text:
    PATRIOT CONSTRUCTION & EQUIPMENT, LLC v. RAGE LOGISTICS, LLC, ET AL.
    No. 15-1136.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    April 6, 2016.

      Murphy J. Foster, III, Jacob E. Rous-sel, Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, LLP, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Patriot Contstruction & Equipment, LLC.
    Emile Joseph, Jr., David J. Ayo, Allen & Gooch, A Law Corporation, Lafayette, LA, for Defendants/Appellees, IDIM Construction, LLC, Trahan Construction, LLC, City of Youngsville.
    James P. Doherty, III, Becker & Hebert, LLC, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Rage Logistics, LLC.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, JIMMIE C. PETERS, and JOHN E. CONERY, Judges.
   PETERS, J.

liThe plaintiff, Patriot Construction & Equipment, LLC, appeals a trial court judgment granting peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action in favor of IDIM Construction, LLC, Tra-han Construction, LLC, and the City of Youngsville, and dismissing the three defendants from the litigation. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

On July 31, 2014, Patriot Construction & Equipment, LLC (Patriot Construction) filed suit against Rage Logistics, LLC (Rage Logistics) on the theories of open account and breach of contract, and against IDIM Construction LLC (IDIM Construction) on the theory of unjust enrichment. Patriot Construction asserted the amount in dispute to be $56,911,24. Patriot Construction amended its original petition on October 7, 2014, adding Tra-han Construction, LLC (Trahan Construction) and the City of Youngsville (the City) as defendants. This amendment identified the following claims against each of the defendants:

(1) Against Rage Logistics—breach of contract, open account, quantum me-ruit, and unjust enrichment;
(2) Against IDIM Construction—breach of contract, detrimental reliance, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment;
(3) Against Trahan Construction—quantum meruit and unjust enrichment; and
(4) Against the City—quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

IDIM Construction responded to the original petition by filing peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action. The basis of the exceptions was the assertion that Patriot Construction failed to comply with the notice ^requirements of Part III of the Louisiana Public Works Act, La.R.S. 38:2241, el seq. After the filing of the supplemental and amending petition, Trahan Construction and the City joined IDIM Construction in filing new peremptory exceptions of no right and no cause of action, again based on Patriot Construction’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Louisiana Public Works Act.

Following a hearing on the exceptions, wherein no evidence was introduced, the trial court granted both exceptions as to all three defendants and dismissed Patriot Construction’s claims against them. The trial court executed a written judgment to this effect on August 4, 2015, and issued written reasons for judgment on August 10, 2015. Thereafter, Patriot Construction perfected this appeal, asserting two assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred when it held that Patriot (a material supplier) did not have a right of action or cause of action for a contractual claim against IDIM (a subcontractor) for amounts due to Patriot for materials supplied in connection with a public works project, when Patriot alleged a direct contractual relationship between Patriot and IDIM.
2. In the event that the Court ultimately finds that Patriot does not have a valid contract directly with IDIM, thereby excluding Patriot as a claimant under the Public Works Act, the trial court erred when it held that Patriot (a material supplier) does not have a cause of action in equity against IDIM (a subcontractor), Trahan (the general contractor), and the City (the owner) to the extent that those entities are holding the payment due to Patriot for materials supplied in connection with a public works project.

J^OPINION

Exceptions of no right and no cause of action are both peremptory exceptions, which may be raised pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 927, and the standards for reviewing judgments addressing these exceptions are well settled. In Miller v. Thibeaux, 14-1107, pp. 5-6 (La.1/28/15), 159 So.3d 426, 430, the supreme court set forth the standard pertaining to the exception of no right of action, as follows:

Except as otherwise provided by law, an action can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest, which he asserts. LSA-C.C.P. art. 681. See also Reese v. State Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 03-1615 (La.2/20/04), 866 So.2d 244, 246. The function of the exception of no right of action is to determine whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the suit. Id. (citing LSA-C.C.P. art. 927). The focus in an exception of no right of action is on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit, but it assumes that the petition states a valid cause of action for some person and questions whether the plaintiff in the particular case is a member of the class that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Id. For purposes of the exception, all well-pleaded facts in the petition must be taken as true. Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corporation, 10-2267 (La.10/25/11), 79 So.3d 246, 253.

With regard to the exception of no cause of action, the supreme court stated the following in Scheffler v. Adams & Reese, LLP, 06-1774, pp. 4-5 (La.2/22/07), 950 So.2d 641, 646-47:

As used in the context of the peremptory exception, a “cause of action” refers to the operative facts which give rise to the plaintiffs right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299, p. 7 (La.3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 118; Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1238 (La. 1993). The purpose of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. Ramey, at 7, 869 So.2d at 118; Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc., 616 So.2d at 1235. No evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the exception of no cause of action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 931. The exception is triable on the face of the pleadings, and, for purposes of resolving the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts Lin the petition must be accepted as true. Fink v. Bryant, 01-0987, p. 4 (La.11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346, 349; City of New Orleans v. Board of Commissioners of Orleans Levee District, 93-0690, p. 28 (La.7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 253. The issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought. Ramey, at 7, 869 So.2d at 118.
Louisiana retains a system of fact pleading, and mere conclusions of the plaintiff unsupported by facts will not set forth a cause or right of action. Montalvo v. Sondes, 93-2813, p. 6 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 127, 131. The burden of demonstrating that a petition fails to state a cause of action is upon the mover. Ramey, at 7, 869 So.2d at 119; City of New Orleans, at 28, 640 So.2d at 253. Because the exception of no cause of action raises a question of law and the district court’s decision is based solely on the sufficiency of the petition, review of the district court’s ruling on an exception of no cause of action is de novo. Fink, at 4, 801 So.2d at 349; City of New Orleans, at 28, 640 So.2d at 253. The pertinent inquiry is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in the plaintiffs favor, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Ramey, at 8, 869 So.2d at 119.

Thus, in both exceptions, we accept the well-pleaded facts in the petition to be true. While no evidence can be introduced to support or oppose an exception of no cause of action, evidence can be introduced to support or oppose an exception of no right of action. Additionally, while evidence could have been introduced as to the exception of no right of action, none was introduced. Thus, as was the trial court, we are left with only the well-pleaded facts of the petition to consider.

In its original July 31, 2014 petition, Patriot Construction asserted that IDIM Construction was a subcontractor on a public works project for the City (the Youngsville Sports Complex), and that IDIM Construction subcontracted its obligation “to provide goods, materials, and/or services to IDIM including, without limitation, dirt, sand and/or other material for the project” to Rage Logistics. In an effort to comply with its requirements under the subcontract with IDIM Construction, Rage Logistics began purchasing dirt, sand, and other materials from Patriot Construction on open account. Rage Logistics would use its own vehicles 1 Bto pick up the dirt, sand, and other materials at Patriot Construction’s site and deliver them to the work site of the public works project. Patriot Construction attached a copy of all of the invoices to the petition, which represented the value of the dirt, sand, and material supplied for the project, and further asserted that it had made amicable demand pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2781, on Rage Logistics for the payment of those invoices, but to no avail. In the alternative, Patriot Construction asserted that a contract existed between it and Rage Logistics; and/or Rage Logistics was liable to it on the theory of unjust enrichment.

