source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
PER CURIAM
     WEIMER, J., GUIDRY, J., KNOLL, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    IN RE: James D. MECCA
    NO. 2016-B-1116
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    01/20/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

| iThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, James D. Mecca, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

In late 2013, the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office obtained information that respondent was receiving drugs for payment of his legal services. Specifically, a cooperating individual (Cl) contacted the Narcotics Division of the Sheriffs Office on December 12, 2013 to advise that she had come into contact with respondent while attending court earlier that morning, and that respondent had offered his legal services in exchange for marijuana. The Cl reported that she had "used respondent in the past for legal counsel, and had paid him with marijuana on three separate occasions over a. period of one. year or more. On the most recent occasion, respondent approached the Cl and said he had heard the Cl may need some help again. The Cl then asked respondent how much his services would cost, or would it be the “same old, same old.” Respondent replied, “same old, same |?old,” meaning, that he would accept marijuana for his legal services in place of currency.

Narcotics officers then arranged for the Cl to speak with respondent by telephone concerning the details of the transaction. During a.recorded conversation about respondent’s fee, the Cl advised respondent that he had “a crap load of smoke if you want some of that” (meaning marijuana). Respondent asked how.much “stuff’ the Cl had, and the Cl responded, “A whole backpack full.” Respondent replied, “Oh, my God,” and readily agreed to “collect payments from both accounts,” meaning that he would accept the marijuana to offset the total attorney’s fees owed by Cl.

Narcotics officers then set up a controlled “exchange” which occurred on December 20, 2013 in the parking lot of a retail store in Covington. The marijuana provided to the Cl by law enforcement was approximately one-half pound in weight and had an approximate street value of $2,500. After departing the area with the marijuana as well as marked cash provided to the Cl by law enforcement, respondent was stopped for a traffic violation and arrested. He was booked with possession with intent to distribute marijuana and failure to stop at a stop sign.

Respondent’s arrest and the law enforcement investigation were reported by the New Orleans media on January 14, 2014. The following day, respondent, through counsel, self-reported his arrest to the ODC as well as his intent to cooperate with the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (“JLAP”). Respondent was subsequently admitted to the Palmetto Addiction Recovery Center in Rayville, Louisiana. Following an evaluation, respondent was diagnosed with alcohol and cannabis dependence and unresolved grief and depression stemming |sfrom the death of his father in 2011. Respondent then entered a ninety-day inpatient treatment program at Palmetto and successfully completed the program in April 2014. On May 2, 2014, respondent executed a five-year recovery agreement with JLAP. He has been fully compliant with the requirements of the agreement since it was executed.

On August 8, 2014, a bill of information was filed charging respondent with possession of marijuana (first offense), a misdemeanor. On the same day, respondent pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to serve six months in the parish jail, suspended, and placed on probation for one year under the supervision of JLAP. He was also required to pay a $200 fine and court costs.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In January 2015, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct as set forth above constituted a violation of Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent answered the formal charges and admitted his criminal conviction. He also requested a hearing in mitigation, which was conducted by the hearing committee in July 2015.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made the following factual findings: Respondent practices primarily in the area of criminal defense in St. Tammany and Washington Parishes. Prior to becoming an attorney in 2002, he was employed in law enforcement. He was arrested in St. Tammany Parish on December 20, 2013 as the result of a “sting” operation conducted by the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office (“STSO”). A Cl posed as a potential criminal client who needed legal representation for her son. The Cl informed the STSO that she had “paid” respondent for representation |4with marijuana in previous representations, which respondent admitted. Respondent told the Cl at that time that if future legal services were required they could work out the “same old same old,” meaning payment of marijuana in lieu of or in addition to money-

On December 16-17, 2013, the Cl placed several phone calls to respondent requesting legal representation of her son. The parties discussed the matter and respondent proposed the sum of $2,500 to handle the case. The Cl subsequently informed respondent that she had a “crap load of smoke” and a “backpack full of marijuana.” Respondent then mentioned the sum of $700 and that he would get back in touch with the CL

On December 20, 2013, the parties made arrangements to meet in the parking lot of a store in Covington. They met in a vehicle and discussed a cash payment for legal services while the police conducted surveillance. The Cl asked respondent if he would take $400 instead of $700 and respondent agreed, then stated he would accept $300. Respondent then asked about the “other thing. [Tjhat’s what-I am most concerned about,” according to the police report. The Cl gave respondent a backpack, which he examined and took with him. He got into his car and left. Shortly thereafter, he was pulled over by law enforcement in front of his law office and arrested by STSO deputies for possession with intent to distribute.

Respondent’s testimony was largely identical to that of the STSO deputy and the police report insofar as what led up to the arrest. He testified that he did indeed make arrangements with the Cl to barter his legal services for marijuana and cash. However, he disputed that he ever planned to distribute the marijuana and stated that it was all for his own personal use. The committee found this portion of respondent’s testimony to be credible and evidently the District Attorney’s Office Rfelt the same way, as the criminal charge of distribution was reduced to simple possession.

Respondent went on to testify that although he was extremely remorseful for the arrest and .the embarrassment it caused his family and the legal profession, it was the best thing that could have happened to him. He testified that following .the death of his father in 2011, he began to spiral downward and isolated himself from his family. He testified that he had no positive ways to cope with his grief as he had few friends and no close family. He testified that the stresses of his legal practice began to wear on him emotionally and to cope he began to escape through excessive consumption of alcohol and marijuana in the evenings. He testified that drinking and use of marijuana compromised his ability to exercise prudent judgment which culminated in the decision to trade legal services for an illegal drug and ultimately to his arrest. He also testified that the arrest forced him to confront his addictions and get sober, which has subsequently led to him becoming a better son, brother, lawyer, and friend.

The committee found respondent’s testimony to be “extremely credible,” and believed that he expressed genuine remorse for his arrest and was forthright in owning up to his problems and the bad decisions he made. However, the committee was troubled that respondent, a member of the bar, had committed a criminal offense, not to mention that the offense had involved bartering legal services for illegal drugs.

Respondent testified that after his arrest, he immediately sought help for his substance dependence issues. He reached out to a fellow lawyer who is active in AA and to Buddy Stockwell, the Executive Director of- JLAP. Respondent was advised to obtain an evaluation at Palmetto. The report of the evaluation, dated January 20, 2014, recommended that respondent sign a minimum five-year contract with JLAP," complete long-term treatment and outpatient treatment for |fiunresolved grief and depression. Testimony revealed that respondent was in inpatient treatment for ninety days at Palmetto. On May 2, 2014, he executed a recovery agreement with JLAP in which he agreed to be monitored for five years. Requirements include drug screens, three . AA meetings per week, and monthly sobriety reports provided to a JLAP monitor.

Mr. Stockwell testified that since his discharge from Palmetto, respondent has been fully compliant with his JLAP contract and has been faithful in following all of its requirements. Mr. Stockwell testified that he is confident that respondent will continue to adhere to his JLAP contract based on what he has observed thus far. Respondent testified, at times emotionally, that he is committed to maintaining 100% sobriety and that he hit rock bottom when he was arrested. He further offered that he is committed to helping others, both criminal clients and legal professionals, if they struggle with addiction. Once again, the committee noted that it was impressed with respondent’s testimony that he. is committed to his treatment plan -and that he plans to use his unfortunate experience to help others in battling the disease of addiction.

