author: QUINCE, C.J.

text:
    Ricky BRADLEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC08-196.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, Michael S. Becker and Rebecca M. Becker, Assistant Public Defenders, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Mary G. Jolley, Wesley H. Heidt, and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.
   QUINCE, C.J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Bradley v. State, 971 So.2d 957, 958 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Jackson v. State, 852 So.2d 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we approve the result reached by the Fifth District in Bradley, and disapprove the results in Jackson and Mobley v. State, 939 So.2d 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), to the extent they hold that a defendant’s plea may not constitute an express waiver of a defective charging document that fails to allege the proper grounds for sentence enhancement.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ricky Bradley was charged by information with robbery with a firearm in violation of sections 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002). See Bradley, 971 So.2d at 958. Citing section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2002), the information alleged that while committing the robbery Bradley was in possession of and carried a firearm. See id. Bradley later entered a plea of nolo contendere to robbery with a firearm pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea agreement called for a twenty-year mandatory minimum prison sentence that resulted from his discharge of a firearm during the robbery. Prior to entry of his plea, Bradley’s counsel stated on the record that Bradley was subject to the twenty-year mandatory minimum term under section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2002). See id.

Although Bradley did not appeal his conviction and sentence, Bradley did subsequently file a motion to correct sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. See Bradley, 971 So.2d at 958. Bradley argued that his twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2002), was illegal because the information charging him with robbery did not allege that he discharged a firearm during the commission of the robbery. The trial court denied the motion. See id.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief and certified conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal on the issue of whether a defendant’s nolo contendere plea constitutes a waiver of a defective charging document that fails to allege the proper grounds for sentence enhancement pursuant to section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes. See Bradley, 971 So.2d at 961. In Bradley, the Fifth District held that the defendant’s explicit plea to discharge of a firearm during the commission of a robbery constituted a waiver of the missing element. See id. at 961. In contrast, under similar circumstances, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Jackson v. State, 852 So.2d 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), held that the defendant’s explicit plea to discharge of a firearm resulting in great bodily harm during the commission of a robbery did not constitute a waiver of the defective information. See id. at 944.

Bradley petitioned this Court for discretionary review, and we accepted review to resolve the conflict that exists between the district courts of appeal.

ANALYSIS

The District Courts

The Florida district courts disagree about whether a defendant’s nolo conten-dere plea may constitute a waiver of a defective charging document that fails to allege the proper grounds for sentence enhancement pursuant to section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes. In Jackson, the defendant pled no contest to eight counts, one of which was robbery with a deadly weapon, a firearm. The defendant claimed that his plea to that felony was improperly reclassified under section 775.087(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1999), because the information did not allege that he “discharged” a firearm or inflicted death or great bodily harm. See 852 So.2d at 942-44. The information only charged that the defendant “carried” a firearm. See id. at 944. The Fourth District concluded that an allegation of “carrying” a firearm cannot sustain a sentence enhancement under section 775.087(2)(a)3; therefore, the defendant’s sentence could not stand. See id. The district court held that the defendant did not waive any challenge to the sentence by way of his no contest plea. See id. The court reasoned that even though Jackson and his counsel were under a mistaken belief that he was pleading to a charge that carried a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence that fact does not make the sentence legal where the information charged a crime with only a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. See id. (citing Leavitt v. State, 810 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Vickers v. State, 630 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)).

The First District Court of Appeal held similarly in Mobley v. State, 939 So.2d 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Mobley entered a plea of guilty to two counts of armed robbery pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea agreement called for concurrent sentences of twenty-five years’ imprisonment with twenty-year mandatory minimum terms for discharging a firearm. See id. at 213. The defendant contended that his twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence was illegal because the information did not charge him with “discharging” a firearm under section 775.087(2)(a)2, Florida Statutes (2002). The information charged the defendant with “possession” of a firearm, which carried a mandatory minimum term of only ten years’ imprisonment under section 775.087(2)(a)1. See id. The First District agreed, holding that because the defendant was only charged with possessing a firearm he could not be sentenced for discharging a firearm. See id. at 214 (citing Jackson, 852 So.2d at 944; Gibbs v. State, 623 So.2d 551, 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)). The district court concluded that the grounds for enhancement of a sentence under section 775.087(2) must be charged in the information. See id. (citing Jackson, 852 So.2d 941; Gibbs, 623 So.2d 551). The court noted that the mere fact that the defendant agreed to the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence was irrelevant. See id. (citing Leavitt, 810 So.2d 1032).

In contrast to the First and Fourth Districts, in Bradley, the case that is now before this Court, the Fifth District held that Bradley’s explicit plea to discharge of a firearm during the commission of a robbery constituted a waiver of the missing discharge element. See 971 So.2d at 960. The district court reasoned that even though the information failed to charge the discharge of a firearm element, the record demonstrates that Bradley was specifically advised of what offense he was pleading to under section 775.087(2) and that he was exposing himself to a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence required for discharge of a firearm. See id. at 961. Additionally, the district court found that the plea proceeding reflected that Bradley was sufficiently put on notice that he was subject to the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence due to his discharge of a firearm during the robbery. See id. The Fifth District disagreed with the Jackson opinion because it found that the Fourth District placed a premium on form at the expense of substance and the defendant in Jackson could not credibly argue that he was not aware of his plea agreement terms. See Bradley, 971 So.2d at 961.

This Case

The Fifth District in Bradley affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief on Bradley’s claim that his twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to section 775.087(2) was illegal because the information charging him with robbery did not allege that he discharged a firearm during the commission of the robbery. The Fifth District held that Bradley’s explicit plea to discharge of a firearm during the commission of a robbery constituted a waiver of the missing element. See 971 So.2d at 961. We agree and hold that the defect in the charging information was cured by the plea to the charge. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.190; Deparvine v. State, 995 So.2d 351, 373-74 (Fla.2008).

In the instant case, Count II of the information alleged:

IN THAT RICKY BRADLEY, on or about August 11, 2002, in the County of VOLUSIA and State of Florida, by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear, did knowingly take away cash and/or u.s. [sic] currency, of some value, from the person or custody of [victim], with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive [victim] or any other person not the defendant(s) of the property, and in the course of committing the robbery RICKY BRADLEY was in possession of and carried a firearm, contrary to Florida Statutes 812.13(1) and (2)(a) and 775.087(2). (1DEG FEL, PBL)

(Emphasis added.)

Where a firearm is possessed or used during the commission of certain enumerated crimes, section 775.087(2)(a), Florida Statutes, often referred to as the 10/20/ Life statute, requires the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. See § 775.087(2)(a)1-3, Fla. Stat. (2007). Bradley was sentenced pursuant to section 775.087(2)(a)2, Florida Statutes (2002), which provides:

Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony listed in sub-subparagraphs (a)1.a.-q., regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and during the course of the commission of the felony such person discharged a “firearm” or “destructive device ” as defined in s. 790.001 shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 20 years.

