author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Jason Dirk WALTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Jason Dirk Walton, Petitioner, v. Julie L. Jones, etc., Respondent.
    No. SC16-448 No. SC17-1083
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [May 17, 2018]
    Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Bryan E. Martinez, Staff Attorney, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Martin J. McClain of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, for Appellant/Petitioner
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Timothy A. Freeland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee/Respondent
   PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on appeal by Jason Walton from an order denying a motion to vacate sentences of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Walton also petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of relief and deny Walton's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Walton was convicted and sentenced to death for the execution-style murders of three individuals that occurred during the commission of a robbery and burglary. Walton v. Dugger (Walton IV ), 634 So.2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 1993).

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the death sentences because the trial court failed to afford Walton an opportunity to confront two codefendants whose confessions and statements were presented during the penalty phase. See [ Walton v. State (Walton I ), 481 So.2d 1197,] 1198-1201 [ (Fla. 1985) ]. The trial court conducted a second penalty phase and the jury again recommended death on all three convictions. See Walton v. State [ (Walton II ) ], 547 So.2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1989).[ ] The trial court again imposed the death penalty on all three convictions, and this Court affirmed those sentences on appeal. See id. at 626. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. See Walton v. Florida [ (Walton III ) ], 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 759, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990).
Walton filed his initial postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective. See Walton [IV ], 634 So. 2d [at] 1060-61.... After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. See id. Walton appealed that denial to this Court and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. See id. This Court initially relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court for resolution of a public records request by Walton. See id. at 1062. On remand, Walton amended his previously filed rule 3.850 motion to add claims based upon information discovered in the public records and newly adduced evidence. See Walton v. State [ (Walton V ) ], 847 So. 2d 438, 442-43 (Fla. 2003). One such claim was that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to adequately investigate and prepare for trial. See id. at 442 n.2. The trial court again denied all of Walton's claims. See id. at 443. Walton appealed that denial to this Court and again petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. See id. This Court affirmed the denial of Walton's postconviction motion and denied habeas relief. See id. at 460. [This Court] also denied a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Walton pursuant to Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). See Walton v. Crosby , 859 So.2d 516 (Fla. 2003).
Walton thereafter filed a successive postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. See Walton v. State [ (Walton VI ) ], 3 So.3d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 2009). The trial court summarily denied relief. See id. at 1002. Walton appealed that denial to this Court, and this Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court. See id.

Walton v. State (Walton VII ), 77 So.3d 639, 640-41 (Fla. 2011). In 2010, Walton filed a second successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 3.851. Id. at 641. The postconviction court denied Walton's motion. See id. at 642. This Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court. Id. at 644.

On May 7, 2015, Walton filed a third successive postconviction motion asserting that he should either be resentenced to life or receive a new penalty phase due to the fact that his codefendant, Richard Cooper, was resentenced to life based on a cumulative review of the evidence. On December 28, 2015, the postconviction court denied Walton's motion. On March 7, 2016, Walton filed a notice of appeal to this Court. On September 16, 2016, this Court relinquished jurisdiction to allow for rehearing. On October 4, 2016, the postconviction court granted rehearing.

On June 20, 2016, Walton filed a fourth successive postconviction motion, asserting that changes in Florida's capital sentencing law are part of the cumulative review of newly discovered evidence. On January 13, 2017, the postconviction court denied Walton's motion. This appeal follows.

Additionally, on June 8, 2017, Walton filed a petition for habeas relief. This Court stayed the proceedings on September 15, 2017, and then, on September 27, 2017, issued an order for Walton to show cause why Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), does not control.

ANALYSIS

We affirm the postconviction court's denial of relief for the reasons discussed below.

Walton's Cumulative Analysis Claim

Walton contends that a proper Swafford / Hildwin cumulative analysis requires consideration of all changes in the law that might apply if a new trial were granted. We find this claim to be meritless.

To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must meet two requirements. First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence. Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. See Jones v. State , 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) ( Jones II ). Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones II test if it "weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability." Jones II , 709 So.2d at 526 (quoting Jones v. State , 678 So.2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996) ). If the defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence, the second prong requires that the newly discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence. See Jones v. State , 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) ( Jones I ).
In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the postconviction court must "consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible" and must "evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial." Id. at 916. This determination includes whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it constitutes impeachment evidence. The trial court should also determine whether this evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the case. The trial court should further consider the materiality and relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly discovered evidence.
Jones II , 709 So.2d at 521 (citations omitted).
When ... the postconviction court rules on a newly discovered evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, this Court "review[s] the trial court's findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial evidence." Green v. State , 975 So.2d 1090, 1100 (Fla. 2008). In addition, "we review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo." Id.

Swafford , 125 So.3d at 767-68 (alteration in original) (quoting Marek v. State , 14 So.3d 985, 990 (Fla. 2009) ).

As to the first prong of the newly discovered evidence test, the postconviction court found that the resentencing of codefendant Cooper qualified as newly discovered evidence. We conclude that the postconviction court's finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Jones II , 709 So.2d at 521 ("First, in order to be considered newly discovered, the evidence 'must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known [of it] by the use of diligence.' " (quoting Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger , 636 So.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Fla. 1994) ) ).

The second prong of the newly discovered evidence test requires that "the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." Id. (citing Jones I , 591 So.2d at 911, 915 ). The postconviction court found that Walton failed to show that the resentencing of his codefendant, Cooper, to a life sentence would probably result in a life sentence for Walton on retrial. Walton contends that the postconviction court erred because a proper cumulative analysis, as performed in Swafford and Hildwin , requires consideration of changes in the law. Walton asserts that his newly discovered evidence, considered together with the changes to Florida's capital sentencing law, i.e., Hurst , would probably result in him receiving a life sentence; thus he is entitled to resentencing.

As an initial matter, this Court has consistently applied its decision in Asay v. State (Asay V ), 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 41, 198 L.Ed.2d 769 (2017), denying the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), as interpreted in Hurst , to defendants whose death sentences were final when the Supreme Court decided Ring . See, e.g. , Hitchcock , 226 So.3d at 217 ; Zack v. State , 228 So.3d 41, 47-48 (Fla. 2017), petition for cert. filed , No. 17-8134 (U.S. Mar. 12, 2018); Marshall v. Jones , 226 So.3d 211, 211 (Fla. 2017), petition for cert. filed , No. 17-7869 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2018); Willacy v. Jones , No. SC16-497, 2017 WL 1033679, at *1 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2017) ; Lambrix v. State , 217 So.3d 977, 988-89 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 312, 199 L.Ed.2d 202 (2017) ; Bogle v. State , 213 So.3d 833, 855 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 738, 199 L.Ed.2d 609 (2018) ; Gaskin v. State , 218 So.3d 399, 401 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 471, 199 L.Ed.2d 362 (2017). Walton's death sentences became final in 1990. See Walton III , 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 759. Therefore, Walton is among those defendants whose death sentences were final before Ring . Thus it is clear that Hurst is not applicable to Walton.