Judges Scott Gardner and Raymond Childress of the 22nd JDC both testified on respondent’s behalf that he has been attentive to his clients, shown excellent skills in his representation, and been respectful to the court and opposing counsel since he has been discharged. Respondent offered further testimony from family members, therapists, and medical professionals treating him and all testimony was unanimous concerning the positive effect that rehabilitation has had on his personal relationships and coping skills with the inherent stress in the legal profession. By all accounts, respondent has worked hard to get .past the dependence issues and has been an active participant in recovery.

There was no testimony offered or evidence submitted that respondent neglected matters connected - to client representations either before or after his |7arrest. Respondent admitted to an arrest for DWI when he was a police officer in the 1980’s, but there was nothing in the record to evidence misconduct as an attorney prior to the arrest in 2013.

Respondent stipulated that his conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, the committee found the sole issue before it is a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s conduct. Considering the prior case law involving attorney misconduct through the use of illegal drugs, as well as respondent’s acknowledgment, remorse,' and excellent compliance thus far, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, fully deferred, provided that he remains compliant with the terms and conditions of his May 2, 2014 JLAP contract.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings do not appear to be manifestly erroneous and are supported by the record. Based on these findings, the board determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The board then determined that respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to the public and the profession. He engaged in criminal conduct, which is a violation of his duty to the public. His misconduct and the press it received cast the profession in a negative light. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the applicable baseline sanction is suspension.

IsThe board recognized the following aggravating factors: substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 2002) and illegal conduct. The board found the following mitigating factors apply: absence of a prior disciplinary record, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, character or reputation, imposition of other penalties or sanctions, remorse, and chemical dependency,

Considering these factors, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from, the practice of law for two years, fully deferred, conditioned upon a period of probation to run concurrently with the remainder of respondent’s JLAP recovery agreement, which will end in May 2019. The board further recommended that respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.

Athough neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the board’s recommendation, on October 7, 2016, we ordered briefing addressing the issue of an appropriate sanction. Both parties filed briefs in response to the court’s order.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. Art. V, § 5(B). When the disciplinary proceedings involve an attorney who has been convicted of a crime, the conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt and the sole issue presented is whether respondent’s crimes warrant discipline, and if so, the extent thereof. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19(E); In re: Boudreau, 02-0007 (La. 4/12/02), 815 So.2d 76; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Wilkinson, 562 So.2d 902 (La. 1990), The discipline to be. imposed in a given ease depends upon the sseriousness of the offense, the circumstances of the offense, and the extent of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n. v. Perez, 550 So.2d 188 (La. 1989).

Here, respondent stands convicted of accepting marijuana in exchange for his legal services, resulting in his arrest on charges of possession with intent: to distribute marijuana and his conviction of possession of marijuana. In connection with his criminal conviction, respondent has acknowledged that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged.

Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to the public and the legal profession. His criminal conduct resulted in harm to the legal profession and potential harm to his clients and the public. The applicable baseline sanction is suspension. The record supports the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the disciplinary board.

We find the appropriate sanction for respondent’s criminal conduct is a one-year suspension from the practice of law. Considering that respondent bartered his legal services for illegal drugs, directly implicating the practice of law and causing harm to the legal profession, we will not defer any portion of the suspension. Accordingly, we reject the board’s recommended discipline and will suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record and the briefs filed by the parties, it is ordered that James D. Mecca, Louisiana Bar Roll number 28148, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one year. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme | inCourt Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

WEIMER, J.,

concurring in part, dissenting in part.

hi agree that the respondent has committed professional misconduct as described in the majority’s opinion; however, I respectfully dissent on the sanction to be imposed.

In my view, the respondent’s actions have placed this court in a quandary. On the one hand, the respondent has made a laudable recovery from the substance abuse issues that undisputedly motivated his misconduct. On the other hand, and also an undisputable proposition, the respondent’s use of his law license in an illegal bargain was an abuse of his privilege to practice law. To resolve this quandary between an attorney’s praiseworthy recovery and his misconduct that debases the privilege to practice law, I believe further details should be considered. Because this case is at its heart a disciplinary matter, it is appropriate to deal first with the details of the misconduct.

Indeed, we cannot and should not overlook the abuse of the respondent’s license to practice law, an abuse which was inherent when he bartered his legal services for an illegal drug. Such action essentially victimizes each attorney who practices law in a legitimate and ethical manner; such action also inappropriately burdens our system of justice. In fact, if the individual with whom he engaged in this illicit transaction had not been an undercover informant for the police, the [¡.individual could have been charged with a felony. Significantly, the respondent engaged in this improper conduct on more than one occasion. Although there is no evidence that the respondent’s misconduct directly harmed any clients, as just noted, he could have put the client involved in the drugs-for-representation transaction at risk of being charged with a crime.

Turning then to how the respondent’s recovery affects this case, it should be noted that at every level, including this court, the attorney disciplinary system encourages attorneys to confront and conquer substance abuse. The record in this case reflects that the respondent clearly accepted responsibility for his actions, promptly self-reported his misconduct, immediately sought out the assistance of the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (JLAP), and acquiesced in submitting to a long-term inpatient treatment effort. He successfully completed treatment and thereafter executed a JLAP monitoring agreement with which he has remained in strict compliance. The hearing committee and the disciplinary board were persuaded by the respondent’s commitment to recovery, his genuine remorse, and his commitment to refrain from further such misconduct. The hearing committee was also favorably impressed with the respondent’s plans to use his unfortunate experience to help others in battling addiction. Two judges testified regarding the respondent’s professionalism after his inpatient treatment. Both judges remarked that the respondent has been attentive to his clients’ cases, has displayed great skill in his representation, and has maintained a re-speetful demeanor with the court and with opposing counsel.

In terms of weighing both the egregiousness of the respondent’s misconduct and his laudable recovery, I agree with the majority’s view that a period of actual suspension from the practice of law is appropriate. Taking all factors into 1 (¡consideration, however, I believe a sanction more in line with that recommended by the Disciplinary Board would adequately serve the goals of the disciplinary system. See Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173, 1177-78 (La. 1987) (noting that “[disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct.”). Accordingly, I would impose a two-year period of suspension, deferring all but six months, and place the respondent on probation for the remainder of his suspension period. As a condition of probation, I would require continued compliance with the respondent’s JLAP recovery agreement for the duration of his probation.

My hope is that the respondent continues on his path to a lifetime of recovery. Virtually all who testified were impressed that he would do so. The sanction that I propose, including the probationary conditions, would provide an extended period during which the disciplinary system could remain vigilant in seeing that the respondent’s expected recovery indeed remains on solid footing.

GUIDRY, J.,

concurring in part, dissenting in part.

hi agree with the majority that the respondent has committed professional misconduct warranting discipline; however, I respectfully dissent on the imposed sanction and would impose greater discipline.

