text:
    CITY OF HERNANDO, Mississippi, Appellant v. NORTH MISSISSIPPI UTILITY COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 2007-CA-00176-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Sept. 2, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 2008.
    Certiorari Denied March 5, 2009.

      Kenneth E. Stockton, attorney for appellant.
    Dennis W. Miller, Jackson, attorney for appellee.
    Before MYERS, P.J., BARNES and ISHEE, JJ.
   BARNES, J.,

for the Court.

¶ 1. In February 1966, the City of Her-nando (the City) and Bright’s Water Association (BWA), a private water company, entered into an agreement whereby, in exchange for the City agreeing not to object to BWA’s serving water to the area located within one mile of the City’s limits, BWA agreed, in the event the City ever annexed the area, to release the area from its service area and to give the City the option to purchase the pipes, equipment, and other assets. In 1990, the City annexed the area covered by the agreement. Subsequently, BWA sold its certificated area and assets to North Mississippi Utility Company (NMUC). In 1992, the City purchased all of the water lines and meters located in the annexed area from NMUC for $10,647.60 pursuant to the terms of the 1966 agreement.

¶ 2. In 2001, NMUC filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of DeSoto County seeking to enjoin the City from serving-water to customers within NMUC’s certificated area. The chancery court granted the injunction on the ground that the 1966 agreement did not comply with the statute of frauds; however, this Court reversed the chancery court’s ruling on appeal and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, the chancery court again enjoined the City from serving water to the annexed area, and it is from this judgment that the City now appeals. We reverse the judgment of the chancery court and render judgment in favor of the City.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. On June 13, 2001, NMUC filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of DeSo-to County seeking to enjoin the City from serving water to customers within NMUC’s certificated area. The complaint alleged that NMUC was the holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Mississippi Public Service Commission permitting it to serve water in certain areas located within the corporate limits of the City, specifically a one-mile area which contained a subdivision known as Creekside. In December 2001, a trial was held, during which the following evidence was adduced.

¶ 4. In 1966, the City was providing water service to residents located within its city limits, and BWA was providing service to certain portions of DeSoto County. In February 1966, the City and BWA executed the following agreement:

THIS AGREEMENT made this the 1st day of February, 1966 between the Town of Hernando, Mississippi, hereafter called the [Town], and Brights Water Association, Inc., hereafter called the Association, WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the town has consented to the association having its service area within one mile of the town’s limits, that of Hernando, and provide water service to certain customers within this limit, and it is necessary in the event the town should annex within its corporate limits any of the area served by the association to agree on ownership [o]f such water lines:
THEREFORE, IN CONSIDERATION of the Town of Hernando permitting the association to serve customers within one mile of its corporate limits, the association hereby agrees in the event any of the area is ever annexed to the town, on request of the town to release such annexed area from its service area, and does hereby give and grant to the town the option of purchasing from the association all pipe lines, mains, fittings, connections, meters and other assets of the association within the annexed ar[e]a at the fair and reasonable value thereof at the time of such annexation.

WITNESS THE SIGNATURES OF THE PARTIES THIS THE 1st day of February, 1966.

The original agreement was not produced at trial; rather, a copy of the agreement located in the City’s minute books was entered into evidence. Jannett Riley, the City’s clerk, testified that the agreement entered into evidence was a true and correct copy of the agreement which appeared in the City’s minutes books from February 1, 1966. Riley testified that she searched the City’s records, but she was unable to locate the original agreement. The copy contained the signature of H.B. Massie, the mayor of the City at the time; however, the signature of Wayne Anderson, the president of BWA at the time, did not appear on the document. Riley stated that Anderson’s name was typed into the signature line. According to Riley, when she transcribes an agreement into the record, there is an agreement somewhere that has been signed by the mayor and the other parties. She stated that she does not require the other party to come in and sign the official minutes; rather, she types in the name and indicates with a “slash-s-slash” that there is a signature on file on the original document. Although Riley was not the city clerk at the time the 1966 agreement was executed, she testified that to the best of her knowledge, her predecessor, who was the city clerk in 1966, followed the same protocol.

¶ 5. At some point in 1966, BWA obtained the certificate of public convenience and necessity for the one-mile area referred to in the agreement. On March 12, 1990, the City annexed the area located within one mile of the City’s limits. The area included Creekside subdivision, which is the subject of this litigation. On June 20, 1991, the City’s attorney sent a letter to Anderson informing him of the City’s intention to initiate proceedings before the Public Service Commission to rescind BWA’s certificate of public convenience and necessity regarding the annexed property. The letter referenced the 1966 agreement and stated that the only assets BWA had in the annexed area were a line on Byhalia Road and a line on Holly Springs Road.

¶ 6. In January 1992, NMUC purchased BWA’s assets, which included a water plant, water lines, and utility easements. NMUC also obtained the certificate of public convenience and necessity to serve water to the one-mile area annexed by the City. In April 1992, the City purchased all of the water lines and meters owned by NMUC in the one-mile area for $10,647.60. At the time the City purchased the lines and meters, there were only eight houses in the area requiring service.

¶ 7. Subsequently, Bill Roberson, the president of NMUC, built a new water plant near the annexed area in order to serve a new subdivision being developed; however, in anticipation of future development, he built the plant with the capacity of serving more people than were living in the area at the time. Roberson stated that he built the plant in order to serve his certificated area, which eventually included Creekside subdivision, but the City began serving the subdivision without his knowledge. However, Roberson admitted that the City had served water to the area at issue since the annexation and purchase of the lines and meters, and NMUC did not object to this service until it built the new water plant. Roberson stated that he was unaware of the contract between BWA and the City until the legal proceedings began. He stated that Anderson never mentioned the agreement during the negotiations for the sale of BWA to NMUC.

¶ 8. According to Roberson, the $10,647.60 payment from the City was only for the water mains and meters; it was not intended to be payment for NMUC’s certificated area. He stated that he sold the water lines and meters to the City because they were too small to service the area. To Roberson’s knowledge, the City has never attempted to obtain the certificated area. According to Roberson, it was unreasonable for the City to assume that when it purchased the water lines and meters in the one-mile area pursuant to the 1966 agreement, it was also purchasing the certificated area and the right to serve the customers in the area when it did not obtain approval from the Public Service Commission. He stated that he would not have been willing to sell the certificated area to the City for what the City paid for the water lines and meters.

¶ 9. Riley testified that her understanding of the 1966 agreement was that the City was buying the water lines, mains, and meter service in the annexed area “that would give us that area back that we had agreed to with Wayne Anderson in '66,” but she had no documentation to that effect. Riley stated that when the City bought the water meters and lines, the attorney for the City was responsible for preparing the documentation for the Public Service Commission, but she was not aware that he ever did so.

¶ 10. Joe Frank Lauderdale, an engineering consultant for the City, testified that since the annexation in 1990, the City had spent approximately $650,000 in improvements affecting the area at issue, and the City currently had an outstanding loan of approximately $500,000 for an additional project. Lauderdale stated that he reviewed the invoice submitted by NMUC for the water lines and meters and found the price to be fair and reasonable. According to Lauderdale, it would not have been feasible for the City to pay $10,647.60 for the water mains and lines in the one-mile area in order to serve only eight customers.

¶ 11. Following the completion of the trial, the chancellor found in favor of NMUC and issued an injunction preventing the City from serving water to Creek-side subdivision. The chancellor stated that although the City had the right to acquire any real property located within an annexed area by a voluntary purchase from a water association or by way of eminent domain proceedings, any such acquisition would have to comply with the statute of frauds as it involved an interest in real property. The chancellor then found that the only evidence of the 1966 agreement was the copy of the entry in the City’s minute books, which was only signed by the City’s mayor at the time, not by the president of BWA, and this evidence did not comply with the statute of frauds. He also noted that Lauderdale admitted that the City did not acquire the approval of the Public Service Commission with regard to the purchase. Accordingly, the chancellor concluded that the City had not purchased the right to service the area; therefore, the city was enjoined from providing water seivice in the area.

¶ 12. The City appealed the judgment of the chancery court, and this Court reversed. City of Hernando v. N. Miss. Util. Co., 901 So.2d 652 (Miss.Ct.App. 2004), cert. denied, 901 So.2d 1273 (Miss. 2005). We found that the 1966 agreement was not subject to the statute of frauds as it was not a contract for the sale or lease of land; rather, “[a]t best, ... the 1966 agreement imposed a burden on the land or granted some rights to supply water to the owners or occupants of the land.” Id. at 656(¶ 19). Therefore, we remanded the case to the chancery court with the following instructions:

On remand, the primary question for the chancellor to decide is whether Hernan-do’s payment of the BWA and NMUC invoices, during 1991 and 1992, constituted full payment for the rights to serve all of the property annexed in 1990. If Hernando paid fair value for BWA’s pipes and equipment within the area of land annexed in 1990, then the 1966 agreement should be enforced and NMUC’s claims should fail.

