author: LAGOA, J.

text:
    Scott J. ISRAEL, Sheriff, Appellant, v. Ron DESANTIS, Governor, Appellee.
    No. SC19-552
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 23, 2019
    Benedict P. Kuehne, Michael T. Davis, and Susan Dmitrovsky of Kuehne Davis Law, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Stuart N. Kaplan of Kaplan & Parker, LLP, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, for Appellant
    Joe Jacquot, General Counsel, Nicholas A. Primrose, John MacIver, Colleen Ernst, and James Uthmeier, Deputy General Counsel, Executive Office of the Governor, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee
   LAGOA, J.

Scott J. Israel ("Israel"), the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, appeals the circuit court's dismissal of his petition for writ of quo warranto, challenging Governor Ron DeSantis's authority to suspend him from office in Executive Order 19-14. Israel appealed the circuit court's order to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which certified the appeal to this Court as one of great public importance requiring immediate resolution by this Court. We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(5), Fla. Const., and affirm the circuit court's order dismissing Israel's petition.

BACKGROUND

In 2016, Israel was reelected as the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, for a four-year term. Following Israel's reelection, two mass shootings occurred during Israel's term of office: the January 6, 2017, shooting at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport in Broward County and the February 14, 2018, school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida.

On January 2, 2019, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission Report was released. Thereafter, on January 11, 2019, Governor Ron DeSantis issued Executive Order 19-14, suspending Israel from office. Executive Order 19-14 alleged that certain actions by Israel "constitute[d] neglect of duty and incompetence." In support of these grounds for Israel's suspension, Executive Order 19-14 asserts various factual allegations, based in part on the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission Report and an internal investigation into the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport shooting. Executive Order 19-14 details how Israel allegedly "egregiously failed in his duties as Sheriff for Broward County," stating that two separate reports "specifically found that Sheriff Israel has not and does not provide frequent training for his deputies resulting in the deaths of twenty-two individuals and a response that is inadequate for the future safety of Broward County residents" and "specifically found that Sheriff Israel has not implemented proper protocols to provide guaranteed access to emergency services, nor proper protocols to have timely, unified command centers set up to control a crime scene leading to confusion, a lack of recognized chain-of-command, and ultimately a failure to contain the dangerous situation."

On March 7, 2019, Israel filed a petition for writ of quo warranto in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, alleging that Governor DeSantis exceeded his constitutional authority when suspending Israel. On April 4, 2019, the circuit court issued a written order dismissing Israel's petition. In its order, the circuit court found that "the allegations set forth in Executive Order 19-14 [were] sufficient to support the specified grounds of neglect of duty and incompetence, and therefore, [met] the jurisdictional requirements for suspension." The circuit court further found that Executive Order 19-14 "alleges facts that support and bear a reasonable relation to the stated grounds" of neglect of duty and incompetence.

On April 5, 2019, Israel appealed the circuit court's order to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. On April 9, 2019, the Fourth District certified the case for pass-through jurisdiction, finding that the appeal involved a question of great public importance that required immediate resolution by this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Since the nature of an extraordinary writ is not of absolute right, the granting of such writ lies within the discretion of the court." Topps v. State , 865 So.2d 1253, 1257 (Fla. 2004). Accordingly, we generally review a circuit court's decision on a petition for writ of quo warranto for an abuse of discretion. See Detzner v. Anstead , 256 So.3d 820, 822 n.4 (Fla. 2018). However, because Israel's petition also concerns matters of constitutional interpretation, our review of the circuit court's constitutional interpretation is de novo. See Zingale v. Powell , 885 So.2d 277, 280 (Fla. 2004).

ANALYSIS

Article V, section 3(b)(8) of the Florida Constitution authorizes the judiciary to issue writs of quo warranto "to state officers and state agencies." "Quo warranto is used 'to determine whether a state officer or agency has improperly exercised a power or right derived from the State.' " League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Scott , 232 So.3d 264, 265 (Fla. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist , 999 So.2d 601, 607 (Fla. 2008) ). The Governor is a state officer. See Whiley v. Scott , 79 So.3d 702, 707 (Fla. 2011).

Israel contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of quo warranto, arguing that Governor DeSantis lacks the authority to suspend Israel from office because Executive Order 19-14 does not provide an "objective factual predicate" to conclude Israel neglected or incompetently performed a specific "duty for which he was bound by law to perform."

We begin our analysis with the plain language of article IV, section 7(a) of the Constitution. Zingale , 885 So.2d at 282. Where the language of the Constitution "is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must be enforced as written," as the "constitutional language must be allowed to 'speak for itself.' " Fla. Soc'y of Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometric Ass'n , 489 So.2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 1986) ; accord Pleus v. Crist , 14 So.3d 941, 944 (Fla. 2009) ("If that language is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must be enforced as written." (quoting Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger , 990 So.2d 503, 511 (Fla. 2008) ) ).

Article IV, section 7(a) of the Constitution provides that the Governor "may suspend from office ... any county officer, for malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, permanent inability to perform official duties, or commission of a felony." Once the Governor suspends a public official, the Florida Senate has the exclusive role of determining whether to remove or reinstate that suspended official. Art. IV, § 7(b), Fla. Const.

As we recently stated, the judiciary has a "limited role in reviewing the exercise of the suspension power, which the Constitution commits to the governor and which inherently involves 'judgment and discretion.' " Jackson v. DeSantis , No. SC19-329, 268 So.3d 662, 663, 2019 WL 1614572 (Fla. Apr. 16, 2019) (quoting State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman , 115 Fla. 119, 155 So. 129, 133 (1934) ). Where an executive order of suspension "names one or more of the grounds embraced in the Constitution and clothes or supports it with alleged facts sufficient to constitute the grounds or cause of suspension, it is sufficient." Hardie , 155 So. at 133. Similarly, the Senate's judgment of removal or reinstatement "is final, and will not be reviewed by the courts," as under the constitutional process for suspension and removal, the "Senate is nothing less than a court provided to examine into and determine whether or not the Governor exercises the power of suspension in keeping with the constitutional mandate." Id. at 134. Assuming that the office of the suspended officer falls under one of the constitutionally enumerated categories and the Governor has filed the executive order of suspension with the custodian of records, the plain language of the Constitution excludes the judiciary from involving itself in the suspension and removal process save for a limited exception.