Turning to what may be considered within a cumulative analysis, this Court stated in Swafford :

The Jones standard requires that, in considering the effect of the newly discovered evidence, we consider all of the admissible evidence that could be introduced at a new trial. Jones II , 709 So.2d at 521. In determining the impact of the newly discovered evidence, the Court must conduct a cumulative analysis of all the evidence so that there is a "total picture" of the case and "all the circumstances of the case." Lightbourne v. State , 742 So.2d 238, 247 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Armstrong v. State , 642 So.2d 730, 735 (Fla. 1994) ).

Swafford , 125 So.3d at 775-76. This Court did not consider any change in law within Swafford . See generally id. In Swafford , this Court reviewed an appeal from a postconviction court's finding that newly discovered negative acid phosphatase (AP) results would not have probably produced an acquittal. See id. at 766. This Court disagreed, holding that the newly discovered AP evidence "so significantly weakened the case against Swafford that it g[ave] rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability for the sexual battery." Id. at 768. This Court then, in performing a cumulative analysis, held that the newly discovered evidence changed the entire character of the case and affected the admissibility of evidence that was originally presented to the jury. Id. at 775-78. In no part of this Court's decision in Swafford was there a discussion or consideration of statutory or decisional changes in the law. See id. Although this Court stated that the newly discovered evidence test "focuses on the likely result that would occur during a new trial with all admissible evidence at the new trial being relevant to that analysis," there is no mention of any changes in law that must be taken into account within a cumulative analysis. See id. at 776. Thus this Court did not hold in Swafford that a cumulative analysis requires consideration of changes in the law that might apply if a new trial were granted. See generally id.

Neither did this Court consider any changes in law while performing a cumulative analysis in Hildwin . See generally 141 So.3d 1178. In Hildwin , this Court reviewed an appeal from a postconviction court's denial of a motion based on newly discovered evidence that established that the DNA did not belong to the defendant. See id. at 1183. This Court held that the newly discovered evidence established that the DNA found on the victim's underwear and on the washcloth at the crime scene belonged to another suspect, which supported the defendant's story that he saw the killer wipe his face with a "white rag." See id. at 1192. This Court then held that the cumulative effect of the newly discovered evidence weakened the case against Hildwin to such an extent that it gave rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability. See id. at 1193. This Court did not discuss any change in law that was considered within the cumulative effect of the newly discovered evidence. See generally id.

Thus in neither Swafford nor Hildwin did this Court hold that a cumulative analysis requires consideration of changes in the law that might apply if a new trial were granted. See generally Swafford , 125 So.3d 760 ; Hildwin , 141 So.3d 1178. This Court applies the Witt v. State , 387 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1980), standard to determine whether decisional changes in the law require retroactive application. See Coppola v. State , 938 So.2d 507, 510-11 (Fla. 2006) ; see also State v. Glenn , 558 So.2d 4, 6 (Fla. 1990) ("[A]ny determination of whether a change in the law requires retroactive application should be decided upon traditional principles pertaining to changes in decisional law as set forth in Witt ." (citing McCuiston v. State , 534 So.2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 1988) ) ). Viewing decisional changes in the law as newly discovered "facts" would erase the need for a retroactivity analysis pursuant to Witt . See Coppola , 938 So.2d at 510-11.

Yet Walton contends that he satisfies the second prong of the newly discovered evidence standard because it is probable that a resentencing jury will not unanimously return death recommendations, and thus, it is probable that life sentences will be imposed. Clearly, Walton is attempting to circumvent this Court's retroactivity holding in Asay V when he asserts that Hurst constitutes a newly discovered fact and is applicable through a cumulative analysis. Thus we conclude that Walton's attempt to shoehorn Hurst retroactivity through a newly discovered evidence claim is meritless. Accordingly, we hold that the postconviction court properly denied Walton's motion.

Walton's McCloud Claim

In Walton's third successive postconviction motion he asserted that he is entitled to a life sentence because his sentences of death are disproportionate to the life sentences imposed on all of his codefendants. The postconviction court found that the life sentences of Walton's two other codefendants, Terry Van Royal, Jr. and Jeffrey McCoy, were irrelevant with regard to proportionality because Van Royal was resentenced to life based on a legal error by the trial judge and McCoy received a life sentence as part of a negotiated plea. Walton now contends that the postconviction court's reasoning is contrary to McCloud . However, McCloud is inapposite because Walton's codefendants received lesser sentences due to purely legal reasons. See Walton II , 547 So.2d at 623 ; see also Jeffries v. State , 222 So.3d 538, 547 (Fla. 2017) ("[W]e have historically refused to review the relative culpability of codefendants when a codefendant pleads guilty and receives a lesser sentence as a result."); Farina v. State , 937 So.2d 612 (Fla. 2006) (holding that the life sentence of a codefendant was irrelevant because the basis for the codefendant receiving the life sentence was purely legal and had no connection to the nature or circumstances of the crime or to the defendant's character or record). Moreover, this Court previously directly addressed Walton's culpability compared to Van Royal, finding that "Walton was indeed more culpable than Van Royal." Walton V , 847 So.2d at 449.

Walton's HurstClaims

Walton also raises several Hurst claims, which we reject. This Court has held that Hurst does not apply retroactively to capital defendants whose sentences were final before the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ring . Asay V , 210 So.3d at 7-14. In Hitchcock , this Court affirmed its decision in Asay V , denying the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida , as interpreted in Hurst , to defendants whose death sentences were final when the United States Supreme Court decided Ring . Hitchcock , 226 So.3d at 217 ; see also Zack , 228 So.3d at 47-48 ; Marshall , 226 So.3d at 211 ;

Willacy , 2017 WL 1033679, at *1 ; Lambrix v. State , 227 So.3d 112, 113 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 312, 199 L.Ed.2d 202 (2017) ; Bogle , 213 So.3d at 855 ; Gaskin , 218 So.3d at 401. Walton is among those defendants whose death sentences became final before Ring .

This Court has previously rejected Eighth Amendment Hurst claims. See Hannon v. State , 228 So.3d 505, 513 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 441, 199 L.Ed.2d 326 (2017) ; Lambrix , 227 So.3d at 113 ; Asay v. State (Asay VI ), 224 So.3d 695, 702-03 (Fla. 2017) ; Hitchcock , 226 So.3d at 216-17. Walton disagrees with the retroactivity cutoff that this Court set in Asay V ; however, that decision is final.

