text:
    Santiago MILIAN, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1083
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JULY 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    RELIABLE FINANCIAL ENTERPRISES, LLC, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1727
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 06, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Laura MAFALE, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. SCHECHER GROUP, INC., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1163
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JULY 09, 2018 Rehearing Denied August 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Luis Armando LANCHEROS, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. SCHECHER GROUP, INC., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1164
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JULY 09, 2018 Rehearing Denied August 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Hugo PEDRIEL, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. SCHECHER GROUP, INC., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1165
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JULY 09, 2018 Rehearing Denied August 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Dismissed.


text:
    Carrie JONES, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1266
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 16, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Dismissed.


text:
    Jacques ARMAND, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Ginou Armand AMISY, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1230
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Ralf BAUCHROWITZ, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. SCHECHER GROUP, INC., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0585
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JULY 09, 2018 Rehearing Denied August 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Ralf BAUCHROWITZ, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. SCHECHER GROUP, INC., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0608
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JULY 09, 2018 Rehearing Denied August 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Dismissed.


text:
    Carlos KEYES a/k/a Carlos Fernandez, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. M & J FILM PRODUCTION, LLC, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1012
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 05, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Beanco THOMAS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1003
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Deny.


text:
    Araceli MARQUEZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0658
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    DAGRAJU, LLC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. SCHECHER GROUP, INC., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0594
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JULY 09, 2018 Rehearing Denied August 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    William AYERS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1736
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed September 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Nelson Rafael RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2539
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed September 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Shelice MCKENZIE, Appellant, v. FIFTEEN FLORIDA MULTIFAMILY, LLC, etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D17-1349
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed September 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Karaka CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1616
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed September 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony B. JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1579
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed September 20, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Richeen PROPHETE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1213
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed September 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Alberto RIVERA, Appellant, v. Maria Teresa RIVERA, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-0039
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed September 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Markeita DAVIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D17-2022
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed September 20, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jack E. VANDELAAR and Jana K. Vandelaar, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2326
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 21, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    BANCO DE LOS TRABAJADORES, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Ricardo Rene Cortez MORENO, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0906
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 18, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    FLORIDA CAPITAL GROUP, INC., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Bart S. BISHOP, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-0340
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    TWO ISLANDS DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. ISLAND ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2090
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.

Denied.


text:
    BENZRENT 6, LLC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. U.S. BANK NA, etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0983
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 14, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Alfredo Mauricio LOWENSTEIN, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. FIRSTBANK PUERTO RICO, etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1328
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 14, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Ricardo Rene Cortez MORENO, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Sergio Hernandez LEMUS, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1389
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Daisy BIVINS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. MIAMI PROPERTY GROUP, LTD, etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0076
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Teresa Diane MONTZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0933
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 4, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Donald MACDONALD, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Gloria MACDONALD, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1015
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 29, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Concepcion BENITEZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1039
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Deverick GLENN, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1427
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Yvette E. BLACKWELL-GOMEZ, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Janis Murray FLEMING, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1539
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 29, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    KINGSTON MORTGAGE LLC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A., etc., et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1542
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 29, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Carry MCCOY, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1550
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 29, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Eddie Edwin GAITOR, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1563
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Mandamus is denied.


text:
    Vicken BEDOYAN and WPM Miami, Inc., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Harout SAMRA, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1756
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    August 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Adacia DOUGLAS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1720
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Lashay WILLIAMS, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. In re: Ayelet EDELSTEIN vs. Eric Ohnona, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1731
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    August 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Furman D. LIVINGSTON Sr., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1752
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    August 28, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Rafael TARAMONA, et al., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., etc., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0328
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Jessica SILVA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. In re: US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, etc., vs. Omar Manso, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0649
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 4, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Pleadro J. SCOTT, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0339
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JULY 12, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Rex E. RUSSO, Appellant / Petitioner(s) v. Mary Cay BLANKS, Clerk, etc., Appellee / Respondent(s)
    CASE NO.: 3D18-0419
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    April 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Mandamus is dismissed.


text:
    Ruben G. ETCHEVERRY, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Marisa GONZALEZ, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1129
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Sarah Olivia HANNA, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Alfredo Jose VARGAS and State of Florida Department of Revenue Child Support Program, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1894
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    SEPTEMBER 25, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Transferred.


