text:
    Marcel A. WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3203
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 3, 2018]
    Marcel A. Wright, Defuniak Springs, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Levine, Conner, and Forst, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Florian JIMENEZ-JIMENEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3791
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 17, 2018]
    Florian Jimenez-Jimenez, Mayo, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gerber, C.J., May and Kuntz, JJ., concur.


text:
    Armando RIVAS, Appellant, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f/k/a The Bank of New York, as Trustee FOR the CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF THE CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-33CB, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-33CB, Luz C. Rivas, any and all unknown parties claiming by, through, under and against the Defendant(s) who are not known to be dead or alive, whether said unknown parties may claim an interest as Spouses, Heirs, Devisees, Grantees, or other Claimants, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Countrywide Bank, FSB, Estates of Boynton Waters West Homeowners' Association, Inc., Tenant, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-3823
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Joseph John HARPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1081
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Peggy Natale, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gerber, C.J., Gross and Conner, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael R. GIBBS, Appellant, v. GEORGE APARTMENTS, INC., and Gorge Giannetti, Sr., Appellees.
    No. 4D17-1343
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jacqueline Shaw JOHNSON, Appellant, v. SPACE COAST CREDIT UNION, FOR FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK OF AMERICA, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1293
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 17, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Cory C. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-0854
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 17, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jimmy K. BONEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3803
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and James W. McIntire, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Warner, Ciklin and Levine, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jevon Deonta WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-0765
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    Jevon Deonta Washington, Lake City, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

May, Damoorgian and Ciklin, JJ., concur.


text:
    Adam CORA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-0869
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    Adam Cora, Moore Haven, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

May, Conner and Forst, JJ., concur.


text:
    Angel MASSAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-265
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brian KABLITZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-670
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    Brian Kablitz, South Bay, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Warner, Taylor and Levine, JJ., concur.


text:
    Richard M. CORATELLO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-368
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    Richard M. Coratello, Lake City, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gross, Levine and Forst, JJ., concur.


text:
    David F. DAMERAU, Appellant, v. Steven H. FRIEDMAN, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-0396
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    Cole M. Gale, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Douglas A. Kahle and Lloyd R. Schwed of Schwed Kahle & Kress, PA, Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Damoorgian, Forst and Kuntz, JJ., concur.


text:
    Duncan Jason SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-0427
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Miguel Adolfo MARTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1174
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Patrick B. Burke, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Warner, Conner and Forst, JJ., concur.


text:
    Garry COLEMAN, Appellant, v. GEO CARE INC., LLC, and Dr. Elizabeth Cooper, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-700
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    Garry Coleman, Miami, pro se.
    Scott C. Cochran and Jeffery R. Lawley of Billing, Cochran, Lyles, Mauro & Ramsey, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Warner, Conner and Kuntz, JJ., concur.


text:
    Calvin BRIDGES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-707
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    Calvin Bridges, Raiford, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gerber, C.J., Gross and Ciklin, JJ., concur.


text:
    James FLOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-539
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    James Floyd, Raiford, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gross, Ciklin and Kuntz, JJ., concur.


text:
    Barrington LEVY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-263
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Noelle YOUNG, a/k/a Noelle Hobbs, a/k/a Noelle Cooper, a/k/a Noelle Anmari Young, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK N.A., Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1857
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Arthur B. CALVIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3524
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    Arthur B. Calvin, Miami, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Matthew Steven Ocksrider, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gerber, C.J., Gross and Conner, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tavarus SHAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3590
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 24, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Hugh Rekeme MURRAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-754
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 31, 2018
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Peggy Natale, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly T. Acuña, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gerber, C.J., Gross and Conner, JJ., concur.


text:
    Charles STOKES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-853
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Alexander LLAGUNO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1062
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 31, 2018
    Richard L. Rosenbaum of the Law Offices of Richard Rosenbaum, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marc B. Hernandez, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Taylor, Ciklin and Forst, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kawayne LAWRENCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1747
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Narine N. Austin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Warner, Taylor and Levine, JJ., concur.


text:
    WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION as Trustee FOR STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS II INC., Bear Stearns Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-AR4, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-AR4, Appellant, v. Rafael LIY, Melany Sophia Liy, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Acting Solely as a Nominee for Pacific Mutual Funding, Inc. d/b/a Pacific Mutual Residential Financing a California corporation, Grand Palms Community Association, Inc., Encino Estates Homeowners Association, Inc., Julieta Bedoya, Alex L. Canas, Unknown Tenant #1 and Unknown Tenant #2, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-2265
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kristy S. HOLT, Appellant, v. FLORIDA 18 LLC, and Abundant Property LLC, Appellees.
    No. 4D 17-2311
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    Phillippe Symonovicz of the Law Offices of Phillippe Symonovicz, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Ryan Lamchick and Alex Wagner of Lamchick Law Group, P.A., Miami, for appellee Florida 18 LLC.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Warner, Taylor and Levine, JJ., concur.


text:
    ASAP RESTORATION AND CONSTRUCTION, INC., a/a/o Suzanne Casey, Appellant, v. TOWER HILL SIGNATURE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2581
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    Gray Proctor of Fox & Loquasto, P.A., Orlando, and Vanessa Valdes of Militzok & Levy, P.A., Hollywood, for appellant.
    Scot E. Samis and Jonathan S. Tannen of Traub Lieberman Straus & Srewsberry LLP, St. Petersburg, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed .

Gerber, C.J., Gross and Conner, JJ., concur.


text:
    Cesar MENDEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3407
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 31, 2018
    Cesar Mendez, Daytona Beach, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gross, May and Kuntz, JJ., concur.


text:
    James E. HENDERSON, Jr., Appellant, v. NORTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a Broward Health Medical Center, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3456
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    James E. Henderson, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, pro se.
    William V. Carcioppolo and Shari D. Smith of La Cava & Jacobson, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gerber, C.J., Gross and Conner, JJ., concur.


text:
    Bruce SANTIAGO, Appellant, v. Solange AVALLONE, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3653
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Harold HOLDREN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-203
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Cephus WADE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-305
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sergey Yury KOLESOV, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-322
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Christian SAGASTUME, Appellant, v. Deryl LOAR and Indian River County Sheriff's Office, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-363
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    Christian Sagastume, Vero Beach, pro se.
    James Harping, Vero Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Gerber, C.J., Gross and Conner, JJ., concur.


text:
    Christopher M. CHAMBERS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 4D18-597
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Harris SHAPIRO, Appellant, v. SPL HOLDINGS, LLC, Central Communities, LLC, Florida Real Estate Value Fund, LP, Florida Real Estate Value Fund Manager, LLC, And 13th Floor Manager, LLC, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-3354
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 7, 2018]
    Robert Pasin of Law Office of Robert Pasin, Coral Springs, for appellant.
    Lara O'Donnell Grillo and Etan Mark of Mark Migdal & Hayden, Miami, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Damoorgian, Conner and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.


