author: CANADY, C.J.

text:
    The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, etc., Petitioner, v. Dianne D. GLENVILLE a/k/a Diane D. Glenville a/k/a Diane Glenville, et al., Respondents.
    No. SC17-954
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    September 6, 2018
    Anthony R. Smith, Kathryn I. Kasper, and Kendra J. Taylor of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Winter Park, Florida, for Petitioner
    Sheryl A. Edwards of The Edwards Law Firm, PL, Sarasota, Florida, for Respondents
   CANADY, C.J.

This case involves a dispute between the former record owners of certain real property and a subordinate lienholder over surplus funds resulting from a judicial foreclosure sale of the property. The crux of the dispute is whether the subordinate lienholder timely filed its claim to the surplus amount under the provisions of chapter 45, Florida Statutes (2015), governing judicial sales. The statute requires that a claim to surplus funds be filed within "60 days after the sale." The specific issue presented is whether the sixty-day period begins upon the public auction of the property, the clerk's issuance of the certificate of title, or some other event.

This Court has for review Bank of New York Mellon v. Glenville , 215 So.3d 1284, 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), in which the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that, under section 45.031, the subordinate lienholder's claim was untimely because it was not filed within sixty days of the public auction. In so holding, the Second District certified conflict with Straub v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 182 So.3d 878, 881 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that the sixty-day period does not begin until the clerk issues and files the certificate of title. This Court granted discretionary review based on the certified conflict. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

We conclude that the sixty-day period begins upon the clerk's issuance of the certificate of disbursements-something the clerk is tasked with doing "[o]n filing a certificate of title." § 45.031(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Section 45.032(3), Florida Statutes (2015)-which neither Glenville nor Straub considered-makes clear beyond any doubt that the sixty-day period begins upon issuance of the certificate of disbursements. Accordingly, we quash Glenville . We also disapprove the certified conflict case of Straub to the extent the Fourth District held that the sixty-day period begins upon the issuance of the certificate of title as opposed to the certificate of disbursements.

I. BACKGROUND

Before presenting the facts and procedural history of Glenville and then discussing Straub , we provide an overview of the general procedures for judicial foreclosure sales.

Judicial Foreclosure Procedures-Generally

Section 45.031, Florida Statutes (2015)-titled "Judicial sales procedure"-as well as certain other sections of the Florida Statutes, address judicial foreclosure sales and set forth the procedures that "may be followed as an alternative to any other sale procedure if so ordered by the court." § 45.031, Fla. Stat. Under section 45.031, the trial court, "[i]n the order or final judgment," "shall direct the clerk to sell the property at public sale on a specified day." § 45.031(1)(a), Fla. Stat. A notice of sale shall then be published at certain times and shall contain certain information, including "[t]he time and place of sale." § 45.031(2), Fla. Stat. The winning bidder is required to post a deposit "[a]t the time of the sale" and must pay the remaining balance within a prescribed period. § 45.031(3), Fla. Stat. "After a sale of the property," the clerk is required to "promptly file a certificate of sale." § 45.031(4), Fla. Stat. "If no objections to the sale are filed within 10 days after filing the certificate of sale," the clerk is then required to file a "certificate of title." § 45.031(5), Fla. Stat. Upon the filing of the certificate of title, "the sale shall stand confirmed." § 45.031(6), Fla. Stat. "On filing a certificate of title," the clerk is then required to disburse the proceeds "in accordance with the order or final judgment" and file a "certificate of disbursements." § 45.031(7)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. "If there are funds remaining after payment of all disbursements required by the final judgment of foreclosure and shown on the certificate of disbursements, the surplus shall be distributed as provided in this section [45.031] and ss. 45.0315-45.035." § 45.031(7)(d), Fla. Stat.

Section 45.031 was amended in 2006 to require that the final judgment of foreclosure, the notice of sale, and the certificate of disbursements include certain language informing subordinate lienholders and other persons claiming a right to any surplus funds that they must file a claim with the clerk of court within "60 days after the sale." See ch. 2006-175, § 1, at 2, 3, 5, Laws of Fla. (amending § 45.031(1)(a), (2)(f), (7)(b), Fla. Stat., respectively). Section 45.031 does not define "sale" or "60 days after the sale." But as the cross-references in section 45.031(7)(d) indicate, other sections of chapter 45 also govern surplus funds. Those other sections include section 45.032, which sets forth detailed requirements and procedures relating to the disbursement of surplus funds. As addressed more fully below, section 45.032 itself prescribes a sixty-day period in the specific context of the filing of claims for surplus funds-a sixty-day period beginning upon the issuance of the certificate of disbursements. See § 45.032(3), Fla. Stat.

Glenville -the Case on Review

Respondents, Diane and Mark Glenville, were the defendant property owners in a foreclosure action. Glenville , 215 So.3d at 1285 n.1. Petitioner, The Bank of New York Mellon, f/k/a The Bank of New York, as Successor Trustee to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Trustee on behalf of the Certificateholders of the CWHEQ, Inc., CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-D (Mellon), was the holder of a second mortgage on the property. A first mortgage on the property was held by JP Morgan Chase, and a third mortgage on the property was held by Florida Housing Finance Corporation (Florida Housing).

In May 2014, JP Morgan Chase brought a foreclosure action against the Glenvilles, seeking to foreclose its interest under the first mortgage. A Final Judgment of Foreclosure was entered against the Glenvilles on May 28, 2015. The final judgment set a public auction date of July 2, 2015, and-in accordance with section 45.031(1)(a), Florida Statutes -included the requisite statement regarding a potential surplus. The public auction was held on July 2, 2015. The clerk issued the certificate of sale on July 6, 2015, after the holiday weekend. On July 14, 2015, the clerk issued the certificate of title. And on July 29, 2015, the clerk issued the certificate of disbursements, which, in accordance with section 45.031(7)(b), Florida Statutes, included the requisite language regarding surplus funds. The certificate of disbursements reflected a surplus of $86,093.27.

On August 4, 2015, Florida Housing filed a claim asserting its right to $20,573.64 of the surplus amount. On September 1, 2015-sixty-one days after the public auction-the Glenvilles filed a Verified Claim for Mortgage Foreclosure Surplus. In their motion, the Glenvilles admitted that Florida Housing's claim was timely and requested that the trial court issue an order disbursing $20,573.64 of the surplus to Florida Housing and the remainder to the Glenvilles. The next day, on September 2, 2015, Mellon filed a claim asserting its right to the entire surplus amount. Mellon's claim was filed more than sixty days after the public auction but within sixty days of the clerk's filing of each of the following: the certificate of sale, the certificate of title, and the certificate of disbursements. No other relevant claims to the surplus were filed.

On November 2, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the parties' competing claims for the surplus. On November 5, 2015, the trial court issued an Order to Disburse Surplus Funds, directing the clerk to disburse $20,573.64 of the surplus to Florida Housing, and the balance to the Glenvilles. The trial court rejected Mellon's claim as untimely under section 45.031 because it "was not submitted within 60 days of the foreclosure sale held on July 2, 2015." Mellon appealed to the Second District, arguing "that a foreclosure sale is not complete until the clerk issues the certificate of sale." Glenville , 215 So.3d at 1285. Mellon thus contended that its claim was timely because it was filed within sixty days of issuance of the certificate of sale.