With regard to IDIM Construction, Patriot Construction asserted that at some point, Rage Logistics ceased transporting and delivering the supplied sand, dirt, and other materials, and that IDIM Construction starting picking up the materials in its own trucks for delivery to the construction site. Claiming to have no contract with IDIM Construction, Patriot Construction asserted an unjust enrichment claim against that entity. This claim is based on the following language in paragraph eleven of the original petition:

When Rage failed to transport and deliver the material from Patriot’s premises to the project site, IDIM took possession of the material at Patriot’s premises using its own truckers, and/or outside truckers hired by IDIM, who hauled the material from Patriot’s premises to the YSC project site with, among other things the intent to exercise control over the material, assert ownership over the material and/or preclude Patriot’s possession thereof.

Finally, Patriot Construction asserted that Rage Logistics and IDIM Construction were liable in solido for the value of the dirt, sand, and other materials it provided.

In its supplemental and amending petition, Patriot Construction added the other two defendants, asserted basically the same factual scenario as it had in the | (-.original petition, and set forth the relationship between the parties to be as follows:

2.
By written contract agreement dated December 19, 2012, the City, as the owner, engaged Trahan, as the general contractor, to construct the public works project known as the Youngsville Sports Complex (“Project”).
3.
Trahan engaged IDIM, as subcontractor, to perform a certain portion of the work on the Project.
4.
IDIM subsequently contracted with Rage to procure, excavate, load and deliver dirt, sand, and/or other material necessary for the completion of the Project.

With regard to the relationship between itself and Rage Logistics, Patriot Construction stated the following:

5.
At Rage’s request, Patriot provided goods, materials, and/or services in connection with the construction of the Project including, without limitation, dirt, sand, and/or other materials on various dates.
6.
Patriot fully and satisfactory [sic] fulfilled its agreement to provide goods, materials, and/or services in connection with the construction of the Project. IDIM and/or Rage picked up the materi-ais provided by Patriot directly from Patriot’s facility.
7.
Throughout the course of the Project, Patriot timely submitted invoices to Rage for the materials satisfactorily provided by Patriot to IDIM and/or Rage. The invoices set forth the correct amount due to Patriot, which total outstanding amount is $56,911.24.

Specifically, with regard to Rage Logistics, Patriot Construction asserted breach of contract, open account liability, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment.

As to IDIM Construction’s liability, Patriot Consti’uction asserted that it “entered into a valid and enforceable contract with Patriot when IDIM directly [7picked up the material provided by Patriot in connection with the Project from Patriot’s facility and represented to Patriot that it would fully compensate Patriot for all material supplied.” Based on IDIM Construction’s actions, Patriot Construction asserts claims of breach of contract, detrimental reliance, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment against it.

As to the City and Trahan Construction, Patriot Construction seeks recovery via quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, based on the fact that these entities had the benefit of the sand, dirt, and materials it provided to Rage Logistics and/or IDIM Construction. That is to say, the sand, dirt, and materials were used in the project, and they should at least be responsible for the value thereof.

Exception of No Right of Action

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 927(A)(6) clearly establishes that the exception of no right of action relates to the “interest in the plaintiff to institute the suit.” Additionally, La.Code Civ.P. art 931 provides that when the peremptory exception of no right of action is pleaded prior to trial, as is the case in the matter before us, “evidence may be introduced to support or controvert” the exception “when the grounds therefore do not appeal’ from the petition.” In this case, no party introduced evidence at the hearing on the exceptions, and we are left with only Patriot Construction’s petitions to determine if it is the entity having an interest in instituting the suit.

In its petitions, Patriot Construction established that it was the party providing the sand, dirt, and materials for the project, and was doing so on credit. That being the case, Patriot Construction is clearly the party with the right to institute the suit. Thus, we find that the trial court erred in granting the exception of no right of action.

| ¡Exception of No Cause of Action

With regard to an exception of no cause of action, “[n]o evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 931. The exception is “triable on the face of the pleadings” and “the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true.” Scheffler, 950 So.2d at 646.

Patriot Construction’s Claims against IDIM Construction

As provided by La.Civ.Code art.1906, “A contract is an agreement by two or more parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or extinguished.” “A contract is formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance.” La.Civ.Code art.1927. Furthermore, “Unless the law prescribes a certain formality for the intended contract, offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing, or by action or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of consent.” La.Civ.Code art.1927. Additionally, La. Civ.Code art. 518 provides, in part:

The ownership of a movable is voluntarily transferred by a contract between the owner and the transferee that purports to transfer the ownership of the movable. Unless otherwise provided, the transfer of ownership takes place as between the parties by the effect of the agreement and against third persons when the possession of the movable is delivered to the transferee.

Patriot Construction claimed in its supplemental and amending petition that it had a contract with IDIM Construction, based on the circumstances surrounding IDIM Construction’s actions in taking over where Rage Logistics left off and going to its premises to load and deliver the sand, dirt, and material needed for the project; and by representing to Patriot Construction that it would be fully | ^compensated. Specifically, Patriot Construction asserted that the actions of IDIM Construction affected the execution of a valid and enforceable contract directly between them, which is not subject to any special rules associated with the public works project. Based on IDIM Construction’s actions, Patriot Construction asserts claims of breach of contract, detrimental reliance, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment.

IDIM Construction, on the other hand, argues that Patriot Construction judicially confessed that no contract existed between them when it stated in its original July 31, 2014 petition that “Patriot had no agreement and/or contract with IDIM.”

We do not agree that Patriot Construction’s statement constitutes a judicial confession.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 1853 provides:

A judicial confession is a declaration made by a party in a judicial proceeding. That confession constitutes full proof against the party who made it.
A judicial confession is indivisible and it may be revoked only on the ground of error of fact.

A finding that Patriot Construction’s statement constituted a judicial confession would require us to ignore all of the facts it asserted prior to and subsequent to that statement, and the facts alleged in both the original petition and the supplemental and amending petition are basically identical. The additional fact in the supplemental and amending petition was that IDIM Construction “represented to Patriot that it would fully compensate Patriot for all material supplied.” Moreover, to accept IDIM Construction’s argument on this point would effectively divide Patriot Construction’s admissions against it. As noted by the supreme court in Leadman v. First National Bank, 198 La. 466, 3 So.2d 739 (1941), all of the allegations in a party’s pleading must be considered in order to find that a judicial confession was made, and the failure to consider all allegations has the effect of dividing a party’s allegations against him. Based on the assertions in its July 31, 2014 petition, we find that Patriot Construction simply meant to imply that it did not have a written contract or agreement with IDIM Construction at the time it obtained the dirt, sand, and other materials from Patriot Construction’s premises.