text:
    Jonathan BREENE and Setai Realty LLC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Marcus ROWAN, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D18-1636
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    AUGUST 24, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Kareem FARRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1564
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [August 16, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Marv A. HUBBARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1753
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [August 30, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Linell FEAGIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1795
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [August 23, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kerby CADET, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1894
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [August 23, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Marcus Tramaine TERRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3939
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [August 23, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kenneth Lee BELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1143
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 6, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antoine ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1169
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 6, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Eric Lashon BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1268
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [August 30, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Daniel JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1526
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [August 30, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    T.S.J., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-115
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 20, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Paul Michael DUMONCEAU, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-778
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 20, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ronnie JHURILAL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1713
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 20, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ernest BARNES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1931
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 20, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S SEVERALLY SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO. MCG987-0079, a foreign corporation, and Policy No. WSG066410-0052, a foreign corporation, Appellant, v. MORTGAGE INVESTORS II, LLC, a Florida Corporation, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2264
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Doreen HOLDEN and Michael Pierrel, Appellants, v. HOMEOWNERS CHOICE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D17-2364 4D17-2397
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kristine DUHAIME, Appellant, v. Renee BUSH and Anna Kruger, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-2630
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    SAITAMA KANKON SOUSAI CENTER CO., LTD., a Foreign Corporation, Appellant, v. UNITED YACHT TRANSPORT, LLC., Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2965
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Edmund ACCARDI, Appellant, v. Charlotte ACCARDI, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3042
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    B.C.S., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3072
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Peter SPOREA, Appellant, v. REGIONS BANK, N.A., Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3148
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Yen BERNSTEIN and Brett Bernstein, Appellants, v. HSBC BANK, USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR the HOLDERS OF DEUTSCHE ALT-A SECURITIES MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, Series 2006-AR6 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR6, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3170
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Meredith Piper WEBER and Jamie Roth, et al., Appellants, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3237
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    MERCO GROUP OF THE PALM BEACHES, INC., Appellant, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY, FL, A Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3271
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Barbara ALTOMARE and Richard Altomare, Appellants, v. BOCAIRE COUNTRY CLUB, INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3363
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Timothy CASTELLANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3718
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Fedner FRANCOIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-0342
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    GARO MANAGEMENT, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. MAGLEV ENERGY, INC., a Florida Corporation; Donald R. Taylor, Jon Harms and Jay Archibald, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-795
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Theodore PULLIAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2149
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Shira THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1724
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Steadroy WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1725
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David Lee MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1920
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    LENDRUM ENERGY, LLC and John Lendrum, Appellants, v. FROMKIN ENERGY, LLC and Fromoil Energy Development, LLC, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-1010
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Victual MCNEAL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1786
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Antonio A. TANKES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1282
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Andrew K. KWAP, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND, New Jersey, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3814
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 4, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tony VALENCIA-SOSA, Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-847
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 4, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    The SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, Appellant, v. Nikolas Jacob CRUZ, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1421
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Elias ROSADO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-2214
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [September 27, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.G. HAMILTON, Appellant, v. Tatiana BASOVA, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-881
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 4, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Bryan BENNETT, Appellant, v. Patricia FYE and Bailee Fye, Appellees.
    Nos. 4D17-2224 & 4D17-2240
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 4, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Joseph BENLOLO, Appellant, v. Scott J. ISRAEL, as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3437
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 4, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Atul PATEL, Ranjan Patel, husband and wife, and Atul & Ranjan Family Trust, Appellants, v. PENINSULA BOYNTON PROPERTY, LLC, a Florida corporation, Practical Elements, Inc., a Florida corporation, Mark Pordes, individually, Federico Drada, individually, and Adam Kaufman, individually, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-577
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 4, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jeremiah MARION, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-960
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 4, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Salina ALLEN, Appellant, v. FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION, any and All Unknown Parties Claiming by, through, Under and Against the Herein Named Individual Defendant(s) Who Are Not Known To Be Dead or Alive, Whether Said Unknown Parties May Claim an Interest as Spouses, Heirs, Devises, Grantees, or Other Claimants, Unknown Tenant 1 n/k/a Lorenzo Allen, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-3530
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 4, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Amy NELSON, Appellant, v. PENINSULA BOYNTON PROPERTY, LLC, a Florida corporation, Practical Elements, Inc., a Florida corporation, Federico Drada, individually, and Adam Kaufman, individually, Appellees.
    No. 4D18-578
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 4, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Eugene JACOBS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, St. Lucie County State Attorney's Office, State Attorney Bruce H. Colton, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1602
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 4, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Barry M. ATKINS and Missy Atkins, Appellants, v. Jessica POST, an individual, Fennemore Craig, P.C., an Arizona Professional Corporation, Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., an Arizona Limited Liability Partnership, Donald W. Bivens, an individual, Patricia Lee Refo, an individual, Robert M. Kort, an individual, and Myndi M. Kort, an individual, Appellees.
    No. 4D17-2837
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [October 4, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John RUIZ and Mary D. Ruiz, Appellants, v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1687
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    October 4, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brenton J. JOHNSON, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-1079
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [August 2, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Phillip J. SHEA, Appellant, v. Carey HAUGHWOUT, et al., Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2237
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [August 2, 2018]
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Michael BOLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3614
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed August 30, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Arthur AVERY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1572
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed August 28, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Richard Anthony PERSAUD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-186
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed August 21, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jeremy KIBLER, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, Successor in Interest to Bank of America, National Association, as Trustee, Successor by Merger to LaSalle Bank National, Etc., Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1426
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed August 14, 2018 Rehearing Denied September 12, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Demetrius ALLEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1857
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed September 11, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Michael BOLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3282
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed August 30, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    QING HE, Appellant, v. PARADISE CAY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and Mingzhi Guo, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-3577
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed August 28, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Peter PRAHASKY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1983
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed August 28, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Robert Eugene FERRONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1493
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jean Lucner SENAT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1444
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Robert MORELLO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-933
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Timothy HAMPTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-889
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Sharon Ashley GLASS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-2057
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Brian KELLY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1220
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Robert John ZUBICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-1090
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jackie Lamont NEWKIRK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-972
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Shawna JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-858
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Troy K. SPARROW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-777
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kenneth O'Brien DUNHAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-388
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Roberto J. RAMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3922
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kevin Trevon WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3182
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Victoria Brook SWEATT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-3063
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jessy J. BURROWS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case Nos. 5D17-2871 5D17-2872 5D17-2873 5D17-2874 5D17-2876
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jashua DANIEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2480
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Rudolph HARRIS, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1809 5D17-1810
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Willie SAMUEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1602
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Torrance Navel CLARK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1235
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Angel Max RIVERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1108
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 2, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Earnest JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Sharona MCCOY, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-591
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    P. F-G., Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-562
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Tommie Lee JENKINS, Appellant, v. PARTNERS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-421
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    CENTERPIECE PROPERTIES, LLC, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Jennifer V. Davis, Marcus L. Davis, Kissimmee Bay Community Association, Inc c/o Florida Association Management, Inc., Appellees.
    Case No. 5D17-1917
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    James Scott PENDERGRAFT, IV., Orlando Women's Center, LLC., Wilson Medical Management, LLC., Wilson Medical Management, Inc., Gorilla Realty Management, LLC., Gorilla Realty Management, Inc., et al., Appellants, v. C.H., as Settlor of the J.F. Special Needs Trust and the Center for Special Needs Trust Administration, Inc., as Trustee of the J.F. Special Needs Trust, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D18-93
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Arnell ELLIOTT, Margaret E. Elliott, as Trustee of the Margaret E. Elliott Family Trust Dated April 10, 2009, Francisco Hernendez, Pareen S. Kanji, Shamshu G. Kanji, Cyndi D. Martin, et al., Appellants, v. ALTAMONTE SPRINGS ACQUISITION, LLC., Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-2596
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Alfredo HOYOS, Appellant, v. Maria Arneson HOYOS, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1453
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    K.D., Father of A.D. and J.D., Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-2257
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    L.G. Mother of J.G. and M.G., Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and Guardian Ad Litem, Appellees.
    Case No. 5D18-1703
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 10, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Kevin J. STEPHENSON, Appellant, v. Barbara STEPHENSON, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D17-1186
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed October 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Randy Luis CAMACHO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 5D18-390
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Decision filed June 5, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


author: Lindsey, N., Associate Judge.

text:
    Robert W. JOSHUA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 4D17-2928
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [March 7, 2018]
    Robert W. Joshua, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R. Napodano, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Lindsey, N., Associate Judge.

Robert W. Joshua ("Petitioner") petitions this Court to issue a writ of prohibition disqualifying the trial judge from further participation in his case. For the reasons set forth below, we deny the petition.

Background

Petitioner was arrested on November 24, 2009 and subsequently charged by an amended information with trafficking in methamphetamine in Count I and trafficking in methylenedioxmethamphetamine ("MDMA") in Count II. Following a jury trial in March of 2015, Petitioner was found guilty of both counts and sentenced concurrently on each count to forty-two months in prison, with a three-year minimum mandatory, followed by ten years' drug offender probation. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion for a new trial and Petitioner filed a direct appeal.

