author: CANADY, C.J. QUINCE, J., dissenting.

text:
    Diego TAMBRIZ-RAMIREZ, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC17-713
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [July 12, 2018]
    Rocco J. Carbone, III, Law Offices of Rocco J. Carbone, III, PLLC, St. Augustine, Florida, for Petitioner
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Mark J. Hamel, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Respondent
   CANADY, C.J.

In this case we consider whether convictions for aggravated assault, attempted sexual battery, and burglary with an assault or battery, which arose during a single criminal episode, violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. We have for review Tambriz-Ramirez v. State , 213 So.3d 920, 923-25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that because burglary with an assault or battery does not necessarily include an aggravated assault or attempted sexual battery, Tambriz-Ramirez's convictions do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. The Fourth District certified conflict with Dykes v. State, 200 So.3d 162 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), Hankins v. State , 164 So.3d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), Smith v. State , 154 So.3d 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), McGhee v. State , 133 So.3d 1137 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), Green v. State , 120 So.3d 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), Estremera v. State , 107 So.3d 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), White v. State , 753 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), and Baldwin v. State , 790 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons we explain, we approve the Fourth District's decision in Tambriz-Ramirez and disapprove the conflicting decisions to the extent that they conflict with this opinion. We also disapprove the decision of the Fifth District in Farrier v. State , 145 So.3d 199 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of the case as set forth in the Fourth District's opinion below are as follows:

[In 2010, a]rmed with a knife and using a shirt as a mask, appellant broke into the victim's home at night and attempted to sexually batter her. The victim testified that during the attack, appellant put the knife to her face and neck. The victim fought off the attacker and, after pulling off the mask, recognized appellant, whom she knew. Appellant ultimately confessed his guilt to police and sent letters to the victim before trial, apologizing and asking her to drop the charges.
The State charged appellant as follows: Count 1, Burglary of a Dwelling with an Assault or Battery While Armed and Masked; Count 2, Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon While Masked; and Count 3, Attempted Sexual Battery-Person 12 Years of Age or Older-Using Great Force or a Deadly Weapon.
The jury convicted appellant as charged on all counts and in a special interrogatory on the verdict form for Count 1 found that during the commission of the burglary he was armed or became armed with "a deadly weapon." The court sentenced him to life in prison for the burglary, a consecutive 15 years in prison for the aggravated assault, and a consecutive 30 years in prison for the attempted sexual battery. Following this Court's remand on direct appeal, appellant was resentenced to 15 years in prison for the attempted sexual battery. See Tambriz-Ramirez [v. State ], 112 So.3d [767,] 768 [ (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ].
Appellant filed a timely amended motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 raising various issues, including a claim that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to raise a double jeopardy violation. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and entered an order denying all of appellant's claims. As to the double jeopardy issue, the trial court concluded that the outcome of the proceedings would not have differed because appellant received a life sentence.

Tambriz-Ramirez , 213 So.3d at 921.

On appeal from the denial of his motion for postconviction relief, Tambriz-Ramirez argued that the trial court erred in concluding that no prejudice occurred in the alleged double jeopardy violation and that Count 2, aggravated assault, and Count 3, attempted sexual battery, were subsumed within Count 1, burglary with an assault or battery, and therefore violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Id. The district court agreed that the trial court erred in concluding that Tambriz-Ramirez was not "prejudiced" by the alleged double jeopardy violation but nonetheless affirmed the denial of relief, concluding that because neither aggravated assault nor attempted sexual battery is subsumed within the offense of burglary with an assault or battery, Tambriz-Ramirez's convictions for separate offenses arising from this same criminal episode did not violate double jeopardy. Id. at 922.

The district court explained that because burglary with an assault or battery does not necessarily include an aggravated assault, aggravated assault is not subsumed within a burglary with an assault or battery offense. Id. at 923. "Simply stated, a defendant can commit a burglary with an assault or battery without also committing an aggravated assault." Id. For analogous reasons, the district court also rejected Tambriz-Ramirez's claim that his attempted sexual battery conviction is subsumed within his burglary with an assault or battery conviction. Id. at 925 (citing State v. Nardi , 779 So.2d 596, 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("[T]he offenses of attempted sexual battery and burglary of a dwelling with battery do not violate double jeopardy principles.")).

In certifying conflict with decisions of the First and Fifth Districts, the Fourth District explained:

[S]ome decisions of the First and Fifth District Courts of Appeal have held that convictions for burglary with an assault and aggravated assault violate double jeopardy. In reaching this conclusion, these courts may have relied on the fact the defendant was charged and convicted of using or being armed with a firearm as to both the burglary and aggravated assault offenses. For example, in Baldwin v. State , 790 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), the First District held:
Because all of the elements of the crime of aggravated assault with a firearm are contained within the crime of burglary with assault while armed with a firearm, Baldwin's dual convictions are in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy.
Id. at 435 ; see also Smith v. State , 154 So.3d 523, 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (concluding that aggravated assault convictions were subsumed within a conviction for armed burglary with assault); McGhee v. State , 133 So.3d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (reversing "the conviction for aggravated assault with a firearm because it is subsumed into the greater offense of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery while armed with a firearm"); Green v. State , 120 So.3d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (same); Estremera v. State , 107 So.3d 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (same); White v. State , 753 So.2d 668, 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (same); cf. Dykes v. State, 200 So.3d 162, 163 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (remanding a rule 3.850 claim for the trial court to determine "if double jeopardy bars [defendant]'s convictions for aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated assault with a firearm because they were subsumed into the greater offense of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery with a firearm"); Hankins v. State , 164 So.3d 738, 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (granting relief where the State conceded that "convictions for aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated assault with a firearm violate double jeopardy because they were subsumed into the greater offense of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery with a firearm").
These holdings cannot be reconciled with the requirement that the [double jeopardy] analysis be conducted "without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial ." § 775.021(4)(a) Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis [added] ). These cases seem to improperly focus on the fact that the burglary and assault offenses were charged and proven with a firearm . Much of the confusion may arise because the reviewing courts looked at the title of the charges, the specific allegations in the charging document, or the jury's findings in its verdict, instead of looking exclusively to the statutory elements of the offenses. In any event, as is now clear, courts should not look beyond the statutory elements when conducting a double jeopardy analysis.
Accordingly, we certify conflict with the decisions of the First and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in Dykes , Hankins , McGhee , Green , Estremera , Baldwin , Smith and White , which hold that an aggravated assault offense is subsumed within a burglary with an assault or battery.

Id. at 924-25 (second alteration in original).

Based on the certified conflict, Tambriz-Ramirez petitioned this Court to invoke its discretionary jurisdiction and we granted his petition. This review follows.

