author: JUSTICE WARD JUSTICE CLARK, JUSTICE SIMON,

text:
    (No. 56118.

      In re ARNIM JOHNSON, Attorney, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 17, 1982.
    Rehearing denied January 28, 1983.

    CLARK, SIMON, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., dissenting.
    James J. Grogan, of Chicago, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
    Arnim Johnson, respondent, pro se.

   JUSTICE WARD

delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a hearing on a complaint filed by the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission which charged professional neglect, a hearing panel of the Commission recommended that Arnim Johnson be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and until the further order of this court. The Review Board of the Commission modified that recommendation and has recommended to us that the respondent attorney simply be suspended from practice for one year. See In re Feder (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 48, 52.

Arnim Johnson was admitted to the bar of this State in 1948. The complaint was in two counts. The first count charged neglect in the handling of a divorce matter and the second count alleged neglect in the handling of a decedent’s estate.

The respondent filed a complaint for divorce in behalf of Jackie Carr in the circuit court of Cook County in June 1977 charging Carr’s wife, Carolyn Louise, with desertion. Ms. Carr was served by publication, and in September the respondent appeared with Carr before a judge of the domestic relations division. The defendant did not appear, and evidence was offered by the respondent to support the complaint for divorce. After the hearing, the respondent and Carr discussed the action taken and Carr testified that he asked the respondent whether or not he could remarry. He said that the attorney replied that he was now free to marry. The respondent denied that the conversation took place. Johnson was paid in full by Carr for his services.

In October 1977 Carr entered into what he believed was a second marriage. After the evidentiary hearing in June the case had been continued for the filing of the transcript and for the entering of a judgment of divorce. The respondent promised to send Carr a copy of his divorce decree. After Carr had made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain a copy, he learned that the respondent had moved his offices to a different address. When he was unsuccessful in further efforts to have the respondent have the judgment of divorce entered, Carr testified that he filed a complaint at the Commission in July 1978. As of the time of the hearing, no transcript of the proceeding had been filed and no judgment had been entered. The pro se brief of the respondent states that at the renewed request of Carr the respondent did have a dissolution-of-marriage decree entered on May 14, 1981.

The second count of the complaint was filed as a result of what was claimed to be the respondent’s improper representation of Mrs. Margaret Johnson as the personal representative of the estate of Lincoln W. Mills. Mrs. Johnson is not related to the respondent. In February 1974 the respondent filed a petition for letters of administration in behalf of Mrs. Johnson in the circuit court of Cook County and she was appointed administrator of the estate of her brother Lincoln W. Mills. In March 1974 the attorney filed a petition for partial attorney fees and was awarded $500. In March he also filed an inventory of the decedent’s property and a bill of appraisal. Mrs. Johnson testified that claims against the estate had been paid by 1976 but that the respondent failed to file a final report and accounting. Mrs. Johnson testified that she asked the respondent on numerous occasions to file a final account and was assured each time that he soon would close the estate. The probate judge to whom the matter was assigned cited Margaret Johnson for contempt and in May 1978 found that she, as the administrator, was obstructing the orderly administration of the estate. The court issued a rule to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court. Mrs. Johnson met with the judge and the judge suggested that she file a complaint against the respondent with the Commission. She did so on July 21, 1978, and on July 24, 1978, the judge found that the respondent had failed to assist her in administering the estate and issued a rule to show cause against him. (It appears that the attorney was not found in contempt of court.) On April 19, 1979, Margaret Johnson was removed as the administrator and the public administrator was appointed to close the estate. This was done on August 14, 1979, without assistance of the respondent.

Before the hearing panel, the respondent, who appeared pro se, stated that the failure to have a decree entered in the Carr matter was simply an oversight and that his efforts to file a transcript and have a judgment entered were frustrated by the failure of Carr to cooperate with him. In the brief filed in this court, the respondent says that the woman whom Carr had believed he was free to marry told the respondent that he had mishandled Carr’s divorce, that she would seek a new attorney, and said that she had refused in behalf of Carr to cooperate with the respondent. The respondent argues, too, that the evidence against him was not clear and convincing.

