author: JUSTICE RYAN JUSTICE SIMON,

text:
    (No. 55661.
    GEORGE E. SCHRAGE III, County Clerk, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Defendants.

      Opinion filed November 25, 1981.

      SIMON, J., concurring in the decision.
    Anthony B. Cameron, State’s Attorney, and Thomas F. Londrigan, of Londrigan & Potter, of Springfield, for plaintiffs George E. Schrage III and Samuel W. Wolf.
    John R. Keith and Giffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk, Cohen & Bodewes, all of Springfield, for plaintiff-intervenors Samuel H. Shapiro et al.

    Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Springfield (Paul P. Biebel, Jr., and Gladys M. Stevens, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for defendants State Board of Elections et al.

    Troupis & Troupis, of Mendota (Christ T. Troupis and James R. Troupis, of counsel), for defendant Judith Koehler.
    Philip J. Rock, intervenor, pro se.

   JUSTICE RYAN

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an original action for declaratory judgment concerning the 1981 legislative redistricting plan. The plan was filed with the Secretary of State pursuant to article IV, section 3(b), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. That section of the Constitution also vests this court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions concerning redistricting of the Illinois House and Senate. Our Rule 382(a) governs the proceedings in such an action. (73 Ill. 2d R. 382(a).) Plaintiffs, George E. Schrage III, county clerk of Adams County, and Samuel W. Wolf, candidate for election to the 83rd General Assembly, filed this action seeking a declaration of the constitutional validity of the decennial redistricting plan for the Illinois House and Senate districts filed with the Secretary of State on October 5, 1981, by the Legislative Redistricting Commission. Named as defendants were the State Board of Elections, the Attorney General, Tyrone C. Fahner, the Secretary of State, Jim Edgar, and Judith Koehler, a candidate for election to the 83rd General Assembly. Five members of the Legislative Redistricting Commission, Samuel H. Shapiro, James J. Donhewald, Martin Murphy, Corneal Davis, and Michael McClain sought and were granted leave to join as plaintiffs. The Commission-member plaintiffs then moved to implead the parties plaintiff in three actions pending in Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concerning the 1981 redistricting plan as parties defendant in the present action. That motion was denied. Because of the statutory timetable for filing nominating documents by candidates seeking legislative office for the 83rd General Assembly, we expedited the hearing of this case.

The Illinois Constitution provides that, in the year following each Federal decennial census year, the General Assembly shall redistrict the legislative districts, and that if no redistricting plan becomes effective by June 30 of that year, then a Legislative Redistricting Commission must be constituted no later than July 10. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(b).) (For a brief history of redistricting in Illinois, see Illinois Legislative Council, Redistricting in Illinois (1981).) The Illinois Constitution further provides that the eight-member Commission shall file with the Secretary of State not later than August 10 a redistricting plan approved by at least five members of the Commission. Failing this, this court submits the names of two persons not of the same political party to the Secretary of State, who must publicly draw, by random selection, the name of one of the two persons who will serve as a ninth member of the Commission. With the addition of the ninth tie-breaking member, the Commission is then required to file a redistricting plan approved by at least five of the members not later than October 5. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(b).) This procedure was followed in Illinois this year. When the eight-member Commission could not agree on a plan, this court submitted to the Secretary of State the names of ex-Governor Richard B. Ogilvie, a Republican, and ex-Governor Samuel H. Shapiro, a Democrat. The Secretary of State drew, by random selection, the name of ex-Governor Shapiro, who served as the ninth member of the Commission. It is the constitutional validity of this 1981 redistricting plan, filed by five members of the Commission, which plaintiffs seek to have this court declare valid in this action.

The action by plaintiffs seeking a judgment declaring the validity of the reapportionment plan is unnecessary because of the constitutional presumption of validity which attaches upon filing of the plan. Specifically, the Illinois Constitution provides:

“An approved redistricting plan filed with the Secretary of State shall be presumed valid, [and] shall have the force and effect of law (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(b).)

In the instant case, with the exception of Representative Koehler’s counterclaim, no specific attack on the redistricting plan has been filed with this court. Because of the constitutional presumption of validity, the reapportionment map is presumed valid absent a specific challenge. It should be noted, however, that, in addition to Representative Koehler’s challenge, filed as a counterclaim in the present action, there are also three challenges to the 1981 reapportionment plan pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. (Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, No. 81-C-6030; De Valle v. State Board of Elections, No. 81-C-6052, and Crosby v. State Board of Elections, No. 81-C-6093.) All three are class actions. The issues involved in those cases are not before this court. We cannot therefore determine the validity of the challenges to the redistricting plan presented in those cases. In this case, we therefore are only concerned with Representative Koehler’s challenge to the constitutionality of the 89th Representative District.

In November 1980 the voters approved a constitutional amendment reducing the size of the Illinois House from 177 to 118 members and eliminating the three-member districts and cumulative voting. The amendment requires that the State be divided into 59 legislative districts (from each of which one State Senator is elected) and that each legislative district be subdivided into two representative districts of approximately equal population (from each of which one State Representative is elected). (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 2 (1980).) (See generally Illinois Legislative Council, Redistricting in Illinois (1981).) It is with the subdivision of Legislative District 45 into Representative Districts 89 and 90 that Representative Judith Koehler’s counterclaim is concerned.

Judith Koehler, a resident of Henry, Illinois, in Marshall County, has served in the House of Representatives since 1980. She first requested the Attorney General to challenge the plan pursuant to article IV, section 3(b), of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(b)). The Attorney General declined to act on her request. In the interim, the present action was filed naming Representative Koehler as a defendant. She responded by filing a counterclaim, seeking to have newly drawn Representative District 89 declared invalid as violative of the compactness requirement of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(a)).

