author: KELLUM, Judge.

text:
    Otha Lee WOODS v. STATE of Alabama
    CR-14-0845.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    June 3, 2016 Rehearing Denied July 29, 2016
    Thomas M. Goggans, Montgomery, for appellant.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and John J. Davis, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   KELLUM, Judge.

The appellant, Otha Lee Woods, pleaded guilty in Montgomery District Court to driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"), a violation of § 32-5A-191(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. Woods appealed to the Montgomery Circuit Court for a trial de novo, where he was again convicted of DUI. The circuit court sentenced Woods to 12 months' imprisonment in the county jail, suspended that sentence and placed Woods on 2 years' supervised probation. The circuit court ordered Woods to pay a $600 fine, $250 to the crime victims' compensation fund, and court costs.

Because Woods does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary in this case. On June 25, 2013, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Alabama state trooper Thomas Hutton observed Woods driving on Interstate 65. Hutton testified that Woods was speeding and that he made several lane changes without signaling. Hutton initiated a traffic stop of Woods's vehicle. When Hutton approached the vehicle and spoke to Woods, Hutton smelled a strong odor of alcohol. Hutton asked Woods to perform several field-sobriety tests, and Woods complied. After Woods was unable to successfully complete the tests, Hutton placed Woods under arrest for DUI. A subsequent breathalyzer test conducted approximately three hours after his initial arrest registered Woods's blood-alcohol level at .08. Woods pleaded guilty to DUI in the Montgomery District Court on December 12, 2013.

Woods's appeal to the circuit court was tried before a jury on January 26, 2015. After both sides rested and the circuit court instructed the jury on the applicable principles of law, the jury found Woods guilty of DUI. This appeal followed.

Woods's sole contention on appeal is that the circuit court erred when it admitted into evidence at trial a redacted copy of the sentencing order in Woods's guilty-plea conviction in the Montgomery District Court in which the district court accepted Woods's plea of guilt to DUI and found him guilty of DUI. Specifically, Woods contends that it was error to "introduce the district court's judgment of guilt in the trial de novo in circuit court." (Woods's brief, p. 2.) Initially, we must address the State's contention that this issue is not preserved for review on appeal.

The record indicates that before trial Woods moved to exclude evidence of his guilty plea in the district court and argued as follows:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand that it is the State of Alabama's intention to offer evidence of Mr. Wood[s]'s plea of guilty in the district court. We would like to make a motion in limine on that. This is a trial de novo. Our position would be that nothing [that] happened downstairs is relevant or admissible up here. Further, under Rule 403, [Ala. R. Evid.,] if it were relevant, somehow it would be substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect. And I'd like to make that motion.
"THE COURT: All right. What says the State?
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If it comes up in the trial, I'll make the same objection.
"[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, it is my understanding, that is an admission of guilty when he plead[s] guilty in court. Regardless of what-I understand what he's saying, it's a trial de novo. That doesn't wipe out what the conviction is there for. It just gives him an opportunity to have a trial by jury, if requested, and the evidence starts over.
"THE COURT: Well, I think the law has-case-law has developed ... whereby our appellate courts have said that when somebody pleads guilty in the lower court, it appeals that, that the fact that they pled guilty can be introduced in the trial. Is that your understanding of it?
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, I need to make my record.
"THE COURT: I know, but is that your understanding?
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think that's correct. Well, maybe I should strike that, because if I say that and the law changes next week, they'll say I invited error, but....
"THE COURT: Well, but I'm just saying, it all depends if the law changes next week, if it's retroactive.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Anything can happen.
"THE COURT: I'm just saying. I mean, you know, let's just say that. That's the state of the law today.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand the Court's position. And I take [it] that means my motion is denied. The Court having denied the motion in limine, will it be necessary for me to object to the same thing in the course of the trial?
"THE COURT: Well, I can't tell you how to practice law."

(Supp. R. 26-28.)

At the close of the State's case, the State attempted to introduce a copy of the district court's sentencing order, which, according to the State, was a certified copy of Woods's guilty plea in district court. The following exchange then occurred:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, first of all, same objection. Same objection we made in our motion in limine. Additionally, Your Honor, this is just a sentencing order, certified copy of his sentencing order. This is not a-
"THE COURT: It says he pled guilty.
"I want to redact that because they don't need to get into sentencing.
"[PROSECUTOR]: I understand.
"THE COURT: He pled guilty.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Anyway, main thing it's the same-
"THE COURT: All right. Noted for the record."

(Supp. R. 66-67.)

The circuit court then admitted into evidence a redacted copy of the sentencing order that was published to the jury. The redacted order stated:

"The Defendant appeared with Counsel Julian McPhillips and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Driving Under the Influence and the Court having ascertained that the Defendant has a full understanding of what a plea means and its consequences and that there is a factual basis for the plea, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Defendant is found to be guilty as charged."

(C. 115.)

Woods testified on his own behalf at trial. On direct examination, Woods denied that he was drunk when he was stopped by police and attributed his high blood-alcohol reading to his use of the prescription drug Albuterol through a nebulizer. During the State's cross-examination of Woods, the following exchange occurred:

"THE COURT: All right. Now, at the time that you left Trussville, had you taken the Albuterol ?
"[Woods]: Yes; yes, sir.
"THE COURT: So you took the Albuterol prior to 2:30?
"[Woods]: Yes, sir.
"....
"[PROSECUTOR]: All right. It'd been-according to this test, it'd be 7:20 p.m. was when you completed the test, so it had been about five hours since you had last taken-or more than five hours since you had taken the Albuterol ?
"....
"[Woods]: I really don't know. I just know when I need it, I use it.
"[PROSECUTOR]: So you don't know when the last time you took the Albuterol ? All right.
"[PROSECUTOR]: I don't have anymore questions at this time.
"THE COURT: All right. Anything else?
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, sir.
"[THE COURT]: Where is that district court document?
"[PROSECUTOR]: I believe I left it with you, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: No. It's probably down there-
"[PROSECUTOR]:-on the bench.
"THE COURT: Ask him about that.
"[PROSECUTOR]: All right.
"Q. [PROSECUTOR]: Mr. Woods, do you recall going to the district court first for this driving under the influence of alcohol case?
"A. Pardon me?
"Q. Do you recall going to the district court for driving under the influence of alcohol and pleading guilty on December 12, 2013?
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Same objection, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: Overrule.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May I have a continuing objection on this line of questioning?
"THE COURT: No such thing as a continuing objection.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you plead guilty to this DUI down in district court?
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Same objection.
"THE COURT: Same ruling; overrule.
"A. No.
"Q. You did not plead guilty to it?
"A. No. I had accepted it, because my lawyer told me to.
"Q. Have you seen the sentencing order, sir? Have you seen a copy of the sentencing order?
"....
"Q. I'm going to show you what has been admitted as State's Exhibit Number 3 and ask if you can read this right here?
"A. Yeah.
"Q. And it says you entered a plea of guilty to the charge of driving under the influence; is that correct? That's the sentencing order from Judge Jimmy Pool. Is that what you just read?
"A. That's what I just read.
"Q. Okay.
"[PROSECUTOR]: That's all the questions I have, Judge."

(Supp. R. 95-97.)

The general rules of preservation are well settled. In Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So.2d 793, 794-95 (Ala.2003), our Supreme Court stated:

" 'Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial.' Newsome v. State, 570 So.2d 703, 717 (Ala.Crim.App.1989). 'An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to appellate review because it has not been properly preserved and presented.' Pate v. State, 601 So.2d 210, 213 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). ' "[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be presented to the trial court by a timely and specific motion setting out the specific grounds in support thereof.' McKinney v. State, 654 So.2d 95, 99 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (citation omitted). 'The statement of specific grounds of objection waives all grounds not specified, and the trial court will not be put in error on grounds not assigned at trial.' Ex parte Frith, 526 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala.1987). 'The purpose of requiring a specific objection to preserve an issue for appellate review is to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged error, giving an opportunity to correct it before the case is submitted to the jury.' Ex parte Works, 640 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Ala.1994)."

