author: VILLANTI, Judge.

text:
    Christopher DeLane DANIELS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4840
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 13, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Karen Kinney, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   VILLANTI, Judge.

Christopher DeLane Daniels seeks review of his convictions and sentences for three counts of sale or delivery of cocaine within 1000 feet of a park, raising a single issue concerning the trial court's failure to conduct a Nelson hearing in response to Daniels' pro se motion entitled "Petition for Nelson Hearing." Because the trial court erred by not conducting a preliminary inquiry into the basis for Daniels' petition, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The law concerning the need for a hearing when a defendant seeks to discharge appointed counsel is clear.

In Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), the court set forth a procedure for handling a request to discharge court-appointed counsel. Maxwell v. State, 892 So.2d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
The first step in the procedure is the preliminary Nelson inquiry in which the court ascertains whether the defendant unequivocally requests court-appointed counsel's discharge and the court asks the reason for the request. The answer to the preliminary inquiry determines the next steps. If a reason for the request is court-appointed counsel's incompetence, then the court must further inquire of the defendant and his counsel to determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that court-appointed counsel is not rendering effective assistance and, if so, appoint substitute counsel. If the reasons for the request do not indicate ineffective assistance of counsel, then no further inquiry is required.
Id. (citations omitted). If there is no need for further inquiry or after such inquiry the court determines there is not reasonable cause to determine that counsel is ineffective, then the court must inform the defendant he or she is not entitled to substitute court-appointed counsel and will have to exercise his or her right to self-representation. Id. Before the court may allow a defendant to represent himself or herself, it must conduct a Faretta [v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ] inquiry to determine that the defendant's waiver of the right to court-appointed counsel is knowing and intelligent. Id.
The preliminary Nelson inquiry is a critical step in the procedure for handling a request to discharge counsel. Maxwell, 892 So.2d at 1102. "Depending on the answer to the preliminary Nelson inquiry, a complex, multi-faceted combined Nelson and Faretta hearing could ensue, or the inquiry could end there." Id. The failure to conduct this preliminary inquiry in response to a defendant's request to discharge court-appointed counsel is a structural defect that requires reversal as per se error. Id. at 1103. Simply put, the trial court may not remove the possibility of discharging court-appointed counsel for incompetence without giving the defendant a chance to be heard on the issue. Id.

Mansfield v. State, 227 So.3d 704, 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (emphasis added). While "a Nelson hearing [may be] unwarranted where a defendant presents general complaints about defense counsel's trial strategy and no formal allegations of incompetence have been made," Morrison v. State, 818 So.2d 432, 440 (Fla. 2002), the need for a preliminary Nelson inquiry arises "when a defendant complains about his appointed attorney, or it may come up when a defendant asks to dismiss his appointed counsel," Jones v. State, 74 So.3d 149, 151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). "In either case, the court must conduct a preliminary inquiry into the reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction," id. (citing Nash v. State, 53 So.3d 1208, 1211 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ), and the defendant has the right to be heard on the issue, see Mansfield, 227 So.3d at 708 (citing Maxwell v. State, 892 So.2d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ). Moreover, even when the defendant files a written motion that implicates Nelson, the court may not rely solely on the written motion but instead is obligated to inquire of the defendant whether he wishes to discharge appointed counsel and exercise his right to self-representation. See Jackson v. State, 33 So.3d 833, 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ; Montgomery v. State, 1 So.3d 1228, 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). The court's failure to do so constitutes a structural defect that requires reversal as per se error. See Maxwell, 892 So.2d at 1103 ; Boaz v. State, 135 So.3d 506, 508 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

Here, Daniels filed a petition asking specifically for a Nelson hearing and asserting that appointed counsel had violated Daniels' due process rights by agreeing to an early trial date for which counsel would not be prepared. Once it reviewed that petition, rather than denying it without a hearing, the trial court should have convened a preliminary Nelson inquiry to allow Daniels to be heard concerning whether he was unequivocally requesting that his court-appointed counsel be discharged and to ascertain all the reasons for the request. Because Daniels' petition was at least minimally sufficient on its face, the trial court's failure to conduct the preliminary Nelson inquiry requires reversal.

Moreover, contrary to the State's assertion here, the error was not rendered harmless by the trial court appointing stand-by counsel for Daniels. As this court has stated, "while the failure to conduct an adequate Nelson inquiry is subject to an abuse of discretion standard and, presumably, a harmless error analysis, the failure to conduct any inquiry is per se error." Jackson, 33 So.3d at 836. Therefore, because there was a complete absence of any inquiry into the legitimacy of Daniels' complaints about his attorney, the error was not harmless.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

KELLY and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.

      Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    FCCI COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. EMPIRE INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee and assignee of Lakeview at Carlton Lakes Condominium Association, Inc.; Patnode Roofing, Inc.; Celerity Construction, Inc. ; and NTC Development, Ltd., Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-1749
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 13, 2018
    Robert M. Darroch and Chad W. Bickerton of Goodman McGuffey LLP, Sarasota, for Appellant.
    Wayne M. Alder and Andrew M. Greenidge of Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck, LLP, Boca Raton, for Appellee Empire Indemnity Insurance Company.
    No appearance for remaining Appellees.
   ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.

FCCI Commercial Insurance Company (FCCI) appeals the trial court's order awarding attorney's fees to Empire Indemnity Insurance Company (Empire), as subrogee and assignee of Lakeview at Carlton Lakes Condominium Association, Inc., under the trial court's inherent authority to impose sanctions for egregious or bad-faith conduct. FCCI had retained an attorney to defend its insureds, Celerity Construction, Inc. (Celerity), and NTC Development, Ltd. (NTC), in Empire's construction-defect action, but on Empire's motion, the trial court disqualified the attorney for misconduct and determined that Empire was entitled to unspecified attorney's fees and costs "in connection with" the motion (the 2012 order). After FCCI intervened and moved for summary judgment on the fee issue, the court held a hearing and awarded Empire attorney's fees as a sanction against FCCI based on its finding that FCCI "did direct and orchestrate" the attorney's misconduct (the 2016 order). Because the evidence did not support a finding that FCCI had engaged in egregious or bad-faith conduct, we reverse the award of fees and direct the trial court to enter summary judgment in FCCI's favor on Empire's supplemental precautionary motion for attorney fees.

Background

In the 2012 order, the trial court determined that the attorney had improperly initiated direct contact with a represented party, had improperly obtained privileged documents from that represented party and then forwarded them to other defendants rather than informing the sender, and, in so doing, had violated various Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. Accordingly, the court disqualified the attorney. The court also generally granted Empire's request for sanctions by determining that Empire was entitled to attorney's fees. Celerity and NTC sought certiorari review of the 2012 order, and this court denied their petition per curiam. See Celerity Constr., Inc. v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co., 125 So.3d 1026 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (table decision).

Thereafter, Empire filed a "supplemental precautionary motion for attorney's fees" based on the 2012 order, in which Empire also sought discovery regarding FCCI's role, if any, in the attorney's misconduct. Consequently, FCCI sought and was granted leave to intervene in connection with the motion. FCCI subsequently moved for summary judgment on the motion, arguing, among other things, that it could not be liable for the attorney's misconduct and that it had not engaged in any misconduct itself. As set forth above, after a hearing, the court denied FCCI's motion for summary judgment and granted Empire's motion for fees. The trial court subsequently entered a final order awarding Empire attorney's fees against FCCI, and this appeal followed.

