source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Larry R. WETZEL, Petitioner, v. The TRAVELERS COMPANIES, INC., Respondent.
    No. SC18-2109
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 4, 2019
    Larry R. Wetzel, pro se, Navarre, Florida, for Petitioner
    No appearance for Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on the petition of Larry R. Wetzel for a writ of mandamus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const. By order dated January 24, 2019, we denied Wetzel's petition pursuant to Huffman v. State , 813 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000). See Wetzel v. Travelers Companies, Inc. , No. SC18-2109, 2019 WL 757936 (Fla. Jan. 24, 2019). Concurrent with the denial of the petition, we expressly retained jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against Wetzel. Id. ; see Fla. R. App. P. 9.410(a) (Sanctions; Court's Motion).

Wetzel was the defendant in two civil actions for fraud, injunctive relief, and damages brought by The Travelers Companies, Inc., in the First Judicial Circuit (Santa Rosa County case number 572013CA000693CAAXMX and Escambia County case number 172013CA001457XXXXXX). Motions for summary judgment against Wetzel were granted in each case. See Travelers Companies Inc. v. Wetzel , No. 572013CA000693CAAXMX (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. Dec. 15, 2014); Travelers Companies Inc. v. Wetzel , No. 172013CA001457XXXXXX (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 2015).

Wetzel began filing petitions with the Court in 2015. Since that time, he has filed six petitions or notices seeking relief related to the above-noted civil cases. See Wetzel v. Travelers Companies, Inc. , No. SC18-2109, 2019 WL 757936 (Fla. Jan. 24, 2019). All six cases have been either denied, dismissed, or transferred. In each case, Wetzel has filed a litany of indecipherable and misleading documents with this Court. This case was no exception. Wetzel filed more than one hundred pleadings that were rambling, repetitive, and irrelevant. Based on Wetzel's filing history in this Court, we issued an order directing him to show cause why he should not be prohibited from filing any further pro se documents in this Court related to circuit court cases number 572013CA000693CAAXMX and number 172013CA001457XXXXXX.

Wetzel filed a response to the order to show cause in which he asserts that the order is null and void because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his cases and has acted in a manner that is inconsistent with due process of law. Upon due consideration of Wetzel's response, we conclude that Wetzel has failed to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. Based on his persistent history of filing pro se petitions that were frivolous, meritless, or otherwise inappropriate for this Court's review, Wetzel has abused the judicial process and burdened this Court's limited judicial resources.

Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is hereby instructed to reject any future pleadings, petitions, motions, documents, or other filings submitted by Larry R. Wetzel that are related to cases number 572013CA000693CAAXMX and number 172013CA001457XXXXXX, unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. Counsel may file on Wetzel's behalf if counsel detemines that the proceeding may have merit and can be brought in good faith.

No motion for rehearing or clarification will be entertained by the Court.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, LAGOA, LUCK, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES-REPORT 2018-14.
    No. SC18-2030
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 11, 2019
    Judge F. Rand Wallis, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Bart Schneider, Staff Liaison, Office of the State Courts Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner
   PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee) has submitted proposed changes to standard jury instructions 3.3(d) (Possession of a [Firearm] [Destructive Device] [and Discharge] [Causing [Great Bodily Harm] [Death] ] ), 8.5(a) (Domestic Battery by Strangulation), 16.5 (Neglect of a Child), 21.14 (False Information to Law Enforcement Investigating a Missing Person 16 Years of Age or Younger Who Suffers [Great Bodily Harm] [Permanent Disability] [Permanent Disfigurement] [Death] ), and 29.24 (Human Trafficking), and asks that the Court authorize the amended standard instructions for publication and use. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

The Committee filed its report on December 7, 2018, having published its proposals in the October 15, 2018, edition of The Florida Bar News . No comments were received by the Committee. We authorize the proposed amendments to the instructions for publication and use as proposed. The significant changes to the instructions are as follows.

First, instructions 3.3(d), 8.5(a), 16.5, 21.14, and 29.24 each include the definition for "great bodily harm" as provided in Wheeler v. State , 203 So.3d 1007, 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), to be given if applicable.

Next, instruction 3.3(d) is updated to cite to section 790.001(6), Florida Statutes (2018), and to include the definition of "firearm."

Lastly, the definition of "bona fide" as "genuine" is added to instruction 29.24, consistent with the sex-offense-related instructions. See In re Stnd. Jury Instrs. in Criminal Cases-Report 2018-04 , 257 So.3d 370, 374 (Fla. 2018).

Having considered the Committee's report, we authorize the amended instructions as set forth in the appendix to this opinion for publication and use. New language is indicated by underlining, and deleted language is indicated by struck-through type. We caution all interested parties that any comments associated with the instructions reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. In authorizing the publication and use of these instructions, we express no opinion on their correctness and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instructions. The instructions as set forth in the appendix shall become effective when this opinion becomes final.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, LAGOA, LUCK, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

3.3(d) POSSESSION OF A [FIREARM] [DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE] [AND DISCHARGE] [CAUSING [GREAT BODILY HARM] [DEATH]]

§ 775.087(2), Fla. Stat.

Give if applicable.

If you find that (defendant)committed (felony identified in §775.087(2)(a)3, Fla. Stat.)and you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that during the commission of the crime, [he] [she] discharged a [firearm] [destructive device], and in doing so, caused [great bodily harm to] [the death of] (victim),you should find the defendant guilty of (felony)with discharge of a [firearm] [destructive device] causing [great bodily harm] [death].

Wheeler v. State, 203 So.3d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

"Great bodily harm" means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.

Give if applicable.

If you find that (defendant)committed (felony identified in § 775.087(2)(a)2, Fla. Stat.)and you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that during the commission of the crime, [he] [she] discharged a [firearm] [destructive device], you should find the defendant guilty of (felony)with discharge of a [firearm] [destructive device].

If you find that (defendant)committed (felony listed in § 775.087(2)(a)1, Fla. Stat.)and you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that during the commission of the crime, [he] [she] actually possessed [a firearm] [a destructive device], you should find the defendant guilty of (felony)with actual possession of a [firearm] [destructive device].

A ["firearm"] ["destructive device"] is legally defined as (adapt from § 790.001(4) or § 790.001(6) Fla. Stat.).

§ 790.001(6), Fla. Stat.

A "firearm" is legally defined as any weapon, including a starter gun, which will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; any destructive device; or any machine gun. [The term "firearm" does not include an antique firearm unless the antique firearm is used in the commission of a crime.]

§ 790.001(1), Fla. Stat., contains the definition of "antique firearm."

§ 790.001(4), Fla. Stat., contains the definition of "destructive device."

Give a and/ or b or both as applicable. See § 775.087(4), Fla. Stat.

To "actually possess" a firearm means that the defendant

a. carried a firearm on [his]_[her] person. or
b. had a firearm within immediate physical reach with ready access with the intent to use the firearm during the commission of the crime.

Comment

This instruction was adopted inJuly 1992 [603 So.2d 1175] and amended in 2008 [995 So.2d 489], and 2019.

8.5(a) DOMESTIC BATTERY BY STRANGULATION

§ 784.041(2)(a), Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Domestic Battery by Strangulation, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant) knowingly and intentionally impeded the normal [breathing] [circulation of the blood] of (victim) against [his] [her] will [by applying pressure on the throat or neck of (victim)] [by blocking the nose or mouth of (victim)].
2. In so doing, (Defendant) [created a risk of great bodily harm to (victim).] [caused great bodily harm to (victim).]
3. (Defendant) was [a family or household member of (victim).] [in a dating relationship with (victim).]