The respondent testified that the reason he did not file the final report and account in the estate matter was differences he had with Mrs. Johnson, over the amounts to be set out in the final report and account. He contended that the figures presented by Mrs. Johnson for the proposed final report and account contradicted in part the report of inventory and that the report and account presented by her were simply inaccurate.

The hearing panel was unconvinced by the respondent’s defenses. There was no way, it concluded, that the cooperation of Carr would have been required under the circumstances in order to have had a decree of divorce entered and in any event the testimony of Carr contra-dieted any claim of noncooperation.

The panel concluded that in the estate matter if there were differences between the respondent and Mrs. Johnson as to what the report should contain, it was his obligation to withdraw from the administration of the estate if he and the client could not compose their differences. Instead of taking either course, the respondent did nothing, and as a result contempt citations were issued against Mrs. Johnson and the estate incurred additional expense through additional premiums on a personal representative’s bond. Too, the probate court files indicated that the final report and account filed by the public administrator followed substantially the inventory which was filed earlier by Mrs. Johnson. The files showed that there were no objections to the final report and accounting as filed.

We consider that the finding of the panel that the respondent was guilty of professional neglect was supported by clear and convincing evidence. The recommendation of the Review Board is appropriate. In In re Chapman (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 494, 501, this court observed:

“The traditionally high standards of the legal profession impose upon an attorney the duty to represent a client with zeal and diligence, and as we said in In re Taylor, 66 Ill. 2d 567, 571: '*** we find that neglect in the performance of an attorney’s duties to a client can be sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. Suspension is a proper punishment “where a corrupt motive and moral turpitude are not clearly shown.” (In re Ahern (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 69, 74 * * *.)”

The respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

Respondent suspended.

JUSTICE CLARK,

dissenting:

I agree with the majority that the failure of the respondent to fulfill his duties as an attorney to his clients can be enough to warrant discipline. However, I believe the conduct of the respondent was not so egregious that it warranted the penalty of a one-year suspension.

The majority opinion cites to In re Chapman (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 494, 501, in support of the proposition that in a case where an attorney has neglected the responsibilities as a representative of his client “ ‘[suspension is a proper punishment “where a corrupt motive and moral turpitude are not clearly shown.” (In re Ahern (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 69, 74 ***.)’ ” Chapman involved an attorney who, like the respondent in the instant case, had not been previously charged with unprofessional conduct. In Chapman this court concluded that a three-month suspension was appropriate when the attorney had failed to prosecute three appeals. There was no clear showing in Chapman that two of the respondent’s clients had suffered any substantial harm. However, because of the attorney’s failure to act, one client was denied an appeal. It was recommended by the Hearing Board that the respondent in Chapman be suspended for a period of three years. While the Review Board had agreed, this court, in considering the circumstances of the case, concluded that a three-month suspension was an appropriate sanction.

It is important that this court be uniform in sanctioning attorneys for similar misconduct. The respondent’s clients here did not suffer any substantial harm. I, therefore, do not believe this respondent should be penalized more severely than the respondent in Chapman.

In In re Kink (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 293, an attorney negligently handled three estates which caused a delay in the receipt of estate funds. We concluded there that the respondent should be censured. I do not see a significant difference in the respondent’s conduct in the instant case.

I feel a suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months would be more consistent with our prior orders in similar cases and, given the facts and circumstances here, I believe a three-month suspension would be a sufficient punishment.

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH joins in this dissent.

JUSTICE SIMON,

also dissenting:

The one-year suspension imposed by the majority in this case is too severe when compared with the punishments imposed on attorneys who have engaged in conduct similar to that of the respondent.

