source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. QUINCE, J., dissenting.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Paul Glen EVERETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1863
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [May 24, 2018]
    Linda McDermott of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Estero, Florida; and Charles E. Lykes, Jr., Clearwater, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Lisa A. Hopkins, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

Paul Glen Everett, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit court's order summarily denying his successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

In 2002, a jury convicted Everett of first-degree murder, burglary of a dwelling with a battery, and sexual battery involving serious physical force. After hearing evidence at the penalty phase, the jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death for the first-degree murder by a vote of twelve to zero. We affirmed Everett's convictions and sentence of death on direct appeal. Everett v. State , 893 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied , 544 U.S. 987, 125 S.Ct. 1865, 161 L.Ed.2d 747 (2005). We also upheld the denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Everett v. State , 54 So.3d 464 (Fla. 2010).

In January 2017, Everett filed a successive postconviction motion to vacate his death sentence in light of Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and Hurst v. State (Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). In September 2017, the circuit court summarily denied the motion. This appeal follows. During the pendency of this case in this Court, we directed the parties to file briefs addressing why the circuit court's order should not be affirmed based on our precedent in Hurst , Davis v. State , 207 So.3d 142 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2218, 198 L.Ed.2d 663 (2017), and Mosley v. State , 209 So.3d 1248 (Fla. 2016).

In Davis , we held that a jury's unanimous recommendation of death is "precisely what we determined in Hurst to be constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence of death" because a "jury unanimously f[inds] all of the necessary facts for the imposition of [a] death sentence[ ] by virtue of its unanimous recommendation[ ]." 207 So.3d at 175. We have consistently relied on Davis to deny Hurst relief to defendants who have received a unanimous jury recommendation of death. See, e.g. , Guardado v. Jones , 226 So.3d 213, 215 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1131, 200 L.Ed.2d 729 (2018) ; Bevel v. State , 221 So.3d 1168, 1178 (Fla. 2017) ; Cozzie v. State , 225 So.3d 717, 733 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1131, 200 L.Ed.2d 729 (2018) ; Morris v. State , 219 So.3d 33, 46 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 452, 199 L.Ed.2d 334 (2017) ; Oliver v. State , 214 So.3d 606, 617-18 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 3, 199 L.Ed.2d 272 (2017) ; Truehill v. State , 211 So.3d 930, 956-57 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 3, 199 L.Ed.2d 272 (2017) ; Tundidor v. State , 221 So.3d 587, 607-08 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 829, 200 L.Ed.2d 326 (2018). Everett is among those defendants who received a unanimous jury recommendation of death, and his arguments do not compel departing from our precedent.

Accordingly, because we conclude that any Hurst error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the circuit court's order summarily denying Everett's successive motion for postconviction relief.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.

PARIENTE, J., concurring in result.

I agree that Everett is not entitled to Hurst relief. I write separately to explain that it is the combination of the jury's unanimous recommendation for death and the absence of any stricken aggravating factor or other issue that would undermine the reliability of the unanimous recommendation that allows this Court to conclude that the Hurst error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in Everett's case.

QUINCE, J., dissenting.

I cannot agree with the majority's finding that the Hurst error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As I have stated previously, "[b]ecause Hurst 'requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death,' the error cannot be harmless where such a factual determination was not made." Hall v. State , 212 So.3d 1001, 1036-37 (Fla. 2017) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 619, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) ); see also Truehill v. State , 211 So.3d 930, 961-62 (Fla. 2017) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While the trial court here found the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator proven, this aggravator requires a factual determination that can only be made by the jury. Therefore, I dissent.

      Hurst v. State (Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017) ; see Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016).

      See, e.g. , Reynolds v. State , 251 So.3d 811, 829-30, 2018 WL 1633075, *14 (Fla. Apr. 5, 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (explaining how Hurst could have affected defendant's decision to waive mitigation); Grim v. State , 244 So.3d 147, 148-52, 2018 WL 1531121, *2-5 (Mar. 29, 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (explaining how a mitigation waiver affects the Hurst harmless error analysis); Middleton v. State , 42 Fla. L. Weekly S637, 2017 WL 2374697, *1-2 (Fla. June 1, 2017) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (explaining how a stricken aggravating factor affects the Hurst harmless error analysis); see also Davis v. State , 207 So.3d 142, 173-75 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2218, 198 L.Ed.2d 663 (2017).


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Thomas Theo BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1538
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    September 13, 2018
    Christopher J. Anderson, Neptune Beach, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Christina Z. Pacheco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on appeal from an order granting in part and denying in part a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence of death was imposed, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the postconviction court's order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Thomas Theo Brown was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of Juanese Miller. This Court described the facts of the case as follows:

Ms. Miller and Brown were both co-workers at a Wendy's restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida. It is clear that they did not get along with each other. On Sunday, June 14, 2009, Ms. Miller poured ice and salt down Brown's back. Brown, who was twenty-seven years old at the time, became visibly upset and told Ms. Miller that he did not want her to bother him. The following day (Monday), Brown and Ms. Miller were both present at a meeting held at the restaurant. At or around the time of the meeting, Ms. Miller called Brown a "p*ssy n*gger," which offended Brown. Angelette Harley, who was both Brown's girlfriend and a Wendy's manager, testified that she thought Ms. Miller and Brown were both "written up." Brown and Ms. Miller's work hours were "cut." Brown, who was upset, wondered why he was in trouble.
Mike Emami, the Wendy's franchisee, testified that it was brought to his attention that there was a conflict between Brown and Ms. Miller. Emami said he discussed the issue with Brown in a fairly calm manner. Emami maintained that no one was reprimanded for the ice incident. Emami was told that everything was okay between Brown and Ms. Miller. While Ms. Miller and Brown did not work together on Tuesday and Wednesday, they both worked at Wendy's on Thursday, the day Ms. Miller was killed.
On Thursday, Wendy's employees testified that they did not notice any problems between Brown and Ms. Miller. At around 11:00 a.m., Brown made a telephone call to Ms. Harley, desiring to know why his work hours were "cut." Emami testified that a manager informed him that Brown was upset regarding his work hours. According to Emami's testimony, Brown could not keep up with the work demand and was consequently moved to perform a different task.
At approximately 12:15 p.m., Emami observed Brown working very slowly and looked unhappy. As a result, Emami pulled Brown to the back of the restaurant in order to talk with him. Emami asked Brown what was wrong and questioned Brown about his attitude. Brown became "very, very upset." Brown and Emami were first arguing inside an office and then proceeded to argue outside of the office. Brown asked why his hours were "cut"; Emami responded that Brown would need to discuss his hours with a manager, not Emami. Brown pointed his hand in Emami's face and said, "[Y]ou don't f*cking know me ... it ain't going to be no more Wendy's." Brown was yelling and screaming. Emami and Brown were "fussing" loudly at each other in what was described as a "heated exchange." Both men were mad and frustrated. An employee testified that Brown told Emami that "someone was going to kick his a* *." Emami testified that he told Brown to leave Wendy's at least five or six times and that if he did not leave, the police would be called; Emami, in fact, did call 911. Brown casually walked out of Wendy's and drove off in his vehicle. An employee testified that Emami said "don't come back," however, Emami denied making such statement. Emami also maintained that he never told Brown that he was fired.
Ms. Harley testified that she received a telephone call from Brown's mother, which prompted Ms. Harley to "keep an eye out" for Brown. Ms. Harley arrived at Wendy's at about 1:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Brown returned to the restaurant. While in the parking lot, Ms. Harley told Brown, who was still in his work uniform, that she wanted to talk to him. Brown declined and said, "[S]he [is] the reason why I don't have my job." Ms. Harley tried to stop Brown from going inside the restaurant. An employee of Wendy's testified that Brown was upset, given his facial expressions. When Brown was inside the restaurant, he asked where Emami was; Emami was no longer there. Ms. Miller was ordering her lunch at the register, while standing on the customer-side of the counter. Ms. Harley testified that it appeared that Brown had no issue with Ms. Miller. Brown left the restaurant, got into his car, and put the car in reverse.
Brown then got out of his car. Ms. Harley again attempted to stop Brown from coming back inside Wendy's. Brown pushed her aside and went back inside the restaurant. Ms. Miller, who had her back to the door, did not see Brown come inside. Brown proceeded to walk toward Ms. Miller. Brown, who was not trying to conceal his identity, reached under his shirt, into his waistband, and pulled out a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson semi-automatic firearm. From a range of two to three feet, Brown fired a shot at Ms. Miller. Brown then asked, "[W]here the f*ck Mike [Emami] at[?]" Brown fired more shots at Ms. Miller. Brown then walked toward the door and pushed the door open a little. Brown turned around and walked back to Ms. Miller, who was lying on the floor. Brown stood over Ms. Miller, and angrily said, "I told you I would kill you, you f*cking b*tch." Brown fired his final shot at Ms. Miller. Before leaving Wendy's and driving off, Brown said, "Now, you can go and tell Mike, tell Mike thanks." There were about ten customers inside of the restaurant at the time of the shooting. In describing Brown, witnesses testified that he snapped, was agitated, angry, focused, pissed-off, and had a mad and blank look on his face.
The next day (Friday), Brown was taken into custody after law enforcement located his vehicle at a Jacksonville hotel. A .40 caliber Smith and Wesson semi-automatic firearm was discovered on a dresser inside of the hotel room where Brown was apprehended. Testimony established that four shell casings recovered from the crime scene were fired from the Smith and Wesson pistol. A notebook was discovered inside Brown's vehicle. In the notebook, there was a passage titled "My life!!!" which stated, in pertinent part:
I've lost the only two jobs I've had in my life for no reason at all, but do people care? No!! The only time people in this world care, is when a person is a threat ... I just offed a B*tch cause she was the cause of my life being f*cked up, this time. If she ain't dead, then she will learn how serous [sic] words can be. I wanted "Mike the owner" to be there, but I guess it ain't his time yet.
The medical examiner testified that Ms. Miller received injuries to her arm, back, neck, lungs, trachea, aorta, rib, kidneys, and abdomen. The medical examiner found that Ms. Miller was also shot in the back of her head, but was unable to determine whether the head wound was inflicted as the final injury. The medical examiner opined that Ms. Miller bled to death, suffering from multiple organ and vascular perforations with hemorrhage.
After the State rested, Brown moved for a judgment of acquittal, claiming that there was no evidence of premeditation. The trial judge denied the motion. The defense did not present a case. Brown then renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court again denied. The jury, which was instructed on only first-degree premeditated murder, convicted Brown of first-degree murder.

Brown v. State , 126 So.3d 211, 213-15 (Fla. 2013) (footnotes omitted).

After the penalty phase hearing, the jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of seven to five. Id. at 216. After weighing and considering the aggravating and mitigating factors and the jury's recommendation, the court sentenced Brown to death on October 28, 2011. On direct appeal, Brown raised five issues. This Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Id. at 221. On May 4, 2014, the Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Brown v. Florida , 572 U.S. 1104, 134 S.Ct. 2141, 188 L.Ed.2d 1130 (2014).

On May 4, 2015, Brown filed his initial 3.851 motion for postconviction relief, raising sixteen claims. Claims 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 pertained to Brown's guilt phase, while claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 pertained to Brown's penalty phase. While Brown's motion was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). On remand, this Court imposed the requirement that the findings necessary for imposing the death penalty must be found unanimously by the jury. Hurst v. State , 202 So.3d 40, 56 (Fla. 2016). In light of this Court's decision in Hurst , the postconviction court granted claim 16-that the Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida invalidated Brown's sentence of death-and found that Brown was entitled to a new penalty phase. As a result, collateral counsel withdrew claims 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 and the postconviction court found claims 1, 2, 7, 9, and 10 moot.

Out of the remaining five claims related to Brown's guilt phase, collateral counsel withdrew claims 4 and 8, and the postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on claims 3, 5, and 6, all of which were premised upon allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied the claims. Now before this Court, Brown appeals the denial of claim 6: that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an improper comment made during the State's closing argument.

ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the postconviction court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object and move for a mistrial during the State's closing argument. According to Appellant, he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object because the State purported to quote words of Appellant that supported the State's argument that the murder was premeditated.

Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:

First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. A court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied.

Maxwell v. Wainwright , 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).

Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court's factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the circuit court's legal conclusions de novo. See Sochor v. State , 883 So.2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).

