author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES-REPORT 2017-07.
    No. SC17-1822
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    November 21, 2018
    Judge F. Rand Wallis, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Bart Schneider, Staff Liaison, Office of the State Courts Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, on behalf of Florida Public Defender Association, Inc., Miami, Florida, Responding with Comments
   PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee) has submitted proposed changes to standard criminal jury instructions 3.6(f) (Justifiable Use of Deadly Force) and 3.6(g) (Justifiable Use of Non-Deadly Force), and asks that the Court authorize the amended standard instructions for publication and use. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

The Committee filed its report proposing amendments to standard criminal jury instructions 3.6(f) and 3.6(g). The proposals were published in The Florida Bar News . One comment was received by the Committee from the Florida Public Defender Association (FPDA). The Committee disagreed with the comment and declined to modify its proposals as suggested by the FPDA.

Following the filing of the Committee's report, the Court published the proposals for comment. One comment was filed with the Court from the FPDA. In its comment, the FPDA raised two issues pertaining to both instructions 3.6(f) and 3.6(g), and one issue limited to the instruction on deadly force. First, the FPDA disagreed with the Committee's proposal to limit the forcible felony language of section 776.013(1), Florida Statutes (2018), by adding the language "against [himself] [herself] [or] [another]." The FPDA pointed out that such language is not included in the statute, and the instruction would not make sense because some forcible felonies are not committed against another person. Second, the FPDA argued that the common law "castle doctrine" should be added to cover those situations in which the defendant is in his place of business and was engaged in criminal activity. Last, the FPDA opposed the Committee's proposal to add the word "unnecessarily" to the instruction pertaining to section 776.041(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2018). We agree with the FPDA on this latter point and delete "unnecessarily" from the Committee's proposal. However, we request that the Committee further consider the FPDA's comment as it pertains to the castle doctrine, and, if appropriate, submit a report proposing additional amendments to instruction 3.6(f).

We authorize the publication and use of instructions 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) as modified by the Court. Significant changes to the instructions are discussed below.

First, both instructions 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) are modified to be consistent with statutory changes to section 776.013(1), Florida Statutes (2018), as enacted in chapter 2017-77, section 1, Laws of Florida. In addition, with regard to those portions of each instruction pertaining to the situation where the defendant acted in response to the imminent commission of a forcible felony, as listed in section 776.08, Florida Statutes (2018), the Court has added an italicized note to trial judges clarifying that the instruction may need to be modified if the forcible felony at issue is not a crime against a person. Whether a person may justifiably use force in response to a forcible felony that is not directed at a person is an issue that is not properly before this Court. Also, the italicized note to trial judges citing section 776.041(1) is expanded to explain that the forcible felony instruction should only be given in cases where the defendant is charged with either an independent forcible felony or felony murder if the underlying felony is an independent forcible felony. See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report 2014-06 , 191 So.3d 411, 412 (Fla. 2016).

Next, instruction 3.6(f) is further modified as follows: (1) the paragraph beginning "It is a defense to the crime[s] of" at the beginning of the instruction now includes the phrase "including lesser-included offenses"; (2) an explanatory note to trial judges is added addressing the fact that there are a number of statutes that pertain to the justifiable use of force; and (3) a new section is added to "inform the jury how to evaluate cases in which there is evidence that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity or was in a place that he or she had no right to be" because in those cases there is a duty to retreat before using deadly force.

Lastly, with regard to instruction 3.6(g), the following additional modifications are made: (1) the language "[or] the imminent commission of (applicable forcible felony listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.) against [himself] [herself] [or] [another]" is added to the sentence pertaining to justification of nondeadly force in defense of a person against the imminent use or threat of imminent use of unlawful force; (2) an explanatory note is added to the instruction for "aggressor" under section 776.041(1), Florida Statutes, that it should only be given in cases where the defendant is charged with either an independent forcible felony or felony murder, if the underlying felony is an independent forcible felony; and (3) two new provisions are to be given if applicable, pertaining to "prior threats" and "specific act of victim known by defendant."

Having considered the Committee's report, we authorize the amended instructions with our modifications, as set forth in the appendix to this opinion, for publication and use. New language is indicated by underlining, and deleted language is indicated by struck-through type. We caution all interested parties that any comments associated with the instructions reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. In authorizing the publication and use of these instructions, we express no opinion on their correctness and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instructions. The instructions as set forth in the appendix shall become effective when this opinion becomes final.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

3.6(f) JUSTIFIABLE [ USE ] [OR] [ THREATENED USE] OF DEADLY FORCE

Because there are many statutes applicable to self-defense, give only those parts of the instructions that are required by the evidence. However, unless the evidence establishes the force or threat of force was deadly or non-deadly as a matter of law, both 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) must be given. Mathis v. State, 863 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Only the discharge of a firearm, whether accidental or not, has been deemed to be the use of deadly force as a matter of law. Hosnedl v. State, 126 So.3d 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Read in all cases.

It is a defense to the crime[s] of (name[s] of relevant crime[s], including lesser-included offenses) if the actions of (defendant)constituted the justifiable [use ] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force. "Deadly force" means force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Definition.

"Deadly force" means force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Both Chapter 776 and § Section 782.02, Fla. Stat., and many statutes within Chapter 776 address the justifiable use of deadly force , however, § 782.02, Fla. Stat., does not address the concept of stand-your-ground/no duty to retreat. Additionally, § 776.013(1), Fla. Stat., covers the situation where the defendant was in a dwelling and had the right to be there while § 776.012(1), and § 776.031(2), Fla. Stat., cover other situations. The Committee advises lawyers and judges to use great caution in deciding which statute or statutes apply.

Give if applicable. § 782.02, Fla. Stat.

The use of deadly force is justifiable if the defendant (defendant)reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] while resisting:

1. another's attempt to murder [him] [her], or
2. any attempt to commit (applicable felony) upon [him] [her], or 3. any attempt to commit (applicable felony) upon or in any dwelling house in which [he] [she] was present occupied by [him] [her].

Give the elements of the applicable felony that defendant alleges victim attempted to commit, but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo v. State, 61 So.3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).

Give if applicable. §§ 776.012(2), 776.031(2), Fla. Stat. Defendant not in a dwelling or residence or defendant was in a dwelling or residence but had no right to be there. Where appropriate, the court should state or define the applicable criminal activity that the defendant may have been engaged in.

(Defendant)was justified in [using] [or] [threatening to use] deadly force if [he] [she] reasonably believed that such [force] [or] [threat of force] was necessary to prevent [imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [or] [another] [or] [the imminent commission of (applicable forcible felony listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.)against [himself] [herself] [or another]]. If (defendant)was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and was in a place [he] [she] had a right to be, then [he] [she] had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand [his] [her] ground.

Give the elements of the applicable forcible felony that defendant alleges victim was about to commit, but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo v. State, 61 So.3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The instruction may need to be modified in the event that the forcible felony at issue is not a crime against a person.

Give the paragraph below when there is evidence that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity or was not in a place where he or she had a right to be, which means there was a duty to retreat. Morgan v. State, 127 So.3d 708 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). Where appropriate, the court should state or define the applicable criminal activity that the defendant may have been engaged in.

If (defendant) was otherwise engaged in criminal activity or was not in a place [he] [she] had a right to be, then the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force was not justified unless [he] [she] used every reasonable means within [his] [her] power and consistent with [his] [her] own safety to avoid the danger before resorting to the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force. The fact that the defendant was wrongfully attacked cannot justify [his] [her] [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force, if, by retreating, [he] [she] could have avoided the need to [use] [or] [threaten to use] deadly force. However, if (defendant) was placed in a position of imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and it would have increased [his] [her] own danger to retreat, then [his] [her] [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force was justifiable.