Analysis

As an initial matter, Empire incorrectly contends that we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Burt v. SP Healthcare Holdings, LLC, 163 So.3d 1274, 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). Not only is the order awarding Empire attorney's fees an executable judgment against FCCI concluding a portion of the litigation ancillary to Empire's ongoing litigation against Celerity and NTC (and other codefendants), see Hastings v. Osius, 104 So.2d 21, 22 (Fla. 1958) ; Burt, 163 So.3d at 1275 ; Saye v. Pieschacon, 750 So.2d 759, 760-61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), but FCCI's limited intervention solely for the purpose of addressing fees demonstrates that the conclusion of the attorney fees proceeding ended judicial labor as to FCCI, see Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(k) ; Smith v. State, 902 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (holding that an order awarding sanctions against an attorney was a final, appealable order because the entry of sanctions ended judicial labor in the case with respect to a nonparty); see also Gator Boring & Trenching, Inc. v. Westra Constr. Corp., 210 So.3d 175, 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("Because the trial court's orders completely dispose of all claims involving Travelers, we have jurisdiction to review Gator's appeal from the dismissal of count II as a partial final judgment in accordance with rule 9.110(k).").

Empire also argues that Celerity and NTC's earlier certiorari proceeding bars this appeal under the law-of-the-case doctrine. Again, Empire is incorrect. First, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply because our review in the prior certiorari proceeding was limited to the attorney's disqualification; we lacked certiorari jurisdiction to review the sanction portion of the order. See Parrish v. RL Regi Fin., LLC, 194 So.3d 571, 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("Generally, an order imposing monetary sanctions against trial counsel and directing that they be paid on a certain date is a final, appealable order.... An order determining an entitlement to attorney's fees and costs without setting the amount is a nonfinal, nonappealable order." (first citing Burt, 163 So.3d at 1275 ; then citing Greenberg v. Greenberg, 129 So.3d 470, 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ) ); DeMartino v. Simat, 948 So.2d 841, 843-44 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("[T]he law of the case doctrine ... applies only to rulings on questions of law that were actually presented and considered in a prior appeal. Other than the dismissal of a previous attempt to appeal a nonfinal, nonappealable order, there have been no appellate court rulings on questions of law in this case." (first citing Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So.2d 101, 106 (Fla. 2001) ; then citing U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So.2d 1061, 1063 (Fla. 1983) ) ).

Moreover, the findings in the 2012 order pertained only to the attorney's conduct, and as explained below, findings of misconduct must be tailored to the entity against which sanctions are entered. Although the findings in the 2012 order provided the context for the 2016 order, the 2012 order did not address whether FCCI had engaged in egregious conduct or had acted in bad faith in directing the attorney. See Juliano, 801 So.2d at 106 ("Under the law of the case doctrine, a trial court is bound to follow prior rulings of the appellate court as long as the facts on which such decision are based continue to be the facts of the case."); Specialty Rests. Corp. v. Elliott, 924 So.2d 834, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("Because they were not parties to the earlier appeal, this court's earlier ruling did not become law of the case as to them and therefore is not binding upon them.").

Turning to the merits, a trial court has the inherent authority to award "attorney's fees where one party has exhibited egregious conduct or acted in bad faith." Bitterman v. Bitterman, 714 So.2d 356, 365 (Fla. 1998). This authority, however, should rarely be exercised, as it is "reserved for those extreme cases where a party acts 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,' " id. (quoting Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1983) ), whether in connection with the conduct leading to the litigation or during the litigation itself, id. (quoting Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982) ). This authority also extends to imposing sanctions against an attorney, Moakley, 826 So.2d at 224, as does the caveat that it be exercised "sparingly and cautiously," id. at 225 (citing Patsy v. Patsy, 666 So.2d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) ).

Before exercising its inherent authority to impose sanctions, a trial court must provide to the parties "notice and an opportunity to be heard-including the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence." Id. at 227. The court's imposition of sanctions under that authority "must be based upon an express finding of bad faith conduct and must be supported by detailed factual findings describing the specific acts of bad faith conduct that resulted in the unnecessary incurrence of attorneys' fees." Id. The court, however, need not employ any "magic words." See Robinson v. Ward, 203 So.3d 984, 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (explaining that the court's order need not specifically intone the words "bad faith" as long as it specifically identifies the incidents of bad-faith conduct). We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's award of sanctions. See Tenev v. Thurston, 198 So.3d 798, 801 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

We have found no case that would preclude a trial court from sanctioning an insurer for egregious or bad-faith conduct that the insurer committed while performing its duty to defend the insured. Nonetheless, in such circumstances, the trial court cannot ignore that it should rarely invoke this inherent authority, see Bitterman, 714 So.2d at 365, and should do so only after complying with Moakley. Thus, although we do not rule out that an insurer could be liable for the egregious or bad-faith conduct of the attorney that it has hired to represent its insured, it would not be sufficient for the trial court to find simply that the insurer had taken an active role in the representation of the insured because no authority provides an exception to the requirement that the trial court make detailed factual findings describing the specific egregious or bad-faith conduct committed by the party against whom sanctions are imposed. See Moakley, 826 So.2d at 227 ; see also Robinson, 203 So.3d at 991 (affirming sanctions imposed against lead trial counsel because the trial court specifically articulated eight instances of egregious or bad-faith conduct during trial but reversing imposition of sanctions against cocounsel based on the same factual findings because cocounsel was only tangentially involved in one of those instances); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Swindoll, 54 So.3d 548, 551-52 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (reversing sanction imposed against State Farm based on conduct of its expert witness on cross-examination because "there is no finding that State Farm's attorneys, much less any State Farm officer or employee, coached [the expert] or elicited the testimony in question" and because there is "no rule of imputation that can justify such an award without some bad faith or egregious conduct on the part of the party or counsel as well"); Shniderman v. Fitness Innovations & Techs., Inc., 994 So.2d 508, 515-17 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (affirming sanctions against attorney based on specific findings of that attorney's egregious conduct, which was independent of the inherent-authority sanction imposed against the attorney's client for separate egregious conduct that the court had already sanctioned); Allegheny Cas. Co. v. Roche Sur., Inc., 885 So.2d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (reversing because the trial court failed to follow Moakley procedures; noting that the court's order awarding fees to Roche "does not specify whether it is against Allegheny and/or Allegheny's attorneys" and that "it is not clear whether the court thought that Allegheny indulged in litigation tactics that warranted sanctions, or that Allegheny was acting in bad faith by refusing to release the money, or both"). Regardless, the trial court in this case did not find that the attorney had engaged in egregious or bad-faith conduct: it found that the attorney's disqualification was warranted, but disqualification does not require a finding of such conduct. Compare Moriber v. Dreiling, 95 So.3d 449, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (explaining that the disqualification of counsel based on the inadvertent disclosure of privileged or confidential information requires a finding of a possibility that the disclosure provided the recipient with an unfair informational advantage, which requires an examination of the actions of counsel upon receipt of information), with Moakley, 826 So.2d at 224, 227 (explaining that "[t]he inequitable conduct doctrine permits the award of attorney's fees where one party has exhibited egregious conduct or acted in bad faith" but that it "is rarely applicable" and "is reserved for those extreme cases where a party acts 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons' " and holding, therefore, that "the trial court's exercise of the inherent authority to assess attorneys' fees against an attorney must be based upon an express finding of bad faith conduct and must be supported by detailed factual findings describing the specific acts of bad faith conduct that resulted in the unnecessary incurrence of attorneys' fees" (quoting Bitterman 714 So.2d at 365 ) ).

To comply with Moakley, the trial court had to make specific findings of FCCI's egregious or bad-faith conduct. The only finding that the court expressly made in the 2016 order as to FCCI, however, was that FCCI "did direct and orchestrate the actions by [the attorney]." At the hearing, the court also stated that it found "very helpful" Empire's memorandum in response to FCCI's motion for summary judgment, and so we assume that the court relied on Empire's assertions in that memorandum, which included that FCCI had "identified and targeted" the deponent early on in the litigation "as someone they wanted to contact and obtain information from," had directed the attorney to contact the deponent and obtain information from him, had "Supervised, Directed, Authorized, and/or Acquiesced in the actions and conduct of [the attorney] with respect to [ ] the filing of all of the pleadings, Motions and Court papers filed on behalf of NTC and Celerity," and had "Authorized and/or acquiesced, and otherwise directed the actions and conduct which formed the basis for the [2012 order]." Empire also suggested that FCCI had told the attorney not just to set a deposition but also to personally contact the deponent despite FCCI's knowing that he was represented by counsel and that FCCI had subsequently reviewed the privileged information received from the attorney's improper contact with the deponent.

