source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    The FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Kelsay Dayon PATTERSON, Respondent.
    No. SC16-1438
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    October 19, 2018
    Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Tallahassee, Florida, Matthew Ian Flicker, Bar Counsel, Tampa, Florida, and Adria E. Quintela, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, Sunrise, Florida, for Complainant
    Russell S. Prince of Palma & Prince, P.A., Valrico, Florida, for Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review a referee's report recommending that respondent, Kelsay Dayon Patterson, be found guilty of professional misconduct in violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar Rules) and that he receive an admonishment for his misconduct. The Florida Bar has petitioned for review, challenging the referee's recommendations as to guilt and the recommended discipline. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. For the reasons discussed below, we approve the referee's findings of fact and recommendation of guilt as to Bar Rule 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct). However, we disapprove the referee's recommendations of no guilt as to Bar Rules 4-1.7 (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients), 4-8.2(a) (Judicial and Legal Officials; Impugning Qualifications and Integrity of Judges or Other Officers), and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and find Patterson guilty of violating each of these rules. We also disapprove the referee's recommended discipline as far too lenient, and instead impose a one-year suspension from the practice of law.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2016, The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Patterson alleging that he violated several Bar Rules in his representation of Johanna Faddis in her civil action against the City of Homestead and other defendants. The Bar's complaint was referred to a referee. The referee held a hearing on both guilt and discipline, and submitted a report containing her findings and recommendations for the Court's review. The referee made the following findings and recommendations.

Patterson represented Faddis in a civil action alleging invasion of privacy against the City of Homestead, its individual council members, and an investigative firm employed by the city. On November 14, 2012, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit entered an order striking Faddis's pleadings on the grounds that she had committed perjury and awarding final judgment in favor of the city and the other defendants. The circuit court found that Faddis's testimony during a deposition in the case on the issue of whether she had been sexually harassed, a material issue in the case, was inconsistent with deposition testimony she gave on the same issue in a separate case involving the city. The circuit court also found that Patterson represented Faddis at the deposition in the separate case and that he should have been aware of the inconsistent testimony prior to filing the complaint. The circuit court ultimately awarded attorney's fees to the city and imposed sanctions against Faddis and Patterson for acting in bad faith. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's order, finding Faddis's conduct was "undertaken with intent to deceive, constituted a deliberate scheme to subvert the judicial process, and amounted to a fraud upon the court." Faddis v. City of Homestead , 121 So.3d 1134, 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

While proceedings were ongoing in the circuit court, Patterson also pursued a civil rights claim against the city and other defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. On September 20, 2013, Patterson sent Judge Jose E. Martinez, the presiding judge in the case, a letter detailing the history of Faddis's circuit court case and expressing his dissatisfaction with its outcome, comparing the alleged injustice suffered by Faddis to the biblical story of Susanna. He expressed his belief that influential members of the community had manipulated the outcome of the case and implied that a district court judge was biased in favor of opposing counsel. The letter was also sent to judges in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit and Third District.

Patterson sent the September 20, 2013, letter based on advice he purportedly received from Judge James Lawrence King, Sr. in 2002, and out of a belief that he was denied the opportunity to present evidence prior to being sanctioned by the circuit court that demonstrated his conduct was not fraudulent.

On December 18, 2013, the circuit court entered a final judgment awarding in excess of $160,000 in attorney's fees against Patterson and Faddis equally. Patterson appealed the circuit court's order on behalf of Faddis to the Third District. The district court affirmed the circuit court's order to the extent it applied to Faddis, see Faddis v. City of Homestead , 160 So.3d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (table), but dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction to the extent Patterson attempted to obtain review of the order as it applied to him, finding that Patterson had failed to identify himself as an appealing party in the notice of appeal. The Third District also directed Faddis and Patterson to show cause why attorney's fees should not be awarded to the city and other defendants for their prosecution of a frivolous appeal. Patterson filed a response containing "incendiary and disparaging comments," such as "We cannot all be judges, politicians, wealthy business men, or local big named law firms with tremendous influence who can supersede all laws on the books." In an opinion dated February 11, 2015, the Third District found that each of the three claims advanced by Patterson on appeal were frivolous and ordered him alone to pay appellate attorney's fees. Faddis v. City of Homestead , 157 So.3d 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), review dismissed , 163 So.3d 508 (Fla. 2015). Before ordering appellate attorney's fees against Patterson, the district court made the following observation:

Curiously, Patterson's response to our order to show cause makes no argument on behalf of his client. Rather, it is a screed following hard upon his reply brief filed in this appeal, where he insinuates that he is "being bullied" by the parties, their counsel, or the court in this case, and that a "miscarriage of justice ... is knowingly being perpetrated upon him," (emphasis added). He likens "the story" of the case he filed on behalf of Faddis to "the story of Fidel Castro's suffocating grip of Cuba, the Holocaust, Jim Crow laws, and Hillary Clinton." According to him, the trial court sanction-and probably, now this one as well-are part of some political scheme to silence him and his client. Patterson is grossly mistaken. This case is not about political connection, human atrocities, bullies, or, as he would have it, the ability of "strong minded individuals" to stand up for the powerless. This case is about an officer of the court who proffered false evidence in violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(4). It is now probably also about an attorney who has impugned the qualifications and integrity of the judges of this court, the trial court, or other officers. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.2(a).

Id. at 453 (footnote omitted).

On these facts, the referee recommended that Patterson be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct) only. The referee determined that the September 20, 2013, letter to Judge Martinez and the filings in the Faddis case contained emotionally charged statements with conspiratorial overtones, but that there was no evidence Patterson knew sending the letter was inappropriate or that he intended to have improper communications with a court. She concluded that Patterson strongly believed that his actions were the appropriate way to expose what he perceived as wrongdoing in Faddis's case-i.e., that politics and undue influence controlled the outcome of the case-and that Patterson's belief, along with the ethical duty he owed Faddis, warranted a recommendation of no guilt as to Bar Rules 4-8.2(a) (Judicial and Legal Officials; Impugning Qualifications and Integrity of Judges or Other Officers) and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). The referee also rejected the Bar's contention that Patterson advanced his own interests instead of his client's interests in the appeal of the circuit court's December 18, 2013, order, creating a conflict of interest in violation of Bar Rule 4-1.7 (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients). The referee found Patterson's explanation credible that his advocacy in the case was aimed at the sanction as a whole, including Faddis.

In recommending discipline, the referee found two aggravating factors and ten mitigating factors. Instead of exclusively relying on the factors listed in the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to make her findings in aggravation and mitigation, see Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 9.22, 9.32, the referee listed several factors she considered in recommending discipline. In aggravation, the referee found that Patterson refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct and that he filed for bankruptcy to avoid the consequences of the sanctions imposed against him. As to mitigation, the referee found the following: (1) the absence of a prior disciplinary record; (2) full cooperation with the disciplinary board; (3) respectful and professional attitude; (4) Patterson's belief that sending a letter to a judge was the correct procedure; (5) Patterson's volunteer work with Big Brothers and Big Sisters; (6) the harshness of the order and opinions issued in Faddis's case; (7) the imposition of sanctions by the circuit court; (8) Patterson's passion for his clients and unselfish motive; (9) Patterson's devotion of significant time and resources to ensuring equal access to the judicial system; and (10) Patterson's existing financial problems that a suspension, as opposed to a reformation program, would only exacerbate.

As a sanction, the referee recommended that Patterson receive an admonishment and that he be placed on probation with various conditions for one year. She also recommended that costs be awarded to the Bar in the amount of $2,827.09.

The Bar filed a notice of intent to seek review of the report of referee, challenging the referee's recommendations of no guilt as to Bar Rules 4-1.7, 4-8.2(a), and 4-8.4(d), as well as the recommended discipline. Patterson did not file an answer brief in this case. After reviewing the report of referee and the Bar's brief, the Court directed Patterson to show cause why the referee's recommended discipline should not be disapproved and a more severe sanction be imposed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Findings of Fact and Recommendations of Guilt

The Bar challenges the referee's recommendations of guilt as to Bar Rules 4-1.7, 4-8.2(a), and 4-8.4(d). To the extent the Bar challenges the referee's findings of fact for the rule violations, this Court's review of such matters is limited, and if a referee's findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, this Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the referee. Fla. Bar v. Frederick , 756 So.2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000) ; see also Fla. Bar v. Jordan , 705 So.2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998). To the extent the Bar challenges the recommendations as to guilt, this Court has repeatedly stated that the referee's factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support the recommendations as to guilt. See Fla. Bar v. Shoureas , 913 So.2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005). Ultimately, the party challenging the referee's finding of fact and conclusion as to guilt has the burden to demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record to support those findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the conclusions. Fla. Bar v. Germain , 957 So.2d 613, 620 (Fla. 2007).