Give if applicable. § 776.013(1), Fla. Stat. Defendant in a dwelling or residence and had a right to be there.

If (defendant) was in a [dwelling] [residence] in which [he] [she] had a right to be, [he] [she] had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand [his] [her] ground and use [or] [threaten to use] force, including deadly force if [he] [she] reasonably believed that such conduct was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [or] [another] [or] [the imminent commission of (applicable forcible felony listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.) ] against [himself] [herself] [or] [another].

Give the elements of the applicable forcible felony that defendant alleges victim was about to commit, but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo v. State, 61 So.3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The instruction may need to be modified in the event that the forcible felony at issue is not a crime against a person.

Force in resisting a law enforcement officer. § 776.051(1), Fla. Stat.

A person is not justified in [using force] [or] [threatening to use force] to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer, or to resist a law enforcement officer who is engaged in the execution of a legal duty, if the law enforcement officer was acting in good faith and he or she is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer.

Give if applicable.

However, if an officer uses excessive force to make an arrest, then a person is justified in the [use] [or] [threatened use] of reasonable force to defend [himself] [herself] (or another), but only to the extent [he] [she] reasonably believes such [force] [or] [threat of force] is necessary. See § 776.012, Fla. Stat.; Ivester v. State, 398 So.2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Jackson v. State, 463 So.2d 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

Read in all cases.

At the end of the last sentence of the paragraph below, there are two sets of brackets. The words within the first set of brackets should be read if the jury is instructed on either § 776.012(2), Fla. Stat., or § 776.031(2), Fla. Stat. The words within the second set of brackets should be read if the jury is instructed on § 776.013(1), Fla. Stat.

If the evidence is in dispute about whether the defendant was in a dwelling or residence or whether the defendant had a right to be there or whether the defendant was engaged in criminal activity, the trial judge must craft a special instruction for the paragraph below.

In deciding whether (defendant)was justified in the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force, you must consider the circumstances by which [he] [she] was surrounded at the time the [force] [or] [threat of force] was used. The danger need not have been actual; however, to justify the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force, the appearance of danger must have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed that the danger could be avoided only through the use of that [force] [or] [threat of force]. Based upon appearances, (defendant)must have actually believed that the danger was real. However, the defendant had no duty to retreat if [he] [she] was [not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and was in a place where [he] [she] had a right to be ] [was in a dwelling or residence in which [he] [she] had a right to be].

Presumption of fear (unlawful and forcible entry into dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle). Give if applicable. § 776.013(12 ), Fla. Stat.

(Defendant)is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] when [using] [or] [threatening to use] defensive force that was intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if:

a. The person against whom the defensive force was [used] [or] [threatened to be used] was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person's will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and
b. (Defendant) knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.

Exceptions to Presumption of Fear. § 776.013(23 )(a)-(23 )(d), Fla. Stat. Give as applicable.

The presumption of reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm does not apply if:

a. the person against whom the defensive force is [used] [or] [threatened to be used] has the right to be in [or is a lawful resident of the [dwelling] [residence]] [vehicle], such as an owner, lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person; or
b. the person or persons sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is [used] [or] [threatened to be used]; or
c. the person who [uses] [or] [threatens to use] defensive force is engaged in a criminal activity or is using the [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] to further a criminal activity; or d. the person against whom the defensive force is [used] [or] [threatened to be used] is a law enforcement officer, who enters or attempts to enter a [dwelling] [residence] [vehicle] in the performance of [his] [her] official duties and the officer identified [himself] [herself] in accordance with any applicable law or the person [using] [or] [threatening to use] the force knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter was a law enforcement officer.
If requested, give definition of law enforcement officer from § 943.10(14), Fla. Stat.

§ 776.013(4), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(5), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter another's [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence.

"Dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent or mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night.

"Residence" means a dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest.

"Vehicle" means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, which is designed to transport people or property.

Aggressor. § 776.041(1), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable and only in cases where the defendant is charged with either: a) an independent forcible felony, Martinez v. State, 981 So.2d 449 (Fla. 2008); or b) felony murder, if the underlying felony is an independent forcible felony, Cook v. State, 192 So.3d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

However, the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force is not justified if you find that (defendant)was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of (applicable forcible felony listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.).

Give the elements of the applicable forcible felony but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo v. State, 61 So.3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The instruction may need to be modified in the event that the forcible felony at issue is not a crime against a person.

Aggressor. § 776.041(2), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

Gibbs v. State, 789 So.2d 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

However, the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force is not justified if you find that (defendant)used [force] [or] [the threat of force] to initially provoke the [use] [or] [threatened use] of force against [himself] [herself], unless:

1. Tthe [force] [or] [threat of force] asserted toward the defendant was so great that [he] [she] reasonably believed that [he] [she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, other than [using] [or] [threatening to use] deadly force on (victim).
[or]
2. Iin good faith, (defendant) withdrew from physical contact with (victim) and clearly indicated to (victim) that [he] [she] wanted to withdraw and stop the [use] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force, but (victim) continued or resumed the [use] [or] [threatened use] of force.

Prior threats. Give if applicable.

If you find that the defendant(defendant) , who because of threats or prior difficulties with (victim), had reasonable grounds to believe that [he] [she] was in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of (victim), you may consider this fact in determining whether the actions of the defendant (defendant) were those of a reasonable person.

Specific act of victim known by defendant. Give if applicable.

If you find that at the time of the alleged (name[s] of relevant crime[s]), (defendant) knew that (victim) had committed an act [or acts] of violence, you may consider that fact in determining whether (defendant) reasonably believed it was necessary for [him] [her] to [use] [or] [threaten to use] deadly force.

Reputation of victim known by defendant. Give if applicable.

If you find that (victim)had a reputation of being a violent and dangerous person and that [his] [her] reputation was known to the defendant(defendant) , you may consider this fact in determining whether the actions of the defendant(defendant) were those of a reasonable person in dealing with an individual of that reputation.

Reputation of victim not necessarily known by defendant (to show victim acted in conformity with victim's character). Give if applicable.

If you find that (victim)had a reputation of being a violent and dangerous person, you may consider this fact in determining whether [he] [she] was the initial aggressor.

Physical abilities. Read in all cases.

In considering the issue of [ self-defense ] [defense of another] , you may take into account the relative physical abilities and capacities of the defendant(defendant) and (victim).

Read in all cases.

If in your consideration of the issue of [ self-defense ] [defense of another] you have a reasonable doubt on the question of whether the defendant(defendant) was justified in the [ use ] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force, you should find the defendant [him] [her] not guilty.

However, if from the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant(defendant) was not justified in the [ use ] [or] [threatened use] of deadly force, you should find [him] [her] guilty if all the elements of the charge have been proved.

Comments

This instruction should be used for crimes committed on or afterJune 20, 2014. See Chapter 2014-195, Laws of FloridaJuly 1, 2017.

A defendant may have knowledge of a victim's prior specific acts of violence because he or she was present during the occurrence of the specific acts or because the defendant heard of the specific acts prior to the date of the alleged act of self-defense. See Smith v. State, 606 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1985 [477 So.2d 985], 1999 [732 So.2d 1044], 2000 [789 So.2d 954], 2006 [930 So.2d 612], 2008 [976 So.2d 1081], 2010 [27 So.3d 640],and 2016 [191 So.3d 411], and 2018.