Generally, this Court's standard of review following the denial of a postconviction claim where the trial court has conducted an evidentiary hearing affords deference to the trial court's factual findings. McLin v. State , 827 So.2d 948, 954 n.4 (Fla. 2002). "As long as the trial court's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, 'this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.' " Blanco v. State , 702 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Demps v. State , 462 So.2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 1984) ).

Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting when the State, during its closing argument, quoted Appellant as saying, "I told you I'd kill you, I had it in my mind to kill you, I've wanted to kill you for several days. I wanted to kill someone to take out my frustration." During the evidentiary hearing, Appellant's trial counsel, Mr. Gazaleh, recalled the prosecutor's closing argument and the quote in contention. He testified that he considered objecting, but based upon the prosecutor's demeanor and tone he did not believe the prosecutor was attempting to quote Appellant. Instead, he believed the prosecutor was providing a general comment on the evidence presented at trial. This decision was based on his professional judgment and experience and falls within the wide range of professional assistance required by Strickland . Thus, Appellant fails to show that counsel's performance was deficient.

Furthermore, Appellant fails to show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's decision not to object to the State's comment during closing argument. Appellant contends that the prosecutor's misstatement wrongfully informed the jury that he admitted to premeditated murder. However, as the postconviction court noted, the record provides ample evidence that Appellant's actions were premeditated. Specifically, "[n]umerous eyewitnesses testified at trial that [Appellant], upon learning that Mr. Emani was not at the restaurant, walked out to his car, attempted to leave, but again reentered Wendy's before shooting the victim four times." Then, after shooting Miller four times, Appellant said to the victim, "I told you I would kill you, you f*cking b*tch." Following the murder, Appellant wrote in his journal:

I've lost the only two jobs I've had in my life for no reason at all, but do people care? No!! The only time people in this world care, is when a person is a threat ... I just offed a B*tch cause she was the cause of my life being f*cked up, this time. If she ain't dead, then she will learn how serous [sic] words can be. I wanted "Mike the owner" to be there, but I guess it ain't his time yet.

Appellant cannot show that but for the State's misquote, the jury would not have found him guilty of first-degree murder. Accordingly, the postconviction court properly denied this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the postconviction court's partial denial of postconviction relief.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      In support of the death sentence, the judge found the following three statutory aggravators, assigning each of them "great weight": (1) Brown was previously convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to the person; (2) Brown was under a sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on felony probation when he committed the murder; and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) manner and without any pretense of moral or legal justification. Id. at 216.

      The judge found two statutory mitigators: (1) Brown was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time he committed the murder (given "some weight"); and (2) Brown's age (twenty-seven years old) at the time of the murder (given "slight weight"). Id. at 216. Additionally, the judge found the following five nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) Brown experienced a difficult childhood that included but was not limited to a lack of parental guidance (given "some weight"); (2) Brown has a borderline retarded IQ (given "some weight"); (3) Brown offered to plead guilty to a sentence of life in prison (given "little" weight); (4) Brown suffers from mental illness (given "some weight"); and (5) the victim did not suffer (given "little weight"). Id. at 216 n.6.

      Brown raised the following claims on direct appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in finding the CCP aggravator; (2) whether Brown's death sentence is a proportionately unwarranted sentence; (3) whether the penalty-phase jury instructions violated Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) ; (4) whether Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), requires the reversal of Brown's death sentence; and (5) whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit Brown to present guilt-phase evidence of his mental condition at the time of the murder. 126 So.3d at 217.


author: LEWIS, J. PARIENTE, J., concurring. POLSTON, J., dissenting.

text:
    W. Riley ALLEN, Petitioner, v. Jairo Rafael NUNEZ, et al., Respondents.
    No. SC16-1164
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    October 4, 2018
    W. Riley Allen of Riley Allen Law, Orlando, Florida; and Thomas D. Hall of The Mills Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
    Elizabeth C. Wheeler of Elizabeth C. Wheeler, P.A., Orlando, Florida, for Respondents
   LEWIS, J.

W. Riley Allen seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Nunez v. Allen , 194 So.3d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), on the basis that it expressly and directly conflicts with several appellate decisions of courts of this State regarding proposals for settlement, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2017), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, for the purpose of assessing attorney's fees. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case originates from a motor vehicle accident in which Gabriel Nunez was operating a vehicle owned by his father, Jairo Nunez, when he struck a truck owned by Allen, which was lawfully parked along a street and unoccupied. Id. Allen filed a one-count complaint against Gabriel and Jairo alleging that Gabriel negligently operated the vehicle and that Jairo, as the owner of the vehicle, was vicariously liable for his son's negligent driving. Id. Allen sought damages for, among other things, the post-repair diminution in the value of his truck, the cost of the repairs, and the loss of use of his truck. Id. Respondents jointly answered the complaint. Id. Allen then served a separate proposal for settlement on each Respondent pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. Id.

The proposal to Jairo provided:

1. This Proposal for Settlement is made pursuant to Florida Statute § 768.79, and is extended in accordance with the provisions of Rule 1.442, Fla. R. Civ. P.
2. The Proposal for Settlement is made on behalf of Plaintiff, W. RILEY ALLEN, and is made to Defendant, JAIRO RAFAEL NUNEZ.
3. This Proposal for Settlement is made for the purpose of settling any and all claims made in this cause by Plaintiff, W. RILEY ALLEN, against defendant, JAIRO RAFAEL NUNEZ.
4. That in exchange for TWENTY THOUSAND AND 00/100 DOLLARS ($20,000.00) in hand paid from defendant, JAIRO RAFAEL NUNEZ, Plaintiff agrees to settle any and all claims asserted against Defendant as identified in Case Number 2010-CA-25627-0, brought in and for the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida.
5. This Proposal for Settlement is inclusive of all damages claimed by Plaintiff, W. RILEY ALLEN, including all claims for interest, costs, and expenses and any claims for attorney's fees.

Id. at 556 (footnote omitted). Allen contemporaneously served an identical proposal for settlement on Gabriel, except that Gabriel's name was substituted in place of Jairo. Id. Neither Respondent accepted his respective proposal; thus the proposals were considered rejected. Id. ; see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(f)(1) ("A proposal shall be deemed rejected unless accepted by delivery of a written notice of acceptance within 30 days after service of the proposal.").

