author: LAGOA, J.

text:
    Carlos FLEITAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D05-687.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 31, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 31, 2009.

      Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Godfrey, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Claudine M. La France, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before RAMIREZ, WELLS, and LAGOA, JJ.
   LAGOA, J.

After this Court reversed and remanded for a new trial in Fleitas v. State, 867 So.2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), the defendant, Carlos Fleitas (“Fleitas”), was tried and convicted for a second time on multiple counts of false imprisonment, lewd and lascivious molestation on a child, lewd and lascivious assault on a child, lewd and lascivious acts involving a child, and battery on a child with bodily fluids. Fleitas appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence for these counts. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

From 1997 to 2001, Fleitas lived with his girlfriend, Maria V., and her children, including the victim, A.V. Soon after Fleitas moved into their house in Homestead, Florida, A.V. and her siblings began to view Fleitas as a father figure. Their biological father, Luis V., had left their home but continued to live in Homestead. A.V. testified that, initially, she and her siblings liked Fleitas and approved of his relationship with their mother.

The first improper incident occurred when A.V. was ten years old. One afternoon, while A.V.’s mother was at work, Fleitas took A.V. and her sisters to a nearby lake. During a game of “tag,” Fleitas carried A.V. toward a deep part of the lake. According to A.V., Fleitas then asked her “if I had ever seen a man’s penis” and “started explaining to me things that a man’s penis does and different things that happen to a man’s penis and explaining to me the same way how milk would come out of women’s breast it would come out of a man’s penis and stuff.” A.V. testified that at the time she did not know much regarding the topic, having never discussed the matter with her parents or at school. She informed Fleitas that she felt uncomfortable and wanted to go home. Upon returning home, Fleitas called her into his room, locked the door, and moved the television in front of the door. He then removed his towel and exposed himself to her. Next, he went to his closet and retrieved a box containing pornographic magazines. Flei-tas told her to sit on his bed and flip though one of the magazines while he masturbated. Fleitas then grabbed her hand and forced her to hold his penis. A.V. testified that after ejaculating on her legs, he tried to make her taste the ejaculate. She resisted by closing her mouth tightly. Fleitas then threatened to cut off her mother’s hands, kill the rest of her family, and burn down the house if A.V. mentioned the incident to anyone.

The following day, while her mother was at work, Fleitas again summoned A.V. into his room, locked the door, and barricaded the door with the television. He then removed his pants, inserted the movie “White Men Can’t Jump” into the VCR, and ordered A.V. to fast forward the movie to a sex scene. He told A.V. to rewind and replay the scene several times while he masturbated. A.V. testified that, again, Fleitas ejaculated onto her legs. According to A.V., Fleitas said that he wanted to “go inside of me” and “teach me how it is to be a woman.” Fleitas also told her that he wanted to photograph her topless, having sex with his son. A.V. testified that after those initial incidents, no more similar episodes occurred until after the family moved to Hialeah, Florida.

A.V. testified that the first night in the new house, after everyone had retired for the night, Fleitas went into the bedroom that she shared with her younger sister. He began to massage her legs and feet and placed his hand over her underwear while he masturbated and ejaculated. A.V. testified that during the following two years, Fleitas made frequent visits to her bedroom in the early mornings. At one point, Fleitas removed a bar from the edge of the bed to gain better access to her legs and feet. A.V. testified that her sister never awoke during any of the incidents.

A.V. testified that Fleitas also exposed himself to her at other times, such as when she passed through his room to take out the garbage. In 2000, she began stacking boxes in front of her bedroom door and sleeping in multiple layers of jeans, sweaters, and bras, hoping to avoid contact with Fleitas. AV.’s mother testified to being concerned about AV.’s strange behavior, but she did not pursue the matter. A.V. testified that the incidents with Fleitas occurred routinely through January 2001.

During that time, A.V. and other members of her family witnessed several violent fights between Fleitas and AV.’s mother. One such incident occurred when AV.’s mother was pregnant with Fleitas’s son. A.V. testified that she was unable to sleep many nights and her grades suffered. During cross-examination, she admitted that at the time she had a boyfriend. Fleitas did not approve of the boyfriend and restricted his access to the house. A.V. testified that one night she resisted Fleitas’s advances and threatened to tell her mother what had happened during the previous three years. When Fleitas reiterated his threats to kill the family, A.V. responded that she did not care if she died and that Fleitas convinced her to remain silent.

In 2001, AV.’s mother expelled Fleitas from their house. During a relative’s birthday party, Fleitas and AV.'s mother began to argue when Fleitas tried to discipline one of AV.’s sisters. The argument escalated, and one of AV.’s sisters unsuccessfully tried to call 911. Fleitas destroyed the phone before the police were contacted. AV.’s mother then left the party with her children and drove to their house to secure the rent money before Fleitas returned. Fleitas moved out of their house that night. During the following three months, Fleitas made almost daily visits to the home. A.V. testified that in March, 2001, when she felt confident that her mother would not allow Fleitas to return, she finally told her mother about the alleged abuse.

A.V.’s mother immediately confronted Fleitas and accused him of raping A.V. AV.’s mother testified that Fleitas denied the rape accusations, stating that he merely touched A.V., and begged A.V.’s mother not to call the police. A.V. testified that she also asked her mother not to involve the police. A few days later, however, A.V.’s mother contacted the police. A.V. went to the Hialeah Police Department and gave a sworn statement to Detective Diaz. She also met with an Assistant State Attorney and provided another sworn statement. Fleitas was arrested on charges of and relating to child sexual molestation.

A.V. testified that in the days that followed she received daily calls from Flei-tas’s relatives asking her to recant her accusations. A.V. was also aware that her mother suffered financial difficulties and was unable to pay the utility bills on time. A.V. testified that she finally succumbed to the pressure and signed an affidavit recanting her story: “I thought that would have been great for everything just to be able to go away and for us just to be safe at home. I was willing to sign anything that was like that.”

Protocol at Florida’s Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) requires DCF investigators to question children in recantation cases. A.V. reaffirmed her re-eantation to two DCF workers, Donald Machacón and Carolyn Cornelius. A.V. also denied the charges to her father, who subsequently told AV.’s mother that if A.V. did not withdraw the recantation the State would place their children in foster care. AV.’s mother then signed a statement stating that the State Attorney’s Office threatened to take away her children if she did not cooperate with the prosecutor. At trial, AV.’s mother admitted that the State Attorney’s Office never made such threats and that she signed the false statement “because Luis [A.V.’s father] told me and I never knew it could be not true.”