On direct appeal, this Court reversed the conviction and sentence on Count I and remanded for further proceedings. Joshua v. State , 205 So.3d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). In addition, this Court stated that the transcripts from two in camera hearings relating to the identity of an alleged confidential informant shall be unsealed and available to the parties. Id. at 855 n.9. This Court affirmed the trial court on all of the other issues raised by Petitioner, including its denial of Petitioner's two prior motions to disqualify the judge. Id. at 856 n.10, 860.

On July 13, 2017, Petitioner filed a Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief raising six grounds. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed his fourth verified motion to disqualify the judge. In the motion, Petitioner sought disqualification on the grounds that the judge in this case was biased in favor of the State, "not exclusively founded upon [the judge's] adverse rulings, but upon what [Petitioner] perceives as [the judge's] intentional, calculated professional ignorance throughout the case and [the judge's] intentional actions [that were] intended to benefit the criminal conspirators and the State."

Petitioner also alleged as a basis for disqualification that the judge's actions were intended to benefit the co-architects, attorney Michael Leader and former Fort Lauderdale Police Detective Thomas Reed, of an alleged criminal conspiracy, including fabricating the existence of the confidential informant and the judge's suppression of this evidence that ultimately led to Petitioner's conviction. In addition, Petitioner alleged that the judge "colluded with criminal conspirators Michael Leader, Ted Daus, Thomas Reed, Frederico Abreu, and Cory and Gabriel Faneca, who manufactured a criminal offense against [Petitioner] ... by willfully and intentionally tailoring his rulings to prevent [Petitioner] from learning key, exculpatory evidence" regarding the identity of the alleged confidential informant, because of his friendship with Michael Leader's father.

Further, Petitioner alleged that because the judge's wife is friends with Detective Reed, the judge, "intentionally and with calculation, ruled that Detective Reed did not make any material false representations at the conclusion of the suppression hearing conducted in [Petitioner's] case, a fact [the judge] knew to be untrue." Finally, Petitioner alleged that the judge "demonstrated bias against him when he ruled that the State was not required to turn over transcripts from the in camera [hearings] which were conducted," "intentionally flouted the order of the District Court to unseal and produce the in camera [hearing] transcripts because of his bias against [Petitioner]," and "intentionally sought to conceal evidence of his bias by refusing to abide by the ruling of the Fourth District Court of Appeal when that court ordered the in-camera [sic] hearings to be made public."

On July 20, 2017, the trial court denied the fourth verified motion to disqualify. The instant petition follows.

Standard of Review

A petition for writ of prohibition is the manner in which a party may seek review of a trial court's denial of a motion to disqualify a trial judge. Sutton v. State , 975 So.2d 1073, 1077 (Fla. 2008). "Whether a motion to disqualify is legally sufficient is a question of law, and the standard of review of a trial judge's determination of a motion to disqualify is de novo ." Gregory v. State , 118 So.3d 770, 778 (Fla. 2013) (citing Stein v. State , 995 So.2d 329, 334 (Fla. 2008) ).

Furthermore, "[w]hether the motion is legally sufficient requires a determination as to whether the alleged facts would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. A motion to disqualify a judge must be well-founded and contain facts germane to the judge's undue bias, prejudice, or sympathy. A mere subjective fear[ ] of bias will not be legally sufficient; rather, the fear must be objectively reasonable." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Analysis

Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(e) provides that "[a] motion to disqualify shall be filed within a reasonable time not to exceed 10 days after discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion ...." Here, other than those portions of Petitioner's fourth motion to disqualify relating to the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to compel discovery of the transcripts of the in camera hearings, Petitioner's claims are both untimely and successive. See Asay v. State , 769 So.2d 974, 980 (Fla. 2000) (claims procedurally barred where the grounds upon which they are based were known at the time of direct appeal); Hedrick v. State , 6 So.3d 688, 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (Claims relating to matters which occurred at trial are procedurally barred.)

Petitioner contends his motion is timely based on St. Pierre v. State , 966 So.2d 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). In St. Pierre , the court held that matters which occurred after trial are timely raised in a post-conviction proceeding since a post-conviction proceeding may be the first time a defendant can seek to disqualify the judge based on conduct that occurred after the trial. Id. at 974. However, Petitioner's fourth motion to disqualify largely complains of the judge's rulings relating to a disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant prior to trial and the judge's alleged participation in a conspiracy against Petitioner. These allegations were raised prior to the pending post-conviction proceeding, as Petitioner complained in his first motion to disqualify that the judge "conspired[ ] and effected a coordinated effort to conceal a true cover-up" through his rulings on the motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant prior to trial.

The allegations in Petitioner's fourth motion to disqualify relating to the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to compel discovery of the transcripts of the in camera hearings are legally insufficient. "[T]he fact that a judge has ruled adversely to the party in the past does not constitute a legally sufficient ground for a motion to disqualify." McGirth v. State , 209 So.3d 1146, 1162 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Thompson v. State , 759 So.2d 650, 659 (Fla. 2000) ). To the extent Petitioner argues in his Reply that he has learned, post-trial, new information concerning the identity of the alleged confidential informant that allows him to "fill in the missing puzzle pieces," the allegations are, nonetheless, again based on the judge's purported participation in a conspiracy through his rulings relating to the handling of the case.

Furthermore, this Court has previously rejected the same type of conspiracy theory advanced by Petitioner and held that a defendant's subjective and unreasonable fear that the trial judge was involved in a conspiracy against the defendant is legally insufficient to warrant disqualification. See Hedrick , 6 So.3d at 692-93 (concluding that the claims raised in the defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge based on the defendant's speculative and unfounded allegations of official misconduct and complaints of the judge's demonstrated bias through his rulings on pretrial motions were procedurally barred and legally insufficient); see also Asay , 769 So.2d at 981 (finding that the defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge, containing sheer speculation rather than well-founded allegations, was correctly denied because it was untimely and legally insufficient).

Conclusion

Accordingly, we conclude, because Petitioner's claims are untimely, successive and/or legally insufficient, that the trial court correctly denied Petitioner's fourth verified motion to disqualify the judge and we deny the petition for a writ of prohibition.

Suarez, R. and Logue, T., Associate Judges, concur.

      On October 23, 2017, the Florida Supreme Court directed that this petition be reviewed and determined by a panel of judges from the Third District Court of Appeal sitting by designation as associate judges of the Fourth District Court of Appeal.

      Similarly, in that appeal, a panel of judges from the Third District Court of Appeal sat by designation as associate judges of the Fourth District Court of Appeal.