Id. at 657(¶22). Following this ruling, NMUC filed a motion for rehearing in this Court and a writ of certiorari with the Mississippi Supreme Court, both of which were denied; NMUC did not argue in either instance that this Court’s instructions for the chancellor on remand were erroneous or too narrow.

¶ 13. On remand, the City filed a motion seeking a determination of whether it paid fair value for the pipes and equipment of NMUC pursuant to this Court’s ruling. The City argued that if it were able to prove that it had paid a fair and reasonable price for the pipes and equipment in the annexed area, the 1966 agreement would be enforceable, and this matter finally concluded. In January 2006, a second trial was held. At the onset of the trial, new counsel for NMUC stated that he was somewhat confused by this Court’s ruling and was not certain that the Court “interpreted this proceeding and what it was about.” He then argued that certificates of public convenience and necessity have value and that the term “other assets” in the 1966 agreement should have been interpreted to include such certificates; therefore, the issue on remand was whether the value of the certificate of public convenience and necessity was greater than $10,647.60, the amount NMUC was paid for the water lines and meters. In response, the City argued that pursuant to the 1966 agreement, NMUC released the portion of its certificated area located within the annexed area in addition to granting the City the right to purchase the pipes and equipment in the area.

¶ 14. During the second trial, much of the evidence presented was the same as that presented in the original trial. Laud-erdale again testified that $10,647.60 constituted a fair and reasonable price for the pipes and equipment listed on the invoice. He further stated that the City did not have a right to serve customers within someone else’s certificated area. Lauder-dale was not aware of the City’s having taken any action with the Public Service Commission in order to acquire the certificate of public convenience and necessity for the annexed area. He testified that based on his experience, a certificate of public convenience and necessity could have value.

¶ 15. James Elliot, an expert in civil engineering, testified on behalf of NMUC. Elliot testified that based on accepted valuation methods, $10,647.60 did not constitute full payment for the right to serve all of the annexed property; rather, according to 1980 prices, fair payment would have been anywhere from $150,000 to $300,000. However, Elliot did state that in his opinion, $10,647.60 was fair value for the pipes and equipment located in the annexed area. According to Elliot, if there was no valid certificate of public necessity and convenience, his values of $150,000-$300,000 would not be correct.

¶ 16. Following the second trial, the chancellor again found in favor of NMUC. The chancellor specifically found that the City had paid fair value for the pipes and equipment located within the annexed area, but “this alone did not constitute full payment for the rights to serve all of the property annexed in 1990.” According to the chancellor, the certificate of public convenience and necessity was a valuable asset for which the City had not paid anything. Accordingly, the chancellor enjoined the City from serving water within the annexed area, and he found that the NMUC was entitled to any monies paid to the City for water service or tap fees provided to customers within the annexed area.

¶ 17. Following the chancellor’s judgment, the City perfected the instant appeal. The City asserts the following grounds for relief: (1) the chancellor erred in failing to abide by this Court’s instructions on remand and in allowing NMUC to present evidence regarding the value of the certificate of public convenience and necessity; (2) the chancellor erred in not addressing the statute of limitations issue as ordered to do so by this Court; and (3) the chancellor erred in again issuing an injunction against the City when this Court found that the chancellor had erred in finding the 1966 agreement unenforceable. Finding error, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court and render judgment in favor of the City.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 18. “Generally, this Court will not reverse a chancellor’s findings unless they are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was used.” Martin v. Fly Timber Co., 825 So.2d 691, 695(¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (citing Anderson v. Kimbrough, 741 So.2d 1041, 1044(¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.1999)). However, “the standard of review for issues concerning the construction of a contract are questions of law that are reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing City of Grenada v. Whitten Aviation, Inc., 755 So.2d 1208, 1214(¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.1999)). As this case involves the construction of a contract, namely the 1966 agreement, we will apply a de novo standard of review.

ANALYSIS

¶ 19. On remand, the chancellor found that the City paid fair value for the pipes and equipment located in the annexed area; however, he further found that the certifícate of convenience and necessity pertaining to the annexed area was “a valuable asset and would be an ‘other asset’ as contemplated by the 1966 agreement, and for which the City of Hernando has clearly not paid anything.” Therefore, the chancellor again enjoined the City from serving water to Creekside subdivision. The City now contends that the chancery court erred in failing to abide by this Court’s instructions on remand and in allowing NMUC to present evidence regarding the value of a certificate of public convenience at the hearing held on remand.

¶ 20. Before delving into an analysis of the City’s argument, we begin by examining the relevant statutory and legal framework. Mississippi Code Annotated section 77-3-11 mandates that before a public utility may provide service, the Mississippi Public Service Commission must have issued to the utility a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Miss.Code Ann. § 77-8-11 (Rev.2000); Town of Enterprise v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 782 So.2d 733, 735(¶ 5) (Miss.2001). “The certificate specifies the exact area to be served and grants the utility receiving it the right to serve that area.” Town of Enterprise, 782 So.2d at 735(¶ 5). However, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 77-3-1, public utilities owned or operated by a municipality are exempt from regulation by the Commission “within their boundaries and up to one mile beyond their corporate boundaries.” Id. (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 77-3-1 (Rev.2000)). Therefore, the City was not required to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity in order to serve water to the annexed area.

¶ 21. Nonetheless, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a “certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Public Service Commission to operate an electric utility is an exclusive right to operate in a designated area, so long as the utility is capable of rendering elective sex-vice to the public located in the area.” Capital Elec. Power Ass’n v. City of Canton, 274 So.2d 665, 668 (Miss.1973) (citations omitted); see also A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Oxford, 830 So.2d 615, 620(¶ 21) (Miss. 2002) (“While certainly not an absolute grant of exclusivity, ... a utility’s ability to provide sex-vice in an area that has been certificated to it by the Commission, shall not be infringed upon by an adjacent municipality. This holds true so long as the utility is willing and able to provide adequate sex-vice to the area.”). Hence, although the City was not required to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity in order to provide water service to the annexed area, it was not permitted to invade the area simply because it was located within the city limits when NMUC held a valid cex-tificate of public convenience and necessity.

¶ 22. We now proceed to an analysis of the City’s argument in this case, which must begin with this Court’s specific instructions to the chancery court on remand. The instructions were as follows:

On remand, the primary question for the chancellor to decide is whether Hernan-do’s payment of the BWA and NMUC invoices, during 1991 and 1992, constituted full payment for the rights to serve all of the property annexed in 1990. If Hernando paid fair value for BWA’s pipes and equipment within the area of land annexed in 1990, then the 1966 agreement should be enforced and NMUC’s claims should fail.

City of Hernando, 901 So.2d at 657(¶22). NMUC argues that “as a result of the remand, the parties were restored to the position on the record occupied at the time of the rendition of the judgment”; therefore, it was entitled to produce “new and additional competent evidence” on remand, specifically evidence regarding the value of certificates of public convenience and necessity. In so arguing, NMUC relies on section 696 of Griffith Mississippi Chancery Practice, which governs the effect of a reversal and remand in chancery court. Billy G. Bridges and James W. Shelson, Griffith Mississippi ChanoeRY Practioe, § 696 (2000 ed.). However, as the City notes, the exact wording of that section refutes NMUC’s argument. The section states:

When a case has been reversed and remanded without final directions, the judgment of the appellate court operates to vacate and annul the final judgment appealed from and to restore the parties to the exact position on the record that they severally occupied at the time of the rendition of the judgment in the trial court.

Id. (emphasis added). Here, this Court provided final directions to the chancellor to be followed on remand. Moreover, as noted above, after this Court issued its opinion containing the instructions to be followed on remand, neither NMUC’s motion for rehearing nor its petition for a writ of certiorari asserted that the language of this Court’s instructions was too narrow.

¶ 23. At the hearing on remand, NMUC, represented by new counsel, contended that the first sentence of this Court’s instructions stating that “the primary question for the chancellor to decide is whether Hernando’s payment of the BWA and NMUC invoices, during 1991 and 1992, constituted full payment for the rights to serve all of the property annexed in 1990” was sufficiently broad to allow the chancellor to consider whether the certificate of convenience and necessity had value and whether the City paid NMUC fair value for the certificate. However, while this sentence, read in isolation, might support NMUC’s contention, the same cannot be said when the sentence is read in combination with the second sentence, “If Her-nando paid fair value for BWA’s pipes and equipment within the area of land annexed in 1990, then the 1966 agreement should be enforced and NMUC’s claims should fail.” Although the first sentence is somewhat broad, the second sentence is very specific and was intended to clarify the exact question to be answered by the chancellor on remand. Therefore, we find that on remand the chancellor was permitted to consider one issue: whether the City paid fair value for BWA’s pipes and equipment within the area of land annexed. Having specifically found that the City did in fact pay fair value, the chancellor was, in accordance with this Court’s instructions, constrained to find that the 1996 agreement was enforceable and that NMUC’s claims should fail. Regardless, however, of whether the chancellor was permitted to consider the value of the certificate of public convenience and necessity on remand, we find that the chancellor erred in con-eluding that the certificate was encompassed by the term “other asset” in the 1966 agreement, and because the City had not paid any value for the certificate, it should be enjoined from providing water to the annexed area.

