Ala.Code 1975.

The defendant in James told the assistant manager of a Winn-Dixie grocery store that another man standing at the register had a gun, and he instructed the assistant manager to “do as he says.” 468 So.2d at 890. The Court held that the defendant’s statement did not constitute attempted theft because “it appears that no property was touched, that the defendant did not attempt to touch any, and that defendant did not ask for, or even remotely allude to, any property.” 468 So.2d at 891.

Rogers is inconsistent with the requirement of A.T.M. and with our application of that requirement in James—that one committing criminal attempt make some move to perform the activity forming the core of the underlying offense. Although the core of theft is asportation of property, the core of night hunting is the taking, capturing, or killing of a protected bird or animal. Merely traveling in a vehicle with a weapon through the habitat of protected wildlife at night falls short of making a move that amounts to “the commencement of consummation” of the offense. A.T.M., 804 So.2d at 174. Such acts may be “remote preparatory acts not reasonably in the chain of causation,” but they do not constitute attempt. Huggins v. State, 41 Ala.App. 548, 550, 142 So.2d 915, 917 (1962).

In stating the prima facie elements of night hunting in Rogers, the Court of Criminal Appeals set a lower evidentiary standard of proof than does the night-hunting statute itself. However, the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers precludes the judiciary from changing a criminal offense. Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645, 662 (Ala.1980). “[A] court may explain the language [in a statute], but it may not detract from or add to the statute.... ” Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Selma v. Randolph, 833 So.2d 604, 607 (Ala.2002) (quoted with approval in City of Prichard v. Balzer, 95 So.3d 1, 3 (Ala.2012)). Appellate courts are “ ‘not at liberty to rewrite statutes.’ ” Walker v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 85 So.3d 1008, 1012 (Ala.Civ.App.2011) (quoting Ex parte Carlton, 867 So.2d 332, 338 (Ala.2003)).

Because we determine that the conduct specified in Rogers as constituting a prima facie case of night hunting does not, by itself and in every case, constitute an overt act toward the commission of the offense of night hunting, we need not determine whether such conduct creates the reasonable inference that the actor intends to hunt after dark. The theory of night hunting crafted by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Rogers is inconsistent with the statute making night hunting a criminal offense.

This Court has never relied upon Rogers. Indeed, this Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in the only decision that has referenced Rogers. In Phillips v. State, 771 So.2d 1061 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that hunting over a baited field, a violation of § 9-11-244, Ala.Code 1975, is a strict-liability offense with no requirement of a culpable mental state. The court noted that Rogers similarly did not require proof of a culpable mental state for the offense of night hunting. We reversed that court’s judgment in Ex parte Phillips, 771 So.2d 1066 (Ala.2000), holding that a culpable mental state is an element of hunting over a baited field in the absence of an express statement in the statute to the contrary. See § 13A-2-4(b), Ala.Code 1975 (“A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, states a crime of mental culpability.”).

Because our review in the instant case presents this Court with its first opportunity to address Rogers, we are not going to decline to pass upon the validity of that case merely because it is assumed by the parties. See Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Miller, 86 So.3d 338, 347 (Ala.2011) (expressly overruling a case without being asked to do so because the case was an “aberration” upon which this Court had not sufficiently relied, and reversing the judgment of the court below). Accordingly, we decline to follow Rogers.

In determining whether, in the absence of Rogers, the State made out a prima facie case of each of the charged hunting offenses, the applicable standard is substantial evidence: Whether the convictions are supported by substantial evidence, i.e., “evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.” American Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 624 So.2d 1362, 1366-67 (Ala.1998) (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989)). The State has failed to prove the offenses by substantial evidence.

The State invoked Rogers as the basis of all the hunting charges against the petitioners. Because we reject Rogers today, and because the State has failed to present substantial evidence that the petitioners are guilty of the charged hunting offenses, all of the petitioners’ convictions must be vacated. As' noted previously, the State did not try the case below on the theory that each of the petitioners aided and abetted one another in the commission of the charged hunting offenses. That theory, therefore, is no longer available to the State, because “the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial when a conviction is reversed solely on the basis of an insufficiency of the evidence.” Lindley v. State, 728 So.2d 1153, 1157 (Ala.1998). We therefore reverse the judgment' of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand for that court to instruct the circuit court to vacate the petitioners’ convictions and sentences and to enter a judgment acquitting the petitioners of all charges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

PARKER and WISE, JJ., concur.

MURDOCK and BRYAN, JJ., concur in the result.

STUART, BOLIN, SHAW, and MAIN, JJ., dissent.

MURDOCK, Justice

(concurring in the result).

The elements of illegal hunting (or attempted illegal hunting) as described in Rogers v. State, 491 So.2d 987 (Ala.Crim.App.1985), do not equate to the elements of the offenses described in §§ 9-11-235 and 9-11-257, Ala.Code 1975, and Rule 220-2-11(1), Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Conservation and Natural Resources), specifically in relation to the elements of intent and an overt act. I agree that this Court should not follow Rogers. I concur in the result reached by the main opinion in this case.

STUART, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the convictions of W.F., W.L.C., and R.J.J. (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the petitioners”) for various hunting offenses. The main opinion states:

“We granted the petition to consider the argument that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming their convictions conflicts with Alabama precedent requiring the State to prove (1) every element of an offense and (2) that the accused acted with a culpable mental state.”

214 So.3d at 1158. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the trial court’s denial of the petitioners’ motion for a judgment of acquittal does not conflict with precedent requiring the State to present sufficient evidence of every element of the offenses of night hunting, hunting from a public road, and hunting from a vehicle to sustain the convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that to establish a prima facie case of those offenses the State must present evidence of each element of the offenses, including the requisite culpable mental state; conducted a review of the evidence to determine whether the State had presented sufficient evidence of every element of the offenses; and concluded that the evidence in the record established a prima facie case that the petitioners did engage in night hunting, hunting on a public road, and hunting from a vehicle.

The main opinion states:

“In determining whether, in the absence of Rogers [v. State, 491 So.2d 987 (Ala.Crim.App.1985)], the State made out a prima facie case of each of the charged hunting offenses, the applicable standard is substantial evidence: Whether the convictions are supported by substantial evidence, i.e., ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ American Natl Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 624 So.2d 1362, 1366-67 (Ala.1993)(quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989)).”