In May 2001, the trial court appointed attorney Richard Hersh as AV.’s guardian ad litem. Hersh encouraged A.V. and AV.’s mother to enter counseling at Kristi House, a nonprofit child sexual abuse support center endorsed by DCF. A.V. testified that the therapy sessions at Kristi House helped her gain the strength to confront the situation. She later told her father that the denials of the charges were false. Shortly thereafter, she formally withdrew her recantation and the case proceeded to trial.

On appeal, Fleitas contends that a new trial is warranted based on the trial testimony of Detective Diaz, which Fleitas argues impermissibly bolstered AV.’s testimony. The State argues that the testimony Fleitas claims constitutes improper bolstering was either unobjected to or solely challenged by a general objection, and therefore was not properly preserved for appellate review. We agree.

It is well settled in Florida that to be preserved for appeal, “the specific legal ground upon which a claim is based must be raised at trial and a claim different than that will not be heard on appeal.” Rodriguez v. State, 609 So.2d 493, 499 (Fla.1992). See also Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1100 (Fla.2004); Spann v. State, 857 So.2d 845, 852 (Fla.2003). Indeed, proper preservation requires the following three steps from a party: (1) a timely, contemporaneous objection; (2) a legal ground for the objection and; (3) “[i]n order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.” Harrell v. State, 894 So.2d 935, 940 (Fla.2005) (quoting Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982)). The purpose of this rule is to place the trial court on notice that an error may have been committed and therefore provide the trial court with an opportunity to rectify the error prior to any potential appellate review.

At trial, Fleitas failed to make a timely, contemporaneous objection when the State questioned Detective Diaz regarding A.V.’s prior statements to the police. Additionally, although Fleitas did object to the Detective’s testimony regarding A.V.’s prior consistent statements to the State Attorney’s Office, Fleitas failed to state the specific legal ground for the objection that he now raises on appeal, i.e., improper bolstering. We, therefore, find that Flei-tas did not properly preserve this issue for appellate review. See Chamberlain, 881 So.2d 1087 (finding that issue was not preserved even though defendant objected on general ground of hearsay, because defendant did not specifically object at trial that the tape was inadmissible as a prior consistent statement). We further note that Detective Diaz never testified as to the content or substance of the prior consistent statement, and we, therefore, question whether the testimony even implicates the doctrine of improper bolstering.

However, even if the issue had been preserved, we find Fleitas’s argument without merit. While prior consistent statements are generally inadmissible when used to bolster a witness’s credibility, see, e.g., Taylor v. State, 855 So.2d 1, 22 (Fla.2003); Bradley v. State, 787 So.2d 732, 743 (Fla.2001); Van Gallon v. State, 50 So.2d 882 (Fla.1951), such statements are admissible if they fall within a hearsay exception or are introduced to rehabilitate a witness or “to rebut an express or implied charge against the witness of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication.” Gardner v. State, 480 So.2d 91, 93 (Fla.1985). See e.g., Griffith v. State, 762 So.2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (“The prior consistent statement was necessary to rehabilitate [the witness] after his impeachment by the defense and was a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.”); Monday v. State, 792 So.2d 1278, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (a prior consistent statement used to rehabilitate a witness who has been impeached may be admissible even in situations where the witness does not claim an exception to the hearsay rule). Because the record establishes that A.V.’s prior statements were introduced to rehabilitate A.V. from Fleitas’s implied argument of “improper influence, motive or recent fabrication,” we find that they were admissible.

Pursuant to section 90.801(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), a prior consistent statement is not hearsay if (1) “the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement” and (2) “the statement is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication.” (emphasis added). Here, the State met the first element of section 90.801(2)(b) because A.V., the declarant, testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. See Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003) (although the witness’s prior consistent statement was introduced via testimony of a friend, the witness testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination).

As to the second element, the prior consistent statements must have been made “before the existence of a fact said to indicate bias, interest, corruption, or other motive to falsify the prior consistent statement.” Taylor, 855 So.2d at 23 (emphasis added). Fleitas argues that this second element has not been met. Specifically, in his reply brief, Fleitas argues for the first time that his defense was not one of recent fabrication or improper influence, but rather that A.V. lied from the onset when she made the allegation against Fleitas. The record, however, refutes this argument.

Indeed, Fleitas’s main theory at trial focused on A.V.’s recantations and, in essence, that her multiple inconsistent stories made her testimony not credible. After her initial report, A.V. signed an affidavit explicitly recanting that initial report. Subsequent to signing the affidavit, A.V. withdrew the affidavit as a lie and testified at trial as to the veracity of the initial report. During eross-examination, Fleitas’s counsel specifically questioned A.V. regarding the three, separate recantations she made during the course of the investigation. A review of the record establishes that throughout the trial, the defense attempted to persuade the jury that A.V.’s reaffirmation of the initial report was a result of improper influence and/or a recent fabrication. The record establishes that defense counsel at trial both directly and indirectly implied that A.V. changed her recantation as a result of improper influence from the State, her mother, her father, and DCF. We, therefore, find that A.V.’s prior statement to Detective Diaz predated the alleged improper influence and/or recent fabrication, and were introduced to rebut Flei-tas’s contention that A.V.’s testimony was not worthy of belief.

These attempts to impeach A.V. show that Fleitas was suggesting, either expressly or impliedly, that A.V. had recently changed or fabricated her testimony. See Griffith, 762 So.2d at 1023 (trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted a prior consistent statement that served to rehabilitate the witness after defense impeached him with prior inconsistent statements from a pretrial deposition, thereby suggesting that that he had changed or fabricated his testimony). Moreover, by repeatedly suggesting to the jury that A.Y. withdrew her recantations due to pressure from the State Attorney’s Office to pursue the charges, Fleitas implied that A.V. had a recent motive to lie. See Smith v. State, 538 So.2d 66, 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (“We find on the record an implied charge by Smith that the victim was improperly influenced by her mother and the state to bring charges against her father, and that this influence created in her a motive to lie.”). We, therefore, conclude that the prior consistent statements were offered to rebut the charges of recent fabrication, improper influence and/or improper motive and, accordingly, were admissible.

We decline to address the remaining issues raised on appeal as we conclude that they are without merit and/or are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986).

Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment of convictions and sentences.

Affirmed.

      . A judgment of acquittal was granted on counts 4, 7, 12 and 14, which involved battery with bodily fluids.