The Second District rejected Mellon's argument and affirmed the trial court's order denying Mellon's claim for surplus funds. Id. The Second District primarily focused on section 45.031(7)(b) and concluded that the statutory provision unambiguously provided that the cutoff for submitting claims for surplus funds is sixty days from the date of the public auction. Id. at 1285-86. The Second District observed that section 45.031(7)(b)"only refers to the 'sale,' not the 'certificate of sale,' " and then noted that " section 45.031 assigns particular and distinct meanings to the terms 'sale' and 'certificate of sale' and does not use them interchangeably." Id. at 1286. For example, the Second District noted that section 45.031(4) uses the two terms separately and distinctly in the same sentence. Id. Thus, according to the Second District, adopting Mellon's argument would not only render section 45.031(4) meaningless but "confuse the meaning of other subsections of the statute." Id. The Second District then supported its conclusion by noting that two of its previous decisions used the public auction "as the start date for the sixty-day period." Id. (citing Mathews v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. , 139 So.3d 498, 499-500 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ; Dever v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n , 147 So.3d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ).

The Second District also rejected a separate argument from Mellon that the sixty-day period should begin from the day the clerk issues the certificate of title. The Second District concluded that Mellon waived that argument by not raising it prior to rehearing. Id. Nevertheless, the Second District noted that Mellon's purportedly waived argument was consistent with the Fourth District's recent decision in Straub , which held that the sixty-day cutoff period begins when the clerk issues and files the certificate of title. Id. at 1287. The Second District then certified conflict with Straub , while opining that Straub 's construction of the term "sale" "confuses the meaning of several subsections of section 45.031." Id. (citing § 45.031(1)(a), (2), (3), (5), and (6), Fla. Stat.).

Straub -the Certified Conflict Case

In Straub , the subordinate lienholders filed their claims to the surplus more than sixty days after the public auction and the filing of the certificate of sale, but not more than sixty days after the clerk's filing of the certificate of title. Straub , 182 So.3d at 880. The trial court determined that the subordinate lienholders' claims were timely. Id. at 879. On appeal to the Fourth District, the homeowner argued that the claims were untimely because the sixty-day period in section 45.031"begins to run when the property is purchased at the auction and the certificate of sale is filed." Id. at 880. The Fourth District in Straub rejected the homeowner's argument and concluded-without mentioning the certificate of disbursements-that the sixty-day period begins to run upon the issuance and filing of the certificate of title. Id. at 881. Straub began by noting that the case presented "an issue of first impression under today's version of section 45.031." Id. at 880. Straub then looked to Allstate Mortgage Corp. of Florida v. Strasser , 286 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1973), in which this Court interpreted a previous version of section 45.031. Straub , 182 So.3d at 880-81.

In Strasser , this Court interpreted the meaning of the term "sale" in section 45.031(1), Florida Statutes (1971), but in the context of the right of redemption. Strasser , 286 So.2d at 201. The statutory language at issue was added in 1971 and provided as follows: "In cases when a person has an equity of redemption, the court shall not specify a time for the redemption, but the person may redeem the property at any time before the sale. " Id. at 202 (quoting § 45.031(1), Fla. Stat. (1971) ). After a default judgment was entered against the property owner in an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the property was sold at public auction. Id. at 201-02. The clerk issued a certificate of sale the day after the auction. Id. at 202. Several days later, before the certificate of title was issued, the circuit court ordered the clerk to accept the property owner's payment in redemption. Id. at 202, 203. The corporation that purchased the property at public auction appealed the trial court's order. Id. at 202. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, concluding that the Legislature intended the term "sale" to refer to the actual transfer of ownership that takes place upon the issuance of the certificate of title. Id. at 202-03. The Third District first noted that the 1971 statutory amendment was in derogation of the common law right to redeem property up until the entry of an order confirming the sale and thus must be strictly construed. Id. at 202. The Third District then noted that the Legislature neither defined the term "sale" nor indicated its intended meaning, so the Third District looked to various definitions before concluding that the Legislature intended the term "sale" to refer to the actual transfer of ownership. Id. at 202-03. And the Third District observed that, under section 45.031(3), Florida Statutes (1971), the transfer of ownership takes place upon the issuance of the certificate of title. Id. at 203. On review, this Court affirmed the decision of the Third District by quoting the Third District's analysis and then concluding that the district court "correctly interpreted" section 45.031(1), Florida Statutes (1971). Id.

After reviewing Strasser , the Fourth District in Straub concluded that Strasser 's reasoning should control the interpretation of the term "sale" in "today's version of [ section 45.031 ]"-that is, the transfer of ownership completed upon filing of the certificate of title. Straub , 182 So.3d at 881. Straub recognized that the Legislature had partially superseded Strasser in 1993 by enacting section 45.0315, which codified the right of redemption and provided that the property could be redeemed at "any time before the later of the filing of a certificate of sale by the clerk of the court or the time specified in the judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure."

Id. (quoting § 45.0315, Fla. Stat. (2014) ). But Straub concluded that the Legislature merely "created a specific window for exercising the right of redemption" and that nothing in the enactment of section 45.0315 suggested that the Legislature "intended to change the plain meaning of the word 'sale' used elsewhere in the statute." Id.

II. ANALYSIS

The certified conflict issue presented in this case requires us to construe the term "60 days after the sale," as used in section 45.031, Florida Statutes (2015). This issue is one of statutory interpretation, which is a pure question of law that this Court reviews de novo. See Borden v. E.-European Ins. Co. , 921 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006).

In 2006, in an apparent response to the growing number of foreclosure sales that were resulting in surplus amounts, the Legislature amended chapter 45, Florida Statutes, by enacting "[a]n act relating to foreclosure proceedings." Ch. 2006-175, Laws of Fla. (title). As indicated above, the 2006 act amended section 45.031 to require that certain statements regarding potential surplus amounts be included in the final judgment of foreclosure, the notice of sale, and the certificate of disbursements. See ch. 2006-175, § 1, at 1-6, Laws of Fla. The 2006 act also created several new statutory sections within chapter 45 to specifically address foreclosure surplus funds. And the 2006 act amended existing section 45.031(7) to add paragraph (d) to directly cross-reference those new statutory sections. See ch. 2006-175, § 1, at 6, Laws of Fla. Namely, section 45.031(7)(d), Florida Statutes (2015), provides that "[i]f there are funds remaining after payment of all disbursements required by the final judgment of foreclosure and shown on the certificate of disbursements, the surplus shall be distributed as provided in this section [45.031] and ss. 45.0315-45.035." The newly created statutory sections include section 45.032, titled "Disbursement of surplus funds after judicial sale."

Because we find section 45.032-and in particular subsection 45.032(3)-to be dispositive of the conflict issue, we begin by examining the relevant provisions of section 45.032. We then explain why section 45.032(3) requires the conclusion that the sixty-day period in section 45.031(7)(b) -and elsewhere in section 45.031 -begins to run upon the issuance of the certificate of disbursements.