214 So.3d at 1163.

I believe the following is a more complete statement of the applicable law:

“When a motion [for judgment of acquittal] is made on the ground that the State has failed to establish a prima facie case, it is the duty of the trial court to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction under the indictment. In its determination, the trial court should consider only the evidence before the [trier of fact] at the time the motion is made and must consider it most favorably to the State. When there is legal evidence from which the [trier of fact] could, by fair inference, find the defendant guilty [of the offense charged], the trial court should submit [the case to the trier of fact for determination].... ”

Andrews v. State, 473 So.2d 1211, 1213-14 (Ala.Crim.App.1985). Moreover, “[i]n dealing -with the sufficiency of the evidence no conviction should be had upon guesswork and suspicion, but must be based upon substantial evidence as to every material element of the crime of such a character as to convince a fair and impartial jury of the guilt of the accused.” Blue v. State, 246 Ala. 73, 79, 19 So.2d 11, 16 (1944).

When a defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case, at the close of all the evidence, or in a posttrial motion, the defendant is asking the trial court to detei’mine, as a matter of law, whether the State presented sufficient evidence of each element of the charged offense to sustain a conviction. A conviction is based upon evidence supporting a finding that the defendant violated a statutory offense. The elements the State must prove to sustain a conviction are provided by the legislature in the statute defining the offense, not by the judiciary in caselaw and not by counsel in argument. As the main opinion recognizes, “the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers precludes the judiciary from changing a criminal offense. Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645, 662 (Ala.1980).” 214 So.3d at 1162. Therefore, because an appellate court is “ ‘ “not at liberty to rewrite statutes,” ’ ” 214 So.3d at 1162, and “ ‘may not detract from or add to the statute,’ ” 214 So.3d at 1162, the elements of an offense can be found only in the statute charging the offense and cannot be changed by caselaw. In other words, although an appellate court may interpret a statute defining an offense, it cannot change the elements required to prove the offense. The sufficiency of the State’s evidence to sustain a conviction does not stand or fall on proof of the elements of an offense as defined in caselaw; the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to sustain a conviction stands or falls on the proof of the elements of the offense as provided by the legislature in the statute. Thus, a trial court, when determining whether the State has presented sufficient evidence of each element of an offense to sustain a conviction, must determine if the State presented substantial evidence of each element of the offense as the offense is defined in the statute. Appellate review of the trial court’s decision likewise rests upon whether the State presented sufficient evidence of the elements of the offense as defined by the statute. See Ex parte Bankston, 358 So.2d 1040, 1042 (Ala.1978)(“The role of appellate court is not to say what the facts are. Our role ... is to judge whether the evidence is legally sufficient to allow submission of an issue for decision [by the trier of fact].”).

“ ‘In reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, this court must view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The test to be applied is whether the [the trier of fact] might reasonably find that the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt; not whether such evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis but guilt, but whether a [trier of fact] might reasonably so conclude. United States v. Black, 497 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir.1974); United States v. McGlamory, 441 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1971); Clark v. United States, 293 F.2d 445 (5th Cir.1961).
“ ‘ “(W)e must keep in mind that the test to be applied is not simply whether in the opinion of the trial judge or the appellate court the evidence fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt; but rather whether the [trier of fact] might so conclude. Harper v. United States, 405 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.1969); Roberts v. United States, 416 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir.1969). The procedure for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence has been aptly set out in Odom v. United States, 377 F.2d 853, 855 (5th Cir.1967):
“ ‘ “ ‘Our obligation, therefore, is to examine the record to determine whether there is any theory of the evidence from which the [trier of fact] might have excluded every hypothesis except guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Rua v. United States, 5 Cir., 1963, 321 F.2d 140; Riggs v. United States, 5 Cir., 1960, 280 F.2d 949. In Judge Thornberry’s words,
the standard utilized by this Court is not whether in our opinion the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom failed to exclude every hypothesis other than guilt, but rather whether there was evidence from which the [trier of fact] might reasonably so conclude.” Williamson v. United States, 5th Cir., 1966, 365 F.2d 12, 14. (Emphasis supplied)” ’
“ ‘ “The sanctity of the [trier-of-fact] function demands that this court never substitute its decision for that of the [trier of fact]. Our obligation is [to] examine the welter of evidence to determine if there exists any reasonable theory from which the [trier of fact] might have concluded that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged.” McGlamory, 441 F.2d at 135 and 136.’
“Cumbo v. State, 368 So.2d 871, 874-75 (Ala.Crim.App.1978).”

Salva v. State, 885 So.2d 231, 236-37 (Ala.Crim.App.2003).

The petitioners were charged with hunting at night, a violation of § 9-11-235, Ala.Code 1975; hunting from a public road, a violation of § 9-11-257, Ala.Code 1975; and hunting with the aid of an automobile, a violation of Rule 220-2-.ll(l), Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Conservation and Natural Resources).

The legislature defined the offense of night hunting as follows:

“It shall be unlawful, except as to trapping as otherwise provided by law, for a person to take, capture, or kill, or attempt to take, capture, or kill any bird or animal protected by the laws of this state between sunset and daylight of the following day, except that the Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources may by a duly promulgated regulation, allow the taking, catching, or killing of raccoons or opossums between sunset and daylight in any county or counties with the state....
“Any person violating this section shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished for the first offense by a fíne of not less than two thousand dollars ($2,000) nor more than three thousand dollars ($3,000) and may be imprisoned in the county jail for a period not to exceed six months. In addition, the court shall revoke all hunting license privileges for a period of three years from the date of conviction.”
“No provision of this section shall be construed to prohibit the nighttime hunting of foxes with dogs.”

§ 9-11-235, Ala.Code 1975.

The legislature defined the offense of hunting from a public road as follows:

“Any person, except a duly authorized law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty or person authorized by law, who hunts or discharges any firearm from, upon, or across any public road, public highway, or railroad, or the right-of-way of any public road, public highway, or railroad, or any person, except a landowner or his or her immediate family hunting on land of the landowner, who hunts within 50 yards of a public road, public highway, or railroad, or their rights-of-way, with a centerfire rifle, a shotgun using slug or shot larger in diameter than manufacturer’s standard designated number four shot, or a muz-zleloading rifle .40 caliber or larger in this state, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished for the first offense by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), and shall be punished for the second and each subsequent offense by a fine of not less than two thousand dollars ($2,000) and shall have all hunting license privileges revoked for one year from the date of conviction.”

§ 9-11-257, Ala.Code 1975.

The offense of hunting with the aid of an automobile is defined as follows:

“It shall be unlawful to concentrate, drive, rally, molest or to hunt, take, capture or kill or attempt to hunt, take, capture or kill any bird or animal from or by the aid of
“(1) Any automobile.... ”

Rule 220-2-11(1), Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Conservation and Natural Resources).

Because the foregoing statutes and rule do not include an express statement of mens rea, § 13A-2-4(b), Ala.Code 1975, provides the culpable mental state, stating:

“Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, an appropriate culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, states a crime of mental culpability.”

