text:
    Alfred MCDONALD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5626
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    David T. JEFFRIES, Appellant, v. Robert Dennis WILLIAMS, Jr., Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-991
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jason MITCHELL, DOC #R56426, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1931
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jonathan SIMONELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1280
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Nicholas Jordan RAMOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2237
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antonio Q. CONNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1763
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jennifer McCoy PARKER and Linda C. Hein, Appellants, v. The CITY OF MADERIA BEACH, a municipal government of the state of Florida, and Travis Palladeno, in his official capacity as mayor for the City of Maderia Beach, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-86
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jonathan Paul WESSEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1668
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Donald Charles ALVINO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3067
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Clinton CHAMBERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1428
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John V. KOLES a/k/a John Koles, Appellant, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; Unknown Spouse of John V. Koles a/k/a John Koles, n/k/a Carol Koles; La Tremiti Homeowner's Association, Inc. ; Palmira Golf and Country Club Master Homeowners Association, Inc., Appellees.
    Case No. 2D16-4522
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ajaysia Cypress SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4924
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Andre JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1619
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Maurice E. CLIMES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1783
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kenneth HEYWARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4613
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Alfred MCDONALD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5667
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jeff A. GREGG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2022
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Edgar ZUNIGA-MEJIA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-984
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert John FRANK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-3496
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael Todd SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4585
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Francisco LACOUTURE, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Katerina M. LACOUTURE and Mayra Lacouture, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-1987
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 31, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Oliver SAMUELS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3413
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 10, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Charles Lee SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2017
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed October 18, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.T., the Father, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-1275 3D17-1277
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JULY 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    M.C., the Father, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-1124
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JULY 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.

Dismissed.


text:
    B.M.P., a minor child, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0695
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JUNE 21, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Adrian ADSIDE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1947
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 8, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Travis BECKLES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1910
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 8, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Steve AUSTIN, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2002
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed October 18, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Keiron Keith JACKMAN, Appellant, v. GEICO INDEMNITY INSURANCE, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-927
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed October 18, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Hernan Lazaro CONCEPCION, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1776
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 8, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Thomas R. JAMES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1723
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 8, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Corey EDWARDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1624
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 8, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Joseph FOX, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1714
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 8, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.T., the father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and Guardian ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    No. 3D17-1679
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 15, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.G., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-627
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 15, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    R & F DEVELOPERS, LLC, Appellant, v. CENTRO INTERNACIONAL SION, ASAMBLEAS DE DIOS, INC., Appellee.
    No. 3D16-1320
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 15, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Charles J. PITTS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-347
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 8, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Hewburn SLOWE, Appellant, v. NEW ARENA SQUARE APTS. NORTH & SOUTH, LTD., Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1314
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 22, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Milagros RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. Alberto LORENZO, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-708
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 22, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert BLAKE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D15-1753
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 15, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Danilo CACACE, Appellant, v. The CLUB INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2178
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 15, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Armando de Armas CARABALLO, Appellant, v. JEROME INTERNATIONAL S.A., Marand RE S.A., Martin Antonio de Armas Silva, and Andres de Armas Silva, Appellees.
    No. 3D17-659
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 22, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    G.R., a Juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-401
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 22, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    The TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY and the Phoenix Insurance Company, Appellants, v. WIND CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., and Coastal Construction of South Florida, Inc. d/b/a Coastal Condominiums, et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D17-124
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 22, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    QUANTUM HEALTH GROUP, LLC, et al., Appellants, v. Odalys AREVALO, et al., Appellees.
    Nos. 3D15-2458 & 3D16-2434
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 22, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Erick BARRIENTOS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2231
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 22, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Justin Nathanial SHROYER, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2080
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 22, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David ZUCKER and Carrie Zucker, Appellants, v. Miguel R. GONZALEZ and GEICO General Insurance Company, a foreign corporation, Appellees.
    No. 3D16-1323
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 22, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ernesto RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., etc., Appellee.
    No. 3D17-287
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed December 13, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rolando DELLANO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-958
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed December 13, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Parmjit Singh PARMAR, etc., et al., Appellants, v. Michael KEISTER, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-661
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed December 13, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    STEINMAUER FAMILY, LLC, Appellant, v. VILLA BELLINI CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.
    No. 3D16-0706
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed November 22, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Graciela LOZANO, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., etc., Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2895
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed December 13, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    L.C., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0113
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 09, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    J.P., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Ileana ROS-LEHTINEN, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2933
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 30, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    M.N.M., the Mother, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2555
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 23, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Odalys AREVALO, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. QUANTUM HEALTH GROUP, LLC, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2356
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    MARCH 07, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   ORDERED.


text:
    Adeena WEISS-ORTIZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. C.W., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0037, 3D17-0036
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 27, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Chevas V. CLEMENTS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, DIVISION OF LICENSING, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2864
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 17, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    C.W., the Father, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2674
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 17, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    M.A., the Mother, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    NO.: 3D16-2827
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 24, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    A.R., The Mother, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0322
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 24, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    L.B., the Mother, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2560
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 22, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    S.N.L., the Mother, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2642
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 22, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    C.M., a Child, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0573
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    MARCH 15, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    M.G., etc., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. F.G., etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0373
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    MARCH 02, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Juan BEJERANO, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 3D170-344
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 17, 2017 Rehearing Denied March 3, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    D.T., The Mother, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2576
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 14, 2017 Rehearing Denied March 15, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    I.L., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2127
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Damon PHELAN, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Michael Kevin LAWHON, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-1858, 3D16-1838, 3D16-1675
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    APRIL 25, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Donna Brown KLINKA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. In re: ESTATE OF John E. BROWN, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0510
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    MARCH 31, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Arnaldo LUGO-FERNANDEZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0682
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    MARCH 30, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Santiago MENDOZA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3117
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [November 22, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dumarsais JEANLOUIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D16-2605
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed May 10, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.A., the Mother, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0689
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    APRIL 19, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied. Vacated.


text:
    Reginald D. WASHINGTON Jr., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-1930
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    APRIL 07, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed without prejudice.