Bar Rule 4-1.7

Broadly speaking, Bar Rule 4-1.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if the representation creates a conflict of interest. The rule specifically prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if there is a substantial risk that the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer's own personal interests. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a)(2). The comment to the rule explains that "[l]oyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client." Id. cmt. Such loyalty may be "impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action on behalf of his or her client because of the lawyer's other interests." Fla. Bar v. Roberto , 59 So.3d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 2011).

Here, the Bar claims that Patterson used the appellate rights of his client, Faddis, to assert his own interests and seek relief from the circuit court's December 18, 2013, order for himself. The circuit court's order imposed in excess of $160,000 in attorney's fees against Patterson and Faddis equally, giving Patterson a significant financial interest in the outcome of any subsequent appeals of the order. Patterson acknowledged such in his formal hearing testimony, stating with respect to Faddis's appeal of the order: "I've always argued that [Faddis] was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and a due process hearing. And then I would be entitled to the same too." That interest created a clear and substantial risk of materially limiting Patterson's independent judgment and loyalty to Faddis, who had an interest in reducing or eliminating her liability under the December 18, 2013, order, even if it was not to the benefit of Patterson. Given the existence of such risk, Patterson was required under Bar Rule 4-1.7(b)(4) to obtain Faddis's informed consent, confirmed in writing, to his continued representation of her. There is no documentation in the record indicating he obtained such consent.

Despite the foregoing, Patterson represented Faddis in her appeal of the December 18, 2013, order. The filings submitted to the district court in the case make clear that Patterson's financial interest in the matter, as well as his personal views on the legal system and the actions of the circuit court, ultimately supplanted his independent judgment and the loyalty he owed to Faddis. Patterson used the initial brief and other filings in the case to present argument on matters that were either already considered by the district court-the dismissal of Faddis's lawsuit-or on his own behalf. His arguments largely focused on the alleged violation of his due process rights, the perceived injustice in the circuit court's actions, and his views on the inequities of the legal system. Patterson devoted only part of the initial brief to presenting argument on Faddis's behalf-alleging that the circuit court awarded sanctions against her without express factual findings of bad faith, a claim the district court found lacked any basis in reality. Faddis , 157 So.3d at 453. None of the filings expressly sought a reduction in the fees owed by Faddis, and Patterson failed to advocate on Faddis's behalf altogether in the response to the district court's show cause order, requesting instead that the court relieve just him from the financial burdens of the circuit court's order.

Accordingly, the record in this case clearly reflects that Patterson had a significant personal and financial interest in the outcome of Faddis's appeal; that he failed to inform Faddis of such interests and obtain her informed consent for his continued representation of her; and that Patterson's personal and financial interests ultimately became the focus of Faddis's appeal, despite the loyalty he owed her. Patterson's actions not only hindered Faddis's ability to obtain a more favorable outcome in her appeal, but nearly resulted in the district court imposing additional sanctions against her for pursuing a frivolous appeal. We therefore disapprove the referee's recommendation and find Patterson guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-1.7.

Bar Rule 4-8.2(a)

Bar Rule 4-8.2(a), in relevant part, states that a "lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge." The applicable standard under the rule is not whether the statement is false, but whether the lawyer had an objectively reasonable factual basis for making the statement. Fla. Bar v. Ray , 797 So.2d 556, 558-59 (Fla. 2001). The burden is on the lawyer who made the statement to produce a factual basis to support the statement. Id. at 558 n.3.

The Bar claims that several statements contained in Patterson's September 20, 2013, letter to Judge Martinez and in the filings for Faddis's appeal of the December 18, 2013, order violated Bar Rule 4-8.2(a). The record reflects that there is no dispute as to whether Patterson sent the September 20, 2013, letter, or as to whether he prepared and submitted the filings in Faddis's appeal. In both the letter and court filings, Patterson either disparaged opposing counsel or expounded upon the alleged bias of judges and the shortcomings of the legal system. For example, during the appeal of the December 18, 2013, order, Patterson stated the following in the reply brief:

Here is the funny thing: Law is not science or math. It does not depend on true holdings and reasons that will allow you to successfully chart a path to Mars or create a molecule of water. Law is whatever the judge or judges that day say it is.

Additionally, in the letter to Judge Martinez, Patterson repeatedly suggested that judges favor one class of influential citizens over all others, referred to opposing counsel as the "elders," and cautioned Judge Martinez that "[j]udges must recognize that in deciding to elevate people like these elders to a status of being above the laws they are complicit in further corroding any remaining sense of justice and fair play left within these elders." He also stated the following:

The undersigned cannot accept that judges who have presided over complex cases, raised children, who have read holy scripts/manuals, and receive the highest levels of diversified education are unable to see any of this from the perspective of [Faddis].

Significantly, Patterson stated the following in his letter with respect to Judge Emas:

Curiously, the author of the 3rd DCA's opinion, Judge Kevin Emas, commented in the oral argument that he was uncertain as to whether [Faddis] had been sexually harassed or not. After being uncertain about whether she was sexually harassed, the opinion issued 2 weeks later gives a rather flinty opinion that she repeatedly lied throughout her litigation, created a fraudulent plan, and set about to achieve an illegal and fraudulent end.... To then see these same elders from Weiss Serota ... pictured with Judge Emas at his investiture ceremony, one can only wonder if Mr. Gredes' burden at oral argument ... was lighter than it should have been.

The referee did not make any specific findings as to whether Patterson had an objectively reasonable factual basis for his statement questioning Judge Emas's integrity, or for any of his other statements. She found only that Patterson's reasoning for sending the letter was "flawed." During the formal hearing, Patterson explained that he sent the September 20, 2013, letter after viewing a photograph on the district court's website of Judge Emas with opposing counsel. According to his testimony, Patterson believed that an injustice had occurred in Faddis's case, and that the influence allegedly wielded by opposing counsel and his firm in the community was the cause of that injustice. Patterson's testimony falls well short of establishing an objectively reasonable factual basis for any of his statements, especially those questioning Judge Emas's integrity, and there is no other evidence in the record that would otherwise establish such a basis. We therefore conclude that Patterson's statements were made with a reckless disregard to their truth or falsity in violation of Bar Rule 4-8.2(a).

The referee based her recommendation of no guilt as to Bar Rule 4-8.2(a) in part on Patterson's ethical duty to his client and his strong belief that sending the September 20, 2013, letter was the appropriate way to expose the perceived wrongdoing in his client's case. Such factors, however, do not relieve Patterson of his guilt and are relevant only in mitigating the discipline imposed. The referee also based her recommendation on the fact that Patterson did not know sending the September 20, 2013, letter was wrong and that there was no evidence he intended to have improper communications with a court. The issue, however, is not whether Patterson sought to have improper communications with a judge about an ongoing case -a violation of Bar Rule 4-3.5 (Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal)-but whether an objectively reasonable factual basis existed for his statements assailing the qualifications and integrity of judges. See Ray , 797 So.2d at 560 (stating that an attorney is not prohibited from communicating with or criticizing a judge as long as the attorney complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct).

Accordingly, the record in this matter clearly contradicts the referee's recommendation as to Bar Rule 4-8.2(a). We therefore disapprove the referee's recommendation and find Patterson guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-8.2(a).

Bar Rule 4-8.4(d)

Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Our review of the record reveals that Patterson engaged in such conduct by pursuing his own interests in Faddis's appeal, hindering her ability to obtain a more favorable outcome, and nearly resulting in the imposition of additional sanctions against her. He also engaged in such conduct by making inappropriate and disparaging statements in court filings and in a letter distributed to other members of the judiciary about opposing counsel and judges that presided in Faddis's case, contributing to the general lack of civility and professionalism this Court is striving to curb in the legal profession. See Fla. Bar v. Norkin , 132 So.3d 77, 89 (Fla. 2013) ("The Court and the Bar share the 'overarching objective of increasing the professionalism aspirations of all lawyers in Florida and ensuring that the practice of law remains a high calling with lawyers invested in not only the service of individual clients but also service to the public good as well.' ").

