author: LAMBERT, J.

text:
    Benjamin DERISO, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D17-1381
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed June 7, 2017

      Benjamin Deriso, Orlando, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   LAMBERT, J.

Benjamin Deriso, the defendant in a felony case pending below in Brevard County, petitions for a writ of prohibition, alleging that the State violated his right to a speedy trial. As we outline below, Deriso is correct. Therefore, we grant his petition.

On August 25, 2015, the State filed an information charging Deriso with one count of acquiring a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge in violation of section 893.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2014). On July 15, 2016, Deriso, who at all times relevant has been a prisoner in Florida in state custody for an unrelated conviction, filed a demand for speedy trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(b). That rule provides, in pertinent part, that “every person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall have the right to demand a trial within 60 days, by filing with the court a separate pleading, entitled ‘Demand for Speedy Trial,’ and serving a copy on the prosecuting authority.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(b); accord Brown v. State, 798 So.2d 773, 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

Once a defendant files a demand for speedy trial, the trial court is required to hold a calendar call within the next five days “for the express purposes of announcing in open court receipt of the demand” and to set the case for trial “no less than 5 days nor more Ilian 45 days from the date of the calendar call.” Fla. R, Crim. P. 3.191(b)(1)-(2), Here, instead of holding the calendar call, the court entered an order on July 22, 2016, “denying” Deriso’s demand for speedy trial, finding that “the speedy trial rule does not apply as [Deriso] is currently a prisoner outside the jurisdiction of [the] court.” This was error. “A prisoner in Florida in state custody may demand speedy trial, even though he or she is not in the jurisdiction of the court where the charge is pending.” Brown, 798 So.2d at 774 n.1 (citing Cheeks v. Swanson, 541 So.2d 1346 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)). Rule 3.191(b) does not require that Deriso be physically in custody in Brevard County in order to demand speedy trial on the charge filed there. See id.; Carter v. State, 509 So.2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).

Because Deriso properly filed and served his demand for speedy trial, the trial court’s failure to hold the calendar call did not toll the running of any time periods under this rule. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(b)(3). Deriso was not brought to trial within fifty days of filing his demand. Thus, pursuant to rule 3.191(b)(4), this triggered Deriso’s right to pursue further relief under subdivision (p), which provides, in pertinent part, that after the expiration of the prescribed time period, “the defendant may file á separate pleading entitled ‘Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time,’ and serve a copy on the prosecuting authority.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(p)(2).

Deriso timely and properly filed his notice advising the court and the prosecutor of the expiration of speedy trial. The trial court was then required to hold a hearing on Deriso’s notice of expiration of speedy trial no later than five days from the date that the notice was filed and, unless one of the reasons set forth in subdivision (j) existed, order that Deriso be brought to trial within ten days..See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(p)(3). This rule further provides that if, through no fault of his or her own, a defendant is not brought to trial within this ten-day period, then upon motion of either the defendant or the court, the defendant is forever discharged from the crime.

The trial court did not hold the required hearing on Deriso’s notice of expiration of speedy trial time nor did it separately order Deriso to be .brought to trial. Twenty-one days after he filed his notice of expiration of speedy trial, Deriso filed a demand for discharge pursuant to rule 3.191(b)(4) and (p)(3). In response, the trial court entered an order denying Deriso’s demand for discharge, finding that because Deriso had not appealed the court’s earlier denial of his demand for speedy trial, “the State was not required to bring [Deriso] to trial within 60 days and [Deriso’s] subsequent filings are moot.” This, too, was error,

“Prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent a trial court from proceeding against an accused after the erroneous denial of a motion for discharge based on a violation of the speedy trial rule.” Reed v. State, 154 So.3d 455, 456-57 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (quoting Hill v. State, 132 So.3d 925, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)). Based on the allegations in the petition for writ of prohibition, we. ordered the State to file a response, which it did. The State conceded that the grounds stated by the trial court in denying both Deriso’s demand for discharge and his earlier demand for Speedy trial were not supportable. Nevertheless, the State argues that pursuant to the “tipsy coachman” doctrine, the court was correct in denying Deriso’s demand for discharge pursuant to rule 3.191(j)(4) because his demand for speedy trial was invalid. The State contends that Deriso’s demand for speedy trial was invalid because Deriso did not affirmatively represent in the demand that he was ready for trial and Deriso had conducted no discovery nor provided the State with a list of his witnesses. The State’s argument is based on rule 3.191(g), which provides, .in pertinent part, that “[n]o demand .for speedy trial shall be filed or served unless the accused has a bona fide desire to obtain a trial sooner than otherwise might be provided” and that “[a] demand filed by an accused who has not diligently investigated the case or who is not timely prepared for trial shall be stricken as invalid upon motion of the prosecuting attorney.”

Based on the record of this case, we disagree with the State. First, the prosecutor never filed a motion to strike Deri-so’s demand for speedy trial as invalid. Second, pursuant to rule 3.191(g), “[a] demand for speedy trial shall be considered a pleading that the accused is available for trial, has diligently investigated the case, and is prepared or will be prepared for trial within 5 days.” Although Deriso has not engaged in discovery nor provided a witness list, there is no requirement under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(a). that a defendant participate in discovery, and the mere fact that Deriso “decide[d] to forego discovery in exchange for a speedy trial cannot serve.as an independent basis for striking a demand as invalid .... ” See Landry v. State, 666 So.2d 121, 127 (Fla. 1995); accord Martin v. State, 503 So.2d 994 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (stating that a demand for speedy trial is not per se invalid simply because defendant has not engaged in discovery). The. court must look at the objective evidence in the record to determine whether an accused’s demand for speedy trial is valid. Landry, 666 So.2d at 128. Here, Deriso has filed no other pleadings or motions that provide objective evidence that he has failed to diligently investigate the case or is not prepared to go to trial. Cf. Jones v. State, 449 So.2d 253, 262 (Fla. 1984) (finding that defendant was not prepared for trial where seventeen defense motions were pending at the time the demand was filed); State v. Kaufman, 421 So.2d 776, 777-78 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (finding that filing a demand for discovery contemporaneously with a demand for speedy trial and then scheduling discovery depositions is “the antithesis of current preparedness for trial” and suggestive that a defendant has not diligently investigated his case and is not prepared, nor will be prepared, for trial in five days). The subjective evaluation by the State here that Deriso is not ready for trial is insufficient. Cf. Landry, 666 So.2d at 128 (“The determination of whether a speedy trial demand is valid should not involve a subjective evaluation of trial strategy or mere second guessing by the trial court.”).

Accordingly, because the record in this case established that Deriso’s right to a speedy trial was violated, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition and order the triaF court to discharge Deriso from the charge filed in Case No. 15-CF-030067, in the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Brevard County, Florida.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION GRANTED.

SAWAYA and WALLIS, JJ., concur.

      . The “tipsy coachman” doctrine allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that “reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons” so long as "there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record," Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 644-45 (Fla. 1999). ’


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LUCAS, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Shane Justin NORTH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2030
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 9, 2017.

      Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   LUCAS, Judge.

The circuit court ruled that Shane North could not tell a jury he had been given permission to take his employer’s scrap materials for himself. That jury found him guilty of two counts of dealing in stolen property. Because the circuit court erred when it ruled this testimony was inadmissible hearsay, we reverse Mr. North’s judgment of conviction and sentences and remand his case for a new trial.

Mr. North was a foreman involved in a dismantling project for a shuttered power plant, a job which entailed removing copper cables, electrical bus bars, rectifiers, and batteries—materials that, even when scrapped, apparently hold significant resale value. His company’s policy prohibited employees from taking or selling these decommissioned materials; instead, a designated scrap vendor was supposed to remove the materials from the job site. When Mr. North’s company truck’s GPS tracking device indicated that his truck had traveled to a metal recycling facility during working hours, the company became suspicious and commenced an investigation into Mr. North’s activities. As a result of that investigation, it was determined that Mr. North had transported and sold nearly four tons of the power plant’s scrapped materials to a recycling facility by representing to the facility that the scrap belonged to him. He was arrested and charged shortly afterward.

Mr. North initially elected to testify at his trial. But before he took the stand, the circuit court engaged in a colloquy with defense counsel concerning the scope and nature of the defendant’s anticipated testimony. The court remarked that Mr. North’s prospective testimony, in which he intended to describe the contents of purported email messages he claimed to have received from his supervisors granting him permission to sell the scrap, appeared to the court to be inadmissible hearsay. Defense counsel argued that the statements would not be hearsay because they went to Mr. North’s state of mind—that is, prior to him selling the material at the recycling facility, Mr. North’s understanding, based upon these emails, was that he had permission from both the scrap vendor and his construction manager to take the materials for himself. The circuit court remained unconvinced and ruled that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay. His testimony thus excluded, Mr. North did not testify and, following the jury’s guilty verdict, was adjudicated and sentenced to thirty months in prison concurrently on each charge. He now timely appeals.

