author: FERNANDEZ, J.

text:
    Jesus ESTRADA, Sr., Appellant, v. Jesus ESTRADA, Jr. and Aixa Estrada, Appellees.
    No. 3D17-1613
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019 Rehearing Denied June 05, 2019
    Jennifer A. Kerr ; David S. Harris, Miami, for appellant.
    Bernhard Law Firm, PLLC and Andrew J. Bernhard, for appellees.
    Before EMAS, C.J., and FERNANDEZ, and MILLER , JJ.

      Did not participate in oral argument.

   FERNANDEZ, J.

Appellant Jesus Estrada, Sr. appeals the trial court's order granting appellees Jesus Estrada, Jr. and his wife, Aixa Estrada's, Motion to Set Aside Void Default and Default Judgment. We agree with appellant that the trial court erred in vacating the default and default judgment, as the judgment in question was not void or voidable. In addition, appellees' Motion to Set Aside Void Default and Default Judgment was legally insufficient, as it was untimely and unverified. We thus reverse the trial court's order granting appellees' Motion to Set Aside Void Default and Default Judgment and remand for the trial court to reinstate the Order of Default and Final Default Judgment.

Appellant filed a complaint against appellees for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and unjust enrichment on November 10, 2014. Appellant, father to appellee Estrada, Jr., claimed he allowed appellees to manage three rental apartment buildings appellant owned in Florida. Appellees, who are residents of Texas, then allegedly induced appellant to sell the properties and converted the proceeds of the sale, totaling $ 2.2 million, to buy seven properties in Texas in appellees' names. Appellant alleged appellees gave appellant seven sham quit-claim deeds purporting to list appellant as the owner of the properties. Thereafter, appellant found out from his other adult son that appellant was not the owner of the properties.

On January 30, 2015, each of the appellees was served with process at their home at 15720 East Davis Road, Edinburg, Hidalgo County, Texas. This is undisputed in the record, and the appellees have not alleged lack of service. Each summons served on each appellee instructed them as follows:

Each defendant is required to serve written defenses to the complaint or petition on Plaintiff's attorney: David S. Harris, Esq., whose address is: 6431 SW 39 Street, Miami, FL 33155 within 20 days after service of this summons on that defendant, exclusive of the day of service, and to file the original of the defenses with the Clerk of this Court either before service on Plaintiff's attorney or immediately thereafter. If a defendant fails to do so, a default will be entered against that defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint or petition.

This language contained in the summons meets Florida's service requirements for litigants, which also includes pro se parties. In addition, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 governs the service of pleadings and documents in Florida. Rule 2.516(b)(2), which deals with parties not represented by an attorney, provides:

Service on and by all parties who are not represented by an attorney and who do not designate an e-mail address, and on and by all attorneys excused from e-mail service, must be made by delivering a copy of the document or by mailing it to the party or attorney at their last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. Delivery of a copy within this rule is complete upon:
(A) handing it to the attorney or the party,
(B) leaving it at the attorney's or party's office with a clerk or other person in charge thereof,
(C) if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein,
(D) if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person's usual place of abode with some person of his or her family above 15 years of age and informing such person of the contents, or
(E) transmitting it by facsimile to the attorney's or party's office with a cover sheet containing the sender's name, firm, address, telephone number, and facsimile number, and the number of pages transmitted. When service is made by facsimile, a copy must also be served by any other method permitted by this rule. Facsimile service occurs when transmission is complete.
(F) Service by delivery after 5:00 p.m. must be deemed to have been made by mailing on the date of delivery.

It is undisputed that appellees did not serve appellant's attorney with any paper or answer to the complaint.

Thereafter, appellant filed a motion for default and default for each appellee. These motions were served on appellees at their home address in Texas, the same home address where each appellee was served with process. Appellees never filed any response to the motions for default and default.

On May 14, 2015, the Miami-Dade Clerk of Courts issued a Notice of Default Not Entered. This notice stated that the reason the clerk was not authorized to enter the default was because the summons were served on out of state defendants. The notice instructed appellant to move for default, which the appellant did that same day. In addition, the notice does not indicate that an answer or other paper was filed by defendants/appellees.

On June 22, 2015, appellees were then served with a Notice of Hearing on appellant's motion for default judgment, which was set for July 21, 2015. At that hearing, the trial court entered an Order of Default against appellees for failing to serve or file any paper as required by law. Appellees did not attend the July 21, 2015 hearing. The Order of Default was served on appellees at their Texas home address.

On August 19, 2015, appellant filed a motion for entry of final judgment and an affidavit of proof of claim signed by appellant, stating that appellees owed appellant $ 2,200,000.00, plus interest and court costs. Appellees never filed any response to this. A copy of this motion for final judgment, along with a copy of the complaint, was served on appellees at their Texas home address. The appellees never filed a response to appellant's motion.

On April 12, 2016, the trial court entered a default final judgment. It was served on appellees at their home address in Texas.

Thereafter, on April 28, 2017, counsel for appellees filed a notice of appearance and filed an unverified motion to set aside void default and default judgment, under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). Appellees' attorney alleged in the motion that appellees served a response to the complaint on February 16, 2015, claiming that appellant had no damages. The court docket reflects that an ex-parte letter was mailed to the Miami-Dade County Court. The docket for the trial court case shows the letter docketed on February 19, 2015. The letter does not state that it was mailed or delivered to appellant's attorney and does not include a certificate of service to appellant's attorney. The date, "February 16, 2015" is typed at the top of the letter, as well as the lower court case number. The Clerk of Courts of Miami-Dade County's name is not stamped on the letter. On the right side of the paper on which the letter is printed, the letter shows an illegible stamped line that looks to be a date with a time. Each appellee also filed an affidavit as to lack of service, claiming that from February 16, 2015 to April 17, 2017, they received no filings or documents relating to appellant's lawsuit and nothing was served on them at their home in Texas. However, appellees do not dispute in their affidavits that they were personally served with the summons and complaint at their home address in Texas, that they failed to serve appellant's counsel with a response, and that the summons instructed that they had to serve appellant's counsel with their response.

Appellant then filed the Affidavit of David S. Harris, appellant's trial attorney, in response to the appellees' unverified motion to set aside void default and default judgment and appellees' affidavits, wherein appellant's trial attorney outlined the procedural history of the case, detailed how the summons and complaint was served on each appellee, and described all the motions and notices he filed. In his affidavit, appellant's trial attorney also stated that he never misrepresented to the court regarding any response filed by appellees; that he was never served with any response to the complaint; that he was never aware before final judgment of any papers filed in the court by either appellee; and that at no time within one year of the entry of the final judgment, did he receive any response, answer, defenses, objections or documents from either appellee; nor did he receive a phone call or email advising him of any response, answer, defenses, or objections to the lawsuit or motions or documents filed by the appellees. He stated that the first notice he received regarding any document filed on behalf of the appellees was after one year expired from entry of the final judgment, when he received a Notice of Appearance from appellees' counsel. Appellant also filed Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Void Default and Default Judgment in support of his position as to why appellees were not entitled to set aside the default and the default final judgment.