The remaining claims against IDIM Construction, detrimental reliance, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment, are based on equitable principals and are generally considered to be quasi contractual in nature. In that regard, La. Civ.Code art. 2055 provides that “[e]quity ... is based on the principles that no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of another and that no one is allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.”

Detrimental reliance “is designed to prevent injustice by barring a party, under special circumstances, from taking a position contrary to his prior acts, admissions, representations, or silence.” Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 251 La. 445, 459, 205 So.2d 35, 40 (1967). As codified in La.Civ.Code art. 1967, detrimental reliance provides that:

A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the promise’s reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reasonable.

Thus, in order to successfully assert a claim for detrimental reliance, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) a representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in position to one’s detriment because of the reliance.” Luther v. IOM Co. LLC, 13-353, pp. 10-11 (La.10/15/13), 130 So.3d 817, 825. However, detrimental reliance is not favored in Louisiana, and the failure of the plaintiff to prove each element.will bar recovery. Id.

The theory of quantum meruit applies in situations where a valid contract exists, but there is no agreement as to price. Tallulah Const., Inc. v. Ne. La. Delta Cmty. Dev. Corp., 07-1029 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/23/08), 982 So.2d 225. In such instances:

[T]he court, in the context of contractual interpretation, shall supply the missing price. The technique or measure used to establish the price varies according to the circumstances of each case. The method to determine the recovery typically amounts to the fair market value for the goods or reasonable value for the services that were the object of the contract.

Id. at 233-34 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).

Unjust enrichment requires “[a] person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of another person” to provide compensation to that person. La. Civ.Code art. 2298. Recovery pursuant to unjust enrichment requires a plaintiff to prove: “(1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection between the enrichment and the resulting impoverishment; (4) an absence of justification or cause for the enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) the lack of another remedy at law.” Davis v. Elmer, 14-1298, p. 7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/12/15), 166 So.3d 1082, 1088. Most importantly, this remedy is “subsidiary in nature and ‘shall not be available if the law provides another remedy.’ ” Walters v. MedSouth Record Mgmt., LLC, 10-353, p. 2 (La.6/4/10), 38 So.3d 243, 244 (per curiam) (quoting La. Civ.Code art. 2298). “The mere fact that a plaintiff does not successfully pursue another remedy does not give the plaintiff the right to recover under the theory of unjust enrichment.” Id.

Considering the foregoing, and considering the well-pleaded facts as true, |12we find that Patriot Construction stated a cause of action for breach of contract, detrimental reliance, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment against IDIM Construction. Therefore, we find merit in this portion of Patriot Construction’s assignment of error.

Patriot Construction’s Claims against the City and Trahan Construction

As previously stated, Patriot Construction has asserted claims of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment against the City and Trahan Construction. These defendants do not question whether Patriot Construction provided the sand, dirt, and materials it claims to have provided through Rage Logistics and/or IDIM Construction. Instead, they assert that they have no liability to Patriot Construction, because it failed to comply with the notification requirements of Part III of the Louisiana Public Works Act, as found in La.R.S. 38:2241, et. seq.

Louisiana Revised Statute 38:2241(A)(1) requires that any contract entered into by a public entity in excess of $5,000.00 “for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public works” must be evidenced by a signed writing. La.R.S. 38:2241(A)(1). If that contract exceeds $25,000.00, the contractor must also provide the public entity with “a bond with good, solvent, and sufficient surety in the sum of not less than fifty percent of the contract price for the payment of the contractor or subcontractor to claimants as defined by La.R.S. 38:2242.” La.R.S. 38:3341(A)(2).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 38:2242(A) defines a “claimant” as including “any person to whom money is due pursuant to a contract with the owner or a contractor or subcontractor for doing work, performing labor, or furnishing materials or supplies for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public works[.]” Thus, Patriot Construction meets the definition of “claimant” with |13regard to the Youngstown Sports Complex project.

As a claimant, Patriot Construction was required to perfect its claim, within forty-five days after recordation of acceptance of the work by the City, by filing a sworn statement of the amount of its claim with the City and the recorder of mortgages for Lafayette Parish. La.R.S. 38:2242(B). The City would then be required to deduct the amount of the outstanding claim from the final payment due to the contractor, and if the City failed to do so, it would become liable for the amount of the claim. La.R.S. 38:2242(D). The failure of Patriot Construction to timely file its sworn statement of the amount of the claim results in the loss of its right to file a privilege or lien on the project. La.R.S. 38:2242(F). Additionally, a subsequent concursus proceeding has as its purpose the payment of all properly recorded claims and that of relieving the City of all personal liability on the claims. La.R.S. 38:2244.

With regard to Patriot Construction’s claim against Trahan Construction, La. R.S. 38:2247 provides that it shall have a separate claim against the contractor and surety provided it has complied with the recordation requirements of La.R.S. 38:2242(B), has given timely notice to the contractor pursuant to the statute, and files a suit against the contractor within one year from the registry of the acceptance of the project by the City.

As noted by the supreme court in State of Louisiana, through the Division of Administration v. MeInnis Brothers Construction, 97-742, p. 9 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 937, 944 (first two alterations in original):

It is a long standing principle of statutory interpretation that “[a]s a general rule, lien statutes are stricti juris and should thus be strictly construed.” Guichard Drilling Co. v. Alpine Energy Services, Inc., 94-1275 p. 7 (La.7/3/95), 657 So.2d 1307, 1313, rehearing denied (La.1995). “[P]ublic contract laws are to be strictly construed such that the privileges granted are not extended beyond the statutes.” Wilkin [v. Dev Con Builders, Inc.], 561 So.2d [66,] 71 [ (La. 1990)]. See also American Creosote Works, Inc. v. City of Natchitoches, 182 La. 641, 162 So. 206 (1935); and Rester v. Moody & Stewart, 172 La. 510, 134 So. 690 (1931). “The Public Works Act is sui generis and provides exclusive remedies to parties in public construction work.” U.S. Pollution Control, Inc. v. National American Ins. Co., 95-153 p. 4 (La.App. 3d Cir.8/30/95) 663 So.2d 119, 122.

Based on the exclusivity of the remedies provided by the Louisiana Public Works Act, we find that Patriot Construction has failed to state a cause of action against either Trahan Construction or the City. As they were the general contractor and the owner of a public works project, Patriot Construction’s only remedy against either was that provided by La.R.S. 38:2242, and it is not entitled to seek recovery under alternate theories of recovery such as quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment granting the exception of no cause of action filed by Tra-han Construction, LLC and the City of Youngsville and against |1fiPatriot Construction & Equipment, LLC, dismissing all claims of Patriot Construction & Equipment, LLC against Trahan Construction, LLC and the City of Youngs-ville; we reverse the trial court judgment granting the exception of no right of action filed by IDIM Construction, LLC, Trahan Construction, LLC, and the City of Youngsville and against Patriot Construction & Equipment, LLC; we reverse the trial court judgment granting the exception of no cause of action filed by IDIM Construction, LLC and against Patriot Construction & Equipment, LLC, dismissing all the claims of Patriot Construction & Equipment, LLC for breach of contract, detrimental reliance, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment against IDIM Construction, LLC; and we remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. We assess one half of the costs of appeal to Patriot Construction & Equipment, LLC and one half to IDIM Construction, LLC.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

      . Patriot Construction FAX-filed its supplemental and amending petition on October 7, 2014, with the original being filed on October 10, 2014.

