text:
    Lisa RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. Richard Scott RODRIGUEZ, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1638
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    James M. PAQUETTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3020
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Deante Trammell DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3157
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gloria GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, Assignee of Citibank, N.A./Sears Mastercard, Respondent.
    Case No. 2D18-4545
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Albert Demetrius DOUGLAS, DOC #718884, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-697
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sergio MORTOLA and Michelle Mortola, Appellants, v. LAKESIDE AT SEVEN OAKS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; Shaoul Mishal; Don Alexander; and Alex Trimarchi, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D18-1662
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jamal Kevin DELAUGHTER, DOC #511498, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1753
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.M.P., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-22
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    William Jason MEREDITH, DOC #I14650, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2975
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert Anthony ORTIZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kurt A. STEPHENS, Appellant, v. DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3414
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Russell CEJAS, a/k/a Russell H. Cejas, DOC #R54227, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1631
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Oui SAYTHANOM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3291
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Otis Lamont JACOBS, DOC #T84745, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-70
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sherrill L. SINGLETON, DOC #158639, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-838
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dennis MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2452
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.D., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3501
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Keathel CHAUNCEY, Esq., as Trustee only, under the 25264 Padre Ln Land Trust, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; Jane B. Robinson ; and Section 23, Property Owner's Association, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-3881
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David C. BRIGGS, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Richard Davies Briggs, Appellant, v. Rebekah ROBINSON and Vibekah Fallen Two, LLC, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-4823
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Wallace Clayton STEWART, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-191
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Guerline JEAN-JAQUES a/k/a Guerline Jean-Jacques, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3552
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Carl Dean KING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-5091
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert John ANDERSON, DOC #R43491, Appellant, v. STATE Of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-107
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    James Lamar JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1115
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Owen D. DENSON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2339
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brian S. ROMINE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2694
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Steven N. ALEXANDER, DOC #138353, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2976
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John STEVENSON, Appellant, v. Karen L. STEVENSON, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3205
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David BAIR and Aileen Bair, Appellants, v. CITY OF CLEARWATER, Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-758
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Richard James PICCOLI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-832
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David M. VECCHIO, Appellant, v. Barbara A. VECCHIO, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-522
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Devin Pierre-Antione DIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1382
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Violet L. COURDUFF, Appellant, v. SARASOTA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-234
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Victor RIVERA, Milagros Rosas, and Rosa Ramos, Appellants, v. SECURITY FIRST INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-27
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gina D. HELLER a/k/a Gina Heller, Appellant, v. PROF-2013-S3 LEGAL TITLE TRUST, BY U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Legal Title Trustee, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2605
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 22, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sam STROTHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3124
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antwanus BRASWELL, DOC #H22341, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3216
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ben Ray YODER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3654
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Terry S. CONNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3982
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Coy Vaughn BENTLEY, Appellant, v. Tuyen Tutu BENTLEY, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4200
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Benedict MOHIT, Individually, and as Trustee for Gita Nagassar Mohit Family Trust, Appellant, v. CITY OF HAINES CITY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4387
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Arthur A. GENOVESE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4570
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM F. SUTTON FAMILY, LLP, William Sutton, Jr., and Carol Sutton, Respondents.
    Case No. 2D18-5121
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    John DOE, a minor, BY AND THROUGH Paul DOE, his next friend and guardian and Paul Doe, individually, Appellants, v. DIOCESE OF VENICE IN FLORIDA, INC., a Non-Profit Florida Corporation; Diocese of Venice in Florida, a Corporation Sole; Bishop Dewane as Corporate Sole of the Diocese of Venice; and Robert Little, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-4795
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 29, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Carlos GUTIERREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4152
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ronald BACLAWSKI and Jamie Baclawski, Appellants, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4026
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    B.M., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4307
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 29, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Heath WHITEAKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-896
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 5, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Maura Lee BURKE, a/k/a Maura Lee Wahlberg, individually and as Trustee of the Grever-Burke Trust, Appellant, v. Roy GREVER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Noreen Grever, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2931
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dean A. SHELLEY, DOC #T81166, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3800
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Bernard D. WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4244
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed May 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert E. DALY and Bridget McNeff-Daly, Appellants, v. PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3577
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 12, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    CITY OF DUNEDIN CODE ENFORCEMENT BOARD, Petitioner, v. ARL & IL REVOCABLE TRUST, Respondent.
    Case No. 2D18-4401
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 5, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    In the INTEREST OF A.M. and A.M., children.
    A.B., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D18-4947
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 5, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    In the INTEREST OF N.W., a child.
    N.M.W., Petitioner, v. Department of Children and Families, Respondent.
    Case No. 2D19-1373
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 5, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Ketel NICOLAS, DOC #Y64236, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1109
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 12, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antari Kashaun JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1391
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 12, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    James GALLASHAW, DOC #J37884, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4030
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 12, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jeanette Trinity WOOD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1024
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 12, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David C. BYARS & Pamela L. Byars, Appellants, v. CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, LLC; Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3210
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    James R. LAPOINT, DOC #Y53338, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3284
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Garfield CHRISTIE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4177
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rodolfo HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-96
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael A. HINDS, DOC #C07943, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1071
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    SYLVITE SOUTHEAST, LLC, n/k/a Sylvite, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, Petitioner, v. URALKALI TRADING, S.A., a foreign entity, and Uralkali Trading, SIA, LLC, a foreign entity, Respondent.
    Case No. 2D18-3635
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    PARKER WAICHMAN, LLP, a Florida limited liability partnership, and Jerrold S. Parker, Appellants, v. Jordan L. CHAIKIN, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4475
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kyle PIERRE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4896
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Younbaron COOPER, DOC #092839, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2415
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gregory W. GOETZ, Appellant, v. Amy CARROLL, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3207
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Stephen D. WHELAN, Appellant, v. CITY OF TREASURE ISLAND, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3912
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    KENF, L.L.C., Appellant, v. JABEZ RESTORATIONS, INC., Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4260
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jay STROUP, DOC #H39668, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3171
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 19, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lissette REEVES, Appellant, v. Jason REEVES, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-5108
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John CAMFIELD, DOC #H52984, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2294
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Troy Matthew WELCH, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1813
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 23, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Belated appeal is granted.


text:
    Deangelo DAWSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3547
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 20, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Joseph E. ABDO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Khalil ABDO, Individually and as a Shareholder of Social Media, Inc., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1773
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Carmen F. CASSIDY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. William Paul CASSIDY, Jr., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1631
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    BLACK POINT ASSETS, INC., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Stephanie L. ROOME, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1534
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    J. Allen MILLER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. 12190 HIGHWAY 19, LLC, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1511
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Rosa VALDES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1456
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.

