text:
    Michaelle NELSON v. Cortney Antwan MADDOX
    2170605
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    August 17, 2018
    Jennifer M. Chambliss of Samford & Denson, LLP, Opelika, for appellant.
    Submitted on appellant's brief only.
   THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

Michaelle Nelson ("the mother") and Cortney Antwan Maddox ("the father") were divorced by a judgment of the Lee Circuit Court. In December 2013, the trial court entered a modification judgment in which it, among other things, awarded the parties joint physical and legal custody of their minor child and ordered that the father pay $200 per month in child support.

On April 19, 2017, the mother filed a petition seeking to modify the father's child-support obligation. The mother signed her petition as a pro se litigant, but that petition includes the name of an attorney representing the Lee County Department of Human Resources ("DHR"). The record indicates that the mother had asked DHR for assistance in obtaining an increase in child support and that DHR had advised the mother to seek the modification of the father's child-support obligation. The action was initially heard by a referee who, in a December 18, 2017, order, stated that the matter should be heard by the trial court.

The trial court conducted an ore tenus hearing at which both parties appeared pro se. The attorney for DHR appeared at the hearing, apparently for the limited purpose of determining the father's child-support obligation, although DHR was not a party to the action. On February 1, 2018, the trial court entered a judgment in which it, among other things, modified custody to award custody of the child to the father and ordered the mother to pay child support. The mother, then represented by an attorney, filed a timely notice of appeal on March 13, 2018.

The record reveals the following pertinent procedural history and facts. The attorney for DHR explained to the trial court that the referee had "bumped" the action to the trial court without making a determination because, the attorney explained, when the parties were before the referee, the father argued that the mother had moved with the child to Georgia in violation of an order of the trial court and that his visitation had been curtailed as a result. For that reason, the attorney for DHR stated, the referee had concluded that, because there were other issues besides child support that needed to be resolved between the father and the mother, the action should be resolved by the trial court. The parties presented evidence regarding the issues of child custody and child support. The child was eight years old at the time of the hearing in this matter.

The record demonstrates that, shortly after the entry of the December 2013 judgment, the mother announced an intention to relocate with the child to the Atlanta, Georgia, area. The father filed in the trial court an objection to that move. The trial court entered an order declining to grant permission for the mother to relocate to Georgia with the child; that order is not contained in the record on appeal, but it is clear that, in resolving this action, the trial court referred to that order. Regardless, the mother relocated with the child to Georgia. In response to questioning by the trial court, the father testified that he could not afford to pay court fees and attorney fees to continue to fight the mother's refusal to return the child to Alabama. The father presented evidence, however, indicating that he traveled to Georgia several times each month to retrieve the child for visitation. The father's testimony was that he returns to Alabama with the child to visit at his home and so that the child can see extended family who live near the father's home. The father also presented evidence concerning the mother's care of the child, his care of the child, their respective homes, and his desire for an award of custody.

The mother, and the attorney for DHR, sought to modify the father's child-support obligation based on the amount of time the child lived with the mother due to the mother's unauthorized relocation to Georgia. The mother did not seek a modification of the joint-custody award set forth in the December 2013 judgment.

Initially, we note that, buried in her argument on another issue, the mother briefly questions the trial court's jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), § 30-3B-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, to modify custody of the child. The mother points out that, because the child has lived primarily in Georgia with her for the last four years, Georgia is the child's home state. See § 30-3B-102(7), Ala. Code 1975 (A child's "home state" is "[t]he state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding."). The mother relies solely on her argument that Georgia is the child's home state, and she makes no argument applying the provisions of the UCCJEA.

In its February 1, 2018, judgment, the trial court specifically determined that it retained jurisdiction over the action. With regard to maintaining jurisdiction over a custody matter, the UCCJEA provides:

"(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 30-3B-204, [Ala. Code 1975,] a court of this state which has made a child custody determination consistent with Section 30-3B-201 or Section 30-3B-203[, Ala. Code 1975,] has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the determination until:
"(1) A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
"(2) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state."

§ 30-3B-202, Ala. Code 1975. The Official Comment to § 30-3B-202 explains, in pertinent part, the requirement that a child and one parent have a "significant connection" with Alabama in order for Alabama courts to retain continuing jurisdiction over the issue of custody of the child:

"1. If a parent or a person acting as a parent remains in the original decree state, continuing jurisdiction is lost when neither the child, the child and a parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent continue to have a significant connection with the original decree state and there is no longer substantial evidence concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relations in that state. In other words, even if the child has acquired a new home state, the original decree state retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, so long as the general requisites of the 'substantial connection' jurisdiction provisions of Section 201 are met. If the relationship between the child and the person remaining in the state with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction becomes so attenuated that the court could no longer find significant connections and substantial evidence, jurisdiction would no longer exist."

(Emphasis added.)

A portion of the Alabama Parent-Child Relationship Protection Act ("the Act"), §§ 30-3-160 through -169.10, Ala. Code 1975, provides that a child maintains a significant connection with this state when the parents have previously been awarded joint legal and/or joint physical custody and one parent remains in Alabama. Specially, the Act provides:

"(b) Where the parties have been awarded joint custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child as defined in Section 30-3-151, [Ala. Code 1975,] and at least one parent having joint custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child continues to maintain a principal residence in this state, the child shall have a significant connection with this state and a court in fashioning its judgments, orders, or decrees may retain continuing jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-202 to 30-3B-204, [Ala. Code 1975,] inclusive, even though the child's principal residence after the relocation is outside this state."

§ 30-3-169.9(b), Ala. Code 1975. The most recent custody judgment between the parties in this case awarded the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of the minor child. The father lives and works in Alabama, and the child often visits him in Alabama. Thus, under the facts of this case, and given provisions of the Act, the child has maintained a "significant connection" to Alabama such that the trial court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to rule on the father's claim for a custody modification. § 30-3-169.9(b).

The mother also sets forth a different argument as to why, she says, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the issue of a custody modification. She contends that, because the father did not file a pleading seeking the modification of custody of the child, either as a counterclaim in this action or by seeking to initiate a new action, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify custody of the child. The mother cites no supporting legal authority for the proposition that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider a claim that was not specifically pleaded by a party. In fact, a claim may be tried pursuant to the implied consent of the parties. See Rule 15(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. ("When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.").

In A.L. v. S.J., 827 So.2d 828 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), the paternal grandmother of a child sought to intervene in a custody dispute between the child's parents, but she asserted no claim in the action seeking an award of custody of the child. In her testimony in that case, however, the paternal grandmother made a request for an award of custody, and neither parent objected. This court held that the issue of the paternal grandmother's request for custody of the child had been tried by the implied consent of the parties. A.L. v. S.J., 827 So.2d at 833.

Similarly, in this case, the father, in proceeding in the trial court, sought an award of custody of the child and presented evidence in support of that request for custody. The mother did not object to the trial court's consideration of the issue of the custody of the child. We conclude that the issue of the father's claim seeking custody of the child was tried by the implied consent of the parties. Rule 15(b) ; A.L. v. S.J., supra. Accordingly, we cannot say that the mother has demonstrated that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the father's claim seeking to modify custody or that it erred in considering that claim.

The mother also argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in modifying custody of the child. We note that, in making that argument, the mother cites and purports to quote from the December 2013 custody judgment that is not contained in the record on appeal. The mother also contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter that judgment because, she claims, the father did not pay the requisite filing fees in that earlier action. The record contains no documentation or other evidence to support the mother's assertions with regard to that 2013 judgment. It was the mother's burden to ensure that the record on appeal contains any evidence necessary for a reversal. Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 711 So.2d 938, 942 (Ala. 1997). Further, the mother did not seek to set aside the December 2013 judgment on that basis, and, therefore, that issue was not before the trial court, has not been determined, and is not properly before this court.