3.6(g) JUSTIFIABLE [ USE ] [OR] [THREATENED USE] OF NON-DEADLY FORCE

Because there are many statutes applicable to self-defense, give only those parts of the instructions that are required by the evidence. However, unless the evidence establishes the force used was deadly or non-deadly as a matter of law, both 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) must be given. Mathis v. State, 863 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Only the discharge of a firearm, whether accidental or not, has been deemed to be the use of deadly force as a matter of law. Hosnedl v. State, 120 So.3d 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Read in all cases.

It is a defense to the crime[s] of (name[s] of relevant crime[s], including lesser-included offenses )if the actions of (defendant)constituted the justifiable [ use ] [or] [threatened] of non-deadly force. "Non-deadly" force means force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Definition.

"Non-deadly" force means force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

In defense of person. §§ 776.012(1), 776.013(1), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

(Defendant)was justified in [using] [or] [threatening to use] non-deadly force against (victim)and had no duty to retreat if [he] [she] reasonably believed that such conduct was necessary to defend [himself] [herself] [another] against [ (victim's)imminent use of unlawful force ] [or] the imminent commission of (applicable forcible felony listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.) against [himself] [herself] [or] [another].

Give the elements of the applicable forcible felony that defendant alleges victim was about to commit, but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo v. State, 61 So.3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The instruction may need to be modified in the event that the forcible felony at issue is not a crime against a person.

In defense of property. § 776.031(1), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

(Defendant)was justified in [using] [or] [threatening to use] non-deadly force against (victim)and had no duty to retreat if:

1. (Victim) [was about to trespass] [or] [was trespassing] or [was about to wrongfully interfere] [or] [was wrongfully interfering] with land or personal property; and
2. The land or personal property was lawfully in (defendant's) possession, or in the possession of a member of [his] [her] immediate family or household, or in the possession of some person whose property [he] [she] was under a legal duty to protect; and
3. (Defendant) reasonably believed that [his] [her] [use] [or] [threatened use] of force was necessary to prevent or terminate (victim's) wrongful behavior.

Presumption of fear (unlawful and forcible entry into dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle). Give if applicable. § 776.013(12 ), Fla. Stat.

(Defendant)is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] when [using] [or] [threatening to use] defensive force if:

a. The person against whom the defensive force was [used] [or] [threatened to be used] was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person's will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and
b. (Defendant) knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.

Exceptions to Presumption of Fear. §§ 776.013(23 )(a)-(23 )(d), Fla. Stat. Give as applicable.

The presumption of reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm does not apply if:

a. the person against whom the defensive force is [used] [or] [threatened to be used] has the right to be in [or is a lawful resident of the [dwelling] [residence]] [vehicle], such as an owner, lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person; or
b. the person or persons sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is [used] [or] [threatened to be used]; or
c. the person who [uses] [or] [threatens to use] defensive force is engaged in a criminal activity or is using the [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] to further a criminal activity; or
d. the person against whom the defensive force is [used] [or] [threatened to be used] is a law enforcement officer, who enters or attempts to enter a [dwelling] [residence] [vehicle] in the performance of [his] [her] official duties and the officer identified [himself] [herself] in accordance with any applicable law or the person [using] [or] [threatening to use] the force knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter was a law enforcement officer.
If requested, give definition of law enforcement officer from § 943.10(14), Fla. Stat.
§§ 776.013(4), 776.013(5), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter another's [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence.

"Dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent or mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night.

"Residence" means a dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest.

"Vehicle" means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, which is designed to transport people or property.

Force in resisting a law enforcement officer. § 776.051(1), Fla. Stat.

A person is not justified in [using] [or] [threatening to use] force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer, or to resist a law enforcement officer who is engaged in the execution of a legal duty, if the law enforcement officer was acting in good faith and he or she is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer.

Give the following instruction if applicable.

However, if an officer uses excessive force to make an arrest, then a person is justified in the [use] [or] [threatened use] of reasonable force to defend [himself] [herself] [another], but only to the extent [he] [she] reasonably believes such force is necessary. See § 776.012, Fla. Stat.; Ivester v. State, 398 So.2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Jackson v. State, 463 So.2d 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

Read in all cases.

In deciding whether (defendant)was justified in the [use] [or] [threatened use] of non-deadly force, you must consider the circumstances by which [he] [she] was surrounded at the time the [force] [or] [threat of force] was used. The danger need not have been actual; however, to justify the [use] [or] [threatened use] of non-deadly force, the appearance of danger must have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed that the danger could be avoided only through the use of that [force] [or] [threat of force], although as I have previously explained, the defendant had no duty to retreat. Based upon appearances, (defendant)must have actually believed that the danger was real.

Aggressor. § 776.041(1), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable and only in cases where the defendant is charged with either: a) an independent forcible felony, Martinez v. State, 981 So.2d 449 (Fla. 2008); or b) felony murder, if the underlying felony is an independent forcible felony, Cook v. State, 192 So.3d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

However, the [use] [or] [threatened use] of non-deadly force is not justified if you find that (defendant)was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of a[n] (applicable forcible felony listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.).

Give the elements of the applicable forcible felony but omit any reference to burden of proof. Montijo v. State, 61 So.3d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The instruction may need to be modified in the event that the forcible felony at issue is not a crime against a person.

Aggressor. § 776.041(2), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

Gibbs v. State, 789 So.2d 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

However, the [use] [or] [threatened use] of non-deadly force is not justified if you find that (defendant)used [force] [or] [the threat of force] to initially provoke the [use] [or] [threatened use] of force against [himself] [herself], unless:

1. Tthe [force] [or] [threatened force] asserted toward (defendant) was so great that [he] [she] reasonably believed that [he] [she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, other than using non-deadly force on (victim).
[or]
2. Iin good faith, (defendant) withdrew from physical contact with (victim) and indicated clearly to (victim) that [he] [she] wanted to withdraw and stop the [use] [or] [threatened use] of non-deadly force, but (victim) continued or resumed the [use] [or] [threatened use] of force.

Prior threats. Give if applicable.

If you find that (defendant) , who because of threats or prior difficulties with (victim) , had reasonable grounds to believe that [he] [she] was in danger of imminent use of unlawful force at the hands of (victim) , you may consider this fact in determining whether the actions of (defendant) were those of a reasonable person.

Specific act of victim known by defendant. Give if applicable.

If you find that at the time of the alleged (name[s] of relevant crime[s]), (defendant) knew that (victim) had committed an act [or acts] of violence, you may consider that fact in determining whether (defendant) reasonably believed it was necessary for [him] [her] to [use] [or] [threaten to use] non-deadly force.

Reputation of victim known by defendant. Give if applicable.

If you find that (victim)had a reputation of being a violent and dangerous person and that [his] [her] reputation was known to the defendant(defendant) , you may consider this fact in determining whether the actions of the defendant(defendant) were those of a reasonable person in dealing with an individual of that reputation.

Reputation of victim not necessarily known by defendant (to show victim acted in conformity with victim's character). Give if applicable.

If you find that (victim)had a reputation of being a violent and dangerous person, you may consider this fact in determining whether [he] [she] was the initial aggressor.

Physical abilities. Read in all cases.

In considering the issue of [ self-defense ] [defense of another] [defense of property], you may take into account the relative physical abilities and capacities of the defendant(defendant) and (victim).

Read in all cases.

If in your consideration of the issue of [ self-defense ] [defense of another] [defense of property] you have a reasonable doubt on the question of whether the defendant(defendant) was justified in the [ use ] [or] [threatened use] of non-deadly force, you should find the defendant [him] [her] not guilty.