"The critical consideration for the preservation of error for appellate review is that the trial court be sufficiently informed of the basis of the defendant's argument." Ex parte Parks, 923 So.2d 330, 333 (Ala.2005). "When the trial court understands the basis for defense counsel's objection, a reviewing court should not be 'too strict in its application of the waiver principle.' " Gamble v. State, 699 So.2d 978, 979 (Ala.Crim.App.1997) (quoting Ex parte Webb, 586 So.2d 954, 956 (Ala.1991) ).

The record as a whole clearly establishes that Woods objected to the admission of any evidence regarding his guilty plea in the district court. Woods first objected to the admission of such evidence in a motion in limine made before trial. During trial, Woods made the same objection when the State moved to admit a copy of the district court's sentencing order, and he objected yet again when the State referenced Woods's guilty plea on cross-examination. Given the objections made by Woods and the circuit court's response to those objections, we are satisfied that Woods properly preserved this issue for review on appeal.

We now turn our review to the substantive issue raised by Woods-whether the circuit court erred when it admitted into evidence at trial a copy of the district court's sentencing order in which the district court accepted Woods's plea of guilt to DUI and found him guilty of DUI.

In its brief on appeal, the State cites this Court's decision in Phillips v. City of Dothan, 534 So.2d 381 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), for the "well established" legal principle that "a defendant's guilty plea in a lower court, but not the judgment itself in the lower court, is admissible in a criminal trial in Circuit Court because a guilty plea is a judicial confession or an admission against interest." (State's brief, p. 10.) In Phillips, the defendant was charged with driving under the influence and entered a guilty plea to that charge in municipal court. The defendant appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo and was subsequently found guilty. During his trial, the defendant testified on cross-examination that he was not driving the vehicle and that he was not guilty of driving under the influence. When the State questioned the defendant about his guilty plea in municipal court, defense counsel objected. The trial court overruled the objection as a declaration against interest of the defendant. Phillips, 534 So.2d at 383.

On appeal, the defendant argued that "the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to question him as to his previous plea of guilty of driving under the influence that was entered in municipal court" because, he argued, he was tried de novo in the circuit court and any evidence of his guilty plea should be inadmissible. Phillips, 534 So.2d at 382. This Court disagreed with the defendant and affirmed his conviction, holding:

"It is well settled under Alabama law that on cross examination of the defendant, a defendant's guilty plea in a lower court, but not the judgment of the lower court, is admissible in the criminal trial in circuit court as being in the nature of a judicial confession or an admission against interest, when there was no evidence that the plea was induced by coercion, threats, or promises or leniency. Daniel v. State, 41 Ala.App. 405, 134 So.2d 752 (1961), cert. denied, 273 Ala. 706, 134 So.2d 757 (1961) ; Edwards v. State, 34 Ala.App. 373, 40 So.2d 103 (1949) ; Gray v. State, 29 Ala.App. 568, 199 So. 255 (1940) ; Booker v. City of Birmingham, 23 Ala.App. 312, 125 So. 603 (1929). See also 22A C.J.S., Judicial Admissions, § 733, n. 18.10 (1961). See also Motley v. Page, 250 Ala. 265, 267, 34 So.2d 201 (1948)."

Phillips, 534 So.2d at 383.

Upon further examination of our holding in Phillips, however, we are convinced that the holding in Phillips violates well settled principles of law regarding a trial de novo and that the admission of such evidence is inherently prejudicial.

Section 12-12-70, Ala.Code 1975, provides for the right to appeal a final judgment of the district court in a criminal case. Section 12-12-71, Ala.Code 1975, provides that all appeals from final judgments of the district court shall be to the circuit court for a trial de novo. "[A] trial de novo means that the slate is wiped clean and a trial in the Circuit Court is had without any consideration being given to prior proceedings in another court."

Yarbrough v. City of Birmingham, 353 So.2d 75, 78 (Ala.Crim.App.1977). This includes guilty-plea proceedings in the municipal or district court. See Ex parte Sorsby, 12 So.3d 139 (Ala.2007).

In Ex parte Sorsby, supra, our Supreme Court explained:

"A trial de novo is '[a] new trial on the entire case-that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law-conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance.' Black's Law Dictionary 1544 (8th ed.1990). In Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Lancaster, 121 Ala. 471, 473-74, 25 So. 733, 735 (1899), this Court stated:
" '[After appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace] the case is to be tried in the circuit court de novo; or, in other words, as if no trial had ever been had, and just as if it had originated in the circuit court. The appeal when taken operates to annul and vacate the entire judgment of the justice of the peace, and not a part only of the judgment. The judgment of the justice cannot upon the trial in the circuit court be looked to as a matter of evidence or of estoppel."The judgment of the justice is not reversed or affirmed; but a new, distinct, and independent judgment, as may be required by the merits shown on the trial, is rendered by the city or circuit court." Abraham v. Alford, 64 Ala. 281 [ (1879) ]; Harsh et al. v. Heflin, 76 Ala. 499 [ (1884) ].'
"(Final emphasis added.) At the district court level, whether [a defendant] is found guilty following a bench trial, stipulates to the facts as alleged by the State in order to be found guilty, or pleads guilty, review in the circuit court is by trial de novo without any consideration being given to the prior proceedings in the district court."

Ex parte Sorsby, 12 So.3d at 146.

The holding in Phillips effectively prevents a defendant from "wiping the slate clean" when a defendant appeals a guilty plea entered in municipal or district court to the circuit court for a trial de novo. Instead, a defendant is encumbered by a guilty plea in the lower court that, once admitted into evidence, answers the ultimate question posed to the trier of fact during a trial de novo-whether a defendant is guilty of the crime charged.

In whatever form, the admission of evidence of a guilty plea made in the lower court in a trial de novo is so overly prejudicial that it runs afoul of Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid., which provides:

"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

(Emphasis added.)

"The proper test for determining whether relevant evidence has been properly excluded under Rule 403 is to determine whether 'its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.' (Emphasis added.) McElroy's Alabama Evidence clarifies the Rule 403 standard by stating: 'This principle does not empower the trial judge to exclude evidence simply because it is prejudicial or because its prejudice outweighs its probative value. Rather, exclusion is merited only when the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value.' Charles W. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 21.01(4) (5th ed.1996) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis original).
" 'Unfair prejudice' under Rule 403 has been defined as something more than simple damage to an opponent's case. Dealto v. State, 677 So.2d 1236 (Ala.Crim.App.1995). A litigant's case is always damaged by evidence that is contrary to his or her contention, but damage caused in that manner does not rise to the level of 'unfair prejudice' and cannot alone be cause for exclusion. Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), reversed in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala.1994). 'Prejudice is "unfair" if [it] has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis." ' Gipson v. Younes, 724 So.2d 530, 532 (Ala.Civ.App.1998), quoting Fed.R.Evid. 403 (Advisory Committee Notes 1972). See, also, Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid."

Ex parte Vincent, 770 So.2d 92, 95-96 (Ala.1999).

