text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Quint MIRE.
    No. 2014-K-2295.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 27, 2016.
   PER CURIAM.

Defendant Quint Mire shot and killed Julian Gajan on February 9, 2011. They were hunting deer out-of-season in the Little Prairie marsh in Vermillion Parish. Defendant shot the victim three times with a semi-automatic shotgun, striking him in the head, neck, and torso from a distance of approximately 40 to 70 feet. Defendant collected the spent shotgun shells and left without trying to render aid and did not seek help. Defendant then discarded the shotgun shells in a canal.

The victim was reported missing the next day. His body was found on February 12, 2011, after a search by state and parish agencies and members of the community. Defendant stood by while others diligently searched and even took steps to divert attention from himself and cast suspicion on others. On February 13, 2011, defendant finally admitted to detectives that he shot and killed the victim. He claimed it was a hunting accident. He said the victim was driving deer toward him and that he mistook the victim for a deer. Defendant took law enforcement officers to the location where the shooting occurred. Defendant was charged with second degree murder, La. R.S. 14:30.1, and obstruction of justice, La. R.S. 14:130.1.

Defendant testified at trial. He characterized the shooting as a terrible mistake. He said that he took up a position while the victim drove the deer toward him. When he saw movement, he fired three times thinking that the victim was a deer. When asked why he did not attempt to assist the victim, defendant claimed he had a crippling fear of the dead. He also claimed it never crossed his mind to call for help. He did not know why he did not report the shooting other than that he was frightened and distraught by it.

The state's witnesses described the tumultuous relationship between defendant and victim over the years and their various business disputes. Witnesses testified that the victim owed defendant over $1,000 for crab traps, the victim had stolen from him, they had physically fought on one occasion, they were evidently unable to reach an agreement over a lucrative contract to provide catfish, and defendant had performed work for the victim but felt undercompensated for it. One witness, Gregory Raspberry, testified that defendant on three occasions speculated to him that he could kill the victim and get away with it. Another witness, Captain Buatt, testified that he examined the place where the shooting occurred. From defendant's vantage point, there was a fairly open line of sight. He opined that fully grown deer in that area were about 34 to 36 inches tall at the top of the shoulders. The victim, who was shot in the head, was 67 inches tall.

The jury found defendant guilty as charged of second degree murder and obstruction of justice. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for murder, and 10 years imprisonment at hard labor for obstruction. The court of appeal, however, vacated defendant's conviction for second degree murder, entered a judgment of guilty of negligent homicide, and remanded for sentencing because it found the evidence insufficient to establish defendant's specific intent. State v. Mire, 14-0435, p. 18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/14), 149 So.3d 981, 991 ("We find that the State did not exclude every reasonable doubt that Defendant had the specific intent to kill the victim. Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction for second degree murder."). For the reasons that follow, we grant the state's application to reverse the court of appeal and reinstate defendant's conviction for second degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility.

The lynchpin of the court of appeal's analysis was its determination that the state failed to establish a clear motive for the killing. See generally State v. Mart, 352 So.2d 678, 681 (La.1977) (finding "that a lack of motive may properly be considered as a circumstance mitigating against specific intent"). The court of appeal erred here in two aspects. First, the state, in fact, presented abundant evidence of motive in the form of witnesses who described the various disagreements and, at times, acrimonious relationship between defendant and victim over the years. As the dissent correctly noted, Mire, 14-0435, pp. 1-2, 149 So.3d at 996-97 (Amy, J., dissenting), the jury was entitled to credit the state's witnesses in this regard and reject the defendant's disavowal of these potential motives within the confines of due process, which allows the trier of fact to make credibility determinations, within the bounds of rationality, and accept or reject the testimony of any witness; and thus, a reviewing court may impinge on the "fact finder's discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law." State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La.1988). The court of appeal acknowledged and summarized the abundant evidence pertaining to potential motivations but then dismissed it all as providing poor and inadequate justification to commit murder. For example, the court of appeal opined:

Witness testimony did not establish a motive for Defendant to kill the victim. If Defendant shot the victim over unpaid money, he would not have left $527.00 in the victim's wallet. If Defendant wanted the fishing contract to himself, he would require significant help to provide ten thousand pounds of fish per week. The motives suggested by the witnesses simply do not make sense.

