author: CONERY, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana IN the INTEREST OF E.A.D.
    JMC-18-451
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    July 2, 2018
    Christine Mire, Mire Law Firm, 2480 Youngsville Highway, Suite C, Youngsville, Louisiana 70592, (337) 573-7254, Counsel for Appellants/Applicants: T.D. and S.D. (maternal grandparents)
    Diane E. Cote, Mary Baudoin, CWS III, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), 825 Kaliste Saloom Road, Brandywine III, Suite 150, Lafayette, Louisiana 70508, (337) 262-5913, Counsel and Case Worker for Appellee/Respondent: State of Louisiana, DCFS
    William T. Babin, 405 West Convent Street, Lafayette, Louisiana 70501, (337) 232-7747 Counsel for Appellees: R.M. and K.M. (foster parents)
    Jami D. Pellerin, Tamiko Chatman, Acadiana Legal Services, 1020 Surrey Street, Lafayette, Louisiana 70501, (337) 237-4320, Counsel for Appellee: E.A.D. (minor child)
    Nicole Guidry, 15th Judicial District Public Defender's Office, 100 South Louisiana Street, Suite 500, Abbeville, Louisiana 70510, (337) 740-8885, Counsel for Appellee: J.D. (biological mother)
    Tracy D. McGraw, Assistant District Attorney, 15th Judicial District Attorney's Office, Post Office Box 3306, Lafayette, Louisiana 70502, (337) 232-5170, Counsel for Appellee: State of Louisiana
    CASA Coordinator, CASA of Acadiana, 1819 West Pinhook, Suite 103, Lafayette, Louisiana 70508
    Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, John E. Conery, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.
   CONERY, Judge.

Appellants, T.D. and S.D., are the maternal grandparents of the minor child, E.A.D. This matter was previously before this court on a writ application in docket number 18-233, State of Louisiana in the Interest of E.A.D. Appellants sought review of the trial court's February 7, 2018 ruling, which ordered that it was in the best interest of this child to allow the adoption by the foster parents, R.M. and K.M., to proceed. On May 16, 2018, this court denied the writ application, finding that T.D. and S.D. had an adequate remedy by appeal. See State of Louisiana in the Interest of E.A.D. , 18-233 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/16/18) (unpublished writ decision). Because the appeal delays had expired, this court considered the timely filed notice of intent to seek writs as a timely filed motion and order for appeal. See Armstrong v. Stein , 94-97 (La. 3/18/94), 634 So.2d 845.

Following the issuance of this court's writ denial, T.D. and S.D. filed a request for the trial court to set a reasonable return date. The trial court set June 30, 2018, as the return date. The State of Louisiana, through the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), filed a motion that opposed the lodging of the entire record of the proceedings. The trial court signed an order on June 7, 2018, stating "that the record to be lodged regarding the appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal is limited to the record of the hearing of January 8, 2018, including the written reasons for judgment and the judgment." T.D. and S.D. assert that this ruling was based on the trial court's interpretation of this court's statement in its writ decision that "the trial court's written judgment dismissing Relators' petition for adoption was signed on December 21, 2017, and notice issued that same date. That judgment was not appealed and is not the subject of the instant proceedings." State of Louisiana in the Interest of E.A.D. , 18-233 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/16/18) (unpublished writ decision).

Following the trial court's June 7, 2018 ruling, and before the trial court record was lodged, T.D. and S.D. filed a motion in this court to supplement the appellate record, which was assigned docket number 18-451. While that motion was pending, the designated trial court record, marked "Designation," was received by this court and assigned docket number 18-465. It contained no pleadings before January 8, 2018. In their motion to supplement the record, T.D. and S.D. have listed fifteen hearings from December 15, 2015, through January 8, 2018. T.D. and S.D. assert that they are appealing rulings other than the February 7, 2018 judgment and that the record should include all pleadings, notices, returns, and transcripts. T.D. and S.D. argue that they were not provided notice or a reasonable opportunity to be heard before those rulings were issued. Accordingly, they ask that the appeal record be supplemented to include: all pleadings filed in this matter; all subpoenas, notices, and returns on service; and transcripts of all hearings.

DCFS opposes the motion to supplement and asserts that the adoption proceedings are separate from the child in need of care proceedings. However, we note that the trial court issued a ruling that the juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction over these proceedings and ordered that the adoption proceedings be transferred to Division I, docket number JC 2015985.

DCFS states that the trial court's designation of the record by the granting of its motion follows the applicable rules of civil procedure and that the appellants, T.D. and S.D., are not entitled to have the record supplemented. DCFS also argues that the motions filed by T.D. and S.D. are premature because the record had not been lodged at the time the motion to supplement was filed. DCFS's proposition that Appellants cannot supplement the record is antithetical to law and jurisprudence.

"[T]he appellant is responsible for the record on appeal." Daigle v. LaPoint , 14-410, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/14), 150 So.3d 599, 603. This court has found that "[t]o the extent the [designated] record is inadequate for the type of review requested by the [appellants]," appellate courts " 'can apply the presumption that the trial court's judgment is correct and affirm.' " Id. at 602-603 (quoting Grantt Guillory Enterprises, Inc. v. Quebedeaux , 12-931, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/13), 110 So.3d 182, 188. "[T]he appellant has a duty to provide the portions which are in fact necessary." Colvin v. Colvin , 97-749, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/10/97), 704 So.2d 353, 355 (emphasis in original).

Designation of the record is addressed in La.Code Civ.P. arts. 2128 and 2132, and Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-1.17. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2128 provides (emphasis added):

The form and content of the record on appeal shall be in accordance with the rules of the appellate court, except as provided in the constitution and as provided in Article 2128.1. However, ... the appellant may designate in a writing filed with the trial court such portions of the record which he desires to constitute the record on appeal.... [T]he other party ... may also designate in a writing filed with the trial court such other portions of the record as he considers necessary.... [A] party or the trial court may cause to be filed thereafter any omitted portion of the record as a supplemental record. When no designation is made, the record shall be a transcript of all the proceedings as well as all documents filed in the trial court.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2132 states that:

A record on appeal ... which omits a material part of the trial record, may be corrected even after the record is transmitted to the appellate court, by the parties by stipulation, by the trial court or by the order of the appellate court. All other questions as to the content and form of the record shall be presented to the appellate court.

When the appellant designates the record, an appellee is provided an opportunity to designate additional portions of the record that it deems necessary for review. See Hamilton v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co. , 10-1005 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/10), 49 So.3d 513. See also Hooper v. Hero Lands Co. , 15-929 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/30/16), 216 So.3d 965, writ denied , 16-971 (La. 9/16/16), 206 So.3d 205 (trial court did not err in ordering production of the entire record to the court of appeal when appellant designated only a portion of the record, but appellee designated the entire record; the court found that "[w]ithout the entire record, it would be extremely difficult to unravel the facts and several complex issues in this case, a difficulty compounded by the appellants' apparent inability to present straightforward and consistent arguments." Id. at 980.) See La.Code Civ.P. art. 2128. See also Hamilton , 49 So.3d 513.

DCFS was successful in having the record designated to its liking and T.D. and S.D. should be allowed an opportunity to designate those portions of the record they deem necessary for review. See Carter v. Barber Bros. Contracting Co., Inc. , 623 So.2d 8, (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied , 629 So.2d 1180 (La.1993). Appellants do not seek to supplement the record with any evidence or testimony that is outside the record, and DCFS has not demonstrated to this court that they will be prejudiced by the supplementation of the record. See Carter , 623 So.2d at 10. Considering "the inadequacy of the record is imputable to the appellant," this court finds that although DCFS, as the appellee, designated the record first, it would be unjust to disallow the appellants, T.D. and S.D., an opportunity to also designate the portions of the they deem necessary.

For these reasons, Appellants' motion to supplement the record is granted. The Clerk of the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette, is ordered to prepare and transmit to this Court by August 1, 2018, a supplemental record, in duplicate, containing the "transcript of all the proceedings as well as all documents filed in the trial court," including but not limited to all pleadings, subpoenas, notices, returns of service, evidence, and transcripts of all hearings in State in the Interest of E.A.D. , bearing docket number JC 2015985, Division I, which were filed or occurred before January 8, 2018. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 2128. Costs for this supplemental record are assessed to Appellants, T.D. and S.D.

MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT GRANTED.

      The initials of the minor child are used to preserve confidentiality of juvenile records. See La.Ch.Code art. 412. See also Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-1 and 5 -2. For the same reason, the mother, the maternal grandparents, and the foster parents are also referred to by their initials.

      On August 15, 2017, T.D. and S.D. petitioned to intervene in the adoption proceedings filed on behalf of R.M. and K.M. in docket number 2017-0041-B in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette. T.D. and S.D. also filed their own petition to adopt E.A.D.