In Ex parte Phillips, 771 So.2d 1066 (Ala.2000), this Court addressed whether evidence of a culpable mental state was required to sustain a conviction for hunting on a baited field, see § 9-11-244, Ala.Code 1975. Like the statutes and the rule defining the offenses of night hunting, hunting on a public road, and hunting from a vehicle, the statute defining hunting on a baited field does not designate a culpable mental state. In Ex parte Phillips, this Court held that application of § 13A-2-4(b), Ala. Code 1975, required that evidence of a “low level of mental culpability” be presented to sustain a conviction for hunting on a baited field. This Court held that the evidence must show that the defendant “either knew or should have known that the area over which he was hunting was baited.” 771 So.2d at 1068.

Reading §§ 9-11-235, 9-11-257, Rule 220—2—.11(1), and § 13A-2-4(b) in part materia, a person commits the offenses of night hunting, hunting on a public road, and hunting from a vehicle when a person knew or should have known that he was taking, capturing, or killing, or attempting to take, capture, or kill a protected bird or animal at night on a public road and from a vehicle. Thus, to establish a prima facie case of night hunting on a public road and from a vehicle, the State must present evidence that the defendant 1) knowingly 2) engaged in the taking, capturing, or killing or in the attempt to take, capture, or kill 3) a protected bird or animal 4) from a vehicle 5) located on a public road 6) at night.

A review of the record establishes that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioners were hunting at night from a vehicle on a public road. Russell Morrow, the retired conservation and enforcement officer for the State of Alabama and a reserve deputy for the Lowndes County Sheriffs Department, testified that he saw the petitioners, stopped on a public road at night, in a vehicle with its left turn signal and headlights engaged; that he heard two high-powered shots fired from inside the vehicle; that the rural area in which the petitioners had stopped the vehicle was frequented by wildlife; that the weapon retrieved from the petitioners’ vehicle after they had been in the hunting cabin for 30 minutes smelled like it had been recently cleaned; and that, when he asked the petitioners what they were shooting at, the petitioners initially denied shooting at anything, then stated that they were shooting firecrackers, and later recanted, admitting that they had a rifle in the truck. Morrow’s testimony that he heard shots fired from the vehicle is evidence indicating that the petitioners knowingly engaged in an overt act toward the commission of the offenses. Evidence of the requisite mens rea may also be inferred from Morrow’s testimony that the petitioners initially stated that they were shooting firecrackers, their subsequent admission to having a rifle in the truck, and the testimony that the rifle had recently been cleaned. From the foregoing evidence, albeit circumstantial, the trial court, as the fact-finder, could have concluded that the State had proven all the elements of night hunting from a vehicle on a public road to support the petitioners’ convictions.

Because an analysis of the evidence in the record supports the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court properly concluded that the State presented sufficient evidence of each element of the charged offenses to sustain the petitioners’ convictions, I respectfully dissent from the decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and to order that the petitioners’ convictions be vacated.

BOLIN, J., concurs.

      . Section 9-11-235 provides, in pertinent part:
      "It shall be unlawful, except as to trapping as otherwise provided by law, for a person to take, capture, or kill, or attempt to take, capture, or kill any bird or animal protected by the laws of this state between sunset and daylight of the following day, except that the Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources may by a duly promulgated regulation, allow the taking, catching, or killing of raccoons or opossums between sunset and daylight in any county or counties within the state....
      "Any person violating this section shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished for the first offense by a fine of not less than two thousand dollars ($2,000) nor more than three thousand dollars ($3,000) and may be imprisoned in the county jail for a period not to exceed six months. In addition, the court shall revoke all hunting license privileges for a period of three years from the date of conviction.”

      . Section 9-11-257 provides:
      "Any person, except a duly authorized law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty or person authorized by law, who hunts or discharges any firearm from, upon, or across any public road, public highway, or railroad, or the right-of-way of any public road, public highway, or railroad, or any person, except a landowner or his or her immediate family hunting on land of the landowner, who hunts within 50 yards of a public road, public highway, or railroad, or their rights-of-way, with a cen-terfire rifle, a shotgun using slug or shot larger in diameter than manufacturer’s standard designated number four shot, or a muzzleloading rifle .40 caliber or larger in this state, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished for the first offense by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), and shall be punished for the second and each subsequent offense by a fine of not less than two thousand dollars ($2,000) and shall have all hunting license privileges revoked for one year from the date of conviction.”

      .Rule 220-2-, 11(1) provides:
      "It shall be unlawful to concentrate, drive, rally, molest or to hunt, take, capture or kill or attempt to hunt, take, capture or kill any bird or animal from or by the aid of "(1) Any automobile....”

      . Although the soundness of Rogers presents this Court with a question of law and not of fact, we are mindful that the facts of the instant case exemplify the extreme to which the theory of liability in Rogers may be pushed. Rogers involved a defendant, with a gun slung over his shoulder, circling a pasture on his motorcycle and using the headlight of the motorcycle to pan the pasture. When a conservation officer attempted to stop the defendant, the defendant gunned the motorcycle and sped to a nearby house. He went inside and removed his shirt, shoes, and socks in an apparent attempt to create the impression that he had not been out of the house. The defendant was charged with and convicted of hunting at night. Here, by contrast, the State sought to establish that riding down a public road in a truck with a weapon inside constituted "possession” of a weapon, and that, if the turn signal or headlights of the truck were engaged, the occupant was in "possession” of a light for purposes of night hunting. We consider Rogers as it may be applied to any situation, and we do so in light of its illustrative application to the relevant circumstances of the instant case.

      . There must be some showing of intent to commit the crime alleged. For example, to be convicted of the crime of possession of burglar’s tools, § 13A-7-8, Ala.Code 1975, it is "insufficient to establish that he had a felonious intent” to show that a defendant merely possesses "common hand tools such as a hammer, a screwdriver, pliers, etc., which could facilitate a forcible entry into premises.” McGlon v. State, 504 So.2d 745, 746 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). See also id.., 504 So.2d at 746 (emphasizing it is "the intention to use the ‘explosive, tool, instrument or other article’ in the commission of a ‘forcible entry’ or ‘theft by a physical taking’ ” that is "the most important element of the offense”).

      . It is worthy of noting that the legislature when defining the offense of taking deer at night in § 9-11-251, Ala.Code 1975, specifically included as an element of the offense the use of a light. Section 9-11-251 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to take, capture or kill deer at night in Alabama by any means or device, including but not limited to the use of any type of light.” Unlike the offense of taking deer at night, the legislature did not include in its definition of the offense of night hunting the use of a light as a means of taking, capturing, or killing or attempting to take, capture, or kill a protected bird or animal.