Mire, 14-0435, p. 17, 149 So.3d at 991. However, the fact a defendant's motivations to commit murder are not objectively reasonable does not render the jury's determination he harbored these motivations and acted on them irrational. The court of appeal erred in substituting its appreciation of the evidence regarding defendant's motive for that of the jury, and thus failed to correctly apply the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

Second, the court of appeal erred in its apprehension of State v. Mart, supra. Defendant in Mart consumed a large quantity of beer and then fired his shotgun at the home of his brother-in-law, with whom he was angry. Afterward, possibly motivated by racial animus, he fired his shotgun at two strangers. He claimed he aimed over their heads and shot only to frighten them. However, one of the two died as a result and Mart was found guilty of second degree murder.

This Court reversed the conviction because it found the trial court erred in rejecting special jury charges requested by the defense regarding intoxication:

In the present record, the evidence of the extensive pre-crime drinking, coupled with the bizarre behavior before and at the time of the crime, constituted appreciable evidence from which the jury might draw the inference that the accused was intoxicated. It was for the jury, not the judge, to determine what effect, if any, this intoxication had upon the presence or absence of the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm required for guilt of second degree murder (and not required for the responsive lesser verdict of manslaughter).
The effect of the denial of the special written charges was to deprive the accused of jury instructions and consideration of his principal defense that he lacked the requisite specific intent required for a conviction of second degree murder, as charged. Therefore, we must reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

Mart, 352 So.2d at 681. In addition, this Court (while recognizing that it was unnecessary to make this determination after finding reversible error) found the trial court erred in failing to qualify its general motive instruction:

Assignment 16 (objection to general charge on motive: "The law considers that no man does any act without a motive for doing it ... it is not necessary to establish a motive to warrant a conviction"). Once a charge concerning motive was given, the charge was incomplete, since affirmative evidence disclosed lack of motive: Under such circumstances, as defendant requested, the jury should be instructed that a lack of motive may properly be considered as a circumstance mitigating against specific intent.

Id.

Mart, notably, did not involve a question of the sufficiency of the evidence. Under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789 (second emphasis added). In the present case (in which the state did not advance a felony-murder theory), the state was required to prove that defendant killed a human being with the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1. Dicta in Mart notwithstanding, motive is not an essential element of the offense and a jury need not find it proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Although fairness may require that-once a jury receives a general instruction that the state need not prove motive, and affirmative evidence discloses a lack of motive-then, at defendant's request, the jury must be instructed that lack of motive may properly be considered as mitigating against a finding of specific intent, that principle was overextended by the court of appeal here, particularly considering that the jury in the present case was not instructed regarding motive.

Although a jury may not speculate "if the evidence is such that reasonable jurors must have reasonable doubt," State v. Lubrano, 563 So.2d 847, 850 (La.1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), the state here presented sufficient evidence, which when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, sufficed to establish defendant shot the victim with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Defendant, an experienced hunter, admitted he pulled the trigger three times. Each shot hit the victim, including shots to the head and neck, which one witness testified was about 30 inches higher than he should have aimed to shoot a deer. Defendant not only did not seek help but also took measures to conceal the shooting and misdirect those searching for the victim. Witnesses testified as to the contentious relationship between defendant and victim over the years and their financial conflicts. One witness testified that defendant had previously spoken of killing the victim. Defendant testified to try to explain his behavior after the shooting and deny he had any reason to kill the victim, and the jury was able to evaluate his credibility in that regard.

From this evidence, the dissenting judge in the court below correctly found the evidence sufficient to prove defendant's specific intent. Mire, 14-0435, pp. 1-2, 149 So.3d at 996-97 (Amy, J., dissenting). In finding otherwise, the court of appeal misapplied the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, which "does not require the reviewing court to determine whether it believes the witnesses or whether it believes the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Major, 03-3522, pp. 6-7 (La.12/1/04), 888 So.2d 798, 802. Although the court of appeal found the evidence of specific intent equivocal, the jury's acceptance of this evidence was not shown to be irrational. Thus, the court of appeal erred in reversing defendant's conviction because of the state's failure to prove a clear and reasonable motive. In accepting a hypothesis of innocence that was not unreasonably rejected by the jury, the court of appeal impinged on the jury's discretion beyond the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.

Accordingly, the ruling of the court of appeal is reversed and defendant's conviction for second degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility are reinstated.