After securing a final judgment in the sum of $29,785.97, Allen filed a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. Nunez , 194 So.3d at 556. Respondents moved to strike Allen's proposals for settlement, contending that because paragraph 5 of the proposals stated that the monetary settlement was inclusive of all damages claimed by Allen, the proposals were ambiguous as to whether acceptance and payment of one of the $20,000 proposals for settlement would have resolved the case against both Respondents or only against the individual Respondent accepting the proposal. Id. at 557.

The trial court granted Allen's motion to enforce the proposals after finding the proposals for settlement were sufficiently clear and unambiguous; it was determined that Allen was entitled to be reimbursed $343,590 in attorney's fees and legal assistant's fees. Id. at 555, 557. Respondents appealed, asserting that the language contained in paragraph 5 of the proposals for settlement caused the proposals to be ambiguous and therefore unenforceable. Id. The Fifth District agreed, reasoning:

Initially, paragraphs two, three, and four in each proposal for settlement make clear that payment of $20,000 by the [Respondent] named in the proposal would settle [Allen]'s claims brought in the case against that specific [Respondent]. However, paragraph five then stated that the proposal for settlement was inclusive of "all damages" claimed by [Allen]. As "all damages" claimed arguably are those that could have been (and were) imposed on both [Respondents] in this case, paragraph five of [Allen]'s proposal for settlement could be reasonably interpreted to mean that the acceptance of the proposal for settlement by only one of the [Respondents] resolved [Allen]'s entire claim against both [Respondents]. Put differently, if paragraph five had stated that the proposal was inclusive of all damages claimed by [Allen] against the individually named [Respondent], similar to the language in paragraph three of the proposal, there would have been no ambiguity.

Id. at 558 (emphasis omitted).

The district court relied on Tran v. Anvil Iron Works, Inc. , 110 So.3d 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), for support. Nunez , 194 So.3d at 558. In Tran , the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and filed an action against the driver of the other vehicle and his corporate employer, which owned the vehicle. Tran , 110 So.3d at 924. During litigation, plaintiff tendered separate proposals for settlement to the individual defendant and the corporate defendant. Id. Each proposal was specific as to the one defendant named therein and each stated that, as a condition of the proposal, the plaintiff would voluntarily dismiss, with prejudice, any and all claims against the specific defendant named in the proposal for settlement. Id. Attached to the proposal for settlement was a copy of the proposed notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice to be filed if the proposal was accepted. Id. However, the attached dismissal notice named both defendants and indicated that the case would be dismissed against both defendants. Id. at 924-25. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding that the proposals for settlement were ambiguous because, while the body of the proposals did not indicate that both defendants would be dismissed, the notices of dismissal attached to the respective proposals did. Id. at 927. The district court held that the discrepancy could reasonably affect the decision to accept the proposal because one defendant might want to accept the proposal directed to it only if it knows for certain that its payment would result in the release of both defendants. Id. at 926 ("This may be especially significant in a case such as this where one defendant is the employer/owner of the car and the other defendant is the employee who was driving the car.").

Likewise, the decision below held that the language in the proposals themselves raised the legitimate question as to whether acceptance resolved Allen's claim for "all damages" against solely the named offeree or resolved the entire claim against both Respondents. See Nunez , 194 So.3d at 559.

This review follows.

ANALYSIS

Attorney's fees under offers of judgment are governed by section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. In relevant part, section 768.79 reads:

(1) In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state ... [i]f a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not accepted by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent greater than the offer, she or he shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred from the date of filing of the demand....
(2) The making of an offer of settlement which is not accepted does not preclude the making of a subsequent offer. An offer must:
(a) Be in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this section.
(b) Name the party making it and the party to whom it is being made.
(c) State with particularity the amount offered to settle a claim for punitive damages, if any.
(d) State its total amount.
The offer shall be construed as including all damages which may be awarded in a final judgment.
....
(6) Upon motion made by the offeror within 30 days after the entry of judgment or after voluntary dismissal or involuntary dismissal, the court shall determine the following:
....
(b) If a plaintiff serves an offer which is not accepted by the defendant, and if the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent more than the amount of the offer, the plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable costs, including investigative expenses, and attorney's fees, calculated in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Supreme Court, incurred from the date the offer was served.

§ 768.79, Fla. Stat. The relevant portions of the current version of rule 1.442 provide:

(c) Form and Content of Proposal for Settlement.
(1) A proposal shall be in writing and shall identify the applicable Florida law under which it is being made.
(2) A proposal shall:
(A) name the party or parties making the proposal and the party or parties to whom the proposal is being made;
(B) state that the proposal resolves all damages that would otherwise be awarded in a final judgment in the action in which the proposal is served, subject to subdivision (F);
(C) state with particularity any relevant conditions;
(D) state the total amount of the proposal and state with particularity all nonmonetary terms of the proposal;
(E) state with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for punitive damages, if any;
(F) state whether the proposal includes attorneys' fees and whether attorneys' fees are part of the legal claim; and
(G) include a certificate of service in the form required by rule 1.080.
(3) A proposal may be made by or to any party or parties and by or to any combinations of parties properly identified in the proposal. A joint proposal shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party.
(4) Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(3), when a party is alleged to be solely vicariously, constructively, derivatively, or technically liable, whether by operation of law or by contract, a joint proposal made by or served on such a party need not state the apportionment or contribution as to that party. Acceptance by any party shall be without prejudice to the rights of contribution or indemnity.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c). Proposals under the offer of judgment statute must strictly conform to these statutory and procedural requirements to entitle the offeror to attorney's fees because the statute is in derogation of the common law that ordinarily requires each party to pay for its own attorney's fees. See, e.g. , Pratt v. Weiss , 161 So.3d 1268, 1271 (Fla. 2015) (citing Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod , 849 So.2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003) ; Gershuny v. Martin McFall Messenger Anesthesia Prof'l Ass'n , 539 So.2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 1989) ). This Court reviews a party's entitlement to attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442 de novo. E.g. , Pratt , 161 So.3d at 1271 (citing Frosti v. Creel , 979 So.2d 912, 915 (Fla. 2008) ).