text:
    J.W., the father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-620
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    D.B. SR., the father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-845
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 31, 2018
    Gary L. Pickett, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Andrew Feigenbaum of Children's Legal Services, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    Jane Kreusler-Walsh of Kreusler-Walsh, Vargas & Serafin, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Thomasina Moore and Laura J. Lee, Sanford, for appellee Guardian ad Litem Program.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Warner, Taylor and Levine, JJ., concur.


text:
    Paulius TELAMY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-903
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 31, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Beresford B. BERTRAM and Theresa Bertram, Appellants, v. HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3813
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 7, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Virginia T. SCOTT, Appellant, v. MANOR CARE OF WEST PALM BEACH FL, LLC d/b/a Manor Care Health Services-West Palm Beach and HCR III HealthCare, LLC, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-2540
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 7, 2018]
    Virginia T. Scott, Jupiter, pro se.
    Scott A Cole and Daniel M. Schwarz of Cole Scott & Kissane, P.A. Plantation, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Warner, Taylor and Levine, JJ., concur.


text:
    Eduardo Francisco Chirinos GUERRERO, Appellant, v. Erika Maria Brain BEDOYA, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-43
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 7, 2018]
    Nancy A. Hass of Nancy A. Hass, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Kevin Coyle Colbert, Miami, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Damoorgian, Ciklin and Levine, JJ., concur.


text:
    William NUNEZREYES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2467
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 7, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John Paul SPENCER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-1830
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 28, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Nancy Jack, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Warner, May and Forst, JJ., concur.


text:
    Shonterrius M. SNIPES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-268
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 28, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Erik Kurt BOE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1082
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 21, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mitchell A. Egber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Damoorgian, Klingensmith and Kuntz, JJ., concur.


text:
    Patrick HAIR, Appellant, v. REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION, and Broward County Supervisor of Elections, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-3661
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 7, 2018]
    Patrick Hair, Sunrise, pro se.
    Katie E. Sabo, Tallahassee, for Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

Warner, Taylor, and Levine, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Dontavis GRIMES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-112
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 10, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Eloy MONTANEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3497
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 10, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jacobo VARELA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3067
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 20, 2018 Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Richard G. MIDWOOD, Jr., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and State of Florida, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-3050
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Otis TIMMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-465
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 17, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Timothy Tad SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3612
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 17, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 23, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Aimee O'Toole HOLAWAY n/k/a Aimee Kilcrease, Appellant, v. Randy HOLAWAY, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-972
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 17, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Pamela Ann LANTRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3563
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 17, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Gerald DORMEVIL, Appellant, v. Rachelle DORMEVIL O/B/O H.D., a Child, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-4037
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 8, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    CONSOLIDATED RESOURCE RECOVERY, INC., Appellant, v. Yuniel LEAL and J. Grez Transport, Inc., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-2071
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 1, 2018 Rehearing En Banc Denied May 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kimberly HONAKER, Appellant, v. ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2264
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 24, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    John Carson CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3968
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 24, 2018 Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Roger James SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-81
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Delvin R. BERG and Holly M. Berg, Appellants, v. FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3139
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    The RESULTS TEAM. COM, INC., Appellant, v. CAPISTRANO CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Cammy Fitzgerald, Shannon Cox and Seminole County Clerk of Court, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-2718
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Milton WEST, Appellant, v. COMMISSION ON ETHICS, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2076
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Nathaniel POOLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1408
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Nicole Joanne Martingano, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

TORPY, BERGER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Christopher J. CAMPA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-817
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    William A. CARPENTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-832
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jammie SIMMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-71
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Christine Lynn HIPPLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3989
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael Paul BUTCHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3495
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    James MCKINNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3318
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jeffrey HOWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1484
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Russell L. YATES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-484
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Daniel COX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3259
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Douglas A. LIVELY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3817
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    John CANNADAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2227
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jerome MCCRAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1795
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Rene GUTIERREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-3720
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kyle POTTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-843
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    D.F., A CHILD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-4001
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kareem HANSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3947
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Freddie DELGADO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-2995
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Arthur FELLNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1715
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jose Luis RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1536
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Willie HULL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-54
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Nikhil Sen SHARMA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3731
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed May 15, 2018
    Martin P. McDonnell, of Law Offices of Martin P. McDonnell, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Ortiz v. State , 227 So. 3d 682, 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) ; Callaway v. State , 202 So. 3d 901, 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).

PALMER, LAMBERT and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Brents Harper BULLOCK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1188
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Octavious T. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3201
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    David Blair JACOBBAUSKI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-4105
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Sherried Oscar WATSON, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1863
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Nathaniel Lamar WOODS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2046
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Will B. VERNELUS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3463
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Lance WINDISCH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-486
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Tisha SUZANNE, Appellant, v. INDIGO LAND GROVELAND, LLC, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D16-4467
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Christopher R. BARSALOU, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-506
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Andrew Jerome HARRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-222
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jorge MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-102
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Charles VANDERSNICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3966
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Christian GEDIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3640
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Juan R. MIRANDA, Appellant, v. Rachel E. SPACAL, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1948
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Lisa SCARCELLA, Appellant, v. MODERN USA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1892
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael J. STRICKLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-538
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ricardo TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-523
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jana KRAJNAK, Appellant, v. Peter KRAJNAK, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1987
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Alba MUNOZ a/k/a Alba R. Munoz, Appellant, v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC, Piedmont Park Homeowners Association, Inc., Bank of America, Pedro Portes and Suntrust Bank, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-2379
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed May 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Akeem William David JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3144
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Appellant was convicted of two counts of resisting an officer without violence after he ran from officers, fell to the ground almost immediately, and continued to resist while on the ground until he was restrained and loaded into a patrol car. The entire encounter took twenty to thirty seconds. Because this incident amounts to one criminal episode and one criminal act, the dual convictions for resisting an officer without violence are a double jeopardy violation. See R.J.R. v. State , 88 So.3d 264, 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ("Florida courts have consistently held that a continuous resistance to an ongoing attempt to effectuate a person's arrest or detainment constitutes only one single instance of resisting an officer."); Williams v. State , 959 So.2d 790, 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("When considering the issue of what constitutes a criminal episode in the context of resisting charges, courts have held that a defendant's continuous resistance to a single ongoing attempt to effectuate his arrest constitutes a single episode of resisting."). The remedy is to "reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate one of the convictions for resisting arrest without violence." See Fogle v. State , 754 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

REVERSED and REMANDED .

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.


author: Jay, J.,

text:
    Laura MYERS, Appellant, v. PASCO COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD and Johns Eastern Company, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 1D17-5457
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 4, 2018
    Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
    Stephen M. Barbas and Kristen H. Emerson of Barbas, Nunez, Sanders, Butler & Hovsepian, Tampa, for Appellees.
   Jay, J.,

In this workers' compensation case, the Claimant seeks relief from a summary final order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying her request for a "one-time change" of physician as permitted by section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2016). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

"[A] claimant who sustains a compensable injury is entitled to a one-time change in treating physician as an absolute right if a written request is made during the course of treatment." Zekanovic v. Am. II, Corp. , 208 So.3d 851, 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). This one-time change must be made with a doctor who practices in the same specialty as the originally authorized physician. Id. (citing Retailfirst Ins. Co. v. Davis , 207 So.3d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ). The doctor's specialty is determinative, "regardless of who makes the selection." Zekanovic , 208 So.3d at 852.