      . In Ward v. State, 610 So.2d 1190, 1191-92 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
      "Circumstantial evidence is not inferior evidence, and it will be given the same weight as direct evidence, if it, along with the other evidence is susceptible of a reasonable inference pointing unequivocally to the defendant's guilt. Ward v. State, 557 So.2d 848 (Ala.Cr.App.1990). In reviewing a conviction based in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence, the test to be applied is whether the jury might reasonably find that the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt; not whether such evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis but guilt, but whether a jury might reasonably so conclude. Cumbo v. State, 368 So.2d 871 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 877 (Ala.1979).”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KELLUM, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    W.F., W.L.C., and R.J.J. v. STATE of Alabama.
    CR-13-1188.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    Dec. 18, 2015.

      Ben C. Hand, Opelika, for appellant.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and William D. Dill, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   After Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court

KELLUM, Judge.

In accordance with the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Ex parte W.F., 214 So.3d 1153 (Ala.2015), we reverse the judgment of the Lowndes Circuit Court and remand this case to the circuit court for that court “to vacate [W.F.’s, W.L.C.’s, and R.J.J.’s] convictions and sentences and to enter a judgment acquitting the petitioners of all charges.” 214 So.3d at 1163.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WINDOM, P.J., and WELCH, BURKE, and JOINER, JJ., concur.


author: MURDOCK, Justice.

text:
    SOUTH ALABAMA BRICK CO., INC., d/b/a Riley-Stuart Supply Co. v. J. Gregory CARWIE, as temporary conservator of Benito Perez, an incapacitated person.
    1130345.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    March 18, 2016.
    Rehearing Denied June 10, 2016.

      William H. Brooks and Ivan B. Cooper of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., Birmingham; Bert P. Taylor of Taylor Ritter, P.C., Orange Beach; and Wes Pipes and William W. Watts III of Pipes, Hudson & Watts, L.L.P., Mobile, for appellant.
    Desmond V. Tobias, Jason S. McCormick, and Bryan E. Comer of Tobias, McCormick & Comer, LLC, Mobile; and R. Bernard Harwood, Jr., of Rosen Har-wood, Tuscaloosa, for appellee.
    Thomas R. Boiler, Mobile, for amicus curiae University of South Alabama Hospitals, in support of the appellee.
   MURDOCK, Justice.

South Alabama Brick Co., Inc., d/b/a Riley-Stuart Supply Co. (“SAB”), appeals from the Mobile Circuit Court’s judgment in the amount of approximately $12.6 million in favor of J. Gregory Carwie, as temporary conservator of Benito Perez, who suffered catastrophic injuries when he fell through a skylight in the roof of a warehouse owned and operated by SAB. We reverse.

I, Facts and Procedural History

SAB is a Dothan, Alabama, based supplier of building materials, including bricks and roofing materials, which has seven locations throughout Alabama and Florida. One of those, locations is a warehouse in Mobile, Alabama (“the warehouse”). The roof of the warehouse includes a large flat area. Contiguous to the large flat area is a large pitched area. The pitched area of the roof contains 37 skylights that are raised above the contours of the roof itself. The flat area of the roof contains 12 skylights that are not raised above the contours of the roof.. The surfaces of both the pitched and flat areas of the roof are corrugated.

In October 2010, SAB noticed that water was dripping into the warehouse from leaks somewhere in the roof. Ramsey Stuart, the general manager of SAB’s Mobile location, contacted Cooner Roofing and Construction, Inc. (“Cooner Roofing”), regarding the need for repairs to the roof.

Bobby Cooner is the president and owner of Cooner Roofing (a business begun by his father). Stuart testified that, when SAB had experienced any “roof issues, leaks or whatever over the years” it would call Cooner Roofing, He testified that he would rely upon Cooner to determine what repairs might be necessary. According' to Stuart, Cooner Roofing’s services in repairing leaks had been acceptable, and, during Stuart’s lengthy association with SAB, he had no recollection of anyone other than Cooner Roofing performing repair work on SAB’s roof.

Cooner examined the warehouse roof and gave SAB two proposals for repairing it. For a price of approximately $10,000, which. SAB accepted, Cooner proposed to repair the roof of the warehouse by putting a coating on some portions of the flat area of the roof, installing a Hydro Stop brand waterproofing system in the middle seam and upper seam of the flat area of the roof, and repairing or replacing the covers for the 37 skylights on the pitched area of the roof. The 12 skylights on the flat area of the roof were not included as part of the work Cooner proposed.

Stuart testified that he had worked at SAB, a business started by his father, for over 30 years and that the skylights had been part of the roof since before he began working at the facility. According to Stuart, neither he nor, to his knowledge, any SAB employee had ever been on the warehouse roof. The record contains no evidence indicating that any SAB employee had ever been on the roof.

SAB was not aware exactly of where Cooner Roofing’s work on the roof would be performed. Stuart did testify that Cooner had advised him that some of his “crew” would be working around some of the skylights. On cross-examination, Stuart testified that he knew that the skylights would not support the weight of a man and that if a person fell through a skylight he likely would suffer grievous injury or death.

At the time of the events in question, Cooner Roofing used subcontractors and/or temporary employees to perform its work. Cooner testified that approximately 90 percent of the company’s work consists of residential roofing projects; he could not name any commercial projects the company had performed other than those it had performed for SAB.

Stuart testified that he could not recall any prior “incidents” involving the safety of Cooner Roofing’s employees or subcontractors and that there had never been any indication that Cooner or Cooner Roofing did not have knowledge of whatever hazards there might be working on metal roofs. Further, Stuart testified that he had no knowledge regarding any fall-protection requirements for working on roofs and that he had left it up to Cooner Roofing to take whatever safety measures it deemed necessary to do its work from time to time on SAB’s roof. There is no evidence indicating that SAB exercised, or reserved the right to exercise, any control over the manner in which Cooner Roofing performed its contractual obligations to SAB.

Cooner Roofing hired Rocael Perez and his “crew,” including Benito Perez, to perform the work on the roof of the warehouse. According to Rocael Perez, the members of his crew were not his employees and they all shared equally the money Cooner Roofing paid for the roofing work.

Cooner testified that he warned Rocael Perez and his crew that the skylights on the flat area could be dangerous. Specifically, Cooner testified that he went up on the flat roof with Stuart and Rocael Perez and that he pointed out each of the 12 skylights on the flat area of the roof to Rocael Perez. Cooner stated that he then told Rocael Perez to follow fall-protection regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) in dealing with the skylights, which he said dictate covering skylights with plywood and using harnesses with ropes while working on the roof. Cooner added, however, that he expected Rocael Perez to purchase his own safety supplies for the project, including the plywood, as well as workers’ compensation insurance. Cooner testified that the estimate he provided to Stuart for the cost of the roofing project included the cost of any safety supplies that might be necessary.