The record clearly contradicts the referee's recommendation as to Bar Rule 4-8.4(d). We therefore disapprove the referee's recommendation and find Patterson guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-8.4(d).

B. Discipline

Lastly, we address the referee's recommended discipline of an admonishment with one year of probation. In reviewing a referee's recommended discipline, this Court's scope of review is broader than that afforded to the referee's findings of fact because, ultimately, it is the Court's responsibility to order the appropriate sanction. See Fla. Bar v. Anderson , 538 So.2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989) ; see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. This Court will generally not second-guess the referee's recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. See Fla. Bar v. Temmer , 753 So.2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).

Here, our review of the record reveals that Patterson's conduct constitutes far more than mere careless neglect deserving of an admonishment. He deliberately disregarded the loyalty he owed his client and placed his personal and financial interests at the forefront of her appeal; he submitted filings to the district court containing unprofessional statements disparaging those involved in his client's case; and he knowingly sent a letter to Judge Martinez and others in the judiciary that disparaged opposing counsel and accused Judge Emas of conduct unbecoming a judge. His conduct violated multiple Bar Rules and he has yet to fully acknowledge the wrongfulness of his actions and accept responsibility for them, even after this Court ordered him to show cause why a more severe sanction should not be imposed.

Furthermore, this Court is greatly troubled by the general lack of respect and professionalism Patterson displayed toward judges and other professionals in court filings and in his letter to Judge Martinez. Such conduct, while an inconvenience or a mere slight to those initially confronted by it, ultimately emboldens others to engage in similar unprofessional or disrespectful acts, the net effect of which is the gradual erosion of public confidence in the courts and the decisions rendered by them. Like all lawyers in Florida, Patterson took the Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar prior to his admission, wherein he affirmatively committed to "maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." This commitment is not extraneous to, but coextensive with the obligations set out in the Bar Rules. The Court expects all lawyers to conduct themselves in a respectful and professional manner when accessing the courts or appearing before a judicial officer, regardless of the form or capacity in which the appearance occurs. See Code for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, Standards of Professionalism (prohibiting members of the Bar from engaging in unprofessional conduct and defining such conduct as "substantial or repeated violations of the Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, The Florida Bar Creed of Professionalism, The Florida Bar Professionalism Expectations, The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, or the decisions of The Florida Supreme Court").

Given the severity of Patterson's misconduct, we conclude that the referee's recommended discipline is not supported and that a suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case. See Fla. Stds. for Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.32 ("Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client."); 6.32 ("Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer engages in communication with an individual in the legal system when the lawyer knows that such communication is improper, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or causes interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding."); 7.2 ("Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.").

In The Florida Bar v. Abramson , 3 So.3d 964 (Fla. 2009), this Court imposed a ninety-one-day suspension on a respondent who engaged in discourteous and disrespectful behavior towards a judge during jury selection in a criminal proceeding. He interrupted the judge, demanded to be heard on a pretrial motion, and asked jurors to weigh in on who they thought was at fault in a disagreement he had with the judge. Id. at 965. The respondent in Abramson , like Patterson, was found to have violated Bar Rules 4-8.2(a) and 4-8.4(d), as well as two other Bar Rules. Id. at 966. Patterson's misconduct, in contrast to that of the respondent in Abramson , is far more egregious in that he deliberately placed his personal and financial interests ahead of his client's interests and did not limit his misconduct to a single proceeding or filing. Furthermore, this Court has become increasingly concerned by the lack of respect and professionalism exhibited by many Florida lawyers during judicial proceedings and would in all likelihood impose a much lengthier suspension on the respondent in Abramson were he to appear before us today. Norkin , 132 So.3d at 89-92 (imposing a two-year suspension on a lawyer who engaged in pattern of disrespectful and unprofessional conduct toward judges and opposing counsel).

In addition, this Court generally imposes a lengthy suspension in cases where a lawyer's personal interests create a conflict of interest. See e.g. , Roberto , 59 So.3d at 1106 (suspending the respondent for one year where the lawyer's personal interests created a conflict of interest); Fla. Bar v. Herman , 8 So.3d 1100, 1106-09 (Fla. 2009) (suspending respondent for eighteen months where he represented a client at the same time he represented his own company, which was the client's competitor, without obtaining the client's consent); Fla. Bar v. Vining , 721 So.2d 1164, 1169-70 (Fla. 1998) (suspending the respondent for six months where the lawyer represented a client individually while his professional association was engaged in litigation with the client).

We conclude, based on a review of relevant case law, and the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the referee, that a one-year suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we approve the referee's findings of fact and recommendation of guilt as to Bar Rule 3-4.3. The referee's recommendations of no guilt as to Bar Rules 4-1.7, 4-8.2(a), and 4-8.4(d) are hereby disapproved, and we find Patterson guilty of violating each of those rules. The referee's recommended discipline is also disapproved and Patterson is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year. Patterson's suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that he can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients. If Patterson notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately. Patterson shall fully comply with Bar Rule 3-5.1(h). Further, Patterson shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until he is reinstated.

Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Kelsay Dayon Patterson in the amount of $2,827.09, for which sum let execution issue.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J. concurs in result.

      We note that the referee's findings of fact and recommendation of guilt as to Bar Rule 3-4.3 are not challenged by either party. Accordingly, and having reviewed the record, we approve the referee's findings of fact and recommendation of guilt as to Bar Rule 3-4.3 without further comment.


text:
    IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO the FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, The Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and The Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure-Electronic Service.
    No. SC17-882
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    October 25, 2018
    Scott Michael Dimond, Chair, Civil Procedure Rules Committee, Miami, Florida, Roger James Haughey, II, Past Chair, Tampa, Florida, Civil Procedure Rules Committee; Eduardo I. Sanchez, Chair, Rules of Judicial Administration Committee, Miami, Florida, Honorable Steven Scott Stephens, Past Chair, Rules of Judicial Administration Committee, Tampa, Florida; Sheila Ann Loizos, Chair, Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, Jacksonville, Florida, H. Scott Fingerhut, Past Chair, Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, Coral Gables, Florida; Courtney Rebecca Brewer, Chair, Appellate Court Rules Committee, Tallahassee, Florida, Kristin A. Norse, Past Chair, Appellate Court Rules Committee, Tampa, Florida; and Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Mikalla Andies Davis, Krys Godwin, and Heather Savage Telfer, Staff Liaisons, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioners
    Victoria Katz of Aderant, Culver City, California; Paul R. Regensdorf, Palm City, Florida; Honorable Richard A. Nielsen, Circuit Judge, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Tampa, Florida; Donald E. Christopher of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Orlando, Florida; and Robert M. Eschenfelder, Bradenton, Florida, Responding with Comments
   PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court for consideration of proposed amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Background

The Florida Bar's Rules of Judicial Administration Committee, the Civil Procedure Rules Committee, the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, and the Appellate Court Rules Committee (Rules Committees) have filed a joint out-of-cycle report proposing a number of rule amendments addressing the computation of time to respond to documents served by e-mail. The Rules Committees published the proposals for comment before filing them with the Court and made revisions to the proposals in response to the comments they received. The amendments before the Court were unanimously approved by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar.

After the joint report was filed, the Court published the proposed amendments for comment. The Court received comments from Victoria Katz, a rules attorney for Aderant CompuLaw, as well as from several members of the original Joint Email Service Committee. The Civil Procedure Rules Committee filed a response to the comments indicating its opposition to the proposed amendment to Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514(a)(1)(A), and suggesting additional amendments to the rule. The Rules of Judicial Administration Committee, the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, and the Appellate Court Rules Committee filed a joint response addressing the concerns raised in the comments and declining to make any further revisions to the proposed amendments.

After considering the proposed amendments, the comments filed, the Rules Committees' responses, and hearing oral argument, we adopt the amendments as proposed and set forth in the appendix to this opinion.

Rules of Judicial Administration

Subdivision (b) of Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514 (Computing and Extending Time) is amended to remove "or e-mail" so that service by mail and e-mail are no longer treated identically. We also amend subdivision (a)(1)(A) of that rule so that time frames are calculated beginning from the next day following the event that triggers the time frame that is not a weekend or legal holiday. Subdivision (b)(1)(D)(iii) (Service; How Made; Service by Electronic Mail ("e-mail"); Time of Service) of rule 2.516 is amended to no longer allow parties an additional five days to respond following service of a document by e-mail. This amendment is consistent with the amendment to subdivision (b) of rule 2.514. Email, unlike postal mail, is now nearly instantaneous and no additional time should be permitted for responses to documents served by e-mail.