REVERSED

CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

I wholeheartedly agree with the result in the per curiam in this matter. However, I write separately to emphasize two fundamental principles of Louisiana criminal law. First, circumstantial evidence is competent, reliable and regularly utilized in criminal trials. See La. R.S. 15:438 ("The rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence"). As the dissent astutely observes, there was an abundance of circumstantial evidence in this case, which, in the jury's eyes, excluded every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. "The test of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is not whether it produces the same conviction as the positive testimony of an eyewitness, but whether it produces moral conviction such as would exclude every reasonable doubt." State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372, 385, (La.1982), citing State v. Jenkins, 134 La. 185, 63 So. 869 (1914).

Second, and as important, I am compelled to note the well-settled principle that the prosecution is not required to prove motive. " 'Motive' is not an element of second degree murder. ....[t]he state is not obligated to prove that the accused had a cause or reason to commit the crime of second degree murder; it is required to prove that the accused had the 'specific intent' to commit the crime." State v. Johnson, 324 So.2d 349, 353 (La.1975). As a result, the court of appeal committed error in reversing the defendant's second degree murder conviction because of its misplaced view that the State failed to prove motive, which is not an element of the charged offense.

      The court of appeal rejected defendant's claim that he should have been granted a new trial based on the state's failure to disclose that Raspberry had worked as a confidential informant in an unrelated narcotics investigation and, as a result, charges against Raspberry had been dismissed. In his opposition to the state's application, defendant argues that the court of appeal erred in this determination. However, although this filing was designated as an opposition, it did not exclusively "[set] forth reasons why the application should not be granted." La.S.Ct. Rule X, § 6. Instead, it effectively constituted a cross-application because it sought substantive review of that portion of the court of appeal's opinion that upheld the district court's denial of defendant's motion for new trial, and is therefore subject to La.S.Ct. Rule X, § 5(a), which provides: "An application seeking to review a judgment of the court of appeal either after an appeal to that court ... shall be made within thirty days of the mailing of the notice of the original judgment of the court of appeal." Defendant filed this cross-application 40 days after the court of appeal rendered its decision and notice of judgment was mailed. Therefore, this claim, which was not timely made, is not considered.

      See, e.g., State v. Severin, 04-0326 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/28/04), 885 So.2d 609, writ denied, 04-2805 (La.3/11/05), 896 So.2d 64. The Fifth Circuit in Severin rejected the defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient because "the State failed to show [he] had a motive for shooting the victims, and thus, failed to prove specific intent." Id., 04-0326, p. 9, 885 So.2d 609, 614. The Fifth Circuit found that defendant's statement that "someone in a bar had spilled a drink on him" and "pissed him off" suggested a motive for defendant to shoot into a crowd outside the bar. Id., 04-0326, p. 15, 885 So.2d at 618.

      Similarly, in State v. Trahan, 11-0148 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/6/11), 69 So.3d 1240, the same circuit court found evidence insufficient to prove the defendant's specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm because no evidence established a motive for the close-range shooting by defendant of her boyfriend:
      Here, though the victim was shot at close range, the "other circumstances" needed to support a finding of specific intent are noticeably lacking. Indeed, no evidence indicates that Defendant possessed a motive for the shooting. Motive is not an essential element of murder, but "a lack of motive may properly be considered as a circumstance mitigating against specific intent." State v. Mart, 352 So.2d 678, 681 (La.1977). The State attempted to show motive by repeatedly stating that Defendant and the victim argued the day of the shooting and that Defendant was mad at the victim. The prosecutor's statements to the jury were merely words. Not one piece of evidence was introduced to prove an argument or that Defendant was angry at the victim.
      The State presented no evidence to the jury that could have allowed them to find that Defendant exhibited the requisite specific intent to kill the victim. Though the State presented evidence showing that the victim was shot in the back at close range, it presented no evidence demonstrating that Defendant aimed the gun at the victim, how the gun discharged, or, as previously discussed, that any acrimony existed between Defendant and the victim. Thus, we can only conclude that the jury arrived at its verdict because of statements made by the prosecutor and defense counsel in their opening statements and in the prosecutor's closing arguments.
      Trahan, 11-0148, pp. 6-7, 69 So.3d at 1244 (footnote omitted). This Court reversed the court of appeal and found the evidence was sufficient:
      A rational trier of fact could find from this evidence that defendant discharged the high-powered hand gun by pulling the trigger while holding the gun no more than three or four feet from the victim as he stood defenseless and bent over the washbasin in the bathroom with his back turned towards her, and from that evidence, that defendant had the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, although she may then have become emotionally overwrought by what had just happened. Other scenarios involving an accidental discharge of the revolver, but not involving the failed hypothesis of innocence proposed by defense counsel and rejected by jurors, were possible but not so probable that a rational juror would necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.
      State v. Trahan, 11-1609, pp. 10-11 (La.7/2/12), 97 So.3d 994, 999-1000.