Turning to that exception, the Constitution requires the Governor to issue an executive order of suspension "stating the grounds" of the officer's suspension. While a suspended officer may seek judicial review of an executive order of suspension to ensure that the order satisfies that constitutional requirement, the judiciary's role is limited to determining whether the executive order, on its face, sets forth allegations of fact relating to one of the constitutionally enumerated grounds of suspension. Id. at 133. Thus, "[a] mere arbitrary or blank order of suspension without supporting allegations of fact, even though it named one or more of the constitutional grounds of suspension, would not meet the requirements of the Constitution." Id. However, where the executive order of suspension contains factual allegations relating to an enumerated ground for suspension, the Constitution prohibits the courts from examining or determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those facts, as the "matter of reviewing the charges and the evidence to support them is solely in the discretion of the Senate." Id. at 134 ; see also State ex rel. Kelly v. Sullivan , 52 So.2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1951) ("It is the function of the Senate, and never that of the Courts, to review the evidence upon which the Governor suspends an officer in the event the Governor recommends his removal from office."). Therefore, the factual allegations in an executive order of suspension must satisfy only a low threshold under the judiciary's limited, facial review, and "if, on the whole, [the executive order] contains allegations that bear some reasonable relation to the charge made against the officer, it will be adjudged as sufficient." Hardie , 155 So. at 133.

Under this standard, Executive Order 19-14 satisfies our limited review. Executive Order 19-14 states that at the time of his suspension, Israel was serving as the Sheriff of Broward County, which is a "county officer" under article VIII, section 1(d) of the Florida Constitution. Executive Order 19-14 names the grounds for Israel's suspension-neglect of duty and incompetence-and provides various factual allegations that reasonably relate to those grounds of suspension.

Israel argues, however, that article IV, section 7(a) of the Constitution limits the grounds for suspension to a statutory duty prescribed to his office, which he claims Executive Order 19-14 fails to identify. "[I]n construing a constitutional provision, we are not at liberty to add words that were not placed there originally or to ignore words that were expressly placed there at the time of adoption of the provision." Pleus , 14 So.3d at 945. There is nothing in the plain language of article IV, section 7(a) stating that the grounds for suspending a public official are solely limited to his or her statutory duties.

Moreover, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "duty" found in article IV, section 7(a) of the Constitution offers no support for Israel's argument. "[U]nless the text of a constitution suggests that a technical meaning is intended, words used in the constitution should be given their usual and ordinary meaning .... To this effect, 'a dictionary may provide the popular and common-sense meaning of terms ....' " Lawnwood , 990 So.2d at 512 (quoting Advisory Opinion to Governor-1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades) , 706 So.2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1997) ). According to Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 259 (1967), "duty" is defined in part as "the action required by one's position or occupation." See also American Heritage Dictionary 573 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "duty" as "[a]n act or a course of action that is required of one by position, social custom, law, or religion").

Furthermore, in Hardie , this Court explained that with regard to the Governor's constitutional suspension power,

Neglect of duty has reference to the neglect or failure on the part of a public officer to do and perform some duty or duties laid on him as such by virtue of his office or which is required of him by law. It is not material whether the neglect be willful, through malice, ignorance, or oversight. When such neglect is grave and the frequency of it is such as to endanger or threaten the public welfare it is gross.

155 So. at 132. "Incompetency ... has reference to any physical, moral, or intellectual quality, the lack of which incapacitates one to perform the duties of his office" and "may arise from gross ignorance of official duties or gross carelessness in the discharge of them ... [or] from lack of judgment and discretion." Id. at 133. A review of Executive Order 19-14 shows that it articulates factual allegations that bear a reasonable relation to the grounds of neglect of duty and incompetence as those terms are understood in their usual and ordinary meaning.

CONCLUSION

The Constitution establishes a clear and unambiguous process for suspension and removal. The Governor may suspend for one or more of the grounds enumerated in article IV, section 7(a), and the Senate may remove or reinstate the officer pursuant to article IV, section 7(b). The Constitution reserves to the Senate the sole responsibility for reviewing the evidence supporting the Governor's executive order of suspension, and it is the constitutional role of the Senate to consider whether the suspended officer merits removal or reinstatement. Where the suspended officer falls within one of the constitutionally enumerated categories and the Governor has filed the executive order of suspension with the state custodian of records, the judiciary's sole role in this process is limited to a facial review of the executive order of suspension to determine whether it contains allegations that bear some reasonable relation to the charge made against the officer. This is "due entirely to the fact that the Constitution itself has set up its own special court to try the matter, namely the state Senate." Hardie , 155 So. at 136 (Davis, C.J., concurring).

Accordingly, we find that the Governor has satisfied the constitutional requirements set forth in article IV, section 7(a) of the Constitution and has the authority to suspend Israel from the office of Sheriff of Broward County. We therefore affirm the circuit court's order denying Israel's petition for writ of quo warranto.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, LUCK, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur.

MUÑIZ, J., concurs with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON and LUCK, JJ., concur.

LABARGA, J., concurs in result only with an opinion.

MUÑIZ, J., concurring.

I concur in the majority opinion but write briefly to address the claim at the heart of Sheriff Israel's petition, i.e. , the assertion that the factual allegations underlying the suspension order are disconnected from Israel's statutory duties. Israel's view of those duties is far too narrow. Section 30.15(e), Florida Statutes (2018), makes sheriffs "in person or by deputy" the "conservators of the peace" in their respective counties. Relatedly, section 30.07, Florida Statutes (2018), authorizes sheriffs to appoint deputies and makes sheriffs responsible for the deputies' neglect in office. A sheriff's myriad day-to-day functions and responsibilities-including the development of policies and the training and supervision of employees-are the essential means of carrying out these overarching statutory obligations. And it requires no imagination to see the connection between these obligations and the significant performance deficiencies alleged in Executive Order 19-14. Of course, Israel is free to dispute the merits of the suspension order's factual allegations and to argue about the proper role of a governor in supervising local officials. But the appropriate forum for those debates is the Senate. It is not this Court's role to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence or to second-guess the governor's exercise of a discretionary function under the Constitution.

CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON and LUCK, JJ., concur.

LABARGA, J., concurring in result only.

As the circuit court correctly noted in its order, this case presents the narrow question of whether the executive order suspending Sheriff Israel alleges facts sufficient to support the suspension on the stated grounds. While I agree that Executive Order 19-14 fulfills this requirement, I write to emphasize that our review of these matters is not pro forma. Indeed, executive orders suspending officials pursuant to article IV, section 7(a), of the Florida Constitution must allege specific, detailed facts which support and allow for meaningful review by the Senate. This requirement, in my view, is of paramount importance when the official in question was duly elected by the voters. Furthermore, the suspension order must provide the official in question with sufficient notice of the allegations to allow the official to mount a meaningful defense.

