author: BOLIN, Justice.

text:
    EX PARTE Willie Earl SCOTT
    (In re: Willie Earl Scott v. State of Alabama)
    1091275
    Supreme Court of Alabama
    March 18, 2011
    John E. Goodman, Michael F. Walker, and John Mark Goodman of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham; and Thomas P. Hanrahan and Ellyce R. Cooper of Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles, California, for petitioner.
    Troy King, atty. gen., and Richard D. Anderson, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
   BOLIN, Justice.

On August 16, 2002, Willie Earl Scott was convicted of two counts of capital murder for killing 10-year-old Latonya Sager. The murder was made capital because it was committed during a rape, see § 13A-5-40(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975, and because the victim was under the age of 14, see § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala.Code 1975. Additionally, Scott was convicted of first-degree rape, attempted murder, and first-degree burglary involving a different victim. The jury recommended, by a vote of 10-2, that Scott be sentenced to death. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Scott to death. The trial court also sentenced Scott to life imprisonment for each of the noncapital convictions, the sentences to be served consecutively.

On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for the trial court to correct a deficiency in the capital-sentencing order. Scott v. State, 937 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.2005). On May 27, 2005, on return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Scott's capital-murder convictions and death sentence. Scott v. State, 937 So.2d at 1088 (opinion on return to remand). On September 16, 2005, the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Scott's application for rehearing. Subsequently, Scott petitioned this Court for certiorari review, which this Court denied on February 17, 2006 (case no. 1050013). Thereafter, Scott petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review, which that court denied on October 2, 2006. See Scott v. Alabama, 549 U.S. 841, 127 S.Ct. 99, 166 L.Ed.2d 71 (2006).

On February 15, 2007, Scott, with the assistance of counsel, filed a Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition in the trial court asserting a number of claims challenging his capital convictions, including ineffective assistance of counsel and a number of constitutional violations. Scott specifically alleged that his trial counsel failed to properly question his competency to stand trial and failed to adequately investigate the underlying facts and mitigating circumstances. Scott also alleged that the trial court interfered with his attorney-client relationship and failed to sua sponte initiate a further competency hearing during the course of trial.

On May 11, 2007, Scott filed a motion seeking discovery of a number of documents he alleged were relevant to his Rule 32 proceeding, including records pertaining to himself, the victims, and assorted family members of the victims'; records pertaining to physical evidence; and documents pertaining to the investigation of the offenses. On May 29, 2007, the State filed an answer to Scott's petition, challenging the claims in Scott's petition on preclusionary, pleading, and evidentiary grounds.

On July 10, 2007, the trial court requested from the State an electronic copy of its answer to Scott's Rule 32 petition. That same day, the State provided the trial court the requested electronic copy of its answer. The State also informed counsel for Scott that same day that the trial court had requested the electronic copy of its answer and that it had provided the same to the trial court.

On July 20, 2007, the State and Scott filed a joint status update asking the trial court to advise the parties if the court wanted either party to provide any additional information. The request further indicated that the State anticipated filing a motion to dismiss the petition "later this year" and that Scott would respond to the motion to dismiss "soon thereafter." It appears that the trial court did not receive timely notice from the clerk's office that this status-update request had been filed by the parties.

On July 30, 2007, the trial court issued a written order summarily denying Scott's Rule 32 petition on preclusionary, pleading, and evidentiary grounds. The trial court adopted nearly verbatim as its order the State's answer to Scott's Rule 32 petition. On August 10, 2007, Scott filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider the summary denial of his Rule 32 petition. Scott also filed an objection to the trial court's "wholesale and nearly verbatim" adoption of the State's answer as its order dismissing his Rule 32 petition. Scott argued that the trial court's substantial adoption of the State's answer indicates the absence of an independent and objective evaluation by the trial court of the merits of his Rule 32 petition. On September 5, 2007, the trial court denied Scott's motion to reconsider and the objection to the trial court's adoption of the State's answer as its order. Scott filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's order denying Scott's Rule 32 petition, Scott v. State, 262 So.3d 1239 (Ala.Crim.App.2010), and overruled Scott's application for a rehearing on June 11, 2010. Thereafter, Scott petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted to determine whether the trial court's adoption of the State's answer to Scott's Rule 32 petition as its order denying Scott's petition conflicts with this Court's decision in Ex parte Ingram, 51 So.3d 1119 (Ala.2010).

Standard of Review

" 'This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal cases de novo.' " Ex parte Morrow, 915 So.2d 539, 541 (Ala.2004) (quoting Ex parte Key, 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.2003) ).

Discussion

In Ex parte Ingram, 51 So.3d 1119 (Ala.2010), the defendant was convicted in 1995 of capital murder and was sentenced to death. The defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. On February 1, 2002, the defendant filed a Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition. In March 2002, the State filed a response to the defendant's petition and a motion for a partial summary dismissal. In April 2002, the defendant filed a response to the State's motion for a partial summary dismissal and an amended Rule 32 petition, which also requested full discovery and funds to allow the defendant to hire certain experts. In July 2002, the State filed responses to the defendant's motions and to his amended Rule 32 petition.

On May 20, 2004, the State filed a proposed order denying the defendant's Rule 32 petition. The defendant did not respond to the State's proposed order. Judge Jerry L. Fielding, who had presided over the defendant's capital-murder trial in 1995, retired while the Rule 32 proceedings were pending, and the case was assigned to Judge William E. Hollingsworth.

On June 8, 2004, Judge Hollingsworth entered an order denying the defendant's Rule 32 petition. The order adopted verbatim the proposed order filed by the State on May 20, 2004, the only modifications being that the heading stated "Order" rather than "Proposed Order" and the signature page contained Judge Hollingsworth's signature rather than Judge Fielding's. Judge Hollingsworth did not hold a hearing or a status conference on the defendant's petition and pending motions and did not explicitly address in the June 8 order the defendant's pending motions. On July 21, 2004, Judge Hollingsworth entered an order purporting to rescind the June 8 order. On September 7, 2004, the Court of Criminal Appeals directed the trial court to set aside its July 21 order, holding that the trial court had lost jurisdiction to modify its June 8 order.

The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately affirmed the summary denial of the defendant's Rule 32 petition. See Ingram v. State , 51 So.3d 1094 (Ala.Crim.App.2006). The defendant petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted in order to determine whether the June 8 order represented the actual findings and conclusion of the trial court.

The defendant noted on appeal that the Supreme Court of the United States had criticized courts for adopting verbatim findings of fact prepared by a prevailing party, Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), and that the appellate courts of this State have warned against the wholesale adoption as the trial court's order of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law drafted by a party. Weeks v. State, 568 So.2d 864 (Ala.Crim.App.1989). Specifically, the defendant contended that, based on certain errors contained in the June 8 order, the trial judge could not have read the proposed order submitted by the State before signing it and issuing it as the order of the court; therefore, he argued, the June 8 order could not represent the actual and independent findings of the trial court.

In reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's order dismissing the defendant's Rule 32 petition, this Court stated:

"It is axiomatic that an order granting or denying relief under Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., must be an order of the trial court. It must be a manifestation of the findings and conclusions of the court. Although no authority other than the creation of the judicial branch and the delegation of judicial authority to the circuit courts of this State in the Alabama Constitution, Ala. Const. 1901, Amend. No. 328, § 6.01(a) (now § 139(a), Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.Recomp.)), is necessary to support this proposition, the provisions of Rules 32.1 through 32.10, Ala. R.Crim. P., also provide support. Among other things, Rule 32.7(d) states that '[if] the court determines' certain matters to be true, it may summarily dismiss the petition; Rule 32.9(c) provides that '[i]f the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order'; Rule 32.9(d) states that '[t]he court shall make specific findings of fact relating to each material issue of fact presented'; and Rule 32.10 refers to 'the decision of a circuit court.'
"....
"... [T]he general rule is that, where a trial court does in fact adopt the proposed order as its own, deference is owed to that order in the same measure as any other order of the trial court. In Dobyne v. State, 805 So.2d 733, 741 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
" ' " 'While the practice of adopting the state's proposed findings and conclusions is subject to criticism, the general rule is that even when the court adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.' " '
" 805 So.2d at 741 (quoting other cases; emphasis added). In McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d 191, 229-30 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that 'even when a trial court adopts verbatim a party's proposed order, the findings of fact and conclusions of law are those of the trial court and they may be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous.' Cf. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656, 84 S.Ct. 1044, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964) (expressing disapproval of the 'mechanical' adoption of findings of fact prepared by a party, but stating that such findings are formally those of the trial judge and 'are not to be rejected out-of-hand').
"In this unusual case, however, we cannot conclude that the above-stated 'general rule' is applicable. That is, despite the fact that the trial judge signed the June 8 order, we cannot conclude that the findings and conclusions in that order are in fact those of the court itself.
"The June 8 order begins as follows:
" 'Having considered the first amended Rule 32 petition presented to the Court, the State of Alabama's amended answer, the State of Alabama's motions to dismiss, the evidence presented at trial, and the events within the personal knowledge of the Court, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and summarily dismisses and denies the claims in Ingram's first amended Rule 32 petition.'
"(Emphasis added.) After a rendition of the facts of the case, the June 8 order states:
" 'The findings by the Court of Criminal Appeals [in Ingram v. State, 779 So.2d 1225 (Ala.Crim.App.1999),] guide the Court in its resolution of the issues presented in the first amended Rule 32 petition. The Court is also relying on the trial transcript where necessary to support the Court's findings and the resolution of this Rule 32 petition. In addition, this Court presided over Ingram's capital murder trial and personally observed the performance of both lawyers throughout Ingram's trial and sentencing.'
"(Emphasis added.)
"The obvious problem with the emphasized portions of the above-quoted passages from the June 8 order is that Judge Fielding, not Judge Hollingsworth, presided over Ingram's capital-murder trial. Although minor factual errors understandably find their way into orders drafted by trial courts in handling busy dockets, an error as to whether the judge in fact sat as the trial judge in a capital-murder trial and is basing his decision on personal observations and personal knowledge acquired by doing so is the most material and obvious of errors.
"Ingram contends that the nature of these errors indicates that the trial judge did not even read the proposed order submitted by the State before signing and issuing it as the order of the court and that the June 8 order cannot represent the actual and independent findings of the trial court. Ingram further contends that Judge Hollingsworth's attempt in the July 21 order to rescind the June 8 order and to recuse himself from the case confirms that Judge Hollingsworth recognized that the June 8 order was fatally flawed.
"Despite the erroneous statements in the June 8 order, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in summarily dismissing Ingram's Rule 32 petition based upon the standard of review an appellate court employs in evaluating findings of fact and conclusions of law even when those findings and conclusions are adopted verbatim from the prevailing party. The Court of Criminal Appeals quoted the following passage from Dobyne:
" ' " ' "While the practice of adopting the state's proposed findings and conclusions is subject to criticism, the general rule is that even when the court adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous...."
" ' " ' Bell v. State, 593 So.2d 123, 126 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 593 So.2d 123 (Ala.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 991, 112 S.Ct. 2981, 119 L.Ed.2d 599 (1992).' " '
"... The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that 'the facts and conclusions of law in the circuit court's [June 8] order were not clearly erroneous' and that therefore the trial court's judgment was due to be affirmed. Ingram II [ Ingram v. State, 51 So.3d 1094, 1100 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) ].
"The State echoes the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals, noting that Ingram failed to explain specifically how any of the trial court's findings and conclusions were clearly erroneous. The State further contends that the erroneous statements in the trial court's June 8 order are harmless because, it argues, the specific findings in the order as to Ingram's claims were not based upon the trial judge's personal knowledge. 'Instead, Judge Hollingsworth denied the individual claims in the Rule 32 petition based on his finding that the claims were not sufficiently pleaded, were not supported by the trial transcript, were decided adversely to Ingram on direct appeal, or were procedurally defaulted.'
"Though the 'clearly erroneous' standard of review may apply in cases in which the trial court has adopted, as its own, the proposed order of the prevailing party, the analysis proffered by both the Court of Criminal Appeals and the State fails to admit of the most fundamental and the first requirement: that the order and the findings and conclusions in such order are in fact those of the trial court.
"In her dissent to the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ingram II, then Judge Cobb took note of the 'disturbing elements in the procedural history of the case and in the order itself.' 51 So.3d at 1117. Indeed, the very reason that 'the practice of adopting the state's proposed findings and conclusions is subject to criticism,' Dobyne, 805 So.2d at 741, is because 'there is an inevitable erosion of the confidence of an appellate court that the findings reflect the considered judgment of the trial court.' Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 709 (Ind.2001).
"Accordingly, appellate courts must be careful to evaluate a claim that a prepared order drafted by the prevailing party and adopted by the trial court verbatim does not reflect the independent and impartial findings and conclusions of the trial court. In Bell v. State, 593 So.2d 123 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) -the case the Court of Criminal Appeals quoted in Ingram II for the 'clearly erroneous' standard of review-the Court of Criminal Appeals observed:
" 'The trial court did adopt verbatim the proposed order tendered by the state; however, from our review of the record, we are convinced that the findings and conclusions are those of the trial court. The record reflects that the trial court was thoroughly familiar with the case and gave the appellant considerable leeway in presenting evidence to support his claims.'
" Bell, 593 So.2d at 126 (emphasis added). The undisputed facts in the present case obviously prevent a similar conclusion here.
"We are forced by the nature of the errors present in the June 8 order to reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. In the simplest terms, the patently erroneous nature of the statements regarding the trial judge's 'personal knowledge' and observations of Ingram's capital-murder trial undermines any confidence that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are the product of the trial judge's independent judgment and that the June 8 order reflects the findings and conclusions of that judge."

Ex parte Ingram, 51 So.3d at 1122-25 (footnote omitted; some emphasis added).