Give as applicable.

"Family or household member" means spouses, former spouses, persons related by blood or marriage, persons who are presently residing together as if a family or who have resided together in the past as if a family, and persons who are parents of a child in common regardless of whether they have been married. With the exception of persons who have a child in common, the family or household members must be currently residing or have in the past resided together in the same single dwelling unit.

"Dating relationship" means a continuing and significant relationship of a romantic or intimate nature.

Wheeler v. State, 203 So.3d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

"Great bodily harm" means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.

Lesser Included Offenses

FELONY DOMESTIC BATTERY BY STRANGULATION - 784.041(2)(a)

CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Battery 784.03 8.3 None

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 2008 [994 So.2d 1038], and amended in 2019.

16.5 NEGLECT OF A CHILD

§ 827.03(2)(b), Fla. Stat.

(Great Bodily Harm, Permanent Disability, or Permanent Disfigurement)

To prove the crime of Neglect of a Child Causing [Great Bodily Harm] [Permanent Disability] [Permanent Disfigurement], the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant)
Give as applicable.
a. [willfully] [by culpable negligence] failed or omitted to provide (victim) with the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain (victim's) physical or mental health.
b. failed to make a reasonable effort to protect (victim) from abuse, neglect, or exploitation by another person.
2. In so doing, (defendant) caused [great bodily harm] [permanent disability] [permanent disfigurement] to (victim).
3. (Defendant) was a caregiver for (victim).
4. (Victim) was under the age of 18 years.

Neglect of a child may be based on repeated conduct or on a single incident or omission that resulted in, or reasonably could have been expected to result in, serious physical or mental injury, or a substantial risk of death, to a child.

Definition. Give in all cases.

"Caregiver" means a parent, adult household member, or other person responsible for a child's welfare.

Definition. Give if applicable.

I will now define what is meant by the term "culpable negligence": Each of us has a duty to act reasonably toward others. If there is a violation of that duty, without any conscious intention to harm, that violation is negligence. But culpable negligence is more than a failure to use ordinary care for others. For negligence to be called culpable negligence, it must be gross and flagrant. The negligence must be committed with an utter disregard for the safety of others. Culpable negligence is consciously doing an act or following a course of conduct that the defendant must have known, or reasonably should have known, was likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Great bodily harm. Wheeler v. State, 203 So.3d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

"Great bodily harm" means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.

Lesser Included Offenses

NEGLECT OF A CHILD CAUSING GREAT BODILY HARM, PERMANENT DISABILITY OR PERMANENT DISFIGUREMENT- 827.03(2)(b)

CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA, STAT. INS. NO. Child neglect 827.03(3)(d) 16.6 Culpable Negligence 784.05 8.9 Inflicting Injury, if culpable negligence is charged Culpable Negligence 784.05 8.9 Exposing Another to Injury, if culpable negligence is charged

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 2002 [824 So.2d 881] and amended in 2013 [122 So.3d 263], and 2019.

21.14 FALSE INFORMATION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATING A MISSING PERSON 16 YEARS OF AGE OR YOUNGER WHO SUFFERS [GREAT BODILY HARM] [PERMANENT DISABILITY] [PERMANENT DISFIGUREMENT] [DEATH]

§ 837.055(2), Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of False Information to Law Enforcement Investigating a Missing Person 16 Years of Age or Younger Who Suffers [Great Bodily Harm] [Permanent Disability] [Permanent Disfigurement] [Death], the State must prove the following six elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Name of law enforcement officer) was conducting a missing person investigation involving a child 16 years of age or younger.
2. (Name of law enforcement officer) was a law enforcement officer.
3. (Defendant) knew (name of law enforcement officer) was a law enforcement officer.
4. (Defendant) knowingly and willfully gave false information to (name of law enforcement officer).
5. (Defendant) intended to mislead (name of law enforcement officer) or impede the investigation.
6. The child who was the subject of the investigation suffered [great bodily harm] [death] [permanent [disability] [disfigurement]].

Definition s.

Patterson v. State, 512 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1stDCA 1987).

"Willfully" means knowingly, intentionally, and purposely.

Wheeler v. State, 203 So.3d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

"Great bodily harm" means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.

Lesser Included Offenses

FALSE INFORMATION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATING A MISSING PERSON 16 YEARS OF AGE OR YOUNGER WHO SUFFERS [GREAT BODILY HARM] [DEATH] [PERMANENT [DISABILITY] [DISFIGUREMENT] - § 837.055(2)

CATEGORY CATEGORY FLA. STAT. INS. NO. ONE TWO Knowingly Giving 837.055(1) 21.15 False Information Concerning a Missing Person Investigation Knowingly Giving 837.055(1) 21.15 False Information Concerning a Felony Criminal Investigation Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1

Comments

As of November 2018, I i t is undetermined whether an element of this crime is that the defendant knew that the missing person investigation involved a child 16 years of age or younger.

As of November 2018, T t here is no case law regarding the definition of "law enforcement officer."

This instruction was adopted in 2013 [131 So.3d 755], and amended in 2019.

29.24 HUMAN TRAFFICKING

§ 787.06(3), Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Human Trafficking, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant) knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the facts, [engaged in] [attempted to engage in] [benefited financially by receiving something of value from participation in a venture that subjected a person to] human trafficking.

Give as applicable .

2. § 787.06(3)(a)1, Fla. Stat.
The human trafficking was for the labor or services of a child.
§ 787.06(3)(a)2, Fla. Stat.
The human trafficking involved (defendant's) use of coercion for the labor or services of an adult.
§ 787.06(3)(b), Fla. Stat.
The human trafficking involved (defendant's) use of coercion for commercial sexual activity of an adult.
§ 787.06(3)(c)1, Fla. Stat.
The human trafficking was for the labor or services of a child who was an unauthorized alien.
§ 787.06(3)(c)2, Fla. Stat.
The human trafficking involved (defendant's) use of coercion for the labor or services of an adult who was an unauthorized alien.
§ 787.06(3)(d), Fla. Stat.
The human trafficking involved (defendant's) use of coercion for commercial sexual activity of an adult who was an unauthorized alien.
§ 787.06(3)(e)1, Fla. Stat.
The human trafficking was for the labor or services of a child by the transfer or transport of the child from outside Florida to within this state.
§ 787.06(3)(e)2, Fla. Stat.
The human trafficking involved (defendant's) use of coercion for the labor or services of an adult by the transfer or transport of the adult from outside Florida to within this state.
§ 787.06(3)(f)1, Fla. Stat.
The human trafficking was for commercial sexual activity of a child by the transfer or transport of the child from outside Florida to within this state.
§ 787.06(3)(f)2, Fla. Stat.
The human trafficking involved (defendant's) use of coercion for commercial sexual activity of an adult by the transfer or transport of the adult from outside Florida to within this state.
§ 787.06(3)(g), Fla. Stat.
The human trafficking was for commercial sexual activity in which a [child] [person who is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated] was involved.

Reclassification. § 787.06(8), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

If you found (defendant)guilty of Human Trafficking, you must further determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that during the commission of the Human Trafficking, [he] [she] caused [great bodily harm] [or] [permanent disability] [or] [permanent disfigurement to [another person] [ (victim)].