text:
    Steven WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3374
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 7, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Richenel METAYER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-414
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 7, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Joseph BRADLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-683
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    November 30, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Doris Rich CORYA, individually; Paul J. Rich Sanders, individually; Doris Corya and Paul J. Rich Sanders, as Co-Trustees of the Trust Under Will of Eleanor M. Rich dated June 10, 1964; and Doris Rich Corya, as Trustee of The Sanders Trust dated October 6, 1953, Revocable Trust of John P. Corya dated October 11, 1993 and Irrevocable Trust of John P. Corya dated October 11, 1993, Appellants, v. Roy SANDERS, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D16-414 4D16-441 4D16-1716
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [November 22, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Morris CHESLA, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4177
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 14, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Irving BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-895
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 14, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Herve GERMAIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D17-917 4D17-918
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 14, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Travis Lukell KENYON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-745
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    December 7, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    D.W., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-977
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 14, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Bart A. HOUSTON, Appellant, v. Elizabeth A. HOUSTON, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-185
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 14, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lawrence LEWIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-233
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 14, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Daniel DAMIANO, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., a national banking association, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-791
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 14, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dean Staubin MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4289
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 21, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ernesto CORRAL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-986
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 14, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gerald ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3118
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 14, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Scott W. BARNES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3168
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 14, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Stephan JEAN-FELIX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-0070
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 21, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    H.S., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-158
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 21, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Innocent O. CHINWEZE, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Appellee.
    No. 4D17-378
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 21, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dominique Louise BRICE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3194
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 21, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Markal TILLMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3128
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 21, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Willie CAREY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-619
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 21, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jermaine T. DAVIS, Appellant, v. Ric BRADSHAW, duly elected Sheriff of Palm Beach County, Florida and the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, a duly established constitutional office, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-636
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 21, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Richard S. LEHMAN, individually and Richard S. Lehman, P. A., Appellants, v. Edna Ramos CHUE, individually, Madelaine Arias, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Hilda Piza Lucom, Larry Miller, as Curator of the Estate of Wilson Charles Lucom, Matias R. Dorta, individually, Matias R. Dorta, P.A., a Florida for Profit Corporation, Gonzalo R. Dorta, P.A., a Florida for Profit Corporation, Gonzalo R. Dorta, P.A., a Florida for Profit Corporation d/b/a Dorta Law, Valores Globales, S.A., an Entity Organized under the Laws of the British Virgin Islands, Margarita Allison, individually, Melinda Morrice, individually, Gilberto Arias, individually, Isabel Maria Clark, individually, Robert Clark, individually, Alexander Clark, individually, Delanda Clark, individually, and Cassandra Clark, Appellees.
    No. 4D16-4020
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [January 11, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    UCF I TRUST 1, Appellant, v. SEASPRAY RESORT, LTD., a Florida Limited Partnership, Prabhjot K. Benisasia, an individual, and Rick Benisasia, an individual, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-891
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 28, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jose GRANADOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2973
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 21, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Randall BARDE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3556
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [December 21, 2017]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lester SWARTZ, Appellant, v. POINCIANA PLACE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4224
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [January 18, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brian FITZPATRICK and Lai Fong Fitzpatrick, Appellants, v. Kelly M. MEREDITH, D.C., et al., Appellees.
    No. 4D17-2262
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    January 18, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee FOR the HOLDERS OF CSAB 2007-1, Appellant, v. Richard CLARKE a/k/a Richard C. Clarke, et al, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-145
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    January 4, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Norman GLAVAS and Luba Glavas, Appellants, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION as Trustee FOR CMALT REMIC SERIES 2007-A6-REMIC PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2007-A6, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2349
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [January 25, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.R.A., the mother, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3182
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [January 22, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    L.H., the Father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and Guardian ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-2863
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [January 18, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Drew Charles ROSEN, Appellant, v. Elke L. ROSEN, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2819
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [January 18, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    N.M., the Father, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3135
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [January 11, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael MARQUARDT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2905
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [January 11, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    REVERSE MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS, INC., Appellant, v. Marie Therese FRANCOIS, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1089
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [January 11, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Artoris N. WATERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2631
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed November 7, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Chester D. BELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3184
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed November 28, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Teresa CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ON BEHALF OF the REGISTERED HOLDERS OF BEAR STEARNS ASSET BACKED SECURITIES I LLC, ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES SERIES 2007-AC1, et al., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D16-1618
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed November 28, 2017 Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc Denied January 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jeffrey W. BOTTS, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Linda A. BOTTS, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    Case No. 5D16-3903
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed November 21, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Daniel Bruce RESLIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1985
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed November 21, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jose Gabriel Lopez HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-394
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 19, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Tyrone CUMMINGS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1244
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Charles HUGHES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-4219
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 5, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Joseph C. BARRINGTON and Mary E. Hudson, Appellants, v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Pine Ridge Property Owners Association, Inc. f/k/a Pine Ridge Service Corporation, Inc., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D16-1100
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed November 28, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Tiffany JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2686
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Henry Willie DOWDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2469
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Thomas MURPHY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1580
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Aldene MCLEAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1553
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Howard Mooney WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-788
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Laq Lamar SWANIGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2793
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Israel Bernabe HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and State of Florida, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-2152
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Anthony BRADSHAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1972
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jerry L. GRAVES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1409
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    M.D., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-736
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Zachary Alan MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-418
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kenneth Charles FINN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-4265
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Timothy D. HAWKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3681
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Marcus M. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2645
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Rony J. VEUS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2448
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Amanda PHIPPS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1364
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ronel OSCAR, Appellant, v. John LONG, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-193
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed January 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Yvonne STEWART, Appellant, v. Dale Wayne SMITH, II, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-63
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    January 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Oakley BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-797
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Atravion Jaquon VIRGIL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2622
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed December 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    A.R., Mother of K.S.R., A Child, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3046
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    January 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Tanner ANDREWS, Appellant, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, as Trustee FOR FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 2011-R1 TRUST and TD Bank National Association, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D16-2843
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed January 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ana DIAZ and Tony Diaz, Appellants, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f/k/a Bank of New York as Trustee FOR the CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OA6, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OA6, et al., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D16-1841
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed January 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    PREFERRED CHOICE RESTAURANTS, LLC, and Jesse Enterprises II, LLC, Appellants, v. ORLANDO OUTLET OWNER, LLC, and Tyrone Nabbie, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D16-1134
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed January 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


author: Klingensmith, J.

text:
    William I. WICHMANN, individually, and William J. Wichmann, P.A., Appellants, v. CONRAD & SCHERER, LLP, J. Michael Fitzgerald, individually, and Fitzgerald & Associates, P.A., Appellees.
    No. 4D16-2864
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    January 10, 2018. Rehearing Denied January 25, 2018
    Nichole J. Segal of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, and William J. Wichmann of Law Offices of William J. Wichmann, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
    Albert L. Frevola and Janine R. McGuire of Conrad & Scherer, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee Conrad & Scherer, LLP.
   Klingensmith, J.

Appellee Conrad & Scherer, LLP ("Conrad") filed suit against appellants William J. Wichmann and his law firm in a multi-count complaint following Wichmann's separation from Conrad. Wichmann responded by filing five counterclaims against Conrad, alleging misconduct on the part of his former employer. The trial court dismissed all five counterclaims, finding they were permissive and brought outside the applicable statute of limitations. We find that counts one through three were compulsory counterclaims, but counts four and five were permissive. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal as to the compulsory counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction, and affirm the trial court's dismissal of the permissive counterclaims.

According to Conrad's complaint, Wichmann was a partner at the firm before he abruptly resigned in February 2009. Days before his resignation, Wichmann "stealthily" took 120 files, original documents, work product, and software from Conrad. Wichmann also used the firm's resources to file "Notices of Change of Law Firm" in several pending state and federal cases, and informed the court that these clients were now being represented by his new law firm, Rothstein, Rosenfeldt, and Adler ("RRA").