      The motion to disqualify on review in the instant petition is Petitioner's fourth motion to disqualify. Petitioner does not seek relief herein as to his third motion.


text:
    J.T., The Father, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),
    CASE NO.: 3D17-2800
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    JANUARY 02, 2018
    J.T., Father of the Minor Child, seeks by way of a petition for writ of mandamus review of the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion for disqualification of the trial judge. We treat this as a petition for writ of prohibition.
    Although we have concluded that the grounds alleged in Petitioner's motion for disqualification are legally insufficient, "[w]hen a judge has looked beyond the mere legal sufficiency of a suggestion of prejudice and attempted to refute the charges of partiality, he has then exceeded the proper scope of his inquiry and on that basis alone established grounds for his disqualification." MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, 565 So.2d 1332, 1339 (Fla. 1990) (citation omitted). Because the trial judge, in the order denying disqualification, has done so, we must grant the writ of prohibition. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(f) ("If any motion is legally insufficient, an order denying the motion shall immediately be entered. No other reason for denial shall be stated, and an order of denial shall not take issue with the motion.").
    We withhold formal issuance of the writ, confident that the trial judge will promptly issue an order of disqualification.
    FERNANDEZ, LOGUE and LINDSEY, JJ.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Steven TOGNOLI, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Lynda Tognoli, Appellant, v. PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D16-224
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [April 25, 2018]
    Thomas J. Seider, Celene H. Humphries and Maegen Peek Luka of Brannock & Humphries, Tampa; Alex Alvarez of The Alvarez Law Firm, Coral Gables; Randy Rosenblum of Dolan, Dobrinsky, Rosenblum, LLP, Miami; Philip Freidin of Freidin Brown P.A., Miami; and Maria P. Sperando of the Law Office of Maria P. Sperando, P.A., Stuart, for appellant.
    Scott D. Kaiser of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Kansas City, Missouri; and Geoffrey J. Michael of Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, DC, for appellee.
    ON REMAND FROM THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
   Per Curiam.

This matter is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of Florida. In a decision rendered June 28, 2017, we per curiam affirmed the trial court's final judgment, which reduced the plaintiff's damages by the percentage of fault that the jury attributed to Mrs. Tognoli, based on our then-binding precedent in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Schoeff , 178 So.3d 487, 488 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). The Florida Supreme Court then quashed our Schoeff decision and held that "the comparative fault statute does not apply to Engle progeny cases in which the jury finds for the plaintiff on the intentional tort claims." Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 232 So.3d 294, 304 (Fla. 2017). Consequently, our decision in the instant case was also quashed.

The parties do not assert issues with the jury's findings of intentional torts and have agreed on the remedy that we likewise deem proper. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter judgment for the entire amount of damages found by the jury.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Damoorgian, Ciklin and Levine, JJ., concur.


text:
    AMERICAN S GROUP, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, Appellant, v. ROBERT GLICKMAN, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2546
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 6, 2018]
    Andrey Solonenko, Miramar, for appellant.
    Mary Ellen R. Himes of Fidelity National Law Group, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed . See , Nat'l Am. Home, LLC v. Deutsche Nat'l Trust Co. , 242 So.3d 1144, 2018 WL 1617644 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 4, 2018).

Warner, Taylor and Levine, JJ., concur.


text:
    Shane RICHARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D18-0640
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 16, 2018]
    Shane Richards, Raiford, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed . See Carter v. State , 127 So.3d 572, 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ; Martell v. State , 676 So.2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

Conner, Forst and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.


text:
    Abimbola ORUKOTAN, Appellant, v. The AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, a State of Florida agency, and State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration. Appellees.
    No. 4D17-2860
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [May 9, 2018]
    Abimbola Orukotan, Hollywood, pro se.
    S.J., Hollywood, pro se, Amicus Curiae.
    Lisa Kuhlman, Senior Attorney, Tallahassee, for appellee, Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
    Tracy Cooper George, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Nicholas A. Merlin, Senior Attorney, Tallahassee, for appellee, Agency for Health Care Administration.
   Per Curiam.

We affirm the trial court's order denying a temporary restraining order but remand for the trial court to include language on relocation as intended by the Court and agreed upon by the parties.

Affirmed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Gerber, C.J., May and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.


author: May, J.

text:
    Jordan B. PALMER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-72
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 13, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Peggy Natale, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marc B. Hernandez, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   May, J.

The protection against double jeopardy is raised in this appeal from the defendant's conviction and sentence for grand theft auto and armed carjacking with a firearm.

The defendant argues the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial when the prosecutor made improper comments during closing. He also argues his convictions for grand theft auto and armed carjacking with a firearm violate his right against double jeopardy. We agree with him on the second issue and reverse on that issue only.

As the victim was leaving a convenience store, the defendant pushed her car door open, put a gun to her head, and told her to get out of the car. Another man came to the passenger side of her car and told her to open the door. When she opened the passenger door, the second man took her purse. The two men left in her car with the defendant driving.

Two days later, a detective located the car and surveilled it. Eventually, three men entered the car. When the officer followed, the car accelerated. The detective turned on his lights and siren and drove in front of the car, causing the car to wreck. The defendant was taken to the hospital, where he told the detective: "You're lucky you came up on us fast or we would have been gone."

The State charged the defendant with (1) armed carjacking with a firearm and (2) grand theft auto. The jury found the defendant guilty as charged, and found he had actual possession of a firearm during the carjacking. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 25 years in prison with a 10-year minimum mandatory sentence, followed by five years of probation on the carjacking count. The court sentenced the defendant to a concurrent five-year prison term on the grand theft auto count.

From his conviction and sentence, the defendant now appeals. We affirm, without further comment, on the trial court's denial of the motion for mistrial.

In his second issue, the defendant argues that his convictions for carjacking and grand theft auto are barred by double jeopardy. The State agrees that grand theft auto is a lesser included offense of carjacking. And, although the information charged the defendant with committing each offense on different days, there was only one 'taking' of the car. As such, the State agrees the carjacking offense subsumes the grand theft auto offense.

Double jeopardy issues involve purely legal determinations and are reviewed de novo. Benjamin v. State , 77 So.3d 781, 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

"A defendant's double jeopardy rights are violated when he is convicted of two 'offenses which require identical elements of proof.' " Ortiz-Medina v. State , 126 So.3d 1183, 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting § 775.021(4)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) ). "For double jeopardy purposes lesser included offenses are tantamount to the greater offense charged if all the constituent essential elements of such lesser offenses are included within the elements of such greater offense." Bell v. State , 437 So.2d 1057, 1058 (Fla. 1983).

The defendant relies on Fryer v. State , 732 So.2d 30 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). There, the Fifth District held that grand theft of a motor vehicle is a lesser included offense of carjacking. Id. at 33. We have held similarly. See Keller v. State , 846 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

While the police found the defendant with the vehicle two days after the carjacking occurred, the defendant only took one vehicle on one occasion. His grand theft auto charge was a lesser included offense of his carjacking charge. Because these charges resulted from a single criminal act, convictions on both of them violate double jeopardy.