Here, when the Claimant requested a one-time change from her orthopedic surgeon, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) authorized a neurosurgeon. When the Claimant filed a petition alleging that the authorization failed to meet the statutory requirements, the JCC denied the petition reasoning that the term "specialty" is broader than the "specialty of [the] physician" and "should be extended to" the types of conditions the doctor treats. Because orthopedic surgeons and neurosurgeons both treat back injuries, and because the Claimant has a compensable back problem, the JCC concluded that the E/C's authorization was in compliance with the statute.

However, the JCC's analysis is not grounded in the language of the statute. Section 440.13(2)(f) requires that the one-time change be made with a physician who practices in the "same specialty " as the originally authorized doctor. Zekanovic , 208 So.3d at 852 (emphasis added). A physician who provides similar services in a different specialty does not qualify as a doctor in the "same specialty" because-quite simply-"same" is different than "similar." See, e.g. , Clare v. Lynch , 220 So.3d 1258, 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ("[I]t is clear that the legislature intended that specialists from the 'same specialty' be required as corroborating experts in medical malpractice litigation. While providers from 'similar' specialties may have been previously permitted, they are not permitted any longer.... The trial court's ruling in this case, which effectively resurrects the prior statutory language by crediting an affidavit from a provider in a 'similar' specialty, constitutes a clear departure from the essential requirements of the law that cannot be countenanced.").

Thus, the neurosurgeon authorized by the E/C did not practice in the "same specialty" as the originally authorized orthopedic surgeon. Id. Consequently, we reverse the order denying the Claimant's claim for a one-time change-and the associated denial of the claim for attorney's fees and costs-and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED .

Wolf and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Betty Caitlin Nicole SMITH, Appellant, v. Zachary Taylor DANIEL, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4240
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 4, 2018
    Betty Smith, pro se, Appellant.
    Zachary Daniel, pro se, Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Appellant, the mother, appeals that portion of the "Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with Dependent or Minor Child" ordering shared parental responsibility and granting supervised parenting time between the parties' minor child and Appellee, the father. Because those provisions of the final judgment ignore an unexpired Kentucky Domestic Violence Order of Protection entered against the father, and for additional reasons discussed below, we reverse.

A trial court has "broad discretion" in determining time-sharing matters and parenting plans, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. J.N.S. v. A.M.A. , 194 So.3d 559, 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ; Miller v. Miller , 842 So.2d 168, 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). In the present case, however, we hold the trial court did abuse its discretion by failing to accord full faith and credit due the Kentucky Domestic Violence Order of Protection under 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) and section 741.315(2), Florida Statutes (2016). See also § 61.526(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). Significantly, the Order of Protection prohibits the father from coming within 500 feet of the minor child. By granting the father "parenting time," even though supervised, the final order directly contravenes the explicit terms of the Order of Protection.

Furthermore, the Order of Protection was direct and unrefuted evidence of domestic violence against the mother and the minor child by the father. Although the trial court did find that domestic violence occurred during the marriage because the father did not refute the mother's allegations of the violence, there is nothing in the final order suggesting that the trial court seriously considered this finding in carrying out its duty to determine the best interests of the child according to the provisions of sections 61.13(2)(c)2. and 61.13(3)(m), 5 Florida Statutes (2016). Nor can the court's pronouncement that the father should enjoy shared parental responsibility and visitation with the minor child be reconciled to its crediting of the mother's testimony that the domestic violence "did substantial emotional damage to the Child" and "that the Child's conditions and [medical] status require special consideration and attention by the Court."

In addition, apart from giving a passing mention to domestic violence, which, as previously noted, is a factor to be considered under section 61.13(3)(m), the final order is otherwise devoid of any suggestion that the trial court considered the remaining factors in section 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Florida Statutes (2016), in order to determine the best interests of the child. See Bainbridge v. Pratt , 68 So.3d 310, 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (concluding that while "there is no statutory requirement that a trial court engage in a discussion as to each of the factors [in section 61.13(3) ], a discussion of the relevant factors can be helpful in determining whether the trial court's judgment is supported by competent, substantial evidence"). For this reason, we conclude that the trial court's award of shared parental responsibility and parenting time is not based on competent, substantial evidence.

Thus, we reverse that portion of the "Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with Dependent or Minor Child" relating to shared parental responsibility and parenting time. We remand the case to the trial court with instructions for it to reconsider, and if necessary, to take additional evidence on and make findings concerning, the Kentucky Domestic Violence Protection Order and the best interests of the child, as those factors directly affect the issues of shared parental responsibility and parenting time.

AFFIRMED , in part, REVERSED , in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings.

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and JAY, JJ., concur.

      18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) states in pertinent part: "Any protection order that is consistent with subsection (b) of this section by the court of one State ... shall be accorded full faith and credit by the court of another State ... and enforced by the court ... of the other State ...." Subsection (b) requires that the issuing state shall have had jurisdiction over the parties and given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard to the party against whom the order is sought. Here, the Order of Protection recites that the court had jurisdiction and Appellee ("Respondent" per the order) "was provided with reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard." Appellee has not challenged the order in any way.

      Section 741.315(2), Fla. Stat., states:
      Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s. 2265, an injunction for protection against domestic violence issued by a court of a foreign state must be accorded full faith and credit by the courts of this state and enforced by a law enforcement agency as if it were the order of a Florida court ....

      Section 61.526(1), Fla. Stat.-appearing in Florida's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act-requires a Florida court to "recognize and enforce a child custody determination of a court of another state ...." The Kentucky Domestic Violence Order of Protection grants temporary custody of the minor child to Appellant.

      Section 61.13(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes, provides that when considering whether to order shared parental responsibility and time-sharing, "the court shall consider evidence of domestic violence ... as evidence of detriment to the child."


author: Winsor, J.

text:
    Thomas John POPE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2487
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 8, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Winsor, J.

In 2012, the Florida Legislature found it was "in the public interest to encourage a person who is aware of or present during another individual's drug overdose to seek medical assistance for that individual." Ch. 2012-36, Laws of Fla. The Legislature therefore enacted the "911 Good Samaritan Act," which provides that anyone "acting in good faith who seeks medical assistance for an individual experiencing a drug-related overdose" is immune from prosecution for drug possession if the evidence "was obtained as a result of the person's seeking medical assistance." § 893.21(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). The issue in this case is whether that statutory immunity reaches Thomas Pope, who sought medical help for a young woman overdosing on heroin.

Many facts are disputed, but the pertinent ones are not. Because neither side asks us to disturb the trial court's factual findings, our obligation is to apply the law to those findings, which means our review is de novo. See Cuervo v. State , 967 So.2d 155, 160 (Fla. 2007).

