author: COLEMAN, JUSTICE, KING, JUSTICE,

text:
    Jeffrey A. WEILL, Sr. v. Karla Watkins BAILEY
    NO. 2015-IA-01379-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    04/06/2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DIANE PRADAT PUMPHREY, NICHOLAS DENSON GARRARD
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JAMES ASHLEY OGDEN, JAMES W. SMITH, JR.
    BEFORE DICKINSON, P.J., COLEMAN AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
   COLEMAN, JUSTICE,

FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Karla Watkins Bailey, former court administrator to Hinds County Circuit Court Judge Jeffrey A. Weill Sr., filed a complaint against Judge Weill in his individual capacity, alleging that he had committed libel against her. Bailey’s complaint and amended-complaint were based on language in a footnote contained in four orders entered by Judge Weill in separate criminal cases that were before him. The alleged libelous language in the orders provided that Bailey had been reprimanded by Judge Weill for engaging in improper ex parte communications while she was his court administrator and she had added a certain public defender as counsel of record in her current position as deputy clerk. ’

¶2. Judge Weill filed a motion to dismiss Bailey’s complaint and amended complaint, raising several grounds for dismissal, including judicial immunity. The trial court denied the motion and ordered the parties to commence discovery. Judge Weill filed a petition for interlocutory appeal. The Court granted the petition. We hold that the trial court erred by failing to correctly apply the doctrine of judicial immunity to Bailey’s claim that Judge Weill libeled her via the underlying orders. Accordingly, the trial court’s order is reversed and we remand for further proceedings consistent vdth the instant opinion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶3. On April 16, 2015, Bailey filed a complaint in the County Court of Hinds County 'against Judge Weill in his individual capacity alleging “libel, slander, defamation of character, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent' infliction of emotional distress; intentional interference with an advantageous situation, negligent interference with an advantageous situation, making defamatory statements with the intent to deprive [Bailey] of her job, defamation of character, harassment, general negligence in releasing information that [was] not accurate or supported by facts.”

¶4. Bailey was employed as Judge Weill’s court administrator from January 2011 until November 29, 2012. Bailey claimed that during her employment, Judge Weill engaged in a pattern of abusive language and disrespectful actions against her. Bailey alleges that, after she left her position as court administrator, a dispute developed between Judge Weill and Hinds County Public Defender Alison Kelly. In the midst of the dispute, Kelly filed motions requesting that Judge Weill recuse himself from fifty-six criminal cases that she had been assigned and in which she was counsel of record. On February 10, 2015, Judge Weill entered separate orders denying Kelly’s multiple motions. Four of the orders (February 2015 orders) also addressed a motion for clarification of representation that Kelly also had filed in the criminal cases. Bailey alleges that the following language, found in a footnote appearing in eaeh of the four orders, libeled her:

The Court notes that the entry of the Motion for Clarification was made by Deputy Clerk Karla Bailey, f/k/a Karla Watkins, who was previously employed as the court administrator for the undersigned and who resigned after being reprimanded for improper ex parte contacts with Ms. Kelly about substantive issues involving the criminal docket. It is presumed that since Ms. Bailey was the deputy clerk who entered the Motion for Clarification, she is also responsible for adding Ms. Kelly’s name as an attorney of record.

¶5. Bailey addressed the February 2015 orders in her complaint:

In the [o]rders, [Judge Weill] specifically named [Bailey] and falsely stated [he] had reprimanded [Bailey] for making improper ex parte contacts with Ms. Kelly. Judge Weill also stated it was his assumption that since [Bailey] was a deputy clerk in the Hinds County Clerk’s office she was the one who entered the Motion for Clarification and she was the one who added Ms. Kelly’s name to the document. Judge Weill continues to make false statements about [Bailey] and her character as he continues his ill-conceived vendetta to discredit Ms. Kelly and attack her character.

¶6. Bailey claimed that she suffered physical injuries, emotional injuries, and loss of reputation as a result of the acts of Judge Weill.

¶7. On May 8, 2015, Bailey filed an amended complaint. According to Bailey, the purpose of filing an amended complaint was to make the allegations in the initial complaint complete and to address the issues more specifically. The amended complaint mirrors the initial complaint. However, Bailey elaborates on her accusations of Judge Weill’s improper conduct while she was employed as court administrator that she had alleged generally in the initial complaint.

¶8. Bailey added that Judge Weill’s statements made in the February 2015 orders denying Kelly’s motions for recusal were “willfully and intentionally made with a desire to harm [Bailey’s] personal, professional and public reputation.” Bailey alleged: “Since the filing of [Bailey’s [c]om-plaint[, she] has been targeted by [Judge Weill’s] associates who on at least two occasions on April 20, 2015 and April 21, 2015 came to her desk in the clerk’s office and made harassing gestures and inappropriate jesters [sic] of intimidation.” Bailey also alleged that Judge Weill “has carried out a pattern of intentional intimidation, punishment and attempted public humiliation against [Bailey] that started in 2012 and has continued as recently as February 2015.”

¶9. On May 15, 2015, Judge Weill filed an answer to Bailey’s-'.complaint and amended complaint. The same day, Judge Weill filed a motion to dismiss Bailey’s complaint and amended complaint. Judge Weill argued that the complaints should be dismissed under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Bailey had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted based on judicial immunity, among other grounds.

¶10. On July 30, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on Judge Weill’s motion to dismiss. After hearing oral arguments of the parties, the trial court denied Judge Weill’s motion to dismiss from the bench. The trial court stated: “There has not beén any discovery. And without some evidence or some testimony, something that the [trial] court can base its opinion on, I don’t have anything to decide that.”

¶11. On July 31, 2015, Bailey filed a motion to file a second amended' complaint, Bailey attached her proposed, second amended complaint to the motion. The second amended complaint contains an additional allegation relating to an article dated May 9, 2015, published in The Clarion-Ledger, which contained Judge Weill’s statements in response to the present lawsuit. The new portion of the proposed second amended complaint relating to The Clarion-Ledger article provided: ’

Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on May 8, 2015. On May 9, 2015 the Defendant is quoted in [T]he Clarion[-]Ledger Newspaper in his individual capacity and not in his official capacity stating that he was “going to seek sanctions against those falsely accusing him” and “I am confident these outrageous claims will ultimately bé ground to dust.” He also stated the claims against him were “utterly false.” These statements constitute lible [sic], per se slander, slander, defamation of character and harassment against the Plaintiff. The statements were made by the Defendant in his individual capacity and not in the scope and course of his employment and not in a matter which he held any jurisdictional control and the actions constituted a nonjudicial act. The Defendant acted with specific intent in his actions with the sole intent to injure Plaintiff. Defendant made these statements and took these nonjudicial actions in [sic] while in complete absence of all jurisdiction to do so.

¶12. The trial court never ruled on the motion to file a second amended complaint and it is currently pending at the trial level. Because the motion to file the second amended complaint neither has been denied nor granted, we do not address the merits of the new allegations contained therein.

¶13. On August 24, 2015, the trial court entered a written order denying Judge Weill’s motion to dismiss. Judge Weill filed a petition for interlocutory appeal. On December 9, 2015, the Court granted Judge Weill’s petition for interlocutory appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14. “The standard of review for a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is de novo.” Burch v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 136 So.3d 1063, 1064-65 (¶ 3) (Miss. 2014). “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Rose v. Tullos, 994 So.2d 734, 737 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2008). ‘When considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of his claim.” Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1275 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2006).

ANALYSIS

I. Whether the trial court erred by denying Judge Weill’s motion to dismiss.

¶15. The Court’s analysis is limited to the issue of judicial immunity, as it is dispositive of the issues raised on interlocutory appeal. Bailey conceded that, despite the additional history between the parties alleged, her complaint and amended complaint arise from two public statements made by Judge Weill. The first statement is contained in a footnote in the February 2015 orders, which Judge Weill entered in four criminal cases before him. The other statements were contained in an article in The Clarion-Ledger quoting responses made by Judge Weill to Bailey’s present lawsuit.

¶16. Bailey’s counsel acknowledged that any claims arising from the factual allegations when Bailey was Judge Weill’s court administrator are barred by the statute of limitations. Bailey’s counsel conceded at the hearing on Judge Weill’s motion to dismiss:

Ñow, I understand that they have seized on some of the facts that we have laid out in the complaint to explain why we think it’s intentional and say that those acts from three years- ago have run under the statute. I don’t dispute that. I’m not making a claim for three years ago when he made those disparaging remarks to her. We believe .that the crux of the claim is for the statement made in the February, 2015 order that you have mentioned. That’s where.it all is. Everything else ivas issues that justify or explain why he did that. (Emphasis added.) •

¶17. Bailey maintained in her appellate brief that her “primary claim stems from the subject February 10, 2015 Orders issued by Judge Weill.” Bailey explained that “[a]ll the other issues that existed while Bailey was employed by Judge Weill are now beyond the statute of limitations and cannot be litigated.” To be sure, Bailey argued that her “action stems from Judge Weill’s February 10, 2015 [ojrders.” Accordingly, the Court’s analysis on the issue is limited to addressing the alleged defamatory language in the footnote contained in the February 2015 orders.