We therefore reverse and remand the defendant's conviction and sentence on the grand theft auto charge and remand the case to the trial court to vacate the conviction and sentence and to reconsider the sentence on the carjacking charge in light of this opinion. This does not preclude the trial court from leaving the sentence on count one as originally imposed.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

Ciklin and Kuntz, JJ., concur.

      We note that this issue was not brought to the attention of the trial court at the time of sentencing. However, the argument can be raised for the first time on appeal as a double jeopardy violation amounts to fundamental error. See Grant v. State , 770 So.2d 655, 657 n.4 (Fla. 2000).


author: Warner, J.

text:
    Marcus Deonte STRONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D16-4226
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 20, 2018]
    Carl H. Lida and Joshua H. Lida of Carl H. Lida, P.A., Plantation, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph D. Coronato, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Warner, J.

Appellant challenges his sentences imposed after his open plea to the court, contending that the trial court relied on factors unsupported by the evidence in the case. The trial judge attributed to the defendant crimes for which he had not been arrested or charged, nor for which there was any evidence of his involvement. Consideration of unproven criminal activity violates due process. We therefore reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

Appellant Strong entered an open nolo contendere plea to Count I, third degree grand theft; Count II, burglary of a dwelling; Count III, possession of burglary tools; Count IV, burglary of a dwelling. These charges arose out of two burglaries on Jupiter Island, Florida, on August 4, 2014. In each of the burglaries, entry was gained by smashing a rear glass door, and jewelry was taken. Appellant was definitively tied to only one burglary through DNA evidence on a pillowcase. When officers identified a suspicious vehicle in the area, an officer was able to stop it on August 7, 2014. Appellant and two co-defendants were in the vehicle.

One co-defendant, Greg Taylor, confessed to the authorities both his involvement in the Jupiter Island burglaries and his participation in two other similar burglaries in western Martin County. He told detectives that appellant was not involved in the western burglaries.

Appellant pled guilty to the charges. Prior to sentencing, the State submitted a memorandum to the court outlining the four burglaries. In it, the State claimed that all of the burglaries qualified as "pillowcase" burglaries. This is a term used by prosecutors to describe a rash of burglaries committed in Martin County by residents of Broward County. The State's entire presentation at sentencing consisted of evidence regarding the pillowcase burglaries. A detective testified that the burglars would use a pillowcase from the burgled home to carry out jewelry and other items. This detective went to Broward County and found the rental agency where "they" rented vehicles, without identifying to whom she was referring. After the arrest of Taylor and appellant, the burglaries stopped. The detective did not testify as to any specific information tying appellant to any of these crimes.

Appellant sought a downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence of 45.75 months in prison. He was nineteen at the time of the burglaries and had no criminal record. His mother, sisters, and cousin testified that he had grown up in a single-parent family and was a good person. They testified that committing these burglaries was entirely inconsistent with his character. His mother testified that he had gotten involved with the wrong set of friends.

In pronouncing sentence, the court first noted that "sending a message to the community" was not a proper consideration. After listening to the argument of counsel and the request for a downward departure, the court said, "[E]ven if mitigating circumstances may exist, they do not warrant departure because this is a case that cries out for punishment. It's a case that terrorized this community, instilling fear and insecurity in its residents." The court then sentenced appellant to a total of twenty-five years for the charges from the two burglaries, sentencing above even the state's recommendation of twenty years. Later, co-defendant Taylor, who was involved with all four burglaries mentioned in the state's sentencing memorandum, was sentenced to 10.2 years in prison, largely based upon his cooperation with the authorities.

After sentencing, appellant's counsel filed a timely motion to vacate the plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant now appeals his sentence, contending that the trial court relied on unsubstantiated matters in passing sentence.

Although a sentence is "generally unassailable" when it is within the statutory limits, a court violates due process by considering unsubstantiated matters. See Williams v. State , 193 So.3d 1017, 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Our court has held "that unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct may not be considered by a trial judge at a criminal sentencing hearing and to do so violates fundamental due process." Reese v. State , 639 So.2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (emphasis added). In Hillary v. State , 232 So.3d 3, 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Fernandez v. State , 212 So.3d 494, 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ), we also held, " '[A] trial court's consideration of a constitutionally impermissible sentencing factor is a fundamental error in the sentencing process' which is reviewable for the first time on direct appeal."

Recently, in Norvil v. State , 191 So.3d 406 (Fla. 2016), our supreme court held that a court may not consider matters outside the provisions of the Criminal Punishment Code in sentencing a defendant. In Norvil , the court considered an arrest subsequent to the charged crime. Id. at 407. The court explained that a subsequent arrest was not listed as a factor for consideration under the CPC or in the presentence investigation report, and thus, could not be considered in sentencing. Id. at 409-10.

The trial court violated constitutional due process by considering unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct in this case. The State presented substantial evidence regarding other "pillowcase" burglaries without ever tying them in any way to appellant, who was charged with only two burglaries on one day. There was no evidence that appellant had any participation with any other burglaries. Nevertheless, the trial court found that this case "terrorized a community" without any evidence to support that these two burglaries, committed on the same day, had that effect on the community. Instead, it is apparent that the court connected appellant with all the pillowcase burglaries and sentenced him in consideration of the effect that they had on the community.

Moreover, these other burglaries, for which there was no evidence of appellant's involvement, are not within the factors which a court may consider under the CPC. Those factors which the court may consider under Norvil are limited to the defendant's involvement in the current charges or the defendant's prior arrests or convictions, not the charges against other persons with whom the defendant may or may not have been associated. "[U]nsubstantiated allegations of misconduct or speculation that the defendant probably committed other crimes may not be relied upon by a trial court in imposing sentence." Nusspickel v. State , 966 So.2d 441, 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

It is the State's burden to show that the trial court did not rely on impermissible factors in sentencing. See Norvil , 191 So.3d at 409. In Mosley v. State , 198 So.3d 58, 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (alteration added), the court further explained what the State must show:

The State bears the burden to show from the record as a whole that the trial court did not consider impermissible factors in rendering its sentence. [citation omitted] We must examine the record to determine whether it "may reasonably be read to suggest" that a defendant's sentence was the result, at least in part, of the consideration of impermissible factors. See Moorer v. State , 926 So.2d 475, 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

The State has failed to carry its burden. When the record as a whole is considered, there is more than enough to reasonably suggest that the court relied on impermissible factors in sentencing appellant.

Because the court considered unsubstantiated matters in sentencing appellant, the court committed fundamental error. We reverse and remand for sentencing by a different judge.

Gross, J., concurs.

Levine, J., dissents with opinion.