Denied.


text:
    Nicole ST. PEARRE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Patricia HYLEN, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1464
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Jonathon BRAY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Najla BRAY, k/n/a Najla Murray, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1422
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Anthony SPILLER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1354
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Kwame MONTAGUE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3574
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Leonardo SOCCOLICH and Mila Soccolich, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FS, d/b/a Christina Trust, Not in Its Individual Capacity but Solely as Trustee for Brougham Fund Trust, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0780
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 21, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Liberty BROWN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. FLORIDA GULF COAST UNIVERSITY, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0121
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 21, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed. Denied.


text:
    Claire Hornbuckle CLEMENTS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. J. Warren HUGHES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3027
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 18, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Dismissed.


text:
    Johnny BROWN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1883
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Antonio FERNANDEZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Bob GUALTIERI, Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1756
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Benjamin W. FOCHT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Mark INCH, Secretary, Fla. Dept of Corrections, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1794
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 21, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Samuel BETANCOURT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1149
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 23, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Stanley H. HUNTER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4634
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 23, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Oral K. DRUMMOND, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1605
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Mandamus is denied.


text:
    Joshua Nicholas HEARNS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1138
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 09, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Mickle Renard LEE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4869
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 23, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Steven A. SPEAR, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0348
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 23, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Denzel R. TARVER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0434
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 23, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Sharrod D. HOLMES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0398
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 26, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Nancy AMIEVA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1944
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Melanie YOUNG and Dennis Hedlund, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Pearl LEE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1886
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Kenneth PEREZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1832
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Carlton D. HOLLIMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0735
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 04, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Joshua A. MCGRAIL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4710
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Peter Demond KITT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1770
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 23, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    ABPAYMAR, LLC, AS TRUSTEE OF the 5649 HAMILTON HARBOR DRIVE LAND TRUST, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0104
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    John A. EFORD, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1353
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    James M. MOORE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Eileen T. MOORE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-2018
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 03, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Demetrius MC LAUGHLIN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1661
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 23, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Paul NEWMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1776
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Demetrius MC LAUGHLIN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Thomas M. KNIGHT, Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1705
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Claire Hornbuckle CLEMENTS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. J. Warren HUGHES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3390
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 18, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Danny Levon BROWN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-1654
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Daniel R. RICHARDSON, Jr. and Vergel Simpson, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3837
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed. Denied.


text:
    M. K. F., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4234
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Phillip W. COLLINS II, DOC #T01400, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2210
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 13, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jean M. JAMISON, Appellant, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1106
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David J. WHITE, Appellant, v. Vonda K. WHITE, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1281
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jennifer M. ROMERO, Appellant, v. WALMART STORES, INC., a Foreign Profit Corporation, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4790
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed February 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Shannon Deron WILLIAMS, DOC #378222, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3355
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 20, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    SECURITY FIRST INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. TRUE BUILDERS, INC., THROUGH ASSIGNMENT FROM Lorenzo RIVERA-CRUZ, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-5165
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 20, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Wendall HALL, Appellant, v. Gail Durand CLARKE, RN and Karen Blankenship, ARNP, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D18-2805
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Maximiliano REY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-2385
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 20, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    William GARRIDO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D19-105
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Steve STERLIN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D19-292
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Bernard JEAN-MARY and Manola Jean-Mary, Appellants, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1953
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Guillermo PAZ, Appellant, v. Claudia E. LONDONO, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2363
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Luis Osvaldo Lulen FERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-2461
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1880
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Cornelius SANDERS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D19-0199
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Luis Raymond GARCIA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1873
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    June ANDERSON, Appellant, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, etc., Appellee.
    No. 3D18-997
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dinah R. VILLAR and Michael A. Villar, Appellants, v. HERITAGE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2189
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ruth P. LAW, Appellant, v. David M. CANDLER, et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D17-2180
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jose M. RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1626
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Cleveland GRAHAM, Jr., Appellant, v. Delores GRAHAM, Appellee.
    Nos. 3D18-1356 & 3D18-738
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Raquel Yurima ROJAS VILLARROEL, Appellant, v. Eduardo Jose GONZALEZ SANCHEZ, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1472
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    C.M., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1998
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    S.G., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1780
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    PILOT AIR FREIGHT CORP., d/b/a Pilot Freight Services, Appellant, v. ACCESS TELECOM INC., Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1030
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Nicholas SHANNON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-2029
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Paul MILLER, Appellant, v. Jennifer Lloret DE GARCIA, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1446
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    MIAMI SKYLINE CONSTRUCTION CORP., Appellant, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1146
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Allen L. DORSEY, Sr., Appellant, v. Keefe CANTEEN, et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D18-1933
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed May 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Garey R. NEHRKE and Margaret Nehrke, Appellants, v. WELLS FARGO BANK and Leisureville Community Association, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 4D18-2368
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 9, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antonio DOLL, Appellant, v. Julie JONES, Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-3288
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 9, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Theodore WILLIAMSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-3263
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 4, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Stephanie COFFEY, Appellant, v. Willie R. PYFROM, Estella M. Pyfrom and Depositor's Insurance Company, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-3183
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.D.G., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-3030
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 23, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Maxime CHERILUS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-3126
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 23, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rural Tremaine SCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2730
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 23, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gloria MALLOL, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE, on Behalf OF the HOLDERS OF the ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGE TRUST 2007-3 ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGE BACKED PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-3, Gloria E. Bencosme and Basilio A. Bencosme, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-2463
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 30, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Roy HOLMES, Appellant, v. Andrea HULBERT, Carolee Watson and Russell Watson, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-2879
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 30, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Herbert RAPPAPORT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-3465
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Abner ZAMBRANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2395
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 30, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rhon O. VASSELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2783
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 30, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    ESTATE OF Caleb Timmothy ISENBERG, BY AND THROUGH Melanie Victoria MCCULLOUGH, Personal Representative and T.G.C., II, by and Through His Parent and Natural Guardian, etc. , Appellants, v. SMITH EQUITIES CORPORATION and Gerald A. Smith, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D18-1130
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kevin ANDREWS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D19-16
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 23, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Sylvester ANDREWS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D19-497
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    R.G., Mother of C.G. and M.G., Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D19-592
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Sabina L. PRYCE-JONES, Appellant, v. Robert S. PRYCE-JONES, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2195
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 21, 2019 Rehearing Denied June 18, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Carla HILEMAN and Jon C. Janney, Appellants, v. Jackie Allen RYAN, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1830
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 7, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    MADISON HIGHLANDS, LLC and American Residential Development, LLC, Appellants, v. FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, SP Gardens, LLC and City Edge Senior Apartments, Ltd., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D18-2420
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Janet A. WAGNER, Appellant, v. Lacy A. YORK AS Successor TRUSTEE OF the HARRY M. CANAVESI LIVING TRUST DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 2001, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D19-421
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Clifford R. SAULTER, Appellant, v. Michael DEW, Secretary of the Florida Department of Transportation, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-2083
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    J.B., Father of J.B., a Child, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D19-0693
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Beulah (Rosita) FARQUHARSON, Appellant, v. Mary Jane ARRINGTON, Osceola County Supervisor of Elections, and as Candidate for Osceola County Supervisor of Elections and Osceola County Commission(ers), Appellees.
    Case No. 5D18-1878
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jakael Reyvon TOLEFREE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3299
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed June 4, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. Latoya JOHNSON o/b/o and as Parent and Natural Guardian of R.W., a Minor, Orlando Health Inc. d/b/a Winnie Palmer Hospital for Women and Babies, and Ronald Eason, M.D., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D18-2551
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Adele SIMONS, and Corner Lakes Estates Homeowners Association, Inc., Appellants, v. ORANGE COUNTY, Banksville of Florida, Inc., CHCG Land Services, LLC., Rolling R. Ranch, Ltd., Mary Rybolt Lamar, Individually and Mary Rybolt Lamar as Trustee of the Eloise A. Rybolt Revocable Trust, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D18-1418
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 28, 2019 Rehearing Denied June 19, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    BOCA STEL 2, LLC, Appellant, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Lillian McCarron, Martin Federal Credit Union, Woodland Lakes II Home Owners Association, Inc., Woodland Lakes Property Owners' Association, Inc., et al, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-2035
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed June 18, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Javier MEDINA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-949
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed June 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Johnathan CONTRERAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2811 5D17-2812
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed June 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