Rules of Civil Procedure

Rules of Civil Procedure 1.170 (Counterclaims and Crossclaims), 1.260 (Survivor; Substitution of Parties), 1.351 (Production of Documents and Things Without Deposition), 1.410 (Subpoena), 1.440 (Setting Action for Trial), 1.442 (Proposals for Settlement), and 1.510 (Summary Judgment) are amended to directly reference Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 (Service of Pleadings and Documents) instead of referencing Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080 (Service and Filing of Pleadings, Orders, and Documents).

We further amend rule 1.351 to reduce the time frame for parties to serve by e-mail a notice of intent to serve a subpoena requesting production of documents and things from fifteen to ten days. Lastly, we also amend rule 1.510 in subdivision (c) (Motion and Proceedings Thereon) to treat summary judgment evidence submitted electronically or by e-mail the same as summary judgment evidence that is "delivered," providing that while service by mail must take place at least five days prior to the day of the hearing, service by delivery, e-filing, and e-mail must take place no later than two days prior to the day of the hearing.

Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.040 (Computation of Time) is amended to remove the reference to subdivision (a) of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514, to conform with the amendment to that rule. As amended, the rule provides that computation of time shall be governed by Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514. Rule 3.070 (Additional Time After Service by Mail, When Permitted, or E-Mail) is deleted in its entirety. The rule provided its own time frames for service by mail and e-mail; specifically, it provided for an additional three days to be added to the deadline when a party had the right or was required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other document on the party by mail or e-mail. Deleting rule 3.070 makes the Rules of Criminal Procedure consistent with the other amendments herein adopted. Computation of time in criminal proceedings is now governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514.

Rules of Appellate Procedure

The Rules Committees' proposed amendments to the Rules of Appellate Procedure all concern enlarging time frames. The Rules Committees' report indicates that in response to the proposed amendments to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514 removing the additional five days when service is made by e-mail, the Appellate Court Rules Committee originally proposed amending the Rules of Appellate Procedure to retain the additional five days for service by e-mail. The Board of Governors expressed concerns about the removal of the five days from the other bodies of rules when service is made by e-mail, while maintaining the five days for e-mail service in the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Board of Governors suggested that the Committees attempt to come to an agreement that would address its concerns and maintain one rule for computation of time. The amendments proposed here reflect a compromise among the Rules Committees to address the Appellate Court Rules Committee's concern about the loss of the five additional days to respond to service of a document by e-mail.

We amend rules 9.100 (Original Proceedings), 9.110 (Appeal Proceedings to Review Final Orders of Lower Tribunals and Orders Granting New Trial in Jury and Nonjury Cases), 9.120 (Discretionary Proceedings to Review Decisions of District Courts of Appeal), 9.125 (Review of Trial Court Orders and Judgments Certified by the District Courts of Appeal as Requiring Immediate Resolution by the Supreme Court of Florida), 9.130 (Proceedings to Review Nonfinal Orders and Specified Final Orders), 9.140 (Appeal Proceedings in Criminal Cases), 9.141 (Review Proceedings in Collateral or Postconviction Criminal Cases), 9.142 (Procedures for Review in Death Penalty Cases), 9.146 (Appeal Proceedings in Juvenile Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Cases and Cases Involving Families and Children in Need of Services), 9.180 (Appeal Proceedings to Review Workers' Compensation Cases), 9.200 (The Record), 9.210 (Briefs), 9.300 (Motions), 9.320 (Oral Argument), 9.330 (Rehearing; Clarification; Certification; Written Opinion), 9.331 (Determination of Causes in a District Court of Appeal En Banc), 9.350 (Dismissal of Causes), 9.360 (Parties), and 9.410 (Sanctions) to enlarge time frames as proposed.

We further adopt the Rules Committees' nonsubstantive editorial amendments to subdivisions (i) (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Parents Claims-Special Procedures and Time Limitations Applicable to Appeals of Orders in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings Involving Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims), (i)(2) (Rendition), (i)(4)(A) (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Motion Filed After Commencement of Appeal; Stay of Appellate Proceeding), and (i)(4)(C) (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Motion Filed After Commencement of Appeal; Duties of the Clerk, Preparation and Transmittal of Supplemental Record) of rule 9.146, as proposed.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rules of Appellate Procedure are hereby amended as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The amendments shall become effective January 1, 2019, at 12:02 a.m.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., dissents.

Attachment

APPENDIX

RULE 2.514. COMPUTING AND EXTENDING TIME

(a) Computing Time. The following rules apply in computing time periods specified in any rule of procedure, local rule, court order, or statute that does not specify a method of computing time.

(1) Period Stated in Days or a Longer Unit. When the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time :

(A)exclude the day of the event that triggers the periodbegin counting from the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday;

(B) - (C) [No change]

(2) - (6) [No change]

(b) Additional Time after Service by Mail or E-mail . When a party may or must act within a specified time after service and service is made by mailor e-mail, 5 days are added after the period that would otherwise expire under subdivision (a).

RULE 2.516. SERVICE OF PLEADINGS AND DOCUMENTS

(a) [No change]

(b) Service; How Made. When service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, service must be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court.

(1) Service by Electronic Mail ("e-mail"). All documents required or permitted to be served on another party must be served by e-mail, unless the parties otherwise stipulate or this rule otherwise provides. A filer of an electronic document has complied with this subdivision if the Florida Courts e-filing Portal ("Portal") or other authorized electronic filing system with a supreme court approved electronic service system ("e-Service system") served the document by e-mail or provided a link by e-mail to the document on a website maintained by a clerk ("e-Service"). The filer of an electronic document must verify that the Portal or other e-Service system uses the names and e-mail addresses provided by the parties pursuant to subdivision (b)(1)(A).

(A) - (C) [No change]

(D) Time of Service. Service by e-mail is complete on the date it is sent.

(i) - (ii) [No change]

(iii) E-mail service, including e-Service, is treated as service by mail for the computation of time.

(E) [No change]

(2) [No change]

(A) - (F) [No change]

(c) - (h) [No change]

RULE 1.170. COUNTERCLAIMS AND CROSSCLAIMS

(a) - (f) [No change]

(g) Crossclaim against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a crossclaim any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of either the original action or a counterclaim therein, or relating to any property that is the subject matter of the original action. The crossclaim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the crossclaimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the crossclaimant. Service of a crossclaim on a party who has appeared in the action must be made pursuant torule 1.080Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516. Service of a crossclaim against a party who has not appeared in the action must be made in the manner provided for service of summons.

(h) - (j) [No change]

Committee Notes [No change]

RULE 1.260. SURVIVOR; SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES

(a) Death.

(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on all parties as provided inrule 1.080Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided for the service of a summons. Unless the motion for substitution is made within 90 days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death in the manner provided for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.

(2) [No change]

(b) - (d) [No change]

RULE 1.351. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS WITHOUT DEPOSITION

(a) [No change]

(b) Procedure. A party desiring production under this rule shall serve notice as provided inrule 1.080Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 on every other party of the intent to serve a subpoena under this rule at least 10 days before the subpoena is issued if service is by delivery or e-mail and 15 days before the subpoena is issued if the service is by mailor e-mail. The proposed subpoena shall be attached to the notice and shall state the time, place, and method for production of the documents or things, and the name and address of the person who is to produce the documents or things, if known, and if not known, a general description sufficient to identify the person or the particular class or group to which the person belongs; shall include a designation of the items to be produced; and shall state that the person who will be asked to produce the documents or things has the right to object to the production under this rule and that the person will not be required to surrender the documents or things. A copy of the notice and proposed subpoena shall not be furnished to the person upon whom the subpoena is to be served. If any party serves an objection to production under this rule within 10 days of service of the notice, the documents or things shall not be produced pending resolution of the objection in accordance with subdivision (d).

(c) - (f) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 1.410. SUBPOENA

(a) - (b) [No change]

(c) For Production of Documentary Evidence. A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, documents (including electronically stored information), or tangible things designated therein, but the court, upon motion made promptly and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or (2) condition denial of the motion on the advancement by the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing the books, documents, or tangible things. If a subpoena does not specify a form for producing electronically stored information, the person responding must produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms. A person responding to a subpoena may object to discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the person identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue costs or burden. On motion to compel discovery or to quash, the person from whom discovery is sought must show that the information sought or the form requested is not reasonably accessible because of undue costs or burden. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources or in such forms if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations set out in rule 1.280(d)(2). The court may specify conditions of the discovery, including ordering that some or all of the expenses of the discovery be paid by the party seeking the discovery. A party seeking a production of evidence at trial which would be subject to a subpoena may compel such production by serving a notice to produce such evidence on an adverse party as provided inrule 1.080Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516. Such notice shall have the same effect and be subject to the same limitations as a subpoena served on the party.