(Emphasis added.)

Prior to Bradley entering his plea of nolo contendere to robbery with a firearm, his counsel informed the court:

[PJursuant to negotiations with the [S]tate of Florida[,] Mr. Bradley is going to withdraw his not guilty pleas as to attempted felony murder and armed robbery with a firearm. He’s going to be pleading no contest to each count of the information. There’s going to be a stipulation that the injuries to the victim ... were moderate. What this does is take it out of the 25 year mandatory sentencing under the 10/20/life bill. Which if they were deemed to be severe injuries!,] it would be a mandatory 25.
The agreement is pursuant to the 10/20/life bill he is still exposed, because the firearm ivas discharged, to 20 years mandatory. He will be sentenced to 20 years in the state prison with the expectations [sic] he will have to serve 20 years day for day with credit for time served. I’ve explained to him the only way he’ll get out in less than 20 years is if some how the laws change and it applies to it. But as it stands now[,] he’s got to do 20 years.

(Emphasis added.) Moreover, during the plea proceeding, the court asked Bradley’s counsel for a factual basis. Bradley’s counsel replied: “We would stipulate the facts alleged in the complaint affidavit in the court file would provide a prima facie case for each charge pled to.” The charging affidavit states that Bradley pulled the trigger of the handgun twice but it misfired. On the third trigger pull, Bradley shot the victim in the lower abdomen. Therefore, when Bradley entered his plea he stipulated to the fact that he discharged a firearm during the commission of the robbery.

Bradley’s explicit plea to the discharge of a firearm constituted an express waiver of the defect in the charging information. Bradley stipulated to the facts alleged in the charging affidavit, and Bradley’s voluntary agreement to the plea was predicated upon a sentence that incorporated discharge of the firearm during the offense. Due process was not violated because Bradley voluntarily pled nolo contendere to the robbery charge in order to receive a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence to avoid a life term, and he stipulated to the factual basis for the sentence. Therefore, Bradley’s plea agreement and the ensuing factual stipulation reflects that he understood the nature and consequences of his plea, negating any notion that he was misled or prejudiced. Thus, contrary to the language from Jackson and Mobley, a defendant’s plea may constitute an express waiver of a defective charging document when he stipulates to facts which include any missing element and voluntarily pleads to a sentence that incorporates the missing element.

CONCLUSION

We therefore approve the result reached by the Fifth District in Bradley to the extent it is consistent with this opinion. We disapprove Jackson and Mobley to the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and CANADY, JJ., concur.

POLSTON and LABARGA, JJ., did not participate.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES—REPORT NO. 2008-07.
    No. SC08-1488.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    Judge Lisa T. Munyon, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orlando, FL, for Petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee) has submitted proposed changes to the Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. The Committee proposes the following new instructions: 16.12 — Leaving a Child Unattended or Unsupervised in a Motor Vehicle; 25.19—Unlawful Sale, Manufacture, Alteration, Delivery, Uttering or Possession of Counterfeit-Resistant Prescription Blanks for Controlled Substances; and 29.13 — Animal Fighting or Baiting, and requests that the Court authorize the new instructions for publication and use. The Committee published the proposals for comment in The Florida Bar Neivs prior to submission to the Court. No comments were received by the Committee.

Having considered the Committee’s report, we hereby authorize the publication and use of the new instructions as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. In doing so, we express no opinion on the correctness of those instructions and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instructions. We further caution all interested parties that any notes and comments associated with the instructions reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. New language is indicated by underlining, and deleted language is struck through. The instructions as set forth in the appendix shall be effective when this opinion becomes final.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

16.12 LEAVING A CHILD UNATTENDED OR UNSUPERVISED IN A MOTOR VEHICLE

§ 316.6135, Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Leaving a Child Unattended or Unsupervised in a Motor Vehicle, the State must prove the following [three] [four] elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

L (Defendant) was a [parent of] [legal guardian for] [person responsible for] (victim).

2. (Victim) was less than 6 years of age.

Give 3a or 3b as applicable.

3. (Defendant) left (victim) unattended or unsupervised in a motor vehicle

a for more than 15 minutes.

Note to Judge: Give 3b, if applicable, only when the crime charged, is a violation of F.S. 316.6135(4).

b. while [the motor was running] [the health of the victim was in danger].

Give if applicable.

4. In so doing, [great bodily harm] [a permanent disability] [permanent disfigurement] was caused to (victim).

Lesser Included Offenses

LEAVING A CHILD UNATTENDED OR UNSUPERVISED IN A MOTOR VEHICLE — 316.6135(4)

CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.

Leaving a Child Unattended 316.6135(1)(a)

None

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 2009.

25.19 UNLAWFUL SALE, MANUFACTURE, ALTERATION, DELIVERY, UTTERING OR POSSESSION OF COUNTERFEIT^ RESISTANT PRESCRIPTION BLANKS FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

§ 831.311, Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Unlawful Sale, Manufacture, Alteration, Delivery, Uttering or Possession of Counterfeit-Resistant Prescription Blanks for Controlled Substances, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

L (Defendant) [sold] [manufactured] [altered] [delivered] [uttered] [possessed] any counterfeit-resistant prescription blanks for controlled substances.

2. The counterfeit-resistant prescription blanks for controlled substances were in the form and content established by the Department of Health pursuant to law.

3. (Defendant) intended [to injure or defraud any person] [to facilitate (insert alleged violation of s. 893.13 as charged in the Information) ].

Definition.

To “utter” means to pass, present or publish.

Lesser Included Offenses

UNLAWFUL SALE, MANUFACTURE, ALTERATION, DELIVERY, UTTERING OR POSSESSION OF COUNTERFEIT-RESISTANT PRESCRIPTION BLANKS FOR CONTROLLED 831.311

CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.

None

Attempt 777.04(1) 51

Comment

The Department of Health is directed by section 893.065, Florida Statutes, to develop and adopt by rule the form and content for a counterfeit-resistant prescription blank which may be used by practitioners for the purpose of prescribing a controlled substance listed in Schedule II, Schedule III, or Schedule IV.

This instruction was adopted in 2009.

29.13(b) ANIMAL FIGHTING OR BAITING

§ 828.122, Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Animal [Fighting] [Baiting], the State must prove the following [one] [three] element(s) beyond a reasonable doubt:

Give as applicable, if (3) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (d) or (h) is charged:

(Defendant) knowingly

[[baited] [bred] [trained] [transported] [sold] [owned] [possessed] [used] a [wild] [domestic] animal for the purpose of animal [fighting] [baiting].] [[owned] [possessed] [sold] equipment for use in the [baiting] [breeding] [training] [transporting] [selling] [owning] [possessing] [using] of a [wild] [domestic] animal for the purpose of animal [fighting] [baiting].] [[owned] [leased] [managed] [operated] [had control of] property used for the [baiting] [breeding] [training] [transporting] [selling] [owning] [possessing] [using] of a [wild] [domestic] animal for the purpose of animal [fighting] [baiting].]