¶18. Mississippi has long recognized the doctrine of judicial immunity. Wheeler v. Stewart, 798 So.2d 386, 392 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2001). The Court has declared that “public policy mandates that a judge should have the power to make decisions without having to worry about being held liable for his actions.” Id."(quoting Loyacono v. Ellis, 571 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss. 1990)). Indeed, the Court “fully recognizes that'the best interests of the people and public order require that judges be immune from civil liability.” Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238.

¶19. The Loyacono Court recognized that the United States Supreme Court addressed the doctrine of judicial immunity in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). The Stump Court held that “judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for .their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are-alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871)).

¶20. In Loyacono, an attorney filed suit against a circuit court judge contending that, as a direct and proximate result of the willful, intentional, or negligent acts of the circuit court judge, he was falsely prosecuted, arrested, incarcerated, and denied due process. Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 237. The trial court granted the circuit court judge’s motion to dismiss, finding that the doctrine of judicial immunity protected the circuit court judge even if he was motivated by malice. Id. The Court affirmed. Id. at 239.

¶21. The Loyacono Court acknowledged that, while the holding in DeWitt v. Thompson, 192 Miss. 615,7 So.2d 529, 532 (1942), seemed to leave open the door as to whether judicial immunity applies in the face of malice, “[pjublic policy mandates that a judge should have the power to make decisions without having to worry about being held hable for his actions, and, thankfully, most judges do not exhibit the type of behavior we find in this instance.” Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238. Accordingly, the “Court fully recognizes that the best interests of the people and public order require that judges be immune from civil liability. There are other remedies for the correction of such behavior.” Id.

¶22. The Loyacono Court stated: “There is a distinction between excess of jurisdiction and a complete absence of jurisdiction.” Id. “Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.” Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351-52. Thus, “[t]he key factor in determining whether judicial immunity exists is whether at the time the judge took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.” Wheeler, 798 So.2d at 392 (¶ 15).

¶23. Bailey argues that Judge Weill is not afforded judicial immunity because his actions were taken in a complete absence of jurisdiction. Bailey contends that Judge Weill had no jurisdictional authority over her individually when he entered the February 2015 orders. However, the question is not whether Judge Weill had jurisdiction over Bailey, individually, the inquiry is “whether at the time the judge took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.” See id. (emphasis added).

¶24. The challenged act is the entry of the February 2015 orders disposing of Kelly’s motions to recuse and for clarification in multiple criminal cases. Judicial immunity exists in the present case because at the time Judge Weill entered the February 2015 orders, he had jurisdiction over the multiple criminal matters before him.

¶25. Bailey’s complaint and amended complaint did not allege that Judge Weill lacked jurisdiction over the criminal matters in which he entered the February 2015 orders. Thus, there is no dispute that, at the time Judge Weill entered the February 2015 orders in his capacity as circuit court judge, he had jurisdiction over the criminal matters before him. Instead, Bailey argues that Judge Weill’s statement that she had been reprimanded for improper ex parte communications in the February 2015 orders was neither necessary or relevant to the issue before Judge Weill. However, the Court has not recognized a relevance exception to the judicial immunity doctrine. “In order to determine the existence of judicial immunity one must look to whether at the time the judge took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.” Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099). It is of no consequence that the February 2015 orders disposing of a motion in criminal matters properly before him included a factual finding that mentioned Bailey.

¶26. Bailey also argues that Judge Weill lost his judicial immunity because his alleged defamation of her constituted a nonjudicial act made in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. However, the Loyacono Court rejected the argument that allegations of malice remove the protection of judicial immunity.

¶27. We hold that the trial court erred by failing to grant Judge Weill’s motion to dismiss Bailey’s complaint and amended complaint based on judicial immunity.

CONCLUSION

¶28. The Court has held that judges of courts of general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. Loyacono, 571 So.2d at 238. Here, Judge Weill entered the February 2015 orders disposing of the public defender’s motions to recuse and for clarification in four criminal matters that were properly before him. Even though Bailey alleged that the language contained in the orders contained libelous language, Judge Weill is afforded judicial immunity from Bailey’s civil action because at the time he entered the February 2015 orders, he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him. See id.; Wheeler, 798 So.2d at 392 (¶ 14). As a result, the Court reverses the trial court’s order and remands the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.

¶29. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, MAXWELL, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. KING, J„ SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS, J. WALLER, C.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

KING, JUSTICE,

SPECIALLY CONCURRING:

¶30. While I agree with the majority that, under the law as it stands, judicial immunity applies to this case, I write separately to express my concern regarding the alleged judicial behavior in this case.

¶31. Bailey essentially alleges that Judge Weill made false statements about her in a court order, and that Judge Weill had no jurisdiction to make these statements, presumably because Bailey believes that these statements were irrelevant to the crux of the order.1 find it concerning that this opinion may allow judges to claim judicial immunity for any gratuitous remarks made in an opinion or order, so long as the judge lias overall authority to promulgate the opinion or order in the first place.

¶32. As the majority indicates, “DeWitt v. Thompson, 192 Miss. 615, 7 So.2d 529, 532 (Miss. 1942), seemed to leave open the door' as to whether judicial immunity applies in the face of malice[.]” Maj. Op. (¶ 21; I believe that this Court may need to revisit this notion at a later date, especially when, as here, the actions were alleged to have been taken with malice and were allegedly irrelevant to the underlying judicial action.

KITCHENS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

      ., Because of concessions made by Bailey and the dispositive issue of judicial immunity, it is not necessary for the Court to address the additional grounds raised by Judge Weill..

      . Bailey also stated in her appellate brief that her "cause of action against Judge Weill stems from the four subject February 10, 2015 Orders issued by Judge Weill, and not from any causes of action arising during the timé she was employed as Judge Weill’s court administrator.”

      . In DeWitt v. Thompson, 192 Miss. 615, 7 So.2d 529, 532 (1942), the Court stated:
      In [Bradley] the [United States Supreme] Court went farther, and held that courts of general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are charged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. We do not go that far in this case, because, as stated, there was no showing of either corruption or excess of jurisdiction.

      . “The primary remedy available to those who believe a judge has acted either contrary to or in excess of his/her authority is to file a complaint with the [Mississippi Judicial Performance] Commission.” Mississippi Comm’n of Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929, 947 (Miss. 1997).

      . A more thoroughly developed record could help prove or disprove these allegations, and would have helped us make a more informed decision regarding judicial immunity. Without a more developed record or any findings of fact by the trial court, I certainly take no position on whether these allegations are true.

      . For example, in a divorce proceeding, if a chancellor had a personal vendetta against a party's sister who was estranged from the party and had no relevance to the divorce or custody issues, could that chancellor in the divorce order falsely state that the party's sister was a prostitute and receive judicial immunity for making that statement?


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: . DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE,

license: Public Domain

text:
    MISSISSIPPI COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE v. Judge Keith Stokes ROBERTS
    NO. 2016-JP-00927-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    04/20/2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DARLENE D. BALLARD, MEGAN C. BRITTAIN
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: R. ADAM KIRK
   KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: .

¶ 1. The Mississippi Commission" on Judicial Performance charges Montgomery County Justice Court Judge Keith Stokes Roberts with misconduct for failing to follow the law in a case before him. Because we find that Judge Roberts committed judicial misconduct and we agree that the recommended sanctions are appropriate, we order that Judge Roberts be publicly reprimanded, fined $3,000, and taxed with the costs of these proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On November 3, 2014, Rebecca Herring brought for hearing before Judge Roberts a claim that Marci Gastineau had given her . a rent check in the amount of $450 that was returned due to insufficient funds. Herring prayed for monetary damages in the amount of $546.50. Gastineau failed to appear and defend the case despite receiving the summons posted on her door, so Judge Roberts continued the case until November 17, -2014. Gastineau was not notified of the new hearing date and again failed to appear, so Herring requests ed a default judgment.

¶ 3. After talking with Herring and looking at the documents she presented, Judge Roberts suggested that she amend her complaint to $3,500 (the jurisdictional limit of the court) plus costs. Herring made such a motion and Judge Roberts entered a default judgment against Gastineau in the amount of $3,564. Judge Roberts then suggested that Herring move to amend her complaint to include an eviction,’ and explained to her his belief that she needed an eviction for the constable to put her in legal possession of the property. Herring made such a motion, and Judge Roberts ordered an immediate eviction.

¶ 4. On June 29, 2015, following an investigation of the matter, the Commission filed a formal complaint against Judge Roberts charging him with violating Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3B(2), 3B(8), and 3C(1) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct, which violates Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, “as said conduct constitutes willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice "which brings the judicial office into disrepute.” Judge Roberts filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Recuse two judges from the hearing panel.- The Commission denied both motions and a formal hearing was held on March 31, 2016, before-a three-judge committee.