Taking Empire's assertions as true, the trial court might have been able to make the requisite findings of specific acts of egregious or bad-faith conduct on FCCI's part. The summary judgment evidence, however, did not support the assertions. First, that evidence establishes that the only direction that FCCI gave the attorney was a general direction to depose the deponent. But setting a deposition does not, in itself, amount to impermissible contact with a represented individual. Indeed, the trial court did not disqualify the attorney because he sought to depose the deponent; it did so based on the manner in which he did it and what he did with the documents that he received from it. There is no evidence demonstrating that FCCI gave the attorney any specifics as to how or when to depose the deponent or whether the attorney should obtain any documents when deposing him. Moreover, although FCCI's "case handling guidelines for law firms for liability matters" require that FCCI and counsel develop a litigation plan and budget at the outset of the case and confer regarding the investigation of a case, that guide also explicitly provides that "in no event shall the Litigation Plan interfere with the rendering of independent professional judgment of defense counsel." Further, the preface to the guidelines also provides:

The Law Firm is expected to work with FCCI and the insured to achieve the best result for the insured in an efficient and cost-conscious manner consistent with the Law Firm's ethical obligations. Nothing contained herein is intended to nor shall restrict Counsel's exercise of professional judgment in rendering legal services for the Insured or otherwise interfere with any ethical directive governing the conduct of counsel.

(Footnote omitted.) Thus, if we assume that the court's invocation of its inherent authority to sanction FCCI is based on the attorney's violations of multiple bar regulations and rules of civil procedure, then there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that FCCI did "direct and orchestrate the actions of [the attorney]."

For the same reason, Empire's reliance on Burt, 163 So.3d 1274, for the alternative proposition that sanctions were available under Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.280 and 1.380 is unavailing. The "sole issue" in Burt was the propriety of a monetary sanction imposed directly against a party's law firm based on that firm's asserted failure to comply with discovery orders. Id. at 1276. Burt, therefore, is inapposite in the context of a party being sanctioned for the conduct of its counsel.

Conclusion

Because the evidence did not support a finding that FCCI had engaged in egregious or bad-faith conduct, the trial court erred in sanctioning FCCI under its inherent authority. Accordingly, we reverse the court's award of fees and remand for the entry of summary judgment in FCCI's favor on Empire's motion.

Reversed; remanded with directions.

MORRIS and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.

      Because this appeal does not require us to review the trial court's findings and conclusions with regard to the attorney's misconduct, the attorney's identity is not relevant to this appeal, and we do not refer to him by name.

      We therefore do not reach FCCI's arguments concerning the amount of the sanctions award.

      Indeed, if the trial court in the 2012 order had made findings regarding FCCI and then had sanctioned FCCI under its inherent authority based on those findings, it would have violated FCCI's right to due process because FCCI was not a party either below until 2014, when it intervened, or in the prior certiorari proceeding. See Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So.2d 221, 226-27 (Fla. 2002) ("[A] trial court['s] inherent authority to impose attorneys' fees against an attorney for bad faith conduct ... carries with it the obligation of restrained use and due process.... [S]uch a sanction is appropriate only after notice and an opportunity to be heard-including the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence.").

      Neither party requested an evidentiary hearing on their motions or challenges the trial court's resolution of the sanctions issue in a summary-judgment fashion.

      In its characterization of FCCI's directions to the attorney, Empire suggests that, in addition to conducting the deposition, FCCI wanted the attorney to communicate with the deponent through some means other than deposition. Contrary to Empire's suggestion, there is no evidence of a direction from FCCI to contact the deponent by other means.

      Although not referenced even indirectly in the trial court's oral ruling or 2016 order, to the extent that the court may have adopted Empire's suggestion that FCCI had reviewed the improperly obtained privileged documents, there is no evidence to support such a finding.


author: Rowe, J.

text:
    GENESIS MINISTRIES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Appellant, v. Gregory S. BROWN, as Property Appraiser for Santa Rosa County, Florida; Stan Colie Nichols, as Tax Collector for Santa Rosa County, Florida; and Leon M. Biegalski, as Executive Director of the Florida Department of Revenue, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-4313
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 25, 2018
    Douglas L. Smith of Burke, Blue, Hutchison, Walters & Smith, P.A., Panama City, for Appellant.
    Thomas M. Findley of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Tallahassee, for Appellees Gregory S. Brown and Stan Colie Nichols; Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Timothy E. Dennis, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee Leon M. Biegalski.
   Rowe, J.

Genesis Ministries, Inc. appeals an order granting summary judgment in favor of Gregory S. Brown and Stan Nichols, as Property Appraiser and Tax Collector for Santa Rosa County, Florida. Genesis had filed an action challenging tax assessments made from 2005 to 2013. Genesis raises several arguments regarding its entitlement to tax exemption during this period, only two of which merit discussion. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that Genesis was not entitled to exemption from ad valorem taxes from 2005 to 2012. However, as to the 2013 tax year, because the property appraiser failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements of section 196.193(5), Florida Statutes (2013), the property appraiser improperly denied Genesis's existing tax exemption for 2013. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment with respect to the 2013 taxes and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of Genesis consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

In 1994, Reverend Dr. Michael Palmer formed Genesis Ministries, Inc. under the laws of Delaware. At or around the same time, Genesis acquired title to property in Santa Rosa County, Florida. From 1994 to 2004, Genesis operated a Christian church and school on the property-Genesis Ministries and Victory Christian Academy. Palmer also formed a Florida non-profit corporation, Genesis Ministries, Inc., without specifying the purpose of the non-profit. Genesis applied for and was granted a "religious exemption" from ad valorem taxes from 1994 to 2004.

In 2004, Palmer closed Victory Christian Academy, dissolved the Florida non-profit Genesis Ministries, and moved to Iowa. After the school closed, Russell Cookston, a former employee of Genesis Ministries, entered into a commercial lease and agreement with Palmer to lease the property where the former church and school had operated. Cookston formed a new corporation called Lighthouse of Northwest Florida, Inc. for the purpose of operating a new Christian church and school-Lighthouse Ministries and Lighthouse Academy. From 2005 to 2013, Lighthouse of Northwest Florida, Inc. paid rent and operated the Christian church and school on the property. Genesis, as the property owner, continued to receive a "religious exemption" from ad valorem taxes from 2005 to 2012.

In a February 26, 2013 letter, the property appraiser informed Genesis that it no longer qualified for a tax exemption for the property. An investigation by the property appraiser revealed that Genesis had dissolved in 2004. Thus, according to the property appraiser, Genesis erroneously received exemption from ad valorem taxes from 2005 to 2012. The property appraiser indicated it would file a lien against Genesis for recovery of the amount of taxes exempted from 2005 to 2012, plus penalties and interest. In the same letter, the property appraiser notified Genesis that it was revoking Genesis's tax exempt status for the 2013 tax year.

In August 2013, Genesis received a standard Truth in Millage Notice listing the amount of taxes owed for 2013. The county's 2013 tax rolls were certified on October 18, 2013, and Genesis's property was listed as fully taxable with no exemption.

After seeking explanation from the property appraiser, Genesis received a letter that the tax determination would not be changed. Genesis then sold the property and paid the tax lien and 2013 taxes under protest. In September 2014, Genesis sued the property appraiser, the tax collector, and the executive director of the Department of Revenue, asserting its entitlement to the religious exemption from 2005 to 2013 and seeking a refund of the taxes paid under protest.