Conrad was granted leave to amend its complaint four times. Finally, in April 2016, the court approved Conrad's fifth amended complaint as the operative complaint. This complaint had a total of twelve counts, including claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conspiracy, and defamation. Conrad requested damages and the imposition of a constructive trust for any income Wichmann acquired in the future because of this "massive client-grabbing scheme."

Wichmann filed his answer and included five counterclaims arising from a fact scenario rivaling those that might be found in a John Grisham novel. Wichmann averred that since 2008, while he was a contract partner with the firm, Conrad and its employees "perpetuated a scheme to manufacture, file and maintain frivolous and fraudulent cases against U.S. corporations." Wichmann also claimed that Conrad and its employees engaged "in illegal acts, including but not limited to witness bribery, suborning perjury and money laundering."

Wichmann claimed he objected and refused to participate in these illegal activities, but the firm nonetheless continued, which "caused or contributed to Wichmann's disassociation from [Conrad]." Under counts one through three, Wichmann alleged that Conrad not only breached its fiduciary duty and contract with Wichmann by engaging in such illegal activities, but Conrad also committed fraud by attempting to conceal the unlawful conduct.

Under counts four and five, Wichmann alleged that after he resigned from Conrad and accepted a position at RRA, Conrad unlawfully and intentionally interfered with Wichmann's business relationship by immediately contacting RRA, making false statements about him, and convincing RRA to revoke its offer of employment.

Conrad moved to dismiss Wichmann's counterclaims, arguing that all five were permissive, not compulsory, because they did not bear a logical relationship to its complaint. As permissive counterclaims, Conrad argued that they were barred by the statute of limitations because they involved facts that occurred seven years prior to Wichmann's filing. The trial court agreed with Conrad and entered an order dismissing Wichmann's counterclaims with prejudice. This appeal followed.

The issue of whether the trial court correctly characterized Wichmann's counterclaims as permissive, rather than compulsory, presents a pure question of law subject to de novo review. See Whigum v. Heilig-Meyers Furniture Inc. , 682 So.2d 643, 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

A counterclaim is compulsory if "it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a). In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory, Florida courts have adopted the logical relationship test:

[A] claim has a logical relationship to the original claim if it arises out of the same aggregate of operative facts as the original claim in two senses: (1) that the same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis of both claims; or (2) that the aggregate core of facts upon which the original claim rests activates additional legal rights in a party defendant that would otherwise remain dormant.

Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc. , 609 So.2d 14, 20 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Neil v. S. Fla. Auto Painters, Inc. , 397 So.2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) ).

"The purpose of the compulsory counterclaim is to promote judicial efficiency by requiring defendants to raise claims arising from the same 'transaction or occurrence' as the plaintiff's claim." Londono , 609 So.2d at 19. Thus, "courts should give the phrase 'transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the suit' a broad realistic interpretation in the interest of avoiding a multiplicity of suits." Stone v. Pembroke Lakes Trailer Park, Inc. , 268 So.2d 400, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).

We find that counts one through three were compulsory counterclaims because they bear a logical relationship to Conrad's complaint. Counts one through three are primarily based on allegations that Conrad illegally paid witnesses and filed fraudulent lawsuits, which required Wichmann to take actions to protect himself and his clients. Those actions became the basis for Conrad's complaint against him.

Specifically, under counts one and three, Wichmann made the following four allegations: (1) Conrad failed to provide Wichmann with enough staff for his cases; (2) Conrad secretly referred Wichmann's clients to outside firms; (3) Conrad did not provide Wichmann enough compensation for bringing in clients; and (4) Conrad failed to agree on a joint letter to clients upon Wichmann's resignation. These four allegations are intertwined with the allegations contained in Conrad's complaint because they are all based on Wichmann's employment relationship with Conrad and the details surrounding his resignation.

Having found these counterclaims to be compulsory, we dismiss the appeal as to these counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction because an order dismissing a compulsory counterclaim is "not appealable until a final disposition of the original cause has [been] obtained on the merits." 4040 IBIS Circle, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank , 193 So.3d 957, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Allen, Knudsen, DeBoest, Edwards & Rhodes, P.A. , 621 So.2d 507, 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) ).

However, we agree with the trial court that counts four and five did not arise out of the same core of operative facts as Conrad's complaint. Conrad's complaint was based on Wichmann's conduct during his employment with Conrad, specifically focusing on the actions he took days before his resignation. On the other hand, counts four and five were based on Conrad's conduct after the firm was informed of Wichmann's resignation. See Callaway Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Banyon Lakes C. Corp. , 831 So.2d 204, 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that the defendant's counterclaim was permissive because the plaintiff's complaint focused on the breach of the contract, but the defendant's counterclaim focused on tortious conduct that occurred after the breach).

Moreover, Conrad's complaint did not "activate[ ] additional legal rights in [Wichmann] that would otherwise remain dormant" because even if Conrad never sued Wichmann for using the firm's resources to steal clients, Wichmann would still have had a cause of action against Conrad for intentional interference with a business relationship. Londono , 609 So.2d at 20. Further, there is no indication that Conrad's "false statements" about Wichmann to RRA were in any way based on Wichmann's purported "massive client-grabbing scheme."

It is well settled that a permissive counterclaim will be barred if it is filed beyond the statute of limitations. See DuBreuil v. James , 365 So.2d 184, 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The trial court properly dismissed counts four and five because they were permissive counterclaims and based on conduct that occurred in 2009. See Effs v. Sony Pictures Home Entm't, Inc. , 197 So.3d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (holding that a party's "claim for tortious interference with a business relationship was barred by the expiration of the applicable four-year statute of limitations"). As a result, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Dismissed in part, Affirmed in part, and Remanded.

Gross and May, JJ., concur.


author: Taylor, J.

text:
    Evander STICKNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-1803
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 14, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Patrick B. Burke, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Taylor, J.

Evander Stickney appeals his conviction and sentence for felony battery. He argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the victim's right to use force. We agree and reverse for a new trial. On the remaining issues raised by appellant, we find no error.

The Information

Appellant was charged by information with aggravated battery and culpable negligence, arising out of a fight he had with his former girlfriend, Marika Ellis.

The Prosecution's Case

At trial, Ellis testified that she and appellant had a two-year old daughter together. Ellis and appellant broke up in April 2015, but they continued to see each other often.

A few days before the incident that led to the criminal charges against appellant, Ellis learned that a woman whom appellant was seeing was pregnant.

On the day of the incident, appellant wanted Ellis to come over so he could explain to her what was going on with the other woman. Ellis arrived at appellant's house shortly before noon and went to appellant's bedroom. Ellis brought their daughter with her. Appellant's aunt, cousin, and grandmother were also in the house.

While appellant and Ellis were talking, appellant received a text message from the other woman. Appellant got upset and threw his phone.

Ellis left to go to the store but eventually returned. Appellant was lying down in his bedroom and appeared to have been crying. Ellis sat on the bed and put their daughter near appellant, hoping to brighten his spirits. Appellant instead got upset and "kind of pushed back" towards their daughter. Ellis was able to grab her and intercept any contact.

