author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    COUNTY OF VOLUSIA, etc., et al., Appellants, v. Kenneth J. DETZNER, etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. SC18-1339
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    September 7, 2018
    Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-Dade County Attorney, Oren Rosenthal, Michael B. Valdes, and Miguel A. Gonzalez, Assistant County Attorneys, Miami, Florida, for Appellant Miami-Dade County
    Daniel D. Eckert, County Attorney, DeLand, Florida, for Appellants Volusia County, Philip T. Fleuchaus, and T. Wayne Bailey
    Andrew J. Meyers, Broward County Attorney, Mark A. Journey, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Joseph K. Jarone, Scott Androne, and Claudia Capdesuner, Assistant County Attorneys, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant Broward County
    Barry Richard of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee Florida Association of Court Clerks, Inc.
    Timothy R. Qualls and Kayla M. Scarpone of Young Qualls, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee Florida Tax Collectors Association
    John A. Tucker of Foley & Lardner, Jacksonville, Florida; Christina M. Kennedy and Virginia R. Beeson, Foley & Lardner, Orlando, Florida; and Robert H. Hosay and James A. McKee of Foley & Lardner, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee Anne M. Gannon, Palm Beach Tax Collector
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, Edward M. Wenger, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Jordan Pratt, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee Kenneth J. Detzner, Secretary of State
    Laura Youmans, Legislative Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida Association of Counties, Inc.
    Thomas W. Poulton of DeBevoise & Poulton, P.A., Winter Park, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida Sheriffs Association
    Gigi Rollini and Glenn Burhans, Jr., of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Association for Constitutional Officers, Inc.
   PER CURIAM.

Volusia, Broward, and Miami-Dade Counties seek review of a circuit court order validating the ballot title and summary of a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution ("Amendment 10"). The First District Court of Appeal certified the order as presenting a question of great public importance requiring this Court's immediate resolution. We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(5) of the Florida Constitution, and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Background

On May 9, 2018, the 2017-2018 Constitution Revision Commission (CRC) submitted its proposed revisions and accompanying ballot summaries to the Secretary of State. Among them was Revision 5, retitled Amendment 10 for the November 2018 ballot. The ballot title and summary for Amendment 10 state:

CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3
ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 4, 11
ARTICLE VIII, SECTIONS 1, 6
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND OPERATION. -
Requires legislature to retain department of veterans' affairs. Ensures election of sheriffs, property appraisers, supervisors of elections, tax collectors, and clerks of court in all counties; removes county charters' ability to abolish, change term, transfer duties, or eliminate election of these offices. Changes annual legislative session commencement date in even-numbered years from March to January; removes legislature's authorization to fix another date. Creates office of domestic security and counterterrorism within department of law enforcement.

At issue in this case is the portion of the summary stating that Amendment 10 requires the election of the five named officers ("constitutional officers") in all counties, and eliminates county charters' ability to abolish, transfer duties, or change the terms of those constitutional offices. The relevant portion of Amendment 10 would amend article VIII, section 1(d) of the Florida Constitution as follows:

(d) COUNTY OFFICERS. There shall be elected by the electors of each county, for terms of four years, a sheriff, a tax collector, a property appraiser, a supervisor of elections, and a clerk of the circuit court; except, when provided by county charter or special law approved by vote of the electors of the county, any county officer may be chosen in another manner therein specified, or any county office may be abolished when all the duties of the office prescribed by general law are transferred to another office. Unless When nototherwise provided by county charter orspecial law approved by vote of the electors or pursuant to Article V, section 16, the clerk of the circuit court shall be ex officio clerk of the board of county commissioners, auditor, recorder and custodian of all county funds. Notwithstanding subsection 6(e) of this article, a county charter may not abolish the office of a sheriff, a tax collector, a property appraiser, a supervisor of elections, or a clerk of the circuit court; transfer the duties of those officers to another officer or office; change the length of the four-year term of office; or establish any manner of selection other than by election by the electors of the county.

Amendment 10 would also add the following section to article VIII of the Florida Constitution:

SECTION 6. Schedule to Article VIII.-
....
(g) SELECTION AND DUTIES OF COUNTY OFFICERS.-
(1) Except as provided in this subsection, the amendment to Section 1 of this article, relating to the selection and duties of county officers, shall take effect January 5, 2021, but shall govern with respect to the qualifying for and the holding of the primary and general elections for county constitutional officers in 2020.
(2) For Miami-Dade County and Broward County, the amendment to Section 1 of this article, relating to the selection and duties of county officers, shall take effect January 7, 2025, but shall govern with respect to the qualifying for and the holding of the primary and general elections for county constitutional officers in 2024.

In June 2018, Volusia County (along with Philip T. Fleuchaus and T. Wayne Bailey, Volusia County voters) and Broward County independently sued the Florida Department of State and Secretary of State Kenneth Detzner, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Both argued that the ballot title and summary of Amendment 10 mislead voters by failing to sufficiently describe Amendment 10's chief purpose. The circuit court consolidated the lawsuits and permitted Miami-Dade County to intervene as a plaintiff. The court further granted leave for the Florida Association of Court Clerks, Florida Tax Collectors Association, and Anne M. Gannon in her capacity as Palm Beach County Tax Collector to intervene as defendants.

All parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted final summary judgment in favor of Appellees, concluding that the ballot language would enable the average voter to understand the primary effect of Amendment 10. Therefore, the court held, Amendment 10 should be included on the November 2018 ballot.

Standard of Review

We review the validity of a proposed constitutional amendment de novo. Armstrong v. Harris , 773 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla. 2000). In conducting this review, our sole task is to determine whether the ballot language sets forth the substance of the amendment in a manner consistent with section 101.161, Florida Statutes (2018).

Section 101.161(1) requires that a constitutional amendment "submitted to the vote of the people" include a title "not exceeding 15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly referred to," and a ballot summary that explains "the chief purpose of the measure" in no more than seventy-five words. In assessing conformity with these requirements, we consider two questions: "(1) whether the ballot title and summary, in clear and unambiguous language, fairly inform the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment; and (2) whether the language of the title and summary, as written, misleads the public." Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Standards for Establishing Legislative Dist. Boundaries , 2 So.3d 175, 184 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Prohibiting State Spending for Experimentation that Involves the Destruction of a Live Human Embryo , 959 So.2d 210, 213-14 (Fla. 2007) ). We exercise "extreme care, caution, and restraint" before striking a proposed amendment from the ballot, holding a proposal invalid only if the record proves the amendment to be "clearly and conclusively defective." Askew v. Firestone , 421 So.2d 151, 156 (Fla. 1982) ; Armstrong , 773 So.2d at 11.

Analysis

I. Chief Purpose

Appellants first argue that the ballot title and summary are defective for failing to inform voters of what the Appellants assert is Amendment 10's true chief purpose: to divest county voters of their current constitutional right to decide the structure of their local governments. Since the summary makes no mention of this loss of rights, Appellants argue, the ballot language is misleading.

We disagree. The summary accurately states the effect that Amendment 10's passage would have on county charters and special laws; there is no need to explain ramifications that are implicit in those statements. The summary tells voters that the amendment would "ensure" election of constitutional officers in all counties, and provides that county charters may not allow for their selection by an alternative method. It is therefore unnecessary to explain the obvious result-that voters would not be able to eliminate election of the officers by charter or special law. Similarly, because the summary makes clear that the existence of the constitutional offices, along with their duties and terms, would no longer be subject to change by charter, it would be redundant to state that county electors could not amend their charter to make the prohibited changes.

II. "Current State of the Law"

Appellants next argue that the ballot language fails to describe "the current state of the law," rendering it misleading in two ways. First, Appellants claim that the ballot language is deficient because it does not inform voters that constitutional officers are typically elected. Without this information, Appellants contend, the ballot summary's statement that Amendment 10 "ensures election" of constitutional officers gives voters the false impression that such elections are a new right, or amounts to "political rhetoric" leading voters to believe that the elections are under threat of elimination. Second, Appellants argue that the summary misleads voters by failing to identify existing constitutional rights that will be affected by Amendment 10's passage. Because both arguments are without merit, we decline to find the ballot language misleading on this basis.

