author: MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

text:
    John H. ANDERSON v. The MISSISSIPPI BAR
    NO. 2018-BR-00911-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    December 6, 2018
    ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER: CHARLES E. LAWRENCE, JR.
    ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: ADAM BRADLEY KILGORE, Jackson
    EN BANC.
   MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. John H. Anderson petitions for reinstatement to the practice of law following a six-month suspension. After review, we find his petition does not adequately state the cause for his suspension, which is a jurisdictional requirement for reinstatement. We thus deny his petition for reinstatement.

Procedural History

¶ 2. On November 30, 2017, the Complaint Tribunal appointed by this Court found the Mississippi Bar had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Anderson had violated Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 8.1(b) by failing to respond to the Bar's lawful demands for information. The Complaint Tribunal further found Anderson had violated Rules 8.4(a) and (d) by committing misconduct in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Tribunal suspended Anderson from the practice of law for six months.

¶ 3. The only way to be reinstated following a suspension of six months or longer is to petition this Court. Miss. R. Discipline 12(a). Anderson originally filed his petition on June 22, 2018. Because Anderson's petition fell short of the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 12.7, the Bar moved to dismiss it. See Miss. R. Discipline 12.7.

¶ 4. Anderson responded to the Bar's motion to dismiss with a motion to amend his petition. He attached his proposed amended petition to his motion. The Bar did not object to Anderson's amending his petition. Rather, it responded as if Anderson's petition had already been amended. But it still took the view that Anderson's petition, as amended, failed to contain the jurisdictional matters required by Rule 12.7. With no objection from the Bar, we deny its motion to dismiss Anderson's original petition filed June 22, 2018. And we grant Anderson's motion to amend and consider the amended petition he filed July 17, 2018.

Discussion

¶ 5. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over attorney reinstatements and "review[s] the evidence in disciplinary matters de novo on a case-by-case basis as triers of fact." In re Benson , 890 So.2d 888, 889 (Miss. 2004). The petitioner carries the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence "that he has rehabilitated himself and established the requisite moral character to entitle him to the privilege of practicing law." Id. (citing In re Holleman , 826 So.2d 1243, 1246 (Miss. 2002) ); Wong v. Miss. Bar , 5 So.3d 369, 371 (Miss. 2008).

¶ 6. "The petitioner must demonstrate this by meeting the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 12." In re Benson , 890 So.2d at 890. Rule 12 requires the petitioner to:

(1) state the cause or causes for suspension;
(2) give the name and current address of all persons, parties, firms, or legal entities who suffered pecuniary loss due to the improper conduct;
(3) make full amends and restitution,
(4) show that he has the necessary moral character for the practice of law; and
(5) demonstrate the requisite legal education to be reinstated to the privilege of practicing law.

Id. Also, while not a jurisdictional requirement, this Court considers the Bar's position when deciding to grant or deny the petition for reinstatement. Id.

I. Cause for Suspension

¶ 7. Significantly, Anderson's amended petition does not state the cause for his suspension. Instead, it merely says he violated Rules 8.1(b), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d). But this Court has been clear-"a mere recitation of the rules is not sufficient to satisfy this jurisdictional requirement." Russell v. Miss. Bar , 255 So.3d 136, 137 (Miss. 2017) (citing In re Asher , 987 So.2d 954, 959 (Miss. 2008) ). In Russell , this Court concluded the suspended attorney had "not provided a meaningful explanation of her actions that led to her suspension." Id. The same is true for Anderson's amended petition.

¶ 8. Anderson did not provide the Court a copy of the Complaint Tribunal's order suspending him. Nor, in explaining why he was suspended, does he describe the actions that led to his client's filing an informal bar complaint, which in turn resulted in a formal bar complaint against him. Instead, he broadly attributes his suspension to his "failure to cooperate," which he claims was "multifaceted." Later in his petition, Anderson asserts "[t]hat while this has not been a single and isolated incident as far as discipline is concerned, the case which resulted in the suspension as well as the majority of the other incidents have resulted from overextension and/or being overzealous."

¶ 9. Though this may be true in a general sense, Anderson's petition "fail[s] to provide a clear description of the improper actions that led to [his] suspension." Russell , 255 So.3d at 137. The record from the disciplinary proceeding reveals that Anderson's client, Diane Keller, had filed an informal complaint after she received only $1,500 of what she thought was a $2,500 settlement for her minor son's personal-injury lawsuit. Anderson never responded to the Bar's multiple requests for information regarding this complaint. But following a formal complaint, he did appear at a hearing before the Complaint Tribunal. And at that hearing Anderson admitted there had never really been a settlement. Instead, despite assuring Keller that her son's case was "going good," Anderson had failed to issue a summons and serve the defendant with the complaint. The action was dismissed for failure to prosecute. A year after dismissal, when Keller called for an update, Anderson reassured her the case was still "going good" and that he had $2,500 for her. Anderson then sent Keller a check from his personal bank account for $1,500, later claiming to the Tribunal that he had taken a forty percent "contingency fee" from the "settlement."

¶ 10. In stating why he was suspended, Anderson makes no mention of the Keller matter and the actions leading to his being disciplined. Thus, he has not satisfied this jurisdictional requirement.

II. Names and Addresses of Those Who Suffered Pecuniary Loss and Amends and Restitution

¶ 11. Anderson does, however, reference Keller when addressing the next two jurisdictional requirements-giving the name and current address of all persons, parties, firms, or legal entities who suffered pecuniary loss due to the improper conduct, and making full amends and restitution. Anderson asserts "[t]he only person which [he] he believe[s] could have pecuniary loss, is the person filing the Informal Complaint"-i.e., Keller. The Complaint Tribunal never found Keller had suffered any pecuniary loss. Nor did it order Anderson to pay Keller the $1,000 she had been led to believe she would receive. Anderson claims the Tribunal's "silen[ce] on this issue" left him "in a quandary as to any further need to pay any monies in an attempt to make [Keller] whole." So at the same time he filed his petition for reinstatement, Anderson forwarded Keller a personal check for $1,000 to "cover any amount which he believes could be in question" in order to address any issues regarding the full-amends and restitution requirement.

¶ 12. While Anderson may have intended to make amends, his subsequent actions do not negate his original misconduct. Based on Keller's informal complaint, the Bar originally suspected Anderson may have withheld client funds. But the disciplinary hearing revealed there were never any settlement funds in the first place. So Anderson's misconduct was not short-changing Keller on her non-existent settlement. It was his failing to prosecute her case, hiding that it had been dismissed, and then making her believe he had received a settlement on her behalf.

¶ 13. Sending Keller more money neither rectifies the underlying issue that led to suspension, nor does it evidence rehabilitation. In his cover letter to Keller, Anderson wrote, "I tend to recall discussion [sic] that you may have expected the entire Twenty Five Hundred Dollars ($2500.00) rather than the 60% or One Thousand Five Hundred ($1,500.00) which I forwarded you. " (Emphasis added.) In other words, Anderson perpetuates the misperception that the money he sent his client was a forwarded settlement payment from the defendant, instead of coming clean to Keller that her case was dismissed because he did not prosecute it.

¶ 14. While Anderson has not necessarily failed to meet these two jurisdictional requirements, his means of providing "restitution" to Keller-which essentially mirrored the actions that led to his suspension-sullies his petition for reinstatement.

III. Requisite Moral Character and Legal Education

¶ 15. Anderson has presented evidence that he has the requisite moral character and legal education to return to the practice of law-the last two jurisdictional requirements. In connection with Anderson's petition, several attorneys and clients have filed letters of support. From these letters, it appears Anderson is very well-meaning and sincere in his desire to help his clients by regaining his law license. Anderson has also attached certificates of completion from several continuing-education seminars, evidencing his desire to stay current in his legal knowledge.

IV. Bar's Position

¶ 16. That said, in his amended petition, Anderson concedes that this most recent disciplinary action "has caused [him] to conclude that [he has] no place in the all day, everyday practice of law" and does "not desire to return to the same." Instead, he requests reinstatement merely "to return and attempt to finish the cases for persons who had sought my services prior to November 30, 2017."

¶ 17. In the Bar's view, Anderson appears to be seeking a "limited" license to work on a few non-contested matters that he was unable to complete before suspension. The Bar strongly opposes this request. Instead, the Bar asserts, "The license to practice law in this state is a continuing proclamation by the Supreme Court that the holder is fit to be entrusted with professional and judicial matters." Miss. R. Discipline, Grounds for Discipline. We agree with this notion and emphasize that there is no recognized manner for reinstatement to the practice of law on a limited basis.

Conclusion

¶ 18. Because Anderson's amended petition fails to meet the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 12, we deny his request for reinstatement.

¶ 19. PETITION OF JOHN HUBERT ANDERSON FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI IS DENIED.

WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH AND KITCHENS, P.JJ., KING, COLEMAN, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.

      Miss. R. Discipline 12.7; In re Benson , 890 So.2d 888, 890 (Miss. 2004).