author: Gross, J.

text:
    Kens Carter JEANCHARLES, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE and Audriana Jean, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-1809
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 15, 2019]
    Thomas L. Hunker of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., via Mission United Veterans Pro Bono Project, Plantation, for appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Child Support Enforcement, Tallahassee, for appellee, Department of Revenue.
   Gross, J.

A father appeals a final administrative support order issued by the Department of Revenue establishing his child support obligation. We reverse because it was an abuse of discretion to deny the father's first and only motion for a thirty-day continuance to obtain a lawyer.

The child here at issue was born on February 18, 2017. The mother applied to the Department of Revenue ("the Department") for assistance in receiving child support from the father.

In November 2017, the father, who lives in Jacksonville, was served with a notice of proceeding to establish administrative support order. He promptly completed and returned his financial affidavit and parent information form on November 17.

On March 5, 2018, the Department sent the father a proposed administrative support order setting his child support obligation. His net income, as stated in the proposed order, exceeded the gross income reported on his W-2. The proposed order suggested his monthly support obligation would be $ 1,272, and that he owed $ 16,612 in retroactive support after receiving credit for payments of $ 1,200.

On March 16, 2018, the father, pro se , submitted a request for an administrative hearing, stating that he disagreed with many findings in the proposed order. The father objected to the amount stated for his monthly income, his number of dependents, and the mother's reported childcare costs, income and assets, as well as the calculation of his retroactive support obligation.

On March 22, 2018, the Division of Administrative Hearings' Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") signed a notice of hearing setting the support hearing in Broward County on May 1, 2018. The notice of hearing contains a paragraph telling the recipients how to request that the hearing be rescheduled. The notice provides:

1. The Hearing.
* * *
b. Requests to reschedule: If you need to request that the hearing be rescheduled, you must file your request in writing with the Division of Administrative Hearings as soon as possible and no later than five days before the hearing date .... Your request to reschedule the hearing must give a good reason why you need the hearing rescheduled, and if there is documentation (such as a notice of previously scheduled court hearing), you should file that documentation with your request. You must send a copy of your request to the Department of Revenue lawyer by mail, fax, or delivery on the same day your request is filed. Your hearing remains scheduled unless and until the Administrative Law Judge issues an order granting your request. If no order is issued before your hearing, or if an order is issued denying your request, you will be expected to attend the hearing as scheduled.

The notice advises that the parties should be prepared for the hearing with witnesses and evidence, and that the hearing is a "formal proceeding before an Administrative Law Judge who is there to hear sworn testimony and consider documentary evidence." The notice advises that the parties have the right to testify under oath, present evidence, and cross-examine opposing witnesses, but that they do not have the right to submit additional evidence after the hearing, "so make sure you come prepared with the evidence you want the Administrative Law Judge to consider." The notice also advises that the parties have "the right to be represented by counsel."

The notice further states that in cases to establish child support, the parties are required to bring evidence of their earnings and relevant expenses for the past three years, however, "relevant expenses do not include common living expenses like rent, mortgage payments, utilities, and car expenses." In addition, the parties are instructed to bring "receipts for all items and money that the non-custodial parent and his or her family have given the custodial parent ... for the support of the child during the last three years."

To a layperson this notice can be an intimidating warning of impending legal storms.

On April 17, a staff attorney with Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc. wrote to Legal Services of Broward County, attempting to secure an attorney for the father. The letter explains that the father lives in Jacksonville and applied for legal services to assist him in setting a child support obligation to the mother, who resides in Broward. The attorney asked Broward Legal Aid to assist the father either through their attorneys or by providing a pro bono attorney.

On April 18, thirteen days before the scheduled hearing, the father filed a request for a thirty-day extension so he could obtain counsel. His letter reads:

To whom it may concern,
I would like to respectfully request a 30 day extension to the following case number: 18-1568CS due to I am currently seeking legal counsel. I have attached a copy of my last legal counsel referral request which is currently pending a response. If I am granted an extension, it would allow me enough time to obtain an attorney ....

The ALJ summarily denied the father's motion for continuance.

Both parents appeared pro se at the hearing. The attorney for the Department asked questions of each parent and the ALJ also questioned the parties.

This does not appear to be a case of a father who ignored his obligations to his child. The father testified that he is in the Navy and for a time the mother and child lived with him and later, with his mother and sister. There was conflicting testimony about how much money the father gave the mother for child support. The father relied upon a statement from the Navy Federal Credit Union to support his claim that he gave the mother a total of $ 12,142. The mother's testimony was confusing; she mentioned rent payments made on behalf of the father's mother and sister, and money she loaned the father. The father said that any rent payments he gave the mother came out of an account at Bank of America, but he did not bring those bank records with him. The parents were not carefully questioned about the payments reflected on the credit union statement.