Scott argues that the trial court's order contains the same citation to caselaw that had been overruled by this Court two years before the entry of the trial court's order and the same typographical errors as contained in the State's answer. Moreover, Scott contends that because the trial court adopted nearly verbatim the State's answer as its order, the order is infected with the adversarial zeal of the State's counsel. Thus, Scott argues that the trial court's order cannot reflect the independent and impartial findings of the trial court and cannot be the product of the trial court's independent judgment. As for Scott's claim that the presence in the trial court's order of the same typographical errors contained in the State's answer is evidence that the trial court's order is not a product of the independent judgment of the trial court, we note that Scott has directed this Court to only two examples of such typographical errors appearing in the approximately 58 pages of text that constitute the State's answer and the trial court's order. This Court recognized in Ex parte Ingram that sometimes minor errors find their way into orders drafted by trial courts. We do not consider the few typographical errors at issue here, by themselves, as sufficient evidence upon which to base a conclusion that the trial court's order is not a product of the trial court's independent judgment. The fact that the same typographical errors appear in the same locations in both the State's answer and the trial court's order does, however, bolster this Court's conclusion reached infra that the trial court's order is not a product of its independent judgment. We also note that the State's answer and the trial court's order are both 58 pages in length. Again, although this fact alone is insufficient evidence upon which to base a conclusion that the order is not a product of the trial court's independent judgment, it bolsters this Court's conclusion reached infra that the trial court's order is not a product of its independent judgment.

Further, Scott notes that in adopting the State's answer the trial court repeated in its order the State's citation to and reliance upon Williams v. State, 783 So.2d 108 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), a case that had been overruled by this Court approximately two years before the trial court entered its order in this case. In Ex parte Taylor, 10 So.3d 1075 (Ala.2005), this Court by implication overruled the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in Williams that " 'a finding of no manifest injustice under the "plain error" standard on a direct appeal serves to establish a finding of no prejudice under the test for ineffective assistance of counsel provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).' " Williams, 783 So.2d at 133 (quoting State v. Clark, 913 S.W.2d 399, 406 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (footnote omitted)). The trial court did not cite Williams for purposes of that holding; rather, it is clear that Williams was cited in support of the trial court's conclusion that Scott had failed to satisfy his burden of pleading under Rule 32. There is no error in citing and relying upon a case for a particular proposition of law when that case has been reversed on a ground other than the specific proposition of law being relied upon. The trial court's citation to Williams in this case does not rise to the level of a material and obvious error as contemplated by the holding in Ex parte Ingram, supra. Accordingly, we do not consider the trial court's citation to Williams as evidence indicating that the trial court's order is not a product of the trial court's independent judgment.

More troubling is Scott's contention that because the trial court adopted verbatim the State's answer as its order, the order is infected with the same adversarial zeal of the State's counsel as is the answer. Scott contends that, although an order prepared by a party for the proposed adoption by the trial court purports to be disinterested, the adversarial zeal of counsel all too often infects the adopted order of the trial court, which is supposed to contain disinterested findings. See Cuthbertson v. Biggers Bros., Inc., 702 F.2d 454 (4th Cir.1983). Scott contends that an answer is a pleading that never is prepared with the pretense of impartiality. We agree. As Scott contends, an answer, by its very nature, is adversarial and sets forth one party's position in the litigation. It makes no claim of being an impartial consideration of the facts and law; rather, it is a work of advocacy that exhorts one party's perception of the law as it pertains to the relevant facts. The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the nature of the State's answer in this case, stating that "the pleading clearly advocated and sought summary dismissal of the majority of Scott's claims." Scott v. State, 262 So.3d at 1246.

This Court stated in Ex parte Ingram that the "appellate courts must be careful to evaluate a claim that a prepared order drafted by the prevailing party and adopted by the trial court verbatim does not reflect the independent and impartial findings and conclusions of the trial court." Ex parte Ingram, 51 So.3d at 1124 (emphasis added). Here, we do not even have the benefit of an order proposed or "prepared" by a party; rather the order is a judicial incorporation of a party's pleading as the "independent and impartial findings and conclusions of the trial court." Id. at 1124. The first and most fundamental requirement of the reviewing court is to determine "that the order and the findings and conclusions in such order are in fact those of the trial court." Id. at 1124. The trial court's verbatim adoption of the State's answer to Scott's Rule 32 petition as its order, by its nature, violates this Court's holding in Ex parte Ingram. Accordingly, we must reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it affirms the trial court's adoption of the State's answer as its order, and we remand the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals with directions to remand the case to the trial court for that court to reverse its order dismissing Scott's Rule 32 petition and to enter a new order in light of this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Woodall, Stuart, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.

Cobb, C.J., and Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., recuse themselves.

      These facts do not appear in the record; however, the State has conceded in its brief to this Court that these facts are true. Accordingly, for the purposes of this petition for certiorari review, we will accept these facts as true. See Washington v. State, 922 So.2d 145 (Ala.Crim.App.2005).

      Chief Justice Cobb and Justice Shaw, Justice Main, and Justice Wise were members of the Court of Criminal Appeals when that court considered this case or Scott's earlier appeals.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JOINER, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Willie Earl SCOTT v. STATE of Alabama.
    CR-06-2233.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    July 29, 2011.
    John Edward Goodman, John Mark Goodman, and Michael F. Walker, Birmingham; and Thomas P. Hanrahan and Ellyce R. Cooper, Los Angeles, California, for appellant.
    Troy King and Luther Strange, attys. gen., and J. Clayton Crenshaw and Michael A. Nunnelley, and Richard D. Anderson, asst. attys. gen., for appellee.
    On Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court
   JOINER, Judge.

Willie Earl Scott appealed the circuit court's summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P. Scott's petition challenged his convictions for two counts of capital murder and his resulting sentence of death and his convictions for first-degree rape, attempted murder, and first-degree burglary and his resulting sentences of life imprisonment for each of those convictions. This Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. Scott v. State, 262 So.3d 1239 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). Scott then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review. On March 18, 2011, the Alabama Supreme Court held:

"The trial court's verbatim adoption of the State's answer to Scott's Rule 32 petition as its order, by its nature, violates this Court's holding in Ex parte Ingram [, 51 So.3d 1119 (Ala.2010) ]. Accordingly, we must reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it affirms the trial court's adoption of the State's answer as its order, and we remand the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals with directions to remand the case to the trial court for that court to reverse its order dismissing Scott's Rule 32 petition and to enter a new order in light of this opinion."

Ex parte Scott, 262 So.3d 1266, 1274 (Ala.2011).

In accordance with the directions of the Alabama Supreme Court, we remand the case to the circuit court. The circuit court is directed to reverse its order dismissing Scott's Rule 32 petition and to enter a new order in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Ex parte Scott.

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Welch, P.J., and Windom, Kellum, and Burke, JJ., concur.

      This case was previously assigned to another judge on this Court.

      Note from the reporter of decisions: On October 6, 2017, on return to second remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, without opinion. On November 22, 2017, that court denied rehearing, without opinion. On March 23, 2018, the Supreme Court denied certiorari review, without opinion (1170184).


author: BURKE, Judge.

text:
    Emmett Leroy DAVIS v. STATE of Alabama
    CR-15-1485
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    September 8, 2017
    Greg Johnson, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Steve Marshall, atty. gen., and James R. Houts, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   BURKE, Judge.

Emmett Leroy Davis was convicted of one count of intentional murder, see § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, and one count of felony murder (robbery), see § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, resulting from the killing of Helen Mayo. Davis was sentenced to 99 years' imprisonment on each conviction; the sentences were ordered to run consecutively.

Because Davis does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary. On December 3, 2012, emergency personnel found 87-year-old Mayo with severe blunt-force trauma to the face inside her home in Cullman County. Mayo stated that she had been "pistol whipped" by a man that "had done work for [Mayo's neighbor] in the past." (R. 485.) Mayo also stated that the man wanted money for a "shot" for "his eye." (R. 486.) Mayo later died as a result of complications resulting from those injuries.