Walton's Habeas Claim

Walton's petition sought relief pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , and our decision on remand in Hurst . This Court stayed Walton's appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock . After this Court decided Hitchcock , Walton responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case. After reviewing Walton's response to the order to show cause, as well as the State's arguments in reply, we conclude that Walton is not entitled to relief. Walton's death sentences became final in 1990. Walton III , 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 759, 107 L.Ed.2d 775. Thus Hurst does not apply retroactively to Walton's sentences of death. See Hitchcock , 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we deny Walton's petition for habeas relief.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of Walton's motion for postconviction relief and deny his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

QUINCE, J., recused.

      The trial judge found the following aggravating factors:
      (1) the murders were committed during the commission of a robbery and burglary; (2) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain; (3) the murders were committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel fashion; (4) the murders were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner; and (5) the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest. The trial judge noted that the first two aggravating circumstances would be considered as one. The trial judge found no mitigating factors and imposed the death sentence.
      Walton II , 547 So.2d at 624.

      Walton's fourth successive postconviction motion reasserted, in part, Walton's third successive postconviction motion arguments in light of Hurst v. State , 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

      Swafford v. State , 125 So.3d 760 (Fla. 2013).

      Hildwin v. State , 141 So.3d 1178 (Fla. 2014).

      Acid phosphatase is commonly found in seminal fluid. See Swafford , 125 So.3d at 766.

      McCloud v. State , 208 So.3d 668 (Fla. 2016).

      Walton claims that: (1) his death sentences violate the Eighth Amendment and the Florida Constitution; and (2) the retroactivity rulings in Asay V and Mosley v. State , 209 So.3d 1248 (Fla. 2016), violate the Eighth Amendment principles announced in Furman v. Georgia , 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).

      The Supreme Court denied certiorari review on August 24, 2017. See Asay v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 41, 41-42, 198 L.Ed.2d 769 (2017).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Eric Kurt PATRICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Eric Kurt Patrick, Petitioner, v. Julie L. Jones, etc., Respondent.
    No. SC16-801 No. SC17-246
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    [June 14, 2018]
    Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Suzanne Myers Keffer, Chief Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant/Petitioner
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Lisa-Marie Lerner and Ilana Mitzner, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee/Respondent
    Billy H. Nolas, Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Tallahassee, Florida, Amicus Curiae The Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Northern District of Florida
   PER CURIAM.

Eric Kurt Patrick, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Patrick also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part the postconviction court's denial of Patrick's postconviction motion and remand for an evidentiary hearing on one claim. We grant Patrick's petition for writ of habeas corpus, which raises a valid claim under Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and Hurst v. State (Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

I. BACKGROUND

In 2009, Patrick was convicted of the kidnapping, robbery, and first-degree murder of Steven Schumacher. Patrick v. State , 104 So.3d 1046, 1054 (Fla. 2012). On direct appeal, we affirmed his convictions and sentences, including a sentence of death for the murder, and summarized the guilt-phase evidence as follows:

Eric Kurt Patrick was recently released from prison and homeless when he met Steven Schumacher at Holiday Park during a rain shower when both men took shelter under a pavilion. Schumacher invited Patrick to lunch, then to stay with him at his home until Patrick was back on his feet. On the night of Sunday, September 25, 2005, Patrick beat Schumacher to death. Patrick left Schumacher's apartment and took Schumacher's truck and parked it at the Tri-Rail station. Patrick withdrew approximately $900 from Schumacher's bank account using his ATM card in three separate transactions. Patrick was arrested after a separate, unrelated encounter with Deputy Kurt Bukata. Patrick [later] confessed to beating Schumacher, stated that he was afraid Schumacher was dead, and that he didn't mean to kill him.
....
On the night of the murder, Patrick and Schumacher drank beers and went to bed. Patrick gave Schumacher a massage, then they both lay naked in bed. According to Patrick, Schumacher attempted anal sex, which Patrick refused. Patrick stated that Schumacher was "riding up on [him] squeezing [him]." After Patrick told him to stop, Schumacher stopped but tried again later. Patrick then explained that he "cut loose on [Schumacher]."
Patrick admitted and the evidence verified that Patrick beat Schumacher in the bedroom, beginning in the bed. He began hitting Schumacher with his fists but also beat him with a wooden box because his hands hurt so badly. Schumacher's nose was broken and his face was cut. He was hit so hard that his teeth were broken. Patrick then tied up Schumacher using a telephone cord at the base of the bed, then taped his mouth when Schumacher yelled for help. Patrick did not want Schumacher "to go to the law" on him. Patrick put Schumacher in the bathtub on his side where Schumacher was later found dead.
Jenny Scott and Robert Lyon, Schumacher's friends, usually saw him daily. They last saw Schumacher on [Sunday,] September 25, 2005 .... Scott did not hear from Schumacher [after that time,] and she also noticed his truck was missing. When Scott went to check on Schumacher on Tuesday, he did not answer so she called the Sheriff's Department.
Deputy James Snell responded to Scott's call. They both went into the apartment and saw that the bedroom was dark and disarrayed. Both Deputy Snell and Scott saw blood stains throughout the room. At that point, Scott ran out of the apartment. Deputy Snell found Schumacher's body in the bathtub. The body was very bloody and the hands and ankles were bound in the back; the head and face were taped, with the face resting on the drain. The pants were pulled down although still on the body. The body was cold and stiff and the blood had pooled. The ankles were bound with torn sheets and a knotted lamp cord. The wrists were bound by a telephone cord and tape. There was bruising on an elbow, the chin, and the top of the head. The tape on the head went both horizontally and vertically and there was a pillow case folded over the mouth under the tape. The tape seemed to be one continuous piece. Deputy Snell informed Scott that Schumacher was dead. Scott then provided the police with a description of Patrick.
The deputies found no evidence of forced entry into the apartment. Additionally, they discovered that the air conditioning was set at sixty degrees so all the windows had condensation on them. In the kitchen trash, the deputies found tape matching that used on Schumacher's face. Schumacher's wallet was in the living room. There were bloody footprints on the tile, a large blood stain on the bedroom carpet, and blood spatter on the dresser and wall. The bedroom lamp was cracked and missing its cord. A cord was in the bed under the sheets. There was blood spatter on the sheets and headboard. Teeth were found in the bedclothes. A broken box with blood on it was under the dresser.
Deputy Kurt Bukata ran into Patrick at a gas station and arrested him on an outstanding warrant. Patrick had injuries on his knuckles and was carrying a duffel bag. Patrick also had some abrasions on his upper body. Bukata inventoried the duffel bag and found blood-stained boots, jeans, briefs, and socks.... DNA tests identified Schumacher's blood on Patrick's jeans.