Section 45.032

As an initial matter, section 45.032(1) defines certain terms that apply not just for purposes of section 45.032 but "[f]or purposes of ss. 45.031 - 45.035." Section 45.032(1)(c) specifically defines the term "surplus" to mean "the funds remaining after payment of all disbursements required by the final judgment of foreclosure and shown on the certificate of disbursements. " (Emphasis added.)

Among other things, section 45.032(2) then "establishe[s] a rebuttable legal presumption that the owner of record on the date of the filing of a lis pendens is the person entitled to surplus funds after payment of subordinate lienholders who have timely filed a claim. " (Emphasis added.)

Section 45.032(3) then references a very specific sixty-day period: "During the 60 days after the clerk issues a certificate of disbursements , the clerk shall hold the surplus pending a court order." (Emphasis added.) Each of the three paragraphs in subsection (3) go on to reference this sixty-day period in the specific context of the filing of claims for surplus funds. Paragraph (a) provides, in part, as follows: "If the owner of record claims the surplus during the 60-day period and there is no subordinate lienholder , the court shall order the clerk to deduct any applicable service charges from the surplus and pay the remainder to the owner of record." § 45.032(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Paragraph (b) then provides, in part, as follows:

If any person other than the owner of record claims an interest in the proceeds during the 60-day period or if the owner of record files a claim for the surplus but acknowledges that one or more other persons may be entitled to part or all of the surplus, the court shall set an evidentiary hearing to determine entitlement to the surplus.

§ 45.032(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Finally, paragraph (c) provides, in part, that "[i ]f no claim is filed during the 60-day period , the clerk shall appoint a surplus trustee from a list of qualified surplus trustees as authorized in s. 45.034." § 45.032(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

Lastly, the Legislature made clear that disputes over surplus funds have no bearing on the validity of the foreclosure sale itself and "do not in any manner affect or cloud the title of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale of the property." § 45.032(5), Fla. Stat.

Statutory Interpretation

In concluding that the sixty-day period referenced in section 45.031 is triggered by the public auction, the Second District in Glenville did not take into account the specific sixty-day period identified in section 45.032(3). Instead, the Second District focused largely on what it considered to be a clear meaning of section 45.031(7)(b) that avoided confusing the meaning of other subsections of section 45.031. Glenville , 215 So.3d at 1286-87. Similarly, the Glenvilles point to numerous instances in section 45.031 in which the term "sale" refers to the public auction, and they appear to urge this Court to follow the principle that presumes "that when the legislature uses the same term multiple times in the same statute, that term carries the same meaning each time it is used." Nat'l Auto Serv. Centers, Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC , 192 So.3d 498, 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (citing Rollins v. Pizzarelli , 761 So.2d 294, 298 (Fla. 2000) ). On the other hand, Mellon's various arguments can be summed up as follows: in no event should the sixty-day period begin before the issuance of the certificate of sale.

We agree with Mellon that the sixty-day period is not triggered by the public auction. In doing so, we conclude that the sixty-day period in section 45.031(7)(b) must be understood in a way that is consistent with the sixty-day period in section 45.032(3). Ultimately, there cannot be two different sixty-day cutoff periods for filing claims for surplus funds.

As with any matter involving an issue of statutory interpretation, courts must first look to the actual language of the statute and "examine the statute's plain meaning." Lopez v. Hall , 233 So.3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018). "When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning."

A.R. Douglass, Inc., v. McRainey , 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931). Here, the Second District concluded that the meaning of the term "sale" as used in section 45.031(7)(b) clearly and unambiguously referred to the public auction, given the Legislature's use of the same term in "other subsections of the statute. " Glenville , 215 So.3d at 1286 (emphasis added). But the Second District stopped short in its consideration of relevant provisions of the statutory scheme for judicial sales. This Court has long recognized that the "plain language" approach

is subject to the qualification that if a part of a statute appears to have a clear meaning if considered alone but when given that meaning is inconsistent with other parts of the same statute or others in pari materia, the Court will examine the entire act and those in pari materia in order to ascertain the overall legislative intent.
When construing a particular part of a statute it is only when the language being construed in and of itself is of doubtful meaning or doubt as to its meaning is engendered by apparent inconsistency with other parts of the same or a closely related statute that any matter extrinsic the statute may be considered by the Court in arriving at the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature.

Fla. State Racing Comm'n v. McLaughlin , 102 So.2d 574, 575-76 (Fla. 1958) (emphasis omitted) (quoting lower court's order).

Section 45.032 is "closely related" to section 45.031. Id. at 576. The two sections are manifestly designed to work in tandem. Not only was section 45.032 created in the same legislation in 2006 that added the statutory language at issue to section 45.031, but that legislation also amended section 45.031 to create two separate cross-references to section 45.032 and other related sections of chapter 45, including a cross-reference in the specific context of foreclosure surpluses. See § 45.031(7)(d), Fla. Stat. The two statutory provisions are without doubt part of the same statutory scheme-that is, they are in pari materia , "in the same matter."

So looking to section 45.032 to understand the meaning of section 45.031 is proper because section 45.031, section 45.032, and several other sections of chapter 45 together comprise a statutory scheme relating to judicial foreclosure sale procedures. See Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc. , 3 So.3d 1220, 1234 (Fla. 2009) ("[B]ecause we are dealing with an entire statutory scheme for granting and terminating charters, we do not look at only one portion of the statute in isolation but we review the entire statute to determine intent."). In the end, looking to section 45.032"is in accord with the principle that we 'give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.' " Id. (quoting Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A. , 963 So.2d 189, 199 (Fla. 2007) ). A harmonization of section 45.031 and section 45.032 leads to the conclusion that the sixty-day period for the filing of claims to surplus funds begins upon the issuance of the certificate of disbursements-that is, after the sale has been confirmed through the issuance of the certificate of title, and after the actual surplus amount has been determined. See §§ 45.031(6), 45.032(1)(c), Fla. Stat. We thus disagree with Glenville 's conclusion that the only reasonable interpretation of "60 days after the sale" as used in section 45.031 is that it means sixty days from the public auction.

Our case law has already recognized that the term "sale" in chapter 45 must be understood in light of the specific context in which it is used. In Strasser we examined a previous version of section 45.031 and concluded that the undefined term "sale" in the specific context there referred to the transfer of ownership occurring upon the filing of the certificate of title. See Strasser , 286 So.2d at 202-03. The point established in Strasser is underlined by the fact that the term "sale" is undefined not just in section 45.031 but in all of chapter 45, and there are other related instances in chapter 45 in which the term cannot be understood to mean the public auction itself. For example, section 45.0315, which addresses the right of redemption, provides that certain persons "may cure the mortgagor's indebtedness and prevent a foreclosure sale " "[a]t any time before the later of the filing of a certificate of sale by the clerk of the court or the time specified in the judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure." (Emphasis added.) In other words, a "sale" can still be "prevent[ed]" even after the public auction.