The trial court dismissed Genesis's complaint on jurisdictional grounds, finding Genesis was barred from challenging both the imposition of the tax lien and the denial of the 2013 exemption because Genesis failed to file suit within 60 days after the certification of the tax rolls as required under section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2013). Genesis appealed, and this Court reversed. See Genesis Ministries, Inc. v. Brown , 186 So.3d 1074, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ( Genesis I ). We held that the 60-day period in section 194.171(2) does not apply to actions challenging a tax lien. Id. at 1079. As to the denial of the 2013 exemption, we reiterated that the 60-day period does not begin to run if the property appraiser fails to strictly comply with the applicable statutory notice requirements. Id. at 1077 (citing Chihocky v. Crapo , 632 So.2d 230, 232-33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ). We remanded the case, noting that further record development was necessary to determine whether the property appraiser complied with the requirements of section 196.193(5), Florida Statutes (2013). Id. at 1080-82.

On remand and after several months of discovery, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. Genesis argued it was entitled to exemption because it continuously operated a Christian church and school on the property through Lighthouse of Northwest Florida, Inc. The property appraiser argued Genesis had no involvement with the operation of the Christian church or school and instead used the property for the purpose of obtaining substantial lease income. As to the denial of the 2013 tax exemption, the parties disputed whether the property appraiser satisfied the statutory notice requirements of section 196.193(5), Florida Statutes.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property appraiser, finding Genesis was not entitled to the tax exemption because it held the real property for the production of commercial rent. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

We review the trial court's order granting summary judgment de novo. Lesnik v. Duval Ford, LLC , 185 So.3d 577, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). "Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P. , 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000).

Unless expressly exempted, all real property in the state is subject to taxation. § 196.001(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). While certain properties may qualify for an exemption, tax exemptions are highly disfavored and are strictly construed against the party claiming them. See Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre , 642 So.2d 1072, 1073 (Fla. 1994). The claimant has the burden to show entitlement to tax exemption, and any ambiguity should be resolved against the taxpayer and against exemption. Volusia Cty. v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. , 341 So.2d 498, 502 (Fla. 1976) ; Markham v. PPI, Inc. , 843 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

A. 2005 to 2012 Taxes

"All property owned by an exempt entity and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation." § 196.192(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The law requires that the exempt entity both own and use the property. Ocean Highway & Port Auth. v. Page , 609 So.2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ("[U]nder the plain language of section 196.192, an ad valorem tax exemption is only permitted when the property in question is both owned and used by the tax-exempt entity.") (emphasis in original); see also Metropolitan Dade Cty. v. Bros. of Good Shepherd, Inc. , 714 So.2d 573, 573 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (reversing final judgment, finding that "the property in question, although concededly used for exempt charitable purposes by an exempt entity, was not, as the statute requires, 'owned' by that entity"). It is not enough that an exempt entity owns the property and that the property is being used for exempt purposes. The exempt entity owner must also be the entity using the property for exempt purposes. Ocean Highway , 609 So.2d at 86.

Here, it was undisputed Genesis owned the property. However, the evidence before the trial court demonstrated that Genesis was not the entity that used the property for exempt purposes. Lighthouse of Northwest Florida, Inc., a distinct and separate entity, operated the Christian church and school on Genesis's property. That a former employee of Genesis formed Lighthouse does not create a corporate or contractual relationship between Genesis and Lighthouse. At oral argument, Genesis admitted that Lighthouse was a completely separate corporate entity. Because the undisputed evidence shows Genesis was not the entity that used the property for exempt purposes from 2005 to 2012, it was not entitled to tax exemption during those years. See § 196.192(1), Fla. Stat. (2005) ; Ocean Highway , 609 So.2d at 86.

B. 2013 Tax Exemption Revocation

Genesis argues the property appraiser's denial of the 2013 exemption was invalid as a matter of law because the property appraiser failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements. In order to revoke an existing tax exemption, the property appraiser must follow the notice requirements outlined in section 196.193(5), Florida Statutes (2013). As we explained in Genesis I , " section 196.193(1)(c) necessarily contemplates that the property appraiser is required to provide notice in accordance with subsection (5) when denying an existing religious exemption." 186 So.3d at 1081. Although dicta, we added that the "Legislature has made clear that the property appraiser's failure to comply with the notice requirements in section 196.193(5) has consequences ... [the] statutory provision would be meaningless if, as Appellees argue, Genesis was barred from challenging the denial of its exemption for 2013 when it was not provided notice of the denial." Id. at 1082 ; § 196.193(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013) ("If a property appraiser fails to provide a notice that complies with this subsection, any denial of an exemption or an attempted denial of an exemption is invalid.").

Now, with a fully developed record after remand, it is undisputed that the property appraiser failed to provide Genesis with the proper notice. The property appraiser's February 26, 2013 letter to Genesis did not notify Genesis of its right to appeal the property appraiser's revocation to the value adjustment board. See § 196.193(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013). And the Truth in Millage Notice, delivered after the July 1 deadline did not cure the deficiency in the notice. See § 196.193(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013) ("If the property appraiser determines that any property claimed as wholly or partially exempt under this section is not entitled to any exemption ... he or she shall notify the person or organization ... in writing on or before July 1 of the year for which the application was filed.").

Accordingly, with regard to the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the property appraiser with respect to the denial of the 2013 tax exemption, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant summary final judgment in favor of Genesis. We affirm the summary judgment order in all other respects.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part with instructions.

Wetherell and Winokur, JJ., concur.

      We affirm without comment all other issues raised by Genesis on appeal.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Jerome Paul SHERIDAN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D18-2164
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed August 10, 2018
    Jerome Paul Sheridan, Sneads, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and, Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the May 19, 2016 judgment and sentence rendered in Case No. 2014-CF-000786-A, in the Circuit Court in and for Hernando County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

COHEN, C.J., TORPY and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Dexter COWAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3728
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed August 10, 2018
    Dexter Cowan, Raiford, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Squire T. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Dexter Cowan appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Cowan raises seven grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the record does not conclusively refute Cowan's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert witness to challenge the conclusions made by the State's fingerprint expert, we reverse the summary denial of Ground Five and remand for attachment of portions of the record conclusively refuting this claim or for an evidentiary hearing. See Cox v. State, 189 So.3d 221, 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ; Ward v. State, 861 So.2d 107, 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ; Baker v. State, 826 So.2d 524, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). We affirm on all other grounds.

AFFIRMED in Part, REVERSED in Part, and REMANDED with Instructions.

PALMER, BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ritchy BIENAIME, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3164
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed August 10, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Thomas J. Lukashow, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Ritchy Bienaime, Bristol, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah A. Chance, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the judgment and sentence under review. However, we remand this case to the trial court to correct a scrivener's error in the judgment, which erroneously states that the defendant was convicted of a third-degree felony when he was convicted of a second-degree felony.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED to correct scrivener's error.

SAWAYA, PALMER and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    D.G., Father of D.L., a Child, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1049
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed August 15, 2018
    Ryan Thomas Truskoski, of Ryan Thomas Truskoski, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
    Ward L. Metzger, Appellate Counsel, Children's Legal Services, Department of Children and Families, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
    Thomasina Moore, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Appellate Counsel, Guardian ad Litem Program, Tallahassee, for Guardian ad Litem.
   PER CURIAM.

D.G. appeals the order terminating his parental rights to D.L. We affirm. The record supports the trial court's findings that the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") proved, by clear and convincing evidence, a ground for termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)(3), Florida Statutes (2017). Because DCF was required to prove only one statutory ground for termination, we do not need to address whether the trial court correctly relied on other grounds for termination. See § 39.802(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; S.D. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. , 80 So.3d 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, C.J., and TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

      Section 39.806(1)(d)(3) provides that grounds for termination of parental rights may be established where the court determines by clear and convincing evidence "that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child and, for this reason, that termination of parental rights of an incarcerated parent is in the best interest of the child."