However, if from the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant(defendant) was not justified in the [ use ] [or]

[threatened use] of non-deadly force, then you should find [him] [her] guilty if all the elements of the charge have been proved.

Comments

This instruction should be used for crimes committed on or afterJune 20, 2014. See Chapter 2014-195, Laws of FloridaJuly 1, 2017.

A defendant may have knowledge of a victim's prior specific acts of violence because he or she was present during the occurrence of the specific acts or because the defendant heard of the specific acts prior to the date of the alleged act of self-defense. See Smith v. State, 606 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1985 [477 So.2d 985], 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], 2006 [930 So.2d 612], 2007 [947 So.2d 1159], 2008 [976 So.2d 1081], 2010 [27 So.3d 640],and 2016 [191 So.3d 411], and 2018.

FLORIDA SUPREME COURT NOTICE OF CORRECTION

DATE: December 6, 2018 CASE OF: IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES - REPORT 2017-07 DOCKET NO.: SC17-1822 OPINION FILED: November 21, 2018

ATTENTION: ALL PUBLISHERS

THE FOLLOWING CORRECTION HAS BEEN MADE IN THE ABOVE OPINION:

Title for instruction 3.6(f) is bolded, and an extra section symbol in instruction 3.6(g) before the statutory citation to "776.013(23 )(a)-(23 )(d)" is deleted.

SIGNED: OPINION CLERK

The corrected hard copy will follow.

      Florida has long recognized the common law "castle doctrine," "which stands for the proposition that a person's dwelling house is a castle of defense for himself and his family, and an assault on it with intent to injure him or any lawful inmate of it may justify the use of force as protection, and even deadly force if there exist reasonable and factual grounds to believe that unless so used, a felony would be committed." Falco v. State , 407 So.2d 203, 208 (Fla. 1981). Although the common law "castle doctrine" was originally limited to the privilege of nonretreat from the home, Weiand v. State , 732 So.2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999), it has also been extended to business premises. Redondo v. State , 380 So.2d 1107, 1110-11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) ("In our view, business or employment premises should enjoy the same sanctity as a home for self defense purposes as in each instance the person attacked has a proprietary or near proprietary interest in the place where he is assaulted which is cloaked with a certain privacy protection ...."), quashed in part on other grounds , 403 So.2d 954 (Fla. 1981) ; see Frazier v. State , 681 So.2d 824, 825 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1996) (agreeing with the Third District Court of Appeal that the "castle doctrine" "extends to protect persons in their place of employment while they are lawfully engaged in their occupation").

      The amendments as reflected in the appendix are to the Criminal Jury Instructions as they appear on the Court's website at www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/instructions.shtml. We recognize that there may be minor discrepancies between the instructions as they appear on the website and the published versions of the instructions. Any discrepancies as to instructions authorized for publication and use after October 25, 2007, should be resolved by reference to the published opinion of this Court authorizing the instruction.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES-REPORT 2018-05.
    No. SC18-1131
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    November 21, 2018
    Judge F. Rand Wallis, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Bart Schneider, Staff Liaison, Office of the State Courts Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
   PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee) has submitted proposed changes to the standard jury instructions and asks that the Court authorize the amended standard instructions for publication and use. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

The Committee proposes amending the following standard criminal jury instructions: 12.1 (Arson - First Degree); 13.1 (Burglary); 13.3 (Trespass - In Structure or Conveyance); 13.4 (Trespass - On Property Other Than a Structure or Conveyance); and 13.21 (Impairing or Impeding Telephone or Power to a Dwelling to Facilitate or Further a Burglary). The proposals were published by the Committee in The Florida Bar News . No comments were received by the Committee. After the Committee filed its report, the Court did not publish the proposals for comment.

Having considered the Committee's report, we amend the standard jury instructions as proposed by the Committee and authorize them for publication and use. We discuss the more significant amendments below.

First, the definitions of "dwelling" and "structure" in instructions 12.1, 13.1, 13.3, 13.4, and 13.21 that are based on sections 810.011(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (2018), are amended to include a bracketed sentence clarifying whether an enclosed space surrounding a building can be considered part of the dwelling or structure. The new sentence reads: "The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungated opening for entering and exiting." Those definitions in those instructions are also amended to add a citation to DuBose v. State , 210 So.3d 641 (Fla. 2017), in which this Court held that an enclosure "need not be continuous[,] and an ungated opening for ingress and egress does not preclude a determination that the yard is included in the curtilage of the house." Id. at 653-54 (alteration in original) (quoting DuBose v. State , 75 So.3d 383, 384-85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ). The definition of "conveyance" found in instructions 13.1, 13.3, and 13.21 is also amended to better track the language of section 810.011(3), Florida Statutes.

Next, instructions 13.1, 13.3, and 13.4 are amended to include a definition of "great bodily harm," providing that " 'Great bodily harm' means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises." The definition is based upon that provided by Wheeler v. State , 203 So.3d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that " 'great bodily harm' is 'distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises as are likely to be inflicted in simple assault and battery.' "

Id. at 1009 (quoting T.W. v. State , 98 So.3d 238, 243 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ).

Additionally, instruction 13.1 is amended to reflect that claims of consent to enter the structure or conveyance, or that the premises were open to the public, are affirmative defenses rather than elements of the crime of burglary. This Court made clear in State v. Hicks , 421 So.2d 510, 511-12 (Fla. 1982), and reiterated in State v. Waters , 436 So.2d 66, 69 n.3 (Fla. 1983), that claims of consent are defenses to burglary that must be raised affirmatively.

Last, in instruction 13.1 the paragraph that currently reads "To 'arm' oneself during the course of a burglary includes possessing a firearm, whether loaded with ammunition or not, at any time during the course of committing the burglary" is amended to read "If you find a firearm to be a 'dangerous weapon,' then to 'arm' oneself during the course of a burglary includes possessing a firearm, whether loaded with ammunition or not, at any time during the course of committing a burglary." This language is amended to better reflect that a firearm must be found to be a "dangerous weapon" under the burglary statute, because there is no authority making such a finding as a matter of law.

The amended criminal jury instructions, as set forth in the appendix to this opinion, are hereby authorized for publication and use. New language is indicated by underlining, and deleted language is indicated by struck-through type. We caution all interested parties that any comments associated with the instructions reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. In authorizing the publication and use of these instructions, we express no opinion on their correctness and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instructions. The instructions as set forth in the appendix shall become effective when this opinion becomes final.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

12.1 ARSON - FIRST DEGREE

§ 806.01(1), Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Arson, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant) [willfully and unlawfully] [while engaged in the commission of [a felony] [(felony alleged)]]]] caused a[n] [fire] [explosion].
Give 2a if § 806.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. is charged.
2. a. A dwelling, whether occupied or not, [or the contents of the dwelling,] was damaged by the [fire] [explosion].
Give 2b if § 806.01(1)(b), Fla. Stat. is charged.
b. A structure, where persons would normally be present at the time of the [fire] [explosion], [or the contents of a structure where persons would normally be present at the time of the [fire] [explosion]], was damaged by the [fire] [explosion].
Give 2c if § 806.01(1)(c), Fla. Stat. is charged.
c. A structure, that (defendant) knew or had reasonable grounds to believe would be occupied by a human being at the time of the [fire] [explosion], was damaged by the [fire] [explosion].

Knighten v. State, 568 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) and N.K.D. v. State, 799 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

In order to convict the defendant of Arson, it is not necessary for the State to prove [he] [she] intended to damage the [dwelling] [structure].

Give if applicable.

The e C ourt instructs you that (name of felony)is a felony.