In this case, the admission of the district court's redacted sentencing order indicating that Woods had pleaded guilty in the lower court to DUI and that the district court had entered a judgment of guilt created "unfair prejudice" by suggesting guilt based on a guilty plea that was entered in a lower court and the conviction appealed for a trial de novo. Because Woods appealed the lower court's judgment for a trial de novo, the "slate was wiped clean" and his plea of guilt was held for naught. Therefore, any admission in the circuit court of his guilty plea in the district court was unfairly prejudicial. Accordingly, the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the district court's redacted sentencing order. To the extent that Phillips and the cases cited therein hold otherwise, those decisions are overruled.

Furthermore, we cannot say that the admission of the redacted sentencing order was harmless error. The harmless-error rule provides, in pertinent part:

"No judgment may be reversed or set aside ... on the ground of ... improper admission or rejection of evidence, ... unless in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken or application is made, after examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties."

Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P.

In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held that before the violation of certain constitutional rights can be held to be harmless, the appellate court must be able to declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In Ex parte Crymes, 630 So.2d 125 (Ala.1993), the Alabama Supreme Court explained:

"In determining whether the admission of improper [evidence] is reversible error, this Court has stated that the reviewing court must determine whether the 'improper admission of the evidence ... might have adversely affected the defendant's right to a fair trial,' and before the reviewing court can affirm a judgment based upon the 'harmless error' rule, that court must find conclusively that the trial court's error did not affect the outcome of the trial or otherwise prejudice a substantial right of the defendant."

630 So.2d at 126. See also Ex parte Greathouse, 624 So.2d 208, 210 (Ala.1993) (holding that the proper harmless-error inquiry asks, absent the improperly introduced evidence, "is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty").

In the instant case, it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict regardless of the admission of the district court's redacted sentencing order.

Accordingly, Woods's conviction is reversed and this case is remanded to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Windom, P.J., and Welch, Burke, and Joiner, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: STUART, Justice. MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).

license: Public Domain

text:
    Ex parte State of Alabama
    (In re: Otha Lee WOODS v. STATE of Alabama)
    1151152
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    December 23, 2016
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Andrew L. Brasher and Brent J. Talley, deputy attys. gen., and John J. Davis, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.
    Thomas M. Goggans, Montgomery, for respondent.
   STUART, Justice.

This Court granted certiorari review to address a question of first impression for this Court: Whether it is improper to admit into evidence in a trial de novo in the circuit court evidence of a defendant's plea of guilty made in the district court? We hold that it is not, and we reverse and remand with directions.

Facts and Procedural History

In the Montgomery District Court, Otha Lee Woods pleaded guilty to and was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, a violation of § 32-5A-191(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. Woods appealed to the Montgomery Circuit Court for a trial de novo.

In the circuit court, Timothy Hutton, the law-enforcement officer who arrested Woods, testified that he stopped Woods's vehicle at 4:50 p.m., that when he approached Woods he smelled alcohol emanating from Woods, that Woods failed the field-sobriety tests Officer Hutton administered, and that at 7:20 p.m. a breath-analyzer test indicated that Woods's blood-alcohol level was .08. Before the State rested, the State moved to admit into evidence the district court's sentencing order incorporating its judgment, which referenced Woods's guilty plea. The circuit court admitted into evidence over Woods's objection a redacted version of the sentencing order, which stated:

"The Defendant appeared with Counsel Julian McPhillips and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Driving Under the Influence and the Court having ascertained that the Defendant has a full understanding of what a plea means and its consequences and that there is a factual basis for the plea, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Defendant is found to be guilty as charged."

(Capitalization in original.)

Woods testified, stating that at the time of his arrest he was taking several medications and that he believed the breath-analyzer machine used for his test was malfunctioning. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Woods if he had pleaded guilty to driving under the influence in the district court. Woods objected to the question, and the circuit court overruled his objection. Woods responded that his counsel had advised him to plead guilty in the district court. Woods, after being asked to read a portion of the district court's sentencing order, agreed with the prosecutor that the order stated that he had entered a plea of guilty to the charge of driving under the influence.

A jury found Woods guilty of driving under the influence. The circuit court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Woods to 12 months' imprisonment. The sentence was suspended, and Woods was ordered to serve two years' supervised probation. Woods appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court's admission of evidence of Woods's plea of guilty made in the district court "violate[d] well settled principles of law regarding a trial de novo and that the admission of such evidence [was] inherently prejudicial." Woods v. State, 261 So. 3d 483, 488 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016). The State petitioned for certiorari review.

Standard of Review

" ' " ' "This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal cases de novo." ' " Ex parte Brown, 11 So.3d 933, 935 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Ex parte Morrow, 915 So.2d 539, 541 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn Ex parte Key, 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003) ).' Hiler v. State, 44 So.3d 543, 546 (Ala. 2009)."

State v. Simmons, 179 So.3d 249, 250 (Ala. 2014).

Discussion

The State contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing the circuit court's judgment because, it says, the circuit court did not err in admitting evidence of Woods's plea of guilty made in the district court.

In Phillips v. City of Dothan, 534 So.2d 381 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

"It is well settled under Alabama law that on cross examination of the defendant, a defendant's guilty plea in a lower court, but not the judgment of the lower court, is admissible in the criminal trial in circuit court as being in the nature of a judicial confession or an admission against interest,[ ] when there was no evidence that the plea was induced by coercion, threats, or promises or leniency."

534 So.2d at 383.

As the Phillips court noted, this principle is well settled. In Booker v. City of Birmingham, 23 Ala.App. 312, 313, 125 So. 603, 604 (1929), the court stated:

"The predicate laid by the appellee showed that, when appellant was arraigned before the recorder, no coercion in the way of hopes, threats, or promises was employed. Over objection, appellee was permitted to prove that appellant was asked by the recorder whether she wished to plead guilty or not guilty, and that appellant pleaded guilty. In overruling appellant's objection, the court did not err. This evidence was admissible as being in the nature of a judicial confession."

Similarly, in Gray v. State, 29 Ala.App. 568, 569, 199 So. 255, 255 (1940), the court stated: "The fact that the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge before the County Court was admissible as being in the nature of a judicial confession." In Daniel v. State, 41 Ala.App. 405, 134 So.2d 752 (1961), the court distinguished between the admission into evidence in a trial de novo of the lower court's judgment as opposed to the admission into evidence of testimony as to the defendant's guilty plea. The court held that "the judgment of the lower court adjudging the defendant guilty is not admissible in a trial de novo in the circuit court." 41 Ala.App. at 408, 134 So.2d at 755. The court reasoned that, because a trial de novo was the equivalent of " 'a statutory grant of a new trial,' " id. (quoting Gravely v. Deeds, 185 Va. 662, 664, 40 S.E.2d 175, 176 (1946) ), the lower court's judgment was irrelevant to the proceeding. However, the court further recognized that "the statement of the clerk that he heard the defendant plead guilty in the lower court was admissible as being in the nature of a judicial confession or an admission against interest." 41 Ala.App. at 408, 134 So.2d at 754.

Booker, Gray, and Daniel, which are all cited in Phillips, harmonize with the principle that "a defendant's guilty plea in a lower court, but not the judgment of the lower court, is admissible in the criminal trial in circuit court as being in the nature of a judicial confession or an admission against interest." 534 So.2d at 383.

In reversing the circuit court's judgment in this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Phillips. In concluding that the admission into evidence at a trial de novo in the circuit court of a guilty plea entered in the district court is erroneous, the Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that a trial de novo from the district court, see § 12-12-71, Ala. Code 1975, " 'means that the slate is wiped clean and a trial in the Circuit Court is had without any consideration being given to prior proceedings in another court.' " Woods, 261 So. 3d at 488 (quoting Yarbrough v. City of Birmingham, 353 So.2d 75, 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) ). The court, quoting Ex parte Sorsby, 12 So.3d 139, 146 (Ala. 2007), further stated that " 'review in the circuit court is by trial de novo without any consideration being given to the prior proceedings in the district court.' " 261 So. 3d at 494. Based on those propositions, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded:

"The holding in Phillips effectively prevents a defendant from 'wiping the slate clean' when a defendant appeals a guilty plea entered in municipal or district court to the circuit court for a trial de novo. Instead, a defendant is encumbered by a guilty plea in the lower court that, once admitted into evidence, answers the ultimate question posed to the trier of fact during a trial de novo-whether a defendant is guilty of the crime charged."