In one part of her brief, the mother alleges that the February 1, 2018, judgment modified a judgment awarding her "sole physical custody" of the child; in making that argument, she appears to be intentionally disregarding the December 2013 judgment based on her argument to this court that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter that judgment. However, given the mother's failure to challenge the December 2013 judgment, we must consider the December 2013 judgment to be the most recent judgment concerning custody. It is undisputed that that judgment awarded the parties joint custody of the child, and any claim seeking to modify that judgment must be determined applying the "best interests of the child" standard. Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987 (Ala. 1988) ; Ex parte Blackstock, 47 So.3d 801, 804 (Ala. 2009) ("Where, as in the present case, there is a prior judgment awarding joint physical custody, ' "the best interests of the child" ' standard applies in any subsequent custody-modification proceeding." (quoting Ex parte Johnson, 673 So.2d 410, 413 (Ala. 1994), quoting in turn Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987, 989 (Ala. 1988) ) ).

It is not clear from the February 1, 2018, judgment whether the trial court used the Couch best-interests standard or the more stringent custody-modification standard set forth in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala. 1984), in reaching its decision to modify custody. However, even assuming that the trial court incorrectly applied the McLendon standard, we must conclude that, because that custody-modification standard is more stringent than the Couch best-interests standard, any error in applying the McLendon standard would be harmless. Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P.; I.M. v. J.P.F., 668 So.2d 843, 845 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995).

The mother also argues that the basis for the change in custody is not supported by the record, i.e., she contends that the evidence does not warrant a change in custody. In modifying custody of the child, the trial court found, in part:

"This Court previously ordered that each of these parties have visitation with the child on a substantially equal basis with each party having the child half of the work-week and rotating weekends. Subsequently, the mother announced an intent to move to the Atlanta, Georgia, area which the father objected to. The Court issued an order declining to grant the mother permission to move the child's residence further from her father. It is now clear that despite all of that, the mother has kept the child in Cumming, Georgia, diminishing the child's ability to have regular ongoing contact with her father ....
"... The Court heard testimony from both sides in regards to all of th[e] issues. The mother remains obstinate and dismissive of the importance of this child's father."

The mother contends that a change in the custodial parent's residence does not, in itself, warrant a modification of custody; she cites Vail v. Vail, 532 So.2d 639 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988), in support of that argument. In that case, the mother, who was the custodial parent, relocated to Georgia with her new husband and the parties' minor children. The father sought to modify custody of the children because that relocation had decreased the time he was able to spend with the children. The trial court, applying the McLendon standard, denied the father's modification petition, and this court affirmed.

Vail v. Vail, supra, is distinguishable from this case, however. First, that case was decided before the 2003 enactment of the Act. Under the Act, a custodial parent's proposed relocation away from the noncustodial parent remains, as it was before the Act, a factor that a trial court may consider in a custody-modification action, see Clements v. Clements, 906 So.2d 952, 958 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). The Act also requires that a trial court consider the various ways in which the proposed relocation might impact the child's interactions with the noncustodial parent. See § 30-3-169.3, Ala. Code 1975 (setting forth those factors).

Further, unlike in Vail v. Vail, supra, the mother in this case was not the custodial parent, i.e., she did not have sole physical custody of the child. Rather, the record indicates that the December 2013 judgment awarded the parties in this case joint legal and joint physical custody of the child. Thus, as already explained, the appropriate custody-modification standard in this case was the "best interests of the child" standard set forth in Couch, supra.

The mother contends that the trial court's findings that she had defied its previous judgments and had diminished the child's contact with the father were not sufficient bases for the modification of custody. However, the father presented evidence indicating that the mother had repeatedly failed to work with him concerning visitation and that she had frequently denied him visitation or had changed plans in such a way that it affected his visitation. On one such occasion, the mother refused to allow the father to take the child to his family's reunion because, she said, the child had a gymnastics lesson. The father also testified that he regularly traveled several hours to exercise his visitation with the child and that the mother refused to meet him to lessen the time he spent traveling to visit the child. We note that the trial court's comments indicate that the December 2013 judgment provided that the parties were to take turns transporting the child to the other parent when custody was transferred.

The mother testified that, while living with her in Georgia, the child has made good grades and has been active in competitive gymnastics. The father presented evidence, however, indicating that the mother lives more than an hour from her place of employment. He stated that the child, who is 8 years old, and her half brother, who is 13, must prepare themselves for school and catch the bus each morning after the mother leaves for work. The father testified that the child had informed him that, when she leaves the school bus in the afternoon, she is typically alone at the mother's home until around 5:00, when her half brother arrives home. The mother disputed that testimony. She stated that the child is either with a sitter in the afternoon or that she stays with a friend until her half brother arrives home, and that the two children then go home together.

The father presented evidence indicating that, before the mother relocated, he turned down a promotion because it would require him to work a shift that would not allow him to pick up the child from school. The record indicates that the father was still working his regular shift at the time of the hearing.

We note that our courts have held, in cases involving the more stringent McLendon standard, that a visitation dispute, alone, may not support a modification of custody. Kelley v. Akers, 793 So.2d 821, 826-27 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) ; Vick v. Vick, 688 So.2d 852, 856 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). However, this court has affirmed a custody modification in a case in which the facts demonstrated that, rather than the existence of a mere visitation dispute, one parent had, or had attempted, to interfere with the child's relationship with the other parent by minimizing contact between them. C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 879 So.2d 1169, 1180 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).

Our supreme court has explained:

"Where, as in the present case, there is a prior judgment awarding joint physical custody, ' "the best interests of the child" ' standard applies in any subsequent custody-modification proceeding. Ex parte Johnson, 673 So.2d 410, 413 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987, 989 (Ala. 1988) ). To justify a modification of a preexisting judgment awarding custody, the petitioner must demonstrate that there has been a material change of circumstances since that judgment was entered and that ' "it [is] in the [child's] best interests that the [judgment] be modified" ' in the manner requested. Nave v. Nave, 942 So.2d 372, 376 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (quoting Means v. Means, 512 So.2d 1386, 1388 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) ).

Ex parte Blackstock, 47 So.3d at 804-05.

Since the entry of the most recent custody judgment, the mother relocated, in contravention of the trial court's order, to Georgia. That move interfered with the father's custodial periods. The trial court made comments during the ore tenus hearing indicating that it found that the mother had placed her interests above those of the child in moving the child away from the father and that it determined that the relocation had not been in the child's best interests.

"As this Court stated in Ex parte Bryowsky, 676 So.2d 1322 (Ala. 1996), quoted in part in Lamb [v. Lamb, 939 So.2d 918 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) ], in an ore tenus proceeding,
" '[t]he trial court is in the best position to make a custody determination--it hears the evidence and observes the witnesses. Appellate courts do not sit in judgment of disputed evidence that was presented ore tenus before the trial court in a custody hearing. See Ex parte Perkins, 646 So.2d 46, 47 (Ala. 1994), wherein this Court, quoting Phillips v. Phillips, 622 So.2d 410, 412 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993), set out the well-established rule:
" ' " 'Our standard of review is very limited in cases where the evidence is presented ore tenus. A custody determination of the trial court entered upon oral testimony is accorded a presumption of correctness on appeal, ... and we will not reverse unless the evidence so fails to support the determination that it is plainly and palpably wrong, or unless an abuse of the trial court's discretion is shown. To substitute our judgment for that of the trial court would be to reweigh the evidence. This Alabama law does not allow....' " '
" 676 So.2d at 1324 ; see Lamb, 939 So.2d at 922 ; see also Ex parte Foley, 864 So.2d 1094, 1099 (Ala. 2003) ('[A]n appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. To do so would be to reweigh the evidence, which Alabama law does not allow.' (citation omitted) )."