At the close of the hearing, the ALJ announced that the father's child support obligation would be $ 627 per month going forward, and that he would provide the amount of retroactive support to be paid in his written order. That order followed, finding $ 7,155 due in retroactive support.

Discussion

When an ALJ denies a litigant's request for a continuance, this court's standard of review is abuse of discretion. Iglesias v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation , 739 So. 2d 707, 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).

While the rule of judicial discretion in granting or denying motions for continuance maintains its vitality, strict adherence to that rule may sometimes bring about unfair and unjust results. Hence, as a component of that rule, appellate courts may in circumstances where that discretion has been abused, correct the injustice by reversal of the trial court's decision.

Myers v. Siegel , 920 So. 2d 1241, 1244-45 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

Under the rules of procedure applicable to administrative proceedings, a motion for an extension of time shall be "filed prior to the expiration of the deadline sought to be extended and shall state good cause for the request." Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.204(4). "The presiding officer may grant a continuance of a hearing for good cause shown." Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.210.

Factors to be considered in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for continuance include whether the denial of the continuance creates an injustice for the movant; whether the cause of the request for continuance was unforeseeable by the movant and not the result of dilatory practices; and whether the opposing party would suffer any prejudice or inconvenience as a result of a continuance.

Fleming v. Fleming , 710 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Although Fleming was a divorce case, appellate courts apply the Fleming factors when determining whether it was an abuse of discretion for an ALJ to deny a timely request for a continuance in a proceeding to determine a parent's child support obligation. See Harris v. Dep't of Revenue ex rel. Insixiengmay , 191 So. 3d 921, 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

The request for a continuance in this case was made so the father could attempt to secure affordable counsel. The father had a right to be represented by counsel, at his own expense, at the support hearing. § 120.62(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). Judicial protection of the right to counsel "ensures continued public confidence in our system of justice." Myers , 920 So. 2d at 1243. In cases involving child support, attorneys assist in arriving at a just result by organizing relevant evidence and ensuring that the evidence is brought to the hearing for a judge or ALJ to consider.

Timely attempting to obtain affordable legal assistance can be "good cause" within the meaning of Rule 28-106.201. Yet, denial of a motion for a continuance is not an abuse of discretion simply because a party is compelled to appear in a legal proceeding without representation. See Hogan v. Aloia , 257 So. 3d 479, 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (applying Fleming factors and finding trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the wife's motion for a continuance after she failed to pay her attorney for several months and he withdrew); Lee v. Lee , 751 So. 2d 741, 743 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (applying Fleming factors and finding trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the husband's motion for a continuance where he ably represented himself after discharging attorneys because he could not afford them). In those cases, appellate courts are still required to apply the Fleming factors to protect the integrity of the proceeding.

Special circumstances sometimes exist, however, in which the denial of a motion for continuance creates an injustice for the movant. In these circumstances, this court's obligation to rectify the injustice outweighs its policy of not disturbing a trial court's ruling on a continuance, ... in particular, in cases where the opposing party would suffer no injury or great inconvenience as a result of a continuance.

Silverman v. Millner , 514 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (internal citations omitted).

Applying the Fleming factors to this case, we conclude that the ALJ abused his discretion in denying the father's motion for a continuance.

1. THE DENIAL OF THE CONTINUANCE CREATED AN INJUSTICE FOR THE FATHER.

The first factor considered under the Fleming analysis is "whether the denial of the continuance creates an injustice for the movant." 710 So. 2d at 603. An injustice can be found when an unfavorable outcome appears to be due to the litigant's limited litigation skill and where the litigant was unrepresented through no fault of his own. See id. at 604.

For example, in Neal v. Swaby , 975 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), at a paternity, visitation, and child support hearing, the mother appeared with counsel and the father requested a continuance to secure counsel (which was denied). Id. at 432. In reversing, the second district ruled that while the father "was articulate," he "was placed at a distinct disadvantage due to his lack of knowledge concerning the nuances of courtroom procedure." Id. at 433. The court held the father "clearly suffered injustice" from the denial of his motion to continue where the final order was partially unsupported by the evidence and the father "was denied visitation with his children as a result of a hearing at which he was required to proceed without legal representation." Id. at 433-434 ; see also Baron v. Baron , 941 So. 2d 1233, 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Here, the denial of the father's request for a continuance created an injustice. The mother appeared pro se , but the Department did not. The Department's attorney had a statutory obligation to establish the father's support obligation such that the child would be "maintained from the resources of [her] parents, thereby relieving, at least in part, the burden presently borne by the general citizenry through public assistance programs." § 409.2551, Fla. Stat. (2018).

While the father is literate and there was no language barrier, he had limited ability to prepare and present his case and protect his rights during the hearing. An attorney would have assisted the father in clearing evidentiary hurdles and organizing his presentation. An attorney would have instructed the father to gather and bring all of his records so he could prove which payments he made to the mother were for child support and which payments were for something else. Without an attorney, the father did not anticipate that the mother would claim the transfers reflected on his credit union statement were for anything other than child support (such as rent or a loan repayment). The father also did not anticipate that counsel for the Department would advocate that he should receive only credit for $ 1,800-the amount the mother agreed was for child support. Rulings in cases like this can have financial impact for years.

The father's credit union statement shows that during the retroactive period, he gave the mother more than $ 11,000. The final order found that the father owed the mother $ 3,355. If the father had been able to prove that all or even most of his payments to the mother during the retroactive period were for child support, his retroactive support obligation would have been less. Because the father was a layman and unprepared to present his case, the court may have required him to pay more in retroactive support than he owed.

On this record, the denial of the father's request for an extension created an injustice.

2. THE REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE WAS UNFORESEEABLE AND NOT THE RESULT OF DILATORY PRACTICES.

The second factor considered under the Fleming analysis is "whether the cause of the request for continuance was unforeseeable by the movant and not the result of dilatory practices." 710 So. 2d at 603. The Department argues that the father knew he would need an attorney on March 16, 2018 when he requested the hearing, but he was dilatory because he waited until two weeks before the trial to seek counsel.

A party is not dilatory when he tries but is unable to secure counsel within thirty days. See Peiman v Peiman , 829 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Peiman is similar to the case at bar. There, a husband's attorney withdrew one month before the dissolution trial, yet the husband did not move for a continuance until the eve of trial. Id. at 309. His motion explained that he had attempted to retain three attorneys, one of whom declined representation just three days before the hearing and another who agreed to represent him but needed sixty days to prepare. Id. The husband's motion for a sixty-day continuance was denied. Id.