¶24. The Mississippi Supreme Court has adopted a three-tiered process for contract interpretation. Gatlin v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 958 So.2d 220, 222(¶ 3) (Miss. 2007) (citing Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So.2d 349, 351-53 (Miss.1990)). The process is as follows:

First we look to the “four corners” of the contract and at the language the parties used in expressing their agreement. “When an instrument’s substance is determined to be clear or unambiguous, the parties’ intent must be effectuated.” Where the instrument is not so clear, we “will, if possible, harmonize the provisions in accord with the parties’ apparent intent.” If we are unable to determine the parties’ intent from examining the four corners of the instrument, we may apply the canons of contract construction. If the intent is still unclear, we may then consider parol or extrinsic evidence.

Id. (internal citations omitted). In this case, we find that the language in the 1966 agreement is clear and unambiguous; therefore, there is no need to proceed beyond the four corners of the agreement.

¶ 25. Initially, we note that when NMUC purchased BWA’s certificate of public convenience and necessity and assets, it became BWA’s successor-in-interest; therefore, it was bound by the 1966 agreement to the same extent BWA was bound. See In re Estate of Harris v. Harris, 840 So.2d 742, 747(¶28) (Miss.Ct. App.2003) (stating that a successor-in-interest can have no greater interest or rights than his or her predecessor). NMUC makes no argument to the Court in this appeal that it is not bound as a successor-in-interest to the agreement; in fact, it refers to itself as BWA’s successor in its brief. Therefore, we will hereinafter refer to NMUC as if it was a party to the original agreement.

¶ 26. NMUC contends that the chancellor was correct in finding that the term “other assets” in the agreement encompassed the certificate of public convenience and necessity; therefore, the City was obligated to pay fair value for the certificate in order to obtain the right to service the annexed area. After a thorough review, we disagree with NMUC’s interpretation of the agreement. The agreement states in pertinent part as follows:

THEREFORE, IN CONSIDERATION of the Town of Hernando permitting the association to serve customers within one mile of its corporate limits, the association hereby agrees in the event any of the area is ever annexed to the town, on request of the town to release such annexed area from its service area, and does hereby give and grant to the town the option of purchasing from the association all pipe lines, mains, fittings, connections, meters and other assets of the association within the annexed ar[e]a at the fair and reasonable value thereof at the time of such annexation.

Based on this language, we agree with the City’s contention that there were two separate and distinct parts to the 1966 agreement: (1) a release of the service area and (2) an option to purchase the pipes and equipment located within the service area. Accordingly, NMUC’s obligation pursuant to the agreement was two-fold: (1) first, NMUC was obligated, upon the City’s request, to release the annexed area from its service area, i.e., the area covered by its cei’tificate of public convenience and necessity; and (2) in a second and separate obligation, NMUC was required to provide the City with the opportunity to purchase the pipes and equipment located within the annexed area. Therefore, by the agreement’s own terms, the certificate of public convenience and necessity was not encompassed by the term “other assets” because in the preceding provision, NMUC agreed to release the annexed area from its service area. As noted above, the City was not required to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity in order to serve water within the annexed area; it was merely prohibited from invading the area covered by NMUC’s certificate of public convenience and necessity. By exercising its rights under the 1966 agreement, the City did not invade NMUC’s certificated area; rather, the portion of NMUC’s certificated area represented by the annexed area was released.

¶ 27. NMUC relies on City of Jackson v. Creston Hills, Inc., 252 Miss. 564, 569-70, 172 So.2d 215, 217-18 (1965), in which the City of Jackson extended its city limits to include an area already being served water by Crestón Hills, a private water company, and for which Crestón Hills held the certificate of public convenience and necessity. The City contended that it had the exclusive right to serve water to all of its inhabitants regardless of whether Creston Hills had the certificate of public convenience and necessity for the area. Id. at 574-75, 172 So.2d at 219. The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed, finding that a certificate of public convenience and necessity is “a valuable right, entitled to protection by the courts.” Id. at 575, 172 So.2d at 220. The court stated as follows:

[The] City had no right to invade the Crestón area without first paying compensation as provided by Section 17 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, which provides that “Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use except on due compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof, in a manner to be prescribed by law[.]” ... We hold that the expansion of the city limits to include the Crestón area did not give the City of Jackson any rights whatever to furnish water to the inhabitants of the area certificated to Crestón by the Public Service Commission.

Id. at 575-76, 172 So.2d at 220. NMUC also relies on Mississippi Supreme Court cases holding that Mississippi Code Annotated section 77-3-11, which, as noted above, exempts municipally owned utilities that operate within one mile of their boundaries from the requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, “does not grant municipalities the ex-elusive right to operate utilities within one mile of their corporate borders.” Town of Enterprise, 782 So.2d at 736 (¶¶ 13-14); see also A.B.E., Inc., 830 So.2d at 619(¶ 17).

¶ 28. Based on this authority, NMUC contends that the 1966 agreement should fail for lack of consideration. According to NMUC, because the City did not possess the absolute right to operate within the one-mile annexed area, it did not give up anything by permitting NMUC to serve customers in the one-mile annexed area. We find this argument to be without merit for two reasons. First, the fact that the City did not have the exclusive right to furnish water to customers within the annexed area does not mean that the City did not give value to BWA in exchange for the release of the service area located in the annexed area. The City had the right to object to BWA’s expansion into the area within one-mile of the City’s limits, and the City provided consideration when it gave up that right. Had the City objected, BWA may have not been able to obtain the certificate for the one-mile area.

¶ 29. Second, this Court found that the 1966 agreement was valid and enforceable on the prior appeal of this case. According to the law of the case doctrine, we are not permitted to reconsider this issue on appeal. The law of the case doctrine states as follows:

Whatever is once established as the controlling legal rule of decision, between the same parties in the same case, continues to be the law of the case, so long as there is a similarity of facts. This principle expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has previously been decided. It is founded on public policy and the interests of orderly and consistent judicial procedure.

Moeller v. Am. Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co., 812 So.2d 953, 960(¶22) (Miss.2002) (citation omitted); see also Bridges & Shelson, supra, § 699. “This doctrine dictates that a mandate issued by this Court ‘is binding on the trial court on remand, unless the case comes under one of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine.’ ” Id. Exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are “ ‘material changes in evidence, pleadings or findings,’ ” or “ ‘the need for the Court to ‘depart from its former decision’ ‘after mature consideration’ so that ‘unjust results’ will not occur.’ ” Id. at 960-61(¶ 22). We do not find any of these exceptions to be applicable to this case; therefore, NMUC’s argument that the 1966 agreement lacked consideration is without merit.

¶ 30. There is an additional reason that Crestón Hills and the other cases relied on by NMUC are not controlling in this case; those cases did not involve a contract such as the one at issue here. While it is clear that certificates of public convenience and necessity can have value and that the City did not have an absolute right to serve water in the annexed area, the City did not simply invade NMUC’s certificated area as was the case in Crestón Hills; rather, the City exercised its rights under a valid agreement that required NMUC to release its certificated area upon the City’s request. Given the existence of the 1966 agreement, the mere fact that a certificate of public convenience and necessity may have value is not dispositive in this case. NMUC has cited no authority that would prevent BWA from contracting away the right to receive monetary value for its certificate.

¶ 31. Therefore, we find that pursuant to the 1966 agreement, NMUC was required to release the portion of its certificated area located within the one-mile annexed area in addition to providing the City with the option to purchase the pipes and equipment located in the area. Not only does the plain language of the agreement support this conclusion, but this is also the most fair reading of the agreement. This is because the City, regardless of the 1966 agreement, always possessed the right to purchase BWA’s certificated area and the pipes and equipment located therein for fair compensation by way of eminent domain. Therefore, under any reading of the agreement other than the one we adopt today, there would have been no reason for the City to enter into the agreement as it would have gained no benefit that it did not already possess. Moreover, the City had been serving at least a portion of the area at issue for approximately twenty years with no objection from BWA or NMUC, and Roberson himself acknowledged that the water pipes and equipment were of no use without the certificated area. Finally, our reading of the agreement is consistent with this Court’s directions to the chancellor that if it was determined on remand that the City paid fair value for the pipes and equipment, the 1966 agreement should have been enforced and NMUC’s claims should have failed.