First, the summary's failure to inform voters that constitutional officers are elected unless otherwise provided by a county charter or approved special law does not mislead voters. While Appellants suggest that this lack of information will lead voters to believe that elections are a new right, the summary does not state that Amendment 10 "creates" or "establishes" a right to elect constitutional officers. Rather, it provides that Amendment 10 "ensures election" of constitutional officers, and this language accurately describes its effect. Because it would prevent county charters or approved special laws from abolishing constitutional offices or allowing for their officeholders to be selected by an alternative method, Amendment 10 would therefore "ensure" that such officers would be elected in "all counties."

Nor does the ballot language suggest that elections are at risk of being eliminated if Amendment 10 is not passed. The summary does not claim that Amendment 10's passage is necessary to preserve the right to elect constitutional officers, as claimed by Appellants. Instead, it states that the amendment would ensure their election because, as noted above, this would be the result of Amendment 10's restrictions on county charters and approved special laws.

The ballot language is also not misleading for failing to identify existing constitutional rights that will be affected by Amendment 10. While Appellants claim that the summary neglects to recognize its impact on article VIII, sections 1(c), 1(d) and 6(e), the title indicates that the proposed amendment will alter article VIII, sections 1 and 6. The summary does not need to further discuss its effect on voters' ability under sections 1 (c) and 6 (e) to amend their county charter because it clearly explains that charters will be prohibited from taking certain actions if Amendment 10 passes. Voters will draw the logical conclusion that they will not be permitted to amend their charter in a manner inconsistent with the amendment. The summary also states that Amendment 10's passage would "ensure election" of constitutional officers; this accurately reflects that voters will no longer have a right under section 1 (d) to approve a special law allowing for the selection of such officers by another method.

III. Multiple Subjects

Appellants next contend that the ballot language is misleading because it groups together four separate measures. Appellants have conceded, however, that CRC proposals are not bound by the single-subject requirement governing initiative petitions. It follows that the bundling of measures creates a defect only if the measures are presented on the ballot in a misleading way. Here, the ballot language is clear; we are therefore unpersuaded by Appellants' argument.

First, the summary does not mislead voters by combining "wholly unrelated" proposals, as argued by Appellants. The factual predicate for this argument is inaccurate. Though the measures address different topics, there is a shared element. As the title states, each proposal relates to "state and local government structure and operation." In any event, there is no basis for concluding that the relationship between the issues addressed in separate measures identified in the ballot summary results in deception of the voters.

Appellants next claim that the CRC's decision to bundle together separate measures left it unable to sufficiently describe the effect of the contested provision within the summary's seventy-five word limit. However, as earlier discussed, the ballot summary provides an adequate description of the amendment's chief purpose as it relates to constitutional officers. That it did so in fewer words than it would have if the measure had been separately submitted to voters is of no consequence.

Finally, the placement of the contested provision does not render the summary defective. Appellants claim that the summary deceptively includes the contested provision regarding constitutional officers, which would have significant effects on the structure of local government, between two "popular" and "largely symbolic" state government measures. But the Appellants do not explain how the structure of the ballot summary misleads the voters concerning what the proposal will do. There is no basis to accept the argument that the proposal is invalid on the ground that voters would be more likely to vote for Amendment 10 because of the ordering of provisions within the summary. There is nothing in the ordering that is deceptive in any way.

IV. Retroactive Application

Appellants last argue that the summary is misleading because it fails to describe Amendment 10's effect on changes previously made to county charters. The two appellants who address this issue take different positions. Volusia County argues that the summary is misleading because it fails to disclose whether Amendment 10 will apply retroactively, thereby negating changes previously made to charters, or prospectively, only preventing charters from making the prohibited changes in the future. Miami-Dade County, on the other hand, contends that the amendment has retroactive application in arguing that the ballot summary is deficient because it does not inform voters that Amendment 10 would invalidate existing charter provisions. However, because our earlier opinions indicate that the question of whether an amendment operates retroactively should be resolved in a post-election action, we decline to consider either argument. See Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Voter Control of Gambling , 215 So.3d 1209, 1216 (Fla. 2017) (holding that a proposed amendment's retroactive application should be determined "after the electorate approved the amendment[ ]"); see also Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster , 984 So.2d 478, 481 (Fla. 2008) (determining that an approved amendment applied retroactively); State v. Lavazzoli , 434 So.2d 321, 322 (Fla. 1983) (determining that an approved amendment did not have retroactive application).

Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, we affirm the circuit court's decision approving Amendment 10 for placement on the ballot. No motion for rehearing will be allowed.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      Words stricken are deletions; words underlined are additions.

      Article VIII, section 1(c) provides that county charters may be adopted, amended, or repealed only by county electors in a special election called for that purpose; section 6 (e) incorporates a provision of the 1885 Florida Constitution granting Miami-Dade County citizens the right to adopt and revise a county charter.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    DEPARTMENT OF STATE, etc., et al., Appellants, v. FLORIDA GREYHOUND ASSOCIATION, INC., etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. SC18-1287
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    September 7, 2018
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, Edward M. Wenger, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Jordan E. Pratt, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellants
    Major B. Harding, Stephen C. Emmanuel, and Kevin A. Forsthoefel of Ausley McMullen, Tallahassee, Florida; Jeff Kottkamp of Jeff Kottkamp, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and Paul Hawkes, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellees
    Ralph A. DeMeo and Lauren M. Deweil of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amici Curiae The Animal Law Section of the Florida Bar and the Animal Legal Defense Fund
    M. Stephen Turner and Leonard M. Collins of Nelson Mullins Broad and Cassel, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Committee to Protect Dogs
   PER CURIAM.

Appellants, the Florida Department of State and Secretary of State Ken Detzner, seek review of the judgment of the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial Circuit in Florida Greyhound Association v. Department of State , No. 2018-CA-1114 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2018). In that decision, the circuit court held the ballot title and summary of a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution ("Amendment 13") were clearly and conclusively defective. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Appellees, Florida Greyhound Association, Inc., and James Blanchard, and entered an injunction forbidding Amendment 13 from appearing on the November 2018 general election ballot. Appellants appealed to the First District Court of Appeal. The district court certified that this case is of great public importance and requires immediate resolution by this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(5), Fla. Const. As explained below, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, vacate the injunction, and order that Amendment 13 shall appear on the November 2018 general election ballot.

Background

The Florida Constitution establishes a Constitution Revision Commission ("CRC"), which convenes every twenty years. Art. XI, § 2(a), Fla. Const. As its name suggests, the mandate of the CRC is to examine the Florida Constitution, hold public hearings, and propose changes or additions to any part of the Florida Constitution it determines to be in need of revision. Id. § 2 (c). The CRC submits its proposed revisions to the Secretary of State, who then authorizes the proposed revisions to be placed on the ballot at the next general election for voter approval. Art. XI, § 5(a), Fla. Const. Florida law provides:

Whenever a constitutional amendment ... is submitted to the vote of the people, a ballot summary of such amendment ... shall be printed in clear and unambiguous language on the ballot .... The ballot summary of the amendment ... and the ballot title to appear on the ballot shall be embodied in the constitutional revision commission proposal ... or enabling resolution or ordinance. The ballot summary of the amendment or other public measure shall be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure.

§ 101.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2018) ; see also Armstrong v. Harris , 773 So.2d 7, 12 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that section 101.161 codifies the "accuracy requirement" implicit in Article XI, section 5 of the Florida Constitution ). This subsection also provides that "[t]he ballot title shall consist of a caption, not exceeding 15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken of." § 101.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2018).

On May 9, 2018, the 2017-18 CRC submitted its final report to the Secretary of State, including several proposed amendments for inclusion on the November 2018 general election ballot. Among these proposed amendments was Amendment 13. If approved by the voters, Amendment 13 would add two new sections to the Florida Constitution. First, Amendment 13 would add the following section to Article X:

Prohibition on racing of and wagering on greyhounds or other dogs.-The humane treatment of animals is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. After December 31, 2020, a person authorized to conduct gaming or pari-mutuel operations may not race greyhounds or any member of the Canis Familiaris subspecies in connection with any wager for money or any other thing of value in this state, and persons in this state may not wager money or any other thing of value on the outcome of a live dog race occurring in this state. The failure to conduct greyhound racing or wagering on greyhound racing after December 31, 2018, does not constitute grounds to revoke or deny renewal of other related gaming licenses held by a person who is a licensed greyhound permitholder on January 1, 2018, and does not affect the eligibility of such permitholder, or such permitholder's facility, to conduct other pari-mutuel activities authorized by general law. By general law, the legislature shall specify civil or criminal penalties for violations of this section and for activities that aid or abet violations of this section.