Analyzing the second Fleming factor, the court in Peiman agreed that thirty days before trial, the husband knew that he needed an attorney; however, the court found that he was not dilatory when he attempted on three occasions to hire an attorney. Id. at 310. The court further found that "the fact that one of the attorneys agreed to represent the Former Husband, but could not do so unless the case was continued, tends to demonstrate that the Former Husband was not requesting the continuance merely for delay." Id.

In the instant case, the father was not on notice that he might need an attorney until he received the notice of hearing on March 22. The letter accompanying the proposed support order suggested that the next step would be somewhat informal, where he could tell his "story to an administrative law judge" who would decide the case.

Objectively, it was the March 22 notice of hearing that triggered the father's need to secure an attorney, if he wanted one. The notice advised him for the first time that the hearing was "formal" and that he had "the right to be represented by counsel."

The father's financial situation limited his ability to pay an attorney. Finding a lawyer who will work for free is sometimes as difficult as hitting a major league knuckleball. The father thought he could retain an attorney in Duval County until Jacksonville Legal Aid declined to represent him, referring him to Legal Aid in Broward County.

The father's efforts were not dilatory. Within three weeks of receiving the notice of hearing, he delivered his records to Jacksonville Legal Aid, which actively sought counsel for him in Broward County. He did not delay in filing his motion-it was filed only three weeks after the notice of hearing was signed and almost two weeks before the scheduled hearing. The request for only thirty additional days was not unreasonable under these circumstances.

3. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THE MOTHER WOULD SUFFER PREJUDICE OR INCONVENIENCE AS A RESULT OF THE CONTINUANCE.

The third and final Fleming factor is "whether the opposing party would suffer any prejudice or inconvenience as a result of a continuance." 710 So. 2d at 603. The Department seems to concede this factor and does not argue on appeal that the mother would have suffered prejudice or inconvenience if the court granted the thirty-day continuance. See , e.g. , Neal , 975 So. 2d at 434 (recognizing that it may be inconvenient and sometimes costly to appear for a hearing that is continued, yet finding the third Fleming factor established where the record did not suggest prejudice or injustice would have befallen the opposing party).

For these reasons, we reverse the final order and remand for a new hearing.

Warner and Forst, JJ., concur.


author: Forst, J.

text:
    R.L., the Father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-3700
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 22, 2019]
    Kevin G. Thomas, Sunny Isles Beach, for appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carolyn Schwarz, Assistant Attorney General, Children's Legal Services, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee Department of Children and Families.
    Vincent Trimarco of Musca Law, Tampa, and Thomasina F. Moore, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Laura J. Lee, Appellate Counsel, Guardian ad Litem Program, Tallahassee, for appellee Guardian ad Litem Program.
   Forst, J.

The father appeals the termination of his parental rights with respect to his three-year-old son, J.L. He challenges the trial court's order on three grounds. We agree with the father that the trial court's determination that he caused "serious bodily injury" to another child is not supported by competent substantial evidence. We affirm the termination order, however, as there is competent substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the father had, essentially, abandoned J.L. We also affirm the trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm.

Background

J.L. was declared dependent by the Department of Children and Families ("the Department") after being born substance exposed. He was reunited with his parents for five weeks before the mother was arrested for domestic battery on the father. The battery occurred after the mother found love letters to the father from his fourteen-year-old female tenant. After the mother's arrest, J.L.-age one-and-a-half at the time-lived with the father for seven weeks, until the father's arrest for his alleged sexual conduct with the fourteen-year-old tenant.

The father pled nolo contendere to aggravated battery and was incarcerated; however, the criminal court determined that no restitution was necessary, finding "no victim sustained any injury or monetary loss." The trial court in the present case nonetheless inferred from the criminal court's judgment that the father had caused serious bodily injury to the alleged victim in that case.

A few months into the father's incarceration, a child advocate informed him that it was important to communicate at least monthly with ChildNet to facilitate continued contact with his son, providing him with ChildNet's address to effectuate supervised written correspondence with J.L. The father replied the following day with questions regarding his case plan. The father also enclosed a letter to J.L., which was to be the only letter he sent to J.L. while the father was incarcerated. During the father's prison term, the child was reunited with the mother. The mother brought J.L. to the prison once for a visit and supervised a few calls between father and son. J.L. lived with the mother for ten months before she suffered a drug relapse. After one failed placement, J.L. was placed with foster parents, with whom he has remained. The Department then petitioned to terminate both the mother's and father's parental rights.

At the termination hearing, a year later, the father testified that he wanted custody of J.L., but that J.L. should live with the mother, and the father would move close to them after his release from prison, which was scheduled to occur several months after the hearing. The trial court found that, while the father had completed his case plan goals to the extent he was able to do so in prison, he had sent only the one letter to J.L. via ChildNet, and his supervised calls with J.L. had ceased over a year before the hearing. Consequently, the father had not been in contact with J.L. for over a year.

The trial court further found that the father knew how to communicate with J.L. and had been informed regarding organizations that would send cards and gifts to the child on his behalf, but he failed to take advantage of the opportunity to communicate. The court additionally determined that, although the father received $ 50 a month while incarcerated, he failed to send any money to J.L. The father could not testify to any details of J.L.'s life following the father's imprisonment, and the trial court determined there had been no observable bond between the father and J.L. since the father's arrest. The court thus concluded the father had abandoned J.L., and that termination was in J.L.'s manifest best interests and the least restrictive means of protecting him from serious harm.

Analysis
To terminate a parent's rights, the State must: 1) prove a statutory ground for termination under section 39.806[, Florida Statutes (2018) ]; 2) show that termination is in the child's manifest best interests; and 3) prove that termination is the least restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm. B.K. v. Dep't of Children & Families , 166 So.3d 866, 872-73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). The State must present clear and convincing evidence of each element, and an appellate court will not reverse a final order terminating parental rights unless it is clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support. Id. at 873.

J.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families , 264 So.3d 973, 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). Abandonment and felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury to a child are statutory grounds for termination. § 39.806(1)(b), (h), Fla. Stat. (2018). "[S]o long as the trial court's ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes, is supported by the evidence, the court's decision [to terminate parental rights] is affirmable." M.D. v. Dep't of Children & Families , 187 So.3d 1275, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

Abandonment occurs when a parent, "while being able, has made no significant contribution to the child's care and maintenance or has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child, or both." § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2018). Conduct leading to incarceration is a consideration but cannot be the sole basis for a finding of abandonment. B.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families , 237 So.3d 390, 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). Further, "[t]he parent's efforts, or lack thereof, to assume parental duties while incarcerated must be considered in light of the limited opportunities to assume those duties while in prison." Id. (quoting In re T.H. , 979 So.2d 1075, 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ).