The hearing on the motion to set aside was held on June 12, 2017. At the hearing, appellant contended that appellees had not served appellant's attorney with a response to the complaint. Appellant further argued that appellees' motion was unverified; thus, the trial court could not consider it. The transcript of the hearing indicates that the trial court did not review the record, but reviewed the docket and granted appellees' motion to set aside default and default judgment.

On appeal, appellant contends that the default final judgment was proper because appellees were personally served with the summons and complaint, had notice of all proceedings, and failed to object. We agree with appellant and reverse the trial court's order granting appellees' motion to set aside void default and default judgment. The trial court's order on appeal was entered pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4), thus the standard of review we apply is de novo . Vercosa v. Fields, 174 So.3d 550, 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) ("Whether a judgment is void is a question of law reviewed de novo.").

First, we agree with appellant that appellees had notice of the lawsuit, thus their due process rights were not violated. Appellees moved to set aside void default and default judgment according to rule 1.540(b)(4). Rule 1.540(b)(4) provides relief from void judgments, which may be granted at any time. Viets v. Am. Recruiters Enters., Inc., 922 So.2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). A violation of due process renders a judgment void. Id. Due process requires fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id.

Here, however, appellees were properly served with the complaint at their home address in Texas. They do not dispute this. Appellees also were subsequently served with the motions for default and notice of hearing on appellant's motion for default judgment, thereby providing them with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Appellees did not attend the hearing, and they did not file objections to any of the motions. Appellees were also served with the order of default, to which they did not object. They were further served with the motion for entry of final judgment and appellant's affidavit claiming the $ 2,200,000.00 in damages, to which appellees also did not object. Therefore, appellee's due process rights were preserved, making the default judgment not void. Curbelo v. Ullman, 571 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 1990).

Moreover, pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(1), 1.540(b)(2), and 1.540(b)(3), voidable judgments must be challenged by motion no later than one year after entry of judgment. In the case before us, appellees filed a notice of appearance and an unverified motion to set aside void default and default judgment on April 28, 2017, which is in excess of one year after entry of judgment by the trial court. As a result of appellees' non-compliance with the time requirements of rule 1.540(b), their motion to set aside void default and default judgment should not have been granted, even as a voidable judgment. See Sterling Factors Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 968 So.2d 658, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (stating that a voidable judgment "cannot be challenged at any time as void under rule 1.540(b)(4)."). Therefore, because the default judgment was neither void nor voidable as a matter of law, the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion to set aside void default and default judgment.

With respect to the ex-parte letter that appears on the docket that appellees claim they mailed to the Clerk of the Court in Miami-Dade County, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b) states that if the trial court is to enter a default judgment after a paper has been filed, it must be done with notice to the party of the application for default. Rule 1.500(b) provides:

By the Court. When a party against whom affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules or any applicable statute or any order of court, the court may enter a default against such party; provided that if such party has filed or served any document in the action, that party must be served with notice of the application for default.

Thus, even if this Court considers the appellees' ex-parte letter to be a document that was filed in the action below, the Order on Default initially entered by the trial court is still not void, as the record reflects that notice of the application for default was served on appellees at their home address in Texas before the trial court entered its default. Thus, according to rule 1.500, the trial court's order on default was not void and should not have been set aside.

In sum, we find that the trial court erred in setting aside the default and default judgment because, as a matter of law, it was neither void nor voidable. We thus reverse the trial court's order granting appellees' Motion to Set Aside Void Default and Default Judgment and remand for the trial court to reinstate the Order of Default and Final Default Judgment in favor of appellant.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

      As previously discussed, the record contains a copy of the docket indicating an ex-parte letter was docketed by the Clerk of Courts of Miami-Dade County on February 19, 2015, however, the letter does not indicate that it was mailed or delivered to appellant's counsel. The Clerk of Court's name is not stamped on the letter. The letter contains one illegible stamp line on it that looks like a date. As the appellant indicates in his brief, all documents filed with the clerk, except for appellees' ex-parte letter, have a five-line stamp. The first line is boldly printed and states, "FILED FOR RECORD". The second line contains the date. The third line is stamped, "Clerk, Circuit & County Cts." The fourth line is stamped, "Miami-Dade County, Fla". The fifth line is stamped, "Civil Division" and contains the deputy clerk's name who stamped the document and filed it. If the clerk's stamp includes Harvey I. Ruvin's stamped name on the third line, then the deputy clerk's name is not stamped on the document. In that case, "Harvey I. Ruvin" is stamped after "Filed for Record", and the date, but before "Clerk, Circuit & County Cts", "Miami-Dade County, Fla", and "Civil Division".

      In addition, with regard to the appellees' contention that the damages were unliquidated, we disagree. The record reflects that the damages awarded to appellant, $ 2.2 million with interest and court costs, was exactly the amount pled in paragraph six of the appellant's complaint (the total proceeds from the sale of the Florida properties) and attested to in appellant's Affidavit in Proof of Claim. Appellees never objected to this amount, even after they received notice of the amount and were given the chance to object before the entry of the final default judgment. Consequently, even if the damages were unliquidated, appellees waived their right to object. Miami Beverly LLC v. City of Miami, 225 So.3d 989 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Yosvani TORRES, Petitioner, v. Mark INCH, etc., et al., Respondents.
    No. 3D19-0402
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019 Rehearing Denied June 03, 2019
    Yosvani Torres, in proper person.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for respondent, the State of Florida.
    Before SALTER, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.
   MILLER J.

Yosvani Torres petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We dismiss the petition as untimely pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(d)(5).

In 2009, Torres was convicted and sentenced for two counts of capital sexual battery, and was duly sentenced. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct review in Torres v. State, 54 So.3d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). On February 4, 2011, the mandate issued and Torres's judgment and sentence became final.

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(d)(5) provides:

A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review shall not be filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final on direct review unless it alleges under oath with a specific factual basis that the petitioner was affirmatively misled about the results of the appeal by counsel. In no case shall a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review be filed more than 4 years after the judgment and sentence become final on direct review.

As Torres filed the instant habeas corpus petition on February 27, 2019, more than eight years after his judgment and sentence became final, we dismiss the petition as procedurally barred under rule 9.141(d)(5). See Mendoza v. State, 224 So.3d 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) ; see also Burroughs v. State, 65 So.3d 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ; Chance v. State, 65 So.3d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Gregory MARTIN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-1848
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Natasha Baker-Bradley, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Natalia Costea, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before LOGUE, SCALES, and LINDSEY, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Gregory Martin appeals his convictions for domestic battery by strangulation and two counts of simple battery. Martin claims these convictions violate double jeopardy because he was "convicted twice-for domestic battery by strangulation and simple battery-for a single act of strangulation."

Martin's argument is without merit. The record plainly reveals that Martin committed two separate, distinct acts of strangulation at two different times and in two different locations. No double jeopardy violation occurred. See Graham v. State, 207 So.3d 135, 137-39 (Fla. 2016) (citation omitted) (quoting Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 302, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) ("If successive impulses are separately given, even though all unite in swelling a common stream of action, separate indictments lie' ... 'The test is whether the individual acts are prohibited, or the course of action which they constitute. If the former, then each act is punishable separately."); see also Schwartzberg v. State, 215 So.3d 611, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (concluding double jeopardy was not violated because "even though both of appellant's battery convictions occurred within the same criminal episode and were part of a 'common stream of action,' ... 'each act is punishable separately' because the 'individual acts' of battery are distinct and prohibited.").