Definitions.

Give in all cases.

§ 787.06(2)(d), Fla. Stat.

"Human trafficking" means [transporting] [soliciting] [recruiting] [harboring] [providing] [enticing] [maintaining] [or] [obtaining] another person for the purpose of exploitation of that person.

"Child" means a person under the age of 18.

"Adult" means a person 18 years of age or older.

Give if applicable.

Wheeler v. State, 203 So.3d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

"Great bodily harm" means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.

§ 787.06(2)(a), Fla. Stat.

"Coercion" means:

1. Using or threatening to use physical force against any person;
2. Restraining, isolating, or confining or threatening to restrain, isolate, or confine any person without lawful authority and against her or his will;
3. Using lending or other credit methods to establish a debt by any person when labor or services are pledged as a security for the debt, if the value of the labor or services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt, the length and nature of the labor or services are not respectively limited and defined;
4. Destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, withholding, or possessing any actual or purported passport, visa, or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of any person;
5. Causing or threatening to cause financial harm to any person;
6. Enticing or luring any person by fraud or deceit; or
7. Providing a controlled substance as outlined in Schedule [I] [II] of Florida Statute 893.03 to any person for the purpose of exploitation of that person.

(Name of controlled substance)is a Schedule [I] [II] drug within Florida Statute 893.03.

Give as applicable.

§ 787.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat.

"Commercial sexual activity" means:

a. (name of chapter 796 crime). (Name of chapter 796 crime) is defined as (insert definition of Chapter 796 crime).
b. an attempt to commit (name of chapter 796 crime). An attempt to commit (name of chapter 796 crime) is defined as (insert definition of attempt in Instruction 5.1 and then define the Chapter 796 crime).
c. sexually explicit performances. Sexually explicit performance means an act or show, whether public or private, that is live, photographed, recorded, or videotaped and intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interest.
d. the production of pornography.

§ 787.06(2)(c), Fla. Stat. Insert definition of loan sharking from §687.071 Fla. Stat. Insert explanation of the statute of frauds from §725.01 Fla. Stat.

"Financial harm" includes [extortionate extension of credit] [loan sharking] [employment contracts that violate the statute of frauds].

§ 787.06(2)(e), Fla. Stat.

"Labor" means work of economic or financial value.

§ 787.06(2)(f), Fla. Stat.

"Maintain" means in relation to labor or services, to secure or make possible continued performance thereof, regardless of any initial agreement on the part of a victim to perform such type service.

§ 787.06(2)(g), Fla. Stat.

"Obtain" means, in relation to labor or services, to secure performance thereof.

§ 787.06(2)(h), Fla. Stat.

"Services" means any act committed at the behest of, under the supervision of, or for the benefit of another. [The term includes, but is not limited to [forced marriage] [servitude] [the removal of organs].]

§ 787.06(2)(j), Fla. Stat. See 8 U.S.C. s. 1324a(h)(3).

"Unauthorized alien" means an alien who is not authorized under federal law to be employed in the United States.

§ 787.06(2)(k), Fla. Stat.

"Venture" means any group of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity.

§ 787.06(3)(g), 794.011(1), Fla. Stat.

"Mentally incapacitated" means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or intoxicating substance administered to that person without his or her consent, or due to any other act committed upon that person without his or her consent.

"Mentally defective" means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect that renders that person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct.

Give if requested. § 787.06(9), Fla. Stat.

The defendant's ignorance of (victim's)age, (victim's)misrepresentation of [his] [her] age, or the defendant's bona fide belief of (victim's)age is not a defense to the crime charged. "Bona fide" means genuine.

Give if requested. § 787.06(101), Fla. Stat.

(Victim's)lack of chastity or the willingness or consent of (victim)is not a defense if [he] [she] was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense.

Lesser Included Offenses

No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense.

Comments

A conviction under § 787.06(3)(f)1, Florida Statutes, (human trafficking via commercial sexual activity of a child by transport or transfer into Florida) is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life. However, a conviction under § 787.06(3)(g), Florida Statutes, (human trafficking via commercial sexual activity where a child was involved but without a finding that the child was transported from outside the state) is a life felony.

This instruction was adopted in 2013 [131 So.3d 692] and amended in 2015 [176 So.3d 938],and 2016 [200 So.3d 754], and 2019.

      The amendments as reflected in the appendix are to the Criminal Jury Instructions as they appear on the Court's website at www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/instructions.shtml. We recognize that there may be minor discrepancies between the instructions as they appear on the website and the published versions of the instructions. Any discrepancies as to instructions authorized for publication and use after October 25, 2007, should be resolved by reference to the published opinion of this Court authorizing the instruction.


text:
    Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 18-352 RE: Dennis Daniel BAILEY.
    No. SC18-2060
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 11, 2019
    Honorable Krista Marx, Chair, Michael Louis Schneider, Executive Director, Alexander John Williams, General Counsel, Judicial Qualifications Commission, Tallahassee, Florida, for Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner
    Michael E. Dutko of Dutko & Kroll, PA, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Judge Dennis Daniel Bailey, Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

During a felony criminal trial, Judge Dennis Daniel Bailey ordered his courtroom deputy, loudly and in front of the jury, to remove one of the defendant's attorneys from a sidebar conference. He then improperly denied the defendant's disqualification motion. Judge Bailey and the Judicial Qualifications Commission have stipulated that he violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and should be publicly reprimanded. We approve the stipulation.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 17, 2018, Judge Bailey was presiding over Genesis Espejo's felony criminal trial in Broward County. During the trial, a legal issue came up that required a sidebar conversation. Ms. Espejo's two attorneys left the defense table and came to the bench for the sidebar. As found by the commission,

[w]hen one of the attorneys tried to help his colleague articulate a point during the sidebar, Judge Bailey repeatedly attempted to quiet him by saying, "One lawyer at a time," "Only one lawyer argues," followed shortly thereafter by, "You have a hard time understanding me? Two lawyers can't argue one argument."

There was no standing order that only one attorney per side was allowed to argue a point, and this was the first time Judge Bailey communicated such an order to counsel.

As the attorney who was trying to help his colleague started to say, "Judge I mean no disrespect," Judge Bailey raised his voice over the "white noise" that he turned on during the sidebar conversation and ordered his courtroom deputy to approach the bench and "return this attorney to his table." "The attorney immediately retreated away from the sidebar and back to counsel table as soon as he saw the deputy approaching." Had the attorney not retreated to counsel table, Judge Bailey "would have allowed the deputy to use physical force, 'if necessary.' " All of this was "in full view and hearing of the jury."

Ms. Espejo's non-removed attorney then moved for time to file a disqualification motion. Judge Bailey allowed a forty-five-minute break to draft and file the motion to disqualify, and then denied it as legally insufficient. Judge Bailey improperly denied the motion because he believed it was a "trial tactic" and he could be fair to the parties. He "did not consider the motion from the defendant's perspective when considering whether or not to grant it."

Based on the sidebar conversation and disqualification motion in the Espejo trial, the commission charged Judge Bailey with violating canons 1, 2A, 3B(1), 3B(4), and 3B(7) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct. The commission held a hearing on the charges (at which Judge Bailey testified), found probable cause for the violations, and recommended that Judge Bailey be publicly reprimanded. Following the hearing, Judge Bailey stipulated that he did not contest the commission's findings and accepted the recommended discipline.

REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS

Still, despite the stipulation, it is up to us to "accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part" the commission's findings and conclusions. Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const. We review the commission's findings "to determine whether the alleged violations are supported by clear and convincing evidence." Inre White-Labora , 257 So.3d 367, 369 (Fla. 2018) (quoting In re Holder , 195 So.3d 1133, 1137 (Fla. 2016) ). Normally, where the commission's findings are undisputed and the "judge admits to wrongdoing," we conclude that the commission's findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Id. (quoting Holder , 195 So.3d at 1137 ). That is what we will do here.

Judge Bailey admitted that "his conduct was inappropriate [and] intemperate and violated the Canons."

[He] admitted and acknowledged that his conduct was not patient, dignified, and courteous as required by Canon 3B(4); that he did not act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Canon 2A); and that he did not personally observe the high standards of conduct required to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary ( Canon 1 ).

And Judge Bailey acknowledged "that he did not properly consider the motion to disqualify from the defendant's perspective" and "did not consider the prejudice his actions may have had on the final verdict."

Based on the commission's uncontested findings, and Judge Bailey's admissions, we agree that Judge Bailey did not establish, maintain, and enforce the highest standard of conduct ( Canon 1 ); did not promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Canon 2); heard a matter in which disqualification was required (Canon 3B(1) ); was not patient, dignified, and courteous to lawyers (Canon 3B(4) ); and did not accord the lawyers a right to be heard according to law (Canon 3B(7) ). In particular, we agree with the commission's findings as follows:

It is impossible to ignore the fact that the efficient administration of justice sometimes requires judges to place restrictions on the presentation of cases or arguments; such as a one-person-per-argument policy. However, such a policy should not be enforced arbitrarily, and never under the threat of physical force, in full view and hearing of the jury.
There are tools that judges have for dealing with inappropriate conduct by lawyers: admonishment, referrals to the Florida Bar, or in extreme cases - contempt proceedings. All of these were available to Judge Bailey if he truly felt that the attorneys were disruptive during the Espejo trial. Yet he chose not to utilize any of them.
While it is necessary for a judge to maintain order and decorum during proceedings, the evidence shows that the two attorneys were speaking respectfully to the Court during the sidebar, and were merely taking turns addressing the court, not speaking over each other. It appears that the attorneys had not breached the order and decorum of the proceedings in any way, other than aggravating Judge Bailey by working together to articulate an argument during a sidebar.
....
... [B]y inviting physical force be visited upon an attorney making an argument during trial, in full view of the jury, Judge Bailey's misconduct was egregious enough that it harmed the integrity of the judiciary, as well as the public's confidence in the judicial system ....

REVIEW OF RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE

For his violations of the code, the commission recommended that Judge Bailey be publicly reprimanded. Where the commission's findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence, as they are here, we give them "persuasive force and great weight" in our consideration of the recommended discipline, In re Recksiedler , 161 So.3d 398, 401 (Fla. 2015) (quoting In re Flood , 150 So.3d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 2014) ), although "the ultimate power and responsibility in making a determination rests with this Court." In re Contini , 205 So.3d 1281, 1284 (Fla. 2016) (quoting In re Davey , 645 So.2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994) ).

Four factors support the commission's recommendation of a public reprimand rather than a more severe sanction for Judge Bailey's conduct. First, Judge Bailey admitted what he did, acknowledged that it should never have occurred, and accepted full responsibility for his actions. Judge Bailey fully cooperated with the commission throughout its investigation. See White-Labora , 257 So.3d at 369 ("[T]he JQC Investigative Panel noted that Judge White-Labora fully cooperated with the JQC, admitted her misconduct, accepted full responsibility for it, and acknowledged that it should not have occurred."); Contini , 205 So.3d at 1284 ("Judge Contini accepted full responsibility for his actions at every stage of these proceedings and, according to the JQC, he 'expressed sincere remorse.' "); In re Holder , 195 So.3d 1133, 1137-38 (Fla. 2016) ("[T]he JQC Investigative Panel noted that Judge Holder accepted full responsibility for his misconduct involving the defendant, and admitted that though he only intended to help the defendant, his actions went too far, creating the appearance of impropriety and partiality and that Judge Holder further regretted and apologized for the misconduct."); Recksiedler , 161 So.3d at 401 ("We have also considered that Judge Recksiedler 'accepts full responsibility for the conduct set forth above, admits that it should not have occurred, and regrets and apologizes for such conduct.' We therefore approve the recommended discipline of a public reprimand.").

Second, in Judge Bailey's time on the bench, he has had no disciplinary problems. And he did not have any disciplinary history in his years as a lawyer. See White-Labora , 257 So.3d at 369 ("The JQC also recognized that, although Judge White-Labora did not take the appropriate steps to inform herself of the propriety of sending the letter, she did not send the letter to promote selfish interests, and she has a lengthy and otherwise previously unblemished history of judicial service."); In re Flood , 150 So.3d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 2014) ("We recognize, however, that in this case the misconduct was an isolated incident in an otherwise exemplary career as a judge.").

Third, Judge Bailey, on his own, signed up for stress management counseling "so that in the future, he is better equipped to handle stressful situations, and does not resort to knee-jerk reactions." He has also apologized, in writing, to Ms. Espejo's attorney for what happened during the trial. See In re Shea , 110 So.3d 414, 419 (Fla. 2013) ("Here, too, were it not for the mitigating circumstances surrounding Judge Shea's misconduct, particularly his self-initiated participation in anger management therapy and his appeals for guidance from more experienced members of the judiciary, this Court would more severely sanction Judge Shea. But in view of the smaller number of infractions as clarified by the second stipulation and Judge Shea's successful and ongoing efforts to manage his temper and foster professionalism, we approve the recommendation of a public reprimand, to be administered by this Court at a future date. We further direct Judge Shea to-within thirty days of the filing of this opinion-write and mail personal letters of apology to those individuals identified in the second stipulation and to continue mental health treatment as recommended by his doctor and family therapist."); In re Wood , 720 So.2d 506, 508-09 (Fla. 1998) ("In reviewing the parties' stipulation, we have considered the admonishment Judge Wood received from the JQC in 1994, his admitted misconduct at issue, his voluntary enrollment in an anger and stress management program, as well as relevant case law. After considering those factors, we approve the parties' stipulation and publicly reprimand Judge Wood.").

And fourth, we have imposed similar discipline for similar conduct. "[A] public reprimand is the appropriate form of discipline for a 'judge's rude or intemperate behavior in open court,' " we have said. In re Collins , 195 So.3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Wood , 720 So.2d at 509 ); see also Shea , 110 So.3d at 416, 419 (finding that a public reprimand, letters of apology, and continued mental health treatment were adequate sanctions for a judge exhibiting a pattern of "rude and intemperate behavior" over a course of four years). We see no reason to do anything different here, especially given Judge Bailey's acceptance of responsibility, history of no disciplinary problems, and initiative in apologizing to Ms. Espejo's counsel and in addressing his anger issues.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we accept the commission's stipulated findings and recommendation that Judge Bailey violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and be publicly reprimanded as a result. We therefore command Judge Dennis Daniel Bailey to appear before this Court for the administration of a public reprimand at a time to be established by the Clerk of this Court.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, LAGOA, LUCK, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur.