I dissent for several reasons. Initially, this court lacks jurisdiction because the appeal was untimely. The trial court entered its sentence on September 29, 2016. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal until December 14, 2016, well past the thirty day time limit for filing an appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b).

Appellant filed three motions after sentencing, none of which suspended rendition of the judgment and sentence from September 29, 2016. First, he filed a "Motion to Vacate Plea Based on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 3.850," which the trial court dismissed without prejudice because there was no oath or affidavit. Second, appellant filed a pro se motion to clarify and correct sentence, which the trial court struck because appellant was represented by counsel. Third, appellant filed a rule 3.800(c) motion to mitigate sentence, but no ruling on that motion appears in the record. None of these motions tolled the time for filing an appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(i)(1) (identifying the types of motions that toll rendition of a final order). The notice of appeal cites the order dismissing the motion to vacate as the order being appealed. However, that order explicitly stated that it was a non-final, non-appealable order.

The majority treats the motion to vacate as a rule 3.170(l ) motion to withdraw plea, since a rule 3.170(l ) motion, unlike a rule 3.850 motion, tolls rendition of the judgment and sentence until disposition of the motion. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(i)(1). Without considering the motion as a rule 3.170(l ) motion, this court would be without jurisdiction. However, there is no basis to treat the rule 3.850 motion as a rule 3.170(l ) motion. The motion cites rule 3.850 in its title, and the substance of the motion refers to Strickland and the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the motion without prejudice because a rule 3.850 motion requires an oath or affidavit. Appellant did not object or ask the trial court to treat the motion as a rule 3.170(l ) motion. Appellant, the state, and the trial court all understood the motion to be filed under rule 3.850, not rule 3.170(l ). Even on appeal, appellant does not suggest the motion was, in fact, a rule 3.170(l ) motion.

The majority states that "[i]t would be ineffective assistance on the face of the record for appellant's attorney to have filed a postconviction motion." While that eventually could turn out to be true, that does not transform the motion that was filed into a rule 3.170(l ) motion so as to confer jurisdiction. Although the state does not argue that the appeal was untimely, it is the duty of this court-and not the state-to determine jurisdiction. Neither the court nor the parties can create jurisdiction where it does not exist. See City of W. Palm Beach v. Palm Beach Cty. Police Benev. Ass'n , 387 So.2d 533, 534 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (recognizing that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the failure to object); W. 132 Feet v. City of Orlando , 80 Fla. 233, 86 So. 197, 198-99 (1920) ("Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority and if want of jurisdiction appears at any stage of the proceedings, original or appellate, the court should notice the defect and enter an appropriate order.").

I further dissent on the merits. Because appellant did not preserve the sentencing issue by raising a contemporaneous objection in the trial court, this court may consider the error only if it is fundamental. Jackson v. State , 983 So.2d 562, 574 (Fla. 2008). No fundamental error occurred below because the trial court did not consider any constitutionally impermissible sentencing factors.

As the majority recognizes, a sentence is "generally unassailable" when, as here, it is within the statutory limits. Williams v. State , 193 So.3d 1017, 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). An exception to this rule exists only where the imposition of sentence violates a defendant's constitutional rights.

Examples of such violations are: (1) when a sentencing court relies upon conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted, (2) where a judge imposes a sentence based on the race, religion, political affiliation, or national origin of the defendant, (3) where a judge takes his own religious beliefs into account in sentencing, (4) where a judge improperly considers a defendant's lack of remorse or failure to accept responsibility, or (5) where a sentence is the product of judicial vindictiveness.

Alfonso-Roche v. State , 199 So.3d 941, 949-50 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (Gross, J., concurring) (citations omitted).

While it is true that the consideration of constitutionally impermissible factors is fundamental error, the majority fails to show where the trial court considered any constitutionally impermissible factors such as unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct. See Reese v. State , 639 So.2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (holding that unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct may not be considered at sentencing).

To the contrary, the record affirmatively shows that the trial court considered only the two burglaries to which appellant pled. At the conclusion of the state's argument at the sentencing hearing, the trial court even sought clarification as to the burglaries in which appellant was involved:

THE COURT: Before we get to the Defendant['s] argument, the argument as far as sending a message to the community, I can no longer, that's not a proper consideration for me, uh, at this juncture under the law. So, I'm going to strike that.
But before we get to the Defendant['s] argument, uh, let me think if I had any other questions based on what I reviewed. The-what about just so you could, uh, address the relative culpability or the involvement of the defendant. I-I remember about the third person, but between the two defendants here-
[PROSECUTOR]: Right.
THE COURT: -you know?
[PROSECUTOR]: There were four homes. He was involved in two of the homes on Jupiter Island.
Uh, and as far as the culpability there was other physical evidence found in both of the homes that linked him to-while there's physical evidence found in the one home, the DNA, uh, linking him to it. As far as what he did in the home, uh, we don't have specific information because he didn't cooperate with us, so I can't comment on that.
As far as the other home when they were stopped in the vehicle, uh, they-there was evidence from the other home found that had been taken of, uh, personalized coins, uh, from the victim's husband who was with the (indiscernible) as well as burglary tools that, when processed, matched, uh, markings from the home.
Uh, so I can, as far as his involvement, I don't-he didn't cooperate.
THE COURT: Is there any suggestion in the facts or that you know of that one dominated the other?
[PROSECUTOR]: Out of the two?
THE COURT: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: No.

(emphasis added). Thus, based on the state's own representation, the court was keenly aware that appellant was involved in only two burglaries. As such, the majority is incorrect in stating that "it is apparent that the court connected appellant with all the pillowcase burglaries."

The majority notes that appellant's sentence was greater than the state's recommended sentence and that a co-defendant received a lesser sentence. However, these factors do not change the fact that appellant's sentence was legal as it fell within the statutory limits under the Criminal Punishment Code. Additionally, a trial court is not bound by the sentencing recommendation of a state attorney. State v. Adams , 342 So.2d 818, 819-20 (Fla. 1977). That a co-defendant received a lesser sentence also does not demonstrate fundamental error because the co-defendant's sentence was the result of a plea and, as the majority acknowledges, was "largely based upon his cooperation with the authorities."

The majority states that "[t]he State's entire presentation at sentencing consisted of evidence regarding the pillowcase burglaries." In fact, the state merely presented evidence of the entire criminal enterprise of appellant and his co-defendants. This evidence consisted of the testimony of a detective as well as the submission by the state of a sentencing memorandum and attachments-including the arrest affidavit, crime lab reports, and cell site records-detailing the criminal actions conducted by appellant and the co-defendants. It would be unreasonable to say that a court cannot even hear such evidence to place the defendant's conduct into context within the entire criminal enterprise.