Const. Revision Comm'n 2017-18 Final Report at 47-48 (underlining omitted). Second, Amendment 13 would add the following section to Article XII:

Prohibition on racing of or wagering on greyhounds or other dogs.-The amendment to Article X, which prohibits the racing of or wagering on greyhound[s] and other dogs, and the creation of this section, shall take effect upon the approval of the electors.

Id. at 48 (underlining omitted). As required by section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes, the CRC's report also includes the language to appear on the ballot describing Amendment 13, which reads as follows:

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
ARTICLE X, NEW SECTION
ARTICLE XII, NEW SECTION
ENDS DOG RACING.-Phases out commercial dog racing in connection with wagering by 2020. Other gaming activities are not affected.

Id.

Appellees filed suit in the circuit court on May 17, 2018, arguing that Amendment 13's ballot language was defective and should be stricken from the ballot. The circuit court agreed, holding that Amendment 13's ballot language "misstates certain facts as to what the Amendment will do, and neglects to give voters crucial information about the actual chief effects of what the CRC was trying to accomplish, thus violating the Constitutional and statutory 'truth in packaging' requirements."

Fla. Greyhound Ass'n , No. 2018-CA-1114, slip op. at 24-25. The circuit court reasoned that Amendment 13 had two chief purposes: recognizing the humane treatment of animals as a fundamental value; and allowing pari-mutuel facilities which currently operate cardrooms or slot machines on the basis of their dog-racing permits to continue to operate those cardrooms and slot machines without conducting the statutorily required dog racing. Id. at 17-23. The circuit court reached this conclusion based on its perception of the CRC's subjective intent with respect to Amendment 13, as expressed by members of the CRC during floor debate of Amendment 13. Id. The circuit court also explained that Amendment 13's "decoupling" of slot machine and cardroom operations from existing requirements to conduct dog racing has "an actual effect on other gaming activities" and on the existing constitutional provisions which regulate those activities, especially Article X, section 23 of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 21-23. Therefore, the circuit court held, the failure to disclose these "fundamental value" and "decoupling" provisions on the ballot rendered Amendment 13's ballot language "clearly and conclusively defective." Id. at 15.

The circuit court also concluded that the ballot language of Amendment 13 was misleading, and therefore defective, because it claims Amendment 13 "prohibits more activity than it, in fact, does." Id. at 16. The circuit court reasoned that the ballot title "ENDS DOG RACING" would lead voters to believe that Amendment 13 prohibits all racing of all dogs, although Amendment 13 would only prohibit "persons authorized to conduct gaming or pari-mutuel operations from the racing of greyhounds, or any other dog, in connection with wagering on the outcome of said race." Id. Furthermore, the circuit court stated, the ballot language failed to inform voters "that wagering on the outcome of dog races which take place outside the State of Florida will not be affected." Id. at 17. Therefore, the circuit court concluded, the ballot language would mislead voters about the scope of conduct Amendment 13 would regulate. Id.

Standard of Review

The issue of whether the ballot language describing a proposed constitutional amendment is deficient presents a pure question of law which we review de novo. Armstrong , 773 So.2d at 11. If the ballot language does not satisfy the requirements of the law, we cannot rewrite it to correct its flaws: the only remedy is for the proposed amendment to be stricken from the ballot. Smith v. Am. Airlines, Inc. , 606 So.2d 618, 621-22 (Fla. 1992). Therefore, we "must exercise extreme caution and restraint before removing a constitutional amendment from Florida voters." Fla. Dep't of State v. Slough , 992 So.2d 142, 147 (Fla. 2008). "In order for a court to interfere with the right of the people to vote on a proposed constitutional amendment[,] the record must show that the proposal is clearly and conclusively defective." Askew v. Firestone , 421 So.2d 151, 154 (Fla. 1982).

Florida law requires the ballot language to give the voters "fair notice" of the decision they must make. Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade Cty. , 394 So.2d 981, 987 (Fla. 1981). In terms of a ballot title and summary, fair notice "must be actual notice consisting of a clear and unambiguous explanation of a measure's chief purpose." Askew , 421 So.2d at 156. To evaluate whether a proposed amendment's ballot language is clearly and conclusively defective, the Court considers two questions: first, "whether the ballot title and summary fairly inform the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment," and second, "whether the language of the ballot title and summary misleads the public."

Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Rights of Elec. Consumers Regarding Solar Energy Choice , 188 So.3d 822, 831 (Fla. 2016). Ballot language may be clearly and conclusively defective either in an affirmative sense, because it misleads the voters as to the material effects of the amendment, or in a negative sense by failing to inform the voters of those material effects. See Armstrong , 773 So.2d at 21 (concluding that "the ballot language in the present case is defective for what it does not say"); Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Term Limits Pledge , 718 So.2d 798, 803 (Fla. 1998) (striking a proposed amendment which "would substantially impact" the powers of the Secretary of State when the ballot language "simply state[d] that the proposed amendment affects the powers of the Secretary of State").

When evaluating whether a proposed amendment's ballot language is clearly and conclusively defective, "a court must look not to subjective criteria espoused by the amendment's sponsor but to objective criteria inherent in the amendment itself, such as the amendment's main effect." Armstrong , 773 So.2d at 18. We read the ballot title and summary as a single text to determine what a reasonable voter would understand it to say. Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Florida's Amend. to Reduce Class Size , 816 So.2d 580, 585 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that the ballot title and summary "must be read together in determining whether the ballot information properly informs the voters"). Although the polestar of our analysis is the candor and accuracy with which the ballot language informs the voters of a proposed amendment's effects, we have also recognized "that voters may be presumed to have the ability to reason and draw logical conclusions" from the information they are given. Smith , 606 So.2d at 621 ; see also Fla. Educ. Ass'n v. Fla. Dep't of State , 48 So.3d 694, 701 (Fla. 2010) ("This Court presumes that the average voter has a certain amount of common understanding and knowledge."). Because of this, ballot language "is not required to explain every detail or ramification of the proposed amendment." Smith , 606 So.2d at 620. However, the notoriety of a proposed amendment and the media attention given to it do not excuse a proposed amendment's ballot language from compliance with the law. See Askew , 421 So.2d at 156 (explaining that sponsors of a proposed amendment have "[t]he burden of informing the public" through the ballot title and summary).

Analysis

This case presents three issues for our consideration. First, we must evaluate whether Amendment 13's ballot language is clearly and conclusively defective because it fails to inform the voters that adoption of Amendment 13 would recognize the humane treatment of animals as a fundamental value. Second, we must analyze whether the ballot language misstates the effect of Amendment 13 on other forms of gaming, and is therefore defective. Finally, we must determine whether the ballot language is misleading because it fails to disclose that adoption of Amendment 13 would not end all racing of dogs and would allow wagering on out-of-state races to continue. We address each of these issues in turn.

I. Fundamental Value

If approved by the voters, Amendment 13 would recognize "the humane treatment of animals" as a "fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida." Amendment 13's ballot language does not inform voters of this provision, and the circuit court concluded that this omission rendered the ballot language clearly and conclusively defective. Appellants argue that the ballot language was not required to disclose this provision to the voters because it is prefatory.

When considering whether ballot language is clearly and conclusively defective, a reviewing court analyzes the text of a proposed amendment to determine its legal significance, and identifies the proposed amendment's chief purpose based on the results of that analysis. See Armstrong , 773 So.2d at 18 (determining the chief purpose of the relevant amendment by analyzing its "main effect"); Smith , 606 So.2d at 620 (striking an amendment where the ballot language "[told] the voter nothing about the actual change to be effected"). It follows that any provision of a proposed amendment which has no legal effect cannot be its chief purpose. Instead, provisions which lack legal significance are considered prefatory. See Massey v. David , 979 So.2d 931, 939 (Fla. 2008) (holding certain statutory terms were prefatory because they "d[id] not actually define a substantive right").