KNOLL, J.,

dissents and assigns reasons:

h.I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to impose a one-year suspension in this matter. The court’s function in disciplinary proceedings is primarily to protect the public, not to punish the lawyer. See Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173, 1177-78 (La. 1987). Recognizing this principle, both the hearing committee and the disciplinary board recommended that any period of suspension imposed against respondent be fully deferred. Furthermore, respondent is contrite and has been an outstanding participant in the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program. Under these circumstances, I find an actual period of suspension of one year to be unduly harsh. I would impose a less harsh sanction.

       Knoll, J., retired, participated in this decision which was submitted prior to her retirement.

      . The marijuana had been placed in a backpack, which also contained a scale and a marijuana grinder. Respondent removed the scale from the backpack and left it in the Cl’s vehicle, apparently not wanting anything suggesting an intent to distribute the marijuana. However, respondent did not remove the grinder from the backpack.

      . The board noted that in the past, the court has ordered lawyers to execute new JLAP agreements upon imposition of a sanction and/or probation; however, in this case, Mr. Stockwell testified that renewal of respondent's JLAP agreement for an additional five-year term would be unnecessary.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE EX REL. Wendell WESLEY v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2025
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/24/2017
   PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to his remaining claims, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. Art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr,P. Art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. Art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr.P. Art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La. C.Cr.P. Art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his |2right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Hughes, J., would grant the writ for the purpose of ordering an evidentiary hearing.


author: JOHNSON, Chief Justice, Hughes, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Calvin James CATALON
    NO. 2017-KK-0099
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    3/31/2017
   JOHNSON, Chief Justice,

would grant defendant’s writ application.

| defendant was charged by grand jury indictment with two counts of aggravated kidnapping and one count of aggravated burglary on October 29, 2009. After his court appearance on June 1, 2010, defendant was not present in court for any proceeding until October 1,2013. The state received formal notice that defendant was incarcerated in Texas on February 1, 2011. Given that the charges at issue in this case are non-capital felonies, La. Code of Crim. Proc. Article 578 required the State to bring defendant to trial within two years from the date of the bill of information. This Court has consistently held that the state “bears the heavy burden of showing that it is excused from trying the accused on a charge later than the period mandated by Article 578.” State v. Groth, 483 So.2d 596, 599 (La. 1986); State v. Devito, 391 So.2d 813 (La. 1980); see also State v. Amarena, 426 So.2d 613 (La. 1983) State v. Driever, 347 So.2d 1132 (La. 1977). That burden requires the state to exercise due diligence in discovering the whereabouts of the defendant as well as in taking appropriate steps to secure his presence for trial once it has found him. See generally State v. Taylor, 439 So.2d 410 (La. 1983); State v. Nations, 420 So.2d 967 (La. 1982); State v. Williams, 414 So.2d 767 (La. 1982).

On March 6, 2014, defendant filed a motion to quash, alleging the statutory and constitutional speedy trial deadlines had lapsed. The trial court initially granted the defendant’s motion to quash. The court of appeal conditionally affirmed the trial court ruling, but remanded to the trial court to determine whether the defense agreed to the continuance granted by the trial court on February 22, 2013, even though neither appointed defense counsel, Frank Olivier, nor defendant was present for that hearing. The court of appeal further instructed the trial court to reverse its ruling on the motion.to quash, should it determine that defense counsel agreed to the continuance. See State v. Catalon, 14-0768 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/23/14), 158 So.3d 114, writ denied, 15-0462 (La. 1/8/16), 184 So.3d 692. Following a hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of the state, having found specifically that defense counsel agreed to the continuance. The court of appeal affirmed. State v. Catalon, 16-0866 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/16/16) (unpub’d).

Defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying the motion to quash, arguing that, because no attorney-client relationship had been established between defendant and his court-appointed attorney Frank Olivier, Mr. Oliver was not authorized to agree to a continuance on his behalf. Defendant states that he was unaware of his first retained counsel’s withdrawal of representation and states that he was also unaware that other counsel had been appointed to represent him. He maintains that he is not indigent and did not request appointed counsel. Defendant argues that these errors invalidate any actions Mr. Olivier took on his behalf as appointed counsel because he lacked authority to take them.

The record does not contain a written motion requesting a continuance. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 580, addresses suspension of time [ limitations and states: “A. When a defendant files a motion to quash or other preliminary plea ... [ ] B. The periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall also be suspended if the court grants a continuance in accordance with the provisions, of Paragraph B of Article 709.” Article 709 deals with “continuance based on absence of a witness.” The record shows that the State made an oral motion for continuance in open court. Article 707 states the mandatory requirement that a Motion for Continuance shall be in writing and shall state the grounds for the motion. Additionally, any such motion made by a defendant must not only be in writing but must be verified by affidavit. Since defendant did not file a written motion to continue, Art. 580 does not apply.

The state’s attorney testified that, although she had no recollection of the particular hearing, since the record shows she orally requested a continuance on behalf of the defense, she surmised she had moved for the continuance as a convenience for defense counsel who could not attend the hearing. She noted this was routine between them. Mr. Olivier confirmed the existence of this regular practice, and also admitted that a specific recollection of this particular instance escaped him. Additionally, by Mr. Olivier’s own admission, he was unaware for months that he was representing defendant, either because he ignored, or never received notice from the clerk of court. He apparently had never met defendant, and he did not recognize him in court.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes a criminal defendant’s right to secure counsel of his or her choice. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed.158 (1932); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Accordingly, a court must give considerable deference to a Defendant’s choice of Counsel."

This record shows that the state not only requested a continuance on behalf of defendant’s' áppointed counsel,' but also raised the objection to the continuance. In Ldoing so, the state acted in its own interest in obtaining the continuance, -.thereby creating a suspension in the delays, and circumventing the issue of a speedy trial. Moreover, when the state objected to the continuance, it amounted to the state arguing that it should be' allowed to proceed against an absent defendant, and his absent defense counsel, when it was the sole responsibility of the state to get the absent incarcerated defendant delivered to court.

In my view, the trial court was not clearly wrong in its initial finding granting defendant’s motion to quash. Considering the state’s three-year delay, between 2010 and 2013 in bringing an incarcerated defendant to court, and the egregious facts surrounding the February 22, 2013, motion hearing, wherein neither defendant nor his counsel were present, I would grant defendant’s writ application.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., would grant for reasons assigned by C.J. Johnson.

Hughes, J.,

dissents and assigns reasons.

hi respectfully dissent and would grant the writ for the reasons assigned by Johnson, C.J.


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    IN RE: Edward HEBERT, II
    NO. 2016-B-2278
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

| iThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Edward Hebert, II, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently suspended from practice.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Before we address the current matter, we find it helpful to review respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 1997. He has been ineligible to practice law since 2006, based on his failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirements. He is also ineligible for failure to pay bar dues and the disciplinary assessment.