261 So. 3d at 489.

We disagree; the admission into evidence in a trial de novo of a defendant's plea of guilty made in the district court, provided that the plea was voluntary, is not error. A trial de novo in the circuit court provides a defendant with a clean slate with regard to a determination of whether he or she is guilty of the offense charged. It is an opportunity to have the defendant's guilt or innocence determined without consideration of the outcome, i.e., the judgment, of the earlier proceeding. Therefore, because the judgment from the prior court proceeding, and not the defendant's guilty plea, answers the ultimate question posed in the trial de novo-whether the defendant is guilty of the offense charged-admission of the judgment, but not of the guilty plea, is prohibited at the trial de novo.

Moreover, a trial de novo does not preclude the admission of evidence used or developed in earlier proceedings. A defendant is not required to enter a plea of guilty in the district court to obtain a trial de novo in the circuit court. Rather, a defendant chooses whether to enter a plea of guilty in the district court. The entry of a guilty plea by the defendant is a voluntary admission and constitutes evidence of culpability. The defendant's guilty plea does not function as a conclusive presumption of guilt, and, like any other piece of evidence, the evidence of a guilty plea can be challenged. Indeed, a defendant's decision to enter a guilty plea in the district court may be based on any number of considerations. For example, a defendant could argue that, even though innocent, he or she entered a plea of guilty to avoid the risk of a harsher sentence at trial. See Phillips, 534 So.2d at 383. Because the evidence of a defendant's guilty plea is merely evidence to be weighed by the trier of fact against other evidence, the admission of that evidence is not precluded in a trial de novo.

Furthermore, we cannot agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the admission into evidence in a trial de novo in the circuit court of a defendant's plea of guilty made in the district court creates unfair prejudice.

Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid., states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ...."

" 'Unfair prejudice' under Rule 403 has been defined as something more than simple damage to an opponent's case. Dealto v. State, 677 So.2d 1236 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). A litigant's case is always damaged by evidence that is contrary to his or her contention, but damage caused in that manner does not rise to the level of 'unfair prejudice' and cannot alone be cause for exclusion. Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), reversed in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994). 'Prejudice is "unfair" if [it] has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis." ' Gipson v. Younes, 724 So.2d 530, 532 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 (Advisory Committee Notes 1972). See, also, Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid."

Ex parte Vincent, 770 So.2d 92, 96 (Ala. 1999).

Although the admission into evidence in a trial de novo in the circuit court of a defendant's voluntary guilty plea in the district court might damage the defendant's case, we cannot conclude that the admission of such evidence unfairly prejudices the defendant. When a defendant enters a voluntary plea of guilty, the defendant acknowledges that he or she understands that he or she is admitting guilt as to the offense charged. As previously stated, a defendant's guilty plea is evidence of culpability; that evidence may be challenged and does not answer the ultimate question posed to the trier of fact-whether the defendant is guilty of the offense charged. Because a defendant voluntarily enters the plea of guilty and, in so doing, acknowledges the consequences of such a plea, we cannot conclude that the admission at a trial de novo in the circuit court of evidence that the defendant entered a guilty plea in the district court creates unfair prejudice, i.e., an undue tendency to suggest a decision based on an improper ground. Ex parte Vincent, 770 So.2d at 96.

Thus, although it is error to admit into evidence in a trial de novo in the circuit court the district court's judgment, the admission of evidence of a defendant's guilty plea entered in the district court is not improper.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded for that court to address Woods's specific argument, not addressed by that court in light of its overruling of Phillips, that, based on Phillips and the cases relied upon in Phillips, the circuit court erred in admitting into evidence the district court's judgment.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.

Murdock, J., dissents.

MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I fully agree with what I consider to be the well reasoned opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I incorporate that reasoning herein by this reference. Without implying any lesser agreement with other aspects of that court's opinion, I note my agreement with that court's understanding of a "de novo" trial and what it means to "wipe the slate clean" for purposes of such a trial. Moreover, I believe that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly analyzes the concept of "unfair prejudice" and that this Court today embraces a new and, I believe, incorrect understanding of that concept that has inappropriate ramifications for both this case and future cases.

      See Rule 801(d)(2)(A), Ala. R. Evid.

      Note from the reporter of decisions: On March 17, 2017, on remand from the Alabama Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, without opinion. On April 7, 2017, that court denied rehearing, without opinion. On November 17, 2017, the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review, without opinion (1160619).


author: WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

text:
    Jarvon Dominque CUBITT v. STATE of Alabama
    CR-14-1500
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    December 16, 2016 Rehearing Denied February 3, 2017 Certiorari Denied November 9, 2017
    Alabama Supreme Court 1160404
    Joseph Charles Guillot and Julian L. McPhillips, Jr., Montgomery, for appellant.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and John M. Porter, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

Jarvon Dominque Cubitt appeals his conviction for first-degree theft of property, see § 13A-8-3, Ala. Code 1975, and his sentence of two years in prison; that sentence was suspended and Cubitt was ordered to serve three years of supervised probation.

Best Buy Store, Inc. ("Best Buy"), created the Best Buy Reward Zone Program ("Reward Zone") to reward repeat customers with discounts on future purchases. As part of the Reward Zone, customers were awarded one Reward Zone point for every dollar they spent at Best Buy. The Reward Zone points do not exist until they are created by the customer when the customer adds those points to his or her Reward Zone account. Customers may create the points and add them to the their account at the point of purchase or later on a computer by providing evidence of a receipt as proof of the purchase amount. Once the points are created by the customer, they are not transferable, they have no cash value, and they must be redeemed for a discount certificate to be useful. For every 250 points a customer accumulates, the customer earns a certificate entitling him or her to a discount of $5 off of a purchase at Best Buy. As part of the "e-learning" training that Best Buy employees receive, the employees are informed that they "are not supposed to [take] customers' points." (R. 239.) Further, Best Buy reserves the right to alter or terminate the Reward Zone program at any time.

Cubitt was a sales associate at a Best Buy Store in Opelika, and, as an employee and customer of Best Buy, he participated in various discount programs such as the Path to Excellence Program, which rewarded employees who performed well, and the Reward Zone Program. While working for Best Buy, Cubitt devised a scheme in which he collected customers' receipts and entered them into his Reward Zone account so as to take credit for other people's purchases and to create points in his account earned by other people. Through the practice of using customers' receipts to generate points in his account, Cubitt accumulated 262,500 points, which he later redeemed for 1,050 discount certificates equaling $5,250 in discounts. With those discount certificates, Cubitt bought various items from Best Buy at greatly reduced prices, including a refrigerator for which he paid two dollars.

After Cubitt bought the refrigerator, Elroid Lights, the market-asset-protection manager at Best Buy, interviewed him regarding his purchases. During the interview, Cubitt detailed the scheme he had used in which he took credit for customers' purchases to accumulate Reward Zone points. Cubitt explained that he had used the Reward Zone points to get discount certificates that he, then, used to purchase items from Best Buy at reduced prices. After the interview, Lights contacted local law enforcement to report Cubitt's actions.