      We recognize that DCF conceded that some of the statutory grounds relied upon by the trial court for termination were not supported by the evidence.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Rebecca OLIVAREZ, Former Wife, Appellant v. Lionel OLIVAREZ, Former Husband, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4050
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    August 16, 2018
    Michael M. Giel of Giel Family Law, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Rebecca Olivarez appeals the trial court's final order of dissolution, which included $23,000 of assets allegedly dissipated during the dissolution proceedings. Absent a showing of misconduct, "it is error to include assets in an equitable distribution scheme that have been diminished or dissipated during the dissolution proceedings." Winder v. Winder , 152 So.3d 836, 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting Roth v. Roth , 973 So.2d 580, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ). Accordingly, we reverse the equitable distribution portion of the final judgment. As a consequence, we also reverse the trial court's determinations of alimony, child support, and attorney's fees for the trial court's reconsideration, if necessary. Branch v. Branch , 775 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (The "reversal of portions of the final judgment necessarily affects the overall plan for equitable distribution of the marital assets and liabilities, as well as other financial aspects" such that "on remand, the trial court may reconsider the entire plan of equitable distribution, including the subjects of alimony and attorney's fees.").

REVERSED and REMANDED .

Lewis, Makar, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Willie George DIXON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3367
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    August 16, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Justin Foster Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven Edward Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Willie George Dixon, Jr. raises three issues on appeal. The first, regarding the trial court's failure to conduct a proper competency determination, requires reversal-which the State concedes. The other two we find to be without merit. The remedy is a remand for the trial court to conduct a nunc pro tunc competency evaluation; if one cannot be done, Dixon must receive a new trial. See Brooks v. State , 180 So.3d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

Makar, Winokur, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Wayne R. CLAUSEN, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Susan A. CLAUSEN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    Case No. 5D16-4114
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed August 17, 2018
    John N. Bogdanoff and Shannon McLin Carlyle, of The Carlyle Appellate Law Firm, Orlando, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
    Andrew Graf and Dusty Twyman, of Rohe Twyman, P.A., Winter Garden, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Wayne Clausen (the Former Husband) appeals the final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered by the trial court, and Susan Clausen (the Former Wife) cross-appeals. We affirm without discussion all issues raised in the appeal and all issues raised in the cross-appeal, except issues related to the alimony award. As to that award, we reverse and remand for further proceedings because the trial court erred in failing to include income imputed to the Former Wife in its calculations and erred in failing to consider the child-related expenses being incurred by the Former Husband.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

PALMER, ORFINGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


author: CRICHTON, Justice WEIMER, J., dissenting. Hughes, J., additionally concurring.

text:
    Kerry MAGGIO v. James PARKER; the Sandwich Kings, LLC (d/b/a Jimmy John's); Republic-Vanguard Insurance Company ; and Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company
    No. 2017-CC-1112
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 27, 2018
   CRICHTON, Justice

In this matter, which is at the summary judgment phase, we are called upon to decide whether a settlement which purports to release "all other persons, firms, or corporations who are or might be liable" applies to defendants who were not direct parties to the settlement. For the reasons that follow, we find that the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment, reverse the opinion of the court of appeal, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The pertinent facts of this case are largely undisputed. On January 14, 2015, plaintiff Kerry Maggio was injured in an automobile accident when his vehicle was struck by a vehicle operated by James Parker, an employee of The Sandwich Kings, LLC d/b/a Jimmy Johns ("Sandwich Kings"). The vehicle operated by Mr. Parker was owned by Brenda Parker and insured by Louisiana Farm Bureau ("Farm Bureau").

On June 19, 2015, plaintiff filed a petition for damages naming as defendants: Mr. Parker; Sandwich Kings, Mr. Parker's employer, contending that Mr. Parker was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident; Republic-Vanguard, Sandwich King's automobile insurer; and Metropolitan Property Casualty Insurance Company, plaintiff's uninsured motorist insurer. Notably, plaintiff did not name Brenda Parker or Farm Bureau as defendants.

Less than one month later, on July 6, 2015, plaintiff entered into a "Final Release and Settlement of Claim" ("Release") with Brenda Parker and Farm Bureau. In exchange for Farm Bureau's $25,000 policy limits, plaintiff executed a release agreement which provides as follows:

FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the payment of $25,000.00 to me/us in hand paid by Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company and Brenda Parker hereinafter called payor(s), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I/we Kerry Maggio address 2148 Cherokee St # B, Baton Rouge LA 70806-6605, being of lawful age, do hereby release, acquit and forever discharge the said payor(s), their agents and employees, and all other persons, firms or corporations who are or might be liable , from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services, loss of consortium, expenses, and compensation on account of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown personal injuries and property damage, resulting or to result from an accident that occurred on or about 01/14/2015 by reason of an automobile accident including any other claims that I/we may have which arose at the time of or prior to such accident, and do hereby for myself (or ourselves) heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, covenant with the said payor(s), their agents and employees, and all other persons, firms or corporations which are or may be liable to indemnify and save them harmless from all claims and demands, costs, loss of services, loss of consortium, expenses and compensation on account of or in any wise growing out of said accident or its results, known and unknown, or prior claims, both to persons and property.
I/we know and understand that the injuries sustained may be permanent and progressive and recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and there may be injuries or results of injuries not yet evident, recognized or known and in making this release, I/we rely wholly upon my/our judgment, knowledge and belief as to the nature, extent and duration of said injuries and as to the questions of liability involved and have not been influenced by any representations regarding the same; that the claims are doubtful and disputed and the above consideration is accepted in full compromise, accord and satisfaction thereof, and the payment of said consideration is not an admission of liability.
I have read this Release or had it read to me and I understand it.
(Emphasis added.)

After obtaining a copy of the release, on March 30, 2016, Sandwich Kings and Republic-Vanguard ("defendants") filed a motion for summary judgment contending that they were entitled to dismissal based upon the July 6, 2015 Release. According to defendants, because the Release released "all other persons ... who are or might be liable" for the injuries plaintiff incurred as a result of the accident, the Release had the effect of releasing defendants. Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment, arguing that defendants were not a party to the release and did not provide any consideration for the release, and therefore, cannot claim a benefit from it.

The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. The defendants thereafter sought supervisory review with the court of appeal, which denied the writ without comment. Defendants then applied for review to this Court. We granted defendants' writ application and remanded the matter to the court of appeal for briefing, argument, and full opinion. Maggio v. Parker , 16-1988 (La. 12/16/16), 211 So.3d 392. On remand, in a divided opinion, the court of appeal found no error in the judgment of the trial court denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Maggio v. Parker , 16-1075 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/17), 2017 WL 2399358 (unpublished) (Theriot, J., dissenting). The majority reasoned that summary judgment was inappropriate because defendants did not meet their burden of proving that the release manifested a clear intention to benefit them as third party beneficiaries. The dissenting judge disagreed, finding the language of the release was clear and unambiguous and "offers no other conclusion than that the relators had been released from liability." Id ., at p. 4. We thereafter granted certiorari to consider the correctness of the court of appeal's ruling. 17-1112 (La. 10/27/17), 228 So.3d 1224.

DISCUSSION

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant. It is reviewed on appeal de novo, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate; i.e ., whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law See , e.g. , Dunn v. City of Kenner , 15-1175, p.10 (La. 1/27/16), 187 So.3d 404, 412. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. All doubts should be resolved in the non-moving party's favor. Hines v. Garrett , 2004-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765. A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 765-66.

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants assert that the clear and unambiguous language in the release discharged all persons, whether or not signatories to the release, who were or could be liable to plaintiff for any and all claims arising out of the January 14, 2015 accident. As set forth above, the release specifically named Farm Bureau and Brenda Parker, and their agents and employees, but also included broad language, stating "all other persons, firms or corporations " were released from liability for the January 14, 2015 accident. According to defendants, under La. Civ. Code art. 2046, because the release is clear and unambiguous, parol evidence cannot be used to determine the intent of the parties.