      . Specifically, Fleitas objects to the following testimony elicited during Detective Diaz's direct examination:
      Q: And in your opinion and experience would you say that she gave you a detailed description of what occurred?
      A: A very detailed description.
      Q: A very detailed description and again you interviewed over a thousand witnesses, correct?
      A: Yes, unfortunately.
      Q: Let me ask you this: What's the significance of a victim in this type of case giving you a detailed account as opposed to a general account?
      A: Well, basically unfortunately something in the case, that’s something she experienced, actually witnessed. You are talking about twelve, thirteen year old telling you such a graphic details. It's hard to believe that she just made up her mind to put these things—
      DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, Your Honor.
      THE COURT: Sustained.

        Q: Detective, there is [sic] two types of cases you deal with. There is [sic] sexual batteries and there is [sic] lewd and lascivious.
      A: Correct.
      Q: Could you say in your opinion that details are more important in this type of case that we are dealing with than a sexual battery case, for example?
      A: Absolutely sex battery cases you got penetration, you got evidence that the Rape Treatment can testify. They can testify for assisting the victim. Molestation cases you got the rubbing and touching and which is not a lasting evidence. You need to rely more on the details that this young victim gives you.
      Q: Now, the statement that she gave you during the preinterview compared to the statement that she gave you during the formal interview would you say that these statements were consistent?
      DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
      THE COURT: Sustained.
      Q: Were the statements she gave you consistent?
      DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
      A: Yes.
      THE COURT: Sustain the objection. Next question.
      Q: Was "A" able to identify the person who sexually abused her?
      DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
      THE COURT: Overruled.
      A: Yes.
      Q: Who did she identify that person to be?
      A: She identified as gentleman named Charlie, which is the boyfriend of her mom.
      Q: Prior to meeting "A” do you have any personal knowledge of her meeting with another officer?
      A: Night before uniform officers were dispatched to her home, yes.
      Q: And in comparing what she told that officer and what she told you, were her statements consistent?
      A: Yes, they were.
      Q: Okay. After speaking to ''A,” did you have an opportunity to speak to her mom, [M.V.]?
      A: Yes.
      Q: And soon after meeting with them and obtaining all the information that you needed, was there eventually an arrest of the defendant in this case?
      A: Yes.
      Q: After the defendant was arrested did you learn that “A" met with the State Attorney's Office and provided a sworn statement also and a pre-file conference?
      DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
      THE COURT: Overruled.
      A: Yes.
      Q: You have any personnel [sic] knowledge of that meeting being consistent with conversations you had had with her?
      DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
      THE COURT: Overruled.
      A: Yes, the file. The charges were filed.

      . The sole exception to the contemporaneous objection rule is fundamental error. Unpre-served issues may constitute grounds for reversal under the fundamental error doctrine.
        See § 924.051(3), Fla. Stat. (2007). The fundamental error doctrine, however, is applied only rarely. Harrell, 894 So.2d at 941. An error need not be preserved if it "reaches to the foundation of the case and is equal to a denial of due process.” Williams v. State, 892 So.2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). See also F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226, 229 (Fla.2003); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993). Indeed, ”[t]o be fundamental, an error must 'reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.' ” Harrell, 894 So.2d at 941 (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So.2d 481, 484 (Fla.1960)). Based on our review of the record, we cannot find that the testimony of Detective Diaz demands application of the fundamental error doctrine.

      . The admissibility of evidence by a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Johnston v. State, 863 So.2d 271, 278 (Fla.2003).

      . We note that the State under section 90.801(2)(b) is not required to show both improper influence and recent fabrication. Section 90.801(2)(b) provides for the admissibility of a prior consistent statement upon a showing of either circumstance.

      . In his reply brief, Fleitas contends that "neither the contents of [A.V.'s] prior statements nor their consistency were the subject of direct examination.” We find this contention without merit. A review of the record shows that A.V.'s prior statements as well as the facts that led her to make those statements were the subject of lengthy examination. Moreover, during A.V.'s direct examination the following exchange occurred regarding her prior statements to Detective Diaz:
      Q: Did the City of Hialeah Police Department respond to the house?
      A: Yes.
      Q: Did you end up speaking with a woman police officer in the back of the house initially?
      A: Yes.
      Q: The following day did you go down to the Hialeah Police Department and speak with a detective who had been assigned to the case?
      A: Yes.
      Q: Was that Detective Ray Diaz?
      A: Yes.
      Q: And did you spend time recounting for him what we had just been talking about the last couple of hours to him?
      A: Yes.
      Q: Once you reviewed everything with him one time though [sic], did there come a time when he had you raise your right hand and take a sworn statement from you?
      A: Yes.
      Q: In the sworn statement you told him again everything that had been going on?
      A: Yes.
      Q: After that did your mom bring you down to the State Attorney's Office to meet with an assistant state attorney to get the case filed?
      A: Yes.
      Q: During that meeting — during that meeting did you raise your right hand and give sworn testimony to that prosecutor to get the case filed?
      A: Yes.
      Q: Did you recount for her as you did for Detective Diaz what had been going on for the last three years?
      A: Yes.

      . On direct examination, A.V. testified as to the contents of the affidavit and whether anyone pressured her to withdraw the affidavit. Specifically, A.V. testified as follows:
      Q: [G]o ahead and read it aloud.
      A: It says I am alleged victim. I have not been pressured or coerced to sign this statement. I have not had sexual contact of any kind with Carlos Fleitas, the defendant at any time. I was upset with Carlos and made false accusation against him. I am telling the truth in this statement. I do not wish to speak to the police or state attorney regarding this case because they have the right to arrest if I say I did not have sex with Carlos. Sworn and subscribed before me this day of—
      Q: Did the police or State Attorney’s Office threaten you that they were going to arrest you if you did not cooperate?

        A: No.
      Q: Did the State Attorney's Office ever threaten they were going to arrest your mother or father, anybody if there was no cooperation in this case?
      A: No.
      Q: Is what's contained in that affidavit the truth or a lie?
      A: A lie.
      Q: Was that lie said because you just wanted this nightmare to be over with?
      A: Yes.