Affirmed.


text:
    CEC ENTERTAINMENT, INC., etc., Appellant, v. Aurora ZALDIVAR, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-474
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019 Rehearing Denied May 24, 2019
    Vernis & Bowling of Miami, P.A., Eric J. Knuth and Christopher C. Horne, Miami, for appellant.
    Lopez & Best and Virginia M. Best and Johanna M. Menendez, for appellee.
    Before EMAS, C.J., and SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

      Did not participate in oral argument.

   FERNANDEZ, J.

CEC Entertainment, Inc., d/b/a Chuck E. Cheese's, Inc., appeals the trial court's order granting Aurora Zaldivar's motion for new trial. Following a review of the record, we reverse the order and remand to the trial court to reinstate the jury verdict.

This case involves the alleged injury of Zaldivar and her minor child at a Chuck E. Cheese's located in Kendall, Florida. Zaldivar filed a complaint on behalf of her son, Christopher Castellanos, a minor, and herself against CEC. Zaldivar alleged that she and Castellanos were injured at CEC's restaurant when a freestanding, unsecured booth, tipped over backward while they were attempting to exit the booth where they had been sitting. Zaldivar alleged that the injuries suffered by her and Castellanos were the result of CEC's negligence. CEC answered that the booth tipped over as a result of the minor son pushing back on the booth, lifting it off the floor.

On September 6, 2016, Zaldivar filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude evidence or mention of her employment as the legal secretary of her attorney, Gabriel Sanchez, and the Sanchez Law Group, who is representing her in this case. CEC responded that Zaldivar failed to demonstrate that the evidence was not admissible under section 90.103, Florida Statutes (2016), and asserted that the evidence was relevant in assessing Zaldivar's credibility, given that she was working for Sanchez and had been a legal assistant for a personal injury firm for nearly a decade. On September 22, 2016, the trial court granted, in part, and denied, in part, Zaldivar's motion in limine stating:

Granted, that the Defendant shall make no mention, suggestion or assertion of any collusion or fraud, between Plaintiff and her attorneys, Gabriel M. Sanchez and The Sanchez Law Group. Denied in part. Defendant can mention where she works and how long she worked for counsel for the Plaintiff. Defendant is limited to only that.

On October 17, 2016, the jury trial concluded. On the question of whether CEC's negligence was a legal cause of Zaldivar and her son's injuries, the jury rendered a verdict of no cause of action and found in favor of CEC. Zaldivar filed a motion for a new trial alleging: 1) the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding Zaldivar's place of employment and that her employer represented her in the claim; 2) the trial court erred by allowing evidence of no other previous incidents at Chuck E. Cheese with respect to a booth tipping over; 3) CEC attacked Zaldivar and Zaldivar's attorney in its closing argument, alleging that Zaldivar participated in fraud and collusion evidenced by her employment with the firm; and 4) Zaldivar's son should not have been on the verdict form as a Fabre defendant, as there was no evidence to support an argument that Zaldivar was comparatively negligent. The only allegation relevant to this appeal concerns the statements made by CEC's attorney during closing arguments, where the attorney called Zaldivar a "magician" and a "manipulator," and violated the Golden Rule by placing the jury in the defendant's position. However, Zaldivar failed to voice a contemporaneous objection at trial.

Zaldivar's motion for new trial was heard on January 4, 2016. The hearing focused on the comments CEC's attorney made during closing. In its defense, CEC relied on the Florida Supreme Court's four-part test in Murphy v. International Robotic Systems, 766 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2000), to determine fundamental error, stating:

[T]urning back to Murphy and the arguments that were raised on the issue of fundamental error. It sets forth the four part tests. I want to bring up this language because it's very important. Harmfulness in this context carries a requirement that the comments be so highly prejudicial as to gravely impair a fair consideration and determination of the case by the jury. Passing remarks of little consequence in the scope of a lengthy trial should find no sympathy -- or find little sympathy if no contemporaneous objection is voiced.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that it had properly allowed evidence regarding Zaldivar's employment but granted a new trial based on the comments CEC's attorney made at closing:

I am finding that you committed error by personally attacking this plaintiff by calling her a magician, a manipulator, as well as the opinion you elicited or presented that is not supported by the evidence. And for that reason I grant a new trial. That's my ruling.... Submit an order, please, that just indicates the motion is granted. You've got a transcript. And if it goes up to the Third, the Third will review the transcript of this hearing as well as the closing argument.

The trial judge did not address the Murphy test nor Zaldivar's failure to voice a contemporaneous objection. No findings were made as to the issues of comparative negligence, Fabre defendants, or fraud and collusion. The trial court entered an order simply granting the motion for new trial. This appeal followed.

The standard of review of an order granting a new trial is abuse of discretion. Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So.2d 490, 497-98 (Fla. 1999). We agree with CEC that the trial court erred in ordering a new trial without considering the full four-part test set forth in Murphy. Yet, even if the trial court properly applied Murphy, the record reflects that the comments made during closing did not rise to the level of fundamental error that would require a new trial. Had Zaldivar voiced a timely objection during CEC's closing argument, the errors could have been cured.

In Murphy, the Florida Supreme Court implemented the four-part test in order to curtail the number of new trials based on "unobjected-to closing arguments." The Supreme Court emphasized this point and summarized the test as follows:

[B]efore a complaining party may receive a new trial based on unobjected-to closing argument, the party must establish that the argument being challenged was improper, harmful, incurable, and so damaged the fairness of the trial that the public's interest in our system of justice requires a new trial.... Although we have not absolutely "closed the door" on appellate review of unpreserved challenges to closing argument, we have come as close to doing so as we believe consistent with notions of due process which deserve public trust in the judicial system.

Murphy, 766 So.2d at 1031 (emphasis added).

The first step, of the four-part analysis, is to determine if the argument is improper. To aid the trial courts in this determination, the Supreme Court provided a number of principles for the courts to consider. One such principle, taken from Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985), provides, "[C]losing argument must not be used to 'inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response ... rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.' " Murphy, 766 So.2d at 1028. In Murphy, during closing argument, defense counsel accused plaintiff of using the lawsuit to cash in on a "lottery ticket" and also repeatedly used the term "B.S. detector." The plaintiff failed to object and later moved for a new trial based on these comments. The Supreme Court held that counsel's comments were improper but did not rise to the level of fundamental error based on the full Murphy analysis. Id. at 1032. In like manner, we find that the trial court correctly determined that CEC's counsel's use of the terms "magician" and "manipulator" to describe Zaldivar, along with the Golden Rule violation, constituted improper argument. However, the trial court failed to apply the remaining three parts of the Murphy test, that being, whether the argument was also harmful, incurable, and of a nature that the public's interest in justice requires a new trial. The Supreme Court cautioned the courts that granting a new trial was not to be used as a vehicle to punish or regulate the misconduct of attorneys. Id. at 1029.