¶5, On May 17, 2016, the Committee filed'its Findings of-Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation. The Committee found that- clear and convincing evidence existed that Judge Robert’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(8), and 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Committee recommended that Judge Roberts be publicly reprimanded,- fined $3,000, and assessed all costs of the proceeding. Judge Roberts filed his objection to the Committee’s findings and recommendation on May 31, 2016. Thereafter, the Commission unanimously adopted the Committee’s findings and recommendation.

¶6. The Commission found that Judge Roberts had committed misconduct by: (1) failing in his administrative duties by not directing the Clerk to issue process for the reset hearing date and ensuring that Gas-tineau received notice of the reset hearing date, (2) failing to give notice to Gastineau that she would face an‘eviction and a 700 percent increase in the amount of the judgment against her, (3) granting unrequested relief by evicting Gastineau,. (4) acting, with ignorance or disregard for any applicable rule of law, (5) entering an unsupported judgment, in favor of Herring which caused direct harm to Gastineau, and (6) giving legal advice to Herring that directly harmed Gastineau. The Commission recommends to this Court that we order that Judge Roberts be publicly reprimanded, fined $3,000, and taxed with the costs of these, proceedings in the amount of $2,381.34.

¶ 7. Judge Roberts objects on multiple grounds: 1) that the Commission violated Rule 6(C) of the Rules of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance, 2) that his due process rights were violated, 3) that Rule 2 applies in that he applied his understanding of the law, 4) that he was not required to renotice Gastineau, 5) that the Commission withheld exculpatory evidence and made its decision to initiate a Formal Complaint without said evidence, and 6) that-the sanctions are inappropriate.

ANALYSIS

¶ 8. The Mississippi Constitution grants this Court the power to impose sanctions for willful judicial misconduct “[o]n recommendation of the commission on judicial performance.” Miss. Const. art. 6, § 177A. When reviewing a judicial performance case, we conduct “an independent inquiry of the record before making a ‘final determination of. the appropriate action to be taken in each case[.]’” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Shoemake, 191 So.3d 1211, 1216 (Miss. 2016) (quoting Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Boone, 60 So.3d 172, 176 (Miss. 2011)). That said, we give careful consideration to the Commission’s findings of fact and recommendations, but we are not bound by them. Shoemake, 191 So.3d at 1216 (citing Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Skinner, 119 So.3d 294, 299 (Miss. 2013)).

¶ 9. To impose sanctions, we must find “clear and convincing evidence of misconduct. Shoemake, 191 So.3d at 1216 (internal quotations omitted), “Willful misconduct in office includes the improper or wrongful use of power of his office by a judge acting intentionally, or with gross unconcern for his conduct and generally in bad faith.” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Skinner, 119 So.3d 294, 299 (Miss. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). Bad faith may be found where there exists “specific-intent to use the powers of the judicial office to accomplish a purpose which- the judge knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate exercise of. his authority.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). While “[wjillful misconduct in office of necessity is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disreputef,] ... [a] judge may also bring the judicial office into disrepute through negligence, ignorance, or incompetence not amounting to bad faith.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). “This Court can generally recognize examples of such conduct when presented before the Court,” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

1. Whether the Commission violated Rule 6(C).

¶ 10. Rule 6(C) of the Rules of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance provides that “[t]he formal complaint shall identify any complainant.” Judge Roberts argues that “any complainant” means that, for a formal complaint to be valid, it must identify a complainant. Yet the modification of “complainant” with “any” indicates that a specific complainant should be identified only if a sworn complainant exists. This is bolstered by other •Rules of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance. Rule 5(A) provides that

Upon receipt of proper information regarding a judge’s conduct or physical or mental condition, the Commission shall initiate a confidential inquiry to determine whether the matter is within the Commission’s jurisdiction. On its own motion, the Commission may make inquiry concerning a judge’s conduct or physical or mental condition, and may file a formal complaint based upon the results of such inquiry on its own motion.
¶ 11. Rule 5(D) provides that
If the initial complaint is not dismissed, the complainant shall be asked to file a detailed, signed, sworn complaint against the judge .... A sworn complaint may be -waived by a two-thirds vote of the Commission; a sworn complaint shall not be required in an inquiry initiated by the Commission on its:own motion..

In this case, the Commission’s investigator received an anonymous tip and brought the information to the Commission. As reflected in the Commission’s minutes, the Commission on its own motion initiated an inquiry and investigation, and thereafter on its own motion filed a formal complaint. Because the Commission initiated the inquiry and filed the formal complaints on its own motion, a sworn complaint identifying a complainant was not required.

2. Whether Judge Roberts’s due process rights were violated.

¶ 12. At a meeting of the Commission, after being presented with the results of the investigation of Judge Roberts’s conduct,''one judge moved to file a formal complaint against Judge Roberts and another judge moved to second the motion. Judge Roberts moved to recuse these two judges, arguing that they became an arm of the prosecution and had personal knowledge due to the motions made. The judges declined to recuse, and Judge Roberts argues that this violated his due process rights.' The combination ' of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory functions in the Commission does not in and of itself violate due process. Miss. Comm’n of Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929, 945-47 (Miss. 1997). “The processes of the Commission do not in and of themselves appear to present an unacceptable-risk of bias,” Id. at 946. And Judge Roberts presents no evidence of actual bias, beyond a vague assertion that the two judges had “been privy to information and ha[d] personal knowledge of the matter that could interfere with their ability to be impartial” because they had been . the members who moved to file a Formal Complaint. This claim of bias is tenuous, at best. “Moreover, the conclusions of the Commission are merely recommendations to this Court and thus have no binding effect. Rather, this Court conducts de novo review of judicial misconduct proceedings and is the final arbiter of these matters.” Id. at 947.

3. Whether Rule 2 of the Rules of the Mississippi Commission of Judicial Performance applies.

¶ 13. Rule 2 provides that “[i]n the absence of fraud, corrupt motive, or bad faith, the Commission shall not consider allegations against a judge for making findings of fact, reaching a legal conclusion, or applying the law as he understands it.” Uniform Justice Court Rule 2.12 provides that “[a] judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed an amount which was demanded in the complaint.” Judge Roberts issued a default judgment that differed both in kind and exceeded an amount demanded in the complaint. The complaint was for a bad check fee and demanded $546.50. The default judgment granted Herring $3,564 (an amount exceeding that demanded in the complaint) and an eviction (a judgment different in kind from that demanded in the complaint). Judge Roberts argued that he believed that he was adjudicating an eviction claim, and thus, he was applying the law as he understood it.

¶ 14. However, Judge Roberts, by his own admission, knew he was adjudicating a bad check claim. Moreover, even if we did give credence to Judge Roberts’s feeble assertions that he thought he was adjudicating an eviction claim, Rule 2 is not a defense, as he clearly should have known that he was adjudicating a bad check claim.

¶ 15. Judge Roberts testified regarding suggesting to Herring that she amend her complaint:

JUDGE ROBERTS: ... And I asked her—I said, “The Court cannot act on its own.” I asked her, “Did I hear a motion?” She made a motion and I sustained her motion and then—
Q. Excuse me. Let me stop you. She made a motion to do what?
A. To amend her complaint to the jurisdictional limit of Justice Court.
Q. All right. Is that the conclusion of your answer?
A. No, ma’am. I passed the folder to Ms. Kelli Tate and I sustained her motion and told her—
On that motion I said, “Now, if you’re going to legally be in possession of your house, the constable has to put you back in possession,” which is what she told me she wanted.
And I asked her again, “Did I hear a motion?” She made a motion and I sustained it.
Q. A motion to do what?
A. A motion for an immediate eviction.

It defies logic that Judge Roberts would ask Herring to move to amend her complaint on a bad check to add an eviction if he “mistakenly” thought he was proceeding on an eviction claim the entire time. He was later asked the question “Did you hear Ms. Herring say that she never asked you for an eviction?” and responded “She made statements and I told her that I would have to have a motion.” Additionally, the court order signed by Judge Roberts states in handwritten form: “oral motion of plaintiff to amend $3,500 plus 64.00 court cost motion sustained!!.] Immediate eviction granted by the court.”

¶ 16. Kelli Tate, the deputy clerk taking notes in the courtroom that day, also testified that Judge Roberts asked for a motion:

MS. TATE: ... At that time, Ms. Herring then stated that her check was for—it was for rent. The bad check was for rent. At that point in time, Judge Roberts then stated, he said:
“The max amount we can do in Justice Court is for $3,500. Do I hear a motion?”
Ms. Herring, at that point in time, she kind of looked confused as if she didn’t know and she looked over at me. I dropped my head. I can’t give any kind of—shake my head “yes” or “no,” nothing.
At that point in time, Judge Roberts then stated again, “$3,500 is the max amount we can do in Justice Court. Do I hear a motion?” And Ms. Herring then stated, “yes.”
And then he gave her—Judge Roberts gave her judgment for $3,500 and an immediate eviction.