Based on Cubitt's scheme, the State indicted him as follows:

"The Grand Jury of Lee County charges that before the finding of this Indictment, Jarvon Dominque Cubitt, alias Jarvon D. Cubitt, whose true Christian Name is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did knowingly obtain, or exert unauthorized control over lawful United States Currency, the exact amount unknown to the Grand Jury, the property of Best Buy Company Inc., d/b/a Best Buy #662, having a value in excess of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2500.00), with the intent to deprive the owner of said property, in violation of § 13A-8-3, of the Code of Alabama, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama."

(C. 96)(emphasis added.)

Before trial, Cubitt filed a motion to dismiss the charge against him. In his motion, he argued, among other things, that nothing was stolen from Best Buy, that the Reward Zone points he had obtained had been abandoned by customers, and that the Reward Zone points belonged to the customers as opposed to Best Buy. The State responded that Reward Zone points are currency that have value and that Cubitt exerted unauthorized control over those points. Later, at trial, Cubitt argued that the indictment against him was defective and that there was a material variance between the indictment and the State's evidence. Cubitt explained that the indictment charged him with taking lawful United States currency from Best Buy but proved that he took Reward Zone points from customers. The State, on the other hand, argued that there was no material variance but this time asserted that the discount certificates Cubitt acquired using the Reward Zone points were currency or its equivalent and that Cubitt unlawfully obtained those certificates from Best Buy. The circuit court allowed the parties to file post-trial briefs on the issue. In his brief, Cubitt reiterated his argument that there was a material variance between the indictment and the proof at trial. This time, the State argued that Reward Zone points and the discount certificates were the property stolen by Cubitt and that those items have monetary value when they are redeemed. It asserted that "the use of the RewardZone program (earning points, redeeming for certificates, using certificates as payment at checkout) is a form of currency." (C. 115.) In the alternative, the State moved to amend the indictment to state that Cubitt "did knowingly obtain or exert unauthorized control over the property at Best Buy Inc, to-wit: RewardZone points and certificates and having a monetary value in an amount exceeding Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00)." (C. 117.)

The circuit court held:

"The Indictment in this case charges that [Cubitt] exercised unauthorized control of United States Currency. However, the evidence at trial established that [Cubitt] took Reward Zone points from customers and used those customers to get certificates in which [Cubitt] was able to redeem for discounts. While there was no evidence at trial that [Cubitt] actually controlled any currency, based on the case law actual possession of currency is not necessary for conviction. The Court finds that a variance exists between the wording of the Indictment and the proof of evidence at trial. However, this variance is not material or fatal. [Cubitt] claimed points from Best Buy customers and used those points to eventually claim monetary discounts in purchasing Best Buy Products. These actions fall within the offense as described in the wording of the Indictment."

(C. 124-25.) It then found Cubitt guilty of first-degree theft of property.

On appeal, Cubitt argues, among other things, that there was a material variance between the indictment and the State's proof at trial because the indictment charged him with obtaining unauthorized control over lawful United States currency from Best Buy, but the State's evidence established that he took Reward Zone points from customers.

This Court has explained:

" 'A fatal variance between allegations in an indictment and proof of those allegations presented at trial exists when the State fails to adduce any proof of a material allegation of the indictment or where the only proof adduced is contrary to a material allegation in the indictment. Johnson v. State, 584 So.2d 881, 884 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). "Alabama law requires a material variance between the indictment and the proof adduced at trial before a conviction will be overturned.
Ex parte Collins, 385 So.2d 1005 (Ala. 1980)." Brown v. State, 588 So.2d 551, 558 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).'
" Bigham v. State, 23 So.3d 1174, 1177 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
" ' "The policy behind the variance rule is that the accused should have sufficient notice to enable him to defend himself at trial on the crime for which he has been indicted and proof of a different crime or the same crime under a different set of facts deprives him of that notice to which he is constitutionally entitled." House [v. State], 380 So.2d [940] at 942 [ (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) ]. "Not every variance is fatal. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). Reviewing a claim of variance requires use of a two step analysis: (1) was there in fact a variance between the indictment and proof, and (2) was the variance prejudicial." United States v. McCrary, 699 F.2d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 1983). "The true inquiry, therefore, is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to 'affect the substantial rights' of the accused." Berger, 295 U.S. at 82, 55 S.Ct. at 630. "Variance from the indictment is not always prejudicial nor is prejudice assumed." United States v. Womack, 654 F.2d 1034, 1041 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156, 102 S.Ct. 1029, 71 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982). The determination of whether a variance affects the defense will have to be made based upon the facts of each case. United States v. Pearson, 667 F.2d 12, 15 (5th Cir. 1982).'
" Smith v. State, 551 So.2d 1161, 1168-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989)."

Hall v. State, 203 So.3d 1277, 1281 (Ala. Cri m. App. 2015). "On the trial of a defendant charged with larceny, where there is some evidence descriptive of the stolen property which is substantially conformable to the description alleged in the indictment, and nowhere contradictory thereof, the identity of the stolen property is a matter addressed peculiarly and solely to the jury, and in such case there is no fatal variance between the allegata and the probata." Brooks v. State, 151 Ga.App. 384, 385, 259 S.E.2d 743, 744 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Section 13A-8-2(a)(1)-(2), Ala. Code 1975, defines the relevant forms of theft of property as:

"(a) A person commits the crime of theft of property if he or she:
"(1) Knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over the property of another, with intent to deprive the owner of his or her property; [or]
"(2) Knowingly obtains by deception control over the property of another, with intent to deprive the owner of his or her property."

At trial, the State established that Cubitt devised a simple scheme to deceive Best Buy and to obtain merchandise at a greatly discounted price. Specifically, Cubitt used customers' receipts to create the appearance that he was entitled to produce points in his Reward Zone account, an account that was at all times in Best Buy's control and subject to change by Best Buy. Cubitt then used the points he created to obtain discount certificates indicating that he was entitled to discounts on the purchase price of items sold by Best Buy. After creating the illusion that he had earned discounts on merchandise sold by Best Buy, Cubitt purchased items at discounted prices. Thus, the State's evidence established that Cubitt "obtain[ed] by deception control over the property of another," i.e., greatly discounted Best Buy merchandise, in violation of § 13A-8-2(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975. The State, however, did not charge Cubitt under § 13A-8-2(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, with theft by deception. Rather, the State charged Cubitt under § 13A-8-2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, with knowingly obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over lawful United States currency from Best Buy. Consequently, there was a variance between the allegations in the indictment and the facts proven by the State at trial.

Further, this Court holds that the variance was material, i.e., prejudicial because it denied Cubitt sufficient notice of what property he was accused of stealing. Hall, 203 So.3d at 1277. The State charged Cubitt with theft of lawful United States currency from Best Buy, although Cubitt did not take any United States currency. See Black's Law Dictionary 465 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "United States currency" as "[c]urrency issued under the authority of the federal government"). Before trial, the State argued that Cubitt had obtained unauthorized control over Reward Zone points. The State's evidence at trial, however, indicated that Cubitt had created those points. Thus, after the State rested its case, it argued that Cubitt had obtained unauthorized control over discount certificates. The Court agreed with the State that Cubitt had obtained something of value. It, however, had trouble pinpointing what constituted the thing of value. Thereafter, in its post-trial brief, the State argued that the property over which Cubitt had obtained unauthorized control was both the Reward Zone points and the discount certificates. Thus, although the State alleged in the indictment that Cubitt had obtained unauthorized control over lawful United States currency, the State was able throughout the trial to amend the property allegedly stolen by Cubitt. Consequently, Cubitt was denied notice of the property he was on trial for stealing, and the variance between the allegations in the indictment and the proof at trial was material. Accordingly, Cubitt's conviction must be reversed.