      In its opinion, the Complaint Tribunal noted Anderson had "an extensive disciplinary history including two informal admonitions, five public reprimands, and one suspension of forty-five days."

      Anderson claims this problem was exacerbated when he entered the ministry in 1989 and sought to be both a pastor and lawyer.

      Anderson agreed to represent Keller's minor son in 1996. In 2002, the son died in an unrelated accident, and Keller became administratix of his estate, of which the tort claim was an asset. Anderson did not file the personal-injury lawsuit until 2007. It was dismissed two years later in 2009.

      Anderson does not provide Keller's full name or current address in the body of his amended petition. But he does attach to his amended a petition a cover letter that he mailed to Keller, along with a $1,000 check. So technically, his amended petition does provide this information.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KING, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

license: Public Domain

text:
    Officer Joe EDNEY in His Individual and Official Capacities v. Carlos WILLIAMS
    NO. 2017-IA-00485-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    December 13, 2018
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ANDREW N. ALEXANDER, III, Greenville
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CARLOS EUGENE MOORE, Grenada
    BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., KING AND ISHEE, JJ.
   KING, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Officer Joe Edney appeals from the trial court's holding that Carlos Williams had established good cause for his failure to serve process within the statutory time period. We find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider in its analysis of good cause Williams's four-and-a-half-year delay in pursuing this action. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision and remand this case to the trial court to include the length of delay in its analysis of good cause.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On or about February 8, 2008, while employed in the Special Operations Unit with the Greenville Police Department, Officer Edney was involved in the arrest of Williams. Williams alleged that Officer Edney had attempted to stop a vehicle in which Williams had been a passenger. The driver of the vehicle continued driving for approximately four blocks, then stopped the vehicle, exited, and started running. Williams also ran until Officer Edney demanded that he stop. Williams stated that after he surrendered, Officer Edney began screaming at him obscenities, threats, and racial slurs. Williams alleged that Officer Edney then sprayed Williams with mace and kicked and stomped Williams in the face, neck, and shoulder, causing him injuries.

¶ 3. On March 11, 2010, Williams filed a complaint against Officer Edney, in his individual and official capacities, in the Washington County Circuit Court. Corporal Vernon Jackson, now deceased, was to serve process on Officer Edney. Corporal Jackson indicated on the return of service that personal service had been made on Officer Edney on March 29, 2010.

¶ 4. On July 16, 2010, Williams filed an application for entry of default, stating that Officer Edney had failed to respond to the complaint. The circuit clerk docketed the entry of default judgment that same day. Williams then filed a motion for default judgment on the issue of liability and for a trial setting on the issue of damages. The circuit court entered default judgment on liability on November 18, 2010, and ordered a separate hearing to be held to determine damages. Although the hearing on damages originally was set to commence June 3, 2011, counsel for Williams requested and was granted a continuance.

¶ 5. For reasons unclear from the record, the case remained stagnant until four and a half years after the entry of default judgment. On April 30, 2015, the circuit court entered an order stating that because Williams had failed to notify or name the City of Greenville as a party, the claims against Officer Edney in his official capacity must be dismissed. The trial court then awarded damages in favor of Williams against Officer Edney individually in the amount of $6,000, in addition to $3,000 in attorneys' fees and $300 in costs.

¶ 6. On July 30, 2015, Officer Edney filed a Motion and Memorandum for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of the motion, Officer Edney stated that, on or about July 5, 2015, he checked his mailbox in Boyle, Mississippi, and found a "Final Judgment" in this action. The attorney for Williams had sent the final judgment to the Greenville Police Department, which had forwarded the judgment to Officer Edney. Officer Edney averred that receipt of the judgment was the first time he became aware that a lawsuit had been filed. Because Officer Edney had not been personally served with process, he contended that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over him. Instead, Officer Edney alleged that Corporal Jackson had delivered the summons and complaint to another Greenville Police Department employee, Yolanda Netterville. He stated that Netterville's signature, not his, appeared on the proof of service. Officer Edney stated that he had never authorized Netterville to receive service of process for him. Thus, Officer Edney argued the default judgment entered against him was void.

¶ 7. Angelia Sorrell, the records clerk for the Washington County Sheriff's Department, submitted an affidavit stating that Netterville's signature appeared on the proof of service. She also wrote that a notation in the docket book located at the sheriff's department indicated that Corporal Jackson had not served Officer Edney but that he had served Netterville instead. Sorrell averred that she had mailed the service of process to the Moore Law Office on March 30, 2010. Sorrell then submitted a supplemental affidavit and certification of record, in which she certified and authenticated a page from the Washington County Sheriff's Department Civil Docket Book 45, Page 59. The page in the docket book stated under the column "How Executed" that Corporal Jackson had "served Yolanda Netterville."

¶ 8. Netterville submitted an affidavit stating that in 2010, she had been employed by the Greenville Police Department as a clerk. She stated that her signature appeared on the first page of the Summons under the language, "I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THIS PROCESS THIS DATE." Netterville stated that Officer Edney had never authorized her to accept service of process or any other document on his behalf. She further stated,

My practice, when I was served with a summons or other document issued for another Greenville Police Department employee was, after signing for receipt of the document, I would place it in the "in-box" for the department in which the employee worked. I presume that I did this with regard to Officer Edney's Summons and Complaint. I have no knowledge concerning what subsequently happened to the documents, or whether [O]fficer Edney ever saw them.

Williams submitted a response in opposition to the motion, arguing that the signature on the front of the summons was unclear and that Officer Edney's name could not be ruled out. Further, Williams argued that no objective evidence had been presented to show that Netterville did not have authority to accept service on Officer Edney's behalf.

¶ 9. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on September 9, 2015. The court found that Officer Edney's motion for relief from judgment was well-taken and held that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over Officer Edney because of improper service of process. The court ordered the entry of default, the default judgment, and the order of the court awarding damages to be set aside. Counsel for Williams immediately made an ore tenus motion for an additional 120 days within which to serve Officer Edney with a copy of the summons and complaint. The trial court reserved ruling and ordered the parties to brief the issue of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for Williams handed a copy of the summons and complaint to Officer Edney.

¶ 10. Subsequently, Officer Edney filed a motion to dismiss, in which he argued that the three-year statute of limitations of Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49 had expired. Williams contended that he should be allowed to begin the lawsuit anew because he had demonstrated a good-faith effort to serve Officer Edney. The trial court found in favor of Williams, holding that Williams had established good cause by showing that he had a reasonable belief that service had been made properly within the statutory period. The trial court granted Williams an additional thirty days from September 6, 2016, to serve process in this case.

¶ 11. Williams then served process on Officer Edney on October 11, 2016, five days after the extension period had expired. On November 8, 2016, Officer Edney filed a motion to quash the untimely summons and to dismiss the action with prejudice. Williams filed a motion for extension of time to serve Officer Edney on November 18, 2016, stating that counsel for Williams had "suffered five death threats related to litigation to remove the state flag," and arguing that Williams should not be penalized.

¶ 12. The trial court found that Williams had failed to timely serve process within the additional time granted by the trial court and had failed to establish good cause for the untimely service of process. The court then dismissed the action without prejudice. Williams made an ore tenus request for reconsideration and argued for the first time that he had served Officer Edney with process at the September 9, 2015, hearing. The trial court found that counsel for Williams had served Officer Edney at the September 9, 2015, hearing, which was well within the additional thirty-day extension. The court vacated its prior ruling granting Officer Edney's motion to dismiss the action and returned the case to the trial court's docket.

¶ 13. Officer Edney now appeals and argues, first, that because Williams failed to obtain personal jurisdiction by proper service of summons and complaint prior to the expiration of the three year statute of limitations, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action with prejudice. Officer Edney argues in the alternative that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case with prejudice because Williams failed to comply with the trial court's thirty-day extension for service of process. Because the first issue is dispositive, we decline to address Officer Edney's second issue.

DISCUSSION

¶ 14. This Court reviews de novo the trial court's grant or denial of a motion to dismiss. Johnson v. Rao , 952 So.2d 151, 154 (Miss. 2007). " M.R.C.P. 4(h) requires service of the summons and complaint within 120 days of filing of the complaint or the action shall be dismissed without prejudice unless 'good cause' can be shown as to why service was not made within that period." Crumpton v. Hegwood , 740 So.2d 292, 293 (Miss. 1999). A trial court's finding on the existence of good cause for a delay in service of process is a finding of fact and is entitled to deferential review. Holmes v. Coast Transit Auth. , 815 So.2d 1183, 1185 (Miss. 2002) (citation omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing good cause. Lewis Entm't, Inc. v. Brady , 142 So.3d 396, 399 (Miss. 2014).