(d) - (h) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 1.440. SETTING ACTION FOR TRIAL

(a) - (b) [No change]

(c) Setting for Trial. If the court finds the action ready to be set for trial, it shall enter an order fixing a date for trial. Trial shall be set not less than 30 days from the service of the notice for trial. By giving the same notice the court may set an action for trial. In actions in which the damages are not liquidated, the order setting an action for trial shall be served on parties who are in default in accordance withrule 1.080Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516.

(d) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

Court Commentary

[No change]

RULE 1.442. PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT

(a) - (b) [No change]

(c) Form and Content of Proposal for Settlement.

(1) A proposal shall be in writing and shall identify the applicable Florida law under which it is being made.

(2) A proposal shall:

(A) name the party or parties making the proposal and the party or parties to whom the proposal is being made;

(B) state that the proposal resolves all damages that would otherwise be awarded in a final judgment in the action in which the proposal is served, subject to subdivision (F);

(C) state with particularity any relevant conditions;

(D) state the total amount of the proposal and state with particularity all nonmonetary terms of the proposal;

(E) state with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for punitive damages, if any;

(F) state whether the proposal includes attorneys' fees and whether attorneys' fee are part of the legal claim; and

(G) include a certificate of service in the form required byrule 1.080Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516.

(3) - (4) [No change]

(d) - (j) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No Change]

RULE 1.510. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(a) - (b) [No change]

(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion must state with particularity the grounds upon which it is based and the substantial matters of law to be argued and must specifically identify any affidavits, answers to interrogatories, admissions, depositions, and other materials as would be admissible in evidence ("summary judgment evidence") on which the movant relies. The movant must serve the motion at least 20 days before the time fixed for the hearing, and must also serve at that time a copy of any summary judgment evidence on which the movant relies that has not already been filed with the court. The adverse party must identify, by notice served pursuant torule 1.080Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 at least 5 days prior to the day of the hearing if service by mail is authorized, or delivered , electronically filed, or sent by e-mail no later than 5:00 p.m. 2 business days prior to the day of the hearing, any summary judgment evidence on which the adverse party relies. To the extent that summary judgment evidence has not already been filed with the court, the adverse party must serve a copy on the movant pursuant torule 1.080Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 at least 5 days prior to the day of the hearing if service by mail is authorized, or by delivery , electronic filing, or sending by e-mail to the movant's attorney no later than 5:00 p.m. 2 business days prior to the day of hearing. The judgment sought must be rendered immediately if the pleadings and summary judgment evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

(d) - (g) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 3.040. COMPUTATION OF TIME

Computation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514(a), except for the periods of time of less than 7 days contained in rules 3.130, 3.132(a) and (c), and 3.133(a).

Committee Notes

[No change]

Court Commentary

[No change]

RULE 3.070. ADDITIONAL TIME AFTER SERVICE BY MAIL, WHEN PERMITTED, OR E-MAIL

Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other document on the party and the notice or document is served on the party by mail, when permitted, or e-mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.

Committee Notes

1968 Adoption. This is the same as rule 1.6(e), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, except for the omission of subdivision (c) of the civil rules, which appears to be inapplicable to criminal cases.

1972 Amendment. Same as prior rule.

RULE 9.100. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS

(a) - (j) [No change]

(k) Reply. Within2030 days thereafter or such other time set by the court, the petitioner may serve a reply, which shall not exceed 15 pages in length, and supplemental appendix.

( l ) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

Court Commentary

[No change]

RULE 9.110. APPEAL PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW FINAL ORDERS OF LOWER TRIBUNALS AND ORDERS GRANTING NEW TRIAL IN JURY AND NONJURY CASES

(a) - (f) [No change]

(g) Cross-Appeal. An appellee may cross-appeal by serving a notice within1015 days of service of the appellant's timely filed notice of appeal or within the time prescribed for filing a notice of appeal, whichever is later. The notice of cross-appeal, accompanied by any filing fees prescribed by law, shall be filed either before service or immediately thereafter in the same manner as the notice of appeal.

(h) - (m) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

Court Commentary

[No change]

RULE 9.120. DISCRETIONARY PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW DECISIONS OF DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL

(a) - (c) [No change]

(d) Briefs on Jurisdiction. The petitioner's brief, limited solely to the issue of the supreme court's jurisdiction and accompanied by an appendix containing only a conformed copy of the decision of the district court of appeal, shall be served within 10 days of filing the notice. The respondent's brief on jurisdiction shall be served within2030 days after service of petitioner's brief. Formal requirements for both briefs are specified in rule 9.210. No reply brief shall be permitted. If jurisdiction is invoked under rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) (certifications of questions of great public importance by the district courts of appeal to the supreme court), no briefs on jurisdiction shall be filed.

(e) - (f) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 9.125. REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS CERTIFIED BY THE DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL AS REQUIRING IMMEDIATERESOLUTION BY THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

(a) - (c) [No change]

(d) Response. Any party may file a response within510 days of the service of the suggestion.

(e) - (g) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 9.130. PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW NONFINAL ORDERS AND SPECIFIED FINAL ORDERS

(a) - (f) [No change]

(g) Cross-Appeal. An appellee may cross-appeal the order or orders designated by the appellant, to review any ruling described in subdivisions (a)(3)-(a)(5), by serving a notice within1015 days of service of the appellant's timely filed notice of appeal or within the time prescribed for filing a notice of appeal, whichever is later. A notice of cross-appeal, accompanied by any filing fees prescribed by law, shall be filed either before service or immediately thereafter in the same manner as the notice of appeal.

(h) - (i) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 9.140. APPEAL PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES

(a) [No change]

(b) Appeals by Defendant.

(1) - (3) [No change]

(4) Cross-Appeal. A defendant may cross-appeal by serving a notice within1015 days of service of the state's notice or service of an order on a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). Review of cross-appeals before trial is limited to related issues resolved in the same order being appealed.

(c) Appeals by the State.

(1) - (2) [No change]

(3) Commencement. The state shall file the notice prescribed by rule 9.110(d) with the clerk of the lower tribunal within 15 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed; provided that in an appeal by the state under rule 9.140(c)(1)(K), the state's notice of cross-appeal shall be filed within1015 days of service of defendant's notice or service of an order on a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). Copies shall be served on the defendant and the attorney of record. An appeal by the state shall stay further proceedings in the lower tribunal only by order of the lower tribunal.

(d) - (i) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

Court Commentary

[No change]

RULE 9.141. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS IN COLLATERAL OR POSTCONVICTION CRIMINAL CASES

(a) [No change]

(b) Appeals from Postconviction Proceedings Under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), 3.801, 3.802, 3.850, or 3.853.

(1) [No change]

(2) Summary Grant or Denial of All Claims Raised in a Motion Without Evidentiary Hearing.

(A) - (B) [No change]

(C) Briefs or Responses.

(i) [No change]

(ii) The court may request a response from the appellee before ruling, regardless of whether the appellant filed an initial brief. The appellant may serve a reply within2030 days after service of the response. The response and reply shall not exceed the page limits set forth in rule 9.210 for answer briefs and reply briefs.

(D) [No change]

(3) [No change]

(c) - (d) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 9.142. PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW IN DEATH PENALTY CASES

(a) Procedure in Death Penalty Appeals.

(1) [No change]

(2) Briefs; Transcripts. After the record is filed, the clerk will promptly establish a briefing schedule allowing the defendant 60 days from the date the record is filed, the state4550 days from the date the defendant's brief is served, and the defendant3040 days from the date the state's brief is served to serve their respective briefs. On appeals from orders ruling on applications for relief under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.851 or 3.853, and on resentencing matters, the schedules set forth in rule 9.140(g) will control.

(3) - (5) [No change]

(b) [No change]

(c) Petitions Seeking Review of Nonfinal Orders in Death Penalty Postconviction Proceedings.

(1) - (7) [No change]

(8) Reply. Within2030 days after service of the response or such other time set by the court, the petitioner may serve a reply, which shall not exceed 15 pages in length, and supplemental appendix.