Generally speaking, a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence will not be reversed unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated, Armstrong v. State, 73 So.3d 155, 166 (Fla. 2011), but “the question of whether a statement is hearsay is a matter of law and is subject to de novo review on appeal,” Cannon v. State, 180 So.3d 1023, 1037 (Fla. 2015) (citing Burkey v. State, 922 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). Mr. North’s appeal concerns the characterization of alleged email statements he claims to have received from third parties, evidence the circuit court believed was hearsay. In the context here, that was an erroneous characterization.

Hearsay, the Florida Evidence Code tells us, “is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” § 90.801(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added). Certain out-of-court statements “may be offered for a multitude of purposes other than to prove the truth of the facts asserted in them.” Massey v. State, 109 So.3d 324, 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Thus, an out-of-court statement may be admissible to establish the material effect that statement had on a listener—regardless of whether that statement was true or not—for “[w]hen a statement is offered to prove what a person thought after the person heard the statement, it is being offered to prove the person’s state of mind and is not hearsay.” Jenkins v. State, 189 So.3d 866, 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); see also Miller v. State, 870 So.2d 15, 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (concluding that defendant’s testimony that a deputy told him “Stop or I’ll shoot” was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove that the deputy intended to shoot the defendant, but rather what the effect of hearing that statement had on the defendant to explain his subsequent conduct). In that light, the alleged email statements concerning Mr. North’s permission to sell the scrap were simply not hearsay. See Buchanan v. State, 743 So.2d 59, 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that trial court erred in excluding as hearsay proffered statements that defendant accused of theft had been told by a woman to retrieve her property, as the testimony was not presented for the truth of the matter asserted but rather to show that the defendant lacked the necessary intent to steal the property); White v. State, 993 So.2d 611, 613 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“The testimony proffered by appellant was not hearsay because it was not offered ‘to prove the truth of the matter asserted’— that appellant’s neighbor had been given the generator in return for work done ... [but] was, instead, offered to negate an essential element of both offenses—intent.”); Alfaro v. State, 837 So.2d 429, 432-33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding improper the exclusion of alleged out-of-court statement of permission for an alleged car thief to drive the purportedly stolen vehicle).

To be sure, our court has held that section 812.091(1) is a general intent criminal offense. See Glenn v. State, 753 So.2d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). But the mens rea that the legislature ascribed to this offense (that the defendant “knows or should know” that the property in question was stolen) must still be proven; Mr. North’s state of mind about his purported permission to take these materials, then, was a material issue in his case. Cf. Foster v. State, 778 So.2d 906, 915 (Fla. 2000) (“Of course, the alternative purpose for which the statement is offered must relate to a material issue in the case .... ” (citing State v. Baird, 572 So.2d 904, 907 (Fla. 1990))). Thus we conclude the circuit court erred in precluding the line of testimony Mr. North , proffered. Because we cannot construe that error as. harmless in this case, we must reverse the circuit court’s judgment and sentences and remand Mr. North’s case for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

VILLANTI, C.J., and SILBERMAN, J., Concur,

      . See § 812.091(1), Fla. Stat. (2013) (“Any person who traffics in, or endeavors to traffic in, property that he or she knows or should know was stolen shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084.”).

      . We further note that the availability of the email authors to testify, a related topic that the circuit court conflated with the present issue, is immaterial, as the availability of the scrap vendor or the construction manager to testify would relate to a separate category of nonhearsay statements not pertinent here, statements of identification. See Smith v. State, 880 So.2d 730, 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (discussing the declarant availability issue in its proper context of statements of identification). Mr. North’s identity was never at issue in the proceedings below.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Charles HUGHES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida and Wayne Ivey, Brevard County Sheriff, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-687
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed June 9, 2017
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Keith S.' Kromash, of Nash & Kromash, LLP, Melbourne, for Appellee, Wayne Ivey, Brevard County Sheriff.
    No Appearance for State of Florida.
    Jeannette L. Estes, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, Lakeland, Amicus Curiae, for State of Florida, Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Charles Hughes, appeals the denial of his habeas. corpus petition. Because the trial court’s order results in a term of detention greater than the statutory maximum of fifteen days, we reverse and remand for consideration of Baker Act proceedings.

The State charged Hughes with attempted first-degree murder, arson of an occupied dwelling, burglary of a dwelling, burglary of a conveyance, and two counts of arson. However, on April 28, 2016, the trial court adjudicated Appellant incompetent to proceed and dismissed his charges without prejudice pursuant to section 916.303, Florida Statutes (2016). The trial court separately found that Hughes posed a danger to himself and others, thus qualifying for involuntary admission to a secure residential facility. The court ordered Hughes’s involuntary admission, which he appealed, resulting in a stay of his admission to residential care. See ■§ 393.11(12)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016), On January 5, 2017, Hughes filed an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his continued detention in the Brevard County Jail. The trial court denied relief.

A defendant “who has been adjudicated incompetent to proceed or not guilty by reason of insanity” may be held in a jail “as an emergency facility for up to 15 days.” § 916.107, Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis added). Thus, because Hughes’s detention exceeded fifteen days, “[n]o statute or rule of procedure authorize^] his continued detention,” and the trial court had grounds to grant his petition. See Pangburn v. Bradshaw, 39 So.3d 578, 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). However, just as the Fourth District Court did in Facyson v. Jenne, 821 So.2d 1169, 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), we find that, despite our “power to release individuals who are being detained without legal authority, we do' not deem such to be an appropriate remedy in this case at this time.” Instead, we recognize the trial court’s finding that Hughes posed a danger to himself and others and grant habeas corpus relief “subject first to consideration of Baker Act proceedings under Chapter 394 by the trial court' if appropriate.” Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. B.N., 979 So.2d 1110, 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

REVERSED and REMANDED with Instructions.

WALLIS, TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Orbary MCKINNON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3167
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed June 9, 2017

      Deana K. Marshall, of Law Office of Deana K. Marshall, P.A., Riverview, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Orbary McKinnon (the defendant) appeals the trial court’s order summarily denying his “Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, Newly Discovered Evidence,” filed pursuant to rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

The defendant filed the instant rule 3.850 motion seeking post-conviction relief based on newly-discovered evidence. In support of his motion, the defendant attached an affidavit from his co-defendant, Norman Lockley, stating that the defendant had not participated in the underlying drug offenses. The trial court summarily denied the motion, concluding that Lock-ley’s recantation was not credible and would not have produced an acquittal on retrial. This appeal followed.

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion without conducting a hearing first. We agree.

The decision to grant or deny an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.850 motion is subject to de novo review. Nordelo v. State, 93 So.3d 178, 184 (Fla. 2012). To uphold the summary denial of a rule 3.850 motion, the claims made must either be facially invalid as a matter of law or be conclusively refuted by the record. McLin v. State, 827 So.2d 948, 954 (Fla. 2002). In undertaking this review, the factual allegations of the motion must be accepted as true unless refuted by the record. Nordelo, 93 So.3d at 184; McLin, 827 So.2d at 956.

To obtain post-conviction relief based on a newly-discovered evidence claim, the newly-discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998). In this regard, newly-discovered evidence constitutes a basis for post-conviction relief if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.” Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So.2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)). Newly discovered recantation evidence does not

necessarily entitle a defendant to a new trial. Florida law treats recantations with suspicion, and requires a new trial only if the court is satisfied that the recantation is true and that “the witness’s testimony will change to such an extent as to render probable a different verdict.” Armstrong v. State, 642 So.2d 730, 735 (Fla. 1994).
An evidentiary hearing is usually required to make that determination.

Robinson v. State, 736 So.2d 93, 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

The trial court erred by summarily denying the defendant’s motion based on the conclusion that Lockley’s recantation was not credible. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. See Nordelo, 93 So.3d at 185-86 (holding that an evidentia-ry hearing is usually required to resolve legal questions on newly discovered evidence claims due to credibility determinations necessary in analysis); McLin, 827 So.2d at 956 (holding that an evidentiary hearing is generally required to determine whether newly discovered evidence is “of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial”).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

COHEN, C.J., PALMER, and TORPY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jon D. PARRISH, Appellant, v. Elena ILINA, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-1963
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed June 21, 2017.
    Parrish, White & Yarnell, Jon D. Parrish and Jonathan M. Weirich (Naples), for appellant.
    Bushell Law and- Daniel A. Bushell (Fort Lauderdale); David C. Levine (Da-nia Beach), for appellee.
    Before EMAS, LOGUE and LUCK, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See DiStefano Constr., Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 597 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1992); Grove Key Marina, LLC v. Casamayor, 166 So.3d 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).


author: MAKAR, J., BILBREY, J., KELSEY, J.,-

text:
    Patrick FLYNN, as Parent and Guardian of S.F., a Minor Child, Appellant, v. Felipe ESTEVEZ, Bishop of the Diocese of St. Augustine, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D15-3923
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed June 27, 2017

      David Dancu, of Naples, Florida, Alan Phillips, of Arden, North Carolina, for Appellant.
    Dennis E. Guidi and Michael J. Korn, of Jacksonville, Florida, for Appellee.
   MAKAR, J.,

The Catholic Diocese of St. Augustine, Florida, through its Bishop Felipe Estevez (whom we’ll call “the Diocese” for simplicity), seeks jurisdictional autonomy under its ecclesiastical powers to prevent a secular court from reviewing its decision to require that all students admitted to its schools be immunized as required by Florida law. Its policy, however, conflicts with a statutory exemption that allows parents to object on. religious grounds to immunization of their children as a condition..of admission to Florida public and private schools. The trial court concluded that the ecclesiastical abstention' doctrine, also called the church autonomy doctrine, pre: eluded it from wading into the religious controversy between the Diocese and a Catholic parent seeking admission of his non-immunized son to first grade. We agree.-.