Rocael Perez testified that before the roofing project for SAB, he had never worked around skylight panels similar to the ones installed in the flat area of the warehouse roof. He stated that before the accident he did not know whether those skylights could hold the weight of a person and he did not know' that they could be dangerous. He testified that Cooner did not tell him that there were skylights on the flat area of the roof and thus did not relate that those skylights could be dangerous. He stated that Cooner Roofing did not provide the crew with any safety guidelines or supplies. Rocael Perez also testified that the skylights on the flat area of the roof were “fitted into the roof,” not raised like ordinary skylights, and that they were “practically identical to the metal” portion of the roof. He conceded that the skylight panels in the flat area of the roof were a different color than the rest of the roof, but he stated that the skylights were old and that the color looked kind of like metal. He testified that, when you are on the roof in the sunlight, the whole roof looks black and the skylights look no different than the rest of the roof.

Another crew member, Byron Perez, testified that Cooner spent only eight minutes on the roof with the crew explaining the job to them. He stated that Cooner did not tell them about the skylights or warn them to be careful because the skylights could be dangerous. Byron gave testimony to the same effect as Rocael about the difficulty of distinguishing between the roof and the skylights. Carwie also presented expert testimony to the effect that the skylights and the danger they presented were not open and obvious.

On October 29, 2010, the second or third day the crew had been working on the warehouse roof, Benito Perez was working on the pitched area of the roof near the crease between the pitched area and the flat area of the roof. According to Byron Perez, Benito Perez stood up, took a step backward, and lost his balance. Benito Perez then proceeded to fall backward onto one of the skylights on the flat area of the roof. He fell through the skylight and hit the concrete floor of the warehouse at least 20 feet below the roof. The fall resulted in catastrophic injuries to Benito Perez.

Carwie, as temporary conservator of Benito Perez, sued Cooner Roofing. The complaint alleged negligence and wantonness; Carwie later added SAB as a defendant.

Following a bench trial, but before the trial court entered a judgment, both SAB and Cooner Roofing filed separate motions they styled as motions for a judgment as a matter of law. SAB also filed a “Supplemental Motion for a Judgment as a Matter of Law." Carwie agreed at the close of trial that he was not pursuing the wantonness claims against SAB and Cooner Roofing, and the trial court entered a judgment in favor of SAB and Cooner Roofing on the wantonness claims. The trial court thereafter entered what it entitled an “Order and Verdict.” At the outset of that order, the trial court noted that SAB’s and Cooner Roofing’s respective motions purporting to request judgments as a matter of law in a bench trial were actually motions for a judgment on partial findings by the trial court pursuant to Rule 52(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court denied the motions.

As to SAB, the trial court noted in its order that SAB had argued that the only duty it owed Benito Perez was the duty a premises owner has to a business invitee. SAB argued that it was not liable to Benito Perez because, irrespective of whether the skylights and the danger presented thereby were open and obvious to Benito, Cooner Roofing, the entity that had employed Benito and that was responsible for stationing him on the roof, had superior knowledge about the dangers presented by the skylights on the flat area of the roof and was responsible for providing any necessary warnings to its own employees. The trial court rejected SAB’s argument.

The trial court also concluded that SAB owed “an additional duty under the facts of this ease” besides the traditional common-law duty of a premises owner to a business invitee. Specifically, relying largely on expert testimony presented by Carwie, the trial court held that SAB had a duty to Benito Perez to ensure that Cooner Roofing was a safe, qualified contractor.

SAB also argued that it was entitled to a judgment on partial findings because Car-wie failed to present expert testimony as to the reasonableness of the medical bills resulting from Benito Perez’s care at University of South Alabama (“USA”) Hospital. SAB contended that because Carwie failed to prove by competent evidence any medical expenses or recoverable damages, his negligence claim must fail. For several reasons, the trial court also rejected this argument. First, the trial court noted that Carwie had sought damages not only for Benito Perez’s medical expenses, but also for Benito’s pain, suffering, and mental anguish. Second, the trial court concluded that testimony from the collections manager of USA Hospital, Teresa Englestead, and from the collections supervisor at USA Physicians Health Services Foundation, Lucy Wilson, was competent to establish the reasonableness of the medical expenses submitted by Benito Perez. Third, the trial court noted that SAB had objected that Englestead and Wilson were not named as expert witnesses in accordance with the pretrial order, but the court concluded that “admission of testimony from witnesses whose identity as an expert may not have been disclosed in accordance with properly conducted pretrial discovery procedure is within the trial court’s sound discretion.”

As noted, the trial court also rejected Cooner Roofing’s motion for a judgment on partial findings. Cooner Roofing argued that the danger of the skylights was open and obvious and, therefore, that it was not liable for Benito Perez’s injuries. The trial court rejected this argument, stating in its order that the question was not simply whether the skylights themselves presented an open and obvious danger “but whether [Benito] Perez appreciated the risk they posed” and that “whether the danger associated with the skylights was open and obvious is a question to be determined by the trier of fact.”

After denying SAB’s and Cooner Roofing’s motions for a judgment on partial findings, the trial court entered its judgment in the same order. The trial court noted that no party had requested that it find the facts specially or state its conclusions of law separately per Rule 52, Ala. R. Civ. P., and so the trial court chose not to detail separate findings of fact or conclusions of law beyond what it had already stated. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Carwie and against SAB and Cooner Roofing in the amount of $12,601,676.

SAB filed a “Motion to Amend Judgment, for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the alternative, for New Trial or Remit-titur.” Thereafter, Cooner Roofing filed a “Notice of Joinder in all Post-Judgment Motions Filed by Defendant South Alabama Brick.” Carwie filed a motion to strike Cooner Roofing’s motion. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied SAB’s motion and granted Carwie’s motion to strike Cooner Roofing’s motion.

SAB filed a timely appeal of the trial court’s judgment. Cooner Roofing has not appealed the judgment against it.

II, Standard of Review

Under Alabama law, the existence of a duty is a legal question to be determined by the court. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 872 So.2d 833, 837 (Ala.2003). On appeal, this Court reviews de novo rulings on the legal issue of the existence of a duty. Ex parte City of Brundidge, 897 So.2d 1129, 1131 (Ala.2004) (“A ruling on a question of law carries no presumption of correctness, and appellate review is de novo.”). In addition, although factual determinations based on evidence received ore tenus are entitled to a presumption of correctness, the question whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard is one of law to which the ore tenus rule has no application. E.g., Ex parte Perkins, 646 So.2d 46, 47 (Ala. 1994).