      As the Supreme Court explained in Jackson v. Virginia:
      [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The criterion thus impinges upon "jury" discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.
      Id., 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789 (citation and footnote omitted).

      In his succinct and well-reasoned dissent, Judge Amy wrote:
      Notably, jurors heard Gregory Raspberry testify that, on several occasions, the defendant spoke of killing the victim. Any assessment as to his credibility was certainly within the province of the jury, as the trier of fact. See State v. Oliphant, 13-2973 (La.2/21/14), 133 So.3d 1255. The jury also heard witness statements indicating that the defendant and the victim had experienced conflict, that the victim allegedly owed the defendant money, that the defendant admitted to repeatedly discharging his weapon (resulting in multiple projectile injuries to the victim), that the defendant left the victim in the marsh at the scene, and that the defendant misled and misdirected those searching for the victim in the days after the incident. Giving the jury's fact-finding role and its apparent rejection of the defendant's version of events, I find these factors sufficiently support the jury's determination of specific intent to kill the victim or to inflict great bodily harm.
      State v. Mire, 2014-435 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/14), 149 So.3d 981, 996-7.

      Incredibly, a majority of the Court of Appeal wrote:
      No one witnessed this shooting, only Defendant knows absolutely what happened. No physical evidence establishes or negates Defendant's intent. Without question, Defendant intentionally fired the shotgun. The issue, however, is whether he intended to kill or cause great bodily harm to the victim.
      State v. Mire, 2014-435 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/14), 149 So.3d 981, 990-1.
      The Court of Appeal further noted: "[t]he State presented no direct evidence to establish defendant's specific intent to kill. No witness established a motive for murder. " Id. at 991. (emphasis added)


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    IN RE: APPEAL OF the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 17-PDB-043
    NO. 2017-OB-1810
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Dennis Donyel THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-1873
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.7.


text:
    ASSUMPTION PARISH POLICE JURY, et al. v. TEXAS BRINE COMPANY, LLC, et al.
    State of Louisiana v. Texas Brine Company, LLC, et al.
    Assumption Parish Sheriff Mike Haguespack v. Texas Brine Company, LLC
    NO. 2018-CC-0311
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 23, 2018
    Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeremi BROCK
    NO. 2018-KK-0306
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    February 22, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Torrey SCOTT
    NO. 2018-KK-0241
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jarret Jean MCCASLAND
    NO. 2017-K-0823
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Damon DELMORE v. STATE of Louisiana
    No. 2017-KH-1304
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Reconsideration granted. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Joseph LEMOINE v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-2212
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


author: JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.

text:
    Camille LANDRY, et al. v. PSA OF LAFAYETTE, LLC, et al.
    NO. 2013-C-0849
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.
   JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., would grant.

GENOVESE, J., recused.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Percy M. TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-2038
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied. Relator has previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Taylor v. State, 16-0190 (La. 3/14/16), 186 So.3d 653.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Hassan A. ABDUL, IV
    v.
    STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-2039
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied. Relator has previously exhausted his right to state collateral review. See State ex rel. Abdul v. State, 16-0323 (La. 8/4/17), 223 So.3d 507.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joshua X. GRIFFIN
    NO. 2017-KO-1027
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


author: GENOVESE, J., would grant.

text:
    Nolvey STELLY v. CITY OF LAFAYETTE, et al.
    NO. 2017-C-2050
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.
   GENOVESE, J., would grant.


author: HUGHES, J., would grant.