¶ 15. Officer Edney first argues that because Williams failed to serve Officer Edney with process, the statute of limitations in this case expired. He avers, therefore, that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Williams's case with prejudice. In contrast, Williams argues that he had in fact served Officer Edney with process shortly after filing his complaint. As this Court has held, "[f]iling a complaint tolls the applicable statute of limitations 120 days, but if the plaintiff fails to serve process on the defendant within that 120-day period, the statute of limitations automatically begins to run again when that period expires." Brady , 142 So.3d at 398 (quoting Watters v. Stripling , 675 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Miss. 1996) ). The incident that Williams complained of occurred on February 8, 2008. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49, Williams was required to file his lawsuit within three years after the cause of action accrued. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2012). On March 11, 2010, Williams filed his complaint against Edney. At that point, the statute of limitations was tolled for 120 days pending service of process upon the defendant, leaving 334 days remaining on the statute of limitations. Officer Edney argues that because he was not properly served, the statute of limitations began running again on July 9, 2010, and that it expired on June 8, 2011.

¶ 16. This Court agrees. Although Williams argues that Netterville had authority to accept process on Officer Edney, the evidence in the record fails to support that contention. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) provides that the "summons and complaint shall be served together." M.R.C.P. 4(d). Service shall be made upon an individual "by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process ...." Id. (emphasis added). Because Officer Edney submitted sufficient evidence showing that Corporal Jackson had served Netterville and not Officer Edney, service of process was effective on Officer Edney only if Netterville had been Officer Edney's agent. "This Court has defined the word agent, '[to] include only agents vested with some general authority and discretion, and not to extend to mere employees having no independent powers.' " Johnson , 952 So.2d at 154 (citation omitted).

¶ 17. "In order for a person to accept service of process on behalf of another, Rule 4(d) requires that the person be an 'agent authorized by appointment or law to receive service of process.' " Lewis v. Forest Family Practice Clinic, P.A. , 124 So.3d 654, 656-57 (Miss. 2013) (citing M.R.C.P. 4(d) ). In Lewis , the process server for the plaintiff testified that he had personally served the defendant doctor with process and that he had relied on the return of process that indicated that he had done so. Id. at 656. The defendant, however, testified that the process server had instead served the clinic's cashier and that he had never received any documents from the process server on that day. Id. This Court found that the cashier had no authority to accept process for the doctor or his practice. Id. at 657.

¶ 18. Here, Officer Edney submitted an affidavit stating that he had "never authorized anyone, including Yolanda Netterville, to accept service of process for [him]...." Officer Edney additionally testified that he had never before been served a subpoena at the Greenville Police Department. Netterville also submitted an affidavit stating that Officer Edney had never authorized her to accept service of process or any other documents on his behalf. Netterville did, however, state that "her practice" when she was served with summons was to sign for the receipt of the document and place the document in the "in-box" for the department in which the employee worked. Williams argues that this vested Netterville with authority to accept process for Officer Edney.

¶ 19. Williams cites Williams v. Kilgore , in which this Court stated, "we find nothing in our case law which precludes the acceptance of service of process by an agent such as an office manager, who, by custom and practice, is vested with apparent authority to do so." Williams v. Kilgore , 618 So.2d 51, 56 (Miss. 1992). The process server in that case had served the office manager of a doctor's office. Id. Although both the doctor and the office manager testified that the office manager was not authorized to accept service of process, the process server testified that on many occasions the office manager had accepted service on behalf of the defendant and on behalf of the other doctors in the office. Id. This Court stated that because the deputy had previously served process on the defendant and other physicians in the office and because the office manager had accepted the documents, process appeared to have been properly served. Id.

¶ 20. This case can be distinguished. A clerk who is employed in one division of a police department does not carry the same apparent authority for the police department as a whole as carries an office manager for a doctor's office. The parties do not dispute that Netterville had not been Officer Edney's personal clerk or even a clerk in Officer Edney's division of the police department. Netterville had been employed as a clerk in the criminal-investigations division of the Greenville Police Department. Officer Edney stated that he had been employed in the felony-narcotics division. In fact, Officer Edney testified that his office had been separate from the police department. Therefore, unlike in Lewis and in Williams , Netterville merely was a coworker of Officer Edney's and was not employed by Officer Edney. Although Netterville stated that she had accepted process for other officers before, this statement fails to convey that she had been authorized to accept process for the entire police department. Netterville also was not called to testify to further develop her affidavit. In addition, the process server here was unable to testify whether or not he had previously served Netterville with process for other officers.

¶ 21. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in its determination that Netterville had lacked authority to accept service on Officer Edney's behalf. The statute of limitations therefore began to run again 120 days after Williams filed his complaint, and it subsequently expired. Because the statute of limitations has expired, this Court must determine whether the trial court erred in determining whether Williams established good cause for his failure to serve process. This Court has previously held that, "at a minimum, a plaintiff attempting to establish 'good cause' must show 'at least as much as would be required to show excusable neglect, as to which simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or ignorance of the rules usually does not suffice.' " Holmes , 815 So.2d at 1186 (citations omitted).

¶ 22. We find that the trial court abused its discretion in its analysis of good cause. Corporal Jackson's indication on the proof of service that he had personally served Officer Edney is a factor in favor of finding good cause. The analysis does not end there, however. Williams's lengthy delay in pursuing this action should be considered in the good cause analysis.

¶ 23. The trial court wrote in its order denying Officer Edney's motion to dismiss that Williams had established good cause and stated,

It is undisputed that the Plaintiff attempted to serve Officer Edney with process within the 120-day time limit. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff did not act diligently. The process server's return indicated that service was properly completed. Counsel was not, therefore, alerted by written return or otherwise of any potential problem. Plaintiff was not aware of a defect in service of process until Officer Edney's Motion for Relief from Judgment was filed. As noted in Spurgeon [v. Egger ], "good cause is likely to be found when the plaintiff's failure to complete service in a timely fashion is the result of the conduct of a third person, typically the process server." Spurgeon [v. Egger ], 989 So.2d [901,] 907 [ (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) ]. Although service was not properly effected through the clerk at the Greenville Police Department, the Court finds that Plaintiff had a reasonable belief that service was properly made within the statutory period. Good [c]ause is established.

The trial court, however, failed to take into account Williams's lack of diligence in pursuing the action. "To meet the burden of proof of good cause, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a diligent effort was made to effect timely service. The plaintiff must show more than that service failed due to 'simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or ignorance of the rules.' " Copiah Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Buckner , 61 So.3d 162, 166 (Miss. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that "placing blame upon a process server, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate good cause. The plaintiff must make a showing of diligence in seeking to effect service.") ). Williams filed his complaint on March 11, 2010. On November 17, 2010, the trial court entered a default judgment against Officer Edney. Yet it was not until April 22, 2015, four and a half years later, that the trial court entered an order on damages. This Court previously has stated that the primary purpose of statutes of limitation is to "compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time.... They are designed to suppress assertion of false and stale claims, when evidence has been lost, memories have faded, witnesses are unavailable, or facts are incapable of production because of the lapse of time." Miss. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Stringer , 748 So.2d 662, 666 (Miss. 1999) (quoting Smith v. Sneed , 638 So.2d 1252, 1263 (Miss. 1994) ).

¶ 24. More than ten years has passed since the incident that Williams complains of occurred. Counsel for Officer Edney asserted that two-thirds of the witnesses that were involved in the case would be unavailable now due to the length of time that has passed since the incident in question. Had Williams been diligent in pursuing the action, Officer Edney might have learned of this action before it became "stale." Because the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the length of delay, we reverse the trial court's decision and remand this case with instructions for the trial court to factor Williams's length of delay in pursuing the action into its analysis of good cause.

CONCLUSION

¶ 25. Because the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider Williams's length of delay in pursuing the action in its analysis of good cause, we reverse the trial court's decision and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 26. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. KITCHENS, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(1) provides,
      All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.
      Miss. Code. Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (Rev. 2012).

      See generally Ogunbor v. May , 204 So.3d 840 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that service upon defendant's coworker was inadequate), cert. denied , 205 So.3d 1083 (Miss. 2016) ; Anthony v. Gary J. Rotella & Assocs., P.A. , 906 So.2d 1205, 1208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) ("Thus, the trial court had no legitimate basis to find that Anthony waived his right to personal service or that his co-worker was authorized to waive his rights for him.").


author: CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:

text:
    In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Richard Harold FLOWERS, Jr.: Claire C. Flowers and Brenda Jane Flowers Paixao, Appellants v. The ESTATE OF Brenda Louise Bargas FLOWERS, Through Its Executor De Bonis Non With Will Annexed, Knox Lemee Flowers, Cecil C. Lang and Linda S. Lang, Appellees
    NO. 2016-CA-00799-COA
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    January 2, 2018
    DAVID NEIL MCCARTY, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
    FLOYD M. MELTON JR., FLOYD M. MELTON III, RICHARD A. OAKES, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
    BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND GREENLEE, JJ.
   CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Claire Flowers and Brenda Jane Flowers Paixao (Jane) appeal the final judgment entered by the Leflore County Chancery Court in the probate of the estate of their father, Richard Harold Flowers Jr.