II. ANALYSIS

The double jeopardy clauses, contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, prohibit the imposition of multiple punishments for the same criminal offense. U.S. Const. amend. V ; art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. But the double jeopardy clauses do not prohibit multiple punishments for different offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction or episode if the Legislature intended to authorize separate punishments. Valdes v. State , 3 So.3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009). "The Double Jeopardy Clause 'presents no substantive limitation on the legislature's power to prescribe multiple punishments,' but rather, 'seeks only to prevent courts either from allowing multiple prosecutions or from imposing multiple punishments for a single, legislatively defined offense.' " Borges v. State , 415 So.2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 1982) (quoting State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343, 1345 (Fla. 1981) ). Double jeopardy claims based on undisputed facts present questions of law and are subject to de novo review. State v. Drawdy , 136 So.3d 1209, 1213 (Fla. 2014).

Where multiple criminal offenses occur in the course of a single criminal episode or transaction, courts employ the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), which is codified at section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes, to determine whether receiving separate punishments for each offense violates double jeopardy. Id. As codified in Florida, that test provides:

(4)(a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.

§ 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009) ; see also Blockburger , 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180 ("The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."). If the offenses are separate, such that multiple punishments are authorized for the same criminal act, courts next look to the exceptions found in section 775.021(4)(b). That subsection reads:

(b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this rule of construction are:
1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof.
2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.
3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.

§ 775.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). "Where even a single act constitutes multiple separate criminal offenses, as defined in section 775.021(4)(a), the offender must be sentenced separately for each offense unless one of the three exceptions in section 775.021(4)(b) applies." Roughton v. State , 185 So.3d 1207, 1210 (Fla. 2016).

The certified conflict here arises from the failure of the First and Fifth Districts to properly apply section 775.021 in the line of conflict cases. In the earliest of the conflict cases, Baldwin , decided on March 6, 2000, Baldwin was convicted of "one count of first degree burglary of a dwelling with assault while armed with a firearm and one count of aggravated assault with a firearm." 790 So.2d at 434 (footnote omitted). The entirety of the First District's double jeopardy analysis in Baldwin is as follows:

Baldwin also challenges his dual convictions on the grounds that the convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Because all of the elements of the crime of aggravated assault with a firearm are contained within the crime of burglary with assault while armed with a firearm, Baldwin's dual convictions are in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. Henderson v. State , 727 So.2d 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

Id. at 435. Three days later, on March 9, 2000, in White , the First District again relied on Henderson in finding a double jeopardy violation. White , 753 So.2d at 669 ("Because all of the elements of the crime of aggravated assault with a firearm are contained within the crime of burglary with assault while armed with a firearm, White's dual convictions are in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. Henderson v. State , 727 So.2d 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)."). In Henderson , Henderson contended "and the State concede[d]" that his convictions for "burglary and aggravated assault," "violate[d] double jeopardy." 727 So.2d at 285-86. The Second District concluded that because the assault consisted of Henderson pointing a firearm at his girlfriend after breaking into her house and the assault arose out of the burglary, there was a double jeopardy violation. Id. at 286. But before either Baldwin or White was decided, the Second District had already receded from Henderson on January 12, 2000, in Washington v. State , 752 So.2d 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

In Washington , Washington contended that his convictions for burglary with a battery and aggravated battery constituted a double jeopardy violation. 752 So.2d at 17. Unlike in Henderson , the Second District in Washington cited and applied section 775.021(4), concluding "that since the State must prove an additional element to convict on an aggravated battery charge, as opposed to a simple battery charge, subsection 775.[0]21(4) authorizes separate punishments for first-degree burglary with a battery and aggravated battery." Id. at 17-18. The Second District stated:

This appeal compels us to revisit our decision in Henderson v. State , 727 So.2d 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), from which we now recede to the extent that it conflicts with our decision here. The State convicted Henderson of first-degree burglary with an assault and aggravated assault. See id. This court reversed Henderson's aggravated assault conviction after the State conceded error. See id. at 286. Our opinion in Henderson cited several cases in support of its holding; however, upon closer review, those decisions are distinguishable from Henderson and the case sub judice .

Id. at 18 (footnote omitted). It is clear to us that Baldwin and White erroneously relied on Henderson , failed to conduct a proper double jeopardy analysis, and were wrongly decided.

The next conflict case to be decided was Estremera by the Fifth District in 2013. Estremera challenged his convictions for aggravated assault with a firearm and burglary with an assault while armed with a firearm on the grounds that the convictions violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. 107 So.3d at 512. The Fifth District also relied on White (which erroneously relied on Henderson ) to conclude that a double jeopardy violation occurred because "[a]ll of the elements of the crime of aggravated assault with a firearm are contained within the crime of burglary with assault while armed with a firearm." Id. (quoting White , 753 So.2d at 669 ).

Seven months after Estremera , the First District decided Green . Green argued that his convictions for burglary with an assault or battery while armed with a firearm and aggravated assault with a firearm constituted a double jeopardy violation. 120 So.3d at 1277. Relying on White and Estremera , the First District concluded that "because all of the elements of the crime of aggravated assault with a firearm are contained within the crime of burglary with an assault while armed with a firearm, convictions for both the burglary and the aggravated assault violate the prohibition against double jeopardy." Id. at 1278 (citing White , 753 So.2d at 669 ; Estremera , 107 So.3d 511 ).

In 2014, McGhee was decided by the Fifth District. McGhee argued that because his convictions for burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery and aggravated assault with a firearm "involve[d] the same victim and occurred in the same incident, the convictions for battery and aggravated assault with a firearm violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy." 133 So.3d at 1138. Citing Green (citing Estremera ) and White , the Fifth District agreed and "reverse[d] his conviction for aggravated assault with a firearm because it is subsumed into the greater offense of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery while armed with a firearm." Id.

The First District decided Smith in 2015, in which it relied on Green and White to conclude that Smith's "aggravated assault convictions (counts III and IV) violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because those offenses are subsumed within his conviction for armed burglary with an assault (count I)." 154 So.3d at 524.

Also in 2015, the Fifth District decided Hankins . Hankins argued that "his convictions for aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated assault with a firearm violate double jeopardy because they were subsumed into the greater offense of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery with a firearm." 164 So.3d at 738. The Fifth District concluded that the State's concession of error was proper and reversed the convictions for aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated assault with a firearm, citing McGhee , 133 So.3d at 1138-39, and Farrier , 145 So.3d at 199-200 ("[reversing] both convictions for aggravated assault with a firearm because they were subsumed into the greater offense of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery with a firearm"). Id.