This Court noted in State ex rel. Hardee v. Allen , 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222, 224 (1937), that "[i]t is not necessary that the allegation[s] of fact be as specific as the allegations of an indictment or information in a criminal prosecution." The allegations must, however, identify the specific instances of alleged misconduct with sufficient detail to facilitate meaningful review by the Senate, by this Court when applicable, and to allow the official to mount a defense. An executive order which presents only general or conclusory allegations will not suffice. This is not a demanding standard, but it is nonetheless a substantive requirement imposed by the Florida Constitution, and this Court is obligated to vacate any suspension which does not satisfy it.

      On January 29, 2019, Israel sought formal review on the merits of his suspension from the Florida Senate, as provided for under article IV, section 7(b) of the Florida Constitution. The Senate scheduled a hearing on Israel's suspension for the week of April 8, 2019, but abated its review pending resolution of Israel's petition.

      Article IV, section 7(a) authorizes the governor to suspend from office "any state officer not subject to impeachment, any officer of the militia not in the active service of the United States, or any county officer." Accordingly, the suspension power may be applied to suspend public officials who are elected by the citizens of Florida. The office of sheriff is not subject to impeachment, and therefore a governor has the authority to suspend a sheriff pursuant to this provision, as occurred in this case.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LABARGA, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    CITIZENS of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. Julie Imanuel BROWN, etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. SC18-213
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 25, 2019
    J.R. Kelly, Public Counsel, Stephanie A. Morse, Associate Public Counsel, and Charles J. Rehwinkel, Deputy Public Counsel, Office of Public Counsel, The Florida Legislature, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant
    Keith C. Hetrick, General Counsel, Samantha M. Cibula, Attorney Supervisor, and Rosanne Gervasi, Senior Attorney, Florida Public Service Commission, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee Florida Public Service Commission
    Stuart H. Singer and Pascual A. Oliu of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and John T. Butler, Assistant General Counsel - Regulatory, and María José Moncada, Senior Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company, Juno Beach, Florida, for Appellee Florida Power & Light Company
   LABARGA, J.

On behalf of the Citizens of the State of Florida, the Office of Public Counsel (OPC) appeals a decision of the Florida Public Service Commission (PSC) allowing the Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) to recover certain environmental compliance costs from ratepayers pursuant to section 366.8255, Florida Statutes (2018). See In re Envtl. Cost Recovery Clause , Order No. PSC-2018-0014-FOF-EI, 2018 WL 334384 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Jan. 5, 2018). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm the PSC's decision.

BACKGROUND

FPL operates the Turkey Point Power Plant (Turkey Point), an 11,000-acre facility located on the shores of Biscayne Bay and Card Sound, roughly twenty-five miles south of Miami. Among the five power-generation units at Turkey Point are two nuclear units, referred to as Unit 3 and Unit 4.

Adjacent to the west side of Turkey Point is the Cooling Canal System (CCS), a 5,900-acre network of unlined canals which serves as the cooling system for Units 3 and 4. Units 3 and 4 are cooled by taking water from the CCS into a heat transfer infrastructure in the power plant. The heated water is then discharged from the power plant into the CCS, where it circulates and cools as it returns to the intake point. By the time the water again reaches the intake point around forty-eight hours later, its temperature has reduced sufficiently to allow it to be useful for cooling. The water is then pumped back out of the CCS into the heat exchange infrastructure, and the cycle begins again. The CCS is a closed-loop system, meaning it does not take in any water from surrounding surface waters, nor does it discharge water into them. Because the CCS is unlined, however, its waters percolate into and mix with the surrounding groundwater.

FPL constructed the CCS in 1971 pursuant to an agreement with the United States Department of Justice. The canals were dug by dragline, and saline groundwater was allowed to naturally fill them via seepage. At that time, the water in the CCS was the same salinity as the adjacent waters of Biscayne Bay. The water in the CCS is recharged naturally by further groundwater inflows and by rainwater, and water leaves the CCS through evaporation and seepage. From 1972 until 2013, no external water sources were used-such as pumping additional water from Biscayne Bay-to augment the effect of annual precipitation and groundwater inflow on the water level in the CCS. As a result, the salinity of the water in the CCS has increased over time: in 2013, the average salinity of the water in the CCS was 70 Practical Salinity Units (PSU), more than double the average salinity of seawater.

The CCS sits atop the Biscayne Aquifer, which extends to the north and west of the CCS. Although some layers of the Biscayne Aquifer contained saline water as early as the 1940s, the shallower layers formed a "lens" of fresh water at the top of the Aquifer. At the time the CCS was constructed, FPL understood the salinity of the waters in the CCS would increase over time. Water of higher salinity is denser than water of lower salinity and will tend to sink through lower-salinity water if placed on top of it.

To prevent CCS water from migrating inland toward the Everglades and to protect the freshwater lens in the top layers of the Biscayne Aquifer, FPL constructed an eighteen-foot-deep interceptor ditch along the western edge of the CCS. As its name suggests, the interceptor ditch's purpose was to act as a physical barrier between the CCS and adjacent waters. Pursuant to a 1972 agreement with the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), FPL was required to operate the interceptor ditch in such a way as to ensure that movement of saline waters into adjacent groundwater did not exceed the amount which would occur without the existence of the CCS.

The 1972 agreement also required FPL to monitor nearby groundwater for any effects caused by the operation of the CCS. This agreement has been modified several times through supplemental agreements between the SFWMD, or its predecessors, and FPL. The Fourth Supplemental Agreement, which became effective in 1983, reduced FPL's monitoring requirements in light of FPL's satisfactory compliance with the provisions of earlier agreements and a perceived reduced need for monitoring. Studies conducted over the years by researchers working under contract with FPL identified increased salinity in some layers of the Biscayne Aquifer, but ascribed these measurements to seasonal fluctuations in salinity caused by a variety of natural processes, such as variable rainwater inputs in wetter or drier years.

In 2008, FPL applied for regulatory permissions to begin a project, known as the Uprate, to increase the generating capacity of Turkey Point. As part of the Uprate, and in light of the increased thermal load the Uprate would place on the CCS, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued new Conditions of Certification for the uprated units. The Conditions of Certification specifically noted that the Uprate could cause the temperature and salinity of the CCS to increase, and imposed conditions to address these changes. Condition X "sets forth the framework for new monitoring and, as may be needed, abatement or mitigation measures" with regard to impacts of the CCS on nearby surface waters and groundwater. Condition X also required FPL to enter into a Fifth Supplemental Agreement with the SFWMD laying out the details of the new monitoring arrangement.