text:
    Kacie Magee BREEN v. Jeanie Candrew HOLMES, Kimberly Jo Graham, "Mandevillenative," Amanda Terrell, "Blonde4u," "Breen Team," Jenafer Mulkey Sheridan, Toni "Whodat" Hawkins, Nikki Costanza, Desiree Waguespack Maestri, "Wearsinkingfast," Sheldon Fleming, and Dianne Arndt
    NO. 2018-C-0049
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.
   HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Shane SALANTHE v. The PARISH OF JEFFERSON THROUGH the DEPARTMENT OF SEWERAGE
    NO. 2018-CC-0032
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Roderick F. LEE v. Thomas D. SAPP, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, BMW Financial Services, N.A., L.L.C. and Financial Services Vehicle Trust, Inc.
    NO. 2018-OC-0044
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Russell Joseph PERRONE v. Shawn W. ROGERS
    Russell J. Perrone, Individually, and as Provisional Administrator of the Succession of Randall William Perrone, Russell J. Perrone,
    John J. Perrone and Deborah H. Perrone v. Shawn W. Rogers
    Deborah H. Perrone and John J. Perrone, Jr. v. Shawn W. Rogers
    NO. 2018-C-0101
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.
   HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    IN RE: Tutorship of Haley JONES
    NO. 2018-CC-0050
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    NEIGHBORS FIRST FOR BYWATER, INC., John Andrews, Georgia Ainsworth, Lane Lacoy, Bart Theriot, Joe Brown and Kathy Brown v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS/The NEW ORLEANS CITY COUNCIL
    NO. 2018-C-0096
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Andrea ADAMS, et al. v. ALLIED SHIPYARD, INC. and The Gray Insurance Company
    Megan St. Pierre, et al. v. Allied Shipyard, Inc.
    Chris Griffin, et al. v. Allied Shipyard, Inc.
    NO. 2017-CC-2079
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Paul W. BROWN v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES - Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System
    NO. 2018-C-0102
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.
   HUGHES, J., would grant.

GENOVESE, J., would grant in part and remand for an award of attorney fees.


text:
    Tom GRAHAM v. NOLA RENEWAL GROUP, LLC
    NO. 2018-CC-0195
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Gerald Rodney WHITE and Charlotte White v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONS DEVELOPMENT, et al.
    NO. 2018-OC-0056
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rashard NEAL
    NO. 2017-KO-1028
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Andrea ADAMS, et al. v. ALLIED SHIPYARD, INC. and the Gray Insurance Company
    Megan St. Pierre, et al. v. Allied Shipyard, Inc.
    Chris Griffin, et al. v. Allied Shipyard, Inc.
    NO. 2017-CC-2077
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joshua K. TRAHAN
    NO. 2018-KK-0063
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Helen MOORE, et al. v. MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE REAL ASSETS, et al.
    No. 2018-C-0088
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Dempsey PENDARVIS v. Doherty Michael JARREAU and Susan M. Jarreau
    NO. 2018-C-0103
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick COBB
    NO. 2018-KK-0057
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Not Considered, not timely filed. See La.S.Ct. Rule X, § 5 (a).


text:
    STATE EX REL. Frederick Dean JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-2035
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied. See State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La. 10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Bradford SKINNER v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2016-KH-2219
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. David L. WILLIAMS, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana
    NO. 2017 KW 1194
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    Richey MENARD, et al. v. The REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM OF ACADIANA, LLC, et al.
    NO. 2019-C-0382
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 29, 2019
    Denied.
   JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Cynthia HOLLIDAY v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LSU AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE, et al.
    NO. 2019-CC-0363
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 29, 2019
    Denied.


text:
    Dr. Charles P. CURRIER and Charles Bradley Currier v. Gregory M. ANDING and CNA Insurance Company
    NO. 2018-C-0038
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2018
    Denied.


text:
    NEW ORLEANS BULLDOG SOCIETY v. LOUISIANA SOCIETY FOR the PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, et al.
    NO. 2019-C-0372
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 29, 2019
    Denied.


author: McCLENDON, J. WHIPPLE, C.J. dissenting.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana IN the INTEREST OF T.C.
    2018 KJ 1246
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Judgment Rendered: DECEMBER 21, 2018
    Hillar C. Moore, III, District Attorney, Otha Nelson, Assistant District Attorney, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana
    Jack Harrison, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant T.C.
    BEFORE: WHIPPLE, CJ., McCLENDON, AND HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
   McCLENDON, J.

T.C., a thirteen-year-old juvenile, was charged by petition in juvenile court with aggravated battery, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:34. He denied the allegation. At an adjudication hearing, following the presentation of evidence, the juvenile court found T.C. delinquent for having committed second degree battery, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:34.1. Prior to that ruling, T.C. sought a directed verdict of acquittal, which the juvenile court denied. Following the disposition hearing, the court ordered disposition to be deferred for six months and placed T.C. on supervised probation for six months, subject to certain conditions. T.C. now appeals, designating one assignment of error. We vacate the delinquency adjudication for second degree battery and enter an adjudication of delinquency for simple battery. We also vacate the disposition and remand for disposition on the modified adjudication.