      . Specifically, the following exchange occurred during A.V.’s cross-examination:
      Q. Now, on one occasion yesterday you testified about an affidavit that you signed onto; is that correct?
      A. Yes.
      Q: And at that time you signed an affidavit that stated that nothing had happened with Mr. Fleitas and that you had made it up; is that correct?
      A: Yes.
      Q: There aren't any fancy words in this document, right?
      A: No.
      Q: You knew all the words in this document? You know the vocabulary; is that correct?
      A: Well, now I do. I guess at the time there was couple but—
      Q: Hard words in here?
      A: Well, I didn't know what affidavit meant and stuff.
      Q: But you knew you were signing a paper?
      A: Yes.
      Q: And you knew that you were signing a paper because you stated in this paper that what you were saying about him were lies?
      A: I was signing a paper that was going to make everything go away.
      Q: Now, subsequent to this affidavit did you have an opportunity to meet with HRS or DCF Investigators?
      A: Yes.
      Q: Do you know what a DCF Investigator is?
      A: Yes.
      Q: What is it?
      A: The people who investigate the cases for HRS.
      Q: And did those HRS Investigators talking first about Miss Cornelius, do you remember Miss Cornelius?
      A: Yes
      Q: She works with kids all day long?
      A; Right.
      Q; And she let you know that?
      A: Yes.
      Q; After she let you know, I work with kids all day long, what did you say?
      A: I told her that wasn’t true....
      Q: What was not true?
      A: What I had said that had happened.
      Q: With Carlos?
      A: Right.
      Q: When did you meet Richard Hersh?
      A: Later on in that time period.
      Q; Did you meet Mr. Machacón, Donald Machacón before you met Mr. Hersh?
      A: I don’t remember what order it came.
      Q: And he went to your school?
      A; Yes.
      Q: And at that school did you tell him anything about the allegations that you made about Mr. Fleitas?
      A: Yes.
      Q: What did you tell Donald Machacón at the school?
      A: That they weren't true.
      Q: Did you tell him why you had said it?
      A: Yes.
      Q: Why did you say the lie in the first place?
      A: I don't remember why it was. I think I said because he didn't treat my mom right.
      Q: Okay. And you didn't want him coming home anymore, right?
      A: I don’t remember.
      Q: You were afraid he would come home?
      A: I don’t remember, but I think it was that he didn’t treat my mom right.
      Q: Now, when you said this to Donald Machacón were you in fear of being hurt?
      A: No.
      Q: There was no reason to be in fear; is that right?

        A: Right. But everything else that was going on is what lead [sic] to my decision to saying what I did.
      Q: And everything that was going on began after you spoke with Mr. Hersh; is that correct?
      A: No.
      Q: Mr. Hersh came to your house?
      A: Yes.
      Q: And Mr. Hersh warned your mother in front of you that if you retracted she could loose [sic] the children, didn't he say that?
      A: No. Everything that was going on in my house had nothing to do with any of the lawyers or anything to do with anything like that. Electricity and emotions and feelings and everything that was going on had nothing to do with the legalness of the case or anything.
      Q: When you were talking to Donald Ma-chacón was anybody else present?
      A: I don't remember.
      Q: Was there a school counselor?
      A: I don't remember.
      Q: Was it in the school counselor’s office?
      A: Yes.
      Q: Your mom was not there?
      A: I don't remember. I don’t think so.
      Q: Your father was not there?
      A: No.
      Q: Anyone from Mr. Fleitas’ family was there?
      A: No.
      Q; It was just you, Mr. Machacón, and probably a counselor, you don't remember that part?
      A: Right.
      Q: Now, when you denied it one time with Miss Cornelius, the first time that you denied it you were in your house; isn’t that correct?
      A: Yes.

      . In opening, defense counsel stated as follows:
      The evidence will show that once [A.V.'s mother] has met with the various counselors, the prosecutor's office, and Mr. Hersh she comes to the realization that if she doesn’t continue this prosecution, even if it is a charade she will loose [sic] all her children. Now, little "A” is now faced with a problem that her mother will lose all of her children if she maintains that what she has alleged against Mr. Fleitas is a lie. She maintained that it was a lie when she provided an affidavit at an attorney’s office. She maintained that it was a lie at least twice to HRS workers. One is Mrs. Cornelius and the other one is Mr. Machacón. Mr. Machacón interviewed her at the school away from the mother, away from the father, and in the presence of the guidance counselor only and at that point the child stated what I said was a lie. I only wanted to make sure he wouldn’t come back home because I didn’t want him there.
      In closing argument, defense counsel again implied that A.V. was influenced by the State and her mother to withdraw her recantations:
      During Maria [V.'s] testimony we began to sense the pressure that is being placed. The allegations by the Fleitas family and submit to you it's by the State Attorney's Office. Let's compare the kind of pressure we are dealing with here. Visits by an elderly lady, visits by family providing rides. Helping get a lawyer. Those are the assistance being offered by the Fleitas family. What is Maria [V.] seeing on the other end. Threats of her children being taken away. Threats that are made surreptitiously through her former husband. A guardian ad litem is appointed on the case and he shows up at her house and as he states I make sure and with no uncertain terms I wanted to make sure that she knew she had to take this child to counseling. Where was the counseling. At the Kristi Office. Where is the Kristi Office according to [A.V.], it's the same place where their office is. Is this independent counseling? Is this private counseling?

      . Specifically, during closing, the defense argued the following to the jury:
      Carlos is not coming back home. She doesn't want him coming back and she admitted that. She admitted that not to someone that the Fleitas family went out and hired, not to Mr. Marcus, not to anybody else. She went out and she admitted that to DCF workers. State of Florida employees whose only interest is to protect children. They go out and interview. She gives them consistent statements recanting that she has made up these allegations against Carlos. That inconsistency in the testimony is enough for you to come back with a not guilty verdict as to all three charges. You say well the prosecution has rehabilitated her. The prosecution has made her come back and be a witness here in the case. Let’s analyze how it was that the prosecution got her to come back and be a witness in the case. She came back and became a witness in the case when her father contacted her at school and took her outside and hugged her and kissed her for the first time like in five years according to him. At that point Miss A.V. changes her testimony. Right or wrong. Wrong. That is what the prosecution offered happened through Mr. Luis [V.]. That never happened. Mr. [V.] testifies and during cross examination read the dates. Oh, yeah, maybe eleven is on the affidavit that "A” signed.... He says, oh yeah, May 11th is crossed out and it says May 17th. May 17th is the day before he speaks to a state attorney. Now, let's see how this gentleman spoke with the state attorney and how we learned that he spoke with a state attorney. He got a call he said.... He doesn't want to admit that it’s the prosecutor that's calling him. I had to go back and bait him through a series of questions, including giving him a multiple choice question who called you "A” the state attorney, "B” Department of Children and Families or "C” the police. After thinking it over for a while and not wanting to give and [sic] answer .... [h]e goes over and he looks at their bench and he said the state attorney and he put his head down.
      In this case this child has given inconsistent statements with the testimony, provided in court. Each inconsistent statement is grounds for you to find reasonable doubt and to come back with a verdict of not guilty is your duty.
      The testimony that she gave which was inconsistent is that now she alleges that this gentleman did certain things with her, which were inappropriate and previous to that she gave inconsistent statements to one, the person that provided the affidavit, to the persons that work for DCF.
      When you have a recantation, when you have that type of inconsistent testimony and inconsistent statement that is an obligation upon you as jurors to determine whether that is a reasonable doubt and if that does create a reasonable doubt, you must come back with a not guilty verdict. You must come back with a not guilty verdict on each count. She recanted on each and every allegation read to her.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LaROSE, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellant, v. PINELLAS VP, LLC, Appellee. Department of Revenue, Appellant, v. TPA Investments, LLC, f/k/a Condo LLC, Appellee.
    Nos. 2D07-6037, 2D07-6039.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Jan. 7, 2009.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Charles Catanzaro, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Karen E. Mailer of Powell, Carney, Mailer, Ramsay & Grove, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellees.
   LaROSE, Judge.