Id. at 1053-54.

Patrick's jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of seven to five. The trial court followed the jury's recommendation, finding seven aggravators and sixteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. On appeal, this Court struck one aggravator (cold, calculated, and premeditated) but affirmed the death sentence, finding the consideration of this aggravator harmless error. Id. at 1055, 1068. Patrick's death sentence became final in 2013. Patrick v. Florida , 571 U.S. 839, 134 S.Ct. 85, 187 L.Ed.2d 65 (2013).

Thereafter, Patrick timely filed his initial motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, followed by a corrected motion, raising seven claims with subparts. Patrick later sought leave to amend his rule 3.851 motion to add a Hurst v. Florida claim. The postconviction court accepted the amendment and, after an evidentiary hearing on certain claims, denied the motion in its entirety. As to the Hurst v. Florida claim, the postconviction court noted that this Court had not yet determined whether the holding in that case would have retroactive effect and denied the claim without prejudice to Patrick's filing a future motion on the same grounds once this Court resolved the retroactivity issue in then-pending cases.

Patrick appealed the denial of his rule 3.851 motion and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court, requesting relief under Hurst v. Florida and Hurst . In his appeal, Patrick argues that the postconviction court erred with respect to the following claims: (1) that he is entitled to a new penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida ; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contest Patrick's Miranda waiver and the voluntariness of his confession; (3) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Frye challenge to shoeprint evidence or otherwise contest its credibility; (4) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present certain mitigation evidence at Patrick's penalty phase; and (5) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately question or challenge two jurors during voir dire. We find no reversible error in the postconviction court's procedural ruling that Patrick's Hurst v. Florida claim was premature, as it was presented to the postconviction court before this Court decided the retroactivity of that decision and Hurst in Mosley v. State , 209 So.3d 1248, 1276 (Fla. 2016). However, as explained below, we grant Patrick a new penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida and Hurst in accordance with his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because Patrick is entitled to a new penalty phase as argued in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, the other penalty-phase claim raised before the postconviction court is moot and need not be addressed. We address each of the remaining claims in turn.

II. POSTCONVICTION APPEAL

Each of the non- Hurst claims at issue on appeal alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Some of these claims were denied after an evidentiary hearing and some summarily. We review the summarily denied claims de novo, accepting their allegations as true to the extent they are not conclusively refuted by the record and reversing for an evidentiary hearing if they are facially sufficient to show entitlement to relief and raise an issue of fact. Ault v. State , 213 So.3d 670, 677-78 (Fla. 2017). As to the claims denied after an evidentiary hearing, we "defer to the postconviction court's factual findings as long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record" and review the postconviction court's legal conclusions de novo. Seibert v. State , 64 So.3d 67, 78 (Fla. 2010).

Substantively, each ineffective assistance of counsel claim required Patrick to show the following, in accordance with Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) :

First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.

Abdool v. State , 220 So.3d 1106, 1111 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Bolin v. State , 41 So.3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) ). These two prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel test present mixed questions of law and fact, Sochor v. State , 883 So.2d 766, 771 (Fla. 2004) (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ) ), but the ultimate conclusions on both prongs are matters of law, Peterson v. State , 221 So.3d 571, 584 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Everett v. State , 54 So.3d 464, 472 (Fla. 2010) ).

A. Confession

Patrick argues that the postconviction court erred in denying the claim that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to consult a psychopharmacologist or addictionologist for the purpose of challenging the validity of his Miranda waiver and the voluntariness of his confession that followed. The motion would have been based on the premise that Patrick was experiencing cocaine withdrawal, which combined with his preexisting conditions of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder to render him unable to comprehend his rights sufficiently to waive them or have the mental capacity to withstand police coercion and speak voluntarily thereafter. Because counsel cannot be deficient for failing to file a meritless motion, see Merck v. State , 124 So.3d 785, 800 (Fla. 2013), we affirm the postconviction court's denial of this claim.

The confession at issue was given during a video-recorded custodial interrogation after Patrick was read his Miranda rights, said he understood them, agreed to waive them, and signed a waiver form. To establish that the proposed motion would have been successful, Patrick presented the postconviction court with the video of the interrogation and the testimony of Dr. William Morton, a psychopharmacologist. After considering the video and Dr. Morton's testimony, the postconviction court made the following significant finding:

While, arguably, an expert could point out the subtleties that would show withdrawal, that is exactly what they would have been in this case. In other words, there was no glaring behavior that would have led a reasonable judge or jury to believe that [Patrick] was under the influence of any drugs or alcohol or manifesting any drug withdrawal symptoms.

The court also stated that it noted no signs of impairment and that Patrick's answers to the detective's questions were relevant and responsive. Patrick argues that the lack of "glaring behavior" does not invalidate his claim but proves the need for expert testimony. Consistent with this position, Dr. Morton testified that he was able to detect nuances that would not be observed by the average lay person. Even so, the essential point of the postconviction court's finding-that the video belies Patrick's claim, even after consideration of his expert's testimony-remains valid.

Indeed, while tired and distressed concerning his crimes, Patrick seemed intelligent, reflective, and engaged during the interview, even drawing a map for the interviewing officer to show where he left the victim's keys, while providing detailed instructions. Moreover, although Dr. Morton indicated that Patrick would have been experiencing a significant level of physical and emotional discomfort from drug withdrawal, he did not testify that Patrick was incapable of understanding the Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them, and he found that Patrick's withdrawal symptoms were only "mild to moderate." Also, although Dr. Morton opined that Patrick showed "confusion" and "some episodes of slow thinking," Patrick made direct comments during the interview indicating that he understood the likely consequences of his statements. This evidence supports the postconviction court's findings and leads us to conclude that Patrick gave his statements with "full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it," such that his Miranda waiver was valid. Ramirez v. State , 739 So.2d 568, 575 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) ). Accordingly, a motion to suppress challenging the validity of Patrick's Miranda waiver would have been unsuccessful. Cf. Buzia v. State , 82 So.3d 784, 793 (Fla. 2011) ; Orme v. State , 677 So.2d 258, 262-63 (Fla. 1996).

Likewise, Patrick could not have succeeded on a motion to suppress his confession due to his experience of withdrawal symptoms during the questioning itself, as this component of the motion would have relied on his subjective mental state, not any specific examples of external pressure from the police beyond the inherent pressure of a custodial interrogation. See Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 165, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ("[W]hile mental condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant's state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry.");

Thomas v. State , 456 So.2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1984) ; see also Rigterink v. State , 193 So.3d 846, 865 (Fla. 2016).

