author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Wade Allen HUTCHINS and Tina Marie Crowder v. SERVICE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL.
    1041199.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    June 26, 2009.
    Leah O. Taylor, Rhonda P. Chambers, and Gregory M. Zarzaur of Taylor & Taylor, Birmingham, for appellants.
    Stephen L. Poer, Cinda R. York, and Kirk D. Smith of Campbell, Waller & Poer, LLC, Birmingham, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Wade Allen Hutchins and Tina Marie Crowder (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the plaintiffs”) appeal from the trial court’s judgment dismissing Service Corporation International (“SCI”) from the underlying action. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

On June 3, 2004, the plaintiffs sued SCI and its subsidiary, SCI Alabama Funeral Services, Inc. (“SCI Alabama”), alleging negligence and/or wantonness, trespass on the case, and the tort of outrage. In addition, Hutchins alleged breach of contract against SCI Alabama. All the claims were related to the services provided by SCI Alabama and SCI in connection with the funeral and burial of the plaintiffs’ father.

On July 26, 2004, SCI and SCI Alabama filed a joint answer to the complaint. One of the affirmative defenses asserted in the answer was that the “[plaintiffs’ claims are subject to arbitration and must be pursued, if at all, in arbitration rather than in court, and for this reason [plaintiffs’ claims are due to be dismissed or stayed.”

On July 27, 2004, the plaintiffs filed an application for the entry of a default judgment against SCI and SCI Alabama based on their alleged failure to “plead, answer or otherwise defend” the case. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ application for entry of default on August 5, 2004. On August 6, 2004, SCI and SCI Alabama filed a motion to dismiss the action and to compel arbitration. On August 12, 2004, SCI and SCI Alabama moved to set aside the default judgment. On August 18, 2004, the trial court granted the motion to set aside the default judgment and recognized that the motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration “remains pending this Court’s ruling.”

The entire argument set forth in the motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration was SCI and SCI Alabama’s contention that the plaintiffs should be compelled to arbitrate all of their claims against SCI and SCI Alabama. The motion requested the following relief:

“[SCI and SCI Alabama] respectfully request this Honorable Court to dismiss [plaintiffs’ claims or in the alternative, enter an order compelling arbitration in accordance with the contract executed by the parties. Plaintiffs’ claims are due to be dismissed or, in the alternative, arbitrated and stayed. Dismissal is proper when claims are due to be arbitrated. See Ex parte Colquitt, 808 So.2d 1018, 1022 (Ala.2001); see also Ameriquest [Mortgage Co.] v. Bentley, [851 So.2d 458] (Ala.2002); Hurst v. Tony Moore [Imports], Inc., 699 So.2d 1249 (Ala.1997).
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants SCI Alabama and [SCI] respectfully request this Honorable Court to dismiss [plaintiffs’ complaint or, in the alternative, stay this action and order this matter to binding arbitration.”

(Capitalization in original.) The plaintiffs responded to this motion on January 19, 2005. The only issue addressed in the response was whether the plaintiffs should be compelled to arbitrate their claims. SCI and SCI Alabama replied to the plaintiffs’ response on January 21, 2005. This reply also discussed only one issue: whether the plaintiffs should be compelled to arbitrate their claims. It requested that the trial court “dismiss [plaintiffs’ complaint oi', in the alternative, stay this action and order this matter to binding arbitration.”

On January 24, 2005, the trial court entered an order, holding that “this action is hereby stayed and [SCI and SCI Alabama’s] motion to compel arbitration should be granted.”

On February 22, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a “motion to alter, amend, or vacate” the order compelling arbitration or, in the alternative, “to reconsider.” This motion argued that the trial court’s order compelling arbitration of the plaintiffs’ claims was contrary to prior decisions of this Court.

On March 25, 2005, the trial court entered a second order, which held that SCI and SCI Alabama’s “motion to dismiss is hereby granted as to [SCI] only. Accordingly, SCI ... is herein dismissed from this ... action and the court’s pi’evious order compelling arbitration of this matter remains in effect as to the remaining parties.”

On April 13, 2005, the trial court entered a “revised order,” which provided:

“[T]he court’s order heretofore entered on January 24, 2005, is hereby set aside and [SCI and SCI Alabama’s] motion to dismiss is hereby granted as to [SCI] only. Accordingly, SCI ... is herein dismissed, without prejudice, from this ... action.
“With regard to remaining defendant SCI Alabama, the court herein grants [SCI Alabama’s] previously filed motion to compel arbitration.”

Therefore, under this order, the trial court dismissed all claims against SCI without sending them to arbitration, and SCI Alabama remained a party to the action, all claims against it were sent to arbitration, and the proceedings in the trial court were stayed.

On May 11, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to this Court. On October 27, 2006, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination as to whether (1) to certify the interlocutory order of April 13, 2005, as a final judgment under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; (2) to adjudicate the remaining claims against SCI Alabama, thus making the interlocutory order final and appealable; or (3) to hold the parties to their concessions in their appellate briefs or take no action, in either of which events the appeal would be dismissed as being from a nonfinal judgment. On November 7, 2006, the trial court certified the interlocutory order of April 13, 2005, as a final judgment under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.

Standard of Review

It is unclear upon what ground the trial court based its dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims against SCI. Nevertheless, this Court has held:

“On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a presumption of correctness. Jones v. Lee County Commission, 394 So.2d 928, 930 (Ala.1981); Allen v. Johnny Baker Hauling, Inc., 545 So.2d 771, 772 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader’s favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief. Raley v. Citibanc of Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So.2d 640, 641 (Ala.1985); Hill v. Falletta, 589 So.2d 746 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether she may possibly prevail. Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So.2d 669, 671 (Ala.1985); Rice v. United Ins. Co. of America, 465 So.2d 1100, 1101 (Ala.1984). We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Garrett v. Hadden, 495 So.2d 616, 617 (Ala.1986); Hill v. Kraft, Inc., 496 So.2d 768, 769 (Ala.1986).”

Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993).

Discussion

In the plaintiffs’ principal brief on appeal, they argue that their claims against SCI are not subject to arbitration and that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against SCI. However, the plaintiffs indicate in their reply brief that they are willing to arbitrate their claims against SCI if this Court finds that the trial court erred in dismissing SCI from the action rather than ordering that the plaintiffs’ claims against SCI be arbitrated.

In its brief to this Court, SCI appears to misconstrue the trial court’s order because SCI states that “because the [plaintiffs’ claims against [SCI] are subject to arbitration, the trial court’s order dismissing those claims is due to be affirmed.” (SCI’s brief, at 9.) However, the trial court’s order did not state that the claims against SCI are subject to arbitration. Instead, the order simply dismissed those claims altogether. Also, SCI “request[s] that this Court affirm the April 13, 2005, order of the trial court and order [plaintiffs to submit to arbitration as to both Defendant [SCI] and SCI Alabama.” (SCI’s brief, at 14.) Again, the trial court’s April 13, 2005, order did not order the plaintiffs to submit their claims against SCI to arbitration; thus, this Court cannot affirm a holding of the trial court that does not exist.

No basis for the dismissal of SCI from the action independent of arbitration was presented to the trial court, and the trial court did not in its order offer any basis for refusing to entertain the plaintiffs’ complaint against SCI. In fact, the above-referenced statements from SCI’s brief appear to concede that SCI should not be dismissed from the action unless the claims against it are ordered to arbitration. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against SCI.