      . Part III of the Act is entitled “CLAIMS OF SUBCONTRACTORS, MATERIALMEN, AND LABORERS ON PUBLIC WORKS.”

      . The written reasons for judgment were issued at the request of Patriot Construction.

      . The invoices total the amount claimed, $56,911.24, and all are addressed to Rage Logistics.

      . Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2781 is the statute setting forth the notice requirements for a claim on open account.

      . Accepting the well-pleaded facts in Patriot Construction’s pleadings to be trae, we must accept that a contract existed between Rage Logistics and Patriot Construction.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GREMILLION, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE in the Interest of D.E.C. & N.H.C.
    No. 15-1138.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    April 6, 2016.

      Jane Hogan, Public Defender’s Office, Fifteenth Judicial District, Lafayette, LA, for Appellant J.C. (father).
    Diane E. Cote, Lafayette, LA, for Ap-pellee State of Louisiana, Department of Children & Family Services.
    Chantel Conrad, Áeadiana Legal Services, Lafayette, LA, for Appellee D.E.C. (child), N.H.C. (child).
    Lucy Melancon, Indigent Defender’s Office, Crowley, LA, for Appellee H.L. (mother).
    Court composed of BILLY HOWARD EZELL, SHANNON J. GREMILLION, and DAVID KENT SAVOIE, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

hThe father, J.C., appeals the trial court’s ruling terminating his parental rights to his children D.E.C., born November 5, 2004, and N.H.C., born November 11, 2005 ,

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to an October 2013 instanter order, D.E.C. and N.H.C. were removed from J.C.’s grandparents’ home, where J.C. had been residing, and placed in the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Social Services’ custody (DCFS). The children were adjudicated in need of care and were placed in foster care with their maternal aunt, G.F. The grandparents kicked J.C. out of their home due to his ongoing drug use and because they could no longer care for the children. J.C. was arrested on October 25, 2013 on domestic violence charges and, at that time, tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, and opiates.

As in all cases in which DCFS has taken custody, a comprehensive and detailed case plan was created for J.C. setting forth requirements for reunification pertaining to housing, food, basic needs, the physical and mental health of the parent, parental substance abuse, and the physical and mental health of the children, among other things. Routine review hearings were held to apprise the trial court of the status of the children and parents. DCFS filed a petition for termination of parental rights and certification for adoption on May 28, 2015. Following a termination hearing on September 16, 2015, J.C.’s parental rights were terminated |¾⅛ a judgment filed October 6, 2015, and the children were freed for adoption. J.C. now appeals and assigns as error:

1. The juvenile court erred in terminating the parental rights of J.C. under La.Ch.C. art. 1015(4) because J.C. did not abandon his children because he did not demonstrate an intention to permanently avoid parental responsibilities.
2. The juvenile court erred in terminating the parental rights of J.C. under La.Ch.C. art. 1015(5) because the agency failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that J.C. had failed to substantially comply with his case plan, that there was no reasonable likelihood of compliance in the near future, and that termination was in the best interest of the children.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

We have stated that “[pjarental rights to the care, custody, and management of children is a fundamental liberty interest warranting great deference and vigilant protection under the law.” In re J.K., 97-336, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97), 702 So.2d 1154, 1156. See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Accordingly, a parent has a strong interest in the accuracy of a decision to terminate his rights. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., N. C., 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). Thus, the Louisiana legislature has imposed strict standards that require the State to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the grounds for termination under La.Ch.Code art. 1015 before a judgment can be issued terminating parental rights. In re J.K., 702 So.2d 1154.

This analysis requires a balancing of the child’s interests and the parent’s interests; however, it has been repeatedly held that the interests of the child are paramount to those of the parent. State ex rel. J.A., 99-2905 (La.1/12/00), 752 So.2d 806. In that case, the supreme court stated:

The fundamental purpose of involuntary termination proceedings is to provide the greatest possible protection to a child whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide adequate care for his physical, |semotional, and mental health needs and adequate rearing by providing an expeditious judicial process for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities and to achieve permanency and stability for the child. The focus of an involuntary termination proceeding is not whether the parent should be deprived of custody, but whether it would be in the best interest of the child for all legal relations with the parents to be terminated. As such, the primary concern of the courts and the State remains to secure the best interest for the child, including termination of parental rights if justifiable grounds exist and are proven. Nonetheless, courts must proceed with care and caution as the permanent termination of the legal relationship existing between natural parents and the child is one of the most drastic actions the State can take against its citizens.

Id. at 811 (citation omitted).

The trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights will not be reversed by the appellate court unless it is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. In re V.F.R., 01-1041 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/13/02), 815 So.2d 1035, writ denied, 02-797 (La.4/12/02), 813 So.2d 412.

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1015(4) sets forth the following as grounds for termination of a parent’s rights to his children:

Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody of a nonpar-ent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him under circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid parental responsibility by any of the following:
(a) For a period of at least four months as of the time of the hearing, despite a diligent search, the whereabouts of the child’s parents continue to be unknown.
(b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to provide significant contributions to the child’s care and support for any period of six consecutive months.
(c) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to maintain significant contact with the child by visiting him or communicating with him for any period of six consecutive months.

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1015(5) sets forth another ground for involuntary termination of a parent’s rights to his children:

14Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1036(C) states:

Under Article 1015(5), lack of parental compliance with a case plan may be evidenced by one or more of the following:
(1) The parent’s failure to attend court-approved scheduled visitations with the child.
(2) The parent’s failure to communicate with the child.
(3) The parent’s failure to keep the department apprised of the parent’s whereabouts and significant changes affecting the parent’s ability to comply with the case plan for services.
(4) The parent’s failure to contribute to the costs of the child’s foster care, if ordered to do so by the court when approving the case plan.
(5) The parent’s repeated failure to comply with the required program of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in the case plan.
(6) The parent’s lack of substantial improvement in redressing the problems preventing reunification.
(7) The persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar potentially harmful conditions.