In 2009, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day for neglecting a legal matter, failing to communicate with his client, making false statements of material fact to his client and the ODC, and failing to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. In re: Hebert, 08-2785 (La. 5/29/09), 9 So.3d 846 (“Hebert I”). In 2012, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for eighteen months for, among other misconduct, failing to communicate with clients, failing to return unearned fees, and failing to cooperate with the ODC in its ^investigation. In re: Hebert, 12-2102 (La. 11/16/12), 125 So.3d 1074 . (“Hebert II”).

Respondent has never applied for reinstatement and thus he remains suspended from the practice of law. Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at issue in the present proceeding.

FORMAL CHARGES

On May 11, 2015, respondent appeared as counsel for Ivan Prevost in the courtroom of Judge Monique Barial of the Orleans Parish Civil District Court. The court rendered a judgment, which respondent was to prepare. Unable to reach respondent to obtain a copy of the judgment, Mr. Prevost went to the court’s chambers to get a copy. The office staff told Mr. Prevost that they had not yet received the circulated judgment. Two days later, Mr. Prevost returned to the court’s chambers to get a copy of the judgment. Mr. Prevost told the staff that he still had not heard from respondent, and had in fact learned that respondent had been disbarred.

Judge Barial then attempted to call the number that was listed on the draft of the judgment that respondent had previously-sent to the court, but he did not return her call. Judge Barial also searched the court’s case management system to determine whether respondent was eligible to practice law. She found respondent listed under his correct name (Edward W. Hebert) and bar roll number (25086), and this information confirmed that he was ineligible to practice. However, on the judgment that respondent had submitted to the court, respondent had listed his name as “E. Hebert” and his bar roll number as 25412. According to the court’s database, that bar roll number belongs to an attorney by the name of Eric T. Hebert. Judge Barial called Eric Hebert, who confirmed that the bar roll number | ¡¡listed on the pleading was his, but that he was not Edward Hebert, and that there was no Edward Hebert at his firm.

Mr. Prevost indicated that respondent had never advised him that he was sus^ pended from the practice of law. Mr. Prevost also confirmed that he paid respondent $500 in cash to represent him. Respondent has not refunded any of Mr. Prevost’s funds.

In July 2015, Judge Barial filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Notice of the complaint was sent to respondent at his primary and secondary bar registration addresses and two other known addresses. Three of the notices were returned as either undeliverable or unclaimed. Respondent personally signed for the fourth notice on November 5, 2015. Out of an abundance of caution, the ODC sent an investigator to attempt to personally serve respondent with a copy of the complaint, without success. To date, respondent has not responded to the complaint.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In February 2016, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct as set forth above violated Rules 5.5(a) (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

| ¿Hearing Committee Report

After reviewing the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee found that the factual allegations in the formal charges were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. Based on these facts, the committee found respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The committee determined that respondent violated duties owed to his client, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Respondent intentionally engaged in the practice of law during his suspension, intentionally attempted to conceal his ineligibility from the court, intentionally converted client funds, and intentionally failed to cooperate with the ODC’s investigation into this matter. Respondent’s conduct caused actual harm to Mr. Prevost, which harm is significant and ongoing, Mr. Prevost was not properly advised that respondent could not lawfully represent his interests, he was deprived of funds and documents needed to pursue his claim further, and he was not provided with sufficient opportunity to obtain alternate counsel to help him pursue his legal matter. Further, respondent appeared in court while he knew he was suspended, and intentionally misrepresented his name and bar roll number to the court in order to conceal the fact that he was ineligible to practice law. Additionally, respondent refused to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation, conduct for which he was disciplined in two prior disciplinary proceedings. Based on the ABA’s Standards for .Imposing Latvyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the applicable baseline sanction is disbarment.

In aggravation, the committee found a prior disciplinary record, a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction | Bof the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1997), and indifference to making restitution. The committee found that no mitigating factors are present.

Considering the foregoing circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be disbarred.

The ODC filed an objection to the leniency of the sanction recommended by the hearing committee.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings in this deemed admitted matter are supported by the factual.allegations in the formal charges and/or by the evidence submitted in support of those allegations. The board also found respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The board determined that respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his client, the legal system, and the legal profession. His misconduct caused serious injury to' his client and to the legal system. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the applicable baseline sanction is disbarment.

In aggravation, the board found a prior disciplinary record, a dishonest or selfish motive, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law. The board found that no mitigating factors are present.

IfiAfter reviewing prior jurisprudence involving similar misconduct, the board recommended respondent be permanently disbarred. The board also recommended respondent be required to provide restitution to Mr. Prevost. Finally, the board recommended that respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

In cases.in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Dorman, 01-3058 (La. 1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

The record in this deemed admitted matter demonstrates that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law after being suspended in Hebert I and Hebert II and misrepresented his identity to the Civil District Court in order to 17conceal his ineligibility. He thereafter failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint filed against him. As such, he has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La. 1984).

The record supports a finding that respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to his client, the legal system, and the legal profession, causing actual harm. The applicable baseline sanction in this matter is disbarment. The aggravating factors found by the disciplinary board are supported by the record, and no mitigating factors are identifiable.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, respondent’s conduct ' falls squarely within Guidelines 8 and 9 of the permanent disbarment guidelines. These guidelines provide as follows:

GUIDELINE 8. Following notice, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law subsequent to resigning from the Bar Association, or during the period of time in which the lawyer is suspended from the practice of law or disbarred.
GUIDELINE 9. Instances of serious attorney misconduct or conviction of a serious crime, when the misconduct or conviction is preceded by suspension or disbarment for prior instances of serious attorney misconduct or conviction of a serious crime. Serious crime is defined in Rule XIX, Section 19. Serious attorney misconduct is | ^defined for purposes of these guidelines as any misconduct which results in a suspension of more than one year.

Respondent practiced law and held himself out as an attorney in 2015 although he never sought reinstatement from his 2009 suspension in Hebert I. Thus, Guideline 8 is applicable. Guideline 9 also applies, as respondent’s current misconduct, taken as a whole, is serious attorney misconduct and was preceded by his one year and one day suspension in Hebert I and his eighteen-month suspension in Hebert II. Respondent’s misconduct during his suspension clearly demonstrates he lacks the fitness to engage in the practice of law in this state and, therefore, we find he should not be given an opportunity to seek readmission.

Accordingly, we will adopt the disciplinary board’s recommendation and permanently disbar respondent. We will also order respondent to pay restitution to Mr. Prevost.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Edward Hebert, II, Louisiana Bar Roll number 25086, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. It is further ordered that respondent shall make restitution of $500 plus legal interest to Ivan Prevost. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


author: PER CURIAM Hughes, J.,

text:
    IN RE: Jeffry L. SANFORD
    NO. 2016-B-2102
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent disrupted a court proceeding by using vulgarities in the courtroom. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline wherein they stipulated that respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Jeffry L. Sanford, Louisiana Bar Roll number 21069, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of thirty days. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a one-year period of supervised probation governed by the conditions set forth in the Petition for Consent Discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

Hughes, J.,

dissents and assigns reasons.

I respectfully dissent. After review of the record, noting the remarks of the trial judge and the apology of respondent, a public reprimand would be sufficient in this case,


text:
    STATE EX REL. Staci ALVARADO v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2217
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| iDenied. Relator shows no error in the lower courts’ rulings.