[[promoted][staged]_[advertised] [charged an admission fee to] a [fight] [baiting] between two or more animals.]

[performed [a service] [an act] to facilitate animal [fighting] [baiting], including, but not limited to, [providing security] [refereeing] [handling or transporting animals] [being a stakeholder of any money wagered on animal fighting or baiting].]

[bet or wagered [money] [valuable consideration] on the [fighting] [baiting] of animals.] [attended the [fighting] [baiting] of animals.]

Give only if (3) (†) is charged:

L An animal was impounded under the “Animal Fighting Act.”

2. (Defendant) knowingly [removed] [facilitated the removal of] the animal from [an agency where the animal was impounded] [a location designated by the court].

3. [He] [She] did so without prior authorization of the court.

Possession of an animal alone does not constitute a violation.

“Animal fighting” means fighting between roosters or other birds or between dogs, bears, or other animals.

“Baiting” means to attack with violence, to provoke, or to harass an animal with one or more animals for the purpose of training an animal for, or to cause an animal to engage in, fights with or among other animals, including the use of live animals in the training of racing greyhounds.

Give if applicable. See section (9).

It is a defense to this crime if [any person is simulating a fight for the purpose of using the simulated fight as part of a motion picture which will be used on television or in a motion picture as long as the crime of cruelty to animals is not committed. (Define animal cruelty. See § 828.12, Fla. Stat.) ] [any person is using animals to pursue or take wildlife or to participate in hunting regulated or subject to being regulated by the rules and regulations of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission.] [any person is using animals to work livestock for agricultural purposes.] [any person is conducting or engaging in a simulated or bloodless bullfighting exhibition.] [any person is using dogs to hunt wild hogs or to retrieve domestic hogs pursuant to customary hunting or agricultural practices.]

Lesser Included Offenses

No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense.

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 2009.

      . As submitted to the Court and previously published in The Florida Bar News, this instruction was numbered 16.7. That instruction number, however, is assigned to the instruction for Use of a Child in a Sexual Performance, previously authorized for use in In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2007-08, 995 So.2d 489 (Fla.2008).

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

      . In instruction 29.13(b), we have included reference to the statutory provision that defines "animal cruelty," section 828.12, Florida Statutes, to make the instruction consistent with section 828.122(9)(a), Florida Statutes.

      .The amendments as reflected in the appendix are to the Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases as they appear on the Court's website at www.floridasupremecourt.org/ jury_instructions/instructions.shtml. We recognize that there may be minor discrepancies between the instructions as they appear on the website and the published versions of the instructions. Any discrepancies as to instructions authorized for publication and use after October 25, 2007, should be resolved by reference to the published opinion of this Court authorizing the instruction.


text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.112-MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES.
    No. SC08-1292.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    Judge O.H. Eaton, Jr., Chair, Criminal Court Steering Committee, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Sanford, FL, for Petitioner.
    Joseph P. George, Jr., Regional Counsel, Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Third Region, Miami, FL, Responding with comments.
   PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a request by this Court, the Supreme Court Criminal Steering Committee (Steering Committee) filed a report proposing amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.112. On October 8, 2008, we amended Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.112 to bring it into conformity with the stated objective that all attorneys representing capital defendants meet certain minimum standards of competency. In re Amendments to Fla. Rule of Crim. Pro. 3.112—Minimum Stds. for Att’ys in Capital Cases, 993 So.2d 501 (Fla.2008). In doing so, we took into account the possible appointment of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel in capital cases. See Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Crim. Defense Lawyers, Inc., 978 So.2d 134 (Fla.2008). However, because the rule as amended had not previously been published, we authorized a sixty-day period for interested persons to file comments with the Court and for the Supreme Court Criminal Steering Committee to file any response. That period has now expired.

The Offices of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel (OCCCRC) for all districts of Florida filed a comment to amended rule 3.112. The Steering Committee agreed with the requested changes, i.e., correcting OCCCRC’s name and making clear that individual contractors are covered by the rule. We herein adopt the requested changes. New language is indicated by underlining. The rule as set forth in the appendix shall be effective immediately upon the release of this opinion.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and CANADY, JJ., concur.

POLSTON and LABARGA, JJ., did not participate.

APPENDIX

RULE 3.112. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES

(a)-(d) [No Change]

(e) Appointment of Counsel. A court must appoint lead counsel and, upon written application and a showing of need by lead counsel, should appoint co-counsel to handle every capital trial in which the defendant is not represented by retained counsel. Lead counsel shall have the right to select co-counsel from attorneys on the lead counsel or co-counsel list. Both attorneys shall be reasonably compensated for the trial and sentencing phase. Except under extraordinary circumstances, only one attorney may be compensated for other proceedings. In capital cases in which the Public Defender or Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel is appointed, the Public Defender or Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel shall designate lead and co-counsel.

(f)-(h) [No Change]

(i) Notice of Appearance. An attorney who is retained or appointed in place of the Public Defender or Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel to represent a defendant in a capital case shall immediately file a notice of appearance certifying that he or she meets the qualifications of this rule. If the office of the Public Defender or Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel is appointed to represent the defendant, the Public Defender or Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel shall certify that the individuals or assistants assigned as lead and co-counsel meet the requirements of this rule. A notice of appearance filed under this rule shall be served on the defendant.

(j) Limitation on Caseloads.

(1) Generally. [No Change]

(2) Public Defender. If a Public Defender or Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel seeks to refuse appointment to a new capital case based on a claim of excessive caseload, the matter should be referred to the Chief Judge of the circuit or to the administrative judge as so designated by the Chief Judge. The Chief Judge or his or her designate should coordinate with the Public Defender or Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel to assess the number of attorneys involved in capital cases, evaluate the availability of prospective attorneys, and resolve any representation issues.

(k) Exceptional Circumstances. [No Change]

Committee Comments

[No Change]

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.


text:
    In re CERTIFICATION OF NEED FOR ADDITIONAL JUDGES.
    No. SC09-173.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
   QUINCE, C.J.

This opinion fulfills the constitutional obligation of this Court to determine the need for additional judges in Fiscal Year 2009-2010 and to certify our findings and recommendations concerning that need to the Legislature. Certification is “the sole mechanism established by our constitution for a systematic and uniform assessment of this need.” In re Certification of Need for Additional Judges, 889 So.2d 734, 735 (Fla.2004).

This Court finds that it must certify to the Legislature the need for additional judgeships. At the same time, this Court is mindful of and concerned by the budget reductions the court system and its justice system partners have sustained over the last year. There is limited value in certifying judicial need when the justice system, including court support staff, supplemental judicial resources, and staffing complements in state attorney and public defender offices, are being reduced to such a degree as to seriously impede the administration of justice in the courts.