SCI also briefly argues on appeal that a dismissal, as distinguished from a stay, is proper when the claims against the party are due to be arbitrated. However, it appears that the trial court never reached this specific issue because the trial court’s final order did not compel arbitration of the claims against SCI. Instead, the order simply dismissed SCI from the action. We recognize that this Court has stated that “[a] trial court is required to stay or dismiss proceedings and to compel arbitration if the parties have entered into a valid contract containing an arbitration agreement.” Ameriquest Mortgage Co. v. Bentley, 851 So.2d 458, 462 (Ala.2002). This Court has also held that a tidal court exceeds its discretion by dismissing rather than staying proceedings pending arbitration if the dismissal creates “a real potential for injustice.” Johnson v. Jefferson County Racing Ass’n, 1 So.3d 960, 970 (Ala.2008). Nevertheless, in the present case, it appears that the trial court did not consider whether a stay, rather than a dismissal, would be prudent pending a decision by the arbitrator because there is no indication in the trial court’s order that the court envisioned the plaintiffs’ claims against SCI being decided by an arbitrator. Therefore, at this time, we will not decide whether a dismissal rather than a stay would be the appropriate relief pending arbitration of the claims against SCI. The trial court should, within its discretion, consider this issue on remand.

Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the claims against SCI without prejudice and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

COBB, C.J., and LYONS, WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, BOLIN, PARKER, MURDOCK, and SHAW, JJ., concur.

      . The plaintiffs state in their brief that they "do not raise any issue on appeal with respect to SCI Alabama.” (Plaintiffs' brief, at 11.)


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Rachel BROWN, a minor, by and through her parents, Michael Brown and Rosemary Gilbert.
    1051336.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    June 26, 2009.

      Mark D. Hess and Laura S. Dunning of Haskell Slaughter Young & Rediker, LLC, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Nat Bryan and Thomas M. Powell of Marsh, Rickard & Bryan, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) appeals by permission, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., from the denial of its summary-judgment motion in an action brought by Rachel Brown, a minor, by and through her parents, Michael Brown and Rosemary Gilbert, to recover uninsured/underin-sured-motorist (“UIM”) benefits. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

For purposes of this permissive appeal, we assume the following relevant facts. Rachel is an unmarried and unemanci-pated minor whose parents are divorced. When Rachel’s parents divorced, they were awarded joint custody of Rachel. Rachel was injured in an automobile accident on February 2, 2004. At that time, Rachel lived primarily with her mother and attended a local high school. On February 28, 2006, Rachel sued State Farm seeking UIM benefits, which she alleged she was entitled to under Mr. Brown’s automobile insurance policy with State Farm.

Ultimately, State Farm filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the trial court denied. Subsequently, the trial court certified its interlocutory order denying State Farm’s summary-judgment motion for permissive review under Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P. Pursuant to Rule 5, State Farm then filed a petition for permission to appeal to this Court, which this Coui’t granted.

Discussion

In its certification for permissive appeal, the trial court must include a statement of the controlling question of law. In conducting our de novo review of the question presented on a permissive appeal, “this Court will not expand its review ... beyond the question of law stated by the trial court. Any such expansion would usurp the responsibility entrusted to the trial court by Rule 5(a)[, Ala. R.App. PJ.” BE & K, Inc. v. Baker, 875 So.2d 1185, 1189 (Ala.2003). Therefore, the only issue before this Court is the following question of law identified by the trial court in its Rule 5 certification:

“Assuming that at the time of her accident Rachel ‘live[d] primarily’ with her mother and not with [Mr. Brown], whether she nevertheless qualifies as
[Mr. BrownJ’s ‘relative’ as his ‘unmarried and unemancipated child away at school’ so as to be entitled to UIM benefits under [Mr. Brown]’s State Farm policfy]?”

The answer to this controlling question of law hinges on the interpretation of the language in the UIM provision in Mr. Brown’s automobile insurance policy. Mr. Brown’s policy provides UIM benefits to those “insured” under the policy. Under the UIM-coverage section of the policy, “insured” is defined as follows:

“Insured — means the person or persons covered by uninsured motor vehicle coverage.

“This is:
“1. the first person named in the declarations;
“2. his or her spouse;
“3. their relatives .... ”

(Emphasis added.)

Rachel claims that she is entitled to UIM benefits under the policy because she is Mr. Brown’s “relative,” a term defined in the policy as follows: “Relative — means a person related to you or your spouse by blood, marriage or adoption who lives primarily with you. It includes your unmarried and unemancipated child away at school.” (Emphasis added.) The controlling question of law as posed by the trial court assumes that Rachel was not living primarily with Mr. Brown at the time of the accident.

Although this Court has previously addressed the first sentence of State Farm’s two-sentence definition of “relative” — “a person related to you or your spouse by blood, marriage or adoption who lives primarily with you” — in an identical policy provision, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Harris, 882 So.2d 849 (Ala.2003), we have not yet addressed the second sentence containing the language at issue in this case.

“When analyzing an insurance policy, a court gives words used in the policy their common, everyday meaning and interprets them as a reasonable person in the insured’s position would have understood them. Western World Ins. Co. v. City of Tuscumbia, 612 So.2d 1159 (Ala.1992); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Edge Mem'l Hosp., 584 So.2d 1316 (Ala.1991). If, under this standard, they are reasonably certain in their meaning, they are not ambiguous as a matter of law and the rule of construction in favor of the insured does not apply. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Harris, 372 So.2d 342 (Ala.Civ.App.1979). Only in cases of genuine ambiguity or inconsistency is it proper to resort to rules of construction. Canal Ins. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 718 So.2d 8 (Ala.1998). A policy is not made ambiguous by the fact that the parties interpret the policy differently or disagree as to the meaning of a written provision in a contract. Watkins v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 656 So.2d 337 (Ala.1994). A court must not rewrite a policy so as to include or exclude coverage that was not intended. Upton v. Mississippi Valley Title Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 548 (Ala.1985).”

B.D.B. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 814 So.2d 877, 879-80 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). However, if a provision in an insurance policy is found to be genuinely ambiguous, “policies of insurance should be construed liberally in respect to persons insured and strictly with respect to the insurer.” Crossett v. St. Louis Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 289 Ala. 598, 603, 269 So.2d 869, 873 (1972).

Both State Farm and Rachel argue that State Farm’s definition of the term “relative” is not ambiguous. State Farm alleges that the “words used in the policy,” when interpreted “as a reasonable person in the insured’s position would have understood them,” 814 So.2d at 880, require that the two sentences that compose the definition of the term “relative” in the policy be read conjunctively. Thus, State Farm contends, reading the sentences conjunctively, this Court must first determine with whom Rachel “lives primarily” before getting to the question whether she was “away at school.” Such a reading requires Rachel to be, while “away at school,” away from her primary residence, not simply the policyholder’s residence, in order to recover UIM benefits under Mr. Brown’s policy.

Rachel, on the other hand, argues that a plain-meaning reading of the two-sentence definition of “relative” in the policy requires that the sentences be read disjunc-tively. Thus, according to Rachel, the second sentence in the definition of “relative” stands alone, and there is no need to first determine with whom an unmarried and unemancipated child who is away at school “lives primarily.” Rather, Rachel argues, in order to recover UIM benefits under Mr. Brown’s policy, she merely needs to be away from Mr. Brown’s home and enrolled in school.