¶ 2. On appeal, Claire and Jane assert the following assignments of error: (1) their brother, Knox Lemee Flowers, lacked standing to be named executor of Richard's estate; (2) the chancellor's final decree failed to follow Richard's intent as expressed in his will; (3) the chancellor erred in awarding attorneys' fees to Knox's attorneys; (4) the chancellor erred by denying Claire and Jane's Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) motion to amend their petition. We find no abuse of discretion by the chancellor, and we therefore affirm. See generally Nichols v. Phillips (In re Estate of Brill) , 76 So.3d 695, 698 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2011).

FACTS

¶ 3. On December 19, 2001, the Leflore County Chancery Court appointed Brenda Bargas Flowers to represent her husband, Richard Flowers Jr., as his conservator due to Richard's physical and mental incapacity and inability to manage his affairs and his estate.

¶ 4. On December 14, 2005, Richard and Brenda filed a petition to adopt D.A., the biological child of Richard and Brenda's daughter, Claire. The chancellor granted the petition on December 15, 2005, and entered an order of adoption, stating that D.A.

be, and he is hereby decreed to be, the child of [Richard and Brenda], who shall have the exclusive custody of [D.A.], and equal parental rights, duties and responsibilities of and toward him to the extent they both were his natural parents with all the incidents, mutual rights, privileges, benefits, duties and responsibilities arising from a natural born parent and child relationship[.]

The order also provided that D.A. "shall inherit from and through" Richard and Brenda.

¶ 5. Sadly, the record reflects that on April 25, 2006, a few months after adopting D.A., Richard died. In his last will and testament, dated January 21, 1983, Richard named his widow, Brenda, as the executor of the estate. Brenda filed a petition to probate the will, and on July 14, 2006, the chancellor appointed Brenda as executor of Richard's estate. Regarding the appointment of alternate executors, Richard's will specified:

[I]f [Brenda] fails to qualify or ceases to act, I appoint as executrix of this will my wife's biological mother, Helen Audry Creasay Baker, to serve ..., or should she fail to qualify or cease to act[,] I appoint as executor of this will The First Greenwood Bank, a Branch of Grenada Bank, in Greenwood, Mississippi[.]

¶ 6. Richard left to Brenda all of his "clothing and personal effects, all boats, boat trailers, boat motors, and all automobiles and vehicles" registered in his name, and stock, among other things. Richard expressed in his will that he made no disposition of household furniture or chattels located in his and Brenda's residence, as the items also belonged to Brenda.

¶ 7. Significant to the issues raised in this appeal, Richard further devised all of his "residuary estate, being all property, real and personal, wherever situated, in which [he] may have any interest at the time of [his] death not otherwise effectively disposed of ... to Brenda ... should she survive [him] for a period of 179 days[.]" Richard's will explained that should Brenda fail to survive Richard for 179 days, the property would then be held in a trust for his son, Knox; daughter, Claire; and

any other child or children born to my wife, Brenda[,] ... and me, in such proportions and in such manner as my trustee shall deem necessary or desirable in their absolute discretion, for the beneficiaries' health, education, welfare, support and maintenance in their accustomed manner of living.

(Emphasis added).

¶ 8. Richard's will further provided as follows:

This Trust shall exist until the youngest living child of mine and my wife attains the age of twenty-five years, at which time the trust will terminate and all the remaining assets of this Trust shall be conveyed and delivered, to my children, Claire Clements Flowers, Knox Lemee[ ] Flowers and any other child or children born to my wife, Brenda Bargas Flowers, and me, in equal shares, per stirpes[.]

¶ 9. Brenda began her duties as executor after her appointment on July 14, 2006. However, Brenda died on August 25, 2006, approximately 122 days after Richard's death. Brenda's will named Knox as the executor.

¶ 10. On September 6, 2006, Knox filed a petition for appointment as Executor De Bonis Non with Will Annexed (hereafter "Executor"). In his petition, Knox acknowledged that Richard's will named Brenda as executor of Richard's estate. Due to Brenda's death, Knox requested to be substituted as Executor of Richard's estate. Knox also filed a petition to probate Brenda's estate and requested that a guardian ad litem be appointed for D.A., who was two years old at the time of the filing.

¶ 11. The record reflects that while Knox served as Executor of Richard's estate, the chancellor approved and authorized Knox's sale of real property owned by Richard's estate as follows: (1) a May 16, 2008 order approving the sale by Knox of real property located at 304 East Monroe Street, Greenwood, Mississippi, for the amount of $65,000, less the prorated taxes for the year 2008, a six-percent commission to Bowie Realty in the amount of $3,900, and a termite inspection in the amount of $107; (2) a September 11, 2009 order approving the sale of real property located at 306 West Church, Greenwood, Mississippi, for the amount of $20,200 and authorizing the execution of any and all documents necessary to complete the sale, less the prorated taxes for the year 2009 in the amount of $1,225.32, and a six-percent commission to Bowie Realty in the amount of $1,212. The record shows that all of the beneficiaries of Richard's will received notice of the sale of the real property. The chancellor then ordered Knox, as Executor, to deposit the balance of the funds in the estate account.

¶ 12. Additionally, in his capacity as Executor of Richard's estate, and again with notice to all of the intended beneficiaries named in Richard's will, Knox liquidated Richard's investment account and deposited the balance of the funds in the estate account.

¶ 13. The record reflects that during the course of the lengthy litigation below, Claire filed several motions relating to Richard's estate, including a December 2007 motion seeking a full accounting of Richard's estate and Brenda's estate, and a January 2008 motion to disqualify Knox as the Executor. The chancellor addressed all of Claire's motions in an order dated February 8, 2008. The chancellor ultimately ordered as follows:

The Conservatorship [of Richard by Brenda] is terminated and closed[.]
....
Knox, as Executor of [Brenda's Estate], ... will list the household goods and personal belongings of Brenda ..., as well as lockbox contents that came into his possession as Executor and will state where these items are presently located, and any items converted to his personal possession or disposed of for his benefit will be noted and charged against any Executor's fee, as may be determined and approved by this Court.
....
Knox, as Executor of [Brenda's Estate], shall furnish an accounting of the Estate from the date of death to the date of any final decree granting [Claire] Guardianship of [D.A.] due to the appeal on file at this time ... and that [Claire] is entitled to an accounting, if and when she becomes a vested remainder beneficiary of this estate from the date of such vesting until delivery of assets to her.
....
[T]he probated claim of [Claire] ... is granted in the amount of $1,200.00 and this court authorizes and directs [Knox] to pay said sum in full satisfaction of the probated claim.

The record also reflects that in the February 2008 order, the chancellor granted Claire "leave to withdraw her Petition for Disqualification of [Knox as the] Executor (Fiduciary) dated January 28, 2008," and ruled that "it is therefore withdrawn."

¶ 14. Claire later filed a motion requesting that the chancellor recuse himself, claiming that she discovered evidence of judicial misconduct. The chancellor denied Claire's motion, stating that Claire failed to present any facts to substantiate her allegations. The chancellor also admonished Claire "for bringing frivolous motions."

¶ 15. On September 4, 2009, Claire filed her second motion for disqualification of Knox as executor of Richard's estate, arguing that Knox failed to follow the instructions of Richard's will since no residuary or assets passed to Claire or Knox as bequeathed in Richard's will. Relative to this claim, the record reflects that the chancellor found that no assets remained to pass to the beneficiaries of Richard's will. Claire further asserted that Richard's will provided that an accounting shall be done by the executor and given to the heirs once a year. Claire claimed that Knox failed to provide an accounting as requested by the will.

¶ 16. Claire also argued that Richard's will provided that Brenda is to be named executor, and that if Brenda should fail to qualify as executor, then Richard's will named Brenda's mother, Helen Baker, as the alternate executor. Claire claimed that Helen informed Claire that she was never approached to be executor of Richard's will and did not know that Richard named her as an alternate executor in his will.

¶ 17. The chancellor held a hearing on the matter on September 11, 2009, and ultimately denied Claire's motion to disqualify Knox as Executor. The chancellor found that Claire presented no facts to substantiate her claims that Knox should be disqualified as Executor. The chancellor also found that Claire's motion was "substantially the same petition and claims as ... filed ... on January 28, 2008, by Claire, and was set to be heard on February 1, 2008, when [Claire] was granted leave of the court to withdrawn her petition." As a result, the chancellor admonished Claire for bringing repetitive and frivolous motions.

¶ 18. Over the next several years, Claire filed numerous petitions revolving around the care and adoption of D.A. On August 19, 2013, the chancellor entered a decree of adoption stating "[D.A.], a child born on July 10, 2004, be and is hereby adjudged and declared to be adopted by [his paternal grandparents,] ... Cecil Carter Lang and wife, Linda S. Lang, and that the said child and the [Langs] be given and accorded all of the rights, benefits and responsibilities arising from a natural born parent and child relationship."