This Court acknowledges that our state and our nation are experiencing an unparalleled economic crisis. During these challenging economic times the Court recognizes that all branches of government must do their share to help balance the state budget, and the judicial branch has participated in that effort. Nonetheless, there comes a time when making necessary adjustments in order to sustain budget reductions cascades into crippling the daily operations of an entire branch of government. Recent action by the Legislature in Special Session A of this year demonstrates to us the Legislature’s acknowledgment of the need to maintain funding for our court system.

In the American system of government, it is the court system that protects rights and liberties, upholds and interprets the law, and provides for the peaceful resolution of disputes. When the adequate funding of the judicial system is compromised, the consequences are tangible and potentially long-lasting. Given the fiscal challenges the state continues to face in funding, this Court has a continuing duty to inform the Legislature on the impact that elimination of court resources has on our citizens, businesses, and the timely administration of justice, even as we make this certification of need.

TRIAL COURTS

Budgetary unification of the trial courts began with an amendment to Article V of the Florida Constitution, approved by the voters in 1998, that required state funding of most court costs. The amendment demanded a greater uniformity of resources across judicial circuits under state funding, which has enhanced the equitable level of trial court services for all Floridians. In 2004, the Legislature implemented the will of the voters by funding that constitutional amendment. As a result, the quality of justice in Florida is now less dependent upon the local economy.

Since the 1998 passage of the constitutional amendment requiring budgetary unification of the court system, the Trial Court Budget Commission, chief judges, and court administrators have actively overseen the allocation and use of the state-funded court elements established in the Florida Statutes as necessary to the adjudication of cases. The result of their work is a court system that is lean, transparent, and accountable for the state funds that are allocated. Given them collective experience, these judges and court administrators understand the resources that are required to efficiently and effectively manage a modern court system. They also understand the impact on access to justice when court resources are reduced below reasonable levels, and have reported their concerns to us.

In Fiscal Year 2007-2008 and in Fiscal Year 2008-2009, the state court budget has been reduced from $491 million to $433 million, which represents a twelve percent decrease. These reductions have come from courts’ operating budgets, including expense dollars, contractual dollars, and the loss of full-time equivalent positions throughout the state courts. In order to comply with the legislative request to reduce its budget, Florida’s trial courts lost eighty-seven case managers, twenty-two magistrates, twenty-eight law clerks, eighteen due process positions (i.e., court reporters, court interpreters, and expert witnesses), and sixty-eight court administration staff. An additional twenty-one positions were eliminated in Special Session A, recently held to further reduce the Fiscal Year 2008-2009 budget. In total, 301 positions have been eliminated throughout the State Courts System, 243 of which were in the trial courts. The loss of these resources is now being felt in every community throughout Florida, and the gains made under the constitutional amendment to provide an equitable level of services in the trial courts regardless of where one lives have been compromised.

CIRCUIT COURT IMPACT

Perhaps no other group is more endangered when court resources become scarce than children and families. In particular, the loss of case managers in the family division directly impacts the level of justice afforded to children and families. Examples of matters handled in the family division include custody, visitation, paternity, child support, dependency, delinquency, termination of parental rights, and domestic and repeat violence cases. Many families involved in these proceedings have limited means and represent themselves in court. Typically, family law case managers are the stewards of cases moving through the various stages of the family court process. Case managers perform intake, screening, evaluation, monitoring, tracking, coordinating, scheduling, and referral activities. Case management functions include ensuring service of process has been successfully completed prior to scheduled hearings, providing referrals to court-ordered services such as batterer’s intervention programs, and performing coordination and tracking duties across multiple cases involving one family. Case manager functions enable cases to proceed smoothly and timely through the court process. When case manager positions are reduced or eliminated, these tasks fall upon the presiding judge. This is an inefficient use of judicial resources, delays case processing, reduces service referrals that can be made, and diminishes the amount of judge time available for adjudicating cases.

Magistrates support the adjudicatory process in the trial courts by performing certain quasi-judicial functions that are routine, computational, or managerial in nature, under the authority of the court. They are used most frequently in family divisions, and preside over hearings in family or child support cases, conduct status or case management conferences, establish attorney fees and costs, and submit recommended orders to judges. Perhaps most importantly, magistrates allow judges to devote their attention to more complex matters, providing a less costly means to process cases through the court system. This division of labor has proven to be both effective and economical. The reduction or elimination of twenty-two magistrates from the case processing equation has required judges to absorb their work. This inevitably contributes to case processing delays.

The loss of twenty-eight staff attorneys and law clerks has also impacted judicial workload and the movement of cases, especially in postconviction criminal cases, including postconviction capital cases. Law clerks provide legal research assistance to judges, including the preparation of legal memoranda and court orders. Their work enhances the adjudication of cases and improves the quality of judicial decisions by identifying and analyzing relevant laws and cases before the court. Without this resource, a judge’s ability to process cases in a qualitative and timely fashion is diminished.

An economic downturn such as the one Florida is currently experiencing increases the workload in the courts. Perhaps no other issue as clearly illustrates the relationship between an economic downturn and increased judicial workload than the mortgage foreclosure crisis. From Fiscal Year 2005-2006 to Fiscal Year 2006-2007, mortgage foreclosure filings increased by ninety-seven percent in Florida trial courts. More recent statistics show that mortgage foreclosure filings increased by 396 percent from Fiscal Year 2005-2006 to Fiscal Year 2007-2008. In fact, according to RealtyTrac, Florida has the second highest rate of mortgage foreclosures in the country. The sheer volume of mortgage foreclosure cases in our circuit civil divisions has been overwhelming. Although many chief judges have allocated additional judicial resources into the circuit civil divisions, the trial judges have been unable to keep pace with the rapid accumulation of mortgage foreclosure cases. The current clearance rate for mortgage foreclosure cases is forty-one percent. Thus, homeowners and lending institutions are experiencing delays in either getting on a judicial docket or having their cases disposed of. Communities are also impacted with properties being left vacant and uncared for during the foreclosure process. Vacant properties can lead to increases in property crimes such as burglaries or vandalism, which in turn will impact the criminal justice system.

COUNTY COURT IMPACT

The loss of funds to hire Civil Traffic Infraction Hearing Officers has had a substantial impact on the operations of the county courts. Civil Traffic Infraction Hearing Officers are members of The Florida Bar who contract with the courts to preside over civil traffic infraction hearings. They are an economical and effective resource that enables county court judges to spend more of their time adjudicating heavy county criminal and civil caseloads. The budget for traffic hearing officers was substantially reduced in the last fiscal year, and due to the uncertainty regarding additional reductions this fiscal year, no funding for this resource has been allocated during the current fiscal year. Now that Special Session A has been completed, what remains of this budget will be allocated to the circuits so that traffic hearing officers will be on line once again, although their availability will be limited. The loss of this resource on a permanent basis would be two-fold: first, county court judges would spend a larger portion of their time presiding over traffic matters; and second, more cases would be dismissed when judges cannot hear them within the required timeframe. The end result is case delay and backlog in county court and the loss of revenues resulting from fines imposed. Some chief judges also report that citizens must travel greater distances to attend traffic court when Civil Traffic Infraction Hearing Officers are no longer available in some branch courthouses; hence, citizens seeking to resolve their civil traffic infractions incur greater inconvenience and cost.