Testimony established that, the day before the attack, Davis, who was known as a local handyman, visited several homes in the area seeking either employment or money. On that day, Davis's vehicle was seen parked in the driveway of Mayo's home. Based on Mayo's statements and on interviews from Mayo's neighbors, Davis was developed as a person of interest. After he was located, Davis attempted to flee from law enforcement. At the police station, Davis admitted to having an artificial eye that caused him pain.

Physical evidence, including certain DNA evidence that matched the DNA profile of Davis, was recovered from the scene. Also, law enforcement recovered from Davis's home a pistol containing DNA evidence that matched the DNA profile of Mayo.

I.

Davis argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress the DNA evidence obtained from his person. Specifically, Davis argues that the taking of his saliva was a "critical stage" of the proceedings and that, pursuant to Rule 16.2, Ala. R. Crim. P., he was entitled to the presence of counsel when the evidence was collected. (Davis's brief, pp. 43-44.)

Before trial, the State filed a request for the production of Davis's saliva for the purpose of obtaining his DNA profile. Both the State's request for production and the circuit court's order permitting the seizure of a saliva sample from Davis were served on Davis and his trial counsel. There is nothing in the record showing that Davis filed an objection to the taking of the DNA swab.

Rule 16.2(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides, in pertinent part:

"Upon motion of the state/municipality and solely in connection with the particular offense with which the defendant is charged, the court shall order the defendant to:
"....
"(6) Permit the taking of samples of defendant's hair, blood, saliva, urine, or other specified materials which involve no unreasonable intrusions into the body;
"....
"The defendant shall be entitled to the presence of counsel at the taking of such evidence."

Initially, we note that Rule 16.2 does not require the presence of counsel, but merely permits an accused, upon request, to have counsel present at the taking of a saliva sample.

Furthermore, Davis was not entitled to have counsel present at the execution of a search warrant permitting the collection of Davis's saliva as evidence. Here, the record shows that the taking of Davis's saliva in order to obtain his DNA profile occurred before the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings and, thus, was not a "critical stage" of his proceedings. Therefore, the circuit court did not err when it denied Davis's motion to suppress.

Finally, error, if any, was harmless. Davis admits that the State also obtained a search warrant to collect his DNA profile via fingernail clippings and scrapings. See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. Accordingly, Davis is not entitled to relief on this issue.

II.

Davis argues that the circuit court erred by allowing the admission of State's Exhibits 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, and 122, all of which were photographic evidence. Specifically, Davis argues that there was a "missing link" in the chain of custody for the identified photographic evidence. (Davis's brief, p. 52.)

At trial, an exchange occurred as follows:

"[Prosecutor]: I'm also going to show you some more pictures here. Me and [defense counsel] have already stipulated to State's Exhibits Number 67, 68, 69, 70, 71 and 72. I'll ask if you recognize these?
"(State's Exhibits Number 67 through 72 were marked for identification and admitted into evidence.)
"[Officer Martin]: Yes, I do.
"[Prosecutor]: What are those pictures of?
"[Officer Martin]: These are photos from what we're calling the foyer. Some of it is stains believed to be blood."

(R. 617-18.) Later, the following exchange occurred:

"[Prosecutor]: Judge, I move to introduce State's Exhibit 122.
"[Defense counsel]: Is that one of the previous ones, [prosecutor]?
"[Prosecutor]: Yeah, this is one of the ones I showed you. Everything is what we went over earlier.
"[Defense counsel]: Okay.
"THE COURT: It's admitted.
"(State's Exhibit Number 122 was admitted into evidence.)"

(R. 623-24.)

Initially, we note that State's Exhibits 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, and 122 were admitted into evidence by stipulation. See Ex parte Deardorff, 6 So.3d 1235, 1241-42 (Ala. 2008) ("Under the doctrine of invited error, a defendant cannot by his own voluntary conduct invite error and then seek to profit thereby"). Moreover, Davis did not raise an objection regarding the admission of the photographic evidence. "Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial." Newsome v. State, 570 So.2d 703, 717 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). Therefore, Davis's argument is not preserved for appellate review.

Further, the argument is meritless. A chain of custody is not required to be established for photographic evidence. See § 12-21-13, Ala. Code 1975. Accordingly, Davis is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III.

Davis argues that the circuit court erred by admitting "testimony from Officer [Bates] regarding 'hand squeezes and whispers.' " (Davis's brief, p. 56.) Specifically, Davis argues that, under Rule 702, Ala. R. Evid., Officer Bates lacked knowledge and training to conduct an interview using such a method.

Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

During voir dire of Officer Bates, defense counsel asked Officer Bates if he had specialized training "with respect to the hand squeezing and the whispers." (R. 478.) Officer Bates indicated that he did not but that he had used the method in previous situations involving persons that could not verbally communicate. Officer Bates also indicated that he could testify regarding some of the specific questions asked of Mayo that elicited hand squeezes and whispers in response. Defense counsel then argued that it had not been shown that Officer Bates had any training to give testimony regarding his method of communication with Mayo. In response, the circuit court held as follows:

"THE COURT: [Defense counsel], I don't think he's been asked yet what questions were responded to verbally and what questions he might have gotten a response using the hand-squeeze method. I don't think it's necessary for him to be an expert. I don't know that there is such a thing as an expert in hand-squeeze communication. You have said you're not challenging the status of the victim at that time, and that is in my opinion the crux of the issue.
"I do find there's sufficient evidence that she could have been in fear of impending death at the time she made these communications, so I will overrule your objection and allow the witness to respond.
"[Defense counsel]: Is the Court taking notice then that it is accepting this as a method of questioning a witness?
"THE COURT: I'm saying that is a description of what may have occurred between this witness and the decedent. And you can explain or challenge it in whatever way you would like to on your cross-examination and make those arguments to the jury, but I think that goes to the weight, not the admissibility."

(R. 482-83.)

Rule 701, Ala. R. Evid., provides:

"If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue."

Here, the circuit court correctly relied on Rule 701 to find Officer Bates's testimony admissible. The record shows that Officer Bates's testimony was based on inferences that were rationally based on his perception. Thus, the circuit court correctly allowed Officer Bates's testimony. Accordingly, Davis is not entitled to relief on this issue.

IV.

Davis argues that the circuit court erred by admitting Mayo's DNA into evidence. Specifically, Davis argues that the State failed to show that the collection of Mayo's DNA was lawfully obtained without a search warrant. Davis also argues that "[t]his argument is not about standing." (Davis's brief, p. 66.) We disagree. Because Davis did not possess any legitimate expectation of privacy or proprietary interest in the saliva taken from Mayo, he does not have standing to challenge the seizure of a DNA sample from her person. See, e.g., State v. Jemison, 66 So.3d 832, 843 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). Accordingly, Davis is not entitled to relief on this issue.

V.

Davis argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence collected pursuant to a search warrant of his home, which search warrant, he says, was based on "unsubstantiated statements and/or omissions in the probable cause affidavit." (Davis's brief, p. 66.) Specifically, Davis argues that the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant (1) omitted the fact that Mayo had stated a name sounding like "Jim" when discussing the attack, (2) incorrectly attributed to Marie Woodard statements indicating that Davis had asked Woodard for money while at her residence and that Davis had appeared agitated, (3) noted that Davis had attempted to leave through the rear of his residence when Arab police knocked on his front door, (4) noted that Davis had been present in Mayo's neighborhood and in the vicinity of her home on December 2, 2012, and (5) noted that the majority of the latex gloves seen in Davis's vehicle were in the rear of the vehicle when photographic evidence showed that the majority of the gloves were in the front seat.