(9) - (11) [No change]

(d) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

Criminal Court Steering Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 9.146. APPEAL PROCEEDINGS IN JUVENILE DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES AND CASES INVOLVING FAMILIES AND CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES

(a) - (f) [No change]

(g) Special Procedures and Time Limitations Applicable to Appeals of Final Orders in Dependency or Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings.

(1) - (2) [No change]

(3) Briefs.

(A) [No change]

(B) Times for Service. The initial brief shall be served within2030 days of service of the record on appeal or the index to the record on appeal. The answer brief shall be served within2030 days of service of the initial brief. The reply brief, if any, shall be served within1015 days of the service of the answer brief. In any appeal or cross-appeal, if more than 1 initial or answer brief is authorized, the responsive brief shall be served within 20 days after the last initial brief or within 10 days after the last answer brief was served. If the last authorized initial or answer brief is not served, the responsive brief shall be served within 20 days after the last authorized initial brief or within 10 days after the last authorized answer brief could have been timely served.

(4) - (7) [No change]

(h) [No change]

(i) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Parents ' Claims - Special Procedures and Time Limitations Applicable to Appeals of Orders in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings Involving Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims.

(1) [No change]

(2) Rendition. A motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel filed in accordance with Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.530 shall toll rendition of the order terminating parental rights under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020 until the lower tribunal files a signed, written order on the motion, except as provided by Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.530.

(3) [No change]

(4) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Motion Filed After Commencement of Appeal. If an appeal is pending, a parent may file a motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.530 if the filing occurs within 20 days of rendition of the order terminating parental rights.

(A) Stay of Appellate Proceeding. A parent or counsel appointed pursuant to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.530 shall file a notice of atimely filedtimely filed, pending motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The notice automatically stays the appeal until the lower tribunal renders an order disposing of the motion.

(B) [No change]

(C) Duties of the Clerk, ; Preparation and Transmittal Transmission of Supplemental Record. If the clerk of circuit court has already transmitted the record on appeal of the order terminating parental rights, the clerk shall automatically supplement the record on appeal with any motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.530, the resulting order, and the transcript from the hearing on the motion. The clerk shall electronically transmit the supplement to the court and serve the parties within 5 days of the filing of the order ruling on the motion, or within 5 days of filing of the transcript from the hearing on the motion by the designated court reporter, whichever is later.

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 9.180. APPEAL PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES

(a) - (e) [No change]

(f) Record Contents; Final Orders.

(1) - (4) [No change]

(5) Costs.

(A) [No change]

(B) Deposit of Estimated Costs. Within1520 days after the notice of estimated costs is served, the appellant shall deposit a sum of money equal to the estimated costs with the lower tribunal.

(C) - (E) [No change]

(6) Transcript(s) of Proceedings.

(A) [No change]

(B) Objection to Court Reporter or Transcriptionist Selected. Any party may object to the court reporter or transcriptionist selected by filing written objections with the judge who made the selection within1520 days after service of notice of the selection. Within 5 days after filing the objection, the judge shall hold a hearing on the issue. In such a case, the time limits mandated by these rules shall be appropriately extended.

(C) [No change]

(7) - (9) [No change]

(g) Relief From Filing Fee and Costs; Indigency.

(1) - (2) [No change]

(3) Costs of Preparation of Record.

(A) [No change]

(B) Time. The verified petition to be relieved of costs must be filed within1520 days after service of the notice of estimated costs. A verified petition filed prior to the date of service of the notice of estimated costs shall be deemed not timely.

(C) - (E) [No change]

(F) Hearing on Petition to Be Relieved of Costs. After giving 15 days' notice to the Division of Workers' Compensation and all parties, the lower tribunal shall promptly hold a hearing and rule on the merits of the petition to be relieved of costs. However, if no objection to the petition is filed by the division or a party within2030 days after the petition is served, the lower tribunal may enter an order on the merits of the petition without a hearing.

(G) - (I) [No change]

(h) - (i) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 9.200. THE RECORD

(a) [No change]

(b) Transcript(s) of Proceedings.

(1) - (4) [No change]

(5) Statement of Evidence or Proceedings. If no report of the proceedings was made, or if the transcript is unavailable, a party may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including the party's recollection. The statement shall be served on all other parties, who may serve objections or proposed amendments to it within1015 days of service. Thereafter, the statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be filed with the lower tribunal for settlement and approval. As settled and approved, the statement shall be included by the clerk of the lower tribunal in the record.

(c) Cross-Appeals. Within 20 days of filing the notice of appeal, a cross-appellant may direct that additional documents, exhibits, or transcript(s) be included in the record. If less than the entire record is designated, the cross-appellant shall serve, with the directions, a statement of the judicial acts to be reviewed. The cross-appellee shall have1015 days after such service to direct further additions. The time for preparation and transmittal of the record shall be extended by 10 days.

(d) - (f) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 9.210. BRIEFS

(a) - (e) [No change]

(f) Times for Service of Briefs. The times for serving jurisdiction and initial briefs are prescribed by rules 9.110, 9.120, 9.130, and 9.140. Unless otherwise required, the answer brief shall be served within2030 days after service of the initial brief; the reply brief, if any, shall be served within2030 days after service of the answer brief; and the cross-reply brief, if any, shall be served within 2030 days thereafter. In any appeal or cross-appeal, if more than 1 initial or answer brief is authorized, the responsive brief shall be served within 20 days after the last initial or answer brief was served. If the last authorized initial or answer brief is not served, the responsive brief shall be served within 20 days after the last authorized initial or answer brief could have been timely served.

(g) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

Court Commentary

[No change]

RULE 9.300. MOTIONS

(a) Contents of Motion; Response. Unless otherwise prescribed by these rules, an application for an order or other relief available under these rules shall be made by filing a motion therefor. The motion shall state the grounds on which it is based, the relief sought, argument in support thereof, and appropriate citations of authority. A motion for an extension of time shall, and other motions if appropriate may, contain a certificate that the movant's counsel has consulted opposing counsel and that the movant's counsel is authorized to represent that opposing counsel either has no objection or will promptly file an objection. A motion may be accompanied by an appendix, which may include affidavits and other appropriate supporting documents not contained in the record. With the exception of motions filed pursuant to rule 9.410(b), a party may serve 1 response to a motion within1015 days of service of the motion. The court may shorten or extend the time for response to a motion.

(b) - (d) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 9.320. ORAL ARGUMENT

Oral argument may be permitted in any proceeding. A request for oral argument shall be in a separate document served by a party:

(a) in appeals, not later than1015 days after the last brief is due to be served;

(b) in proceedings commenced by the filing of a petition, not later than1015 days after the reply is due to be served; and

(c) [No change]

Each side will be allowed 20 minutes for oral argument, except in capital cases in which each side will be allowed 30 minutes. On its own motion or that of a party, the court may require, limit, expand, or dispense with oral argument.

RULE 9.330. REHEARING; CLARIFICATION; CERTIFICATION; WRITTEN OPINION

(a) Time for Filing; Contents; Response.

(1) - (2) [No change]

(3) Response. A response may be served within1015 days of service of the motion.

(b) [No change]

(c) Exception; Bond Validation Proceedings. A motion for rehearing or for clarification of an order or decision in proceedings for the validation of bonds or certificates of indebtedness as provided by rule 9.030(a)(1)(B)(ii) may be filed within 10 days of an order or decision or within such other time set by the court. A reply may be served within510 days of service of the motion. The mandate shall issue forthwith if a timely motion has not been filed. A timely motion shall receive immediate consideration by the court and, if denied, the mandate shall issue forthwith.

(d) - (e) [No change]

Committee Notes [No change]

RULE 9.331. DETERMINATION OF CAUSES IN A DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL EN BANC

(a) - (c) [No change]

(d) Rehearings En Banc.

(1) Generally. A rehearing en banc may be ordered by a district court of appeal on its own motion or on motion of a party. Within the time prescribed by rule 9.330, a party may move for an en banc rehearing solely on the grounds that the case or issue is of exceptional importance or that such consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity in the court's decisions. A motion based on any other ground shall be stricken. A response may be served within1015 days of service of the motion. A vote will not be taken on the motion unless requested by a judge on the panel that heard the proceeding, or by any judge in regular active service on the court. Judges who did not sit on the panel are under no obligation to consider the motion unless a vote is requested.