I.

Patrick Flynn and his wife have eight children, all of whom attended schools under the control of the Diocese to ensure a comprehensive Catholic education. Earlier in their lives, some of the older children received vaccinations prior to the.Flynns deciding that, doing so was inconsistent with their relationship with God. The youngest—who has not been vaccinated— graduated in 2015 from kindergarten at Holy Spirit School, a private Catholic elementary school in Jacksonville, Florida, operated by the Diocese, the latter wielding ecumenical authority over elementary and high schools under its dpminion in Northeast Florida. The Diocese previously allowed non-vaccinated students to attend its schools but changed its policy for the 2015-2016 school year, requiring that all students be immunized as a condition of admission. As a result, Flynn provided the school with his religious objection in writing and attempted to resolve the matter internally with the Diocese. Nonetheless, his rising-first-grader was denied admission, prompting Flynn-to sue in circuit court for injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming the new policy violated his statutory right to exempt his child from compulsory immunizations at Holy Spirit.

Student immunization is pervasive. Like every other state, Florida imposes student immunization requirements on both public and private schools from prekindergarten to grade twelve. § 1003.22, Fla. Stat. (2009). As a “private school” under Florida’s education statutes, Holy Spirit must comply with various laws including the one mandating that students be immunized against communicable diseases. Statutory exemptions exist such as a medical exemption certified by a licensed physician, a temporary exemption for transferees and homeless children, and so on. Id. § 1003.22(5)(a)-(e). The Department of Health can also determine “that, according to recognized standards of medical practice, any required immunization is unnecessary or hazardous.” Id. § 1003.22(5)(d). During any declared communicable disease emergency, children “identified as not being immunized against the disease for which the emergency has been declared shall be temporarily excluded from school” until a county’s health department specifies. Id. § 1003.22(9).

Florida’s statutory religious exemption provides that immunization requirements do not apply if “[t]he parent of the child objects in writing that the administration of immunizing agents conflicts with his or her religious tenets or practices.” § 1003.22(5), Fla. Stat. The exemption has existed for decades and been interpreted to prohibit any inquiry into whether the parent’s statement of religious objection was in good faith. Dep’t of Health v. Curry, 722 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). In reaching its conclusion, this Court noted that “two very important social policies” were at issue: “the desire to protect the public health and welfare and the desire to protect a parent’s fundamental right to raise his or her child according to the religious tenets that he or she chooses.” Id. at 877. When the “two policies collide” the parental interest is afforded “greater protection ... by prohibiting any inquiry by the Department into the bona fides of the parent’s or guardian’s objection.” Id.

Turning back to Mr. Flynn’s claims, the Diocese moved to dismiss them based on its view that all children to be enrolled in its schools “must be properly immunized for the common good” and that this “requirement is a religious tenet and practice” of the Diocese. It contended that it could not be compelled by a secular tribunal to comply with the statutory religious exemption, which would invade its ecclesiastical sovereignty as to an internal church policy and violate the First Amendment’s free exercise and establishment clauses. It said that resolution of Mr. Flynn’s request to declare his religious objection valid and to admit his non-immunized child to Holy Spirit would “inappropriately entangle [the trial court] in constitutionally protected church doctrine” and improperly place it in the position of determining “the religious morals, tenets and practices of a given religion.”

At the hearing, Mr. Flynn was the only witness, testifying that “to vaccinate our children would be deep within our conscience to offend God.” Post-hearing, the Diocese provided supplemental documentation including excerpts of the Catholic Church’s Code of Canon Law regarding the “Role of a Bishop” and the “Recourse Against Administrative Decrees,” which the trial court held “plainly evidence a hierarchical decision-making process” and “avenues by which church members may seek redress as to matters decided by a Bishop.” No materials were submitted to the trial court that discuss the specific religious foundation of the Diocese’s prior or current policies on immunizations (including no Biblical references or citations), nor did any witness on behalf of the Diocese testify as to such matters.

In a detailed written order, the trial court denied relief to Mr. Flynn, holding that the merits of his claim could not be addressed because of the church autonomy doctrine, stating the following:

The State of Florida by statute has provided parents what the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not: a right based on religious belief to exempt their school-age children from mandatory statutory immunization. In the case at bar, the Court is presented with a conflict between a statutory right provided to parents and a Constitutional right provided to the church. A statute must always yield to the Constitution.
The Florida statute on immunizations, including the section on religious exemptions, remains valid and enforceable except that the exemption cannot be applied to a church in such a manner as to constitute a governmental intrusion into the church’s right to determine the operation of its parochial schools. Where that conflict arises, the statute is unconstitutional as applied, and the civil courts may not insert themselves into the operation of the church to compel it to exempt a student on religious grounds from mandatory immunization, nor to admit an unimmunized student to the school.

Because Mr. Flynn had no likelihood of succeeding on the merits (due to the church autonomy doctrine’s application), and proved only one of the three other requirements for injunctive relief, the trial court denied relief and dismissed the action. This appeal resulted.

II.

The church autonomy doctrine, or ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, prevents civil courts from deciding matters that require adjudication of “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them,” Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871), such that “secular courts must accept the decision by the highest ecclesiastical authority on such matters.” The doctrine precludes secular courts from becoming arbiters of religious matters and the circumvention or erosion of church doctrine by those who disagree with it.

The doctrine, which has roots in both the free exercise and establishment clauses of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const, amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’), has its core application in cases where a court intrudes on a church’s autonomous management of its own internal affairs and property, thereby either burdening or .inhibiting the exercise of religious freedom (free exercise clause) or fostering an excessive government entanglement with religion (establishment clause). The doctrine has parallels to the “ministers exception” with which it shares the common feature of allowing churches to exercise their religious freedoms without governmental interference into its internal affairs. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 196, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012) (“When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”). As the Seventh Circuit has noted, the ministers exception is a misnomer that “is better termed the ‘internal affairs’ doctrine” because:

In a religious nation that wants to maintain some degree of separation between church and state, legislators do not want the courts to tell a church whom to ordain (or retain as an ordained minister), how to allocate authority over the affairs of the church, or which rituals and observances are authentic..... The courts are not to resolve schisms or review excommunications.

Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). In Florida, courts have interpreted the doctrine as a jurisdictional bar, meaning a claim should be dismissed upon a determination that it requires secular adjudication of a religious matter. See Bilbrey v. Myers, 91 So.3d 887, 891 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (noting that most courts deem it an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction while others deem it a defense or a matter of justiciability, but stating that “[t]o date, Florida courts have treated the prohibition as a bar to subject-matter jurisdiction”).

The scope of the doctrine is not unlimited; courts have held that the application of a neutral law that does not require inquiry into or resolution of an ecclesiastical matter may be permissible, for example by the application of secular tort claims by third parties against a religious institution, allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation, or claims of breach of contract. As our Court has observed, a “church or religious organization seeking to avoid application of a neutral state law must first show why apjplication of the law requires adjudication of an ecclesiastical matter.” Archdiocese of Miami, 945 So.2d at 529; see also Malicki, 814 So.2d at 360 (“[T]he ‘threshold inquiry is whether there is a conflict between conduct that is required by law and conduct that is prohibited by religious principles.’ ”) (quoting Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F.Supp. 73, 78 (D.R.I. 1997)). Simply because a church is involved as a litigant does not make the matter a religious one; instead, inquiry must be made as to the nature of the dispute and whether it can be decided on neutral principles of secular law without a court intruding upon, interfering with, or deciding church doctrine.