The most recent of the conflict cases is Dykes , decided by the Fifth District in 2016. Dykes contended that his convictions for burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery with a firearm, aggravated battery with a firearm, and aggravated assault with a firearm violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. 200 So.3d at 162-63. The Fifth District agreed, citing McGhee and Estremera for support. Id. at 163.

None of the decisions in the eight conflict cases contains a proper double jeopardy analysis in accordance with section 775.021. Instead, they all rely on cases in a line which can be traced back to the erroneous decisions in Baldwin and White . When a proper double jeopardy analysis is conducted in accordance with section 775.021(4)(b) and our recent decision in Roughton , 185 So.3d 1207, it is clear that Tambriz-Ramirez's convictions do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

The Fourth District below conducted a proper double jeopardy analysis in this case:

Appellant's double jeopardy claim is based on his contention that the aggravated assault and attempted sexual battery offenses are "subsumed within" the burglary offense. In relevant part, the burglary statute provides:
[ (1)(b) For offenses committed after July 1, 2001, "burglary" means:
1. Entering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein ....]
(2) Burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender:
(a) Makes an assault or battery upon any person; or
(b) Is or becomes armed within the dwelling, structure, or conveyance, with explosives or a dangerous weapon; or
(c) Enters an occupied or unoccupied dwelling or structure, and:
1. Uses a motor vehicle as an instrumentality, other than merely as a getaway vehicle, to assist in committing the offense, and thereby damages the dwelling or structure; or
2. Causes damage to the dwelling or structure, or to property within the dwelling or structure in excess of $1,000.

§ 810.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2009).

(1) An "aggravated assault" is an assault:
(a) With a deadly weapon without intent to kill; or
(b) With an intent to commit a felony.
§ 784.021, Fla. Stat. (2009). A simple "assault" is "an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent." § 784.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2009).
Appellant was charged and convicted of a first-degree felony burglary with an assault or battery , and he was also found to have been armed with a deadly weapon during the burglary. His aggravated assault was based on his use of the same deadly weapon . However, the analysis must be conducted "without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial ." § 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). The Florida Supreme Court emphasized this in Roughton , where it held that, when considering a statute that proscribes conduct in the alternative (offenses that can be committed in more than one way), the analysis must consider the entire range of conduct prohibited by the statutes, not the specific conduct charged or proven at trial. 185 So.3d at 1210-11.
Thus, the fact that appellant was charged and found guilty of a burglary with an assault or battery while armed with a deadly weapon and that he was also charged and found guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is irrelevant. Examining strictly the statutory elements and the entire range of conduct proscribed by these statutes demonstrates that these are separate offenses for which the Legislature intends separate punishments. The statutory elements of aggravated assault include (a) use of a deadly weapon or (b) intent to commit a felony, and neither of these elements is subsumed within a burglary with an assault or battery. We also observe that being or becoming armed with a dangerous weapon during a burglary, which can include mere possession of the weapon, is distinct from using a deadly weapon to commit an aggravated assault.
The subsumed-within exception of section 775.021(4)(b) 3, applies "only if the greater offense necessarily includes the lesser offense." State v. McCloud , 577 So.2d 939, 941 (Fla. 1991). Aggravated assault is not necessarily included within a burglary with an assault or battery offense. Simply stated, a defendant can commit a burglary with an assault or battery without also committing an aggravated assault.

Tambriz-Ramirez , 213 So.3d at 922-23.

Similarly, the offenses of attempted sexual battery and burglary of a dwelling with battery do not violate double jeopardy principles. " 'Sexual battery' means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual battery does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose." § 794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2009). In order to prove the crime of attempted sexual battery, the State must prove that (1) the defendant did some act towards committing the crime of sexual battery that went beyond just thinking about it and (2) the defendant would have committed the crime of sexual battery except that someone prevented him from committing the crime or he failed to commit the crime. § 777.04(1), Fla. Stat. (2009) ; Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 5.1. The burglary statute prohibits

1. Entering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter; or
2. Notwithstanding a licensed or invited entry, remaining in a dwelling, structure, or conveyance:
a. Surreptitiously, with the intent to commit an offense therein;
b. After permission to remain therein has been withdrawn, with the intent to commit an offense therein; or
c. To commit or attempt to commit a forcible felony, as defined in s. 776.08.

§ 810.02(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). Each offense clearly requires proof of elements the other does not, and the statutory elements of an attempted sexual battery are not subsumed within the elements of burglary with a battery. In other words, one can commit a burglary with a battery without committing an attempted sexual battery.

Tambriz-Ramirez also argues that aggravated assault and attempted sexual battery are degree variants of burglary with an assault or battery, and therefore convictions for both violate the prohibition against double jeopardy under section 775.021(4)(b) 2., Fla. Stat. (2009). Section 775.021(4)(b) 2. prohibits multiple convictions and sentences for "[o]ffenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute ." (Emphasis added.) Tambriz-Ramirez's argument here fails because burglary, assault, and sexual battery are not different degrees of "the same offense." See Valdes , 3 So.3d at 1076 (holding that the degree-variant exception applies "only when the statute itself provides for an offense with multiple degrees"); State v. Reardon , 763 So.2d 418, 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ("[T]he two offenses [burglary with a battery and aggravated battery] are not degrees of the same crime ...."). In Valdes , we held that section 775.021(4)(b) 2. "prohibits separate punishments only when a criminal statute provides for variations in degree of the same offense, so that the defendant would be punished for violating two or more degrees of a single offense." 3 So.3d at 1076 (quoting State v. Paul , 934 So.2d 1167, 1177 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., specially concurring)). The crimes here are different offenses, prohibited by different statutes, and they criminalize different conduct.

Nonetheless, Tambriz-Ramirez urges this Court to conclude that "[w]hen a statute implicitly (or explicitly) relies on another statute's elements for purposes of an enhancement, and can only establish that enhancement by tracking the other statute's language, then the legislature has established a relationship of degrees between the same offense," Petitioner's [Initial] Brief at 25, 2017 WL 3674928, Tambriz-Ramirez v. State, No. SC17-713 (Fla. Aug. 16, 2017), and thus "intended to disallow separate punishments for degree variants of one another, regardless of whether they are contained within separate statutes," id. at 27. We reject that argument, because it directly contravenes the plain language of section 775.021(4)(b) 2.

Finally, Tambriz-Ramirez relies on our decision in Cleveland v. State , 587 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1991), to argue that "this Court has held that double jeopardy convictions occur when a defendant receives cumulative punishments based on enhanced conviction [sic] by use or possession of a firearm and a separate conviction based on the same act." Petitioner's [Initial] Brief at 7, Tambriz-Ramirez v. State, No. SC17-713 (Fla. Aug. 16, 2017) ; see also id. at 32. But our holding in Cleveland was very narrow. In Cleveland , we held

that when a robbery conviction is enhanced because of the use of a firearm in committing the robbery, the single act involving the use of the same firearm in the commission of the same robbery cannot form the basis of a separate conviction and sentence for the use of a firearm while committing a felony under section 790.07(2).