Definitions. Give as applicable.

Patterson v. State, 512 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

"Willfully" means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely.

Berry v. State, 566 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

"Unlawfully" means without a legitimate, lawful purpose.

§ 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. Dubose v. State, 210 So.3d 641 (Fla. 2017).

"Dwelling" means a building [or conveyance] of any kind, whether such building [or conveyance] is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding it. [The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungated opening for entering and exiting.] For purposes of arson, a "dwelling" includes an attached porch or attached garage.

§ 806.01(3), Fla. Stat.;

"Structure" means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft.

If the defendant is charged with causing a fire or explosion while committing a felony, define the felony that the defendant was allegedly committing.

Lesser Included Offenses

ARSON - 806.01(1) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. None Arson - second degree 806.01(2) 12.2 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Criminal mischief 806.13 12.4

Comment s

A special instruction is necessary in cases where the dwelling is vacant and the homeowner does not intend to return.SeeSee Mitchell v. State, 734 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], and 2014 [146 So.3d 1110], and 2018.

13.1 BURGLARY

§ 810.02, Fla. Stat.

Give if the information or indictment charges entering with the intent to commit an offense:

To prove the crime of Burglary, the State must prove the following [ two ] [three] elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant) entered a [structure] [conveyance] owned by or in the possession of (person alleged).
2. At the time of entering the [structure] [conveyance], (defendant) had the intent to commit [(the crime alleged)] [an offense other than burglary or trespass] in that [structure] [conveyance].

The offense intended cannot be trespass or burglary. If requested, the jury should be instructed on the elements of the offense(s) intended.

Affirmative defenses. Give element 3 only if defendant meets his or her burden of production that he or she had an invitation or license to enter, or that the premises were open to the public. See State v. Hicks, 421 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1982), and State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1983). Failure to instruct on consent constitutes fundamental error where consent is the sole or primary defense. Faulk v. State, 222 So.3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) and Harrison v. State, 229 So.3d 830 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

3. [(Defendant) was not [licensed] [invited] to enter the [structure] [conveyance].] [The premises were not open to the public at the time of the entering.]It is a defense to the crime of Burglary if [(defendant) was [licensed] [or] [invited] to enter the [structure] [conveyance]] [the premises were open to the public at the time of the entering]. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that](defendant) was not [licensed] [or] [invited] to enter the [structure] [conveyance]] [the premises were not open to the public at the time of the entering].

Give if applicable.

If the [license] [invitation] to enter was obtained by (defendant's) trick or fraud or deceit, then the [license] [invitation] to enter was not valid.

Give if applicable.

If (defendant)entered premises that were open to the public, but then entered an area of the premises that [he] [she] knew or should have known was not open to the public, (defendant)committed a burglary if [he] [she] entered that non-public area with the intent to commit [ (the crime alleged)] [an offense other than burglary or trespass] in that non-public area.

Give if applicable. § 810.07 , Fla. Stat.

You may infer that (defendant)had the intent to commit a crime inside a [structure] [conveyance] if the [entering] [attempted entering] of the [structure] [conveyance] was done stealthily and without the consent of the owner or occupant.

Give if applicable.

The entry necessary need not be the whole body of the defendant. It is sufficient if the defendant, with the intent to commit a crime, extends any part of [his] [her] body into the [structure] [conveyance].

Give if the information or indictment charges remaining with the intent to commit an offense:

To prove the crime of Burglary, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant) had permission or consent to enter a [structure] [conveyance] owned by or in the possession of (person alleged).
2. (Defendant), after entering the [structure] [conveyance], remained therein

Give 2a, 2b, or 2c as applicable.

a. surreptitiously and with the intent to commit [(the crime alleged)] [an offense other than burglary or trespass] inside the [structure] [conveyance].
b. after permission to remain had been withdrawn and with the intent to commit [(the crime alleged)] [an offense other than burglary or trespass] inside the [structure] [conveyance].
c. with the intent to commit or attempt to commit a [forcible felony] [(the forcible felony alleged)] inside the [structure] [conveyance].

The offense intended cannot be trespass or burglary. Forcible felonies are listed in § 776.08 Fla. Stat. If requested, the jury should be instructed on the elements of the offense(s) or forcible felony/felonies intended.

Proof of intent.

The intent with which an act is done is an operation of the mind and, therefore, is not always capable of direct and positive proof. It may be established by circumstantial evidence like any other fact in a case.

Even though an unlawful [entering] [remaining in] a [structure] [conveyance] is proved, if the evidence does not establish that it was done with the intent to commit [ (the crime alleged)] [an offense other than burglary or trespass], the defendant must be found not guilty of burglary.

Proof of possession of stolen property.

Proof of possession by an accused of property recently stolen by means of a burglary, unless satisfactorily explained, may justify a conviction of burglary if the circumstances of the burglary and of the possession of the stolen property convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the burglary.

Definitions; give as applicable.

§ 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. Dubose v. State, 210 So.3d 641 (Fla. 2017).

"Structure" means any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, that has a roof over it, and the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding that structure. [The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungated opening for entering and exiting.]

§ 810.011(3), Fla. Stat.

"Conveyance" means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad vehicle or car, trailer, aircraft or sleeping car; and to enter a conveyance includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance.

Burglary enhancements:

With an assault.

If you find (defendant)guilty of burglary, you must also determine if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt whether, in the course of committing the burglary, (defendant)assaulted any person. An assault is an intentional and unlawful threat, either by word or act, to do violence to another, at a time when the defendant appeared to have the ability to carry out the threat and [his] [her] act created a well-founded fear in the other person that the violence was about to take place.

With a battery.

If you find (defendant)guilty of burglary, you must also determine if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt whether, in the course of committing the burglary, (defendant)battered any person. A battery is an actual and intentional touching or striking of another person against that person's will or the intentional causing of bodily harm to another person.

While armed.

If you find (defendant)guilty of burglary, you must also determine if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt whether, in the course of committing the burglary, (defendant)was armed or armed [himself] [herself] within the [structure] [conveyance] with [explosives] [a dangerous weapon].

Definitions. Give as applicable. § 790.001(5), Fla. Stat. See exceptions in § 790.001(5)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat.

"Explosive" means any chemical compound or mixture that has the property of yielding readily to combustion or oxidation upon application of heat, flame, or shock, including but not limited to dynamite, nitroglycerin, trinitrotoluene, or ammonium nitrate when combined with other ingredients to form an explosive mixture, blasting caps, and detonators.

State v. Rodriguez, 402 So.2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

A "dangerous weapon" is any weapon that, taking into account the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce death or great bodily harm. It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant intended to use or was willing to use the weapon in furtherance of the burglary in order for a weapon to constitute a "dangerous weapon."

Wheeler v. State, 203 So.3d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

"Great bodily harm" means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.

Hardee v. State, 534 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1988).

If you find a firearm to be a "dangerous weapon," then to To "arm" oneself during the course of a burglary includes possessing a firearm, whether loaded with ammunition or not, at any time during the course of committing the burglary.

Structure or conveyance is a dwelling.

If you find (defendant)guilty of burglary, you must also determine if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt whether the [structure] [conveyance] [entered] [remained in] was a dwelling.

Definition. Give as applicable. Dubose v. State, 210 So.3d 641 (Fla. 2017).

"Dwelling" means a building [or conveyance] of any kind, whether such building [or conveyance] is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding it. [The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungated opening for entering and exiting.] For purposes of burglary, a "dwelling" includes an attached porch or attached garage.

Human being in structure or conveyance.