Relator has now fully litigated her application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P, art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless she can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted her right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Jerxavier LANE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2170
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Lane v. State, 16-2217 (La. 1/23/17), 209 So.3d 87. We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relief.

OPINION

The Court has fbr-its consideration Feffiioner's'lViotion to. Withdraw Guilty ¾⅝ filed on July 2,2015, Fo'rthe reasons stated below4he Petitioner's'motkm-is DENIES,

Petitioner was -charged, with an indictment: for Second Degree Murder, On June .14,2dl1, the .State, fifed an amended.indictroent of manslaughter,'to which Petitíoner pTeAgiñity. TheCoust ■informed Petitioner of his rights as,per Botkin and senteneeáhúato ibrty-(40)yesrs--at hard, labor and he was committed to the Louisiana Department .of Corrections, subject tq the; conditions provided by law.

In his motion, Petitioner alleges violations of his canstikmonaliights. These violations are: (1) The Court abused its discretion when- sentencing, hunt (2)'The Court; counsel, and DA refused to raise the question-of'his menta!'health3,(3) The- .indictment was not endorsed by a-true bill; (4) die plea colloquy was inadequate; (5) The Court and counsel wrongfully- influenced him into-pleading guilty; (6) The DA failed to commence the trial within »tW6 ⅝⅞ limitation; (7) The DA withheld evidence concerning guilt or innocence; and (8) The plea; Was made involuntarily and iminteiligently.

When aitlefen'daut enters an. unreserved plea of guilty-, he waives Ms rights to attack the strength of the State’s case and any.nomjin'!sdietioMil defeats in the State's case, Stitfe'v. Crosby, 338 So, 2d 584, (La, 197S); Stctta v. Swim 33,739 (La, App. 2'd-Cit. lW70Q^768iS6.2d822. •ft by-a contested trial. StM ⅞ ⅝⅜ 567 So, 2d 744, (La. App, 2d Cir. 1990); State v. Hardy, 39,233, (La. App. 2S Civ. 1/261$$), 892 So, 2d 710, 712; By pleading-guilty, therefore, petitioner has waived his right to -complain about any portion- of the 'State’s case against him.

is obligated to ascertain the substance of the pleading, Adams v, Parish 43,047,6 (La.App.2d Gsr. 3/1'9/OS) 978 So.2d 1202,1207; Smith v. Cajún Insulation, M, 392 Só,2d 398 (1⅜ 1,980); Font MotorCrecTu Cq. v, Frown, 32,995 (La.App,2d-Cir. 4/5/00); 750 J3o.2d.654. Petitioners motion, notwithstanding ⅝ caption, was cletttrly intended by its veiy substance to s'erv6'-SS an Application for,Post-Conviction Relief.

Louisiana Coda' of Criminal Procedure article 924(1.) .(tefito &i application for post oonviciiou.reliefas, “apetition filed by aperson.m custody pfievsentence foltowtogconvlotionfor-tbti-.cotomissito of an'of&nse'se'aldagtto havRthe-oaüvíotío'n andte'e'utéitóeteet'-asids," 'Peiitfoiier’s 'Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, filed onJúly2,2015, in-spite-of its naroeo? caption,-was'cleraiy filed, while-he was -in- custody, after sentencing, 'and-for the purpüée o'i!&iviS%ltis conviction, atid sentence set aside.

The -guidelines fbr Post Conviction Relief are outlined in tha Louisiana C'ode'of Criminal Law and Procedure. According -'to- La. C.Cr.P, Art. 93⅛8, “no application fbr-posb-conviction relief, including applications which seefe an tmt-oMme appeal, sháTl- bé tíohéidéted'if ⅛ te filed more-thairtwo (2) years after tire judgment of conviction and sentence has.b'ecome final?’., unless certain- circumstances' exist. .Nona of tire considered circumstances existid fee case át.Bar.

Petitioner’s motion-is both ruitimely mrd.repetitive; Petftio'n&’s sentence-and conviction became final in June 2011. 'Tliis.motion was not filed until ’July' 2,2015, far beyemdrfee two (2) year .period from final judgment ⅛ which totiile an-applicatten for posfeconvictton relief,. It.aiso raiseatlre saino claims feat werebonsidered and denied by this .Court in his tinrely-filed Application for PosteEonvi'clfan Relief. Tile-new caption on.tlris pleading,- which.ccavtafos-.'fee same substance, is simply an- attempt to get around the statutory JifflitationB.pl’aced.on post*ootivictkin-roK.et

. Even if Petitioner’s' motion were to fall 'Under a Motion te Wi todraw Plea Agreement, -ibis. CSurf does not have- any authority'to. withdraw Petitioner's ptea. Under Code of Criminal .Procedure Mole' 559(a), the tiou.rt 'may permit a plea of guilty at any time: before'-sentencing, Petitioner'haa'Blready been sentenced, & addition, tho-Court-infonned'Petitioner at sentcncing.of


text:
    STATE EX REL. Travis BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2155
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   PER CURIAM:

11 Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relief.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

|2Attachment

OKKER-

This Court has -considered defendant, Travis Sqott Brown’s, Petition for Tost Conviction Relief:’ Pursuant, to the Court’s May 4,2015 Order, tire St, TaromaftyP.arish District. Attorney filed an'Answer to the Petition’for Post-Conviction Relief jn thisinmtteti The-feoart lists reviewed &e ¿tire record and finds,-that-the isstto&raiseii ínJie'-Péíifton fftr..Pes|-Convjctío¡a.&lísf may be deolded’.oa'the.record andad eyidentihryheai-ing is necessary.

The Court End's tliat PetitioB.enhasfftOed.toprpve'growula'Upattwlubh.reHefsliáil'beg^Rnted. Accordingly, tliis'Court finds thatthe Petition of défendaut.is MtooutimsMt'and miistibe,denied, IT IS HERBBY.0M3ERBD that thePetitionfarPost-ConviCtion-RelMCledbyTravis Scott Brown is denied.

IT 1& FURTHER ORDERED that the Cierli.of Court for tire,Parish of St, Tammany give ¿otto of tliis d'ehiai to Petitioner,,-'thfc&'strict Attorney fdr the Pariah of St- Tatfunany and toe Petitioner’s'-custodian.

SIGNED AT COVINGTON, LOUISIANA, ⅜⅛ ,tith day of July, 2QJ5.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Dwight SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2148
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator’s application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated several applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in state collateral proceedings in accord with La. C.Cr.P, art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow | ^exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Anthony FARRIER v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2134
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   PER CURIAM:

|, Denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court’s written reasons denying relator’s application.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully .litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

JUDGMENT

The defendant, Anthony Farrier, hereinafter referred to as Petitioner, has filed with this Court a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on or about July 16, 2015, It is the ruling

of this Court that Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

Petitioner was charged with one count of Aggravated Rape in violation of La, Rev. Stat. Ann. art, §14:42. On January 6,2014, the State amended the charge to one count of Sexual Battery in violation of La, Rev. Stat, Ann. art, §14:43,1 (C)(l). On January 9,

2014, the State amended the charge again to reflect one count of Sexual Battery with a victim under thirteen in violation of'La. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. §14:43,1(C)(2); Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of the amended charge. On February 10,2014, Petitioner was sentenced to seventy-five (75) years in the Department of Corrections at hard labor. The first twenty-five (25) years were to be served without the benefit of probation, paroie or suspension of sentence.- Petitioner was given credit for time served and this sentence was to run concurrent with any other sentences he is serving.