Representative Koehler alleges that the 1981 reapportionment plan would create the 89th Representative District as a loosely bound-together group of 60 townships measuring in excess of 125 miles in length connected at its center by a strip of land six miles wide. As presently drawn, the district would stretch through seven counties and more than 60 towns, and would cover parts of four congressional districts, two Illinois Appellate Court districts, and five (pre-1981 apportionment) Illinois House of Representative districts. The proposed district would not be served by either a single common television station, or a single common newspaper. The issue thus presented by Representative Koehler’s counterclaim is whether this representative district is compact within the meaning of article IV, section 3(a), of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.

The 1970 Illinois Constitution provides a three-part test of constitutional validity for redistricting plans under article IV, section 3(a). Specifically, it requires that the districts formed must be “compact, contiguous and substantially equal in population.”

The 1970 Constitution does not itself define compactness, nor does it provide explicit standards for its determination. Compactness was, however, a requirement also present in the 1870 Constitution. That constitution required that all senatorial and representative districts be formed of “contiguous and compact territory.” (Ill. Const. 1870, art. IV, §§ 6, 7.) The continuing importance of the compactness requirement was reflected in the Report of the Legislative Committee which proposed the language adopted by the 1970 Convention. It stated:

“Perhaps no standards for drawing legislative district boundaries possess a longer history than the traditional standards of compactness and contiguity. In our present Constitution, these standards are found in both Sections 6 and 7. These standards directly reflect the objective of improving legislative representation through seeking to insure that districts are not gerrymandered.” 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1352-53 (hereafter cited as Proceedings).

While the word “compact” was not defined in the 1870 Constitution, this court was called on to give meaning to that term in a redistricting context as early as 1895. In People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson (1895), 155 Ill. 451, this court ruled on a challenge to the constitutionality of an apportionment of the State into senatorial districts. It was argued that the districts were not formed of contiguous and compact territory. In Thompson, the court stated:

“[W]e are of the opinion that as used in the constitution, eo” the word ‘compact’ means ‘closely united,’ and that the provision that districts shall be formed of contiguous and compact territory means that the counties, or subdivisions of counties, when combined to form a district, must not only touch each other, but must be closely united, territorially.” (Emphasis added.) (People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson (1895), 155 Ill. 451, 478.)

While the court upheld the apportionment of the senatorial districts in Thompson, it nonetheless gave meaning to the constitutional compactness requirement.

A more recent opinion of this court in People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 156, is consistent with this standard. In Grivetti the court heard a challenge to the constitutional validity of the decennial redistricting plan for the Illinois House and Senate drawn by the Legislative Redistricting Commission under the 1970 Constitution. In Grivetti, as in Thompson, the court did not interpret the compactness standard to require perfect compactness as in a circle or a square. ((People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 156, 166; People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson (1895), 155 Ill. 451, 482.) Rather, it required that districts formed be “reasonably compact.” People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 156, 166.

The court’s observation in Grivetti that “compactness, while an end to be sought in the redistricting process, is clearly subservient to the dominant requirement of equality of population among legislative districts” should not be read, as plaintiffs have urged, as a death knell to the compactness requirement. (People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 156, 166.) Rather, the recognition in that case of the necessity to comply with the “one man - one vote” requirement (People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 156, 167) simply emphasized the then-recent constraints which had been added to traditional considerations. The compactness standard is, after all, a constitutional requirement in Illinois (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(a)) and cannot be ignored in redistricting the State. It cannot be written out or replaced by another requirement short of redrafting or amending our present constitution.

Although the court has refused to require perfect compactness (Thompson, Grivetti), it has also refused to allow the constitutional requirement of compactness to be ignored. In Thompson the court unequivocally recognized the necessity to comply with the compactness standard. In that case it said:

“[I]f it clearly appeared that in the formation of any district the requirement of compactness of territory and equality in population had been wholly ignored, had not been considered or applied at all, to any extent, then the [result] would be clearly unconstitutional.” (People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson (1895), 155 Ill. 451, 477.)

In addition to the necessity for complying with the requirements of the Constitution, there are pragmatic reasons for taking cognizance of compactness. As recognized in both the 1870 and 1970 constitutions, requiring compactness prevents gerrymandering. In fact, compactness is “almost universally recognized” as an appropriate anti-gerrymandering standard. Edwards, The Gerrymander and “One Man, One Vote, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 879, 893 (1971); Schwartzberg, Reapportionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion of Compactness,” 50 Minn. L. Rev. 443, 444 (1966); People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson (1895), 155 Ill. 451, 479.

Although this court has not heretofore invalidated any legislative or representative district on the basis that it violates the constitutional compactness requirement, other States with similar constitutional provisions have done so. In In re Legislative Districting of General Assembly (Iowa 1972), 193 N.W.2d 784, 791, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled on an attack on the validity of a legislative reapportionment plan. The court held that plan to be unconstitutional for failure, inter alia, to comply with the compactness standard. The court found numerous house districts to be lacking in compactness and observed:

“Nothing appears to indicate the strange shapes are necessitated by considerations of population equality or result from unfeasibility. The legislature failed to comply with the constitutional mandate to devise districts consisting of compact territory.” In re Legislative Districting of General Assembly (Iowa 1972), 193 N.W.2d 784, 791.

Other States, too, have reached a similar result with regard to the compactness standard. In Acker v. Love (1972), 178 Colo. 175, 178, 496 P.2d 75, 76, the Supreme Court of Colorado held the reapportionment of the State legislative districts to be unconstitutional because the newly drawn districts failed to meet the constitutional mandate that each district be as compact in area as possible. In Preisler v. Doherty (1955), 365 Mo. 460, 284 S.W.2d 427, the Supreme Court of Missouri held seven senatorial districts established in 1952 to be invalid for failure to observe non-discretionary limitations imposed by the State constitution. Referring to People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, the Missouri Supreme Court found the districts to be invalid because, inter alia, “the Board did not apply the principle of compactness of territory in the 1952 redistricting but instead completely disregarded this mandatory provision of the Constitution.” (Preisler v. Doherty (1955), 365 Mo. 460, 469-70, 284 S.W.2d 427, 434.) One of the invalidated districts is strikingly similar to Representative District 89 which is before us in this case. See also In re Livingston (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1916), 96 Misc. 341, 160 N.Y.S. 462; In re Sherill (1907), 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124; State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock (1912), 241 Mo. 433, 146 S.W. 40; Annot., 2 A.L.R. 1337, 1356 (1919).