Cleveland , 587 So.2d at 1146. Thus, Cleveland does not prohibit Tambriz-Ramirez's multiple convictions here.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we approve the decision of the Fourth District in Tambriz-Ramirez , and disapprove the conflicting decisions of the First and Fifth Districts in Dykes , Hankins , Smith , McGhee , Green , Estremera , White , and Baldwin , and the decision of the Fifth District in Farrier to the extent that they conflict with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result.

QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.

QUINCE, J., dissenting.

As I have previously stated, " section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes -which requires a double jeopardy analysis to be conducted without regard to the specific charges against a defendant or which charges have been proven-is antithetical to the purpose and meaning of the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Florida Constitutions." Roughton , 185 So.3d at 1211 (Quince, J., dissenting). In this case, as in Roughton , I would consider only the allegations against the defendant and what the State proved to conduct a proper double jeopardy analysis.

Here, Tambriz-Ramirez was convicted as charged of burglary with assault or battery while armed and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Tambriz-Ramirez , 213 So.3d at 921. Tambriz-Ramirez was found to have been armed with a deadly weapon, and both the aggravated assault and burglary with assault or battery were based on his use of the same deadly weapon. Id. at 923. A burglary with assault or battery requires (1) "[e]ntering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein" and (2) "[m]ak[ing] an assault or battery upon any person ... with ... a dangerous weapon." § 810.02(1) - (2), Fla. Stat. An aggravated assault requires (1) an assault "[w]ith a deadly weapon without intent to kill" or (2) with an intent to commit a felony. § 784.021, Fla. Stat. Reviewing the statutes, burglary with assault or battery contains the element of entering a dwelling, structure, or conveyance, while aggravated assault does not. However, the remaining elements of both crimes punish the same conduct. Therefore, it cannot be said that each offense has an element the other does not have in order to satisfy Blockburger .

I would conclude that double jeopardy precludes convictions for both burglary with assault or battery and aggravated assault based on the same conduct, quash the decision below, and approve the conflict cases. Accordingly, I dissent.

      The Fourth District in Tambriz-Ramirez did not certify conflict with Farrier .

      And burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment, if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender makes an assault or battery upon any person. § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LAWSON, J. PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Robin EUSTACHE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC16-1712
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [July 12, 2018]
    Peter D. Webster, David L. Luck, and Jorge A. Perez-Santiago of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Miami, Florida, for Petitioner
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia A. Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Rachael Kaiman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Respondent
   LAWSON, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Eustache v. State , 199 So.3d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), which certified the following question to be of great public importance:

WHERE A DEFENDANT IS INITIALLY SENTENCED TO PROBATION OR COMMUNITY CONTROL AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, AND THE TRIAL COURT LATER REVOKES SUPERVISION FOR A SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION AND IMPOSES A SENTENCE ABOVE THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER CAP UNDER SECTIONS 958.14 AND 948.06(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS THE COURT REQUIRED TO IMPOSE A MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE THAT WOULD HAVE ORIGINALLY APPLIED TO THE OFFENSE?

Eustache , 199 So.3d at 490. We answer the certified question in the affirmative. The Fourth District also certified conflict with Christian v. State , 84 So.3d 437 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), on the same issue. We disapprove Christian to the extent it holds that a minimum mandatory sentence cannot be imposed on a defendant who substantively violates youthful offender supervision.

For the reasons that follow, we hold that upon revocation of a youthful offender's probation for a substantive violation, the trial court is authorized to either impose another youthful offender sentence, with no minimum mandatory, or to impose an adult Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) sentence, which would require imposition of any minimum mandatory term of incarceration associated with the offense of conviction. Because the trial judge in this case was convinced by the parties that he lacked the discretion to reimpose a youthful offender sentence, Eustache is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding. Because the Fourth District affirmed the sentence, we quash the decision below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), (4), Fla. Const.

BACKGROUND

Eighteen-year-old Robin Eustache entered a guilty plea to robbery with a firearm, which carries a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. Eustache , 199 So.3d at 486. The trial court, however, sentenced him as a youthful offender under the Florida Youthful Offender Act (Act) to four years in prison and two years of probation. Id. The Act, codified at sections 958.011 - 958.15, Florida Statutes (2005), provides an alternate sentencing scheme for use by judges when sentencing defendants between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. Youthful offender sentencing is discretionary, but if the trial judge elects to impose a youthful offender sentence, minimum mandatory terms otherwise associated with the offense of conviction do not apply, and the sentence is capped at six years or the maximum sentence for the crime(s), whichever is least. § 958.04(1) - (2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Defendants sentenced under the Act are classified as "youthful offenders" and provided with multiple benefits, including placement in institutions separate from the adult prison population, special rehabilitation programs, and the possibility of early release upon recommendation by the Department of Corrections. §§ 958.03(5), 958.04(2)(d), Fla. Stat.

After serving the prison portion of his sentence, Eustache violated his probation by committing two new drug offenses, and entered a plea admitting the violation. Eustache , 199 So.3d at 486. The trial court found Eustache guilty of the probation violation, revoked his probation, and sentenced him on the underlying offense of robbery with a firearm to fifteen years in prison with a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. Id. Eustache did not file a direct appeal.

Eustache filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, arguing that his counsel at sentencing was ineffective for not advising him that he was subject to the minimum mandatory sentence. Id. After the trial court agreed and granted the motion, Eustache withdrew his initial plea and entered an open plea to the violation of probation. Id. Both parties advised the trial court at sentencing that if it chose to revoke Eustache's probation, it was required to impose at least the ten-year minimum mandatory sentence and had no ability to avoid the minimum mandatory even by imposing another sentence within the cap, which the trial judge accepted as true. Id. at 486, 490. The trial court revoked Eustache's probation and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison, applying the ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. Id. at 486.

Eustache then filed a second rule 3.850 motion, arguing that his sentence is illegal either because the trial court wrongly believed it was required to impose the minimum mandatory sentence or because the trial court should not have imposed the minimum mandatory sentence at all. Id. The State's response contended that once the trial court exercised its discretion to revoke probation and impose a sentence above the youthful offender cap, it was required to impose the minimum mandatory sentence enhancement. Id. After the trial court summarily denied the motion, adopting the State's reasoning, Eustache appealed to the Fourth District. Id.