In December 2016, Thomas Pope and two friends were doing heroin together at Pope's home. One of the friends, a young woman named Ashley, overdosed and stopped breathing. Pope immediately got on the phone with 911, providing his address and seeking help. He answered the 911 operator's questions regarding Ashley's condition, and he followed the operator's instructions to monitor her breathing and tilt her head to open her airway. Emergency responders quickly arrived, recognized symptoms consistent with a heroin overdose, and successfully administered a medication to counteract the effects. Ashley survived.

Despite some admirable efforts to save his friend, Pope's conduct was far from exemplary. At some point after the 911 call but before responders arrived, Pope moved Ashley to the front porch, leaving her briefly unattended. He tried to hide the heroin and rearranged things inside the home. When emergency responders arrived, he initially refused to answer the door, and when he finally did, he did nothing to help them help his friend. He denied knowing Ashley, saying he had no idea where she came from or what she had taken. He was belligerent, somewhat aggressive, and entirely uncooperative.

The State charged Pope with possession of heroin and marijuana, both of which were found inside the home. Pope moved to dismiss under the 911 Good Samaritan Act, arguing that because authorities found the drugs only because of his seeking medical treatment in good faith, he could not be prosecuted. The court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. The court found the whole episode was a "fluid situation" that involved some good faith and some bad faith. It explained that although Pope may have acted initially in good faith when seeking medical assistance, he was later not acting in good faith when he was "making things more difficult" for the responders.

After the court denied Pope's motion, he pleaded guilty, specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of his dispositive motion. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i). The court imposed a fifteen-month sentence, and Pope now appeals the order denying immunity.

It is undisputed that Pope contacted 911 for no reason other than to "seek[ ]medical assistance for an individual experiencing a drug-related overdose." See § 893.21(1). And it is undisputed that evidence of Pope's drug possession "was obtained as a result of [Pope's] seeking medical assistance." See id. The only issue on appeal is whether Pope acted in good faith in seeking the assistance. See id. (limiting immunity to "[a] person acting in good faith who seeks medical assistance") (emphasis added).

Pope argues that by providing the 911 operator with Ashley's location and condition, and then following the operator's instructions in rendering medical aid, he met the statute's "good faith" requirement. The trial court's contrary conclusion-and the State's argument on appeal-relate more to what Pope did after he sought medical assistance. The State argues (correctly) that Pope could have and should have done more. But the Legislature did not condition immunity on doing more than seeking medical assistance in good faith. The Legislature could have imposed more conditions. Indeed, other legislatures have. See, e.g. , W. Va. Code § 16-47-4 (2015) (limiting immunity to those who "[c]ooperate[ ] with and provide[ ] any relevant information requested by emergency medical assistance personnel or law-enforcement officers needed to treat the [overdosing] person"); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11376.5 (West 2013) (limiting immunity to those who do "not obstruct medical or law enforcement personnel"); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4769 (West 2013) (limiting immunity to those who "provide[ ] all relevant medical information as to the cause of the overdose ... when a medical provider arrives").

Regardless of whether Pope should have behaved better, his purpose in contacting 911 was to save his friend. That was a good-faith purpose. Under a plain reading of the 911 Good Samaritan Act, we conclude Pope was "[a] person acting in good faith who [sought] medical assistance." § 893.21(1). The Act therefore gave him immunity from prosecution, so the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss.

REVERSED .

Makar and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    DYCK-O'NEAL, INC., Appellant, v. Hoang N. NGUYEN, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-203
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 8, 2018 Rehearing Denied July 10, 2018
    Susan B. Morrison, of Law Offices of Susan B. Morrison, P.A., and David M. Snyder, of David M. Snyder, and Joshua D. Moore, of Law Offices of Daniel C. Consuegra, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Gregory S. Gilbert, of Parker & DuFresne, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED . See Dyck-O'Neal, Inc., v. Lanham , 214 So.3d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (certifying conflict between this Court's decision Higgins v. Dyck-O'Neal, Inc. , 201 So.3d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), and decisions by the other four district courts of appeal), review granted , SC17-975, 2017 WL 4052015 (Fla. Sept. 14, 2017).

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Lewis and Makar, JJ., concur.


author: SILBERMAN, Judge.

text:
    Edwin ROLLINS, #X78152, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-209
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 8, 2018
    Edwin Rollins, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wendy Buffington, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   SILBERMAN, Judge.

Edwin Rollins appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 that raises four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm without comment the summary denial of claims three and four. We reverse the summary denial of claims one and two because the record attachments do not conclusively refute those claims, and we remand for an evidentiary hearing.

On April 10, 2013, Rollins was charged with burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and resisting arrest without violence. The State filed the charges after Rollins entered a neighbor's apartment to hide from law enforcement. After a Faretta hearing on July 10, 2013, Rollins was allowed to represent himself. At some point he had counsel reappointed, and on October 9, 2013, again requested to represent himself, which the trial court allowed after another Faretta hearing. Rollins represented himself at his jury trial on October 23, 2013, and was convicted of both charges. He had new counsel appointed for sentencing in December 2013. The trial court sentenced Rollins to seven years in prison to be followed by five years of probation for burglary and to time served for resisting arrest.

Rollins filed a motion for postconviction relief and an amended motion which were both dismissed. He timely filed the operative motion, his second amended motion. Claims one and two are related. Rollins alleged that he advised counsel when they first met that he had permission to enter the residence and requested that counsel verify his invited entry defense. In claim one, Rollins alleged that the State had made two favorable plea offers-an offer of one year and an offer of five years. Rollins alleged that counsel failed to advise or discuss with Rollins the evidence against him, particularly the victim's statement made on the night Rollins was arrested in which she asserted that she did not give Rollins permission to enter her residence. He also alleged that counsel failed to advise him of the maximum penalty he faced. In claim two, Rollins asserted that counsel failed to "compel" the victim's statement and discuss it with Rollins before he rejected the favorable plea offer of one year.

Rollins alleged that he rejected the plea offers not knowing the strength of the State's case against him or the maximum penalty he faced. If counsel had informed him that the victim had asserted in her statement that she did not give Rollins permission to enter her residence and the maximum penalty he faced, Rollins would have accepted the offers that were less severe than the sentence he received of seven years in prison, followed by five years of probation.

The postconviction court ordered the State to respond, and the State filed a response with attachments. The postconviction court summarily denied the claims. In doing so, the court attached and incorporated the State's response in the court's one-page order. Rollins timely appealed.

Rollins asserts on appeal that the postconviction court failed to attach any records to its order that conclusively refute his claims. In doing so, he contends that the State's response does not constitute record attachments. As the State argues in its answer brief, the postconviction court may incorporate the State's response in its order, although it is not the favored practice. See Barnes v. State, 38 So.3d 218, 219-20 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). The postconviction court's incorporation of and reliance on the State's record attachments is not a ground for reversal.

Rollins also asserts that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying his motion before he filed his reply to the State's response. The State is correct that rule 3.850 does not provide for a reply but contemplates only a motion and an answer. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(6) ; see also Evans v. State, 764 So.2d 822, 823 (Fla. 2000) (determining that the defendant was not denied due process when the trial court disposed of the postconviction motion before the defendant filed a reply). Thus, the postconviction court did not err in entering its order before Rollins filed a reply.