If you find (defendant)guilty of burglary, you must also determine if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt whether, in the course of committing the burglary, there was another human being in the [structure] [conveyance], at the time [he] [she] [entered] [remained in] the [structure] [conveyance].

Offense intended is theft of a controlled substance.

If you find (defendant)guilty of burglary, you must also determine whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense intended to be committed therein was theft of a controlled substance. Pursuant to Florida law, (name of controlled substance )is a controlled substance. A theft occurs when a person knowingly and unlawfully obtains or uses or endeavors to obtain or use the property of the victim and does so with the intent to, either temporarily or permanently, deprive the victim of his or her right to the property or any benefit from it or to appropriate the property of the victim to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to it.

Traveling from county of residence into another county with intent to commit a burglary and with purpose to thwart law enforcement efforts to track stolen property. § 843.22, Fla. Stat.

If you find (defendant)guilty of [Burglary] [Attempted Burglary] [Solicitation to Commit Burglary] [Conspiracy to Commit Burglary], you must also determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. (Defendant) had a county of residence within Florida; and
2. (Defendant) travelled any distance with the intent to commit a burglary in a county in Florida other than [his] [her] county of residence; and
3. The purpose of (defendant's) travel was to thwart law enforcement attempts to track items stolen in the burglary.

"County of residence" means the county within this state in which a person resides.

Evidence of a person's county of residence includes, but is not limited to:

1. The address on a person's driver license or state identification card;
2. Records of real property or mobile home ownership;
3. Records of a lease agreement for residential property;
4. The county in which a person's motor vehicle is registered;
5. The county in which a person is enrolled in an educational institution;
6. The county in which a person is employed.

Dwelling or structure with use of motor vehicle or damage.

If you find (defendant)guilty of burglary, you must also determine if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt whether, in the course of committing the burglary, (defendant)entered a [dwelling] [structure] and

1. used a motor vehicle as an instrumentality, other than merely as a getaway vehicle, to assist in committing the offense, and thereby damaged the [dwelling] [structure].
or
2. caused damage to the [dwelling] [structure] [property within the [dwelling] [structure]], in excess of $1,000.

Authorized emergency vehicle.

If you find (defendant)guilty of burglary, you must also determine if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt whether the conveyance [entered] [remained in] was an authorized emergency vehicle.

Definition. See § 316.003 (1), Fla. Stat.

An "authorized emergency vehicle" is a vehicle of the fire department (fire patrol), police vehicles, and such ambulances and emergency vehicles of municipal departments, public service corporations operated by private corporations, the Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Corrections as are designated or authorized by their respective department or the chief of police of an incorporated city or any sheriff of a county.

State of emergency.

The definitions of structure, dwelling, and conveyance are different for counties where a state of emergency has been declared under chapter 252. See § 810.011(1), (2), and (3), Fla. Stat.

If you find (defendant)guilty of burglary, you must also determine if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt whether

1. the burglary was committed within a county that was subject to a state of emergency that had been declared by the governor under chapter 252, the State Emergency Management Act,
and
2. the perpetration of the burglary was facilitated by conditions arising from the emergency.

Definition.

The term "conditions arising from the emergency" means civil unrest, power outages, curfews, voluntary or mandatory evacuations, or a reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel.

§ 810.011(4), Fla. Stat.

An act is committed "in the course of committing" if it occurs in the attempt to commit the offense or in flight after the attempt or commission.

Lesser Included Offenses

BURGLARY WITH ASSAULT OR BATTERY OR WHILE ARMED OR WITH USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE OR PROPERTY DAMAGE - 810.02(2) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Burglary 810.02(4) 13.1 Aggravated battery 784.045 8.4 Persons Engaged in 790.07(2) 10.3 Criminal Offense Having Firearm Battery 784.03 8.3 Aggravated assault 784.021 8.2 Persons Engaged in 790.07(1) 10.3 Criminal Offense Having Weapon Assault 784.011 8.1 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Burglary 810.02(3) 13.1 Trespass 810.08(2)(a) 13.3 Trespass 810.08(2)(b) 13.3 Trespass 810.08(2)(c) 13.3 Criminal Mischief 806.13 12.4

It is probably best for the jury to make special findings regarding enhancements instead of listing all of the necessary lesser-included offenses of the highest form of Burglary charged.SeeSee Justice Pariente's concurring opinion in Sanders v. State, 944 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2006)(Pariente, J., concurring).

BURGLARY OF DWELLING; BURGLARY OF STRUCTURE OR CONVEYANCE WITH HUMAN BEING INSIDE; BURGLARY OF AN AUTHORIZED EMERGENCY VEHICLE* - 810.02(3) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Burglary 810.02(4) 13.1 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Trespass 810.08(2)(a) 13.3 Trespass 810.08(2)(b) 13.3 Trespass 810.08(2)(c) 13.3

It is probably best for the jury to make special findings regarding enhancements instead of listing all of the necessary lesser-included offenses of the highest form of Burglary charged.SeeSee Justice Pariente's concurring opinion in Sanders v. State, 944 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2006)(Pariente, J., concurring).

BURGLARY - 810.02(4) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. None Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Trespass 810.08(2)(a) 13.3 Trespass 810.08(2)(b) 13.3 Trespass 810.08(2)(c) 13.3 Criminal Mischief 806.13 12.4

It is probably best for the jury to make special findings regarding enhancements instead of listing all of the necessary lesser-included offenses of the highest form of Burglary charged.SeeSee Justice Pariente's concurring opinion in Sanders v. State, 944 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2006)(Pariente, J., concurring).

Comments

As of June 2018, the courts had not determined which definition of "motor vehicle" applies to the burglary statute.

When the compounded offense of burglary with an assault or burglary with a battery is charged, the jury can convict on two lesser-included offenses.SeeSee Gian-Grasso v. State, 899 So.2d 392 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1985 [477 So.2d 985], 1997 [697 So.2d 84], 2003 [850 So.2d 1272], 2007 [962 So.2d 310], 2008 [986 So.2d 563], 2013 [109 So.3d 721], 2015 [176 So.3d 938],and 2017 [217 So.3d 965], and 2018.

13.3 TRESPASS - IN STRUCTURE OR CONVEYANCE

§ 810.08, Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Trespass in a [Structure] [Conveyance], the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

Give a. for trespass and/or b. for trespass after warning to depart.
a. 1. (Defendant) willfully entered or remained in a [structure] [conveyance].
2. The [structure] [conveyance] was in the lawful possession of (person alleged).
3. (Defendant's) entering or remaining in the [structure] [conveyance] was without authorization, license, or invitation by (person alleged) or any other person authorized to give that permission.
b. 1. (Defendant) had been authorized, licensed, or invited to enter or remain in a [structure] [conveyance].
2. [The owner] [The lessee] [A person authorized by the owner or lessee] of the premises warned (defendant) to depart.
3. (Defendant) refused to depart.

Authority to enter or remain in a [structure] [conveyance] need not be given in express words. It may be implied from the circumstances. It is lawful to enter or remain in a [structure] [conveyance] of another if, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that [he] [she] had the permission of the owner or occupant.

Definitions. Give as applicable.

§ 810.08(3), Fla. Stat.

"Person authorized" means an owner or lessee, or his or her agent, or any law enforcement officer whose department has received written authorization from the owner or lessee, or his or her agent, to communicate an order to depart the property in case of a threat to public safety or welfare.

Rozier v. State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

"Willfully" means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely.

§ 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. ; and State v. Hamilton, 660 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 1995) ; Dubose v. State, 210 So.3d 641 (Fla. 2017).