STATE ATTORNEY AND PUBLIC DEFENDER STAFFING

This Court is increasingly concerned about the relationship between the certification of new judgeships, specifically those judges who would be assigned to criminal divisions, and the staffing complements of state attorneys’ and public defenders’ offices. We relate the criminal justice system to a three-legged stool comprised of judges, state attorneys, and public defenders. If one leg is compromised, the stool cannot function as designed. Authorizing judgeships without corollary funding for state attorneys and public defenders creates an imbalance in the criminal justice system. We encourage the Legislature to provide for sufficient staffing of state attorneys’ and public defenders’ offices whenever a judgeship is authorized and designated for the criminal division.

USE OF SENIOR JUDGES AND SUSTAINED NET NEED

Florida has used a weighted caseload methodology to evaluate judicial workload since 1999. Over the last nine years we have conducted a continual evaluation of the certification process in an ongoing effort to enhance and refine it. This year we have incorporated a new feature into our methodology: the use of sustained judicial need.

In last year’s certification of need opinion we directed the Commission on Trial Court Performance and Accountability to study the use of senior judges and the implications for including senior judge availability when evaluating judicial workload. The Commission, through its Court Statistics and Workload Committee, surveyed the chief judges and analyzed how senior judges are being used in the trial courts.

In its final report on this subject, the Commission concluded that the current judicial certification framework does not assess all workload. Temporary spikes in' filings and workload due to extended absences of sitting judges have historically not been included in the calculation of judicial need. And, based on the information provided by the chief judges, it appeal's that senior judge resources are used primarily to address workload beyond the certification model.

The Commission made the following four primary recommendations to the supreme court:

1. The supreme court should not include the utilization of senior judges in its certification methodology.
2. Senior judge resources should be requested during the legislative budget process and allocated to the circuits based on all need above sustained need, including filing spikes, unanticipated vacancies, extended leave, and backlog need.
3. The supreme court should extend the judicial weighted workload model to define and calculate sustained need.
4. The Court Statistics and Workload Committee should endeavor to improve circuit level reporting on senior judge usage to achieve accountability and transparency. This enhanced reporting is a critical component of the allocation process.

The Court adopts the recommendations of the Commission and will direct the Commission to refine those areas identified in the report necessary to accomplish full implementation.

In regard to recommendation 3, above, the Court concludes that the most appropriate and valid measure of sustained judicial need in Florida is a minimum of the calculated net need over a three-year period. This three-year period will be recalculated each year to encompass the current year’s net need and the previous two years’ net need in the sustained judicial need calculation. This new methodology has been applied to this year’s certification of trial court judges. In addition, this Court has examined case filing and disposition data, analyzed various judicial workload indicators, and considered judgeship requests submitted by the lower courts. Our analysis follows.

TRIAL COURT CERTIFICATION

In Fiscal Year 2006-2007, approximately ninety-nine percent of all court filings in Florida were processed in the circuit and county courts. Trial court judges are on the front lines in dispensing justice. Their work is vital to our citizens and businesses, who expect the judicial branch to help resolve issues fairly, peaceably, expeditiously, and in a manner that promotes the rule of law.

As previously mentioned, this Court uses a case-weighting system based on accepted standards of measurement in determining the need for additional judges. The case weighting system distinguishes different types of cases and assigns different amounts of time that must be spent on each type of case, producing a total judicial need for each circuit. Additionally, we adjust for differing jury trial rates in each circuit and county and consider the actual number of judges requested by the chief judge. The resulting certification is an objective statement of what the trial courts need to responsibly meet their workload obligations.

From Fiscal Year 2005-2006 to Fiscal Year 2006-2007, filings increased by seven percent in circuit court. Growth in civil filings by thirty-eight percent is the main contributing factor to the statewide increase in circuit court. Real property and mortgage foreclosure case filings have nearly doubled from the previous fiscal year, representing an increase of 55,568 filings. Contract and indebtedness and condominium case filings have also risen considerably, seventeen percent and 147 percent respectively.

Substantial growth in filings in all felony case types also contributed to the overall rise in circuit court filings from Fiscal Year 2005-2006 to Fiscal Year 2006-2007. The largest felony case type in terms of number of filings-property crime (including burglary, theft, worthless checks, and other felonies)-increased by six percent. Additionally, capital murder and noncapital murder case filings rose by a considerable percentage, seventeen percent and twenty-two percent respectively.

County court filings experienced significant growth from Fiscal Year 2005-2006 to Fiscal Year 2006-2007, as well, with statewide filings increasing by seven percent (excluding civil traffic infractions). Growth in civil filings was the main contributing factor to the statewide increase in county court, with overall civil filings rising by thirteen percent. County court cases involving small claims (up to $5,000) and civil ($5,001 to $15,000) increased by twenty-two percent and seventeen percent respectively. In county criminal, statewide filings grew by four percent, which included a four percent increase in misdemeanors and a twenty-three percent increase in county ordinance case filings.

In light of the foregoing considerations, this Court certifies the need for twenty-nine new circuit court judges for Fiscal Year 2009-2010, distributed as follows:

1. Five additional circuit court judges for the First Judicial Circuit;
2. Four additional circuit court judges for the Fifth Judicial Circuit;
3. Three additional circuit court judges for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit;
4. Two additional circuit court judges each for the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Nineteenth Judicial Circuits; and
5. One additional circuit court judge each for the Second, Eighth, Eleventh, Fifteenth, and Eighteenth Judicial Circuits.

We also certify the need for thirty-nine new county court judges for Fiscal Year 2009-2010, as follows:

1. Six additional county court judges each for Duval, Miami-Dade, and Broward Counties;
2. Five additional county court judges each for Hillsborough and Palm Beach Counties;
3. Two additional county court judges each for Volusia and Orange Counties; and
4. One additional county court judge each for Columbia, Marion, Alachua, Polk, Brevard, St. Lucie, and Lee Counties.

In addition to the judges certified today, we specifically reviewed requests from chief judges to certify two circuit judges in the Ninth and Eleventh Judicial Circuits and to certify one circuit judge in the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits. We note that the sustained judicial need is less than 0.5 for each of those requested judgeships. We have determined that in the absence of special circumstances, we must deny these requests.

We also reviewed requests from chief judges to certify additional county court judges for Escambia, Okaloosa, Duval, Citrus, Lake, St. Johns, Orange, Osceola, Highlands, Polk, Manatee, Sarasota, Bay, Broward, Brevard, Seminole, St. Lucie, Collier, and Lee Counties. We have determined that in the absence of special circumstances, we must deny these requests as well.

DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL CERTIFICATION

Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.240(b)(2) delineates the criteria for certifying the need for additional judges in the district courts of appeal. Based on these criteria, we do not certify the need for any additional district court judges. Our determination is bolstered by the fact that the district courts have not requested the certification of any additional judgeships this year.