As to the merits, Rollins contends that the postconviction court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on claims one and two because they are fact-based claims which were not conclusively refuted by record attachments. Our review of the summary denial of a rule 3.850 motion is de novo. Jennings v. State, 123 So.3d 1101, 1121 (Fla. 2013). The court reviewing a summary denial of a postconviction claim under rule 3.850 must accept the allegations in the motion as true unless they are refuted by the record. Id. Generally, an evidentiary hearing is warranted unless (1) the record conclusively shows that the defendant is not entitled to relief, or (2) the claim is legally insufficient. Id. It is the defendant's burden to establish a prima facie case on the basis of a legally valid claim. Id.

To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must establish "(1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Alcorn v. State, 121 So.3d 419, 425 (Fla. 2013) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ). In the context of misadvice leading to a rejection of a plea offer,

to establish prejudice, the defendant must allege and prove a reasonable probability, defined as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, that (1) he or she would have accepted the offer had counsel advised the defendant correctly, (2) the prosecutor would not have withdrawn the offer, (3) the court would have accepted the offer, and (4) the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.

Id. at 430.

Rollins alleged all four elements in claims one and two. At issue on appeal is only the first element, whether Rollins would have accepted the offer had counsel advised him properly. Based on the State's response, the postconviction court summarily denied the claims, stating that "the Defendant was well aware of the facts of his case and seemed uninterested in plea negotiations." In its response, the State relied on a letter Rollins wrote to the trial court that was filed on October 10, 2013, and one sentence from Rollins' mother's statement at the sentencing hearing on December 12, 2013, to argue that the record conclusively refuted his claims.

In Rollins' letter he expressed his desire to exercise his speedy trial rights and stated that the victim did not want anything to do with the case and had not been showing up to court dates. At the sentencing hearing, Rollins' mother stated that Rollins "was offered at one point a year in the county jail, but at the advisement of his lawyer he told him that he could possibly get it trespassing [sic] because of the nature of it."

The State also argued in its response that Rollins did not allege whether the plea offer was made prior to the decision to represent himself or when he rejected the offer. Thus, the State asserted below and in its answer brief that claims one and two are also facially insufficient.

In his second amended motion, Rollins alleged that counsel brought the plea offers to him. Rollins also alleged counsel conveyed the first plea offer to him shortly after they had their first meeting. Rollins further alleged that at no time did counsel discuss the benefits of accepting the plea or possible consequences of rejecting it. Rollins also alleged that he requested counsel to verify his invited entry defense and that he rejected the offer "while awaiting for his invited entry defense to be verified." These allegations are sufficient to show that counsel conveyed the plea offers and allegedly misadvised Rollins while Rollins was represented by counsel.

With respect to whether the claims are conclusively refuted by the record attachments incorporated in the postconviction court's order, Rollins' letter of October 10, 2013, does not conclusively refute the claim. In determining the prejudice prong, the courts consider "the circumstances as viewed at the time of the offer and what would have been done with proper and adequate advice ." Id. at 432 ; see also Armstrong v. State, 148 So.3d 124, 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). The letter does not indicate what Rollins knew at the time of the offer about the victim's statement to law enforcement or about the maximum penalty of fifteen years that he faced for the second-degree felony. The letter also does not indicate what he would have done with proper and adequate advice.

Similarly, the mother's statement at sentencing does not conclusively refute Rollins' claim. The mother told the court that counsel advised Rollins that "he could possibly get it trespassing [sic]." Her statement does not address whether counsel failed to provide information on the victim's statement or the maximum penalty Rollins faced or what Rollins would have done with proper advice.

Thus, we reverse the summary denial of claims one and two and remand for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the claims. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D) ("On appeal from the denial of relief, unless the record shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief, the order shall be reversed and the cause remanded for an evidentiary hearing or other appropriate relief.").

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

CRENSHAW and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.

      After reviewing the initial pro se brief, this court ordered the State to file an answer brief. The State filed its answer, and Rollins then filed a reply.

      Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).


text:
    Neelam UPPAL, Appellant, v. The HEALTH LAW FIRM, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-0671
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed June 12, 2018 Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 31, 2018
    Neelam Uppal, Largo, pro se.
    George F. Indest III, of the Health Law Firm, Altamonte Springs, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(a).

WALLIS, LAMBERT, and EDWARDS, J.J., concur.


text:
    K.C., Father of C.D., a Child, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-0712
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed June 22, 2018
    Edward Juan Lynum, of Lynum & Associates, PLLC, Wildwood, for Appellant.
    Stephanie C. Zimmerman, of Children's Legal Services, Bradenton, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The father, K.C., appeals the final judgment terminating his parental rights as to his five-year-old child, C.D. We only find merit in K.C.'s argument that the Department of Children and Families (the "Department") failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that K.C.'s parental rights should be terminated under section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), for abandoning the minor child, and section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, for engaging in conduct toward the child that demonstrates that his continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, physical, mental and emotional health of the child irrespective of services. See S.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 202 So.3d 769, 776 (Fla. 2016) (reiterating that trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more grounds for termination have been established).

Even so, we affirm the final judgment because the trial court's termination of K.C.'s parental rights based on section 39.806(1)(e) 1., Florida Statutes (2016), is supported by clear and convincing evidence. See D.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 211 So.3d 351 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (citing M.D. v. State, 187 So.3d 1275, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("[S]o long as the trial court's ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes, is supported by the evidence, the court's decision [to terminate parental rights] is affirmable.") ). We agree with the trial court that the Department presented clear and convincing evidence that the termination of parental rights was in the manifest best interests of the minor child and that it is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm.

Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment terminating K.C.'s parental rights to C.D., but we remand with directions for the entry of an amended final judgment striking any language from the judgment regarding sections 39.806(1)(b) and (1)(c) as grounds for the termination of the parental rights.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED with directions.

SAWAYA, PALMER and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Robert Wayne CONNELLY, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-1082
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 28, 2018
    Robert Wayne Connelly, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed as unauthorized. See Baker v. State , 878 So.2d 1236, 1245-46 (Fla. 2004) ("[F]rom now on, we will dismiss as unauthorized, habeas corpus petitions filed by noncapital defendants that seek the kind of collateral postconviction relief available through a motion filed in the sentencing court, and which (1) would be untimely if considered as a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850, (2) raise claims that could have been raised at trial or, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence, or (3) would be considered a second or successive motion under rule 3.850 that either fails to allege new or different grounds for relief, or alleges new or different grounds for relief that were known or should have been known at the time the first motion was filed.").

Roberts, Ray, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Reginald W. DARLING, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-1580
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 28, 2018
    Reginald W. Darling, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed as unauthorized. See Baker v. State , 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 2004).

Lewis, Makar, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ernest BARNWELL IV, Petitioner, v. Julie L. JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-0905
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 28, 2018
    Ernest Barnwell IV, pro se, Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed as unauthorized. See Baker v. State , 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 2004) (habeas corpus cannot be used to litigate issues that could have been or were raised on direct appeal or in postconviction motions).