      We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 12, Fla. Const.

      Canon 1 states: "An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective." Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 1.
      Canon 2A states: "A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 2A.
      Canon 3B(1) states: "A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required." Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3B(1).
      Canon 3B(4) states in pertinent part that "[a] judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity." Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3B(4).
      Canon 3B(7) states in pertinent part that "[a] judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law." Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3B(7).


text:
    Marcelo Augusto ALVES, Appellant, v. Mark S. INCH, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Appellees.
    No. 1D17-4399
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 5, 2019 Rehearing Denied March 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John GAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2275
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019 Rehearing Denied March 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Silas KENDRICKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1381
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 28, 2019 Rehearing Denied March 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Hakeem BYRD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2102
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 22, 2019 Rehearing Denied March 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Rufus HAMPTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4069
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 13, 2019 Rehearing Denied March 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Richard GRAGG, III, Appellant, v. FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY, BOARD OF TRUSTEES, and United Faculty of Florida, FAMU Chapter, Appellees.
    No. 1D18-2158
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 25, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kurt Henry Van ZEELAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2553
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 12, 2019 Rehearing Denied March 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Curtis Lee JONES III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3237
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 3, 2019 Rehearing Denied March 29, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dehvin James JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0848
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jermaine LEWIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2148
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kyndal EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1243
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kyndal EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1242
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kyndal EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1241
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Shantwaun TURNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3697
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Curtis L. ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3389
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Daryl Wade MAYATTE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-5130
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    WALT DISNEY PARKS AND RESORTS U.S., INC. and Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., Workers' Compensation Department, Appellants, v. Althea BENNETT, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3021
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kenneth RICKERSON, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-3762
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   DENIED.


text:
    Allyson Denise HAWKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2605
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Britnee Angelique MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4826
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brian Nephi MCLELLAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1911
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Frederick E. MELVIN, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-693
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Matthew Walter MAHALICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-696
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Frederick E. MELVIN, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-621
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Steven Derrell BROWN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4202
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Joann SOWDERS, Appellant, v. PIER PARK, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1473
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Christopher MCRAE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4587
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Giovanna RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2972
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Matthew MARRAFFINO, Appellant, v. STERICYCLE/SEDGWICK CMS, Appellees.
    No. 1D18-0757
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    W.N.S., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-417
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Willie COX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4830
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    C.J.S., Father of C.J.M, a Minor Child, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4207
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 9, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Antwan Marcell ABNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2882
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Erwin D. WILLIAMS, Former Husband, Appellant, v. Andrea WILLIAMS, Former Wife, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2189
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kevin SYMONETTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-788
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Cameron H. WATERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4322
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Amos TAMBUNGA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4232
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Cristina MORRIS, Appellant, v. BAOWEI XIA, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2912
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    FILED April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Scott JOHNSON, Husband, Appellant, v. Peggy JOHNSON, Wife, and Dicey V. Absher, Appellees.
    No. 1D18-2539
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Miguel RIVERA SANTIAGO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0682
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Mary HEKTNER, Appellant, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF BREVARD COUNTY, and Sedgwick CMS, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 1D18-3792
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    S.B., Mother of A.M.S., a Minor Child, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-5175
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    James SOLOMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1510
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Alan Jerome CROTZER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-4154
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Brandon Jaron MCKNIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-492
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David Lecannon SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-124
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Fabian JENNINGS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3873
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Erin W. PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. Donald E. PHILLIPS, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-4114
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    J. B., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0039
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    W.L., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1370
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    TC 09, LLC, John and Jane Doe, et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. ROSEWOOD GARDENS OF TAMPA BAY, INC., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0581
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Tristan Endrion HAMILTON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4754
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 31, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    OVERSTREET WEALTH MANAGEMENT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. ADVANCED HORIZONS VI, LLC INC., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0536
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Merandelet JEANBAPTISTE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0388
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    S.N.B., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0259
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Reshaunte ANGLIN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0192
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Daleanne BEARB, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. WELLS FARGO BANK NA, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0505
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Russell BALENGER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY FSB, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0481
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Daniel FULLER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0296
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    OVERSTREET WEALTH MANAGEMENT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. RS WESTSHORE, LLC INC., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0231
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 20, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    A.C.-L., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1449
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Scott GATES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0494
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Mark William GACHES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Chad CHRONISTER, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, Florida Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0973
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 19, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Tyrone PRESHA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.:2D19-0136
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 13, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    David Aaron GILLETT and Jordan, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Michael PITTMAN and Associates Consulting, Inc., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3841
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Socorro Marines DIAZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2424
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Louella T. CALDWELL, Appellant, v. Linda TRUMBLE, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4387
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert L. DAVIS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0456
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 06, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    L.L., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-5106
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David ROJAS, DC #362996, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2213
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 15, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Justin FORD, DOC #D51823, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2984
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kent PLUMMER and Oksana Paschenko, Appellants, v. The WAVE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION OF ST. PETERSBURG, INC., Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-897
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Alvin BOUYER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1802
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Christopher D. WARD, DOC #979923, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1778
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kelvin JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1894
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dan WESNER d/b/a Fish Tales, Appellant, v. JMS MARINAS, LLC d/b/a Maximo Harborage Marina, a Delaware limited liability company, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3358
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Juan SOTO, DOC #Y29598, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2435
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lisa Michelle DILLARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2900
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 22, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Shawn M. MATZEN, Appellant, v. Rene M. MATZEN, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-3741
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 22, 2019.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    JOSEPH KEEGAN, LLC, a Michigan Limited Liability Company, Appellant, v. Leon Dale JONES, Individually, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1744
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 7, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Mario Martinez GUZMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-3081
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 21, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    HERNANDEZ TECHNOLOGIES, INC. d/b/a First Capital Payments, Appellant, v. CHETU, INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2899
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 7, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jason YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-3046
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 28, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Bishan A. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1394
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [February 7, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    E.W., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D18-1153 4D18-1155 4D18-1156
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 21, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lawton COHEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1165
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 21, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Julian Brook DESANTIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2328
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 21, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Calvin BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2593
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 21, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antwan Akeene WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2184
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 28, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Gregg Scott KLEINSTEIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2884
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 28, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Alvin Eugene TURNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2704
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 21, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sieharra Nichole HORNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2805
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    March 21, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Marvin JEAN-MICHEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1617
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 28, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Marcia SUPRIA, Appellant, v. GOSHEN MORTGAGE, LLC, in substitution for the original Plaintiff Christiana Trust, a Division of Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB, as trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2012-13, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2495
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 28, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Geoffrey Sean KENNEDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2504
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 28, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sandra CHIN, Appellant, v. ENCLAVE AT ST. LUCIE WEST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2581
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 28, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Peppy MARTIN, Appellant, v. Marcelo SARMIENTO, Palm Beach County Sheriff and Tri-County Humane Society, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-3098
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 28, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ann Marie BENEDETTO a/k/a Annmarie Benedetto, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE, on Behalf OF the HOLDERS OF the HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST MORTGAGE LOAN PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-12, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1425
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 28, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jamol EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1721
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 28, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Maria COLEGAS, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS LEGAL TITLE TRUSTEE FOR TRUMAN 2016 SC6 TITLE TRUST, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-3010
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 28, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David J. JENKINS and Kay Jenkins, Appellant, v. SAFEPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1874
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 4, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anne TILLS and James Tills, Appellants, v. HSBC BANK USA, AS TRUSTEE FOR MERRILL LYNCH MORTGAGE INVESTORS, INC., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Mana Series 2007-A3, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2084
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 4, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Thomas CAMPANIELLO, Appellant, v. Edith EGLIN, John Schaefer, Henry P. Hoffstot, III and Phipps Plaza Condominium Association, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Appellees.
    Nos. 4D18-604 4D18-1072
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 4, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Paul MICHELIN, Appellant, v. Louisa MICHELIN, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2474
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 4, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    LIBERTY HOME EQUITY SOLUTIONS, INC., f/k/a Genworth Financial Home Equity Access, Inc., Appellant, v. Patsy RAULSTON a/k/a Patsy I. Raulston, et al., Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1729
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 4, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Bobby COFIELD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D19-210
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 26, 2019 Rehearing Denied March 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jack JEAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2250
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [January 17, 2019]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony MCGEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D19-381
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Timothy MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D19-271
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ernesto VILLANEDA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-3646
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed March 5, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Linda A. NASH, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., as Successor by July 1, 2011, De Jur Merger With BAC Home Loans Serving, LP, f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, Richard M. Annette and MTG Electronic Registration, Etc., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-3604
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed February 26, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Raymond A. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-4026
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Anthony JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-3738
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jacquelin D. LANGLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-3610
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019 Rehearing Denied May 1, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Felix MARTINEZ-CANDELARIA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-3114
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael BREGMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-3005
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Brandon STEVENS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-2958
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Reginald PATTERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-2949
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Willie HOLLIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-2704
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    David LUCIO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-2550
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Demario GILMORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-2542
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Thomas Eugene GRAVES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-2289
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Anthony R. FREGENTI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-2177
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Ronald James LEDDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-3659
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael David SPEAR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-3189
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Joseph HALLIDAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-3109
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kevin Lamont MCCULLOUGH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-2459
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Halbert James HUNTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1183
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Garfield OXABLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-724
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Christopher LOWRY-ROJAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3849
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Alfonso VILELA-RAMIREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3060
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    B.V., Father of N.Z., L.V., R.V., and R.V., Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D19-0127
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Marquies Allen BRISBANE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2968
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Steven COOK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1415
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed April 2, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael P. MATOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2176
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed January 22, 2019 Rehearing Denied March 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