It is possible to establish a mathematically precise standard of compactness. (See Reock, Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative Apportionment, 5 Midwest J. of Pol. Sci. 70 (1961); Dixon, Computers and Redistricting: A Flea for Realism, 2 Rut. J. of Computers & Law 15 (1971). However, we find it unnecessary to adopt such a procedure in this case. Rather, we can rely on a visual examination of the questioned district as other courts have done. In In re Sherill, the New York Court of Appeals observed:

“A reference to the diagram will show how grossly the provision of the Constitution in regard to compactness has been violated in the thirteenth senatorial district which is within the county of New York.” (188 N.Y. 185, 210, 81 N.E. 124, 132.)

In order to determine whether the reasonable compactness standard of Thompson and Grivetti has been met, a more precise measurement is unnecessary.

A visual examination of Representative District 89 reveals a tortured, extremely elongated form which is not compact in any sense. (See the following map.) Nor were the plaintiffs able to advance any reason which might possibly justify such a radical departure from the constitutional requirement of compactness in this case. As demonstrated later, equal population of the 89th and 90th districts can be achieved without doing violence to the concept of compactness. Whatever the reason, Representative District 89 fails to meet the compactness standard as required by article IV, section 3(a) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.

We have already indicated that the constitutional requirement of compactness is not to be ignored both because it is a constitutional requirement and because it has traditionally been utilized as a safeguard against the creation of gerrymandered districts. There is, in addition, another important reason to require a strict adherence to this constitutional requirement. We have, after all, a representative form of government. The creation of a representative district which is extremely elongated and not “closely united” significantly impedes vital constituent-representative communication, thus preventing the achievement of a legislative process which is, in fact, representative.

The plaintiffs also contend that our decision in People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 156, requires that the population variance of each legislative and representative district must be less than 1%. We do not understand Grivetti to so hold. In fact, we interpret “substantially equal in population,” as required by our constitution, to be as expansive as the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “one man, one vote” as it applies to redistricting of State legislature. We will discuss later the decisions of the Supreme Court which have defined the constitutional limits of “one man, one vote” as applied to State legislative redistricting.

In Grivetti we stated that a plan in which each legislative district deviated in population less than 1% clearly was in compliance with the one-man, one-vote rule. We did not hold in Grivetti that our constitution of 1970 required that the population variance between each district must be less than 1%. We stated that a 1% population variance is constitutional, but we did not set that variance as a constitutional standard or limit that had to be observed in future redistricting. People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 156, 166.

The Illinois Constitution of 1970 requires that all legislative districts be “substantially equal in population.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(a).) An interpretation of the “substantially equal in population” standard is contained in the 1970 constitutional convention legislative committee’s explanation on the proposed standards for redistricting. The committee stated:

“Recognizing that equality of population is the primary criterion for redistricting, the Legislative Committee decided to place the flexible phrase, ‘substantially equal in population’ in the sub-section on standards. The degree of flexibility of this phrase will clearly be determined by the courts. The Legislative Committee believes it is important to recognize the ‘equality of population’ criterion in a way which will allow redistricting in Illinois to accord with the prevailing Supreme Court decisions on this subject. Should the Supreme Court ever relax the ‘one man, one vote’ standard, Illinois would not be precluded from creating districts within more flexible population limitations imposed by the courts.” (6 Proceedings 1293, 1354.)

The explanation of this standard as given by Delegate Perona in the debates is, in part, as follows:

“Insofar as the population standard, the committee has adopted the terminology from Reynolds v. Simms, [(1964), 377 U.S. 533, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 84 S. Ct. 1362] which requires a substantial equality of population. It permits some leeway if the Supreme Court would permit leeway eo#.” (4 Proceedings 2935.)

It is thus clear that the requirement that legislative districts be “substantially equal in population” is coextensive with the Federal requirement of “one man, one vote” and that this constitutional standard is flexible and is to be interpreted in accordance with the prevailing United States Supreme Court decisions.

In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has relaxed the “one-man, one-vote” requirement as applied to the redistricting of State legislative districts. (See Mahan v. Howell (1973), 410 U.S. 315, 35 L. Ed. 2d 320, 93 S. Ct. 979; Gaffney v. Cummings (1973), 412 U.S. 735, 37 L. Ed. 2d 298, 93 S. Ct. 2321; White v. Regester (1973), 412 U.S. 755, 37 L. Ed. 2d 314, 93 S. Ct. 2332.) In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court recognized that “distinctions may well be made between congressional and state legislative representation” (Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 578, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 536, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1390) in applying the equality-of-representation principle. The rationale for this distinction is that almost invariably there is a greater number of seats in a State legislative body than there are in congressional delegations; consequently, “it may be feasible to use political subdivision lines to a greater extent in establishing state legislative districts than in congressional districting while still affording adequate representation ***.” (Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 578, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 536-37, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1390.) In Mahan v. Howell the court concluded that State legislative redistricting should be governed by the “as nearly of equal population as is practicable” equal protection standard of Reynolds v. Sims, not the more stringent, mechanical test of absolute equality of population enunciated in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969), 394 U.S. 526, 22 L. Ed. 2d 519, 89 S. Ct. 1225, for congressional reapportionment. 410 U.S. 315, 324-25, 35 L. Ed. 2d 320, 330, 93 S. Ct. 979, 985.

In Gaffney, White, and Mahan, the Supreme Court relaxed the “one-man-one-vote” requirement and, in so doing, acknowledged another portion of Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion in Reynolds v. Sims. In these cases the court has recognized that substantial equality of population is the dominant standard, but that other factors should also be taken into consideration in redistricting State legislative districts.