On February 5, 2016, the circuit court held a suppression hearing during which Officer Craig Montgomery of the Arab Police Department testified regarding the facts contained in the affidavit. In denying Davis's motion to suppress, the circuit court held: "And I find for the record that you did not establish any willful, misleading or false statement in the affidavit. And even excluding those items that you have challenged, I do find that there's probable cause for the District Judge in [Marshall] County." (R. 210.)

In Washington v. State, 922 So.2d 145, 172-73 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005), this Court held:

"In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978), the United States Supreme Court recognized a limited right to challenge the veracity of an affidavit submitted in support of a warrant; the Court held that
" 'where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.'
" 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674. The holding in Franks has been interpreted to include not only false statements in an affidavit, but also material omissions from an affidavit. See Wyley[ v. State, 565 So.2d 1200 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) ]; Williams v. State, 440 So.2d 1139 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) ; and 2 W. Lafave, Search and Seizure, § 4.4(b) (3d ed. 1996), and the cases cited therein.
"... In United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1990), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld an affidavit submitted in support of an arrest warrant that omitted the fact that numerous witnesses had failed to identify the defendant in a photographic lineup. In doing so, the Court held that, in the context of omissions, the Franks requirement that the falsity be made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth requires more than the mere fact of omission; the Court explained:
" 'Affidavits "are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965). An affiant cannot be expected to include in an affidavit every piece of information gathered in the course of an investigation. However, every decision not to include certain information in the affidavit is "intentional" insofar as it is made knowingly. If, as the district court held, this type of "intentional" omission is all that Franks [v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978),] requires, the Franks intent prerequisite would be satisfied in almost every case.
" ' Franks clearly requires defendants to allege more than "intentional" omission in this weak sense. "The mere fact that the affiant did not list every conceivable conclusion does not taint the validity of the affidavit." United States v. Burnes, 816 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1987). Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead, the magistrate. See [United States v.] Reivich, 793 F.2d [957,] 961 [ (8th Cir. 1986) ]. To obtain a Franks hearing the defendant must show that the omission is the product of a "deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth." Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684.
"[M]ere[ ] negligen[ce] in ... recording the facts relevant to a probable-cause determination" is not enough. Id. at 170, 98 S.Ct. at 2683.
" 'This case presents a question of omission rather than commission on the part of the agent. While omissions may not be per se immune from inquiry, see United States v. Owens, 882 F.2d 1493, 1498-99 (10th Cir. 1989) ; Reivich, 793 F.2d at 961, the affirmative inclusion of false information in an affidavit is more likely to present a question of impermissible official conduct than a failure to include a matter that might be construed as exculpatory. This latter situation potentially opens officers to endless conjecture about investigative leads, fragments of information, or other matter that might, if included, have redounded to defendant's benefit. The potential for endless rounds of Franks hearings to contest facially sufficient warrants is readily apparent.
" 'Here [the defendant] made no showing, and the district court possessed no evidence, that agent Moore had the requisite intent to mislead. The most that the record here reveals about Moore's failure to include the photospread information is that he did not believe it to be relevant to the probable cause determination. At the very worst, he was merely negligent in disclosing all relevant considerations to the magistrate. His acts fell far short of the level of flagrant police action Franks is designed to prevent, and a hearing under that decision was not required.'
" [Montana Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ] 599 F.2d [295] at 300-01 [ (9th Cir. 1979) ]."

Washington, 922 So.2d at 172-74.

Here, Davis failed to demonstrate that the affidavit was the result of perjury or a reckless disregard for the truth. For instance, with regard to the statement attributed to Woodard, i.e. that Davis had appeared agitated when speaking to her, Woodard testified that Davis had made comments about personal safety that "just came out of the blue," were not normal, and were "strange." (R. 82-83.) Also, Officer Montgomery testified that he did not include the information about Mayo stating a name sounding like "Jim" because, he said, he simply forgot during the preparation of the warrant. (R. 852.) Furthermore, Davis failed to demonstrate that the "unsubstantiated statements" or "omissions" from the affidavit were material to the finding of probable cause. "In determining whether a statement or omission is material, the affidavit must be corrected, i.e., the false statements removed or the omissions added, and then reviewed to determine whether the affidavit, as corrected, was sufficient to establish probable cause." Washington, 922 So.2d at 174. Therefore, the circuit court did not err when it denied Davis's motion to suppress on this ground. Accordingly, Davis is not entitled to relief on this issue.

VI.

Davis argues that the circuit court erred by allowing the State to suppress a "chain-of-evidence form." (Davis's brief, p. 74.) Specifically, Davis argues that the State withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

This argument, however, which Davis has raised for the first time on appeal, is not preserved for appellate review.

" 'Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial.'
Newsome v. State, 570 So.2d 703, 717 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). 'An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to appellate review because it has not been properly preserved and presented.' Pate v. State, 601 So.2d 210, 213 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). ' "[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be presented to the trial court by a timely and specific motion setting out the specific grounds in support thereof." ' McKinney v. State, 654 So.2d 95, 99 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (citation omitted). 'The statement of specific grounds of objection waives all grounds not specified, and the trial court will not be put in error on grounds not assigned at trial.' Ex parte Frith, 526 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1987). 'The purpose of requiring a specific objection to preserve an issue for appellate review is to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged error, giving an opportunity to correct it before the case is submitted to the jury.' Ex parte Works, 640 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Ala. 1994)."

Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So.2d 793, 794-95 (Ala. 2003).

Moreover, even if this issue had been properly preserved, Davis failed to meet his burden of establishing a Brady violation and, thus, his argument is without merit. Accordingly, Davis is not entitled to relief on this issue.

VII.

Davis argues that the circuit court erred by sentencing him to two counts of murder of the same victim. Specifically, Davis argues that his convictions violate double-jeopardy principles because, he says, he is being punished twice for the same offense. As noted above, Davis was convicted of intentional murder and felony murder based on the predicate felony of first-degree robbery.

Section 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, defines intentional murder as follows: "A person commits the crime of murder if ... [w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of that person or of another person." Felony murder, as defined by § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, occurs when a person

"commits or attempts to commit ... robbery in any degree ... and, in the course of and in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant if there be any, causes the death of any person."