We hold that the definition of “relative” in the State Farm policy is not ambiguous, and we agree with State Farm’s interpretation. When the words in the policy are given their common, everyday meaning, it is clear that the first sentence of the definition provides coverage for a policyholder’s child who lives primarily in the policyholder’s home. For purposes of the certified question in this case, it is assumed that Rachel lives primarily with her mother and, thus, is not included within the first sentence of the definition of “relative” in the policy. The second sentence is obviously intended to expand on the first sentence and to indicate that a child who is away at school is not excluded from the term “relative” in the policy by virtue of the language “lives primarily with you.” Although the policy does not define the phrase “away at school,” the language must be interpreted as a reasonable person in the policyholder’s position would have understood the common, everyday meaning of the phrase. A child whose primary residence is not the policyholder’s residence and who is attending a local high school is not “away at school” under any reasonable interpretation of that phrase. To read the two-sentence definition of “relative” disjunc-tively would, in effect, rewrite State Farm’s policy to expand UIM coverage to unintended beneficiaries.

For these reasons, we answer the controlling question of law identified by the trial court in the negative. Rachel cannot “qualifiyj as [Mr. Brownj’s ‘relative’ as his ‘unmarried and unemancipated child away at school’ so as to be entitled to UIM benefits under [Mr. Brownj’s State Farm polic[y,j” because she does not live primarily with Mr. Brown, her father, and she is not temporarily away from her primary residence for the purpose of attending school. Thus, State Farm’s summary-judgment motion is due to be granted.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s order denying State Farm’s summary-judgment motion is reversed, and this case is remanded for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

COBB, C.J., and LYONS, WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, BOLIN, PARKER, MURDOCK, and SHAW, JJ., concur.

      . State Farm alleges that this Court and the Court of Civil Appeals decided in Harris and B.D.B. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 814 So.2d 877 (Ala.Civ.App.2001), respectively, that the definition of "rel-alive” in State Farm’s policy is not ambiguous. However, Harris and B.D.B. addressed only the first sentence of State Farm's definition of "relative,” not the language in the second sentence that is at issue here.


author: SHAW, Justice.

text:
    ASSURANT, INC. v. Debra A. MITCHELL.
    1061754.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    June 26, 2009.

      Michael L. Bell, S. Andrew Kelly, John D. Mayo, and Craig N. Rosier of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
    Thomas B. Albritton of Albrittons, Clifton, Alverson, Moody & Bowden, P.C., Andalusia, for appellee.
   SHAW, Justice.

The defendant below, Assurant, Inc. (“Assurant”), appeals from the trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against it by the plaintiff, Debra A. Mitchell. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2000, Mitchell purchased a manufactured home from Grand Luxor Homes, Inc. (“Grand Luxor”). In connection with the purchase, Mitchell received a comprehensive manufactured-home insurance policy issued by American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida (“American Bankers”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Assu-rant. The policy contained an arbitration provision that provided, in pertinent part:

“Any and all disputes, controversies or claims of any kind and nature between YOU and US arising out of or in any way related to the validity, enforceability, interpretation, performance or breach of any provision of this policy, including this arbitration provision, and upon which a settlement has not been reached by YOU and US, shall be resolved, exclusively, by arbitration in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. Section 1 Et Seq.).”

(Capitalization in original.) The policy defined “YOU” as “the person named on the Declarations Page and that person’s husband or wife who lives in the same MANUFACTURED HOME as the named insured,” and further stated that “US” “always means American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida.” (Capitalization in original.) Although Assurant is the parent company of American Bankers, Assurant acknowledges that it was not a signatory to Mitchell’s policy, which was renewed every year.

After her manufactured home allegedly suffered wind and water damage, Mitchell made numerous claims under the policy. Correspondence in the record indicates that several of Mitchell’s claims were denied because the adjuster determined that the alleged damage was not covered by the policy. All the claim-related correspondence directed to Mitchell bore either the names “Assurant Group” and “American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida” or the heading “American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida” with a designation that the corresponding claims adjuster was affiliated with “Assurant Claims.”

Following the denial of her claims, Mitchell sued Assurant; Edwin Edwards, who Mitchell alleged was an agent of Assu-rant; Grand Luxor; and Destiny Industries, LLC (“Destiny”), the manufacturer of Mitchell’s manufactured home. In her complaint, Mitchell alleged that, on August 31, 2006, she

“had either a contract of insurance with Assurant Inc., by and through its subsidiary American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, or was the third-party beneficiary of a contract between American Bankers and Assurant, either of which required, among other things, that Assurant would provide benefits as descxibed in [Mitchell’s] policy of insurance with American Bankers in return for the premium which [she] paid and which was ultimately received by Assu-rant.”

Mitchell asserted numerous claims against Assurant, including breach of contx*act and bad-faith refusal to pay a claim; claims of fraud based on statements allegedly made to her by representatives of Assurant; claims of fraudulent suppression based on facts that, she claims, were not disclosed to her by Assurant; and a negligence claim related to Assurant’s inspections of the damaged manufactured home.

Assurant filed a motion to compel Mitchell to arbitrate her claims under the arbitration provision in the policy and supported that motion with evidentiary exhibits. Mitchell filed a response, which was also supported with evidentiary exhibits. Thereafter, the parties filed several supplemental pleadings and evidentiary exhibits in support of their respective positions.

On May 29, 2007, the trial coui't denied Assurant’s motion to compel arbitration; subsequently, the trial court vacated this initial denial because of an apparent issue as to notice to one of the parties. The trial court conducted a hearing on Assu-rant’s motion to compel, and on September 4, 2007, entered an order again denying Assurant’s motion. Assurant appeals.

Standard of Revieiv

“ ‘[T]he standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to compel arbitration at the instance of either party is a de novo determination of whether the trial judge erred on a factual or legal issue to the substantial prejudice of the party seeking review.’ Ex parte Roberson, 749 So.2d 441, 446 (Ala.1999). Furthermore:
“ ‘A motion to compel arbitration is analogous to a motion for summary judgment. TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739 So.2d 1110, 1114 (Ala.1999). The party seeking to compel arbiti'ation has the burden of proving the existence of a contract calling for arbitration and proving that that contract evidences a transaction affecting interstate commerce. Id. “After a motion to compel arbitration has been made and supported, the burden is on the non-movant to present evidence that the supposed arbitration agreement is not valid or does not apply to the dispute in question.” ’
“Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So.2d 277, 280 (Ala.2000) (quoting Jim Burke Auto., Inc. v. Beavers, 674 So.2d 1260, 1265 n. 1 (Ala.1995) (emphasis omitted)).”

Vann v. First Cmty. Credit Corp., 834 So.2d 751, 752-53 (Ala.2002).

Discussion

I.

“The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (‘the FAA’), provides that ‘[a] written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable .... ’ 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA ‘mandates the arbitration of claims encompassed by an arbitration clause that is contained in a binding contract that involves interstate commerce.’ Ex parte Conference America, Inc., 713 So.2d 953, 955 (Ala.1998).”

Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato, 968 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Ala.2007).

In support of its motion to compel arbitration, Assurant argued that it was entitled to enforce the arbitration provision in the policy both because public policy favors arbitration and because, it said, “[a]ll of [Mitchell’s] claims against Assurant specifically arise out of, relate to and are based or otherwise dependent upon the manufactured home policy issued by American Bankers.” Assurant denied any involvement in the handling of Mitchell’s claims. In support of that denial, Assurant submitted the affidavit of Jessica M. Olich, vice president and corporate counsel for Assu-rant, in which Olich testified that there was no agreement between Assurant and American Bankers that would allow Assu-rant to adjust claims filed under a policy issued by American Bankers. Relying on the “by and through” language in Mitchell’s complaint, Assurant further argued below, as it does on appeal, that Mitchell alleged that American Bankers was either acting as the agent of Assurant or that Assurant was the alter ego of American Bankers.

Assurant produced substantial evidence showing the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Vann, supra. Therefore, the burden then shifted to Mitchell to present evidence indicating that the arbitration provision did not apply to her claims against Assurant.