In choosing the appropriate sanctions to impose on attorneys in disciplinary proceedings we should carefully consider the recommendations of the boards, but “the final responsibility for imposing discipline rests with this court.” (In re Schuyler (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 6, 18.) In determining the appropriate sanction in a particular case, we are to consider any relevant mitigating or aggravating factors that are unique to the case. (In re O’Hallaren (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 426, 433.) In several cases, however, we have also emphasized that “ ‘[predictability and fairness require that there be a degree of consistency in the sanctions imposed for similar types of conduct ***.’ (In re Hopper (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 318, 324.) Sanctions should be imposed consistent with those imposed in cases with factual situations substantially similar to the case under consideration.” In re Freel (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 263, 270; see also In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7,11; In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 276, 283.

The majority’s imposition of a one-year suspension is not accompanied by a careful examination of the cases in which other attorneys have been found guilty of neglecting their client’s matters. Instead, the majority simply observes that suspension is a proper punishment in cases in which a corrupt motive and moral turpitude are not shown. In many cases of professional neglect suspension is a proper remedy, but in many other cases of this type censure has also been considered a proper remedy. (See In re Kink (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 293; In re Ahem (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 69.) Only by reviewing the punishments imposed in similar cases of professional neglect can we establish a fair and proper punishment for this respondent as well as one consistent with the sanctions imposed on others.

A review of these cases illustrates that suspension has been limited to cases of outrageous neglect and irresponsibility. For example, in In re Taylor (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 567, and In re Simpson (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 562, the attorney-respondents were each suspended for one year because they completely neglected matters entrusted to them by clients after money had been paid in advance for fees and costs. In Simpson the court emphasized the outrageous character of the attorney’s conduct: “His unprofessional conduct was not merely failing to do the work he should have done *** but *** failing even to commence the divorce action, destroying the file, and remaining incommunicado from his client for over two years, while retaining the fee paid to obtain the divorce ***.” (47 Ill. 2d 562, 566.) Moreover, in Simpson the attorney had apparently converted to his own use money that had been entrusted to him by a client for the purchase of a surety bond. Other disciplinary cases in which this court has imposed suspension involve similar circumstances of complete neglect and outrageous conduct. See, e.g., In re Levin (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 205 (clients’ action dismissed because attorney failed to provide answers to interrogatories, to produce clients for depositions, and to obtain documentation of alleged settlement agreement); In re Chapman (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 494 (two clients denied appeals because of attorney’s neglect; attorney misrepresented to clients the status of their cases).

The respondent’s conduct, although reprehensible, is not as outrageous as that of the attorneys in Taylor and Chapman. The principal basis for the charge of neglect in the estate matter involves the respondent’s failure to file the final account despite numerous inquiries from his client. The principal basis for the charge of neglect in the divorce matter is the respondent’s failure to prepare and submit to the court the final decree of divorce. In both matters the respondent performed considerable legal work, but through oversight and mistaken judgment, and probably also through inattention to responsibility, he failed to complete the entrusted matters.

The respondent’s conduct appears to be no worse than the conduct of the attorney-respondents in In re Kink (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 293, and In re Ahern (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 69, cases where the attorney received a censure. In Ahern an attorney was censured for failing to complete properly matters that had been entrusted to him by clients and for which he had already received a fee. In one matter he had been asked to obtain a marriage annulment. He had filed a complaint but had failed to obtain the appropriate decree. In another matter the attorney represented the executor of an estate. He procured the admission of the will but was thereafter unable to proceed because of an alleged dispute with the executor. In finding that censure was the most appropriate penalty this court observed that the attorney’s “misconduct, altho[ugh] it involves an error in judgment, is not shown to have resulted from corrupt motives.” 23 Ill. 2d 69, 74.

In Kink an attorney was also censured for failing to complete properly three estate matters entrusted to him. This court found that he had failed to close two estates, had misrepresented the status of the matters to his clients, and had been evasive in failing to respond to his client’s inquiries. In deciding that the attorney in Kink should be censured this court distinguished Taylor and Chapman, in which suspensions had been imposed. In doing so the court observed that “[although respondent was negligent and dilatory in representing his clients’ interest, he did render some services on their behalf.”