In these consolidated appeals, the Florida Department of Revenue (Department) appeals two summary final judgments in favor of Pinellas VP, LLC (Pinellas VP), and TPA Investments, LLC (TPA Investments). We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(a). Because the principal balance of a mortgage is taxable consideration under section 201.02(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and the real property transfers involved here occurred between distinct entities, the trial court erroneously applied Crescent Miami Center, LLC v. Florida Department of Revenue, 903 So.2d 913 (Fla.2005), to preclude the Department’s efforts to collect documentary stamp taxes. Consequently, we reverse.

Background

At the outset, we note that an individual, Grady C. Pridgen, III, is the sole member of Pinellas VP and the sole shareholder and director of Tarpon Ridge, Inc. (Tarpon Ridge). In turn, Tarpon Ridge is the managing and sole member of TPA Investments. TPA Investments and Lindell-Gandy, LLC (Lindell-Gandy), are members of Imperial, LLC (Imperial). Mr. Pridgen is not a member of Lindell-Gan-dy. Thus, Mr. Pridgen sits atop a corporate structure diagrammed below:

The Underlying Transactions

In May 2005, Pinellas VP acquired twenty acres of land from Tarpon Ridge by Warranty Deed. Although Pinellas VP did not pay money for the acreage, the land was subject to an existing mortgage. Pi-nellas VP recorded the Warranty Deed and paid a $19,250 documentary stamp tax based on the outstanding principal balance of the mortgage.

Also in May 2005, Imperial transferred real property to TPA Investments and Lindell-Gandy as tenants in common. They, too, paid no money for the property. But, the property was subject to an existing mortgage. Imperial had executed a promissory note securing that mortgage; Mr. Pridgen personally guaranteed one-half of the note. TPA Investments recorded the Warranty Deed and paid a $161,546.70 documentary stamp tax based on the outstanding principal balance of the mortgage.

At the end, Pinellas VP and TPA Investments owned land subject to mortgages. Unquestionably, the parcels were newly acquired assets. But, the transferees risk the loss of the land if the underlying mortgage obligations are unsatisfied. At the same time we cannot ignore that Tarpon Ridge and Imperial divested themselves of any benefit in the real estate, although they retain the financial obligations of the mortgages. Mr. Pridgen’s obligations and benefits, if any, exist independent of the transactions carried out by independent entities.

Both Pinellas VP and TPA Investments requested refunds from the Department. After the Department denied these requests, Pinellas VP and TPA Investments sued the Department for refunds. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Pinel-las VP’s and TPA Investments’ motions, ruling that they were entitled to tax refunds, plus interest. The trial court denied the Department’s motions.

Arguments on Appeal

Essentially, both Pinellas VP and TPA Investments argue that summary judgment was appropriate because the underlying property transactions involved no exchange of value; thus, there was no taxable event under Crescent Miami. They also assert that Mr. Pridgen ultimately was responsible for the mortgage debt. Therefore, the transactions effected only mere transfers in ownership.

The Department relies on section 201.02(1) for the proposition that the principal balance of a mortgage is taxable consideration. The Department also argues that Crescent Miami is inapplicable because that case involved no mortgage and the property transfer took place between a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary. The Department emphasizes that the transfers here involved distinct entities that, through apparently careful corporate planning, ultimately have a common shareholder or member. The Department’s position is well taken.

Analysis

We review the summary final judgments de novo. See Murphy v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Lake Wales, Inc., 974 So.2d 565, 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate only when no issues of material fact remain and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Neither Pinellas VP nor TPA Investments has satisfied this burden.

Section 201.02(1) levies a tax on deeds conveying an interest in real property:

On deeds, instruments, or writings whereby any lands, tenements, or other real property, or any interest therein, shall be granted, assigned, transferred, or otherwise conveyed to, or vested in, the purchaser or any other person by his or her direction, on each $100 of the consideration therefor the tax shall be 70 cents. When the full amount of the consideration for the execution, assignment, transfer, or conveyance is not shown in the face of such deed, instrument, document, or writing, the tax shall be at the rate of 70 cents for each $100 or fractional part thereof of the consideration therefor. For purposes of this section, consideration includes, but is not limited to, the money paid or agreed to be paid; the discharge of an obligation; and the amount of any mortgage, purchase money mortgage lien, or other encumbrance, whether or not the underlying indebtedness is assumed. If the consideration paid or given in exchange for real property or any interest therein includes property other than money, it is presumed that the consideration is equal to the fair market value of the real property or interest therein.

The tax amount is based on the consideration paid for the property interest. Id. “[T]he amount of any mortgage ... whether or not the underlying indebtedness is assumed” is taxable consideration. Id. The Department asserts that the principal balances on the mortgages constitute taxable consideration. We agree.

Statutory language controls statutory interpretation unless such an interpretation is unreasonable or clearly contrary to legislative intent. Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla.2007). Here, section 201.02(1) is clear and unambiguous; mortgages are forms of taxable consideration. Both Pinellas VP and TPA Investments acquired real property subject to preexisting mortgages. The principal amount of the mortgages brings the transactions within the scope of section 201.02(1).