Mitchell argues on appeal that her claims against Assurant are separate and distinct from any potential claims she may have against American Bankers and are based on “things Assurant said and did outside of any policy of insurance with American Bankers.” Mitchell’s brief, at 7. She further contends that she does not “seek [from Assurant] the insurance benefits available to her under the policy with American Bankers.” Id., at 2. Mitchell also specifically denies that she has alleged that Assurant is the principal of American Bankers and maintains that she has not alleged that Assurant is the alter ego of American Bankers. We disagree.

The substance of Mitchell’s complaint controls in determining the claims alleged therein.

“The substance of the plaintiffs allegations control, not the effort given by the plaintiff to style the claims throughout litigation. Bailey v. Faulkner, 940 So.2d 247, 253 (Ala.2006) (‘Faulkner places great reliance on the fact that he has been careful to style his claims throughout this litigation as negligence and wantonness claims, rather than as an alienation-of-affections claim. However, “[t]his Court has always looked to substance over form.” Southern Sash Sales & Supply Co. v. Wiley, 631 So.2d 968, 971 (Ala.1994).’ (footnote omitted)).”

Elizabeth Homes, 968 So.2d at 8. Further, “a plaintiff is in control of his or her complaint, [and] we [therefore] accept [the plaintiffs] allegations on their face.” National Auction Group, Inc. v. Hammett, 854 So.2d 65, 70 (Ala.2003).

Mitchell’s complaint explicitly alleges that Assurant was acting “by and through” American Bankers, that Assurant would “provide [the] benefits as described in [Mitchell’s] policy of insurance with American Bankers,” and that her policy premiums would ultimately be received by Assu-rant. It states that Mitchell

“had either a contract of insurance with Assurant Inc., by and through its subsidiary [ ] American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, or was the third-party beneficiary of a contract between American Bankers and Assurant, either of which required, among other things, that Assurant would provide benefits as described in [Mitchell’s] policy of insurance with American Bankers in return for the premium which [she] paid and which was ultimately received by Assu-rant.”

(Emphasis added.)

Further, Mitchell’s use in the complaint of the phrase “by and through” evokes Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-300, which “permits] a party to be named in the complaint as the actor and then allow the proof to show the acts alleged to have been committed by the named party were actually committed by an agent.” Prickett v. Little, 47 Ala.App. 166, 169, 252 So.2d 93, 96 (1971). See also Sibley v. Adams, 56 Ala.App. 572, 576, 324 So.2d 287, 289 (1975) (“Under [the predecessor statute to § 6-5-300] it is permissible in any case to aver that defendant committed an act and at trial prove that the act was committed by or through an agent, servant or employee acting within the line and scope of his employment.”). Despite her arguments to the contrary, Mitchell has, in fact, alleged an agency or alter ego relationship between Assurant and American Bankers.

In Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Spraggins, 853 So.2d 913 (Ala.2002), this Court held that a parent corporation, as an “alter ego” of the subsidiary, could invoke an arbitration provision found in a contract between the plaintiff and the subsidiary even though the parent corporation was not a signatory to the underlying contract. Discussing Ex parte Gray, 686 So.2d 250 (Ala.1996), this Court stated:

“[In Gray,] this Court recognized that a party who had entered into an arbitration agreement with a car dealership could not avoid arbitration by suing an agent of the dealership who was not a signatory to the agreement. Federal courts that have addressed the issue have recognized that the alter ego of a signatory to an arbitration agreement is entitled to compel its enforcement. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Bright Metal Specialties, Inc., 251 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir.2001); and Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 234 (2d Cir.1960).”

853 So.2d at 919-20. Cf. Stevens v. Phillips, 852 So.2d 123, 131 (Ala.2002) (holding that because the plaintiffs claims against an employee arose out of representations by the employee “while she was acting as an agent within the line and scope of her employment with Southern Homes,” for purposes of the case, the employee “ ‘stands in the shoes’ ” of her principal); Lee v. YES of Russellville, Inc., 784 So.2d 1022, 1027 (Ala.2000) (“[I]f an agent acting within his authority enters a contract on behalf of an undisclosed principal, the agent is liable on the contract ...; the undisclosed principal is also liable.”); and McDougle v. Silvernell, 738 So.2d 806, 809 (Ala.1999) (concluding that a closing attorney, as an agent of a title-insurance company, had standing to enforce an arbitration provision contained in a title-insurance policy as to claims of the purchaser despite the fact that he was not a party to the insurance policy).

Mitchell’s complaint alleges that there was an agency relationship or a parent-subsidiary relationship between Assurant and American Bankers. Further, the correspondence that Mitchell submitted in opposition to Assurant’s motion bolsters the allegation of an agency or alter ego relationship, as it clearly bears the names of both Assurant and American Bankers. In her brief to this Court, Mitchell attempts to distinguish the agency/alter ego cases cited by Assurant; however, we note that Mitchell does not provide any evidence, and does not cite any authority, in support of her own position that she has not alleged the existence of either relationship. We thus see no merit in Mitchell’s argument, especially in light of the language in her complaint. Because of the relationship between Assurant and American Bankers, Assurant is entitled to enforce the arbitration-provision in Mitchell’s insurance policy with American Bankers. Spraggins, supra.

II.

Mitchell next argues that, even if we decide that Assurant is entitled to enforce the arbitration provision, her claims do not arise under the American Bankers insurance policy; however, we are unpersuaded by her argument.

“ ‘In interpreting an arbitration provision, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” ’ The Dunes of GP, L.L.C. v. Bradford, 966 So.2d 924, 927 (Ala.2007) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)) (emphasis omitted). Indeed, ‘ “a motion to compel arbitration should not be denied ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.’ ” ’ Id. (quoting Ex parte Colquitt, 808 So.2d 1018, 1024 (Ala.2001), quoting in turn United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)) (emphasis omitted). ‘While, “as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control, ... those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability.” ’ Carroll v. W.L. Petrey Wholesale Co., 941 So.2d 234, 237 (Ala.2006) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)).”

Kenworth of Mobile, Inc. v. Dolphin Line, Inc., 988 So.2d 534, 545 (Ala.2008).

“ ‘[I]n order for a dispute to be characterized as arising out of or relating to the subject matter of the contract, and thus subject to arbitration, it must at the very least raise some issue that cannot be resolved without a reference to or construction of the contract itself.’ ”

Elizabeth Homes, 968 So.2d at 7 (quoting Koullas v. Ramsey, 683 So.2d 415, 418 (Ala.1996)).

Although Mitchell argues that her claims against Assurant arise from statements, advice, and actions by Assurant independent of the denial of her claims under the insurance policy, the thrust of Mitchell’s complaint is that Assurant, as the principal or alter ego of American Bankers, breached the insurance policy issued to her by American Bankers and engaged in the complained-of conduct while performing duties that arose under that policy. Compare Ex parte Gray, 686 So.2d at 251. Mitchell’s dispute relates directly to the adjustment procedures and ultimate outcome of the claims process, which she initiated pursuant to her policy with American Bankers. There is no evidence indicating that Assurant was in any way acting outside the insurance policy. Therefore, there is no merit in this argument.

III.