Our analysis indicates that the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal have the highest weighted caseloads per judge. In Fiscal Year 2007-2008 the weighted caseload per judge in the Second District was 312 and in the Fourth District was 302. Even though qualified for the certification of a judgeship, neither district is requesting one in the face of the current budget situation and staffing shortages. As the chief judge of the Second District observed, “Recent reductions in this court’s salary and benefits budget have made it impossible to fully staff the fourteen judges who currently serve on the court. Since the beginning of FY 2008-09 on July 1, four of our judges have functioned with less than the full complement of two staff attorneys in their suites.” He further states, “At the same time, two of our Central Staff attorney positions are unfilled and will remain so for the remainder of the fiscal year.” The chief judge also notes that “it is impossible to predict the precise impact of this understaffing,” but estimates that “fully one-fifth of the cases filed in our court this fiscal year will go unassigned for lack of professional staff.” Similar observations were shared with this Court by the chief judge of the Fourth District Court of Appeal. We share the concerns of the chief judges of the district courts and offer the above examples to the Legislature as evidence of the real impact the budget reductions are having on the district courts of appeal and consequently the citizens of Florida.

CONCLUSION

This opinion fulfills this Court’s constitutional obligation to determine the need for additional judges in Fiscal Year 2009-2010. It also reflects the court system’s commitment to continually monitor and evaluate judicial workload by incorporating refinements to our methodology. We believe that the sustained judicial need issue described in this opinion will enhance the long-term assessment of judicial need and better reflect the manner in which valued resources are being used in the courts. We thank the Commission on Trial Court Performance and Accountability and the Court Statistics and Workload Committee for their ongoing efforts to improve the evaluation of judicial workload.

Florida’s court system remains among the finest in the country. Our judges serve a vital role in keeping our courts open and accessible to all. Yet the demands on our judiciary from sustained growth in cases and demands for access cannot be efficiently and effectively met because of the significant loss of court resources. With the $49 million budget reduction the courts have experienced over the last two fiscal years, judicial dockets are full, scheduling is problematic, and case processing times are delayed. Clearance rates are falling and backlogs are developing. Unfortunately, we anticipate that this trend will continue unless further steps are taken to stabilize court funding.

Although we have identified our judicial need in this opinion, our primary concern at this time is with the reductions to court support staff and supplemental resources. Florida’s court system can ill afford to sustain any further reductions to the statutorily defined court elements. To do so would undermine the administration of justice. We are encouraged by the creation of the State Courts Revenue Trust Fund in Special Session A as an initial positive step by the Legislature to address the courts’ funding needs.

We submit this opinion recognizing that the State of Florida is experiencing difficult economic times. This Court strongly encourages the Legislature to maintain court funding at a level that allows the court system to meet its constitutional obligations. In better economic times, we encourage the Legislature to authorize the circuit and county court judgeships certified in this opinion.

It is so ordered.

WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.

      . Article V, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides in pertinent part:
      Determination of number of judges. — The supreme court shall establish by rule uniform criteria for the determination of the need for additional judges except supreme court justices, the necessity for decreasing the number of judges and for increasing, decreasing or redefining appellate districts and judicial circuits. If the supreme court finds that a need exists for increasing or decreasing the number of judges or increasing, decreasing or redefining appellate districts and judicial circuits, it shall, prior to the next regular session of the legislature, certify to the legislature its findings and recommendations concerning such need.

      . RealtyTrac is an online realtor website that tracks mortgage foreclosures by state and may be found at www.realtytrac.com.

      . RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 Percent in 2008, http://www.realtytrac.com/ foreclosure/foreclosure-rates.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).

      . A recently completed study by The Washington Economics Group, Inc., has estimated delay in processing mortgage foreclosure cases costs Florida’s economy $17 billion a year. The Economic Impacts of Inadequate Funding for Florida Courts, http://www. floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources/nsf/ Attachment.

      .In Fiscal Year 2006-2007, Civil Traffic Infraction Hearing Officers heard more than 413,000 cases in Florida.

      . See In re Amended Certification of Need for Additional Judges, 980 So.2d 1045 (Fla.2008).

      . Office of State Courts Administrator, Recommendations on Senior Judge Resources in the Judicial Weighted Workload Model, (2008) (prepared for the Trial Court Performance and Accountability Commission by the Office of the State Courts Administrator), available at http://www. ilcourts.org/gen_pub-lic/pubs/bin/JudgeResourceReport.pdf.

      . This system was developed in response to the proviso language of the 1998 General Appropriations Act, in which the Legislature directed that the judicial branch employ a certification methodology that relies on case weights and calculations of available judge time to determine the need for additional trial court judges. See ch. 98-422, § 7, at 3963, Laws of Fla. Pursuant to this direction, the judicial branch undertook an extensive project to design and implement a weighted caseload system, assisted by the National Center for State Courts and endorsed by the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability.

      . Also important to note is that the current case weights factor in the availability of other court resources in the disposition of cases. Continued reductions in staff resources increase judicial time spent on each case and could result in the need for even more judges than what the current methodology reflects.

      . Total judicial need is the total number of judges required to complete all expected workload. Net judicial need is the difference between the total judicial need and the number of existing judges. Sustained net need is defined as constant need over time.

      . The number established in the rule, 280, does not represent the filings per judge but is a weighted threshold calculated according to the process described in the 2005 report of the Commission on District Court of Appeal Performance and Accountability. Supreme Court of Florida Commission on District Court of Appeal Performance and Accountability, DCA Workload Report to the Supreme Court (2005), available at http://www.ilcourts. org/gen_public/court-services/CourtServices PandA.shtml.

      . Certification request letter from Slevan T. Northcutt, Chief Judge, Second District Court of Appeal, to Chair, District Court of Appeal, Budget Commission (Aug. 15, 2008) (on file with Office of State Courts Administrator).


text:
    Robert BUTLER, Petitioner, v. Henry YUSEM, et al., Respondents.
    No. SC07-2306.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    John R. Beranek of Ausley and McMul-len, Tallahassee, FL, H. Michael Easley of Jones, Foster, Johnston, and Stubbs, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, and Richard H. Wllits, Lake Worth, FL, for Petitioner.

      Henry Yusem, pro se, Brian Yusem, pro se, and H.Y. (Wyncreek), Inc., pro se, Boca Raton, FL, and Andrew Carlton, pro se, Sapphire, NC, for Respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

Butler seeks review of Yusem v. Butler, 966 So.2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), arguing that the Fourth District Court of Appeal erred in holding that (1) his claims for fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty were barred by a failure to show justifiable reliance; and (2) he was not entitled to prejudgment interest on attorneys’ fees. We agree.

The trial court found that Butler could not recover on his claims of fraud, negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty due to his failure to show due diligence. Yusem, 966 So.2d at 412. On appeal, the Fourth District agreed with Butler by noting that a lack of due diligence could not bar his recovery because the defendants failed to plead this affirmative defense. Id. But the Fourth District then concluded that the trial court “misapplied the term ‘due diligence’ to express its conclusion that Butler did not justifiably rely on representations made by the Appellants” and, on that basis, affirmed that Butler could not recover. Id.