Additionally, the proposal must be sufficiently clear and free of ambiguity to allow the offeree the opportunity to fully consider the proposal. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols , 932 So.2d 1067, 1079 (Fla. 2006). Nonetheless, this Court has not required the elimination of every ambiguity-only reasonable ambiguities:

We recognize that, given the nature of language, it may be impossible to eliminate all ambiguity. The rule does not demand the impossible. It merely requires that the settlement proposal be sufficiently clear and definite to allow the offeree to make an informed decision without needing clarification. If ambiguity within the proposal could reasonably affect the offeree's decision, the proposal will not satisfy the particularity requirement [of rule 1.442(c)(2)(C)-(D) ].

Id. Ultimately, "[p]roposals for settlement are intended to end judicial labor, not create more." Id. (quoting Lucas v. Calhoun , 813 So.2d 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ). Accordingly, courts are discouraged from "nitpicking" proposals for settlement to search for ambiguity. Carey-All Transp., Inc. v. Newby , 989 So.2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Nichols , 932 So.2d at 1079 ).

This Court recently rejected an argument that a nearly identical settlement proposal was ambiguous and therefore unenforceable on the matter of attorney's fees. Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp. , 202 So.3d 846 (Fla. 2016). Anderson involved an armed robbery, carjacking, and shooting that occurred in the parking lot of an Embassy Suites hotel in Orlando, Florida. Id. at 848. Troy Anderson filed an action against Hilton Hotels Corporation (Hilton), W2007 Equity Inns Realty, LLC (W2007), Interstate Management Company, LLC (Interstate), and SecurAmerica, LLC, for negligence. Id. Anderson's wife, Paula Anderson, also sought damages for loss of consortium. Id. at 849. Anderson proposed offers of settlement to Hilton, W2007, Interstate, and SecurAmerica. Id. The offer made to Hilton, it its entirety, stated:

PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF, TROY [ANDERSON], PURSUANT TO RULE 1.442
Plaintiff, TROY ANDERSON, by and through his undersigned attorneys, hereby serves his Proposal for Settlement, pursuant to Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, to Defendant, HILTON HOTELS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, doing business as EMBASSY SUITES ORLANDO AT INTERNATIONAL DRIVE AND JAMAICAN COURT, also doing business as HILTON WORLDWIDE, and states in support thereof as follows:
1. This Proposal for Settlement is made pursuant to Florida Statute § 768.79, and is extended in accordance with the provisions of Rule 1.442. Fla. R. Civ. P.
2. This Proposal for Settlement is made on behalf of Plaintiff, TROY ANDERSON ("PLAINTIFF"), and is made to Defendant, HILTON HOTELS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, doing business as EMBASSY SUITES ORLANDO AT INTERNATIONAL DRIVE AND JAMAICAN COURT, also doing business as HILTON WORLDWIDE ("HILTON").
3. This Proposal for Settlement is made for the purpose of settling any and all claims made in this cause by PLAINTIFF against HILTON.
4. That in exchange for SIX HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND AND 00/100 DOLLARS ($650,000.00) in hand paid from HILTON, PLAINTIFF agrees to settle any and all claims asserted against HILTON, as identified in Case Number 2009-CA-040473-O, brought in the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida.
5. This Proposal for Settlement is inclusive of all damages claimed by PLAINTIFF, including all claims for interest, costs, and expenses and any claims for attorney's fees.

Id. The offers to each defendant were identical other than the specifically designated party and the specific amount proposed. Id. Paula Anderson also made separate offers, identical to those of Anderson, to each of the defendants. Id. Prior to trial, however, Paula dismissed her cause of action. Id. Anderson obtained a favorable jury verdict that was twenty-five percent greater than the settlement offer and subsequently sought attorney's fees. See id. at 850, 857-58. The trial court and the Fifth District both concluded that the term "PLAINTIFF" in paragraph 5 of Anderson's offer could reasonably be interpreted to include both Anderson and his wife, Paula. Id. at 850-51.

On appeal, this Court acknowledged that the proposal clearly and consistently used the singular term "PLAINTIFF," defined as Troy Anderson in paragraph 2. Id. at 855. This Court also recognized that paragraph 3 indicated that each proposal was designed to settle "any and all claims of PLAINTIFF [Troy Anderson] against [RESPONDENT]," clearly delineating that the only parties to be affected by acceptance would be Troy Anderson and the designated Respondent. Id. This Court further noted that the offer made by Troy Anderson made no reference to Paula Anderson or her loss of consortium claim, "which Anderson was not obliged to address in his claim." Id. Paula Anderson had made her own separate, nearly simultaneous offers to each of the Respondents. Id. This Court then held that

[i]f a party receives two simultaneous offers from two separate parties, common sense dictates that the offeree should possess all the information necessary to determine whether to settle with one or both of the offerors. In reading the entirety of Anderson's proposals, the only reasonable interpretation is that Troy Anderson offered to settle only his claims with each Respondent in his offer.

Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). Thus this Court quashed the Fifth District's holding that Anderson's proposals for settlement were ambiguous. Id. at 858.

The Second District has also rejected arguments that similar settlement proposals were ambiguous and therefore unenforceable on the matter of attorney's fees. See Miley v. Nash , 171 So.3d 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ; Bright House Networks, LLC v. Cassidy , 242 So.3d 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).

Miley involved an accident between Martha Nash and Kyle Miley in a car owned by his father, Glenn Miley. 171 So.3d at 147. Martha filed a complaint against Kyle and Glenn seeking damages for her injuries; Garfield Nash, Martha's husband, also sought damages for loss of consortium. Id. Martha and Garfield Nash pursued their claims against Glenn Miley solely under a theory of vicarious liability. Id. Prior to trial, Kyle offered a settlement proposal to Martha in "an attempt to resolve all claims and causes of action resulting from the incident or accident giving rise to this lawsuit brought by Plaintiff Martha Nash against Defendant Kyle Miley." Id. The proposal contained a condition that Martha dismiss her claims against both Kyle and Glenn, but did not address Garfield Nash's pending claim for loss of consortium, which was ultimately dropped prior to trial. Id. After Martha obtained a favorable jury verdict that was significantly less than the amount in Kyle's offer, the trial court denied Kyle's motion for attorney's fees for five reasons: the proposal (1) failed to specifically identify the claims to be resolved by it; (2) failed to address Garfield Nash's loss of consortium claim; (3) failed to state with particularity any relevant conditions; (4) failed to state the amount and terms attributable to each party; and (5) required dismissal of both Kyle and Glenn without attributing the payment owed. Id.