We follow "principles parallel to those of statutory interpretation when reviewing issues related to constitutional provisions." Slough , 992 So.2d at 148. Although prefatory language may aid a court to determine legislative intent when the operative terms of a provision of law are ambiguous, such language does not control interpretation of the operative terms of that provision. See Dorsey v. State , 402 So.2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 1981) (noting that the law "is well settled that such 'prefatory language' cannot expand or restrict the otherwise unambiguous language of a statute").

Amendment 13's fundamental value provision is devoid of any legislative or judicial mandate: it bestows no rights, imposes no duties, and does not empower the Legislature to take any action. Furthermore, it is well settled that the Florida Constitution permits the Legislature to impose civil and criminal penalties for inhumane treatment of animals. See Porter v. Vinzant , 49 Fla. 213, 38 So. 607, 608 (1905) (holding that the general powers delegated by the Legislature to the City of Jacksonville included the power to adopt an ordinance prohibiting cruelty to animals). Irrespective of whether the CRC intended Amendment 13's fundamental value provision to have independent legal effect, it manifestly does not. See Armstrong , 773 So.2d at 18 (explaining that a proposed amendment is analyzed on the basis of "objective criteria inherent in the amendment itself" and not "subjective criteria espoused by the amendment's sponsor").

Appellees compare the fundamental value provision of Amendment 13 to similar provisions of Article IX, section 1(a) and Article X, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. The relevant portions of these sections provide that "education of children is a fundamental value of the people of State of Florida," Art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const., and that "[i]nhumane treatment of animals is a concern of Florida citizens." Art. X, § 21, Fla. Const. Appellees argue that, because the ballot language describing those amendments informed voters that approval of those measures would recognize education as a "fundamental value" and inhumane treatment of animals as a "concern," respectively, Amendment 13's ballot language must also disclose its recognition of a fundamental value. See Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Limiting Cruel and Inhumane Confinement of Pigs During Pregnancy , 815 So.2d 597, 597 (Fla. 2002) (quoting ballot language); see also 30 J. of the 1997-1998 Const. Revision Comm'n 250 (May 5, 1998), available at http://fall.fsulawrc.com/crc/journal/index.html (text of ballot language describing Article IX, section 1(a) ).

This argument lacks merit. Although the drafters of those amendments did inform voters of the provisions in question by disclosing them in the ballot language describing those amendments, we have never held that they were required to do so. Appellees cite no case actually interpreting the substance of either provision or applying them to adjudicate a party's rights or duties. The relevant amendment to Article IX, section 1(a) was not challenged in court, and our Advisory Opinion regarding Article X, section 21 did not discuss whether disclosure of the provision in question was necessary. See generally Confinement of Pigs , 815 So.2d at 599-600. Furthermore, the comparison to Article IX, section 1(a) is unavailing. Although that subsection begins by recognizing the education of children as a fundamental value, it continues: "It is, therefore , a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders." Art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). Unlike the fundamental value provision in Amendment 13, which is freestanding, the fundamental value provision in Article IX, section 1(a) is explicitly linked to the provisions that follow it. Irrespective of whether the fundamental value provision of Article IX, section 1(a) contributes to the creation of a private cause of action-an issue which is not before us in this case, and about which we express no opinion-it is evident that the fundamental value provision of Amendment 13 does not do so.

Because the fundamental value provision does not have any independent legal significance, we conclude it is prefatory and that its omission from the ballot summary does not render the ballot language clearly and conclusively defective. We therefore conclude the circuit court erred when it held the ballot language was clearly and conclusively defective for failing to inform the voters that approval of Amendment 13 would recognize the humane treatment of animals as a fundamental value.

II. Other Forms of Gaming

The circuit court also determined Amendment 13's ballot language was clearly and conclusively defective because, the circuit court reasoned, it would mislead voters about the effects Amendment 13 would have on other forms of gaming. Specifically, the circuit court concluded the ballot language failed to inform voters that Amendment 13 would materially affect Article X, section 23 of the Florida Constitution. The circuit court further concluded that, contrary to the ballot language's claim that other forms of gaming would not be affected, Amendment 13 would affect other forms of gaming by doing away with the requirement that cardrooms and slot machine facilities whose licenses are based on underlying dog-racing permits continue to conduct dog races.

"A ballot summary may be defective if it omits material facts necessary to make the summary not misleading." Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen.-Ltd. Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices , 592 So.2d 225, 228 (Fla. 1991). A ballot summary is not required to affirmatively advise the electorate that the proposed amendment it describes would not modify any current constitutional provision, but a ballot summary must not conceal a conflict between the proposed amendment and an existing constitutional provision. See Slough , 992 So.2d at 147-48. It is not always necessary for a ballot summary to state which provisions of the Florida Constitution would see their effects altered by the proposed amendment. See Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Tax Limitation , 673 So.2d 864, 868 (Fla. 1996). A ballot summary also is not per se defective because it fails to advise voters of exceptions to the mandate of the proposed amendment, provided the ballot language is not otherwise misleading. See Reduce Class Size , 816 So.2d at 585-86 (holding that the relevant ballot language was not defective for failing to inform voters of an exception for "extracurricular classes"). A ballot summary may not, however, fail to inform the voters of the repeal of an existing constitutional provision. See Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re 1.35% Prop. Tax Cap, Unless Voter Approved , 2 So.3d 968, 976 (Fla. 2009) (holding ballot language was misleading because it did not "inform the voter of the repeal of an existing constitutional provision").

We conclude Amendment 13 would have no effect on any existing provision of the Florida Constitution. Article X, section 23 of the Florida Constitution authorizes Broward and Miami-Dade Counties to conduct referenda in order to authorize the operation of slot machines "within existing, licensed pari[-]mutuel facilities ... that have conducted live racing or [jai alai] games in that county during each of the last two calendar years before the effective date of this amendment." Art. X, § 23(a), Fla Const. Because that amendment became effective in 2004, its effect is to authorize Broward and Miami-Dade Counties to approve slot machine operations at pari-mutuel facilities which conducted racing or games in 2002 and 2003. Article X, section 23 imposes no continuing requirement for those facilities to conduct dog racing or any other pari-mutuel activity in order to operate slot machines. That requirement is imposed by statute. § 551.104(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018) (requiring "[a]s a condition of licensure" that slot machine operators shall "[c]onduct no fewer than a full schedule of live racing or games as defined in s. 550.002(11)"). Similarly, the link between cardroom operations and dog racing is a creature of statute, not the Florida Constitution. § 849.086(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018) (providing that "[a] cardroom license may only be issued to a licensed pari-mutuel permitholder"); see also § 550.3551(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018) (requiring a pari-mutuel permitholder to conduct a certain number of races as a condition of licensure).

Absent these statutory requirements to conduct dog racing in order to maintain a current license in good standing, pari-mutuel permitholders in Broward County or Miami-Dade County would qualify to operate slot machines pursuant to Article X, section 23 even if they had not conducted a single race or game since 2003. In other words, Article X, section 23 relates only to past dog racing, and Amendment 13 relates only to future dog racing. If approved, Amendment 13 would not authorize the creation of new slot machine operations in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties, or anywhere else: only existing gaming activities would be affected, and only to the extent that certain statutory requirements would be removed. Amendment 13's ballot language cannot be defective for failing to disclose a material effect on Article X, section 23 because Amendment 13 has no such effect in the first place. We therefore conclude the circuit court erred when it determined the ballot language was defective for failing to inform voters that Amendment 13 would materially affect Article X, section 23.