In Petitioner’s application he alleges ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to: (1) request a continuance after the State’s amendment of the charges the day before trial; (2) object to the State’s expert vouching for credibility of the witness; (3) conduct adequate investigation prior to trial; and (4) object to prosecutor’s improper comments during closing arguments.

First, Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a continuance after the State amended the charges the day before trial. However, this assertion is without merit in that the charge was amended from one sex offense to another; the. State did not amend the charge to reflect a different type of offense as to put a burden on counsel or take counsel by surprise. The factual basis for the amended charge remained the same and counsel was fully prepared to try the case as counsel -was aware that the State -would be amending the charge prior to the actual amendment.

Second, Petitioner asserts that counsel failed to object to the State's expert—Anne Troy—vouching for the credibility of the witness. Petitioner asserts that Ms. Troy testified about whether her findings were consistent with the victim’s version of the story and that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this type testimony. Pursuant to Code of Evidenoe article 702 an expert is allowed to testify in the form of opinion testimony. Article 704 further provides that "testimony in the form of on opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not to be excluded solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. However, in .a criminal case, an expert witness shall not express an opinion as to the guiit or innocence of the accused”. In diis matter, Ms. Troy did not testify concerning Petitioner’s guilt or Innocence. Site presented her expert testimony concerning her Findings in tliis matter. As a result, there wás no objectionable testimony and counsel’s failure to object was not ineffective.

Moreover, Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing conduct an adequate investigation prior to trial concerning the jail tapes that were presented in the trial. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that had counsel reviewed the tapes, she would have been able to present a defense concerning the admissibility and contents of the tape, However, this issue was fully litigated on appeal and will not be considered. The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “unless required in the interest of justice, any claim for relief which was fully litigated in an appeal from the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction and sentence shall not be considered”. La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 930.4(A). S<¡sState v. Farrier, 162 So.3d 1233, 1246 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/23/15).

Finally, as the Court instructed the jury, closing arguments were not considered as evidence in this matter. As a result, counsel's failure to objeot to what Petitioner deems to be inappropriate does not render counsel ineffective. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that [he “benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be -whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that tire trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result”, id. at 669. In particular, the defendant must show that his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s errors, the result(s) of'the trial would have been different. Id. See also State v. Skipper, 101 So.3d 537, 542 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/10/12), State v. Cavazos, 2011-0733, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/16/12), 94 So.3d 870, 883, In the instant application, Petitioner fails to meet this burden.

THEREFORE, IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is without merit and is hereby denied.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this the ,^/jpJday of August 2015.

       Jury selection began on January 7, 2014, Opening statements began on January 8,2014


text:
    STATE EX REL. Michael MCPHERSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2127
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   PER CURIAM:

h Denied. Relator shows no error in the lower courts’ rulings.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the harrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Carl NOVEL v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-2087
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   PER CURIAM:

| denied. Relator fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to the remaining claims, relator fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator’s claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Freddie R. LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-CI-2068
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   PER CURIAM:

JjNot considered; not timely filed. La. S.Ct.R. X, § 5(a); see also State v. Crandell, 05-1060 (La. 3/10/06), 924 So.2d 122.


text:
    IN RE: Keith D. THORNTON
    NO. 2017-OB-0291
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   PER CURIAM

[ iThis proceeding arises out of an application for reinstatement to the practice of law filed by petitioner, Keith D. Thornton, an attorney currently suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2004, we suspended petitioner for one year and one day for engaging in misconduct that included neglect of a legal matter, failure to communicate with a client, and failure to cooperate with the ODC in three separate investigations. In re: Thornton, 04-0488 (La. 7/2/04), 876 So.2d 781 (“Thornton I”). Petitioner did not seek reinstatement from this suspension.

In 2007, we suspended petitioner for two years for engaging in misconduct that included neglect of a legal matter, failure to communicate with his client, failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. In re: Thornton, 07-0204 (La. 6/15/07), 958 So.2d 656 (“Thornton II").

In May 2016, petitioner filed an application for reinstatement with the disciplinary board, alleging he has complied with the reinstatement criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E) The ODC took no position regarding 12the application for reinstatement. Accordingly, the matter was referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee.

Following the hearing, the hearing committee recommended that petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law, subject to a two-year period of supervised probation with conditions. Petitioner objected to this recommendation, and the matter was reviewed by the disciplinary board.

A majority of the board agreed that petitioner should be reinstated subject to a two-year period of supervised probation with conditions. One board member dissented and would recommend that the period of probation be limited to one year.

Petitioner filed an objection in this court to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

After considering the record in its entirety, we find petitioner has met his burden of proving that he is entitled to be reinstated to the practice of law. Petitioner has demonstrated that he recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of the misconduct for which he was suspended in Thornton I and Thornton II. Petitioner has also shown that he possesses the requisite competence, honesty, and integrity to be reinstated to the practice of law. However, as recognized by the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, further precautions are warranted to insure that the public will be protected as petitioner returns to practice nearly ten years after his suspension. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(J).

Accordingly, we will order that petitioner be conditionally reinstated to the practice of law, subject to a two-year period of probation governed by the following conditions:

|31. Successful completion of a two-year probationary period during with petitioner will be supervised by a probation monitor or will associate with a law firm or other lawyer licensed to practice law in Louisiana who will be responsible for monitoring him during that period.

2. No less than quarterly reporting to the probation monitor, if a probation monitor is utilized.

3. Successful completion and attendance at the LSBA Annual Solo and Small Firm Conference and the LSBA Four Corners Seminar.

4. Petitioner must not violate any Rules of Professional Conduct throughout the period of his conditional reinstatement.

5. Should petitioner have a disciplinary complaint lodged against him at any time during the period of his conditional reinstatement, he must promptly and fully cooperate with any investigation conducted by the ODC.

6. Should petitioner fail to comply with these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated immediately or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary enforcement, as appropriate.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Keith D. Thornton, Louisiana Bar Roll number 20392, be immediately reinstated to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a two-year period of supervised probation governed by the conditions set forth herein. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the ODC, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. Should petitioner fail to comply with the conditions of Lprobation, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated immediately or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, as appropriate. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dustin MANTIA
    NO. 2017-KK-0240
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   PER CURIAM

I,The grant of the motion to suppress is hereby reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. We find the stop was not unreasonably prolonged in violation of Rodriguez v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). Furthermore, even if the strictest reading of Rodriguez interprets a one-minute delay as an improper extension of the traffic stop, we find the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the search.

Hughes, J., would deny the writ.