After determining that the argument is improper, the next step is to consider whether the argument is harmful. Id. The Supreme Court defined "harmfulness" as comments that are "so highly prejudicial and of such collective impact as to gravely impair a fair consideration and determination of the case by the jury." Id. And, "[p]assing remarks of little consequence in the scope of a lengthy trial should find little sympathy if no contemporaneous objection is voiced. " Id. at 1029-1030 (emphasis added). Courts are to consider if the verdict could not have been reached but for such comments. Id. at 1030.

Yet, even if an argument is found to be both improper and harmful, the complaining party must also prove that it was incurable. "[A] timely objection to improper closing argument is required before a new trial may be granted based on such argument unless 'the improper remarks are of such character that neither rebuke nor retraction may entirely destroy their sinister influence.' " Id. (citing to Baggett v. Davis, 124 Fla. 701, 169 So. 372, 379 (1936) ). The Supreme Court stated that "it will be extremely difficult for a complaining party to establish that the unobjected-to argument is incurable." Id. at 1030.

Lastly, "the party finally must also establish that the argument so damaged the fairness of the trial that the public's interest in our system of justice requires a new trial." Id. (citing Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, N.A., 666 So.2d 580, 585 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ). The extremely limited types of arguments that would fall under this description would be a closing argument that would appeal to "racial, ethnic, or religious prejudices." Id. at 1030.

In light of our review of the four-part test in Murphy, we cannot find that CEC's comments, though improper, rise to the level of fundamental error requiring a new trial in this case. As defined in Murphy, the level of harmfulness required is not present in this case, and the alleged errors could have been cured had a proper objection been voiced. See also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Ledoux, 230 So.3d 530, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (finding that though plaintiff's argument at closing violated the Golden Rule, defendants failure to make a contemporaneous objection waived the claim from appellant review without a showing of fundamental error); City of Miami v. Kinser, 187 So.3d 921, 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) ("While it is clearly improper for an attorney to bolster the credibility of a witness, attack a party for putting on a valid defense, or appeal to the conscience of the community, most of the improper arguments were timely objected to; curative instructions were given by the trial court; and the prejudice to the City caused by these improper arguments was mitigated by the curative instructions."). As to the public interest portion of the analysis, CEC's comments plainly do not fall within the traditional categories of prejudice.

Upon review of the record, we find that the trial court erred in ordering a new trial without considering the full four-part test set forth in Murphy. Yet, even if the trial court properly applied the Murphy analysis, the record reflects that the comments made during closing did not rise to the level of fundamental error that would require a new trial. Therefore, the trial court's order granting a new trial is reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict.

Reversed and remanded.

      Fabre v. Marin, 623 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).


author: LINDSEY, J.

text:
    ALL SEASONS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Pedro Dedesma a/k/a Peter Dedesma, Manuel De La Morena, Emilio Gomez, and John Sanchez, et al., Appellants, v. PATRICIAN HOTEL, LLC, and All Seasons Suites, LLC, Appellees.
    Nos. 3D17-132 & 3D17-130
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 24, 2019. Rehearing Denied June 06, 2019
    Fowler White Burnett, P.A., and Alice K. Sum, Miami; Dorta & Ortega, P.A., and Omar Ortega and Rosdaisy Rodriguez, Coral Gables, for appellants.
    Smoler & Associates, P.A., and Bruce J. Smoler (Hollywood); Phillips, Cantor & Shalek, P.A., and Jeffrey B. Shalek, and Gary S. Phillips (Hollywood), for appellees.
    Before LOGUE, LINDSEY and HENDON, JJ.

      Judge Hendon did not participate in oral argument.

   LINDSEY, J.

In these consolidated cases, All Seasons Condominium Association, Inc. (the "Association"), Pedro Dedesma a/k/a Peter Dedesma, Manuel De La Morena, Emilio Gomez, John Sanchez, and Vero Financial Services, et al. (the "Unit Owners") appeal the trial court's final judgment as to liability in favor of plaintiff, Patrician Hotel, LLC and intervening plaintiff, All Seasons Suites, LLC (the "Final Judgment") rendered on December 15, 2016. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 15, 2010, the Association, acting through its Board of Directors (the "BOD"), unanimously voted to sell the All Seasons Condominium (the "Condominium")-located at 3621 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach and consisting of 106 separate condominium units-to Simon Nemni ("Nemni") for approximately $7.3 million. The BOD and Nemni entered into a Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (the "Master Purchase Agreement") with an effective date of October 19, 2010 (the "Effective Date").

The Master Purchase Agreement required the Association, within 120 days of the Effective Date, to use its best efforts to obtain consent from 100 percent of the Unit Owners to sell their respective units (the "Sale Approval"). Specifically, Paragraph 6 of the Master Purchase Agreement provides:

Seller shall use its best efforts to obtain written acceptance by each unit owner to the sale of the units in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. If Seller obtains fewer than 100 percent of acceptance of the unit owners, but approval by a sufficient number of unit owners to satisfy the requirements of § 718.117, Florida Statutes, then Seller, at its sole and absolute election, may seek approval by a court of competent jurisdiction of a plan of termination that incorporates the terms of this Agreement. Seller shall have one hundred twenty (120) days from the Effective Date of this Agreement to either obtain the consent of all unit owners to a closing under this Agreement, or a court order approval (collectively, "Sale Approval"). In the event Seller is unable to obtain 100% approval of the unit owners and elects not to seek court approval of a plan of termination, or seeks but is unable to obtain a court order approving the plan of termination within the applicable time period, then Buyer shall be entitled to the immediate return of its deposit and this Agreement shall be deemed terminated and Seller shall have no liability whatsoever to Buyer.

(Emphasis added). Under Paragraph 6, therefore, the 120-day deadline for Sale Approval was February 16, 2011. Moreover, the Master Purchase Agreement tethers the transaction's "closing date" to the Sale Approval deadline, stating that the sale closing shall be within sixty days of the Sale Approval.

To consummate the sale, the Association was required to obtain written acceptance of every Unit Owner before February 16, 2011, which was to be accomplished through the execution of a Supplemental Contract for Purchase and Sale of All Seasons Condominium Unit (the "Supplemental Contract") by each individual Unit Owner and the Association. Each Supplemental Contract incorporated the Master Purchase Agreement by reference, therefore, every Unit Owner who executed a Supplemental Contract joined the Master Purchase Agreement and agreed to sell their respective unit to Patrician. In other words, the Association was obligated to obtain a Supplemental Contract from every Unit Owner before February 16, 2011, in order for the Condominium sale to move forward. Each Supplemental Contract purportedly gave the BOD authority to take certain actions reasonably necessary to complete the transaction. For example, Paragraph 9(f) of the Supplemental Contract provides:

Seller proxies his vote, and this document shall serve as such proxy, to the Board to vote in favor of any and all resolutions deemed necessary by the Board under the existing Declaration or By-Laws of the Association to consummate the Master Purchase Agreement, the sale of the Real Property, the plan of termination, or to commence and prosecute any legal action necessary to accomplish these matters.