In Mahan v. Howell the United States district court had concluded that a 16.4% total population variation between the largest and smallest districts was unconstitutional per se under the “one-man, one-vote” rule. The district court recognized that the variances were caused by the Virginia General Assembly’s desire to maintain the integrity of traditional political subdivision lines defined as county and city boundaries. The Supreme Court reversed, and stated:

“We likewise reaffirm its [Reynolds v. Sims] conclusion that ‘[s]o long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a bicameral state legislature.’ ” Mahan v. Howell (1973), 410 U.S. 315, 325, 35 L. Ed. 2d 320, 330, 93 S. Ct. 979, 985.

Later, in the same year, the court decided Gaffney v. Cummings and White v. Regester, wherein the maximum deviations between any two districts were 7.83% and 9.9%, respectively. In both cases the court pointed out that its reapportionment decisions do not require that all deviations from absolute equality, however small, must be justified by a rational State policy. Noting the 9.9% variance from the ideal population for a district, the court stated in White v. Regester:

“Very likely, larger differences between districts would not be tolerable without justification ‘based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.’ Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S [533, 579, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 537, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1391.]” 412 U.S. 755, 764, 37 L. Ed. 2d 314, 323, 93 S. Ct. 2332, 2338.

Plaintiffs state that local governmental unit boundaries are irrelevant and in argument have focused on the nearly perfect compliance with the equality-of-population requirement of the 89th and 90th legislative districts. Plaintiffs’ argument implies that the essential criterion governing the Redistricting Commission was compliance with the 1% population deviation which this court held in Grivetti was acceptable. We noted above that Grivetti did not establish a 1% deviation test or standard. The question of whether political subdivision boundaries have been ignored in the establishment of the 89th Representative District is not an issue in this case. However, we have cited the above cases touching on this subject to point out that in drawing State legislative district boundaries, absolute equality of population among the districts is not the sole consideration. Deviations are permitted, at least to the extent approved in the above cases, to accommodate the interests of political subdivisions. The desirability of making this accommodation was noted by Chief Justice Warren in Reynolds v. Sims:

“A State may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme. Valid considerations may underlie such aims. Indiscriminate districting, without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering.” 377 U.S. 533, 578-79, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 537, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1390.

We have above discussed the intent manifested at the convention which drafted our 1970 Constitution that the requirements of our constitution concerning legislative redistricting be flexible enough so that its provisions may be capable of embracing the present, as well as the future, construction of the Supreme Court with regard to the “one-man, one-vote principle.” It is clear that the sense of the convention was that the requirement of our constitution, as it pertains to legislative redistricting, be coextensive with those of the Federal Constitution. Therefore, the concern expressed by the Supreme Court in the above cases as to the need to recognize matters other than strict equality of population in redistricting for State legislative districts should also be matters of concern of the Redistricting Commission. Pursuant to the holdings of the above cases, we recognize the need, within the confines of acceptable deviations from equality of population, to balance the needs of other interests in adopting a legislative redistricting plan. These cases have recognized the need to consider these other interests to obviate the potential for gerrymandering present in blind adherence to the standard of equality of population. Gerrymandering can be as invidious as malapportionment of population in depriving voters of an equal voice in choosing their representatives. The goal of “one man, one vote” cannot be achieved without eliminating the use of the gerrymandering as a device to dilute group voting strength. Edwards, The Gerrymander and “One Man, One Vote” 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 879 (1971).

For the reasons stated above, we hold that the 89th Representative District, as drawn in the plan filed by the Redistricting Commission with the Secretary of State, is invalid. We do not pass on the validity of' the other legislative or representative districts. No dispute has been raised as to their validity, and they stand unchallenged before this court. The constitutional presumption that these districts are valid will prevail until the contrary is established. It is possible in this case to correct the constitutional invalidity of Representative District 89 without affecting the rest of the plan other than Representative District 90.

Representative Koehler has submitted two alternative proposals for drawing the boundary between Representative District 89 and Representative District 90. It is contended that both compactness and substantial equality of population in the two districts will be achieved by drawing the boundary line in an east-west direction instead of a generally north-south direction as the Redistricting Commission has done.

The following maps and population figures have been submitted concerning the two alternative proposals. Plaintiffs have not disputed the accuracy of these figures.

Alternative #1

Population (Census figures)

89th - 95,573

90th - 97,530

Population - deviation from 96,767 (Perfect Statewide mean)

89th - 1.2%

90th - .8%

Maximum Length

89th - 48 miles

90th - 60 miles

Alternative #2

Population (Census figures)

89th - 96,630

90th - 96,473

Population - deviation from 96,767 (Perfect Statewide mean)

89th - .1%

90th - .3%

Maximum Length

89th - 54 miles

90th - 60 miles

It is the order of this court that the State Board of Elections establish the boundaries between the 89th and 90th Representative Districts in accordance with the map of alternative proposal No. 2, which reflects the closer approximation to equality of population. The east-west boundary between the 89th and 90th representative districts will thus follow the north boundary lines of Dillon, Hopedale, and Little Mackinaw townships in Tazewell County; thence south along the county line to the north boundary line of Mount Hope township in McLean County; thence east to the northeast corner of said township.

Certain errors and omissions in the redistricting plan as filed with the Secretary of State have been called to our attention by the State Board of Elections. The plaintiffs have requested this court to correct them. It is not contended that any of these corrections will change the character of any district to the extent that it would render the same invalid. These errors primarily are concerned with overlapping of certain district boundaries and complete omission of certain census tracts from any legislative district. A separate order will be entered directing the State Board of Elections to correct these errors and omissions.

It is the order of this court that the 89th and 90th Representative Districts as created by the redistricting plan filed with the Secretary of State by the Legislative Redistricting Commission are invalid. The State Board of Elections is directed to draw the boundaries between the 89th and 90th Representative Districts as set forth in this opinion.