      T.D. and S.D.'s petition to adopt E.A.D. as well as their separate petition to intervene in adoption proceedings initiated by E.A.D.'s foster parents, R.M. and K.M., were initially assigned to Division B at docket number 2017-0041. The minute entry from docket number 2017-0041-B, states "that the juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction over these proceedings" and ordered that the adoption proceedings be transferred to docket number 2015-0985-I, which is the docket number of the proceedings concerning E.A.D., including the child in need of care proceedings.

      Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-1.17 states that "the parties may designate, in writing, portions of the record to constitute the record in a Court of Appeal."


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, DISSENTING:

license: Public Domain

text:
    Darius Parnell HAYNES a/k/a Darius Haynes a/k/a Darius P. Haynes a/k/a Dirk v. STATE of Mississippi
    NO. 2016-KA-01747-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    May 31, 2018 Rehearing Denied August 30, 2018
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, BY: MOLLIE M. McMILLIN, GEORGE T. HOLMES
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, BY: ALICIA AINSWORTH
    EN BANC.
   CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. After a trial, a jury convicted Darius Parnell Haynes in the Circuit Court of Copiah County of two counts: possession of cocaine while in possession of a firearm and possession of a weapon by a felon. Because the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction of possession of cocaine, we affirm Haynes's conviction for possession and the corresponding sentence. The conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon are not affected as Haynes has not requested that we review them.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On March 27, 2016, Haynes and Kimmeisha Harris fought at a friend's house. After the fight, Haynes left with Xavier Brown in Brown's maroon Mercury Marquis, which had broken-out back window. Meanwhile, Harris went to the hospital, where she gave Investigator Wendell Fountain a statement. Harris told Investigator Fountain that, during the fight, she thought she had seen Haynes with a gun and that Haynes had threatened to shoot her. Harris also gave Investigator Fountain a description of the car in which Haynes had left.

¶ 3. After leaving the hospital, Investigator Fountain spotted a maroon Mercury Marquis with a broken-out back window at a nearby gas station. Brown was standing outside the car, pumping gas. Haynes was sitting in the passenger seat. Investigator Fountain approached the vehicle and noticed a small plastic bag containing a white substance, which was identified at trial as 0.34 grams of cocaine. The plastic bag was in plain view, located in the ashtray between the driver and passenger seats. Investigator Fountain asked Haynes "if he knew why he was making contact with him." According to Investigator Fountain, Haynes said, "It's probably because of a little incident that I just had." Investigator Fountain then received consent from Brown to search the car, and he found a gun in the glove box. Brown testified that the gun in the glove box belonged to Haynes and was the same gun from the incident at the friend's house.

¶ 4. Brown also testified concerning State's Exhibit 3, the small plastic bag of cocaine that Investigator Fountain had recovered from the ashtray. The following exchange between the State and Brown entered evidence:

State: [D]id you get a chance to snort any of that cocaine that night?
Brown: Yes, sir.
...
State: So when you had that substance, you believed it to be cocaine?
Brown: Yes, sir.
State: And so you said you snorted it.
Brown: Yes, sir.
State: Who else was with you when you snorted that substance believed to be cocaine?
Brown: Darius [Haynes].
State: And did he snort some of that substance that you believed to be cocaine?
Brown: Yes, sir.
State: So when the officer came up, he saw the remainder of the substance; is that right?
Brown: Yes, sir.
State: And the substance that you two were using came out of this content [sic]?
Brown: Yes, sir.

Brown also testified that the cocaine found in the car belonged only to him, not Haynes.

¶ 5. On November 16, 2016, a jury found Haynes guilty of possession of cocaine while in possession of a firearm and possession of a weapon by a felon. The trial court sentenced Haynes to three years for the possession offense, which was enhanced due to the firearm possession, and to ten years for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Both sentences were to be served concurrently without the benefit of parole. Haynes filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, and Haynes filed his notice of appeal as to both counts. On appeal, Haynes contests only his conviction on Count I. He argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for possession of cocaine.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. This Court reviews de novo a trial court's ruling on the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Brooks v. State , 203 So.3d 1134, 1137 (Miss. 2016). When reviewing a case for sufficiency of the evidence, " '[a]ll credible evidence [that] is consistent with guilt must be accepted as true, and the State is given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence.' " Burrows v. State , 961 So.2d 701, 705 (Miss. 2007) (quoting Daniels v. State , 742 So.2d 1140, 1142 (Miss. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. State , 194 So.3d 855, 867-68 (Miss. 2016) ). We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, while keeping in mind the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof standard. Dees v. State , 126 So.3d 21, 26 (Miss. 2013). "Should the facts and inferences ... 'point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty,' the proper remedy is for the appellate court to reverse and render." Brown v. State , 965 So.2d 1023, 1030 (Miss. 2007). Ultimately, " '[t]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Shelton v. State , 214 So.3d 250, 256 (Miss. 2017) (quoting Bush v. State , 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Little v. State , 233 So.3d 288, 291 (Miss. 2017) ).

ANALYSIS

Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Haynes of possession of cocaine.

¶ 7. Haynes was charged and convicted under Mississippi Code Sections 41-29-139(c)(1)(B), which makes it a crime to possess one-tenth (0.1) gram or more, but less than two (2) grams, of a Schedule II controlled substance, and 41-29-152(1), which allows for a sentence enhancement of a possession conviction. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(c)(1)(B) (Rev. 2013); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-152(1) (Rev. 2013). "Possession of a controlled substance may be actual or constructive, individual or joint." Dixon v. State , 953 So.2d 1108, 1112 (Miss. 2007). "Two or more persons may be in possession where they have joint power of control and an inferable intent to control jointly." Wolf v. State , 260 So.2d 425, 432 (Miss. 1972). In this case, the record is uncontradicted that Haynes lacked actual possession of the cocaine at the time of his arrest, so the State had the burden to prove Haynes had constructive possession of it.

¶ 8. For constructive possession, this Court has developed the following framework:

[W]hat constitutes a sufficient external relationship between the defendant and the narcotic property to complete the concept of "possession" is a question which is not susceptible to a specific rule. However, there must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding that defendant was aware of the presence and character of the particular substance and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it.... Constructive possession may be shown by establishing that the drug involved was subject to [the defendant's] dominion or control. Proximity is usually an essential element, but by itself is not adequate in the absence of other incriminating circumstances.

Hudson v. State , 30 So.3d 1199, 1203 (Miss. 2010) (citations omitted). Moreover, one who owns a vehicle in which contraband is found is presumed to be in constructive possession of those illicit items. Dixon , 953 So.2d at 1113. "However, when contraband is found [in a vehicle that is] not owned by a defendant, mere physical proximity to the contraband does not, in itself, show constructive possession .... [T]he State [is] required to establish additional incriminating circumstances in order to prove constructive possession." Ferrell v. State , 649 So.2d 831, 834 (Miss. 1995) (emphasis in original).

¶ 9. Here, the evidence in the record is legally sufficient to support the conviction of possession of cocaine. The cocaine was discovered in plain view in a car in which Haynes was sitting. More so, Haynes was sitting in the passenger seat right next to the ashtray that held the cocaine. The record also demonstrated that Haynes was aware of the cocaine as Brown admitted that he and Haynes had "snorted" cocaine from the package in the ashtray "that night" and that Officer Fountain "saw the remainder of the" cocaine that the two had used. The fact that Brown and Haynes had "snorted" this same cocaine also shows that Haynes exerted "dominion and control" over the cocaine.

¶ 10. The dissent relies on Harris v. Blackburn , 646 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1981), a split-panel, Fifth Circuit decision as authority to reverse. The evidence of Haynes's use of the seized cocaine, though, distinguishes this case from Harris. Unel Harris, the defendant in Harris -who was a passenger in someone else's car-was not linked to the specific heroin that was recovered from the vehicle. Harris , 646 F.2d at 906. In its analysis, the Harris court noted that Harris's track marks, "given the absence of any traces of heroin use or of any paraphernalia needed for such use in [the] car, ... in no way operate to prove that Harris had control or dominion over the specific heroin found wrapped in packets in [the] car." Id. Unlike the lack of evidence in Harris , the evidence in this record demonstrates that Haynes used a portion of the same cocaine that was found in the ashtray. In other words, we-unlike the Fifth Circuit panel-are faced with evidence that "operate[s] to prove that [Haynes] had control or dominion over the specific [cocaine] found wrapped in [a] packet[ ] in [Brown's] car." Id. Indeed, Brown agreed that he and Haynes had "snorted" cocaine from the package in the ashtray "that night" and that Officer Fountain "saw the remainder of the" cocaine that the two had used. Thus, Harris is not persuasive given the evidence in the record.

¶ 11. Further, the dissent's position would narrow established criminal law by equating ownership and possession-two distinct concepts in our law. Possession-not ownership-is the issue before this Court.