Both intentional murder and felony murder are violations of the same statute prohibiting murder. See Commentary to § 13A-6-2 (" Section 13A-6-2 attempts to clarify, simplify, and justify working criteria for what constitutes murder"). In Ex parte Rice, 766 So.2d 143 (Ala. 1999), Rice was indicted for two counts of capital murder, murder-robbery and murder-kidnapping, and was convicted of two counts of felony murder as lesser-included offenses, specifically of a felony murder committed during a kidnapping and of a felony murder committed during a robbery. The Alabama Supreme Court in Rice determined that Rice could not be convicted of two counts of felony murder and sentenced twice and stated:

"Our conclusion is consistent with decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals holding that a defendant who commits one killing generally cannot legally be convicted and sentenced for two murders, see, e.g., Rolling v. State, 673 So.2d 812 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) ; Meyer v. State, 575 So.2d 1212 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) ; Coral v. State, 628 So.2d 954 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), aff'd, 628 So.2d 1004 (Ala. 1993) ; Loggins v. State, [771 So.2d 1070] (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) [, aff'd, 771 So.2d 1093 (Ala. 2000) ]. It is also consistent with the decisions of other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, see, e.g., Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 911 (Alaska 1970) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. Arnett, 158 Ariz. 15, 19-20, 760 P.2d 1064, 1068-69 (1988) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder); People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261, 1269-71 (Colo. 1983) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both murder after deliberation and felony murder); State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 705-11, 584 A.2d 425, 429-31 (1990) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both felony murder and first-degree manslaughter as a lesser included offense of intentional murder); State v. Lewis, 245 Conn. 779, 818, 717 A.2d 1140, 1161 (1998) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both murder and felony murder); Gaskin v. State, 591 So.2d 917, 920 (Fla. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1244, 113 S.Ct. 22, 120 L.Ed.2d 948 (1992) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder); Pressley v. State, 235 Ga. 341, 219 S.E.2d 418 (1975) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both malice murder and felony murder); Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 739 (Ind. 1989) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both murder and felony murder); People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill.2d 353, 154 Ill.Dec. 562, 568 N.E.2d 783, 792 (1990) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both intentional murder and felony murder), vacated on other grounds; State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 1972) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and murder in perpetration of robbery); State v. Sullivan, 224 Kan. 110, 112, 578 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (1978) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130, 136 (Me. 1990) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both intentional or knowing murder and depraved-indifference murder); Wooten-Bey v. State, 308 Md. 534, 520 A.2d 1090, 1092 (1987) (stating that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder); People v. Densmore, 87 Mich.App. 434, 440-41, 274 N.W.2d 811, 814 (1978) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. Grayson, 546 N.W.2d 731, 739 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of two variations of murder); State v. White, 254 Neb. 566, 577 N.W.2d 741, 745-48 (1998) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. Watson, 261 N.J. Super. 169, 618 A.2d 367, 373 (1992) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both purposeful and knowing murder and felony murder); State v. Wilson, 345 N.C. 119, 123, 478 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1996) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. Huertas, 51 Ohio St. 3d 22, 28, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1066 (1990) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, and aggravated murder in the course of aggravated burglary); State v. White, 549 N.W.2d 676, 681 (S.D. 1996) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. Hurley, 876 S.W.2d 57, 69-70 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder), superseded by statute; Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both manslaughter and intoxication manslaughter); Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 95-96, 472 S.E.2d 263, 273 (1996) (holding that a defendant who killed more than one person cannot, as to each victim, be convicted of capital murder for the murder of multiple persons); Byrd v. United States, 510 A.2d 1035, 1036-37 (D.C. App.1986, en banc) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of both premeditated murder and felony murder); cf., State v. Landgraf, 121 N.M. 445, 453, 913 P.2d 252, 261-62 (App. 1996) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of two variations of vehicular homicide)."

Rice, 766 So.2d at 151-52.

When multiple offenses are prosecuted in one trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause "prevent[s] the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). A defendant suffers multiple punishments in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause when he or she is convicted of more offenses than the legislature intended. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985). In Missouri v. Hunter, the United States Supreme Court noted that "[t]he opinion in Blockburger[ v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932),] stated: 'The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.' 284 U.S. at 304." 459 U.S. at 366. However, the Court further stated that " '[t]he Blockburger test is a "rule of statutory construction," and because it serves as a means of discerning congressional purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.' Albernaz v. United States, ... 450 U.S. [333,] 340 [ (1981) ] (emphasis added)." Id at 367.

Both crimes of which Davis was convicted constitute murder under the same statute. In this case, there was one murder of one victim under one set of circumstances. Section 13A-6-2(a) commences by stating that, "[a] person commits the crime of murder if he or she does any of the following ...," thus indicating that the legislature's intent was to set out alternative methods of committing murder. Moreover, that statute provides a single sentencing provision that applies to both subsection (a)(1) and subsection (a)(3).

"The inquiry is whether the Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments. The Blockburger test is a useful tool for ascertaining legislative intent, but it is not the only tool. Other (nonexclusive) considerations relevant to determining whether the Legislature intended multiple punishments are: whether the offenses provisions are contained within the same statutory section, whether the offenses are phrased in the alternative, whether the offenses are named similarly, whether the offenses have common punishment ranges, whether the offenses have a common focus (i.e. whether the 'gravamen' of the offense is the same) and whether that common focus tends to indicate a single instance of conduct, whether the elements that differ between the offenses can be considered the 'same' under an imputed theory of liability which would result in the offenses being considered the same under Blockburger (i.e. a liberalized Blockburger standard utilizing imputed elements), and whether there is legislative history containing an articulation of an intent to treat the offenses as the same or different for double jeopardy purposes."

Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

Felony murder and intentional murder may be considered as separate offenses under the test set out in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), because felony murder requires proof of a felony, which intentional murder does not, and intentional murder requires proof of intent, which felony murder does not. However, it is clear that the legislature intended that both constitute murder, a single offense carrying a single sentence. Therefore, Davis's convictions and sentences for the same murder violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

This case is remanded to the circuit court to vacate one of Davis's murder convictions and its corresponding 99-year sentence. Due return shall be made to this Court within 42 days of the issuance of this opinion.

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Windom, P.J., and Welch and Kellum, JJ., concur.

Joiner, J., concurs in the result.

      In his appellate brief, Davis raises additional claims in support of his argument regarding the motion to suppress. Those claims, however, have not been preserved for appellate review. See Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So.2d 793, 794-95 (Ala. 2003).

      Note from the reporter of decisions: On December 8, 2018, on return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, without opinion. On January 5, 2018, that court denied rehearing, without opinion. On March 16, 2018, the Supreme Court denied certiorari review, without opinion (1170328).


text:
    FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: B.C.E.
    CASE NO.: SC19-32
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    JANUARY 18, 2019
    Upon consideration of the Report and Recommendation filed by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, it is ordered that the Board's recommendation is approved by the Court and B.C.E. shall be admitted to The Florida Bar subject to the following conditions:
    1. The applicant's license to practice law shall be placed on probation for a period of three years.
   2. During the period of probation, the applicant shall:

(a) abstain from the consumption of alcoholic beverages;
(b) abstain from the use of controlled substances except as prescribed by a duly licensed medical physician and approved by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.;
(c) participate actively in the program offered by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. during the entire probationary period by complying with the rehabilitation contract with that organization executed on June 23, 2015, and by extending the contract to cover the entire period of probation if necessary;
(d) participate actively in Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous by attending, at least, weekly meetings or such greater frequency as required by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.; practice AA/NA principles in all of his affairs; and carry the AA/NA message to other substance dependent individuals;
(e) attend attorney support meetings at least monthly, or at such greater frequency as required by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.;
(f) submit to and pay for a minimum of eight (8) random urine drug/alcohol screens annually, as well as any other hair, blood, sweat, or other substance screening tests determined to be appropriate by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.;
(g) submit quarterly sworn statements to The Florida Bar by March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31 during the probationary period attesting to his compliance with the conditions set forth in 2 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) above.