On appeal, the Second District reversed and concluded that the proposal complied with rule 1.442. Id. Although the district court acknowledged that the language in the terms "all claims" that "[gave] rise to the lawsuit" could have been more definite, it concluded that these terms were not so ambiguous as to prevent Martha Nash from making an informed decision about settling her claim. Id. at 148. The district court also held that the proposal did not need to address Garfield Nash's claim for loss of consortium, which was a separate and derivative claim. Id. at 148-49 ("Because the proposal explicitly stated that it was to cover all claims brought by Martha Nash, it was not deficient for failing to address the other pending claim in the lawsuit brought by an entirely different plaintiff."). The district court also concluded that the particularity requirement had been satisfied and further held that apportionment with respect to Glenn Miley was not required because he was only alleged to be vicariously liable. Id. at 149 (citing Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442 ). Thus the Second District reversed the trial court's order denying attorney's fees. Id. at 150.

In Cassidy , five members of the Cassidy family filed a one-count complaint for breach of contract against Bright House. 242 So. 3d at 458. Bright House served one proposal for settlement on Albert B. Cassidy, who did not accept the proposal. Id. Bright House filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs after the trial court entered summary judgment in its favor. Id. The trial court denied Bright House's motion because paragraph 4 of the proposal stated that acceptance of the offer would dismiss "all claims" against Bright House. Id. The trial court found that paragraph 4 created ambiguity with regard to which claims were to be dismissed. Id. The Second District reversed, holding that the proposal did not contain a level of ambiguity that would "render Albert B. Cassidy unable to make an informed decision without needing clarification." Id. at 460.

Albert B. Cassidy has no authority to cause the other plaintiffs' claims to be dismissed. It is clear that the Proposal was made only to Albert B. Cassidy and that the Proposal defines the claims to be resolved as those asserted in this action by Offeree (Albert B. Cassidy) against Offeror (Bright House).

Id. The district court held that, when read as a whole, there was no ambiguity within the proposal that would reasonably affect Albert B. Cassidy's decision. Id. Thus the district court reversed the trial court's order denying attorney's fees. Id.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal has likewise rejected similar attempts to inject ambiguity into otherwise sufficient proposals. See Kiefer v. Sunset Beach Invs. , LLC , 207 So.3d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ; Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Llanio-Gonzalez , 213 So.3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ; Alamo Fin., L.P. v. Mazoff , 112 So.3d 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ; Land & Sea Petroleum, Inc. v. Bus. Specialists, Inc. , 53 So.3d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

In Kiefer , Sunset Beach Investments, LLC (Sunset Beach), filed an action asserting claims of professional negligence against Kiefer, Kimley-Horn, and two licensed engineers. 207 So.3d at 1009. While the case was pending, Kiefer served Sunset Beach a proposal for settlement that included a required release as a condition of the agreement. Id. Simultaneously, each of the other codefendants served separate proposals for settlement on Sunset Beach. Id. Sunset Beach did not accept any of the proposals. Id. Kiefer prevailed on a motion for summary judgment, obtained judgment in his favor as to the only claim asserted against him, and subsequently filed a motion for attorney's fees based upon the rejected proposal for settlement. Id. at 1009-10. The trial court denied Kiefer's motion after finding the release attached to the proposal for settlement to be ambiguous. Id. at 1010. The trial court found ambiguity with the fact that, unlike each of the other paragraphs of the proposal for settlement and release, the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the release were not specifically limited to Kiefer and Sunset Beach. Id. The fifth paragraph in question stated that the release covered "any and all claims for attorney's fees, costs and premiums, as a result of the incident and matters set forth in the lawsuit." Id. The sixth paragraph stated that Sunset Beach would release all claims that related to the lawsuit. Id. On appeal, the Fourth District reversed and held that the settlement proposal was unambiguous. Id. at 1011. The district court held that, when read as a whole, the release related to Sunset Beach and Kiefer and not the other codefendants. Id. The district court relied on Anderson in holding the proposal for settlement was not ambiguous due to the fact that other claims remained and other parties were not mentioned. Id. at 1012. Thus the Fourth District reversed the trial court's order denying attorney's fees. Id.

In Llanio-Gonzalez , Costco Wholesale Corporation (Costco) served a proposal for settlement on Elaine Llanio-Gonzalez, who brought an action for her injuries in a slip and fall. 213 So.3d at 945. Costco also served a proposal for settlement on Luis Gonzalez for his loss of consortium claim. Id. Each proposal included a required release as a condition of the agreement. Id. The attached releases provided that each plaintiff would release Costco and "all related, associated or affiliated companies"

from any and all claims. Id. The plaintiffs did not accept Costco's proposals for settlement and Costco ultimately prevailed on a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 946. Costco then moved for attorney's fees after obtaining judgment in its favor. Id. The trial court denied Costco's motion after finding the releases attached to the proposals for settlement to be ambiguous. Id. The trial court found ambiguity with the fact that each proposal for settlement contained narrow language offering to release only the defendant but the attached releases contained broader language releasing individuals and entities in addition to Costco. Id. On appeal, the Fourth District agreed with Costco that the proposals were unambiguous and were therefore enforceable. Id. at 947. The district court held that although the attached releases were more expansive, their effect was the same. Id. The district court held that the proposals for settlement and accompanying releases were sufficiently clear and definite to allow the plaintiffs to make an informed decision on whether to accept the proposals. Id. Thus the Fourth District reversed the trial court's order denying attorney's fees. Id.

Alamo Financing involved a motor vehicle accident between plaintiff, Matthew Mazoff, and defendant, Paola Alvarado-Fernandez; Alamo Financing owned the vehicle driven by Alvarado-Fernandez, while a separate entity, Alamo Rental (US), Inc., leased the vehicle to Alvarado-Fernandez. 112 So.3d at 627. Mazoff sought damages from Alamo Financing and Alvarado-Fernandez, alleging specifically that Alamo Financing was vicariously liable for Alvarado-Fernandez's negligence. Id. Alamo Financing proposed an offer of settlement to Mazoff that contained a condition that Mazoff would release Alamo Financing and "their parent corporations, subsidiaries, officers, directors, and employees" from any and all claims. Id. Mazoff subsequently moved to add Alamo Rental as a defendant after learning that Alamo Rental was the entity that leased the car. Id. at 628.