11 GENOVESE, J., would deny.

       Justice Weimer is recused.


author: PER CURIAM CLARK, J.,

text:
    Alden CHAUVIN, Anyce Chauvin Lambert and Melvin A. Cannon v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, Valero Refining—New Orleans, L.L.C., Shell Pipeline Company, LP, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C., Parkway Pipeline & St. Charles Parish Sewerage District No. 1 through the St. Charles Parish Council
    NO. 2017-OC-43
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    03/31/2017
   PER CURIAM

L La. Code of Civil Proc. Article 1974 provides:

The delay for applying for a new trial shall be seven days, exclusive of legal holidays. The delay for applying for a new trial commences to run on the day after the clerk has mailed, or the sheriff has served, the notice of judgment as required by Article 1913.

(Emphasis added.)

This statute specifically addresses the procedure for applying for a new trial. Plaintiffs timely filed a motion for new trial based on the date notice of judgment was served by the sheriff. This request for a new trial was timely, as was the subsequent devolutive appeal.

Appeals are favored under the law. Shell Pipeline Corp. v. Kennedy, 2000-3207 (La. 10/16/01), 799 So.2d 475, 478. Plaintiffs’ appeal is reinstated and the matter is remanded to the court of appeal for consideration on the merits.

CLARK, J., dissents and would deny the writ application.

CRICHTON, J., would deny.

CLARK, J.,

dissents.

hi dissent, and would deny the writ application.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rogers LACAZE
    No. 2016-KP-0234
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    December 20, 2016
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated December 16, 2016; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 375-992; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-K-0891

11 Reconsideration denied as moot.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Rodney J. TOLLIVER v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2013-KH-2893
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying for Rehearing of this Courts order dated October 28, 2016; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 101950; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00930.

JjNot considered. See La.S.Ct. Rule IX.


text:
    STATE EX REL. James EARL v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-1416
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated November 7, 2016, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 11 CRS 112566; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA1383

| ¶ Reconsideration denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Horace TOPPINS v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-1440
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated November 7, 2016 Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 1987-CR-135; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-KH-78

| r Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Sylvester TRACKLING v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-1484
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated November 7, 2016, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 431-778; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016 K 0402.

1 ^Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Gill W. JASMINE, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-1760
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Plaintiffs); Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated November 7, 2016, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 1996-CR-ll; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-KH-444.

11 Reconsideration denied.


text:
    CENTRAL PROPERTIES v. FAIRWAY GARDENHOMES, LLC, et al. Husker Partners/US Bank d/b/a Husker Partners v. Fairway GardenHomes, LLC, et al. Husker Partners/US Bank d/b/a Husker Partners v. Fairway GardenHomes, LLC, et al.
    NO. 2016-C-1855
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2013-15867 C/W 2013-15871 & 2013-15880; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0111 C/W 2016 CA 0112 C/W 2016 CA 0113.

I, Granted.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kerry J. PAUL
    No. 2015-KP-2278
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated November 2, 2016; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 490-825; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-K-0902.

Rehearing denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant. CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Donald RUNNELS v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2015-KH-0836
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Allen, 33rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2010-5578; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 14-01150.

| denied. See State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, pp. 1-2 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.

GENOVESE,J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Robert L. DAVIDSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2015-KH-1426
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 416537; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CW 0580;

denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Morris JAMES
    NO. 2015-KO-2044
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 12-597; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 15-414

iDenied.


text:
    John W. SMITH v. HIGHLINES CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., and the Gray Insurance Company
    NO. 2016-C-1443
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017


text:
    JAZZ CASINO COMPANY, L.L.C. v. Cynthia BRIDGES, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Revenue
    NO. 2016-C-1663
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 585,287; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1721

h Granted.


text:
    NEW ORLEANS BULLDOG SOCIETY v. LOUISIANA SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, et al.
    NO. 2016-C-1809
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 15-7003; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-CA-1351;

| j Granted.


text:
    CENTRAL PROPERTIES v. FAIRWAY GARDENHOMES, LLC, et al. Husker Partners/US Bank d/b/a Husker Partners v. Fairway Gardenhomes, LLC, et al. Husker Partners/US Bank d/b/a Husker Partners v. Fairway Gardenhomes, LLC, et al.
    NO. 2016-C-1946
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2013-15867 C/W 2013-15871 & 2013-15880; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0111 C/W 2016 CA 0112 C/W 2016 CA 0113

Granted.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Renaldo JOSEPH
    NO. 2016-KK-1689
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 528-816; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-0661

L Granted. The matter is remanded to the district court to conduct a preliminary hearing at which defendant’s subpoenaed witnesses testify. See C.Cr.P. art. 294.

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny.


text:
    Laura B. CREIGHTON, Individually and as Curator of Darrell D. Berrigan v. EVERGREEN PRESBYTERIAN MINISTRIES, INC. and ABC Insurance
    NO. 2016-C-2012
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2014-0002465; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1867

11 Writ granted. Judgment sustaining the defendants’ peremptory exception of prescription, granting partial summary judgment, and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court to allow the parties to fully address the applicability of La. C.C. art. 3493.10.


text:
    Denise JONES v. JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO. 1 d/b/a West Jefferson Medical Center Dr. Julie Taylor
    NO. 2016-CC-2030
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 739-711; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-C-522

It Granted. The judgment of the court of appeal is reversed. The judgment of the district court is reinstated, but amended to provide that only the portion of the medical review panel’s opinion addressing Dr. Taylor is inadmissible; in all other respects, the panel opinion is admissible. See McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hospital, 2010-2775 (La. 7/1/2011), 65 So.3d 1218.

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Larry Wayne MCCRAY v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2014-KH-2162
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated February 5, 2016, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 157,515; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49636-KH;

hNot considered. See La.S.Ct. Rule DC, § 6.


text:
    Forrest P. WALL, M.D., F.A.C.S. v. Gregory W. BRYAN, DPM, Michelle R. Ritter. M.D., R. Blair Drummond, DPM. Jana Cruey-Roark, and Ambulatory Surgery Center of Louisiana, LLC
    NO. 2016-CC-1755
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div.C, No. 584,344-C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,108-CW

h Denied.


text:
    ST. JAMES BEHAVIORAL HEALTH HOSPITAL, INC. v. Gopinath GOPALAM, Apollo Management Consultants, LLC and Sevenhills Healthcare, LLC
    NO. 2016-C-1709
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 103,146; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 1210

h Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    ST. JAMES BEHAVIORAL HEALTH HOSPITAL, INC. v. Gopinath GOPALAM, Apollo Management Consultants, LLC and Sevenhills Healthcare, LLC
    NO. 2016-C-1706
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 103,146; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA 1210;

h Denied.