FACTS

Testimony adduced at the adjudication hearing revealed that on September 15, 2017, two sixth-grade students engaged in a physical altercation at Woodlawn Middle School in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. According to the victim, M.J., T.C. approached him between classes, said "let's fight," and struck him twice in the face. T.C. was wearing a metal wristwatch with sharp protrusions, and the watch contacted M.J.'s face during the second strike. The wound from the second contact began to bleed, and it eventually led to a scar, which was visible at the adjudication hearing. M.J. testified that the wound did not hurt, but later testimony from M.J.'s mother revealed it required nine stitches in the hospital that day. M.J. returned to school the following day. M.J.'s mother also authenticated a video of M.J.'s injuries, which was taken at the hospital and was played for the court. Additional photos of the injury and of the wristwatch, taken by an investigating sheriff's deputy, were also admitted into evidence. The deputy, Sergeant Calvin Praider with the East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office, testified that T.C. told him in an interview that M.J. was teasing him about not advancing from the sixth grade to the seventh grade, and that was why T.C. struck him. T.C. admitted to striking M.J., who did not strike him first. T.C. told Sgt. Praider that the watch fell off after he hit M.J. and that he picked it up and ran away. T.C. testified that the watch belonged to his mother and that he knew it was too big for his wrist and hung loose. He also stated that he and M.J. had gotten into a fight the previous year, but that no one knew about it.

T.C. does not argue that he did not cause serious bodily injury to M.J. In his sole assignment of error, T.C. argues that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that he had the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury to M.J. when he struck him. In support, T.C. points to some of the court's reasoning when ruling on the adjudication. Specifically, T.C. urges that the juvenile court demonstrated a mistaken belief that second degree battery is a general intent crime. T.C. correctly notes that aggravated battery only requires general intent. He claims that when the juvenile court adjudicated T.C. delinquent of the lesser-included offense of second degree battery, the court erroneously applied that general-intent analysis to a specific-intent crime. In contrast, the State argues the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supported beyond a reasonable doubt that T.C. committed a battery without consent, with the intent to inflict serious bodily injury on M.J.

In a juvenile adjudication proceeding, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the delinquent act alleged in the petition. LSA-Ch.C. art. 883. The burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, is no less severe than the burden of proof required in an adult proceeding. State in Interest of S.T., 95-2187 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/28/96), 677 So.2d 1071, 1074. Accordingly, in delinquency cases, the standard of review for the sufficiency of evidence, is that enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), i.e. , whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821. Further, because a review of the law and facts in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated, an appellate court must review the record to determine if the juvenile court was clearly wrong in its factual findings. See La. Const. art. 5, § 10 ; State in Interest of D.M., 97-0628 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/07/97), 704 So.2d 786, 789-90.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:34.1 provides, in pertinent part, that second degree battery is a battery when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury. In order to prove a second degree battery, the State must prove that the juvenile: (1) committed a battery upon another, (2) without his consent, and (3) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury. State v. Young, 00-1437 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 847, 852. "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which involves unconsciousness, extreme physical pain or protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death. LSA-R.S. 14:34.1B(3). Second degree battery is a crime requiring specific criminal intent. State v. Fuller, 414 So.2d 306, 310 (La. 1982). Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. LSA-R.S. 14:10(1). Such state of mind can be formed in an instant. State v. Cousan, 94-2503 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, 390. Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of a defendant. State v. Graham, 420 So.2d 1126, 1127 (La. 1982). More specifically, the intent to inflict serious bodily injury may be inferred from the extent and severity of the victim's injuries. State v. Cornwell, 17-0044, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/27/17), 2017 WL 4314372 (unpublished). The existence of specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the trier of fact. State v. McCue, 484 So.2d 889, 892 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1986).

The trier of fact, in this case, the juvenile court, is charged with making credibility determinations. Credibility determinations, as well as the weight to be attributed to the evidence, are soundly within the province of the fact finder. State ex rel. T.C., 09-1669 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/16/11), 60 So.3d 1260, 1263. Moreover, conflicting testimony as to factual matters is a question of weight of the evidence, not sufficiency. Id.See also Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 46, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2220-21, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). Such a determination rests solely with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. T.C., 60 So.3d at 1263 ; see also State in Interest of D.L.P., 17-1148 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/21/17), 240 So.3d 945, 949. A trier of fact's determination as to the credibility of a witness is a question of fact entitled to great weight, and its determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly contrary to the evidence. T.C., 60 So.3d at 1263 ; see State v. Vessell, 450 So.2d 938, 943 (La. 1984). In the absence of internal contradictions and irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence, the testimony of one witness, if believed by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction. State ex rel. DJ., 00-1592 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/28/01), 783 So.2d 558, 562. However, because a review of the law and facts in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated, an appellate court must review the record to determine if the juvenile court was clearly wrong in its factual findings. D.L.P., 240 So.3d at 947.