¶ 32. Although we find that the language of the 1966 agreement is clear and unambiguous, we note that even if the language were found to be ambiguous, our conclusion would remain the same. Under the doctrine of ejusdem genens, “[i]n the construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, ... where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in them widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.” Black’s Law Dictionary 517 (6th ed.1990); see also Cole v. McDonald, 236 Miss. 168, 187, 109 So.2d 628, 637 (Miss.1959). Here, the 1966 agreement gave the City the option to purchase from NMUC “all pipe lines, mains, fittings, connections, meters, and other assets ... within the annexed ar[e]a.” Pipe lines, mains, fittings, connections, and meters are physical assets; therefore, according to the doctrine of ejusdem genens, the term “other assets” should be construed to include other physical assets, and a certificate of public convenience and necessity would not constitute a physical asset, but rather an intangible asset. This interpretation is supported by the agreement’s prefatory language, which states, “it is necessary in the event The Town should annex within its corporate limits any of the area served by the association to agree on ownership of such water lines.” This language indicates that the water lines and equipment were the assets the parties intended to be purchased, not the certificated area.

¶ 33. Based on the foregoing, we find the chancellor’s judgment on remand to enjoin the City from providing water to the annexed area to be erroneous. The chancellor found, and the evidence clearly supports, that the City paid fair value for the pipes and equipment within the annexed area. Therefore, pursuant to this Court’s instructions, the chancellor should have enforced the 1966 agreement and concluded that NMUC’s claims were without merit. Because he did not do so, we reverse the chancellor’s judgment and render judgment in favor of the City. We do not address the City’s remaining grounds for appeal.

¶ 34. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF DESOTO COUNTY IS REVERSED AND RENDERED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE AP-PELLEE.

KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.

      . According to Riley, the city hall had been moved since 1966, and many of the older records were no longer available.

      . In actuality, NMUC assumed BWA’s outstanding debt as payment for the assets.

      . The invoice was submitted by NMUC and described the items being sold as 2,060 feet of pipe and meter services along Byhalia Road and 2,208 feet of pipe and meter services along Holly Springs Road. The invoice made no specific mention of the certificate of public convenience and necessity.

      .Roberson is also the owner of DeSoto County Water Maintenance Company, which is a sister corporation of NMUC. In November 1991, the City paid DeSoto County Water Maintenance Company $26,357 for a connection line between water lines in the annexed area and the lines that already existed in the City.

      . Lauderdale stated that the improvements were not made specifically for Creekside; rather, they also benefitted areas that were already within the city limits prior to the annexation.

      . We also found that even if the statute of frauds was applicable, the City proved “the existence and contents of the 1966 agreement not only by parol evidence through the testimony of Ms. Riley, but also through the official city minutes that were kept pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 21-15-17 (Rev.2001).” City of Hernando, 901 So.2d at 657(¶ 21).

      . The Court also found that the chancellor had failed to address the City’s claim that NMUC’s action was barred by tire three-year statute of limitations set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-49 and, therefore, remanded the issue for further consideration. Id. at (¶¶ 23-24).

      . The figures Elliot used to reach these amounts were derived from those used in Bear Creek Water Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Madison, 416 So.2d 399 (Miss.1982), in which Elliot testified as an expert witness. In Bear Creek, the Town of Madison held a certificate of public convenience and necessity permitting it to furnish water to a portion of Madison. Id. at 400. Madison subsequently annexed a portion of Bear Creek's certificated area and filed a petition to condemn Bear Creek's certificate of public necessity and convenience for the annexed area. There were no physical assets owned by Bear Creek in the annexed area; rather, the only asset at issue was the certificate itself. The issue in Bear Creek revolved around what formula should be used to place a value on the certificate of public convenience and necessity for the purposes of determining what Madison was required to pay Bear Creek as just compensation. Id. The supreme court found that the trial court had utilized an incorrect method of valuation, and the court concluded that in valuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity, “past revenues, present physical facilities, [and] the likelihood of expansion and other business factors, including the likelihood of future revenues,” should be considered. Id. at 402-03. Elliot testified that on remand, he projected these figures, and the jury awarded $134,000 to Bear Creek, which amounted to approximately $548 per acre in 1980 prices.
      In the case at bar, Elliot used the $548-per-acre figure and multiplied it by the number of acres in the one-mile annexed area to arrive at a $300,000 value for the annexed area, assuming everything was exactly comparable to the situation in Bear Creek. He stated that if the situation was only fifty percent comparable to the situation in Bear Creek, the certificated area would still be worth approximately $150,000. Elliot stated that using 1990 prices would increase the amount considerably.

      . In Harris, Vaughn, who owned a one-fifth interest in a piece of property, had signed a contract agreeing not to divide the property for a certain period of time. Harris, 840 So.2d at 747(¶ 28). When Vaughn died, his wife and daughter inherited his one-fifth interest in the property. Id. Vaughn’s brother argued that the wife and daughter should not be bound by a contract they never signed; this Court, however, found that the wife and daughter were successors-in-interest to tire property and, therefore, were bound to the contract to the same extent Vaughn was bound. Id.

      . NMUC argued in its motion for rehearing and petition for writ of certiorari, inter alia, that it should not have been bound to the agreement because it was not a party to the agreement, had no knowledge of the agreement, and did not assume BWA's obligation under the agreement. As noted above, both the motion for rehearing and the petition for writ of certiorari were denied. In finding that the 1966 agreement was valid and enforceable and in remanding the case to the chancellor with instructions to determine whether the City paid a fair and reasonable price for the pipes, this Court implicitly found that NMUC was bound by the agreement.

      . We also find it noteworthy that Roberson admitted that when NMUC purchased BWA's assets and certificated area, the bill of sale made no specific reference to the certificated area. Roberson staled that the certificated area did not have to be included in the bill of sale because "when [BWA] sold me this, the certificated area had to go along with it.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ROBERTS, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Stephanie ROBERSON, Appellant, v. LFI FORT PIERCE, INC., Deep South Trucking, Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association and American Interstate Insurance Company, Appellees.
    No. 2008-WC-00094-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Sept. 16, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 2008.
    Certiorari Denied March 5, 2009.

      Stephanie Roberson, pro se.
    Thomas Lynn Carpenter, Phillip W. Jar-rell, attorneys for appellees.
   ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court.

¶ 1. Following an accident that occurred while at work, Stephanie Roberson filed a petition to controvert with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission). The administrative law judge (ALJ), who initially heard Roberson’s case, denied benefits, and Roberson appealed. However, Roberson’s appeal was filed outside the time allowed, and the Commission dismissed her case. The Commission’s decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Lamar County, and Roberson now appeals to this Court. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In September 1999, Roberson worked for LFI Fort Pierce, Inc., a franchise of Labor Finders International. On September 10, 1999, she was instructed to report for work at Deep South Trucking. Once she arrived and began work, she claimed a work-related injury on her first day at work. Roberson filed a petition to controvert, pro se, and a hearing was subsequently held on November 2, 2006. In an order filed on February 28, 2007, the ALJ ultimately found that Roberson failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a causal connection between her alleged injuries and the September 10,1999, accident.

¶ 3. As it happened, Roberson was out of town when the ALJ issued the February 28, 2007, opinion and did not immediately receive it when it was mailed to her house. When she returned to her home in late March 2007, she retrieved her mail and discovered the ALJ’s opinion. On April 2, 2007, thirty-three days after the ALJ’s opinion, Roberson filed a letter with the Commission expressing her desire to appeal the ALJ’s opinion. The Commission sua sponte dismissed Roberson’s appeal on April 5, 2007, as it found Roberson failed to file her appeal within twenty days as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-47 (Rev.2000). Roberson subsequently appealed the Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court of Lamar County, and the trial court affirmed the Commission’s decision.

ANALYSIS

¶ 4. Our standard of review in workers’ compensation cases is one of deference. We must employ the substantial-evidence test. Total Transp., Inc. v. Shores, 968 So.2d 400, 404(1(15) (Miss. 2007). That is, “[rjeversal is proper only when [the] Commission[’s] order is not based on substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, or is based on an erroneous application of the law.” Id. (citation omitted).

WHETHER THE COMMISSION’S DECISION DISMISSING ROBERSON’S APPEAL AS UNTIMELY WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

¶ 5. Roberson argues that the trial court erred in failing to reverse the Commission’s decision to dismiss her appeal as untimely. She readily admits that her appeal from the ALJ’s decision was filed outside of the deadline provided in section 71-3-47, but she argues that her tardiness should be excused. We begin our analysis by noting that Roberson failed to cite any authority whatsoever in support of her appeal to this Court. Typically, an appellant’s lack of authority renders an issue proeedurally barred from review on appeal. J.P.M. v. T.D.M., 932 So.2d 760, 779(¶ 61) (Miss.2006). Such is the case here, as we find Roberson’s sole issue on appeal is barred from our review. However, notwithstanding the procedural bar, Roberson still could not prevail on appeal.

¶ 6. Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-47 states that the decision of an ALJ “shall be final unless within twenty (20) days a request or petition for review by the full commission is filed.” Additionally, Procedural Rule 10 of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission states, in part, “[i]n all cases where either party desires a review before the Full Commission from any decision rendered by an Administrative Judge, the party desiring the review shall within twenty (20) days of the date of said decision file ... a written request ... for review before the Full Commission.” The temporal mandate of section 71-3-47 is not solely a procedural mechanism as compliance with the section is required in order for the Commission to have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Williams v. Furniture Land, 637 So.2d 191, 191 (Miss.1994); Marlboro Shirt Co. v. Whittington, 195 So.2d 920, 921 (Miss.1967).