Interpretation of the sixty-day provision of section 45.031(7)(b) in light of the sixty-day provision of section 45.032(3) is also supported by the rule that "a specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms." McKendry v. State , 641 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994). Section 45.031 is clearly the more general statute. Section 45.031 is generally titled "Judicial sales procedure" and covers far more than foreclosure surpluses. Section 45.032, on the other hand, is specifically titled "Disbursement of surplus funds after judicial sale" and solely addresses foreclosure surpluses. Indeed, the very definition of the term "surplus" is found in section 45.032. Under this Court's longstanding approach to statutory interpretation, section 45.032(3) controls the relevant sixty-day period.

Our reasoning regarding the conflict issue also requires that we disapprove the reasoning of Straub . Straub correctly determined that the sixty-day cutoff period does not begin until after the actual transfer of ownership of the property, but Straub erroneously concluded that the sixty-day period begins upon the issuance of the certificate of title. Although the Legislature may have contemplated that the certificate of disbursements would be issued on the same day as the certificate of title, see § 45.031(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (requiring the clerk to file the certificate of disbursements "[o]n filing a certificate of title"), that will not always be the case, as Glenville demonstrates. And section 45.032(3) provides that the actual triggering event is the issuance of the certificate of disbursements.

III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that "60 days after the sale," as used in chapter 45 in the context of claims to surplus funds, means sixty days after the clerk issues the certificate of disbursements. Mellon's claim to the surplus was timely filed before the expiration of that sixty-day period. Accordingly, we quash the Second District's decision in Glenville . And we disapprove the reasoning of Straub , which is inconsistent with our reasoning here.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. LEWIS, J., concurs in result.

      We note that during the most recent legislative session, the Legislature passed Committee Substitute for Committee Substitute for House Bill 1361. Among other things, the bill amends sections 45.031 and 45.032, as well as certain related sections of the Florida Statutes, to revise (lengthen) the time period within which subordinate lienholders and other persons must file a claim to the surplus amount. The bill, which provides for an effective date of July 1, 2019, was signed by Governor Scott on March 21, 2018. See ch. 2018-71, Laws of Fla. We do not address this legislation.

      The trial court's order reflects a surplus of $90,564.93, as opposed to the $86,093.27 surplus amount reflected in the certificate of disbursements. The actual amount of the surplus is not relevant to the legal issue presented in this case.

      The Second District also rejected Mellon's reliance on certain cases that involved "a mortgagor's right of redemption, which is governed by section 45.0315, not section 45.031." Glenville , 215 So.3d at 1287.

      Section 45.0315, which addresses the right of redemption, is the only cross-referenced section that was in existence before the effective date of the 2006 act.

      "Surplus trustees" are third-party trustees who must be approved by the Department of Financial Services and whose primary duty "is to locate the owner of record within 1 year after appointment." See § 45.034(1), (6), Fla. Stat.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 16-377 RE: Scott C. DUPONT
    No. SC16-2103
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    September 6, 2018
    Eugene Pettis, Chair, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Michael Louis Schneider, Executive Director and General Counsel, Alexander J. Williams, Assistant General Counsel, Henry M. Coxe, III, Special Counsel, Judicial Qualifications Commission, Tallahassee, Florida; Brian T. Coughlin and Ashley W. Cox of Bedell, Dittmar, DeVault, Pillans & Coxe, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida; and Lauri Waldman Ross of Ross & Girten, Counsel to the Hearing Panel of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Miami, Florida, for Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner
    Rutledge R. Liles and Pamela H. Klavon of Liles Gavin, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, for Judge Scott C. DuPont, Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review the recommendation of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) that Judge Scott C. DuPont of the Seventh Judicial Circuit be removed from office for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 12, Fla. Const. We previously entered an order in this case approving the JQC's recommendation of removal and removing Judge DuPont from office. See In re DuPont , No. SC16-2103, 2018 WL 3153686 (Fla. June 25, 2018). This opinion follows.

I. BACKGROUND

Judge DuPont was elected to the Seventh Circuit bench in 2010. At the time, he was thirty-eight years old and had six years of legal experience.

A. Charges

On November 23, 2016, the JQC filed a Notice of Formal Charges against Judge DuPont. An Amended Notice of Formal Charges was filed on August 16, 2017. The amended notice alleged, in relevant part, the following violations of canons 1, 2A, 3A, 3B2, and 7A, 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:

1. While engaged in a contested election to retain judicial office, you had a campaign website created and maintained to assist in your election. On the homepage of that website you had a tab devoted to your opponent entitled, "About Judge DuPont's Opponent."
If a viewer clicked on that tab, it took the viewer to a page where you posted the results of a search you obtained through an internet website, "Instant Checkmate." Before a search can be conducted on the "Instant Checkmate" website, a caution notice appeared. That notice stated in part, "Please BE CAREFUL when conducting a search ...." At the bottom of this website's initial page the disclaimer stated, "The information available on our website may not be 100% accurate, complete or up to date, so do not use it as a substitute for your own due diligence, especially if you have concerns about a person's criminal history ."
In spite of those warnings, and instead of taking any steps to verify the scandalous information about your opponent found on the website, you recklessly posted the results of the search under the heading "Do You Trust [Malcolm Anthony] to be your Circuit Judge? " Those unsubstantiated and unverified entries included:
a. A suggestion that your opponent employed aliases, when in fact you had no information that he did so.
b. A suggestion that there existed "Imposter Information" about your opponent, which implied he had posed as an imposter. You did this with no information that would justify the inclusion of the listing for any other purpose than to impugn your opponent.
c. Your posting of the entries stated that your opponent had received three parking tickets for parking in a handicapped zone, yet you never verified whether your opponent personally received the tickets or if it was a third party using his vehicle. In response to the 6(b) Notice of Investigation in this inquiry, you only produced two such tickets. To compound the inappropriate imputation, the heading of the entries listed "booking dates" that suggested there was an arrest associated with those entries, which was not accurate.
d. You posted information that stated that your opponent's wife had been arrested 3 times, and his daughter had been arrested 21 times. You did nothing to verify the accuracy of those statements and you posted this information in spite of not even knowing the identities of your opponent's wife or children.
2. Your website implied that your opponent's legal name change was an attempt to hide his past by stating that he was managing member of HideYourPast.com in 2013, and then stating that he changed his legal name. Your opponent's name change was legally completed in 1990, but nowhere did you provide that information.
3. At a televised candidate forum, you asserted facts about your opponent's driving record that were not accurate, and you did nothing to verify the information. Rather, you relied on an e-mail from a person working on your campaign that suggested your opponent received a ticket for passing a school bus while it was loading or unloading children. In response to the 6(b) Notice of Investigation in this inquiry, you were unable to provide any documentation to substantiate your assertions.
....
5. During the same forum, you announced your position that it is not the role of a circuit court judge to determine whether a given statute is unconstitutional, because that would be "legislating from the bench." You further stated that you have refused to find statutes unconstitutional and that "[i]f they don't like the decision, they can appeal it." In doing so you announced your position that you would not find any statute to be unconstitutional. Previously upon assuming your judicial office, you had sworn under oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States and the Florida Constitution.
6. Prior to making public the material critical of your opponent, you were advised not to publish the material by two judges, on two separate occasions. On one of the occasions, you were advised to be certain of the accuracy of the information.
7. You attended a required Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee training session at the outset of the 2016 judicial campaign. The session specifically included instruction that compliance with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Election Code, were solely your responsibility, not that of campaign managers or others. Notwithstanding this instruction, you included in your response to the initial 6(b) investigation hearing notice that you relied on your campaign manager for guidance regarding the claims about your opponent.
....
10. In May 2016, you presided over first appearance hearings in Putnam County during the extended Memorial Day weekend. Your judicial assistant circulated e-mails to court personnel advising that, for the three-day holiday period, first appearance hearings would commence at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, 7:00 a.m. on Sunday and 6:30 a.m. on Monday. Your judicial assistant apologized in an e-mail to court personnel, explaining that Judge DuPont had "27 places to be in (4) counties over these (3) days or the early times would not be necessary."
You were at the time campaigning for reelection inasmuch as your opponent had announced his intention to run against you for your circuit seat a month earlier.
On Saturday, May 28, you conducted the first appearance hearings at 6:30 a.m. instead of 7:00 a.m. as your judicial assistant had advised. When you conducted the hearings, there were no lawyers present for either the State of Florida or the Public Defender's Office. You proceeded to handle all matters that morning without counsel. You significantly increased the bonds of some defendants without counsel.
....
12. In 2011, you served over the family law division in Putnam County. A party appeared before you and asserted an inability to pay support. You ordered the deputy sheriff to search the individual to determine if there was anything of value on his person, and directed that the deputy seize the money that was in his possession.