Ellis then got up and said she was "getting the hell out of there." Appellant responded, "[T]hen get the fuck out." Appellant got up and was angry. He and Ellis started yelling at each other. Appellant's aunt and cousin came into the room.

As Ellis tried to walk around appellant to leave, she grabbed some cereal that was on the dresser so that she would have some food on hand in case her daughter got hungry. Appellant grabbed Ellis's hand, she let go of the box, and the cereal spilled on the floor. Appellant said to his aunt and cousin, "Do you see this shit?"

Appellant hit Ellis's back from behind as she was holding their daughter, causing her to stagger but not to fall. Appellant then backed Ellis into the corner. Appellant's cousin told appellant to let Ellis go, and then attempted to get the child from Ellis.

Appellant pushed Ellis's head several times with his finger or hand, and told her, "Now I have to fuck you up." At that point, Ellis was holding a bag containing two drinks: one in a glass bottle and the other in a plastic bottle. Ellis flung the bag at appellant. Ellis assumed that it hit him, because he grabbed his head.

Appellant then punched Ellis in the face, causing Ellis to drop their daughter onto the bed. After the first swing, appellant continued to punch Ellis in the face. Ellis lost two teeth, sustained a broken jaw, and suffered black eyes. The State introduced photos of Ellis's injuries and presented medical testimony about her injuries.

Appellant eventually stopped punching Ellis. He left the residence and Ellis called 911. During the 911 call, Ellis screamed for about three minutes and then reported that appellant fought her because she poured out some cereal. Ellis also described her injuries.

Photos of appellant after the incident show him with a laceration above his left eyebrow.

The day after the incident, appellant sent a text message to Ellis in which he apologized.

Sergeant Martin interrogated appellant. During appellant's statement to the detective, appellant said in relevant part that: (1) Ellis threw cereal on the floor after he told her to leave; (2) they were initially yelling in each other's faces, but were not touching each other; (3) she then repeatedly hit him in his eye with a drink bottle until the bottle busted; (4) he "just retaliated" and hit her; and (5) he knocked out her teeth, but did not swing at her with the intent to knock out her teeth.

The Defense's Case

The defense presented the testimony of appellant, his grandmother, and his cousin. For purposes of this opinion, we will focus on appellant's testimony.

Briefly, appellant testified that, prior to Ellis hitting him with the bottle, he did not point his finger at her or punch her. Ellis hit appellant "at least twice" with the bottle, and the bottle broke. When Ellis hit appellant the second time with the bottle, appellant swung at her. Appellant swung "immediately after" Ellis hit him with the bottle. Ellis continued to hit appellant after striking him with the bottle. Appellant testified that he stopped swinging when Ellis stopped. He claimed that he was just trying to protect himself.

Jury Instructions

During a preliminary charge conference, the trial court stated that "the evidence suggests that [Ellis] could avail herself of the defense of self-defense," and that Ellis would seem to be "entitled" to a special jury instruction with respect to her right to use self-defense. The trial court asked whether the State wished to have a self-defense for the benefit of Ellis, and the State responded in the affirmative. The trial court then replied: "I suggest that it should be done, and you need to prepare that, but be careful how you do that. I would suggest that you track the language of the Self-Defense Instruction ...."

Later, during the final charge conference, defense counsel objected to the proposed jury instruction concerning Ellis's right to use self-defense. He argued that the victim was not on trial and that such an instruction was not appropriate. The trial court ruled that the instruction was "entirely appropriate."

Thus, in addition to instructing the jury on appellant's right to use non-deadly force in self-defense, the trial court instructed the jury on the victim's right to use non-deadly force in self-defense.

Appellant did not request an instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force, and the trial court did not give such an instruction.

Closing Argument

In closing argument, the State argued that Ellis acted in self-defense when she hit appellant with the bottle, and pointed out that the jury would receive a jury instruction "on how Ms. Ellis was using self-defense." The State also argued that appellant did not act in self-defense because, among other things, the "threat was already over" when he started hitting Ellis.

Verdict and Sentence

The jury found appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of felony battery as to Count I, and found appellant not guilty as to Count II. The trial court sentenced appellant to three years in prison, followed by two years of probation. The trial court also ordered appellant to make restitution.

Appellate Analysis

On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the alleged victim's right to use self-defense. Appellant contends that the instruction was misleading and improperly shifted the focus of the case from appellant's claim of self-defense to the right of the victim to hit appellant with a glass bottle. Appellant complains that the instruction was not only irrelevant, but it created a presumption of provocation.

A trial court's decision to give or withhold a jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Calkins v. State , 170 So.3d 888, 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). However, the trial court's discretion on a jury instruction issue "is strictly limited by case law." Newman v. State , 976 So.2d 76, 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Florida courts have held that it is error for a trial court to modify the standard jury instructions and instruct the jury on the victim's right to use force. See , e.g. , Butler v. State , 493 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1986) ;

Mann v. State , 135 So.3d 450 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

In Butler , the seminal case on this issue, the Florida Supreme Court held that giving an instruction on the justifiable use of force in one's home was reversible error where the alleged crime of attempted murder occurred in the victim's home and where the victim denied attempting to use force. 493 So.2d at 452-53. There, the trial court gave a modified version of the standard instruction on the justifiable use of force in one's home by changing the word "defendant" to "person." Id. at 452.

On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court found that the instruction (1) was unrelated to the evidence at trial, and (2) was extremely confusing and misleading. Id. The court reasoned: "The instruction improperly shifted the focus of the case from the applicability of the defense of self-defense to the right of the victim to fight force with force. As a result, the confusing and misleading instruction virtually negated the defendant's only defense, that of self-defense." Id. at 453.

Relying upon Butler , the Fifth District in Mann held that a modified jury instruction on the victim's right to use non-deadly force in defense of his property improperly shifted the focus of the case from the applicability of the defendant's claim of self-defense to the victim's right to use non-deadly force to protect his wife's cat. 135 So.3d at 455. The court explained that "because [the victim] was not charged with any offense, his right to act in defense of his wife's cat is irrelevant." Id. The court further found that the instruction "improperly creates a presumption of provocation," and "might lead a reasonable jury to conclude that [the victim's] right to use non-deadly force precluded [the defendant's] right to use deadly force." Id. 456.

Several other post- Butler cases have reached similar conclusions. See Hansen v. State , 898 So.2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ; Desouza v. State , 650 So.2d 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ; Mason v. State , 584 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). For example, in Mason , the First District explained that an instruction on the victim's right to use self-defense in the home "was misleading and confusing since it tended to shift the focus away from the issue of whether the defendant was justified in the use of force, and to place emphasis on whether the victim was justified in defending himself-a question which was not at issue in this case." 584 So.2d at 167.