¶ 7. The record in this case makes clear that the ALJ’s order denying Roberson’s claim was filed on February 28, 2007. Equally clear is that Roberson failed to file her appeal of the ALJ’s decision until April 2, 2007, thirty-three days later, and well over the twenty-day deadline required by section 71-3-47. Roberson argues that her delay should be excused. She claims that a family emergency arose in January 2007, and as a result, she went to Illinois. She did not return until March 27, 2007. She also ai’gues that her delay should be excused as a result of her pro se status. However, absent “unique facts [that] would permit her petition to be considered constructively filed” within the twenty-day time period, which are not present in the instant case, Roberson’s reasons for missing the deadline are simply insufficient. Ford v. KLLM, Inc., 909 So.2d 1194, 1196(¶5) (Miss.Ct.App.2005). Therefore, we find that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Thus, this issue is without merit.

¶ 8. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAMAR COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.


author: CARLTON, J., IRVING, J., BARNES, J.,

text:
    James Calvin CHAPMAN, Appellant v. Debbie WARD, Appellee.
    No. 2007-CA-00030-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Nov. 12, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 3, 2009.

      Sharon Patterson Thibodeaux, Brandon, attorney for appellant.
    Robert W. Long, Canton, attorney for appellee.
   CARLTON, J.,

for the Court.

¶ 1. James Calvin Chapman and Debbie Ward were granted a divorce based on irreconcilable differences in 2001. Debbie was granted primary custody of the couple’s four children. James was granted visitation and ordered to pay child support.

¶ 2. In 2006, James filed a petition to hold Debbie in contempt for failing to grant him visitation and to modify the original judgment. Debbie filed an answer and a counterclaim. The chancellor entered an order granting James additional visitation, and relieving him of paying future child support. James was ordered, however, to pay $14,840.85 to Debbie for back child support arrearages already vested and due.

¶ 3. James now appeals and raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the chancery court commit manifest error in looking to the transcript of the court’s ruling of July 9, 2001, in interpreting James’s child support obligation rather than looking at the judgment of divorce entered on March 12, 2002, nunc pro tunc July 9, 2001?
2. Did the chancery court commit manifest error when it failed to grant James a credit/set-off against his child support arrearage for sums Debbie received from the Social Security Administration for lump-sum back payments on behalf of the minor children of the parties?

¶ 4. We find no error and affirm the chancery court.

FACTS

¶ 5. James and Debbie were divorced by an entry of judgment of divorce on March 12, 2002, nunc pro tunc July 9, 2001. Debbie was awarded primary physical custody of the couple’s four children. James and Debbie were awarded joint legal custody of the children. James was unemployed at the time of the divorce due to a work-related injury. He was awaiting a hearing with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission.

¶ 6. Under the judgment of divorce, James had the following child support obligation:

[T]he husband shall pay child support 24% of his adjusted gross income with said support due the first month he earns a paycheck and continuing on the 1st day of each month until the minor children are emancipated and with the appropriate withholding order entered.

¶ 7. The transcript of the divorce trial clearly reflects that James knew that he would be expected to pay Debbie 24% of any income he received. James told the chancellor that he was awaiting payment for a workers’ compensation claim. However, James had been unemployed since the divorce and had not paid any child support whatsoever at the time of the hearing in this case. He did, however, receive workers’ compensation benefits beginning in October 2002, at which time the court-ordered child support payments began to accrue and vest. James received separate payments of $16,000, $12,165.92, and $26,250. James was ordered by the chancellor to pay 24% of the total of these sums, with interest, as back child support arrearages.

¶ 8. James was determined by the Social Security Administration to be totally disabled in late 2005. As a result, Debbie subsequently received three lump-sum back payments from Social Security for the benefit of the three youngest children. The record is unclear as to when the payments were actually received, but it appears they were received sometime in 2006. In addition to the lump-sum payments, Debbie also receives a monthly benefit check from the Social Security Administration for the benefit of the three minor children. Even though we can only surmise that the benefits were received in 2006 by implication from the date of the application for benefits, the record is clear that James had already been in default for approximately four years for his failure to pay any child support payments from the workers’ compensation benefits he received beginning in October 2002.

¶ 9. James filed a “Petition to Find Defendant in Contempt and to Modify Judgment of Divorce” on March 9, 2006, in the Chancery Court of Madison County. James sought to have the judgment of divorce modified due to his disability to require that the social security benefits payable for the benefit of the minor children stand in lieu of the past arrearages and also future child support payments yet due.

¶ 10. Debbie filed her “Answer to Petition to Find Defendant in Contempt and to Modify Judgment of Divorce” along with a “Counterclaim for Citation of Contempt and Modification” on June 14, 2006. In her counterclaim, Debbie asked the court to find James in contempt for his default in child support due for the approximate four-year period in which James failed to pay child support of 24% of the workers’ compensation benefits along with 24% of any monthly unemployment benefits and/or workers’ compensation benefits he received.

¶ 11. On August 15, 2006, the court granted part of the relief requested by James and part of the relief requested by Debbie. Without articulating the policy or procedure, the chancellor followed established procedure in case law for addressing arrearages and considering a modification of child support in a case where the noncustodial parent comes to court with unclean hands. See Lane, 850 So.2d at 126(¶ 11). He addressed the arrearages in a cleansing judgment and then modified James’s future support obligation prospectively, giving him credit for an alternate source of payment of child support. The chancellor ordered James to pay Debbie, the custodial parent, what he owed in child support arrearages, plus interest, but the chancellor also gave James credit prospectively for the social security benefits paid to the three minor children as an alternate source of payment as the child support became due. He also ordered the social security benefit payments be made directly to Debbie by Social Security in the future, thereby relieving James of future support obligations. Specifically, the court entered its “Opinion and Final Judgment” ordering James to pay Debbie $15,844.26, the child support due in arrearages, by September 11, 2006, and relieving James of any further child support obligation. The court later amended its ruling to correct a calculation error and ordered James to pay $14,840.85, the child support arrearages due, as child support from the workers’ compensation benefits he received. This judgment cleansed James of his unclean hands due to the arrearages and allowed the chancellor to modify James’s support obligation prospectively.

DISCUSSION

¶ 12. This Court has explained our standard of review in domestic relations cases as follows:

This Court has a limited standard of review in examining the decisions of a chancellor. A chancellor’s findings will not be disturbed upon review by this Court unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied the wrong legal standard. The standard of review employed by this Court for review of a chancellor’s decision is abuse of discretion. The standard of review for questions of law is de novo.

Burnett v. Burnett, 792 So.2d 1016, 1018-19(¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

I. Whether the chancellor erred in looking to the transcript of the court’s ruling of July 9, 2001, in interpreting the child support obligation, rather than looking at the judgment of divorce entered Mach 12, 2002, nunc pro tunc July 9, 2001.

¶ 13. James ai’gues that the chancellor should not have relied on the trial transcript to determine that he owed Debbie child support from his workers’ compensation earnings. Both Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-19-101(3)(a) (Rev.2004) and the transcript of the divorce hearing are, however, perfectly clear that workers’ compensation benefits are income for purposes of child support assessment. James clearly understood what the chancery court intended in its initial decision. The chancellor specifically advised James that child support was payable from “income from any source.... If you get income and it is not where a wage order is applicable, then, you’re obligated to take 24 percent of that and send it to [Debbie].” James responded, “Yes, sir.” The court was perfectly within its right to look at the transcript to clarify the court’s and James’s understanding of the divorce decree. See S(c)holtz ex rel. Barnett Nat. Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 88 F.2d 184, 185 (5th Cir.1937) (“[E]very judgment may be construed and aided by the entire record.”). See also Spearman v. J & S Farms, Inc., 755 F.Supp. 137, 140 (D.S.C.1990) (a court may resort to the record if it finds the meaning of a judgment is ambiguous). This issue is without merit.

II. Whether the chancellor erred in failing to grant James a credit/set-off against his child support arrearage for sums Debbie received from the Social Security Administration for lump-sum back payments on behalf of the minor children of the parties.

¶ 14. James asserts in his remaining argument that the chancellor erred in not granting him a credit against his child support arrearage for the Social Security Administration’s award of benefits to the minor children. We disagree. The chancellor did not commit manifest error in ruling that James owed Debbie the sum of $14,840.85 as child support arrearages due from the workers’ compensation benefits he received beginning in 2002. Additionally, the chanceiy court did not commit manifest error by refusing to allow James a credit or set-off against this child support arrearage due for sums later received by Debbie in 2006 from the Social Security Administration as a result of James’s disability. James did not come to court with clean hands and was not entitled to such.