The Diocese claims that resolution of this case necessarily requires a civil court to decide matters of church governance and theological controversy, and that, accordingly, jurisdiction is lacking. Its claim to ecclesiastical autonomy in this case is well-founded in many respects though not without its blemishes. First of all, the focal point of the litigation is the application of a religious exemption from an otherwise religion-neutral state immunization law against a religious institution, the latter seeking immunization from the former. To begin, neutral state laws compelling immunizations are generally considered to be constitutionally valid ones that do not violate religious freedoms. Florida’s immunization law falls into this category, such that we must necessarily reject Mr. Flynn’s claim at the outset to a free-standing federal or state constitutional right of religious freedom to refuse immunizations for his child as a condition of school admission. Developments in immunological medicine and legal doctrine could alter the current consensus, but no precedent yet exists in support of a generalized constitutional right against immunizations.

Preliminarily, Mr. Flynn argues that if the Legislature had wanted a religious school to have the right to refuse admission on religious grounds to non-immunized student applicants it could have said so in the statute. But a legislative license isn’t needed to exercise a constitutional freedom. Archdiocese of Miami, 945 So.2d at 531 (“[Ajbsent the requirements of the First Amendment ... the statute must yield to the United States Constitution.”). Instead, the question properly framed is whether the Diocese’s constitutional freedoms would be sufficiently compromised if civil courts compel the admission of non-immunized students to its private, religious schools.

Turning to the religious exemption, whether the Diocese must comply with it by honoring Mr. Flynn’s statutory right to except his son from immunization at the school presents a novel question. At first glance, the exemption is neutral in the sense that it does not limit itself to a specific religion; require inquiry into the motivations or sincerity of the beliefs of those who invoke the exemption; or permit governmental discretion as to what constitutes a valid or recognized religion under the exemption. As our Court has held, the Legislature could have written the exemption to require some degree of inquiry as to the genuineness of the religious objection, but it did not; indeed, the Legislature may have deemed it ill-advised to give the State the power to do so, which would inject the government into religious disputes. Curry, 722 So.2d at 877 (noting the potential for “danger” of giving the Department of Health “the authority to determine the bona fides of such objections would pose to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions”).

For similar reasons, it becomes apparent that the application of the statutory exemption to the Diocese is problematic due to the intramural ecclesiastical kerfuffle that underlies this dispute. The Diocese has a religiously-based immunization policy with which one of its members disagrees; Mr. Flynn seeks the power of the State to compel the Diocese to depart from its point-of-view and admit his non-immunized son. But doing so would further his own religious views at the expense of the Diocese’s on the topic of immunizations. We are convinced that a secular court should not be making the judgment as to which side’s religious view of immunization is to be respected. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (“The government may not ... lend its power to one or the other side in controversies oyer religious authority or dogma.”), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(l) (Nov. 16,1993), held unconstitutional by Cty. of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). Unlike other church autonomy cases, the unique feature of this one is that both parties assert Catholic religious doctrine as the basis for their litigation positions, which cautions against a secular court wading into the squabble. We do not suggest a different result if a Presbyterian, Hindu, or Jewish parent asserted a religious objection at Holy Spirit, but the wholly intra-church nature of the dispute makes resolution of the legal question more straight-forward.

Moreover, we have little pause in concluding that the issue of immunization is simultaneously a secular/scientific one as well as one involving religious faith and ecclesiastical morality; most matters of public concern have concurrent viewpoints from secular, scientific, religious, and moral perspectives. Every state requires that students be vaccinated (excepting out those with medical contraindications and the like), reflecting the secular, scientific consensus that immunization is necessary; at the same time, all but three.states have statutory religious exemptions, reflecting that immunization has a pervasive and obvious religious dimension in our Nation. In light of the near countrywide availability of a statutory right to object to compulsory student vaccinations on religious grounds, we cannot' hold, as Mr. Flynn asserts, that resolution of the conflict between his religious objection and the Diocese’s immunization policy is a purely secular* ’ one, requiring only the application of neutral legal principles. Civil courts may adjudicate a dispute under the neutral principles of law approach provided they do not make “inquiry into religious doctrine” and are not “resolving a religious controversy” in doing so. Se. Conference Ass’n of Seventh-Day Adventists, Inc. v. Dennis, 862 So.2d 842, 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979)). Refereeing a religious dispute about. student immunization between a Catholic diocese and one of its parishioners requires deciding which religious view should prevail, a function from which a secular court should abstain. The Diocese is hierarchical, its official documents showing that it is the highest authority on internal religious matters within its geographic area. We are not presented with a “purely secular” dispute involving a church and a third party; instead, we have a religious disagreement between a church and one of its members for which abstention is appropriate.

Mr. Flynn claims the Diocese’s vaccination policy must be actually rooted in a specific religion doctrine, tenet, or text, and that its “general concern about the ‘common good ’ ” is a religiously ineffectual basis for invoking the abstention doctrine. Though the trial court wasn’t presented with the specific religious basis for the Diocese’s new policy, we find no fault in its- conclusion that “immunizations of children attending Catholic schools is an issue of faith, discipline, and Catholicism [that] can only properly be determined by the church and not by the civil courts.” Courts are in no more of a position to compel the Diocese to provide a sufficient quantum of passable proof that its view of immunization is consistent with the Catholic faith than to do so1 as to Mr. Flynn’s personal views of Catholic doctrine on the very same subject. See Malicki, 814 So.2d at 355-56 ((“[I]t is not within the “judicial function and judicial competence” ’ of civil courts to determine which of two competing 'interpretations of scripture are correct.”) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982)). Mr, Flynn points out that- he has no duty to prove that his objection is religious, citing Curry, yet he insists that the Diocese must provide adequate proof that sufficiently grounds its religious viewpoint in specific church tenets. We can’t help' but note the incongruity of giving primacy to a parishioner’s religious viewpoint that is contrary to that of his mother-church on-the same topic; respectfully, it would be an odd role reversal—a devotee’s tail wagging the corpus of church leadership—to do so. Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2008) (workers administering Salvation Army rehabilitation centers and thrift shops fall within ministers exception, cautioning that the “commercial tail must not be allowed to wag the ecclesiastical body”). On this point, we find no fault with the trial court’s conclusion that the Diocese’s student immunization policy is a matter of “faith, discipline, and Catholicism” that furthers the “public good,” particularly as to those who are poor or afflicted with diseases and other maladies who benefit from an immunized populace. That the Diocese’s policy happens to be consistent with secular notions of the “public good” does not diminish or negate its religious nature. Given that the issue of student immunization is one of widespread theological debate, and that the dispute in this case is purely'intra-church, we sée no basis for remanding to ’ compel the Diocese to explicate the ecclesiastical particulars'of its policy.

Moreover, the Catholic Church’s governance of its parochial schools is inherently religious, its obvious mission being the transmission of its religious values, as recognized in caselaw beginning decades ago. See, e.g., Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Oakey, 339 F.Supp. 545, 551 (D. Vt. 1972) (noting that both parties agreed that “Roman Catholic parochial schools ... are a part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church” and that “[a]ll the church schools are vehicles for transmitting the faith of the sponsoring church to the next generation”); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) (noting district court findings that “parochial schools constituted ‘an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church’ ” making them ‘“a powerful vehicle for transmitting the Catholic faith to the next generation’ ”). In this context, courts have been cautious to interfere with matters of church governance of schools and educational endeavors, the thought being that a church’s educational mission is part of its central nervous system as an inculcator of spiritual values. This makes sense because protecting churches from secular intrusion into inculcation of core religious tenets is a foundational principle animating the doctrine. The degree of risk of governmental intrusion into and possible entanglement with the Diocese’s operation of its school as to immunization policy is uncertain. On the one hand, the state compels that the Diocese have a policy that excepts religious objectors and that some record-keeping be done; on the other hand, the impact of allowing non-immunized students to matriculate—contrary to the Diocese’s religious policy—undermines religious authority and sends the message that the secular government can, by statute, take away a constitutional freedom. It would be akin to a final judgment on a religious matter:

Such a judgment could cause confusion, consternation, and dismay in religious circles. The commingling of religious and secular justice would violate not only the injunction in Matthew 22:21 to “render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s,” but also the First Amendment, which forbids the government to make religious judgments. The harm of such a governmental intrusion into religious affairs would be irreparable ...

McCarthy, 714 F.3d at 976 (discussing the irreparable harm from allowing a jury to decide whether a nun was a member of the church in the context of the collateral order doctrine, which allows for interlocutory appeals). If anything, the potential harm from secular intrusion on the Diocese’s religious governance of its schools is enough to warrant pause; as we said recently, “the controversy is solely over how the Church should govern itself—an essentially religious matter.” Rosenberger, 72 So.3d at 204. To interlinéate our holding in that case with this one, “[w]e can discern no way under the facts of this case to draw a clean line between essentially religious matters protected by the First Amendment and matters of [immunization] law.” Id. at 204-05.

III.

In this case, a Catholic parent’s statutory religious exception for student immunizations runs head-on into the Catholic Church’s constitutional religious freedoms to operate its parochial schools without governmental interference. The trial court was correct to abstain from deciding whose religious views on the matter should prevail.