Ex parte Blackstock, 47 So.3d at 805.

Given the evidence in the record, the trial court's findings, and the applicable standard of review, we cannot say that the mother has demonstrated that the trial court erred in modifying custody of the child.

The mother also argues that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay child support. She bases her argument on appeal, at least in part, on her contention that the trial court lacked the authority to modify custody of the child. We have rejected that contention and have affirmed the custody award.

The trial court awarded the father sole physical custody of the child.

"The general rule is that a child has a fundamental right to be supported by his or her parents until he or she reaches the age of majority and that if the parents are divorced, the courts have the jurisdiction to require the non-custodial parent to pay a certain amount of child support and to modify the amount of child support required of the non-custodial parent until the child reaches the age of majority."

Wilson v. Hermanson, 655 So.2d 1071, 1072-73 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995). Given the mother's failure to demonstrate that the trial court erred in modifying custody, there is no error in the trial court's ordering the mother to pay child support for the benefit of the child.

The mother does not dispute on appeal that the child-support determination was calculated in compliance with the Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., child-support guidelines, or allege that the trial court erred in determining the amount of her child-support obligation. Accordingly, any argument with regard to those issues is waived. See Boshell v. Keith, 418 So.2d 89, 92 (Ala. 1982) ("When an appellant fails to argue an issue in its brief, that issue is waived.").

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Pittman, Thomas, Moore, and Donaldson, JJ., concur.

      The record does not contain the date of the parties' divorce judgment. In at least one part of the record, the December 2013 judgment is referred to as the "divorce judgment," but the record indicates that the December 2013 judgment was entered some time after the parties divorced. In her appellate brief, the mother refers to the December 2013 judgment as a ".00 modification judgment." Regardless, it is undisputed that the December 2013 judgment was the most recent custody judgment and that the modification action currently at issue was designated in the trial court as a ".02" action.

      That judgment specified that the change of custody would not occur until the end of the 2017-2018 school year so as not to disrupt the child's academic school year.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MOORE, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Lee Carroll RICHARDS v. Ana FRANKLIN, Sheriff of Morgan County
    2170601
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    August 17, 2018
    Jonathan D. Watson, Decatur, for appellant.
    Steve Marshall, atty. gen., and Sharon E. Ficquette, chief legal counsel, and Jennifer M. Bush, asst. atty. gen., Department of Human Resources, for appellee.
   MOORE, Judge.

Lee Carroll Richards ("the father") appeals from a judgment entered by the Morgan Circuit Court ("the circuit court") denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We reverse the circuit court's judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

On January 21, 2016, the Morgan District Court ("the district court") entered a judgment, based on a stipulation of the father and the State Department of Human Resources ("DHR"), acting on behalf of Kimberly A. Wilson ("the mother"), the mother of the father's children, finding the father in civil contempt for his failure to pay child support as previously ordered. The father was sentenced to incarceration pending the payment of the $24,675.02 child-support arrearage amount established by the judgment; that sentence was suspended so long as the father made timely payments on the arrearage amount. On March 7, 2018, the district court, in a proceeding initiated by DHR on behalf of the mother, entered a judgment finding that the father was not in compliance with the January 21, 2016, judgment and requiring that the father be incarcerated and that the father pay $3,000 to purge himself of the contempt and to obtain a release from incarceration. That same day, the father filed in the circuit court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, naming Ana Franklin, sheriff of Morgan County, as the respondent; however, attorneys for DHR represented "the respondent" and participated in that proceeding.

The circuit court conducted a trial on the father's petition on March 16, 2018. At that trial, the father introduced into evidence his affidavit of substantial hardship indicating that his monthly income is $2,588 and that his monthly expenses, excluding his child-support obligation, are $2,655. The father testified that his assets consist of an automobile worth between $300 and $400 and tools for his job. According to the father, he has no cash or bank accounts and lives "week to week."

Steve Namie, an employee of the Morgan County Sheriff's Department who runs the inmate work-release program, testified that, while incarcerated, the father would be eligible for the work-release program. He testified that transportation would not be provided but that the father's employer would be allowed to transport the father to and from work. Namie testified that he had not inquired as to whether the father's employer would agree to transport the father. There was no evidence indicating whether the father might be allowed to transport himself to and from work.

Following the trial, the circuit court entered an order that same day, denying the father's petition and stating, in pertinent part:

"After hearing on March 16, 2018, the Court finds [that the father] does have the present ability to pay child support. He has made an average of $2,000.00 per month over the last three (3) years. He lives in a nice home, 45 minutes away from where he is employed and spends $350.00 - $400.00 per month traveling to and from work. [The father] has 3 children and has only paid $330.60 throughout the entirety of 2017 toward his child support obligation. The Court is left to conclude that [the father] is purposefully living pay check to pay check for no reason other than to circumvent his obligation to pay support for his three (3) minor children."

The father filed his notice of appeal to this court on March 16, 2018. This court subsequently granted a motion filed by the father seeking his immediate release from incarceration pending the disposition of his appeal.

Discussion

On appeal, the father argues that the circuit court erred in denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus because, he says, he lacks the present ability to purge himself of the contempt.

" 'Although one may be guilty of contempt, ... imprisonment, as a means of coercing payment, may not be imposed if there is shown a present inability to pay.' Ex parte Talbert, 419 So.2d 240, 241 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). " 'Imprisonment for contempt should never be imposed by a judge where failure to pay [court-ordered support] is not from contumacy, but from inability to comply with the order.' " Taylor v. Johnson, 764 So.2d 1281, 1282 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000), quoting Ex parte Talbert, 419 So.2d at 241."

G.W. v. Sheriff of Jefferson Cty., 885 So.2d 807, 808-09 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).

In G.W., this court addressed a situation similar to the one in this case. G.W. was found in contempt of court for his failure to pay court-ordered child support, and the court "issued a writ of attachment and set a cash bond in the amount of $2,550 in order for G.W. to purge himself of the contempt." 885 So.2d at 808. G.W. did not appeal the contempt judgment. G.W. was subsequently arrested, and, after a hearing, the trial court reduced the cash bond to $2,000. Id. G.W. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. G.W. appealed the denial of his petition to this court, and he subsequently filed a motion for his immediate release from incarceration, which this court granted pending a ruling on his appeal. In reversing the judgment denying G.W.'s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, this court held that, although "there was evidence presented from which the trial court could have found that G.W. had $800 worth of assets, as stated in his bankruptcy petition," "that evidence is insufficient to show that G.W. has the present ability to pay the $2,000 he was ordered to pay in order to purge himself of contempt." 885 So.2d at 810. This court noted that, although it had been argued that G.W. was voluntarily unemployed, which, if true, would support a finding of contempt, a contemnor still should "not be imprisoned to coerce payment when he or she does not have the present ability to pay." 885 So.2d at 810 n.3. Therefore, this court reversed the judgment denying G.W.'s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Similarly, in the present case, although the circuit court found, based on ore tenus testimony, that the father had the ability to pay his past-due child-support payments and was purposefully living "pay check to pay check," those findings support only the underlying finding of contempt. The judgment does not indicate that the father has $3,000 at his disposal with which to purge himself of contempt; in fact, the circuit court's specific finding that the father purposefully lives "pay check to pay check" would indicate that the father does not have more than one month's income accumulated that could be used to purge himself of contempt.