¶ 12. Brown's testimony that "the cocaine belonged to me" did not foreclose the jury from determining that Haynes also had possessed the cocaine, as Haynes exerted "dominion and control" over it. Hudson v. State , 30 So.3d 1199, 1203 (Miss. 2010). As we noted above, "[p]ossession of a controlled substance may be ... individual or joint." Dixon , 953 So.2d at 1112. "Two or more persons may be in possession where they have joint power of control and an inferable intent to control jointly." Wolf v. State , 260 So.2d 425, 432 (Miss. 1972). Further, the jury simply could have found that Brown's claim of ownership was not truthful. " 'Factual disputes are properly resolved by a jury....' " Flynt v. State , 183 So.3d 1, 10 (Miss. 2015) (citing Beasley v. State , 136 So.3d 393, 403 (Miss. 2014) ).

¶ 13. In fact, the evidence of Brown's and Haynes's prior relationship served to discredit Brown's claim of ownership. Brown-a short while before the interaction with Officer Fountain-had broken up an altercation between Haynes and others, had seen Haynes brandish a weapon and had agreed to transport Haynes away from the scene. Brown knew Haynes. From his own testimony, he had used drugs with Haynes. The jury could have found that Brown had an incentive to claim ownership of the cocaine and shield his friend from further criminal liability in light of Haynes's prior felony record and the fact that Haynes had a firearm in the vehicle.

¶ 14. The only question before us on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the jurors could have found the essential elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. On this record, they could. Today, we heed the guidance of the dissent in Harris that an appellate court is not to "undertake[ ] a de novo review of the evidence using the typewritten transcript of the testimony." Harris , 646 F.2d at 908 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).

CONCLUSION

¶ 15. The cocaine was recovered in plain view next to Haynes. The evidence demonstrated that Haynes had used that same cocaine earlier that night. These facts are enough to support the jury's finding that Haynes possessed the cocaine. Thus, we affirm Haynes's conviction and sentence.

¶ 16. AFFIRMED.

RANDOLPH, P.J., COLEMAN, MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR. WALLER, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS, P.J., KING AND ISHEE, JJ.

WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, DISSENTING:

¶ 17. Because I find that the evidence is legally insufficient to support Darius Haynes's conviction for constructive possession of the cocaine, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 18. Investigator Wendell Fountain found Haynes sitting in the passenger seat of Xavier Brown's car. Located between the driver and passenger seats was a plastic bag containing 0.34 grams of cocaine. "Where the premises upon which contraband is found is not in the exclusive possession of the accused, the accused is entitled to acquittal, absent some competent evidence connecting him with the contraband." Powell v. State , 355 So.2d 1378, 1379 (Miss. 1978). Moreover, "mere physical proximity to the contraband does not, in itself, show constructive possession." Cunningham v. State , 583 So.2d 960, 962 (Miss. 1991). Since the car did not belong to Haynes, his "mere physical proximity" to the cocaine is insufficient to establish constructive possession.

¶ 19. Brown, the owner and the driver of the car, testified that he and Haynes had snorted some of the cocaine from the plastic bag earlier that day; however, Brown also claimed exclusive ownership of the remaining cocaine that was found in his car. We must consider Brown's uncontradicted testimony when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. Ferguson v. State , 137 So.3d 240, 243 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2014) (citation omitted) (When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, "[t]his Court must 'consider all of the evidence-not just the evidence [that] supports the case for the prosecution ....' "); see also Downs v. State , 962 So.2d 1255, 1259 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2007) ; Taggart v. State , 957 So.2d 981, 986 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2007) ; Garrison v. State , 950 So.2d 990, 998 (¶ 32) (Miss. 2006) ; McDowell v. State , 807 So.2d 413, 425 (¶ 38) (Miss. 2001).

¶ 20. In a strikingly similar case, the Fifth Circuit found comparable evidence insufficient to support a conviction. Harris v. Blackburn , 646 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1981). In Harris , police officers "discovered an automobile, idling with its lights on ...." Id. at 905. "Upon inspection, the officers found two occupants, Martin Thibodeaux in the driver's seat and appellant [Unel] Harris in the passenger's seat. The car was owned by Thibodeaux." Id. When the officers looked in the car, they saw heroin "in 'plain view' in [the] console between the two men ...." Id. at 906. Both men "appeared to be under the influence of drugs at the time ... and Harris's arm bore track marks, two of which" indicated that Harris had used heroin within the last five hours. Id. at 905. Thibodeaux claimed ownership of both the car and the heroin. Id. However, Harris was charged and convicted in Louisiana for constructively possessing heroin. Id. at 905.

¶ 21. Harris filed for a writ of habeas corpus with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used for his conviction. Id. The district court denied the writ, and Harris appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Id. The appellate court reversed the district court's decision because of insufficiency of the evidence and remanded for the issuance of the writ. Id. at 907.

¶ 22. According to the Fifth Circuit, "mere presence in the area where the narcotic is discovered or mere association with the person who does control the drug or the property where it is located, is insufficient to support a finding of possession." Id. at 906. "Moreover, while it can be inferred ... from the location of the heroin in 'plain view' in the console that Harris had knowledge of the presence of drugs, it is clear that knowledge of the presence of drugs is insufficient to prove 'dominion' or 'control' over the drugs ...." Id. And "Thibodeaux's own stipulated testimony that Harris neither owned nor controlled the heroin further defeats any inference of possession." Id.

¶ 23. The State's central argument in Harris , though, was that Harris's "track marks," which proved Harris had used heroin within the previous five hours, was sufficient evidence to prove possession of the heroine in the car. Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected that argument:

It is clear that the presence of "fresh" track marks on Harris's arm establishes that Harris was a heroin user at the time of his arrest. However, given the absence of any traces of heroin use or of any paraphernalia needed for such use in Thibodeaux's car, these track marks in no way operate to prove that Harris had control or dominion over the specific heroin found wrapped in packets in Thibodeaux's car.

Id. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held "that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Harris possessed the heroin found in Thibodeaux's car ...." Id.

¶ 24. Just as in Harris , Haynes did not own the car in which the controlled substance was found in "plain view" between the driver and passenger seats. In both cases, the owner of the vehicle claimed possession of the controlled substance. And, like Harris, Haynes had consumed some of the drug earlier in the day. But, as the Fifth Circuit contemplated, the previous use of the drug "in no way operate[s] to prove" that Haynes "possessed" the drug of which Brown claimed ownership. Id.

¶ 25. The State was required to put forth some competent evidence that connected Haynes to the "specific" cocaine located in the car. Id. ; see, e.g. , Fultz v. State , 573 So.2d 689, 691 (Miss. 1990) (suggesting fingerprints on the drugs would be sufficient evidence); Cutrer v. State , 410 So.2d 1308, 1309 (Miss. 1982) (evidence sufficient when defendant kicked drugs under seat before stepping out of vehicle); Curry v. State , 249 So.2d 414, 414 (Miss. 1971) (evidence by owner of car was sufficient where owner, who had made entire trip from Texas to Hattiesburg with car occupants, was seated in front passenger seat in close proximity to marijuana and had made suspicious downward-reaching motion when sighted by police). The evidence is insufficient to support a finding that Haynes had constructive possession in this case.

¶ 26. I respectfully dissent.

KITCHENS, P.J., KING AND ISHEE, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      Brown's testimony took place before Allison Conville of the Mississippi Forensic Laboratory had identified the white substance in State's Exhibit 3 as cocaine.

      Upon review of the trial court's bench order and the written sentencing order, there is a possible discrepancy as to the length of the sentence for the possession of cocaine. The bench order could be read to sentence Haynes to six years on the charge. We find that the trial court's written order-sentencing Haynes to three years-controls. Our determination does not affect the length of time served by Haynes given his sentence for possession of a firearm.

      Haynes also previously had moved for directed verdict at the close of both the prosecution's and defense's cases-in-chief.

      Compare Ownership , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("Ownership implies the right to possess a thing ...") with Possession, Criminal Possession , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("... the exercise of dominion over property"), ("The unlawful possession of certain prohibited articles, such as illegal drugs ...").

      Brown's and Haynes's prior relationship further distinguishes this case from Harris. In Harris , there was no evidence of any relationship between the driver of the vehicle and the defendant. Harris , 646 F.2d at 906.

      Louisiana's constructive possession laws and standards for sufficiency of the evidence are identical to those of Mississippi. See Harris , 646 F.2d at 906.


author: ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

text:
    In the Matter of C.W.: The Mississippi Department of Mental Health and State of Mississippi v. LAMAR COUNTY, Mississippi
    In the Matter of R.M.: Mississippi Department of Mental Health and State of Mississippi v. Lamar County, Mississippi
    NO. 2017-CA-00718-SCT NO. 2017-CA-00721-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    August 16, 2018
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: MARY JO WOODS, DOUGLAS T. MIRACLE, WILLIAM MELVIN ROSAMOND, CYNTHIA TOMLINSON EUBANK, JACKSON
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: KATHY DENISE SONES, COLUMBIA
    BEFORE WALLER, C.J., MAXWELL AND ISHEE, JJ.
   ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. This case requires this Court to determine if Mississippi Code Section 41-21-77 allows a director of a state hospital independently to override a commitment order of a chancery court for treatment of mental illness. It does not. And because this statutory question comes to this Court through the vehicle of a citation of contempt, this case also requires this Court to review the citation of contempt to determine whether the chancery court's classification of the contempt was correct and whether correct procedures were followed in the finding of contempt. As fully explained below, we find that the chancery court erred in its contempt determination. We reverse the chancery court's contempt finding, we remand the case for an entry of an order of recusal, and we otherwise order proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In 2017, two individuals-R.M. and C.W. -were committed to the South Mississippi State Hospital (SMSH) to be treated for mental illness. As required under the commitment statute, both R.M. and C.W. were evaluated by court-appointed physicians, one a medical doctor, the other a psychologist. In the cases of both individuals, the evaluating physicians were the same two physicians. And in both cases, the physicians' recommendations were the same: the medical doctor found that both individuals were, to some degree, mentally ill and thus needed treatment; the psychologist found that both individuals were not mentally ill and did not need treatment.