Our opinion in M.D. v. Department of Children & Families , 187 So.3d 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) is on point. There, a father was found to have abandoned his child after having little involvement with the child in the six months prior to his two-year incarceration during which he sent only two letters. Id. at 1278. In contrast, in B.F. , we reversed a termination where the incarcerated father frequently communicated with the child telephonically, and the child recognized him as his father. 237 So.3d at 393. In the case at hand, as the trial court found, the father "did not bother to make bonafide efforts to maintain a relationship with his child from the moment it ceased to be as convenient as simply picking up the phone to [call the mother] to speak with [the child] or ask about his well-being." The finding of abandonment is supported by competent substantial evidence.

We also agree with the trial court that termination is the least restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm. Under section 39.806(2), Florida Statutes (2018), reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required when termination is proven under sections 39.806(1)(b) through (d) or (1)(f) through (m). As discussed, termination here was premised and proven under section 39.806(1)(b) ; therefore, the Department is not required to offer additional services to allow the father an opportunity to keep his parental rights intact. Furthermore, while the father may want some relationship with J.L.-on his own terms-the trial court was not required to preserve the "parental bond at the cost of [the] child's future" with his foster parents, who intend to adopt him. S.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families , 202 So.3d 769, 778 (Fla. 2016) (citation omitted); see also B.K. , 166 So.3d at 877 ("[I]f the focus is on the child, and not the parent, where the child has bonded with her caregivers, termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from the harm of continued instability in her life.").

As to the ground for termination based on the commission of a felony battery that resulted in serious bodily injury to a child, the father pled nolo contendere to aggravated battery, the elements of which include causing great bodily harm or using a deadly weapon or knowingly battering a pregnant person. § 784.045, Fla. Stat. (2016). Because the trial court had heard nothing about the use of a deadly weapon or the victim being pregnant, it inferred a finding of great bodily harm to the fourteen-year-old victim. This finding lacks evidentiary support. The evidence was that the mother discovered love letters from the father's fourteen-year-old tenant; the father was arrested for sexual battery seven weeks later; he pled nolo contendere to aggravated battery; and the restitution order stated that "no victim sustained any injury." Thus, a holding that the father had committed a felony battery that resulted in serious bodily injury does not follow from this evidence, and the order must therefore be corrected.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's finding of abandonment and that termination is the least restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm. We remand, however, "for [the] court to strike all findings of termination" based on section 39.806(1)(h). J.C. , 264 So.3d at 978.

Affirmed in part; Remanded in part.

Warner and Kuntz, JJ. concur.

      The trial court's factual findings reflect that the father earned $ 50 a month, in accordance with the father's testimony. However, the court's legal findings reflect that the father earned $ 50 a week. We find the discrepancy to be harmless as there is no evidence that the father sent any funds to the child during the duration of his incarceration.

      The mother's parental rights were also terminated. She has not appealed from the termination order.


author: Warner, J.

text:
    A.D., the mother, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES and Guardian Ad Litem, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-3753
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 30, 2019]
    Antony P. Ryan, Regional Counsel, and Paul O'Neil, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carolyn Schwarz, Assistant Attorney General, Children's Legal Services, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee Department of Children & Families.
    Thomasina Moore, Statewide Director of Appeals, Joanna Summers Brunnell, Senior Attorney, Tallahassee, and Douglas J. Glaid, Fort Lauderdale, Florida Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
   Warner, J.

A mother appeals the trial court's final judgment terminating her parental rights to her son. She does not contest the trial court's determination that grounds for termination exist, but she contends that the court erred in finding that termination was in the manifest best interests of the child. We conclude that certain key findings in the judgment regarding the child's best interests are not supported by competent substantial evidence. We reverse for the trial court to conduct a prompt additional hearing to determine whether termination is in the child's manifest best interests in this unusual case.

In August 2015, the then seven-year-old child, X.P., and his brother were sheltered based on allegations that the appellant's boyfriend engaged in frequent acts of violence and alcohol abuse towards the mother and children. The mother, A.D., consented to a dependency. X.P. went into foster care, and between his removal and the spring of 2016, he was moved from a traditional foster home to a therapeutic foster home. In the summer of 2016, an older sister who lived in Washington State agreed to take both children. X.P. lived with the older sister for a few months, but she found him too difficult to handle. In the fall of 2016, he returned to Florida, where the Department of Children and Families eventually placed him in a level-one therapeutic foster home in Florida City. This home was a multiple-hour drive from Broward County, where he had lived with his mother. X.P. had many challenges and was Baker-Acted at least four times during his foster care, including once while he was in the therapeutic home in Florida City.

Meanwhile, A.D. was given a case plan, but she did not complete many of the tasks. She began by taking a domestic violence course and undergoing a psychiatric evaluation, but other tasks remained incomplete. She visited with X.P. in 2015, but in early 2016, she was arrested for burglary and grand theft. She moved to Illinois to be with family, and then she was extradited to Florida to face other charges. She spent a few months in jail from late 2016 to early 2017. She did not document consistent employment or suitable housing. When X.P. returned to Florida and was placed in the home in Florida City, she visited him only sporadically, as she frequently did not have transportation. Therapeutic visitation sessions were set up, and those which occurred went well, according to the supervisor. Mother and child had a bond between them. But frequently A.D. cancelled visitation sessions. While the child advocate who was responsible for providing services for A.D. did set up some therapy for her, A.D. apparently required trauma therapy. She did not consistently attend therapy sessions, nor did she receive trauma therapy.

Because of the failure to complete her case plan, DCF petitioned for termination of the mother's parental rights as to X.P. DCF listed two grounds: 1) the mother's failure to substantially comply with her case plan under section 39.806(1)(e)(1), Florida Statutes ; and 2) her engagement in conduct that demonstrated that her continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship threatened her son's life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health, irrespective of the provision of services, under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes.

At the final hearing in March of 2018, the principal witnesses for DCF and the Guardian ad Litem Program were the child advocate and the guardian ad litem. Because of the child's placement in Florida City, the child advocate had not seen or talked to the child since the fall of 2016, and the guardian had never met nor spoken with X.P. Instead, a child advocate and guardian located in Miami had taken the responsibility to visit the child. The witnesses at trial merely referred to their reports. These other individuals reported that the child was doing well with the current foster mother and progressing at school. The child advocate did note that X.P. had been Baker-Acted four times since being sheltered, including once after he arrived in Florida City. The child expressed a desire to be with his mother, although he told others that he wanted to stay with his foster mother.