¶ 19. On April 15, 2015, Claire filed a petition for a full accounting, asserting again that she believed that Knox misappropriated funds and chattels belonging to Richard's estate, and that Knox mismanaged the estate to the detriment of the heirs and against the instructions of Richard's will. As stated, Claire's claims of mismanagement stem from the lack of sufficient assets in Richard's estate to pass to the will's beneficiaries.

¶ 20. The record reflects that on September 15, 2015, Claire, acting pro se, filed a 616-page pleading in the trial court challenging prior rulings and raising various claims for relief. In this 616-page pleading, Claire set forth petitions for the following: (1) a trial by jury, (2) a change of venue, (3) relief from the judgments, and (4) requested compensatory and punitive damages. Claire named her sister, Jane, as an interested party.

¶ 21. In this 616-page pleading, Claire set forth her petition for relief from the judgments, claiming that she was entitled to relief from the prior orders of the chancellor, including the final decree of adoption of D.A., due to fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, and misconduct by numerous parties, including Knox, Floyd Melton Jr. and Floyd Melton III (Knox's attorneys), Cecil and Linda Lang, and Richard A. Oakes Jr. (attorney for the Langs). Claire asserted that the numerous chancellors assigned to this action acted

in ways prejudicial to the administration of justice and to the ideas of "fair" hearings. The [d]efendants, including the chancellors, intentionally made their actions and inactions so convoluted between the cases to ensure that no one would be inclined to assist Claire with correcting the great injustice that has occurred.

¶ 22. In this same petition for relief from the judgments, Claire further asserted that Oakes and the Langs were brought into these cases to ensure that D.A. was kept away from her, and to "ensure that their own pockets were lined with funds 'legally obtained' through the court, a court which was prejudicial and unable to provide the appropriate administration of justice." Claire also alleged that the Langs and Oakes ensured the Langs would wrongfully obtain Social Security death benefits on behalf of D.A. by keeping his last name as Flowers and not notifying Social Security of the adoption of D.A. in August 2013. Finally, Claire alleged that Oakes was in direct violation of Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct.

¶ 23. In her petition for compensatory and punitive damages, also set forth in the 616-page pleading, Claire claimed that she suffered the following:

[P]hysical, emotional, and monetary damages as a direct result of the actions and inactions of the [d]efendants (excluding Brenda Jane Paixao, D.A., and Christopher Lang) ... [and she] is entitled to an award of compensatory and punitive damages for fraud, negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, civil conspiracy, and malice.

¶ 24. On January 4, 2016, Claire filed an amended petition for compensatory and punitive damages, which constituted part of the 616-page pleading, claiming that the proximate consequences of the defendants' negligence or wantonness, jointly and severally, caused Claire to suffer physical and emotional injuries and monetary damages. On January 8, 2016, Claire filed a motion for leave to admit an amended petition for compensatory and punitive damages, part of the 616-page pleading.

¶ 25. On January 19, 2016, the chancellor held a hearing on Oakes's Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Claire's 616-page pleading. Oakes argued that "[n]owhere in [Claire's] petition does anything come anywhere close to pleading fraud with the degree of specificity required to survive a Motion to Dismiss." The chancellor issued a bench ruling granting Oakes's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The chancellor also granted Oakes's and the Meltons' motions to strike themselves as defendants in the cause due to Claire's failure to obtain leave from the court under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to add them as defendants. The chancellor advised Claire to file a written motion "to add Oakes or whoever as a defendant." The record reflects that Claire filed no appeal of the chancellor's rulings regarding the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or motion to strike. Thus, Oakes and the Meltons were stricken as defendants from this action.

¶ 26. On February 16, 2016, in response to the chancellor's order of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), Claire filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) motion for leave to amend her 616-page pleading. In her motion, Claire stated that she "specifically requests that she be allowed to amend those portions of the complaints by which the court ruled were insufficient at stating a claim for relief. Those portions include stating fraud and negligence per se with the correct specificity."

¶ 27. On February 26, 2016, Oakes filed a response to Claire's Rule 15(a) motion for leave to amend her 616-page pleading, requesting that Claire's motion be denied. Oakes argued that Claire failed to "attach a proposed amended petition that would permit the chancellor to determine whether justice requires that leave to amend be granted." Oakes further stated that he

was dismissed as a respondent in the above captioned causes as a result of [Claire's] failure to obtain leave of court to add him as a party. Even if the [c]ourt were to grant [Claire's] motion to allow her to amend her petitions, such amendments would have no effect on [Oakes] as he has been dismissed as a respondent and he would not be reinstated as such simply by [Claire] amending her petitions.

The record shows that the additional defendants listed in Claire's 616-page pleading also joined Oakes's motion requesting that the chancellor deny Claire leave to amend her pleading. At a hearing held on March 30, 2016, the chancellor denied Claire's motion to amend her pleading.

¶ 28. On March 31, 2016 (filed on May 6, 2016), the chancellor entered his final decree, drawing a conclusion to the lengthy litigation below. In his final decree, the chancellor provided in his findings that "on August 25, 2006, Brenda Bargas Flowers died and Knox Lemee[ ] Flowers was properly appointed Executor to serve without bond, inventory, appraisal and accounting to any court on September 6, 2006." The chancellor also held that Knox's fee for acting as Executor was required to be determined by Brenda's estate, as "there [were] no assets left" in Richard's estate.

¶ 29. The record reflects that in the text of the final decree, the chancellor expressly identified the bank records and expenditures. The chancellor also expressly set forth an accounting of the estate's debts and assets.

¶ 30. Additionally, in the final decree, the chancellor awarded Melton Law Firm "reasonable attorney's fees" for services rendered, and held that "the fee for Melton Law Firm ... is to be determined [by Brenda's Estate] as there are no assets left" in Richard's estate. The chancellor also awarded Orsborn, Sutphen, and O'Neal reasonable accounting fees for services rendered, and again stated that the fee would be determined by Brenda's estate, as no assets remained in Richard's estate.

¶ 31. The chancellor recognized that while Brenda briefly served as executor of Richard's estate upon her appointment on July 14, 2006, she (as executor) advanced personal funds to pay obligations of Richard's estate. The chancellor reviewed the amounts provided, and he found that these amounts were advanced and expended by Brenda in her capacity as executor to pay legitimate expenses of Richard's estate and thus constituted debts to Brenda's estate. As a result, the chancellor held that Brenda's estate was entitled to be reimbursed from the funds remaining in Richard's estate.

¶ 32. Since Richard's estate lacked assets, the chancellor found moot the issue of whether Brenda and D.A. would be entitled to a widow's allowance or minor's allowance, explaining as follows:

Brenda ... is entitled to a widow's allowance and [D.A.], the surviving minor child of Richard ..., is entitled to a minor's allowance in an amount to be determined by this court. [However,] the Court makes no ruling on the widow's allowance nor the minor's allowance as there are no funds left in the Estate from which to pay such allowances.

¶ 33. The chancellor then ratified the petition to close Richard's estate, and the chancellor held that no further accounting by Knox as Executor was necessary. The chancellor denied Claire's motion to perfect an inventory and to produce vouchers. The chancellor held that "the [e]state has produced all accountings and documents necessary to satisfy this court that all moneys and assets of the estate have been properly expended and accounted for."

¶ 34. On May 6 and on May 9, 2016, the chancellor denied Claire's motions for leave to amend in accordance with Rule 15(a) as to the Meltons, Oakes, and Waldo Sterling Stuckey Jr. In all three orders on the matter, the chancellor explained: "[T]he motion filed by [Claire] fails to state how she would amend her prior pleadings or fails to attach a proposed amended pleading which would allow the court to determine whether justice required that she be given leave to file amended pleadings[.]"

¶ 35. Claire and Jane now appeal, raising four assignments of error, which we address in turn below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 36. Chancellors are "entitled to deferential review in matters involving questions of fact"; and when reviewing a chancellor's findings of fact, this Court applies a manifest-error standard. Estate of Brill , 76 So.3d at 698 (¶ 13). We review a chancellor's legal findings de novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Knox as Executor

¶ 37. Claire and Jane argue on appeal that Richard failed to name Knox as executor in his will. As a result, Claire and Jane assert that Knox should never have been named executor of Richard's estate. Claire and Jane claim that due to the chancellor's error in appointing Knox as executor, "every single action [Knox] took was void."

¶ 38. Claire and Jane also argue that Knox breached his fiduciary duty to administer the estate. Claire and Jane state that Claire failed to receive any money from Richard's estate, contrary to Richard's intent as expressed in his will. Upon review of this case on appeal, we address Claire and Jane's argument regarding Richard's testamentary intent, the accounting of Richard's estate, and the assets of the estate at length later in this opinion.