I believe that the majority’s decision to suspend Amim Johnson for one year is inconsistent with Kink and Ahem. The respondent’s shortcomings are substantially equivalent to the shortcomings of the attorneys in those cases, and fairness requires that he receive a comparable penalty. I would therefore censure him instead of imposing a one-year suspension.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM:

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 56759.

      In re SYED MOHAMMED JAWAID IQBAL JAFREE, Attorney, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 17, 1982.
    Rehearing denied January 28, 1983.

      James J. Grogan, of Chicago (John C. O’Malley, of counsel), for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
    Syed M. J. Iqbal Jafree, respondent, pro se.

   PER CURIAM:

The Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission filed a three-count complaint before the Commission charging respondent, Syed Jafree, with professional misconduct. The complaint alleged that respondent instituted numerous defamatory and frivolous lawsuits, appeals and administrative actions. The Hearing Board recommended that he be disbarred, and the Review Board adopted that recommendation.

Three issues are presented for review: (1) whether this court has jurisdiction; (2) whether the Administrator proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent instituted frivolous and defamatory litigation; (3) what sanction, if any, is appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

Respondent was admitted to practice law in Illinois in 1972, and shortly thereafter was appointed an assistant Attorney General for this State. His employment was terminated in 1973, at which time he filed a civil rights action against the former Attorney General, William Scott. The suit was eventually dismissed for want of prosecution. Subsequently, respondent filed a number of appeals and other lawsuits in Federal courts, naming as defendants William Scott, certain judges, lawyers, lay people, and a former President of the United States. Essentially, respondent charged defendants with employment discrimination and other civil rights violations. He sued both in his own name and on behalf of others. The suits were generally dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, failure to file pleadings within the time allowed by court, or neglecting to pay court fees or to post bond.

In 1977, this court granted the Administrator’s motion for an order requiring respondent to submit to a mental examination. He refused and was suspended from the practice of law until such time as he complied with the order. Respondent eventually submitted to the examination and was permitted to resume his legal practice.

In 1979, the Commission began investigating respondent’s litigation practices, and his alleged abusive and defamatory criticisms of the judiciary. A complaint was voted by the Inquiry Board in early June of 1980. On June 11, 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an order in Jafree v. Scott (No. 79—1231), affirming the district court’s dismissal of respondent’s civil rights complaint. In so holding, the court noted respondent’s history of vexatious litigation, and concluded its order with the following statement:

“In light of [respondent’s] repeated failure to conform his practice in this court to an acceptable standard, and out of our concern for the administration of justice and the public interest, we are submitting the history of Jafree’s litigation in [this] court to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission for further action.”

Count II of the Administrator’s complaint was based upon the above order.

Following the institution of the complaint, respondent filed several suits in the Federal district court, seeking to enjoin the present disciplinary proceeding. In one of these suits, he named over 50 defendants, including members of this court, members of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Federal district court judges. He also sued unnamed parties under the fictitious name “Judgeso N. Thetake.” Respondent’s defamatory and conclusional complaint alleged an ongoing conspiracy between the defendants to violate his constitutional rights.

Respondent also petitioned this court to dismiss the complaint and requested four days of oral argument relative to this motion. In the event we refused to dismiss the proceedings, respondent requested that a public hearing on the merits be conducted for six or seven months. He did not, however, respond to the complaint or appear at the proceedings before the Hearing Board. Consequently, and pursuant to the Administrator’s motion, the allegations of the complaint were deemed admitted.