In the final judgment, entered eight months after the hearing, the court found that grounds for termination existed. The mother had failed to complete her case plan, and her continued involvement with the child would be harmful to his safety irrespective of the provision of services because she had failed to use the services provided to her for almost three years. A.D. has not challenged these findings.

A.D. does, however, contend that many of the key findings as to manifest best interests of the child were not supported by competent substantial evidence. "Full and accurate fact finding is essential not only on the question whether DCFS has authority to terminate parental rights but also on the question whether it is in the child's best interests to do so. See § 39.809(5), Fla. Stat. (2000) ][.]" C.C. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. , 812 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Even where the grounds for termination are proven, the court still must determine whether termination of parental rights is in the child's manifest best interests. Id.

As to the child's manifest best interests, while the trial court addressed each statutory factor in section 39.810(1) - (11), Florida Statutes (2018), there was no competent substantial evidence to support several key findings. The court found that while the child had a bond with his mother, termination would not harm the child, or the risk of harm from reunification was greater than the harm from termination. However, there was insufficient evidence to make that evaluation, and the mother and child continued to have a bond. While the court faulted the mother for not visiting with more regularity, the child's placement in Florida City was a substantial obstacle for the mother, who did not have a source of transportation. The only real evidence presented on this issue was from the therapeutic visitation supervisor, who confirmed the bond between mother and child.

The court's finding that it was "unlikely" that the child would remain in long-term foster care is also not supported by competent substantial evidence. The child, age eleven, has significant and severe behavioral problems. He has been through multiple placements and had been Baker-Acted many times. He was not in a pre-adoptive placement, and the child advocate conceded that the child was at risk of languishing in foster care. Therefore, this key finding, that the child would not linger in foster care, is unsupported by the evidence.

A.D. contends the court's findings that the child would "enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship as a result of the termination" and that he was in "a nurturing and loving environment" in his current placement were also unsupported. There was practically no evidence about the condition of the foster home. Although the child advocate and guardian testified that the child was doing much better in that placement and both recommended that termination was in the best interest of the child, neither witness had seen or talked to the child in about two years and talked with the foster parent only occasionally. They were basing their recommendation on the reports of others.

Finally, it is concerning that the court did not enter the final judgment until eight months after the hearing. Before the final judgment was entered, several judicial reviews appear in the record which are at significant odds with the findings of the trial court. They show that the child had a behavioral problem at school and frequently had to be removed from class. He was falling behind educationally. And while the social reports show that at first the child seemed to be adjusting well to his foster parent, a report made three weeks prior to the entry of the final judgment states that the foster parent is terminating her care, as the child is doing very badly both at home and at school. Further, there are motions which show that A.D. has finally responded to services, which DCF provided after the hearing. She has improved her condition, and her visits with the child have been more regular. The child expresses a desire to see his mother more often.

While some of these post-hearing reports may not have been seen by the trial court before entering the final judgment, they exemplify how the lives of children are constantly changing. If a court is to wait so long to issue a final judgment in a termination of parental rights case, the court may well need to hold an additional hearing to determine what has transpired in the child's life before entering the ultimate order affecting the child's future. And although the record contains these other reports, our determination that there is no competent substantial evidence to support key findings on X.P.'s manifest best interests is based solely on the evidence presented at the final hearing.

The child is not in a pre-adoptive placement, and the mother contends that it is in his best interests to re-adjudicate him dependent and to give her another case plan. DCF and the GAL point out that one of the primary goals of chapter 39 is to ensure the child's permanent placement with his biological or adoptive family and that no child remains in foster care for more than one year. § 39.001(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2018). Clearly, at the time of the final hearing, it had been nearly three years from removal, but there is no indication that the child is any closer to permanency or adoption. It is the child's best interests which should be paramount, not the desire to close a case.

Given the lack of evidence on critical issues regarding the child's manifest best interests at the final hearing, we reverse and remand the case for the trial court to hold prompt additional hearings to determine what is in the child's best interests at this time. It may still be that termination is in the child's manifest best interests, but on this record, that case is not made.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Forst and Kuntz, JJ., concur.


author: Conner, J.

text:
    Barbara TURKELL-WHITE and Pat W. White, Appellants, v. WELLS FARGO BANK N.A., Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1402
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 5, 2019]
    Kendrick Almaguer and Lanzce A. Francis of The Ticktin Law Group, Deerfield Beach, for appellants.
    Mary J. Walter of Liebler, Gonzalez & Portuondo, Miami, for appellee.
   Conner, J.

Pat W. White ("White") and Barbara Turkell-White ("Turkell-White") appeal the final judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("the Bank") after a nonjury trial. The appellants assert two reasons the final judgment should be reversed: (1) the Bank lacked standing at the time suit was filed; and (2) the Bank failed to join an indispensable party.

Because Turkell-White died before suit was filed and neither she nor her estate was a party to the suit below, we dismiss the appeal as to her. We affirm without discussion the trial court's determination that the Bank had standing to foreclose. We also affirm the trial court's final judgment, despite the assertion of failure to join an indispensable party, and explain our reasoning.

Background

In 2017, the Bank filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint seeking to foreclose on a note and mortgage executed solely by Barbara A. Turkell-White in 2007. The complaint further alleged that White and two others (determined later to be Turkell-White's two daughters) were "the current owner(s) of the real property which is the subject of the Mortgage." The Bank alleged that Turkell-White passed away on April 4, 2015. The copy of the note attached to the complaint stated the original lender was Wachovia Mortgage Corporation and contained a blank indorsement signed by the original lender. Also attached to the complaint was a copy of the mortgage, identifying Turkell-White, "[a] married woman," as the only borrower.

White and the two daughters filed an answer and affirmative defenses. The answer admitted the allegation that White and the two daughters were "the current owner(s) of the real property which is the subject of the Mortgage." They asserted affirmative defenses of: (1) unclean hands; (2) lack of standing; and (3) failure to satisfy conditions precedent.

Prior to trial, the Bank filed a motion in limine seeking to limit White's ability to raise affirmative defenses, since White did not sign the note or mortgage, and had not assumed the liability for either. Therefore, the Bank sought to limit White to defenses associated with the right of redemption. The trial court granted the Bank's motion in limine in part, limiting White to the defenses of unclean hands, standing, and the right of redemption.