With regard to Amendment 13's effect on other forms of gaming, we conclude the ballot language's statement that "[o]ther gaming activites are not affected" by Amendment 13 is accurate. To "affect" is defined as "to produce a material influence upon or alteration in" a thing or activity. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 19 (10th ed. 1994). A reasonable voter would understand the phrase "are not affected" as used in Amendment 13's ballot summary to mean the activities in question will continue without material change. See Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Fla. Marriage Prot. Amend. , 926 So.2d 1229, 1237 (Fla. 2006) (analyzing the "plain meaning" of words in the ballot summary "according to dictionary definition"). If approved by the voters, Amendment 13 would forbid licensed Florida pari-mutuel operators from racing any dog in Florida in connection with a wager, and it would also prohibit all persons in Florida from wagering on live dog races which occur in Florida. Furthermore, as discussed above, it would remove existing statutory requirements that cardrooms and slot machine operations which obtained their licenses based on underlying dog-racing permits continue to conduct dog races in order to maintain their cardroom and slot machine licenses. If Amendment 13 is adopted, therefore, the only activities which will change in a material way are dog racing in Florida and wagering thereon, which will cease. Horse racing, jai alai, and other permitted gaming activities will continue on January 1, 2021, just as they did on December 31, 2020. Cardrooms and slot machine operations at horse-racing facilities and jai alai frontons will continue to be linked to the relevant underlying pari-mutuel permits. In short, Amendment 13 will not directly affect other forms of gaming. The ballot language accurately informs voters of this, and we therefore hold the circuit court erred when it concluded the ballot language would mislead voters about Amendment 13's effect on other forms of gaming.

III. "Ends Dog Racing"

"When the summary of a proposed amendment does not accurately describe the scope of the text of an amendment, it fails in its purpose and must be stricken." Term Limits Pledge , 718 So.2d at 804. A proposed amendment "must stand on its own merits and not be disguised as something else." Askew , 421 So.2d at 156. Furthermore, as we have stated, "the [ballot] title cannot be read in isolation. Section 101.161 requires the ballot summary and title to be read together." Tax Limitation , 673 So.2d at 868.

The circuit court concluded Amendment 13's ballot language was defective because it would mislead voters to conclude that Amendment 13 would end all racing of all dogs, when its true scope was much more limited. The circuit court also concluded the ballot language would mislead voters to believe that all wagering on dog racing would be prohibited, even though in-state betting on out-of-state racing would be allowed to continue.

We disagree. First, a reasonable voter would not interpret the ballot language as a whole to state that Amendment 13 would prohibit races of dogs in other contexts than in connection with wagering. Although the ballot title "ENDS DOG RACING" would permit that conclusion if taken in isolation, the ballot summary clarifies that Amendment 13 prohibits only "commercial dog racing in connection with wagering." Reading the ballot summary as a single text, it would be unreasonable to conclude Amendment 13 extends to other forms of racing. The ballot language accurately describes the scope of Amendment 13 as being limited to racing of dogs in connection with wagering. Therefore, we conclude the circuit court's determination to the contrary was error.

Furthermore, a reasonable voter would not interpret the ballot language to mean that Amendment 13 will prohibit persons in Florida from wagering on out-of-state dog races. Such an interpretation misreads the ballot language. The ballot summary states Amendment 13 "[p]hases out commercial dog racing in connection with wagering." The direct object of the verb phrase "[p]hases out" is "dog racing" and not "wagering." According to the plain text of the ballot language, therefore, "dog racing" is the primary regulated activity, and reasonable voters would understand this to be so. In effect, the circuit court held voters would read an additional phrase into the ballot summary, such that it would read: "Phases out commercial dog racing in connection with wagering and wagering in connection with dog racing by 2020." The italicized clause is not present in the ballot language. Although we assume, within certain limits, that voters will extrapolate from ballot language with respect to certain reasonably ascertainable effects of a proposed amendment on related provisions of existing law, see Smith , 606 So.2d at 621, nothing in our precedent supports the conclusion that reasonable voters will add terms to the ballot language on their own initiative in such a way as to expand the proposed amendment's scope. To the contrary, we have explained that a ballot summary must not "require[ ] the voter to infer a meaning which is nowhere evident on the face of the summary itself." Id. We therefore conclude the circuit court erred when it determined Amendment 13's ballot language misled voters with regard to Amendment 13's scope.

Conclusion

As explained above, we hold Amendment 13's fundamental value provision is prefatory, and that the ballot language is not clearly and conclusively defective for failing to inform voters of that provision. We further hold the ballot language accurately states the effect, or lack thereof, Amendment 13 would have on other forms of gaming should it be adopted by the voters. Finally, we hold the ballot language does not mislead voters with respect to Amendment 13's scope. Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is hereby reversed, the injunction entered pursuant to that judgment is hereby vacated, and it is hereby ordered that Amendment 13 appear on the ballot for the November 2018 general election. No motion for rehearing will be allowed.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.

I agree with the circuit court that the language of the ballot title and summary of Amendment 13 is clearly and conclusively defective as it relates to the free-standing casinos without pari-mutuel activities provided for in Article X, section 23, of the Florida Constitution. Accordingly, I dissent.

As stated by the circuit court, contrary to the ballot summary and title's assertion that other forms of gaming would not be affected by Amendment 13, the facilities whose licenses are based on underlying dog-racing permits are currently required to continue to conduct dog races. The majority concludes that because the restriction on the licenses is merely statutory and the constitutional provision was based on past dog races, not future races, Amendment 13 will not affect other forms of gaming. I disagree. There is no reasonable way for a voter to know whether, by voting yes for this amendment, they are also voting to either suspend or expand all pari-mutuel activities in the State because Amendment 13 would waive an important condition of licensure for operators of cardrooms and slot machines whose licenses arose out of their pari-mutuel dog racing permits.

For these reasons, I dissent.

      "[T]he wisdom of a proposed amendment is not a matter for our review." Askew , 421 So.2d at 155. Therefore, our decision to approve or disapprove a proposed amendment's ballot language should not be construed as approval or disapproval of its substance.


text:
    Leonard P. GONZALEZ, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1146
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    September 13, 2018
    Eric C. Pinkard of Creed and Pinkard, Tampa, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Lisa A. Hopkins, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on appeal from an order partially denying a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence of death was imposed, we have jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.

FACTS

Leonard Patrick Gonzalez, Jr., was convicted for the July 9, 2009, murders of Byrd and Melanie Billings. The underlying facts of these murders were provided in our opinion on direct appeal. See Gonzalez v. State , 136 So.3d 1125, 1135-39 (Fla. 2014). After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the case proceeded to its penalty phase and the jury recommended sentences of death for both murders by a vote of ten to two. Id. at 1139. We affirmed Gonzalez's convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Id. Thereafter, Gonzalez filed his initial motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, which he later amended to include a claim for relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and Hurst v. State , 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The postconviction court summarily denied relief on two of Gonzalez's claims but granted a new penalty phase based on his Hurst claim. This is his appeal.

DISCUSSION

Gonzalez raises two claims in his appeal: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to renew his motion for change of venue and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the indictment. In a motion governed by rule 3.851, where a defendant makes a facially sufficient claim that requires a factual determination, the circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing. See Mann v. State , 112 So.3d 1158, 1161 (Fla. 2013). Nevertheless, "claims may be summarily denied when they are legally insufficient, should have been brought on direct appeal, or are positively refuted by the record." Id. (quoting Marek v. State , 8 So.3d 1123, 1127 (Fla. 2009) ). A circuit court's decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing is reviewed de novo. Id. at 1162.

A successful claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must prove that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Rutherford v. State , 727 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1998). To establish deficiency, a defendant must show a specific act or omission by counsel that falls "outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards." Maxwell v Wainwright , 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986). The act or omission must constitute an error "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed ... by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Additionally, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective and "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

To establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "Reasonable probability" is defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. "Mere speculation is not sufficient to form the basis for postconviction relief." Ellerbee v. State , 232 So.3d 909, 918 (Fla. 2017) (citing Derrick v. State , 983 So.2d 443, 462 (Fla. 2008) ).

In his first issue on appeal, Gonzalez argues that the postconviction court erred by summarily denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly argue the motion for change of venue. Because the record positively refutes Gonzalez's claim, the lower court properly summarily denied this claim.

Florida law provides that a defendant is permitted to move for a change of venue when a fair and impartial trial cannot be had for any reason other than the prejudice of the trial judge. See Ellerbee , 232 So.3d at 919 (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.240). To determine whether a change of venue is proper, the trial court must consider: "(1) the extent and nature of any pretrial publicity and (2) the difficulty encountered in actually selecting a jury." Griffin v. State , 866 So.2d 1, 12 (Fla. 2003). When considering the second prong, the court must consider "whether any difficulty encountered in selecting a jury ... reflected a pervasive community bias against [the defendant] which so infected the jury selection process that it was impossible to seat an impartial jury." Rolling v. State , 695 So.2d 278, 287 (Fla. 1997). "[I]f prospective jurors can assure the court during voir dire that they are impartial despite their extrinsic knowledge, they are qualified to serve on the jury, and a change of venue is not necessary." Id. at 285 (citing Davis v. State , 461 So.2d 67, 69 (Fla. 1984) ).