T.C. acknowledged striking M.J., although he explained that he did not intend to strike M.J. with the watch. T.C. testified that he knew the watch was loose on his wrist, and "probably compressed with [M.J's] face or something." The juvenile court found that T.C. did not have the specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury. In adjudicating T.C. delinquent, the court declared that T.C. "did not have the intent to cause that injury, but he intended to punch [M.J.]." The court noted the watch must have "slipped down" to the back part of T.C.'s hand, and consequently inflicted the injury without T.C.'s specific intent to do so. Based on the record, we cannot say that the juvenile court was clearly wrong in so concluding. However, the juvenile court's language is indicative of its conclusion that T.C. had general intent to commit the offense of second degree battery, which is not sufficient for a finding of delinquency. The juvenile court, while we accept its appreciation of the facts, committed legal error in applying a general intent standard to a specific intent crime.

Given the juvenile court's determination that T.C. did not have the specific intent to cause the disfigurement to M.J., after our own thorough review of the record, and considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we are constrained to find that the evidence does not support the juvenile court's adjudication of delinquency based on the commission of second degree battery. This assignment of error has merit.

While we find insufficient evidence to support the adjudication of delinquency based on the commission of second degree battery, the discharge of T.C. from supervision is not warranted. The discharge of a juvenile is neither necessary nor proper when the evidence supports a conviction on a lesser and included offense that is a legislatively authorized responsive verdict. State ex rel. B.L., 02-0923 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/28/03), 839 So.2d 246, 250 (citing LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821E). If an appellate court finds the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, supports only a conviction of a lesser included responsive offense, the court, in lieu of granting a post-verdict judgment of acquittal, may modify the verdict and render a judgment of conviction on the lesser included responsive offense. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821E; State v. Ledet, 96-0142 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/8/96), 694 So.2d 336, 346, writ denied, 96-3029 (La. 9/19/97), 701 So.2d 163 ; see also State in Interest of J.W., 597 So.2d 1056, 1059 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1992) (rule that discharge of defendant is neither necessary nor proper when evidence supports conviction of lesser and included offense which is legislatively authorized responsive verdict is applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings). Simple battery is a responsive verdict for aggravated battery. See LSA-C.Cr.P art. 814(18). The evidence in the instant case, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, T.C's commission of a simple battery. Accordingly, we vacate T.C.'s adjudication of delinquency for second degree battery and enter an adjudication of delinquency for simple battery. We also vacate the disposition and remand the matter to the juvenile court for disposition on that offense in accordance with this opinion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the adjudication of delinquency for second degree battery and enter an adjudication of delinquency for simple battery. We vacate the disposition and remand for disposition on the modified adjudication consistent with our opinion herein.

ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY MODIFIED; DISPOSITION VACATED; AND REMANDED.

Whipple, C.J. dissents and assigns reasons.

WHIPPLE, C.J. dissenting.

In his sole assignment of error, T.C. argues that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that he had the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury to M.J. when he struck him. In support, T.C. points to some of the court's reasoning when ruling on the adjudication. Specifically, T.C. contends that the comments of the juvenile court demonstrate a mistaken belief that second degree battery is a general intent crime, thereby warranting that the adjudication be vacated and modified to a disposition of delinquency for simple battery. I disagree.

Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 14:34.1 :

A. Second degree battery is a battery when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury[.]

In order to prove a second degree battery, the State must prove the juvenile: (1) committed a battery upon another, (2) without his consent, and (3) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury. State v. Young, 2000-1437 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 847, 852.