At the nonjury trial, the Bank presented evidence that the note and mortgage were in default, and established standing at the time suit was filed and at the time of trial, compliance with notice of default, opportunity to cure, acceleration, and the balances due after default.

In defense, White testified that prior to Turkell-White's death, the property was transferred to a trust, but he could not recall the name of the trust. He testified the beneficiaries of the trust were himself and Turkell-White's two daughters. At the conclusion of questions by the attorneys, the trial court questioned him further regarding the alleged trust, specifically asking if White had any paperwork verifying the existence of the trust or naming the trustee. White responded by stating, "It's a Letter of Trust," and that he was the trustee and upon his death, the property passes to the daughters. White further volunteered: "There were several properties that were put in."

During his motion for involuntary dismissal, White argued that the Bank failed to prove standing and join an indispensable party - the trust. The trial court entered a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of the Bank. White and Turkell-White gave notice of appeal.

Appellate Analysis

We agree with the Bank's arguments that the appeal as to Turkell-White should be dismissed. The record below and on appeal clearly showed that neither Barbara A. Turkell-White nor her estate were named parties in the suit below. The complaint described her as the original maker of the note and mortgagor, but clearly alleged she died prior to suit being filed.

"Generally, a non-party in the lower tribunal is a 'stranger to the record' and, therefore, lacks standing to appeal an order entered by the lower tribunal." Portfolio Invs. Corp. v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. , 81 So. 3d 534, 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) ; see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(g)(1) (defining "[a]ppellant" as "[a] party who seeks to invoke the appeal jurisdiction of a court" (emphasis added)). The instant case is also not a "unique circumstance" where Turkell-White or her estate was not named a party, and did not seek intervention, but was still not a stranger to the record. See Portfolio , 81 So. 3d at 536 (finding a unique circumstance where the appellant was not a party and did not seek to intervene or substitute itself, but it had participated, the appellee understood the appellant "had stepped into" the shoes of a party, and appellee did not object to the appellant's participation in the litigation). Therefore, Turkell-White does not have standing to appeal in this case, and as to her, the appeal is dismissed. See W.K. v. Dep't of Children & Families , 230 So. 3d 905, 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ("We dismiss the foster parents' appeal because they do not have standing to appeal.").

White argued for the first time at trial that the "uncontroverted evidence" presented proved that the subject property was transferred to a trust and, therefore, the Bank was required to join the trust in the action. White correctly argued that "[a]n owner of property must be joined in a foreclosure proceeding of that property in order to make a decree of foreclosure valid." 3709 N. Flagler Drive Prodigy Land Tr. v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 226 So. 3d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). White was entitled to make the argument for the first time at trial under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(h)(2), which provides that "[t]he defenses of failure to state a cause of action or a legal defense or to join an indispensable party may be raised by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits [.]" Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)(2) (emphases added).

White's argument that he provided "uncontroverted evidence" as to the trust's ownership of the property was properly rejected by the trial court. The only evidence to support the assertion was White's own conclusory testimony, simply stating that the property at issue was placed in a trust. In fact, he could not name the trust in which the property was allegedly placed, and provided no documentary support for the assertion.

In City National Bank of Miami v. Simmons , 351 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), appellees sued appellant to foreclose a mortgage on property "the legal title to which [wa]s held by appellant as trustee under an unrecorded Land Trust Agreement." Id. at 1110. Appellant moved to dismiss, in part, claiming that appellees failed to join an indispensable party - the trust beneficiaries. Id. However, this Court held:

Fla.R.Civ.P. Rule 1.140 provides that failure to join indispensable parties may be raised by motion. Obviously, this contemplates a speaking motion which should contain the facts demonstrating why the alleged indispensable parties are indispensable . Appellant's motion to dismiss simply states conclusions. Appellant did not attach a copy of the Land Trust Agreement to its motion to support the allegation relative to indispensable parties. Therefore, while a motion is the proper vehicle to raise the issue of indispensable parties, appellant's motion was insufficient.

Id. (emphases added).

White's argument suffers from the same deficiency here. He did not bring any documentation to support his conclusion that a trust owned the property, and there was nothing but his conclusory testimony to support the assertion. Additionally, this testimony conflicted with his own pleadings. In his answer, White "admitted" the paragraph in the complaint that alleged that he and Turkell-White's two daughters were "the current owner(s) of the real property which is the subject of the Mortgage." The trial court was entitled to weigh the credibility of witnesses and in granting judgment in favor of the Bank, the trial court obviously did not believe, by the greater weight of the evidence, White's testimony as to the ownership by the trust.

We dismiss the appeal as to Turkell-White and affirm the final judgment as to White.

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part.

Gerber, C.J., and May, J., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Albert T. OWENS, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 3D18-2187
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed December 19, 2018.
    Albert T. Owens, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for respondent.
    Before LAGOA, FERNANDEZ and LUCK, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

On November 13, 2018, this court issued an opinion denying Albert T. Owens' petition for a writ of mandamus to the trial court in case number F98-43488. Our opinion included an order directing Owens to show cause why he should not be prohibited from further pro se filings related to Eleventh Judicial Circuit court case number F98-43488. On November 26, 2018, Owens filed his response to the order to show cause. We've considered Owens' response and conclude that he has failed to show sufficient good cause supporting his request to continue to file pro se appeals, petitions, motions or other pleadings in case number F98-43488. See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1999) and Concepcion v. State, 944 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

We direct the Clerk of the Third District Court of Appeal to refuse to accept any such papers relating to the specified circuit court case number unless they have been reviewed and signed by an attorney who is a duly licensed member of The Florida Bar in good standing. See Whipple v. State, 112 So.3d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

Additionally, any such further and unauthorized pro se filings by Owens may subject him to appropriate sanctions, including the issuance of written findings forwarded to the Department of Corrections for its consideration of disciplinary action and forfeiture of gain time. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2017).

      Including the underlying Petition, Owens has filed at least fourteen unsuccessful appeals and/or petitions with this Court, stemming from his 2004 conviction and sentence for second degree murder, grand theft, and second degree arson. All claims have been reviewed and deemed meritless. See 3D02-3239; 3D05-1394; 3D05-2243; 3D07-2637; 3D09-2980; 3D11-1484; 3D12-1372; 3D13-1032; 3D13-2070; 3D14-0356; 3D14-1321; 3D14-2724; 3D17-2786; and 3D18-2187.


text:
    Dontae Rashawn MORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D13-1971
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 2, 2017
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, Terri L. Backhus, Special Assistant Public Defender, and Cynthia Dodge, Assistant Public Defender (substituted as counsel of record), Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, CRENSHAW, and SALARIO, JR., Concur.