In cases where a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move for a change a venue, we have stated:

[T]he defendant "must, at a minimum, 'bring forth evidence demonstrating that the trial court would have, or at least should have, granted a motion for change of venue if [defense] counsel had presented such a motion to the court.' " Dillbeck v. State, 964 So.2d 95, 104 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Wike v. State, 813 So.2d 12, 18 (Fla. 2002) ); see also Taylor v. State, 120 So.3d 540, 551 (Fla. 2013), cert. denied, [571] U.S. [1166], 134 S. Ct. 1009, 187 L.Ed.2d 856 (2014).

Carter v. State , 175 So.3d 761, 776 (Fla. 2015). Logic dictates, then, that where trial counsel did move for a change of venue and was denied, a defendant cannot demonstrate that the trial court would have granted the motion. Furthermore, Gonzalez has not presented evidence that demonstrates that the trial court should have granted the motion.

Gonzalez's motion and his initial brief focus on what he terms "the inflammatory media coverage" within Escambia County surrounding the crime. He alleges that counsel's motion for change of venue was inadequate because it did not inform the court of the inflammatory and prejudicial nature of the coverage. Gonzalez complains that by having the trial court take judicial notice of the coverage rather than bring in the articles and reports, trial counsel "effectively abandoned any realistic hope of obtaining a change of venue." Finally, Gonzalez alleges that the cursory voir dire was insufficient to determine whether the jurors lacked prejudice and could be fair and impartial.

Other than the general allegation that voir dire was "cursory," Gonzalez does not point to a specific biased juror who served, nor does Gonzalez specifically allege which juror, if any, was not properly rehabilitated during voir dire or, failing that, that Gonzalez was unable to strike either for cause or by using one of his peremptory strikes. The record before this Court demonstrates that trial counsel provided prospective jurors with a questionnaire inquiring, among other things, about their exposure to pretrial publicity. Members of the venire who responded that they were familiar with the publicity were asked if they could set it aside and consider only the evidence presented during the trial. Two prospective jurors who indicated they could not set aside what they had heard or read were excused for cause. Once the jury selections were completed, Gonzalez was asked personally if he was satisfied with the jury as selected and he replied affirmatively. Accordingly, the record reflects that Gonzalez was able to select a fair and impartial jury and the trial court would not likely have granted a renewed motion for change of venue at that time.

Because the record positively refuted Gonzalez's claim, the postconviction court properly summarily denied his claim. Gonzalez's argument amounts to a second-guessing of counsel's argument on the motion for change of venue, but the record demonstrates that counsel presented a cogent argument that was carefully considered by the trial court. Further, Gonzalez has not alleged that the jury that was impaneled was biased. Therefore, he cannot demonstrate that counsel's failure to secure the change of venue constituted ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

In his second issue on appeal, Gonzalez alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to challenge his indictment based on the alleged interference of the grand jury by Sheriff Morgan. The postconviction court summarily denied this claim, finding it insufficiently pleaded because the claim was based purely on speculation. While this Court may conclude that any speculation regarding Sheriff Morgan's practice of greeting prospective jurors could have been clarified in an evidentiary hearing, Gonzalez failed to allege a legally sufficient claim that such a practice would entitle him to relief.

The grand jury issued its indictment on Tuesday, August 11, 2009. Gonzalez asserts that defense counsel had a good faith basis to believe that Sheriff Morgan greeted the members of the grand jury because Sheriff Morgan's practice on Mondays and Tuesdays was to greet prospective jurors at the parking lot where they are directed to park and greet them by giving them his business card and thanking them for appearing.

The State asserts that in addition to Gonzalez's claim being speculative, defense counsel would have had no legal basis to object to an already empaneled grand jury because Florida law provides that such a challenge may be made only on the ground that the grand jurors were not selected according to law. See Seay v. State , 286 So.2d 532, 535 (Fla. 1973).

Gonzalez's reliance on this Court's decision in Rudd v. State ex rel. Christian , 310 So.2d 295 (Fla. 1975), which held that an indictment should be set aside when a state attorney or his or her assistants should in any way attempt to influence the findings of a grand jury other than presenting evidence and rendering legal advice, is misplaced. Christian , which considers the propriety of a state attorney's or assistant state attorney's attempts to influence a grand jury, does not apply to Sheriff Morgan, who is neither a state attorney nor an assistant state attorney.

Further, as we provided in Seay , Florida Statutes are explicit that "[a] challenge or objection to the grand jury may not be made after it has been empaneled and sworn." Seay , 286 So.2d at 535 (quoting section 905.05, Florida Statutes (1973) ). Gonzalez has not alleged a legal basis for trial counsel to have challenged the indictment or the grand jury and, therefore, the postconviction court properly summarily denied his claim as legally insufficient.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the postconviction court's summary denial of Gonzalez's claims.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, J., concur in result.

      Specifically, the venire was asked: (1) "Have you seen, heard, or read anything about the killing of Byrd Billings or Melanie Billings at [their address] on or about July 9, 2009?"; (2) "What have you heard or read?"; (3) "Did you form an opinion about the case? Please explain."


text:
    IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES - REPORT NO. 18-01.
    No. SC18-694
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    September 13, 2018
    Laura K. Whitmore, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, Tampa, Florida, Jeffrey Alan Cohen, Vice Chair and Subcommittee Chair, Miami, Florida, and Nichole J. Segal, Filing Subcommittee of the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Petitioner
   PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases (Committee) has submitted proposed changes to the Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases and asks that the Court authorize the amended standard instructions for publication and use. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

The Committee proposes amendments to instructions 402.4 (Medical Negligence) and 402.9 (Preliminary Issues - Vicarious Liability). The Committee's proposals were published in The Florida Bar News and no comments were received that addressed the Committee's proposals, which are straightforward and noncontroversial.

The Committee proposes removing the second paragraph of instruction 402.4a (Medical Negligence), which is derived from section 766.102(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and concerns the standard of care for affirmative medical intervention. The paragraph provides:

If you find that (describe treatment or procedure) involved in this case was carried out in accordance with the prevailing professional standard of care recognized as acceptable and appropriate by similar and reasonably careful [physicians] [hospitals] [health care providers], then, in order to prevail, (claimant) must show by the greater weight of the evidence that his or her injury was not within the necessary or reasonably foreseeable results of the treatment or procedure.

The Committee proposes deleting this paragraph because it is susceptible to varying interpretations as it can be read as instructing the jury that it may find that the defendant acted within the prevailing professional standard of care and still find the defendant liable. See Auster v. Gertrude & Philip Strax Breast Cancer Detection Inst., 649 So.2d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We delete the second paragraph from instruction 402.4a, as proposed.

The Committee also proposes deleting the second Note on Use for instruction 402.4a, which refers to the second paragraph of the instruction, and removing the numbering for the remaining Note on Use. We delete the second Note on Use for 402.4a and remove the numbering for the remaining Note on Use, as proposed.

Next, instruction 402.9a(1) is modified, as proposed by the Committee, to make clear that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of vicarious liability should be based on the circumstances of the parties' dealings with each other and not on the basis of the labels used by them. The Committee determined that the proposed amendment removes ambiguity from the instruction.

Having considered the Committee's report, we authorize the amended instructions, as set forth in the appendix to this opinion, for publication and use. New language is indicated by underlining, and deleted language is indicated by struck-through type. In authorizing the publication and use of these instructions, we express no opinion on their correctness and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instructions. We further caution all interested parties that any comments associated with the instructions reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. The instructions set forth in the appendix shall become effective when this opinion becomes final.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

402.4 MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE

a. Negligence (physician, hospital or other health provider):

Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care on the part of a [physician] [hospital] [health care provider] is that level of care, skill and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by similar and reasonably careful [physicians] [hospitals] [health care providers]. Negligence on the part of a [physician] [hospital] [health care provider] is doing something that a reasonably careful [physician] [hospital] [health care provider] would not do under like circumstances or failing to do something that a reasonably careful [physician] [hospital] [health care provider] would do under like circumstances.