Here, the modified jury instruction on Ellis's right to use non-deadly force was misleading and confusing, because it improperly shifted the focus of the case from appellant's claim of self-defense to the issue of Ellis's right to use force. Because Ellis was not charged with any offense, the question of whether Ellis was legally justified in using force against appellant was not at issue in this case. Although we do not comment on the Fifth District's characterization of the instruction as creating a "presumption of provocation," see Mann , 135 So.3d at 456, the instruction was, at a minimum, misleading and confusing.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the victim's right to use force in self-defense. Moreover, given the disputed evidence in this case and the difficulty in determining how the improper instruction might have affected the jury's consideration of appellant's self-defense claim, we cannot conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio , 491 So.2d 1129, 1138-39 (Fla. 1986). We therefore reverse appellant's conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and Remanded .

Forst and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.

      The standard instruction on appellant's justifiable use of non-deadly force already instructed the jury on the law of self-defense as applied to an aggressor who initially provoked the use of force against himself, so a separate instruction as to Ellis's right to use self-defense was unnecessary and improperly shifted the focus of the case.


author: Kuntz, J.

text:
    Paul KUNZ, as next friend of W.K., a minor child, Appellant, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-648
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 14, 2018]
    Paul Kunz, Boca Raton, for appellant.
    Sean Fahey and Shawntoyia N. Bernard, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Kuntz, J.

Paul Kunz, as next friend of W.K., filed a complaint asserting the School Board of Palm Beach County ("School Board") falsified its class-size counts to conceal violating article IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution. After the circuit court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, W.K. declined to amend the complaint and appealed the court's order.

On multiple occasions our supreme court has held the constitutional amendment at issue (otherwise known as the Class-Size Amendment) compelled an appropriation of funds by the legislature, not the utilization of any specific procedure by that branch. Because the amendment compelled appropriation to achieve a goal, and not a method of enforcement, it does not provide a private right of action to enforce any specific procedure. Furthermore, such a challenge to the procedure implemented by the legislature, and enforced by the executive branch, is not appropriately addressed by the judiciary. Nor is the judiciary in a position to monitor the classroom count of each classroom in the nearly 4,200 public schools in this state. Instead, the issue presented is a political question best left to the legislative and executive branch of government. As such, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal.

Background

W.K., a student in a Palm Beach County school, filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief based upon the assertion that, since 2010, the School Board had "falsified" its class-size counts to conceal violating article IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution. In the complaint, W.K. sought: (1) a declaration that the School Board's student-teacher count was unconstitutional; (2) to enjoin the School Board from using a student-teacher count that did not comply with the Class-Size Amendment; (3) to require a re-count of all elementary schools in the county; and (4) to require the School Board to provide sufficient teachers to bring all elementary classes into compliance with the Class-Size Amendment.

The School Board moved to dismiss, arguing the Class-Size Amendment was not self-executing and did not confer a private cause of action. The court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss; however, a transcript of the hearing was not provided. After the hearing, the court issued a written order granting the motion to dismiss for three stated reasons. First, the court found W.K. did not have a legal right to pursue a private cause of action against the School Board because the plain language of the Class-Size Amendment did not provide for private causes of action. Second, the court found W.K. failed to sufficiently plead a claim challenging section 1002.13, Florida Statutes. Third, the court found W.K. did not have a legal right to pursue "district or county wide relief."

The court's order dismissed the complaint without prejudice and allowed W.K. twenty days to file an amended complaint. W.K. declined to amend and, instead, filed a notice of appeal. We subsequently relinquished jurisdiction and the court issued a final order dismissing the complaint with prejudice, noting that the record showed W.K. had failed to file an amended complaint.

Analysis

Our constitution establishes that each of the state's 67 counties constitute a school district, and that each school district is to be governed by a school board. Art. IX, § 4, Fla. Const. Further, it is the function of the school board to "operate, control and supervise all free public schools within the school district." Id. In other words, the school board is vested with exclusive authority over the free public schools within its district, subject only to "such infringement ... expressly contemplated ... by the Florida Constitution." Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty. v. Fla. Charter Educ. Found., Inc. , 213 So.3d 356, 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

In 2002, the Class-Size Amendment "add[ed] both a maximum class size requirement and an obligation on the legislature to fund the class size requirement to article IX, section 1, of the Florida Constitution." Fla. Educ. Ass'n v. Fla. Dept. of State , 48 So.3d 694 (Fla. 2010). The language of the Class-Size Amendment provides:

To assure that children attending public schools obtain a high quality education, the legislature shall make adequate provision to ensure that, by the beginning of the 2010 school year, there are a sufficient number of classrooms so that:
(1) The maximum number of students who are assigned to each teacher who is teaching in public school classrooms for prekindergarten through grade 3 does not exceed 18 students;
(2) The maximum number of students who are assigned to each teacher who is teaching in public school classrooms for grades 4 through 8 does not exceed 22 students; and (3) The maximum number of students who are assigned to each teacher who is teaching in public school classrooms for grades 9 through 12 does not exceed 25 students.

Art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const.

The Class-Size Amendment specifically provides that "the legislature shall make adequate provision to ensure that" the amendment is carried out. And, consistent with that obligation, "in the last two decades, K-12 education has been the single largest component of the state general revenue budget." Citizens for Strong Sch., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ. , 232 So.3d 1163, 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA Dec. 13, 2017) (internal quotation omitted). In an effort to ensure the legislative appropriations are used to reduce classroom size, the legislature enacted section 1003.03, Florida Statutes, which instructs school boards to meet the various class-size requirements at each school "on or before the October student membership survey" of each respective school year.

Here, W.K. purports to avoid attacking the legislative funding or the reporting requirements. Instead, W.K. states that the challenge is limited to the validity of the report submitted by one particular school. W.K. argues the School Board "adopted a practice of intentionally miscounting and thereby falsely certifying class-size compliance." Specifically, W.K. alleged that "[t]he District took the position that it could average class size across grades kindergarten through 3rd because the District arbitrarily designated [the school] a choice school." W.K. also challenged other aspects of the classroom count calculation, and argued that "the District utilized as 'classes' small group pull out sessions, including 1-on-1 sessions, for children needing remedial instruction. Thus, under the District's method, a class of thirty-five children can be averaged with one-on-one remedial instruction, and the class goes from grossly over the limit to compliant."

Putting aside the labels, W.K.'s challenges are to the process of conducting classroom counts, which the legislature has established. For example, the legislature enacted legislation to provide for a system of classroom counts-one that presents various options, and which charges Florida's Department of Education with enforcement. The Department of Education is also charged with monitoring the classroom counts, and with instituting the legislature's chosen system to ensure each district is in compliance with the requirements. § 1003.03(4), Fla. Stat. (2016). With regard to the challenge to labeling classes as "core curricula," that is also a decision made by the legislature, which enacted specific legislation to determine what could be considered "core-curricula courses," and what is to be included in the classroom counts. §§ 1003.01(14), .03(6), Fla. Stat. (2016). If the Department of Education finds a school is not in compliance, the Department is also charged with levying penalties.