For these reasons, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of this claim.

B. Shoeprint Evidence

Patrick also argues that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Frye hearing concerning expert testimony that the boots found in his duffel bag matched bloody shoeprints at the scene, or to challenge the credibility of that evidence. This claim was based on articles indicating that the FBI has questioned the validity of shoeprint identifications. At trial, Patrick's counsel advised the court that he did not raise a Frye challenge to this evidence because, "candidly, there [was] so much other evidence" and the defense was not contesting that Patrick was at the murder scene. He also noted that he probably would not cross-examine the State's expert about the new studies because he did not find them "anywhere near important enough."

At the time of Patrick's trial, "new or novel scientific evidence" was admissible in Florida trials only when it passed the test set forth in Frye v. United States , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). We have previously rejected a claim that shoeprint evidence is "new or novel." Ibar v. State , 938 So.2d 451, 467-68 (Fla. 2006). Thus, the postconviction court properly ruled that if a Frye hearing had been requested, it would have been denied.

Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine the State's expert concerning the validity of shoeprint identification is a separate question. This Court has explained that "strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct." Darling v. State , 966 So.2d 366, 382 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Howell v. State , 877 So.2d 697, 703 (Fla. 2004) ). A decision that lodging a particular challenge to the validity of evidence would be a waste of resources in light of counsel's knowledge of corroborating facts can be a reasonable strategic decision. Id. Here, the record establishes that counsel made a decision not to explore defects in shoeprint identification in part because he had chosen as a matter of strategy, and consistently with Patrick's confession and other evidence, to admit Patrick's presence at the scene. Accordingly, the record establishes that counsel's decision was a reasonable strategic one and, therefore, not deficient. See id. Moreover, given the concession both in defense argument and in Patrick's confession that Patrick was at the scene, there is no reasonable probability that a successful challenge to the validity of shoeprint comparison as a field would have affected the outcome of Patrick's trial. In other words, our confidence in the outcome is not undermined. Thus, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of this claim.

C. Jurors

In the last of the appellate issues that we address, Patrick argues that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge or adequately question two jurors concerning alleged biases. We address this claim as to only one of the jurors, as the claim concerning the other juror relates to the penalty phase, and we have determined that the penalty-phase claims are moot. In pertinent part, Patrick claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge a juror who was biased against him based on his drug use and participation in sexual acts with the male victim. We affirm the denial of this claim except as it relates to statements this juror made regarding the effect evidence of homosexuality would have on his deliberations. For the reasons explained below, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on that aspect of the claim.

A valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge a juror must demonstrate that "one who was actually biased against the defendant sat as a juror," meaning that the juror had a "bias-in-fact that would prevent service as an impartial juror." Carratelli v. State , 961 So.2d 312, 323-24 (Fla. 2007). The evidence of the juror's actual bias must amount to "something more than mere doubt about that juror's impartiality." Mosley , 209 So.3d at 1265. Otherwise, the defendant cannot show prejudice. Carratelli , 961 So.2d at 324. Our cases addressing such claims tend to focus on this prong of the Strickland test, as it is necessary to establish that the juror was actually biased before proving that counsel performed deficiently by failing to challenge that juror due to bias. See, e.g. , Hall v. State , 212 So.3d 1001, 1016 (Fla. 2017) ; State v. Bright , 200 So.3d 710, 742 (Fla. 2016). Accordingly, our analysis of this issue begins with the prejudice prong.

The juror at issue said that he would give a witness's testimony less weight or credence if the witness was on drugs at the time that he observed the things about which he testified. These comments do not show bias, but rather reflect the reality of the effect that drug use can have on a person's ability to see, understand, and remember events. See Trease v. State , 768 So.2d 1050, 1054 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Edwards v. State , 548 So.2d 656, 658 (Fla. 1989) (describing the circumstances under which evidence of a witness's drug use is relevant for impeachment purposes)). Therefore, this aspect of the claim was properly denied.

In contrast, the juror showed actual bias stemming from Patrick's sexual activity. He said that he "would have a bias if [he] knew the perpetrator was homosexual." When asked if he would still hold the prosecutor to the proper burden of proof, he answered, "Put it this way, if I felt the person was a homosexual, I personally believe that person is morally depraved enough that he might lie, might steal, might kill." The juror said "yes" when asked if this bias might affect his deliberations.

The State contends that this juror's bias was not against the defense, as there was no evidence that Patrick was homosexual, and instead suggested more bias against the victim. However, the evidence and arguments at trial indicated that, while Patrick denied being homosexual, he willingly participated in sexual and intimate acts with the male victim before the encounter in question and that he had engaged in similar activity in the past with other men. Applying this evidence to the juror's voir dire answers establishes that, by the juror's own acknowledgement on the record, he was predisposed to believe that Patrick is morally depraved enough to have committed the charged offenses. Although Patrick does not identify as homosexual and indicated in his confession that his sexual activity with men was for material support rather than personal fulfillment, these points do not eliminate the bias that this juror said he would feel based on the evidence that trial counsel and the trial court knew the jury would hear during trial. Also, the fact that the juror's bias would have extended to the victim does not refute the bias he acknowledged or render him impartial.

Because the juror's voir dire answers concerning homosexuality meet the Carratelli test for prejudice, the validity of the summary denial of this claim depends on the performance prong. Failure to raise a meritorious issue is not deficient performance when it results from the exercise of professional judgment after considering alternative courses. Occhicone v. State , 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). As the State argues, the record in this case suggests possible strategic grounds, relating to both phases of the trial, for not striking this juror. We need not detail these grounds but note that when applying Strickland , "[g]enerally, an evidentiary hearing is required to conclude that action or inaction was a strategic decision." Pineda v. State , 805 So.2d 116, 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). On this record, we can neither ignore the possibility that counsel's failure to challenge this juror was strategic nor conclude that it was. Therefore, we reverse the postconviction court's denial of this claim and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

III. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

While Patrick's postconviction motion was pending before the circuit court, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida , in which it held that Florida's former capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it "required the judge to hold a separate hearing and determine whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify imposing the death penalty" even though "[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death." Hurst v. Florida , 136 S.Ct. at 619. On remand from this decision, we reached the following holding:

[B]efore the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, the jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of death.

Hurst , 202 So.3d at 57.

We have held that Hurst applies retroactively to "defendants whose sentences became final after the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ring [ v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) ]." Mosley , 209 So.3d at 1276. Because Patrick's death sentence became final in 2013, Hurst applies retroactively to him. See id. And because the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to five, Patrick's death sentence violates Hurst . See Kopsho v. State , 209 So.3d 568, 570 (Fla. 2017).