¶ 3. In addition to the documents submitted to the chancery court by the evaluating physicians, both R.M. and C.W. waived their rights to a commitment hearing, as is allowed under Mississippi Code Section 41-21-76 (Rev. 2013). In their respective waiver documents, both R.M. and C.W. indicated they understood their need for treatment. Once the waivers were received by the chancery court, the chancery court signed and entered orders of commitment; both orders were entered on the same day, March 14, 2017.

¶ 4. Upon receipt of the orders of commitment, SMSH's Facility Director Sabrina Young denied admission to both patients. Young sent a letter to the Lamar County Chancery Clerk detailing her reasons for denying admission to R.M. and C.W. In both cases, Young, through consultation with SMSH's clinical physician, independently had determined that both R.M. and C.W. needed treatment for drug and alcohol issues, not treatment for mental illness. And because SMSH was not equipped to treat patients for drug and alcohol issues, Young determined that SMSH did not have services or facilities to treat adequately the two individuals. Young based her authority to deny R.M. and C.W. admission on Mississippi Code Section 41-21-77 (Rev. 2013), which states that "no person shall be so delivered or admitted until the director of the admitting institution determines that facilities and services are available."

¶ 5. After receiving Young's letter, the chancery court felt that it was left with no other option than to dismiss the case and release R.M. and C.W. from the custody of Lamar County. Next, the chancery court, with Special Master William Andrews presiding, issued show-cause orders in both cases, directing Young, as director of SMSH, to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court for her refusal to abide by the orders of commitment. The order also directed the Attorney General to show cause why the statute relied on by Young-Section 41-21-77-should not be declared unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed the facility director to refuse to provide medical treatment to R.M. and C.W. based on the unavailability of facilities or services.

¶ 6. On April 10, 2017, the chancery court conducted the show-cause hearing. Special Master Andrews presided over the hearing, and Chancellor Deborah Gambrell was in attendance. Young and the SMSH clinical physician testified at the hearing. The culmination of the testimony was clear: while the chancery court ordered the two individuals to be committed based on their mental illness, SMSH, upon reviewing the same documents presented to the chancery court, disagreed and found that the two individuals instead needed treatment for alcohol and drug issues.

¶ 7. At the end of the hearing, the special master dictated his findings of fact and conclusions of law into the record, determining that Young was in civil contempt and sanctioning her the sum of $1,400, to be paid to the court within thirty days. Yet the special master did not stop there. The special master went on to find that if the finding of contempt was not upheld on review, and if Section 41-21-77 indeed allowed the director of a state hospital to overrule an order of commitment, the statute would be unconstitutional pursuant to Section 86 of the Mississippi Constitution (requiring the Legislature to provide care and treatment for the mentally ill). The special master also found Section 41-21-77 to be an encroachment of executive action on the judicial powers of the court, thus violating Section 144 of the Mississippi Constitution.

¶ 8. The findings of fact and conclusions of law were submitted to Chancellor Gambrell for review and signature. Chancellor Gambrell adopted these findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State of Mississippi and the Department of Mental Health appeal both cases, which this Court consolidated.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9. Statutory interpretation is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Arceo v. Tolliver , 19 So.3d 67, 70 (Miss. 2009). As for contempt, the standard of review depends on the classification of the contempt citation. On one hand, "[i]f the contempt is civil, the proper standard utilized for review is the manifest error rule." In re McDonald , 98 So.3d 1040, 1043 (Miss. 2012). On the other hand, when reviewing a citation for criminal contempt, this Court "will proceed ab initio and will determine on the record whether the person is guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. But if a case necessitates reversal on other procedural grounds, it is not necessary to review the record to determine if a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Mississippi Code Section 41-21-77

¶ 10. The basis for the chancery court's contempt finding was that the facility director was without authority to deny admission to R.M. and C.W. for mental-illness treatment at SMSH. And so, as an initial matter, to review properly the contempt finding, this Court first must determine what authority, if any, Section 41-21-77 grants to a facility director as it relates to admissions.

¶ 11. When engaging in statutory interpretation, we begin with the text of the statutory provision in question. Broadly speaking, Section 41-21-77 sets forth the procedures to be followed when an individual has been committed to a treatment facility. Among numerous other directives, Section 41-21-77 provides that "no person shall be so delivered or admitted until the director of the admitting institution determines that facilities and services are available." This clause, this Court has said, is a qualification that merely protects the hospital against overcrowding. Attorney Gen. v. In Interest of B.C.M. , 744 So.2d 299, 302 (Miss. 1999). But "[i]t does not equip the director of such an institution to exercise discretion regarding the necessity of an individual's placement in a state facility." Id. Indeed, "[t]here is nothing in this statement by the Legislature suggesting that the director has any authority to override a court's decision to commit an individual." Id.

¶ 12. In its appeal, the linchpin of the State's argument is that, within Section 41-21-77, a definitional distinction exists between the terms "facilities" and "services." "Facilities," the State argues, denotes an actual, physical place, while "services" means clinically specialized treatments. "Treatment facility" is defined under the statute as:

[A] hospital, community mental health center, or other institution qualified to provide care and treatment for persons with mental illness, persons with an intellectual disability or chemically dependent persons.

Miss. Code Ann. § 41-21-61(i) (Rev. 2013). The term "services," however, is left undefined under the statute.

¶ 13. The State contends that the issue here is with the word "services," not "facilities." And, as the State correctly notes in its brief, in B.C.M. , this Court was confronted with a denial of admission based on a facility's lack of actual physical capacity (beds) to admit the individual, unlike here, where denial was based on the availability of clinical services. See B.C.M , 744 So.2d at 302. Thus, the State concludes, this Court's holding in B.C.M. is inapplicable here. But we fail to see how such a factual distinction would render the holding of that case inapplicable here. While B.C.M. may have addressed a different reason for which a facility denied admission to an individual, in the opinion, this Court interpreted the meaning of the statute nonetheless. And it did so without any qualifications or equivocations. To this extent, this Court was clear: the statute does not arm a facility director with the independent discretion to override a court order of commitment. See id.

¶ 14. Here, the facts are simple. The chancery court, after reviewing documents submitted by the evaluating physicians, came to the conclusions that R.M. and C.W. needed treatment for mental illness. And it issued orders of commitment consistent with those conclusions. Then, upon receiving the orders of the chancery court, the facility director, Young, reviewed the same documentation that the chancery court reviewed and arrived at the conclusion that the chancery court was wrong; what these two individuals needed, Young found, was not treatment for mental illness, but treatment for drug and alcohol addiction. But this was not Young's call to make. The chancery court's determination on the necessity of treatment for mental illness, however wrong it theoretically may have been, was its ruling nonetheless. And it was entitled to the full force of law. Young and SMSH were not at liberty to second guess the chancery court and to determine for themselves whether mental-illness treatment for R.M. or C.W. was necessary.

¶ 15. Again, the distinction between facility and services, a distinction into which the State puts much stock, on these facts, is irrelevant. Perhaps, had the chancery court determined that the two individuals needed treatment for alcohol and drug addiction and erroneously ordered them to be committed at SMSH (erroneous in that SMSH is without capability to treat alcohol and drug issues), then an argument may exist that SMSH was without facilities or services for treatment, as contemplated by the statute-both in the physical and clinical sense. But that was not the case. And the two individuals were committed for treatment of mental illness, which SMSH undeniably was equipped to treat, both with physical facilities and clinical capabilities.

¶ 16. At bottom, the chancery court had found that these two individuals should be treated for mental illness, and it is undisputed that SMSH possessed both the facilities and services for such treatment, notwithstanding Young's independent conclusion overriding the chancery court's orders. And this is precisely what this Court has held as an impermissible exercise of discretion. See B.C.M. , 744 So.2d at 302. So Young's reliance on Section 41-21-77 is misplaced.