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Welch, Burke, and Joiner, JJ., concur. Kellum, J., not sitting.


text:
    FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: M.S.
    CASE NO.: SC18-2098
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    JANUARY 4, 2019
    Upon consideration of the Report and Recommendation filed by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, it is ordered that the Board's recommendation is approved by the Court and M.S. shall be admitted to The Florida Bar subject to the following conditions:
    1. The Applicant's license to practice law shall be placed on probation for a period of five years.
   2. During the period of probation, the Applicant shall:

(a) abstain from the consumption of alcoholic beverages;
(b) abstain from the use of controlled substances except as prescribed by a duly licensed medical physician and approved by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. (FLA);
(c) participate actively in the program offered by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. during the entire probationary period by complying with the rehabilitation contract with that organization executed on March 26, 2018, and by extending the contract to cover the entire period of probation if necessary;
(d) participate actively in Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous by attending, at least, weekly meetings or such greater frequency as required by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.; practice AA/NA principles in all of his affairs and carry the AA/NA message to other individuals with a substance use disorder;
(e) attend attorney support meetings at least monthly, or at such greater frequency as required by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.;
(f) submit to and pay for a minimum of eight (8) random urine drug/alcohol screens annually, as well as any other hair, blood, sweat, or other substance screening tests determined to be appropriate by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc; and
(g) submit quarterly sworn statements to The Florida Bar by March 3l, June 30, September 30, and December 31during the probationary period attesting to his compliance with the conditions set forth in 2 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) above.

3. The Florida Bar shall monitor the conditions set forth in the Consent Agreement pursuant to Rule 1-3.2(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, and the costs thereof shall be paid by the Applicant to The Florida Bar or its designated monitoring agency.

4. To monitor effectively the provisions in this agreement, the Applicant shall reside within Florida during the entire period of probation. Any business or pleasure trips outside Florida that exceed ten days shall occur only with the advance approval of The Florida Bar. If the Applicant relocates outside Florida during the probationary period for any reason, the Applicant shall surrender his license to practice law in Florida and if the Applicant fails to do so, the Supreme Court of Florida shall terminate his license.

5. The Applicant shall immediately inform The Florida Bar of any criminal arrest or prosecution and the filing of any grievance or complaint related to the Applicant's practice of law.

6. If the Applicant's license is surrendered or terminated during the probationary period, the Applicant shall resume the practice of law in the State of Florida only upon full compliance with the rules and regulations governing admission to The Florida Bar.

7. A failure to observe the conditions of the probation or a finding of probable cause by The Florida Bar as to conduct of the Applicant committed during the period of probation may terminate the probation and subject the Applicant to all available grievance procedures and disciplinary sanctions including disbarment under the Rules of Discipline. Upon receiving notice of a violation of the court's order of conditional admission, The Florida Bar may immediately petition the Court for an order of suspension. The Applicant shall have ten days to file a response. If no response is timely filed by the Applicant, then the Court shall issue an order suspending the Applicant. If a response is filed, the matter shall be disposed of as the Court directs. Unless terminated by the Court, an order of suspension shall remain in effect until final disposition of the grievance procedures commenced by The Florida Bar against the Applicant.

8. If circumstances so warrant it, the Applicant and The Florida Bar may stipulate to an extension of the period of probation or The Florida Bar may petition the Court for such an extension with a final decision to be made by the Court.

9. The Applicant acknowledges that an uninterrupted period of documented sobriety for a minimum period of time must be established prior to admission to The Florida Bar on an unconditional basis. Should the period of probation be extended pursuant to either paragraph 7 or 8 above, the Applicant, therefore, further agrees that such extension shall be for a minimum of three up to five years.

10. The Applicant specifically consents to and authorizes the release of any and all materials in the Applicant's file to The Florida Bar that the Bar may request from the Board to enable the Bar to fulfill its responsibilities under this Consent Agreement.

A True Copy

Test:

John A. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court


text:
    Jose Antonio JIMENEZ, Petitioner(s) v. Julie L. JONES, etc., Respondent(s)
    CASE NO.: SC18-1999
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    DECEMBER 12, 2018
    Jose Antonio Jimenez, a prisoner under sentence of death and under an active death warrant, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that an amendment to article X, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, which was approved by the voters of Florida on November 6, 2018, entitles him to vacatur of his death sentence or resentencing under chapters 2016-13 and 2017-1, Laws of Florida, which revised section 921.141, Florida Statutes. He also requests a stay of his execution so that this Court can consider this claim.
    Jimenez is not entitled to relief on this claim for two reasons. First, this amendment will not go into effect until January 8, 2019. See art. XI, § 5(e), Fla. Const. ("Unless otherwise specifically provided for elsewhere in this constitution, if the proposed amendment or revision is approved by vote of at least sixty percent of the electors voting on the measure, it shall be effective as an amendment to or revision of the constitution of the state on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January following the election, or on such other date as may be specified in the amendment or revision."). Second, even if the amendment were in effect, it does not change the law applicable to Jimenez's conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death.
    Once amended in accordance with the November 2018 election, article X, section 9 will provide as follows: "Repeal of a criminal statute shall not affect prosecution for any crime committed before such repeal." This language has no application to Jimenez's case. No applicable criminal statute has been repealed, and, more importantly, Jimenez's convictions and sentence of death were final many years ago. Jimenez v. State , 703 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied , 523 U.S. 1123, 118 S.Ct. 1806, 140 L.Ed.2d 945 (1998).
    Jimenez's argument hinges on the novel assertion that the repeal of a constitutional prohibition mandates affirmative application of the action previously prohibited. It does not. Prior to its recent amendment, article X, section 9, prohibited the Legislature not just from making the repeal of a statute retroactive, but also from making an amendment to a criminal statute applicable to pending prosecutions or sentences. That prohibition will be removed effective January 8, 2019, meaning that there will no longer be any provision in the Florida Constitution that would prohibit the Legislature from applying an amended criminal statute retroactively to pending prosecutions or sentences. However, nothing in our constitution does or will require the Legislature to do so, and the repeal of the prohibition will not require that they do so. Moreover, the Legislature did not attempt to apply chapters 2016-13 and 2017-1 retroactively, and we have already rejected Jimenez's argument that chapters 2016-13 and 2017-1 apply retroactively to his case. Jimenez v. State , 247 So.3d 395 (Fla. 2018), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 598, 202 L.Ed.2d 435 (2018). Therefore, the constitutional amendment to article X, section 9, approved by the voters on November 6, 2018, would not afford Jimenez relief even if it had already gone into effect.
    Jimenez also re-raises claims previously rejected by this Court, contending that the amendment approved by the voters on November 6, 2018, justifies our reconsideration of them. We disagree. First, Jimenez once again contends chapters 2016-13 and 2017-1 created a new substantive offense of capital first-degree murder, which entitles him to application of those provisions to his case as a matter of due process. Jimenez made this argument in response to this Court's order to show cause in case number SC17-2272. We rejected this argument, explaining that Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), as interpreted in our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017), "does not apply retroactively to Jimenez's sentence of death." Jimenez , 247 So.3d at 396 (citing Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017) ). We have more recently addressed the argument in more detail, and rejected it, in Foster v. State , 258 So.3d 1248, 1252-53 (Fla. 2018). Second, Jimenez argues that failure to apply chapters 2016-13 and 2017-1 to his case is arbitrary, in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, when his case is compared to the cases of other defendants who have been granted new penalty-phase proceedings for crimes that occurred before the 1992 murder for which Jimenez has been sentenced to death. He raised these arguments in response to this Court's order to show cause in case number SC17-2272 as well. We rejected them when we held that Hurst does not apply retroactively to Jimenez's sentence of death. 247 So. 3d at 396. We also rejected these arguments when they were raised in Lambrix v. State , 227 So.3d 112, 113 (Fla. 2017) (rejecting claims that this Court's decisions concerning the retroactivity of Hurst violate the rights to due process and equal protection due to arbitrariness). The amendment to article X, section 9 of the Florida Constitution has no effect on our prior consideration of these claims.
    Moreover, because the claims to a substantive right under chapters 2016-13 and 2017-1 and the claims arguing violations of due process and equal protection due to this Court's retroactivity holdings were previously presented to this Court in case number SC17-2272, they are procedurally barred. See Lambrix v. State , 217 So.3d 977, 989 (Fla. 2017) ("Lambrix cannot use a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus to raise claims that he raised in a prior proceeding.").
    For the foregoing reasons, Jimenez's petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. Having fully considered Jimenez's petition, we deny his motion for a stay of execution and deny his request for oral argument as moot. No rehearing will be entertained by this Court.
    CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      On December 10, 2018, Jimenez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, raising the same claims presented in this petition, in addition to other claims that we recently rejected. See Jimenez v. State , Nos. SC18-1247 & SC18-1321, 43 Fla. L. Weekly S433, --- So.3d ---- (Fla. Oct. 4, 2018), petition for cert. docketed , No. 18-6970 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2018).