We first address the issue of whether this court has jurisdiction over the cause. Respondent raises a number of arguments, many of which are vague, irrelevant and conclusional, in support of his allegation that this court lacks jurisdiction. He initially contends that he was never served with process. The evidence indicates otherwise. An affidavit attesting to proof of service was filed with the Commission. John W. Stephenson, the affiant and an investigator for the Commission, stated that he served respondent with the complaint during the afternoon of January 27, 1981. He indicated that he approached respondent on a comer of Dearborn Street in Chicago and showed to him the first page of the complaint. Respondent stated that he would not accept any documents and proceeded to walk away. Stephenson followed, and attempted to convince him to accept the papers, but he refused. Eventually, Stephenson told him that he should consider himself served, and placed the documents on respondent’s shoulder. The papers fell to the sidewalk and Stephenson then departed. He stated that he was unsure whether respondent retrieved the documents.

The affidavit of service should be considered prima facie evidence that the process was properly served. It should not be set aside unless the return has been impeached by clear and satisfactory evidence. (Cf. Marnik v. Cusack (1925), 317 Ill. 362, 364 (same principle with regard to a sheriff’s return); see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 13.2(1).) The evidence indicating a lack of service is respondent’s own assertion, and his Ghent’s affidavit stating that she was with him on January 27, 1981, and that no one served him with process. (The affidavit was included in respondent’s brief.) It is unclear whether this affidavit was presented to the Commission, but in any case, the hearing panel was justified in accepting as true Stephenson’s affidavit. See 73 Ill. 2d R. 105(b)(1).

Further, it is interesting that respondent claims to have had no knowledge of the pending complaint, and yet he requested this court to dismiss if. He stated in a letter that he “reliably learned” a complaint was voted against him. Although the service was somewhat irregular due to respondent’s conduct, we agree with the Hearing Board that, under the circumstances, the service was sufficient.

In a related contention, respondent argues that Stephenson could not properly serve him with process because he is an agent of Carl Rolewick, the Administrator. Respondent stated that “[ejxpecting Master Rolewick to effect genuine service through one of his servants is an invitation for trouble, and is like letting the fox look after the chicken coop.” However, service may be made “by any person over 21 years of age not a party to the action.” (73 Ill. 2d R. 105(b)(1).) Stephenson was not a party to these proceedings, and the service was in compliance with our rule.

Respondent next asserts that the court of appeals may not properly “beef” to this court regarding his conduct. He argues that the cause should have been remanded to the Federal district court for disciplinary action because his alleged misconduct occurred in the Federal courts. As noted by the Administrator, “[tjhis court has the inherent power to *** discipline attorneys who have been admitted to practice before it.” (In re Mitan (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 118, 123, cert. denied (1979), 444 U.S. 916, 62 L. Ed. 2d 171, 100 S. Ct. 231.) That certain instances of respondent’s alleged misconduct occurred before other tribunals does not affect our power, and indeed duty, to consider the propriety of his conduct.

Respondent urges a number of other reasons why only the Federal courts may impose upon him any necessary sanctions. His arguments are generally unsupported, irrelevant and scurrilous. For example, he accuses the court of appeals of referring his misconduct to the Commission in order to avoid exposing the improper activities of Federal court judges. Respondent continually asserts that the Seventh Circuit acted in bad faith, and states that “[i]t cannot eat and keep its cakes, or talk turkey from both ends of its mouth.” Other than to note the extreme impropriety of such statements, they merit no further comment.

Respondent alleges that the Administrator has acted improperly and that such impropriety is attributable to this court. Therefore, it is urged that we lack jurisdiction to consider the cause. As with the majority of respondent’s assertions, this syllogism is supported neither in the record nor the law. Respondent is obsessed with alleging the misconduct of others and says little of relevance in his own defense.

Respondent urges that it would violate his due process and first amendment rights to sanction him for filing frivolous lawsuits. He argues that the term “frivolous” is unclear, overbroad and subjective. We do not consider the word “frivolous” to be a term which is so vague and ambiguous as to deny notice of what conduct is improper. Indeed, respondent himself cites in his brief the meaning of “frivolous,” as defined in the dictionary. Therefore, there is no violation of due process. Similarly, sanctioning a respondent for filing frivolous suits does not violate the first amendment. “While attorneys are not to be denied access to our courts, they will not be permitted to abuse the license and privilege to practice law by instituting groundless lawsuits ***.” (In re Sarelas (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 87, 98, cert. denied (1972), 406 U.S. 968, 32 L. Ed. 2d 666, 92 S. Ct. 2412.) Respondent’s other constitutional objections are also without merit.