¶ 17. We turn next to the constitutional issue raised by the chancery court. In its contempt ruling, the chancery court alternatively held that, if Section 41-21-77 allows the director of a state hospital to overrule an order of commitment, then the statute violates certain sections of the Mississippi Constitution. Namely, it would violate Section 86 (placing the duty of the treatment and care of the insane on the Legislature) and Section 144 (vesting the judicial power in the Supreme Court and other courts). See Miss. Const. art. 4, § 86 ; Miss. Const. art. 6, § 144.

¶ 18. As to the constitutionality of the statute, we decline to pass judgment on its constitutionality for several reasons. First is this Court's well-established presumption that a statute is constitutional unless the statute is shown to be in "palpable conflict with some plain provision of the constitution." B.C.M. , 744 So.2d at 301 (quoting State v. Mississippi Ass'n of Supervisors, Inc. , 699 So.2d 1221, 1223 (Miss. 1997) ). We find that there is no "palpable conflict" between the statute, as interpreted above, and any provisions of our Constitution. The State argued that Section 41-21-77 cloaked the facility director with the discretion to override a court order and deny admission to the two individuals; it does not. And so, despite Lamar County's arguments, the statute is not in palpable conflict with the Section 86, nor is it an encroachment of the executive into a judicial function thus in violation of Section 144. Accordingly, we refrain from ruling on the constitutionality of Section 41-21-77, as it is not in "palpable conflict" with any plain provisions of the Constitution.

¶ 19. But that is not the only reason we should refrain from engaging in a constitutional examination of Section 41-21-77. The genesis of the constitutional issue here derives from the chancery court's "alternative" holding. It is axiomatic that statements which are unnecessary to a court's ruling are dicta . McKibben v. City of Jackson , 193 So.2d 741, 744 (Miss. 1967). That said, alternative holdings are not automatically dicta . Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. , 337 U.S. 535, 537, 69 S.Ct. 1235, 93 L.Ed. 1524 (1949) (holding that "where a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum.").

¶ 20. Here, the record is clear; the statute did not do what Young thought it did, and thus she had no legal grounds to overrule the orders of commitment. The finding of contempt had absolutely nothing to do with the possibility of the statute's unconstitutionality. In fact, had the statute been declared unconstitutional, likely, no grounds would exist to find Young in contempt, as she would have been cloaked with legal authority to deny admission, regardless of however unconstitutional that authority might have been.

¶ 21. Simply put, the chancery court could have found Young in contempt only if Section 41-21-77 did not grant her the authority to refuse admission to the individuals; it could not have found Young in contempt if Section 41-21-77 did grant her the authority to refuse admission but was unconstitutional. And the special master admitted as much when he stated:

In the event that the finding of contempt is not upheld upon review, it is the opinion of this [c]ourt that Section 41-21-77 [,] that allows the director of a hospital ... to overrule an order of commitment[,] is unconstitutional[.]

And so, by his own words, the special master acknowledged that the only reason the constitutional issue would arise was if, and only if, the contempt finding was not upheld. What is more, the record reveals that the special master had some hesitation regarding the propriety of a constitutionally based alternative finding. From the bench, he stated: "Now, on the constitutionality issue I recognize ... that the [c]ourt may be off-base in rendering a decision in that regard." This is further evidence of the unnecessary nature of the alternative holding. Simply put, by making the alternative holding, the chancery court was hedging its bets in the event that this Court decided to reverse the finding of contempt (presumably based on Section 41-21-77 ).

¶ 22. The chancery court's alternative holding addressing the constitutionality of the statute was a statement unnecessary to the chancery court's finding of contempt. The decision holding Young in contempt did not "[rest] on two or more grounds;" it rested on only one Young's failure to comply with a court order. It is dicta , and, as such, we decline to address the alternative holding here.

¶ 23. We find that the chancery court did not err in finding that Section 41-21-77 did not authorize Facility Director Young to override the court's orders of commitment and to deny admission to R.M. and C.W. for treatment of mental illness.

II. Contempt

¶ 24. Having determined that Section 41-21-77 did not authorize Young to override the orders of commitment, we now turn to the issue underlying this appeal the chancery court's citation of civil contempt. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the chancery court found Young to be in civil contempt for her failure to comply with Section 41-21-77. As to the specifics of the contempt sanction, the chancery court found:

The director is in civil contempt of this [c]ourt and should be sanctioned. It is the opinion of the [c]ourt that the director should be sanctioned at the rate of $100 per day for seven days in each of these cases for a total of [fourteen] days and should be sanctioned the sum of $1,400, which she should pay into this [c]ourt within the next [thirty] days.

¶ 25. To review a citation for contempt, we must first classify the nature and purpose of the citation of contempt, as contempt citations come in two varieties: criminal and civil.

A. Classification of the Contempt

¶ 26. When determining the type of contempt, the initial inquiry is whether the contempt is civil or criminal in nature. In re Smith , 926 So.2d 878, 887 (Miss. 2006). And though the chancery court found that the contempt here was civil, its classification is not conclusive. In re McDonald , 98 So.3d at 1043. Thus, in undertaking this task, "this Court focuses on the purpose for which the [contempt] power was exercised." Id. In other words, "the determination should focus on the character of the sanction itself and not the intent of the court imposing the sanction." Id.

¶ 27. This Court previously has distinguished between civil and criminal contempt as follows:

If the primary purpose of the contempt order is to enforce the rights of private[-]party litigants or enforce compliance with a court order, then the contempt is civil. Purvis v. Purvis , 657 So.2d 794, 796 (Miss. 1994). The contemnor may be jailed or fined for civil contempt; however, the contemnor must be relieved of the penalty when he performs the required act. Id. at 796-97. Criminal contempt penalties, on the other hand, are designed to punish the contemnor for disobedience of a court order; punishment is for past offenses and does not terminate upon compliance with the court order. Common Cause of Miss. v. Smith , 548 So.2d 412, 415-16 (Miss. 1989).

In re Williamson , 838 So.2d 226, 237 (Miss. 2002). What is more, "in criminal contempt, the court is the aggrieved party, so the fine is paid to the court." Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Winters , 815 So.2d 1168, 1180 (Miss. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McGill , 890 So.2d 859 (Miss. 2004).

¶ 28. Lamar County argues that since enforcement of the chancery court's orders was not available (because R.M. and C.W. had been released and their cases dismissed), the chancery court was using the power of contempt to ensure future compliance with its orders, thus making this a citation for civil contempt. We disagree.

¶ 29. Despite Lamar County's contention, everything in the record, and indeed even Lamar County's own framing of the issue, reveals that while the contempt was titled as civil, it was, in fact, criminal in nature. For one, the finding of contempt was to punish the facility director for the past actions of refusing admission to R.M. and C.W. and sending letters to the chancery court advising that the facility did not have services adequately to address the patients' alcohol and substance-abuse treatment. The finding of contempt was not intended "to compel compliance with an order, admonition, or instruction, but rather as punishment for past offenses." In re McDonald , 98 So.3d at 1043.

¶ 30. Further, even Lamar County agrees that there is no way the facility director could purge (relieve) herself of the contempt, since the cases were dismissed. Such provides even further evidence that the citation was for criminal contempt. See In re Williamson , 838 So.2d at 237. And, while Lamar County argues that the contempt was civil because it was to ensure future compliance with court orders, those orders are nonexistent. Should they be discovered at some point in the future, they will be wholly separate from the present case. This is unlike a citation of civil contempt for a father in arrears on child-support obligations who can cure contempt by complying with the court order and paying. Here, there is no such order for which the chancery court could use the power of civil contempt to enforce compliance. The two individuals were released by the chancery court, the case was dismissed, and the individuals are not in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Mental Health. So it is clear that, in this case, the contempt-while perhaps serving the collateral benefit of compelling compliance with hypothetical, future, court orders-primarily was to punish the facility director for her past act of failing to comply with the commitment orders.

¶ 31. Lastly, the record shows that, pursuant to the citation of contempt, Young was to pay a defined amount of money as a fine directly to the chancery court itself, not to a private litigant. See Winters , 815 So.2d at 1180. Taken altogether, the evidence in the record reveals that the chancery court's citation of civil contempt actually was a citation of criminal contempt.

¶ 32. But the analysis does not end there. The next determination to be made is whether the criminal contempt was constructive or direct. "Where the act constituting the contempt is committed in the immediate presence of the court, the contempt is defined as direct. Where an act is committed out of the presence of the court, the proceeding to punish is for indirect (sometimes called constructive) contempt." Varvaris v. State , 512 So.2d 886, 887 (Miss. 1987). Here, it is clear that the alleged contemptuous act, refusing to comply with orders of commitment, occurred outside the presence of the chancery court. So this is a case of constructive-criminal contempt, which requires additional procedural safeguards.

B. Constructive-Criminal-Contempt Procedure

¶ 33. Because the contempt citation was a constructive-criminal-contempt citation, our next task is determine if the chancery court adhered to the procedural safeguards that such a citation demands. This Court has held that, in a case of constructive-criminal contempt, "defendants must be provided with procedural due process safeguards, including a specification of charges, notice, and a hearing." In re Williamson , 838 So.2d at 237. Here, as a general matter, the special master did provide some notice to Young of the nature of the alleged contumacious conduct and charges through the orders to show cause. And the special master held a hearing.