Upon further testimony, she stated that “Well, at that time, I think Judge Roberts asked if she wanted an eviction and she said, yes, and he granted her immediate eviction.”

¶ 17. Judge Roberts also testified that he read the complaint aloud in court at the beginning of the proceeding. The complaint has the word “complaint” at the top, followed by the Defendant’s address, then states:

2. My complaint is based on the following facts:
return check 450.00
late fee 25.00
bank fee 7.50
3.1 seek the following relief:
$482.50—Complaint
$64.00—Court Cost
$546.50—Total

Nothing in the complaint mentions eviction.

¶ 18. It is simply not credible under these circumstances that Judge Roberts mistakenly believed he was adjudicating an eviction claim. It is clear that Judge Roberts was adjudicating a complaint for a bad check, and knew as much. Moreover, Rule 2 prevents a judge from being sanctioned for applying the law as he understands it in the absence of bad faith, which is defined as a “specific intent to use the powers of the judicial office to accomplish a purpose which the judge knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate exercises of his authority.” Miss. Comm’n of Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929, 936 (Miss. 1997) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). It is beyond the pale that Judge Roberts should have known that his actions amending the complaint and ordering an eviction were beyond the legitimate exercises of his authority. The clear and convincing evidence establishes that Judge Roberts misapplied the law by failing to give notice of an eviction and increase in the amount of judgment, granting unrequested relief, entering an unsupported judgment, and disregarding applicable rules of law, and that his conduct rose to the level of bad faith; therefore, he violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.

¶ 19. The caselaw addressing Rule 2 supports the notion that it may not be used in the face of such egregious mistakes. In Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Smith, Judge Smith was accused of judicial misconduct for knowingly dismissing or remanding to the file cases in which defendants made deals to avoid prosecution in exchange for a payment into a “drug fund.” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Smith, 109 So.3d 95, 96 (Miss. 2013). Judge Smith raised Rule 2 as a defense, arguing that he committed no fraud, possessed ho corrupt motive, and did'not act in bad faith. The 'Court rejected this argument, noting that a judge may behave in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice so as to bring the judicial office into disrepute though negligence or ignorance. Id. at 98-99. It also noted that “[t]his Court can recognize generally an example of willful misconduct presented for review, without a detailed discussion of each Canon, violated.” Id. at 99.

¶ 20. When Judge Lewis refused to return a handgun to the accused in contravention of the law, he also claimed that the Commission lacked jurisdiction under Rule 2. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Lewis, 830 So.2d 1138 (Miss. 2002). Judge Lewis argued that “he was simply interpreting the law as it applied to the ease.” Id. at 1140-41. The Court found his argument to be without merit, noting that Rule 2 is inapplicable when a “judge should have been aware that his actions were prohibited.” Id. at 1141.

¶ 21. In Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Russell, the Court likewise found that Rule 2 was inapplicable. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929 (Miss. 1997). Judge Russell had released four prisoners after they had been sentenced, without authority do so. Id. Judge Russell argued “that at all relevant times he did not act in bad faith because he applied the law as he understood it.” Id. at 936. The Court found that the legal authority was clear, and thus Judge Roberts should have been aware that he exceeded his legal authority; it therefore declined to apply Rule 2, finding ample evidence of bad faith. Id.

¶ 22. Last, Judge Dodds asserted Rule 2 as a defense in a case in which he improperly issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against a pastor, had the pastor arrested pursuant to the TRO, and responded personally to .an incident at the church. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Dodds, 680 So.2d 180 (Miss. 1996). Judge Dodd stated that his mistakes were “due to errors of judgment, lack of diligence and misinterpretation of the law,” but were not based on fraud, corrupt motive, or bad faith. Id. at 192. The Court found his argument to be without merit. Id. It found that “Dodds should have known the limits of his authority.” Id.

¶ 23. Judge Roberts’s statements that he believed he was adjudicating an eviction matter lack credibility. But even if his explanation was credible, the record unequivocally establishes that Judge Roberts should have known the limits of his legal authority. Therefore, Rule 2 is inapplicable, and Judge Roberts clearly committed judicial misconduct.

4, Whether Judge Roberts had a duty to renotice Gastineau.

¶ 24. It is undisputed, that Gasti-neau received notice of the November 3 hearing date. For Judge Roberts to have committed judicial misconduct, we must first find that service .of, process was required to be reissued after the hearing was continued.

¶25. In McCormick Motor Car Co. v. McDonald, this Court addressed whether a default judgment entered by a justice of the peace was void because the initial hearing date, at which neither party appeared, was “not a regular day for the justice of the peace ... to hold his court.” McCormick Motor Car Co. v. McDonald, 163 Miss. 409, 121 So. 121, 122 (1929). Both parties were properly summoned for such date, neither appeared, and the cause was continued. Id. Only the plaintiff appeared on the date to which the cause was continued. Id. The Court held that “[a]s this order of continuance was entered oh the day on which he was summoned to appear, he must be treated as having had due notice of the continuance of the cause[.]” Id. at 123.

¶ 26. Judge Roberts entered an order of continuance on November 3, 2014—-the date when Gastineau was summoned to appear—so we find she “must be treated as having due notice of the case,” We also note, that, while justice courts are not subject to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, matters requiring a Rule 81 summons which are “not heard on the day set for hearing ... may by order signed on that day be continued to a later day for hearing without additional summons on the defendant or respondent.” M.R.C.P. 81(d)(6). In the absence of a rule, stating otherwise, we will, not sanction a justice court judge for conduct approyed for other judges, We find that. Judge Roberts did not commit misconduct by failing to have service of process reissued.

5. Whether Judge Roberts improperly gave legal advice.

¶27. Clear and convincing evidence exists that Judge Roberts gave Herring legal advice. Several witnesses, including Judge Roberts himself, indicated that he strongly and inappropriately suggested that Herring amend her complaint up to the jurisdictional monetary limit, although the record indicates that no proof of damages in that amount was presented. Moreover, his own testimony indicated that he advised Herring that she needed to move to amend her complaint to add an eviction claim in order for her to be in legal possession of her property. He informed her that the constable had to formally evict the tenant, stating by his own admission that he said “Now, if you’re going to legally be in possession of your house, the constable has to put you back in possession .... Did I hear a motion?” Consequently, Judge Roberts’s actions in this context also rise to the level of judicial misconduct.

6. Whether the Commission withheld exculpatory evidence.

¶ 28. In the hearing before the Commission, the Commission’s investigator claimed that he got no information of substance from Herring, because she did not want to speak with him. Herring, while admitting that she refused to go to the sheriffs office because her hip hurt and she refused to allow the investigator to interview her at her home because she did not want to get dressed, stated that she told the investigator “basically what I’ve told y’all today.” Judge Roberts claims that it is a fact that Herring gave the investigator “the whole story” and that the investigator misrepresented the truth, and thus, exculpatory evidence was withheld. At essence, this objection boils down to a credibility issue. The question is whether Herring is more credible when she says she told Stokes the whole story, or Stokes is more credible when he says he did not get anything of substance from the conversation. This Court, in its independent review of the record, will “accord careful consideration [of] the findings of fact and recommendations of the Commission ... which has had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” Mississippi Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Boone, 60 So.3d 172, 176 (Miss. 2011). The Commission clearly found the investigator’s testimony more credible.

¶ 29. Moreover, the evidence at issue is not actually exculpatory. While Herring’s testimony differed slightly from Tate’s and Judge Roberts’s, at its heart, she testified that Judge Roberts suggested that she amend her complaint. She also testified that she did not ask for an eviction because she knew that Gastineau had already vacated her property. She stated that “I just remember that [Judge Roberts] said he was going to grant [an eviction] and put me back into possession of my house[,]” while admitting that she did not ask for an eviction in her initial complaint. Her testimony confirms the heart of Judge Roberts’s misconduct, and is not exculpatory.

7.Whether the sanctions are appropriate.

¶ 30. The Commission recommends that Judge Roberts be publicly reprimanded, fined the sum of $3,000, and ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings in the amount of $2,381.34. When implementing sanctions against judges, we are cognizant that the “primary purpose of sanctions is to restore and maintain the dignity and honor of the judicial office and to protect the public against future excesses, rather than punishment of the individual.” Shoemake, 191 So.3d at 1221 (internal quotations omitted). “The official integrity of the justice court judges is vitally important, for it is on that level that most citizens have their only experience with the judiciary.... Therefore, it is imperative for justice court judges to conduct themselves with the utmost diligence in order to uphold the public’s confidence.” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Guest, 717 So.2d 325, 329 (Miss. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

¶ 31. To determine appropriate sanctions, this Court must consider:

(1) the length and character of the judge’s public service;
(2) whether there is any prior caselaw on point;
(3) the magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered;
(4) whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of conduct;
(5) the extent to which the conduct was willful, and the extent to which the conduct exploited the judge’s position to satisfy his or her personal desires or was intended to deprive the public of assets or funds rightfully belonging to it;
(6) the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating factors.