In the appellee's brief, which was filed by DHR, Mims v. Mims, 472 So.2d 1063 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985), and Watts v. Watts, 706 So.2d 749 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997), are cited in support of the argument that the circuit court could have determined that the father had the ability to pay the $3,000 required to purge himself of contempt. We note, however, that in both Mims and Watts there was evidence from which the trial court found an ability to pay. Specifically, in Mims, this court reasoned:

"The husband[, the contemnor,] contends that he owns no property and that the house where he stays, a motor home, a truck, and a boat, motor and trailer, are all items of property in his wife's name. The wife, however, is unemployed, and there was no evidence that she has any income.
"Additionally, there was testimony from the husband that he and his wife had recently taken two four-week vacations."

472 So.2d at 1064. This court determined that "the trial court could reasonably conclude from the evidence and inferences therefrom, coupled with the prior history of this case, that the husband has the ability to pay and could purge himself from the order of contempt." 472 So.2d at 1064-65.

Similarly, in Watts, the contemnor's "assertion that he no longer own[ed] the house in question was disputed by the introduction of his complaint for a divorce from his current wife," and "[t]he trial court also noted the discrepancy in the evidence regarding the consideration that [the contemnor] received for the sale of the house." 706 So.2d at 751. This court further noted that "the trial court found that [the contemnor] lacked credibility and believed that [the contemnor] had the ability to pay the amount ordered to purge himself of contempt." 706 So.2d at 752.

Unlike in Mims and Watts, the circuit court in the present case did not find that the father was untruthful in claiming that he lacked the ability to purge himself of contempt. Instead, the circuit court specifically found that the father did, in fact, live "pay check to pay check" purposefully.

Because, like in G.W., the evidence in the record indicates that the father does not have the present ability to pay the amount required by the circuit court to purge himself of contempt, we conclude that the circuit court erred in denying the father's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand this cause for the circuit court to enter a judgment consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Thompson, P.J., and Pittman and Thomas, JJ., concur.

Donaldson, J., concurs specially.

DONALDSON, Judge, concurring specially.

I concur. I write specially to note that Lee Carroll Richards, the petitioner, was confined solely for civil contempt and not criminal contempt. "Civil contempt carries no definite term of imprisonment; the party jailed on a contempt ' " 'charge carries the [key] of his prison in his own pocket' [and] can end the sentence and discharge himself at any moment by doing what he had previously refused to do." ' " Davenport v. Hood, 814 So.2d 268, 273 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. State, 675 So.2d 512, 513 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), quoting in turn other cases). Therefore, a person jailed for civil contempt must know where the jail key is located (i.e., what the person must do to be released) and be able to reach the key (i.e., have the ability to comply with the terms of release).

      We also note that, although there is evidence indicating that the father is eligible to participate in the work-release program, the father's eligibility for that program does not negate the evidence of his " 'present inability to pay' " the $3,000 required to purge himself of contempt. G.W., 885 So.2d at 808 (quoting Ex parte Talbert, 419 So.2d 240, 241 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982) ).


author: JOINER, Judge.

text:
    Cynthia Pearl WALLEN v. CITY OF MOBILE
    CR-17-0286
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    August 10, 2018
    Brent T. Day of Solon Law, L.L.C., Mobile, for appellant.
    E. Erich Bergdolt, asst. city atty., City of Mobile, for appellee.
   JOINER, Judge.

Cynthia Pearl Wallen appeals her convictions for six counts of violating Mobile's ordinance prohibiting public nuisances, see § 7-21, Mobile City Code 1991. She was fined $25 for each count and was ordered to pay court costs for one of those convictions (CC-16-4904).

Wallen does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against her; thus, only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary here. Just before 5:00 p.m. on March 9, 2016, Officer Corey Tillman, an animal-control officer with the City of Mobile, received an anonymous complaint about multiple dogs barking at Wallen's home located on Staples Road in Mobile. In response to the complaint, Officer Tillman drove to Wallen's home and, per protocol, parked his vehicle across the street in an effort not to disturb the dogs on her property. According to Officer Tillman, as he sat in his vehicle, he heard multiple dogs barking continuously in Wallen's backyard for approximately 10 minutes.

At that point, Officer Tillman got out of his vehicle and went to Wallen's home to speak with her. Wallen answered the door, and Officer Tillman told her why he was there. Specifically, he told her that he had received a complaint about her barking dogs and that he could smell feces and urine from the road. According to Officer Tillman, Wallen told him that she did not think her dogs were a problem and she took him to her backyard so that he could look at them. Officer Tillman testified that he saw 28 dogs in Wallen's backyard that day and that he took pictures of the unsanitary conditions in which they were being kept. He then issued a citation to Wallen for violating Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance.

That same day, Julie Brannon, a realtor in the area, went to list a house for sale that was located behind Wallen's home. As she walked around the property, Brannon heard Wallen's dogs barking and thought that the noise was "overwhelming." (R. 114.) According to Brannon, the noise went on continuously for 30 to 45 minutes while she was there. Brannon further testified that, each time she showed the house to a potential buyer, she heard the dogs barking.

Between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on October 21, 2016, Officer Tillman received another anonymous complaint concerning the noises and the smell coming from Wallen's backyard where her dogs were kept. Once again, Officer Tillman drove to Wallen's residence and parked across the street. He waited for 10 minutes before attempting to speak with Wallen, and during that time, he said, her dogs barked nonstop. He tried to speak with Wallen that day, but she was not home. He left her a notice and later mailed the public-nuisance citations issued against her to her home.

On November 30, 2016, Officer Joshua Seals, an animal-control officer with the City of Mobile, received a complaint about dogs barking at Wallen's address. After he arrived at Wallen's residence, Officer Seals stated that he sat in his vehicle and waited for 15 or 20 minutes. During that time, he said he heard "many" dogs barking nonstop. When he went to speak with Wallen about the noise, she was not at home. He left her a notice to contact animal control and left.

On January 25, 2017, Office Seals received another complaint about barking dogs at Wallen's home. Officer Seals, once again, went to Wallen's home and sat in his vehicle for 15 to 20 minutes listening to the dogs bark. At some point, Officer Seals spoke with Wallen and informed her that he had received a complaint about her dogs barking. According to Officer Seals, Wallen referred him to her attorney.

Between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on February 9, 2017, Officer Tillman received another anonymous complaint concerning the noises and smell coming from Wallen's property. He again observed the dogs barking continuously for 10 minutes. Officer Tillman said that, when he tried to talk to Wallen about the complaint, she was uncooperative and told him to stay away from her property. Officer Tillman issued another citation to Wallen for violating Mobile's public nuisance ordinance.

On March 3, 2017, Officer Joshua Seals received another anonymous complaint about the noise coming from Wallen's property. While sitting in his vehicle across from Wallen's home, Officer Seals heard her dogs barking nonstop for approximately 15 to 20 minutes. He then decided to speak with one of Wallen's neighbors about the noise. At some point during their conversation, Wallen pulled up in her vehicle and began filming Officer Seals. Officer Seals issued Wallen another public-nuisance citation.