The Master Purchase Agreement and Supplemental Contracts both contain explicit "time is of the essence" provisions. Similarly, the Master Purchase Agreement and Supplemental Contracts both include identical provisions requiring any modification or amendment, to either agreement, be in writing and signed by all respective parties thereto. Paragraph 12 of the Supplemental Contract-which is identical to Paragraph 20 of the Master Purchase Agreement-provides:

No amendment, change or modification of this Agreement shall be valid, unless in writing and signed by all of the parties hereto. Each Party has participated fully in the negotiation and preparation of this Agreement with full benefit of counsel. Accordingly, this Agreement shall not be more strictly construed against any Party.

On December 19, 2010, counsel for Nemni sent an email to the Association's attorney, requesting a sixty-day extension of the inspection period and a modification to Paragraph 6 of the Master Purchase Agreement regarding the defined closing date. The email states in relevant part:

My client is spending significant time and money on this project. He remains motivated and desires to undertake all activities necessary to close this transaction successfully. However, he will need a sixty (60) day extension to the Inspection Period in order to position this transaction for closing. In addition, since the closing date is currently linked to the date on which your client obtains Sale Approval, I would suggest modifying Paragraph six (6) of the contract to state that the closing date will be sixty (60) days following the conclusion of the Inspection Period or sixty (60) days following the date on which the Seller obtains Sale Approval, whichever is later. Please submit this request to your clients and advise me of their response as soon as possible, as my client's work is very much in process and advancing. In the interim, this email is intended to protect my client's deposit from becoming non-refundable and shall function as a termination of the contract in the (hopefully unlikely) event that your clients do not agree to the extension of the Inspection Period requested herein.

Peter Dedesma, who was President of the BOD and a Unit Owner, emailed the Association's attorney on December 28, 2010, stating, "I indicated to Mr. Nemni that the Board after informal discussion decided [to] grant the 60 [day] extension and accept the amendment to closing date but we need to wait until next week to hold a board meeting to make it official." Dedesma, Nemni, and the BOD ostensibly treated these emails as an amendment to the Master Purchase Agreement and Supplemental Contracts that extended the Sale Approval deadline by sixty days, from February 16, 2011, to April 16, 2011. Dedesma testified at trial that only 67 of the 106 Unit Owners had signed Supplemental Contracts as of February 16, 2011.

On April 13, 2011, approximately fifty-six days after the original Sale Approval deadline of February 16, 2011, had expired, the BOD held a meeting and voted unanimously to approve the First Addendum to the Master Purchase Agreement (the "First Addendum"). The First Addendum extended the Sale Approval deadline for five periods of sixty days each (the "Extension Periods"), for a total possible extension of 300 days. Additionally, although the First Addendum permitted Nemni, as the Buyer, to terminate the agreement at the end of each Extension Period, it is silent as to the Seller's ability to terminate.

On November 22, 2011, All Seasons Suites, LLC ("Suites") entered into an agreement to acquire all of the membership interest in Patrician after Patrician closed under the Master Purchase Agreement, which would make Suites the owner of the Condominium upon completion of the Condominium sale. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement with Suites, Nemni was to realize a profit of over $3 million. On December 11, 2011, the BOD, through its counsel, sent a letter to Nemni's attorney (the "Termination Letter"), advising that the Association would not exercise the final Extension Period under the First Addendum and that it was terminating the Master Purchase Agreement because "the Association is unable to obtain 100% acceptance by the unit owners to the sale." The Termination Letter further provided that the Association would authorize the immediate release of Nemni's deposit being held in escrow.

Patrician filed an action for specific performance on January 9, 2012. A notice of lis pendens was recorded on January 25, 2012, and a non-jury trial was ultimately held on April 12-14 and 19-21, 2016. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on July 25, 2016, concluding that Paragraph 9(a), 9(b), 9(e), and 9(f) of the Supplemental Contracts demonstrate that the Unit Owners gave explicit authority to the BOD to act on their behalf. More specifically, although the trial court found that the proxy language in Paragraph 9(f) was not a statutory proxy governed by section 718.112, Florida Statutes (2010), or a General Real Estate Power of Attorney, the trial court did conclude that Paragraph 9(f) was a general proxy by which the Unit Owners gave the BOD authority to take all action reasonably necessary to effectuate a closing under the Master Purchase Agreement.

On December 15, 2016, the trial court entered final judgment for specific performance and damages in favor of Patrician and against the Association as well as certain Unit Owners. Final judgment was also entered for specific performance in favor of Suites and against Presidential Management Group, Inc. Defined Benefit Plan ("Presidential Management"). Additionally, final judgment was entered as to liability only for tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship in favor of Suites and against Dedesma and the Association. However, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to: (i) enter subsequent order(s) in favor of Patrician and against applicable defendants to determine the amount of damages to be awarded to Patrician, and (ii) conduct a trial on the issue of damages regarding the finding of liability in favor of Suites and against Dedesma and the Association. This timely appeal followed.

II. JURISDICTION

The trial court's Final Judgment is a non-final order because it reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of damages to be awarded to Patrician and to also conduct a trial on the issue of damages regarding the finding of liability in favor of Suites. See 1st Priority Restoration, Inc. v. Salame, 129 So.3d 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (holding that a portion of the trial court's order was not final or appealable because the underlying net damages amount had not yet been adjudicated and reduced to a final judgment). However, orders that determine "the right to immediate possession of property" are non-final orders appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii). Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii). We therefore treat the appeal in this case as one taken from a non-final order that determines the right to immediate possession of property because the trial court's grant of specific performance concerned the immediate right to real property under the Master Purchase Agreement and Supplemental Contracts. See Malek v. Bright, 7 So.3d 598, 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) ("Upon further review of the jurisdictional questions promulgated by this Court to the parties sua sponte in this case, we treat the appeal in this case as one taken from nonfinal orders which determine the right to immediate possession of property under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii).").

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's decision to grant specific performance is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Muniz v. Crystal Lake Project, LLC, 947 So.2d 464, 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ("The decision whether to grant or withhold a judgment for specific performance is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court which will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous."). However, the interpretation of a contract involves a pure question of law that is subject to a de novo standard of review. Hammond v. DSY Developers, LLC, 951 So.2d 985, 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Florida Power Corp. v. City of Casselberry, 793 So.2d 1174, 1178 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ).

IV. ANALYSIS

Specific performance is an equitable remedy that can "only be granted when 1) the plaintiff is clearly entitled to it, 2) there is no adequate remedy at law, and 3) the judge believes that justice requires it." Castigliano v. O'Connor, 911 So.2d 145, 148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (citing Mrahunec v. Fausti, 385 Pa. 64, 68, 121 A.2d 878, 880 (1956) ). "In order for a contract to be subject to specific performance, it must appear from the writing constituting the contract that the obligations of the parties with respect to [the] conditions of the contract and actions to be taken by the parties are clear, definite and certain." de Vaux v. Westwood Baptist Church, 953 So.2d 677, 682 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (quoting Brown v. Dobry, 311 So.2d 159, 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) ); see also 330 Michigan Ave., Inc. v. Cambridge Hotel, Inc., 183 So.2d 725, 726-27 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) ("Specific performance will not be enforced where the contract is not definite and certain as to essential terms and provisions and is incapable of being made so by the aid of legal presumption or evidence of established customs.").