3. The Florida Bar shall monitor the conditions set forth in the Consent Agreement pursuant to Rule 1-3.2(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, and the costs thereof shall be paid by the applicant to The Florida Bar or its designated monitoring agency.

4. To monitor effectively the provisions in this agreement, the applicant shall reside within the State of Florida during the entire period of probation. Any business or pleasure trips outside Florida that exceed ten days shall occur only with the advance approval of The Florida Bar. If the applicant relocates outside the State of Florida during the probationary period for any reason, the applicant shall surrender his license to practice law in Florida and if the applicant fails to do so, the Supreme Court of Florida shall terminate his license.

5. The applicant shall immediately inform The Florida Bar of any criminal arrest or prosecution and the filing of any grievance or complaint related to the applicant's practice of law.

6. If the applicant's license is surrendered or terminated during the probationary period, the applicant shall resume the practice of law in the State of Florida only upon full compliance with the rules and regulations governing admission to The Florida Bar.

7. A failure to observe the conditions of the probation or a finding of probable cause as to conduct of the applicant committed during the period of probation may terminate the probation and subject the applicant to all available grievance procedures and disciplinary sanctions including disbarment under the Rules of Discipline. Upon receiving notice of a violation of the Court's order of conditional admission, The Florida Bar may immediately petition the Court for an order of suspension. The applicant shall have ten days to file a response. If no response is timely filed by the applicant, then the Court shall issue an order suspending the applicant. If a response is filed, the matter shall be disposed of as the Court directs. Unless terminated by the Court, an order of suspension shall remain in effect until final disposition of the grievance procedures commenced by The Florida Bar against the applicant.

8. If circumstances so warrant it, the applicant and The Florida Bar may stipulate to an extension of the period of probation or The Florida Bar may petition the Court for such an extension with a final decision to be made by the Court.

9. By executing this Agreement, the applicant acknowledges that an uninterrupted period of documented sobriety for a minimum period of time must be established prior to admission to The Florida Bar on an unconditional basis. Should the period of probation be extended pursuant to either paragraph 7 or 8 above, the applicant, therefore, further agrees that such extension shall be for a minimum of three up to five years.

10. By executing this Agreement, the applicant specifically consents to and authorizes the release of any and all materials in the applicant's file to The Florida Bar that the Bar may request from the Board to enable the Bar to fulfill its responsibilities under this Consent Agreement.

A True Copy

Test:

John A. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court


text:
    FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: S.A.P.
    CASE NO.: SC19-26
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    JANUARY 22, 2019
    Upon consideration of the Report and Recommendation filed by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, it is ordered that the Board's recommendation is approved by the Court and S.A.P. shall be admitted to The Florida Bar subject to the following conditions:
    1. The applicant's license to practice law shall be placed on probation for a period of three years.
   2. During the period of probation, the applicant shall:

(a) abstain from the consumption of alcoholic beverages;

(b) abstain from the use of controlled substances except as prescribed by a duly licensed medical physician and approved by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.;

(c) participate actively in the program offered by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. during the entire probationary period by complying with the rehabilitation contract with that organization executed on May 7, 2018, and by extending the contract to cover the entire period of probation if necessary;

(d) participate actively in Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous by attending, at least, weekly meetings or such greater frequency as required by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.; practice AA/NA principles in all of his affairs and carry the AA/NA message to other substance dependent individuals;

(e) attend attorney support meetings at least monthly, or at such greater frequency as required by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.;

(f) submit to and pay for a minimum of eight random urine drug/alcohol screens annually, as well as any other hair, blood, sweat, or other substance screening tests determined to be appropriate by Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc.;

(g) continue to consult with Harris Feinstein, M.D., or other licensed mental health provider, at least, quarterly or more frequently as his mental health provider deems necessary;

(h) follow promptly, diligently, and completely all instructions by his mental health provider, including the taking of any medication in the recommended manner as may be presented by his mental health provider;

(i) have his mental health provider submit quarterly reports to The Florida Bar during the entire probationary period. These reports shall confirm the applicant's consultations for the preceding quarter and shall advise The Florida Bar of the applicant's continuing ability to engage in the active practice of law;

(j) obtain an agreement from his mental health provider stating that the mental health provider will immediately notify The Florida Bar if the applicant misses a scheduled appointment without prior rescheduling; and

(k) submit quarterly sworn statements to The Florida Bar by March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31 during the probationary period attesting to his compliance with the conditions set forth in 2 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (j) above.

3. The Florida Bar shall monitor the conditions set forth in the Consent Agreement pursuant to Rule 1-3.2(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, and the costs thereof shall be paid by the applicant to The Florida Bar or its designated monitoring agency.

4. To monitor effectively the provisions in this agreement, the applicant shall reside within the State of Florida during the entire period of probation. Any business or pleasure trips outside Florida that exceed ten days shall occur only with the advance approval of The Florida Bar. If the applicant relocates outside the State of Florida during the probationary period for any reason, the applicant shall surrender his license to practice law in Florida and if the applicant fails to do so, the Supreme Court of Florida shall terminate his license.

5. The applicant shall immediately inform The Florida Bar of any criminal arrest or prosecution and the filing of any grievance or complaint related to the applicant's practice of law.

6. If the applicant's license is surrendered or terminated during the probationary period, the applicant shall resume the practice of law in the State of Florida only upon full compliance with the rules and regulations governing admission to The Florida Bar.

7. A failure to observe the conditions of the probation or a finding of probable cause as to conduct of the applicant committed during the period of probation may terminate the probation and subject the applicant to all available grievance procedures and disciplinary sanctions including disbarment under the Rules of Discipline. Upon receiving notice of a violation of the Court's order of conditional admission, The Florida Bar may immediately petition the Court for an order of suspension. The applicant shall have ten days to file a response. If no response is timely filed by the applicant, then the Court shall issue an order suspending the applicant. If a response is filed, the matter shall be disposed of as the Court directs. Unless terminated by the Court, an order of suspension shall remain in effect until final disposition of the grievance procedures commenced by The Florida Bar against the applicant.

8. If circumstances so warrant it, the applicant and The Florida Bar may stipulate to an extension of the period of probation or The Florida Bar may petition the Court for such an extension with a final decision to be made by the Court.

9. By executing this Agreement, the applicant acknowledges that an uninterrupted period of documented sobriety for a minimum period of time must be established prior to admission to The Florida Bar on an unconditional basis. Should the period of probation be extended pursuant to either paragraph 7 or 8 above, the applicant, therefore, further agrees that such extension shall be for a minimum of three up to five years.

10. By executing this Agreement, the applicant specifically consents to and authorizes the release of any and all materials in the applicant's file to The Florida Bar that the Bar may request from the Board to enable the Bar to fulfill its responsibilities under this Consent Agreement.