Urging us to ignore the clear statutory language, Pinellas VP and TPA Investments argue that Crescent Miami entitles them to refunds. See 903 So.2d 913. We are unpersuaded. In Crescent Miami, a corporation transferred a tract of land to its wholly owned subsidiary. Id. at 914. The subsidiary did not pay consideration, but did pay the documentary stamp tax based on the fair market value of the land. Id. The property was not subject to a mortgage. Id. Our supreme court held that the subsidiary was entitled to a refund. Id. at 919. The supreme court rejected the Department’s position that the parent received consideration based on the fact that its ownership interest in the subsidiary increased because the subsidiary now had more assets. Id. The court held that this was not an example of nonmone-tary consideration because the beneficial ownership of the property never changed; after the transfer, the parent continued to reap the benefits of owning the property, and only the form of ownership changed. Id.

Crescent Miami is factually distinguishable from the cases before us for at least two reasons: (1) Crescent Miami involved no mortgage and (2) Crescent Miami involved a direct transfer between a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary. Id. We cannot ignore the existing mortgages which section 201.02(1), specifically includes as forms of consideration. Nor can we accept that the transfers are immune from taxation merely because the grantors and grantees, separate and distinct corporations or limited liability companies, shared a common individual shareholder or member. That fact is irrelevant to our analysis. Presumably, Mr. Pridgen structured his affairs for legitimate business and personal reasons. As a result, he distanced himself from and was a stranger to the transactions. Unlike the corporation in Crescent Miami, Mr. Pridgen was not a party to the underlying transactions. Despite his status in the structure of these entities, he did not own the transferred properties. He was at least one step removed from each corporation or limited liability company involved in these transactions.

Conclusion

Because section 201.02(1) plainly authorizes the imposition of a tax on the underlying real estate transactions, and because Crescent Miami is factually distinguishable and, thus, not controlling, the trial court erred in granting summary final judgments in favor of Pinellas VP and TPA Investments.

Reversed.

NORTHCUTT, C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., Concur.

      . As Pinellas VP conceded at oral argument, Mr. Pridgen is not personally liable for the documentary stamp taxes; thus reflecting his attenuated relationship to the underlying transactions.


author: KHOUZAM, Judge.

text:
    Christian CLEMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D08-1523.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Jan. 7, 2009.
   KHOUZAM, Judge.

Christian Clemons appeals from the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Because the postconviction court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the rule 3.850 motion in light of Clemons’ pending appeal from his convictions, we reverse and remand.

Clemons entered a plea to sale or delivery of hydrocodone and sale or delivery of diazepam for offenses that occurred in August 2006. Within thirty days of the entry of the judgment and sentences on Clemons’ plea, his attorney filed a timely motion to withdraw plea that was denied. After the motion was orally denied, but prior to the rendition of a written order, Clemons filed a notice of appeal — the written order-denying Clemons’ motion to withdraw plea was ultimately rendered on March 7, 2008. The appeal is currently pending before this court in case number 2D08-286.

Shortly after filing with this court the notice of appeal in case number 2D08-286 Clemons filed with the trial court the rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief that is the subject of this appeal. In his rule 3.850 motion Clemons collaterally challenged his convictions. In an order rendered on March 17, 2008, during the pen-dency of the related appeal, the trial court summarily denied Clemons’ motion for postconviction relief.

Generally, the direct appeal of a defendant’s judgment and sentence divests the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on a motion for postconviction relief in the case from which the appeal has been taken. See Ortiz v. State, 768 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). A timely motion to withdraw plea delays rendition of a defendant’s judgment and sentence until the trial court files a signed, written order disposing of the motion. See Wofford v. State, 866 So.2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (granting belated appeal to proceed as seeking review of the underlying judgment and sentence for which rendition was postponed pending order denying defendant’s timely motion to withdraw plea); see also Haber v. State, 961 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (recognizing principle in regard to issue concerning whether subsequent rule 3.850 motion was timely). Clemons’ appeal following the oral denial of his motion to withdraw plea was premature. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h)(3). However, this court’s jurisdiction vested upon the trial court’s rendition of the written order denying the motion to withdraw plea on March 7, 2008. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(l). Thus, on March 17, 2008, the date of rendition of the written order summarily denying Clemons’ motion for postconviction relief, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on this collateral matter.

We therefore reverse the order summarily denying Clemons’ rule 3.850 motion and remand to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the motion. Clemons may refile his motion when the direct appeal becomes final. See Ortiz, 768 So.2d at 1177-78.

Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT, C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Anthony Jerome COOPER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D08-6217.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 13, 2009.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 27, 2009.
    Anthony Jerome Cooper, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004).

HAWKES, C.J., KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lewis Q. STEVENSON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D08-5630.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 13, 2009.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 2009.

      Lewis Stevenson, Jr., pro se, Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Allen v. Live Oak Ford Mercury, 647 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

HAWKES, C.J., KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Stefan M. LINDEN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D08-6180.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 13, 2009.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 27, 2009.
    Stefan M. Linden, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004).

HAWKES, C.J., KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.


author: SUAREZ, J. SHEPHERD, J.,

text:
    CENTRAL MOTOR COMPANY d/b/a Central Hyundai, Appellant, v. Earline P. SHAW, Appellee.
    No. 3D07-765.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 14, 2009.
    Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 20, 2009.

      Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod and Allen J. Smith, for appellant.
    Timothy Carl Blake, Miami, for appellee.
    Before SHEPHERD and SUAREZ, JJ, and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   SUAREZ, J.

Central Motor Company (“Central Motor”) appeals the denial of a motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2007). We affirm the trial court’s order denying attorney’s fees and costs.

Central Motor sold Shaw a ear which was financed by Hyundai Motor Finance Company (“Hyundai Finance”) through a retail installment sales contract. Shaw sued both Central Motor and Hyundai Finance for unfair and deceptive trade practices. She alleged that both companies acted in concert by failing to inform her of the rates and terms of the loan, which were higher than the normal buy-rate. In February, 2004, Central Motor sent a Proposal for Settlement in which it offered Shaw $1,000.00 in exchange for a voluntary dismissal with prejudice of the action against Central Motor. Shaw did not accept. On October 4, 2006, with the knowledge of Central Motor, Shaw and Hyundai Finance entered into a settlement agreement whereby Hyundai Finance and Shaw stipulated that Hyundai Finance would pay a total of $10,000.00 to Shaw and her attorney, to be divided equally, and that Shaw would voluntarily dismiss with prejudice her lawsuit against both Hyundai Finance and Central Motor. Hyundai Finance paid the $10,000.00 to Shaw, and Shaw voluntarily dismissed with prejudice her lawsuit as stipulated. After the voluntary dismissal with prejudice was taken, Central Motor filed a Supplementary Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs pursuant to the offer of judgment statute. See § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (2007).