author: May, J.

text:
    Maria Serret TEJADA, Appellant, v. Forfeiture of 2015 CADILLAC ESCALADE VIN NO: 1GYS4BKJ5FR157228, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1474
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 3, 2019]
    Fred Haddad of Fred Haddad, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Gregg Rossman and Alexander Fischer of Rossman Legal, Davie, for appellee.
   May, J.

The defendant appeals a final summary judgment forfeiting an Escalade. She argues the trial court erred in entering summary judgment because: (1) there were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment; (2) forfeiture actions may only be decided by a jury; (3) the vehicle was not "contraband;" and (4) the forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment. We find no merit in the first three issues, but reverse on the fourth issue based on a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision.

The Town of Davie ("Town") petitioned for forfeiture of the defendant's Escalade after she pleaded to two misdemeanors involving the registration of the vehicle in a false name. The defendant's family had contacted Massachusetts law enforcement and reported her missing. A national bulletin listed the defendant and her son as missing. Information through homeland security indicated that the defendant might be in Davie, Florida.

Law enforcement conducted surveillance to find the defendant. They found her at her son's school. They observed her park and exit a 2015 Escalade.

When law enforcement confronted her, they asked her to identify herself, at which point she gave the false name of "Amarilys." She then gave them her real name. Law enforcement verified she was not missing or endangered and notified Massachusetts law enforcement.

They ran a teletype check of the Escalade, which listed Amarilys Ambert as the registered owner. They asked the defendant for the registered owner's contact information; she refused to provide it. Being unable to locate or contact the registered owner, and because the defendant refused to provide her driver's license, law enforcement arrested the defendant and had the Escalade towed.

During the tow inventory of the Escalade, law enforcement found a Florida driver's license on the front seat with the name Amarilys Ambert and the defendant's photo. They also found two debit cards in the name of Amarilys Ambert.

The Town filed an action to forfeit the defendant's Escalade as contraband obtained and used in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. The defendant moved to dismiss the action, alleging the Escalade was not contraband under section 932.701, Florida Statutes (2016). The trial court denied the defendant's motion.

In her deposition, however, the defendant explained that she was given money to purchase the Escalade in New Jersey. When the defendant signed the sales contract, she placed it under the name of Amarilys Ambert Cancel. She also titled the vehicle and applied for a tag under that name. She used the name because she was running away from her family. She had no knowledge of whether a person by that name existed.

The Town moved for summary judgment. During the hearing, the Town argued the defendant used a fictitious name to purchase and title the Escalade. Titling the vehicle under a false name made the vehicle per se contraband.

The defendant opposed the motion and claimed the Town failed to prove any fraud. She argued a jury should determine whether fraud occurred. She demanded a jury trial. The court granted the Town's motion and entered a final judgment of forfeiture, relying on City of Sweetwater v. Zaldivar , 559 So.2d 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

From this judgment, the defendant now appeals.

The defendant argues that based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because: (1) there were genuine issues of material fact concerning her intent to defraud and whether the inventory search was valid; (2) forfeiture actions may only be decided by a jury; (3) the Escalade was not contraband; and (4) forfeiture of the Escalade was an excessive punishment under the Florida Constitution. The Town responded that summary judgment was properly entered because it established the elements of section 319.33, Florida Statutes (2016) ; there were no material issues of fact; summary judgments are appropriate in forfeiture actions; and the Escalade's forfeiture was not excessive punishment under Article I, § 17 of the Florida Constitution.

We have de novo review. Dennis v. Kline , 120 So.3d 11, 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

The Third District has held that a pleader must allege facts showing the motor vehicle was used in violation of section 319.33 to be subject to forfeiture. Zaldivar , 559 So.2d at 661. Intentionally submitting an application with a false name is " 'inherently misleading and injurious, both to the agency responsible for the motor vehicle records, and those who depend on them.' " Id. (citation omitted). "Thus, no allegation or proof of intent to defraud is necessary ... in a civil action seeking forfeiture of the vehicle." Id. The Third District allowed the forfeiture of a vehicle under section 319.33 because the City alleged ultimate facts showing the defendant used a false name when he applied for title to the car. Id. at 662.

Here, the defendant violated section 319.33(1)(e), which provides it is unlawful "[t]o use a false or fictitious name, give a false or fictitious address, or make any false statement in any application or affidavit required under the provisions of this chapter or in a bill of sale or sworn statement of ownership or otherwise commit a fraud in any application." § 319.33(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2016). "Any motor vehicle used in violation of this section shall constitute contraband which may be seized by a law enforcement agency and shall be subject to forfeiture proceedings." § 319.33(6), Fla. Stat. (2016).

The defendant admitted signing the sales contract under the name of Amarilys Ambert Cancel, which is not her real name. She had the dealership title the vehicle, applied for a tag, and applied for and received a Florida license under the same false name. In short, the Town proved sufficient facts to warrant the forfeiture.