Judge DuPont responded to the amended notice. As to paragraphs 1-3 and 5, Judge DuPont admitted that he was "careless" in not personally confirming the accuracy and source of the information he disseminated about his opponent, Malcolm Anthony, and the Anthony family but stated that he would show that he acted "in good faith, with the belief that the information was accurate." As to paragraphs 6 and 7, Judge DuPont denied the allegations as framed and stated that he "at all times believed the information published was accurate" and "acted in good faith." As to paragraph 10, Judge DuPont denied the allegations as framed. He admitted that he started the first appearance hearings on Saturday, May 28, 2016, early but stated that "is common over a holiday weekend," he conducted the hearing appropriately "within his judicial discretion," that only two bonds were raised, and that he appointed the public defender to represent those charged. As to paragraph 12, Judge DuPont denied the allegations as framed but admitted "that he enlisted the assistance of the deputy in divesting the party of assets in his possession" and stated that he was attempting to ensure that the party complied with the law and precedent relating to his obligation to support his family.

B. Findings of the JQC

After an evidentiary hearing before the JQC's Hearing Panel, the JQC issued its findings and recommendation of discipline on February 15, 2018.

2011 Family Court Hearing

In April 2011, approximately four months into his first term, Judge DuPont presided over a hearing involving support of a minor child. When Judge DuPont questioned the absence of a certificate for successful completion of a parenting class, the husband explained that he did not take the class because he lacked the necessary funds. Judge DuPont then ordered his bailiff to search the husband for money. The search yielded $180, which the man claimed he was holding for someone else. Judge DuPont immediately turned the $180 over to the wife, ordering it credited to outstanding child support.

The court-ordered search was reported by law enforcement officers to Judge Terrill J. LaRue, then administrative judge for the Seventh Circuit. Judge LaRue thought that Judge DuPont had simply made a rookie mistake. He explained to Judge DuPont that he had employed "a very poor procedure" which should not be used again. Judge LaRue was taken aback when Judge DuPont insisted, "I can do that" and "we do that all the time in St. Johns County."

Judge DuPont testified before the panel that he had directed several such searches previously, but never did so again after this incident. He stated that in ordering such a search, he was acting in the best interest of children who are in need of support.

The JQC found Judge DuPont guilty of this charge, found in paragraph 12 of the amended notice.

Dissemination of False and Misleading Information About the Anthonys

In 2015, Judge DuPont qualified for a second judicial term. In preparation for his campaign, Judge DuPont certified that he had "received, read, and unders[tood] the requirements of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct" and he attended a candidate election forum held by the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee (JEAC). During the forum, candidates were reminded that compliance with Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct and Florida Statutes was the candidate's responsibility and that candidates could not rely on campaign managers or others for compliance.

For the 2016 campaign, Judge DuPont hired Maureen France, an experienced campaign consultant already in the midst of handling multiple campaigns for other judicial candidates. According to France, Judge DuPont sought "opposition research" on his opponent, Anthony. France recommended Bill Tavernier, a researcher with whom she was acquainted, to conduct that research. France told Judge DuPont she would relay any information Tavernier discovered but that it would be up to Judge DuPont to determine its validity. Judge DuPont suspected that Anthony changed his name for meretricious reasons and was running from financial problems, and he sought research on Anthony's name change and "different legal problems he may have had." France emailed Tavernier a list of topics that the judge wanted researched.

Tavernier performed two hours of research, pulling information off various websites. Among these websites was InstantCheckmate.com, a subscription service "originally created as a resource for online daters." Tavernier also pulled up "case history-type" reports from clerk of court websites. Tavernier located Anthony's name change but did not notice that the petition for name change was filed by both Anthony and his wife. Tavernier searched Anthony's name on sunbiz.org, and found him listed as the manager of a former Florida limited liability company, known as "Hideyourpast.com llc," which had been administratively dissolved three years earlier. Tavernier did not determine what the purpose of the company had been.

In June 2016, Tavernier emailed to France documents regarding Anthony's name change and other documents with a note stating that "other violations were all in Duval. St. Johns consists of speeding, school bus and again driving with an expired tag," all of which France promptly forwarded to Judge DuPont. Tavernier admitted that his "research" was cursory at best and not vetted. He testified that he was not requested to and did not pull underlying documentation. His reference to a school bus in his email to France may have been "meant for someone else" since he was working on several projects simultaneously.

The 1990 petition for name change filed by Malcolm Anthony Neundorfer, was joined in by his wife, Andrea Lynette Neundorfer. Evidence adduced from Andrea Anthony reflected there was nothing nefarious about this name change, which dropped the difficult to pronounce Neundorfer, in favor of Anthony's then middle name. Hideyourpast.com was an internet business created as part of Anthony's law practice, which processed information for persons eligible to have criminal records sealed or expunged.

Judge DuPont did nothing to verify the information provided by Tavernier. He testified that he relied on France and Tavernier to determine its accuracy and that France confirmed its accuracy multiple times. France attested to the opposite; she made it clear to Judge DuPont when she was hired that she "wasn't really going to be involved" and would simply pass on research for the judge's review and decision. She testified that Judge DuPont never questioned, and she never confirmed, the accuracy of the information she relayed to him.