The evidence at trial included DCFS’s records and testimony of various witnesses. DCFS’s paper trail documenting this case includes the following highlight of events:

•January 13, 2013 hearing: continued custody with DCFS
•March 31, 2014 hearing: continued custody with the State; reunification with the parent(s) remained the goal. Neither parent attended the hearing. The status report to the trial court stated:
| Jn order for [J.C.] to be reunified with his children, [D.E.C.] and [N.H.C.], he will need to demonstrate the ability to care for them, by establishing and maintaining adequate housing, completing an assessment with a local substance abuse clinic and follow the treatment recommendations if there are any. [J.C.] will also need to follow the scheduled visitation contract, participate and complete a parenting class approved by the agency and pay monthly parental contribution to help pay for the cost to care for [D.E.C.] and [N.H.C.] while they are in foster care.
[J.C.] states he is working but he has not provided worker with check stubs verifying his employment and he has not been available for monthly home visits. [J.C.] is residing with his mother in low-income housing for elderly and disabled individuals. On January 15, 2014, [J.C.] tested positive for opiates. [J.C.] was referred to the Nurturing Parenting Program for parents in Substance Abuse Treatment and Recovery through Gulf Coast Teaching Family Services. [J.C.] was terminated from [the] parenting program for not attending. He has not addressed his substance abuse issues and he has not paid monthly parental contributions. [J.C.] has visited his children one time since they entered foster care.
• October 13, 2014 hearing: J.C.’s counsel indicated that he was working offshore. The status report to the trial court stated:
[J.C.] states he is working but he has not provided worker with check stubs verifying his employment and he has not been available for monthly home visits. The agency does not know where [J.C.] is residing. On January 15, 2014, [J.C.] tested positive for opiates. [J.C.] was referred to the Nurturing Parenting Program for parents in Substance Abuse Treatment and Recovery through Gulf Coast Teaching Family Services. [J.C.] was terminated from [the] parenting program for not attending. He has not addressed his substance abuse issues and he has not paid monthly parental contributions. [J.C.] has visited his children one time since they entered foster care.

At this time, it was noted that the children were placed in a certified foster home because the maternal aunt requested that the children be removed in May 2014 due to her impending divorce.

•January 14, 2015 hearing: At this time the goal was changed to adoption. The status report to the court stated:
HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT
[J.C.’s] last known address was XXXXXX, Basile, LA. At this time the agency does not know whereabouts of [J.C.]. [J.C.] stated he was working at Wolverine Industries but he has not provided worker with | ficheck stubs. [J.C.] has not provided verification of parental contributions.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
On January 15, 2014 [J.C.] tested positive for opiates. He has not addressed his substance abuse issues. [J.C.] was able to be reached to discuss a referral for a substance abuse assessment.
PARENTING
[J.C.] was referred to Gulf Coast Social Services for Nurturing Parenting Program. [J.C.] was terminated from parenting program for not attending. [J.C.] has visited his children one time since they entered foster care.
March 25, 2015 hearing: J.C. did not attend and had no contact with his court-appointed attorney; goal changed to adoption
HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT
[J.C.’s] last known address was XXXXXX, Basile, LA. At this time the agency does not know whereabouts of [J.C.]. [J.C.] stated he was working at Wolverine Industries but he has not provided worker with check stubs.
[J.C.] has not provided verification of parental contributions.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
On January 15, 2014 [J.C.] tested positive for opiates. He was unable to be reached to discuss a referral for a substance abuse assessment and he has not provided the agency with verification of having completed a substance abuse assessment and/or treatment.
PARENTING
[J.C.] was referred to Gulf Coast Social Services for Nurturing Parenting Program. [J.C.] was terminated from parenting program for not attending. [J.C.] has visited his children one time since they entered foster care.

In the May 2015 petition for termination, DCFS cited La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4) and (5) as the reasons why J.C.’s parental rights should be terminated because he failed to attend visitation; failed to comply with the required prógram of treatment and rehabilitation services; is incapable of parenting due to his substance abuse; he failed to contribute to the costs of the children’s care; there was no substantial improvement in redressing the problems; he is unable to provide |7an adequate home for the children; and the conditions that led to the children’s removal persist.

• June 17, 2015 hearing: No appearance by J.C. Adoption is the goal. Status is identical to the March 25, 2015 hearing.
• September 16, 2015 termination hearing: The status report to the court stated:
HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT
The Acadia Parish DCFS Office was contacted by the Evangeline Office July 21, 2015; stating [J.C.] informed them he had a case with the Acadia Parish office. Evangeline Parish worker verified the reason they had contact with [J.C.] was due to the open ease regarding his younger three children in their parish. At that time, the agency was provided with [J.C.’s] current address. [J.C.’s] younger three children came into care on July 21, 2015 due to dependency. On July 30, 2015, agency visited [J.C.’s] house. He resides with his live in girlfriend (and mother of his youngest three children] in a three bedroom one bathroom home in Basile La. According to the couple, they have been residing in this home since January of 2015. The lease the couple provided stated they have resided in the home since March of 2015. [J.C.] provided verification that he has worked for L and L sandblasting in Eunice, La.
[J.C,] has not provided verification of parental contributions for the life of the case plan.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
[J.C.’s] last drug screen was on July 16, 2015 and he tested positive for Amphetamines, Marijuana, and opiates. [J.CJ submitted to this screen as a result of the investigation in Evangeline Parish. He did not make contact with the agency regarding [N.H.C.] and [D.E.C.] until the new investigation began for his younger children.
PARENTING
[J.C.] was referred to Gulf Coast Social Services for Nurturing Parenting Program. [J.C.] was terminated from parenting program for not attending. He has visited with his children one time since they entered foster care.

Exhibits admitted into evidence from Gulf Coast Social Services confirm that J.C. did not attend any of the scheduled parenting classes. Ville Platte Behavioral Health had no records on J.C. J.C. submitted to three drug tests during |sthe pendency of the case. Drug testing reports submitted into evidence showed J.C.’s status on February 15, 2013, as negative; January 15, 2014 negative from a urine test, but a hair test from the same day indicated a positive result for opioids; and July 16, 2015 positive for amphetamines, cannabinoids, and opiates.

Testimony elicited from the September 16, 2015 hearing included that of Keisha Benoit, Kimberly Blair, and J.C. Benoit, who was the case worker until December 2014, testified that the children came into DCFS’s care because of neglect due to abandonment and substance abuse issues. She testified that the primary aspects of J.C.’s plan included substance abuse treatment, securing adequate housing, parental contributions, and visitation with the children. Benoit said that J.C. never provided proof of stable housing and that she had trouble contacting J.C. She said that she resorted to sending letters to his mother’s house. J.C. never provided proof of employment, but Benoit said that she was able to contact his employer and confirm his employment for most of the year. She further said that J.C, did not provide any proof of parental contributions. Benoit testified that J.C. never attempted to receive the required substance abuse treatment. She further stated that J.C. did not attend the parenting classes, even though DCFS would have provided transportation to the classes which would have been scheduled around J.C.’s work schedule. Benoit testified that J.C. only visited with his children two times (once at the DCFS office and the other at the foster parents’ house) over the course of her involvement with his case plan.

Blair, who was the caseworker from January 2015 until the time of the hearing, testified that she learned of J.C.’s address on July 21, 2015, only because the Evangeline Parish DCFS opened up a case on his three younger children. Blair said she had no contact with J.C. until the removal of his three younger children. | sBlair said she tried to contact J.C. by visiting his mother, but his mother failed to inform her that J.C. was living down the street. Instead, the mother often said that J.C. was working offshore. Blair reviewed three letters that were sent certified to J.C.; two at his mother’s house and signed for by his mother, and one which his girlfriend signed for at his address. The letters indicated all the parts of the case plan that J.C. still needed to complete.