The defendant next argues her answer and memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment motion created genuine issues of material fact for a jury to decide. However, she fails to explain what issues of fact remained. A review of the defendant's answer and affirmative defenses suggests there were issues concerning the Town's alleged violation of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution by searching the Escalade without a warrant.

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution generally prohibits warrantless searches. See Amend. IV, U.S. Const. An inventory search is an exception to the general rule. State v. Waller , 918 So.2d 363, 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

" 'An inventory search is the search of property lawfully seized and detained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items (such as might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against false claims of loss or damage.' " Id. at 367 (citing Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 811 n.1, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ). "Contraband or evidence seized in a valid inventory search is admissible because the procedure is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement." Rolling v. State , 695 So.2d 278, 294 (Fla. 1997).

The defendant argues the Town failed to factually refute the constitutional violations raised and failed to establish the defenses are legally insufficient. However, the record shows the Town did refute these claims.

At the hearing, the defendant claimed she was not under arrest; law enforcement did not have a warrant; and they did not have probable cause when the search occurred. The Town responded that the inventory search occurred after law enforcement took the defendant into custody. The Town lawfully took the Escalade because its registered owner could not be found. It conducted an inventory search in good faith. There was no material fact in dispute about the search.

Next, the defendant argues that issues of forfeiture must be decided by a jury. The defendant is simply wrong. Summary judgment is proper where pleadings, depositions, affidavits and other evidence disclose no issue of material fact. See Swift v. Century Ins. Co. of New York , 264 So.2d 88, 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).

The trial court reviewed the pleadings, the defendant's deposition, the affidavits, and the arguments. There were no genuine issues of material fact. The trial court correctly granted the Town's motion for summary judgment.

The defendant next argues the Escalade is not contraband pursuant to section 932.701. She contends because she was not convicted of a felony, the Escalade cannot be contraband under this section. We disagree.

Section 932.701 defines contraband as:

Any personal property, including, but not limited to, any vessel, aircraft, item, object, tool, substance, device, weapon, machine, vehicle of any kind, money, securities, books, records, research, negotiable instruments, or currency, which was used or was attempted to be used as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of, any felony, whether or not comprising an element of the felony, or which is acquired by proceeds obtained as a result of a violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.

§ 932.701(2)(a) 5., Fla. Stat. (2016). The statute does not require the individual to be convicted of a felony. It merely requires the individual be using the vehicle in the commission of a felony, which is what occurred here.

Here, law enforcement arrested the defendant for "possession of unlawfully issued, stolen, fictitious, blank, forged, counterfeit driver's license." This is a felony under section 322.212, Fla. Stat. (2016). While the State amended the information to allege a misdemeanor charge, that does not eliminate the statute's application for the forfeiture proceeding.

The Escalade was also contraband under section 319.33(1)(e). That section provides it is unlawful "[t]o use a false or fictitious name, give a false or fictitious address, or make any false statement in any application or affidavit required under the provisions of this chapter or in a bill of sale or sworn statement of ownership or otherwise commit a fraud in any application." § 319.33(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2016). The defendant obtained the Escalade using a false or fictitious name and acquired title of the vehicle with this false name.

The statute further provides "[a]ny motor vehicle used in violation of this section shall constitute contraband which may be seized by a law enforcement agency and shall be subject to forfeiture proceedings pursuant to ss. 932.701 - 932.704." § 319.33(6), Fla. Stat. Even if it could be said that the vehicle did not automatically fall under section 932.701's definition of contraband, it fits within the definition under section 319.33.

And last, the defendant argues the seizure of the Escalade constitutes excessive punishment, prohibited by Article I, § 17 of the Florida Constitution. She explains the forfeiture is excessive punishment because she was convicted of only two misdemeanor charges, thus the punishment was disproportional. The State responds the forfeiture is directly related to the crime and does not constitute excessive punishment. By granting summary judgment, the trial court rejected the defendant's argument sub silencio.

Very recently, the United States Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue. Timbs v. Indiana , --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 682, 203 L.Ed.2d 11 (2019). There, the Court held the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive fines. Id. at 687. The Court did so in a case very similar to this one where an Indiana resident had his new Land Rover SUV forfeited based on his conviction for dealing in a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit theft. Id. at 686.

The Indiana trial court denied the State's request to forfeit the $42,000 vehicle finding the forfeiture to be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses. Id. The intermediate appellate court agreed. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed holding the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause was inapplicable to the state's forfeiture. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 691.

Similarly, the Escalade's forfeiture in this case may be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the two misdemeanor offenses to which the defendant pleaded or even the felony charges for which she was arrested. Because the trial court did not have the benefit of Timbs when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment, we remand the case to the trial court to determine if the value of the forfeited property is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses.

Reversed and remanded.

Ciklin and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.

      The trial court did not have the benefit of the Court's recent decision when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Antione HASTIE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-3159
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 3, 2019]
    Antione Hastie, Fort Lauderdale, pro se.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeanine M. Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Antione Hastie appeals the trial court's denial of his Rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. We reverse and remand for the trial court to remove the violent career criminal (VCC) designation from Hastie's grand theft convictions.

On November 24, 2015, Hastie entered a negotiated plea of no contest in seven criminal cases. He was designated a habitual felony offender (HFO) and a VCC and was sentenced to fifteen years in prison with a ten-year mandatory minimum pursuant to his VCC designation. For the VCC predicate, the trial court used a previous burglary conviction where Hastie was a juvenile but was tried and convicted as an adult.

On July 26, 2018, Hastie filed the subject Rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence and argued that he could not be sentenced as a VCC for his grand theft convictions because they are not enumerated offences in the VCC statute and because his juvenile burglary conviction was wrongfully used to impose a VCC sentence. The lower court denied Hastie's motion.

The trial court correctly considered Hastie's juvenile burglary offense for his VCC designation because he was tried and convicted as an adult. See generally Reed v. State , 880 So.2d 1269 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (explaining that a juvenile's adult conviction can be considered for habitual offender sentencing). However, Hastie's VCC sentences for his grand theft convictions are illegal.

The VCC statute states, in relevant part:

(d) "Violent career criminal" means a defendant for whom the court must impose imprisonment ... if it finds that:
1. The defendant has previously been convicted as an adult three more times for an offense in this state or other qualified offense that is:
a. Any forcible felony ...
b. Aggravated stalking ...
c. Aggravated child abuse ...
d. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult ...
e. Lewd or lascivious battery ...
f. Escape ...
g. A felony violation of chapter 790 involving the use or possession of a firearm. ...
3. The primary felony offense for which the defendant is to be sentenced is a felony enumerated in subparagraph 1....

§ 775.084, Fla. Stat. (2015).

Grand theft is not enumerated as a primary or predicate offense; therefore, Hastie's VCC sentences for those convictions should be vacated. See Bynes v. State , 127 So.3d 556, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ("As the State concedes, grand theft clearly does not qualify for VCC sentencing."). We reverse and remand for the ministerial entry of a corrected sentence at which Hastie need not be present.

Reversed and remanded for resentencing.

Gross, Forst and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.


author: Klingensmith, J.

text:
    Thelma ROWE-LEWIS, Appellant, v. Horace LEWIS, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1982
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 3, 2019]
    Thelma Rowe-Lewis, Miramar, pro se.
    No appearance for appellee.
   Klingensmith, J.