Assurant also contends that it is entitled to enforce the arbitration provision as a nonsignatory under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or “intertwining,” and as a third-party beneficiary to the insurance policy. In response, Mitchell argues, pointing to the language in the arbitration provision specifically naming American Bankers as the only other party to the agreement, that neither of those two doctrines is available when: (1) in the case of equitable estoppel, the language of the arbitration provision precludes a nonparty from seeking arbitration, and (2) in the case of a third-party beneficiary, the intent to impose the benefit on the third party is not indicated by the language in the contract. Ex parte Stamey, 776 So.2d 85 (Ala.2000); see also First Family Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Rogers, 736 So.2d 553 (Ala.1999) (holding that the language of an arbitration provision limiting the parties did not allow the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to compel arbitration by nonparty), and Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So.2d 375, 380 (Ala.2006) (noting that there is an exception to the equitable estoppel rule requiring the arbitration provision to contain sufficiently broad language indicating that the nonsig-natory was contemplated as a party). However, because of our rationale in Part I above, we pretermit discussion of this issue.

Conclusion

We conclude that Mitchell has failed to present any evidence showing that the arbitration provision in the insurance policy does not apply to her claims against Assu-rant. Furthermore, all the claims alleged in Mitchell’s complaint appear to revolve around her dissatisfaction with the claims process outlined in that policy and Assu-rant’s performance with regard to the claims process, which performance was undertaken pursuant to the policy. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Assu-rant’s motion to compel, and we reverse the order denying that motion and remand the cause for the entry of an order compelling Mitchell to arbitrate her claims against Assurant.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

COBB, C.J., and LYONS, WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, BOLIN, PARKER, and MURDOCK, JJ, concur.

      . This case was originally assigned to another Justice on this Court; it was reassigned to Justice Shaw.

      . This date represents the issue date of a letter denying Mitchell’s August 26, 2006, claim for “water damage” related to the leaking roof of her manufactured home.

      . There is no dispute below or on appeal as to whether the transaction in this case involved interstate commerce for purposes of whether the Federal Arbitration Act applies in this case.

      . "Subsidiary” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as being "[u]nder another's control.” The entry further indicates that the term is often used to refer toa" ‘subsidiary corporation’; i.e. one that is run and owned by another company which is called the 'parent.' ” Black’s Law Dictionaiy 1428 (6th ed. 1990).

      . Alabama Code 1975, § 6-5-300, provides:
      "In any civil action, it shall be permissible to allege in any pleading that any party or parties committed an act, and proof that any such party or parties committed such act by or through an agent, servant, or employee acting within the line and scope of his employment shall be sufficient proof of such allegation ....”
      (Emphasis added.)

      . Mitchell also argues that the door-closing statute, Ala.Code 1975, § 10-2B-15.02, invalidates the insurance policy — and its arbitration provision — because American Bankers was allegedly not qualified to do business in Alabama at the time the policy was issued. This argument is without merit, in that the record indicates that American Bankers was in fact qualified to do business in Alabama at the time the insurance policy here was issued.

      . Mitchell does not argue on appeal that the language of the arbitration provision prevents

        Assurant from invoking arbitration under the agency and alter ego principles discussed above.


author: STUART, Justice.

text:
    Ex parte Yvonne SUMERLIN. (In re Doris Williford, as the personal representative of the estate of Austin Taylor Terry, deceased v. Susan Toole et al.).
    1080520.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    June 26, 2009.

      Sharon E. Fiequette, gen. counsel, and Felicia M. Brooks, staff atty., Department of Human Resources, for petitioner.
    Ted Taylor, Leah O. Taylor, and Rhonda P. Chambers of Taylor & Taylor, Birmingham; J. Gusty Yearout of Yearout & Tray-lor, P.C., Birmingham; and William A. Short, Bessemer, for respondent.
   On Application for Reheating

STUART, Justice.

This Court’s opinion of April 24, 2009, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.

Yvonne Sumerlin petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in her favor on the ground that she is entitled to State-agent immunity in a wrongful-death action pending against her and others. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

Facts

On Friday, September 6, 2002, the mother of Austin Taylor Terry admitted 12-month-old Terry, who had bruises on both sides of his face, both ears, his neck, and his clavicle area, to the Children’s Hospital of Alabama. Wanda Hawkins, a medical social worker at Children’s Hospital, notified the Jefferson County Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) of Terry’s injuries and reported to the intake worker that Terry had suffered “suspicious non-accidental injuries”; as part of the initial-intake information, the intake worker designated the case as one requiring an “immediate” response. Hawkins also spoke with Sumerlin, a service supervisor at DHR. According to Hawkins, she told Sumerlin that Terry should not be allowed to go home with his mother until DHR could conduct an investigation because she suspected child abuse and neglect based on the nature of Terry’s injuries and his mother’s “flat affect,” i.e., her nonrespon-sive attitude.

Sumerlin did not have an investigator available on September 6, 2002, to immediately investigate the suspected abuse. Sumerlin, however, confirmed that Terry could remain at Children’s Hospital, a protective environment, until Monday, September 9, when the situation could be investigated. Sumerlin requested that the hospital contact DHR before discharging Terry.

That same day, Terry’s father learned of Terry’s hospitalization and contacted DHR. Because he telephoned the DHR office after office hours, his call was forwarded to an on-call DHR service worker, Tammie Godfrey. After speaking with Terry’s father, Godfrey went to Children’s Hospital. At the hospital, Godfrey met with Terry’s father and helped police officers take photographs of Terry. Godfrey also talked with Terry’s mother. Godfrey learned that Terry’s mother and Chris Wesson, her boyfriend, had been in the house with Terry on the day Terry was injured. According to Terry’s mother, Terry had fallen out of his crib. Godfrey concluded that Terry should not go home with his mother upon his discharge from Children’s Hospital, and she informed the police of her conclusion. She summarized her findings in a report and submitted it to an administrative assistant at DHR.

On Monday, September 9, 2002, Sumer-lin assigned the investigation of Terry’s suspected abuse to Joann Hood. During Sumerlin’s deposition, she was asked why she did not assign a caseworker to Terry’s case immediately on Friday, September 6. She responded:

“Because I had handled it over the phone that Friday. When I spoke with Ms. Hawkins she told me that — because it came in that Friday as an emergency, and I talked with her, she said the baby would be in the hospital and the baby would be there through Monday and [it] was not a life-threatening situation, I was told the baby was in a stable situation, if the baby could stay there because my emergency person for that day [Friday, September 6] was currently working an emergency. She agreed that the baby would stay there until my worker saw him on Monday.”

That same day, Monday, September 9, Cindy Deerman, a medical social worker at Children’s Hospital, telephoned DHR and spoke with Sumerlin to find out DHR’s plan for Terry. Sumerlin, who had not received Godfrey’s report, informed Deer-man that Terry could go home with his mother at discharge and that Hood would meet Terry and Terry’s mother at their house. The materials indicate that Terry was discharged from Children’s Hospital at 1:30 p.m. on Monday, September 9.

On September 10, 2002, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Hood visited Terry and his mother at their house. Wesson was in the house at the time of Hood’s visit. Hood interviewed Terry’s mother and Wesson. She also telephoned Martha Musso, Terry’s great-grandmother. During the visit, Wesson and Terry’s mother showed Hood Terry’s crib. Wesson and Terry’s mother explained that something was wrong with the rail on the crib because it would come off track and fall down. They stated that Terry had been injured when he fell out of the crib. Hood observed the bruise on the right side of Terry’s face and the blotches on his jaw area. She concluded that Terry’s injuries were consistent with his having fallen out of the crib. Hood told Terry’s mother to acquire another crib, and she had Terry’s mother and Wesson place the side of the crib with the broken rail against the wall to prevent future falls until they could acquire another crib. Hood determined, based on her initial investigation, that it was safe to leave Terry in his mother’s care.

On November 3, 2002, Terry died from brain injuries caused by punches to his head inflicted by Wesson. Wesson is currently serving a 20-year sentence for manslaughter as a result of Terry’s death.

