author: THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

text:
    Timothy ANDREWS v. Wanda ANDREWS
    2160259
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    December 15, 2017
    Letta Dillard Gorman, Geneva, for appellant.
    Stephen G. McGowan, Dothan, for appellee.
   THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

Timothy Andrews ("the husband") and Wanda Andrews ("the wife) were divorced by an October 2, 2013, judgment of the Houston Circuit Court ("the trial court") that incorporated a settlement agreement reached by the parties. The October 2, 2013, divorce judgment provided, in relevant part:

"(5) ALIMONY: The husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $500 each month, for a period of eight (8) years, as alimony in gross. That said alimony shall begin on the first day of the month immediately following the signing of this agreement.
"(6) MISCELLANEOUS: That the husband shall maintain his current life insurance policy with Alfa Insurance with the wife named as the irrevocable beneficiary for a period of eight (8) years."

On June 16, 2016, the wife filed a petition for a rule nisi in the trial court, alleging that the husband had failed to pay alimony as required by the divorce judgment and had failed to maintain the life-insurance policy. The wife sought to have the husband held in contempt for his alleged failure to comply with the above-referenced provisions of the divorce judgment and sought a judgment for the amount of the accumulated arrearage and an award of an attorney fee.

The husband answered and denied liability, and he sought to dismiss the wife's petition. The husband later counterclaimed seeking to reduce or eliminate his alimony obligation, which he characterized as one for periodic alimony. Before the trial court, the husband argued, among other things, that his alimony obligation had terminated because the wife had remarried; he cited as support for his position § 30-2-55, Ala. Code 1975 ("Any decree of divorce providing for periodic payments of alimony shall be modified by the court to provide for the termination of such alimony upon petition of a party to the decree and proof that the spouse receiving such alimony has remarried ...."). The wife maintained that the husband's alimony obligation had not terminated upon her remarriage because, she said, the obligation was one for alimony in gross, or a property settlement, as opposed to periodic alimony. See Lacey v. Lacey, 126 So.3d 1029, 1035 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) ("An award of alimony in gross is in the nature of a property division, and such an award is not subject to modification.").

The trial court conducted an ore tenus hearing. On November 29, 2016, the trial court entered a judgment concluding that the alimony award and the provision requiring the husband to maintain the life-insurance policy were awards of alimony in gross that were not subject to modification. The trial court found the husband in contempt of the 2013 divorce judgment and ordered that he purge himself of contempt by paying the wife $9,000 as an arrearage in alimony in gross within 90 days. The trial court also denied the husband's counterclaim. The husband filed a postjudgment motion, which the trial court denied. The husband filed a timely notice of appeal.

After reviewing the record on submission, this court discovered that the husband had stated during his testimony at the ore tenus hearing that he had filed a bankruptcy action in 2015 and that, if the trial court did not eliminate the alimony obligation, he intended to amend that bankruptcy action to include that obligation. This court issued an order on August 30, 2017, requiring the parties to submit letter briefs regarding the status of that bankruptcy action and whether, if it had been amended, the bankruptcy court had issued a stay that would prohibit this court's consideration of the issues raised in this appeal; in that order, this court cited 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and Hill v. Hill, 730 So.2d 248, 251 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).

In response to this court's order, the husband submitted a letter brief in which he represented that he had been discharged from bankruptcy in August 2015 and that he had reopened the bankruptcy case following the entry of the trial court's November 29, 2016, judgment to amend his bankruptcy petition and the relevant schedules to include his alimony-in-gross obligation; the husband argued that his reopening the bankruptcy proceeding triggered the automatic-stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). In his filing before this court, the husband asserted that the wife had not objected to the amendment to his bankruptcy petition and that, "[c]learly, the bankruptcy was automatically closed on July 10, 2017[,] without making a determination of the dischargeability of the identified debts to the [w]ife ...." In support of those assertions, the husband attached to his letter brief only a "case summary" of the bankruptcy action, which indicates that the wife was listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy action, that the husband was discharged from Chapter 7 bankruptcy on August 3, 2015, that his bankruptcy case was reopened on January 6, 2017, and that the bankruptcy action was "terminated" on July 10, 2017.