Accordingly, we must consider whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:

The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman [v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.

Hurst , 202 So.3d at 68 (quoting State v. DiGuilio , 491 So.2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986) ). While at least three of the aggravators in this case are such that no reasonable juror would have failed to find their existence, based on the jury's seven-to-five recommendation for a sentence of death, we cannot determine that the jury unanimously found that the aggravating factors were sufficient to impose a sentence of death. Nor can we "determine that the jury unanimously found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigation." Kopsho , 209 So.3d at 570. "We can only determine that the jury did not unanimously recommend a sentence of death." Id. Therefore, because we cannot say that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the sentence, the Hurst error in Patrick's sentencing was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. id.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby granted. We vacate the death sentence and remand to the circuit court for a new penalty phase. See Hurst , 202 So.3d at 69.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief except as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning juror bias on the basis of homosexuality, and we grant Patrick's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the postconviction claim concerning juror bias and remand for an evidentiary hearing. We also vacate Patrick's death sentence and instruct the circuit court to hold a new penalty phase in the event that Patrick's conviction for first-degree murder is confirmed after the rule 3.851 motion at issue in this appeal is finally resolved at both the circuit court level and this level.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which CANADY, J., concurs.

POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority's decision to affirm in part and reverse in part the postconviction court's denial of Patrick's postconviction motion and to remand for an evidentiary hearing on one claim. I dissent as to its grant of Patrick's petition for writ of habeas corpus and vacating of the death sentence pursuant to Hurst . See Mosley v. State , 209 So.3d 1248, 1285 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, J., dissenting on retroactivity of Hurst ). I would also affirm the denial of Patrick's other penalty phase claims.

CANADY, J., concurs.

      The aggravators the trial court found were the following: (1) Patrick was under a sentence of imprisonment (great weight); (2) Patrick had a prior violent felony (great weight); (3) the murder occurred in the course of a felony, specifically robbery or kidnapping (great weight); (4) pecuniary gain (merged with the in the course of a felony aggravator); (5) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight); (6) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (great weight); and (7) the victim was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age (seventy-two) or disability (great weight).

      The mitigating circumstances found were the following: (1) Patrick's father was physically and mentally abusive (little weight); (2) Patrick had a tragic youth (little weight); (3) his childhood was unstable (little weight); (4) there was family abuse (some weight); (5) substance abuse from an early age (little weight); (6) Patrick suffered from severe drug abuse at the time of the crime (some weight); (7) Patrick sought absolution and forgiveness (little weight); (8) Patrick had remorse (some weight); (9) he loves his family (little weight); (10) Patrick is close to his mother (some weight); (11) his brother attended the trial (little weight); (12) Patrick confessed (little weight); (13) he had good conduct throughout the trial (little weight); (14) he suffered from emotional stress combined with a history of family dysfunction (little weight); (15) he had experienced childhood sexual abuse and exploitation (some weight); and (16) he had some mental health history as discussed in number 14 (little weight). Patrick , 104 So.3d at 1055 n.2.

      Patrick raised the following claims in his corrected rule 3.851 motion: (1) application of the one-year time limit of rule 3.851 to Patrick's case violates his rights to due process and equal protection; (2) section 27.7081, Florida Statutes (2014), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 are unconstitutional both facially and as applied because public records in the possession of state agencies have been withheld; (3) Patrick is being denied various constitutional rights because of the rules prohibiting his attorneys from interviewing jurors to determine the extent to which constitutional error is present; (4.1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly challenge Patrick's waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and the voluntariness of his confession; (4.2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a challenge to the shoeprint evidence under Frye v. United States , 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ; (4.3) the State failed to disclose that much of the testimony of Martin Diez was false and coerced; (4.4) the cumulative effect of counsel's ineffective assistance, prosecutorial misconduct, and the other errors in this case entitles Patrick to a new trial; (5) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present available mitigation evidence; (6) section 922.105, Florida Statutes (2014), and Florida's existing procedure for lethal injection violate article II, section 3 and article I, sections 9 and 17 of the Florida Constitution and the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, both as applied and facially; and (7) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately question or challenge two jurors.

      The Florida Legislature has since amended the Evidence Code to replace the Frye test with the test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). We have declined to adopt that test to the extent it is procedural. In re Amendments to the Fla. Evid. Code , 210 So.3d 1231, 1238-39 (Fla. 2017).

      Assuming arguendo that Patrick's claim that he was denied a fair trial because of the other juror's views concerning the death penalty extends to how the juror's views would have affected his guilt-phase deliberations, we note that the denial of the claim was proper. Patrick argues that this juror indicated a strong predisposition for recommending the death penalty by declaring that he leaned toward the death penalty at a level of "eight or nine" on a scale of one to ten. However, this juror later said that he was "[r]ight in the middle" concerning the death penalty, would "go by the law," and would have to "hear everything." His comments do not show actual bias. Cf. Guardado v. State , 176 So.3d 886, 899 (Fla. 2015).

      Patrick's counsel was aware that this evidence would be presented at trial, as it was part of his confession, and Patrick's counsel acknowledged at a sidebar before the voir dire questioning at issue that there would be evidence of "[h]omosexual acts."

      Specifically, no reasonable juror would have failed to find that Patrick was under a sentence of imprisonment, that he had a prior violent felony, or, in light of the guilt-phase verdict, that the murder occurred in the course of a felony.


author: PER CURIAM. QUINCE, J., dissenting.

text:
    Ray Lamar JOHNSTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC17-1678
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 5, 2018
    James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, James L. Driscoll Jr., David Dixon Hendry and Gregory W. Brown, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Timothy A. Freeland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

Ray Lamar Johnston appeals an order summarily denying his first successive postconviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.

The underlying facts of this case were described in this Court's opinion on direct appeal. Johnston v. State , 841 So.2d 349, 351-55 (Fla. 2002). Johnston was convicted of the first-degree murder of Leanne Coryell, kidnapping, robbery, sexual battery, and burglary of a conveyance with assault. Id. at 351. Following a unanimous jury recommendation for death, the trial court sentenced Johnston to death. Id. at 355.

In this successive postconviction motion, we affirm the denial of Johnston's claim that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and Hurst v. State , 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). Johnston received a unanimous jury recommendation of death and, therefore, the Hurst error in this case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Davis v. State , 207 So.3d 142, 175 (Fla. 2016). Additionally, we affirm the denial of Johnston's Hurst -induced Caldwell claim. See Reynolds v. State , No. SC17-793, --- So.3d ----, ---- - ----, slip op. at 26-36, 2018 WL 1633075, at *10-12 (Fla. Apr. 5, 2018).

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.

QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.

QUINCE, J., dissenting.