In July 2016, Judge DuPont filled out a League of Women Voters questionnaire, and asked France to review his following proposed response:

Character, Honesty, Integrity, Common Sense, and Experience distinguishes me from my opponent, Malcolm Anthony. I have brought to the bench and maintained the highest morals, values, and ethical standards. My opponent, Malcolm Anthony, has been ticketed twice for parking in handicapped parking without a permit, he has been ticketed once for speeding in a school zone, and he has been ticketed once for passing a school bus while it was loading children. He is a current member of www.hideyourpast.com, which is a website that you join to hide your personal history, he has changed his legal name ....

France asked Judge DuPont if he was sure that he wanted to include specifics in his response, since, she said, "I don't know that we know the specifics for example if the school bus had children on it, etc." France also tried to talk Judge DuPont out of posting materials she forwarded from Tavernier on his campaign website, concerned that use of unvetted materials could get them all in trouble. France tried to dissuade Judge DuPont from using these materials "many times." After discussions with the designer of the campaign website, France took the step of requesting that Judge DuPont execute a "hold harmless" agreement protecting her and the web designer. The agreement provided that the DuPont campaign "shall fully defend, indemnify, and hold harmless" France and the web designer "from any and all claims, lawsuits, demands, causes of action, liability, loss, damages and/or injury, of any kind whatsoever." Judge DuPont insisted that the information be posted on the website but refused to sign the agreement.

Judge DuPont also discussed the negative information about Anthony with two other judges before he posted it on the website. Judge McGillin cautioned Judge DuPont that "you need to be very, very sure of the information that you have before you use it." Judge DuPont told Judge Foxman that he possessed information reflecting that Anthony had numerous traffic issues, including "citations for parking in a handicapped zone, something to do with a school bus moving violation," and that Anthony had changed his name and was "somehow affiliated with a website that would conceal your identity or your past." Judge Foxman advised Judge DuPont that the use of such materials was "unnecessary" in his opinion because Judge DuPont was winning handily. But when it became readily apparent that he was not going to be able to talk Judge DuPont out of using the materials, Judge Foxman warned Judge DuPont to make sure the information "was both true and accurate." Judge DuPont responded that "his campaign people ... were experienced at this." Judge DuPont testified that during several conversations he and Judge Foxman had about the campaign, Judge Foxman "never told me not to use it" and "there came a time where he indicated that he doesn't see how I can't use it." Judge Foxman testified that this was "not true," and he said nothing remotely close to that during their discussions.

In late July 2016, Judge DuPont's campaign website went up with a picture of Anthony under the caption "About Judge DuPont's Opponent." To the right of the photograph, appeared the following statements:

• HideYourPast.com Managing Member 2013, with an asterisk noting, "All information obtained from public records and websites,"
• Changed his Legal Name SCROLL TO PAGE 4 BELOW

To the right of the picture, immediately below these statements, bold print queried, "Do You Trust Malcolm Anthony to be your Circuit Court Judge? " Judge DuPont's campaign website listed "imposter information," suggesting Anthony was using "aliases." It connected Anthony's name change to "HideYourPast.com," insinuating that Anthony had secrets in his past that he sought to conceal. It indicated that Anthony had received three parking tickets for parking in a handicapped zone, with associated "booking dates," suggesting arrests when there were none. As "Possible Matching Arrest Records for Family/Known Associate," the website listed three arrest records for Andrea Anthony and twenty-one arrest records for Elizabeth Anthony, the candidate's then-twenty-one-year-old daughter. Neither had ever been arrested. Elizabeth is a second lieutenant serving with the Army Corps Reserves, and, at the time the information was posted on Judge DuPont's campaign website, was enrolled in veterinary school in Gainesville, Florida.

Judge DuPont admitted only to "mistakes" and "carelessness," and denied violating the judicial canons, including canon 7, on the basis that he did not "knowingly"

or intentionally disseminate false information. He claimed he relied on France and Tavernier for the accuracy of the information. The panel concluded that it is impossible to reconcile Judge DuPont's testimony with the testimony of other witnesses, documentary evidence, and his own admissions. The panel found that the timing and content of emails between Judge DuPont and France supported France's account that the judge knew she was not going to be vetting any of the research provided, that it lacked detail, and that it should not be used. The panel concluded that Judge DuPont's explanation why he did not sign the "hold harmless" agreement, which was because he had "no idea" why France's name appeared on the agreement and she was unable to explain, defies logic and common sense. The panel found that Judge DuPont clearly knew that France and the web designer requested the agreement's execution to protect them from the repercussions of his decision to publish the unvetted information about Anthony. Judge DuPont also ignored the warnings of Judges McGillin and Foxman and decided to post unvetted information impugning Anthony, and his wife and daughter, despite certifying that he understood the judicial canons, attending the JEAC seminar, and receiving multiple warnings from his own campaign manager and two judicial colleagues.

The JQC found Judge DuPont guilty of the allegations found in paragraphs 1-3 and 5-8 of the amended notice.

The Televised Candidate Forum

A televised judicial candidate forum for the Seventh Circuit was held on July 26, 2016. Judge DuPont, Anthony, and Judge McGillin all participated in the forum. The moderator first asked the candidates, "Why should voters support you rather than your opponent?" Anthony responded by recounting his thirty-three years of experience practicing law "in every conceivable field," teaching law at two universities and police academies, his experience as a prosecutor and special prosecutor, and his "AV preeminent" rating by Martindale Hubbell for legal ability and ethics. He invited the public to compare his resume with Judge DuPont's. Judge DuPont took the microphone immediately thereafter, responding:

Thank you very much. Let's talk about the facts.
Fact one: I've presided over 30,000 cases since I've been serving as your circuit court judge, my opponent has presided over zero.
Fact number two: I have maintained the highest ethical, moral, and value standards on the bench as I have been serving as your circuit court judge.
Fact number three: My opponent has been ticketed twice for parking in handicapped parking without a permit.
Fact number four: My opponent has been ticketed once for speeding in a school zone.
Fact number five: My opponent has been ticketed for passing a school bus while it was stopped and loading children.
Fact number six: My opponent has changed his legal name.
Fact number seven: My opponent is a current member of www.hideyourpast.com. That's H-I-D-E-Y-O-U-R-P-A-S-T dot com.
And for those of you who don't know what that is, it's a website you join to hide your personal history.
....
Those are the facts ladies and gentlemen. Thank you.

Later, the moderator asked each candidate to describe their judicial philosophy substantively. Judge DuPont responded:

Thank you very much. I know that this sounds cliché, but-uh, my philosophy is to not legislate from the bench.
I don't believe that the Constitution is living and breathing. And I don't believe that it evolves on its own. I believe that our founders knew exactly what they were doing when they created it-and that they created a mechanism whereby it can be changed.
And to be quite honest with you, uh, there have been numerous [sic] where I have actually been asked by attorneys to find that [a] statute is unconstitutional. I have refused to do that, because my thought process is there's another way to do that.
If they don't like the decision they can appeal it, and it can start going up the food chain to do it that way.
But even though I've been asked to find a statute unconstitutional as a sitting judge, I have refused to do so. Because again, it's not my job to legislate from the bench.