Gerald Bates, Jr., testified that he purchased the house adjacent to Wallen's property on November 30, 2016. On January 25, 2017, February 9, 2017, and March 3, 2017, he telephoned animal control to report that Wallen's dogs had been barking nonstop and that he was concerned about the conditions in which they were being kept.

In May 2017, Wallen appeared before the Mobile Circuit Court and entered a plea of not guilty to the multiple charges against her alleging violations of Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance, § 7-21, Mobile City Code, 1991. On June 13, 2017, she filed a motion to dismiss. In her motion, Wallen argued that § 7-21 of the Mobile City Code was unconstitutionally vague, that it violated her due-process rights, and that it failed to provide for reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. On June 23, 2017, the City of Mobile filed its response in which it argued that Wallen's contentions were without merit. Wallen's motion was ultimately denied.

On September 27, 2017, a jury trial was held. In addition to the testimony discussed above, three of Wallen's neighbors also testified. Claude Jefferson stated that he lived 300 yards away from Wallen and that he had never had any issues with her or with her barking dogs. Jauran Jackson testified that he could hear Wallen's dogs barking whenever he was in his backyard but that they would bark only if someone was with them. Finally, Marjorie Anthony stated that she lived across the street from Wallen and that she was home all day, every day. According to Anthony, although she has heard Wallen's dogs occasionally bark throughout the day, the noises they made had never disturbed her.

Penny McKinney, an employee of the City of Mobile animal shelter, testified that she was called out to Wallen's home twice after receiving complaints about barking dogs. When she responded to the first complaint, she drove to Wallen's home and, as she sat in her vehicle per protocol, she stated that she did not hear any barking. When she responded to the second complaint, she did the same thing and, once again, did not hear any barking.

Finally, Wallen testified in her own defense. She told the jury that, for 48 years, she had raised and competed in dog shows with her dogs. According to Wallen, the highest number of dogs she had on her property at one time was between 28 and 29, but on average she generally had between 14 and 18 dogs at her home. When asked if she had ever received any noise complaints about her dogs before the first nuisance complaint in March 2016, Wallen stated that she had not.

Following deliberations, the jury found Wallen guilty of six counts of violating Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance, § 7-21(1), Mobile City Code 1991, for the incidents involving her barking dogs. On November 1, 2017, she was ordered to pay a $25 fine for each conviction and was also ordered to pay court costs for one conviction (CC-16-4904). Thereafter, Wallen filed a timely notice of appeal.

I.

Wallen first argues that Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance, § 7-21(1), Mobile City Code 1991, is unconstitutionally overbroad because, she says, it regulates without reference to time, place, and manner. (Wallen's brief, pp. 13-16.) Specifically, Wallen argues that the ordinance fails to: (1) provide a time frame for when it is unlawful for animals to make "disturbing noises;" (2) limit the place or proximity of the barking; and (3) limit the manner in which the animals are or are not allowed to make "habitual noises." Id. For the reasons provided herein, we conclude that this argument is without merit.

In addressing constitutional challenges to statutes and regulations, the Alabama Supreme Court has stated:

" 'Our review of constitutional challenges to legislative enactments is de novo.' Richards v. Izzi, 819 So.2d 25, 29 n. 3 (Ala. 2001). Additionally, acts of the legislature are presumed constitutional. State v. Alabama Mun. Ins. Corp., 730 So.2d 107, 110 (Ala.1998). See also Dobbs v. Shelby County Econ. & Indus. Dev. Auth., 749 So.2d 425, 428 (Ala. 1999) ('In reviewing the constitutionality of a legislative act, this Court will sustain the act " 'unless it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is violative of the fundamental law.' " ' White v. Reynolds Metals Co., 558 So.2d 373, 383 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18 So.2d 810, 815 (1944) ) ). We approach the question of the constitutionality of a legislative act ' " 'with every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and seek to sustain rather than strike down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the government.' " ' Monroe v. Harco, Inc., 762 So.2d 828, 831 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156, 159 (Ala. 1991), quoting in turn McAdory, 246 Ala. at 9, 18 So.2d at 815 ).
"Moreover, in order to overcome the presumption of constitutionality, ... the party asserting the unconstitutionality of the Act ... bears the burden 'to show that [the Act] is not constitutional.' Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys. of Montgomery v. Talley, 291 Ala. 307, 310, 280 So.2d 553, 556 (1973). See also Thorn v. Jefferson County, 375 So.2d 780, 787 (Ala. 1979) ('It is the law, of course, that a party attacking a statute has the burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality....')."

State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So.2d 1012, 1017 (Ala. 2006). Additionally, the Alabama Supreme Court has also stated that "[s]tatutes and regulations are void for overbreadth if their object is achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Ross Neely Express, Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 437 So.2d 82, 85 (Ala. 1983). This Court has previously adopted that reasoning. See, e.g., Duffy v. City of Mobile, 709 So.2d 77, 80 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (stating that a statute or an ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad "if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct").

The City of Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance, § 7-21(1), Mobile City Code, 1991, provides, in pertinent part:

"It shall be unlawful for any person to fail to exercise the necessary care and control to prevent an animal in his or her possession or care from creating a public nuisance. For purposes of this section, an animal is a public nuisance if the animal:
"(1) Habitually makes disturbing noises including, but not limited to crowing, barking, yelping, whining, or other utterances causing unreasonable annoyance or discomfort to others in close proximity to the premises where the animal is kept."

Wallen does not state which, if any, protected freedoms the above ordinance encroaches upon. Therefore, Wallen has failed to establish how the overbreadth doctrine applies in the present case and, as a result, how the City's public-nuisance ordinance is unconstitutional in that respect. Thus, she is not entitled to relief on this claim.

II.

Next, Wallen argues that the City's public-nuisance ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. (Wallen's brief, pp. 17-21.) Specifically, Wallen contends that the ordinance is impermissibly vague on its face because, she says, there are no objective standards for determining whether a dog's barking is "habitual," whether it constitutes a "disturbing noise" or an "unreasonable annoyance," or whether it creates "discomfort to others." Id. For the reasons provided herein, we conclude that this argument is without merit.

In Alabama, the judicial power to declare a statute void for vagueness

" 'should be exercised only when a statute is so incomplete, so irreconcilably conflicting, or so vague or indefinite, that it cannot be executed, and the court is unable, by the application of known and accepted rules of construction, to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended.' "

Vaughn v. State, 880 So.2d 1178, 1195-96 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Jansen v. State ex rel. Downing, 273 Ala. 166, 170, 137 So.2d 47, 50 (1962) ). " 'To withstand a challenge of vagueness, a statute [or ordinance] must: 1) give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, and, 2) provide explicit standards to those who apply the laws.' " Moore v. City of Montgomery, 720 So.2d 1030, 1032 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting Culbreath v. State, 667 So.2d 156, 158 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) ). The one challenging a statute or ordinance bears the burden of demonstrating that the statute or ordinance should be declared unconstitutional. State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So.2d 1012, 1017 (Ala. 2006).

When addressing a constitutional challenge to a statute based on the vagueness doctrine, this Court has previously stated:

" ' " 'As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 [357], 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed. 2d 903 (1983) (citations omitted). A statute challenged for vagueness must therefore be scrutinized to determine whether it provides both fair notice to the public that certain conduct is proscribed and minimal guidelines to aid officials in the enforcement of that proscription. See Kolender, supra ; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed. 2d 222 (1972)." '
" Timmons v. City of Montgomery, 641 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala. Cr. App. 1993) (quoting McCorkle v. State, 446 So.2d 684, 685 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983) ). However,
" ' " '[t]his prohibition against excessive vagueness does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision. Many statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for "[i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties." Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286, 65 S.Ct. 666, 668, 89 L.Ed. 944 (1945).' " '
" Sterling v. State, 701 So.2d 71, 73 (Ala. Cr. App. 1997) (quoting Culbreath v. State, 667 So.2d 156, 158 (Ala. Cr. App. 1995), abrogated on other grounds, 717 So.2d 30 (Ala. Cr. App. 1997) )."