Alamo Financing unsuccessfully moved for attorney's fees after obtaining judgment in its favor. Id. On appeal, the Fourth District agreed with Alamo Financing that the proposal was not ambiguous and was therefore enforceable. Id. The district court rejected Mazoff's argument that the language "all Claims made in the present action by the party to whom this proposal is made including any claims that could be made against Defendant ALAMO FINANCING, L.P., which arise out of the same occurrence or event set forth in this action," could extinguish Mazoff's claims against Alvarado-Fernandez. Id. at 629-30. Specifically, the district court acknowledged that when read in isolation, this clause could suggest that Mazoff's separate claims against Alvarado-Fernandez may be affected by his acceptance of Alamo Financing's offer; nonetheless, the context of the entire offer indicated that Alamo Financing was the only offeror and the only party to be dismissed from suit upon Mazoff's acceptance. Id. at 630. The Fourth District similarly dispensed with Mazoff's suggestion that the proposal was unenforceably ambiguous because it could have constituted a release of Alamo Rental, which was not a party to the lawsuit at the time the offer was made. Id. at 630-31.

In Land & Sea Petroleum , a seller made two separate proposals for settlement with the two different brokers with whom it was engaged in a contract dispute. 53 So.3d at 351-52. Other than the name of the individual broker, the proposals were identical and indicated that they would resolve "any and all claims that could have been or should have been brought" by the individually named broker against the seller upon payment of $500. Id. at 352. Neither broker accepted its respective proposal.

Id. The seller prevailed on a motion for summary judgment and subsequently moved for attorney's fees. Id. In response, the brokers contended that the proposals were ambiguous because they did not specify which side would pay the $500 and did not specify the claims that the proposals would settle. Id. The trial court ultimately denied the seller's motion for attorney's fees; on appeal, however, the Fourth District reversed. Id. at 352-53. The district court held that, because the only relationship that existed between the brokers and the seller arose from the brokerage contract, there were no other possible claims which could have existed between the parties either within or outside of the action. Id. at 353-54. The district court also held that it was apparent that the seller was offering to pay each of the brokers $500 in exchange for resolving the brokers' respective claims because the brokers were suing for a commission and the seller raised no counterclaim. Id. at 353 ("The brokers' reliance on the fact that the seller did not expressly state that it would be the party paying the $500 seems to be the type of 'nit-picking' which the second district cautioned against in Carey-All .").

There can be no doubt this Court possesses discretion to exercise jurisdiction in this case. The dissent convolutes and misstates discretionary and subject-matter jurisdiction within the Florida Constitution. Jurisdiction exists where a decision of a district court expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or of this Court on the same question of law. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; see also Knowles v. State , 848 So.2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 2003) (accepting jurisdiction based on conflict created by misapplication of decisional law); Robertson v. State , 829 So.2d 901, 904 (Fla. 2002) (stating that misapplication of decisional law creates conflict jurisdiction); Acensio v. State , 497 So.2d 640, 641 (Fla. 1986) (accepting jurisdiction based on conflict created by misapplication of decisional law). The decision below expressly and directly conflicts with this Court's decision in Anderson and the decisions of the Second and Fourth Districts in Miley , Cassidy , Kiefer , Llanio-Gonzalez , Alamo Financing , and Land & Sea Petroleum . In each of the seven conflict cases discussed, the point of law at issue was whether an offer by a single offeror to a single offeree was considered sufficiently clear and enforceable, although it did not address separate pending claims of other parties to the litigation. However, in the decision below the Fifth District determined that such an offer was ambiguous and unenforceable because it could have possibly affected the unaddressed claims of the other codefendant. Therefore, we properly have jurisdiction on this matter and quash the decision below.

The reading of Allen's offers as espoused by the Respondents and the Fifth District was unreasonable under these circumstances and in contravention of this Court's direction in Nichols . Each proposal clearly and consistently used the singular term "PLAINTIFF," which was defined as W. Riley Allen in paragraph 2. Moreover, paragraph 3 indicated that each proposal was designed to settle "any and all claims of PLAINTIFF against [RESPONDENT]," which by its clear terms suggested that the only parties to be affected by the proposal would be Allen and the designated Respondent. In reading the entirety of this proposal, the only reasonable interpretation is that Allen offered to settle his claims with only the Respondent specified in each respective proposal.

If two codefendants each receive a proposal for settlement, in which they are specifically named, each codefendant should possess all the information necessary to determine whether to settle. See Nichols , 932 So.2d at 1079 ("[T]he settlement proposal [must] be sufficiently clear and definite to allow the offeree to make an informed decision without needing clarification."). In this context, it appears disingenuous to assert that there exists a legitimate question as to whether one codefendant's acceptance could have settled the offeror's claim against the other codefendant.

The Respondents' interpretation of the proposal for settlement ignores the well-established principle that "the intention of the parties must be determined from an examination of the entire contract and not from separate phrases or paragraphs." Moore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 916 So.2d 871, 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Thus, any potential ambiguity in paragraph 5 is resolved by examining the proposal for settlement as a whole.

Therefore, we conclude that the proposal was unambiguous for the purpose of determining Allen's entitlement to attorney's fees.

CONCLUSION

Reading the plain language of Allen's offers, we hold that these offers to settle his claims against the Respondents were unambiguous. The "nitpicking" of these offers by the district court below to find otherwise unnecessarily injected ambiguity into these proceedings and created more judicial labor, not less. Cf. Nichols , 932 So.2d at 1079. Furthermore, the plain language of both section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 indicate that Allen's entitlement to attorney's fees was actualized after he submitted sufficient offers and obtained satisfactory judgments in his favor. Therefore, we quash the decision below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, QUINCE, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion.

POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON, J., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurring.

I fully concur in the majority's conclusion that the proposal for settlement in this case was unambiguous, and thus enforceable. Majority op. at 1211. I write separately to, once again, highlight the proliferation of litigation surrounding proposals to settle, which runs counter to the entire purpose of these proposals-to reduce litigation. In light of the exorbitant amount of litigation, I urge courts to focus on the goal of reducing litigation when reviewing a proposal for settlement. Additionally, because it is "impossible to eliminate all ambiguity," courts must remember that a proposal need only "be sufficiently clear and definite to allow the offeree to make an informed decision without needing clarification." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols , 932 So.2d 1067, 1079 (Fla. 2006).