¶ 39. First, we will solely address Claire and Jane's assignment of error asserting that the chancellor abused his discretion in appointing Knox as Executor of Richard's estate. As stated, Richard's will named Brenda as his primary executor, with his mother-in-law, Helen Baker, and The First Greenwood Bank, listed as alternate executors. When Richard died, the chancellor admitted Richard's will to probate and appointed Brenda as executor of Richard's estate on July 14, 2006, in accordance with Richard's will. Brenda began performing her duties as executor upon her appointment, as evidenced by her payment toward debts of Richard's estate. After probate began on Richard's estate, and after Brenda's death, Knox separately petitioned the court on September 6, 2006, to be appointed as both the executor of Brenda's estate and as Executor of Richard's estate. In his petition, Knox acknowledged that Richard's will named Brenda as Executor of Richard's estate, but since Brenda died, Knox requested to be substituted as Executor of Richard's estate. The chancellor then appointed Knox as Executor of Brenda's estate and also as Executor of Richard's estate.

¶ 40. The record reflects that in January 2008, less than a year and a half after Knox's appointment, Claire filed her first motion to disqualify Knox as Executor of Richard's estate. The record shows that in an order entered in February 2008, the chancellor granted Claire "leave to withdraw her Petition for Disqualification of Executor (Fiduciary) dated January 28, 2008," and ruled that "it is therefore withdrawn." On September 4, 2009, Claire filed another motion to disqualify Knox as executor. In an order entered in October 2009, the chancellor denied Claire's motion after finding that Claire "presented no facts to substantiate her claims that [Knox] should be disqualified as Executor de bonis non with will annexed." The record additionally reflects that in the March 31, 2016 final decree, chancellor stated that Knox had been "properly appointed" as Executor.

¶ 41. Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-7-39 (Rev. 2013) provides the procedure for appointing an Executor:

If there be no executor named in any last will and testament, or if the executors named all renounce the executorship or, being required to qualify, shall all refuse or fail to do so or shall refuse or wilfully neglect, for the space of forty days after the death of the testator, to exhibit the will and testament for probate or shall all be disqualified, then administration with the will annexed shall be granted to the person who would be entitled to administer according to the rule prescribed for granting administration. Before granting such administration, each executor named in the will and testament who has not renounced the executorship shall be summoned to show cause why administration should not be granted. If any executor named be absent from the state at the time of the probate of the will and administration should be granted during his absence, such executor shall be allowed forty days after his return to make application for letters testamentary and, on his qualifying, the letters of administration shall be revoked; and the administrator shall deliver all the estate which has come to his hands to the executor and settle the account of his administration.

¶ 42. Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-7-53 (Rev. 2013) establishes the authority of the chancellor to appoint a temporary administrator when "necessary for the care and preservation of the estate." Section 91-7-53 provides the following:

Whenever it shall be necessary for the care and preservation of the estate of a decedent before the grant of letters testamentary, or of administration, to the person entitled thereto, the chancery court or chancellor in vacation, or the clerk of such court, on the petition of any creditor or other interested person, shall appoint a suitable person to be known as "temporary administrator." The person named as executor or the person apparently entitled to letters of administration may be appointed temporary administrator, unless the court shall find that the circumstances require the appointment of a different person.
Whenever an appeal shall be taken from the grant of letters testamentary, or of administration, or whenever a last will and testament shall be contested, the chancery court or chancellor in vacation, on petition of any interested person, may appoint a temporary administrator if it shall appear necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties, and may make such appointment on such terms and impose such conditions as may seem proper.
The powers of such temporary administrator may be special or general, as the court may find proper, and he may be authorized to take charge of, preserve, and administer the estate until the appeal or contest shall be determined. Letters may be issued to him in ordinary form, except that he shall be therein designated as temporary administrator, and any terms or conditions imposed shall be stated therein; and the letters shall state that he is to act only until another appointment shall be made, either temporary or permanent.

¶ 43. Additionally, "[a] chancellor has a large [amount of] discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed administrator of an estate except in cases made mandatory by the statute." Estate of Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Mohamed , 55 So.3d 1057, 1059 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2011) ; In re Estate of Burnside , 227 Miss. 110, 112, 85 So.2d 817, 818 (1956). We also recognize that "[a]n administrator de bonis non [with the will annexed] can be appointed on the removal of an executor or his resignation, without notice to the legatees and without waiting for the final settlement." Sivley v. Summers , 57 Miss. 712, 712 (1880).

¶ 44. Relevant to this appeal, in Ricks v. Johnson , 134 Miss. 676, 99 So. 142, 146 (1924), the Mississippi Supreme Court explained as follows:

The appointment of an executor by a testator in his will is not absolute, since the right of the one named to act is restricted by statute, and such nomination cannot be final, since the nominee may either accept the office or refuse to serve. But, if the one named in the will as executor is qualified and willing to act, the court must appoint him to the office. If the nominee accepts the appointment under the will, and does not waive his rights by failing to take the proper steps as required by statute for proving the will, the court must, after proper proceedings, appoint him to the office unless he be shown to be incompetent or disqualified for some legal cause. The testator has the right to select as executor of his last will any one whom he may desire and the fitness of the one selected by the testator is not a matter which the court can investigate except in the cases where the law has specially so provided.

The supreme court further held as follows:

If qualified and willing to act, the nominee of the testator must be appointed executor. It has, however, been held that, where conditions after the death of the testator had so changed that, had he anticipated them, he unquestionably would have made a different choice, the court in its discretion could refuse to appoint the one named in the testator's will . The purpose of the law in securing this right manifestly is to enable the testator to control the disposition of the estate and to name the person who shall exercise this power and right.

Id. (emphasis added).

¶ 45. We find nothing in the record to reflect that Knox's petition to the chancellor to serve as Executor of Richard's estate was served on the beneficiaries of Richard's will or the alternate executors named in Richard's will prior to his appointment. However, the record shows that during the course of the ten years of litigation, Claire and Jane possessed sufficient notice of the chancellor's appointment of Knox as Executor of Richard's estate to raise the issue of the propriety of the appointment and of Knox's qualifications. The record reflects that over the years, Claire filed several petitions wherein she indeed raised the issue of Knox's qualifications and the propriety of his appointment to the consideration of the chancellor-one in January 2008, and a second in September 2009. The record additionally reflects that Claire and Jane had ample notice of the multiple motion hearings, including the March 30, 2016 hearing.

¶ 46. As stated, "[a] chancellor has a large [amount of] discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed administrator of an estate[.]" Estate of Wallace , 55 So.3d at 1059 (¶ 8). Additionally, we apply a manifest-error standard when reviewing a chancellor's findings of fact. Estate of Brill , 76 So.3d at 698 (¶ 13). Upon review, the record reflects that probate of Richard's estate had opened and that Brenda, the appointed executor, died during the course of her duties as executor. The chancellor possessed the discretion to appoint an Executor in order to represent the best interests and the preservation of Richard's estate. Moreover, the record shows no abuse of discretion by the chancellor in appointing Knox to serve in this capacity. Therefore, we find no reversible error by the chancellor in appointing Knox as Executor. See Estate of Wallace , 55 So.3d at 1059 (¶ 8) ; In re Estate of Burnside , 227 Miss. at 112, 85 So.2d at 818.

II. Accounting

¶ 47. Claire and Jane next assert that Knox failed to honor the clear wishes of Richard's will and thus breached his fiduciary duty to administer the estate. Claire and Jane claim that Richard "decreed that Claire would receive half of the remaining estate," but Claire failed to receive any money from the estate. Claire and Jane assert that Knox mismanaged the estate's funds and failed to provide an accounting of the assets and expenditures of Richard's estate. Upon review, we acknowledge that the chancellor found that upon approving the final accounting and closing of Richard's estate, the estate possessed no assets.

¶ 48. "On appeal, this Court 'will not reverse a chancery court's findings, be they of ultimate fact or of evidentiary fact, where there is substantial evidence supporting those findings.' " Langston v. Williams (In re Estate of Langston) , 57 So.3d 618, 619 (¶ 16) (Miss. 2011).

¶ 49. As stated, Knox possessed the duty as the Executor of Richard's estate to file a final accounting and have it approved by the chancellor. Hayes v. Holman , 165 Miss. 494, 144 So. 690, 692 (1932) ; see Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-47 (Rev. 2013) (functions of fiduciary with will annexed). The record reflects that in its March 31, 2016 final decree, the chancellor stated that Knox had provided and filed "a complete accounting of all assets belonging to [Richard] from the last accounting in the Conservatorship in December of 2002 through the date of the filing of the Petition to Close Estate." After reviewing the accounting filed by Knox, the chancellor held "[t]hat all acts of [Brenda] and [Knox], and all accountings heretofore filed in this cause are ratified, confirmed and approved." The chancellor expressly identified monetary advances paid by Brenda on behalf of Richard's estate, which the chancellor determined constituted legitimate expenses.