City of Montgomery v. Norman, 816 So.2d 72, 76-77 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). Finally, the "mere fact that a statute contains a term that is not specifically defined by the statute or as part of the statutory scheme does not automatically render the statute void for vagueness." Lansdell v. State, 25 So.3d 1169, 1176 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).

In the present case, Wallen was convicted of six counts of violating Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance. That ordinance provides, in pertinent part:

"It shall be unlawful for any person to fail to exercise the necessary care and control to prevent an animal in his or her possession or care from creating a public nuisance. For purposes of this section, an animal is a public nuisance if the animal:
"(1) Habitually makes disturbing noises including, but not limited to crowing, barking, yelping, whining, or other utterances causing unreasonable annoyance or discomfort to others in close proximity to the premises where the animal is kept."

Wallen contends that the above ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because, she says, there are no objective standards for determining whether a dog is barking "habitually" or whether a dog's barking constitutes a "disturbing noise" or an "unreasonable annoyance" and that causes "discomfort to others." (Wallen's brief, pp. 17-21.) We disagree.

In looking at § 7-21(1), Mobile City Code 1991, we conclude that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague because it sets forth sufficient standards to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice of what conduct the ordinance prohibits. Specifically, the ordinance incorporates an objective standard by prohibiting only those "disturbing noises" that are "habitually" made by an animal and that cause "unreasonable annoyance or discomfort" to those in "close proximity to the premises where the animal is kept."

Here, the ordinance clearly defines those "disturbing noises" as noises that include "but [are] not limited to crowing, barking, yelping, whining or other utterances." § 7-21(1), Mobile City Code 1991 (emphasis added). Additionally, although not defined in the ordinance, a reasonable person would understand that the term "habitually" means something more than incidental barking and indicates that a mere one-time disturbance is not enough to trigger application of the ordinance. Importantly, courts in other jurisdictions have found that use of the word "habit" in a dog-barking statute is not unconstitutionally vague as being beyond the comprehension and understanding of a person of common intelligence. See, e.g., State v. Cole, 18 Ariz.App. 237, 501 P.2d 413, 415 (1972). Finally, with regard to what constitutes an "unreasonable annoyance" and creates "discomfort to others," courts in other jurisdictions have also found such language is not unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Richard, 772 So.2d 994, 997 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (construing noise ordinance to proscribe only objectively "unreasonable" noises to overcome constitutional infirmity of vagueness) and Stephens v. City of Spokane, 312 Fed. Appx. 66 (9th Cir. 2009) (making it an infraction in city code section to allow an animal to "unreasonably" disturb an individual by "habitually barking" is not unconstitutionally vague). Under these circumstances, Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance provides "both fair notice to the public that certain conduct is proscribed and minimal guidelines to aid officials in the enforcement of that proscription" and is not unconstitutionally vague. City of Montgomery v. Norman, 816 So.2d 72, 76-77 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, Wallen is not entitled to relief on this claim.

III.

Finally, Wallen argues that § 7-21, Mobile City Code 1991, is unconstitutional as applied to her. (Wallen's brief, pp. 22-24.) Although the argument is not a model of clarity, Wallen appears to argue that the City's public-nuisance ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to her because, she says, it allows her neighbor, Gerald Bates, to continually "harass" her with noise complaints. (Wallen's brief, pp. 24.) According to Wallen, before Bates moved in behind her, she had never received a noise complaint about her dogs. Id. Since he moved in, however, she claims that he has repeatedly "harassed" her with noise complaints despite "knowing full well that dogs bark sometimes." Id. Wallen contends that this violates her constitutional rights and that she should not have been convicted. (Wallen's brief, pp. 22-24.)

This claim fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., which requires that an argument contain "the contentions of the appellant/petitioner with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts of the record relied on." "[W]e are not required to consider matters on appeal unless they are presented and argued in brief with citations to relevant legal authority." Zasadil v. City of Montgomery, 594 So.2d 231, 231 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). Failure to comply with Rule 28(a)(10) has been deemed a waiver of the issue presented." C.B.D. v. State, 90 So.3d 227, 239 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).

In its entirety, Wallen's argument reads as follows:

"[Wallen] has owned dogs before she moved into her current home. [Wallen] testified that she has been involved in the care of dogs since fifteen (15), (16) years of age. [Wallen] moved into the home around 2011. On direct examination [Wallen] was asked: 'Until March 9th of 2016, you've not received any complaints, right?' [Wallen] answered: 'No. So for four (4) years the appellant lived peacefully in tranquility with her neighbors. On March 9, 2016, the realtor, Julie Brannon, came to [Wallen]'s neighborhood to look at and list the property adjacent to [Wallen]'s home. This date is also coincidentally the first time [Wallen] was issued a citation. [Wallen] received the next citation on October 21, 2016; the record does not reflect if this coincides with another visit by Julie Brannon. On November 30, 2017, Gerald Bates, Jr. came out to the adjacent property to measure the water level he testified that he had come out previously to look at the property a few times one of which may have been the October 21, 2016 date. However, on November 30, 2017 when Mr. Bates Jr. was at the property is also the same day the second complaint was issued after and anonymous report. The following three citations January 25, 2017, February 9, 2017 and March 3, 2017, Mr. Bates admitted that he was the one who called Animal Control to complain about [Wallen]'s dogs barking.
"Mr. Bates was aware of the barking dogs before he purchased the house. On direct examination when asked 'So even though you heard the dogs barking that day, you went ahead and made the purchase?' He responded: 'We did. It was just the waterfront, I mean it's affordable waterfront....' Mr. Bates never intended to try to work with [Wallen] to resolve this issue. He testified 'Well, I mean, if there's 29 dogs, trying to get all of them to stop barking at any given time, it's really not going to happen. He didn't say the dogs barked all the time, instead he stated that in his opinion it was impossible to have that many dogs being quiet no matter what [Wallen] did to address the situation. When asked on direct examination: 'Have you ever addressed the issue of her ( [Wallen's] ) dogs barking with her?' Mr. Bates answered 'Actually, no we didn't talk about that.' Even though Mr. Bates had an issue with the dogs before he even purchased the house and self admittedly called Animal Control at least three times, he did not think to once address this issue with [Wallen]. Is this because Mr. Bates never intended to live next door to [Wallen] and her dogs but already decided that he would continue calling Animal Control and use this statute to harass [Wallen] into getting rid of her dogs or moving altogether?
"The statute is unconstitutional as applied to [Wallen] because it allows one neighbor to dictate and harass [Wallen] using the statute. For four (4) years [Wallen] lived peacefully with her neighbors. Julie Brennon a realtor comes to see the adjacent home and the complaints start. Mr. Bates becomes interested in the adjacent property and purchases the property and the additional complaints follow. The effect of this is that one person, knowing full well that the dogs bark sometimes, can come in and disrupt four (4) years of tranquility, while [Wallen] who has lived there peacefully is at the mercy of the whims of her knew neighbor. This is exactly the behavior that the constitutional protections that are being violated are designed to protect against. To allow Mr. Bates with the help of Animal Control to get away with this behavior would be unconscionable."