Although a lack of due diligence could not bar Butler’s claims, the Fourth District erred by recharacterizing the trial court’s ruling as a lack of justifiable reliance. We remand for the Fourth District to address whether it may apply justifiable reliance under the tipsy coachman doctrine to affirm the trial court. On remand, if the Fourth District concludes that it may rely on the tipsy coachman doctrine, the Fourth District must address Butler’s claims individually to determine whether justifiable reliance applies to each claim. In its decision under review, the Fourth District lumped Butler’s claims for fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty together and then applied the justifiable reliance requirement to all his claims.

In addition, the Fourth District should have awarded Butler interest on some of his fees. See generally Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212, 214 (Fla.1985). Prejudgment interest begins to accrue on “the date the entitlement to attorney fees is fixed through agreement, arbitration award, or court determination.” Quality Eng’d Installation, Inc. v. Higley S. Inc., 670 So.2d 929, 930-31 (Fla.1996). Yet the result of the Fourth District’s ruling is that even fees incurred as damages are not subject to prejudgment interest. See Yusem, 966 So.2d at 414. While some of Butler’s fees do not warrant prejudgment interest because his entitlement does not arise until he becomes a prevailing party, section 8 of the Guarantee and Indemnification Agreement between Butler and Yusem allows for recovery of fees incurred on behalf of the partnership and no such “prevailing party” provision applies. Thus, the Fourth District erred by not awarding prejudgment interest on the fees Butler incurred in the FDIC litigation, because those fees were fixed when paid and Butler’s recovery was not contingent on his status as a prevailing party.

Accordingly, we quash the Fourth District’s decision in Yusem to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion and remand for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.

      . Because the underlying facts of this case are laid out in great detail in Yusem, we do not repeat them here. We have conflict jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

      . From our review of the record, it is clear that the trial court applied the defense of due diligence, not lack of justifiable reliance. Indeed, its order repeatedly used the term "due diligence.”

      . See, e.g., Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 906 (Fla.2002) ("[T]he 'tipsy coachman’ doctrine allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that 'reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons' so long as 'there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.' " (quoting Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 644-45 (Fla.1999))).

      .Section 11.4 of the Limited Partnership Agreement states that Butler may only recover attorneys' fees if he is the prevailing party in "any matter.” The prevailing party clause also bars recovery under section 13 of the Guarantee and Indemnification Agreement. See Yusem, 966 So.2d at 408.

      . Specifically, section 8 provides:
      In addition to his other obligations under the Guaranty, Guarantor also hereby agrees to indemnify, defend, protect and hold [Butler] harmless from and against (a) any and all liability, loss, claims of third parties, costs, damage and expense (including reasonable attorneys' fees) that [Butler] may incur or sustain as a result of or in connection with the actions of HY/Inc. as General Partner under the Limited Partnership Agreement or otherwise under the Contracts or in connection with the Partnership, and (b) any loss of any benefit that would have inured to the benefit of [Butler] had Guarantor been a party to any of the Contracts in place of HY/Inc.

      . In that suit, Butler paid $1.72 million to settle a claim with the FDIC and incurred substantial fees on behalf of the partnership. Yusem, 966 So.2d at 409-10.


text:
    LEHTINEN, VARGAS & RIEDI, P.A., et al., Petitioners, v. Glenn F. STRAUB, Respondent.
    No. SC08-110.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    Shelley J. Leinicke of Wicker, Smith, O’Hara, McCoy, and Ford, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and William F. Fink of Wicker, Smith, O’Hara, McCoy, and Ford, P.A., Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
    Larry A. Zink of Zink, Zink and Zink Co., L.P.A., Hillsboro Beach, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Straub v. Lehtinen, Vargas Riedi, P.A., 980 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal recognized the viability of a false light invasion of privacy cause of action but certified the following question as one of great public importance: “Does Florida recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy, and if so, are the elements of the tort set forth in section 652E of Restatement (Second) of Torts?” Straub, 980 So.2d at 1087. The Fourth District had previously certified the same question in Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 944 So.2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), quashed, 997 So.2d 1098 (Fla.2008). When the Fourth District issued its decision in Straub, Jews for Jesus was pending review in this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

We stayed proceedings in this case pending disposition of Jews for Jesus, in which we ultimately declined to recognize false light as a viable cause of action in this State, answered the certified question in the negative, and quashed the Fourth District’s underlying Jews for Jesus decision. See Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So.2d 1098, 1115 (Fla.2008). We thus issued an order in the present case directing respondent to show cause why we should not exercise jurisdiction, summarily quash the Fourth District’s Straub decision and remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Jews for Jesus. Respondent did not respond to that order. We conclude that the Fourth District’s opinion in Straub, in which the Fourth District recognized a cause of action for false light, is inconsistent with this Court’s opinion in Jews for Jesus.

We accordingly grant the petition for review in the present case, quash the decision under review, and remand to the Fourth District for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in Jews for Jesus.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.


text:
    Robert E. DRAGON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC06-2001.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    John R. Blue and Stephanie Zimmerman of Carlton Fields, P.A., St. Petersburg, Florida, and Alina Alonso of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Dragon v. State, 937 So.2d 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in King v. State, 911 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), and the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Kidd v. State, 855 So.2d 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

We stayed the present case pending our disposition of Saintelien v. State, 990 So.2d 494 (Fla.2008), in which we ultimately approved the decisions of the Second and Fifth District Courts in King and Kidd “to the extent that a rule 3.800(a) motion may be used to challenge a sexual predator designation when it is apparent from the face of the record that the defendant did not meet the criteria for designation as a sexual predator.” Saintelien, 990 So.2d at 497.

We have determined to exercise jurisdiction and grant the petition for review in the present case. The decision under review is quashed, and this matter is remanded to the Fourth District Court for reconsideration upon application of this Court’s decision in Saintelien.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.


text:
    K.Q.S., etc., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC08-408.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Mary Jane Lord, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Giselle Lylen Rivera, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We initially accepted review of the decision in K.Q.S. v. State, 975 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), based on certified conflict with J.D. v. State, 954 So.2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Upon further consideration, we exercise our discretion and deny jurisdiction. Accordingly, we hereby discharge jurisdiction and dismiss this review proceeding.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J, and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.

POLSTON, J., recused.


text:
    Brian LOWRY, Petitioner, v. CENTRAL LEASING MANAGEMENT, INC., et al., Respondents.
    No. SC08-1543.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    Susan W. Fox of Fox and Loquasto, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Petitioner.
    Hinda Klein of Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel, Lurvey, Morrow and Sche-fer, P.A., Hollywood, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Lowry v. Central Leasing Management, Inc., 33 Fla. L. Weekly D1241, — So.3d-, 2008 WL 1930055 (Fla. 1st DCA May 5, 2008), in which the First District Court of Appeal cited as authority its decision in Murray v. Manners Health/ACE USA, 946 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), quashed, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008). See also Lowry v. Central Leasing Management, Inc., 988 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (additionally certifying a question of great public importance). When the First District issued its decision in Lowry, its Murray decision was pending review in this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § (3)(b)(3)-(4), Fla. Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981).