Id.

a.Length and Character of Public Service

¶ 32. Judge Roberts was elected to the position of justice court judge in November 2005, and has held that position ever since. The Commission has dismissed three informal complaints against Judge Roberts and has cautioned him each time. On August 31, 2009, Judge Roberts was cautioned about engaging in ex parte communications. On August 11, 2014, Judge Roberts was cautioned regarding expungement procedures. On June 16, 2015, Judge Roberts was cautioned regarding issuance of an arrest warrant for the Montgomery County Sheriff. This case is the first Formal Complaint filed against Judge Roberts.

b. Prior Caselaw on Point

¶ 33. While no caselaw directly on point exists, this Court has made clear that abuse of process, failure to follow statutory dictates, and procedural errors are sanctionable. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Thompson, 80 So.3d 86 (Miss. 2012); Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Dearman, 66 So.3d 112 (Miss. 2011); Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Roberts, 952 So.2d 934 (Miss. 2007); Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Willard, 788 So.2d 736 (Miss. 2001). Judge Roberts testified that he read Herring’s complaint in court and that he, at the least, prompted her to amend her complaint, knowing that the defendant was not present, and while charged with knowledge of the Uniform Justice Court Rules. It should have been clear to him given prior caselaw that doing so was misconduct.

c. Magnitude of Offense and Harm Suffered

¶ 34. Judge Roberts’s actions unquestionably result from an utter failure to apply fundamental tenets of law. However, the offense does not involve fraud or generally egregious or outrageous conduct.

¶ 35. Gastineau was irreparably harmed by Judge Roberts’s actions. On a $546.50 complaint, she was forced to pay $3,994.71, and she now presumably has an eviction on her record. Gastineau testified that she has an eight-year-old son with a rare disease who was in and out of the hospital during the time her paycheck was garnished. Because of the judgment and garnishment, she lost her ear, got behind on her other bills, and had to file bankruptcy.

d. Pattern of Conduct

'¶ 36. The Commission admits that Judge Roberts’s prior complaints do not address similar issues. This appears to be an isolated incident.

e. Willful Conduct, Conduct Intended to Deprive the Public of Assets, or Conduct Exploiting the Judge’s Position

¶ 37. Judge Roberts’s conduct did not deprive the public of assets, nor was it intended to do so. Nor did his conduct appear to be exploiting his position. However, reading a clear and unmistakable document aloud in court, then claiming to believe that the document is something entirely different is, at the least, ’ extreme negligence that m'ay amount to willful conduct.

f Mitigating or Aggravating Factors

¶ 38. Judge Roberts’s failure to acknowledge any wrongdoing is an aggravating factor. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Littlejohn, 172 So.3d 1157, 1162 (Miss. 2015). Furthermore, Judge Roberts attempted to lay blame on others for his conduct, which is also an aggravating factor. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Thompson, 169 So.3d 857, 874 (Miss. 2015) (Aggravating factors were that “Judge Thompson attempted to ‘pass the buck’ to others and claimed that it was another person’s responsibility to have explained to him what to do as judge in either justice court or drug court, and that he had done nothing wrong in failing to be knowledgeable of the,law or procedures he was implementing. Throughout the entire process with the Commission, . Judge Thompson has failed to accept any responsibility for the failures that occurred ....”). Judge Roberts attempted to lay blame on the clerk’s office, claiming that it had been using the wrong form on eviction matters in general, so he believed this was also an eviction matter on the wrong form, .despite the fact that he read the complaint and the substance of -it had nothing to do with eviction. He also tried to lay blame on Herring, in that- it was her motion on which he erred.

CONCLUSION

¶ 39., Based on the above factors, particularly with regard to the monetary harm done to Gastineau and the failure to accept responsibility, we find the Commission’s recommended sanctions of a public reprimand, a $3,000 fine, and costs of the proceeding in the amount of $2,381.34 are appropriate.

¶40. After a review of the record, we disagree with the Commission’s finding of misconduct for Judge Roberts’s failure to renotice Gastineau, but we agree with the remainder of its findings of misconduct. We impose a public reprimand, a $3,000 fine, and the costs of the proceedings in the amount of $2,381.34,

¶ 41. The public reprimand shall be read in open court by the presiding judge of the Circuit Court - of Montgomery County on the first day of the next term of that Court in which a jury venire is present after the issuance of the Court’s mandate in this case, with Judge Roberts in attendance.

¶ 42. The Clerk of this Court shall send copies of this opinion and the mandate of this Court to the Chancery Clerk of Montgomery County, the Circuit Clerk of Montgomery County, the Montgomery County Justice Court Clerk, the County Administrator of Montgomery County, and the Montgomery County Board of Supervisors.

¶ 43. MONTGOMERY COUNTY JUSTICE COURT JUDGE KEITH STOKES ROBERTS SHALL BE PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED, FINED $3,000, AND ASSESSED COSTS OF $2,381.34, THE PUBLIC REPRIMAND SHALL BE READ IN OPEN COURT BY. THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE NEXT TERM OF THAT COURT IN WHICH A JURY VENIRE IS PRESENT AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THIS COURT’S MANDATE, WITH JUDGE ROBERTS IN ATTENDANCE.'

WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., AND KITCHENS, J., CONCUR. MAXWELL, J„ CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT WITHOUT ' SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DICKINSON, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COLEMAN AND BEAM, JJ.; MAXWELL, J., JOINS IN PART. CHAMBERLIN, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE,

DISSENTING:

¶ 44.1 write separately for two reasons: I disagree with the plurality’s finding that Judge Roberts gave legal advice; and this Court’s definition of “bad faith” in the context of judicial performance complaints requires nothing more than a finding that the judge “should have known” better. This astonishingly weak standard—if applied fairly and equally to all judges and not just to our justice court judges—would result in a finding of judicial misconduct on the part of every county, youth court, circuit, and chancery judge we have reversed for erroneous rulings.

There is no clear and convincing evidence that Judge Roberts gave legal advice.

¶ 45. The plurality finds that Judge Roberts advised Herring to amend her complaint to the jurisdictional limit and to seek an eviction. However, at the hearing before the Commission, Herring. testified that she had told Judge Roberts what Gastineau owed, including late fees, and this added up “to be more than .that check.” She then told Judge Roberts that she had received a second,bad check from Gastineau. According to Herring, Judge Roberts then asked her, “Would you like to make a motion to amend ... to $3,500. That’s all I can do, or would you rather take it to a higher court?”

¶ 46. When asked if Judge Roberts told her to amend the amount in her complaint Herring stated, “He asked me, but he didn’t tell me.” Further, when asked if Judge Roberts instructed her. to amend her complaint Herring said,

No, he just asked me. And I thought that was the same thing as, do you want to amend this up or down? Because the other judge from Montgomery County does the same thing now. And then the judge that has retired did' the same thing then.

Additionally, when Herring was asked if it was her decision to amend the complaint to the jurisdictional limit she said, “I guess so.”

¶ 47. Clearly, Herring presented evidence that she was entitled to more money than was originally pleaded, and Judge Roberts did no more than ask her if she wanted to amend her complaint. As to whether Judge Roberts advised Herring to amend her complaint to seek an eviction, I find that he simply asked her if she wanted t.o make a motion after she presented evidence of damages that exceeded her original demand. Asking a plaintiff if he or she wants to amend a complaint, without more, is not the same as advising him or her to do so. Because I do not find clear and convincing evidence that Judge Roberts was attempting to give legal advice, I dissent from the plurality’s finding on this point.

There is no clear and convincing evidence that Judge Roberts engaged in fraud, corruption, or bad faith.

¶ 48. Rule 2 of the Rules of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance prevents a judge from being sanctioned “for making findings of fact, reaching a legal conclusion, or applying the law as he understands it” “[i]n the absence of fraud, corrupt motive or bad faith.” This rule, if properly applied, recognizes the reality that all judges make mistakes. Indeed, if trial judges did not make errors of law or fact, we would not need appellate courts. Judicial misconduct should be found only upon clear and convincing proof of a corrupt motive or some other appropriate grounds for a finding of bad faith.

¶ 49. But this Court has stated that “ ‘[a] specific intent to use the powers of the judicial office to accomplish a purpose which the judge knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate exercises of his authority constitutes bad faith.” ’ Assuming we expect judges, for instance, to know the rules of evidence, judges commit judicial misconduct every time we reverse their erroneous decisions. This, of course, is absurd.

¶ 50. But out of all the mistakes judges make where they “should have known” their errors, I find it a bit unfair to single out justice court judges—who are not required to be lawyers—and punish them for their mistakes where there is no allegation—let alone evidence—of fraud or corruption. In my view, in the context of judicial misconduct, including what the judge “should have known” in the definition of bad faith defeats the purpose of Rule 2, and leaves the rule open to selective and arbitrary enforcement.