However, Louisiana jurisprudence contemplates a wide range of conduct, resulting in a wide range of consequences, considered to be evidence of specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. See State v. Fuller, 414 So.2d 306, 310 (1982) (evidence defendant hit victim with blow sufficient to knock him over pool table and blow caused victim's sight to be permanently impaired sufficient to support finding of intent to do serious bodily harm); State v. Scheanette , 51,851 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So.3d 718, 723 (sufficient evidence supported conviction for second degree battery where victim testified that while driving, defendant punched her in face under eye, hard enough to split skin open, causing her to bleed profusely, required four or five stitches, and injury caused extreme physical pain, resulting in a permanent scar on victim's face); State v. Hager, 2013-546 (La. App. 5th Cir. 12/27/13), 131 So.3d 1090, 1093 (evidence defendant punched victim in the eye with sufficient force to fracture her right orbital bone, requiring surgical repair, sufficient to establish specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury); State in Interest of C.R., 2011-831 (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/8/12), 95 So.3d 1121, 1124 (evidence permitting inference of requisite specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury sufficient to support adjudication as delinquent; juvenile came up behind victim and choked him into unconsciousness); State v. Hamilton, 2009-1048 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/23/09), 2009 WL 5647220 (unpublished) (evidence supported a finding of specific intent where the record established defendant repeatedly struck the victim, causing laceration requiring at least four stitches over left eye, and a key-lime-sized hematoma behind left ear, and where victim testified that the pain caused by the injuries was severe and excruciating); State v. Johnson, 602 So.2d 310, 312 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1992) (sufficient evidence of intention to inflict serious bodily injury where defendant's blow knocked victim to the ground and defendant struck victim "square in the head" with his closed fist on juvenile's "blindside."); State v. Accardo, 466 So.2d 549, 552 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 468 So.2d 1204 (La. 1985) (evidence that defendant struck minor victim in head either with fist or blackjack sufficient to show juvenile possessed specific intent to cause serious bodily injury when he struck victim).

In the instant case, according to the testimony of M.J., T.C. approached him from behind and struck him twice in the head. T.C. was wearing a watch with a metal wristband that aggravated the injuries to M.J. Although M.J. claimed at the adjudication hearing that the injury did not hurt still, his mother testified that the wound in fact required nine stitches and left a lasting scar, which required the application of a medical ointment for a year.

In adjudicating T.C. delinquent, the juvenile court judge, as the trier of fact, clearly accepted the testimony of the State's witnesses and found that the essential elements of second degree battery were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. T.C. acknowledged striking M.J., although he claimed that he did not intend to strike M.J. with the watch. T.C. testified that he knew the watch was loose on his wrist, and offered the explanation that it "compressed with [M.J's] face or something." However, the juvenile court found the State proved that T.C. had the specific intent to cause M.J. a serious bodily injury by striking him with a watch. Moreover, the blows did cause M.J. obvious disfigurement. While the injury is on the "low end" of the scale of severity, this is also apparently reflected in the relatively light disposition T.C. received. Notwithstanding the semantics of the juvenile court's stated reasoning, it applied the specific intent standard when adjudicating T.C. delinquent. The juvenile court recognized the watch was not a deadly weapon per se when it found T.C. not guilty of aggravated battery. As evident from the juvenile court's comments, the watch was still viewed as the key instrumentality of damage coming from the punches, which resulted in a finding of second degree battery. Although the court said he "did not have the intent to cause that injury," the court went on to correctly note, "[y]ou don't have to intent [sic] that particular injury occur." The juvenile court then reasoned that while that specific serious injury was not intended, the fact that T.C. struck M.J. from behind with the watch on T.C.'s hand was proof of T.C.'s intent to inflict a serious injury.

Accordingly, after a thorough review of the record, and considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, I find the record supports the juvenile court's adjudication. After undertaking the mandated review of the law and facts in a juvenile proceeding, I am unable to conclude that the juvenile court's finding was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Thus, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the juvenile court's adjudication of delinquency based on the commission of second degree battery.

      Pursuant to Rules 5-1(a) and 5 -2 of the Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, the initials of the minors involved in this matter will be used instead of their names.

      In the absence of specific procedures provided by the Louisiana Children's Code, the court shall proceed in accordance with the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. See LSA-Ch.C. art. 803.

      Battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another. LSA-R.S. 14:33.

      T.C. concedes that the State established the first two elements.

      The responsive verdicts for aggravated battery, pursuant to LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 814, are as follows:
      18. Aggravated Battery:
      Guilty.
      Guilty of second degree battery.
      Guilty of simple battery.
      Not guilty.

      We note that Judge Anthony J. Graphia presided over the adjudication hearing and Judge White presided over the disposition hearing.

      Battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another. LSA-R.S. 14:33.

      Here, T.C. concedes the State established the first two points.