"A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship." La. Civ. Code art. 3071. The compromise instrument is governed by the same general rules of construction applicable to contracts. Brown v. Drillers, Inc ., 93-1019 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 741, 748. Therefore, in interpreting a contract, the analysis must start with the premise that legal agreements have the effect of law upon the parties and that the courts are bound to give legal effect to all such contracts according to the true intent of the parties. Leenerts Farms, Inc. v. Rogers , 421 So.2d 216 (La. 1982). See also Brown , 630 So.2d at 748 (a compromise "must be interpreted according to the parties' true intent"). This principle is enshrined in the Civil Code, which states: "A compromise settles only those differences that the parties clearly intended to settle, including the necessary consequences of what they express." La. C.C. art. 3076.

Accordingly, when the words of the settlement agreement are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent. C.C. art 2046. However, Louisiana courts have crafted a jurisprudential exception to the extrinsic evidence rule for compromise agreements. When a dispute arises as to the scope of a compromise agreement, "extrinsic evidence can be considered to determine exactly what differences the parties intended to settle." Brown , 630 So.2d at 749. As this Court unanimously remarked in Brown , an opinion authored by Justice Pike Hall, a "long line of jurisprudence holds that a general release will not necessarily bar recovery for those aspects of a claim not intended by the parties to be covered by the release." Id. Intent is determined by reading the compromise instrument "in light of the surrounding circumstances at the time of execution of the agreement." Id. at 748-49. The parties to a release instrument are therefore "permitted to raise a factual issue as to whether unequivocal language in the instrument was intended to be unequivocal." Id.

In interpreting this jurisprudential rule, courts have cautioned that, absent some substantiating evidence of mistaken intent, no reason exists to look beyond the four comers of the instrument to ascertain intent. Brown , 630 So.2d at 749. Therefore, utilizing a case-by-case analysis, Louisiana courts have limited the application of the extrinsic evidence exception to cases in which substantiating evidence is presented establishing either (1) that the releasor was mistaken as to what he or she was signing, even though fraud was not present; or (2) that the releasor did not fully understand the nature of the rights being released or that the releasor did not intend to release certain aspects of his or her claim. Id. When the factual circumstances surrounding the execution of the release instrument do not fall within either of the above categories, Louisiana courts have applied the general rule of construction in La. Civ. Code art. 2046 and have not hesitated to confine their analysis to the four corners of the instrument. Brown , 630 So.2d at 749.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the terms of the Release in this case, the nature of the substantiating evidence presented, and circumstances surrounding the signing of the Release. As an initial matter, the Release unambiguously released "all other persons, firms or corporations who are or might be liable from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services, loss of consortium, expenses, and compensation on account of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown personal injuries and property damage, resulting or to result from an accident that occurred on or about 01/14/2015." Defendants argued that this broad language released them from any liability they may have had to plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff must offer substantiating evidence of mistaken intent to oppose summary judgment.

Circumstances unique to this case surrounding the signing of the document give rise to an issue of fact regarding intent sufficient to defeat summary judgment. First, the released parties, Farm Bureau and Brenda Parker, were not made defendants in the lawsuit. In other words, the Release was negotiated with potentially liable parties who were not involved in the litigation. Second, the Release was signed just weeks after the lawsuit was filed, and yet the Release did not expressly include defendants. Indeed, defendants were not involved in the Release negotiations and contributed nothing to the settlement. Third, plaintiff did not dismiss the lawsuit against defendants after the Release was signed. Rather, defendants and plaintiff engaged in discovery that lasted for several months after to the signing. Plaintiff has therefore satisfied his burden to introduce extrinsic evidence under Brown to determine "exactly what differences the parties intended to settle" and whether the language of the Release "was intended to be unequivocal." Brown , 630 So.2d at 749. We express no opinion here as to whether this evidence establishes mistaken intent outside of the summary judgment context. We merely find that the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the intent of the parties. See La. C. Civ. P. art. 966(C).

Additionally, we note that defendants, at this stage of the proceedings, have not demonstrated that a third-party benefit was conferred upon them such that summary judgment is warranted. Pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1978, "[a] contracting party may stipulate a benefit for a third party" who is not named in the contract; in Louisiana, such a contract for the benefit of a third party is called a "stipulation pour autrui." See Joseph v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Parish of St. Mary , 05-2364, p.9 (La. 10/15/06), 939 So.2d 1206, 1212. A stipulation pour autrui is never presumed. Id. There are three criteria for determining whether contracting parties have provided a benefit for a third party: 1) the stipulation is "manifestly clear"; 2) there is certainty as to the benefit provided the third party; and 3) the benefit is not a "mere incident of the contract between the promisor and the promisee." Id. In short, the "most basic requirement" of a stipulation pour autrui is that the contract manifest a clear intention to benefit the third party; absent such a clear manifestation, a party claiming to be a third party beneficiary cannot meet his burden of proof. Id. (citations omitted).

This Court has recognized that summary judgment "is rarely appropriate for a determination based on subjective facts such as intent, motive, malice, knowledge or good faith." Penalber v. Blount , 550 So.2d 577 (La. 1989). Considering the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry for determining third-party beneficiary status, we find the lower courts reached the correct result in denying defendants' motion for summary judgment insofar as they claim that the Release manifested a clear intention to benefit them as third-party beneficiaries.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and court of appeal denying the motion for summary judgment of defendants Sandwich Kings, LLC and Republic-Vanguard Insurance Company. The matter is remanded for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED

WEIMER, J., dissenting.

I concur in the dissent of Justice Clark in this matter and write separately only to offer additional comments.

In my opinion, the fundamental flaw in the majority opinion is that it eschews civil law principles that recognize the supremacy of legislation and embraces a jurisprudential pronouncement ( Brown v. Drillers, Inc. , 93-1019 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 741 ) when a specific codal provision governs the resolution of this case. Specifically, La. C.C. art. 2046 provides:"When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent."

The applicability of this codal provision is implicitly acknowledged with the declaration that the "Final Release and Settlement of Claim" at issue herein "unambiguously released 'all other persons, firms or corporations who are or might be liable from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services, loss of consortium, expenses, and compensation on account of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown personal injuries and property damage, resulting or to result from an accident that occurred on or about 01/14/2015.' " Maggio v. Parker , 17-1112, slip op. at 6 (La. 6/ /18) (emphasis added). With this acknowledgment, the inquiry should have ended.

Nevertheless, under the guise of following the jurisprudential "exception" to the clear directive of La. C.C. art. 2046 recognized in Brown , an examination is made of the factual evidence to determine "whether unequivocal language in the instrument was intended to be unequivocal ." Maggio , supra (quoting Brown , 630 So.2d at 749 ), emphasis added. This language from Brown represents a form of judicial "double speak," which evades and erodes the provisions of La. C.C. art. 2046. (After all, "unequivocal" or "unambiguous" language is certainly, by any definition of the term, "clear and explicit" language, which should trigger application of La. C.C. art. 2046, and its directive that when the words of a contract are clear and explicit, "no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent.") The resort, in this case, to jurisprudence over directly applicable codal authority is at odds with Louisiana's civil law heritage.

Moreover, that reliance on jurisprudence is unnecessary, as Brown is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. In Brown , the plaintiff, Buell Brown, filed suit against numerous defendants, seeking damages for injuries resulting from his fall from a drilling rig. Mr. Brown's wife later asserted a loss of consortium claim. Subsequently, the parties entered into a settlement, whereby the Browns released their claims against the defendants and dismissed their lawsuit. Five years later, Mr. Brown died as a result, at least in part, of the injuries he sustained in his fall, and his widow filed a wrongful death action. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the wrongful death action was barred under the terms of the release. Mrs. Brown opposed the motion, arguing that she never intended to dismiss her wrongful death claims, as she did not expect Mr. Brown to die from his injuries.