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Aaron H. HOLLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1528
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 11, 2018 Rehearing Denied January 17, 2019
    Aaron H. Holley, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Barbara Debelius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf, Makar, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Travis D. SMITH, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-3314
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 7, 2018 Rehearing Denied January 17, 2019
    Travis D. Smith, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

DENIED.

Wolf, Makar, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Raymond FAULK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4609
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 5, 2018 Rehearing Denied January 17, 2019
    Raymond Faulk, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Ray, Kelsey, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Charles OSBORN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2136
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    November 21, 2018 Rehearing Denied January 17, 2019
    Charles Osborn, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Donnell R. CARTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5264
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 21, 2018
    Donnell Carter, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Bilbrey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Bill Harley SLAUGHTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-326
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 21, 2018
    Matthew R. McLain of McLain Law, P.A., Longwood, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Roberts and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    John Robert BOISVERT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-0473
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 18, 2018 Rehearing Denied January 7, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and David A. Henson, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Keri DAUB, f/k/a Keri Wims, Appellant, v. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF JACKSONVILLE, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-1480
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 12, 2018 Rehearing Denied January 17, 2019
    Lynn W. Martin of the Law Offices of Lynn W. Martin, P.A., St. Augustine, for Appellant.
    Jenifer S. Worley and William T. Stone, Jr., of Saalfield Shad, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Wetherell, J., concur; Winsor, J., dissents.


text:
    Roy Otis FLOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2442
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 14, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Lewis, and Rowe, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ronald WILLARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3811
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 3, 2019
    Ronald Willard, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Bryan Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Mario M. BRINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2100
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 3, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jeffery T. CRYSTAL, Appellant, v. REGUS MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3781
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 3, 2019
    Jeffrey T. Crystal, pro se, Appellant.
    Dennis Dean Leone, Mitchell C. Robiner, and Jonathan K. Stitt of Shankman Leone, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ava Electris CANNIE aka Eva Helene Cannie, Appellant, v. JACKSONVILLE GOLF and Country Club Homeowners Association, Marsh Landing Management Co. and Country Club Concierge Magazine, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 1D18-4787
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 7, 2019
    Ava Electris Cannie, pro se, Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellees.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED .

Makar, Winokur, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    James Ray DEAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3900
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 7, 2019
    James Ray Dean, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Bryan Jordan, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Terrance L. KIMBROUGH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4196
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 3, 2019
    Terrance L. Kimbrough, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Roberts and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ronald WILLARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3507
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 3, 2019
    Ronald Willard, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Amanda D. Stokes, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Steven P. MCKENNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3410
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 7, 2019
    Steven P. McKenney, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED .

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Precious Eugene MITCHELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-525
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 7, 2019
    Precious Mitchell, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Roberts and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ricardo DUNCAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0334
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 7, 2019
    Ricardo Duncan, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wetherell, Bilbrey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    William Henry BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-67
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 7, 2019
    William Henry Brown, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael McDermott, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Roberts and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Erik Deshawn BENSTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5167
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 7, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kevin Steiger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Lewis, Ray, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Andrew MITCHELL, Appellant, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3692
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 7, 2019
    Andrew Mitchell, pro se, Appellant.
    Rana Wallace, General Counsel, Florida Commission on Offender Review, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED.

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tavarious Nikeya THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-419
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 7, 2019
    Tavarious Nikeya Thomas, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Barbara Debelius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Roberts and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lucious M. JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5036
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 7, 2019
    Lucious M. Jackson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Roberts and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ON BEHALF OF Jessica Ashley Cheyenne COLLINS, Appellant, v. Bradley Jacob HARRIS, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2776
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 8, 2019
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Robert L. Sirianni Jr., Brownstone, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Lewis, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael Dominique DONSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0185
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 8, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Lewis, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.


text:
    Raytaurus E. ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1720
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 7, 2019
    Raytaurus E. Armstrong, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Bilbrey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ronald WILLARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3475
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 3, 2019
    Ronald Willard, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Bryan Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Antoine BANKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4304
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 8, 2019
    Antoine Banks, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Lewis, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.


text:
    Roderick C. HALLMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3568
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 8, 2019
    Candice K. Brower, Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, and Michael J. Titus, Assistant Conflict Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Osterhaus, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kenneth Michael GILLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0290
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 8, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant;
    Kenneth Michael Gilley, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Lewis, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael Alexander THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3331
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 8, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; Michael Alexander Thomas, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Lewis, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gary MILLS, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-3174
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 8, 2019
    Gary Mills, pro se, Petitioner.
    Kenneth S. Steely, General Counsel, and Gayla Grant, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

DENIED on the merits.

Wolf, Lewis, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.


text:
    James Ray EGGLESTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0471
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 8, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Lewis, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jymerius Javonte BROWNLEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0322
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 8, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Lewis, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.


text:
    Timothy Deante BURROUGHS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4090
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 8, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Joanna A. Mauer, Assistant Public Defender, and Kathleen Pafford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Ray, Kelsey, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Bill Harley SLAUGHTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2607
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 14, 2019
    Matthew R. McLain, Longwood, for Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Harvey PRICE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1735
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 14, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Robin B. Rogers, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, and Frank X. Moehrle, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Osterhaus, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kristopher QUILLIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1053
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 14, 2019
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Steven Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Joanna Mauer, Assistant Public Defender, Flor Diaz, Assistant Public Defender, and Kathleen Pafford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Brooke Moody, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Makar, Winokur, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Hector Javier LEBRON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4279
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 3, 2019
    Hector Javier Lebron, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven Edward Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Osterhaus, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Greg MAKI a/k/a Gregory Eugene Maki and Elizabeth Maki a/k/a Elizabeth Ann Maki, Appellants, v. MULTIBANK 2009-1 RES-ADC VENTURE, LLC, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-925
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed November 30, 2018
    Gregory Maki and Elizabeth Maki, pro se.
    Stephen P. Drobny, Ronald D.P. Bruckmann, and Zachary D. Ludens of Jones Walker LLP, Miami, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SALARIO, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    HARVEY MOORE AND ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellant, v. HAHN LOESER & PARKS, LLP, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5658
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 12, 2018.
    G. Donovan Conwell, Jr. of Conwell Business Law, LLLP, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Edmond E. Koester of Coleman, Yovanovich & Koester, P.A., Naples, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, KELLY, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Charles Andrew ROWAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5285
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 31, 2018
    Charles Andrew Rowan, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kiersten E. Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, CRENSHAW, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Timothy ROCKETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2356
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 12, 2018
    Timothy Rockett, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Betancourt v. State, 804 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2001) ; Franke v. State, 997 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

NORTHCUTT, CASANUEVA, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Roland Carly SAINTLOT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2522
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 12, 2018.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Saintlot v. State, 190 So. 3d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (table decision); Saintlot v. State, 97 So. 3d 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (table decision); Steward v. State, 931 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ; Coke v. State, 955 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ; Harris v. State, 777 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

NORTHCUTT, CASANUEVA, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Joshua ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1725
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 12, 2018.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Keene v. State, 500 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) ; Harris v. State, 483 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).