In October 2009, FPL and the SFWMD entered into the Fifth Supplemental Agreement which, together with the Conditions of Certification, created what is known as the 2009 Monitoring Plan. The agreement stated that the SFWMD had evaluated "recent monitoring data" which indicated "the interceptor ditch may not be effective in restricting the movement of saline water westward from the [CCS]." It further noted that "a full delineation" of past, present, and future impacts of the CCS on nearby groundwater was "a necessary first step in evaluating existing conditions and, if necessary, identifying potential solutions to abate, mitigate, or remediate the movement of saline water and other water quality and ecological impacts from the [CCS]." To accomplish this, the Fifth Supplemental Agreement required FPL to implement the 2009 Monitoring Plan. It further provided that, if the SFWMD determined the expanded monitoring required by the 2009 Monitoring Plan revealed a need for corrective action, FPL and the SFWMD would consult with one another to identify and implement measures to mitigate, abate, or remediate the impacts of the CCS.

FPL petitioned the PSC to allow recovery of the costs of implementing the 2009 Monitoring Plan pursuant to section 366.8255, Florida Statutes, and the PSC approved recovery of those costs. See In re Envtl. Cost Recovery Clause , Order No. PSC-09-0759-FOF-EI, 2009 WL 4021870 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Nov. 18, 2009). In its order approving recovery, the PSC approved a stipulation that "the water quality issues the [2009 Monitoring Plan] is being undertaken to address relate to the operation of the Turkey Point plant as a whole and not just the [Uprate]." Id. at 13 (emphasis added).

Between 2009 and 2016, FPL provided updated testimony regarding the status of the 2009 Monitoring Plan and FPL's actions in response to consultations with environmental regulators during that period arising out of data gathered through the 2009 Monitoring Plan. Those data revealed that, over the decades of the CCS's operation, a hydraulic gradient had formed in which the hypersaline water of the CCS seeped into the lower-salinity waters of the Biscayne Aquifer below, forming a plume of hypersaline water that is spreading through the Aquifer. Once the water directly below the CCS was saturated to the depth of the less-transmissive limestone layer which defines the lower boundary of the Biscayne Aquifer, the hypersaline plume began to migrate westward through more laterally transmissive layers. By 2014, monitoring data allowed regulators to conclude that CCS waters had infiltrated into the Biscayne Aquifer as much as three miles west of the CCS, and that the CCS was releasing, on average, 600,000 pounds of salt per day into the Biscayne Aquifer.

On April 16, 2013, the SFWMD issued written notice to FPL that the SFWMD had determined saline intrusions into the Biscayne Aquifer had exceeded levels that would have been present in the absence of the CCS. Pursuant to the Fifth Supplemental Agreement, the SFWMD directed FPL to begin consultations to identify mitigation, abatement, or remediation measures. The Miami-Dade County Department of Environmental Resources Management (DERM) issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to FPL on October 2, 2015, alleging the westward migration of hypersaline water from the CCS violated Miami-Dade County Code section 24-42(4). DEP issued an NOV of its own on April 25, 2016.

Following issuance of the respective NOVs, FPL entered into a Consent Agreement (CA) with DERM, and a Consent Order (CO) with DEP. The CA stated that "DERM maintains there is hypersaline water attributable to FPL's actions in the groundwaters outside the boundaries of the [CCS], which exceeds County water standards and criteria." The CA further states that FPL "acknowledges" the presence of hypersaline water in those areas and "agrees to the terms of [the CA] without admitting the allegations made by the ... NOV."

The CA requires FPL to "freshen" the CCS by pumping fresh water-approximately fourteen million gallons per day-from the Upper Floridan Aquifer into the CCS. It also requires FPL to construct a Recovery Well System (RWS) to "intercept, capture, contain, and retract the hypersaline groundwater" to the boundaries of the CCS. The RWS would accomplish this by pumping hypersaline water out of the Biscayne Aquifer and injecting it into a naturally saline feature known as the Boulder Zone Formation, located 3,200 feet beneath the ground surface. FPL's models predicted the RWS would cause the hypersaline plume to stop expanding after three years of operation, would begin to retract it after five years, and would achieve complete retraction of the plume into the boundaries of the CCS after ten years.

The CO contains similar provisions, requiring FPL to maintain the salinity of the CCS at or below 34 PSU, to halt the intrusion of hypersaline CCS water into nearby groundwater, and to mitigate the impact of the hypersaline plume. The CO independently requires FPL to operate the RWS and requires the extent of the hypersaline plume to be established by Continuous Surface Electromagnetic Mapping.

In 2016, FPL petitioned the PSC for recovery of actual and estimated environmental compliance costs, including those associated with the CO and CA. At that time, the PSC deferred consideration of those costs until its 2017 Environmental Cost Recovery docket.

In re Envtl. Cost Recovery Clause , Order No. PSC-16-0535-FOF-EI, at 12, 2016 WL 6947159 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Nov. 22, 2016). The PSC held hearings in its 2017 Environmental Cost Recovery docket on October 25-27, 2017. During those hearings and in its briefing before the PSC, FPL argued the PSC had, in its 2009 order, approved the 2009 Monitoring Plan itself for cost recovery pursuant to section 366.8255, and that FPL had presented evidence at that time "that the project may need to progress from monitoring to implementation of taking required corrective actions, if warranted by the results of the monitoring." FPL contended the costs of the CO and CA were reasonable and prudent environmental compliance costs incurred through the implementation of agreements with environmental regulators, and therefore should be recoverable through the section 366.8255 mechanism. In all, FPL estimated it would spend $ 176 million in environmental compliance costs "to fulfill its obligations under the [CA] and [CO]" by 2027.

OPC, the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, and the Florida Industrial Power Users Group opposed FPL's petition. OPC emphasized that the costs FPL sought to recover were incurred as "the direct result of FPL's repeated decades-long failures to prudently manage its nuclear facility's cooling canal water." OPC contended that to regard the costs at issue in this case as outgrowths of the 2009 Monitoring Plan mischaracterized those costs, given that the costs are an order of magnitude greater than the costs of the 2009 Monitoring Plan. OPC further argued that the section 366.8255 mechanism allows "timely recovery of costs imposed by prospective regulations to prevent harm," but does not allow recovery of costs of efforts to remediate past environmental harm. OPC contended that, because of the "clearly preventive orientation" of section 366.8255, the costs of complying with the CO and CA do not qualify for recovery because the harm in question has already occurred.

The PSC approved FPL's recovery of $ 132,577,031 as costs of compliance with the CO and CA pursuant to section 366.8255. In re Envtl. Cost Recovery Clause , Order No. PSC-2018-0014-FOF-EI, at 5, 22-23. The PSC rejected OPC's argument that remediation costs were per se ineligible for recovery under section 366.8255, and held FPL could recover its costs of complying with the CO and CA through the section 366.8255 mechanism. Id. at 8.