Brown clearly arose under unique facts, as the wrongful death claim in that case did not accrue until long after the settlement was confected. Unlike Brown , where the issue before the court was whether a release confected while an injured party was still alive extended to the future, uncontemplated wrongful death action of his widow and minor child, this case involves a plaintiff who was obviously aware of his claims against the instant defendants, as he filed suit on June 19, 2015, alleging that James Parker, The Sandwich Kings LLC, Republic-Vanguard Insurance Company, and Metropolitan Property Casualty Insurance Company were liable for the damages he suffered as a result of the accident, and entered in the settlement with Farm Bureau and Brenda Parker less than one month later.

Nevertheless, under the aegis of following Brown , an attempt is made to identify "[c]ircumstances unique to this case surrounding the signing of the document [that] give rise to an issue of fact regarding intent." Maggio , slip op. at 7. While, admittedly, the circumstances identified are unique to this case, many of the cited circumstances are ultimately irrelevant. For example, it is of no moment that the defendants were not specifically named in the release document, as that document expressly, explicitly, and clearly extends the release to "all other persons, firms or corporations who are or might be liable." It is equally of no moment that the defendants did not participate in the settlement negotiations or contribute any money towards the settlement because, as third party beneficiaries of the release, there is no requirement that the defendants furnish consideration for that release. See J. Denson Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The Stipulation Pour Autrui , 11 Tul.L.Rev. 18 (1936-1937).

Moreover, there are other circumstances unique to this case that are not mentioned and that are, in my mind, significant. Foremost among those is the fact that the plaintiff signed the release directly below the following sentence, appearing in bold print in the document: "I have read this Release or had it read to me and understand it. " Justice Clark observes in his dissent what has been recognized for over a century: "signatures to [a document] are not mere ornaments," which statement reflects the principle of Article 2046. See Boullt v. Sarpy , 30 La.Ann. 494, 495 (La. 1878). A party who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its contents and cannot avoid its obligations merely by protesting that he did not understand the provisions. Maggio , slip op. at 2-3 (Clark, J., dissenting). This principle especially holds true in a case, such as this one, where the plaintiff had the advice and endorsement of counsel, who signed the document directly below the plaintiff. If the plaintiff did not wish to release his claims against the defendants herein, he could have simply refused to sign the release as written or inserted a reservation of rights clause. He did neither.

The situation in which the plaintiff finds himself as a result of his failure to reserve his rights against the defendants herein is not an unsympathetic one. However, the resolution of this case, on the thin case of "unilateral mistake" presented by the plaintiff, threatens to upset all compromises going forward and wreak havoc on the law favoring compromises. That resolution, moreover, is unnecessary, as it resorts to jurisprudence when there is a civil code article directly on point, which provides the solution to the issue presented. Because there are no relevant facts at issue, the matter should be resolved as a matter of law.

Finally, the document at issue is entitled "Final Release and Settlement of Claim." The result of the majority's resolution of this case is that there will now be a trial on the issue of intent, a trial which subverts the release's entire purpose-to clearly and explicitly conclude this litigation. The document entitled "Final Release and Settlement" is not now in any way final. (Emphasis added.)

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

GUIDRY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for the reasons assigned by Justice Clark.

Clark, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

For the reasons that follow, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In this matter, we are asked to determine whether the unambiguous language of a compromise must be enforced as written. In conformity with established law, I answer affirmatively. As an initial (and notable) matter, the majority recognizes that the language of the contract is indeed unambiguous. However, it relies on a jurisprudential exception that allows extrinsic evidence to be considered to glean the parties' intent in entering into the contract and the scope of the matters compromised. See Brown v. Drillers, Inc. , 93-1019 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 741. In order to take advantage of this exception, the releasor must (1) have either been mistaken as to what he/she was signing or (2) not have fully understood the nature or the extent of the rights he/she was releasing. Id. I believe the majority's reliance on Brown to justify the examination of extrinsic evidence is against the very language therein which instructs courts to "confine their analysis to the four corners of the instrument" when the above categories are not met. For the following reasons, I do not believe the Brown exception should have been invoked, and, accordingly, I find any resulting consideration of parol evidence is inappropriate

First, I note that at the time the July 6, 2015 release was signed, the record reveals that plaintiff was aware of his claim against the Sandwich King defendants, having just filed suit against them in the preceding weeks. The provision of the compromise which released "all other persons, firms or corporations who are or might be liable" is neither confusing nor ambiguous. A reasonable person signing a compromise with such language, knowing that he or she had just recently filed a lawsuit against defendants who were allegedly liable, would know that this provision would have the effect of releasing these defendants. Plaintiff now contends he did not fully understand the nature of the rights he was releasing; however, such a contention does not change the fact that he signed the release, which contained a provision that stated, "I have read this Release or had it read to me and understand it." In Aguillard v. Auction Management Corp. , 04-2804, p. 23 (La. 6/29/05), 908 So.2d 1, 17, this court explained that a person who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its contents:

It is well settled that a party who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its contents and cannot avoid its obligations by contending that he did not read it, that he did not understand it, or that the other party failed to explain it to him.See, e.g., Tweedel v. Brasseaux , 433 So.2d 133, 137 (La. 1983) (stating: "The presumption is that the parties are aware of the contents of writings to which they affixed their signatures ... The burden of proof is upon them to establish with reasonable certainty that they have been deceived." "If a party can read, it behooves him to examine an instrument before signing it; and if he cannot read, it behooves him to have the instrument read to him and listen attentively whilst this is being done.") [emphasis added].

To allow a party to circumvent the provisions to which he contractually agreed, merely by protesting that he did not understand the provisions, undermines the essence of compromise agreements and could result in the real undoing of Louisiana contract law. As we explained in Lama v. Manale , 218 La. 511, 515, 50 So.2d 15, 16 (1950) :

Where there is a clause in a contract, and that clause is the agreement of the parties, the defense of a lack of knowledge of its existence is untenable. Courts are not created to relieve men of their bad bargains made. Where a clause of a contract is clear and unambiguous, "the letter of it should not be disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing the spirit." [emphasis added].

If the plaintiff wished to reserve his claims against the Sandwich King defendants he either could have declined to sign the release as written or inserted a reservation of rights. The plaintiff's subsequent representation that he was unaware of the broad scope of the provision, while potentially true and sympathetic, does not merit an abandonment of established Louisiana contract law, which requires clear and unambiguous language of contracts to be honored.

Second, the majority's willingness to wander outside of the four corners of the document in search of the party's intent is in contravention of previous cases, which have held similar releases to be clear and explicit (See Baudoin v. Montoya , 07-910 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/30/08), 974 So.2d 877, writ denied , 08-479 (La. 5/2/08), 979 So.2d 1284 (expansive language in a settlement agreement settled and dismissed all claims against anyone arising out of an automobile accident, regardless of whether they were signatories to the settlement); Hudson v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co. , 43,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/10/08), 1 So.3d 627, writ denied , 09-235 (La. 3/27/09), 5 So.3d 148 (broad language contained in a settlement agreement evinces intent to dismiss all claims against anyone arising out of the accident); Silva v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 09-686 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/23/10), 38 So.3d 934, writ denied , 10-932 (La. 6/25/10), 38 So.3d 342 (holding a broad release was clear and unambiguous and evidenced an intent to release all parties liable for the accident); Palmer v. Walker , 09-756 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/12/10), 31 So.3d 443 (plaintiff's failure to specifically reserve rights in a settlement agreement results in the release of all non-settling parties, including employers and insurers); Migliore v. Traina , 474 So.2d 980 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1985) (finding release language is so broad it clearly covers any liability of any persons whatsoever arising from the accident, in the absence of any attempt to limit the broad language of the release).