¶ 34. Yet, when reviewing the record, other procedural defects (specific to constructive-criminal contempt) emerge. For one, since Special Master Andrews initiated the constructive-criminal-contempt proceedings, he was required to recuse himself and to have the hearings conducted by another judge. See In re McDonald , 98 So.3d at 1044. This Court has held:

[I]n cases of indirect or constructive criminal contempt, "where the trial judge has substantial personal involvement in the prosecution, the accused contemnor must be tried by another judge." ... [E]xamples of "substantial personal involvement in the prosecution" warranting recusal include cases where the trial judge acts as a "one-man grand jury;" where the trial judge is "instrumental in the initiation of the constructive-contempt proceedings;" and where the trial judge "acts as prosecutor and judge."

Graves v. State , 66 So.3d 148, 154 (Miss. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). What is more, this Court long has held "that a judge who initiates constructive contempt proceedings has substantial personal involvement and must recuse himself." In re McDonald , 98 So.3d at 1044 (emphasis added). Here, Special Master Andrews initiated the contempt proceedings when he issued the show-cause order. And because the proceedings were for constructive-criminal contempt, Special Master Andrews was required to recuse himself. He did not. We find that his failure to do so requires reversal of the contempt judgment.

¶ 35. But that is not all. As mentioned above, the order to show cause provided some notice to Young of the nature of the alleged contumacious conduct and charges, but it is undisputed that the special master did not issue a summons notifying Young of the criminal nature of the proceedings. The special master believed he was initiating not criminal-contempt proceedings but civil-contempt proceedings. Nonetheless, "[c]riminal-contempt defendants are entitled to notice under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 81(d), which requires service of process." Id. at 1045 ; M.R.C.P 81(d)(2).

¶ 36. Here, the record shows that Young was not provided notice through Rule 81. As discussed above, Young's citation was a citation of criminal contempt, and so she was entitled to notice via a Rule 81 summons. The chancery court failed to provide such notice, and, therefore, we find that the chancery court erred, creating an additional ground for reversal.

¶ 37. We find that the chancery court's classification of the contempt citation was in error, and this erroneous classification led the chancery court to conduct the contempt proceedings in a procedurally defective manner. As for the substance of the contempt finding, due to the procedural defects of the criminal-contempt proceedings, we need not consider whether the citation was correct substantively. See In re McDonald , 98 So.3d at 1043. Based on the chancery court's procedural error, we reverse the chancery court's contempt finding and remand the case for an entry of an order of recusal; we otherwise order proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CONCLUSION

¶ 38. Young's reliance on Section 41-21-77 is misplaced, as it does not provided facility directors with the authority to second-guess the court and to refuse to comply with a lawful order of commitment. For this erroneous reliance on Section 41-21-77, Young was found to have been in civil contempt. But, upon reviewing the record, we find that, while the chancery court labeled Young's contemptuous conduct as civil, it was in fact criminal. This is not merely a superficial issue of semantics and labels, for along with criminal contempt flows various important procedural safeguards, safeguards that were not followed in this case. As a result, we reverse the chancery court's contempt finding, and we remand the case for entry of an order of recusal; we otherwise order proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 39. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH AND KITCHENS, P.JJ., KING, COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR.

      Initials have been used to protect anonymity.

      Initials have been used to protect anonymity.

      Special Master Andrews presided over both the commitment proceedings as well as the contempt proceedings.


author: RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ISHEE, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:

text:
    HEMPHILL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. CITY OF CLARKSDALE, Mississippi
    NO. 2017-CA-00008-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    August 16, 2018
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: CHRISTOPHER SOLOP, LYNN PATTON THOMPSON, JACKSON
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CURTIS D. BOSCHERT
    EN BANC.
   RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. The City of Clarksdale ("City") solicited sealed bids for a public construction project. The City received sealed bids from Landmark Construction Company, GCI ("Landmark"), and Hemphill Construction Company, Inc. ("Hemphill"). When unsealed, both bids exceeded the project's allocated funds by more than ten percent. Rather than rebidding the contract, the City conditionally awarded a contract to Landmark, dependent upon the City's obtaining additional public funds to match Landmark's bid. The City's actions were not provided for in the public bidding laws. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Coahoma County Circuit Court and remand the case to the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In February 2015, the City issued an Advertisement for Bids for the 2014 Community Development Block Grant ("CDBG") Wastewater Improvements - Contract # 1 (Equipment and Controls). The Advertisement called for the City to receive written, sealed bids at the Clarksdale Public Utilities Commission ("CPU") up to and until 1:30 p.m. on May 27, 2015, at which time any bids would be opened publicly and would be considered by the City at the next meeting of the Board of Mayor and Commissioners of the City.

¶ 3. The sealed bids were opened on May 27, 2015, and the Certified Tabulation of Bids revealed Landmark's lump-sum bid was $924,527 and Hemphill's lump-sum bid was $953,800.

¶ 4. Twelve days later, the City held a meeting. The June 8, 2015, minutes of the City reflect that Bill Coker, the City's grant consultant on the project, presented the Certified Tabulation of Bids, which showed that Landmark's bid, combined with the lowest bid on Contract 2: Solid Waste-Denali Water Solutions, LLC- exceeded the project budget by more than ten percent, specifically, $216,182. Coker advised the City that the Mississippi Development Authority would consider increasing CDBG funds by $75,000, and that the Clarksdale Public Utilities Commission ("CPU") would increase its matching funds by an additional $141,182. Coker recommended that the City accept the lowest bids for each Contract, contingent upon the funding increase. The City then accepted Coker's recommendation and decided to award Contract # 1 conditionally to Landmark, dependent upon the aforementioned increased funding. The minutes of the City reflect that there had been no consideration of the City's statutory authority to accept either bid.

¶ 5. On June 19, Hemphill protested the award to Landmark. The City responded to Hemphill on July 9, stating that the City disputed Hemphill's claims, and advised that the contract had been awarded to Landmark.

¶ 6. On July 13, Coker informed the City that the additional CDBG and CPU funding had been acquired. The City then granted the Mayor permission to execute the Mississippi Development Authority Modification on Wastewater Treatment Plant Contract, which modified the budget by increasing it to $216,182. That same day, the City authorized the Mayor to execute a Notice of Award to Landmark.

¶ 7. Hemphill filed a Bill of Exceptions in the Circuit Court of Coahoma County pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2012), appealing the City's July 13 decision to award the contract to Landmark. Hemphill argued, inter alia , that the City had violated Mississippi Code Section 31-7-13 by awarding the contract to Landmark, because the bids submitted exceeded the allocated funds by more than ten percent. Mississippi Code Section 31-7-13(d)(iv) provides that:

if the lowest and best bid is not more than ten percent (10%) above the amount of funds allocated for a public construction or renovation project, then the agency or governing authority shall be permitted to negotiate with the lowest bidder in order to enter into a contract for an amount not to exceed the funds allocated .

Miss. Code Ann. § 31-7-13(d)(iv) (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). Hemphill argued that the City had violated this statute by securing additional funding after the bids were opened because the bids were more than ten percent of the total budget, and, therefore, the City could not negotiate or enter into a contract with Landmark. Hemphill also argued that, even though there is no precise caselaw addressing Section 31-7-13, there are Attorney General public-bidding opinions advising municipalities that they are prohibited from securing additional funds after bids have been opened to negotiate or enter into a contract with a bidder whose bid exceeds the project funds by more than ten percent. See Op. Miss. Att'y Gen. 2012-00195 (April 20, 2012); Op. Miss. Att'y Gen. 98-0764 (Dec. 23, 1998). Finally, Hemphill argued that the City's decision to award the contract to Landmark was arbitrary and capricious.

¶ 8. After a hearing, the circuit court held that the City's award of the project to Landmark did not violate state law, finding that:

[t]he purpose of [ Mississippi Code Section] 31-7-13(d)(iv) is to allow a governmental entity to negotiate with the lowest bidder to bring the bid within the amount of funds allocated. In this case Clarksdale did not negotiate with Landmark. Clarksdale obtained additional funds from the MDA and the CPUC to meet the lowest bid. The bid laws do not prohibit this, accordingly, Clarksdale's actions were not improper.
...
From a policy perspective, the State Legislature has left the decision on when to rebid construction projects with the local governing authorities. [ Mississippi Code Section] 31-7-13 does not prohibit Clarksdale from obtaining or allocating additional funds to meet the lowest bid and since it does not, Clarksdale's award of the Contract to Landmark was not improper.

¶ 9. It is from this Order that Hemphill appeals. Hemphill requests that this Court reverse and remand for a trial on damages.