On the court’s own motion, the clerk of this court is directed to issue the mandate forthwith.

Order entered.

JUSTICE SIMON,

concurring in the decision:

I concur in the result, but do not understand the need, in deciding this case, to review the requirements of People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 156, relating to permissible population variances, as the majority has done. Whether Grivetti permits variances of more than 1% consistently with the “one-man, one-vote” principle is not before us. No one raises that issue in this proceeding. No one contends or suggests that population variance in any legislative or representative district established by the map presented in this case is more than 1%. In fact all parties to this action have represented to us that all population variances in the map are less than 1%. The redrawn representative districts in the 45th Legislative District which we are approving by this decision present population variances of one-tenth of 1% in the 89th and three-tenths of 1% in the case of the 90th, variances which satisfy the most restrictive interpretation of Grivetti. In this setting, I see no need for the court’s gratuitous advice that a greater variance would not offend Grivetti. The suggestion is clearly dictum. The only value it has is as a possible aid to those given responsibility for legislative redistricting in future decennials. But, I trust they will be capable of grappling with the difficult problem of equal representation without our premature advice given without awareness of the circumstances which will confront the redistricters 10 years from now. For that reason, I think we should refrain from offering such guidance.

Besides, the court belies its own suggestion that a variance of more than 1% is acceptable by choosing alternative No. 2 over alternative No. 1 in redistricting the 89th and 90th Representative Districts, giving as its reason that the former “reflects the closer approximation to equality of population.” (88 Ill. 2d at 108.) This convinces me that even if the majority believes variances of more than 1% are acceptable, it finds variances of less than 1% preferable.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JUSTICE SIMON

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 54437.
    SIERRA CLUB et al., Appellees, v. DAVID KENNEY et al., Appellants.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1981.

      Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Springfield (Clifford L. Weaver, of Ross, Hardies, O’Keefe, Babcock & Parsons, of Chicago, Special Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.
    David Lincoln Ader, of Chicago, for appellees.
   JUSTICE SIMON

delivered the opinion of the court:

The local chapter of the Sierra Club brought suit in the circuit court of Jersey County to enjoin the Illinois Department of Conservation from logging or inviting bids for logging a portion of Pere Marquette State Park. The circuit court refused to issue the injunction but held up the Department’s proposal for logging pending a review of the plans of the successful bidder. A divided appellate court reversed, holding that there was no statutory authority for the proposal; it enjoined the cutting of trees in State parks. (90 Ill. App. 3d 230.) This court granted leave to appeal under Rule 315 (73 Ill. 2d R. 315). The appellate court’s analysis was correct, but the result it reached must be modified.

Pere Marquette State Park was established in 1932 near the confluence of the Illinois and Mississippi rivers. At the time the action was started, the park’s 7,743 acres made it the largest .State park in Illinois. The area the Department proposed logging is in the Camden Hollow section of the park. The main recreational feature of that area is hiking and equestrian trails.

Camden Hollow, like much of the park, has been subject to many wildfires in the past. In 1974, an accidental man-made fire partially burned 345 acres of Camden Hollow. The terrain is rugged, and the fire damage was heavier higher up on the ridges. No immediate steps were taken in the burn area, and the natural process of regeneration began. The burn area, like much of the park, consists of oak and hickory trees, with a scattering of other species like maple, ash and elm. By the time the suit was heard, a rich new growth of young trees and other vegetation had joined the trees that survived the fire to fill the burn area.

In 1978, following a change in Department of Conservation policy, the Division of Forestry proposed that, for the first time in any Illinois State park, a commercial timber harvest and sale be carried out in the burn area. The Master Management Plan that was developed for Pere Marquette State Park at the same time labels the burn area as part of the Natural Resource Zone of the park. The plan calls for developing that zone by rehabilitating areas damaged by fire (with emphasis on the 1974 burn area), by grazing and by intensive logging.

The logging proposal had four listed purposes: salvage (of dead or injured trees to permit the use of wood fiber in the form of lumber or firewood that might otherwise go to waste), sanitation (to remove fire-damaged trees that are more susceptible to insects or disease), rehabilitation (to create conditions favorable for the growth and regeneration of the oak-hickory climax forest) and wildlife habitat/ improvement (to create small openings and cover for game and to increase the eventual output from the remaining trees).

The proposal noted that delay in cutting would result in a substantial loss of wood fiber and the inherent revenue. It postulated that giving the remaining trees more light would increase their growth rate, that increased growth could be obtained through selective harvesting, and that this was desirable for healthy forest development.

The proposed logging was to be carried out by a commercial operator, who would bid for the right to remove trees marked in advance by the Department. In a marking guide drawn up to facilitate the selection of trees to be cut down, the listed objectives of the Department were salvage, sanitation and rehabilitation. The marking guide stated that wood-fiber production was not a management objective on the site. Trees that were injured by fire, insects or disease, or were susceptible to such injury, were to be marked for logging, provided they were merchantable. But, unsalvageable trees were to be left standing because of the potential value to wildlife. The Department proposal foresaw further cutting of timber that had no commercial value by an organization like the Youth Conservation Corps.

Initially marked for cutting were 1,973 trees, or 1% of the trees in the burn area. Of these, 18% were dead; another 60% were live trees to be removed because of damage from the 1974 fire. The remaining 22% were to be logged because they were “economically mature,” although three-fourths of these had also suffered slight damage in the fire.

Three hundred forty-eight dead trees were marked for logging in the burn area; 862 dead trees were left unmarked because they were unmerchantable. Of the 1,625 live trees marked, only 1.7% would die each year. If not logged under the Department’s plan, though, only 7.1% of those living trees could be salvaged after they died. Ninety additional dead standard trees were later marked for cutting as well.

On August 28,1978, the Division of Forestry announced a timber sale of the 2,063 trees. The sale was by sealed bid only; specifications for the maintenance of logging and park roads, for firebreaks and for erosion control were mandated. The bids were scheduled to be accepted on October 18,1978, but the Sierra Club brought this suit before the bid date.