The memorandum and attachments recounted that four burglaries occurred during a week-and-a-half timeframe, including two burglaries on July 26 in Indiantown and Stuart and two burglaries on August 4 in Jupiter Island. In all four burglaries, the suspects broke a rear glass door and took jewelry and other items. Blood found on a pillowcase in one of the homes burglarized on August 4 matched appellant's DNA. Three days after the August 4 burglaries, an officer conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by appellant in which the two co-defendants were passengers. The vehicle had been seen in Jupiter Island around the time of the August 4 burglaries. Inside the vehicle, detectives found stolen items from one of the burglarized Jupiter Island homes. The detectives also found a crowbar with paint matching pry marks from the second burglarized Jupiter Island home. Cell site information placed appellant and the two co-defendants on or near Jupiter Island around the time of the August 4 burglaries. Appellant was charged with and pled to the August 4 Jupiter Island burglaries. One of the co-defendants pled to all four burglaries.

The majority makes much of the fact that the sentencing memorandum addressed all four burglaries. However, this memorandum was directed to both appellant and a co-defendant. The memorandum made clear that appellant was charged with only two of the burglaries, while the co-defendant was charged with all four. Although the majority states that "[t]he detective did not testify as to any specific information tying appellant to any of these crimes," the sentencing memorandum and attachments tied appellant to the two burglaries. Additionally, by entering the plea to the two burglary charges, appellant admitted that there was a factual basis for the charges against him.

Significantly, the trial court did not make any statements indicating that its sentence was motivated by an improper factor, including "consideration of unproven criminal activity." The fact that the state referenced the July 26 "pillowcase burglaries" does not in any way suggest the trial court adopted such reasoning as its own, especially where the trial court did not make any statements indicating agreement with such arguments. In fact, the trial court did not make any reference whatsoever to the July 26 burglaries. See Charles v. State , 204 So.3d 63, 66-67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (affirming where, after the state urged the court to "send a message," the court imposed the maximum sentence without any comment or elaboration); Barlow v. State , 238 So.3d 416, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (affirming where there was no indication that the trial court based its sentence on testimony regarding uncharged conduct).

"[T]rial judges are routinely made aware of information which may not be properly considered in determining a cause. Our judicial system is dependent upon the ability of trial judges to disregard improper information and to adhere to the requirements of the law in deciding a case or in imposing a sentence." Harvard v. State , 414 So.2d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 1982). Where there is no evidence in the record that the sentencing court relied upon an allegedly improper argument by the state, this court will not speculate and infer impropriety. See Charles , 204 So.3d at 66. There is no case law to support the proposition that even if there was improper argument by the state-which the record does not show-that such improper argument by the state, without adoption by the trial court, in and of itself creates fundamental error.

The majority states that "the trial court found that this case 'terrorized a community' without any evidence to support that these two burglaries, committed on the same day, had that effect on the community." The trial court could find that the crimes potentially affected the greater community beyond the two victims in this case based on appellant's admission and plea. Would the majority require the state to introduce testimony from the victims' neighbors to prove the effect of these two burglaries on the community? Common sense dictates not. Unless the legislature creates a calculus to determine how many burglaries create "terror" in a community or we ask judges to remove this word from their vocabulary, then the trial court should be permitted to use this language to characterize these two burglaries while imposing a sentence within the legal statutory limits. At best, the trial court's comment characterizes the gravity of the two burglaries-to which appellant pled-on the community. At worst, this "stray remark" does not reflect an underlying improper sentencing rationale. See Oyola v. State , 158 So.3d 504, 509 (Fla. 2015) ("We have affirmed sentencing orders when the inappropriate language is confined to a stray remark that does not reflect an underlying improper sentencing rationale.") (emphasis added).

It is not reasonable to infer from the trial court's isolated comment that the trial court considered all four burglaries in sentencing appellant. There is no reason to doubt that the trial court earnestly believed that the two particular burglaries charged to appellant constituted "terrorizing the community." Although this type of comment may be considered by some observers as being somewhat overstated, it simply is not the type of language that requires a reversal or resentencing.

This case is unlike Reese , 639 So.2d 1067, upon which the majority relies. In that case, the prosecutor argued during sentencing that the defendant appeared in other drug sting operation videos and was a principal in other cases. Despite the defense's objection, the trial court stated that it would consider the state's argument for sentencing purposes. This court reversed, holding that the trial court could not consider unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct. In contrast with Reese , here appellant did not object to the state's arguments, and the trial court never gave any indication that it would actually consider any unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct.

The facts of this case are actually contrary to the facts in those cases which have resulted in reversal based on a trial court's comments during sentencing. Before pronouncing its sentence, the trial court did not make comments suggesting it accepted the state's arguments of uncharged crimes as true. Rather, the trial court focused its inquiry on the particular burglaries with which appellant was actually charged. Cf. Norvil v. State , 191 So.3d 406 (Fla. 2016) (reversing where, immediately before pronouncing sentence, trial court emphasized and relied upon a subsequent arrest and pending charge); Hillary v. State , 232 So.3d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (reversing where trial court, by its own admission, considered defendant's subsequent arrest without conviction when sentencing defendant for the primary offenses); Williams v. State , 193 So.3d 1017, 1019 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (reversing where "it is clear from the trial judge's comments at the sentencing hearing that he accepted as true, and based his sentencing decision on, the prosecutor's assertions" of unsubstantiated conduct); Drinkard v. State , 177 So.3d 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (reversing where, at sentencing, trial court repeatedly referred to the state's evidence that appellant had been racing on a highway, conduct for which appellant had been acquitted); Yisrael v. State , 65 So.3d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (reversing where court questioned defendant about dismissed and pending charges shortly before imposing maximum allowable sentence).

The majority argues that the state did not meet its burden of showing that the trial court did not rely on impermissible factors in sentencing. However, both of the cases the majority relies on- Norvil and Mosley v. State , 198 So.3d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) -involved preserved error and not fundamental error. The fundamental error "standard imposes a high burden on the defendant to establish that the error 'goes to the foundation of the case or the merits of the cause of action and is equivalent to a denial of due process.' " Abdool v. State , 53 So.3d 208, 220 (Fla. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Bailey v. State , 998 So.2d 545, 554 (Fla. 2008) ). Appellant has not met his burden.

In conclusion, there is no fundamental error requiring a reversal and resentencing. Nothing in the record shows that the trial court relied on "unproven criminal activity" to violate due process. Due process means the right to a fair sentencing process. United States, ex rel. Welch v. Lane , 738 F.2d 863, 864-65 (7th Cir. 1984). Due process does not require reversal of appellant's sentence based on the facts of this case. Therefore, I dissent.

      Strong was sentenced to five years on Count I the grand theft; fifteen years on Count II burglary of a dwelling, concurrent with Count I; five years on Count III, possession of burglary tools; and ten years on Count IV burglary of a dwelling, concurrent with Count III but consecutive to Counts I and II.