As the majority explains, proposals for settlement are governed by section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2017), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. Majority op. at 1210. Under section 768.79, if a plaintiff serves a proposal for settlement, which the defendant does not accept "and the plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent greater" than the proposal, the plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees. § 768.79(1). The defendant can, likewise, recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees if the plaintiff fails to accept the defendant's proposal and "the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than" the defendant's proposal. Id. Rule 1.442 sets forth the procedure for serving proposals for settlement, the form these proposals should take, and the substance they should include.

This Court has explained that rule 1.442"was implemented solely to encourage settlements in order to eliminate trials if possible." Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort , 553 So.2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989) ; see Cheek v. McGowan Elec. Supply Co. , 511 So.2d 977, 981 (Fla. 1987). Despite the intended purpose of the rule, however, I have expressed concern as to "whether either the rule or the statute is fulfilling its intended purpose of encouraging settlement or at times is having the opposite effect of increasing litigation." Campbell v. Goldman , 959 So.2d 223, 227 (Fla. 2007) (Pariente, J., specially concurring); see Lamb v. Matetzschk , 906 So.2d 1037, 1042-43 (Fla. 2005) (Pariente, C.J., specially concurring); Sec. Prof'ls Inc. v. Segall , 685 So.2d 1381, 1384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

In Lamb , the Court interpreted rule 1.442"to require differentiated offers of judgment, regardless of whether the offer emanates from or is directed to joint parties who have a common interest." 906 So.2d at 1042 (Pariente, C.J., specially concurring). Specifically, the Court "prohibit[ed] a joint offer by a plaintiff directed towards two defendants, one of whom [wa]s only vicariously liable for the acts of the other defendant." Id. at 1044 (Pariente, C.J., specially concurring). I questioned whether this approach would actually foster the primary goal of rule 1.442 to encourage settlements and reduce litigation, particularly in cases "where the liability of one defendant is based on vicarious liability and the issue of vicarious liability is undisputed." Id. (Pariente, C.J., specially concurring).

Likewise, in Campbell , I "reluctantly agree[d]" with the majority's conclusion that section 768.79 and rule 1.442 "require[d] that an offer of settlement cite the Florida law on which it is based." 959 So.2d at 227 (Pariente, J., specially concurring). My reluctance stemmed from the fact that "there was no lack of clarity, uncertainty, or confusion" in the offer in Campbell , because although the plaintiff's offer did not mention the statute, the offer did specify that it was made pursuant to rule 1.442. Id. (Pariente, J., specially concurring). Thus, it was a minor omission, not an actual ambiguity, that spawned an unnecessary amount of litigation.

This case presents another example of unnecessary litigation prompted by a clearly unambiguous proposal for settlement. As the majority explains, by "nitpicking" the precise wording of the proposals in this case, the district court "unnecessarily injected ambiguity into these proceedings and created more judicial labor, not less." Majority op. at 1217. Rather than comb through the terms of a proposal in search of ambiguity, I again urge courts to refrain "from 'nitpicking,' " and find a proposal unenforceable only when there is a reasonable ambiguity as to its meaning. Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp. , 202 So.3d 846, 853 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Carey-All Transp., Inc. v. Newby , 989 So.2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ).

POLSTON, J., dissenting.

Because the Fifth District's decision in Nunez v. Allen , 194 So.3d 554, 556 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), does not expressly and directly conflict with the decisions argued by the Petitioner during jurisdictional briefing, this Court does not have the constitutional authority to review this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Specifically, this case is distinguishable from Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp. , 202 So.3d 846 (Fla. 2016). In Anderson , 202 So.3d at 849, 854-55, this Court considered whether the term "Plaintiff" in separate proposals for settlement from two different plaintiffs to multiple defendants could reasonably be construed to include both plaintiffs. This Court held that the proposals for settlement were unambiguous as they were clearly only intended to settle the claims of the individual plaintiff named in the proposals. Id. In contrast, in this case, there was only one plaintiff who sent two proposals for settlement to two different defendants, a father and son. Nunez , 194 So.3d at 556. The Fifth District determined that the proposals for settlement were ambiguous because it was unclear whether the language "all damages claimed by the Plaintiff" (where both defendants were coextensively liable for all of the alleged damages) meant that payment of the delineated amount (which was the same figure in both proposals) would settle the case as to one or both of the defendants. Id. at 558. Therefore, because there was only one plaintiff in Nunez rather than the two plaintiffs involved in Anderson , and because different clauses were analyzed, Nunez and Anderson do not conflict.

Additionally, Nunez is not in conflict with Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Alabama , 202 So.3d 391 (Fla. 2016). In Kuhajda , 202 So.3d at 395, this Court considered whether an offer for settlement must meet a requirement stated in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 that is not listed in section 768.79, Florida Statutes. This Court in Kuhajda , 202 So.3d at 395, also considered whether "the failure to include the attorney's fees language in the offer of judgment" created ambiguity when attorney's fees were not sought in the pleadings. Therefore, because Kuhajda addressed different issues of law than Nunez , the decisions do not conflict.

Accordingly, because there is no express and direct conflict between Nunez and the decisions argued by the parties during jurisdictional briefing, this Court does not have the authority to review this case. I respectfully dissent.

CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON, J., concur.

      Hereinafter, Gabriel and Jairo Nunez may be referred to collectively as Respondents or individually according to their first names.

      Tellingly, the dissent states that this Court's jurisprudence "in this area of the law seems inconsistently applied and unpredictable," but "[e]ven if there are other cases ... in conflict, I would not exercise jurisdiction." Dissenting op. at 1219 note 3. However, the purpose of conflict review is the elimination of inconsistent views about the same question of law. See Gerald Kogan & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court , 18 Nova L. Rev. 1151, 1231 (1994). Therefore it is paramount this Court exercise jurisdiction to eliminate any inconsistencies in this area of law. See, e.g. , Wainwright v. Taylor , 476 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1985).

      In my view, our jurisprudence in this area of the law seems inconsistently applied and unpredictable. Even if there are other cases cited by the majority (not argued by the Petitioner) that are in conflict, I would not exercise jurisdiction.