"Structure" means any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, that has a roof over it, and the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding that structure. [The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungated opening for entering and exiting.]

§ 810.011(3), Fla. Stat.

"Conveyance" means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad vehicle or car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car; and to enter a conveyance includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance.

While armed.

If you find the defendant guilty of trespass in a [structure] [conveyance], you must then determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed or armed [himself] [herself] with a firearm or other dangerous weapon during the trespass.

Human being in structure or conveyance.

If you find the defendant guilty of [attempted] trespass in a [structure] [conveyance], you must then determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a human being in the [structure] [conveyance] at the time of the [attempted] trespass.

§ 790.001(6), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

A "firearm" is any weapon, including a starter gun, which will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; any destructive device; or any machine gun. [The term "firearm" does not include an antique firearm unless the antique firearm is used in the commission of a crime.] See § 790.001(1) Fla. Stat. for the definition of "antique firearm" and § 790.001(4) Fla. Stat. for the definition of "destructive device."

A "dangerous weapon" is any weapon that, taking into account the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce death or great bodily harm.

Wheeler v. State, 203 So.3d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

"Great bodily harm" means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.

Lesser Included Offenses

TRESPASS IN STRUCTURE OR CONVEYANCE - 810.08 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. None Attempt (except refuse 777.04(1) 5.1 to depart)

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1985 [477 So.2d 985], and 2012 [87 So.3d 679], and 2018.

13.4 TRESPASS - ON PROPERTY OTHER THAN A STRUCTURE OR CONVEYANCE

§ 810.09(1)(a)1 and 2, Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Trespass on Property other than a Structure or Conveyance, the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant) willfully entered upon or remained in property other than a structure or conveyance.
2. The property was [owned by] [in the lawful possession of] (person alleged).
3. Give one of the following paragraphs, as applicable.
Give if § 810.09(1)(a)1, Fla. Stat. is charged.
Notice not to enter upon or remain in that property had been given by [[actual communication to the defendant] [[posting] [fencing] [cultivation] of the property in the manner defined in this instruction]].
Give if § 810.09(1)(a)2, Fla. Stat. is charged.
The property was the unenclosed curtilage of a dwelling and (defendant) entered or remained with the intent to commit a crime thereon other than trespass.
4. (Defendant's) entering upon or remaining in the property was without authorization, license, or invitation from (person alleged) or any other person authorized to give that permission.

Authority to enter upon or remain in property need not be given in express words. It may be implied from the circumstances. It is lawful to enter upon or remain in the property of another if, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that [he] [she] had the permission of the owner or occupant.

Definitions.

§810.011(1) , Fla. Stat. ; and State v. Hamilton, 660 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 1995) ; and DuBose v. State, 210 So.3d 641 (Fla. 2017).

"Structure" means a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, and the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding it. [The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungated opening for entering and exiting.]

§ 810.011(3), Fla. Stat.

"Conveyance" means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad vehicle or car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car; and "to enter a conveyance" includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance.

§ 810.09(3), Fla. Stat.

"Person authorized" means any owner, his or her agent, or a community association authorized as an agent for the owner, or any law enforcement officer whose department has received written authorization from the owner, his or her agent, or a community association authorized as an agent for the owner, to communicate an order to leave the property in the case of a threat to public safety or welfare.

§ 810.09(1)(b) , Fla. Stat.

"Unenclosed curtilage of a dwelling" means the unenclosed land or grounds, and any outbuildings, that are directly and intimately adjacent to and connected with the dwelling and necessary, convenient, and habitually used in connection with that dwelling.

§ 810.011(2) , Fla. Stat. Dubose v. State, 210 So.3d 641 (Fla. 2017).

"Dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, and the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding that dwelling. [The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungated opening for entering and exiting.]

Rozier v. State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

Willfully" means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely.

§ 810.011(5)(a)1. and (b), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

Notice not to enter upon property may be given by posting signs not more than 500 feet apart along and at each corner of the property's boundaries. The signs must prominently state, in letters not less than two inches high, the words "No Trespassing" The signs also must state, with smaller letters being acceptable, the name of the owner or lessee or occupant of the land. The signs must be placed so as to be clearly noticeable from outside the boundary lines and corners of the property. [If the property is less than five acres in area, and a dwelling house is located on it, it should be treated as posted land even though no signs have been erected.]

§ 810.011(6), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

Notice not to enter property may be given by cultivation of the property. "Cultivated land" is land that has been cleared of its natural vegetation, and at the time of the trespass was planted with trees, a crop, an orchard or a grove, or was a pasture. [Fallow land, left that way as part of a crop rotation, is also "" cultivated land. "" ]

§ 810.011(7), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

Notice not to enter property may be given by fencing the property. "Fenced land" is land that has been enclosed by a fence of substantial construction. The fence may be made from rails, logs, posts and railings, iron, steel, barbed wire or other wire or material. The fence must stand at least three feet high. [If a part of the boundary of a piece of property is formed by water, that part should be treated as legally fenced land.]

Give if applicable.

When every part of property is either posted or cultivated or fenced, the entire property is considered as enclosed and posted land.

Enhanced penalty. Give if applicable.

If you find the defendant guilty of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, you must then determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed with a firearm or other dangerous weapon during the trespass.

§ 790.001(6), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

A "firearm" is any weapon [including a starter gun] which will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; any destructive device; or any machine gun. [The term "firearm" does not include an antique firearm unless the antique firearm is used in the commission of a crime.] See § 790.001(1), Fla. Stat. for the definition of "antique firearm" and § 790.001(4), Fla. Stat. for the definition of "destructive device."

A "dangerous weapon" is any weapon that, taking into account the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce death or great bodily harm.

Wheeler v. State, 203 So.3d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

"Great bodily harm" means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.

Lesser Included Offenses

TRESPASS ON PROPERTY OTHER THAN STRUCTURE OR CONVEYANCE - 810.09(1)(a) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. None Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1985,2012 [87 So.3d 679], and 2018.

13.21 IMPAIRING OR IMPEDING TELEPHONE OR POWER TO A DWELLING TO FACILITATE OR FURTHER A BURGLARY

§ 810.061, Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Impairing or Impeding Telephone or Power to a Dwelling to Facilitate or Further a Burglary, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

Give as applicable.
1. (Defendant)
a. damaged a [wire] [line] that transmitted [telephone service] [power] to a dwelling.
b. impaired equipment necessary for [telephone] [power] transmission to a dwelling.
c. [impaired] [impeded] [telephone] [power] transmission to a dwelling.
2. (Defendant) did so for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the [commission] [attempted commission] of a burglary of that dwelling.
To define a burglary, see the elements of burglary in instruction 13.1. To define an attempt, see instruction 5.1.

Definitions.

§ 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. Dubose v. State, 210 So.3d 641 (Fla. 2017).

"Dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding it. [The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungated opening for entering and exiting.] For purposes of this crime, a "dwelling" includes an attached garage.

§ 810.011(3), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

"Conveyance" means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad vehicle or car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car; and "to enter a conveyance" includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance.

"Impaired" means to be diminished, damaged, or weakened.

"Impeded" means to slow something down or prevent an activity from making progress at its previous rate.

"Facilitate" means to help or assist, or to make something possible or easier.

An "attempt" to commit a crime is the formation of an intent to commit that crime and the doing of some act toward the commission of the crime other than mere preparation to commit the crime.

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 2007 [953 So.2d 495] and amended in 2018.