On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed Eustache's fifteen-year sentence and application of the adult minimum mandatory sentence enhancement, holding that under the Act, a trial court, after revoking youthful offender supervision and choosing not to impose a sentence within the youthful offender cap for a substantive violator's underlying offense, must impose any minimum mandatory sentence required for adult offenders charged with the same offense. Id. at 489-90. In so holding, the district court relied on the Second District's decision in Yegge v. State , 186 So.3d 553, 556-57 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (upholding application of minimum mandatory sentence enhancements to a youthful offender's sentence following a substantive probation violation), as well as its own decision in Goldwire v. State , 73 So.3d 844, 846 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (holding that it is within the court's discretion to revoke youthful offender status and apply minimum mandatory sentence enhancements). Id. The district court receded from its statement in Blacker v. State , 49 So.3d 785, 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), that minimum mandatory penalties cannot be imposed even after a youthful offender substantively violates supervision, certified direct conflict with Christian to the extent it agreed with Blacker , and certified the question as one of great public importance. Id. at 490.

ANALYSIS

This case concerns interpretation of the Youthful Offender Act. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. See Borden v. East-European Ins. Co. , 921 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006). "When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, ... the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Holly v. Auld , 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey , 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931) ).

The sentencing of a youthful offender upon revocation of probation or community control is governed by sections 958.14 and 948.06, Florida Statutes (2005). In section 958.14, part of the Act, the Legislature provides that a youthful offender who violates probation or community control is to be sentenced under section 948.06, a separate provision of general law applicable to adult CPC sentences. The Act then distinguishes between substantive violations and technical or nonsubstantive violations. As explained in Christian , Florida courts have consistently treated conduct involving a new criminal offense, such as Eustache's illegal drug possession, as a substantive violation. Christian , 84 So.3d at 439-41.

Section 958.14 of the Act reads in full:

A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06. However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for a substantive violation for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, with credit for time served while incarcerated, or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated.

§ 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 958.14 clearly and unambiguously requires sentencing within the six-year cap for youthful offenders who commit technical probationary or community control violations and clearly and unambiguously permits sentencing above the six-year cap upon revocation of a youthful offender's probation or community control for a substantive violation. Section 958.14 also clearly and unambiguously directs that a violation of probation or community control "shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06." Id.

Section 948.06(2)(b) provides,

If probation or community control is revoked, the court shall adjudge the probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and proven or admitted, unless he or she has previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation or the offender into community control.

§ 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). This section clearly provides for the imposition of "any sentence" that was "originally" available to the sentencing judge.

Focusing on the plain language of section 948.06(2)(b), which applies to all violations of probation proceedings-youthful offender and non-youthful offender alike-the Fourth District held that after revoking a youthful offender's probation or community control for a substantive violation, the sentencing court could only sentence according to one of the two options it had at the original sentencing proceeding: it could either (1) impose a sentence under the six-year sentencing cap (with no minimum mandatory); or, alternatively, (2) impose an adult sanction (in which case it also would be required to impose any minimum mandatory provision(s) associated with the offense(s) ). Eustache , 199 So.3d at 487. We agree that this holding properly reflects a plain reading of this unambiguous statute, and that no additional analysis is warranted. See Holly , 450 So.2d at 219.

In addition, we note that the Fourth District's holding (that a trial judge must impose any associated adult minimum mandatory sentence(s) on a youthful offender when exceeding the initial six-year statutory cap for substantive probationary violations) is arguably inconsistent with dicta from State v. Arnette , 604 So.2d 482, 484 (Fla. 1992), stating that "youthful offenders maintain youthful offender status even when they violate a condition of [probation or] community control." Florida's district courts of appeal have generally read this language from Arnette to mean that even where a trial court imposes a prison sentence in excess of the six-year statutory cap after a substantive probation violation, the defendant retains his or her youthful offender "status" along with the other attendant benefits of youthful offender sentencing. See, e.g. , Christian , 84 So.3d at 442 ; Blacker , 49 So.3d at 788 ; Gadson v. State , 160 So.3d 496, 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ; Jacques v. State , 95 So.3d 419, 420-21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) ; Hudson v. State , 989 So.2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). It was the Arnette majority's statement that a defendant always retains his or her "youthful offender status" after violating probation that led the panel in Christian to conclude that minimum mandatory terms did not apply to any post-violation sentence. Christian , 84 So.3d at 443. Even the Fourth District, in this case, held that Eustache would retain his youthful offender "status" for most purposes. Eustache , 199 So.3d at 487. However, we reject this portion of the Fourth District's analysis.

The sole issue in Arnette was whether a trial court could impose a sentence in excess of the six-year cap after a defendant violated his or her youthful offender probation. 604 So.2d at 483. Arnette held that that the trial court was limited to the youthful offender six-year cap, even after a probation violation. Id. That holding was superseded by the enactment of chapter 90-208, section 19, at 1161, Laws of Florida, which amended the Act (adding the language quoted above which provides discretion to impose a CPC sentence-up to the maximum period of incarceration provided by general law for the offense(s)-upon finding a substantive violation of youthful offender probation). Because Arnette has been superseded by statute as to the sole issue decided in that case, we see no need to recede from Arnette in order to clarify that when a youthful offender commits a substantive violation of probation and the trial court elects to impose a sentence in excess of the six-year cap, the sentence necessarily becomes an adult CPC sentence such that the defendant does not retain his or her "youthful offender status." We disapprove of Christian to the extent that it holds otherwise.

As explained above, the trial judge imposed Eustache's current sentence after being incorrectly told by both the state and defense counsel that he had no discretion to impose a sentence below the ten-year minimum mandatory term, when the judge did have the discretion to reimpose a youthful offender sentence with no minimum mandatory. Because defendants generally must be sentenced by a court that is able to exercise its discretion and consider all of its options before imposing a sentence, see Soanes v. State , 31 So.3d 914, 914-15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ; see also Munnerlyn v. State , 795 So.2d 171, 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), this error warrants remand and resentencing.

CONCLUSION

We answer the certified question in the affirmative, quash the decision below, and disapprove Christian and the decisions cited in footnote 3 to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion. We remand this case to the Fourth District with instructions to remand to the trial court for resentencing.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.

LABARGA, J., dissents.

PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the majority's determination that "Eustache is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding" because the trial court was under the mistaken impression that it could not reimpose a youthful offender sentence. Majority op. at 1098-99. I dissent, however, from the majority's conclusion that, when a trial court elects to impose an adult sentence for a youthful offender's probation violation, it must also impose the statutory mandatory minimum punishment. Majority op. at 1098-99.