A True Copy

Test:

John A. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court


text:
    Dennis MCCLOUD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4339
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 14, 2018 Rehearing Denied February 7, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    ROYAL AMERICAN REAL ESTATE, INC., Appellant, v. BOARDWALK BEACH RESORT COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1387
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 12, 2018 Rehearing Denied February 7, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    George Robert GRIECO, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-3357
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    December 7, 2018 Rehearing Denied February 7, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   DENIED.


text:
    Terrill L. PALMORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3435
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    August 10, 2018 Rehearing Denied January 28, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2156
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Trent Cole ASKEGARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0983
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Trent Cole ASKEGARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0980
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Trent Cole ASKEGARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0985
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Richard Warren VANZILE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2706
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Antonio Marcus ODOM, II, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-768
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Trent Cole ASKEGARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0981
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Trent Cole ASKEGARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0978
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Kadeem Denzel ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4317
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Norman E. CAISON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2980
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Skyler D. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3501
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jared ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2177
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Talacius Okevian HORNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2943
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Orin BATTLES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2404
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Lee A. KENNEDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2478
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Therall Authur WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2454
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jonathan RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2192
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Zachary Taylor WOOD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1425
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Vladislav BUDNIK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-493
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony D. KELLEM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2408
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Brandon Trenell ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2223
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robb William BJORKLUND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1955
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    John SCOLES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1923
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Janet ELDRIDGE, Appellant, v. Anthony BROTHERS, M.D., Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3744
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jimmy Alexis BUONOMO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2533
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    O. C-L., Father of A.S., J.Y.C., D.I.C., R.M.C., Minor Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3511
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Shawn D. SIMMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-506
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    February 8, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Lucia G. GRADINARIU, Appellant, v. Bill FURST, as Sarasota County Property Appraiser, Barbara Ford-Coates, as Sarasota County Tax Collector, Kathy Dent, as Sarasota County Supervisor of Elections, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-2830
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 15, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Eric A. LEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4884
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 20, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    E.R., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4180
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Roger J. KELLOGG, DOC #T92685, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4819
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 15, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Steven BEEBE, DOC #R79546, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1455
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 15, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    A.L.Q., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4637
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Erica GRANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4318
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 22, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Simuel HOWARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-82
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 20, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    IN the INTEREST OF B.W., A.W., and L.W., children.
    C.W., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D18-553
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    E.W., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4524
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Hugh Oscar KUNSELMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-153
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 29, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Anthony J. CIRRUZZO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3148
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 29, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    IN the INTEREST OF A.S., L.S., B.S., G.S., and C.S., children.
    T.S., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D18-634
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 29, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Walter CORSE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1752
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Neelam T. UPPAL, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee.
    Case Nos. 2D16-810 2D16-1022 CONSOLIDATED
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Z.M., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3997
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    J.W., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2985
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 6, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    M.D.M., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3646
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 13, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Nagy FARAG, Appellant, v. Helana FARAG, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1661
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Walter John BROIS, Doc #539452, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-834
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    IN the INTEREST OF J.A., a child,
    G.A.R., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D18-376
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    S.P., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4377
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    IN the INTEREST OF A.W.S., JR., a child.
    A.S., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D18-1254
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 25, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    IN the INTEREST OF N.B., S.B., and D.B., children.
    E.B., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D18-1611
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 25, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    IN the INTEREST OF C.L., a child.
    C.L., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-4953
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 20, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    S.M.K., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-0588
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed as moot. Denied as moot.


text:
    Damien Delon JONES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-5077
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    October 09, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    IN the INTEREST OF T.B. and G.B., children.
    E.L.C., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-583
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 8, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    IN the INTEREST OF M.L., a child.
    J.M., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D18-619
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 27, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    K.L.F., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. G.H., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-5046
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 17, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Sebastian BARRIOS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4988
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.

Denied.


text:
    REHABILITATION AND HEALTHCARE CENTER OF TAMPA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Michael WARD, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4918
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Hector CRUZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE o/b/o Kathie Lee Segarra, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3639
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 03, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Douglas Marshall JACKSON a/k/a Ben Yahweh Abiyah-Mosheh and Andrew Rolle a/k/a Ben Yahweh Solomon, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DESOTO CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3890
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Derek HARRIS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY FSB, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4416
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Terry Lee FREEZE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Mike CARROLL, Secretary, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4418
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Betty FUSCO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. LENNAR HOMES, LLC, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4430
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    John HUNSINGER, et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Alexander KAPLAN, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4444
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    TOBIAS REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4562
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Samuel BELSITO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. SCRIBNER CONTRACTING, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4505
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    M.G. and T.J. Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4567
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    November 19, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Petition.


text:
    Littlejoe J. GARCIA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Jennifer RODRIGUEZ, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4851
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Richard HESS, Meredith Hess and Lucre, Inc., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. John PATRICK, Ted Patrick, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4852
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Terri L. OLIVER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. SEACOAST NATIONAL BANK, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4596
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 3, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    PARENT SUPPORT, LLC d/b/a Cares Treatment, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4639
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 03, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Bobbie K. GRANT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. George J. ACHENBACH, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4861
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Jahi Amadi HASANATI, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Jason WOOD, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-3642
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 09, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Dismissed. Denied.


text:
    Brian ROBERSON as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ted Roberson, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3120
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 07, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Brenda Xiomara COTO DIAZ, Personal Representative of the Estate of Guillermo Diaz, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Elena Yamile FARAH, as Personal Representative Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2739
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 03, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    TODAY'S BANK, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. WALDEN LAKE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3786
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Benson Labo CALLIER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE O/B/O Latarsha L. DENSON, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2603
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 10, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Gail Anne NICHOLS, et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Grady C. JUDD, Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2656
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 03, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Leeann J. GALEA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Matthew J. KROL, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0489
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    December 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.

Denied.


text:
    B.H., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4723
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 14, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Ervin Lee HUTSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4863
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Jamescy JOHNSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4708
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Edward Ruiz MURGUIA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4263
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Christina PAYLAN, M.D., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4854
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Grant.


text:
    Christina PAYLAN, M.D., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4083
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Christina PAYLAN, M. D., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4963
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied as moot.


text:
    Veronica Ann SANCHEZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2725
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Samuel SINGLETON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1877
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Marcus VERNA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2410
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Jasson A. YOUNG, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3191
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 22, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Tyrone L. CARTER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4875
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Kenneth Alton PROCTOR, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4949
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Jay BARRINGER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3297
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    James Alexander LOGAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4951
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 15, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Tichina JONES and Robert Jones, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. LAMAR COMPANY, LLC, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-3076
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Craig A. JACKSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0207
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 31, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Joe Nathan HILL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2967
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 24, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Shawn HENRY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4908
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 11, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Brian JESTER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Thomas M. KNIGHT, Sheriff of Sarasota County, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4565
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    November 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    THANH-THUYTHI LE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATION TRUST CO., as Trustee, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D19-0340
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 31, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Temarcus Royelle GRADY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4864
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 31, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    William Richard GELLER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Robert Howard MARTYNE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-1586
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 30, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Denis Lee HARGROVE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4703
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Michael E. ELLIOTT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-0313
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    February 13, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Benjamin Paul FERMOR, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Rachel Jennifer DANIELS, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2530
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 31, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Lamar FANCY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4681
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 31, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Roland EDWARDS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-2996
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 03, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Troy Craig DRISKELL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4909
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 31, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Benjamin CORTES-MONTALVO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-5017
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    January 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Andrew T. SCOTT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-1847
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed December 5, 2018.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Linda DAVIS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Michael D. LANG, as Trustee, et al, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D18-4638
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    November 30, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.

Denied.


text:
    Jimmy CAME, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D18-970
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed January 16, 2019
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.