Therefore, in order to obtain specific performance of an enforceable contract for the purchase and sale of real property, the statute of frauds requires the contract be in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. See India Am. Trading Co., Inc. v. White, 896 So.2d 859, 860 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) ("Pursuant to the statute [of frauds], no action can be brought to enforce a contract for the sale of land unless the contract is in writing and signed by the party to be charged." (quoting Cavallaro v. Stratford Homes, Inc., 784 So.2d 619, 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Thus, this Court has held that the statute of frauds requires satisfaction of the following two conditions in order to obtain specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property: (i) "the contract must be a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought," and (ii) "the writing must contain all of the essential terms of the sale and these terms may not be explained by resort to parol evidence." Fox v. Sails at Laguna Club Dev. Corp., 403 So.2d 456, 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (citing Rundel v. Gordon, 92 Fla. 1110, 111 So. 386 (1927) ). As a general rule, "[t]here is no definitive list of essential terms that must be present and certain to satisfy the statute of frauds. Rather, the essential terms will vary widely according to the nature and complexity of each transaction and will be evaluated on a case by case basis ...." Socarras v. Claughton Hotels, Inc., 374 So.2d 1057, 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

In the instant case, the dispositive question before us is whether the Unit Owners gave authority to the BOD and Dedesma, through the Supplemental Contracts, to take all action reasonably necessary to effectuate a closing under the Master Purchase Agreement, including the extension of the Sale Approval deadline and execution of the First Addendum. Absent such grant of authority by the Unit Owners, the Master Purchase Agreement and Supplemental Contracts automatically terminated on February 16, 2011, when the Sale Approval prerequisite of 100 percent Unit Owner consent was not satisfied.

A. The Proxy Provision

Patrician and Suites contend that the proxy language under Paragraph 9(f), whether read in isolation or together with other provisions in the Supplemental Contracts, operates as a general proxy that provided the BOD with actual authority to bind the Unit Owners to the Master Purchase Agreement and First Addendum. However, pursuant to section 718.112, Florida Statutes (2010), "unit owners in a residential condominium may not vote by general proxy, but may vote by limited proxies substantially conforming to a limited proxy form adopted by the [Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes]." § 718.112(2)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (2010).

Accordingly, the Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes (the "Division") promulgated Florida Administrative Code Rule 61B-23.002(5), which states that unit owners, while not permitted to vote by general proxy, "may vote by limited proxy substantially similar to the SAMPLE LIMITED PROXY FORM adopted by the division as DBPR Form CO 6000-7." Fla. Admin. Code R. 61B-23.002(5) (2010). In no way does the one-sentence proxy language of Paragraph 9(f), nor any other provision of the Supplemental Contract or Master Purchase Agreement, bear any resemblance or similarity to the sample proxy form adopted by the Division as DBPR Form CO 6000-7. Moreover, to the extent Patrician and Suites contend that Paragraph 9(f) should be treated as a general proxy not governed by chapter 718 of the Florida Statutes, we disagree because such a position overlooks the simple fact that this entire dispute concerns the failed purchase and sale of a condominium building. Furthermore, both the Supplemental Contracts and Master Purchase Agreement state that certain obligations contained therein must comply with the statutory requirements or procedures under chapter 718. As such, the proxy provision of the Supplemental Contracts is not a valid proxy, general or limited, under Florida condominium law.

B. Actual Authority

Patrician and Suites also assert that, pursuant to the Supplemental Contracts, the Unit Owners provided actual and apparent authority to Dedesma and the BOD to act on their behalf for all purposes related to closing under the Master Purchase Agreement. To establish the existence of an actual agency relationship, the following essential elements must be established: "(1) acknowledgment by the principal that the agent will act for him, (2) the agent's acceptance of the undertaking, and (3) control by the principal over the actions of the agent." Fernandez v. Florida Nat'l Coll., Inc., 925 So.2d 1096, 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting Goldschmidt v. Holman, 571 So.2d 422, 424 n.5 (Fla. 1990) ).

In the instant case, there can be no doubt that a Unit Owner who properly executed a Supplemental Contract before February 16, 2011, gave certain limited authority to the BOD to vote on their behalf for resolutions, under the Declaration or By-Laws, which the BOD deemed necessary to consummate the transaction. Paragraph 9(f), however, does not evince an actual agency relationship whereby a Unit Owner, in signing a Supplemental Contract, manifested their intent to grant the BOD and Dedesma actual authority to take any action on their behalf in order to effectuate a closing. For example, Patrician and Suites contend that the December 2010 email exchange between Nemni's counsel, the Association's counsel, and Dedesma extended the Supplemental Contract deadlines because Dedesma had the actual authority to take any action, on behalf of the Unit Owners, to accomplish the Condominium's sale. However, the express language of Paragraph 9(f) makes no reference to Dedesma or the Supplemental Contracts, while the record is silent as to any acknowledgment by the Unit Owners that Dedesma or the BOD were granted such broad authority over their individual property rights.

"It is axiomatic that the clear and unambiguous words of a contract are the best evidence of the intent of the parties." Murry v. Zynyx Mktg. Commc'ns, Inc., 774 So.2d 714, 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (citing Turk v. Hysan Prods. Co., 149 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963) ). Clear and unambiguous contracts, therefore, "should be construed as written, and the court can give them no other meaning." Gulliver Schs., Inc. v. Snay, 137 So.3d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (quoting Khosrow Maleki, P.A. v. M.A. Hajianpour, M.D., P.A., 771 So.2d 628, 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ). In construing a contract, the legal effect of its provisions "must be determined from the words of the entire contract and a court may not violate clear meaning to create ambiguity." AAA Life Ins. Co. v. Nicolas, 603 So.2d 622, 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (citing Hoffman v. Robinson, 213 So.2d 267, 268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) ). "Stated another way, an isolated sentence of [a contract] should not be construed alone, but it should be construed in connection with other provisions ... to arrive at a reasonable construction to accomplish the intent and purpose of the parties." Hand v. Grow Constr., Inc., 983 So.2d 684, 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, Paragraph 12 of the Supplemental Contracts and Paragraph 20 of the Master Purchase Agreement both state in unambiguous and identical language that "[n]o amendment, change or modification ... shall be valid, unless in writing and signed by all of the parties hereto." Accordingly, if Paragraph 9(f) gave the BOD and Dedesma actual authority to modify the Sale Approval deadline and other essential terms of the executed Supplemental Contracts, as Patrician and Suites argue properly occurred through the December 2010 email exchange and First Addendum, Paragraph 12 of the Supplemental Contracts and Paragraph 20 of the Master Purchase Agreement would be rendered useless and inexplicable. Perez-Gurri Corp. v. McLeod, 238 So.3d 347, 350 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) ("[W]e are constrained by law to construe a contract as a whole so as to give effect, as here, to all provisions of the agreement if it can be reasonably done." (quoting McArthur v. A.A. Green & Co. of Fla., 637 So.2d 311, 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) ) ); see also Silver Shells Corp. v. St. Maarten at Silver Shells Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 169 So.3d 197, 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ("[A] cardinal principle of contract interpretation is that the contract must be interpreted in a manner that does not render any provision of the contract meaningless."). Thus, reading the Supplemental Contract "as a whole," Paragraph 9(f) does not confer actual authority upon the BOD or Dedesma to act on behalf of the Unit Owners and modify the essential terms of their distinct Supplemental Contracts.