      The dissent contends that the appeal is untimely filed. The motion to vacate the plea was filed within thirty days of the sentence imposed, making it timely under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l ) and postponing rendition for purposes of appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(i)(1). Although the motion was styled Motion to Vacate Plea Based upon Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 3.850, the ground was misadvice of counsel. In substance, it was a motion pursuant to the Rule, not a postconviction ineffective assistance claim. In any event, the court erred in failing to treat it as a Rule 3.170(l ) motion. See Applegate v. State , 23 So.3d 211, 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). Further, a timely filed motion to vacate the plea defers rendition of the sentencing judgment. See Wilson v. State , 128 So.3d 898, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). It would be ineffective assistance on the face of the record for appellant's attorney to have filed a postconviction motion and thus cut off the appellant's right to appeal his sentence. The appeal was timely from the denial of the motion by the trial court. Furthermore, the State never argued in its brief or by motion to dismiss that the appeal was untimely. While jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the court simply by failing to object to an untimely appeal, this court determines its own jurisdiction, and we conclude that the timely filed motion should be treated as a Rule 3.107(l) motion, making the appeal timely.

      The State cites to Imbert v. State , 154 So.3d 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), as authority for consideration of uncharged crimes. Imbert relied on this court's decision in Norvil v. State , 162 So.3d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). However, Norvil was quashed by the supreme court in Norvil v. State , 191 So.3d 406 (Fla. 2016). Moreover, in Imbert , the uncharged conduct considered by the trial court was directly tied to the defendant. In this case, the uncharged conduct was never directly tied to the appellant.

      According to the lower court docket, the trial court dismissed the motion because of appellant's pending appeal.

      Additionally, this sort of testimony may be irrelevant and thus inadmissible. See § 90.402, Fla. Stat.


text:
    ADAM JEFFREY KATZ, P.A., a Florida professional association, and Adam J. Katz, individually, Appellants, v. Aniel JEROME, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-2835
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 13, 2018]
    Richard S. Lubliner of Lubliner Kish PLLC, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
    No appearance for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

Affirmed. See Evans v. McDonald , 313 F. App'x. 256, 257 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting expert testimony in legal malpractice action is not required where "the lawyer's lack of care and skill is so obvious that the trier of fact can resolve the issue as a matter of common knowledge"); Suritz v. Kelner , 155 So.2d 831, 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963) (finding expert testimony was unnecessary where jury could find the attorney was negligent based on the facts presented by the plaintiff).

Warner, Taylor and Levine, JJ., concur.


text:
    Brandon Nicholas SANTOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D17-1064
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    [June 27, 2018]
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Stacey Kime, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
   Per Curiam.

We grant the motion for rehearing, vacate our prior opinion, and substitute the following in its place.

Appellant was convicted of first degree murder with a firearm under sections 775.087 and 782.04, Florida Statutes (2012), and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his custodial interview because the police did not inform him that an attorney was attempting to invoke his right to remain silent during the interrogation. He also claims that the court improperly refused to give a curative instruction during closing arguments. We affirm on both points.

A few days after the murder, the police conducted three interviews with the appellant, only the last of which was a custodial interrogation. During the second interview, appellant detailed the murder and confessed that he planned the crime in advance. Following his arrest, appellant was interviewed at the police station, where he again confessed. During this third interview, appellant's father called a detective assigned to the murder case, although not present at the station. He informed the detective that he hired an attorney to represent his son and that the attorney advised him not to let the appellant speak to law enforcement. Minutes later, the attorney left this detective a voicemail, attempting to invoke the appellant's right to remain silent. At trial, appellant moved to suppress the third interview, arguing that the police violated his due process rights by not informing him that the attorney was attempting to assist him.

For motions to suppress, we afford a presumption of correctness to a trial court's factual findings, but review de novo questions of law. Wyche v. State , 987 So.2d 23, 25 (Fla. 2008). It is a violation of due process for the police not to inform a defendant that an attorney retained by the accused's family has offered assistance. Haliburton v. State , 514 So.2d 1088, 1089-90 (Fla. 1987) ; see Bruce v. State , 92 So.3d 902, 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ("Under Haliburton II , a suspect must be informed promptly of efforts by a lawyer to provide legal assistance relating to the detention."). However, in light of appellant's second confession, we find that the trial court's failure to suppress the third interview was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DiGuilio , 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).

Appellant further contends that the court erred in denying his request for a curative instruction when, during the State's closing rebuttal argument, the prosecutor indicated that the appellant's motive for killing the victim was that appellant did not want his girlfriend to "find out about this Haitian girl." The court sustained defense counsel's objection to the Haitian reference, finding the testimony that appellant was trying to hide his relationship with the victim because she was Haitian came out in testimony which was stricken by the court and thus not in evidence. Defense counsel asked the court to instruct the jury to disregard the statement. The prosecutor contended that she was entitled to argue inferences from the evidence, as there was no other testimony establishing that the victim was Haitian. The court sustained the objection and simply told counsel to "stay away from the Haitian" reference. The prosecutor then continued to argue that appellant's motive for the victim's murder was to prevent his girlfriend from finding out about the victim and that appellant had been having sexual relations with her. She further noted that appellant had also not told his family about the victim. The defense made no objection to these arguments.

By requesting a curative instruction, appellant preserved this issue for appeal. See Companioni v. City of Tampa , 51 So.3d 452, 454 (Fla. 2010). The trial court had discretion, however, in determining whether to give a curative instruction. See Salazar v. State , 991 So.2d 364, 372 (Fla. 2008) ("[A]s to not giving the curative instruction, the trial court had the discretion not to give a curative instruction if it believed that doing so would draw further attention to the improper comment."). From the record, it appears that the court may have considered a curative instruction as calling attention to the error, if there was error at all, because there was evidence other than the stricken testimony to establish that the victim was Haitian.

Nevertheless, even if the court should have given a curative instruction, we conclude that this reference, which has some support in the evidence, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition to a dying declaration of the victim identifying the appellant as her killer, the appellant himself confessed to the murder, including his planning it for several weeks. The prosecutor mentioned the victim's ethnic background only once during her closing argument. We conclude that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error did not contribute to the verdict reached. See Rich v. State , 18 So.3d 1227, 1230-31 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Affirmed.

Warner, Gross and Levine, JJ., concur.

      Since the defense only objected to the reference to the victim as being Haitian, there was evidence in the record from the victim's sister that the family was Haitian. Therefore, the court may have been incorrect in sustaining the objection, because there were facts in evidence from which the prosecutor could make the argument. To the extent that the prosecutor was arguing that the appellant wanted to hide his relationship with the victim from his girlfriend, as well as his family, these facts could be inferred from properly admitted testimony.