Essentially, W.K. asks this court to reach inside a system established by the legislature and direct the process be conducted in a different manner. That we cannot do. As the First District recently explained, "[a] strict separation of powers supports the foundation and logic of the political-question doctrine, in that Florida's organic law does not permit a 'dispersal of decisional responsibility' which would allow the courts to dictate educational policy choices and their implementation to the other two branches of government, absent specific authorization by law. Citizens for Strong Sch., Inc. , 232 So.3d at 1169-70 (citation omitted). It is not appropriate, nor would it be wise, for this court to order this specific school to conduct its count in a manner contrary to the system developed by the legislature. Nor is it appropriate for us to question whether the system established by the legislature is the most effective system.

Further, on a more basic level, W.K.'s argument that the classroom count of one school violates the constitution fails to appreciate our supreme court's prior holdings regarding this specific amendment. In allowing the Class-Size Amendment to be placed on the ballot, our supreme court was clear that the amendment dealt with reducing class size through legislative funding. The Class-Size Amendment was presented to the voters with a summary that our supreme court stated "makes clear that the Legislature is responsible for providing funding to reduce the number of students in public school classrooms in various grade levels." Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Fla.'s Amend. to Reduce Class Size , 816 So.2d 580, 585 (Fla. 2002).

The court also noted that "the primary purpose of the amendment-the legislative funding of reduced classroom size-is adequately disclosed in the ballot title and summary." Id. Importantly, the court held that the fact that the amendment dictated the manner in which class sizes would be reduced, through legislative appropriations , did not violate the single subject requirement. Id. at 583.

Later, our supreme court again addressed this specific amendment and noted that the provision at issue in this appeal "requires the State to make adequate provision for reasonable class size." Bush v. Holmes , 919 So.2d 392, 416 n.16 (Fla. 2006). And, in considering a subsequent proposed constitutional amendment in 2010, our supreme court held that the proposed amendment would not diminish a constitutional right because "Floridians would have the same right to have the Legislature 'make adequate provision' to ensure that there are a sufficient number of classrooms for the required class sizes." Fla. Educ. Ass'n , 48 So.3d at 703.

Clearly, the constitutional provision at issue placed a burden on the legislature to sufficiently fund our schools in order to reduce class size. But, our supreme court held, it was a requirement that the legislature appropriate funds and not a directive that they accomplish the task in any specific manner. The legislature has done so through appropriations and by establishing a system that requires schools to report classroom size to the county school board, and ultimately the state, before an established deadline. The legislative and executive branches have also established rules the schools must follow when conducting the required counts.

It is not for the courts to question whether the manner in which the legislative or executive branch carries out these requirements is wise. Nor could we mandate the amendment be carried out in any particular manner. Such decisions are best left to the legislative or executive branch of our government, comprised of persons who must answer to their constituents. There is no place for the courts in such disputes, especially on an individual classroom basis and outside the process established to handle this exact issue.

Finally, we note that the circuit court allowed W.K. the opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies in the original complaint. W.K. declined to do so. Therefore, to the extent any of the issues in the complaint could have been cured, those issues have been waived.

Conclusion

W.K. sought a declaration that the Palm Beach County School District was intentionally falsifying classroom counts in violation of the Class-Size Amendment to the Florida Constitution. However, our supreme court has decided that the amendment at issue related to appropriations by the legislature. Further, the legislature has appropriated funds to reduce classroom size and has established a process, enforced by the Department of Education, to ensure schools comply with that process. It is not for the courts to question the wisdom of that process, nor to intervene on a classroom by classroom basis to oversee the process. Therefore, the court's dismissal of W.K.'s complaint is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Warner and Conner, JJ., concur.

      We question whether Kunz, as the alleged guardian of W.K., was required to proceed as "next friend." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(b). However, regardless of the label, W.K. is the real party in interest whether the suit is brought on behalf of W.K. or as next friend of W.K. Gilbertson v. Boggs , 743 So.2d 123, 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), receded from on other grounds in Beckford v. Drogan , 216 So.3d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ; see also Watson By & Through Watson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 639 So.2d 687, 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Therefore, we proceed to the merits without altering the semantics of Kunz's action on behalf of his child.


text:
    Michael HUDSON, Appellant, v. CITY OF SUNRISE, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-0748
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 14, 2018]
    Michael Hudson, Sunrise, pro se.
    Gregg Rossman of Rossman Legal, Davie, for appellee.
   Klingensmith, J.

Michael Hudson appeals the trial court's entry of final summary judgment and a final order of forfeiture in favor of the City of Sunrise as to Hudson's interest in money and a vehicle. Hudson challenges the trial court's judgment and order as to the money which was entered without an evidentiary hearing. He contends that he had the right to such a hearing to prove his standing as a claimant because he asserted a bona fide claim to the money. Because the judgment and final order were entered without providing Hudson with an evidentiary hearing, we reverse.

This dispute arises from an incident where Sunrise police officers observed Hudson engage in what they determined to be a drug transaction. The officers conducted a traffic stop on Hudson's vehicle and noticed the distinct odor of cannabis emanating from the passenger compartment. Soon after, a K-9 officer alerted to the presence of a controlled substance in a plastic container found inside Hudson's vehicle. A subsequent search of the vehicle produced four identical Western Union credit cards bearing the names of other individuals and co-mingled with Hudson's personal credit cards. These credit cards were later identified as having been obtained from fraudulent tax returns. During the search, the officers also discovered a water bill in Hudson's name as well as a furniture receipt, each featuring the same residential address. Upon taking Hudson into custody, they found he was also carrying $1,770 in cash.

Hudson waived his Miranda rights and admitted during questioning that he possessed the Western Union credit cards, but that someone else gave them to him. He also admitted he had sold cocaine in the transaction observed by the officers, and the drugs had been stored in the plastic container alerted to by the K-9. He also admitted to being part of a larger cannabis-smuggling ring that operated between Arizona and Florida.

Officers later conducted a search at the address listed on the water bill and furniture receipt. When they walked to the rear of the residence, they saw two bags of cannabis in plain view on the ground, and a towel wrapped around a clear plastic bag that tested positive for cocaine. The home's outdoor garbage cans were found to contain credit cards and credit card approval forms with various names on them.

From the search conducted inside the home, officers seized various papers and documents containing other individuals' personal identification and social security numbers, several fraudulent credit cards, two laptop computers, and two cell phones. Hudson was charged with the use, or possession with intent to fraudulently use, personal identification information without consent. Based on what they found at the home and in the vehicle, the officers concluded that the money Hudson was carrying was obtained either through the sale of controlled substances or through identity fraud. They then seized both the money and Hudson's vehicle to begin the process of forfeiture.

The City provided Hudson with a notice of seizure, and informed him of his right to request an adversarial preliminary hearing pursuant to section 932.703(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2015). Hudson refused to sign the notice and failed to request an adversarial preliminary hearing. Thereafter, the City filed its forfeiture complaint and affidavit, and the trial court entered an order finding probable cause based on the City's documents. See § 932.704(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016) ; see also Sanchez v. City of West Palm Beach , 149 So.3d 92, 97-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ("Only where 'no person entitled to notice requests an adversarial preliminary hearing' is the court's review limited to the traditional probable cause determination where the court 'review [s] the complaint and the verified supporting affidavit to determine whether there was probable cause for the seizure.' " (alteration in original) (quoting § 932.704(5)(b) ) ). Later, Hudson filed a written response to the City's forfeiture complaint, but the trial court deemed his submission to be a mere unsworn denial of the allegations in the City's complaint, rather than defenses to the forfeiture.