Eustache was originally sentenced under the Youthful Offender Act to four years' imprisonment followed by two years' probation. Majority op. at 1098-99; see § 958.04, Fla. Stat. (2017). After being on probation for more than one year and successfully completing all probation tasks and paying all probation costs, Eustache violated his probation. Majority op. at 1099. Upon resentencing, the trial court, under the mistaken impression that it could not reimpose a youthful offender sentence, sentenced Eustache to fifteen years' imprisonment with a ten-year mandatory minimum. Id.

Under the majority's interpretation, when Eustache is again resentenced the trial court will have only two options: it can sentence Eustache (1) as a youthful offender to a sentence of less than six years' imprisonment; or (2) to an adult sentence that necessarily includes a ten-year mandatory minimum term. Majority op. at 1098-99, 1099-1100. Because an adult sentence imposed under the majority's interpretation of the statutes has to include a mandatory minimum term, the majority's result would also strip Eustache of his youthful offender status, causing him to lose all of the benefits of that designation, including entitlement to early release. Of course, this point becomes moot if the trial court elects to reimpose a youthful offender sentence. Majority op. at 1098-99, 1101-02.

However, a reading of the applicable statutes does not require the majority's result. In fact, concluding that the statute is ambiguous and construing it in favor of Eustache leads to a significantly different result. See § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; see also Crews v. State , 183 So.3d 329, 333 (Fla. 2015). Construing the statute favorable to Eustache, as the rule of lenity requires, affords the trial court the following options: it could sentence Eustache (1) as a youthful offender to a sentence of less than six years' imprisonment; (2) to a term of years, including a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence; or (3) to any adult term of years sentence it determines is appropriate, without being required to impose a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, allowing Eustache to maintain his youthful offender designation. This interpretation is also consistent with this Court's well-reasoned opinion in State v. Arnette , 604 So.2d 482, 484 (Fla. 1992), holding that "youthful offenders maintain youthful offender status even when they violate a condition of [probation or] community control." Majority op. at 1101 (quoting Arnette , 604 So.2d at 484 ).

I. Rule of Lenity

First, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that sections 958.14 and 948.06, Florida Statutes (2017), are unambiguous. Majority op. at 1100-01. While differing interpretations of the same statute from district courts of appeal might not always prove that a statute is ambiguous, that conclusion is reinforced here by the contradictory district court decisions. See majority op. at 1100. Compare Christian v. State , 84 So.3d 437, 439-45 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), and Blacker v. State , 49 So.3d 785, 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), with Yegge v. State , 186 So.3d 553, 557-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), and Goldwire v. State , 73 So.3d 844, 846 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

Although the majority's interpretation of sections 958.14 and 948.06, Florida Statutes (2017), is not unreasonable, as the district court decisions indicate, there is another equally, if not more, reasonable interpretation. An alternate interpretation hinges on the phrase in the Youthful Offender Act stating that penalties under the Act are imposed "[i]n lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law." § 958.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2017). Arguably, minimum mandatory sentence enhancements are included in the phrase "other criminal penalties." Mendez v. State, 835 So.2d 348, 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

As Judge Conner explained in Eustache , concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with Judge Davis's specially concurring opinion in Yegge that "the maximum sentence for the offense" under section 958.14 is not necessarily synonymous with "a defendant's maximum exposure in a criminal case." Yegge v. State , 186 So.3d 553, 560-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (Davis, J., specially concurring). As Judge Davis observed, "[t]he maximum sentence for an offense is determined by the legislature via statute. But a defendant's maximum exposure is determined by the statutory maximum sentence combined with other specific factors as related to the particular defendant or the specific circumstances of the commission of the offense." Id. at 561 (emphases added). Thus, the meaning of "maximum sentence" in the context of sections 958.14 and 948.06 appears to be ambiguous.

199 So.3d at 491 (Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, this interpretation furthers the policy reasons expressed by the Legislature in punishing youthful offenders differently than adults. See § 958.021, Fla. Stat. (2017).

By contrast, the majority's preferred interpretation of the statute leads to a draconian result not specifically required anywhere in the statute. Where a statute is "susceptible of differing constructions" so that there are two different, reasonable interpretations of the statute, the rule of lenity, as expressed in section 775.021(1), applies. Crews , 183 So.3d at 333 (quoting § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2014) ). It is a "requirement," not an option, to apply the rule of lenity. Id.

The rule of lenity provides that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of the defendant. See State v. Weeks , 202 So.3d 1, 8 (Fla. 2016). Regarding the rule of lenity, Judge Conner explained:

The rule of lenity requires that "any ambiguity or situations in which statutory language is susceptible to differing constructions must be resolved in favor of the person charged with an offense." State v. Byars , 823 So.2d 740, 742 (Fla. 2002) ; see also Kasischke v. State , 991 So.2d 803, 814 (Fla. 2008). The Legislature has not clearly required the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence for a youthful offender who substantively violates probation or community control. If the Legislature had intended the outcome espoused by the majority, it could have easily added language to section 958.14 stating that if a sentence above the cap provisions of section 958.04(2) is imposed, all sentencing enhancements and minimum mandatory provisions apply.

Eustache , 199 So.3d at 491 (Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The rule of lenity compels the opposite result than that reached by the majority-that trial courts have the discretion to impose a sentence above the youthful offender sentencing cap that does not also have a mandatory minimum requirement.

II. Arnette

Further, because I would construe the statute in favor of youthful offenders, I would not find conflict with this Court's interpretation of the Youthful Offender Act in Arnette . In Arnette , this Court properly interpreted section 958.14 as requiring the court to sentence the probation violator to a sentence that it could have originally imposed under the Act. Arnette , 604 So.2d at 484. Contrary to the majority's assertions, the 1990 amendment to the Act that allowed sentencing above the six-year cap does not supersede the overriding principle of Arnette -that youthful offender status and all of its benefits should be maintained even after a substantive probation violation. Id. ; see majority op. at 1101-02.

The benefits conferred to youthful offenders by the statute are substantial. Among them are the opportunity to receive, upon successful participation in the youthful offender program, "a recommendation to the court, by the department, for a modification or early termination of probation, community control, or the sentence at any time prior to the scheduled expiration of such term." § 958.04(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-601.226(6). Additionally, youthful offenders enjoy participation in many different programs, including, "career and job training," "life and socialization skills training," and "a comprehensive transition and postrelease plan." § 958.12(1) - (2), Fla. Stat. (2017). Finally, youthful offenders can also "work at paid employment, participate in an education or a training program, or voluntarily serve in a public or nonprofit agency or a public service program in the community," while incarcerated. Id. § 958.09(1)(b).