It is next asserted that this court lacks jurisdiction because of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Apart from the question of how these doctrines might apply in disciplinary cases, they are clearly not applicable here. In this case the Administrator previously brought a petition under Rule 758 requesting this court to transfer respondent to inactive status. Pursuant to this rule, an attorney may be placed on an inactive status when he “is incapacitated from continuing to practice law by reason of *** mental disorder.” (73 Ill. 2d R. 758.) Respondent argues that this court’s dismissal of the petition operates as a bar to the present proceeding. However, an adjudication on a Rule 758 petition is not the equivalent of a disciplinary action. In the latter, the issue is whether respondent has engaged in misconduct. In a Rule 758 proceeding, the action brought relates to a respondent’s mental capacity to practice law. A determination respecting such capacity does not preclude a disciplinary action based on misconduct.

Finally, respondent alleges that “[t]his court lacks *** the impartiality and appearance of fairness which are necessary” to decide this cause. We find no support for these claims, and aside from various conclusional allegations, respondent points to none.

We next consider whether the Administrator proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent instituted frivolous and defamatory lawsuits. Respondent argues that he filed the lawsuits in good faith, and that but for “judicial corruption” he would have prevailed. The record is replete with evidence which belies this contention. As previously noted, respondent failed to respond to the complaint after being served with process. The Commission therefore deemed the facts of the complaint as admitted. On the basis of these facts and the numerous exhibits introduced into evidence, the Commission found that respondent filed approximately 30 frivolous lawsuits, 15 groundless appeals, and numerous vexatious claims before State agencies.

A hearing panel’s determination “is accorded substantially the same weight as that of any trier of fact with respect to the resolution of factual matters.” (In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7, 10, citing In re Hopper (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 318, 323.) The panel determined that the Administrator proved the allegations in the complaint, and we find this decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

We have reviewed documents, complaints, and certain lawsuits filed by respondent. In addition, the Administrator cites in his brief numerous cases which respondent concedes he instituted. For example, he sued on behalf of all the trees in the United States to have the forma pauperis forms used in the Federal district court declared unconstitutional. (Financially Poor People ex rel. Jafree, Asian American Community Legal Aid Clinic and Trees of the United States of America v. Executive Committee of the United States District Court and the United States of America minus Jafree et al. (N.D. Ill.), 78 C 1815.) He filed suit against law schools seeking to have law degrees awarded to him nunc pro tunc (e.g., Jafree v. University of Chicago Law School (N.D. Ill.), 77 C 3453); he sued several individuals for breaching the United States Treaty of Friendship with Pakistan (Jafree v. Price et al. (N.D. Ill.), 77 C 1225); and he filed a complaint against William Scott with the Pollution Control Board alleging pollution of the mind and contamination of the air with character assassination. (Jafree v. Illinois Attorney General, PCB 76—286.) It would be fruitless to recite all the cases instituted by respondent in the past nine years. Despite his protestations to the contrary, it seems clear that respondent’s purpose is to harass defendants with vexatious claims. As one judge stated:

“The court is not unaware of the multitude of abortive actions filed in recent years by plaintiff Jafree against the present defendants, especially Scott. This history of litigation cannot help but reflect on Jafree’s good faith and motivations.” People ex rel. Waxman v. Herzog (N.D. Ill. 1978), 455 F.Supp. 523, 524.

The remaining question concerns what sanction, if any, should be imposed. Our research reveals no Illinois case in which an attorney has escaped sanction for misconduct similar to that involved herein. The final responsibility for the imposition of discipline rests with this court. (In re Hopper (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 318, 323.) In determining the appropriate sanction, we must consider all the facts and circumstances. “Nevertheless, where the facts are similar to those in other cases, a uniform standard of discipline should be sought.” In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7, 11, citing In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 276, 283.