The materials before us indicate that Sumerlin admitted that intake information relevant to Terry’s suspected abuse “fell through the cracks.” She stated that Hood reported her initial investigation findings to Sumerlin and that based on the information she had she agreed with Hood’s recommendation that Terry stay in the home with his mother.

Doris Williford, as personal representative of Terry’s estate, filed a wrongful-death action against Sumerlin, in her individual capacity, and others, including Susan Toole, the child-welfare administrator for DHR. In the complaint, Williford alleged that Sumerlin negligently and wantonly violated duties she owed Terry, who, as a victim of child abuse, was in need of the State’s protection. Specifically, Willi-ford alleged that Sumerlin negligently and/or wantonly violated applicable standards of care in child welfare:

“(a) by failing to comply with applicable rules, standards, regulations policies and/or procedures regarding the proper care, investigations and reporting of a suspected child abuse and/or neglect case in Jefferson County, Alabama;
“(b) by failing to ensure that [Hood] complied with mandatory rules and regulations pertaining to child abuse investigations;
“(c) by failing to timely and adequately gather and communicate to [Hood] all pertinent information regarding Austin Taylor Terry;
“(d) by failing to dispatch [Hood] or another child abuse and neglect investigator to Children’s Hospital within 12 hours after receipt of the report of alleged abuse to Austin Taylor Terry;
“(e) by failing to implement safety measures for the protection of Austin Taylor Terry prior to his release from Children’s Hospital;
“(f) by failing to implement a safety plan for the protection of Austin Taylor Terry;
“(g) by failing to comply with the requirements of the R.C. Consent Order[] by assigning the Austin Taylor Terry investigation to a case worker, [Hood], whose case load exceeded the R.C. case load mandate; and,
“(h) by failing to require timely completion of the investigation and reporting of said investigation by [Hood].”

Sumerlin answered, denying the material allegations of the complaint and asserting the defense of State-agent immunity. After some discovery was conducted, Sum-erlin moved for a summary judgment, arguing that she was entitled to State-agent immunity because, she said, her duties were supervisory in nature and she had not acted beyond her authority by violating any DHR policies. She maintained that Williford could not provide any evidence indicating that Sumerlin had “failed to follow applicable law or departmental rules, practices, or procedures or that [she] acted outside her authority as an employee of [DHR].” Additionally, she asserted that Williford could not provide any evidence indicating that Sumerlin had “acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of law.”

Williford responded, arguing that Sum-erlin was not entitled to State-agent immunity because, she said, Sumerlin had acted “beyond her authority” or “under a mistaken interpretation of the law” by failing to follow established policies in the Child Protective Services Policies and Procedures Manual (hereinafter “the DHR manual”) and to ensure that Hood followed those requirements. Specifically, she alleged that Sumerlin failed to follow the following two policies regarding intake and initial assessment in cases of suspected child abuse or neglect:

“CA/N [child abuse/neglect] Intake “IV. Analysis and Decision-Making
“D. DHR Response Times
“DHR’s response time is the time frame within which in-person initial contact shall be made with (1) the children who are allegedly at risk of serious harm and (2) all other children in the home.
“Designated response times are ‘immediate’ and ‘within five (5) calendar days.’ ‘Immediate’ is defined as ‘as soon as possible after a report is received, but no later than twelve (12) hours from receipt of the intake information.’
“CA/N [child abuse/neglect] Initial Assessment
“VI. Review, Approval, and Assignment for On-going Services
“1. Supervisory Review
“Supervisors shall review all initial assessments to determine that:
“ — child welfare staff have complied with the general requirements and information collection protocol;
“ — any deviations have received supervisory concurrence and been adequately documented;
“ — documented information is pertinent and sufficient to make the required initial assessment decisions.”

According to Williford, Sumerlin failed to ensure that an investigation of Terry’s suspected abuse was conducted “immediately” and that Hood had compiled her investigation information and documented her initial-assessment decision. Additionally, Williford maintained that Sumerlin deviated from DHR policy by failing to evaluate Hood’s assessment and failing to concur with Hood’s deviations from policy. Lastly, she argued that Sumerlin violated the R.C. consent decree by assigning the case to Hood, whose caseload was over the standard set in the R.C. consent decree.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied Sumerlin’s summary-judgment motion, stating:

“Generally, State agents are afforded immunity when the conduct made the basis of the claim is based upon the exercise of judgment in discharging governmental duties. Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000). But a State agent is not immune from civil liability in her personal capacity ‘when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.’ 792 So.2d at 405. ‘A State agent acts beyond authority and is therefore not immune when he or she fails to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist.’ Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.2003); Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173, 178 (Ala.2000).
“After consideration of the briefs, evi-dentiary submissions and arguments of counsel, the Court concludes that the motion for summary judgment filed by ... Yvonne Sumerlin [is] due to be denied. [Williford] has submitted substantial evidence that ... Sumerlin violated mandatory duties described in the DHR’s Child Protective Services Policies and Procedures Manual. ‘The mandates of the DHR Manual ... are precisely the sort of “detailed rules or regulations” that State agents cannot ignore, except at their peril.’ Gowens v. Tys., 948 So.2d 513, 527 (Ala.2006).”

On January 27, 2009, Sumerlin filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court, requesting an order directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment for her based on State-agent immunity.

Standard of Revieiv

‘ “ ‘While the general rule is that denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, the exception is that the denial of a motion for summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus.’ Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912 (Ala.2000). A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is: ‘(1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.2001).” ’
“Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So.2d 450, 452 (Ala.2006) (quoting Ex parte Nall, 879 So.2d 541, 543 (Ala.2003)).”

Ex parte Sawyer, 984 So.2d 1100, 1105-06 (Ala.2007).

Analysis

Sumerlin contends that the trial court erred when it denied her summary-judgment motion because, she says, she is entitled to State-agent immunity. Willi-ford contends that Sumerlin is not entitled to State-agent immunity because, she says, Sumerlin acted beyond her authority or under a mistaken interpretation of law when she violated mandatory duties described in the DHR manual and standards set out in the R.C. consent decree.