(Wallen's brief, pp. 22-24.) Wallen's argument here is nothing more than a conclusory allegation with no citations to any legal authority supporting her claims. As such, it does not comply with the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P. Thus, it will not be considered by this Court.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is due to be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Windom, P.J., and Welch, Kellum, and Burke, JJ., concur.

      Wallen was convicted in the Mobile Municipal Court. She then filed a notice of appeal for a jury trial de novo in the Mobile County Circuit Court. Following a jury trial, Wallen was convicted of six counts of violating the City's ordnance prohibiting public nuisances.

      Specifically, Wallen was convicted of five counts of public nuisance for noise related to the dogs on her property in violation of § 7-21(1), Mobile City Code, 1991. See CC-16-4904; CC-17-1020; CC-17-1021; CC-17-1827; and CC-17-1828. She was also convicted of one count of public nuisance for odor related to the dogs on her property in violation of § 7-21(2), Mobile City Code 1991. See CC-17-1830.


text:
    FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: K.E.S.
    CASE NO.: SC19-707
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    MAY 9, 2019
    Upon consideration of the Report and Recommendation filed by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, it is ordered that the Board's recommendation is approved by the Court and K.E.S. shall be admitted to The Florida Bar subject to the following conditions:
    1. The Applicant's license to practice law shall be placed on probation for a period of four years from her sobriety date of February 15, 2016.
   2. During the period of probation, the Applicant shall:

(a) abstain from the consumption of alcoholic beverages;
(b) abstain from the use of controlled substances except as prescribed by a duly licensed medical physician and approved by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.;
(c) participate actively in the program offered by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. during the entire probationary period by complying with the rehabilitation contract with that organization executed on April 3, 2019, and by extending the contract to cover the entire period of probation if necessary;
(d) participate actively in Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous by attending, at least, weekly meetings or such greater frequency as required by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.; practice AA/NA principles in all of her affairs and carry the AA/NA message to other individuals with a substance use disorder;
(e) attend attorney support meetings at least monthly, or at such greater frequency as required by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.;
(f) submit to and pay for a minimum of eight (8) random urine drug/alcohol screens annually, as well as any other hair, blood, sweat, or other substance screening tests determined to be appropriate by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.; and
(g) submit quarterly sworn statements to The Florida Bar by March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31 during the probationary period attesting to her compliance with the conditions set forth in 2 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) above.

3. The Florida Bar shall monitor the conditions set forth in the Consent Agreement pursuant to Rule 1-3.2(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, and the costs thereof shall be paid by the Applicant to The Florida Bar or its designated monitoring agency.

4. To monitor effectively the provisions in this agreement, the Applicant shall reside within the State of Florida during the entire period of probation. Any business or pleasure trips outside Florida that exceed ten days shall occur only with the advance approval of The Florida Bar. If the Applicant relocates outside the State of Florida during the probationary period for any reason, the Applicant shall surrender her license to practice law in Florida and if the Applicant fails to do so, the Supreme Court of Florida shall terminate her license.

5. The Applicant shall immediately inform The Florida Bar of any criminal arrest or prosecution and the filing of any grievance or complaint related to the Applicant's practice of law.

6. If the Applicant's license is surrendered or terminated during the probationary period, the Applicant shall resume the practice of law in the State of Florida only upon full compliance with the rules and regulations governing admission to The Florida Bar.

7. A failure to observe the conditions of the probation or a finding of probable cause by the Florida Bar as to conduct of the Applicant committed during the period of probation may terminate the probation and subject the Applicant to all available grievance procedures and disciplinary sanctions including disbarment under the Rules of Discipline. Upon receiving notice of a violation of the Court's order of conditional admission, The Florida Bar may immediately petition the Court for an order of suspension. The Applicant shall have ten days to file a response. If no response is timely filed by the Applicant, then the Court shall issue an order suspending the Applicant. If a response is filed, the matter shall be disposed of as the Court directs. Unless terminated by the Court, an order of suspension shall remain in effect until final disposition of the grievance procedures commenced by The Florida Bar against the Applicant.

8. If circumstances so warrant it, the Applicant and The Florida Bar may stipulate to an extension of the period of probation or The Florida Bar may petition the Court for such an extension with a final decision to be made by the Court.

9. The Applicant acknowledges that an uninterrupted period of documented sobriety for a minimum period of time must be established prior to admission to The Florida Bar on an unconditional basis. Should the period of probation be extended pursuant to either paragraph 7 or 8 above, the Applicant, therefore, further agrees that such extension shall be for a minimum of three up to five years.

10. The Applicant specifically consents to and authorizes the release of any and all materials in the Applicant's file to The Florida Bar that the Bar may request from the Board to enable the Bar to fulfill its responsibilities under this Consent Agreement.

A True Copy

Test:

John A. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court


text:
    Kevin FOSTER-BEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1587
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 15, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Khalil Keari BARNETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4338
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 15, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    AFFIRMED.


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    Giri KALIKI, Appellant, v. Mahitha ALAVALAPATI, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4863
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 15, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    AFFIRMED.


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    Lamarquis Dewayne POWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1649
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 15, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Affirmed.


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    Kenneth Takvis LIZZAMORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3764
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 21, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Affirmed.


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    Justin WARREN, Appellant, v. ESCAMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1077
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 15, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    AFFIRMED.


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    Ellis Dale FORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0004
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2019 Rehearing Denied May 3, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    AFFIRMED.


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    John FRANCES, Appellant, v. BAYOU BREEZE CONDOMINIUM a/k/a Pensacola Executive House Condominium, Inc.; Its Officers, Directors, Agents, Servants, and/or Employees Individually and/or in Their Official Capacities; Charles D. Cross ; Bobby J. Trammel; and Kathie W. Petkovic, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-4837
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 29, 2019 Rehearing Denied May 15, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Affirmed.


text:
    T.W., Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Respondent.
    No. 1D19-0127
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 8, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Denied.


text:
    Edwin George SCHONFELD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3110
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 8, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Dennis LONG, Appellant, v. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4955
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 8, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Dismissed.


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    Herbert Alexander WEGER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-967
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 8, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    AFFIRMED.


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    Roshad Shonad FOSTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-777
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 8, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Willie Lee SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D19-0511
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 8, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
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    Donald GOINS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D19-0427
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 8, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Denied.


text:
    Allen Lenard MCGRIFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1087
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 8, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Affirmed.


text:
    J.P., A Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4807
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 15, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Affirmed.


text:
    William WALLACE, Appellant, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-5179
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 15, 2019 Rehearing Denied June 12, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Dismissed.


text:
    CLEARWATER AVIATION, INC., and Douglas Paton, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Stephen G. Fox, Deceased Appellants, v. NEW HEIGHTS AVIATION, LLC, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2717
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 29, 2019.
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Affirmed.


text:
    Michael T. FALGOUST, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1834
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 27, 2019.
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Affirmed.


text:
    Salle BELL, in her capacity as guardian of the property of the minor children K.P. and K.M., Appellant, v. Tye WEISENFLUH, as personal representative of the Estate of Kristen Weisenfluh, deceased; and Bayfront HMA Medical Center, LLC, d/b/a Bayfront Health-St. Petersburg, Appellees.
    Case Nos. 2D17-4454 2D17-5149 CONSOLIDATED
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019.
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Affirmed.


text:
    Robert LONG and Nicole Long, Appellants, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON fka The Bank of New York AS TRUSTEE FOR the CERTIFICATE HOLDERS CWALT, INC., Alternative Loan Trust 2006-OA17, Mortgage Passthrough Certificates, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-872
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019.
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Affirmed.