Blair said that the records only indicate one December 2013 visit by J.C. He did not make any parental contributions for the life of the case or attend parenting classes. J.C. was also required to complete a Family Violence Intervention Program as part of his probation relating to his domestic violence charges; however, a revocation hearing was scheduled for December 17, 2015, because J.C. provided no proof that he attended the program. Blair was never contacted by J.C. from the time she took over the case in January 2015 through July 2015, when his other three children came into DCFS’s care.

Blair said the children are doing extremely well in their foster home. D.E.C. and N.H.C. are both doing well in school, achieving honor roll status. They are also involved in T-ball, baseball, Girl Scouts, Cub Scouts, and church activities. Blair testified that both children wish to be adopted by their foster parents.

On cross-examination, Blair admitted that J.C. had recently been compliant with the housing and employment requirements of his plan. However, J.C. never informed DCFS of his stable housing, and DCFS was under the impression that he continued to reside with his mother.

J.C. testified that he had been living at his current address for nearly a year. He said that he called the DCFS offices and left messages, but they denied receiving them due to problems with the voicemail messaging system. However, |1flJ.C. said that he usually tried calling the foster mom (the maternal aunt) rather than DCFS. J.C. claimed to have visited with his children four times while they were in this foster home; twice at Burger King and twice at the maternal aunt’s residence. J.C. then said that he did not attempt to contact his caseworker because he was talking directly to the foster mom. J.C. claimed his mother did not give him any of the certified mail sent by DCFS until recently because she forgot. J.C. had been employed at L & L Sandblasting for three months.

Regarding his positive drug screen in January 2015, J.C. said he did not have a prescription for the medication but had taken it because he had a toothache and could not afford to go see a dentist. However, he said he had been prescribed painkillers for the five or six teeth he had pulled.

J.C. said he did not visit his children more often because he did not have any transportation. However, he had not requested any transportation within the previous year. Regarding the financial contributions required of the plan, J.C. said that he gave money orders to the foster mom, who refused them. J.C. claims that he then told the foster mother “go ahead and send them. You got them over there, go ahead and send them to Baton Rouge.” He admitted he had provided no evidence of the money orders to DCFS. J.C. said he had completed four out of twelve of the Family Violence Intervention Program classes and was scheduled to attend another the next day. He admitted he had not attended any parenting classes, claiming that a lack of transportation prevented him from doing so. J.C. admitted that he was aware that he had to obtain substance abuse referrals and a mental health assessment but said that he did not do so because he lacked transportation because he was laid off and “living from house to house.”

In J.C. said he desired to have custody of D.E.C. and N.H.C. and believed he could now complete his substance abuse assessment, mental health assessment, provide clean drug screens, and complete parenting classes. When questioned if there was anything else he would like to tell the trial court as to why he did not want his rights terminated, J.C. stated:

I really don’t want my rights terminated. I’d like to have—I wasn’t able at the time of the first two (2), I wasn’t stable, I was messed up. I’ve straightened up a lot. And with the prior case, I was the one that called OCS personally to let them know what was going on and let them know I had my kids and they respond. I gave them to them grandmother temporarily because I didn’t want them around to see none of that stuff. And with the drug screen and the hair follicle and the piss test, the drug screen, I had passed it. It was the hair follicle was the only thing that come up dirty.

Shortly thereafter, J.C. admitted that if he were to be drug-tested that day, it would come back positive for prescribed Xanax and Lortabs and Pereocet for which he had no prescription. The following colloquy then ensued:

Q. Your children, two (2) children, these two (2) children, [D.E.C.] and [N.H.C.], came into care because of your drug use. And two-and-a-half (2⅜) years later you are still using drugs that are not prescribed you.
A, Yes, ma’am; okay.

We find little analysis is required to affirm the termination of J.C.’s rights to his children subject to this appeal. J.C. utterly failed to address any of the issues warranting the removal of his children and, in fact, was under the influence of drugs at the time of trial. The three subsequent children born to J.C. and his girlfriend are also in DCFS’s care. J.C. has repeatedly shown that he is unable to meet the most basic needs of the children in his care, and there is no reasonable expectation that this will change anytime in the near future. J.C., at most, visited with his children four times over the course of a two-year period. He did not 1 ^attend parenting classes, did not make parental contributions, did not obtain assistance with his substance abuse issues, and did not maintain contact with the agency. J.C.’s excuse of “lack of transportation” is simply insufficient and not credible, particularly’ in light of the fact that DCFS offered to transport J.C. The children have been in the DCFS’s care for over two years. The best interests of these children demand that a permanent, stable home be afforded to them, and J.C. has demonstrated, time and time again, that he will be unable to meet those demands. We find no manifest error in the trial court’s ruling terminating J.C.’s parental rights to his children in accordance with La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4) and (5). Accordingly, there is no merit in J.C.’s assignment of error.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court terminating J.C.’s parental rights to his children, D.E.C. and N.H.C., is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against J.C.

AFFIRMED.

      . Pursuant to Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2, initials are used throughout to protect the identity of the minor.

      . The mother stipulated to the termination of her parental rights at the same hearing.


author: COOKS, Judge.

text:
    The WOOD GROUP PSN, INC. v. Todd ROMERO.
    No. 16-64.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    June 8, 2016.

      Patrick A. Johnson, Allen & Gooch, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, The Wood Group PSN, Inc.
    Henri M. Saunders, Saunders & Cha-bert, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Todd Romero.
    Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, JOHN E. CONERY, and DAVID KENT SAVOIE, Judges.
   COOKS, Judge.

UFACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 3, 2013, Todd Romero was employed by The Wood Group PSN, Inc., working as an operator, maintaining satellite oil well platforms in Black Bay, Louisiana. On this date, Romero and a fellow employee were being transported by crew boat from headquarters to a well. Romero alleged when he stepped off the boat onto the platform, he twisted his left ankle. There were no witnesses who saw Romero twist his ankle.

Romero maintained he had to be assisted back to the vessel, where he was taken back to the main platform. He claims he then remained on the waterside docking platform before being taken ashore. There was testimony from Romero’s coworker and boat captain, challenging his version of events.

Later that day, Romero was treated at Plaquemines Medical Center and diagnosed with a sprained ankle. Subsequent to that diagnosis, Romero was seen twice by Dr. Gregory Gidman, an orthopedic surgeon. He then was treated by Dr. Castleman Greene, also an orthopedic surgeon, who referred him to his partner, Dr. James Lalonde, Jr. Eventually, Dr. La-londe performed an arthroscopy of the left ankle on July 15, 2013 and fusion surgery November 20, 2013. Following the two surgical procedures by Dr. Lalonde, Romero saw Dr. Robert Steiner, for an independent medical examination.