GENOVESE, J., would grant in part.


text:
    Peter and Kathy DOTTOLO v. C.C.E. HOMES, LLC
    NO. 2016-CC-2002
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2009-0003857; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW 0721

iDenied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darken NEALY
    NO. 2016-KK-2059
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 529-171; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-1019

| iDenied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Stanley MITCHELL
    NO. 2015-KO-2356
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 14-444-F; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,188-KA

I denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dallas GREEN
    NO. 2016-KP-0380
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2013-02953; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-K-1360;

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alex BERNARD
    NO. 2016-KK-1355
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 528-021; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-0466

denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Malcolm SMITH, Joshua Vaughn, Alex Bernard, and Darrian Franklin
    NO. 2016-KK-1607
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 528-021; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-0703

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    ST. JAMES BEHAVIORAL HEALTH HOSPITAL, INC. v. Gopinath GOPALAM, Apollo Management Consultants, LLC and Sevenhills Healthcare, LLC
    NO. 2016-C-1696
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 103146; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0170

Denied.


text:
    ST. JAMES BEHAVIORAL HEALTH HOSPITAL, INC. v. Gopinath GOPALAM, Apollo Management Consultants, LLC and SevenHills Healthcare, LLC
    NO. 2016-C-1697
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 103,146; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA1210

| denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. David WEST v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2015-KH-1501
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated September 23, 2016 Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Division C, No. 316-252; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-KH-0683

liNot considered. See La.S.Ct. Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Nathaniel PAYTON v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-1538
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated September 16, 2016, Parish of Orleans, Criminal. District Court Div. B, No. 486-528; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-K-669.

hNot considered. See La.S.Ct. Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Ryan D. RUSSELL, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2015-KH-1544
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated September 23, 2016, Parish of Red River, 39th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 99,657; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50308-KH

hNot considered. See La.S.Ct. Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Michael RAVY v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2015-KH-1682
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated October 10, 2016, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 87-2-157-B; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KW 0910

hNot considered. See La.S.Ct. Rule IX, § 6.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Malcolm SMITH, Joshua Vaughn, Alex Bernard, and Darrian Franklin
    NO. 2016-KK-1608
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 523-095, 524-004, 526-187, 528-021, 528-228; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-0703

hDenied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Dustin Michael SCHEXNAYDER, Sr. and Marilyn Faucheaux Tarto, Individually and as Duly Appointed Curator of Dustin Michael Schexnayder, Sr. v. ST. CHARLES PARISH, Vernon Joseph “V.J.” St. Pierre, Jr., President of St. Charles Parish, The St. Charles Parish Council, The State of Louisiana and The United States Army Corps of Engineers
    NO. 2016-C-2006
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 74,864; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-42;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Military Dept, and Dept. of Public Safety, Office of State Police v. EXPLO SYSTEMS, INC., Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company, and Seneca Specialty Insurance Company
    NO. 2016-CC-2008
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 73438; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,192-CW;

| denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Justin CRAFT
    NO. 2016-KK-2009
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 529-688; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-K-1052

h Denied,


text:
    STATE of Louisiana IN the INTEREST OF A.H.
    NO. 2016-CJ-2017
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 12614; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-053-JAC

| ¶ Denied.

CRICHTON, J., would grant and reinstate the trial court judgment.


text:
    BRIER LAKE, INC. v. Herbert S. JONES
    NO. 2016-C-2021
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 2014-14928; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 CA1735;

| denied.


text:
    \STATE of Louisiana v. Adam O’NEAL
    NO. 2016-KK-2029
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div E, No. 313,944; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 16-00454

[t Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant in part.


text:
    PRIORITY HOSPITAL GROUP, LLC v. James MANNING, Pathway Healthcare, LLC, Pathway Rehabilitation Hospital of Bossier, LLC and Dan Bob Turner
    NO. 2016-CC-2032
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 148,429; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 51,-226-CW

Denied.


text:
    CAJUNS FOR CLEAN WATER, LLC, et al. v. CECELIA WATER CORPORATION, et al.
    NO. 2016-C-2033
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 82253; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 15-804

^Denied.

GENOVESE J. recused.


text:
    Michelle GAUTHIER v. DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC.
    NO. 2016-C-2047
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 146867; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 50,-936-CA;

11 Denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.

CLARK, J., would grant.

CRICHTON, J., would grant.


text:
    Noemie I. MOONAN, Widow of Andrew Vincent Moonan, III and Michael Andrew Moonan, Son of Andrew Vincent Moonan, III v. LOUISIANA MEDICAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Dr. Frank J. Monte
    NO. 2016-C-2048
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 721 511; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 16-CA-113

h Denied.


text:
    Frank RIDEAU v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and Francis Gauthier
    NO. 2016-CC-2051
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 623,918; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CW 1091;

| denied.

CRICHTON, J., would grant.


text:
    Andreanna POLK v. SENTRY SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, Government Employees Insurance Company, Jefferey Huffman, and Jerry Galathe
    NO. 2016-CC-2053
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2016-2982; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-C-0939

| denied.


text:
    Tommie HEBERT, et ux. v. J. Oran RICHARD, et al.
    NO. 2016-C-2058
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2008-1200; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 16-427

|! Denied.


text:
    Breanne BOUQUET, Chris Bouquet, Individually, and on behalf of their Minor Children, Ronnie Bouquet and Keira Bouquet v. Shaundrieka WILLIAMS, Bush Truck Leasing, Inc., GEICO General Insurance Company, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
    NO. 2016-C-2077
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 625874; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0134;

| denied.


text:
    Tammy CHAUVIN, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana THROUGH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT
    NO. 2016-C-2079
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 40,034; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0199

| rPenied.


text:
    RDK PROPERTIES, L.L.C. v. Harry Frank PARKS, et al.
    NO. 2016-CC-2080
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 247,619; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 16-00672;

11 Denied.


text:
    Maya DVILANSKY v. James CORREU
    NO. 2016-CJ-2081
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2016-09495; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2016-CA-0279

h Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant in part.


text:
    Breanne BOUQUET, Chris Bouquet, Individually and on Behalf of Their Minor Children Ronnie Bouquet and Keira Bouquet v. Shaundrieka WILLIAMS, Bush Truck Leasing, Inc., GEICO General Insurance Company, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
    NO. 2016-C-2082
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 625874; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0134

| ¶ Denied.


text:
    Jill NEECE v. LOUISIANA HORSEMEN’S BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ASSOC., et al.
    NO. 2016-C-2084
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 04, No. 13-02181; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 16-205

|! Denied.


text:
    HORNBECK OFFSHORE OPERATORS, LLC v. CROSS GROUP, INC., Cross Rentals, Inc., and Cross Services, Inc.
    NO. 2016-C-2095
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2011-10511; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0174;

| denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Calvin A. ROUSSELL, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-0976
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 573,881; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016-KW-0058;

hNot considered; not timely filed. See La.Sup.Ct. Rule 10, § 5.


text:
    IN RE: APPEAL OF the DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 16-PDB-039
    NO. 2016-OB-1994
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 16-PDB-039;

17 Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher Scott GARROTT
    NO. 2015-KO-2346
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 542259; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2015 KA 0116

| jDenied as repetitive. See State v. Garrott, 15-2288 (La. 3/4/16), 188 So. 3d 1057.


text:
    ORACLE OIL, LLC v. EPI CONSULTANTS, A Division of Cudd Pressure Control, Inc.
    NO. 2016-C-2049
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    January 9, 2017
   Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 159212; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2016 CA 0145

| ¶ Denied.