AFFIRMED.

BILBREY, J., concurs with opinion, KELSEY, J., concurs in result only with opinion.

BILBREY, J.,

concurring.

I join in Judge Makar’s opinion. I write separately to emphasize that although this case involves an “intramural” dispute with adherents of the same religion, the church autonomy doctrine would apply even if Mr. Flynn was not Catholic. The doctrine simply holds that a state or federal court generally cannot intervene in matters of church affairs. There are, as Judge Makar explains, certain important exceptions to this limitation on jurisdiction which do not apply here. Application of,the church autonomy doctrine does not require a dispute between two religious points of view.

The “church autonomy doctrine” arises from “a long line -of Supreme Court cases that affirm the fundamental right of churches to ‘decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.’” EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002). The doctrine does not shield a church from liability in tort or for breach of contract. Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir.1985); Bryce, 289 F.3d at 657. Also, certain hiring practices may be subject to scrutiny. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171; Bryce, 289 F.3d at 657; Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347 (Fla. 2002). Before applying the doctrine, it must be first determined with the conduct being challenged is “rooted in religious belief.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). Here, the conduct being challenged is the Diocese’s decision to require immunization, a requirement that is said to be religiously based.

All that is required for application of the doctrine is for a church or ecclesiastical body to take a position on religious grounds; it matters not that the opponent of the church have a religious basis in opposition. As Judge Makar observes, “the Catholic’s Church governance of its parochial schools is inherently religious, its obvious mission being the transmission of religious values....” (Maj. Op. at 1251). In my view, that is all that is needed in order to invoke the “church autonomy doctrine.” Whatever rights Mr. Flynn may have under section 1003.22(5)(a), Florida Statutes, such rights are of no consequence under the doctrine. Mr. Flynn’s only recourse would be to find an exception to the application of the doctrine, which he has not done.

Perhaps all of the above is a minor point. But, I would not want to create the notion that the invocation “church autonomy doctrine” depends on a clash of theological or religious views. The doctrine’s reach is greater than that.

KELSEY, J.,-

concurring in result only.

This case can be resolved easily and expeditiously under well-settled precedent. The Diocese asserted the common-good principle as a foundational religious tenet supporting its vaccination requirement. The law does not require the Diocese to defend or substantiate - its beliefs, but the Diocese indicated that it derived this tenet from well-known Biblical admonitions to elevate the interests of others above one’s own. See, e.g„ Leviticus 25:35 (imposing obligation to relieve the poverty of others); Matthew 7:12 (articulating the “Goldeh Rule” of giving others the same consideration and treatment you would want to receive); Matthew 22:37-39 (commanding to love others as much as self); Philippians 2:1-8 (admonishing to consider' others more important than self). See Gwyneth A. Spaéder, The Moral Obligation to Vaccinate: Autonomy and the Common Good, Nat’l Cath. Bioethics Q., Summer 2016, at 245, 245, 247.

Although a vaccination requirement may create a moral dilemma for Catholics and others who oppose the development of vaccines using cell lines from tissue harvested from abortions—see id. at 249-51—that was not Mr. Flynn’s objection.. Mr. Flynn disagreed with the Diocese’s common-good tenet, instead asserting his contrary belief in the supremacy of what he considered a faith-based “well-formed consciences of parents” right with respect to matters involving their children, particularly introducing foreign substances into their children’s bodies. Mr. Flynn also argued that the availability of a statutory exemption from vaccination under section 1003.22(5)(a) of the Florida Statutes trumped the Diocese’s First-Amendment rights.

The trial court correctly refused to become entangled in this dispute. Our Constitutional protections according to their plain meaning and longstanding application do not allow the'government to reject a religious tenet or re-label it as secular in order to subject a religious institution or an individual to government control. Amend. 1, U.S. Const. (embodying Free-Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 355-56, 360 (Fla. 2002) (recognizing prohibition of government and judicial entanglement in matters of church governance, faith, and doctrine); Malichi v. Archdiocese of Miami, 945 So.2d 526, 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (enforcing church autonomy doctrine).

      . The Diocese points out that no written objection is in the record, but Mr. Flynn’s testimony on the matter is sufficient and the trial court's finding that Flynn "provided Holy Spirit Catholic School and Bishop Estevez a written objection pursuant to [the statute]’’ is hot in dispute.

      . ' See States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School Immunization Requirements, National Conference of State Legislatures (Aug, 23, 2016) at http://www. ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-statelaws.aspx ("All 50 states have legislation requiring specified vaccines for students.”).

      . The statutory definition notes that a "private school may be a parochial, religious, denominational, for-profit, or nonprofit school.” § 1002.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2007).

      . Section 1002.42(6)(a) (2016), Florida Statutes, states that the “governing authority of each private school shall: (a) Require students to present a certification of immunization in accordance with the provisions of s. 1003.22(3)-(11).” In turn, section 1003.22, Florida Statutes, which deals with school-entry health examinations and immunizations, states that "Each district school board and the governing authority of each private school shall establish and enforce as policy that, pri- or to admittance to or attendance in a public or private school, grades kindergarten through 12, or any other initial entrance into a Florida public or private school, each child present or have on file with the school a certification of immunization for the prevention of those communicable diseases for which immunization is required by the Department of Health ....” § 1003.22(4), Fla. Stat. (2017). The Diocese’s participation in the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program also requires that it comply with these requirements as to immunizations and its exemptions. See § 1002.421(1), Fla. Stat. (2013) (“A Florida private school participating in the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program ... must comply with all requirements of this section in addition to private school requirements outlined in s. 1002.42.”).

      . In denying injunctive relief, the trial court concluded that Mr. Flynn had no adequate remedy at law, but that irreparable injury would not result because his child "may attend public school, where he may avail himself of Florida’s religious exemption from mandatory immunization, or he may attend another private (including religious) school [that] permits him to claim such exemption.” As to the public interest, the trial court found it would be served if more, rather than fewer, school children were immunized.

      . Malichi v. Archdiocese of Miami, 945 So.2d 526, 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); see Watson, 80 U.S. at 727 (‘‘[W]henever the questions of •discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.”); see also Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952) (“[Watson v. Jones] radiates ... a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”). .

      . See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) ("First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them.”); Watson, 80 U.S. at 729 (“But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed.”); McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A secular court may not take sides on issues of religious doctrine."), Of course, “[a] secular court must be allowed .to decide ... whether a party is correct in- arguing that there is an authoritative church ruling on an issue, a ruling that removes the issue from the jurisdiction of that court,” McCarthy, 714 F.3d at 976.

      . See, e.g., Kedroff, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143 (statute transferring control of churches violates free exercise of religion); Watson, 80 U.S. 679 (pre-incorporation case involving dispute between members of church); Rosenberger v. Jamison, 72 So.3d 199, 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding that because- “the underlying dispute concerns the Church's form of governance . . the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from adjudicating such ecclesiastical matters”); Archdiocese of Miami, 945 So.2d at 532 (adjudicating Catholic priest's claim to workers compensation "would excessively entangle civil courts in the resolution of a completely internal church matter involving no third parties”).

      . See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 351 (Fla. 2002) ("First Amendment does not provide a shield behind which a church may avoid liability for harm caused to an adult and a child parishioner arising from the alleged sexual assault or battery by one of its clergy.”); Bilbrey, 91 So.3d at 891 (church autonomy doctrine does not preclude claims based on neutral tort principles such as defamation and breach of fiduciary duty).

      . See Favalora v. Sidaway, 995 So.2d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding that church autonomy doctrine does not bar claims arising from fraudulent misrepresentation that induces another to drop a civil suit).

      . Bendross v. Readon, 89 So.3d 258, 261 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (holding that neutral statute governing not-for-profit corporations could be applied "without inquiry into religious doctrine and without requiring the court to interpret the policies or practices of the [church], the abstention doctrine does not bar this case”).

      . See Phillips v. City of N.Y., 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015) ("[M]andatory vaccination as a condition for admission to school does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.”) (agreeing with Workman v. Mingo Cty. Bd. of Educ., 419 Fed.Appx. 348, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2011) and citing Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166-67, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944)), cert. denied sub nom., Phillips v. City of N.Y., N.Y., — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 104, 193 L.Ed.2d 37 (2015); Boone v. Boozman, 217 F.Supp.2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (“The Supreme Court has long recognized that a state may require public and private school children to be immunized. The constitutionally-protected free exercise of religion does not excuse an individual from compulsory immunization; in this instance, the right to free exercise of religion and parental rights are subordinated to society’s interest in protecting against the spread of disease.”); Douglas Cty. v. Anaya, 269 Neb. 552, 694 N.W.2d 601, 608 (2005) (law requiring metabolic testing of newborns "is a neutral law” that applies "to all babies born in the state and does not discriminate as to which babies must be tested. Its purpose is not directed at religious practices or beliefs.”); see generally Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67, 64 S.Ct. 438 (persuasive dicta saying that the "right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death”); see also Sean Coletti, .Taking Account of Partial Exemptors in Vaccination Law, Policy, and Practice, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 1341, 1342 (2004) (footnotes omitted) ("Today, mandatory vaccination statutes stop the epidemic spread of disease through less than universal vaccination; this effect is commonly referred to as ‘herd immunity.' While a certain number of vaccinations are considered ‘mandatory’ in every state for public school attendance, the compulsory nature is limited to the exclusion of unvaccinated children during outbreaks, while unvaccinated preschoolers can be barred from school altogether.”).