[If you find that(describe treatment or procedure) involved in this case was carried out in accordance with the prevailing professional standard of care recognized as acceptable and appropriate by similar and reasonably careful [physicians] [hospitals] [health care providers], then, in order to prevail,(claimant) must show by the greater weight of the evidence that his or her injury was not within the necessary or reasonably foreseeable results of the treatment or procedure.]

NOTES ON USE FOR 402.4a

1.SeeF.S. 766.102. Instruction 402.4a is derived fromF.S. 766.102(1) and is intended to embody the statutory definition of "prevailing professional standard of care" without using that expression itself, which is potentially confusing.

2. The second bracketed paragraph is derived fromF.S. 766.102(2)(a) and should be given only in cases involving a claim of negligence in affirmative medical intervention.

b. Negligence (treatment without informed consent):

[Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care.] Reasonable care on the part of a [physician] [health care provider] in obtaining the [consent] [informed consent] to treatment of a patient consists of (1). When issue is whether consent was obtained irregularly:

obtaining the consent of the patient [or one whose consent is as effective as the patient's own consent such as (describe)],at a time and in a manner in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice among members of the profession with similar training and experience in the same or a similar medical community.

(2). When issue is whether sufficient information was given:

providing the patient [or one whose informed consent is as effective as the patient's informed consent, such as (describe)]information sufficient to give a reasonable person a general understanding of the proposed treatment or procedure, of any medically acceptable alternative treatments or procedures, and of the substantial risks and hazards inherent in the proposed treatment or procedure which are recognized by other [physicians] [health care providers] in the same or a similar community who perform similar treatments or procedures.

NOTE ON USE FOR 402.4b

This instruction is derived from the provisions ofF.S. 766.103.

c. Foreign bodies:

[Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care.] The presence of (name of foreign body)in (patient's)body establishes negligence unless (defendant(s))prove(s) by the greater weight of the evidence that [he] [she] [it] was not negligent.

NOTES ON USE FOR 402.4c

1. This instruction is derived fromF.S. 766.102(3). The statute uses the term "prima facie evidence of negligence." The committee recommends that term not be used as not helpful to a jury. Rather, the committee has used the definition of prima facie. See,e.g., State v. Kahler, 232 So.2d 166, 168 (Fla. 1970) ("prima facie" means "evidence sufficient to establish a fact unless and until rebutted").

2. Before this instruction is given, the court must make a finding that the foreign body is one that meets the statutory definition. SeeKenyon v. Miller, 756 So.2d 133 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

d. Failure to maintain evidence or keep a record:

(1). Adverse Inference.

If you find that:

(Name of party)[lost] [destroyed] [mutilated] [altered] [concealed] or otherwise caused the (describe evidence)to be unavailable, while it was within [his] [her] [its] possession, custody, or control; and the (describe evidence)would have been material in deciding the disputed issues in this case; then you may, but are not required to, infer that this evidence would have been unfavorable to (name of party).You may consider this, together with the other evidence, in determining the issues of the case.

NOTES ON USE FOR 402.4d(1)

1. This instruction is not intended to limit the trial court's discretion to impose additional or other sanctions or remedies against a party for either inadvertent or intentional conduct in the loss, destruction, mutilation, alteration, concealment, or other disposition of evidence material to a case. See,e.g., Golden Yachts, Inc. v. Hall, 920 So.2d 777, 780 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006);Am. Hosp. Mbmt. Co. of Minnesota v. Hettiger, 904 So.2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005);Jost v Lakeland Reg. Med. Ctr., 844 So.2d 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003);Nationwide Lift Trucks, Inc. v. Smith, 832 So.2d 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002);Torres v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 762 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); andSponco Mfg., Inc. v. Alcover, 656 So.2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

2. The inference addressed in this instruction does not rise to the level of a presumption.Pub. Health Tr. of Dade Cty. v. Valcin, 507 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1987), and Instruction 402.4d(2).

3. This instruction may require modification in the event a factual dispute exists as to which party or person is responsible for the loss of any evidence.

(2). Burden shifting presumption.

The court has determined that (name of party)had a duty to [maintain (describe missing evidence)] [keep a record of (describe subject matter as to which party had record keeping duty)]. (Name of party)did not [maintain (describe missing evidence)][or] [keep a record of (describe subject matter as to which party had record keeping duty)].

Because (name of party)did not [maintain (describe missing evidence)][or] [keep a record of (describe subject matter as to which party had a record keeping duty)],you should find that (name of invoking party)established [his] [her] (describe applicable claim or defense)unless (name of party)proves otherwise by the greater weight of the evidence.

NOTES ON USE FOR 402.4d(2)

1. This instruction applies only when the court has determined that there was a duty to maintain or preserve the missing evidence at issue and the party invoking the presumption has established to the satisfaction of the court that the absence of the missing evidence hinders the other party's ability to establish its claim or defense. SeePub. Health Tr. of Dade Cty. v. Valcin, 507 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1987).

2. This instruction may require modification in the event a factual dispute exists as to which party or person is responsible for the loss of any evidence.

e. Res Ipsa Loquitur:

[Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care.] If you find that ordinarily the [incident] [injury] would not have happened without negligence, and that the (describe the item)causing the injury was in the exclusive control of (defendant)at the time it caused the injury, you may infer that (defendant)was negligent unless, taking into consideration all of the evidence in the case, you find that the (describe event)was not due to any negligence on the part of (defendant).

402.9 PRELIMINARY ISSUES - VICARIOUS LIABILITY

On (claimant's)claim there is a preliminary issue for you to decide. That issue is:

a. Agency:

(1). Employment, including independent contractor and exceptions:

whether (name)was an employee of (defendant)and was acting within the scope of [his] [her] employment at the time and place of the incident in this case. An employee is a person who is hired by (defendant)to act on behalf of (defendant),and whose actions are controlled by (defendant)or are subject to (defendant's)right of control. An employer is responsible for the negligence of an employee if the negligence occurs while the employee is performing services which [he] [she] was employed to perform or while the employee is acting at least in part because of a desire to serve [his] [her] employer and is doing something that is reasonably incidental to [his] [her] employment or something the doing of which was reasonably foreseeable and reasonably to be expected of persons similarly employed.

[But a person is not responsible for the negligence of an independent contractor or of the agents or employees of an independent contractor. An independent contractor is a [person] [business] engaged by another to perform specific work according to [his] [her] [its] own methods and whose methods of performing the work are not controlled by the person engaging [him] [her] [it] and are not subject to that person's right of control. Whether a [person] [business] is an independent contractor is to be determined on the basis of all of the circumstances of the parties' dealings with each other and not on the basis of the labels used by them.

A person is, however, responsible for the negligence of an independent contractor if [the independent contractor is an [actual] [or] [apparent] agent of that person], [the employer did not exercise due care in the [selection] [or] [retention] of the independent contractor] [or] [the employer undertook to perform the services resulting in the injury to (claimant).]*

* The bracketed language contained in the last two paragraphs is only to be used when there is a claim of independent contractor status. SeeCarlisle v. Carnival Corp., 864 So.2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003);Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So.2d 842 (Fla. 2003). If an exception to independent contractor status is claimed, then the applicable portions of the following provisions should also be given.

[ (Name)is an agent if (defendant)authorized [him] [her] to act on (defendant's)behalf.] [ (Name)is an apparent agent if, by words or conduct, (defendant)caused or allowed (claimant)to believe that (name)was an agent of and had authority to act for (defendant).]A person is responsible for the negligence of [his] [her] independent contractor if, at the time and place of the incident, the independent contractor was an [agent] [or] [apparent agent] of the employer and was acting within the scope of his or her [apparent] authority.*

* If the court determines that issues on bothactual agency andapparent agency should be submitted to the jury, both bracketed sections should be used with appropriate transitional language.

[In [hiring] [or] [retaining] another to perform services, the employer must exercise due care to assure that the person is competent to perform the services. A person is responsible for the negligence of [his] [her] independent contractor if, in [hiring] [or] [retaining] the independent contractor, the employer failed to exercise due care.]