III. Analysis

A SAB’s Duty to Benito Perez as a Business Invitee

A premises owner’s legal duty to a party injured by a condition of the premises depends upon the legal status of the injured party. Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis, 58 So.3d 93, 98 (Ala.2010). In this case, Benito Perez was on SAB’s premises to confer a material or commercial benefit to SAB. Accordingly, the relationship between SAB, the premises owner, and Benito Perez, a roofer, is that of invitor/invitee. See Ex parte Mountain Top Indoor Flea Mkt., Inc., 699 So.2d 158, 161 (Ala.1997) (“ ‘In order to be considered an invitee, the plaintiff must have been on the premises for some purpose that materially or commercially benefited the owner or occupier of the premises.’ ” (quoting Sisk v. Heil Co., 639 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Ala.1994))).

Alabama law is well-settled regarding the scope of the duty an invitor owes a business invitee. “The owner of premises owes a duty to business invitees to use reasonable care and diligence to keep the premises in a safe condition, or, if the premises are in a dangerous condition, to give sufficient warning so that, by the use of ordinary care, the danger can be avoided.” Armstrong v. Georgia Marble Co., 575 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Ala.1991) (emphasis added). We have said that a premises owner’s duty to warn extends only to “hidden defects and dangers that are known to [the premises owner], but that are unknown or hidden to the invitee.” Raspilair v. Bruno’s Food Stores, Inc., 514 So.2d 1022, 1024 (Ala.1987). More specifically, we have explained that a plaintiff must establish “ ‘(1) that the defect or danger was “hidden”; (2) that it was “known to the owner”; and (3) that it was “neither known to the contractor, nor such as he ought to know.” ’ ” Roberts v. NASCO Equip. Co., 986 So.2d 379, 384 (Ala.2007) (quoting Ex parte Meadowcraft Indus., Inc., 817 So.2d 702, 706 (Ala.2001), quoting in turn Glenn v. United States Steel Corp., 423 So.2d 152, 154 (Ala.1982)).

“In discussing a premises owner’s liability towards an independent contractor, this Court has recognized that an ‘ “ ‘owner of premises is not responsible to an independent contractor for injury from defects or dangers which the contractor knows of, or ought to know off ” ’ ”

986 So.2d at 383 (quoting Veal v. Phillips, 285 Ala. 655, 657-58, 235 So.2d 799, 802 (1970)). See also Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So.2d 985, 989 (Ala.1980) (to the same effect).

This Court has elaborated on the nature of a premises owner’s duty to a business invitee as follows:

“ ‘ “ ‘The duty to keep an area safe for invitees is limited to hidden defects which are not known to the invitee and would not be discovered by him in the exercise of ordinary care. All ordinary risks present are assumed by the invitee, and the [invitor] is under no duty to alter the pi'emises so as to [alleviate] known and obvious dangers. The [invitor] is not liable to an invitee for an injury resulting from a danger that was obvious or that should have been observed in the exercise of reasonable care.’ ” ’ ”

Jones Food Co. v. Shipman, 981 So.2d 355, 362 (Ala.2006) (quoting Sessions v. Non-nenmann, 842 So.2d 649, 651-52 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Breeden v. Hardy Corp., 562 So.2d 159, 160 (1990) (bracketed language in original; some emphasis omitted)). Of particular importance to this case, the Court in Jones Food then stated:

“ ‘ “ ‘The entire basis of an invitor’s liability rests upon his superior knowledge of the danger that causes the invitee’s injuries. If that superior knowledge is lacking, as when the danger is obvious, the invitor cannot be liable.’ ” ’ ”

981 So.2d at 362 (quoting Sessions v. Non-nenmann, 842 So.2d at 651-52, quoting in turn Breeden v. Hardy Corp., 562 So.2d at 160 (emphasis added)). And as to an independent contractor in particular, we have explained: “ ‘ “There is no duty to warn” ... an independent contractor “who has equal or superior knowledge of a potential danger.” Roberts, 986 So.2d at 383-84 (quoting Fielder v. USX Corp., 726 So.2d 647, 650 (Ala.1998), quoting in turn Alabama Power Co. v. Williams, 570 So.2d 589, 592 (Ala.1990) (emphasis added)).

In Gray v. Mobile Greyhound Park, Ltd., 370 So.2d 1384 (Ala.1979) this Court took note of these same fundamental precepts, as set out in Corpus Juris Secun-dum, to explain what the Court referred to as the “no-duty” rule applicable to a premises owner that lacks “superior knowledge” of a danger:

“Th[e] absence of duty is commonly referred to as the ‘no duty’ rule and has been thoroughly discussed in 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(53), at pages 764-68, as follows:
“ ‘The basis of the inviter’s liability for injuries sustained by the invitee on the premises rests on the oumer’s superior knowledge of the danger, and, as a general rule, he is not liable for an injury to an invitee resulting from a danger which was known to the invitee or which was obvious or should have been observed by the invitee in the exercise of reasonable care, or from a condition which was as well known or as obvious to the invitee as to the inviter, or from a danger which the invitee should reasonably have appreciated before exposing himself to it, or which the inviter had no reason to believe would not be discovered by the invitee.’ ”

370 So.2d at 1388 (emphasis added); accord General Motors Corp. v. Hill, 752 So.2d 1186, 1187 (Ala.1999) (“ ‘[A]n invitor is not liable for injuries to an invitee resulting from a danger that was known to the invitee or that the invitee should have observed through the exercise of reasonable care.’ ” (quoting Ex parte Industrial Distribution Servs. Warehouse, Inc., 709 So.2d 16, 19 (Ala.1997))).

As indicated by the “ought to know” and “should have known” aspects of the standard quoted above, the duty of a premises owner is measured by an objective standard, not the subjective state of the invitee’s knowledge. The question is what was objectively reasonable for the invitor to expect the invitee to know. “As discussed in Sessions [v. Nonnenmann, 842 So.2d 649 (Ala.2002) ], the question is whether the danger should have been observed, not whether in fact it was consciously appreciated....” Jones Food, 981 So.2d at 362. And as we explained in Sessions, 842 So.2d at 653-54, an invitor’s duty before an accident is not determined by “the invitee’s subjective state of mind” at the moment of the accident.

With these legal principles in mind, we turn to the particulars of this case. Ultimately, the trial court’s judgment holds SAB responsible for not directly warning Benito Perez of the danger posed by the skylights. We consider this judgment in the context of the fact that Benito Perez’s injuries did not result from his deliberately stepping onto a skylight. Rather, Benito Perez was injured as a result of an accidental fall onto and through one of the skylights.