It was discovered by the employer that, prior to the alleged accident on February 3, 2013, Romero previously injured the same left ankle in June 2006, while in the course and scope of his employment with Action Oilfield Services. Following a MRI, which disclosed a torn ligament, Romero underwent a lateral ligament tear and ankle reconstruction in August 2006, performed by Dr. Robert Brennan at Baton Rouge General Hospital. In connection with the 2006 work accident, he received workers’ compensation benefits and was out of work, or |3under physical restrictions, for approximately seven months. The evidence was uneontroverted that Romero failed to disclose his prior work-related ankle surgery to any of his medical providers. He also failed to disclose the prior condition to the present employer when he sought employment.

On May 28, 2013, the employer filed a 1008 Disputed Claim alleging Romero violated La.R.S. 23:1208 and committed fraud by intentionally misrepresenting his medical condition by failing to disclose the prior ankle injury and resulting surgery, thus limiting their knowledge of necessary facts to comment on the issue of causation. Romero filed an answer with an incorporated exception of vagueness and a recon-ventional demand asserting the employer failed to timely pay indemnity and medical benefits to him.

The matter proceeded to a hearing before the Office of Workers’ Compensation on January 28, 2015. The WCJ, after accepting post-trial memoranda from the parties, rendered judgment in favor of the employer and against Romero, finding he violated the provisions of La.R.S. 23:1208 by making intentional and willful misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining workers’ compensation benefits. Therefore, the WCJ found Romero forfeited his entitlement to benefits, but declined to award restitution or assess a civil fine. The WCJ specifically found the sanction of forfeiture was a sufficient remedy. The WCJ rendered written reasons for judgment, which stated in pertinent part:

Romero’s excuses do not make sense under the circumstances and do nothing to counter the documented fact that every time he was asked about prior injuries, surgeries, MRIs or workers’ compensation claims he either denied any such thing or left the answer blank. There is deliberateness to his consistently false responses and omissions that point overwhelmingly to an attempt to hide information ...
The false statements are those same statements to the doctors detailed above. The claimant himself admits the statements are false. The WCJ finds the false statements to be willful because Romero testified he did not disclose information about the 2006 accident, surgery and compensation claim because he had recovered 100% and did not think he needed to disclose the information because of his [ recovery. The testimony evidences a deliberate thought process, a decision reached, therefor [sic] intentional or willful...
An important factor in the jurisprudence and in the fact finding process for an alleged violation of 23:1208 is the claimant’s credibility. Mr. Romero was not credible in his testimony. His testimony about the circumstances surrounding the injury was often contradicted by his co-employee Colton Crain and the boat captain, Captain Pace. There is surveillance video that appears inconsistent with the complaints that were being made around the same time. His repeated response to the question of why he failed to disclose the prior injury sounded rote, and his demeanor was such that the WCJ wondered whether he was taking the proceedings seriously. There was nothing positive in his speech, eye contact, posture or phrasing to overcome the contradictions to his testimony or the overt misrepresentations. For these reasons, the WCJ finds that Romero violated provision (A) of La.R.S. 23:1208 and forfeits his entitlement to benefits. The further sanctions found in the statute are discretionary and the WCJ declines to award restitution or assess a civil fine, finding that the sanction of forfeiture is a sufficient remedy in this case.

Romero timely appealed the judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation, asserting the WCJ “was clearly wrong in finding that [he] made intentional and willful misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining workers’ compensation benefits.”

ANALYSIS

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1208 provides in pertinent part:

A. It shall be unlawful for any person, for the purpose of obtaining or defeating any benefit or payment under the provision of this Chapter, either for himself or for any other person, to willfully make a false statement or representation.
E. Any employee violating this Section shall, upon determination by workers’ compensation judge, forfeit any right to compensation benefits under this Chapter.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Resweber v. Haroil Constr. Co., 94-2708, p. 14 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 7, 16, addressed the proof required to prove fraud under La. R.S. 23:1208:

IfiBy its plain words Section 23:1208 requires only that 1) the claimant make a false statement or representation, 2) the statement or representation be willfully made, and 3) the statement or representation be made for the purpose of obtaining workers’ compensation benefits.
The legislature has made a policy decision that willful and deliberate false statements made specifically for the purpose of obtaining workers’ compensation benefits is an attempt to defraud the workers’ compensation system and should be dealt with harshly. The legislature has shown a continued effort over recent years to make Section 1208 easier to enforce and to make its penalties stronger.

The Resweber court noted the false representations must be made for the purpose of obtaining benefits, and must be more than inadvertent or inconsequential statements. The court stated:

It is evident that the relationship between the false statement and the pending claim will be probative in determining whether the statement was made willfully for the purpose of obtaining benefits. A false statement which is inconsequential to the present claim may indicate that the statement was not willfully made for the purpose of obtaining benefits. Clearly, an inadvertent and inconsequential false statement would not result in forfeiture of benefits.

Id. Section 1208 applies to false statements or representations regarding prior injuries; it applies to statements made to insurance investigators and physicians alike; and it imposes no requirement that the employer show prejudice. Id.

A review of the record reveals a consistent pattern of misrepresentation and/or omissions concerning Romero’s pri- or ankle injury. In the Medical History Questionnaire filled out by Romero at Plaquemines Medical Center, where he was taken on the day of the alleged accident, Romero circled “N” for no to the question “Have you ever been treated for any of the following condition or diseases ... Leg/knee/hip/ ankle injury.” Romero also answered no when asked if he had ever had any orthopedic surgery. He also responded no when asked in the questionnaire if he had any “[pjrior work related accidents/Exposure w/ any other job” and if he had “ever filed an occurrence/accident report with a previous employer?” Likewise, he responded no when asked if he had ever filed for workers’ | ficompensation insurance or received money as a result of a workers’ compensation claim. At trial, Romero acknowledged he should have answered yes to the above questions, and there was no claim that he did not understand the questions.

The day after the accident, Romero was taken by the employer to be treated by Dr. Gidman. Romero filled out several forms, including a “Patient History” form. When asked “Have you ever had a similar injury,” Romero left that response blank. He also circled none to the question “Have you ever had any of the following tests (circle those that apply): MRI X-ray CT Nerve Test Other.” Romero also provided no response to the question Please list all surgeries you have had and the year they were performed.” As to why he did not answer the questions accurately, Romero stated he did so because he thought he had fully recovered. He did not contend he misunderstood the questions. In his deposition testimony, Dr. Gidman discussed his personal exchanges with Romero:

A. ... Have you seen any doctors, had any treatment, any loss of work to the area that I’m looking at.
Q. Okay. And he said no?
A. Right.
Q. Okay. And again, if Mr. Romero did have such doctor’s visits or
A. Right. Because it’s be import—important if he’s had a previous ankle fracture or if he’s had recurrent dislocations of the ankle.
Q. Okay. With regards to past surgical history, would you just have asked him, “Have you had any past surgical history?”
A. Yeah, if you had any surgeries in the past.
Q. Okay. And what did he tell you?
A. He denied any surgeries.
Q. Okay. And to summarize based upon your examination of Mr. Romero he didn’t disclose the prior surgery to you?
|7A. Right, he did not.
Q. He did not disclose the prior MRI to you?
A. He did not.
Q. He did not disclose to you the prior ankle injury?
A. He—he did not.