¶ 51. Judge Roberts, I believe, made a mistake in applying the law as he understood it, and the complaint against him should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 2. The appropriate remedy for Judge Roberts’s mistake is reversal by an appellate court, not a public reprimand and hefty fine.

COLEMAN AND BEAM, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION. MAXWELL, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.

      . At the formal hearing before the Commission, Gastineau testified that she spoke to a clerk at the court and was told she did not want to contest the claim. She further stated that she chose not to appear because she did not want to take off from work or contest the claim.

      . Later in his testimony, Judge Roberts attempted to backtrack on this testimony and said that "Ms. Herring, in fact, started talking and made a motion on her own.” Either way, he recognized that a motion had to be,made to change this complaint to an eviction, supporting the notion that he knew that he was not adjudicating an eviction claim.

      .The top of the order is typewritten and states the “character of suit” and notes the "court cost,” "bad check,” "late fee,” and "service charge."

      . In addition to the violations of Rule 2.12, proper eviction procedures were not followed in this case.

      . The record contains no basis for the $3,500 judgment ordered, and Herring admitted that she did not itemize any damages or give Judge Roberts any. specific number.

      . In so holding, we do not single out justice court judges, as the dissent alleges. Rather, we hold them to the standard to which we hold other judges, regardless of their background or lack of legal training. A flagrant disregard for the law by someone charged with its-knowledge goes beyond a simple re--versible error. As this Court has stated:
      .There are good reasons .why our justice, court -judges must regard scrupulously, the nature of their office!' In the first place, most of our citizens have their primary, if not their only, direct contact with the law through the office. of the justice court judge.... The perception of justice of most of our citizens is forged out of their experiences with our justice court judges. If these judges do not behave with judicial temperament and perform their duties according to the law and by references to the process of adjudication, there seems little, hope that our citizenry at large may understand and respect the legal process.
      Some say this is unrealistic, that our Justice Court- Judges for the most part have no formal training in the law. -No doubt these public servants are at a: disadvantage. The people have insisted only that each shall be a “high school graduate or have a general equivalency diploma." Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171 (1890), as amended. Yet the time is at hand when we insist that our justice court judges be nothing less than just that-judges.
      When a person assumes the office of Justice Court Judge in this state, he or she accepts the responsibility of becoming learned in the láw. When such a person takes the oath of office, he or she yields the prerogative of executing the responsibilities of the office on any basis other than the fair and impartial and competent application of the law to the facts. The preservation of the rule of law as our last best hope for the just ordering of our society requires nothing less than an insistence by this Court that our justice court judges be in fact what they are in name: judges.

        In re Bailey, 541 So.2d 1036, 1039 (Miss. 1989).

      . The issue of not renoticing Gastineau was only one of several acts of misconduct found by the Commission. The crux of the matter is that Judge Roberts blatantly violated the law and irreparably harmed Gastineau. Removing the charge of misconduct for failure to renot-ice Gastineau does not’significantly alter any of the six factors that will be discussed infra.

      . E.g., Burnham v. Burnham, 185 So.3d 358 (Miss. 2015) (”[G]iven that the chancellor's equitable distribution of-marital property was significantly affected by findings that were unsupported by the evidence at trial, we must reverse and remand for á new equitable distribution.”).

      . Plur. Op. at ¶ 27.

      . Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929, 936 (Miss. 1997) (quoting Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Gunn, 614 So.2d 387, 390 (Miss. 1993)).

      . I do not mean to say that a judge’s misapplication of the law could never be judicial misconduct. For instance, in a case where the judge knowingly misapplied the law it would certainly rise to the level of judicial misconduct. But in cases where a mistake was made, Rule 2 should prevent a finding of misconduct.


author: RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: KING, JUSTICE,

text:
    MISSISSIPPI COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE v. Charles L. VESS
    NO. 2O16-JP-01098-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    04/20/2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DARLENE D. BALLARD, RACHEL WILSON MICHEL, MEAGAN COURTNEY BRITTAIN
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: SCOTT FLETCHER SLOVER
   RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission) filed a Formal Complaint charging Charles L. Vess, Justice Court Judge, South District, Adams County, Mississippi (Judge), with willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Commission and Judge entered- into a Stipulation - of Agreed Facts and Proposed Recommendation, which was accepted unanimously by the Commission, providing that Judge had violated Canons 1, 2(A), 3(B)(2), 3(B)(4), and 3(B)(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, and recommending that he be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office without pay for a period of thirty days, fined $1,100, and assessed costs of $200.

¶2. After conducting our mandated review of the Commission’s recommendation consistent with Section 177A of Article 6 of the Mississippi Constitution, Rule 10 of the Rules of the Commission on Judicial Performance, Rule 10 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, and.our caselaw, we adopt the recommendation of the Commission and order that Judge be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office without pay for a period of thirty days, fined- in the amount of $1,100, and assessed the costs of this proceeding in the amount of $200.

FACTS

¶ 3. In the present case, Judge agreed to the following findings of fact:

[Judge] admitted that while serving as Justice Court Judge, Southern District for Adams County, Mississippi, he presided over the case of State v. Michael Thomas, cause number 271-637-2. During the course of the hearing on State v. Michael Thomas, Defendant Thomas repeatedly placed his hands in his pockets. Thomas’s mother and court staff advised Thomas ■ to remove his hands from, his pockets, but he.continued,his habit of placing his hands in his pockets.
[Judge] admitted that while presiding over State v. Michael Thomas, he made a statement-that indicated that Thomas’s habit of placing his hands in his pockets was threatening to [Judge] and that [Judge] may have to use his gun on Thorna?,
[Judge] further admitted to • asking Thomas if he used drugs after remanding the pending case to the file, and upon an affirmative answer from Thomas, [Judge] admitted that he made disparaging remarks about Thomas’s drug use to Thomas’s mother. [Judge] further admitted that he made additional disparaging remarks about Thomas’s mother’s parenting skills and asked other demeaning questions and made other demeaning comments and accusations.

¶ 4. Judge -previously has been before the Commission, resulting in four informal actions and three formal actions. The informal actions included “a procedural irregularity and bias in a criminal case, setting aside a Judgment without prior notice in a DUI case, sitting as a municipal judge without holding a license to practice law, and inappropriate courtroom demeanor.” Judge also has been the subject of three disciplinary proceedings: Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Vess, 637 So.2d 882 (Miss. 1994) (Vess 7); Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Vess, 692 So.2d 80 (Miss, 1997) (Vess II); and Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Vess, 10 So.3d 486 (Miss. 2009) (Vess III). In Vess I, this Court affirmed the recommendation of a public reprimand and a $100 fine for accepting restitution payments from a litigant on behalf of a victim. Vess I, 637 So.2d at 882. In Vess II, this Court affirmed the recommendation of a public reprimand , and costs in . the amount of $1,173.45 for ex parte communications with the defendant, defendant’s mother, arresting officer, and prosecuting attorney, and for interfering with the defendant’s bonding process, Vess II, 692 So.2d at 86; In Vess III, this Court affirmed the recommendation of a public reprimand, costs, and a fine for ex parte communications with both the complaining party and her family and the defendant and her family and holding the same defendant in contempt on a ten-year-old incomplete, order, inter alia. Vess III, 10 So.3d at 488-90.

¶5. On May . 16, 2016, the Commission filed a “Formal Complaint” charging Judge with violation of Canons l, 2A, 3(B)(4), and 3(B)(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaging in willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. Judge did not file an answer to the Formal Complaint.

¶ 6. Subsequently, the Commission and Judge filed an Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed. Recommendation. Judge stipulated that he had violated Canons 1, 2(A), 3(B)(4), and 3(B)(5) and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution based on the above, agreed-upon facts. The jointly proposed recommendation was that he be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office without pay for a period of thirty days, fined in the amount of $1,100 (an amount constituting two weeks’ pay), and assessed costs of $200. In paragraph 12, Judge also:

agrees to publicly apologize to Ms. Jackson-Moore for his conduct towards her and agrees he will retire and shall not seek re-election to any judicial office in the future. [Judge] further acknowledges the two (2) unresolved inquiries pending before the Commission [ ] that remain pending and unaffected by this Agreement.

The Commission unanimously' approved the Stipulation of Agreed Facts and Proposed Recommendation, However, in their Findings of Fact and Recommendation to this Court, the Commission did not incorporate the language contained in paragraph 12 cited above.

¶7. Pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution and Rule 10(A) of the Rules of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance, the matter was presented to this Court. See Miss. Const. art. 6, § 177A; Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance R. 10(A). On September 1, 2016, the Commission filed a Motion for Approval of Recommendation Filed by the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance and a Brief in Support of Joint Motion for Approval of Recommendation Filed by the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance.