¶ 15. This Court recently held in Keith v. Purvis, 982 So.2d 1033, 1036(¶ 8) (Miss. Ct.App.2008) (citations omitted), that “Mississippi law is clear that social security benefits received by a minor child based on a non-custodial parent’s retirement or disability are an alternate source of satisfying court-ordered child support obligations and are credited toward the discharge of those obligations.” However, Keith does not stand for the proposition that social security benefits received in lieu of child support may be used to satisfy child support arrearages. This Court held that “[sjocial security benefits may be credited against a non-custodial parent’s support obligation up to the amount of the support obligation.” Id. at 1037(¶ 12) (citing Mooneyham v. Mooneyham, 420 So.2d 1072, 1074 (Miss.1982)) (emphasis added).

¶ 16. In Keith, Jackie Keith was ordered to pay child support to Deanna Purvis. Keith, 982 So.2d at 1035(¶ 3). Keith timely satisfied his obligation each month. Id. at (¶ 4). Keith was later declared disabled by the Social Security Administration. Id. at (¶ 3). As a result of his disability, Keith’s dependent child received a lump-sum payment covering the same period of time for which Keith had already paid support. Id. The chancellor in Keith did not allow Keith any credit toward any future support obligations and likewise refused to allow any reimbursement for any alleged overpayment. Id. at (¶ 5).

¶ 17. This Court held in Keith that “social security benefits may be credited against a noncustodial parent’s support obligation up to the amount of the support obligation.” Id. at 1037(¶ 12) (citations omitted). “Several courts that have specifically considered the mechanics of applying credit for a lump-sum payment of retroactive disability benefits adhere to the general rule that social security benefits may be credited against support obligations only for the period in which the benefits are actually received.” Id. at (¶ 13) (citations omitted). The courts adhere to this rule based on the importance of meeting the current needs of children and protecting their right to regular and uninterrupted support. Id. (citations omitted). Otherwise, noncustodial parents would have an incentive to withhold child support payments in the hope that future benefits paid to the child would satisfy the child support they owed. Id. (citations omitted).

¶ 18. Like the analysis in Keith, and the authority cited therein, allowing credit to James for his arrearages for his failure to pay child support from his workers’ compensation benefits would encourage noncustodial parents to suspend payment while awaiting the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits, social security benefits, or other income, and it also would give them ammunition to pick and choose from which income sources they wish to pay child support.

¶ 19. Precedent does not allow the noncustodial parent to receive credit for ar-rearages, only credit for the current support due. Id. at 1038(¶ 18). Furthermore, to allow James credit for arrearages when he failed to pay child support from his workers’ compensation benefits clearly conflicts with the policy of meeting the child’s current needs through receipt of regular uninterrupted child support payments. Id. at 1037(¶ 13) (citing Newman v. Newman, 451 N.W.2d 843, 844 (Iowa 1990)).

¶ 20. James cites Professor Deborah Bell’s treatise, Bell on Mississippi Family Law, 338 (Nautilus Publishing Co.2006) as authority for the proposition that social security benefits paid to a child as a result of the payor’s employment can offset child support arrearages. However, the cases cited by Professor Bell do not support such a proposition. Professor Bell relies on Mooneyham, 420 So.2d at 1073; Hammett v. Woods, 602 So.2d 825 (Miss.1992); and Bradley v. Holmes, 561 So.2d 1034, 1035-36 (Miss.1990).

¶ 21. James’s reliance on those cases, and on Professor Bell’s treatise, is misplaced. There is no authority in Mooney-ham to allow social security payments to be used to satisfy the noncustodial parent’s debt of past-due child support payments. In Mooneyham, the noncustodial father, Richard, was allowed to offset his child support obligation through social security disability payments which were paid directly to his child. Mooneyham, 420 So.2d at 1072. However, Richard’s child support payments were not in arrears. Id. Rather, he had faithfully met his support obligations. Id. The facts in Mooneyham reflect that Richard had been receiving a check for $77 per month in social security payments for the benefit of the child, which he mailed to her monthly. Id. at 1073. The custodial parent filed for and received direct payment of the social security benefit, at which time the payment was increased to $135.70 per month. Id. Richard mailed the balance of his $150 child support obligation, totaling $15.30 per month, each month to the child. Id. Though he did not seek a modification of child support at that time, through social security payments and supplemental payments made by Richard, the child support obligation was continuously met. Id. Thus, while Richard was entitled to have his child support obligations credited by the amount paid directly to the child by the Social Security Administration, the extension of this holding as authority to allow one with unclean hands to satisfy child support arrearage with social security benefits is improper. The chancery court in Mooneyham attempted to find Richard in arrears because he failed to obtain a modification of his child support and decreased his payment without court permission to make up the difference between his support obligation and the social security benefit payments. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court acknowledged that he was indeed entitled to a credit for those amounts paid directly to the child, so there was in fact no arrearage. Id. at 1073.

¶ 22. Judge Barnes’s dissent improperly cites to dicta in a footnote at the end of the opinion in Keith, in which the dissent claims this Court cited Mooneyham for the proposition that the supreme court allowed arrearages to be satisfied out of social security benefits. Keith, 982 So.2d at 1039 n. 3. However, the footnote in Keith was not a holding but rather an in artful attempt to acknowledge that the supreme court had impliedly held that crediting social security benefits against child support arrearage does not constitute an impermissible retroactive modification of support. Id. The footnote does not hold this proposition and does not directly cite Mooney-ham. Rather, the introductory signal used at the end of the acknowledgment was the word “see,” which means that the proposition is not directly stated by the cited authority, but obviously follows from it. The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation R. 1.2, at 46 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. Eds., 18th ed.2005). Keith made this gratuitous acknowledgment in its resolution of a related issue of reimbursement of benefits. Keith, 982 So.2d at 1039(1122).

¶ 23. The dissent’s use of this footnote as authority as opposed to the actual facts of the case of Mooneyham is an example of the danger of unnecessary dicta in an opinion. Nonetheless, dicta or not, the facts and holding of Mooneyham speak for themselves. In Moaneyham, the noncustodial parent, Richard, was not in default and did not have unclean hands when he came into court. Mooneyham, 420 So.2d at 1072. The supreme court gave retroactive credit to the father for social security payments that the custodial parent received directly for support as it came due. Id. at 1073-75. However, the facts in Mooneyham are clear that at no time did the support obligation go unsatisfied. Id. at 1073. The problem, as addressed in Mooneyham, arose when the mother began receiving a greater amount directly from the Social Security Administration for the benefit of the child. Id. The noncustodial parent in Mooneyham reduced his child support payment to cover the difference between the benefit payment and the support obligation without first seeking a modification. Id. However, child support was paid each month and no ar-rearage or default existed. Id. The noncustodial parent in Mooneyham did not have unclean hands at the time, and the court retroactively recognized that he paid his support as it was due and that he was not in default.

¶ 24. However, the facts in the case before us are markedly different. James paid no child support in the five years between the judgment of divorce in 2001 and the petition to modify the judgment of divorce filed in 2006, despite the significant income, approximately $54,000, he received as workers’ compensation benefits. He was clearly in arrears and in default for lack of payment of child support prior to the receipt of any benefits by the three minor children and had unclean hands when he sought modification. It is noteworthy that James had paid no support for his four children, ever. Such was not the case in Mooneyham.

¶ 25. Likewise, I find Hammett inapplicable here. Hammett sought to have an arrearage of $4,308 placed in a trust account for his disabled child until the child reached the age of thirty-six. Hammett, 602 So.2d at 829. The supreme court affirmed the chancellor’s refusal to allow the money to be placed in trust. Id. The supreme court held that past-due support payments become vested when due and cannot be modified. Id. (citing Thurman v. Thurman, 559 So.2d 1014, 1017 (Miss. 1990)). The court recognized that the social security benefits received by a minor child are an alternative source of payment for child support, but that such receipt of benefits failed to alter the father’s obligation to pay support and did not constitute a change of circumstances. Id.

¶ 26. Professor Bell also cites Bradley, for her proposition that child support ar-rearages can be satisfied by social security or disability benefit payments. In Bradley, the child’s mother elected to receive social security benefits for the child based on the child’s step-father, rather than the child’s father. Bradley, 561 So.2d at 1035. Understandably, the mother elected to receive benefits based on the step-father’s retirement, rather than the father’s, because that benefit was significantly greater. Id. Regardless of whose retirement was used to calculate the social security benefits for the child, the benefit was more than sufficient to satisfy the natural father’s monthly support obligation of $20 per week. Id.

¶ 27. The supreme court in Bradley merely recognized that the monthly child support obligation of the natural father had been satisfied, albeit by a social security benefit payment based on the stepfather’s retirement. Id. A review of the case indicates that the benefits were paid when child support was due and no true arrearages existed. Id. The mother simply elected to receive benefits for the child based on the step-father’s retirement because of the obvious financial benefit to the child, despite the natural father’s request that the mother apply for social security benefits based on his retirement. Id. The court in Bradley recognized that social security benefits received by the mother on behalf of the child under the Social Security Act are considered an alternative source of payment that satisfies the noncustodial parent’s child support obligation. Id. Thus, although the child was receiving benefits based on her step-father’s retirement, not her natural father’s retirement, the monthly support obligation for the child was continuously met and no arrear-ages existed. Id. Bradley, therefore, does not stand for the proposition that child support arrearages can be satisfied through later payment of social security benefits. Again, the Bradley court, as other courts have, recognized that a credit or offset up to the amount of the support obligation due was proper. No past debt or arrearage was extinguished by the Bradley court’s recognition that the child’s natural father was entitled to credit for benefits paid based upon the step-father’s retirement.