Six months later, the City filed a motion for summary judgment against Hudson in the forfeiture proceeding. Hudson then filed an unsworn affidavit in opposition to the City's motion and attached a sworn affidavit from his mother, which stated, "I Catherine Hudson swear and affirm that [I] gave my son Michael Hudson $1,550.00 in [U.S.] currency as a birthday gift."

Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the City's motion for summary judgment. Near the end of the summary judgment hearing, Hudson advised the trial court that "the issue of standing, from my understanding and my position is that it should be a hearing before the Court where the Court determines if I have standing or if I'm a claimant or not and even in the same case law that [the City] cited, on here it says that." The City responded that Hudson's bald assertion that "the money is mine," sworn or otherwise, was insufficient for Hudson to carry his burden to prove that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Fraser v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles , 727 So.2d 1021, 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

The trial court granted the City's motion and entered final judgment in its favor as to both the money and the vehicle, finding that Hudson did not have standing to contest the forfeiture. In doing so, the trial court ruled that the only sworn testimony submitted in opposition to the City's motion for summary judgment, namely the mother's affidavit, was legally insufficient since it contained just one sentence that purported to describe a portion of the $1,770 as a birthday gift with no further facts as to how, when, or where the alleged gift to her son took place. This appeal followed.

" 'Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Arp v. Waterway E. Ass'n, Inc. , 217 So.3d 117, 120 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Cohen v. Arvin , 878 So.2d 403, 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ). Summary judgment is subject to a de novo standard of review. See id.

Forfeitures are not favored in law or equity, thus forfeiture statutes must be strictly construed. See Cochran v. Harris, 654 So.2d 969, 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Forfeiture proceedings in Florida are a two-stage process:

The first stage is an adversarial preliminary hearing in which the seizing agency is required to establish probable cause that the property subject to forfeiture was used in violation of the Forfeiture Act. § 932.701(2)(f), Fla. Stat. The Forfeiture Act provides that when personal property is seized, any "person entitled to notice" should receive notice of the right to a preliminary hearing within five days after the seizure and may make a request within fifteen days after receiving notice that the hearing be held. § 932.703(2)(a), Fla. Stat. The Act defines "person entitled to notice" as "any owner, entity, bona fide lienholder, or person in possession of the property subject to forfeiture when seized, who is known to the seizing agency after a diligent search and inquiry." § 932.701(2)(e), Fla. Stat. The second stage is a forfeiture proceeding "in which the court or jury determines whether the subject property shall be forfeited." § 932.701(2)(g), Fla. Stat. At the forfeiture proceeding, the court "shall" order the seized property forfeited to the seizing agency "[u]pon clear and convincing evidence that the contraband article was being used in violation" of the Forfeiture Act. § 932.704(8), Fla. Stat. (2002). The person contesting the forfeiture in the second stage is identified in section 932.704 as a "claimant." The class of persons who are claimants is narrower than those entitled to notice of the adversarial preliminary hearing. A claimant is defined in section 932.701(2)(h) as "any party who has proprietary interest in property subject to forfeiture and has standing to challenge such forfeiture, including owners, registered owners, bona fide lienholders, and titleholders."

Velez v. Miami-Dade Cty. Police Dep't , 934 So.2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 2006).

To have standing in a forfeiture proceeding, "the alleged claimant has the burden of proving bona fide ownership of the seized property." Fraser , 727 So.2d at 1025. Proof of a bona fide claim "is required to prevent fraudulent statements of ownership." Id. Factors to be considered in a trial court's assessment of the bona fide nature of a claim "include, but are not limited to, physical possession of the property and sources from which the money or other intangible property may have originated, such as employment, business ventures, loans, gifts and the like." Id.

Given that "this is a factual determination to be made by the trial judge, the claimant ought to have the opportunity to present his evidence on the issue to convince the court of the bona fide nature of his claim." Id. "[I]f the trial court is presented with conflicting evidence and no waiver of rights by the claimant, ... the better procedure [is] to hold an evidentiary hearing."

Chuck v. City of Homestead Police Dep't , 888 So.2d 736, 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).

In Fraser , a vehicle was stopped for speeding. 727 So.2d at 1022. It was registered to the appellant's stepson, and during a search of the vehicle, an officer found four large bundles of money hidden inside its bumper, totaling $41,500. Id. Prior to the forfeiture proceeding, the appellant signed and submitted a sworn affidavit that stated, "the entire [$41,500] seized from [my stepson] on June 15, 1993, by Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Michael Van Leer in West Palm Beach belongs to me, [the appellant]." Id. at 1023. During a later deposition, the appellant asserted that he received the money by working. Id. He refused, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to inform counsel as to why the money was in the bumper, where it came from, why the money was in the car, or what corporation or person paid the appellant that much money. Id.

This court, while citing portions of the law delineated above, reversed and remanded. We stated, "Relying on Byrom , in which the supreme court reversed for a factual determination of the bona fide nature of the claim of ownership, we reverse and remand to afford appellant a hearing before the trial court in which he can present evidence of his claim of ownership." Id. at 1025. We continued:

If the facts as presented convince the court that appellant has a bona fide claim of ownership to the money, then appellant should be given the opportunity to be heard on the forfeiture. On the other hand, if the trial court finds that appellant has not carried his burden to prove his claim of ownership, then the trial court may dismiss appellant's claim for lack of standing.

Id.

Here, we find the trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to establish whether Hudson possessed standing to contest forfeiture of the money at the forfeiture proceeding. See Velez , 934 So.2d at 1164. Hudson's opportunity to prove the bona fide nature of his interest was essentially truncated by the trial court's determination that the City's verified forfeiture complaint constituted uncontested testimony. See Fraser , 727 So.2d at 1024. While the prospect of holding an evidentiary hearing in this matter was discussed, the trial court's failure to conduct such hearing after Hudson provided his mother's affidavit supporting a bona fide claim to the money deprived Hudson of the opportunity to establish himself as a claimant for the forfeiture proceeding. See § 932.701(2)(h) ; Velez , 934 So.2d at 1164.

We reverse the final summary judgment and final order of forfeiture entered in favor of the City and remand for the trial court to conduct the necessary evidentiary hearing to determine whether Hudson possessed standing as a claimant to the $1,770 in the forfeiture proceeding under sections 932.701(2)(g), 932.701(2)(h), and 932.704. See Velez , 934 So.2d at 1164. We affirm without comment as to the other issues raised by Hudson in this appeal.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Taylor and Forst, JJ., concur.

      After amendments were enacted in 2016, section 932.703(2) became 932.703(3). However, the substance of the law has remained substantially the same since the 1996 amendments.

      Pursuant to the 2016 amendments to section 932.704(8), the clear and convincing standard was changed to beyond a reasonable doubt.