Insigna v. LaBella, 543 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1989);F.S. 766.110.

[When a [person] [facility] undertakes to perform services, [he] [she] [it] cannot transfer the obligation to perform those services to an independent contractor and remains responsible for the negligence of [his] [her] independent contractor.]

As to nondelegable duties for treatment, seeWax v. Tenet Health Systems Hospital, Inc., 955 So.2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006);Pope v. Winter Park Healthcare Group, 939 So.2d 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006);Shands Teaching Hospital Clinic, Inc. v. Juliana, 863 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003);Irving v. Doctors Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). There is, however, no civil liability underF.S. 458.320(2)(b) to ensure that staff physicians are financially responsible.Horowitz v. Plantation General Hospital Limited Partnership, 959 So.2d 176 (Fla. 2007).

(2). Agency without claim of independent contractor:

whether (name)is an agent of (defendant)[ (name)is an agent of (defendant)if (defendant)authorized [him] [her] to act on (defendant's)behalf.] [ (name)is an apparent agent if, by words or conduct, (defendant)caused or allowed (claimant)to believe that (name)was an agent of and had authority to act for (defendant).]A person is responsible for the negligence of an [agent] [or] [apparent agent] if at the time and place of the incident complained of the [agent] [or] [apparent agent] is acting within the scope of [his] [her] [apparent] authority.

NOTES ON USE FOR 402.9a(2)

Roessler v. Novak, 858 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003);Orlando Regional Medical Center v. Chmielewski, 573 So.2d 876 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). If the court determines that issues on bothactual agency andapparent agency should be submitted to the jury, both bracketed sections should be used with appropriate transitional language.

b. Joint venture:

whether at the time and place of the incident complained of, (name)was engaged in a joint venture with (defendant)and was acting on behalf of the joint venture and within the scope of its business at the time and place of the incident in this case. A joint venture exists when two or more persons combine their resources or efforts and agree to undertake some particular business transaction in which they have common interests in the purposes to be accomplished, joint control or right of control of the venture, joint ownership interest in the subject matter of the venture and a common right and duty to share in profits and losses. Each member of a joint venture is responsible for the negligence of another member if the other member's negligence occurs while [he] [she] is acting on behalf of the joint venture and to further the purpose of the joint venture.

NOTE ON USE FOR 402.9b

Arango v. Reyka, 507 So.2d 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).


text:
    Ronald NEWMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3687
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 19, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tommy DUNN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3483
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 19, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Calmino F. WOODS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1598
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 19, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert Glen HILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3585
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 17, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Pamela Joyce WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5041
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    August 10, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael T. FREDRICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3566
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    August 8, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Juanita JORDAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2513
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    August 7, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kavon M. GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3290
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 27, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jen CHENG, Appellant, v. Sydney CANFIELD, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1884
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 18, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gregory HARRIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Judge Thomas Rebull, Assistant State Attorney Griska Mena Rodriguez, Assistant State Attorney Steven Demanovich, Assistant State Attorney Natalie Snyder, Assistant Public Defender Kelly Foster, Regional Counsel Jelani Davis and Johnny Broudy, Respondents.
    No. 1D18-2816
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    August 22, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   DENIED.


text:
    U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION as trustee FOR CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP., HOME EQUITY ASSET TRUST 2006-4, HOME EQUITY PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-4, Appellant, v. Linda F. SHARPTON a/k/a Linda Sharpton; Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., Successor by merger to Aames Funding Corporation d/b/a Aames Home Loan; Magnolia Ridge North Homeowners Association, Inc.; Unknown Spouse of Linda F. Sharpton a/k/a Linda Sharpton; Unknown Tenant in Possession of the Subject Property, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-5288
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    August 15, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Keshon B. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-2080
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Darryl SCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0541
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jerry GALLION, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0474
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Omar JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2611
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Shelby KOON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1378
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Terry Ray POPE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0871
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Garrett EURE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0829
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tajmahal MANN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4314
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tony M. MIMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2750
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   DISMISSED.


text:
    Charleston Dywane GRINER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0107
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Donald J. DICKERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1691
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Immanuel WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3103
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1157
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Deavis Nathaniel SAULSBERRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2610
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Russell K. SIMARD, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-817
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    James KING, Appellant, v. Julie L. JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3539
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Anthony Jamaine MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5185
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Julius HEARNS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1981
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Allan KOEDITZ, Petitioner, v. SECOND HARVEST FOOD BANK/ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES, Respondents.
    No. 1D18-1554
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    April Elizabeth TAUSCHER, Appellant, v. James Walter TAUSCHER, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3909
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Anne-Mari ERIKSEN, Appellant, v. Christopher IKNER, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-957
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Scott MEIDE, Appellant, v. Belinda MITCHELL, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1214
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Joseph A. MUSA and Mary Ann Musa, Appellants, v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, AS TRUSTEE OF UPLAND MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST A., Appellee.
    No. 1D18-749
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gerry REALIN, Appellant, v. CITY OF ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT/EMPLOYERS MUTUAL INC., Appellees.
    No. 1D18-0602
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Arthur W. LAUX, Former Husband, Appellant, v. Melissa P. LAUX, Former Wife, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3120
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Danny PEREZ, Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES and Sedgwick CMS, Appellees.
    No. 1D18-0948
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Timothy HIBBARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4744
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gabriel WRIGHT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-5364
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    John H. SCOTT, Appellant, v. Melissa M. SCOTT, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2713
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Christopher Ryan MULLINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5045
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Dwayne Tyrone ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2025
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael J. MCNEIL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-143
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Sharon DENT, Petitioner, v. TARGET CORPORATION/SEDGWICK CMS, Respondents.
    No. 1D18-1551
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Stanislaw CHYLINSKI, Petitioner, v. GAYLORD PALMS/MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.
    No. 1D18-1550
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Nicholas J. KOSTELNY and Julianne L. Kostelny, Appellants, v. BLUEWATER BAY RESORT, LLC, and Europco Management Company of America, LLC, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-3711
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Everett Marshall GARRETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1924
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sherry SCHWEHM, Petitioner/Wife, Appellant, v. Christopher SCHWEHM, Respondent/Husband, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2295
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kristina Leightner WOOLF, Appellant, v. Anthony M. WOOLF, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-267
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jeremy James HURD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3775
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John Henry MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3521
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jason CUSTARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3285
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    James ARNOLD, Appellant, v. THG RENTALS & SALES OF CLEARWATER, INC., and Summit Claims Center., Appellees.
    No. 1D17-2093
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Deoclecio SAMPAIO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4349
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ronald PIKE, Appellant, v. SELECT STAFFING and Corvel Enterprise Corp., Appellees.
    No. 1D17-2595
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Edward F. BENSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-0056
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Joel MARTINEZ, DC# S31701, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2711
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John H. PASCHAL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4840
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 22, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert Shelton BLALOCK, DOC #U16481, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2447
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Russell CLARK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4270
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Justin FORD, DOC #D51823, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4598
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    William BROWN, DOC #H34171, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4708
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Fernando CANTRES, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D13-5571
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 29, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Keontay BAKER, DOC #H0418, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4809
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Theodore ROLLO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-306
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Edward L. WEBB, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-438
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gerald A. MELTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-466
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sean Patrick BRADY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4569
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Melvin CASTELLON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4583
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 13, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    In the INTEREST OF O.R.T., a child.
    T.S.V. and R.E.V., Appellants, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-4216
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Delmar CASTLEBERRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-433
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antwuan BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-347
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Marton Sandor PAL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4081
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Donnis T. FOSTER, DOC #075819, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-256
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Curtis YOUNG, DOC# 363850, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4335
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Willie LAWSON, as parent and guardian of Bryton Lawson, a minor, Petitioner, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 2D18-1023
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Cedric Lavon MICKENS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-904
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Digna ZORRILLA, Appellant, v. Evelyn Leonardo FERNANDEZ, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2453
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Fardous LAMMERS, Appellant, v. Migdallia C. TERRELL, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-780
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 17, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jennifer Apgar REVERDES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3548
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 12, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Marcos FRANCISCO-JIMENEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4960
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Corey MCGHEE, DOC #T09807, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-5075
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.