ANALYSIS

¶ 8. The Mississippi Constitution vests this Court with the power, “[o]n recommendation of the commission on judicial performance... [to] remove from office, suspend, fíne or publicly censure or reprimand any justice or judge of this state for ,.. willful misconduct in office ... or [ ] conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute....” Miss. Const. art. 6, § 177A. “This Court, as the ultimate decision-maker in judicial performance cases, makes the final determination as to the appropriate action to be taken when a judge has committed willful misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute .... ” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Skinner, 119 So.3d 294, 299 (Miss. 2013) (citations omitted).

I. Misconduct

¶ 9. Judge admits that, when he threatened to use a gun on a defendant, he was guilty of misconduct. Judge also admits that it was improper to make disparaging remarks to the defendant’s mother, demean her parenting skills, and make other demeaning comments and accusations. Judge acknowledges that his conduct violated Canons 1, 2, 3(B)(4), and 3(B)(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution.

¶ 10. We have made it “quite clear that the power granted to judges does not license them to be disrespectful to the lawyers and citizens who appear in their courtrooms; and that judges must conduct themselves with appropriate judicial demeanor.” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Smith, 78 So.3d 889, 893 (Miss. 2011), overruled in part on other grounds by Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Darby, 78 So.3d 889 (Miss. 2011).

¶ 11. In Smith, the judge “acknowledged that he abused his contempt powers and exhibited poor courtroom demeanor.” Smith, 78 So.3d at 890. The judge further admitted that he “address[ed] the lawyers and'bail bondsman discourteously, that is, without respect and appropriate judicial temperament [sic]....” Id. at 892. That Court held that the judge “committed willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into 'disrepute.” Id. at 895. In Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Gunter, 797 So.2d 988 (Miss. 2001), that Court held that the judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct when he called a defendant’s mother before the bench and “harshly berated and humiliated her.” Gunter, 797 So.2d at 989.

¶ 12. We accept the Commission’s findings and the Judge’s admission that his actions constituted willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute. We will now consider what sanctions are commensurate with this finding.

II. Sanctions

¶ 13. The sanctions in a judicial misconduct case should be proportionate to the judge’s offense. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Harris, 131 So.3d 1137, 1144 (Miss. 2013). To determine whether the recommended sanctions are proportionate to the offense, this Court applies a six-factor test, which includes the following:

(1) the length and character of the judge’s public service; (2) whether there is any prior caselaw on point; (3) the magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered; (4) whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of conduct; (5) whether the conduct was .willful, intended to deprive the public of assets, or if it exploited the judge’s position; and (6) the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating factors.

Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Thompson, 169 So.3d 857, 869 (Miss. 2015).

A.The Length and Character of the Judge’s Public Service

¶ 14. The Commission’s brief stated that:

[Judge] has served as a Justice Court Judge for the Southern District of Adams County, Mississippi for twenty-four (24) years. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Vess, 10 So.3d 486, 490 (Miss. 2009).
This Court previously has found that Judge Vess “is a long-term community leader and volunteer... he has served as president of the Natchez Historical Society and as a board member of the American Red Cross ... contributes his time to other local organizations ... he serves as an instructor in domestic violence prevention and established a library at the Natchez City Jail.” Id.

B.Prior Caselaw on Point

C.The Magnitude of the Offense and the Harm Suffered

¶ 15. Judge’s actions compromised the integrity of the judiciary in a manner that did not promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Judge threatened use of a weapon on the defendant. Judge interrogated that same defendant concerning his use of drugs, which had no bearing on the charge before the court. Finally, Judge interrogated, demeaned, and intimidated the defendant’s mother about the defendant’s drug use and her parenting skills.

¶ 16. As discussed supra, the judges in Smith and Gunter engaged in similar acts and misconduct to which Judge has admitted. ■ In both of those cases, this Court accepted the recommendation of the Commission and publicly reprimanded the judges. Smith, 78 So.3d at 895; Gunter, 797 So.2d at 992. Regarding the severity of the sanction, we have imposed a similar punishment requested by the Commission in cases of greater severity. In Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Littlejohn, 172 So.3d 1157 (Miss. 2015), the judge held a party in contempt for failing to pay a sum the party had appealed with a supersedeas bond. Littlejohn, 172 So.3d at 1160. We held that the judge had abused his power of contempt and illegally had incarcerated the party. Id. That judge’s conduct was more egregious than the misconduct at issue in today’s case and in Smith and Gunter, and further, that judge refused to acknowledge any wrongdoing. Id. at 1162. Yet, we imposed a thirty-day suspension without pay, in addition to a public reprimand, which is the same sanction recommended by the Commission and agreed to by Judge. Id, at 1163. At the same time, Judge has a history (supra) with the Commission. Thus, we impose a more, severe sanction than those sanctions adopted in Smith and Gunter.

D.Whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of misconduct.

¶ 17. The incident at issue today is dissimilar to any of his prior incidents. The prior complaints do not mirror the present complaint, evincing no pattern of similar misconduct.

E.The Extent to Which the Conduct Was Willful, and the Extent to Which the Conduct Exploited the Judge’s Position to Satisfy his or her Personal Desires or Was Intended to Deprive the Public of Assets or Funds Rightfully Belonging to It

¶ 18. There is no claim or evidence that Judge’s actions were intended to exploit his position to satisfy his personal desires or to deprive the public of assets or funds.

F. The Presence-or Absence of ' Mitigating or Aggravating Circumstances

¶ 19. “This Court consistently has recognized that mitigating circumstances exist when a judge acknowledges his or her errors, which Judge ... did in this case by ¿ntering into the [Stipulation of Agreed Pacts] and Proposed Recommendation with .the Commission.” Darby II, 143 So.3d 564, 570 (Miss. 2013); see, e.g., Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Darby, 75 So.3d 1037, 1044 (Miss. 2011); Skinner, 119 So.3d at 307; Smith, 78 So.3d at 895. Judge has acknowledged wrongdoing.

CONCLUSION

¶ 20. Judge’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2(A),. 3(E)(4), and 3(B)(5) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. Judge’s actions. constituted willful misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought the judicial office into .disrepute.

¶21. For these reasons, this Court affirms the recommendation of the Commission and orders that Judge Vess be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office without pay for a period of thirty (30) days, fined in the amount of $1,100, and assessed the costs of this proceeding in the amount of $200.

¶ 22. The Clerk of this Court is directed to mail a copy of this opinion and the mandate of this Court-to the Clerks of the Adams County Chancery, Circuit, and Justice Courts and to the Adams County Board of Supervisors and the Adams County Administrator.

¶ 23. ADAMS COUNTY JUSTICE COURT JUDGE CHARLES L. VESS SHALL BE SUSPENDED PROM OP-FICE FOR A PERIOD OF THIRTY (30) DAYS WITHOUT PAY, EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE OF ISSUANCE OF THIS COURT’S MANDATE, PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED, FINED $1,100, AND ASSESSED COSTS OF $200. THE PUBLIC REPRIMAND SHALL BE READ IN OPEN COURT BY THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE ADAMS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE NEXT TERM OF THAT COURT IN WHICH A JURY VE-NIRE IS PRESENT AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THIS COURT’S MANDATE, WITH JUDGE VESS IN ATTENDANCE.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS, COLEMAN, MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR. KING, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. CHAMBERLIN, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

KING, JUSTICE,

CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:

¶ 24.1 agree with the majority that Justice Court Judge Vess engaged in conduct that violated the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct. However, I would hold that Judge Vess should be removed from office.

¶25. As noted by the majority, Judge Vess has been the subject of four prior informal actions and three prior formal actions. The three formal actions were in 1994,1997, and 2009. This certainly evinces a pattern of conduct, one that Judge Vess has not corrected. When sanctioned in 2009, Judge Vess had served as a justice court judge for seventeen years. Judge Vess has’ now served as a justice court judge for twenty-four years. Having had four prior informal actions and three prior formal actions, and having served as a justice court judge for an extended period of time, Judge Vess should have been very much aware that the conduct addressed in this case was contrary to the Code of Judicial Conduct.

¶ 26. As this Court said in In re Inquiry Concerning Justice Court Judge William E. Bailey'.

There are good reasons why our justice court judges must regard scrupulously the nature of their office. In the first place, most of our citizens have their primary, if not their only, direct contact with the law through the office of the justice court judge.... The perception of justice of most of our citizens is forged out of their experiences with our justice court judges. If these judges do not behave with judicial temperament and perform their duties according to the law and by reference to the process of adjudication, there, seems little hope that our citizenry at large may understand and respect the legal process.

In re Bailey, 541 So.2d 1036, 1039 (Miss. 1989).

¶ 27. Justice, one would expect, would therefore require that Justice Court Judge Vess be removed from office.

      . Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved.”

      . Canon 2(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “[a] judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."