We stayed proceedings in this case pending our disposition of Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008), in which we quashed the First District’s underlying Murray decision. When our de-cisión in Murray became final, we issued an order directing respondents in the present case to show cause why we should not exercise jurisdiction, summarily quash the decision being reviewed, and remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Murray. Respondents in their response concede that we should so proceed.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for review in this case, quash the decision below, and remand for reconsideration upon application of our decision in Murray.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.


text:
    Carlos MACIAS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC07-1229.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    Carlos Macias, pro se, Wewahitchka, Florida, for Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Macias v. State, 956 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal cited as authority its decision in Saintelien v. State, 937 So.2d 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), approved in result, 990 So.2d 494 (Fla.2008). At the time the Fourth District Court issued its decision in Macias, its Saintelien decision was pending review in this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V; § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981).

We stayed the present case pending our disposition of Saintelien, in which we ultimately held that “a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence may be used to challenge a sexual predator designation, but limit our holding to cases where it is apparent from the face of the record that the defendant did not meet the criteria for designation as a sexual predator.” Saintelien v. State, 990 So.2d 494, 495 (Fla.2008). In so holding, we approved the result the Fourth District Court’s underlying Saintelien decision. See id. at 497.

We have determined to accept jurisdiction and grant the petition for review in the present case. The decision under review is quashed, and this matter is remanded to the Fourth District Court for reconsideration upon review of the record and application of this Court’s decision in Saintelien.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. David Dwayne BROWN, Respondent.
    No. SC07-2247.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.

      Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, Bureau Chief, and Ansley E. Peacock, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Howard K. Blumberg, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Brown v. State, 967 So.2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Garzon v. State, 939 So.2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), approved, 980 So.2d 1038 (Fla.2008). At the time the Third District issued its decision in Brown, Garzon was pending review in this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

We stayed proceedings in this case pending disposition of Garzon, in which we ultimately approved the Fourth District’s underlying Garzon decision. See Garzon v. State, 980 So.2d 1038 (Fla.2008). We thereafter issued an order in this case directing respondent to show cause why we should not accept jurisdiction, summarily quash the decision being reviewed, and remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Garzón. Upon reviewing respondent’s response and petitioner’s reply thereto, we issued an order accepting jurisdiction and ordering merits briefing. Petitioner thus filed its initial brief and respondent his answer brief, whereupon petitioner filed a motion to strike respondent’s answer brief.

In considering the motion, the Court had occasion to review anew the cases at issue and the parties’ response and reply to our order to show cause. Upon reevaluation, we have determined that merits briefing is unnecessary and that the Court should proceed, as it originally intended, to summarily quash the decision being reviewed and remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Garzón. We have already accepted jurisdiction by order. The decision under review is quashed, and this matter is remanded to the Third District for reconsideration upon application of this Court’s decision in Garzón. Petitioner’s motion to strike respondent’s answer brief is accordingly denied as moot.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.


text:
    Bettye PITTMAN, Petitioner, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Respondents.
    No. SC08-352.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    Philip M. Burlington of Burlington and Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, and Randall T. Porcher of Gonzalez, Porcher, Garcia, Albear, and Roca, Lake Worth, FL, for Petitioner.

      Jerry K. McKim and Kurt A. Wyland of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder, and Carson, LLP, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Pittman v. Palm Beach County School District, 972 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), in which the First District Court of Appeal cited as authority its decision in Murray v. Mariners Health/ACE USA, 946 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), quashed, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008). When the First District issued its decision in Pittman, its Murray decision was pending review in this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § (3)(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981).

We stayed proceedings in this case pending our disposition of Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008), in which we quashed the First District’s underlying Murray decision. When our decision in Murray became final, we issued an order directing respondents in the present case to show cause why we should not accept jurisdiction, summarily quash the decision being reviewed, and remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Murray. Upon review of respondents’ response and petitioner’s reply thereto, we have determined to so proceed.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for review in this case, quash the decision below, and remand for reconsideration upon application of our decision in Murray.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.


text:
    Maria BUITRAGO, Petitioner, v. LANDRY’S, et al., Respondents.
    No. SC07-762.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    Susan W. Fox of Fox and Loquasto, P.A., Tampa, FL, and Wendy S. Loquasto of Fox and Loquasto, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
    No Appearance for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Buitrago v. Landry’s, 949 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), in which the First District Court of Appeal certified a question of great public importance. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § (3)(b)(4), Fla. Const.

We stayed proceedings in this case pending our disposition of Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008). When our Murray decision became final, we issued an order directing respondents in the present case to show cause why we should not exercise jurisdiction, summarily quash the decision being reviewed, and remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Murray. Respondents did not file a response.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for review in this ease, quash the decision below, and remand for reconsideration upon application of our decision in Murray.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.


text:
    Victor RIVERA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC07-936.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Shannon Patricia McKenna, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, Bureau Chief, and Douglas J. Glaid, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We initially accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Rivera v. State, 954 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), review granted, 968 So.2d 557 (Fla.2007) (table), based on express and direct conflict with the decisions of the other district courts in Hinkel v. State, 937 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), Briggs v. State, 929 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), Reed v. State, 810 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), Henderson v. State, 720 So.2d 1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), Tillman v. State, 693 So.2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), Silverstein v. State, 654 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), and Van Ellis v. State, 455 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. After further, full consideration, we have determined that we should exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction. Accordingly, this review proceeding is dismissed.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.


text:
    Murray BREITBERG, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC07-13.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 26, 2009.
    Murray Breitberg, pro se, South Bay, FL, for Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Breitberg v. State, 942 So.2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal cited as authority its decision in Saintelien v. State, 937 So.2d 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), approved in result, 990 So.2d 494 (Fla.2008), and certified conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in King v. State, 911 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), and the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in King v. State, 855 So.2d 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). At the time the Fourth District Court issued its decision in Breitberg, its Saintelien decision was pending review in this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

We stayed the present case pending our disposition of Saintelien, in which we ultimately approved in result the Fourth District Court’s underlying Saintelien decision, and approved the decisions of the Second and Fifth District Courts in King and Kidd “to the extent that a rule 3.800(a) motion may be used to challenge a sexual predator designation when it is apparent from the face of the record that the defendant did not meet the criteria for designation as a sexual predator.” Saintelien v. State, 990 So.2d 494, 497 (Fla. 2008).

We have determined to exercise jurisdiction and grant the petition for review in the present case. The decision under review is quashed, and this matter is remanded to the Fourth District Court for reconsideration upon review of the record and application of this Court’s decision in Saintelien.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.