The district courts of appeal also agree that Arnette was not superseded by statute, as evidenced by the majority's disapproval of the language in twenty-one district court cases. See majority op. at 1102, note 3. Indeed, as then-Judge Lawson reasoned in Christian :

In Goldwire v. State , 73 So.3d 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), another Fourth District panel appears to have mislabeled a youthful offender sentence above the six-year cap (as now authorized by the Youthful Offender Act itself following a substantive violation of probation) as a "non-youthful offender sentence." Id. at 846. This mislabeling caused the panel to conclude (erroneously, in our view) that the trial court had the discretion to avoid other sentencing features applicable to a youthful offender sentence, and impose a firearm minimum mandatory following a substantive violation of probation. Id. We do not believe that Arnette permits this result. See Arnette , 604 So.2d at 484 ("youthful offenders maintain youthful offender status even when they violate a condition of community control"). Although the legislature amended the version of Youthful Offender Act at issue in Arnette to authorize a youthful offender sentence above the six-year cap following a substantive violation of probation, the statute has not been amended to authorize imposition of a non-youthful offender sentence following a substantive violation. Nor has the statute been amended to authorize variation from any other feature of a youthful offender sentence following a substantive violation of probation.

Christian , 84 So.3d at 444 n.7.

However, the majority's limiting interpretation of the statute necessarily requires it to abandon the core principle of Arnette and disapprove of the district court cases that have relied on Arnette . The majority acknowledges the inconsistency of its decision with our jurisprudence, stating, "we note that [this opinion] is arguably inconsistent with dicta from State v. Arnette , 604 So.2d 482, 484 (Fla. 1992)," and the "district courts of appeal have generally read this language from Arnette to mean that even where a trial court imposes a prison sentence in excess of the six-year statutory cap after a substantive probation violation, the defendant retains his or her youthful offender 'status'

along with the other attendant benefits of youthful offender sentencing." Majority op. at 1101.

Rather than receding from long-standing precedent for the sole purpose of denying youthful offenders additional legal protections deemed appropriate by the Legislature, this Court should read the statute to preserve the benefits granted to youthful offenders by the Legislature. As the Legislature stated:

The purpose of this chapter is to improve the chances of correction and successful return to the community of youthful offenders sentenced to imprisonment by providing them with enhanced vocational, educational, counseling, or public service opportunities and by preventing their association with older and more experienced criminals during the terms of their confinement. It is the further purpose of this chapter to encourage citizen volunteers from the community to contribute time, skills, and maturity toward helping youthful offenders successfully reintegrate into the community and to require youthful offenders to participate in substance abuse and other types of counseling and programs at each youthful offender institution.

§ 958.021, Fla. Stat. (2017). There is no reasonable basis for this Court to discard the intent of the Legislature and abandon our holding in Arnette .

CONCLUSION

Because the statute is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations, I would apply the rule of lenity in favor of the youthful offenders in this state. I would further decline the invitation to recede from the principles espoused in Arnette . Accordingly, although I concur in part as to the majority's holding that Eustache is entitled to resentencing, I dissent as to the majority's interpretation of the statute.

      See Ch. 921, Fla. Stat. (2015).

      While the 2005 version of the Youthful Offender Act applies to Eustache, there is no substantive difference between that version and the current 2017 version.

      We also disapprove similar language in the following cases: Yegge , 186 So.3d at 556 ("[T]he trial court must continue a youthful offender's status after a substantive violation of probation or community control ...."); Larkins v. State , 159 So.3d 386, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (holding youthful offender status cannot be revoked even for committing a substantive probation violation); Cooper v. State , 235 So.3d 1034, 1035-37 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (same); Peterson v. State , 176 So.3d 1015, 1015 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (same); Gadson , 160 So.3d at 496 (same); St. Cyr v. State , 106 So.3d 487, 488-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (same); Josey v. State , 128 So.3d 247, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (same); Lachenauer v. State , 117 So.3d 880, 880-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (same); Mistretta v. State , 99 So.3d 561, 561-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (same); Christian , 84 So.3d at 442 (same); Tidwell v. State , 74 So.3d 503, 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (same); Blacker , 49 So.3d at 788 (same); Johnson v. State , 41 So.3d 1115, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (same); Hudson , 989 So.2d at 726 (same); Rogers v. State , 972 So.2d 1017, 1019-20 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (same); see also Lewis v. State , 159 So.3d 288, 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (holding youthful offender status could not be revoked upon violation of probation for a substantive violation involving a new law offense); Smith v. State , 143 So.3d 1023, 1024-25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (same); Williams v. State , 110 So.3d 39, 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (same); Jacques , 95 So.3d at 420-21 (same); Mosley v. State , 77 So.3d 877, 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (same); Lee v. State , 67 So.3d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (same); Gardner v. State , 656 So.2d 933, 937-38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (same).


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    Debra MCCLELLAND, Appellant, v. HIGHLAND COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD and Ascension Insurance, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-4256
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jahi Amadi HASANATI, Appellant, v. Tony ANDERSON, Warden of Hamilton Correctional Institution, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3129
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Alpha A. GERMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3139
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Paul BURNS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D16-0801
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Taikwan Keman CROSBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1346
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Terry ADKISON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3643
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Stacey Renee MCRAE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2670
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Bruce O. FOUNTAIN, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1875
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    John Thomas KELLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2826
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Charles Edward LEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5682
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    GULF COAST TRAFFIC ENGINEERS/SUMMIT CONSULTING, LLC, Appellants, v. Erick L. COOK, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1192
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gernard CHESTNUT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2656
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 29, 2018 Rehearing Denied July 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Reco Alexander FERBA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3534
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018 Rehearing Denied July 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Samuel JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5735
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Matthew L. GORDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0016
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018 Rehearing Denied July 19, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Alis E. ORELLANA, Appellant, v. WOOLEMS, INC., Amerisure Insurance, Patrick Carney, 1695 Now, LLC, Claremont Financial Services, and Travelers, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-2758
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 2, 2018 Rehearing Denied July 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Shawn Michael BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3364
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2018 Rehearing Denied July 18, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    William ESCOFFERY, Appellant, v. Claude PERRY, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-107
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Travis THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0680
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018 Rehearing Denied July 18, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Richard Leroy DOUGLAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0609
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Gary Demetruis MC CLOUD, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1806
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Delio ROMANES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1804
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    David RENCZKOWSKI, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida,Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2028
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 07, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Lenard ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-4134
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 18, 2018 Rehearing Denied July 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.G., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1136
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Carlton D. HOLLIMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1882
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Rashad FIELDS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1888
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Brian Carl CRAMER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1663
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Jakeilah WEEKS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1761
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Writ of mandamus is denied.


text:
    Sammy THORNTON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1796
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Robert B. CUMMINGS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1695
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Mario PRESTON, Appellant/ Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1705
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Richard DELGADO-CRUZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1927
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Edgar Reynel PAZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1876
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Germaine HARRIS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1569
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Carely POETTKER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Thomas M. KNIGHT, Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1990
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 05, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Denied.