A hearing was held in which photographs of the area were presented by both sides. The trial judge also personally toured the area to be logged. At the hearing, David Kenney, the Director of the Department of Conservation, testified that the purpose of the operation was salvage, sanitation, the safety of those using the park, and the improvement of the park by hastening the regenerative process. The logging was to be handled by commercial sale because the Department did not have the manpower to do the job itself. The successful bidder would pay the Department for the right to log the park and then could sell the wood to recover costs. Kenney was unaware of plans to log any other State parks.

Allen S. Mickleson, the State Forester, and as such in charge of the Division of Forestry, testified that the proposed logging would speed up the natural processes of rehabilitating the burn area. Like Director Kenney he identified the purposes of the logging as salvage, sanitation, rehabilitation, and safety. In his opinion as a forester, the Department’s plan was conservative forestry.

Mickleson said that 30 acres of the burn area were excluded from the sale because of the steep terrain or the lack of serious fire damage. The burn area, in his opinion, had been devastated.

Protection for the delicate ecosystem of the burn area was built into the contract for the logging. Water bars were required on skid trails, skidding of logs could only be uphill, and rubbertired, not tracked, vehicles were required. Mickleson admitted that some of the smaller growth in the area would have to be taken out to accommodate equipment and to build staging yards to store the logs before they were driven out of the park. He did not anticipate excessive compacting of the soil or the widening of any roads for the logging machinery.

Mickleson had been State Forester under a prior administration and had been witness to several policy shifts within the Department of Conservation. He characterized the decision to log as a change from emphasis on preservation or recreation with little emphasis on conservation to one of total balance, dedicated to multiple use of the State parks. Multiple use, he said, could be a combination of productive and “nature conservation concerns.” The Department believed in conserving natural resources; Mickleson noted that because of the energy shortage there was a commercial demand for the logs being removed.

The Sierra Club presented testimony of two witnesses who had observed the area to be logged. One, a veteran hiker, said that the effects of the fire varied throughout the area, with some trees completely dead, others showing some foliage along with scars from the fire, and still others showing complete foliage despite minor fire damage. After a similar fire in Georgia whose effects he had observed, the area was not logged, but left to natural regeneration.

Edmund Woodbury, chairman of the Sierra Club’s Great Lakes Chapter, testified that a lay person would not notice that there had been a fire in the burn area. Once he learned that there had been a fire, however, its effects became clear. It seemed to him that most of the trees marked for cutting had a full canopy of leaves. He saw extensive new growth of vegetation and trees sprouting from stumps in the burn area. A site he had seen in Canada after a forest fire had been turned into a wasteland by the combined effect of a ravaging fire and man’s cleanup.

Two forestry experts testified. For the Sierra Club, Dr. James S. Fralish, an associate professor of forest ecology at Southern Illinois University, told of the results of controlled experiments with forest fires he had carried out in Shawnee National Forest in southern Illinois. Different types of trees display differing resistance to fire; pines and oaks are especially resistant.

Dr. Fralish, who had toured the burn area, characterized it as in a state of recovery. Many trees killed by the fire were sprouting back from the base. He saw oak saplings six to eight feet high already. Although most of the trees marked for cutting had some kind of minor fire damage, Dr. Fralish said that it was common for trees similarly o scarred to continue to grow for 60 to 70 years after a fire. About 10% of the trees were barren.

Dr. Fralish would not call the burn area devastated. While some areas were poorly stocked with trees, others were adequate; the area marked for logging was not overstocked or surplus. Dr. Fralish saw no evidence of insect infestation in the area marked for logging or of a threat to low-vigor trees there. He could find no reason to rehabilitate the area; the habitat was all there and did not have to be reconstructed. Cutting the low-vigor trees in the burn area to favor the high-vigor trees would change the character of the stand, because the low- and high-vigor trees are scattered together throughout the park.

Dr. Fralish listed the dangers of the proposed logging. Mechanized equipment could squash the young regrowth. Skidding logs could tear up the litter layer on the forest floor and disturb the process of decay that provides nutrients. Heavy equipment could cause soil erosion. As a general rule, he said, the more the cutting, the more the damage to the ecosystem.

For the Department, Dr. George Thompson, chairman of the department of forestry at Iowa State University, testified that overall the burn area was of average quality, with some good and some poor portions. Dr. Thompson considered the proposed logging to be a conservative plan in keeping with good forestry practices. But he had never heard of a commercial logging operation to remove live, dead and damaged trees after a fire like this in Iowa.

The trial judge found that the 345-acre burn area had not been devastated, and that the tract had shown the ability to regenerate itself through natural processes, but that the Department’s plan to log could not be said to be against good forestry management. However, the circuit court judge found that the logging of trees as proposed posed great dangers to the environmental well-being of the area in question. He cited increased dangers of fire, erosion and injury to young trees not designated for cutting. He expressed the fear that a poorly handled logging operation would cause permanent and widespread injury to the area, and that the operation would deny access by the public to the area for two years.

Although he refused to enjoin the logging proposal, the trial judge required that the Department furnish proof that the contractor chosen was a reliable and responsible operator and that there would be no permanent injury because of the logging.

The Department’s proposal to log the Camden Hollow section of Fere Marquette State Park was apparently a good-faith attempt to exercise its discretion in the management of the park consistent with advanced and scientific forestry practices. However, Fere Marquette is a State park, not a State forest, and the techniques developed to encourage productivity and growth in State forests or privately owned timberlands are inappropriate in State parks. The production of commercially valuable timber and forests is subordinated in parks to preservation and recreation. The decision is not left to the discretion of the Department; the policy has been mandated by statute. To the extent that the decision to log reflected a policy change in the Department, it was a change in policy the legislature had not authorized the Department to make.