      . See Moore v. Draper, 57 So.2d 648, 650 (Fla. 1952) (“Religious freedom cannot be used as a cloak for any person with a contagious or infectious disease to spread such disease because of his religion.”).

      . In relevant part, the Florida Constitution says; “There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.” Art. I, § 3, Fla. Const. (2017).

      . See Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084, 1090 (8th Cir. 2000) (replacement of sect-specific language with neutral language "does not facially differentiate among religious sects, for its terms, legislative history, and effect all suggest denominational neutrality”).

      . See Curry, 722 So.2d at 877 (holding that when the “desire to protect the public health and welfare” conflicts with the "desire to protect a parent’s fundamental right to raise his or her child according to the religious tenets that he or she chooses, ... greater protection [will] be afforded to the latter by prohibiting any inquiry by the Department into the bona fides of the parent's or guardian’s objection”).

      . See Boone, 217 F.Supp.2d at 942 (statute that creates exemption where "immunization conflicts with the religious tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination of which the parent or guardian is an adherent or member” held to be unconstitutional).

      . We recognize the seeming anomaly, as did the trial court, that Mr. Flynn may exercise his religious exemption at a public school, a non-religious private school, or even a private religious school that wishes to recognize it, which exists for two primary reasons related to a constitution’s hierarchy of values. First, Florida’s education laws, like those of most states, require religious accommodation by public and private schools but grant private religious schools more leeway in the operation of their schools to preserve free exercise rights. Second, constitutional rights create asymmetries in favor of protected freedoms such that statutory and other lesser rights must give way if they conflict or cannot coexist with the former.

      .See Martha McCarthy, Student Vaccination Requirements: Can Nonmedical Exemptions Be Justified?, 320 Ed. Law Rep. 591, 595 (2015) ("Every state allows medical exemptions for children who are medically fragile, have compromised immune systems, or for some other medical reason should not be vaccinated.”).

      .States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School Immunization Requirements, . National Conference of State Legislatures (Aug. 23, 2016) at http://www. ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-statelaws.aspx. Notably, eighteen states “allow philosophical exemptions for those who object to immunizations because of personal, moral or other beliefs." Id. -As two commentators recently noted;
      Religious objections are complex in nature. State legislators considering religious exemptions rpust grapple with the tension between preserving parents’ First Amendment interests in religious freedom and maintaining herd immunity to protect public health. Additionally, unlike a medical diagnosis which can be clinically assigned by a licensed health professional, religious exemptions are uniquely personal in nature and may not fit any recognized metric. Religious practice and belief is highly individualized and there is often a great deal of disagreement regarding religious objection or acceptance of vaccination even within individual religions.
      Christine Kiracofe, and Nicholas Atwood, Giving Kids A (Required) Shot; Mandatory Vaccination Laws and Exceptions for Public K-12 Students in the United States, 324 Ed. Law Rep. 611, 614 (2016).

      . Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 110, 73 S.Ct. 143 (“Hierarchical churches may be defined as those, organized as a body with other churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head.”).

      . As our supreme court has noted;
      A court ... must determine whether the dispute "is an ecclesiastical one about 'discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law,' or whether it is a case in which [it] should hold religious organizations liable in civil courts for ‘purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religiously affiliated organization.’ ”
      Malicki, 814 So.2d at 357 (citations omitted).

      . After appellate briefing concluded, the Diocese filed as supplemental authority an article from a Catholic bioethics center that sets forth a detailed discussion of the religious and moral underpinnings establishing that immunization. is a religious duty of Catholics. Gwyneth A, Spaeder, The Moral Obligation to Vaccinate: Autonomy and the Public Good, 16.2 National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 245 (2016). The article—which does not purport to be an ■ authoritative document or sacred text of the Catholic Church—is akin to a secondary authority, much like a law review, that advocates a viewpoint on the matter. Though we do not rely upon it substantively, we view it as supportive of the conclusion that the trial court confronted an inherently religious question that justified abstention.

      . See Oakey, 339 F.Supp. at 551 (issuing injunction to prevent state government from implementing statute limiting aid to schools to the teaching of specific secular subjects); Dlaikan v. Roodbeen, 206 Mich.App. 591, 522 N.W.2d 719, 720 (1994); (upholding lack of jurisdiction over claim that religious, school denied student admission, saying "there can be no distinction between a church providing a liturgical service in its sanctuary and providing education imbued with its religious doctrine in its parochial school”); In re St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016) (upholding ápplication of ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to expulsion of student); see also N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979) (interpreting federal statute to avoid "a significant risk that the First Amendment will be infringed” via the National Labor Relations Board’s encroachment on operations of church-operated schools). ■

      . Indeed, matters of religious faith and governance oftentimes arise in the public schools, involving activities such as prayer, saying the Pledge of Allegiance or saluting the flag, teaching religion and the use of religious texts, curricular decisions such as the evolution/creationism and contraceptive debates, and dress codes. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000) (student-led, student-initiated invocations prior to football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) ("nonsectarian” prayer by clergyman at graduation ceremony); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (daily period of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer); Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (textbooks and instructional materials); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (wearing armband as protest of Vietnam war); Sch. Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (bible reading and prayer); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962) (program of daily classroom invocation); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (saluting flag). A private religious school might deem these activities compulsory for its student body as means of establishing proper morals and devotion to one's religion-or country, a decision shielded by its religious freedom rights.


author: LaROSE, Judge.

text:
    Frederick HEINE and Barbara Heine, Appellants, v. LEE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida; and Alico West Fund, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D16-2804
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 30, 2017

      Robert K. Lincoln of the Law_ Office of Robert K. Lincoln, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellants.
    Hala Sandridge and Victoria J. Ogun-toye of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, P.C., Tampa, for Appellee Alico West Fund, LLC; and Mark A. Trank and Michael D. Jacob, Lee County Attorney’s Office, for Appellee Lee County.
   LaROSE, Judge.

Frederick and Barbara Heine appeal a final summary judgment entered in favor of Alico West Fund,' LLC, and -Lee County, in the Heines’ lawsuit brought under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2015) (the Consistency Statute). We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).

The Heines challenged a rezoning resolution approved by the Lee County Board of County Commissioners (the Board) that authorized rezoning of Alico’s property. The Heines alleged that the resolution was inconsistent-with various provisions of Lee County’s comprehensive plan. The trial court found otherwise, ruling that' the Heines’ claims fell outside the purview of the Consistency Statute.

On appeal, the Heines raise several issues challenging summary judgment. After careful review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm in all respects. However, we write to explain why the trial court properly construed the Consistency Statute.

Background

Alico owns over eight hundred acres of land in Lee County. North Lake is situated on the western portion of its property. The Heines live in a residential community south of the Alico property and the North Lake. Their residence faces the South Lake. The North Lake and South Lake are connected; the Heines enjoy a recreational easement for the use of the North Lake.

In 2010, Lee County amended its comprehensive plan. The amendment changed the land use designation for a portion of Alico’s property to “University Community.” The designation requires that “[a]ll development within the University Community must be designed to enhance and support [Florida Gulf Coast University].” The 2010 plan amendment significantly increased the potential development densities and intensities of Alico’s property.

Following the 2010 plan amendment, Al-ico applied to rezone a portion of its property for a project called CenterPlace. Alico intended to develop CenterPlace to cater to the housing, commercial, and recreational needs of nearby University students, faculty, and staff. County zoning staff recommended approval of Alico’s request. After several public hearings, a zoning hearing examiner, too, recommended approval. Subsequently, after another public hearing, the Board approved a resolution granting Alico’s application.

The resolution rezoned Alico’s property to “Compact Planned Development,” and authorized an increase in development of up to 250 hotel rooms, 246,500 square feet of commercial/retail space, 100,000 square feet of office space, and 300,000 square feet of research and development space. The resolution also authorized up to 250 wet boat slips on the North Lake, 50 dry slips, installation of a boat ramp, and up to 20 trailer parking spaces.