text:
    Juan Francisco VEGA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1962
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Edward STODDARD, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1969
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Steven T. HUMPHREY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1573
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Steven T. HUMPHREY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1571
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Richard STARKS, Jr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1760
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Tia PISANI, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1787
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 14, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Steven T. HUMPHREY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1579
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Mauro RAMIREZ Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1549
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Steven T. HUMPHREY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1577
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Submitted.


text:
    Brian THARP, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Thomas M. KNIGHT, Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2002
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 05, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Denied.


text:
    George E. BAKER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1836
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed. Denied.


text:
    Steven T. HUMPHREY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1575
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Joshua Carlton BELL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. PASCO COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1759
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Timothy J. KOMOLL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Sarah W. KOMOLL, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2075
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Mario RIOS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1799
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Christina PAYLAN, M. D., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. OFFICE OF the STATE ATTORNEY FOR the THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1673
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    L.C., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. HIGHLANDS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2466
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Phillip Lee BUTLER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. IRA SERVICES, LLC, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2425
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 18, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Judy WEBER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Peter D. WEBER, as Personal Representative, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2155
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 16, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Dismissed.


text:
    Peter Thomas STAVROU, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. ISLAND BREEZE BOAT CLUB & RENTAL, INC., et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2286
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Stael GABRIEL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1884
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Anita M. MCFARLAND, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2277
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 18, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Gary W. BOWMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2187
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Michael JUREK, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1896
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Mark H. STIMSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0755
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Daniel FLORES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2078
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Cliff J. GUERRIERI, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Janice Marie HILLIGARDT, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1724
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    HEFFICO, as Trustee FOR TRUST 120913-302, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2291
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Tatiana Ivanovna PEACOCK, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DISCOVER BANK, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2508
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed. Denied.


text:
    Richard John FUSARI, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Susan Lorraine SIMMONS-FUSARI, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1945
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    John S. STRITZINGER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2110
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 18, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Antonio JOHNSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. BANK OF AMERICA, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2276
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Michael KIM, et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Weifen KAO, a/k/a Jenny Kao, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0717
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Jessica L. SANCHEZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Heriberto SANCHEZ, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0825
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Ervin Edgar DAY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1823
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Noel D. CLARK, Jr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Lucinda Whitaker STEPP, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0359
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 09, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    MAXIMUM HOME HEALTH CARE, INCORPORATED, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-4733
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    DEVO ACQUISITIONS ENTERPRISES, LLC, et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. MADISON AT SOHO II CONDOMINIUM, ASSOC, INC., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1984
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 19, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Certiorari is dismissed.


text:
    Jason SELTZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Maylee M. MEDINA, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2087
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 18, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Michael F. THOMAS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1827
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Esther PENA and Lorenzo Pena, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2315
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Anthony PARKS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. EXCEL RENT A CAR, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-0805
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Carolina VALENCIA, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. FIFTEEN HOMESTEAD COA TOWNHOME OWNER LLC, etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2240
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Luis SIFONTES, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. TRG COLUMBUS DEVELOPMENT VENTURE, LTD., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2079
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 19, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Valeria KRASAVINA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. ALEXIS BARBARA, LLC, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2573
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Franklin VALDEZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. V.A. LEASING CORPORATION, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0091
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 23, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Charles G. BLANC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2489
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    MAIKO 2308 LLC, etc., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. 1010 BRICKELL HOLDINGS LLC, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2527
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Jesus A. GONZALEZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0137
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 29, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Transferred.


text:
    Shawna KAURICH, etc., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Thomas AGRAIT, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0103
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 26, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Ricardo Rene Cortez MORENO, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Sergio Hernandez LEMUS, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2477
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 04, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Marina R. BALDOVINO, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-1654
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    DECEMBER 14, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is granted. Dismissed.

Motion is granted. Remanded.


text:
    Mark Randall SMITH, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2705
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    OAKWOOD INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Yvonne COLEMAN, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2495
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 04, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    APETY AVENTURA, LLC, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Albert HANOUNA, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2615
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 04, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Solimar ARANCIBIA f/k/a Solimar Rodriguez, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Jose R. CASTILLO, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2753
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 03, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Albert T. OWENS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2786
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 04, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Luc BOISSON, Jr., and Michele P. Boisson, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. CITIBANK, N.A., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0956
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 04, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Rodrick Johnson SAMS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2002
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    DECEMBER 14, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Jimmie EVANS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-2841
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    DECEMBER 14, 2017 Rehearing Denied January 4, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Teodoro ITURRIOZ and Angie Iturrioz, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. HOMEOWNERS CHOICE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D16-1786
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Candice Lynn WOLFSON, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Howard WOLFSON, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0975
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 04, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Rajnauth BISNAUTH, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-1068
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 04, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Eniel PLANAS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Julie JONES, etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-1582
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 04, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Cosset SANCHEZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Enrique SANCHEZ, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-1599
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Russel LAZEGA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. FLORIDA FAMILY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2593
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Maria N. VAZQUEZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. 21ST MORTGAGE CORP., etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2693
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Raymond Anthony Hanna EL, etc., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2772
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Fawaz ALOTAIBI, D.D.S., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Cecilia Raquel CASTRO, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0060
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 01, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Babacar M'BOW, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0046
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 01, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Carolina Diaz PADRON, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Miguel Osio ZAMORA, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2659
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, etc., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Carlos Adrian VILLACIS, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D14-1254
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    DOOLEYMACK CONSTRUCTORS OF SOUTH FLORIDA, LLC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. VICTORIA MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-1519
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 01, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Tajhon WILSON, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-1997
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Ernesto RODRIGUEZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. WILMINGTON TRUST, N.A., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2256
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Dismissed.


text:
    SECRET OF THE ISLANDS, INC., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Laura MADDISON, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-1179
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Victor PESINA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2117
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed February 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dedrick FERGUSON, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2785
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Luisa FARBMAN and Michelle Adams, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Max ADAMS, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2231
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    LEMONI CAFE, INC., et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Erika VILA, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2577
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Lazaro ALVAREZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. EL FARO LATIN CAFE, INC., etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2288
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Ricardo LOPEZ, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. WILMINGTON TRUST, N.A., etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0126
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 09, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Leon LEE, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2616
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 07, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Transferred.


text:
    Angela GARRETT, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. PROGRESSIVE SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2791
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 17, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    CHAMPION TITLE AND TRUST CORPORATION, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. PLATTE RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2416
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    FEBRUARY 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Luz Myriam Cardozo CALDERON, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-1927
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 23, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.