The PSC also found "[t]he costs FPL is requesting to recover are the result of the anticipated evolution of the original [2009 Monitoring Plan]." Id. at 18. The PSC noted its 2009 order approving the 2009 Monitoring Plan had specifically acknowledged the potential for mitigation costs to arise out of the expanded monitoring, and that the 2009 order had stated the 2009 Monitoring Plan had been undertaken to address water quality issues linked to the operation of Turkey Point generally, beyond just those connected with the Uprate. Id. at 17. Therefore, the PSC found, the 2009 Monitoring Plan "is inclusive of the plant as a whole." Id. at 18. The PSC reasoned that "an increase in costs itself is not a change in scope of a project," and referenced testimony presented by FPL that environmental compliance programs routinely evolve from monitoring to mitigation and remediation. Id. at 17-18.

OPC appealed, arguing that section 366.8255, Florida Statutes, limits cost recovery to costs incurred in preventing future environmental harm. OPC further contends the PSC erred when it concluded the costs of implementing the CO and CA were anticipated evolutions of the 2009 Monitoring Plan.

ANALYSIS

Protecting the Environment

Section 366.8255, Florida Statutes, also known as the Environmental Cost Recovery Clause or ECRC, allows a public utility to petition the PSC for recovery of "prudently incurred environmental compliance costs ... through an environmental compliance cost-recovery factor that is separate and apart from the utility's base rates." § 366.8255(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). "Environmental compliance costs" are defined as "all costs or expenses incurred by an electric utility in complying with environmental laws or regulations." Id. § 366.8255(1)(d). "Environmental laws or regulations" are, in turn, defined as "all federal, state, or local statutes, administrative regulations, orders, ordinances, resolutions, or other requirements that apply to electric utilities and are designed to protect the environment." Id. § 366.8255(1)(c).

OPC contends the phrase "protect the environment" limits recovery of costs under section 366.8255 to costs incurred in preventing future environmental harm, because the word "protect" is inherently forward-looking and any measure which mitigates, remediates, or otherwise cleans up existing harm does not "protect the environment." Therefore, OPC argues, the PSC erred in approving recovery of the costs of compliance with the CO and CA because those costs have been and will be incurred in the course of redressing past environmental harm, not preventing future environmental harm.

This issue presents a question of statutory interpretation by an administrative agency, which we review de novo. Art. V, § 21, Fla. Const. "[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Holly v. Auld , 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey , 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931) ).

The phrase "protect the environment" has a clear and definite meaning. Standing alone, the word "protect" means to safeguard a thing or shield it from injury. See, e.g. , Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 999 (11th ed. 2003). Any prospective element of this definition is a function of cause and effect: a protective measure cannot turn back time and prevent a harm which has already occurred. When the thing to be protected is the environment, however, the relationship between prospective and retrospective measures is more complex. Unlike types of harm which, by their nature, occur as discrete incidents, environmental harm can take the form of ongoing damage caused by a continuous presence of pollutants in a resource or ecosystem. See, e.g. , Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Fleet Credit Corp. , 691 So.2d 512, 513-14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (explaining the "continuing injury to groundwater caused by the current seepage of hazardous substances disposed and discharged on commercial property in the 1980s" and noting that "it is the ongoing contamination, not the initial disposal of wastes, that constitutes a continuing, but abatable, nuisance"). In such a situation, the remediation of past harm through abatement of the pollution-causing source and cleanup of contaminated resources or ecosystems is an essential part of shielding as-yet uncontaminated ecosystems, or portions thereof, from harm. Perhaps unlike some other kinds of protective measures, actions prudently needed to "protect the environment" can primarily remedy existing conditions caused by past actions, provided the harm in question continues to adversely impact the environment. This would be especially true where continuing environmental damage is expected to spread and increase if remedial action is not taken.

The present case illustrates this principle. Hypersaline waters have migrated into the Biscayne Aquifer, and the hypersaline plume from the CCS is causing the interface between fresh and saline water in the Biscayne Aquifer to migrate farther west. The waters of the Biscayne Aquifer are an important natural resource, and the intrusion of saline waters into the Biscayne Aquifer impairs the reasonable and beneficial use of the waters in the Biscayne Aquifer. If the existing hypersaline plume were removed by the RWS but the water in the CCS were not freshened, hypersaline water would continue to infiltrate into the Biscayne Aquifer and the existing harm would continue to expand. If the water in the CCS were freshened but the RWS were not operated, the hypersaline plume would remain in the Biscayne Aquifer and the existing harm would both continue into the future and expand in the future by diffusing farther into the Biscayne Aquifer. By removing the existing hypersaline plume and freshening the CCS, FPL is both remedying the existing harm and preventing future harm. Because of the nature of the environmental harm at issue in this case, prevention and remediation are inextricably intertwined. Safeguarding the Biscayne Aquifer from future saline intrusion requires the cleanup of existing saline intrusion, and that action protects the environment from future harm.

We therefore reject OPC's reading of section 366.8255(1)(c) and affirm the decision of the PSC with respect to this issue.

Evolution of 2009 Monitoring Plan

OPC further argues the PSC erred when it determined the costs of the CO and CA were "the result of the anticipated evolution of the original [2009 Monitoring Plan]," and are therefore within the scope of the 2009 Monitoring Plan, for which the PSC had previously approved recovery. In re Envtl. Cost Recovery Clause , Order No. PSC-2018-0014-FOF-EI, at 17-18. The PSC explained its decision by noting that its 2009 order approving recovery of the costs incurred in implementation of the 2009 Monitoring Plan "specifically included discussion of the potential for mitigation costs." Id. at 17. The PSC further noted its 2009 order had determined that the 2009 Monitoring Plan was concerned with monitoring the environmental impacts of the operation of Turkey Point as a whole and was not limited to monitoring the impacts of the Uprate. Id. at 17-18. The PSC also referred to testimony by FPL witness Michael Sole that "environmental compliance programs evolve based upon information that determines the next appropriate action." Id. at 18. Based upon the record before it in this docket, and upon the language of its 2009 order, the PSC concluded the costs at issue in this case "shall be considered part of the existing [2009 Monitoring Plan]." Id.

The PSC's determination that the costs at issue in this case are an anticipated evolution of the 2009 Monitoring Plan is a finding of fact, which this court will not disturb if it is supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record. Sierra Club v. Brown , 243 So.3d 903, 907-08 (Fla. 2018).

We conclude there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the PSC's conclusion. The Conditions of Certification for the Uprate and the Fifth Supplemental Agreement with the SFWMD both characterize the 2009 Monitoring Plan as an investigative first step to determine the environmental impacts of the Uprate specifically and also FPL's operation of Turkey Point more generally. Moreover, by requiring FPL to consult with the SFWMD regarding mitigation, abatement, and remediation measures if the data indicated the need for such measures, the Fifth Supplemental Agreement-out of which the 2009 Monitoring Plan arose-contemplated the possibility that the 2009 Monitoring Plan could evolve to include active environmental protection measures.