“ ‘State-agent immunity protects state employees, as agents of the State, in the exercise of their judgment in executing their work responsibilities.’ Ex parte Hayles, 852 So.2d 117, 122 (Ala.2002). In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000), a plurality of this Court articulated the following test for State-agent immunity:
“ ‘A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent’s
“ ‘(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or
“ ‘(2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as:
“ ‘(a) making administrative adjudications;
“ ‘(b) allocating resources;
“ ‘(c) negotiating contracts;
“ ‘(d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or
“ ‘(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; or
“ ‘(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers’ arresting or attempting to arrest persons; or
“ ‘(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students.
“ ‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity
“ ‘(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency require otherwise; or
“ ‘(2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.’
“Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405 .... The Court adopted the Cranman test for State-agent immunity in Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173, 177-78 (Ala.2000).
“ ‘This Court has established a “burden-shifting” process when a party raises the defense of State-agent immunity.’ Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So.2d 450, 452 (Ala.2006). A State agent asserting State-agent immunity ‘bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiffs claims arise from a function that would entitle the State agent to immunity.’ 946 So.2d at 452. Should the State agent make such a showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of the two categories of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman is applicable. The exception being argued here is that ‘the State agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority.’ 946 So.2d at 452. One of the ways in which a plaintiff can show that a State agent acted beyond his or her authority is by proffering evidence that the State agent failed ‘“to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist.” ’ Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d at 178).
“In Giambrone v. Douglas, supra, and Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201 (Ala.2003), this Court discussed the violation-of-rules basis for denying a State agent immunity. We described those cases in Gowens v. Tys. [S.], 948 So.2d 513, 524-26 (Ala.2006):
‘““The complaint in Giambrone [v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046 (Ala.2003),] sought compensation for injuries suffered by 15-year-old Jake Giambrone, a member of the wrestling team, in an impromptu wrestling match with Michael Douglas, the head wrestling coach for Auburn High School. 874 So.2d at 1049. Douglas outweighed Giambrone, who was a freshman, by approximately 70 pounds. Id. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Douglas on the ground of State-agent immunity.
“ ‘ “In this Court, the appellant argued that the summary judgment was improper, because there was evidence indicating that ‘[Douglas] violated the competition guidelines as promulgated by the National Federation of Wrestling (“NFW”); and ... engaged in “inequitable competition” with Jake in violation of the code of conduct contained in the Alabama High School Athletic Directors and Coaches Association Directories (“the Athletic Directories”).’ 874 So.2d at 1051 (emphasis added). This Court agreed with that argument and reversed the summary judgment. 874 So.2d at 1057.
“‘“In doing so, the Court noted that, as a general principle, ‘Douglas was permitted to exercise broad judgment in the education of his students.’ 874 So.2d at 1053. It explained, however, that Douglas’s supervisor, the athletic director, had ‘instructed the coaches ... to follow the guidelines in the Athletic Directories,’ and that he had ‘provided Douglas with a book containing rules promulgated by the NFW in order to make sure that Douglas knew the rules for conducting wrestling matches.’ 874 So.2d at 1054. The Court stated:
“ ‘ “ ‘Although [the athletic director] was not directed by the [Auburn City Board of Education] to impose on the coaches at Auburn High School the guidelines and rules of the ... NFW and the Athletic Directories, it was within the exercise of his judgment to “insist” that the coaches comply with those guidelines and rules.
“““Therefore, Douglas’s “broad authority” to exercise judgment in the safe conduct of his wrestling team practices was limited by the guidelines and rules furnished and imposed by [the athletic director].’
“ ‘ “874 So.2d at 1054. The Court concluded:
“ ‘ “ ‘The guidelines and rules removed Douglas’s judgment in determining whether he should participate in a “full speed” challenge match with a student who was less experienced, much younger, and smaller than Douglas. Moreover, the guidelines and rules restricted the type of moves that are permissible in the sport of wrestling. Because a trier of fact could determine that Douglas performed an illegal move during an “inequitable” challenge match, thereby failing to discharge his duties pursuant to “detailed mies or regulations,” we cannot determine at this stage in the proceedings that Douglas is entitled to State-agent immunity. Douglas did not meet his burden of establishing that his actions and decisions involved functions that entitled him to immunity.’ ”
‘Howard [v. City of Atmore,] 887 So.2d [201,] 208 [(Ala.2003)] (emphasis added in Howard).’ ”

Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So.2d 1276, 1280-85 (Ala.2008) (some emphasis omitted).

Williford agrees that Sumerlin has made a sufficient showing that the claims against Sumerlin arise from actions taken by her while executing her work responsibilities as a State employee. Williford, however, contends that Sumerlin is not entitled to State-agent immunity because, she says, Sumerlin “acted beyond her authority” or “under a mistaken interpretation of law.” Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392, 405 (Ala.2000). According to Williford, Sumer-lin acted beyond her authority by violating detailed and mandatory DHR policies in the DHR manual and by violating detailed and mandatory directives in the R.C. consent decree. Williford argues that Sumer-lin acted beyond her authority in three ways.

First, Williford contends that she satisfied her burden of establishing that Sumerlin acted beyond her authority by violating the provisions of the DHR manual when she did not immediately investigate or immediately assign someone to investigate Terry’s suspected abuse. According to Williford, when Sumerlin received the suspected-abuse report regarding Terry on Friday afternoon, September 6, an immediate response was required. Williford maintains that Sumerlin acted beyond her authority by not assigning a caseworker to investigate the allegation until Monday, September 9.

The DHR manual provides that the DHR response times within which an in-person initial contact must be made with children who are allegedly at risk of serious harm are “immediate” or “within five (5) calendar days.” “Immediate” response time is defined as “as soon as possible after a report is received, but no later than twelve (12) hours from receipt of the intake information.” A supervisor is involved in determining whether a response time is to be “immediate” or “within five (5) calendar days.” An “immediate” response time is required by the child-welfare staff “when intake information indicates serious harm will likely occur within twenty-four (24) hours to the children identified in the report as allegedly abused or neglected.” The manual further provides that factors that suggest a child may be at risk of serious harm within 24 hours include, but are not limited to:

“ — Child death report is received with alleged abuse/neglect as the cause, and there are other vulnerable children in the home;
“ — Child is under age six (6) years and the alleged abuse/neglect is attributed to the parents’ or primary caregivers’ substance abuse, mental illness, mental retardation, or family violence;
“ — Child is being hit, beaten, severely deprived notv;
“ — Child is unsupervised or alone now;
“ — Child is in life threatening living arrangements now;
“ — Serious allegations have been reported and a child is accessible to the person allegedly responsible for abuse/neglect or accessibility to the person is unknown;
“ — Serious allegations have been reported and the child/family situation may or will change quickly;
“ — Allegations involve failure to thrive;
“ — Allegations involve medical neglect of handicapped infants;
“ — Parents/primary caregivers are failing to seek medical care for a health problem which, if left untreated, could cause serious harm;
“ — Parents/primary caregivers have been reported as being under the influence of substances ?iotu;
“ — Parents/primary caregivers’ whereabouts are unknown; and
“ — There is a history of CA/N [child abuse/neglect] reports which suggest the children may be at risk of serious harm flow.”

(Emphasis in original.)

Sumerlin stated in her deposition that on Friday, September 6, when she received the initial-intake information that designated the need for an “immediate” response in Terry’s case, she did not have an investigator available. Therefore, recognizing the exigency of the circumstances, she contacted Children’s Hospital to further evaluate Terry’s case and to determine if Terry was at risk of serious harm at that time and how best to address Terry’s needs. After talking with Hawkins, the medical social worker at Children’s Hospital, she learned that Terry would remain in the hospital until Monday, September 9; therefore, Terry was not unsupervised or alone, and he was not in a life-threatening living arrangement. Because Terry was in a safe environment, Surnerlin exercised her judgment and determined that an investigator could be assigned to Terry’s case on Monday when the threat of serious harm to Terry might return. The materials before us support a finding that Sumerlin did not ignore her responsibility; rather, she exercised her judgment in her supervisory capacity to deal with exigent circumstances. Indeed, nothing before us indicates that Sumerlin exceeded the scope of her discretion in light of the facts that she had no personnel to assign to Terry’s case on Friday afternoon and that Terry was not at that time in a life-threatening situation. Consequently, Williford has not established that Sumerlin acted beyond hér authority in this regard.

Next, Williford maintains that Sumerlin is not entitled to State-agent immunity because, she says, Sumerlin acted beyond her authority by failing to review and approve Hood’s initial assessment of Terry’s case. The DHR manual provides under the initial-assessment section:

“CA/N [child abuse/neglect] Initial Assessment
“VI. Review, Approval, and Assignment for On-going Services
“1. Supervisory Review
“Supervisors shall review all initial assessments to determine that:
“ — child welfare staff have complied with the general requirements and information collection protocol;
“ — any deviations have received supervisory concurrence and been adequately documented;
“ — documented information is pertinent and sufficient to make the required initial assessment decisions.”