Thelma Rowe-Lewis appeals the trial court's final order denying her motion for rehearing and reconsideration and motion to set aside final judgment of dissolution. We find two of her arguments on appeal merit discussion. First, we agree that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to set aside final judgment, based on fraud, without holding an evidentiary hearing. Second, we have been given the opportunity to, once again, address a trial court's failure to make specific factual findings in an order denying an alimony request.

Facts

After a final hearing on Rowe-Lewis's petition for dissolution of marriage, the trial court entered its final judgment of dissolution, which denied her request for alimony. The judgment stated she did not have a substantial need for alimony and former husband did not have the ability to pay. It also indicated that the court considered all of the statutory factors related to alimony listed in section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (2017). However, of the statute's eight listed factors, the judgment only listed specific findings for section 61.08(2)(j) : "Any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties." For this factor, the judgment noted that the trial court considered Rowe-Lewis's "steady employment history."

The judgment also directed the parties to keep their respective assets and liabilities, including vehicles. Though the judgment also stated former husband could keep the vehicles owned by his company, the judgment was silent as to the distribution or valuation of former husband's business-a towing company organized as an S-corporation in which he was the sole shareholder.

Rowe-Lewis moved to set aside the final judgment of dissolution pursuant to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540(c). The motion alleged that former husband's financial affidavit and corresponding testimony were fraudulent. Rowe-Lewis identified specific, un-disclosed assets and income sources, including payments deposited into the towing company's primary business checking account, which she claimed former husband used for personal expenses. Rowe-Lewis also presented records as proof of these payments. She alleged that if former husband had reported this financial information accurately, then the court could have found that: he had the ability to pay retroactive and ongoing spousal support; he had the ability to pay more child support; and that his business was an asset of the marriage which should have been equitably distributed. As such, Rowe-Lewis argued she was injured by former husband's fraudulent misrepresentation.

The trial court entered an order denying Rowe-Lewis's motion to set aside the final judgment-which was treated as a motion for rehearing and reconsideration-without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Rowe-Lewis also filed a self-titled motion for rehearing and reconsideration. In it, she claimed, among other things, that there were several errors in the final judgment. The trial court denied the motion for rehearing and reconsideration, but entered an amended final judgment correcting two of the alleged errors. This appeal follows.

Evidentiary Hearing Necessary Regarding the Fraud Allegation

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) applies to family court proceedings. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(b) ; Lefler v. Lefler , 776 So.2d 319, 321 (4th DCA 2001). "A court's denial of 1.540(b) relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Acosta v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. , 88 So.3d 415, 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ; accord Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. , 20 So.3d 952, 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

A rule 1.540(b) motion "should not be summarily dismissed without an evidentiary hearing unless its allegations and accompanying affidavits fail to allege a colorable entitlement to relief." Coleman , 20 So.3d at 954 ; accord Hinson v. Hinson , 985 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). "To warrant an evidentiary hearing, a Rule 1.540(b) motion must ... plead fraud with particularity[ ] and ... explain why the fraud, if it exists, would entitle the movant to have the judgment set aside." Coleman , 20 So.3d at 955 (citations omitted). Thus, for a court to determine whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on allegations of fraud, it must evaluate whether "the parties' assertions, if true, would have altered the final judgments from which relief was sought ...." Id. at 956.

The record indicates that an evidentiary hearing was necessary. See Coleman , 20 So.3d at 954 ; Hinson , 985 So.2d at 1121. Although we make no determination about the veracity of Rowe-Lewis's claims, they were neither boilerplate nor merely conclusory; instead, they were alleged with particularity and with supporting documentation, presenting a colorable entitlement to relief. See Coleman , 20 So.3d at 954 ; Hinson , 985 So.2d at 1121. Furthermore, sufficiently pled fraud allegations are ordinarily not suitable for summary disposition and require a full explanation of the facts and circumstances of the alleged wrong. See Coleman , 20 So.3d at 954. Therefore, if Rowe-Lewis's factual claims are found to be true after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court must then make a legal determination about whether the former husband's business income was retained for a corporate purpose. See Zold v. Zold , 911 So.2d 1222, 1231-32 (Fla. 2005) (indicating that "pass-through" income of an S-corporation retained for a non-corporate purpose may constitute income reportable in alimony proceedings).

Factual Findings Needed Regarding Section 61.08(2)

Although "[t]he nature and amount of an award of alimony is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court," an alimony award must be "supported by competent substantial evidence." Brezault v. Brezault , 199 So.3d 519, 521 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citation omitted).

Section 61.08(2) provides a specific, non-exhaustive list of factors for a trial court to consider in determining whether a party is entitled to alimony. "[T]he court shall include findings of fact relative to the factors enumerated in subsection (2) supporting an award or denial of alimony." § 61.08(1) (emphasis added); see also Patino v. Patino , 122 So.3d 961, 963 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (reversing where the trial court failed to make factual findings as to each factor listed under section 61.08(2) ).

In Brezault , the trial court awarded the husband alimony. 199 So.3d at 521. In its final judgment, the court simply listed all of the factors in section 61.08(2) and stated that it "considered" them. Id. While portions of the final judgment made findings as to several factors, there were not factual findings for each factor. Id. at 522. We held that this was error and reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to make the required findings of fact under section 61.08(1) and (2). Id. at 523.

In this case, as in Brezault , the final judgment stated that the trial court considered the requisite statutory factors, but failed to make findings of fact corresponding to each of them. Though the final judgment does contain a finding as to section 61.08(2)(j), it did not make factual findings regarding the other listed factors, including, inter alia : the standard of living during the marriage; the age and the physical and emotional conditions of the parties; or the contribution of each party to the marriage-all of which are relevant to this case. See § 61.08(2). While we understand that each statutory factor may not be relevant in every case, the trial court should nonetheless address the facts that do pertain to a listed factor, or state in the final judgment why the court did not find that factor applicable under the circumstances. See §§ 61.08(1) and (2) ; Brezault , 199 So.3d at 522-23 ; Patino , 122 So.3d at 963.

Conclusion

Because we agree with Rowe-Lewis's arguments that the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on her fraud claim and failed to make findings of fact as required by sections 61.08(1) and (2), we reverse the court's determination as to alimony. We remand this matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and for entry of a final judgment that includes the requisite findings of fact under section 61.08(1), and also addresses each of the factors under section 61.08(2). On remand, the trial court should also address the issue of whether former husband's business is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution, and if so, make specific findings as to both the valuation and distribution of the business in its final judgment. See § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat. (2017) (setting forth the process for deciding how assets are to be identified and distributed); Whelan v. Whelan , 736 So.2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (noting that the "[f]ailure to make sufficient findings regarding value of property and identification of marital assets and debts constitutes reversible error and requires remand for appropriate findings to be made" (alteration in original) ).

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

May and Ciklin, JJ., concur.

      Although the trial court cites to an administrative order as authority for considering the motion to set aside the final judgment without holding an evidentiary hearing, this court has previously held that a local rule cannot be applied in a way that conflicts with a rule of the court. See Dougan v. Bradshaw , 198 So.3d 878, 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("[A]n administrative order which attempts to amend a statute or rule by adding terms and conditions ... is invalid." (Alteration added) (citation omitted) ). Similarly, an administrative order cannot supersede an opinion issued from this court.