I cannot agree with the majority's finding that the Hurst error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As I have stated previously, "[b]ecause Hurst requires 'a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death,' the error cannot be harmless where such a factual determination was not made." Hall v. State , 212 So.3d 1001, 1036-37 (Fla. 2017) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 619, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) ); see also Truehill v. State , 211 So.3d 930, 961 (Fla.) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 3, 199 L.Ed.2d 272 (2017). The jury in this case did not make all the factual findings that Hurst requires a jury to make in order to impose all the aggravators at issue in this case. Therefore, I dissent.

      We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

      Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Bruce CUNNINGHAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0544
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    Bruce Cunningham, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Christopher BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3780
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Renaud DUBUISSON, Appellant, v. Julie JONES, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-2274
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    Renaud Dubuisson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee; Kenneth Steely, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Winokur, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Sylvester MARTIN Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0400
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Jason LULL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0616
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    Jason Lull, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Willie GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1963
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Breon Lamar LAWSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2175
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Eugene G. MEIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0328
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    Eugene G. Meier, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Harry Jake SANDE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4563
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jeremy Adam DEMOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2788
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Charles Demetries BOUTWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2107
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Courtney Lamar DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1744
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 3, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Josiah BETHEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-2858
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Branden J. BAILEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D18-1145
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    Branden J. Bailey, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits.

Roberts, Ray, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Samuel Christopher GOLDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2218
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    Samuel Christopher Golden, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Robert Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .


text:
    Albert CARTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1020
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    Albert Carter, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael Patrick RAHN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0686
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    Michael Patrick Rahn, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Chrishon Alfredo NOBLES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4656
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Timothy SNEED, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-2459
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    Timothy Sneed, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brett Coleman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits.

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Stacie J. HAWKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1548
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Karl Ronald MENZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-4967
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Markeith EVERETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-681
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

WOLF, ROWE, and WINSOR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Mary Virginia GRAHAM, Petitioner, v. BARMARRAE BOOKS, INC., and Constance Rae Uphold, Respondents.
    No. 1D17-573
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   DENIED.


text:
    Neil RIVERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-658
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 7, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender; Flor Diaz, Steven L. Seliger, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Roberts, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Adolfo L. PENA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-3761
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    Adolfo L. Pena, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Roberts, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jerry Neil ALFRED, Appellant, v. John A. BARFIELD, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2358
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Willie HOPKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1460
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David NICKELSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3024
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    David Nickelson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Osterhaus, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Spencer CLEMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2811
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Jasmine Russell, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jerry Neil ALFRED, Appellant, v. John A. BARFIELD, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2270
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    Jerry Neil Alfred, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Kenneth Steely, General Counsel, and Beverly Brewster, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jon David PAUL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1617
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    Joseph C. Bodiford, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gharrett A. HERRES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-3366
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Darrell THORNTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1390
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Treyston Kristopher MULDER, Appellant, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF JACKSON COUNTY, Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1149
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Donald Vernon KELLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2697
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    Donald Vernon Kelley, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

DENIED .

Roberts, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Bradley OBENOUR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2562
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Tracy Devon NEWTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2556
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Benjamin KELLY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1407
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    Benjamin Kelly, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael McDermott, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Row e, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Brodrick THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1229
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kasey Lacey, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ronald MCKEEHAN, Appellant, v. WARDEN N. W. FLORIDA RECEPTION CENTER, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-0758
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Walt McCoy PORTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1158
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kevin Steiger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Rowe and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kevin Lamar BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4432
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    Kevin Lamar Brown, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Amanda D. Stokes, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Cody Andrew PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1403
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Lori Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Ray, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ronald D. HARDEE, Appellant, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-264
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 9, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 31, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    William MCNEIL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4844
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    William McNeil, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED.

Lewis, Makar, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jeffery Alexzander SCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4745
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael Jerome GRATTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4108
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; Michael Jerome Gratton, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Harry Lee WILSON, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA UNITED AUTO SALE REBECCA GOODING, Respondents.
    No. 1D17-3774
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    Harry Wilson, pro se, Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondents.
   Per Curiam.

DENIED.

Lewis, Makar, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lisa FELTON-WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION and Elite Health Billing, LLC, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-2181
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Matthew D. CHESTER, II, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-66
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    Mark V. Murray, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Robert Charles Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Anthony William LORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5769
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    David Lee CALLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-3616
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    Joseph C. Bodiford and Gannon M. Coens of Bodiford Law, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Dewey Wayne HAMM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0275
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Ray, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Arthur BRADDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0646
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   AFFIRMED.


text:
    Daniel TOBEY, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Respondent.
    No. 1D17-4728
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    Seth E. Miller, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
    Rana Wallace, General Counsel, and Mark Hiers, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Commission on Offender Review, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits.

Lewis, Roberts, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Travis D. SIMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1625
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 11, 2018
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jay BARRINGER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2432
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 31, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Justin Wallace BRYANT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1630
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 29, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Mandamus is denied.


text:
    Akeem COLLINS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2159
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 29, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Daniel BROWN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1398
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 28, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Belated appeal is denied.


text:
    Chad BERKOWITZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. U.S. BANK TRUST, NA, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-0901
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 31, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Dismissed.


text:
    Samuel W. BALLINGER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. REGIONS BANK, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2556
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 31, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    James M. WEST, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2919
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 10, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Leonel SALDANA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1809
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 3, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Charles COOPER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2947
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 29, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Writ of habeas corpus is denied.


text:
    George E. BAKER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2946
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 29, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Mandamus is denied.


text:
    Travis VELSOR, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2617
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 04, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    John SELINGER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Grady C. JUDD, Sheriff, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2882
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 02, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Marshall PERFECT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-42
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Jerilyn Joan MCMAHON and Dale Keith McMahon, Appellants, v. DIGITAL RECEPTION SERVICES, and Tracy A. Keough, Appellees.
    Case Nos. 2D16-5353 2D16-5606
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Clifford LINDQUIST, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1696
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 4, 2017.
    Clifford Lindquist, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Lindquist v. State, 140 So. 3d 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (table decision); Lindquist v. State, 968 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ; Bizzell v. State, 912 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ; Salters v. State, 840 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ; Harris v. State, 777 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ; Hill v. State, 804 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

LaROSE, C.J., and CRENSHAW and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Richard A. DOUCETTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1309
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed September 29, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    HIGH TOWER RESTORATION, LLC, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. HIGH TOWER ROOFING AND CONTRACTING, LLC d/b/a High Tower Roofing, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1160
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 24, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Jose MENDEZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-4115
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 04, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Dennis FIELDS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF REVENUE CHILD SUPPORT, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-4966
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 04, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Darrell Jerome BURNSIDE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2872
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 25, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Charles MCCUMBER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Jessica STARLING, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-0068
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 28, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed. Dismiss is denied.


text:
    Matthew OREFICE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2036
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Samuel D. HART, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1962
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 23, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Kevin WASHINGTON, Jr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. PINPOINT REALTY GROUP, LLC, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-5025
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 07, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Writ of mandamus is denied.