ISSUES

¶ 10. Hemphill frames the issue on appeal as follows:

Whether the circuit court erred in not finding that Clarksdale violated Mississippi Code Annotated Section 31-7-13 when the bids submitted by Landmark and Hemphill in response to its Advertisement for Bids exceeded the allocated/budgeted funds by more than ten percent (10%) and rather than rejecting these bids and re-advertising, Clarksdale elected to secure additional funding and awarded the contract to Landmark.

¶ 11. Hemphill also argues that the City's decision to award the contract to Landmark was arbitrary and capricious. The first issue is case-dispositive.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12. "Our analysis begins with a determination of the scope of review. Municipalities have only such powers as are expressly granted or necessarily implied by statutes. Such powers are to be construed most strongly against an asserted right, if the right is not clearly given." Hemphill Constr. Co., Inc. v. City of Laurel , 760 So.2d 720, 723 (Miss. 2000) (citing City of Jackson v. McMurry , 288 So.2d 23 (Miss. 1974) ). When the public bid laws do not expressly provide for the action taken by the municipality, the question becomes whether such action is "necessarily implied." Id. Only if the municipality's action was necessarily implied by the statute is the municipality's action entitled to deference. Id.

¶ 13. For questions of law, a municipal board's decision is reviewed de novo. Nelson v. City of Horn Lake ex rel. Bd. of Aldermen , 968 So.2d 938, 942 (Miss. 2007) (citing A & F Props., LLC v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Supervisors , 933 So.2d 296, 300 (Miss. 2006) ). "Likewise, this Court applies a de novo standard of review to matters regarding statutory interpretation." Weiner v. Meredith , 943 So.2d 692, 694 (Miss. 2006).

DISCUSSION

¶ 14. The public-purchase laws concerning bidding requirements neither expressly grant, nor clearly give, any municipality the power to award a contract, post-bid-opening, to a bidder whose bid exceeded the allocated project funds by more than ten percent, nor the power to procure additional public funds, post-bid-opening, to award the contract to such bidder. Since there is no express grant or clearly given authority, the City is left only with the dubious argument that its ultra vires acts were necessarily implied by statute.

The term "necessarily implied" is somewhat restrictive. "Necessarily implied" refers to a logical necessity and means that no other interpretation is permitted by the words of the instrument construed, and it has been defined as an implication which yields so strong a probability of intent that any intention to the contrary cannot be supposed leaving no room for doubt.

Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. , 573 So.2d 1343, 1346 (Miss. 1990) (citing Strong v. Bostick , 420 So.2d 1356, 1361 (Miss. 1982) ). Such an argument is untenable, for it cannot be argued fairly that its acts necessarily were implied by statute.

¶ 15. The City allocated public funds to finance a public construction project. The City then solicited sealed bids for the project. Landmark and Hemphill submitted sealed bids. It is undisputed that, after the bids were unsealed, both bids exceeded the original allocated funds by more than ten percent. Therefore, the City was without statutory authority under Section 31-7-13 to award either bid. Notwithstanding, the City sought and procured additional public funds for the project, requiring Landmark to hold its bid open, contingent upon the City's receipt of additional funding. The City then allotted the original allocated funds, plus the newly procured public funds, to the project and accepted Landmark's bid. These steps, taken after the bids were opened, frustrate the powers expressly granted, clearly given, or necessarily implied in the public-purchasing laws and render the ten-percent limitation not only superfluous, but meaningless. "A construction which will render any part of a statute inoperative, superfluous, or meaningless is to be avoided." McCaffrey's Food Market, Inc. v. Miss. Milk Comm'n , 227 So.2d 459, 463 (Miss. 1969).

¶ 16. Mississippi Code Section 31-7-13(d)(iv) specifically provides that, if the lowest and best bid is not more than ten percent above the amount of funds allocated for a public construction project, then governing authority shall be permitted to negotiate with the lowest bidder in order to enter into a contract for an amount not to exceed the funds allocated .

¶ 17. In considering a statute passed by the Legislature,

the first question a court should decide is whether the statute is ambiguous. If it is not ambiguous, the court should simply apply the statute according to its plain meaning and should not use principles of statutory construction. Whether the statute is ambiguous or not, the ultimate goal of this Court is to discern and give effect to the legislative intent.

Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Cole ex rel. Dillon , 954 So.2d 407, 412-13 (Miss. 2007) (quoting Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Allred , 928 So.2d 152, 154 (Miss. 2006) ) (internal alterations omitted).

¶ 18. Mississippi Code Section 31-7-13 (d)(iv) is unambiguous. In its plainest terms, the statute provides that an agency or governing authority (here, the City) shall be permitted to "negotiate ... to enter into a contract " if the "bid is not more than ten percent (10%) above the amount of funds allocated " for the project. (Emphasis added.) Three words/phrases in this statute are examined: (1) "funds allocated," (2) "negotiate," and (3) "enter into a contract." Each word and phrase must be read together and given effect. See Morgan v. State ex rel. Dist. Attorney , 208 Miss. 185, 44 So.2d 45, 49 (1950) ("[E]very word, sentence, phrase, or clause in a statute must be given a meaning, if possible, and this rule is not avoided by the use of the aid to statutory construction, 'ejusdem generis.' "). See also McCaffrey's Food Market, Inc. , 227 So.2d at 463 (statutes "must be viewed or read as an integrated whole, and the task of the court is to fit, if possible, all parts of a statute into a harmonious whole.")

¶ 19. The first phrase, "funds allocated," is included twice in the statute. The term "funds allocated" is in the past tense and can only refer to funds that already have been allocated, not funds to allot in the future. The City's authority to "negotiate ... to enter into a contract" was limited by the amounts originally allocated for the project, i.e. , before the bids were opened. Based on the plain and precise language of the statute, the City was without statutory authority to negotiate, conditionally accept, or enter into a contract with either Landmark or Hemphill based on the amount of funds that the City had allocated when the bids were opened. Both bids exceeded the funds allocated for the project by more than ten percent, both when the bids were made and later opened.

¶ 20. Hemphill submitted to the trial court an Attorney General public-bidding opinion that recognized this principle. While Attorney General opinions are not binding on this Court, "they certainly are useful in offering guidance to the Court." Jones Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Revenue , 111 So.3d 588, 602 (Miss. 2013) (citing Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dale , 914 So.2d 698, 703 (Miss. 2005) ) (citations omitted). In 2012, the Attorney General was asked whether the amount of funds allocated for a project may be determined after bids have been received. The Attorney General opined that:

a determination as to the amount of the funds allocated, as contemplated in Section 31-7-13(d)(iv), is a factual determination to be made by the public entity seeking to procure the construction contract. While there is no specific statutory provision directing a public entity as to whether the determination is to be made prior to the solicitation of bids or may be made after bids are received, such determination as to the amount of funds available for the procurement of the proposed construction contract should be made prior to the solicitation of bids. In fact, the term "allocated" is in the past tense and presumes that the allocation has already been completed.

Op. Miss. Att'y Gen. 2012-00195 (April 20, 2012) (emphasis added). The Attorney General further opined that only the funds that the public entity contemplated using for the procurement of the construction contract may be considered to trigger its authority to negotiate with the lowest and best bidder under Mississippi Code Section 31-7-13(d)(iv).

¶ 21. The City unconvincingly counters that Mississippi Code Section 31-7-13 applies only when the governing authority "negotiates" with the lowest bidder. The City argues that Mississippi Code Section 31-7-13(d)(iv) does not apply in this case because it "did not negotiate with Landmark nor did it change the plans and specifications set forth in the Advertisement to allow for negotiations." The City's actions belie its words.

¶ 22. Clarksdale conditionally accepted Landmark's bid before awarding Landmark the contract. Clarksdale's action required Landmark to keep its bid open if and until (1) Clarksdale could acquire additional CDBG match funds, (2) Clarksdale could acquire additional CPU match funds, (3) approval was given by the Mississippi Development Authority, and (4) the City attorney reviewed and approved the transaction. Despite the delay created by the City's conditional acceptance, Landmark reciprocated by leaving its bid open for an uncertain time. While the City argues that it did not negotiate with Landmark, one need not modify a construction plan or change advertisement specifications to "negotiate." Indeed, "negotiate" is defined as follows: "to transact business," "to confer with another so as to come to terms or reach an agreement," or "to settle or arrange by conferring or discussing." Negotiate , Webster's II New College Dictionary 732 (2001).

¶ 23. Assuming arguendo that the City did not negotiate with Landmark, the applicable statute states that a governing authority "shall be permitted to negotiate with the lowest bidder in order to enter into a contract for an amount not to exceed the funds allocated ." Miss. Code Ann. § 31-7-13(d)(iv) (emphasis added). In reading the statute "as an integrated whole," as we must, it is abundantly clear that the statute does not apply exclusively to negotiation authority, for the authority to "negotiate" is predicated on the authority also to "enter into a contract." Miss. Code Ann. § 31-17-3(d)(iv). Because both bids exceeded ten percent of the funds allocated, the City had no authority to "negotiate ... to enter into a contract" with either bidder.