During closing argument, Judge DuPont stated,

[T]he question that you have to walk away from tonight is this: Who do you trust? Do you trust me? Or do you trust my opponent, who again, has received two tickets for parking in handicapped without a permit, he's been ticketed for speeding in a school zone, he's been ticketed for passing a school bus without-while it was loading the children, he's also a current member of HideYourPast.com.
And walk away with this: Please remember what he said. HideYourPast.com is a website you go to erase your criminal history.[ ] He's a member.

The panel concluded that Judge DuPont never had a single public record reflecting that Anthony was ticketed for speeding in a school zone or for passing a school bus while it was loading children. Judge DuPont later attributed this charge to information provided by France via phone, but he claimed that he "didn't remember" France's emailed warning against using such unknown specifics.

After the televised judicial forum, Judge McGillin became concerned that "there was something terribly wrong" and he might have just witnessed ethics violations. Judge McGillan ran Anthony's name through the Duval County Clerk's CORE record system (at "attorney access" level ), and although multiple violations of parking in handicapped spaces popped up, the underlying documents revealed ordinary parking tickets. It took Judge McGillin only "a click of the mouse" to determine that the database search used to obtain information about Anthony "hadn't gotten into the details."

The panel concluded that Judge DuPont's statement about his "judicial philosophy" violated canon 7. By definition, Judge DuPont's oath of office required his determination of a statute's constitutionality when the issue came before him in a proper case, but Judge DuPont publicly pledged at the televised forum to hold no statute unconstitutional and to require litigants to appeal.

The JQC found Judge DuPont guilty of the allegations found in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the amended notice.

First Appearances Memorial Day Weekend 2016

On May 25, 2016, Judge DuPont's judicial assistant notified necessary personnel, including attorneys from the state attorney's and public defender's offices, that Judge DuPont would be handling first appearances during the upcoming Memorial Day weekend. The next day, at Judge DuPont's direction, his judicial assistant notified the same people that the time of first appearances on Saturday and Sunday had been moved up from 9 a.m. to 7 a.m., which was due to Judge DuPont's campaign-related obligations that weekend.

On Saturday, May 28, 2016, with no notice to anyone, Judge DuPont began the 7 a.m. first appearance hearings at 6:30 a.m. and conducted them without counsel in attendance. Judge DuPont admittedly ignored the requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.130(a) -which requires the attendance of counsel at first appearance proceedings-and was unable to explain why he started the proceedings early in the absence of counsel.

The panel found Judge DuPont guilty of this charge, found in paragraph 11 of the amended notice.

Character and Fitness

Judge DuPont called numerous live character witnesses and offered letters and affidavits from others attesting to his fitness. The panel found that by all accounts, Judge DuPont is a hard-working judge, who gave willingly of his time, and was extraordinarily efficient. He is interested in children, established the first truancy court in Putnam County, and created a series of forms in different legal areas to help pro se litigants navigate the legal system.

Judge Terrence Perkins, Chief Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit from June 2013 through June 2017, testified that he received far more complaints about Judge DuPont than any other judge, which were mostly related to "heavy handedness." Judge Perkins refused to assign Judge DuPont to a criminal division, fearing that such heavy-handedness might lead to excessive or inappropriate incarcerations. Instead, he transferred Judge DuPont to the civil division to take him "out of the firing line" and place him in a position where "he wasn't putting people in jail all the time." Judge Perkins initially attempted to address problems directly with Judge DuPont, but this proved ineffective because Judge DuPont "would say the right things; it just didn't seem to change the behavior." Judge Perkins then reached out for assistance from other judges, notably Judge Alexander, Judge DuPont's judicial mentor.

Judge Wendy Berger, a former Seventh Circuit judge who was elevated to the Fifth District Court of Appeal in 2012, rendered a qualified opinion that Judge DuPont was fit to serve, but should be sanctioned if the allegations regarding the election were proven.

Like Judge Berger, Judge Carlos Mendoza, a federal judge and former Seventh Circuit judge, offered a qualified opinion regarding Judge DuPont's fitness. Although he testified that he never saw any evidence of "heavy handedness" from Judge DuPont, Judge Mendoza was disappointed about the negative information Judge DuPont posted about Anthony on his website and the wallet search during the 2011 family court hearing, but he urged sanctions short of removal, because he likes Judge DuPont and thinks he has "a good heart."

Hubert Grimes, a retired Seventh Circuit judge, testified that Judge DuPont is "a good man," who has an "excellent reputation" for truth and veracity.

James Alexander, a lawyer practicing in St. Johns County who had appeared before Judge DuPont, described Judge DuPont's first year as "kind of shaky"; he said that Judge DuPont was "pretty tough," "rough around the edges," "heavy-handed," overbearing, that he overreacted on occasion, did not appear to know what he was doing, and failed to listen to lawyers and litigants. But Alexander opined that Judge DuPont "grew into the job," improved, and became more receptive after a period of twelve to eighteen months, in which he went from a "D-" judge to an "A+" judge.

Judge DuPont's judicial mentor, Judge John Alexander, testified that Judge DuPont is the hardest working judge in the Seventh Circuit. He characterized Judge DuPont as "efficient, dedicated ... diligent" and a "straight shooter" who was doing an "excellent job." Judge Alexander was not in touch with Judge DuPont during the 2016 campaign and was unfamiliar with the campaign website. Judge Alexander opined that Judge DuPont was presently fit to serve but characterized his conduct as "befuddling."

II. ANALYSIS

"This Court reviews the findings of the JQC to determine whether the alleged violations are supported by clear and convincing evidence ...." In re Shea , 110 So.3d 414, 418 (Fla. 2013) (quoting In re Woodard , 919 So.2d 389, 390 (Fla. 2006) ). "This quantum of proof is an intermediate standard, more than 'a preponderance of the evidence,' but less than 'beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.' " In re Hawkins , 151 So.3d 1200, 1212 (Fla. 2014) (quoting In re Holloway , 832 So.2d 716, 726 (Fla. 2002) ). "If the findings meet this intermediate standard, then they are of persuasive force and are given great weight." In re Turner , 76 So.3d 898, 901 (Fla. 2011) (quoting In re Graziano , 696 So.2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997) ). We have noted that any conflicts in the evidence should be resolved in favor of the JQC's findings. In re Henson , 913 So.2d 579, 591-92 (Fla. 2005).

A. Undisputed Charges

As a preliminary matter, Judge DuPont does not appear to dispute the JQC's findings with respect to the charges alleged in paragraph 5 of the amended notice, alleging a violation of canon 7 by promising not to find statutes unconstitutional, or paragraph 10 of the amended notice, alleging violations of canons 1, 2A, and 7A by holding first appearances without counsel present. Those charges are supported by audio or video evidence of the alleged violations. Judge DuPont expressly admitted wrongdoing regarding holding first appearance hearings without counsel present. Because the JQC's findings are undisputed and Judge DuPont has admitted this misconduct, we conclude that the findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Murphy , 181 So.3d 1169, 1176 (Fla. 2015) (citing In re Diaz, 908 So.2d 334, 337 (Fla. 2005) ; In re Andrews, 875 So.2d 441, 442 (Fla. 2004) ); In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77, 85 (Fla. 2003) ).