      The amendments as reflected in the appendix are to the Criminal Jury Instructions as they appear on the Court's website at www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/instructions.shtml. We recognize that there may be minor discrepancies between the instructions as they appear on the website and the published versions of the instructions. Any discrepancies as to instructions authorized for publication and use after October 25, 2007, should be resolved by reference to the published opinion of this Court authorizing the instruction.


text:
    Ted HORN, Appellant, v. COCA COLA COMPANY, and CNA, Appellees.
    No. 1D18-1644
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 26, 2018 Rehearing Denied December 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ariel M. LOPEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1388
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Otha L. ABNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-3464
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018 Rehearing Denied December 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Alphonso JAMES, Sr., Appellant, v. Julie L. JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0998
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 4, 2018 Rehearing Denied December 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Wilson PEREZ, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-3318
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   DISMISSED.


text:
    Tramain SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2021
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Anthony Jerome THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-0147
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 7, 2018 Rehearing Denied December 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    AMERICA'S CNG, LLC, Appellant, v. CITY OF LAKE CITY, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4859
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 31, 2018 Rehearing Denied December 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Gregory D. TRUETTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1419
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Reggie R. GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1226
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Derrick FREDERICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3904
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John Richard DANIELS III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4864
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Shaborn JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1261
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Antonio MILLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0013
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Nathaniel A. TOLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0823
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Troy Lee PARKER Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1171
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Adam S. BURKE, Appellant, v. Molly E. BURKE, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1596
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Debbie A. HALL, Appellant, v. CARROLL FULMER LOGISTICS CORPORATION; and Moses Bryant, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-4461
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Darrell THORPE and Crystal Thorpe, Appellants, v. US BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR CP SRMOF II 2012-A TRUST; Selene Finance, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-3854
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David ALLEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1998
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David CREECH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2563
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Judy Ann Jean KEETER, et al., Appellant, v. The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FICA the Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders of CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2006-0A11, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-0A11; Unknown Tenant in Possession of the Subject Property, Appellees.
    No. 1D18-3554
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    ST. JAMES HEALTHCARE GROUP, INC. d/b/a St. James Health and Rehabilitation Center on Behalf of Betty Roberts, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, State of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5441
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jonathan HARDT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2521
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    James E. HENRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2469
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Terrence Harold KOENIG, Jr., Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-1504
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   DENIED.


text:
    Paul William HURST, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-1415
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Mark R. GANTT, Sr., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-1413
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Deshawn Montaye MCQUEEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-644
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Markus Quin BISHOP, Husband, Appellant, v. Fany Zulinda ROJAS, Wife, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5295
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    James SMART, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4277
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Walter Michael THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-4775
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    W.A., Father of M.A., a Minor Child, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3670
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Frederick Eugene LITTLES, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1444
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Stephane SIMEON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2892
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Zachary LITTLETON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3699
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Louis C. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5545
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Charmaine BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5789
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Teresa GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. Anthony POLK, D.D.S., Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2543
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    T.A.W., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2310
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    T.A.W., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2309
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    T.A.W., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2311
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dieuvella M. CELESTIN, Appellant, v. REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION and Apex Security & Convention Services Inc., Appellees.
    No. 1D18-46
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Claudia TORIOLA, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3980
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Charles F. MCCLELLAN, an Individual, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-2292
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Natasha NEMETH, an Individual, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-2293
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   DENIED.


text:
    Eric Jermaine HAYWARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-15
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Bonnie Sue BOTTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2410
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Erin SCHLAGEL, Appellant, v. SHANDS TEACHING HOSPITAL AND CLINICS, INC., a Florida Non-Profit Corporation, d/b/a UF Health Shands Davis Cancer Center, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5303
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Bill Allan WREEDE, DOC #104669, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1351
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    TAMPA HYDE PARK CAFE LLC d/b/a The Hyde Park Cafe, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-3531
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tyree JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1551
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony E. SUTTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2167
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Samantha Beatrice RACINE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3991
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 5, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-5067
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Johnny Fred BYRD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2711
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael DELGALLO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2549
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jrokton Dominque WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1004
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Virgil Eugene DEBOSE, Doc #745270, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4056
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Neelam UPPAL, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2356
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 3, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Reginald Leon SMITH, Doc #268051, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-125
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 28, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jamie GEER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1032
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 26, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Steven D. MACK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1018
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Johnathan DANZEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3116
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Edward L. WEBB, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4057
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    HARVEY MOORE AND ASSOCIATES, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. HAHN LOESER & PARKS, LLP, an Ohio limited liability partnership; Trial Practices, Inc., a Florida corporation; Trial Simulations, Inc., a Florida Corporation; Trial Visualization, Inc., a Florida corporation; Harvey Moore, an individual; and Lynette M. Moore, an individual, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-3193
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Geoffrey STILWELL a/k/a Geoffrey A. Stilwell and Lori T. Stilwell, Appellants, v. The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f/k/a The Bank of New York, AS TRUSTEE FOR the CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF CWALT, INC., Alternative Loan Trust 2005-42CB, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-42CB; Carillon Woods Homeowners' Association, Inc.; PNC Bank, National Association, f/k/a National City Bank; Unknown Tenant #1; Unknown Tenant #2; and Any and All Unknown Parties Claiming By, Through, Under, and Against the Herein Named Individual Defendant(s) Who Are Not Known To Be Dead or Alive, Whether Said Unknown Parties May Claim an Interest As Spouses, Heirs, Devisees, Grantees, or Other Claimants, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-1567
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Leo Bobby JACKSON, DOC# 076465, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5492
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 19, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert BLACKBURN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1820
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 19, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ronnie Lamar JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1239
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Charlton OLIVER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1283
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 17, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sandy Star TEETER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3052
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 19, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David DANIELS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3611
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 19, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John Anthony DECESARE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3695
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 19, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Daniel James TURNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-705
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 19, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Johnathan BERRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1861
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Juan Manuel MOLINA, DOC #T07199, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3227
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 19, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Julious JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3533
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 19, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony Scott CHAIRMONT, GDC ID #0001086419, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4303
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 19, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony GRANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3606
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 31, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Feroz BHOJANI, Appellant, v. SOLOMON LAW GROUP, P.A. and A.O.K. Liquors & Spirits of Tampa Bay, Inc. a/k/a A.O.K. Liquors of Tampa Bay, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-4844
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 31, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    NEW SUSHINE GROUP, LLC, and New York Mart Group, Inc., Appellants, v. SKKR TRADING, LLC d/b/a 38 Live Bait, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1432 2D17-2051
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ryan Lee HANNINEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4026
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 7, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Andre Tremayne HODGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1389
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 7, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Deon Lamar FLETCHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1817
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tollyn J. TWITCHELL and Robina M. Twitchell, Co-Trustees of the Tollyn J. Twitchell Living Trust under Agreement Dated November 3, 2010, Tollyn J. Twitchell, Individually, Terry G. Twitchell and Lea Koester, Personal Representative of the Estate of Sylvia T. Hutchins, Appellants, v. Whitney L. SCOTT, Successor Trustee of the Sylva T. Hutchins Revocable Trust, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3447
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Katrelle JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3399
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 7, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brandon EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3438
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Alejandro FLORESSANCHEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-438
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 7, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gina PAETH, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR the C-BASS MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, Series 2006-RP2; Elizabeth Janet Paeth; Unknown Tenant #1 n/k/a Kathryn Wilbourne; and Unknown Tenant #2 n/k/a Alexander Wilbourne, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-4659
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 7, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    James R. WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1336
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antonio Montez MITCHELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2856
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kutchev PIERRE, a/k/a Kutchev Celestial Pierre, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-50
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 7, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.