The Department of Conservation’s responsibility is to manage all State parks, including Pere Marquette, in keeping with the policies established by the legislature. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 465.) The Department is to fulfill this task, as it fulfills its other statutory tasks, through the use of the statutory powers granted it (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 127, par. 63a1 et seq.). The Department is directed to keep the State parks “open to and ### for the benefit and enjoyment of all the people” of the State. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 465.

In addition to State parks, the legislature has established State forests (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 96½, par. 5901) and State nature preserves (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 466a). Each was similarly placed under the Department’s control. Different interests are at stake in the management of each type of resource. The options are to develop the land for the commercial value of its timber, to use the land for recreation, or to preserve the land in its natural splendor for its aesthetic and cultural value. These uses are not necessarily conflicting, but are not perfectly reconcilable. The statutes governing the management of State forests, State parks and nature preserves reflect a legislative balancing of interests to allow a mix of different uses at each type of resource.

In State forests, the legislature has chosen to give priority to the production of continuous crops of timber for the use of the people and industries of the State. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 96½, par. 5905.) The Department is authorized to sell the timber, but is restricted to cutting and removing forest products in keeping with the best forestry practices. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 96½, par. 5906.) Commercial timber forests are also suitable for recreation and provide scenic beauty; thus, as a second priority the legislature has decreed that the Department must also make State forests accessible to the general public for recreation by providing improved highways through the forests. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 96½, par. 5906.) Residual uses are contemplated by the legislature as well — State forests protect watersheds and maintain the purity of streams and springs. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 96½, par. 5902.

At the other end of the spectrum, nature preserves are established by the legislature to preserve and protect areas “against modification resulting from occupation or development which would destroy their natural condition.” These lands have been set aside for research, teaching, natural and historic interest, and as “living illustrations of our original heritage wherein one may experience or envision primeval conditions in a wilderness type environment.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 466a.) In maintaining nature preserves, the legislature has commended the Department to conserve the “original character as distinguished from the artificial landscaping” of the land. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 467.) In a nature preserve, then, the interest in the preservation of aesthetic and cultural values takes first priority, to the exclusion, if necessary, of conflicting commercial or recreational uses.

State parks strike a third balance; but while they are different from state forests they bear many similarities to nature preserves. They place the major emphasis on recreation but are also dedicated to preservation. State parks are established to preserve large forested areas and marginal lands near waters for recreation. But the types of recreation to be offered are limited. The legislature mandates that a State park offer recreation opportunities “different from that given by the typical city park.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 466(3).) But recreation is not the sole priority; the parks are also preserved by legislative directive for their aesthetic and cultural value so that they “may remain unchanged by civilization, so far as possible, and be kept for future generations.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 466(3).

In addition, State parks are established to preserve the most important historical sites, to set aside areas of scenic and scientific interest, and to connect parks through a system of scenic parkways. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, pars. 466(1), (2), (4).) Notably lacking from the purposes of a State park is any mention of improving or selling the timber grown in them.

To serve the prime recreational purpose of the State park the legislature allows some improvements, but these alterations of the park’s original character are limited to those which aid recreation — roads, bridges, trails, camping sites, picnic areas, and the like. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 468(3).) If natural plant areas in a park are devastated, the Department is authorized to replant, increase or supplement those areas. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 468(4).) But the statutory authority for improving the parks is narrow — in maintaining a State park the Department is barred from artificial landscaping. As in a nature preserve, the mandate of the legislature is to conserve the original character of the park. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 467.

In summary, the scheme adopted by the legislature reserves State forests for commercial development and recreation, State parks for recreation and preservation, and nature preserves for preservation and recreation. In State forests there is little place for preservation of the forest in its natural state — improvement of the stand is the order of the legislature. In State parks and nature preserves there is little place for improvement of the forest for commercial development —preservation, for recreation or aesthetic or cultural values, and recreation are what the legislature has ordered.

When the question is the management of forested lands, the distinction between State parks and nature preserves, on the one hand, and State forests, on the other, crystallizes in the criminal penalty provisions of the statutes controlling each. It is a misdemeanor to remove individual trees or timber in a State park or nature preserve. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 468(b)(1).) By contrast, only removing trees is a misdemeanor in a State forest. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 96½, par. 5911(2).) The difference in wording can be readily explained by the differing legislative intent on the use to which parks, preserves and forest are to be put. State forests exist to grow trees for timber, and thus it is illegal to remove trees before their time but not illegal to harvest them as timber. State parks and preserves are not meant to provide commercial timber, and thus it is illegal to remove both trees and timber from them.

This interpretation of the statutes unifies both the general grants of power to the Department and the specific instructions given to the Department on how to manage the areas under its control. It does not defer to the interpretation adopted by the Department, the administrative agency delegated to carry out the statutes, because the Department does not have a long experience with its interpretation or the policy it now proposes to pursue which has lent credence to it. (See American Oil Co. v. Mahin (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 199, 205.) This is, in fact, the first time the Department’s interpretation has been put to the test.

The objectives stated by the Department’s witnesses bear little relationship to the recreational, aesthetic or cultural uses of a State park. Salvaging timber before it rots is equivalent to the production of a crop of timber. Sanitation of a forest can protect it from disease or infestation that would threaten the proper uses of a State park, but no evidence here indicates any unusual threat of insect infestation or disease. Likewise, the safety of those in a park can be imperiled by dead or injured trees, especially near trails or campsites, but there is no evidence of such threats from the trees marked for logging. The evidence shows no need to rehabilitate the burn area; all that is required for the forest to regain its original vigor is time. By selective harvesting of trees in the burn area the productivity of the forest can be more than doubled, but stimulating forest growth in this manner is the work of civilization from which the legislature tells us the State parks are to be, so far as possible, immune.

The goals of the Department in embarking in good faith on a logging program in a burn area may be laudable, and a sound exercise of discretion, when applied to a State or privately owned forest. But careful and prudent exercises of discretion are to no avail if the result is beyond the goals mandated by the statutes granting the Department the authority to manage State lands. (Village of Lombard v. Pollution Control Board (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 503 (Board without the power to require regional sewage facilities because not authorized to take such action by statute).) The Department’s discretion is harnessed within the policies adopted by the legislature. In a State forest, it is to manage the trees to produce the most and best timber available. In a State park, it is to leave the trees be.