Following Board approval, the Heines sued Lee County and Alico, alleging that the resolution was inconsistent with Lee County’s comprehensive plan. The Heines challenged the resolution on numerous grounds: (1) failure to include enforcement conditions for the construction of a minimum square footage of commercial space and minimum residential density requirements; (2) failure to ensure the installation of plantings, buffers, and landscaping “using xeriscape principles”; (3) failure to “ensure that there will be a mix of housing types sufficient to meet the varying lifestyle of students, faculty, administration and support staff’; (4) failure to obtain prior approval by the University; (5) failure to give adequate consideration to noise, security, and visual impacts on the property; and, (6) failure to meet the 2010 plan amendment’s safety requirements pertaining to the University. The trial court granted summary judgment on Ali-co’s and Lee County’s joint motion, ruling that the Heines’ challenges were not within the scope of the Consistency Statute because “they do not qualify as uses, densities, or intensities of uses.”

Standard of Review

We review the trial court’s interpretation and construction of the Consistency Statute de novo. See A.J.R. v. State, 206 So.3d 140, 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“We also apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s construction of a statute.” (citing State v. C.M., 154 So.3d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015))). Further, because we are tasked with reviewing the trial court’s award of summary judgment, we likewise employ de novo review. Gator Boring & Trenching, Inc. v. Westra Constr. Corp., 210 So.3d 175, 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

Analysis

The Heines argue that the trial court erroneously limited the scope of claims allowed under the Consistency Statute. They insist that the trial court adopted a too narrow and restrictive reading of the Consistency Statute, thus thwarting its remedial purpose. They urge us to adopt an expansive reading of the statute so as to allow a broader variety of claims under the Consistency Statute. They maintain that reading the statute in pari materia with other statutory provisions compels reversal. See State v. Fuchs, 769 So.2d 1006, 1009 (Fla. 2000) (“[Statutes which relate to the same or closely related subjects should be read in pari materia.” (citing State v. Ferrari, 398 So.2d 804, 807 (Fla. 1981))). We are not persuaded.

Florida law mandates consistency between a local government’s comprehensive plan and its development orders. See § 163.3194(l)(a) ("After a comprehensive plan ... has been adopted in conformity with this act, all development undertaken by, and all actions taken in regard to development orders ... shall be consistent with such plan or element as adopted.”). To ensure compliance with this obligation, the Florida Legislature permits “[a]ny aggrieved or adversely affected party [to] maintain a de novo action ... to challenge any decision of such local government granting ... a development order.” § 163.3215(3); see also Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So.2d 191, 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“[W]e observed that section 163.3215 had liberalized standing requirements and demonstrated ‘a clear legislative policy in favor of the enforcement of comprehensive plans by persons adversely affected by local action.’ ” (quoting Sw. Ranches Homeowners Ass’n v. Broward County, 502 So.2d 931, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987))).

But the type of claim allowed under the Consistency Statute is not unlimited. The statute authorizes an aggrieved party to bring an action to challenge a development order that “materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property which is not consistent with the comprehensive plan.” § 163.3215(3). A plain reading of this text compels us to conclude, as did the trial court, that the Heines’ challenges to the rezoning resolution do not fall within the ken of these three areas.

“Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis regarding the construction and application of the statute.” Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013) (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003)). Accordingly, we “ ‘begin with the actual language used in the statute’ because legislative intent is determined first and foremost from the statute’s text.” Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So.3d 186, 190 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 198 (Fla. 2007)).

When a statute is clear, courts will not look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent. Instead, the statute’s plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent.

State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004) (citation omitted).

The pertinent language of the Consistency Statute is clear and unambiguous. The statute enunciates only three bases upon which a party may challenge a development order’s purported inconsistency ■with a comprehensive plan. Therefore, we will not resort to rules of statutory construction to countenance the Heines’ expansive view of the statute’s scope. That task, if undertaken at all, is for the legislature. As our sister district observed, “there is no basis for us to look to ‘polestars’ when the ship of statutory interpretation is guided by clear text. That is to say, we look only to clear text for statutory meaning, not to the stars.” Brown v. State, 848 So.2d 361, 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

The Heines claim that the trial court should have construed the Consistency Statute in pari materia with section 163.3194(3)(a), which provides as follows:

A development order or land development regulation shall be consistent with the comprehensive plan if the land uses, densities or intensities, and other aspects of development permitted by such order or regulation are compatible with and further the objectives, policies, land uses, and densities or intensities 'in the comprehensive plan and if it meets all other criteria enumerated, by the local government.

(Emphasis added). They argue that the language, “other aspects of development permitted,” allows an attack upon the development order, apart from grounds of use, density, or intensity explicitly provided for in the Consistency Statute. However, once again, “the ‘in pari materia’ canon of statutory construction would be appropriate only if we found the statute ambiguous.” Brown, 848 So.2d at 364 (emphasis omitted). We do not. We will not rewrite the Consistency Statute to include language omitted by the legislature. The Florida Supreme Court has observed:

Even where a court is convinced that the Legislature really meant and intended something not expressed in the phraseology of the act, it will not deem itfeelf authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which 'is free from ambiguity. ... If it has been passed improvidently the responsibility is with the Legislature and not the courts.

Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 462, 454 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693, 694-95 (1918)); see also Capeletti Bros., Inc v. Dep’t of Transp., 499 So.2d 855, 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“The omission may be a legislative oversight; nevertheless, courts should not rewrite legislation to cure an omission by the legislature just because it" seems' to fit' overall legislative policy.”).

We have no basis to conclude that the absence of the “other aspects of development permitted” language in the Consistency Statute was a legislative oversight. See, e.g., Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton, 894 So.2d 20, 24 (Fla. 2004) (“The absence of a causation requirement in the statute cannot be viewed as a legislative oversight,”). The omission of such language is presumed to be deliberate, and is evidence that the Consistency Statute limits the scope of claims to use, density, and intensity challenges only. “This conclusion logically derives from a general principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that ‘express mention of one thing is the exclusion of another.’ ” Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of St. Pete Beach, 940 So.2d 1144, 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Inman v. State, 916 So.2d 59, 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)).

The Heines argue that the Consistency Statute is remedial in nature; thus, it must be read liberally. See Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So.2d 561, 565-66 (Fla. 2000) (“[Rjemedial statutes should be liberally construed in favor of granting access to the remedy provided by the Legislature.” (citing Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994))). In support of their position, they rely on Education Development Center, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 751 So.2d 621, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). There, the Fourth District recognized that “[sjection 163.3215 enlarged the class of persons with standing to challenge a development order as inconsistent with the comprehensive plan,” Id, Our sister,, district stated that section 163.3215 “should be liberally construed to advance the intended remedy, i.e., to ensure standing for any party with a protected interest under the comprehensive plan who will be adversely affected by the governmental entity’s actions.“ Id. (emphasis added) (citing Parker v. Leon County, 627 So.2d 476, 479 (Fla. 1993)). The Heines, however, conflate the Consistency Statute’s expansive conferral of standing with the scope of what a plaintiff with standing may challenge. See Martin County Conservation All. v. Martin County, 134 So.3d 966, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“Section 163.3215 is a remedial statute designed to enlarge the class of persons with- standing to' challenge a local development order”). Because the Consistency Statute was intended to liberalize standing, not broaden the scope of what a party with standing may challenge beyond use, density, and intensity, the trial court did not err in construing the statute literally, rather than liberally.

Conclusion

Because the trial court correctly construed the Consistency Statute as permitting only those challenges specifically authorized therein, and properly applied the statute to the facts of this case, we affirm.

Affirmed.

CRENSHAW and SLEET, JJ„ Concur.

      . The Heines also separately appealed the trial court’s order dismissing their declaratory judgment action, and petitioned for issuance of a writ of certiorari, seeking second-tier review of the Board's resolution. These cases, along with the instant appeal, were consolidated to travel together.

      . The Board’s rezoning resolution qualifies as a "development order.” See § 163.3164(15) (defining a "development order” as "any order granting, denying, or granting with conditions an application for a development permit”).


text:
    Edward P. LUECK, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D17-1260
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed June 30, 2017
    Edward P. Lueck, Blountstown, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and,' Kaylee Tatman, Assistant Attorney General," Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the May 24, 2016 judgments and sentences in Case No. 2013-CF-305141, in the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

COHEN, C.J., BERGER, LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Edward P. LUECK, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D17-1258
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed June 30, 2017
    Edward P. Lueck, Blountstown, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and, Kaylee Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the May 24, 2016 judgments and sentences in Case No. 2013-CF-305418, in the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

COHEN, C.J., BERGER, LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Appellant, v. ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER, LLP, Appellee.
    CASE NO. 1D16-4801
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2017

      Brittany Adams Long, Christopher B. Lunny, and Thomas A. Crabb of Radey Law Firm, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ceci Culpepper Berman, Philip J. Pado-vano, and Joseph T. Eagleton of Brannock & Humphries, Tampa; Jack E. Fernandez, D. Lee Fugate, Morris (Sandy) Weinberg, Jr., and Sara L.A. Lawson of Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”), appeals a trial court order granting mandamus relief to Appellee, Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP. For the following reasons, we reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Appellee, Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP (“Zuckerman”) is a law firm that represents a defendant in a federal criminal case. Zuckerman’s client is charged with Medicaid fraud and other related offenses. Beginning in October 2014, and continuing through February 2015, Zuckerman submitted public records requests to AHCA pursuant to Chapter 119, Florida Statutes. In all, Zuckerman submitted ten different requests seeking records dating back to 2002. The requested records generally relate to the calculation of behavioral health capitation payments certified by HMOs to AHCA. The letters contained a total of seventy-seven search requests.