¶ 24. Next, the City argues that, "if the Legislature did not want a municipality to have the option to obtain additional funding, it would have prohibited it." The City then asserts that "it is reasonable to infer " that it had such statutory authority. Such an argument exposes the invalidity of the actions taken by the City. The City did not have authority to procure additional funds post-bid-opening, for municipal powers "are to be construed most strongly against an asserted right, if the right is not clearly given ." Hemphill Constr. Co., Inc , 760 So.2d at 723. The City unconvincingly urges this Court to hold the opposite, arguing that, because the right to procure additional funds post-bid-opening was not clearly given, it is reasonable to infer it had such authority. Such a conclusion directly conflicts with this Court's precedent and the body of statutory law that grants municipal entities their public-purchasing authority.

¶ 25. Finally, the City argues that its ultra vires acts were consistent with the principles behind the public-purchasing laws because it awarded the public contract "to the lowest and best bidder." This Court previously has rejected this very same argument. In Hemphill Construction Co. Inc. , Harold West Contractors, Inc., ("West") submitted the lowest bid for a construction project and later was allowed to amend its bid price after the bids already had been opened. Hemphill , 760 So.2d at 722. West was the lowest bidder before and after the bid amendment, so the City of Laurel chose to award the contract to West. Id. at 723. The losing bidder (Hemphill) appealed, arguing that Laurel was not authorized by statute to allow a bid to be amended post-opening. Id. Laurel responded that, because the contract recipient ultimately was the lowest bidder both before and after the bid correction, the overall purpose (i.e. , "spirit") of the public-bidding laws was met in those circumstances. Id. at 724. This Court rejected Laurel's argument, holding that its "decision [was] not intended to impute any culpable wrongdoing by the City of Laurel or West." Id. "While the City may be comfortable with its decision in this instance, however, the broader public will lose in the long run if the public purchase laws are circumvented." Id.

¶ 26. The foundational principles underlying the statutory requirements of competitive bidding negate any inference that the City could obtain additional public funds post-bid opening. Such a concocted procedure does not "protect the public from collusive contracts," or "prevent favoritism, fraud, extravagance, and improvidence." Id. Furthermore, it does not "promote actual, honest, and effective competition" and it certainly does not allow contracts to "be secured at the lowest cost to taxpayers." Id. Indeed, the City increased the expenditure of public funds by more than $200,000. The City's argument that "the public's interests were protected because the contract was awarded to the lowest bidder," is unavailing. As this Court stated in Hemphill Construction Co., Inc. , "the broader public will lose in the long run if the public purchase laws are circumvented." Id. at 724.

CONCLUSION

¶ 27. The City was without statutory authority to procure additional public funds post-bid-opening to award the contract to Landmark, for its bid exceeded ten percent of the public funds allocated for the project. We hold that the circuit court erred in affirming the City's decision to award the contract to Landmark. Accordingly, the Court reverses the judgment of the Coahoma County Circuit Court and remands the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 28. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. ISHEE, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS, P.J., AND KING, J.

ISHEE, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:

¶ 29. The majority holds that Mississippi Code Section 31-7-13(d)(iv) precludes a governing authority from procuring additional funding for a public-construction project after the opening of sealed bids. (Maj. Op. ¶ 27). I would find there to be no such preclusion. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

¶ 30. Section 31-7-13, Hemphill argues (and the majority agrees) required the City to reject both bids because they both were ten percent more than the original amount allocated for the project. But Clarksdale argues that, while the text of Section 31-7-13(d)(iv) grants a municipality the discretion to negotiate under certain circumstances, it does nothing to prevent a governing authority from securing additional funding. After examining the text of the statute, I agree.

¶ 31. My agreement with Clarksdale's position is based on the text of the provision, which provides that if the bid is not more than ten percent higher than the amount (originally) allocated, a governing authority "shall be permitted to negotiate with the lowest bidder in order to enter into a contract for an amount not to exceed the funds allocated." Miss. Code Ann. § 31-7-13(d)(iv) (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). A plain reading of the text confirms that this statute applies only when the governing authority negotiates with the lowest bidder. To negotiate means "[t]o communicate with another party for the purpose of reaching an understanding[,]" or "[t]o bring about by discussion or bargaining[.]" Negotiate , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Here, nothing in the record indicates that the governing authority (the City) undertook any action which resembled "negotiations" with Hemphill or Landmark. Neither discussions nor bargaining took place with either party post-bid; the City simply obtained funding to meet the lowest bid.

¶ 32. Absent from the text of the statute, however, is any language which prohibits a governing authority from obtaining additional funding to pay for a public project. To be sure, when reading the text of Section 31-7-13(d)(iv), it is reasonable to infer that if all of the submitted bids exceed the funding a governing authority possesses for a project, the governing authority in that instance has no choice but to reject all bids, as it simply could not pay the price of the bid. However, if all bids exceed the budgeted amount for a project, but the governing authority can procure additional funding, there is simply nothing in the text of the statute that prohibits it from doing so.

¶ 33. In support of its finding that Section 31-7-13(d)(iv) precluded Clarksdale from obtaining additional funding, the majority reasons that the allocated amount is to be determined before bid solicitation. (Maj. Op. ¶ 20). In doing so, the majority cites an opinion of the Attorney General that-ironically enough-states that, while the funding determination should be made before bids are solicited, "there is no specific statutory provision directing a public entity as to whether the determination is to be made prior to the solicitation of bids or may be made after bids are received." Op. Miss. Att'y Gen. 2012-00195 (April 20, 2012) (emphasis added). So, while that Attorney General's opinion suggests that it may be a wise and preferable policy to require such determination before solicitation, it also simultaneously reinforces my position that no statute demands such.

¶ 34. For the reasons stated above, in the end, I would affirm the City's award of the contract to Landmark. I respectfully dissent.

KITCHENS, P.J., AND KING, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      The CDBG Wastewater Treatment Improvements Project was broken into two contracts: Contract # 1: Equipment and Controls, and Contract # 2: Solid Waste. This appeal concerns Contract # 1 only.

      Hemphill also argued that it met the requirements for preference under Section 3 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968; therefore, the City was required to award Hemphill the contract. The circuit court found that Hemphill was not entitled to Section 3 preference. Hemphill does not appeal that determination.

      Allocate : "1. To set aside for a special purpose. 2. To distribute according to plan: ALLOT." Webster's II New College Dictionary 30 (2001).

      McCaffrey's Food Market, Inc. , 227 So.2d at 463.


text:
    Donte SHEPARD v. STATE of Mississippi
    2016-CT-01567-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 10, 2018 Closed: August 9, 2018
    Certiorari - Granted.


text:
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    2016-CT-01002-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 3, 2018 Closed: August 2, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
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    2016-CT-00122-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 4, 2018 Closed: August 2, 2018
    Certiorari - Granted.


text:
    Daniel Israel SINGLETON v. Jacquelyn BANKS
    2016-CT-01078-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 7, 2018 Closed: August 2, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    Shuntez JOHNSON v. STATE of Mississippi
    2016-CT-01287-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 15, 2018 Closed: August 9, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    James D. HAVARD v. Tanelle SUMRALL
    James D. Havard v. Tanelle Sumrall
    2015-CT-00138-COA 2016-CT-01585-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 17, 2018 Closed: August 9, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    Samuel Andrew JOHNSON v. Wythe RHETT
    2016-CT-01532-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 22, 2018 Closed: August 9, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    Hunter Lane SARRETT v. STATE of Mississippi
    2016-CT-01267-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 22, 2018 Closed: August 9, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
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    2016-CT-00524-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 22, 2018 Closed: August 16, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    Ned B. CLARK, Jr. v. Charles MCCORKLE
    2016-CT-00888-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 25, 2018 Closed: August 9, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    Brett JONES v. STATE of Mississippi
    2015-CT-00899-SCT
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 22, 2018 Closed: August 2, 2018
    Certiorari - Granted.


text:
    Curtis Ray MCCARTY, Jr. v. Arthur WOOD, III
    2016-CT-00928-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 29, 2018 Closed: August 2, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    Jerold Wayne SMITH v. STATE of Mississippi
    2017-CT-00259-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: June 8, 2018 Closed: August 23, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    Timothy Scott BEASLEY v. STATE of Mississippi
    2016-CT-00685-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: June 11, 2018 Closed: August 23, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    Matthew Edward PIERCE v. STATE of Mississippi
    2016-CT-00700-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: June 12, 2018 Closed: August 9, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    David Michael LYON, Jr. v. Billy MCGEE
    2016-CT-00637-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: May 29, 2018 Closed: August 2, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    Willie Carl PICKETT v. STATE of Mississippi
    2016-CT-00932-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: June 25, 2018 Closed: August 30, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    Graham Read IRBY v. Sudhakar MADAKASIRA, M.D.
    2015-CT-01759-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: June 26, 2018 Closed: August 30, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.


text:
    Vanessa Lynn PAGE v. STATE of Mississippi
    2016-CT-01456-COA
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Filed: July 3, 2018 Closed: August 16, 2018
    Certiorari - Denied.