Based on his examination and Romero’s complaints, Dr. Gidman diagnosed him with a work-related sprain placed him in a protective boot for immobilization of the ankle. In the follow-up visit with Dr. Gid-man, he noticed no swelling and instructed Romero to remain in the boot and was maintained at light duty. Romero requested to see a doctor closer to his home.

During his deposition, Dr. Gidman was shown the medical reports from Romero’s 2006 left ankle surgery. He noted the two injuries were very similar and the two surgeries were similar.

Following his two visits to Dr. Gidman, Romero was seen by Dr. Castleman Greene on March 19, 2013, complaining of left ankle pain. Dr. Greene recommended a MRI, a bone scan and prescription medication. He recommended Romero continue wearing the boot.

In the admission forms filled out for Dr. Greene, Romero repeatedly denies or does not answer inquiries as to prior ankle problems. In the medical history section, Romero left the answer blank as to past surgical history, and denied any prior “musculoskeletal problems,” “difficulty walking” or “joint stiffness or swelling.” At trial, Romero again acknowledged these omissions and misrepresentations, but attempted to justify them by stating he believed he had fully recovered from his prior ankle injury.

At trial, the employer presented video surveillance of Romero standing and walking without use of the boot during the time period he was being treated by | sDrs. Gid-man and Greene and under orders to remain in the boot at all times. One portion of the video surveillance showed Romero pushing his apparently stalled pick-up truck backwards while not wearing his boot. The WCJ, in her written reasons for judgment, specifically noted this video as inconsistent with Romero’s complaints during the time period in question.

Dr. Greene referred Romero to Dr. La-londe for further treatment. Romero complained of a significant amount of pain in his ankle. In his deposition, Dr. Lalonde stated he did not recall Romero informing him of the prior accident and surgery, and was clear such information would be something he would have liked to have known about. Dr. Lalonde did acknowledge the intake forms and medical history forms filled out by Romero had no indication of any prior surgei’y.

Dr. Lalonde diagnosed Romero with “anterior impingement of the ankle,” which he explained was “[bjasically scar tissue on part of the ankle.” Dr. Lalonde eventually recommended Romero undergo an ar-throscopy of the ankle to clear up that problem. On July 15, 2013 the arthrosco-py was performed by Dr. Lalonde. The surgical admission record has no mention of the prior 2006 surgery. The reason for this omission was explained by Dr. La-londe:

Q. Why didn’t you note the 2006 surgery [in the surgical admission record]?
A. Why didn’t I?
Q. Yes, doctor.
A. I wasn’t aware of it.

Following the arthroscopy, Dr. Lalonde recommended physical therapy for Romero. On October 10, 2013, Dr. Lalonde concluded that physical therapy was not helping and recommended Romero undergo a fusion surgery of the ankle, which was performed on November 20, 2013. Dr. Lalonde believed the surgery was successful.

LDr. Lalonde testified it was his belief that Romero “was able to do everything prior to the fall” and “that he was not having any problems.” This opinion was based on Romero’s history to Dr. Lalonde and was contradicted by the testimony of Colton Crane, a co-worker of Romero, who stated he saw Romero limping on his left ankle prior to the date of the accident.

On February 6, 2014, Romero was seen by Dr. Robert A. Steiner for an Independent Medical Examination. Dr. Steiner’s report provides that Romero “denies prior problems with the left foot or ankle.” Dr. Steiner was of the belief that Romero aggravated his pre-existing osteochondral lesions assuming that the history given of no previous complaints was correct.

Romero made several arguments in support of his assertion that the trial court erred in its judgment. He claimed in brief that he suffers from a lack of mental acuity sufficient to commit the fraud. He argues he did not graduate high school until he was twenty-two years old. Romero fails to acknowledge that he has since earned a T2 production license, a hydrolic crane operator card and became qualified as a first-aid responder. As the employer notes, these post-high school trainings and certifications do not support his argument that he lacks the mental acuity to commit fraud. Regardless, the record is clear that at no point during the proceedings did Romero assert that he did not understand any of the questions asked of him regarding his medical history. Thus, we find this argument lacks merit.

Romero also argues his fraud was harmless and/or the employer suffered no prejudice as a result of any fraud. This argument also lacks merit, as the jurisprudence is consistent that La.R.S. 23:1208 imposes no requirement that the employer suffers prejudice because of the false statements. Resweber, 660 So.2d 7; Edwards v. South eastern Freight Lines, Inc., 14-871 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/4/15), 158 So.3d 227.

ImLastly, Romero acknowledges he did not disclose his past ankle injury and resultant surgery, but contends these misrepresentations and omissions were not made for the purpose of obtaining any benefit or payment. This same argument was made to the WCJ, who thoroughly addressed it, and concluded the “statements were, indeed, made for the purpose of obtaining benefits.” The WCJ noted this court in KLLM v. Reed, 00-295, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/11/00), 771 So.2d 728, 732, explained “[t]he relationship between the false statement and the pending claim will be probative in determining whether the statement was made willfully for the purpose of obtaining benefits.” In KLLM, this court affirmed the WCJ’s determination that the worker willfully misrepresented his medical history and present condition for the purpose of obtaining benefits. Much as here, the WCJ in KLLM found the worker “consistently failed to disclose” accidents that produced symptoms substantially similar to those he attributes to the present accident. Id. The WCJ in this case noted “there is a very strong relationship between the failure to disclose the prior left ankle surgery and the pending claim for treatment and disability due to the left ankle.”

This court in Jones v. Trendsetter Production Co., Inc., 97-299 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/25/98), 707 So.2d 1341, writ denied, 98-793 (La.5/15/98), 719 So.2d 463, reversed the WCJ’s denial of forfeiture for the claimant’s failure to disclose a prior back injury (for which he was out of work for two to three years), where the record revealed that the claimant obviously misrepresented his medical history to his treating physicians. Similarly in Menard v. Mama’s Fried Chicken, 97-488 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/98), 709 So.2d 303, writ denied, 98-956 (La.6/5/98), 720 So.2d 681, we also reversed the WCJ’s refusal to order forfeiture, finding that the claimant’s denial of previous back injuries was not inadvertent or inconsequential because it went to “the crux of the matter,” the causation of the claimant’s present injuries. Id. at 305.

InThe evidence is uncontradicted that Romero consistently misrepresented his medical history to the numerous providers who treated him. The issue of whether an employee has forfeited his right to workers’ compensation benefits is a question of fact that should not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. KLLM, 771 So.2d 728. For the reasons set forth above, we find no manifest error in the WCJ’s determination that Romero willfully misrepresented his medical history and present condition for the purpose of obtaining benefits.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant, Todd Romero.

AFFIRMED.