(2) - (3) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

Court Commentary

[No change]

RULE 9.350. DISMISSAL OF CAUSES

(a) [No change]

(b) Voluntary Dismissal. A proceeding of an appellant or a petitioner may be dismissed before a decision on the merits by filing a notice of dismissal with the clerk of the court without affecting the proceedings filed by joinder or cross-appeal; provided that dismissal shall not be effective until1015 days after service of the notice of appeal or until 10 days after the time prescribed by rule 9.110(b), whichever is later. In a proceeding commenced under rule 9.120, dismissal shall not be effective until 10 days after the serving of the notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction or until 10 days after the time prescribed by rule 9.120(b), whichever is later.

(c) - (d) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 9.360. PARTIES

(a) Joinder for Realignment as Appellant or Petitioner. An appellee or respondent who desires to realign as an appellant or petitioner shall serve a notice of joinder no later than the latest of the following:

(1) within1015 days of service of a timely filedpetition ornotice of appeal or petition;

(2) - (3) [No change]

The notice of joinder, accompanied by any filing fees prescribed by law, shall be filed either before service or immediately thereafter. The body of the notice shall set forth the proposed new caption. Upon filing of the notice and payment of the fee, the clerk shall change the caption to reflect the realignment of the parties in the notice.

(b) - (c) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]

RULE 9.410. SANCTIONS

(a) [No change]

(b) Motion by a Party.

(1) - (2) [No change]

(3) Initial Service. A copy of a motion for attorneys' fees as a sanction must initially be served only on the party against whom sanctions are sought. That motion shall be served no later than the time for serving any permitted response to a challenged document or, if no response is permitted as of right, within1520 days after a challenged document is served or a challenged claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is made at oral argument. A certificate of service that complies with rule 9.420(d) and that reflects service pursuant to this subdivision shall accompany the motion and shall be taken as prima facie proof of the date of service pursuant to this subdivision. A certificate of filing pursuant to subdivision (b)(4) of this rule shall also accompany the motion, but should remain undated and unsigned at the time of the initial service pursuant to this subdivision.

(4) [No change]

(5) Response. A party against whom sanctions are sought may serve 1 response to the motion within1015 days of the final service of the motion. The court may shorten or extend the time for response to the motion.

Committee Notes

[No change]

      We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

      The Joint Email Service Committee was established in 2009 to devise a system that would effectively move Florida courts away from a paper-dominated system into one utilizing e-mail as the principal means of service. In In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Florida Probate Rules, Florida Small Claims Rules, Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure-Electronic Filing , 102 So.3d 451 (Fla. 2012), the chair of The Florida Bar's Rules of Judicial Administration Committee, together with the committee chairs for several bodies of court rules, filed an out-of-cycle report proposing new Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 (Service of Pleadings and Documents), which implemented mandatory e-mail service for all cases in Florida. The Court adopted the amendments as proposed.


text:
    IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.800.
    No. SC17-999
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    October 25, 2018
    Courtney Rebecca Brewer, Chair, Appellate Court Rules Committee, Tallahassee, Florida, Kristin A. Norse, Past Chair, Appellate Court Rules Committee, Tampa, Florida; and Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, and Heather Savage Telfer, Staff Liaison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
   PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court for consideration of proposed amendments to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.800 (Uniform Citation System). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

The Florida Bar's Appellate Court Rules Committee (Committee) proposes amendments to rule 9.800 to substantially update the uniform citation formats provided in that rule. The Committee's proposal to amend the rule was first presented to the Court in the Committee's regular-cycle report of proposed rule amendments in In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure-2017 Regular-Cycle Report , No. SC17-152 (Fla. report filed Jan. 31, 2017). The Court, on its own motion, entered an order directing that the proposed amendments to rule 9.800 be severed and addressed in the instant case. See In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of App. Pro.-2017 Regular-Cycle Report , No. SC17-152 (Fla. order filed May 31, 2017).

We have fully considered the Committee's proposed amendments. We adopt many of the Committee's proposed amendments. However, we have revised a number of the Committee's proposals.

Accordingly, we amend Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.800 as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The amendments shall become effective January 1, 2019, at 12:01 a.m.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 9.800. UNIFORM CITATION SYSTEM

This rule applies to all legal documents, including court opinions. Except for citations to case reporters, all citation forms should be spelled out in full if used as an integral part of a sentence either in the text or in footnotes. Abbreviated forms as shown in this rule should be used if the citation is intended to stand alone either in the text or in footnotes.

(a) Florida Supreme Court.

(1)1887-present: Fenelon v. State, 594 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1992).

(2) 1846-1886:Livingston v. L'Engle, 22 Fla. 427 (1886).

(2) Fenelon v. State, 594 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1992).

(3) Forrecent opinionscases notyetpublished intheSouthern Reporter, cite toFlorida Law Weekly :Traylor v. State, 17 Fla. L. Weekly S42 (Fla. Jan. 16, 1992). If not therein, cite to the slip opinion:Medina v. State, No. SC00-280 (Fla. Mar. 14, 2002).With a slip opinion cite, citations to Westlaw: Singh v. State, No. SC10-1544, 2014 WL 7463592 (Fla. Dec. 30, 2014), or LEXIS:Johnston v. State, No. SC09-839, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 62 (Fla. Jan. 21, 2010), may also be provided.

(b) Florida District Courts of Appeal.

(1)Sotolongo v. State, 530 So.2d 514 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988);Buncayo v. Dribin, 533 So.2d 935 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Sotolongo v. State, 530 So.2d 514 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).

(2) Forrecent opinionscases notyet published inSouthern Reporter, cite toFlorida Law Weekly: Myers v. State, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D1507 (Fla. 4th DCA June 5, 1991). If not therein, cite to the slip opinion:Fleming v. State, No. 1D01-2734 (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 6, 2002).With a slip opinion cite, citations to Westlaw: Williams v. State, No. 2D14-2438, 2014 WL 3418358 (Fla. 2d DCA June 12, 2014), or LEXIS: Minakan v. Husted, No. 4D09-4439, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 288 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan. 20, 2010), may also be provided.

(c) Florida Circuit Courts and County Courts.

(1)Whidden v. Francis, 27 Fla. Supp. 80 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1966)Circuit Court: State v. Ruoff, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 619 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 2010)

(2)State v. Alvarez, 42 Fla. Supp. 83 (Fla. Dade Cty. Ct. 1975)County Court: Gables Ins. Recovery v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 637 (Miami-Dade Cty. Ct. Oct. 8, 2014).

(3) Foropinionscases not published inFlorida Law Weekly Supplement, cite toFlorida Law Weekly Supplement:State v. Ruoff, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 619 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 2010)Florida Supplement or Florida Supplement Second: Whidden v. Francis, 27 Fla. Supp. 80 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1966). If not therein, cite toFlorida Law Weekly :State v.Cahill, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C41 (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. Mar. 5, 1991). If not therein, cite to the slip opinion:Jones v.City of Ocoee, No. CVAI-93-18 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 1996).With a slip opinion cite. citations to Westlaw: Berne v. State, No. 2006-CA-9772-O, 2009 WL 8626616 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. Oct. 26, 2009), or LEXIS: Alberti v. Gangell. No. 51-2008-CA-0198-WS/H. 2014 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 55 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Apr. 16, 2014), may also be provided.

(d) Florida Administrative Agencies. (Cite if not in Southern Reporter.)

(1)For decisions of the Public Employees Relations Commission: Indian River Educ. Ass'n v. School Bd., 4 F.P.E.R. 4262 (1978)For agency final orders: Dep't of Health v. Migicovsky, No. 2011-16915 (Fla. Bd. of Med. Dec. 17. 2012) (Final Order No. DOH-12-2692-FOF-MQA).

(2) For decisions of theFlorida Public Service Commission:In re Application of Tampa Elec. Co., 81 F.P.S.C. 2:120 (1981)Division of Administrative Hearings: Dep't of Fin. Servs., Div. of Ins. Agent & Agency Servs. v. Pearson, No. 13-4478PL (Fla. DOAH Oct. 15, 2014) (Recommended Order).

(3) For decisions posted on the Division of Administrative Hearings' website:Big Bend Hospice, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Administration, Case No. 01-4415 CON (Fla. DOAH Nov. 7, 2002; Fla. AHCA Apr. 8, 2003).

(4) For decisions that are not posted on the Division of Administrative Hearings' website but are reported in the Florida Administrative Law Reports:Insurance Co. v. Dep't of Ins., 2 F.A.L.R. 648 A (Fla. Dep't of Ins. 1980).