Roberts, Ray, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Junior J. BATISTA, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-1459
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 28, 2018
    Junior J. Batista, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Kristen J. Lonergan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition seeking belated appeal is denied. See Powell v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 727 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

Rowe, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    William G. GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4766
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 28, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

In this Anders appeal, we affirm Appellant's judgment and sentence, but remand for the trial court to correct two scrivener's errors in the order revoking his probation. Although the trial court orally pronounced its finding that Appellant violated Condition 5 by committing the lesser-included offense of battery, Condition 7 by using intoxicants to excess, and Special Condition 5 by failing to abstain entirely from the use of alcohol, the revocation order states that he violated the conditions of his probation in material respect by "[v]iolation of Conditions 5, 5, Special Condition 12, 7, Special Condition 5, 2, and Special condition 3." Additionally, Appellant admitted violating only Condition 7 and Special Condition 5, but the revocation order states that he "[a]dmits violation," thereby incorrectly suggesting that he admitted violation as to each condition. We, therefore, remand for the trial court to correct the revocation order. See Harris v. State , 229 So.3d 444, 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (affirming a judgment and sentence in an Anders appeal, but remanding for the trial court to correct the revocation order to conform to its oral pronouncement as to which alleged violations supported revocation and to accurately reflect the offense for which the appellant was on probation); see also Williams v. State , 138 So.3d 1102, 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ; Nickolas v. State , 66 So.3d 1077 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Appellant need not be present. See Williams , 138 So.3d at 1103.

AFFIRMED and REMANDED .

Lewis, Makar, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.

      Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

      Initially, the State alleged two violations of Condition 5, violations of Special Conditions 3, 5, and 12, and violations of Conditions 2 and 7. At the violation of probation hearing, the trial court granted the State's motions to dismiss one of the alleged violations of Condition 5, the alleged violation of Condition 2, and the alleged violations of Special Conditions 3 and 12. With regard to the remaining alleged violation of Condition 5, committing the new law offense of aggravated battery, the State argued for a finding of the lesser-included offense of battery.


text:
    Amador MALDONADO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-17
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed June 29, 2018
    Amador Maldonado, Crawfordville, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Amador Maldonado appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm as to Grounds One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Seven, and Eight. However, because the record does not conclusively refute Maldonado's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call witnesses, we reverse the summary denial of Ground Six and remand for attachment of portions of the record conclusively refuting that claim or for an evidentiary hearing. See Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000) ("[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient." (citing Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1996) ) ).

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

SAWAYA, BERGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tom Henry PARKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1557
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed June 29, 2018
    Tom H. Parks, Perry, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the order entered by the circuit court in Case No. 2017-100954-CFDL denying Appellant's Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief filed in that case, albeit not for the reasons provided by the court. We do so without prejudice to Appellant timely raising in Case No. 2007-000909-CFAWS his instant claim that the forfeiture of gain time by the Department of Corrections ("DOC") thwarted his plea bargain, as that appears to be the case so affected by the forfeiture. See Dellahoy v. State , 816 So.2d 1253, 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ("The DOC's forfeiture of the gain time cannot be countermanded by the court, but neither can that forfeiture thwart the plea bargain.").

AFFIRMED, without prejudice.

TORPY, WALLIS, and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Christopher NEWCOMBE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-4769
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 5, 2018
    Mark V. Murray, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED . See Lee v. State , 223 So.3d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), rev. granted , 2018 WL 2065542 (Fla. Feb. 8, 2018).

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Lewis and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Vanisha Vanessa WEIR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-485
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 3, 2018
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Alexandra K. Galvin, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Haynes v. State , 106 So.3d 481, 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) ; see also Tucker v. State , 174 So.3d 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

TORPY, EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ryan DOYLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1378
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    Ryan Doyle, South Bay, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of the trial court's denial of his rule 3.850 motion. We affirm as to Grounds One, Three, Four and Five. However, we reverse as to Ground Two because it was facially sufficient and the attached records do not conclusively refute Appellant's claim.

We remand for the postconviction court to reconsider Ground Two and either conduct an evidentiary hearing or attach records conclusively refuting Appellant's claim set forth in Ground Two.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

TORPY, LAMBERT and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Bilal Hasson LEVERETT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-0100
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 5, 2018
    Bilal Hasson Leverett, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

Wolf, Lewis, and Ray, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gregory J. BATIZI, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D18-1165
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    Gregory J. Batizi, Blountstown, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and, Kaylee Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the October 2, 2017 judgment and sentence rendered in Case No. 2016-CF-1986, in the Circuit Court in and for St. Johns County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

EVANDER, LAMBERT and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Steven SHAREK, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D18-1044
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    Steven Sharek, Bonifay, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the September 8, 2016 judgment and sentence rendered in Case No. 2016-CF-18435-A, in the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

PALMER, BERGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gregory WHITAKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-925
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    Gregory Whitaker, Live Oak, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Gregory Whitaker, appeals the summary denial of his motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In his motion, Appellant alleged, inter alia , that trial counsel was ineffective because (1) counsel failed to take any depositions or otherwise "look into [Appellant's] case," and (2) Appellant informed counsel that he was sick on the morning of trial and that he was therefore unable to think clearly.

Although these claims were facially insufficient as alleged, Appellant was not given an opportunity to amend his claims. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f). Therefore, we reverse as to these two claims with instructions that the trial court give Appellant an opportunity to amend. We otherwise affirm.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

COHEN, C.J., EVANDER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Corey THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-185
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    Corey, Thomas, Jasper, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lori Hagan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the summary denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion. We find merit in Appellant's challenge to the summary denial of claim 3 and, accordingly, reverse as to that claim. In all other respects, we affirm.

Claim 3 involves the contention that counsel was ineffective in advising Appellant to withdraw a motion to sever the murder charge from the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge. The trial court concluded that this was an obvious trial strategy that could be discerned conclusively from the records attached to the order. We disagree. On remand, unless other records exist that conclusively refute this claim, the trial court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing on claim 3.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

SAWAYA, PALMER and TORPY, JJ., concur.


text:
    OSCEOLA REGIONAL HOSPITAL, d/b/a Osceola Regional Medical Center, Petitioner, v. Ashley CALZADA and Juan L. Calzada, Individually and o/b/o J.L.C.O., a Child, Eric Frendak, CRNA, Osceola OB/Gyn, Michael R. Denardis, D.O., OB Hospitalist Group, LLC, Ezer A. Ojeda, M.D., et al., Respondents.
    Case No. 5D17-4097
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    Jason M. Azzarone, David S. Nelson, and Louis J. La Cava, of La Cava & Jacobson, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioner.
    Heather M. Kolinsky, of Law Office of Chad A. Barr, P.A., Altamonte Springs, for Respondents Ashley Calzada and Juan Calzada, individually and on behalf of J.L.C.O., a Child.
    No Appearance for other Respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

Osceola Regional Hospital, d/b/a Osceola Regional Medical Center ("Osceola Hospital"), a defendant in a medical malpractice action brought by Ashley and Juan Calzada, seeks certiorari review of an order denying its motion to dismiss complaint. In its motion, Osceola Hospital alleged, inter alia , that the Calzadas had failed to comply with certain presuit investigation requirements applicable to medical malpractice cases under chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2013), with regard to their claims that Osceola Hospital was liable for the actions of three identified nurses. Because the trial court denied the motion without making necessary findings, we grant the petition.