text:
    Michael T. LIVORSI, et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Peter M. BLAKELEY and Amy Blakeley, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0087
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 24, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Dismissed.


text:
    Kenneth WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3663
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2019.
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Affirmed.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. M. G., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0337
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 05, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Dismissed.


text:
    Clifford SUGGS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. LELY COUNTRY CLUB PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0733
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 3, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Dismissed.


text:
    Lisa Marie KORN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Kevin J. RAMBOSK, Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0586
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 11, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Denied.


text:
    John BLACKWELDER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0880
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 11, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Denied.


text:
    Sarah Jo MERRIMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Thomas M. KNIGHT, Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0974
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 22, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Denied.


text:
    Steven C. WHITE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Grady C. JUDD, Sheriff of Polk County Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0819
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 11, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Dismissed.


text:
    Randal Thomas ROSADO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-5041
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 23, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Dismissed.


text:
    PRECON CORPORATION, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4844
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    December 14, 2018
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Granted.


text:
    Thaddeus T. HOWARD, Jr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2858
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 24, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Dismissed.


text:
    Melvin E. GAVRON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3914
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 22, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Dismissed.


text:
    Terry COLLINS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0694
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 11, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Denied.


text:
    Steven C. WHITE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Grady C. JUDD, Sheriff of Polk County, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0818
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 11, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS
    Dismissed.


text:
    K. WADE FOSTER, M. D., P. A., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Tonya M. TERWILLIGER, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4786
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Trenton HUNT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0889
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 02, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Stephen BREWSTER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0754
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Kenneth George MOORE, Jr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Chad CHRONISTER, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0609
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    John L. NORMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0583
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Danilo Baldemar PEREZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1365
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    TRINITY HEALTH CORPORATION, BayCare Health System, Inc., et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Susan SANDERS, Appellee/Responden(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4334
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Nathan C. FLOYD, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1062
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Mandamus is dismissed.


text:
    Bethany L. CARVALLO a/k/a Bethany Cavallo, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3451
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Victor TABARRINI, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Steve TABARRINI, et al, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4471
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 18, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Christopher MOLDOVAN and John Gagne, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0506
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 05, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Dismissed.


text:
    William DIAMOND-SLOBODIAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. FORECLOSED ASSETS SALES AND TRANSFER PARTNERSHIP, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4546
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 03, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Marshall ADAMS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. JASPER CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-5117
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Dismissed.


text:
    C. C.-K., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. R. J. B., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4507
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 18, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Laurie ZILIOLI, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Bob GUALTIERI, Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0417
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    David GUZMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4256
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 25, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Samuel WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4454
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Richard M. BOOMER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4151
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ronald FISHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4248
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Isaac E. ABRAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4417
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Karra LAWSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, et al, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1552
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 21, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    TRANSGUARD INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Robin KLEIN d/b/a Klein Construction, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4879
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 21, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Jason Barrett BOUCHARD, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Sandy Alene BOUCHARD, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1434
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 21, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Joseph Manuel LEWIS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-5060
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 06, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    G.S., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0534
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 02, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    C.C., et al, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Lori W. CLIFFORD, et al, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1097
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 02, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Matthew Gregory MANJA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Danielle GOTTSCHLING, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1535
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 02, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Carmello RIVERA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4616
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 18, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Ulysses Lee WILLIAMS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1034
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 18, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    David J. REYES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1837
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 20, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Nelson E. MORALES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1953
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Christopher DUNN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1905
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 12, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    John SEXTON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0221
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Michael HANEY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4535
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Jacob ALLEN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2014
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 03, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Altus Jermar LEE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2186
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 01, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Christopher AMY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1302
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 26, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Roger Marx DESENBERG, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1300
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Shawn G. JOHNSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1063
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Antonio D. TAYLOR, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1032
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Danny Levon BROWN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0953
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 23, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Tommy CHAPMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0935
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 23, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Daniel CRUZADO MARTINEZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0835
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 23, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.


text:
    Russ Franklin Joel WILSON, Sr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0820
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 22, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Antwaun Anthony THOMPSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.:2D18-1971
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 25, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Granted.


text:
    Otario GARRETTE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.:2D19-1493
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 25, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Garrett M. KERN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0749
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 24, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Carlos J. CERVANTES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0338
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 24, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Regino RODOLFO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4429
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 09, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Tony Lamar SMITH, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3434
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 29, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Marquis RIDDLE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3195
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 26, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Mandamus is denied.


text:
    Clayton CLARKE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2968
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 20, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Davarius Antawn DURHAM, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4806
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 22, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Wilfredo LUGO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4840
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 18, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Angela DEBOSE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0611
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 19, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Sherman L. MYERS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-5069
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 25, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Jose Valentin ORTEGA, Jr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0764
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 6, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    James LEDBETTER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Cheryl LEDBETTER, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0608
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 06, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Casey James PARENTE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Colonel Wayne BUNTON and State of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.:2D19-1612
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Kevirent BRUNDAGE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0729
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 09, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Brian LAMARKCUFFIE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.:2D19-1273
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Timothy Justin TACY, Sr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Mark INCH, Secretary D. O. C., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1550
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Tennessee Ernie BOLTON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1192
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 15, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Vacate.


text:
    Frank P. ROSSOTTO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. WACHOVIA BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3870
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 06, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    J.R., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0667
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 06, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    J.A.F., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, IN the INTEREST OF: P.C.F., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0785
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 06, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Matthew Tyrone SIMMONS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.:2D19-1590
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Eric Anthony ALLEN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Chad CHRONISTER, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0323
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 01, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Granted.


text:
    David Lee HAYES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3608
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 31, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Charles James LAWN, Jr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Karen WEIL, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.:2D19-1061
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 15, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Demetrius Mc LAUGHLIN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Thomas KNIGHT, Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1690
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Dale H. ESTEVEZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0930
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 26, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Carla L. RUSHING, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0056
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 15, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Carla L. RUSHING, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1332
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 8, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Dismissed.


text:
    Terry L. GARNTO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1156
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 09, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    PIL KIM, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. EUN KIM, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1034
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 08, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Granted.


text:
    Cleveland DUBOSE, Jr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.:2D19-1269
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Brian K. ALLEN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.:2D19-1439
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Henry Keith CAVALIERE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0561
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 10, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    William BURRELL, IV, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Natalie BELL, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0405
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 08, 2019
    FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
    Denied.


text:
    Juan Francisco VEGA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Robert W. GERMAINE, Clerk, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0932
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Emerson PINKNEY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0951
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 26, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Angela DEBOSE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. ELLUCIAN, L.P., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1023
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Leslie COONRADT a/k/a Leslie Lynn Coonradt, et al. Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3142
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 05, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Kendal Arthur BURGE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1380
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 13, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Transferred.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Department of Legal Affairs, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Ashley Brooke Moody, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STONEBRIER HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1867
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 04, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    PAGE 42, LLC and Shazam Auto Glass, LLC, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. PROGRESSIVE SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0689
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.

Denied.


text:
    Dejuan BELL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1313
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    J. P., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Grady C. JUDD, Sheriff of Polk County, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1077
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 25, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Dewey N. HOWARD, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0700
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    J.A.S., Appellant, v. H.B.D., Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2918
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 6, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Darrin C. LAVINE and Gregory R. Wilson, Appellants, v. R.P. FUNDING, INC.; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; and Government National Mortgage Association, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-3294
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.