Similarly, the proxy language of Paragraph 9(f) does not qualify as a general power of attorney under Florida law. The trial court found that the December 2010 emails between Nemni's counsel, the Association's attorney, and Dedesma operated as an extension of the Sale Approval deadline from February 16, 2011, to April 16, 2011, because Dedesma had the authority to extend the Supplemental Contracts for all Unit Owners who signed one. However, even under the most generous reading of Paragraph 9(f), the purported proxy language does not confer the authority upon the BOD, much less Dedesma, to unilaterally extend the Sale Approval deadline and the defined closing date outlined in the Supplemental Contracts. "The established rule is that a power of attorney must be strictly construed and the instrument will be held to grant only those powers which are specified." Bloom v. Weiser, 348 So.2d 651, 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) ; see also Dingle v. Prikhdina, 59 So.3d 326, 328 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) ("Generally, the rule is that a power of attorney must be strictly construed and the instrument will be held to grant only those powers which are specified." (citing Bloom, 348 So.2d at 653 ) ).

Paragraph 9(f) of the Supplemental Contract states that the Unit Owner "proxies his vote ... to the Board to vote in favor of any and all resolutions deemed necessary by the Board under the existing Declaration or By-Laws of the Association to consummate the Master Purchase Agreement, the sale of the Real Property, the plan of termination," or to take legal action necessary to accomplish such matters. Because neither Paragraph 9(f), nor any other provision of the Supplemental Contracts, contain a specific grant of power authorizing the BOD or Dedesma to modify essential terms of the Supplemental Contracts, no general power of attorney existed to permit the extension of the Sale Approval deadline or subsequent execution of the First Addendum on behalf of the Unit Owners.

C. Apparent Authority

Next, we address the issue of an agency relationship based on apparent authority. "An agent's authority need not be conferred in express terms, but may be implied or apparent under justifying circumstances." Am. Ladder & Scaffold Co. v. Miami Ventilated Awning Mfg. Co., 161 So.2d 699, 700 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (citing Thomkin Corp. v. Miller, 156 Fla. 388, 24 So.2d 48, 49 (Fla. 1945) ). An agency relationship based on apparent authority only exists if the following three elements are present: "1) a representation by the purported principal; 2) reliance on that representation by a third party; and 3) a change in position by the third party in reliance on the representation." Ocana v. Ford Motor Co., 992 So.2d 319, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So.2d 119, 121 (Fla. 1995) ). "Apparent authority does not arise from the subjective understanding of the person dealing with the purported agent, nor from appearances created by the purported agent himself." Izquierdo v. Hialeah Hosp., Inc., 709 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (quoting Spence, Payne, Masington & Grossman, P.A. v. Philip M. Gerson, P.A., 483 So.2d 775, 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) ). Instead, the words and actions of the principal must be the focus because apparent authority exists only where the principal creates the appearance of an agency relationship. See Guadagno v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., Inc., 972 So.2d 214, 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ; see also Jackson Hewitt, Inc. v. Kaman, 100 So.3d 19, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ("In considering a claim based on apparent authority, the inquiry properly focuses on the actions of or appearances created by the principal, not by the agent."). However, any reliance by a third party on a purported agent's apparent authority must be reasonable. Regions Bank v. Maroone Chevrolet, L.L.C., 118 So.3d 251, 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (citing Izquierdo, 709 So.2d at 188 ); see also Sterling Crest, Ltd. v. Blue Rock Partners Realty Group, LLC, 164 So.3d 1273, 1279 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) ("Reliance of a third party on the apparent authority of a principal's agent must be reasonable and rest in the actions of or appearances created by the principal, and not by agents who often ingeniously create an appearance of authority by their own acts." (internal quotations and citations omitted) ).

Here, there was no reasonable basis to believe that the BOD and Dedesma had the apparent authority to modify essential terms within a Unit Owner's individually executed Supplemental Contract. Such a position is untenable and would lead to illogical results. See King v. Bray, 867 So.2d 1224, 1227 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) ("The courts generally agree that where one interpretation of a contract would be absurd and another would be consistent with reason and probability, the contract should be interpreted in the rational manner."). For example, to accept the apparent authority argument proffered by Patrician and Suites would mean the BOD and Dedesma also possessed the authority to reduce the overall Condominium sale price, so long as such action was deemed necessary to consummate the transaction. This, in turn, would reduce the amount each Unit Owner could ultimately receive for selling their individual property, which would be an unreasonable outcome.

Accordingly, any reliance by a third party on such a tenuous appearance of apparent authority is unreasonable. Indeed, Dedesma himself did not believe he possessed the apparent authority to bind the Unit Owners, writing in response to Nemni's December 2010 deadline extension request that, "the Board after informal discussion decided [to] grant the 60 [day] extension and accept the amendment to closing date but we need to wait until next week to hold a board meeting to make it official." The record is silent as to any express or implied representation of authority by the Unit Owners to Nemni or Suites that created the reasonable appearance of an agency relationship with Dedesma or the BOD. See Roessler v. Novak, 858 So.2d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ("[A]pparent authority exists only where the principal creates the appearance of an agency relationship."). Moreover, Patrician and Suites mistakenly rely on the conduct of Dedesma and the BOD as manifestations of apparent authority. See Sterling Crest, Ltd., 164 So.3d at 1279 ("[M]anifestations of authority by a purported agent do not establish apparent authority to act. Where there are no manifestations of authority by the principal to a third party, apparent authority is not in issue.").

Furthermore, the plain language of the Supplemental Contracts and the Master Purchase Agreement establish that the parties agreed not to allow a waiver or modification of any contractual term without first reducing it to writing. See Bradley v. Sanchez, 943 So.2d 218, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (finding a contract provision that provided "[m]odifications of this Contract will not be binding unless in writing, signed and delivered by the party to be bound" was language that prevented an oral waiver or modification to the written contract). Similarly, Paragraph 12 of the Supplemental Contracts and Paragraph 20 of the Master Purchase Agreement clearly state that "[n]o amendment, change or modification of this Agreement shall be valid, unless in writing and signed by all of the parties hereto." This language prevents an oral modification or waiver of the closing date and Sale Approval deadline. See Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So.2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (concluding that the language of a similar provision precluded an oral waiver or modification of the closing date). Accordingly, the time of the essence provisions found in Paragraph 16 and Paragraph 25 of the Supplemental Contract and Master Purchase Agreement, respectively, could not have been waived by Dedesma or the BOD unless in writing and signed by all parties against whom the waiver was asserted. See Rybovich Boat Works, Inc. v. Atkins, 587 So.2d 519, 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) ("Thus under the anti-waiver provision of this agreement the time of the essence provision could not have been waived unless there was a writing signed by the party against whom the waiver was asserted."). Because the purported extension of the Supplemental Contracts and Master Purchase Agreement was not in writing, nor signed by the Unit Owners, there was no waiver of any deadline and both agreements automatically terminated on February 16, 2011. Thus, the BOD and Dedesma lacked the apparent authority to modify essential terms of executed Supplemental Contracts.