It is clear that filing frivolous and defamatory lawsuits is conduct warranting disbarment. (People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Metzen (1919), 291 Ill. 55.) This is particularly true where, as here, the respondent also manifests an abusive and offensive attitude toward the judiciary. In Metzen, the attorney brought one unauthorized suit against a judge, intimidated the judge, and released a story to the press concerning the suit. In disbarring the attorney, this court stated:

“Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges, personally, by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted.” 291 Ill. 55, 58.

In the instant case, it was found that respondent filed over 40 groundless lawsuits and appeals, and made numerous scurrilous and defamatory statements about the judiciary, and certain judges. In light of the result reached in Metzen, it would be anomalous to impose, in this case, any sanction less than disbarment. Further, the cases in which the respondent was suspended for filing frivolous lawsuits are distinguishable from the instant case.

In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Standidge (1928), 333 Ill. 361, the attorney instituted a suit against three appellate court judges who had previously ruled against him in a case. He charged that the judges had “wantonly” made false findings in reaching their decision. Although this was the only instance of misconduct, this court suspended the attorney from the practice of law for six months.

In In re Mason (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 53, an attorney instituted a suit against a judge who “restrained” him for one weekend pending a hearing on a mental illness petition. The attorney requested a reporter to print a story concerning the suit. This court found that the lawsuit was filed for the purpose of bringing the judiciary into disrepute. It was also noted that the attorney tended to engage in unconventional behavior. He was suspended for a period of one year.

The attorney in In re Phelps (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 319, was charged in a three-count complaint with misconduct arising out of a divorce action. Count I alleged that she filed in the appellate court a defamatory and frivolous petition charging circuit court judges with the commission of illegal acts. In count II it was charged that the attorney filed an action in the Federal district court seeking damages from certain judges and attorneys, and charging the judges with acting in a discriminatory manner. Count III alleged that the attorney filed with this court documents containing defamatory statements regarding members of the judiciary. Each of these charges arose out of one cause of action prosecuted by the attorney. This court adopted the recommendation of the Board of Governors and suspended the attorney for two years and until further order of this court.

Finally, in In re Sarelas (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 87, the attorney was suspended for two years and until further order of this court for filing approximately 15 frivolous lawsuits and appeals. However, the opinion emphasized that “[t]he evidence clearly warrants the disbarment of the respondent,” and that “[h]e has exhibited a continuous course of conduct of the type which we have found sufficient, in a single incident, to warrant disbarment.” 50 Ill. 2d 87, 98, citing People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Metzen (1919), 291 Ill. 55.

In the instant case, respondent has practiced law in Illinois for approximately 10 years. As previously noted, he was suspended once for failing to comply with an order of this court. He has made it clear that he refuses to recognize the authority of the Administrator and harbors extreme contempt for the judicial system and members of the judiciary. Since admittance to the bar of this State, respondent’s legal career has been characterized by the filing of frivolous lawsuits and scurrilous charges. He continuously repeats irrelevant and unfounded charges against everyone whom he feels has wronged him. For example, respondent refers to the Administrator as “Rolewicked,” and accuses him of tampering with his mail. He imagines that a number of judges are engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to deprive him of his rights. In a previous written request for subpoenas, which respondent included in his brief, he asserts that one judge threatened to accuse him of rape. Further, “agents” of Scott and Rolewick attempted to purchase pornographic “information” about him. He also claimed that his cases were dismissed to cover up Scott’s own activities.

We cannot help but conclude that respondent is incapable of conforming his conduct to an acceptable standard. His unprofessionalism is an abuse of the privilege to practice law and clearly tends to bring the judicial system and legal profession into disrepute. Accordingly, we adopt the recommendations of the hearing panel and Review Board and order that respondent be disbarred.

Respondent disbarred.