The DHR manual also provides the following time frame for completion of initial assessments:

“B. Time Frame For Completion
“1. Initial Assessments
“Initial assessments shall be completed within ninety (90) days from the date the intake information is received. An initial assessment is considered complete when:
“ — The general requirements and information collection protocol have been followed;
“ — Analysis and decision-making have occurred;
“ — Documentation has been completed and due process rights have been initiated (including entry of the preliminary CA/N [child abuse/neglect] disposition into the Central Registry); and
“ — Supervisory reviews and approval has occurred.”

The initial-intake call of the suspected abuse of Terry occurred on September 6, 2002; Teiry died on November 3, 2002. It appears undisputed that Hood did not daily document her investigative findings in DHR’s computer system. Indeed, it appears that she did not input the data regarding the Terry investigation until November 4, 2002, the day after Terry died.

In her deposition, Sumerlin explained that she had daily meetings with Hood about her initial findings with regard to Terry and that Sumerlin agreed with Hood’s determinations. She stated that because Hood’s assessment was ongoing, i.e., that Terry’s initial assessment was not completed and because Hood had not documented her findings in the DHR computer system, Sumerlin had not documented her official supervisory approval of Hood’s recommendation. Because the DHR manual provides 90 days for completion of an initial assessment and 90 days had not passed from the initial intake in Terry’s case, Williford has not established that Sumerlin acted beyond her authority by not having completed and documented her supervisory review of Hood’s initial assessment.

Last, Williford contends that Sum-erlin is not entitled to State-agent immunity because, she says, Sumerlin acted beyond her authority or engaged in a mistaken interpretation of the law when she assigned the Terry case to Hood for investigation. According to Williford, Hood’s caseload exceeded the caseload mandate set forth in the R.C. consent decree. The R.C. consent decree mandated one investigation worker for every 13.5 child-abuse and neglect reports. Although Hood stated in her deposition that during the fall of 2002 she was assigned between 35 to 50 open cases, the materials before us indicate that for the month of September 2002 Hood had 19 open cases.

In support of her contention that she did not violate the mandates of the R.C.. consent decree, Sumerlin provided an affidavit from Mike Salter, director of DHR’s Division of Management & Fiscal Analysis. He explained the requirements of the R.C. consent decree with regard to caseload standards, stating:

“Each county was to determine the monthly average caseloads and document the caseload for each worker. Every three months the counties were to report the caseload data to the DHR State Office. If the county had more than ten percent of its workers exceeding the caseload standards, the county would file an exception report with the DHR State Office identifying the reasons for the overages and actions that would be taken to reduce them within the next thirty days. If a county reported an excess of the caseload standards for two consecutive quarters, the state and county offices would analyze the problem together to determine the factors that were causing the overage and take any needed corrective action within thirty days. Thus, the county and state offices had seven months to identify caseload problems and implement corrective action to solve the issue rather than one month.
“In April of 1999, an R.C. Child Welfare Staffing Committee (hereinafter ‘staffing committee’) was established to monitor county staffing on a monthly basis or more frequently if necessary, to ensure that counties were meeting the standards. In addition, a computer reporting system was developed whereby counties could enter data concerning the number of cases their workers had and send this data to the DHR State Office where it would be compiled into a report. When it appeared to the committee that a county may have had inadequate staff, an in-depth look at the county staffing level is undertaken.
“The Office of Management and Fiscal Analysis produced detailed information about the staffing need in the county based on the caseload counts. The data was calculated using a six-month average to avoid having temporary spikes or dips in caseloads changing a county staffing level from month to month. When it became apparent that a county was experiencing staffing shortages based upon the averages for the county, its allocation was increased and the county would then be given authority to hire additional staff. However, a county director or a county supervisor did not determine the allocation for staffing.
“It was not possible to conclude that a county was not in compliance with the Staffing Order without a review of what a worker’s caseloads were for several consecutive months. In this case, Joann Hood, a child abuse and neglect worker, was over caseload standards for September of 2002, but under caseload standards for the immediate following month of October of 2002.
“While it is true that, at any given point in time, the counties may have workers that have one or more cases over the caseload standards, the same counties may also have workers who are carrying fewer cases than required under the standards. Counties would be authorized to hire a sufficient number of workers to meet or exceed the need shown by the caseloads in that county. However, in any given month, an individual worker in that county may be under or over the standards depending on the number of cases the county received that month and the number of cases the county closed that month. The only way a county director could insure that workers never exceeded the standards would be to constantly move the cases from worker to worker every month so that the caseloads were always equal. However, optimal outcomes for children would not be achieved by assigning them a new worker every few months to meet a caseload standard.
“On January 16, 2007, the federal court determined that DHR had complied substantially with the R.C. Decree and granted [DHR’s] motion to terminate the R.C. Consent Decree ....”

In light of the fact that the R.C. consent decree provided averages for caseloads over a period of time and in light of the fact that the evidence indicates that Hood’s average caseload over the acceptable period did not exceed the mandates of the R.C. consent decree, Williford has failed to establish that Sumerlin acted beyond her authority or that she acted under a mistaken interpretation of the law in this regard.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Williford has not established that Sumerlin is not entitled to State-agent immunity. Consequently, a summary judgment is proper for Sumerlin on the ground of State-agent immunity. We, therefore, issue the writ and direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to set aside its order denying Sumerlin’s summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment for Sumerlin.

APPLICATION GRANTED; OPINION OF APRIL 24, 2009, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

COBB, C.J., and LYONS, WOODALL, SMITH, BOLIN, PARKER, MURDOCK, and SHAW, JJ, concur.

      . Terry’s parents were divorced. His mother had legal custody; his father had supervised visitation rights.

      . In 1998, R.C., an eight-year-old boy who had been placed in the custody of the Alabama DHR after he had been abused by his mother and neglected by his father, filed a class-action lawsuit against the commissioner of the Alabama DHR. R.C. v. Walley, 390 F.Supp.2d 1030 (M.D.Ala.2005). As the class representative, R.C. challenged the conditions and practices of Alabama’s child-welfare system. After two years of litigation, the parties negotiated a consent decree that was approved by the court, which provided, among other things, mandates with regard to child-welfare-worker caseloads.

      . Williford urges that Terry’s case was closed because, she says, Hood had stopped investigating the case. Investigation, however, is only a portion of the initial assessment and continues until the initial assessment is completed. An initial assessment, as provided in the DHR manual, is not complete until the documentation has been completed and the preliminary child-abuse/neglect disposition is entered into the central registry. Hood was still working on the initial assessment, and Sumerlin could not review Hood's initial assessment until Hood completed the documentation. Therefore, the materials before us support a finding that Terry’s case was not closed.

      . Within this argument, Williford appears to maintain that Sumerlin did not adequately supervise Hood. On rehearing, she states: “Sumerlin's and Hood’s premature and incorrect conclusion that additional investigation was not necessary is in direct violation of the DHR manual.” An incorrect conclusion, however, does not establish that Sumerlin exceeded the scope of her authority in supervising Hood. Additionally, as we recognized in Gowens v. Tys. S., 948 So.2d 513, 532 (Ala.2006):
      "The plaintiffs' theory of the case is that [DHR] conducted a negligent investigation of the [alleged abuse], and their theory against [the supervisor], specifically, is that she acted negligently in supervising [the caseworker's] investigation. On its face, their theory against [the supervisor] is 'contrary to well-established immunity principles.’ Vick v. Sawyer, 936 So.2d [517], 523 [(Ala.2006)]. See also Love v. Davis, 14 F.Supp.2d 1273, 1278 (M.D.Ala.1998) ('[B]ecause supervisory and training functions require constant decision-making, they are, for the most part, discretionary.’).”