As the record reflects, this is precisely what occurred: the monitoring data led environmental regulators to conclude the CCS was causing violations of applicable groundwater quality standards, and those conclusions resulted in the CO and CA. This evolution from monitoring to remediation is reflected in the regular updates FPL provided to the PSC between 2009 and 2015 regarding the expectations of the 2009 Monitoring Plan, the initial corrective actions FPL took, and finally the requirements of the CO and CA themselves. We therefore conclude the PSC's finding on this issue is supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record and affirm the PSC's decision with respect to this issue.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hereby affirm the decision of the Florida Public Service Commission.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, LAGOA, LUCK, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur.

      At the time, the SFWMD was known as the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District.

      The parties also refer to the 2009 Monitoring Plan as the Turkey Point Cooling Canal Monitoring Plan Project, or TPCCMP.

      The CA was later amended to include monitoring and remediation for exceedances of permitted ammonia levels in Biscayne Bay. That amendment is referred to as the CAA.

      Our decision today does not address situations in which the environmental harm is completely contained and the remediation for which the utility seeks cost recovery would not be preventing additional future harm. That question is not presented in this case, and we render no opinion as to that issue.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Larry James BARBER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC18-1739
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 25, 2019
    Larry James Barber, pro se, Crawfordville, Florida, for Petitioner
    No appearance for Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on the petition of Larry James Barber for a writ of prohibition. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. Const. Petitioner Barber has pro se filed fifteen petitions or notices with this Court since February 13, 1998. On December 19, 2018, we dismissed the instant petition, expressly retained jurisdiction, and ordered Barber to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief in this Court related to circuit court case number 131981CF0242300001XX. See Barber v. State , No. SC18-1739, 2018 WL 6720521 (Fla. Dec. 19, 2018).

We now find that Barber has failed to show cause why he should not be barred, and we sanction him as set forth below.

In Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court (Miami-Dade County) case number 131981CF0242300001XX, Barber was convicted of one count of robbery with a firearm; he was sentenced to life imprisonment on April 7, 1982. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Barber v. State , 438 So.2d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

Since February 13, 1998, Barber has demonstrated a pattern of vexatious filing of meritless pro se requests for relief in this Court. Including the petition in the instant case, Barber has filed fifteen pro se petitions or notices with this Court since February 13, 1998. The Court has disposed of fourteen of these filings to date, not including the petition in this case. This Court has never granted Barber the relief sought in any of his filings here. Each of the fourteen petitions and notices was denied, dismissed, or transferred to another court for consideration; his petition in this case is no exception.

Barber filed the instant petition for writ of prohibition with this Court on October 16, 2018. The Court dismissed the petition on December 19, 2018, pursuant to Pettway v. State , 776 So.2d 930, 931 (Fla. 2000). In doing so, we expressly retained jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against Barber. On the same day, we ordered Barber to show cause why the Clerk of this Court should not be directed to reject any future pleadings, petitions, motions, letters, documents, or other filings submitted to this Court by him related to case number 131981CF0242300001XX. This Court also directed Barber to show cause why, pursuant to section 944.279(1), Florida Statutes, a certified copy of this Court's findings should not be forwarded to the appropriate institution for disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Florida Department of Corrections.

Upon consideration of Barber's response, we find that his arguments are without merit and that he has failed to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. Therefore, based on Barber's extensive history of filing pro se petitions and requests for relief that were meritless or otherwise inappropriate for this Court's review, we now find that he has abused this Court's limited judicial resources. See Pettway v. McNeil , 987 So.2d 20, 22 (Fla. 2008) (explaining that this Court has previously "exercised the inherent judicial authority to sanction an abusive litigant" and that "[o]ne justification for such a sanction lies in the protection of the rights of others to have the Court conduct timely reviews of their legitimate filings"). If no action is taken, Barber will continue to burden this Court's resources. We further conclude that Barber's prohibition petition filed in this case is a frivolous proceeding brought before this Court by a state prisoner. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2018).

Accordingly, we direct the Clerk of this Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Larry James Barber that are related to case number 131981CF0242300001XX, unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. Furthermore, because we have found Barber's petition to be frivolous, we direct the Clerk of this Court, pursuant to section 944.279(1), Florida Statutes (2018), to forward a copy of this opinion to the Florida Department of Corrections' institution or facility in which Barber is incarcerated.

No motion for rehearing or clarification will be entertained by this Court.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, LAGOA, LUCK, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur.

      See Barber v. State , No. SC18-1739, 2018 WL 6720521 (Fla. Dec. 19, 2018).


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Travis Devon WATKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1061
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 20, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 29, 2019
    Travis Devon Watkins, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Steven Edward Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Roberts and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Charles E. BELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-940
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 20, 2019 Rehearing Denied May 01, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Matthew JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2355
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 12, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 25, 2019
    Matthew Johnson, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Amanda D. Stokes, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Wetherell, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jonathan Rashad PETERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1637
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 22, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 25, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; Jonathan Rashad Peterson, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Wetherell, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Daniel C. YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3760
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 24, 2019
    Daniel C. Young, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Rowe, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Maurice Antonio MOBLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3972
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 27, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 23, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jeffrey SUNDWALL, Appellant, v. FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1429
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 21, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 23, 2019
    Jeffrey Sundwall, pro se, Appellant.
    Brandy Elaine Elliott, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Osterhaus, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Roy S. JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5315
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 20, 2019
    Roy S. Jackson, Appellant, pro se.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Roberts and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Keidrick L. EWING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2425
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 5, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 23, 2019
    Keidrick L. Ewing, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Roberts, Wetherell, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Doug H. WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2394
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 5, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 24, 2019
    Doug H. Wilson, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Samuel Steinberg, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Makar, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lamar J. FLOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3777
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 25, 2019
    Lamar J. Floyd, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Bilbrey, Winokur, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    George WALKER, IV, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2464
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 1, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 30, 2019
    George Walker, IV, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Roberts and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lakita GRANT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D19-0117
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 7, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 25, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    John OSBORN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2431
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 7, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 25, 2019
    John Osborn, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ernest Miessel GRUBB, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1118
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 5, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 23, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and M.J. Lord, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell and Makar, JJ., and Brasington, Monica J., Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    Arrie Frank ROBERTS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-679
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 5, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 23, 2019
    Arrie Frank Roberts, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Lewis, Wetherell, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Derrick CUMMINGS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2955
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 21, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 25, 2019
    Derrick Cummings, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Ray, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Rayna GOMES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4678
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 21, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 24, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    John W. SAATIO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D19-0563
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 15, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 30, 2019
    John W. Saatio, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED .

Roberts, Ray, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tyrone Brett LIGHTSEY, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-2484
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 12, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 23, 2019
    Tyrone Brett Lightsey, pro se, Petitioner.
    Kenneth S. Steely, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED.

Lewis, Winsor, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Davene Ann OWENS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1813
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gregory HARRIS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3138
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 25, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Olin Merrill LEWIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2262
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 21, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 30, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Ray, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Isaac WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2028
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 21, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Elizabeth LUCKETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1811
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Theron SAPP, Appellant, v. Mark S. INCH, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4666
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael Shane CAGLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1675
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Terrance L. YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4227
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kirk P. DIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4190
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Kirk P. Dixon, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Barbara Debelius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nordeen MAHMOUDI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1432
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kevin Daniel SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1033
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and L. Allen Beard, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    John Wesley MONTGOMERY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3703
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    John Wesley Montgomery, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Monteco Devante BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5019
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Monteco Devante BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5018
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jonathan Craig CODY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1905
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Andrew David HAWTHORNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4465
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Candice Kaye Brower, Office of Regional Conflict, Gainesville, and Melissa Joy Ford, Assistant Regional Conflict Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Makar and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Richard MCBEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0819
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Christa Michelle MORENO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0445
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Mario SPAN, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5286
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ray JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4097
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Clarence TELFAIR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3473
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 17, 2019
    Clarence Telfair, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Makar and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Charles JONES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D19-1045
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 17, 2019
    Charles Jones, pro se, Petitioner.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for belated appeal is denied.

Lewis, Wetherell, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lester YARBROUGH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3269
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 17, 2019
    Lester Yarbrough, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Makar and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Steven L. BALDWIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3884
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    Steven L. Baldwin, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Rosalina LINAM, Appellant, v. Daniel LINAM, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4911
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Darrell USRY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D19-0939
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 17, 2019
    Darrell Usry, pro se, Petitioner.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED .

Lewis, Wetherell, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jerome ROBERSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D19-139
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 17, 2019
    Jerome Roberson, pro se, Petitioner.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The amended petition for belated appeal is denied on the merits.

Lewis, Wetherell, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Clifton M. BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2033
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 17, 2019
    Clifton M. Brooks, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Lewis, Winsor, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Diana COSTARAKIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-95
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kerrick Van TEAMER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4968
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 24, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf, Winokur, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Felicia ELLISON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-904
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 24, 2019
    George T. Reeves of Davis, Schnitker, Reeves & Browning, P.A., Madison, for Petitioner.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Samuel B. Steinberg, Assistant Attorney General, and Benjamin Louis Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

DENIED.

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Kelsey and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Thomas JC MORNING, Jr., Appellant, v. Gastonleng Marie Francois MORNING, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4009
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 24, 2019
    Aaron B. Wentz and Kelly A. Simon of Aaron B. Wentz, P.A., Fort Walton Beach, for Appellant.
    Clark H. Henderson, Shalimar, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Jay, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Clarence S. TELFAIR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2319
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2019
    Clarence S. Telfair, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Roberts, Wetherell, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lila Jeanne POTTER, Appellant, v. MAXIM ALLEGIS GROUP/MAXIM HEALTHCARE, Ace USA, and ESIS, Appellees.
    No. 1D18-1034
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 24, 2019
    Michael J. Winer and John F. Sharpless of Law Office of Michael J. Winer, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Clinton C. Lyons, Jr., of Moran Kidd Lyons Johnson, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Lewis, Wetherell, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ronnie GAINES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4686
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 24, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Jasmine Quintera Russell, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Makar, Osterhaus, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Christopher Delaine BRYANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4658
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 24, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kathryn Lane, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Frank X. Moehrle, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Makar, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Latonya FISHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-566
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 21, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Clark E. Green, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, SLEET, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Matthew STRATIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-274
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 21, 2018
    Matthew Stratis, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SLEET, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Alonzo GUTIERREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1688
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 30, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael BURCH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1069
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 7, 2018
    Matthew J. Wells of Law Office of Matthew J. Wells, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Elbert Calvin GRIFFIN, DOC #761368, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4448
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ezra RAULERSON, IV, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4462
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Carol J. Y. Wilson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Dawn A. Tiffin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Alan LEVE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4187
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 27, 2019
    Robin H. Stevenson, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Peter Koclanes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, BADALAMENTI, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Donna MCCUE-EMERY, Appellant, v. David Thomas EMERY, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3666
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 27, 2019
    Allison M. Perry of Florida Appeals, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    David L. Hurvitz of Law Office of David Hurvitz PA, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, CASANUEVA, and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Anthony Victor LEROSE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4864
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Julius J. Aulisio, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan S. Tannen, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and KHOUZAM and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Aaron Lewis JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1329
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael GRIDER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1901
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019.
    Michael Grider, pro se.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Alek L. NEWPORT, DC #493638, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1921
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, SALARIO, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Paul M. HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1923
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kevon M. WILLIAMS, DOC #R78867, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2154
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gary Lee NORMAN, DOC #H20835, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2188
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Pamela H. Izakowitz, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Gary Lee Norman, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Peter Koclanes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, LUCAS and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jason Matthew BRADLEY, DOC# 539841, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2450
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Jason Matthew Bradley, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, LUCAS, AND SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Demario Lashawn WEBSTER, DOC #H23555, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2475
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Demario Lashawn Webster, pro se.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, SALARIO, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Joseph Emmanuel FOOTE, DOC #Y64947, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2626
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Andres Sanchez Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Joseph Emmanuel Foote, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, LUCAS AND SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Glen A. CREARY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3238
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, BLACK, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    William COON, DOC #H04539, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2568
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tyler BIGHAMES, DOC #Y48245, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3994
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 12, 2019.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, SLEET, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Bryan WADDELL, Appellant, v. Eric WARREN and Laura Cross, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-1992
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 10, 2019
    Samuel S. Mehring, Jr., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Anthony J. Russo and Mihaela Cabulea of Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa; And Michael Roe and John C. Basquill of Austin Roe & Basquill, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and MORRIS and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Trenton Lloyd JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2864
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019
    Lee Adam Cohen of Cohen Law, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Blain A. Goff, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and KHOUZAM and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Kevin Edward YUHAS, DOC #C11931, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4761
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 5, 2019
    Howard L. Dimming, II, Public Defender, and Pamela Izakowitz, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Kevin Yuhas, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, LUCAS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM JJ., Concur.