Motions for leave are denied.


text:
    Francesco G. LAGANA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION O/B/O DUNCAN SEAWALL DOCK & BOAT LIFT, LLC, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-5090
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 31, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Garvin JACKSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. PUBLISHERS CLEARING HOUSE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-3055
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 17, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    D.P.G., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. GIFT OF LIFE ADOPTIONS, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-3918
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 02, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Earl Allen POTEAT, III, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Julie Anne POTEAT, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-0621
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 22, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    S. M., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1563
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 31, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Theresa M. VERRENGIA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1981
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 10, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted.


text:
    Angel LOPEZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-0987
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Barbara A. JONES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSN., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1242
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Toriano PARKER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2249
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 31, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Kimberly GOODMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Sean GOODMAN, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2211
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 23, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Frank W. ROBERTO, Jr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-5073
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 25, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    Reginald J. WOOLEY, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. BANK OF AMERICA, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2091
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 20, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Stuart GITLOW & William Gitlow, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Lynne HENNECKE & Stanley Edward Gitlow, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-0052
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 08, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismiss.


text:
    Ana Estela Pimentel JORGENSEN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Scott Edward JORGENSEN, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-4327
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 04, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Robert C. WIELAND, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D16-5014
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 4, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    William D. STOGNER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES DIVISION OF LICENSING, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-0268
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 22, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    David S. HASTINGS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Elaine L. SIRT-HASTINGS, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1492
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 31, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Bill SEASTROM, a/k/a Bill V. Seastrom, et al., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOC., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-0954
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 24, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Granted. Dismissed.


text:
    Darlene DEEGAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. HSBC BANK USA, National Assoc. as Trustee, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2026
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 04, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Peter N. FRASER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Jennifer L. FRASER, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-1944
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 26, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    David Antonio CANADY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2094
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 18, 2017
    David Antonio Canady, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See McDonald v. State, 957 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2007) ; Knight v. State, 808 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2002) ; Ellington v. State, 96 So. 3d 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ; State v. Garcia, 923 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ; State v. Newmones, 765 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

KELLY, VILLANTI, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Christopher SPRADLIN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2058
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 30, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed. Denied.


text:
    Alvin D. HOWARD, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Anthony HOWARD, et al., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2152
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    August 16, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Writ of mandamus is denied.


text:
    Usha PATEL, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOC., Appellee/Respondent(s).
    CASE NO.: 2D17-2183
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 13, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Dismissed.


text:
    Christopher R. NEFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-1860
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Glenmore POOLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1147
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Sarah Elizabeth WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Byron Lafayette WILLIAMS, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1836
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Maureen Green ALTMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D14-4883
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 18, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Robert W. ROSE, Appellant, v. CASTLE KEY INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-668
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017
    Robert M. Brush of Brush & Coyle, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellant.
    David B. Shelton of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SLEET, LUCAS, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Michael S. ZINOVOY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 2D17-1781
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017
    Brooke Elvington of Brooke Elvington Appellate Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, and Ronald J. Russo, Tampa, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Denied.

KELLY, SLEET and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Tony M. BROWN, DOC #043545, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW and John Willis, Warden, Respondents.
    Case No. 2D17-469
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Denied.


text:
    John G. WERNER a/k/a John Werner and Lucy Werner, Appellants, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; Camellia Estates Homeowners Association, Inc., Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1597
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Roderick Deon NANCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1918
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017.
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Ryan N. BARRETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-879
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017
    Ryan N. Barrett, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    C.M.D., Appellant, v. K.R.B., Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-2200
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017
    Elizabeth S. Wheeler of Berg & Wheeler, P.A., Brandon, for Appellant.
    Andrea Black of Andrea Black, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Dismissed.

CASANUEVA, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ernesto PEREZ-HERRERA and Ana Maria Perez, Appellants, v. Simon MOLINA and Rufina Espinoza DeMolina, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D15-4835
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    COLONY BEACH & TENNIS CLUB ASSOCIATION, INC., Jay Yablon, individually, Robert Erazmus, individually, Bruce Pinsky, individually, Brenda Joyce, individually, Stuart Ross, individually, Paula Slattery, individually, and Blake Fleetwood, individually, Appellants, v. Sheldon and Carol RABIN, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-248
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017
    Jeffery W. Warren, Keith D. Skorewicz and Lauren B. Rehm of Bush Ross, P.A., Tampa, for Appellants.
    Alan E. Tannenbaum of Tannenbaum Scro, P.L., Sarasota, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, SLEET, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Wade Christian ARVO, DOC #760199, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-2793
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Joanna Beth Conner, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, SLEET, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Christopher R. NORTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1973
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew J. Salvia, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and SILBERMAN and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jeannette CARLO-GOMEZ, Appellant, v. Victor M. GOMEZ, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-2480
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 20, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    David MOSES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5008
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017
    David Moses, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Chelsea S. Alper, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and MORRIS and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Eddie WALKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-2580
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Karry A. TOLBERT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-4170
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Carol J.Y. Wilson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and SILBERMAN and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellant, v. JIA HUANG, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3118
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017
    Kimberly S. Mello and Danielle M. Diaz of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tampa; and Michele L. Stocker of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
    Charles D. Radeline of Radeline Law Firm, PLC, Palm Harbor, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Dismissed.

KELLY, CRENSHAW, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ronald Austin DOVE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3843
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Deborah PAPPION, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3970
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Paul Joseph CIANO and Mina Ciano, Appellants, v. Beverly Jean CIANO, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-4766 2D16-4797
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    Dawn RUFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-5586
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    TRUST NO. 3008FD DATED 07/13/2015, DEMA INVESTMENTS LLC as Trustee, Appellant, v. LASALLE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee FOR CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF BEAR STEARNS ASSET BACKED SECURITIES I LLC, ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-HE6, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-804
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017
    DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
   Affirmed.


text:
    LEE WETHERINGTON HOMES, LLC, Appellant, v. Brian A. SCHAFFER, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-260
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed October 25, 2017.
    Robert P. Watrous of Robert P. Watrous, Chartered, Sarasota, for Appellant.
    Jennifer Anne Gore Maglio of Maglio Christopher & Toale, P.A. Law Firm, Sarasota, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and MORRIS and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.