In response to the requests, AHCA prepared search terms derived from the requests and provided the agency’s IT unit with the requests and search terms in order to conduct searches of its system to identify responsive documents. AHCA searched its hard copy and electronic databases, with much of the search focused on email documents within the agency’s database. The searches yielded an extraordinary riumbér of results. When AHCA notified Zuckerman of the large number of results, Zuckerman asked AHCA to suspend its searches until , the parties could confer on the search terms, with the goal of narrowing the searches and reducing the number of results.

The parties met to refine the search terms in- order to narrow the .searches for responsive documents. The searches took between four to six weeks to complete due to the large number of records to be searched. The narrowed search terms nevertheless yielded a massive number of results. As the searches were, performed, AHCA prepared invoices and delivered them to Zuckerman, Pursuant to section 119.07(4)(d), the invoices included a “special service charge,” billed to reimburse AHCA for extensive use of its information technology and substantial clerical and supervisory hours expended by agency personnel. The time and effort were expended, in part, to review and redact any confidential information, from the documents. Upon receipt of the invoices, Zuckerman refused to pay, asserting the fees were unreasonable. However, Zuck-erman never withdrew these requests. As a result of non-payment, AHCA declined to produce the records. AHCA ultimately advised Zuckerman it had complied with its obligations under Chapter 119 and would provide the records once payment was received.

Subsequently, the searches were further refined, and AHCA again searched its email systems. This search produced fewer responsive documents. AHCA accordingly calculated significantly reduced cost reimbursement and submitted invoices for review and redactions. Zuckerman never paid these invoices either.

On November 23, 2015, pursuant to rule 1.630, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Zuckerman filed its Petition for Writ of Mandamus (the “Petition”), attaching the ten sets of public records requests. An alternative writ of mandamus was issued to AHCA ordering AHCA to show cause why the relief requested in the Petition should not be granted. AHCA filed a response to the alternative writ asserting a number of defenses. In its response, AHCA contended, among other things, that Zuckerman sought to impose mandamus for non-ministerial actions, that is, the discretionary act of review and redaction of exempted information, and that Zucker-man had failed to satisfy a condition precedent to production of the documents because it had failed to pay for the cost of production.

The matter proceeded to evidentiary hearing on the Petition on October 4, 2016. Following the hearing, on October 21, 2016, the trial court entered its “Order on Public Records Final Hearing.” Rather than order production of all documents identified in the Petition, the trial court ordered AHCA to produce a modified list of documents within forty-eight hours, without requiring any' payment prior to production. Further, the order retains jurisdiction for future -computation of reasonable costs incurred by AHCA in preparation of the records. This timely appeal followed. ,

ANALYSIS

AHCA raises six issues on appeal, two of which are dispositive. This Court agrees with AHCA that it was error for the lower court to order production within forty-eight hours of the issuance of the order without pre-payment of AHCA’s charges. Additionally, Zuckerman failed to establish a clear legal' right to mandamus relief.

The proper standard utilized in reviewing a trial court’s decision on a petition for writ of - mandamus is abuse of discretion. Brown v. State, 93 So.3d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). “In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus,-the petitioner must have a clear legal right to the requested relief, the respondent must have an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested action, and the petitioner must have no other adequate remedy available.” Putnam Cty. Envtl. Council v. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 168 So.3d 296, 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (quoting Huffman v. State, 813 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000)). The duty of the respondent in a mandamus action must be ministerial in nature,-and not discretionary. Wuesthoff Mem’l Hosp. Inc. v. Florida Elections Comm’n, 795 So.2d 179, 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). A duty is ministerial when “there is no room for the exercise of discretion, and the performance being required is directed by law.” Town of Manalapan v. Rechler, 674 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Mandamus is available only to enforce an established legal right, not to establish that right. Miami-Dade Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. An Accountable Miami-Dade, 208 So.3d 724 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).

With respect to public records requests pursuant to Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, “[i]t is the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal records are open for personal inspection and copying by any person. Providing access to public records is a duty of each agency.” §119.01(1), Florida Statutes. However, this Court has recognized a records custodian’s duty to redact exempted portions of public records before they are released. Morris Publ’g Grp., LLC v. State of Fla., 154 So.3d 528, 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). There are numerous categories of records that are exempt from disclosure in a public records request. § 119.071(5)(a)5, Florida Statutes (“Social security numbers held by an agency are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Árt. I of the State Constitution.”); § 119.071(5)(b), Florida. Statutes. (“Bank account numbers and debit, charge, and credit card numbers held.by an agency are exempt, from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.”); § 394.4615(1), Florida Statutes. (“A clinical record is confidential and exempt from the provisions, of s. 119.07(1).”). , ; - ;

Section 119.07(4), Florida Statutes, provides in part, “[t]he custodian of public records shall furnish a copy or a certified copy of the record upon payment; of the fee prescribed by law.” (Emphasis - supplied) While access to public records is of the utmost importance, “Florida has long required those who seek such records to defray the extraordinary costs associated with their requests.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Highlands Cty. v. Colby, 976 So.2d 31, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Florida courts have consistently held that where a service charge is warranted, an agency is authorized to require payment before producing the records. Morris Publ’g, 154 So.3d at 534; Wootton v. Cook, 590 So.2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Colby, 976 So.2d at 37. Requiring an advance deposit is prudent given the legislature’s determination that taxpayers should not shoulder the entire expense of responding to an extensive request for public records. Colby, 976 So.2d at 37. A person who has not paid for the cost of production is not entitled to mandamus relief on a public records request. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 995 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

In the present case, which deals with a dispute over a large public records request, the lower court seemingly failed to appreciate the amount of time required to properly prepare the requested documents, especially given the need to review and redact confidential information. The lower court’s order, which is devoid of specific findings of fact and citations to legal authority, is contrary to prior decisions of this Court and the language of controlling statutes. By ordering production of the requested documents within forty-eight hours of issuance of its order, the court effectively requires AHCA to ignore its statutory duty to redact exempted information. The sheer number of documents encompassed by Zuckerman’s requests precludes thorough review in the time allowed. Further, decisions of this Court and the language of section 119.07(4), Florida Statutes, dictate that Zuckerman should be required to pay for the cost of searching, review, and redaction of exempted information prior to production. It is unreasonable to require a publicly funded agency to absorb the large financial cost associated with preparation of these records. Zuckerman is a private law firm, and while discovery may be costly, it is a necessary component of litigation. Requiring a state agency to fund, at least in advance, litigation expenses of a private firm is against this state’s public policy. The lower court abused its discretion by ordering production of the responsive documents within forty-eight hours of the issuance of the order without requiring advance payment of AHCA’s invoices.

Here, the elements for mandamus relief were not met. AHCA’s duty in this case was not merely to collect a fee and send records over immediately. AHCA’s duty to protect exempted information through redaction precedes its duty to provide the documents to Zuckerman. Zucker-man’s right to the records is not absolute. The applicable statute provides that Zuck-erman is not entitled to receive exempted information in connection with a public records request. AHCA’s duty is not ministerial, and Zuckerman’s right is not indisputable. Mandamus requires both elements to be met. Therefore, mandamus relief was improper.

CONCLUSION

The trial court erred by requiring production of documents within forty-eight hours of the date of the order because the documents could not be reviewed for redaction within this compressed time period. The trial court further erred by requiring production of the documents prior to payment of AHCA’s invoices. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s October 21, 2016, order and vacate the writ of mandamus. This ruling renders moot the remaining issues on appeal.

WOLF and WETHERELL, JJ., and LESTER, DON H., ASSOCIATE JUDGE, CONCUR.

      . One search alone yielded over one billion emails.

      . Designated as an "order to show cause,’

      .The order grants mandamus relief and will be treated as a writ of mandamus.

      . As these issues were raised by AHCA in its response to the alternative writ of mandamus, its memorandum of law and at the hearing itself, we are perplexed by Zuckerman’s contention that these issues were not preserved,

      . We also note that the lower court was without authority to issue mandamus relief and retain jurisdiction for computation of reasonable reimbursement costs at some future date. "It is well-settled that mandamus is not appropriate to control or regulate a general course of conduct for an unspecified period of time.” Stone v. Ward, 752 So.2d 100, 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). A writ of mandamus is not to be issued where continued supervision is required. Id. at 102.