Benito Perez was injured on the second or third day he was working on the warehouse roof. Nonetheless, the parties disagree (and the trial court undertook to resolve their factual disagreement) as to what information Cooner had shared with Benito Perez regarding the skylights and, if Cooner had not done enough in this regard, whether Benito Perez reasonably could have been expected to discern the existence of the skylights and the danger they posed. But the question presented in this appeal is not the existence of a legal duty on the part of Cooner Roofing to warn or otherwise to provide a safe work environment for its employee, Benito Perez. (Clearly there was such a duty and we do not have before us an appeal by Cooner Roofing of the trial court’s judgment against Cooner Roofing for the breach of that duty.) Instead, the question is whether there existed a direct duty on the part of SAB to Benito Perez.

Benito Perez was an employee of Coon-er Roofing, not SAB. SAB contracted with Cooner Roofing, not Benito Perez, to repair the warehouse roof. The resolution of this appeal therefore does not turn on whether the danger posed by the skylights was open and obvious to Benito Perez. It turns on whether, applying the standards set out above, we can say it was reasonable for SAB to expect that its independent contractor, Cooner Roofing, had knowledge equal or superior to that of SAB as to the danger that would be posed if an employee of Cooner Roofing were to fall from an elevated position onto one of the skylights on the flat area of the roof.

As set out above, the existence of a duty by a premises owner to a business invitee, and particularly to an independent contractor, depends on superiority of knowledge. In this case, there is no evidence that, in fact, SAB had knowledge superior to that of its roofing contractor as to the danger posed to a man accidentally falling onto a skylight on the roof of the warehouse. Moreover, as noted, the standard by which we judge the premises owner is whether the premises owner acted in an objectively reasonable manner. The premises owner is not an insurer of his premises and, by the same token, is not an insurer of the acts or omissions of the contractors it brings onto its premises. The existence of a duty on the part of the premises owner to an employee of such a contractor depends, then, on what information the premises owner reasonably could have expected that contractor to have known and acted upon. Accordingly, we must ask whether it was reasonable for SAB to expect that Cooner, as a professional roofer who had prior experience on multiple occasions with SAB’s roof and who also had inspected that roof on the present occasion to determine the source of multiple leaks and where repairs would be needed to correct those leaks, and who told Stuart that his crew would need to work near the skylights, would have an awareness of the danger that would exist if a member of that crew were to fall onto one of those skylights from an elevated position on the adjacent slanted roof. Was it objectively reasonable for SAB to expect a roofing contractor in Cooner Roofing’s position to issue to its own employees any necessary warnings regarding the hazard of working near, or to take any necessary physical measures to prevent, or to mitigate the consequences of, a fall onto, one of those skylights?

We must conclude under the circumstances presented that SAB reasonably could have expected that Cooner Roofing had at least as much knowledge as did SAB of the danger that would exist if one of Cooner Roofing’s employees were to fall onto a skylight, especially from the elevated position where, as it turned out, the employee was stationed by Cooner Roofing. Where a premises owner can reasonably expect that its contractor knows as much or more than the premises owner does regarding a dangerous condition—whether this is so because the danger is open and obvious to anyone, because the owner has told the contractor all it knows, or because of the contractor’s expertise and previous experience on the premises—the superiority-of-knowledge test is not met and the premises owner has no further duty to warn the contractor. By extension, in that circumstance, the premises owner has no additional, direct duty to warn the contractor’s employees or any subcontractors. To hold otherwise would be to say that a premises owner, despite hiring a contractor whom the owner, for one of the reasons stated above, reasonably expects knows as much of more about the owner’s land, building, or fixtures as does the premises owner, must somehow “pull aside” or otherwise communicate directly with each and every employee of the contractor, subcontractor, employee of any subcontractor, etc. Obviously, at the point at which the contractor knows as much or more as does the premises owner regarding the land, building, or fixtures, the responsibility for sharing that information with its own employees or with subcontractors falls to the contractor.

In Armstrong, this Court held that when a premises owner is found to owe a duty to warn, that duty is satisfied, as a matter of law, when the contractor or supervisory personnel has knowledge of the dangerous condition:

“Once a third party discharges its duty by warning the employer, the duty of warning each of the employer’s individual employees falls to the employer. ‘[T]he owner or occupier of particular property has a duty to warn the employees of an independent contractor who has undertaken to do work on the property, of dangers that are hidden on or inhere in that property, and ... this duty is discharged if those in charge of the work for the independent contractor are given warning or have knowledge of the danger.’ Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bivins, 276 F.2d 753, 758 (5th Cir.1960) cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835, 81 S.Ct. 70, 5 L.Ed.2d 61 (1960); see, also, Cook v. Branick Manufacturing, Inc., 736 F.2d 1442 (11th Cir.1984).”

575 So.2d at 1053. Moreover, in Ex parte Meadowcraft Industries, supra, we explained that knowledge of a general contractor retained to install a conveyor at defendant’s plant concerning the dangers of the conveyor-belt system was imputed to the employee of a subcontractor. 817 So.2d at 708. The constructive knowledge imputed to individuals working on the project, by virtue of the knowledge of a general contractor, is sufficient to discharge the premises owner of any duty to warn each individual worker of the condition of the premises. See also Farr Metal, Inc. v. Hines, 738 So.2d 863, 864 (Ala.1999) (holding that “direct knowledge” possessed by supervisory employees of plaintiffs employer, as to opening in upper floor of building through which plaintiff fell, “removed any duty on part of [defendant],” another subcontractor which created the hole, “to inform [plaintiff] of the possible danger presented by the opening”); Crawford Johnson & Co. v. Duffner, 279 Ala. 678, 189 So.2d 474 (1966) (holding that premises owner’s duty to warn is discharged if plaintiffs employer has knowledge of dangerous condition); Ramirez v. Alabama Power Co., 898 F.Supp. 1537, 1547-48 (M.D.Ala.1995) (applying Alabama law and explaining that a premises owner fulfills a duty to warn by warning plaintiffs employer of any danger).

In fact, faced with similar factual situations where a worker has fallen through a skylight, often with tragic consequences, courts around the country have held that the premises owner, is not liable. See, e.g., Strickland v. Timco Aviation Servs., Inc., 66 So.3d 1002 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2011) (holding that airplane-hangar owner had no legal duty to warn independent contractor of danger posed by skylights on roof); Crenshaw v. Arkansas Warehouse, Inc., 379 S.W.3d 515 (Ark.Ct.App.2010) (holding that warehouse owner did not have duty to warn independent contractor of danger of skylights on roof); Saunders v. Industrial Metals & Surplus, Inc., 285 Ga.App. 415, 646 S.E.2d 294 (2007) (affirming summary judgment in favor of warehouse owner on claim of roofer who fell through skylight); and Merrill v. Knauf Fiber Glass GmbH, 771 N.E.2d 1258 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (to the same effect).