¶ 28. Child support payments become vested in the child when due, and once vested, cannot be modified or forgiven by the courts. Houck v. Ousterhout, 861 So.2d 1000, 1002(¶ 9) (Miss.2003). Each payment that is overdue becomes a judgment against the delinquent parent, to which the only defense is payment. Id. In this case, the chancellor recognized such with a judgment for arrearages. Furthermore, emancipation of one of the children does not preclude the noncustodial parent or the emancipated child from seeking payment of the debt from James. See id. I agree that the law allows social security benefits to serve as an alternate source of payment when the benefits are paid in the month the support is due. However, social security benefits cannot extinguish child support arrearages in default. See Keith, 982 So.2d at 1037 (¶¶ 13-14) (adopting holdings of other jurisdictions that social security benefits may be credited against support obligations only for the period in which the benefits are currently due). Therefore, we find that the chancellor’s decision was based on substantial evidence, complied with prior precedent of this Court, and was not an abuse of discretion. See Burnett, 792 So.2d at 1018-19(¶ 6).

¶ 29. Furthermore, James came into the chancery court seeking modification of his child support obligations with unclean hands. This Court has explained the doctrine of unclean hands as follows:

The principle of “unclean hands” dictates that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.... [T]he meaning of this maxim is to declare that no person as a complaining party can have the aid of a court of equity when his conduct with respect to the transaction in question has been characterized by wilful inequity.... The court may apply this doctrine sua sp07ite where it is shown applicable.

Lane, 850 So.2d at 126(¶ 11) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Though Debbie did not affirmatively plead that James should be prevented from seeking modification because of the clean-hands doctrine, the chancellor could have grounded his decision to deny relief to James on the basis that he came before the court with unclean hands. The chancellor’s judgment did indeed reflect the cleansing procedure. James’s hands were cleansed by the entry of judgment against him for the arrearages. See id. at 127(¶ 14). The chancellor was then free to modify James’s support obligation and allow the disability benefit payments received by the children prospectively to satisfy his future support obligations. See id. However, the chancellor could not have allowed James to satisfy the child support arrearages, which began to accrue in 2002, by using the lump-sum payments already made to the noncustodial parent four years later. Again, “[t]his Court cannot eviscerate the ‘bedrock’ principle that child support ar-rearage [cannot] be forgiven.” Id. at 127(1114) (citing Williams v. Rembert, 654 So.2d 26, 29 (Miss.1995)). James is a prime example of why courts adhere to such a rule. James came to court in default with child support arrearages and consequently unclean hands. James should not benefit by being able to satisfy his child support debt with benefits paid to his children. This would encourage noncustodial parents to withhold support while awaiting some future benefit that might not ever arrive.

¶ 30. For the reasons stated above, we find that James’s arguments lack merit. There is no evidence in the record that the chancellor abused his discretion or that his ruling was manifestly in error. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

¶ 31. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., AND ROBERTS, J., CONCUR. CHANDLER, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. IRVING, J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER, J.; CARLTON, J., JOINS IN PART. BARNES, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, C.J., GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ.

IRVING, J.,

CONCURRING:

¶ 32. I agree that the judgment against James Calvin Chapman in the amount of $14,850.85 in favor of Debbie Ward for past-due child support payments should be affirmed even though, at the time of the judgment, Debbie had already received a lump-sum payment from the Social Security Administration for the benefit of the dependent children. I believe that the judgment should be affirmed because James came into court with unclean hands and should not be granted any relief from his child support obligations that accrued prior to Debbie’s receipt of the lump-sum social security payment.

¶ 33. In the judgment of divorce, entered March 12, 2002, nunc pro tunc July 9, 2001, the chancellor ordered James to pay twenty-four percent of his adjusted gross income, with said support due the first month he earns a paycheck. Technically, James never earned a paycheck within the literal meaning of the word. He did, however, receive gross income within the meaning of Mississippi Code Annotated, section 43-19-101 (Rev.2004), because he received substantial workers’ compensation benefits. Section 43-19-101(3)(a) defines gross income to include workers’ compensation benefits. There is no doubt, however, that James knew that he was supposed to pay twenty-four percent of his workers’ compensation benefits to Debbie as child support for the parties’ minor children.

¶ 34. James began receiving the workers’ compensation benefits in October 2002. At that point, the court-ordered child support payments began to accrue. Yet, he paid nothing to Debbie for child support. It is clear from the record that at the time of the divorce, James was not working, presumably due to a work-related injury, and that the parties contemplated that James would soon begin receiving workers’ compensation payments as a result of the injury.

¶ 35. In late 2005, James was found to be disabled by the Social Security Administration. As a result, he received a lump-sum payment. His minor children, who were the subjects of the child support judgment, also received lump-sum payments. Although it is not entirely clear in the record, it appears that these lump-sum payments for the children were not received until sometime in 2006 prior to James’s filing his petition to modify the judgment of divorce. In the petition, he sought a setoff or credit against the children’s lump-sum social security payments for his past-due child support payments that had vested and accrued back in 2002 when he received the workers’ compensation payments.

¶ 36. The chancellor ruled that James was not entitled to a setoff against the lump-sum social security benefits because that was never the intent of the court. Specifically, the chancellor found that “[h]ad any of [the court-ordered child support payments] included social security payments or benefits the Court would not have ordered [James] to pay 24% to [Debbie].”

¶ 37. As I stated in Keith v. Purvis, 982 So.2d 1033, 1041(¶32) (Miss.Ct.App. 2008) (Irving J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I believe that a custodial parent is not entitled to receive double child support payments, paid either directly by the noncustodial parent to the custodial parent or by the Social Security Administration on behalf of the disabled noncustodial parent. However, I believe that, in this case, James should be required to pay the court-ordered child support payments from the workers’ compensation benefits that he received and that Debbie should be allowed to keep that portion of the lump-sum payment that corresponds with the arrearage of James’s child support obligations. My reasoning, as previously noted, is based on the fact that James came into court with unclean hands. Therefore, he should not have been allowed to invoke the power of the court to aid him until he had complied with his court-ordered child support obligation. I note that Debbie did not affirmatively plead the clean-hands doctrine in the court below. However, she did include a general prayer of relief in her response to James’s petition to modify the original judgment of divorce. Since Debbie asked for general relief in her response, the chancellor could very well have grounded his decision to deny relief to James on the basis that he was in court with unclean hands. I believe it was appropriate to do so. Therefore, on that basis, I would affirm the chancellor’s decision. In other words, I would find that James was required to pay the delinquent child support payments before his prayer for relief from future child support obligations could be considered.

¶ 38. Our facts here are remarkably similar to the facts in Keith except they are in the inverse. In Keith, Jackie Keith was ordered to pay child support to Deanna Purvis. Keith, 982 So.2d at 1035(113). He did so faithfully and timely. Id. at (¶ 4). He later was declared disabled by the Social Security Administration. Id. at (¶ 3). As a result of this disability, his dependent child that was the subject of the child support order received a lump-sum payment that covered the same period of time for which Keith had already paid support. Id. Although I dissented in Keith, this Court held that Keith was not entitled to a credit or setoff against the social security lump-sum payment for the child support payments that he had already paid. Id. at 1036(¶ 10). Part of the rationale for that holding was that the payments had vested and could not be reimbursed. Id. at 1039(¶ 21).

¶ 39. Keith timely paid his child support payments as they became due. In today’s case, James did not. Had James paid his child support obligation when he received his workers’ compensation payments and kept his child support payments current, I would find that he should be given credit for the lump-sum social security payment that Debbie later received. In my judgment, no principle of law enunciated in any of the cases cited by the majority in Keith or in this case prohibits a noncustodial parent from being credited with, or refunded, monthly dependent social security payments that are paid in a lump sum after the noncustodial parent has been adjudged disabled if all vested, court-ordered child support payments have been paid when the social security payments are received. The fact that vested child support payments cannot be forgiven is no impediment to giving a credit or refund because no vested child support payments are being forgiven. They already will have been paid. The issue to be resolved, under those circumstances, is what is the proper disposition or application of lump-sum social security payments that are received by a custodial parent for the benefit of a dependent child of a disabled social security recipient who is under a court order to pay child support but who is current with his court-ordered child support payments when the lump-sum payment from the Social Security Administration is received.