D. Statute of Frauds

Lastly, the statute of frauds requires a written contract for the sale of real estate and further "prohibits the oral modification of a contract for the sale of land under the doctrine of promissory estoppel." Bradley, 943 So.2d at 222 (citing Shore Holdings, Inc. v. Seagate Beach Quarters, Inc., 842 So.2d 1010, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ). The Florida Supreme Court has explained that "the Statute of Frauds is a legislative prerogative, grounded in a policy judgment that certain contracts should not be enforced unless supported by written evidence." DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC, 112 So.3d 85, 93 (Fla. 2013) (citing Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 So.2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1966) ). Accordingly, "[t]he statute should be strictly construed to prevent the fraud it was designed to correct, and so long as it can be made to effectuate this purpose, courts should be reluctant to take cases from its protection." LaRue v. Kalex Constr. & Dev., Inc., 97 So.3d 251, 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (quoting Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132, 181 So. 341, 344 (1937) ).

Here, no Unit Owner signed or was made a party to the December 2010 email chain that allegedly extended the Supplemental Contract and Master Purchase Agreement deadlines. No Unit Owner who executed a Supplemental Contract prior to the February 16, 2011 date was asked to re-execute their Supplemental Contract, and Dedesma clearly stated that the requested extension would not be "official" until the BOD met and voted on a resolution, which did not occur until April 13, 2011. Accordingly, the statute of frauds was not satisfied and no enforceable contract was in existence for the First Addendum to modify when approved by the BOD on April 13, 2011, approximately fifty-six days after the original Sale Approval deadline expired.

Additionally, any suggestion that partial performance by the parties was sufficient to remove the December 2010 email extensions and First Addendum from the purview of the statute of frauds is misplaced. "[B]efore it becomes proper or necessary to determine whether the facts permit the enforcement of such a contract, as an exception under the Statute of Frauds, it must first be determined that" an oral contract exists. Gable v. Miller, 104 So.2d 358, 360 (Fla. 1958). Because the BOD and Dedesma lacked the authority to unilaterally modify essential terms of a Unit Owner's executed Supplemental Contract, there was no contract in existence on April 13, 2011, for the BOD and Nemni to modify. Moreover, the trial court relied primarily on conduct by the BOD, purportedly on behalf of Unit Owners, to conclude that the Unit Owners partially performed and therefore the statute of frauds did not apply. However, such conduct by the BOD is immaterial and does not illustrate partial performance by Unit Owners because neither the BOD nor Dedesma was acting as an agent authorized to unilaterally extend the Supplemental Contracts or Master Purchase Agreement.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Unit Owners did not give authority to the BOD and Dedesma, through the Supplemental Contracts, to take all action reasonably necessary to effectuate a closing under the Master Purchase Agreement, including the extension of the Sale Approval deadline and execution of the First Addendum. Accordingly, the Master Purchase Agreement and executed Supplemental Contracts automatically terminated on February 16, 2011, when the Sale Approval condition of 100 percent Unit Owner consent was not satisfied.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

      While this action was pending, appellants, Eugenio Carrasco and Irma Carrasco, owners of Unit 305, voluntarily dismissed their appeal.

      On August 5, 2011, Nemni assigned his interest in the Master Purchase Agreement to Patrician Hotel, LLC ("Patrician").

      Paragraph 16 of each Supplemental Contract provides that "[t]ime is of the essence of all the terms, provisions and covenants of this Agreement," while Paragraph 25 of the Master Purchase Agreement states in relevant part:
      Time is of the essence of all the terms, provisions and covenants of this Agreement. Time is important to both Seller and Buyer in the performance of this Agreement, and they have agreed that strict compliance is required as to any date or time periods set forth or described herein.

      Presidential Management was the sole member of Patrician Hotel, LLC. Nemni, as the authorized agent for Presidential Management, executed the November 22, 2011 agreement with All Seasons Suites, LLC, whereby Suites was to acquire Presidential Management's 100 percent member interest in Patrician.

      We decline to address the portion of the final judgment on the tortious interference claim as well as the trial court's reservation of jurisdiction to enter subsequent orders to determine damages, and to conduct an additional trial on damages - without making a finding as to whether those portions of the order on appeal are final and, consequently, whether we have jurisdiction - because those issue are moot based on our decision herein.

      Florida's statute of frauds is outlined in section 725.01, Florida Statutes (2010), and provides in pertinent part:
      No action shall be brought whereby ... to charge any person ... upon any contract for the sale of lands ... unless the agreement or promise upon which such action shall be brought, or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some other person by her or him thereunto lawfully authorized.

      The Florida Power of Attorney Act, §§ 709.2101-.2402, Florida Statutes (2011), did not go into effect until October 1, 2011. See § 709.2106(2) ("A power of attorney executed before October 1, 2011, is valid if its execution complied with the law of this state at the time of execution."). Thus, Paragraph 9(f) must be considered under § 709.01-.11, Florida Statutes (2010).

      The record is not clear as to the nature of the BOD's "informal discussion" purportedly approving Nemni's extension request. However, to the extent the BOD used email to cast a vote on the issue, such action is explicitly prohibited under section 718.112. See § 718.112(2)(c) ("Members of the board of administration may use e-mail as a means of communication but may not cast a vote on an association matter via e-mail.").


text:
    Carlos PAZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D19-409
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed May 1, 2019 Rehearing Denied May 22, 2019
    Carlos Paz, in proper person.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before EMAS, C.J., and SCALES and LINDSEY, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(2) (providing: "A second or successive motion is an extraordinary pleading. Accordingly, a court may dismiss a second or successive motion if the court finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits ..."); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1) (providing that a claim of newly-discovered evidence must be made "within 2 years of the time the new facts were or could have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence"); Long v. State, 183 So.3d 342 (Fla. 2016) (establishing two-prong test to be applied in a motion to vacate judgment and sentence based upon newly-discovered evidence relating to a guilty plea, and reaffirming that the burden is on the defendant to establish a legally sufficient claim premised on newly-discovered evidence); Berry v. State, 175 So.3d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (affirming trial court's denial of motion to vacate plea and sentence where defendant failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that the claimed newly-discovered evidence was unknown to defendant, his trial counsel and the trial court within the two-year period under rule 3.850, and failed to establish that the evidence could not have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence).


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Gerardo MARTINEZ-SEGURA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4762
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2019 Rehearing Denied June 13, 2019
    Gerardo Martinez-Segura, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Gerardo Martinez-Segura appeals an order summarily denying his rule 3.850 motion. Consistent with the State's concession, we reverse in part. The trial court erred in summarily denying as to grounds four and five, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's advice (or lack of advice) regarding the deportation consequences of Martinez-Segura's plea. On remand, the trial court must either attach records conclusively refuting these allegations or hold an evidentiary hearing. As to the remaining grounds, we affirm.

AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.

Rowe, Bilbrey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.