      Byrom v. Gallagher , 609 So.2d 24, 27 (Fla. 1992).

      We do not discuss Hudson's standing as to the vehicle for purposes of the second stage of the forfeiture proceeding because he did not provide sworn testimony proclaiming an interest in the vehicle. See Fraser , 727 So.2d at 1024-25.


author: Conner, J.

text:
    WATER BRIDGE 5 ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, v. Cynthia DAVIS, Perry Davis, "___" Davis, Cecil Davis, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-1494
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 14, 2018]
    Michael R. Bass of Michael R. Bass, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellees.
   Conner, J.

Water Bridge 5 Association, Inc. ("the Association") appeals the final judgment awarding attorney's fees and costs in its favor, contending the award was for a lower amount than supported by the evidence. We agree with the Association's argument as to the award of attorney's fees, due to an inconsistency in the final judgment. However, due to the lack of a transcript of the hearing, we disagree with its argument as to the award of costs. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Background

The case began with the Association filing a complaint against four tenants seeking injunctive relief. A clerk's default was entered against all four tenants, followed by a default final judgment. Thereafter, the Association moved for attorney's fees and costs against the four tenants, attaching to the motion an affidavit of fees and costs reflecting an hourly attorney's fee rate charge of $195 per hour and 31.7 hours of total hours expended and anticipated to be expended to complete the matter, amounting to a total of $6,181.50 in attorney's fees. In addition, the Association sought $1,056.63 in costs. The Association also filed an affidavit of another attorney attesting to the reasonableness of the hourly rate and the hours claimed.

Subsequently, the trial court issued its final judgment awarding the Association attorney's fees and costs as to the four defaulted parties. Although the trial court's findings as to the reasonableness and amount of attorney's fees (31.7 hours at an hourly rate of $195.00) and costs were typed in the final judgment, the total amounts of fees and costs to be awarded were crossed out, with different amounts written over them by hand ($1500 for fees, instead of $6,181.50; $443.93 for costs, instead of $1,056.63). Similarly, the typed amount of the total judgment was also crossed out and corrected by hand with initials ($1500 for fees, instead of $6,181.50; $443.93 for costs, instead of $1,056.63; $1,943.93 for total judgment, instead of $7,238.13).

The Association filed a motion for rehearing, arguing that the final judgment reflected that the trial court made a finding that 31.7 hours was a reasonable number of hours spent on the case and that the hourly rate of $195 per hour for counsel was reasonable, but that the trial court's award of only $1,500.00 in fees was inconsistent with those findings. In its motion, the Association argued that nothing had been presented at the hearing contesting the amount of time expended or the hourly rate charged and that the trial court had not expressed why it was only awarding $1,500.00. The Association also argued that the trial court's award of costs of only $443.93 failed to include other reasonable and necessary costs. The trial court denied the motion for rehearing.

The Association gave notice of appeal.

Analysis

"[T]he award of attorney's fees is a matter committed to sound judicial discretion which will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion." DiStefano Constr., Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. , 597 So.2d 248, 250 (Fla. 1992). It is well settled that "[a]n award of attorney's fees must be supported by substantial competent evidence and contain express findings regarding the number of hours reasonably expended and a reasonable hourly rate for the type of litigation involved." Nagl v. Navarro , 187 So.3d 359, 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Diwakar v. Montecito Palm Beach Condo. Ass'n , 143 So.3d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ).

On appeal, the Association argues that the face of the final judgment reflects an error committed by the trial court, in that the findings are inconsistent with the amount of attorney's fees awarded. Specifically, the Association points out that the final judgment indicates that the trial court found that 31.7 hours of attorney's time was reasonably expended and that an hourly rate of $195.00 for the Association's attorney was reasonable. Given the predicate findings, the amount of attorney's fees awarded should have amounted to $6,181.50 (31.7 hours x $195.00 = $6,181.50). However, as discussed above, the trial court only awarded $1,500.00 in attorney's fees. The Association argues that there is no justification for the trial court's award.

We agree with the Association's argument. The appellate record does not contain a transcript of the fee and cost hearing. Thus, it is unclear what the trial court's ruling at the hearing actually was. Given the handwritten and initialed changes in the order, it is likely that the trial court indeed only found $1,500 to be a reasonable amount of attorney's fees. It is therefore a possibility that the Association provided the trial court with its typed up proposed final judgment, and the trial court made its handwritten adjustment to the total amounts without adjusting the typed proposed findings concerning the reasonable amount of time expended and hourly rate. As discussed below, normally, the lack of a transcript would be fatal to the Association's appeal. However, we are able to discern error without the need of transcript.

"Under prevailing law, the trial court must make findings to substantiate a fee award and allow for meaningful review." Schneider v. Schneider , 32 So.3d 151, 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). "[A]n award of attorney's fees without adequate findings justifying the amount of the award is reversible even where the appellant has provided an inadequate record of the trial court proceedings." Macarty v. Macarty , 29 So.3d 434, 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (quoting Esaw v. Esaw , 965 So.2d 1261, 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ) (reversing the award of attorney's fees because the portion of the order awarding fees was facially erroneous and remanding for the trial court to make the necessary findings). We hold that an award of attorney's fees in an amount inconsistent with predicate findings as to the reasonable number of hours spent or the reasonable hourly rate is likewise reversible.

The Association also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding it costs of only $443.93, which represents the filing fee. The Association argues that the trial court did not award other reasonable and necessary costs such as service of progress charges, summons fees, mailing charges, costs to obtain a death certificate for one of the parties, and the cost to obtain proof of non-military service. We note that, unlike the attorney's fees award, the issue concerning the amount of costs awarded does not appear to involve an inconsistency within the final judgment. Rather, the Association claims that the trial court's award of costs was an abuse of discretion because it failed to include other costs which the Association deemed reasonable and necessary. However, without a transcript of the hearing, we are unable to review what evidence and arguments were brought before the trial court so as to determine whether its award of costs was an abuse of discretion.

"A trial court's ruling is presumed correct, and where no transcript is provided, the appellate court cannot determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's rulings or the court misconceived the law. Thus, failure to provide the transcript generally thwarts appellate review." Wofford v. Wofford , 20 So.3d 470, 473-74 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (footnote omitted and internal citation omitted); see also Perez v. Fay , 198 So.3d 681, 683 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (explaining that the trial court has discretion in determining the amount of costs to be allowed based on the evidence in the record ). We have held that "[t]he appellant has the burden of making 'any reversible error clearly, definitely, and fully appear.' " E & I, Inc. v. Excavators, Inc. , 697 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). It is well established that "[i]n appellate proceedings, the decision of a trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error." Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee , 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979). As such, given the lack of a transcript of the hearing in which evidence of costs was presumably presented, the Association has failed to demonstrate any error in the trial court's award of costs.

As discussed above, we reverse the award of attorney's fees and remand for the trial court to correct the discrepancies between the findings pertaining to the reasonableness of the time expended, the hourly rate, and the amount of attorney's fees awarded. The final judgment awarding costs is affirmed.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Warner and Kuntz, JJ., concur.