Osceola Hospital's motion required the trial court to determine whether the Calzadas complied with chapter 766. However, after conducting a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court simply denied the motion without explanation. By doing so, the trial court "effected a denial of the procedural safeguards of chapter 766 for which certiorari relief is appropriate." PP Transition, LP v. Munson , 232 So.3d 515, 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (granting certiorari relief where trial court denied hospital's motion to dismiss without making express findings on plaintiffs' compliance with presuit investigation requirements applicable to medical malpractice cases); see also Martin Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Herber , 984 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding that trial court departed from essential requirements of law by failing to determine whether patient conducted reasonable investigation and whether her claim rested on reasonable basis). On remand, the trial court shall make express findings as to whether the Calzadas complied with chapter 766's presuit requirements.

PETITION GRANTED.

SAWAYA, TORPY AND EVANDER, JJ., concur.

      Our decision does not preclude the trial court from addressing the Calzadas' claim that they were excused from providing a corroborating affidavit because of Osceola Hospital's alleged failure to timely provide requested medical records pursuant to section 766.204, Florida Statutes (2013).


text:
    Sean James KOEHLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-4062
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    John P. Guidry, II, of the Law Firm of John Guidry, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse in part the summary denial of Appellant's Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion. Appellant challenges the summary denial of Ground One of his motion in which he claimed that counsel misadvised him about eligibility for youthful offender sentencing, causing him to reject a plea offer. The allegations are insufficient in that Appellant did not allege all of the Alcorn factors. Nevertheless, Appellant should be given an opportunity to amend. See Charles v. State , 193 So.3d 46, 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).

The trial court also erred in summarily denying that portion of Ground Five in which Appellant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the court's failure to give him credit for time served in jail in North Carolina on the Florida offenses. This claim is cognizable in this proceeding. See Bonilla v. State , 110 So.3d 492, 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (holding that claim seeking out-of-state jail credit may be raised on direct appeal or in rule 3.850 motion). Because Appellant was not required to provide proof of his allegations at this stage, his failure to prove entitlement to the out-of-state credit does not support summary denial. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing on this portion of Ground Five is necessary unless other records refute the claim.

In all other respects, we affirm.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

TORPY, BERGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.

      Alcorn v. State , 121 So.3d 419, 422 (Fla. 2013).


text:
    Widaey DINNALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3148
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    Matthew R. McLain, of McLain Law, P.A., Longwood, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant's conviction following his no contest plea to attempted second-degree murder with a firearm has previously been affirmed by this court and will not be disturbed. Appellant committed the crime when he was seventeen years old. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a twenty-five year term of incarceration with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence. Although we affirm the twenty-five year sentence, we reverse in part and remand for resentencing solely to provide for judicial review after twenty years to allow for the possibility of early release. See Kelsey v. State , 206 So.3d 5, 8 (Fla. 2016) ; Montgomery v. State , 230 So.3d 1256, 1263 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) ; Burrows v. State , 219 So.3d 910, 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with instructions.

PALMER, EVANDER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Corey SCHOFIELD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0528
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 9, 2018
    John Edward Eagen, Tallahassee; Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Appellant's notice of appeal failed to timely invoke the Court's jurisdiction to review the Judgment and Sentence. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Any request for belated appeal must be filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c).

Roberts, Wetherell, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Bryant COMMANDER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-36
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 9, 2018
    Rudolph C. "Rusty" Shepard, Jr., Jean Marie Downing, and Chad R. Templeton of Shepard Law, Panama City, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

Bryant Commander was charged with aggravated assault with a firearm based on an incident that occurred in a Walmart parking lot in November 2016. He filed a motion to dismiss the charges under the Stand Your Ground law ( § 776.032, Fla. Stat.) in July 2017. The trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing.

Commander sought review of the trial court's ruling by filing a petition for writ of prohibition in this court. In the petition, Commander argued that the trial court erred by imposing the burden of proof on him to establish his immunity from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground law. We ordered the state to show cause why the petition should not be granted, and in response, the state conceded error based on the prosecutor's agreement at the evidentiary hearing that the state had the burden to prove that Commander was not immune from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground law.

We accept the state's concession of error because it is supported by the record and is consistent with the statute in effect at the time of the evidentiary hearing. See § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. (2017) (created by chapter 2017-72, Laws of Florida, effective June 9, 2017); see also Martin v. State , --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 2074171 (Fla. 2d DCA May 4, 2008) (holding that the 2017 amendment changing the burden of proof under the Stand Your Ground law was procedural in nature and, thus, could be applied retroactively in cases involving offenses committed prior to the amendment's effective date); but see Love v. State , --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 2169980 (Fla. 3d DCA May 11, 2018) (certifying conflict with Martin and holding that the 2017 amendment changing the burden of proof under the Stand Your Ground law was substantive in nature and could not be applied retroactively). Accordingly, we grant the petition, quash the order denying Commander's motion to dismiss, and remand for the trial court to reconsider the motion based on the evidence presented at the hearing and the state's burden of proof under section 776.032(4).

PETITION GRANTED .

Roberts, Wetherell, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


author: B.L. Thomas, C.J.

text:
    Aron C. TASH, Appellant, v. Aaron J. ROGERS o/b/o Minor Child E.R., Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2861
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 9, 2018
    Chris M. Pratt, Palmetto, for Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   B.L. Thomas, C.J.

Aron Tash appeals a final judgment granting a permanent injunction for protection against repeat violence in favor of Appellee, Aaron Rogers, and his daughter, E.R. We reverse.

Rogers is married to Appellant's ex-wife, and the record demonstrates the discordant relationship between the two men and their families; however, the record does not support a finding that Appellant committed two incidents of violence against Rogers, E.R., or another member of their immediate family within the meaning of section 784.046(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2017). "Violence" is defined as "any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death ...." § 784.046(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017). "Repeat violence" is defined as "two incidents of violence or stalking committed by the respondent, one of which must have been within 6 months of the filing of the petition, which are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner's immediate family member." § 784.046(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017).

As we have previously held, "[c]ompetent, substantial evidence must support the trial court's finding that two incidents of repeat violence occurred." Russell v. Doughty , 28 So.3d 169, 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing Shocki v. Aresty, 994 So.2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) ; Clement v. Ziemer, 953 So.2d 700, 702 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ; Santiago v. Towle, 917 So.2d 909, 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ).

The record here contains allegations of three incidents involving Appellant and Rogers or E.R. In the first incident, the evidence established that Appellant spit in Rogers' face and threatened to kill him. Because intentionally spitting in a person's face constitutes battery, see, e.g. , Mohansingh v. State , 824 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), this incident qualified as one of the requisite acts of violence, although it occurred more than six months before the petition was filed. See § 784.046(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (listing battery as an act of violence); § 784.046(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (providing that only one of the acts of violence on which an injunction is predicated must have occurred within six months of the petition).