¶ 50. With respect to the final accounting, the final decree further provided as follows:

That [Knox] has not received any compensation for acting as Executor De Bonis Non with Will Annexed of this Estate and he requested that this Court upon the hearing herein approve a proper amount as a fair compensation for his time and expenses in serving in this capacity. The Court does find that the fee for [Knox] for acting as Executor De Bonis Non with Will Annexed is to be determined in the Estate of [Brenda] as there are no assets left in the Estate of [Richard].
That the Estate is indebted to the Melton Law Firm, PLLC, Attorneys, for reasonable attorney's fees and services rendered in this cause and expenses incurred in rendering these services in this cause and upon a hearing herein, the Executor requested that this Court approve a reasonable amount to be paid. That the Court does find that the fee for Melton Law Firm, PLLC, Attorneys is to be determined in the Estate of [Brenda] as there are no assets left in the Estate of [Richard].
That the Estate is indebted to Orsborn, Sutphen & O'Neal, CPAs[,] for reasonable accounting fees and services rendered in this cause and to be rendered for final return preparation[,] and the Executor requested this Court approve a reasonable amount to be paid. The Court does find that the fee for Orsborn, Sutphen & O'Neal, CPAs[,] for reasonable accounting fees and services rendered in this cause and to be rendered for final return preparation is to be determined in the Estate of [Brenda] as there are no assets left in the Estate of [Richard].
That while serving as Executrix in this cause, [Brenda] advanced personal funds to pay Estate obligations as follows, to-wit:
04/14/06 CK#849 Heritage Photography $48.15 05/04/06 CK#804 Market Place $143.92 (Food for Memorial Service) 05/07/06 CK#805 Reverend Bernard Nail $75.00 05/08/06 CK#807 Big Star $47.52 (Food for Memorial Service) 06/05/06 CK#1001 [Insurance Co.] $1,705.25 (Funeral Services) 07/13/06 CK#1003 Floyd M. Melton, Jr. $25,000.00 (Legal Fees) 07/13/06 CK#1004 Hospice Ministries $990.00 07/13/06 CK#1005 Planters Bank & Trust $27,985.70 (Paid off 306 W. Church Loan) 07/13/06 CK#1006 Planters Bank & Trust $20,049.92 (Paid off Monroe Street Loan) 07/13/06 CK# [sic] [CPAs] $8,168.00 (Accounting Services) 07/13/06 CK#1009 [Land Redemption] $2,477.76 (Redeemed 2004 Taxes) 07/13/06 CK#1010 [Tax Collector] $1,827.96 (2005 Property Taxes) 07/13/06 CK#1011 [Land Redemption] $2,842.67 (2003 Taxes) 07/17/06 CK#1012 [Conservatorship account] $5,000.00 (To Pay Final Bills for Richard Flowers) Total Advances on behalf of the Estate $96,361.85
That the Executor De Bonis Non with Will Annexed of this Estate requested that this Court approve such sums as it may see fit to be repaid to the Estate of [Brenda] being administered in Cause No. E06-0089 in this Court. The Court finds that the above listed sums were advanced and expended by [Brenda] to pay legitimate expenses of the Estate of [Richard], and that the Estate of [Brenda]
is entitled to be reimbursed from the funds remaining in the Estate of [Richard], the extent that the Estate has funds to reimburse the Estate of [Brenda].

After reviewing the accounting provided by Knox, the chancellor determined that Knox's executor fee, the Meltons' attorneys' fees, and the fee to the accounting firm must all be determined by Brenda's estate, as "there are no assets left" in Richard's estate.

¶ 51. We further acknowledge that the record reflects that at the March 30, 2016 hearing on Knox's petition to close Richard's estate and approve the final accounting, Claire admitted that she possessed a copy of the final accounting of Richard's estate. The record reflects that Claire also possessed notice as to Knox's sale of two parcels of real property owned by Richard's estate, as well as notice of the many other filings in the record of this lengthy litigation. In determining that the final accounting herein, as set forth in the final decree, constitutes a sufficient final accounting, we find the precedent of McLemore v. McLemore (In re Estate of McLemore) , 63 So.3d 468, 493 (¶ 79) (Miss. 2011), instructive.

¶ 52. In Estate of McLemore , 63 So.3d at 493 (¶ 79), the supreme court reviewed the chancellor's denial of a motion to order the co-executor of an estate to account for estate funds and property. The supreme court explained that the co-executor had been called to testify before the trial court regarding the estate funds, and the chancellor had available to him the bank records of the new rental account and a summary of all the receipts and expenditures made on behalf of the estate. Id. at (¶ 78). In denying the motion for an accounting, the chancellor opined: "There's got to be an end to this somewhere certainly. I would think that that was litigated, discussed, testified to under oath." Id. at (¶ 79). Upon review, the supreme court found no abuse of discretion of the chancellor's denial of the motion. Id.

¶ 53. After reviewing the present matter, we find, similar to Estate of McLemore , that the record contains substantial evidence in support of the chancellor's determination that Knox provided an adequate accounting of Richard's estate. We also find that the record shows that throughout the ten years of litigation herein, Claire possessed notice of the estate actions, debts, liquidation of funds, and property sales. She also possessed access to the court file. Therefore, similar to Estate of McLemore , 63 So.3d at 493 (¶ 79), we find that the estate accounting was litigated, sufficiently determined, and sufficiently provided, as set forth in the chancellor's final decree. See also Estate of Langston , 57 So.3d at 619 (¶ 16).

III. Attorneys' Fees

¶ 54. Claire and Jane submit that the chancellor erred in awarding a fee paid by Richard's estate to Knox's attorneys.

Claire and Jane argue that the attorneys failed to submit a bill, time calculation, or showing of work performed; rather, the attorneys simply made a request for a "reasonable fee."

¶ 55. "The decision whether to award attorney's and [executor's] fees is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the chancery court. In the absence of an abuse of that discretion, this Court will not disturb the chancellor's rulings." Lynn v. Lynn (In re Last Will & Testament of Lynn ), 878 So.2d 1052, 1057-58 (¶ 22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) ; see also Miss. Code Ann. §§ 91-7-47 and 91-7-53.

¶ 56. Notwithstanding the lack of estate assets herein, we acknowledge that precedent establishes a temporary administrator is "entitled to compensation for, and necessary attorney's fees incurred in, the performance of [the] duties on the same basis as would a regular administrator for the performance of the same duties." King v. Wade , 175 Miss. 72, 166 So. 327, 329-30 (1936). Furthermore, Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-7-261 (Rev. 2013) (insolvent estates) provides as follows, establishing that creditors of an estate must be paid before any heir receives distribution or inheritance:

The executor or administrator shall take proper steps speedily to ascertain whether the estate be solvent or insolvent. If both the real and personal estate be insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased, he shall exhibit to the court a true account of all the personal estate, assets of every description, the land of the deceased, and all the debts due from the deceased; and if it appear to the court that the estate is insolvent, it shall make an order for the sale of all the property. The proceeds of such sale and all other assets shall be equally distributed among all the creditors whose claims shall be duly filed and established, in proportion to the sums due and owing to them respectively, the expenses of the last sickness, the funeral, and the administration, including commissions, being first paid.

¶ 57. As previously stated and as reflected in the final decree, upon closing Richard's estate, the chancellor provided substantial evidence to support his finding that no assets remained in the estate. In his March 31, 2016 final decree, the chancellor held as follows:

That the Estate is indebted to the Melton Law Firm, PLLC, Attorneys, for reasonable attorney's fees and services rendered in this cause and expenses incurred in rendering these services in this cause and upon a hearing herein, the Executor requested that this Court approve a reasonable amount to be paid. That the Court does find that the fee for Melton Law Firm, PLLC, Attorneys[,] is to be determined in the Estate of [Brenda] as there are no assets left in the Estate of [Richard].

The chancellor determined that Knox's attorneys, the Meltons, were entitled to receive attorneys' fees, but since no assets remained in Richard's estate, the fee must be determined by Brenda's estate.

¶ 58. Upon review, we find that the chancellor was within his discretion to award attorneys' fees to Melton Law Firm, as well as executor's fees to Knox. See In re Lynn , 878 So.2d at 1057-58 (¶ 22) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-261 (creditors of an estate must be paid before heirs receive distribution or inheritance). This issue lacks merit.

IV. Rule 15 Motion to Amend

¶ 59. Finally, Claire and Jane appeal the denial of Claire's motion for leave to admit her amended petition for compensatory and punitive damages. Claire and Jane argue that leave to amend should have been granted because none of the respondents asserted that they would be prejudiced if the motion were granted.

¶ 60. In her amended petition, Claire sought to include claims against the various attorneys involved in the representation of Richard's estate, Brenda's estate, and the guardianship of D.A. At a hearing on Claire's motion, the chancellor made a bench ruling wherein he granted Oakes's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Claire's petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The chancellor also granted Oakes's and the Meltons' (among others) motions to strike themselves as defendants in the cause due to Claire's failure to obtain leave from the court under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to add them.

¶ 61. As stated, in response to the chancellor's order of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), on February 16, 2016, Claire filed a motion for leave to amend her petition for compensatory and punitive damages, and her amended petition for compensatory and punitive damages in accordance with Rule 15(a). In her motion, Claire stated that she "specifically requests that she be allowed to amend those portions of the complaints by which the court ruled were insufficient at stating a claim for relief. Those portions include stating fraud and negligence per se with the correct specificity."