NORTHCUTT, CASANUEVA, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Anthony RIVERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2494
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 12, 2018
    Anthony Rivera, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Boler v. State, 678 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1996) ; Franke v. State, 997 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ; Coughlin v. State, 932 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (en banc); Shortridge v. State, 884 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ; Cooper v. State, 800 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

NORTHCUTT, CASANUEVA, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Mark Antonio BURGOS, DOC #T72747, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-728
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 14, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Cynthia J. Dodge, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, and Helene S. Parnes, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and VILLANTI and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    William Charles DEVLIN, DOC #725818, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1101
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 12, 2018
    Gary J. Schwartz, Orlando, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kiersten E. Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

MORRIS, LUCAS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Larry GADSDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2357
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 12, 2018
    Larry Gadsden, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Gutierrez v. State, 854 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) ; Edwards v. State, 743 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ; Barnes v. State, 634 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

NORTHCUTT, CASANUEVA, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    William R. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2451
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 12, 2018.
    William R. Johnson, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Comer v. Moore, 817 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 2002) ; Benedetto v. State, 957 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ; Cookshot v. State, 846 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ; Sanchez v. State, 765 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) ; Tiger v. State, 764 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

NORTHCUTT, CASANUEVA, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Rashidi Abdu GIBSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2829
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 14, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Joseph N. D'Achille, Jr., Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Linsey Sims-Bohnenstiehl, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and KHOUZAM and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jon P. MOYER, DOC #C11849, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3918
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 14, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Clayton R. Kaeiser, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and VILLANTI and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ezekiel GARZA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3978
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 14, 2018.
    Howard L. Dimming, II, Public Defender, and Julius J. Aulisio, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, LUCAS, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Josue VILLA-GOMEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2034
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 14, 2018.
    Rupak R. Shah of Escobar & Associates, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marilyn Muir Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    James HARRIS, DOC #R63924, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1128
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 19, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SLEET and LUCAS JJ., Concur.


text:
    Michael Anthony REEVES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1486
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 19, 2018
    Michael Anthony Reeves, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Tonja Vickers Rook, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and VILLANTI and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Blaise COOK, a/k/a Blaise Dana Cook, a/k/a Blaise Dana Peachey, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4038
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 14, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Deana K. Marshall, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Johnny T. Salgado, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and VILLANTI and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Justin Glen WOODY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4905
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 14, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Ronald N. Toward, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Sebastin Jerome CHRISTMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-585
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 19, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Peter Koclanes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Yvon AUGUSTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-469
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 19, 2018
    Rachael E. Reese of O'Brien Hatfield, P.A., Tampa, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marilyn Muir Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Gerald Elicious TOLBERT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-542
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 19, 2018.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, MORRIS, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Marcus Earl BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-749
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 19, 2018.
    Marcus Earl Brooks, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and KELLY and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jose Antonio CARIAS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3791
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew D. Bernstein, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ronald E. CORKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3826
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 21, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Rachel Roebuck, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KHOUZAM and BADALAMENTI, JJ., and CASE, JAMES R., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE, Concur.


text:
    Abel Alonso HUERTA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1181
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 19, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, MORRIS, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Heribierto RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1376
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed December 19, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and VILLANTI and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Xavier THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4852
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, And Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Johnny T. Salgado, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Manuel SANTIAGO, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-930
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and William L. Sharwell, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and NORTHCUTT and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Daniel C. HOEFT, Kathryn Stout, and Tim Hoeft, Appellants, v. Thomas HOEFT, the previously appointed and discharged Personal Representative of the Estate of Alice Mae Hoeft, deceased, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1042
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
    Douglas G. Jackson of The Law Firm of Douglas G. Jackson, P.A., Saint Petersburg, for Appellants.
    Paul A. Nelson of Paul A. Nelson, P.A., Saint Petersburg, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, LUCAS, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Thomas P. FLEMING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2555
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See State v. Whitehead, 472 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1985) ; Robinson v. State, 37 So. 3d 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ; Cook v. State, 816 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; Diaz v. Jones, 215 So. 3d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ; Coke v. State, 955 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ; Johnson v. State, 917 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ; LaMar v. State, 823 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

CASANUEVA, LUCAS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Vernal CURRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2597
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019.
    Vernal Curry, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2005) ; Milks v.State, 894 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2005) ; Bizzell v. State, 912 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ; Sheppard v. State, 907 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ; Shaw v. State, 780 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ; Gibson v. State, 721 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) ; Banaszak v. State, 579 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) ; Johnson v. State, 917 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ; Hannah v. State, 869 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) ; Martell v. State, 676 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

CASANUEVA, LUCAS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Michael V. SOSA, DOC #T32330, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-615
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019.
    Michael V. Sosa, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and LUCAS and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Charles CALHOUN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3150
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew D. Bernstein, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan S. Tannen, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and NORTHCUTT and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Donald R. BRAILSFORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1996
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
    David B. Falstad, Winter Park, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bilal Ahmed Faruqui, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and NORTHCUTT and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    David FRANKLING, Appellant, v. US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR CMLTI 2005-7, and Laura A. Dorsey, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-3041
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
    Michael Alex Wasylik of Ricardo & Wasylik, PL, Dade City, for Appellant.
    Alan M. Pierce of Liebler, Gonzalez & Portuondo of Miami, for Appellee US Bank National Association.
    No appearance for remaining Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Douglas J. MIKULICIC, Appellant, v. Julie A. MIKULICIC, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3980
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
    Gary E. Williams and Stephen D. Gregg of The Law Firm for Family Law, Clearwater, for Appellant.
    Jane H. Grossman, St. Petersburg, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and NORTHCUTT and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Raymond ROGERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4402
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
    Raymond Rogers, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and C. Todd Chapman, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jo-Quan MATHIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-1387
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019.
    Jo-Quan Mathis, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Charles Kelly SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2533
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
    Charles Kelly Smith, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See State v. Mancino, 705 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 1998) ; Hughes v. State, 22 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ; Waiter v. State, 965 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ; Vonador v. State, 915 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ; Pitts v. State, 832 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; Simms v. State, 949 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ; Labadie v. State, 840 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

CASANUEVA, LUCAS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Timothy D. MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-2594
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000) ; Martin v. State, 888 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

CASANUEVA, LUCAS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Albert R. WALLS, DOC #757396, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-883
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019.
    Albert R. Wall, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, SLEET, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    J.P.C., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-918
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Brandon R. Christian, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    PANTHER TRACE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, v. Thomas THOMPSON; Deidre Thompson ; and Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., as Trustee for the Registered Holders of New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-B Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-4676
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 9, 2019.
    Leslie M. Conklin, Clearwater, for Appellant.
    Paul M. Messina, Jr. and Michelle M. Gervais of Blank Rome LLP, Tampa, for Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
    No appearance for remaining Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and KELLY and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


text:
    James Kenneth COCHRAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1843
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed January 4, 2019
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Lisa Lott, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, KELLY, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.