As to the other two acts, which both occurred within six months of the date Rogers filed the petition, Appellant argues that neither incident constituted an act of violence. During one incident, Appellant allegedly approached Rogers' ten-year-old daughter, E.R., at her elementary school and made inappropriate remarks about her being "messed up" because of her parents. Because there was no allegation that Appellant made physical contact with or threatened any harm to E.R., this incident was not a violent act under section 784.046(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

With regard to the other incident, Rogers alleged that Appellant approached him, looked at him, and said under his breath that he would kill Rogers and his family. Rogers alleged that he knew Appellant carried a pocketknife and knew Appellant had been previously convicted of attempted aggravated assault, but did not allege that Appellant displayed the knife or committed any other overt act beyond the threatening statement.

Appellant's threat did not constitute an assault or any other enumerated act of violence under section 784.046(1)(a). "An 'assault' is defined as 'an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.' " Gagnard v. Sticht , 886 So.2d 321, 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting § 784.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) ). Threatening to kill someone is insufficient to constitute an assault if there is no evidence of an "overt act[ ] indicating an ability to carry out the threat[ ] or justifying a belief ... that violence was imminent." Id. (citing Johnson v. Brooks , 567 So.2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) ); see also Perez v. Siegel , 857 So.2d 353, 355 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (explaining that verbal threats, without an act creating a well-founded fear of imminent violence, were insufficient to qualify as assault).

Appellate courts apply an objective standard in determining whether a reasonable person would experience a well-founded fear of imminent harm. "We have rejected the view that the state must meet both an objective and subjective standard." Fussell v. State, 154 So.3d 1233, 1236 n.5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing Thomas v. State, 989 So.2d 735, 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ("In determining whether a victim was put in fear ... the question is whether the circumstances surrounding the incident would cause a reasonable person to be afraid, not whether the victim was actually afraid.") ); L.R.W. v. State, 848 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ("There is moreover, no requirement that the victim of an assault actually testify to his or her state of mind. If the circumstances are such as would ordinarily induce fear in the mind of a reasonable person, then the victim may properly be found to have been in fear." (citation omitted) ).

Here, the record lacks any evidence that Appellant committed any act evidencing his ability to carry out the threat, thus, there was no evidence that would support a finding that a reasonable person would experience a well-founded fear that violence was imminent. Accordingly, the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence of two incidents of violence committed by Appellant against Rogers, E.R., or another member of their immediate family. Russell, 28 So.3d at 170.

REVERSED .

Bilbrey and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Petitioner, v. Jerome JONES and State of Florida, Respondents.
    Case No. 5D18-2126
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 12, 2018
    Joyce L. Miller, of Department of Children & Families, Tavares, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent, State of Florida.
    No Appearance for other Respondent.
    ON PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
   PER CURIAM.

Based on the State's proper concession of error, we grant the Department of Children and Families' petition for writ of certiorari and remand this case for further proceedings under section 916.17, Florida Statutes (2018). The lower court shall release Mr. Jones from custody of the department or conduct a hearing pursuant to section 916.17(2) within seven days from the date of this opinion.

PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED AND REMANDED.

ORFINGER, TORPY and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jose N. VAZQUEZ FIGUEROA, Appellant, v. Hon. Daniel D. RAULERSON, in his Capacity as a Candidate; Craig Latimer, in his Official Capacity as Supervisor of Elections of Hillsborough County, Florida; Kristy Reid Bronson, in her Official Capacity as Chief of Bureau of Election Records, Division of Elections, State of Florida; and Ken Detzner, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Florida Department of State, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-0405
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 9, 2018
    Jose N. Vazquez Figueroa, pro se, Appellant.
    Emmett Mitchell, IV, Roger N. Beaubien, and Richard E. Coates, Coates Law Firm, PL, Tallahassee, for Appellee Daniel D. Raulerson; David A. Fugett, General Counsel, and Jesse Dyer, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee, for Appellees Ken Detzner and Kristy Reid Willis f/k/a Kristy Reid Bronson; Mary Helen Farris, General Counsel, and Robert E. Brazel, Chief Assistant County Attorney, Office of the County Attorney, Tampa, for Appellee Craig Latimer.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED . See McPherson v. Flynn , 397 So.2d 665, 667-68 (Fla. 1981) (holding courts have no jurisdiction after an election to determine an individual's right to hold office); Norman v.Ambler , 46 So.3d 178, 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that circuit court was without power to entertain defeated candidate's challenge to primary opponent's qualification for state senate based on alleged inaccuracies in financial disclosure forms because primary had already occurred).

Lewis, Kelsey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


author: WALLIS, J.

text:
    David D. HOLLOWAY, Appellant, v. Johna HOLLOWAY, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1709
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 13, 2018
    Susan W. Savard and Jennifer R. Lawson, of Green Family Law, P.A, Orlando, for Appellant.
    Julie F. Weinberger and Morgan A. Weinberger, Kissimmee, for Appellee.
   WALLIS, J.

Former husband, David Holloway, appeals from a final order granting his supplemental petition for modification of alimony and awarding former wife, Johna Holloway, a portion of her attorney's fees. Former husband raises numerous arguments attacking the trial court's decision to modify his monthly alimony obligation and to require him to pay former wife alimony arrears. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to modify alimony and to award alimony arrears, we affirm as to those points. We reverse, however, the court's order awarding former wife attorney's fees because that decision is not supported by the record.

"An award of attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding depends upon the relative financial circumstances of the parties." Kouzine v. Kouzine, 44 So.3d 213, 215 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). When considering the relative financial circumstances of the parties, the court must determine whether one party has a need for such fees and whether the other party has the ability to pay them. Id. It is error for the trial court to require one party to pay attorney's fees where both parties are in equal financial positions. Id. at 216.

Here, the evidence established that both parties are in a similar financial position, and they are equally able to pay their own attorney's fees. Therefore, it was error for the court to order former husband to pay a portion of former wife's attorney's fees. See id. (finding court abused its discretion in requiring husband to pay one-half of wife's attorney's fees where parties were in equal financial positions); Price v. Price, 951 So.2d 55, 59 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (requiring husband to pay wife's attorney's fees error where husband was in no better financial position than wife to pay her fees). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees to former wife.

AFFIRMED in Part; REVERSED in Part.

SAWAYA and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Petitioner, v. Jerome JONES and State of Florida, Respondents.
    Case No. 5D18-2127
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed July 12, 2018
    Joyce L. Miller, of Department of Children & Families, Tavares, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent, State of Florida.
    No Appearance for other Respondent.
    ON PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
   PER CURIAM.

Based on the State's proper concession of error, we grant the Department of Children and Families' petition for writ of certiorari and remand this case for further proceedings under section 916.17, Florida Statutes (2018). The lower court shall release Mr. Jones from custody of the department or conduct a hearing pursuant to section 916.17(2) within seven days from the date of this opinion.

PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED AND REMANDED.

ORFINGER, TORPY and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.