Based on the foregoing, I do not believe that either of the trigger requirements have been met to employ the Brown exception. Thus, based on the clear language of the settlement, the compromise should be enforced as written with no further consideration of extrinisic evidence.

Last, I disagree with the majority's view that the existence of a stipulation pour autrui cannot be established via summary judgment in this case. I find that all requirements for a third-party beneficiary contract are satisfied. (See , Joseph v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 2 of Parish of St. Mary , 05-2364, p. 9 (La. 10/15/06), 939 So.2d 1206, 1212, wherein the criteria are succinctly set forth.) Clearly the stipulation for a third party is manifestly evident, as the compromise explicitly provides for the release of "all other persons, firms, or corporation who are or might be liable." There is certainty as to the benefit provided the third party, as the compromise releases the third parties from further liability. Finally, the benefit is not a mere incident of the contract between plaintiff and Brenda Parker/Farm Bureau, but is in fact a separate and specific provision releasing all other persons. Accordingly, I would reverse and render judgment in favor of the defendants.

Hughes, J., additionally concurring.

Civil Code article 3075 provides: A compromise entered into by one of multiple persons with an interest in the same matter does not bind the others, nor can it be raised by them as a defense , unless the matter compromised is a solidary obligation (emphasis added). End of story. As for stipulation pour autrui, there must be specific intent by the contracting parties to benefit (the here unnamed) beneficiary. It's supposed to be a stipulation , not an accident.

Just because the law has been poorly argued, or the lower courts or this court failed to discover the correct law to apply to the facts, is not an excuse to fail to apply the law correctly once it is discovered. Louisiana has fact pleading. It is our duty to apply the correct law to the facts. Lack of research is not a worthy position for the state's highest court.

      See La. C.C. art. 2 ("Legislation is a solemn expression of the legislative will."); La. C.C. art. 1, 1987 Revision Comment (c) ("In Louisiana, as in other civil law jurisdictions, legislation is superior to any other source of law.").

      Synonyms for unequivocal ("not subject to misinterpretation or to more than one interpretation") include: "clear, clear-cut, crystal clear, decided, ... evident, obvious, open-and-shut, ... plain, straightforward, ... unambiguous, unambivalent, unmistakable." See Merriam-Webster Thesaurus at merriam-webster.com (online 6/18/2018). Words related to unequivocal include: "comprehensible, ... graspable, ... understandable, ... simple, ... uncomplicated, ... discernible, ... black-and-white, explicit, ... well-defined, ... [and] readable." Id. The words "clear" and "explicit" are used in La. C.C. art. 2046.
      While no relevant "absurd consequences" from the application of La. C.C. art. 2046 in this case have been noted, a complete, full, and final release of Brenda Parker and "all other persons, firms or corporations who are or might be liable" would protect her from a potential third-party claim based on negligent entrustment.

      As Professor Smith explains:
      There is nothing in the laws of this State or in the civil law background to our Code to indicate in any fashion that a third party beneficiary must furnish anything in the nature of consideration for the promise in his favor. The "consideration" for the promise is furnished by the promisee and the promise is binding for this reason.
      Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The Stipulation Pour Autrui , 11 Tul.L.Rev. at 51.

      Basically, the only fact presented by the plaintiff in favor of his position that he did not intend to release the defendants herein is that, following execution of the release, he continued to engage in discovery and did not dismiss his lawsuit against the defendants. However, as noted previously, weighed against this consideration is the fact that the plaintiff signed the release fully aware of his claim against the defendants, having filed suit a few weeks earlier. Given the clear and unequivocal language of the release, the only reasonable explanation for the plaintiff's subsequent conduct is that he simply did not read the release, despite his representations to the contrary. While unfortunate, it is not the role of the courts to relieve individuals of their own bad bargains. Lama v. Manale , 218 La. 511, 515, 50 So.2d 15, 16 (1950).


text:
    IN RE: Gregory Timothy DISCON
    NO. 2018-B-0975
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 10, 2018
    ORDER
   Considering our Order in 18-OB-1323 rendered this day, granting the Petition for Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Gregory Timothy Discon,

IT IS ORDERED that these proceedings be and hereby are dismissed as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Stay filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel in this matter be and hereby is denied as moot.


text:
    IN RE: Gregory Timothy DISCON
    NO. 2018-OB-1323
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 10, 2018
    ORDER
   The Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that while he suffered from an addiction to cocaine, he stole approximately $50,000 from a client and his law firm and then attempted to hide the theft by falsifying documents and forging the signature of a judge. Respondent now seeks to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The ODC has concurred in respondent's petition.

Having considered the Petition for Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Gregory Timothy Discon, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22037, and the concurrence thereto filed by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of Gregory Timothy Discon for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Gregory Timothy Discon shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.


text:
    IN RE: Norman R. GORDON
    NO. 2018-OB-1312
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 7, 2018
    ORDER
   Considering the Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status filed by respondent, and the representation by respondent's counsel that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel has agreed to the entry of an order transferring respondent to disability inactive status,

IT IS ORDERED that Norman R. Gordon, Louisiana Bar Roll number 6173, be and he hereby is transferred to disability inactive status. All disciplinary proceedings against respondent shall be deferred until such time as he resumes active status.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order shall be effective immediately.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _____ day of ___________________, 2018.

FOR THE COURT:

_________________________

JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Chase Dakota SAXON
    NO. 2018-KH-0793
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 3, 2018
    WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the "extraordinary circumstances" that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Carter Vincent ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-1530
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 3, 2018
    Denied.


author: JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.

text:
    STATE EX REL. Gary JUENGAIN v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-2175
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 3, 2018
    Not considered. See La.S.Ct.R. IX, § 6.
   JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Jamie HAWTHORNE v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
    NO. 2017-CI-0539
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 3, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    IN RE: Appeal of the DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NOS. 17-PDB-091, 17-PDB-092, 17-PDB-095, 17-PDB-096
    NO. 2018-OB-0467
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Duke HAMPTON
    NO. 2018-KK-1338
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 10, 2018
    Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Kevin ROMERO v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2018-KH-0001
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 3, 2018
    Denied. Relator has previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Romero v. State, 17-0674 (La.), ---So.3d ----.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Samuel BARKER v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-2172
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 3, 2018
    Not considered. See La.S.Ct.R. IX § 6.


author: HUGHES, J., would grant.

text:
    IN RE: Appeal of the DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 17-PDB-093
    NO. 2018-OB-0657
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Leave to appeal denied.
   HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    William and Imelda WILHITE v. Heath Brian VEILLON
    NO. 2018-CC-0399
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Second application for reconsideration not considered. Judgment is final. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2167. No further filings shall be accepted in this matter.


author: WEIMER, J., recused.

text:
    STATE EX. REL. Theodore SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-0833
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Denied. Relator has previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Smith v. State, 15-0018 (La. 10/30/15), 178 So.3d 131.
   WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    Rene NETTER v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
    NO. 2017-CI-0810
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court below before filing in this Court nor shown the "extraordinary circumstances" that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).


text:
    Zachary ZAUNBRECHER, individually and on behalf of his deceased father, Michael Blake Zaunbrecher v. Marissa MARTIN, Jeremy Ponthieux, and Nathan Ponthier
    NO. 2018-CC-0639
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.


text:
    Joel GUZMAN v. JAGO SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al.
    NO. 2018-C-0648
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Not considered. Not timely filed. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.


text:
    Kenneth BERTHELOT v. Russell INDOVINA, Progressive Security Insurance Company, and Pro-Mag Inspections, LLC
    NO. 2018-CC-1082
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michelle BENJAMIN
    NO. 2013-KD-0895
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE EX. REL. Deontay D. HARDY v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-0843
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Kenneth DUROSSEAU v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-0849
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Denied.


author: GENOVESE, J., recused.

text:
    STATE EX REL. Dale MILLER v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-0889
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Denied.
   GENOVESE, J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Leonard CAIN v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017-KH-0902
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    August 31, 2018
    Denied.