B. Dissemination of False and Misleading Information About the Anthonys

Judge DuPont admitted that he acted inappropriately in failing to personally verify the negative and false information he disseminated about Malcolm Anthony and his family during the 2016 judicial campaign, but Judge DuPont claims that while he was "careless," he did not "knowingly" violate the canons of judicial conduct because he did not "know" that the information was false and believed it was accurate. He testified that he relied completely on France and Tavernier to provide him accurate information and admitted doing "absolutely nothing" to verify any of the information. We reject Judge DuPont's reasoning that he did not "knowingly" disseminate false information or misrepresent information about Anthony because he did not have personal knowledge that the information was false.

Not only did Judge DuPont fail to verify the accuracy of the information he was provided as was his obligation, but it also appears that Judge DuPont actually manufactured some of the facts he disseminated in relation to that information. For example, Judge DuPont stated that Anthony was a "current member of www.hideyourpast.com, which is a website that you join to hide your personal history." First, hideyourpast.com LLC was administratively dissolved in 2013, three years before Judge DuPont made the statement that Anthony was a "current member." Second, while Anthony had been a managing member of the LLC prior to 2013, there is nothing in the record to indicate that he personally used the services of the LLC, the purpose of which was to help people seal and expunge criminal records in connection with Anthony's law practice.

Judge DuPont also posted "Possible Matching Arrest Records for Family/Known Associate[s]" of Anthony on his website. The website listed three arrest records for a person named Andrea Anthony and twenty-one arrest records for a person named Elizabeth Anthony. Andrea Anthony is the name of Anthony's wife, and Elizabeth Anthony is the name of his then twenty-one-year-old daughter. But neither of them had ever been arrested and thus could not be the individuals identified in the website. At the hearing, Judge DuPont testified that he did not know that Andrea and Elizabeth were relatives of Anthony; he stated that he thought they were possible family members. He admitted being only "careless to the point that [he] should have known that it was family." Judge DuPont's "careless" actions with respect to Anthony's wife and daughter caused the potential for harm to both of them. There is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the JQC's finding that such "carelessness" is inconsistent with a judge acting in such a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and contrary to canon 2A.

We therefore conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the JQC's findings that Judge DuPont violated canons 1, 2A, and 7A by knowingly misrepresenting facts about the Anthonys during his 2016 campaign.

C. The Search During the 2011 Family Court Hearing

With regard to the search during the 2011 family court hearing, Judge DuPont admits that the search and seizure occurred, but he emphasizes that it was not forceful and he felt that it was appropriate because other judges in the Seventh Circuit employed similar techniques. Judge DuPont's motives in conducting the search may have been "pure" as he claims, but we have previously condemned such unlawful, judicially ordered seizures in open court, see In re Turner , 76 So.3d 898, 906 (Fla. 2011), and we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the JQC's findings that Judge DuPont violated canons 1 and 2A.

D. Discipline

The JQC recommends that Judge DuPont be removed from office. Under article V, section 12(c)(1) of the Florida Constitution, we have discretion to either accept, reject, or modify the commission's findings and recommendation of discipline. In re Renke , 933 So.2d 482, 493 (Fla. 2006). "Although this Court gives the findings and recommendations of the JQC great weight, the ultimate power and responsibility in making a determination to discipline a judge rests with this Court." Id. at 493. We are authorized to remove a judge from office for "conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary demonstrating a present unfitness to hold office." Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const. "[T]he object of disciplinary proceedings is not for the purpose of inflicting punishment, but rather to gauge a judge's fitness to serve as an impartial judicial officer." In re Dempsey , 29 So.3d 1030, 1034 (Fla. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting In re McMillan , 797 So.2d 560, 571 (Fla. 2001) ).

We examine judicial misconduct for present fitness to hold office "from two perspectives: its effect on the public's trust and confidence in the judiciary as reflected in its impact on the judge's standing in the community, and the degree to which past misconduct points to future misconduct fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office."

In re Murphy , 181 So.3d at 1177 (quoting In re Sloop , 946 So.2d 1046, 1055 (Fla. 2006) ). "It is clear that a member of the judiciary or judicial candidate should not [intentionally] mislead the public by placing factually incorrect statements in campaign materials." In re Dempsey , 29 So.3d at 1033. And "[w]e have repeatedly placed judicial candidates on notice that this type of misconduct will not be tolerated." Id.

We have also repeatedly warned that we will not allow judges who have committed egregious misconduct during a judicial campaign in order to attain office to serve the term of their judgeship. See In re Renke , 933 So.2d at 495 ; In re McMillan, 797 So.2d at 573 ; In re Alley , 699 So.2d 1369, 1369, 1370 (Fla. 1997). To do so "clearly sends the wrong message to future candidates; that is, the end justifies the means and, thus, all is fair so long as the candidate wins." In re Renke , 933 So.2d at 495 (quoting In re McMillan, 797 So.2d at 573 ).

Judge DuPont's assertion that he had no evil intent in disseminating the false information about Anthony is irrelevant. As stated in article V, "[m]alafides, scienter or moral turpitude on the part of a justice or judge shall not be required for removal from office of a justice or judge whose conduct demonstrates a present unfitness to hold office." Art. V, § 12, Fla. Const. Further, in holding first appearances early on the Saturday of Memorial Day weekend in 2016 without counsel present in order to suit his campaign schedule, Judge DuPont blatantly disregarded the rules of criminal procedure and disrespected the attorneys and the rights of the inmates involved in the proceeding. This behavior was not inadvertent, and Judge DuPont has offered no excuse or explanation for it. Judge DuPont's misconduct both negatively affects the public's trust and confidence in the judiciary and points to the potential of future misconduct fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office.

Like Judges Renke, McMillan, and Alley, Judge DuPont committed egregious misconduct during his campaign to attain his office. Under these circumstances, we cannot allow Judge DuPont to serve the term of his judgeship. Based on the misrepresentations Judge DuPont made during his campaign to attain his office as well as the other instances of misconduct during his time in office, we conclude that Judge DuPont has demonstrated a present unfitness to hold office and approve the recommended discipline of removal from office.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that Judge DuPont's violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct warrant the most severe sanction of removal from office. Accordingly, Judge DuPont has been removed from office. The removal took effect on June 25, 2018.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result.

      Anthony had previously responded that "HideYourPast.com is a website to help people seal and expunge criminal records. It is a legitimate business. It just has a good name that attracts customers."

      The "attorney access" level used by Judge McGillin is greater than access granted the general public, but less than "judicial access" afforded to judges.

      James Alexander is a cousin of Judge John Alexander, Judge DuPont's mentor.

      Although Judge DuPont admits to making this statement, he asserts that he does not believe this statement violated canon 7 because he did not mean that he would never find a statute unconstitutional, only that he does not go into a case looking to overturn a statute but instead presumes statutes are constitutional. We reject this argument. Judge DuPont made the statement in a very public forum and failed to take any steps to correct the statement even after he realized that he "screwed up."