B. The Additional Duty Imposed by the Trial Court

After purportedly applying to SAB the duty owed by a premises owner to a business invitee, the trial court undertook to impose a different, additional duty on SAB. It held that SAB had a duty to Cooner Roofing’s employee, Benito Perez, “to insure that Cooner Roofing was a qualified contractor.” In essence, the trial court held that SAB had a duty to protect Benito Perez from the negligence of his own employer by not hiring that employer in the first place. In support of this additional duty, the trial court cited and described three cases:

“Hathcock v, Mitchell, [277 Ala. 586,] 173 So.2d 576, 584 (Ala.1965) (building owner has duty to employ qualified and competent architect and contractor; negligence where owner knew or should have known in exercise of due diligence that architect and contractor were not qualified) (citing Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Bibb, [164 Ala. 62,] 51 So. 345 (Ala.1910) (negligence for master to employ unqualified servant where servant’s incompetency was proximate cause of the injury)); see also Mentzer v. Ognibene, [408 Pa.Super. 578,] 597 A.2d 604, 610 (1991) (The general rule ‘recognize[s] that the owner who has entrusted the responsibility for the work to a qualified contractor justifiably depends upon the contractor’s expertise’).”

These cases, however, are inapposite. The issue they address is when, if ever, a premises owner is responsible for (a) injuries to third parties (b) resulting, not from some preexisting condition of the premises known to the owner, but from conditions created by the faulty workmanship or other negligence of an independent contractor committed by the contractor in the course of performing its contract. In Hathcock v, Mitchell, 277 Ala. 586, 173 So.2d 576 (1965), the Court addressed the liability of a landlord for damage suffered by its tenant as a result of the collapse of a roof negligently installed several days earlier by the owner’s contractor. Similarly, in Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Bibb, 164 Ala. 62, 51 So. 345 (1910), the issue was a landowner/employer’s liability to its employee for personal injuries suffered as a result of the negligent operation of a mine car by a contractor of the employer. See also Mentzer v. Ognibene, 408 Pa.Super. 578, 597 A.2d 604 (1991) (holding that property owners were not personally negligent in failing to prevent negligence of independent contractor or to warn contractor’s own employee of dangers created by contractor’s negligence).

The issue of the responsibility of a premises owner for the negligence of its contractor that injures another is an altogether different issue than the issue of a premises owner’s duty to the contractor (and by extension its employees) to warn or protect against preexisting conditions of the premises into which the premises owner invites the contractor.

TV. Conclusion

The condition at issue here was a preexisting condition of a facility owned by SAB. SAB hired an independent roofing contractor, Cooner Roofing, with previous experience repairing the roof of that facility, to make repairs determined by .that contractor to be necessary and appropriate. Under the circumstances of this case, SAB was not legally responsible for warning Cooner Roofing’s employees of the risks of working on that roof. Because of our disposition of the issue of liability, we need not reach SAB’s arguments relating to the damages awarded against it.

The judgment of the trial court against SAB is reversed, and this cause remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of SAB.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MOORE, C.J., and BOLIN, MAIN, and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

      . Records showed that, in just the last seven years before the incident, Cooner Roofing had performed work on SAB’s roof on at least three other occasions.

      . Cooner also gave SAB an option for more extensive work to the roof at a greater cost, which SAB did not accept.

      . Stuart testified that SAB did not even possess a ladder that could have enabled any of its employees to go onto the roof.

      . It is unclear whether Rocael Perez was a subcontractor of Cooner Roofing who, in turn, employed Benito Perez, or whether Benito was a direct employee of Cooner Roofing along with the other members of the crew. The rationale for our decision applies to either circumstance. For purposes of this opinion, we treat Benito Perez as an employee of Cooner Roofing.

      . Pictures of the roof introduced by both parties showed that the skylight panels on the flat area of the roof were a black or faded brown color while the rest of the roof was gray in color.

      . Rule 52(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
      “If during a trial without a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue, or the court may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. Such a judgment may be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law.”

      . The trial court took the position that SAB’s motion for a judgment on partial findings “hinges on what ... Cooner ..., the owner of Cooner Roofing, knew about the dangers of the skylights on SAB's warehouse roof.” The trial court expressed utter disdain for Cooner and decided his uncontroverted testimony was not worthy of belief. For the reasons explained in the text, the trial court’s disbelief of Cooner’s testimony is not dispositive of whether SAB owed a duty directly to Cooner Roofing’s employee, Benito Perez, in this case.

      . Carwie introduced certified medical bills totaling $800,960.70. Also, Kathy Smith, a registered nurse and life-care-planning expert, testified that the future care for Benito Perez, if he is transferred to a long-term-care facility, would range from $1,930,610 to $2,279,119.54 over the course of his life.

      . Before trial, Carwie listed Englestead and Wilson as fact witnesses, not as expert witnesses.

      . In addition to its argument that it owed no duty to Benito Perez, SAB makes several arguments relating to the damages award in this case. These include an argument that Carwie failed to prove medical expenses by competent evidence and that the _ damages award, particularly the damages attributable to mental anguish and pain in excess of $9 million, is excessive. Because of our decision on the issue of duty, we pretermit consideration of these latter issues.

      . Carwie’s attempt to distinguish Meadow-craft is without merit. Although it is true that the Court in Meadowcraft noted that the injured worker knew or should have known of the hazard from his own experience, that fact was not necessary to the holding that the premises owner’s duly was discharged based upon the general contractor’s awareness of the hazard. See 817 So.2d at 709.

      . Even if the issue in this case could be said to fall in the former category, the law provides that it is the independent contractor in such cases, not the premises owner, who bears responsibility for the employee’s injury where the premises owner has not retained control over the manner in which the contractor performs its work.
      "Generally, the owner of premises ... owes no duty to the employees of an independent contractor with respect to conditions arising in the progress of work on the contract. Hughes v. Hughes, 367 So.2d 1384 (Ala.1979). The test for whether such an owner will be viewed as a prime contractor is whether the owner reserved the right of control over the contractor’s work....

        “More specifically, the issue presented here is whether [the defendant] retained the right to direct the manner in which [the contractor] performed its work."

        Pate v. United States Steel Corp., 393 So.2d 992, 994 (Ala.1981). See also Armstrong, 575 So.2d at 1053 ("Because Georgia Marble Company did not retain any control over the work to be done, the relationship between Georgia Marble Company and Armstrong was not that of a master and a servant. Their relationship was that of an owner of premises and a business invitee."); Weeks v. Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc., 419 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Ala.1982) ("[A] premises owner owes no duty of care to employees of an independent contractor with respect to working conditions arising during the progress of the work on the contract.”). The evidence at trial was undisputed that SAB did not retain or purport to exercise any control over the manner in which Cooner Roofing or Benito Perez, or any other person working on the roof, performed the work on SAB’s roof.