      . Canon 3(B)(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides, in pertinent part, that “[¡judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom they deal in their official capacities

      .Canon 3(B)(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice [and] ... shall not ... by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon -race, gender, religion,- '.national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status....”


author: MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

text:
    Christopher Scott ROUTH v. STATE of Missisippi
    NO. 2016-KM-00546-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    04/27/2017

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DAVID NEIL McCARTY, MERRIDA COXWELL
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JOSEPH SCOTT HEMLEBEN
    BEFORE WALLER, C.J., KING AND MAXWELL, JJ.
   MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Criminal contempt “involves an act ‘which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.’ ” In this case, Christopher Scott Routh was found in direct criminal contempt after he disrespected the court—specifically by standing up to dispute a judge’s bond ruling after the bond hearing had been concluded and despite being directed by the judge to sit down and make any further argument by written motion. Because the record supports the criminal-contempt finding beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm.

Background Facts and Procedural History

¶2. On April 23, 2016, Christopher Routh represented Loren Shell-Blackwell (Blackwell) at her arraignment hearing. Routh is an attorney with the Hinds County Public Defender’s Office. Blackwell had been indicted for capital murder.

¶ 3. Prior to the hearing, Blackwell had been out on bond, under house arrest. Routh requested Blackwell remain on bond and under house arrest. Routh argued his client had a constitutional right to reasonable bail. He also asserted the State had no evidence linking her to the crime.

¶ 4. The State responded that its policy is to request bond be denied to those charged with capital murder, and Blackwell should be no exception. The State argued, contrary to Routh’s no-evidence claim, that Blackwell’s DNA had been found at the murder scene, plus she had given incriminating statements to the police. Moreover, Blackwell posed a flight risk, having no ties to Hinds County. The State also pointed out that the only reason Blackwell had been granted bond previously was because she was pregnant. And now that her child was born, there was no longer any reason she remain out of jail.

¶ 5. At this point, the circuit judge asked Routh about Blackwell’s infant, whom she had brought with her to the hearing. Routh responded that the baby had a certain digestive condition that required his mother breast-feed him. The judge asked what evidence Routh had to support this contention. At first, Routh equivocated, saying he was not familiar with the exact condition but that was what his client told him. But then Routh began talking about a hospital discharge form. When asked if he wanted to introduce the form into evidence, Routh said yes. But before offering it, the judge permitted the State to review the form. The State pointed out that the document was a general discharge form from the hospital. It merely directed the baby be regularly fed breast milk or formula. After reviewing the record himself, the judge agreed the document contained no diagnosis of a gastrointestinal issue and no prescription for breast milk only. Because the form Routh presented stated the infant could be fed formula instead of breast milk, the judge found no compelling reason to grant bond on this basis.

¶ 6. The judge then announced his decision—

I’m going to deny bond. It’s a capital murder charge. Another purpose of bond is to protect the public. Capital murder is an extremely serious charge which can carry the death penalty, and the DNA evidence cited by the State, along with the other summary of the evidence presented by the State, is compelling. So I’m going to deny bond.

But the judge then immediately advised he would “reconsider [his decision] upon the filing of the proper motion with proper evidence.”

¶7. At this point, the judge turned to Blackwell and asked if she had funds to hire a lawyer. When she answered “no,” the judge told her he would appoint someone to represent her. Blackwell, audibly upset, then asked if she could speak. The judge responded that he did not “believe now would be the time.” But he reassured her that her appointed attorney would be in touch with her.

¶ 8. As a final matter, the judge asked if there was a family member who could take care of Blackwell’s child or should social services be called. After Routh assured the judge the baby could go with Blackwell’s relative who was in the courtroom, the judge concluded the hearing.

¶ 9. At this point, Routh interjected, asking if he could make an argument. The judge told him he could not because the hearing was over. Routh launched into his argument anyway. At the same time the judge was asking him to sit down, Routh asserted that the Constitution required the reason denying bail be placed on the record. He then accused the judge of failing to do so.

¶ 10. The judge found Routh in direct criminal contempt. After a ten-minute recess, the judge sentenced Routh. At sentencing, the judge told Routh—

Mr. Routh, you had plenty of opportunity to make a record today and make your arguments. I’ll note that you blatantly misrepresented something on the record today. After I made my ruling, I had told you I was not going to hear any further argument and you repeatedly refused my directive to sit down. I advised you to file a detailed written motion if you had anything else to present on this issue, and I’ll still consider any written motion on the bond issue. Because you were held in direct criminal contempt and because of your refusal to abide by the rules of this court, I’m going to sentence you to spend some time in jail. I’m going to commit you to the custody of the sheriff of Hinds County for the afternoon until 5:00 p.m.

¶ 11. Routh immediately filed an emergency petition with this Court, which was deemed in part to be a notice of appeal of: the contempt finding. This Court also granted Routh’s request for bond, permitting Routh to be released that day upon posting a $500 supersedeas bond.

Discussion

¶ 12. The only question on appeal' is whether the record, viewed ab initio, supports finding Routh in direct criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mingo v. State, 944 So.2d 18, 82 (Miss. 2006) (proceeding “ab initio” on criminal-contempt appeals, “determin[ing] on the record whether the person in contempt is guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt”). After review, we find that it does.

¶13. “Conduct directed against the court’s dignity and authority is criminal contempt.” Purvis v. Purvis, 657 So.2d 794, 797- (Miss. 1994). “It involves an act “which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.’ ” Id. (quoting Lawson v. State, 573 So.2d 684, 686 (Miss. 1990)). Here, Routh challenged the dignity and authority of the trial court when he interjected his argument after the judge had ruled on- the bond issue, clearly instructed Routh -any further argument should be made by written motion; ended the hearing, denied Routh’s request to make further oral argument, and directed Routh to sit down.

¶ 14. On appeal, Routh argues he was asserting ’ his client’s constitutional right—namely, the constitutional requirement that, “[i]n any case where bail is denied before conviction, the judge shall place in the record-, his reasons for denying bail.” Miss, Const, art.'3, § 29(4). According to Routh,. “an attorney respectfully asking for a trial court to follow Constitutional-law can never warrant criminal contempt.” The problem with this argument is that the transcript clearly shows the judge had followed the Constitution. Before" denying bond, the-judge explained his reasons -for doing so~(l) the fact the crime was capital and punishable by death, (2) the need to protect the- public, (3) the State’s strong evidence against Blackwell, and (4) the lack. of evidence to support Routh’s contention that Blackwell’s baby required breast milk. See Miss. Const, art. 3,- § 29(1) (providing “all persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties-, except for capital offenses ... when the proof is evident or presumption great” (emphasis added)). So the judge had already complied with this constitutional requirement before the acts giving rise to the criminal contempt. Thus, Routh cannot rely on “invoking a constitutional safeguard” as justification to continue arguing after the hearing had ended and while he was being asked to sit down. At this point, Routh was simply disputing the judge’s decision to deny bond.

¶ 15. Moreover, had Routh believed the judge had not followed the Constitution when denying bond, Routh could have made this argument in a written motion. While the judge denied bond, he promised to reconsider his decision- “upon the filing of the proper motion with proper evidence.” But instead of filing a motion, Routh chose to disrupt the court.

¶ 16. “The contempt power is an important tool for keeping order and maintaining an efficient court system.” In re Hoppock, 849 So.2d 1275, 1278 (Miss. 2003). We find the judge was trying to, maintain order in his courtroom in the midst of a difficult situation—a new mother distraught over being denied bond and having to leave her baby with a relative. Routh made the courtroom more chaotic by standing up to dispute the judge’s ruling after the hearing had ended and despite being ordered to sit down, thereby “prevent[ing] the orderly administration of justice.” In re Williamson, 838 -So.2d 226, 237 (Miss. 2002) (“Direct criminal contempt involves words spoken or actions committed in the. presence of the court that are calculated to embarrass or, prevent the orderly administration of justice.”). In doing so, he “engaged in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal,” in violation of Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(d). Thus, we find the judge was within his authority to find Routh in direct criminal contempt.

Conclusion

¶ 17. Disrupting the court by disputing a judge’s ruling—after being expressly told not to—supports a finding of criminal contempt. We therefore affirm Routh’s conviction of direct criminal contempt.

' ¶ 18. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Purvis v. Purvis, 657 So.2d 794, 797 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Lawson v. State, 573 So.2d 684, 686 (Miss. 1990)).

      . The audio-recording of the arraignment hearing is part of the record.

      . Whether the contempt is civil .or criminal hinges on the purpose of the contempt finding. "If the primary purpose of the contempt order is- to enforce the rights of private party litigants dr enforce compliance With a court order, then the contempt is civil,’" Mingo, 944 So.2d at 32. But if the purpose is "to punish the contemnor for disobedience of a court order,” then the contempt is criminal. Id, Here, the purpose of the contempt finding was to punish Routh for disobeying the judge’s order 'to sit down. So the contempt was clearly criminal, prompting this Court's heightened review.