¶ 40. It is clear that if the social security payment had not been received in lump sum and instead had been received in monthly increments commencing at the same period of time that the monthly court-ordered child support obligation began, the payments could be substituted up to the amount of the court-ordered child support payment in lieu of the disabled social security recipient’s monthly court-ordered child support payment. This being the case, I can see no logical reason why the lump-sum payment cannot be credited or refunded to the disabled recipient on the back-end, provided that all payments which were due on the front-end had been paid when the lump-sum payment was received.

¶ 41. In Keith, the message that is being unwittingly sent to obligators in child support orders is this: if you are a disabled social security recipient expecting a lump-sum social security payment on behalf of your dependent child, you may refuse, with impunity, to pay your court-ordered child support obligation pending receipt of the lump-sum social security payment. The flip side of the above message to a disabled social security recipient who struggles to keep his court-ordered child support payments current while waiting for the social security payments to begin is that you will be punished because you will not be given any credit for the child support payments that you made pending the commencement of the social security payments.

¶ 42. I fully embrace the jurisprudence of this state that obligators in child support orders are required to meet their obligation to make timely payments for the support of their minor children. However, when they have met that obligation and a lump-sum social security payment (representing the aggregate of payments owed from the time of a disabled recipient’s application for benefits to the date of the commencement of monthly payments) is received and the monthly social security payments begin to flow to the recipient’s dependent child, adjustments can be, and should be, made to reimburse the recipient for child support payments already made and to substitute the dependent’s social security payments for the recipient’s future child support payments, up to the amount of the recipient court-ordered support obligation. Resolving the problem in this manner satisfies two equally important interests: (1) the State’s interest in assuring that minor dependents receive adequate and timely support from the parent charged with the responsibility of providing the support, and (2) the right of the child-support obligator to be treated in the same manner as other child-support obli-gators who are given credit for social security payments in lieu of child support payments but provided no lump-sum social security payments to their dependents.

¶ 43. For the reasons presented, I concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.

CHANDLER, J., JOINS THIS OPINION. CARLTON, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.

BARNES, J.,

DISSENTING:

¶ 44. The majority affirms the chancery court’s decision to deny James a credit against child support arrearages for the sums Debbie received from the Social Security Administration for lump-sum back payments to her minor children because of James’s disability. Believing the majority opinion is contrary to Mooneyham v. Mooneyham, 420 So.2d 1072, 1074 (Miss.1982), I respectfully dissent, as I would reverse and render the chancellor’s decision and grant James a credit for the social security benefits paid to the minor children based on his disability.

¶ 45. James and Debbie were divorced by an entry of judgment of divorce on March 12, 2002, nunc pro tunc July 9, 2001. Debbie was awarded primary physical custody of the four children with the parties being awarded joint legal custody. At the time of the divorce, James was unemployed as a result of a work-related injury and was awaiting a hearing with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission.

¶ 46. Under the judgment of divorce, James had the following obligation:

That the Husband shall pay child support 24% of his adjusted gross income with said support due the first month he earns a paycheck and continuing on the 1st day of each month until the minor children are emancipated and with the appropriate withholding order entered.

¶ 47. It is undisputed that James has been unemployed since the divorce and has not paid any child support. James received workers’ compensation payments of $16,000, $12,165.92, and $26,250. It is based on these figures that the chancellor ordered James to pay 24% (along with interest) for back child support.

¶ 48. James was determined by the Social Security Administration to be totally disabled. As a result, Debbie received three lump-sum back payments from Social Security for the benefit of the three youngest children. It is unknown whether any benefits were paid for the fourth child who is no longer a minor. Debbie also receives a monthly benefit check from the Social Security Administration for the benefit of the three minor children.

¶ 49. James filed a “Petition to Find Defendant in Contempt and to Modify Judgment of Divorce” on March 9, 2006, in the Chancery Court of Madison County. James sought to have the judgment of divorce modified due to his disability to require that the social security benefits payable for the benefit of the minor children stand in lieu of the past and future child support payments.

¶ 50. Debbie filed an “Answer to Petition to Find Defendant in Contempt and to Modify Judgment of Divorce along with a Counterclaim for Citation of Contempt and Modification” on June 14, 2006. In the counterclaim, Debbie asked the court to find James in contempt for failure to pay child support of 24% of the workers’ compensation benefits along with 24% of any monthly unemployment benefits and/or workers’ compensation benefits.

¶ 51. On August 15, 2006, the court entered its “Opinion and Final Judgment” ordering James to pay Debbie $15,844.26 by September 11, 2006, and relieving James of any further child support obligation due to the receipt of social security benefits by the children based on James’s disability. The court later amended its ruling to correct a calculation error and ordered James to pay $14,840.85 as child support from the workers’ compensation benefits he received.

¶ 52. James argues that he should have been given credit against any arrearage for child support for the Social Security Administration’s award of benefits to the minor children. As this Court recently held in Keith v. Purvis, 982 So.2d 1033, 1036(¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2008) (citations omitted), “Mississippi law is clear that social security benefits received by a minor child based on a non-custodial parent’s retirement or disability are an alternate source of satisfying court-ordered child support obligations and are credited toward the discharge of those obligations.”

¶ 53. While my research indicates that no authority is exactly on point with the facts of this case, I find Mooneyham controlling. In Mooneyham, the Mississippi Supreme Court, after reviewing the decisions of eight other jurisdictions, stated:

Where the father who has been ordered to make child support payments becomes totally and permanently disabled, and unconditional [s]ocial [s]ecurity payments for the benefit of the minor children are paid to the divorced mother, the father is entitled to credit for such payments by the government against his liability for child support under the divorce decree.

Mooneyham, 420 So.2d at 1074 (quoting Andler v. Andler, 217 Kan. 538, 544, 538 P.2d 649, 654 (1975)). The supreme court determined that the chancery court erred in awarding a lump-sum decree against the father for back child support payments where the Social Security Administration had made payments under his prior earnings for the benefit of the minor. Id. at 1074.

¶ 54. In 1992, the supreme court again looked at Mooneyham and stated: “We have held that SSI benefits received by a minor child based on his parent’s disability or retirement are considered an alternative source of payment which should be credited toward satisfaction of child support obligations.” Hammett v. Woods, 602 So.2d 825, 828 (Miss.1992) (citing Bradley v. Holmes, 561 So.2d 1034, 1035 (Miss. 1990); Mooneyham, 420 So.2d at 1073-74). In her treatise on family law, Professor Deborah H. Bell also recognizes that “[e]hild support arrearages are offset by social security or disability benefits paid as a result of the payor’s employment.” Deborah Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law, 338 (Nautilus Publishing Co.2006) (citing Hammett, 602 So.2d 825; Mooneyham, 420 So.2d 1072).

¶ 55. The chancery court in its opinion and amended opinion cited Mooneyham and Bradley and stated that the “Mississippi Supreme Court has held that payment of social security benefits for the benefit of the minor children under the Social Security Act are considered an alternative source of payment that satisfies child support and should be credited toward that obligation.” The court, however, did not recognize that this credit also applies to past-due child support. Under the cases cited, I find this to be in error. The majority states that Mooneyham is not a true arrearage ease. I disagree. The only reason the appellant father did not have child support arrearages is because in Mooneyham the supreme court gave retroactive credit to the father for the social security payments when the ap-pellee mother began receiving them directly. In Keith, this Court cited Mooneyham for the proposition that “the Mississippi Supreme Court has impliedly held that crediting social security benefits against support arrearage does not constitute an impermissible retroactive modification of support.” Keith, 982 So.2d at 1039 n. 3 (emphasis added). I find no distinction between the case at bar and Mooneyham. Accordingly, I would reverse and render the chancellor’s decision, and grant James a credit to his child support arrearages for his social security payments made directly to his children, as the Mississippi Supreme Court did in Mooneyham.

KING, C.J., GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      .The oldest child was no longer a minor at the time the social security benefits were paid. The chancellor’s amended order reflects that the oldest child did not receive any social security benefits. Hence, receipt by the other three children of any social security benefits would not have impacted any arrear-ages owed to the oldest child.

      . See Lane v. Lane, 850 So.2d 122, 126(¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2002), discussed later in this opinion, for an explanation of the clean-hands doctrine and modification.

      . There was also a dispute between the parties as to visitation, but this is not an issue before us on appeal.

      . In Keith, there was no arrearage. In this case, James clearly is in default and arrears. We seek here only to address the arrearages issue before us and do not seek to re-hash Keith. In this case, James came to court with indisputable unclean hands and failed to present evidence as to when the social security benefits were received. The benefits are equitably deemed a benefit to the child. James could not get a modification of his child support obligations without a cleansing judgment and social security benefits do not satisfy ar-rearages.

      . The lump-sum payment represented the aggregate of monthly dependent payments retroactive to the date of James’s application for disability status. This lump-sum payment was not received until sometime after February 2006, but it was enough to cover the aggregate of dependent monthly payments that had become due under an order for child support entered by the court on March 12, 2002, nunc pro tunc July 9, 2001. Prior to receipt of the lump-sum payment, James had not paid any child support, even though he had received substantial workers’ compensation benefits in October 2002.