Under the statute, if there is a judgment of no liability or one for at least twenty-five percent of the offer of settlement, the offeror in this case, Central Motor, is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. Central Motor filed the Supplementary Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs in reliance upon the fact that, in February of 2004, it had filed a Proposal for Settlement in which it had offered Shaw $1,000.00 in exchange for a voluntary dismissal with prejudice. Central Motor contends that, because it paid no money toward the October, 2006 stipulated settlement, its offer of judgment for $1,000.00 was not accepted, and Shaw received the $10,000.00 from Hyundai Finance, it is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. Based on the facts before us, we disagree and affirm the trial court’s denial of Central Motor’s Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs.

In its brief, Central Motor relies on the case of MX Investments, Inc. v. Crawford, 700 So.2d 640 (Fla.1997). MX Investments is factually distinguishable and not dispositive of this case. In MX Investments, after suit was filed, MX Investments served two offers of judgment. Prior to trial, plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. MX Investments then moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to its statutory offers of judgment. The issue before the Florida Supreme Court was whether attorney’s fees should be awarded pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2007), where a voluntary dismissal without prejudice had been taken. Like the facts in MX Investments, Central Motor filed an offer of judgment. The offer was for $1,000.00. Unlike the facts of MX Investments, this lawsuit ended with the payment of money to the plaintiff with the agreement that such payment would release the action against both defendants, and that the plaintiff would enter a voluntary dismissal with prejudice as to both defendants. Central Motor, having benefited from Hyundai Finance’s payment of $10,000.00 to settle the lawsuit, now seeks additional profit from the settlement by requesting attorney’s fees and costs. This is not the intent of the statute, and such interpretation would lead to an absurd result. See Wollard v. Lloyd’s & Cos., 439 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla.1983).

The history of cases interpreting the intent of the offer of judgment statute and those adopting Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 “reflect that an award of attorney fees authorized by section 768.79 is a sanction against the rejecting party for the refusal to accept what is presumed to be a reasonable offer ... for unnecessarily continuing the litigation.... The factors specified in rule 1.442 each have to do with the evaluation and nature of the offers and the case in litigation.” Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So.2d 210, 222 (Fla.2003). For Central Motor to receive an award of attorney’s fees and costs, this Court would have to find that Shaw, by rejecting Central Motor’s offer, caused “delay costs and expenses” unnecessarily prolonging the litigation. The facts of this case do not demonstrate that Shaw’s rejection of the offer unnecessarily prolonged the litigation adding additional costs and expenses such that she should be sanctioned. She should not be sanctioned when, with Central Motor’s knowledge, she later agreed to settle her claim against both Hyundai Finance and Central Motor for a much greater amount than offered by Central Motor alone. Without objection, Central Motor knowingly allowed the money to be paid on its behalf to secure a complete release from the litigation. Now Central Motor should not be permitted to profit more, in attorney’s fees and costs, than it already has from Hyundai Finance’s settlement with Shaw that resulted in its being released from the lawsuit. Because Shaw agreed to the dismissal with prejudice against both defendants as part of the terms of the settlement, and since Central Motor knowingly benefítted from the $10,000.00 payment on its behalf to secure, not only Hyundai Finance’s, but Central Motor’s release from litigation, the dismissal with prejudice here should not be considered a basis for an award of attorney’s fees and costs within the meaning of the offer of judgment statute. To do otherwise would counter the intent of the statute and would amount to nothing more than a “gotcha” tactic. See Salcedo v. Asociacion Cubana, Inc., 368 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

There is no reason to impose a sanction on Shaw for rejecting Central’s $1,000.00 offer in 2004, when Shaw achieved a much better $10,000.00 settlement with Hyundai Finance in 2006, along with the release of both defendants from the lawsuit — strictly a windfall readily accepted by Central Motor. Accordingly, we find that, based on these facts, Central Motor is not entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. See § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (2007); Sarkis, 863 So.2d at 218 (“[A]ttorney fees awarded pursuant to the offer of judgment statutes are sanctions ... for unreasonable rejections of offers of judgment.”); Wollard v. Lloyd’s & Cos., 439 So.2d at 218 (“It is a mere tenet of statutory construction that statutes will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result.”).

Affirmed.

SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge, concurs.

SHEPHERD, J.,

dissenting.

If this were a court of equity, I might agree with the majority. However, this is a court of law, and under Section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2004), Central Motor Company is entitled to recover its reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to the statute.

The necessary facts in this case are that on February 18, 2004, Central Motor made an offer of judgment solely on its own behalf in the sum of $1000. Ms. Shaw declined to accept. Two-and-a-half years later, on October 4, 2006, counsel for Hyundai Motor Finance Company sent the following settlement confirmation letter to counsel for Ms. Shaw:

Dear Tim:
Confirming our recent telephone conversations, Hyundai Motor Finance Company has agreed to settle the lawsuit filed by Earline Shaw on the following terms:
1. Hyundai will pay Earline Shaw $5000 and the Timothy Carl Blake trust account $5000.
2. Earline Shaw will dismiss her lawsuit with prejudice against Hyundai and Central Motors.
3. Earline Shaw will sign a release in favor of Hyundai and Central Motors.
Enclosed is a proposed release and a voluntary dismissal. Please have signed and return to me. By the time you return the documents to me, I should have the checks for you.
/s/ Bruce Charles King

Counsel for Central Motor was copied on the letter. He knew settlement discussions were occurring between counsel for Ms. Shaw and Hyundai Finance. It is also undisputed that Central Motor consistently rebuffed entreaties by both counsel for Ms. Shaw and counsel for Hyundai Finance to participate in any settlement negotiations or offer of settlement. Counsel for Hyundai Finance was not authorized to represent Central Motor in settlement negotiations. Nor was there any legerdemain by Central Motor in refusing to settle. From all that appears in the record, this is a case in which Ms. Shaw’s counsel simply forgot about the existence of an ancient offer of judgment.

Nevertheless, the trial court denied Central Motor’s motion for attorney fees, stating, “Something sounds kind of inequitable about this. Both defendants get settled. I am going to deny the motion.” In so ruling, the trial court acted contrary to law.