¶ 62. The defendants listed in Claire's petition joined Oakes's motion requesting that Claire's motion for leave to amend be denied. The defendants argued that Claire failed to "attach a proposed amended petition that would permit the chancellor to determine whether justice requires that leave to amend be granted" and that the parties were "dismissed as [respondents] ... as a result of [Claire's] failure to obtain leave of court to add [them] as part[ies]."

¶ 63. We review the denial of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. Crater v. Bank of New York Mellon , 203 So.3d 16, 19 (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). We will affirm the chancellor's decision "unless the discretion he used is found to be arbitrary and clearly erroneous." Breeden v. Buchanan , 164 So.3d 1057, 1064 (¶ 27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Poole ex rel. Poole v. Avara , 908 So.2d 716, 721 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2005) ).

¶ 64. Rule 15(a) provides as follows:

On sustaining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), ... leave to amend shall be granted when justice so requires upon conditions and within time as determined by the court, provided matters outside the pleadings are not presented at the hearing on the motion.

Regarding Rule 15 amendments to pleadings, the supreme court has held as follows:

While proposed amendments have been liberally permitted throughout Mississippi legal history and are encouraged under Rule 15 [,] a party cannot fail to convey the subject matter of the proposed amendment to the trial judge and if they do so fail, no error can be predicated on the judge's failure to allow the amendment.

Parker v. Miss. Game & Fish Comm'n , 555 So.2d 725, 730-31 (Miss. 1989). Additionally, in Price v. Price , 430 So.2d 848, 849 (Miss. 1983) (citing Watts v. Patton , 66 Miss. 54, 5 So. 628 (1889) ), the supreme court explained that a chancellor's refusal to allow the amendment of a pleading cannot be reviewed on appeal where the record fails to show the proposed amendment.

¶ 65. In his order denying Claire's motion for leave to amend in accordance with Rule 15(a), the chancellor explained the following: "[T]he motion filed by [Claire] fails to state how she would amend her prior pleadings or fails to attach a proposed amended pleading which would allow the court to determine whether justice required that she be given leave to file amended pleadings[.]" The record reflects that the motion to amend filed by Claire contained only bare allegations and contained no facts or actions from which to determine the existence of a cause of action. See also M.R.C.P. 9(b) (providing that fraud must be pled with specificity); Faul v. Perlman , 104 So.3d 148, 156 (¶ 26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing the elements a plaintiff must show to establish negligence per se). The record reflects that the chancellor thus properly found that Claire failed to state a basis for amending her pleadings. See Parker , 555 So.2d at 730-31.

¶ 66. Additionally, with respect to a claim of fraud, we recognize the following guidance:

[T]he facts on which the charge of fraud is predicated must be specifically stated with full definiteness of detail. No general averment of a fraudulent course of business, and no bare statement of a corrupt design on the part of the defendant, is sufficient. The acts themselves which are claimed to be fraudulent must be clearly set out. It must further appear by definite averment in what manner the fraudulent acts wrought injury to the complainant. Fraud cannot be inferred, but must be distinctly charged, and with such fullness and precision that a court of chancery would be enabled to grant full and complete relief and redress should the bill of complaint be taken as confessed.

Weir v. Jones , 84 Miss. 602, 36 So. 533, 534 (1904). Claire's failure to provide a basis for amending her pleadings and her failure to plead fraud and negligence with the required specificity prevented the chancellor from determining whether Claire had a cause of action or just allegations without facts.

¶ 67. Furthermore, as previously stated, the record also shows that Oakes, Stuckey, Melton Jr., and Melton III were dismissed from the litigation as defendants because Claire failed to obtain leave of court before she added the attorneys as parties as required by Rule 21. Claire filed no appeal of the dismissal of the attorneys as parties. In Crater , 203 So.3d at 21 (¶ 16), this Court addressed a Rule 15(a) motion to amend filed against a nonparty:

Because the motion to amend asserted claims only against a nonparty, devoid of any factual allegation, after the statute of limitations had run, and sought to exercise a statutory right that does not exist, the claims raised by [the petitioner] in her amended complaint were futile. Because the amendment was futile, the chancery court was not required to grant leave for the amendment. Therefore, the chancery judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling on the motion to dismiss prior to ruling on [the petitioner's] motion to amend.

¶ 68. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor's denial of Claire's motion to amend.

¶ 69. AFFIRMED.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., GREENLEE AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., AND BARNES, J., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WILSON, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. FAIR AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      In their notice of appeal, Claire and Jane specified that they are appealing the Leflore Chancery Court's final decree docketed May 9, 2016, as well as all other orders entered in this matter and docketed that day.

      The record reflects that over the course of these proceedings, several chancellors were appointed to, and later recused themselves from, this cause.

      We have substituted initials for the minor's name.

      We note that Jane is Brenda's biological daughter. Richard also had three other children who are not parties to this action.

      Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-7-69 (Rev. 2013) provides that "[i]f an executor or administrator die, resign, be removed, or become incompetent, letters of administration de bonis non with the will annexed, or de bonis non, shall be granted to the person entitled, and he shall proceed in the administration of the estate."

      The chancellor appointed a guardian ad litem for D.A. On September 8, 2006, the guardian ad litem requested that the chancellor "award temporary sole physical custody of [D.A.] to Warren Simpson." Finally, on November 13, 2007, the chancellor entered a final judgment awarding custody of D.A. to his paternal grandparents, Carter and Linda Lang.
      On February 8, 2008, upon petition by Knox, Richard's conservatorship was terminated and closed, and the chancellor entered an order ratifying and approving Brenda's actions as conservator as evidenced through accountings filed by Brenda during her tenure as Richard's conservator.

      However, Jane did not join this action as a party until December 2015, when she filed a notice of joinder in the motion for a full accounting of Richard's estate.

      The record shows that at the March 31, 2016 hearing to which Claire was a party, various checks written on behalf of Richard's estate were admitted into evidence.

      Richard executed his will in 1983, when Knox was roughly one and a half years old.

      See also 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 1146 :
      A proceeding for the appointment of an administrator with the will annexed is entirely distinct from the proceeding for the admission of a will to probate. A written petition for probate of the will is not necessary to give the court jurisdiction to appoint an administrator with the will annexed.

      See also Parker v. Benoist , 160 So.3d 198, 210 (¶ 28) (Miss. 2015).

      However, a final accounting provided by the Executor "would be void for want of such notice." Id. at 723. See also 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 1143 :
      Where a decedent has left a will but such will does not nominate any executors, or none of the persons named as executors can or will act as such, the court appoints a person to perform the necessary duties connected with the settlement of the estate, and such appointee is termed an administrator "with the will annexed," or "cum testamento annexo." Such an appointment is also proper where the person nominated as executor is incompetent or unfit for appointment, renounces, or dies without having applied for letters testamentary, or where an executor who has qualified dies, resigns, or is removed before the estate is completely administered. Administration with the will annexed should not be granted unless the exigency is made apparent. Executors named, if alive and competent, should have full opportunity to take or renounce the trust. It is also necessary that there should be a valid will, which has been duly admitted to probate. There must, of course, be assets to be administered by the appointee as administrator.

      See Sivley , 57 Miss. at 712.

      Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-7-47 provides:
      (1) Every executor or administrator with the will annexed, who has qualified, shall have the right to the possession of all the personal estate of the deceased, unless otherwise directed in the will; and he shall take all proper steps to acquire possession of any part thereof that may be withheld from him, and shall manage the same for the best interest of those concerned, consistently with the will, and according to law. He shall have the proper appraisements made, return true and complete inventories except as otherwise provided by law, shall collect all debts due the estate as speedily as may be, pay all debts that may be due from it which are properly probated and registered, so far as the means in his hands will allow, shall settle his accounts as often as the law may require, pay all the legacies and bequests as far as the estate may be sufficient, and shall well and truly execute the will if the law permit. He shall also have a right to the possession of the real estate so far as may be necessary to execute the will, and may have proper remedy therefor.
      (2) In addition to the rights and duties contained in this section, he shall also have those rights, powers and remedies as set forth in Section 91-9-9.

      As previously explained in this opinion, the record contains two orders entered by the chancellor approving and authorizing Knox's sale of real property owned by Richard's estate: (1) a May 16, 2008 order approving the sale by Knox of real property located at 304 East Monroe Street, Greenwood, Mississippi, for the amount of $65,000, less the prorated taxes for the year 2008, a six-percent commission to Bowie Realty in the amount of $3,900, and a termite inspection in the amount of $107; and (2) a September 11, 2009 order approving the sale of real property located at 306 West Church, Greenwood, Mississippi, for $20,200 and authorizing the execution of any and all documents necessary to complete the sale, less the prorated taxes for the year 2009 in the amount of $1,225.32, and a six-percent commission to Bowie Realty in the amount of $1,212. The chancellor ordered that Knox, as Executor, deposit the balance of the funds in the estate account.