(5) For orders that are not posted on the Division of Administrative Hearings' website or reported in one of the above reporters:In re Town of Inglis Petition for Waiver, Final Order No. 07 0590 (Fla. DEP Apr. 12, 2007) (available from the agency clerk).

(3) To cite a case's subsequent history at the agency and in the courts: Dep't of Health v. Sabates, No. 10-9430PL (Fla. DOAH June 23, 2011) (Recommended Order), adopted with reduced penalty, No. 2009-06686 (Fla. Bd. of Med. Aug. 29, 2011) (Final Order No. DOH-11-2101-FOF-MQA), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 104 So.3d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

(4) Decisions that are not available online may be cited to an administrative law reporter as follows if published therein:

(A) Florida Administrative Law Reports: Dep't of Health v. Sabates, 34 F.A.L.R. 2378 (Fla. Bd. of Med. 2011);

(B) Florida Career Service Reporter: Arenas v. Dep't of Corr., 25 F.C.S.R. 309 (Fla. Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm'n 2010);

(C) Environmental and Land Use Administrative Law Reporter: In re Riverview Pointe. Manatee Cty., 2013 E.R. F.A.L.R. 50 at 2 (Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. 2012);

(D) Florida Department of Revenue Tax Reporter: Technical Ass't Advm't 09A-049, 2009 Tax F.A.L.R. 431 (Fla. Dep't of Rev. 2009);

(E) Florida Public Employee Reporter: Delgado v. Sch. Dist. of Broward Cty., 36 F.P.E.R. 207 (Fla. Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm'n Gen. Counsel 2010;

(F) Florida Public Service Commission Reporter: In re Nuclear Cost Recovery Clause, 2013 F.P.S.C. 10:149 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 2013;

(G) Florida Compensation Reports: Whitney v. Mercy Hosp., 9 F.C.R. 373 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n 1976);

(H) Florida Division of Administrative Hearings Reports Fla. Real Estate Comm'n v. Warrington, 39 F.D.O.A.H. 747 (Fla. Real Estate Comm'n 1977);

(I) Florida Administrative Reporter Cockrell v. Comptroller, 12 F.A.R. 192 (Fla. Comptroller 1979).

(e) Florida Constitution. (Year of adoption should be given if necessary to avoid confusion.)When citing a provision that has been repealed, superseded, or amended, provide the year of adoption of the provision or the version thereof being cited.

(1) Current provision: Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

(2) Historical provision: Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. (1972).

(f) Florida Statutes (Official) .

(1) §350.34, Fla. Stat. (1973)48.031, Fla. Stat. (2014).

(2) §120.53120.54, Fla. Stat. (Supp.19741998 ).

(g) Florida Statutes Annotated. (To be used only for court adopted rules, or references to other nonstatutory materials that do not appear in an official publication.)When citing material other than a section of Florida Statutes, provide page numbers.

32 Fla. Stat. Ann. 116 (Supp.1975)7 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11 (2017).
30 Fla. Stat. Ann. 69-70 (2004).

(h) Florida Administrative Code. When citing an administrative rule that has been repealed superseded, or amended, provide the year of adoption of the provision or the version thereof being cited.

Fla. Admin. Code R. 62D-2.014.
Fla. Admin. Code R. 62D-2.014 (2003).

(h i ) Florida Laws. (Cite if not in Fla. Stat. or if desired for clarity or adoption reference.)

(1) After 1956: Ch. 74-177, § 5, at 473, Laws of Fla.
(2) Before 1957: Ch. 22000, Laws of Fla. (1943).

( i j) Florida Rules. When citing a rule that has been repealed, superseded, or amended, provide the year of adoption of the rule or the version thereof being cited.

(1) Florida Rules of Civil Procedure: Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.180.

(2) Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: Fla. R. Civ. P.-S.V.P. 4.010.

(3) Florida Rules of Judicial Administration: Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.110.

(4) Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850.

(5) Florida Probate Rules: Fla. Prob. R. 5.120.

(6) Florida Rules of Traffic Court: Fla. R. Traf. Ct. 6.165.

(7) Florida Small Claims Rules: Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.070.

(8) Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure: Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.070.

(9) Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure: Fla. R. App. P. 9.100.

(10) Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators: Fla. R. Med. 10.100.

(11) Florida Rules for Court-Appointed Arbitrators: Fla. R. Arb. 11.010.

(12) Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure: Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.010.

Fla. Admin. Code R. 62D 2.014.

(13) Rules Regulating the Florida Bar: R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.10. 1.10.

(14) Code of Judicial Conduct: Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 4B.

(15) Florida Bar Foundation Bylaws: Fla. Bar Found.By LawsBylaws, art. 2.19(b).

(16) Florida Bar Foundation Charter: Fla. Bar Found. Charter, art. III, § 3.4.

(17) Integration Rule of the Florida Bar: Fla. Bar Integr. R., art. XI, § 11.09 (1981).

(18) Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission Rules: Fla. Jud. Qual. Comm'n R. 9.

(19) Florida Standard Jury Instructions, Civil: Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 601.4.

(20) Florida Standard Jury Instructions, Contract and Business: Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Cont. & Bus.) 416.12.

(21) Florida Standard Jury Instructions, Criminal: Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.7.

(22) Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 9.32(a).

(23) Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar: Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 3-23.1.

( j k ) Florida Attorney General Opinions.

Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 73-178 (1973).

( k l ) United States Supreme Court.

(1) Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965).

(2) (Cite toUnited States Reports, if published therein; otherwise cite toSupreme Court Reporter, Lawyer's Edition, or United States Law Week, in that order of preference. Foropinionscases not published in these reporters, cite toFlorida Law Weekly Federal: California v. Hodari D., 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S249 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1991)). If not therein, cite to the slip opinion: Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, No. 17-387 (U.S. May 21, 2018). With a slip opinion cite, citations to Westlaw: Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, No. 17-387, 2018 WL 2292445 (U.S. May 21, 2018), or LEXIS: Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, No. 17-387, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3085 (U.S. May 21, 2018), may also be provided.

( l m ) Federal Courts of Appeals.

(1) Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bivins, 276 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1960).

(2) Foropinionscases not published inthe Federal Reporter, cite toFlorida Law Weekly Federal :Cunningham v. Zant, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C591 (11th Cir.MarchMar. 27, 1991).If not therein, cite to Federal Appendix: Evans v. McDonald, 313 F. App'x 256 (11th Cir. 2009). If not therein, cite to the slip opinion: Airtran Airways, Inc. v. Elem, No. 13-14912 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2014). With a slip opinion cite, citations to Westlaw: Murphy v. Dulay, No. 13-14637, 2014 WL 5072710 (11th Cir. Oct. 10, 2014), or LEXIS: Murphy v. Dulay, No. 13-14637, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 19311 (11th Cir. Oct. 10, 2014), may also be provided.

( m n ) Federal District Courts.

(1) Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F.Supp. 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971).

(2) Foropinionscases not published inthe Federal Supplement, cite toFlorida Law Weekly Federal :Wasko v. Dugger, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D183 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 1991).If not therein, cite to the slip opinion: Slay v. Hess, No. 5:14-cv-264 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2014). With a slip opinion cite, citations to Westlaw: Taylor v. Bradshaw, No. 11-80911-CIV, 2014 WL 5325291 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2014), or LEXIS: Taylor v. Bradshaw, No. 11-80911-CIV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148468 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2014), may also be provided.

( n o ) United States Constitution.

(1) Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, U.S. Const.

(2) Amend. V, U.S. Const.

( op ) Other Citations. When referring to specific material within a Florida court's opinion, pinpoint citation to the page of the Southern Reporter where that material occurs is optional, although preferred. All other citations shall be in the form prescribed by the latest edition ofThe Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, The Harvard Law Review Association, Gannett House, Cambridge, MA 02138. Citations not covered in this rule or inThe Bluebook shall be in the form prescribed by theFlorida Style Manual (available at www.law.fsu.edu/lawreview/florida-style-manual) published by the Florida State University Law Review, Tallahassee, FL 32306.

( p q ) Case Names. Case names shall be underscored(or italicized) in text and in footnotes.

Committee Notes

[No Change]

      The Board of Governors of The Florida Bar unanimously approved the proposed amendments. The Court published the amendments to rule 9.800 along with the other proposals in Case No. SC17-152. No comments were filed addressing rule 9.800.