Section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2004), reads:

(1) In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred by her or him or on the defendant’s behalf pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other contract from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and attorney’s fees against the award. Where such costs and attorney’s fees total more than the judgment, the court shall enter judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff for the amount of the costs and fees, less the amount of the plaintiffs award. If a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not accepted by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent greater than the offer, she or he shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred from the date of the filing of the demand. If rejected, neither an offer nor demand is admissible in subsequent litigation, except for pursuing the penalties of this section.
(7)(a) If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to the provisions of this section, the court may, in its discretion, determine that an offer was not made in good faith. In such case, the court may disallow an award of costs and attorney’s fees.
(b) When determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to this section, the court shall consider, along with all other relevant criteria, the following additional factors:
1. The then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim.
2. The number and nature of offers made by the parties.
3. The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.
4. Whether the person making the offer had unreasonably refused to furnish information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of such offer.
5. Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions of far-reaching importance affecting non-parties.
6. The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the person making the offer reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be prolonged.
(8) Evidence of an offer is admissible only in proceedings to enforce an accepted offer or to determine the imposition of sanctions under this section.

768.79(1), (7), (8), Fla. Stat. (2004).

Construing a substantively identical version of this statute in 1995, the Florida Supreme Court held that by adopting this statute:

[T]he legislature has created a mandatory right to attorney’s fees if the statutory prerequisites have been met ... i.e., (1) when a party has served a demand or offer for judgment, and (2) that party has recovered a judgment at least 25 percent more or less than the demand or offer.

TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So.2d 606, 611 (Fla.1995) (“[T]he words shall be entitled ... in subsection (1) quoted above cannot possibly have any meaning other than to create a right to attorney’s fees when the two preceding prerequisites have been fulfilled.... ”). In this case, Ms. Shaw voluntarily dismissed her complaint against Central Motor with prejudice. “[Wjhen a plaintiffs voluntary dismissal is with prejudice or is a second voluntary dismissal[,] the defendant [is] entitled to attorney fees in accord with section 768.79....” MX Invs., Inc. v. Crawford, 700 So.2d 640, 642 (Fla.1997) (emphasis added). Central Motor Company has satisfied all the requirements necessary to be entitled to a fee and cost award.

If entitlement is shown under the statute, a trial court still may “in its discretion ... disallow an award of attorney’s fees, but only if it determines that a qualifying offer ‘was not made in good faith.’ TGI Friday’s, 663 So.2d at 612; accord Segarra v. Mellerson, 675 So.2d 980, 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). As explained by the Florida Supreme Court in TGI Friday’s:

That is the sole basis on which the court can disallow an entitlement to an award of fees. In that circumstance, however, a “not in good faith” offeror — though prima facie entitled to fees under section 768.79(7) — -has lost that entitlement because the offeree has succeeded in persuading the trial judge that the offeror acted without good faith. His entitlement to fees has thus been disallowed because his intentions have been shown to be “not in good faith.” Here, however, that provision is inapplicable because there was no evidence that the demand was “not made in good faith,” and no finding to that effect by the trial judge.

TGI Friday’s, 663 So.2d at 612 (emphasis added). The same is true in our ease. Ms. Shaw did not assert below that Central Motor’s offer was “not made in good faith.” See § 768.97(7)(a).

Nevertheless, the majority affirms on the ground that Central Motor (1) acquiesced to, and (2) profited from the settlement. As to the former, it is clear from the record of the hearing on Central Motor’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to Offer of Judgment that both counsel for Ms. Shaw and counsel for Hyundai Finance wanted a global settlement. As counsel for Ms. Shaw put it, “I said I couldn’t settle unless I settled with both. I did talk to [counsel for Central Motor] and tried to get him to pay the plaintiff some money.” (emphasis added). Similarly, out of concern of a potential cross-claim if the litigation were to continue solely against Central Motor, Hyundai Finance also desired a global settlement. Both counsel for Ms. Shaw and Hyundai Finance acknowledge that Central Motor simply refused to settle. That was its right. It also had no legal obligation to remind either party of its long-outstanding offer of judgment. The fact that counsel for Ms. Shaw and Hyundai Finance ultimately entered into a settlement agreement that conferred a benefit to Central Motor is also of no legal significance. These two parties had no right to decide what “profit” Central Motor should receive as a result of its ten-year defense of this action brought against them.

In her brief, Ms. Shaw makes one additional argument to excuse her from having to respond to Central Motor’s offer of judgment, namely that Central Motor and Hyundai Finance were in privity with each other. That is true in the sense that Hyundai Finance agreed to purchase the retail installment contract executed by Ms. Shaw. See Baskerville-Donovan Eng’rs, Inc. v. Pensacola Executive House Condo. Ass’n, 581 So.2d 1301, 1303 (Fla.1991) (“The term ‘privity’ is a word of art ... used to describe the relationship of persons who are parties to a contract.”). However, it is clear Central Motor and Hyundai Finance are separate entities— one a local automobile dealership and the other the national finance arm of an automobile manufacturer. Hyundai Finance was under no obligation to purchase any retail installment contract procured by Central Motor. The relationship between Central Motor and Hyundai Finance does nothing to assist Ms. Shaw in her defense of Central Motor’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to the offer of judgment statute. See Networkip, LLC v. Spread Enters., Inc., 922 So.2d 355, 358 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“A third party is considered a beneficiary to the contract only if the contracting parties intend to primarily and directly benefit the third party.”); City of Tampa v. Thornton-Tomasetti, P.C., 646 So.2d 279, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (stating that contracting parties’ intention is determinative, and “it is not enough that the ... services ultimately rendered accrue to the [third party]”).

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the order on appeal with directions to the trial court to award reasonable attorney fees and costs to Central Motor pursuant to the offer of judgment statute.

      . Both Hyundai Finance and Central Motor received complete releases from Shaw.

      . 768.79 Offer of judgment and demand for judgment—
      (1) In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by her or him or on the defendant's behalf pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other contract from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and attorney's fees against the award.
      (7)(b) When determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees pursuant to this section, the court shall consider, along with all other relevant criteria, the following additional factors:

        1. The then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim.
      2. The number and nature of offers made by the parties.
      3. The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.
      4. Whether the person making the offer had unreasonably refused to furnish information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of such offer.
      5. Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties.
      6. The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the person making the offer reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be prolonged.

      . As the dissent points out, the entitlement to attorney's fees is expressly authorized as a matter of right by section 768.79(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2007). See op. at-. However, "[w]hile the reasonableness of the rejection of the offer ha[s] no bearing on the issue of entitlement to fees, the factors set forth in section 768.79(2)(b), which have been incorporated into rule 1.442, would have a bearing on the amount of attorney fees awarded by the court.” Sarkis, 863 So.2d at 221 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). (The section has been renumbered as 768.79(7)(b) in 1990 when the statute was amended.)