text:
    Brian Michael CHIPMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1000
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 12, 2019
    Brian Michael Chipman, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and LUCAS and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Scott Dennis ELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1350
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 12, 2019
    Michael Hrdlicka of Gomez & Touger, P.A., Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and C. Todd Chapman, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, SLEET, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Tory R. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1821
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 12, 2019.
    Tory R. Williams, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jerry HELMS, an individual, and Mario Rizzi, an individual, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Bryan MILK, an individual, Michael R. Kelly, an individual, Lisa Kelly, an individual, Progressive Auto Management, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Progressive Auto Center, Inc., a Florida Corporation, and BML, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
    Case No. 2D18-748
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 12, 2019
    Daniel Simon, Kubs Lalchandani and James M. Slater of Lalchandani Simon PL, Miami, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
    Gregory N. Woods and Rachel A. Kerlek of Woods, Weidenmiller, Michetti & Rudnick, LLP, Naples, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant Bryan Milk.
    Edmond E. Koester, Alex R. Figares and Matthew B. Devisse of Coleman,
    Yovanovich & Koester, P.A., Naples, for Appellees/ Cross-Appellants Michael R. Kelly, Lisa Kelly, Progressive Auto Management, Inc., Progressive Auto Center, Inc., and BML, LLC.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and MORRIS and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ciara Abigail ROSENBLATT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1477
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Clark E. Green, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bilal Ahmed Faruqui, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Tyrone TERRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1011
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nicole J. Martingano, Assistant Attorney General, Elba Caridad Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Travis SMALLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1300
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Timothy J. Ferreri, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Eric DOW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1323
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019.
    Eric Dow, pro se.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cynthia Richards, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Victor BREWER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1972
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Kevin L. TURNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1989
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ciaran TEMPLAR-OBRIEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1991
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, KHOUZAM, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Barris J. HARRELL, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2023
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, KHOUZAM, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Brandon FLINT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2069
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, MORRIS, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    German Pito AYALA, DOC #719868, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2062
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
    German Pito Ayala, pro se.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, MORRIS, and SMITH, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Keith R. LONG, DOC #079409, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2140
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Destina CANTWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2481
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Maureen E. Surber, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, MORRIS, and SMITH, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Toshiba J. SANDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3376
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, MORRIS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jennifer HOLT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4147
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Carly J. Robbins-Gilbert, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, SLEET, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Chester R. HOFFMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2543
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
    Chester R. Hoffman, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, VILLANTI, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ken Edward HUSE, DOC #U23123, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4747
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jeffrey Charles MURPHY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2492
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Rocco J. Carbone, III, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Peter Koclanes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, KHOUZAM, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Richard GAUGH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3240
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, MORRIS, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Brian M. CASEY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0570
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Patrick Jon RAYHA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0816
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 20, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   2D19-816 is dismissed as a duplicate of 2D19-776, which was initiated by the notice of appeal filed by Attorney Matthew Wells. Appellant's pro se motion to stay is stricken because Appellant is represented by counsel.

SILBERMAN, SLEET, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    J.P., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Grady C. JUDD, Jr., Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1638
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 03, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The circuit court shall immediately release Petitioner from secure detention. The circuit court may place Petitioner in a consequence unit or in nonsecure detention in accordance with § 985.255(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2018). See RAP, v. Parkins, 994 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

NORTHCUTT, LUCAS, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Rebecca Jane MILLER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1445
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 12, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of petition for habeas corpus is transferred to the 20th Judicial Circuit Court for Charlotte County.

MORRIS, BLACK, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Tom BELL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0839
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Vacated.

Dismissed.


text:
    James Michael SIMS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0003
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 13, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Maylene CRUZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Carmine MARCENO, Sheriff of Lee County, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1053
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 15, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Steven MAFFIA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0798
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 12, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The circuit court order under judicial review in this appeal struck appellant's motion for postconviction relief without prejudice to appellant filing a facially sufficient motion. This circuit court order is a nonfinal, nonappealable order under the authority of Pillaio v. State. 60 So. 3d 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), and Lee v. State. 939 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Gregory ROLAND, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. POLK COUNTY COURTHOUSE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-5102
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Walter VEGA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4865
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 12, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The petition for belated appeal is dismissed as untimely. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141 (c)(5)(A). Petitioner's notice of appeal of the trial court's February 19, 2019, order is treated as a motion to review the trial court's order denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of counsel and is granted to the extent that this court has reviewed the trial court's order and approves of the same.

NORTHCUTT, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Michael HURLEY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0883
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 12, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

NORTHCUTT, SALARIO, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Eric Scott HARRISON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-5018
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 06, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Mynor G. MATIAS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0170
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 25, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Cedric DOZIER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-5048
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 21, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Patrick Jay BANKS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0726
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    James Arthur LEE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0571
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Verdell HUNT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0551
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 26, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Mandamus is dismissed.


text:
    Joseph Rodney MCLAIN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0532
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 26, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition for belated appeal is denied. See Jordan v. State, 549 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

MORRIS, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Dale E. SWATMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0629
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 18, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Robert D. ASWELL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0722
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 26, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   The petition for belated appeal of the summary denial of petitioner's postconviction motion in the trial court is granted in circuit court case number 2017-CA-1222-ES for review of the trial court's order of April 24, 2017.

The circuit court clerk shall treat this order as a notice of appeal, promptly certify same and return it to this court as with any notice of appeal, and a new appellate case number will be assigned to this appeal and an acknowledgment letter will issue at that time. The summary record shall be transmitted to this court when the certified copy of this order is returned by the trial court clerk.

After a new appellate case number is assigned and an acknowledgment letter has issued, this court will issue an order advising the appellant of the due date of the optional initial brief.

MORRIS, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Wresley TORRES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0720
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 26, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    James MCCOBB, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0627
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 26, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Shaun A. MARTINEZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0411
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 03, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed because of the appellant's failure to satisfy this court's February 6, 2019, fee order.

LaROSE, C.J., and KHOUZAM and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Marquis Jarvis RIDDLE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0245
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Mestelle TELSAINT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0593
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 26, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    John Russell COLUMBIA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0447
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 26, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   Petitioner's petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied.

MORRIS, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Angel Luis RIVERA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0393
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Christine CAVALARIS, f/k/a Christine Saccone, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Robert C. BURKE, Jr., Esq., Robert Kelly, Esq., Mariel Cavalaris, Michelle Towns and Lainie Rendina, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3763
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Kathleen TUITE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. ESTATE OF Pamela TUITE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3918
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 24, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed for failure of appellant to comply with this court's order of March 26, 2019, requiring the filing of an initial brief.

MORRIS, BLACK and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Crystal FEDELE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0115
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 2019
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
   This appeal is dismissed because of the appellant's failure to satisfy this court's January 10, 2019, fee order.

VILLANTI, SALARIO, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Gary S. LLOYD, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NOS. :2D19-0113 2D19-0119 2D19-0813
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 12, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Thomas MCDUFFIE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0741
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.