The plan to log in Pere Marquette State Park is not authorized by statute. In addition, it runs afoul of several statutory provisions. Fires and their effects are part of the original character of Pere Marquette State Park. The source of a fire (natural or man-made) does not change its natural effect. However characterized, the Department’s program constitutes artificial landscaping. The legislature has chosen not to permit this. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 467.

The effort to attenuate the effects of the fire by logging to speed regrowth does not leave the park unchanged by civilization, as the legislature intended. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 466(3).) Even though the plan may be conservative forestry, there is no showing that any of the techniques of civilization are necessary to serve the recreational purpose of the park. It should be noted that by leaving the burn area alone, the Department would serve one park purpose — providing an area of scientific interest, a living laboratory in which the process of regeneration could be studied. In addition, the loss of two years of public access to the burn area of the park violates the legislative decree that State parks be kept open for the benefit of all the people. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 465.

It is unnecessary to consider the place in this statutory scheme of the Department’s authority to replant devastated park areas. Even if this authority embraced the clearing of deadwood prior to planting, the section does not apply in this case, because the trial judge found that the area was not devastated, a statutory prerequisite to the Department’s authority to replant (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 468(4)).

The Department claims three statutes give it the authority to log in the park. All three fall within the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois rather than the specific statutes establishing State parks. The first is the power granted to the Department of Conservation to promote forestry, including measures for reforestation, woodland management and forest marketing and utilization. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 127, par. 63a8.) This statute’s all-encompassing provisions, consistent with the Department’s duties with the purposes of State forests but inconsistent with the purposes of State parks, cannot control the more specific State-park statute. A policy expressed in a specific statutory reference should prevail over general statutory statements. Hofeld v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co. (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 522, 533-34.

Second, the Department points to its authority to sell “surplus agricultural products grown on land owned by the Department, when such products cannot be used by the Department.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 127, par. 63a26.) Is timber an agricultural product? In People ex rel. Pletcherv. City of Joliet (1926), 321 Ill. 385, the court examined a statute which turned on whether land was used for agricultural purposes. A dictionary definition was cited which said that, in its broadest sense, agriculture included forestry. But the statement was mere dicta; the land in question grew grapes and hay. The same statute was declared unconstitutional in Forsythe v. Village of Cooksville (1934), 356 Ill. 289. While analyzing the statute, the court said, again in dicta, that timberlands would not be covered by the statute. It is unnecessary to resolve the issue here. Even if timbered lands were agricultural, the Department has not fulfilled the other requirements necessary to harvest surplus agricultural products.

The statute the Department points to requires that the agricultural product to be sold be surplus. The record does not indicate that the trees in the burn area are. The only direct evidence on the point was that the land was not overstocked and that there was no surplus. The Department’s own evidence suggested a proper use for even the dead trees — as a wildlife habitat. The statute also requires that the agricultural products be grown by the Department. The Department has not grown these trees. What it proposes is a harvest of wild trees. Finally, the statute requires that the Department be unable to use the products to be sold. There is no showing that the 2,063 trees here cannot be used by the Department, either in their present state as stark reminders of the effects of fire in woodland habitats or as firewood to be used in the Department’s campgrounds.

Third, the Department points to its authority to sell “gravel, sand, earth or other material” from State-owned land as empowering it to carry out a commercial timber harvest. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the term “other materials” can only be interpreted to include materials of the same general type. (Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436.) Timber, like sand, gravel and earth fill, is part of the bounty of the earth’s surface. But it would both defy common sense and render the other statutes on timber sales surplusage to include timber in this section. We decline to do so.

Pere Marquette State Park in its present state is an irreplaceable natural resource. It is held in trust by the State, a holding designed by the legislature to serve the enjoyment and benefit of all the people of the State as a whole. Its future should not be charted by the Department’s strained interpretation of guidelines the legislature has given to the agency entrusted with the management of this resource. Where the authority for the Department’s irrevocable plan is at best ambiguous, and at worst nonexistent, it is prudent to adopt a “fail-safe” interpretation of the statutes governing the Department and the parks. If the legislature, when presented with the problem, should approve the logging proposal, the trees will still be there to cut. If this court allowed the logging despite our view that the legislature had not intended such a result, it would take decades for the area to regain its original character as a forest untouched by the improvements of man.

Accordingly, we find the logging proposal inconsistent with the legislative purpose for a State park. The Department should therefore be enjoined from proceeding with its logging proposal without more concise legislative directives. The circuit court was incorrect in finding statutory authorization for the logging proposal. The appellate court correctly reversed that portion of the circuit court’s judgment.

The appellate court, however, went too far. In ordering the circuit court to enter an injunction as sought in the complaint, the court mandated the Department to “keep from cutting down, harvesting, and logging trees in state parks and conservation areas or from inviting and/or accepting bids, and/or making or entering into contracts or other arrangements, or from in any way authorizing any person to cut down, harvest, and log trees located in or on state parks or conservation areas.” This injunction is too broad. While the proposed logging does not comply with the statutes, another selective removal of trees might. An area might have to be opened up for a hiking trail, picnic area or campground, and in such a case the recreational use of the park would take priority over the desire for preservation. It is only when the logging does not serve the recreational or preservation purposes of the park that it must be enjoined.

Instead of the broad injunction entered by the appellate court, the circuit court’s injunction should be limited to the Department’s proposed timber sale in Pere Marquette State Park. The Department should be left free to carry on its statutory duties in the future in keeping with the views expressed in this opinion and the careful exercise of the Department’s discretion.

Accordingly, the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are vacated and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for entry of an injunction that is in accordance with the views expressed herein.

Vacated and remanded, with directions.