On September 7, 2017, this court issued a second order requiring the parties to submit letter briefs regarding the validity of the husband's notice of appeal, citing Hewett v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 197 So.3d 1105, 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) ("[T]he filing of a notice of appeal during the pendency of a bankruptcy stay should be deemed void as a violation of the automatic stay."); In re Capgro Leasing Associates, 169 B.R. 305, 310 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Eight of the twelve circuit courts of appeals have held that the automatic stay prevents a debtor from appealing the decision of a non-bankruptcy forum, where that action was originally commenced against the debtor."); and Autoskill Inc. v. National Educational Support Systems, Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1486 (10th Cir. 1993) (" 'Rule 6009, [Fed. R. Bankr. P.,] along with [ 11 U.S.C. §] 362 itself, make it clear that the automatic stay does not apply to the continued prosecution of actions by the trustee or debtor in possession. Those entities may continue or pursue litigation without leave of court (or release of stay under section 362 ).' " (quoting 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 6009.03 & n. 7, at 6009-3 (15th ed. 1992))), overruled on other grounds by TW Telecom Holdings Inc. v. Carolina Internet Ltd., 661 F.3d 495 (10th Cir. 2011).

The wife complied with this court's September 7, 2017, order and submitted a letter brief in which she asserted that, based on Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1486, the husband's notice of appeal was valid and that we should affirm the trial court's judgment. After seeking an extension, which we granted, the husband also complied with this court's second order requesting letter briefs regarding the husband's bankruptcy filing. Although not abundantly clear from the husband's second letter brief, it appears that the husband also believes his notice of appeal was valid based on the reasoning set forth in Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1486. The husband concluded his second letter brief with one sentence asserting, for the first time and without citations to any supporting authority, that the trial court's judgment was void because, he says, the wife's "claims would have been covered in the bankruptcy and no stay was requested nor was any amended claim filed post petition when the bankruptcy was reopened."

As an initial matter, we first address whether the husband violated an automatic stay of the bankruptcy court when he filed his notice of appeal of the November 29, 2016, judgment in this court. 11 U.S.C. § 362 provides, in relevant part:

"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title."

The bankruptcy code also provides that "[a] case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause." 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). However, once a debtor has been discharged, the automatic-stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 are not triggered by the simple reopening of a bankruptcy case. See, e.g., Wisler v. White (In re White), 383 B.R. 366, 368 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008) ; Burke v. United States (In re Burke), 198 B.R. 412, 416 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996) ("Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C), the automatic stay expired upon the Debtor's discharge." (footnote omitted)); and In re Gruetzmacher, 145 B.R. 270, 274 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991) ("The Court therefore holds that the reopening of the debtor's bankruptcy case ... did not reinstate the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362.") This appeal is therefore distinguishable from Hewett, 197 So.3d 1105 ; In re Capgro Leasing Associates, 169 B.R. 305 ; Autoskill, 994 F.2d 1476, and other cases in which courts have considered the validity of a notice of appeal filed during the pendency of a bankruptcy petition, i.e., before the debtor's discharge. See also Johnson v. Cramer, 598 So.2d 980, 981 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (holding that the reopening of a closed bankruptcy action did not provide for an automatic stay). Given the foregoing authority, we conclude that the husband's notice of appeal, filed after he sought to reopen his former, closed bankruptcy action, was not rendered void by the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

As indicated, in a one-sentence statement in his second letter brief, the husband asserts, without elaboration or citation to authority, that the trial court's judgment was void, purportedly because, he says, the alimony obligation was addressed in the bankruptcy action. The parties presented evidence to the trial court regarding the husband's bankruptcy filing and how it had impacted the division of their property, such as their marital home and a boat. The husband testified that he had not included the alimony obligation specified in the divorce judgment as a part of his 2015 bankruptcy action. The husband did not present any evidence to this court, in response to our requests for letter briefs, concerning whether the alimony obligation was addressed in the original bankruptcy action or in the reopened action.

The bankruptcy code provides that a bankruptcy action "voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged...." 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1). The husband's own evidence indicates that the 2015 bankruptcy action did not determine the extent of his liability for alimony under the divorce judgment, and, therefore, the November 29, 2016, judgment enforcing the divorce judgment cannot be said to be void under 11 U.S.C. § 524. Further, during the hearing on the merits, the husband indicated that he intended either to amend the bankruptcy filing or to seek bankruptcy protection in another filing if the trial court determined that the alimony provision of the divorce judgment was one providing for alimony in gross. The husband raised no argument concerning the bankruptcy in his appellate brief filed in this court. In a letter brief filed at the request of this court, the husband made only a cursory statement that the wife's alimony claim "would have been covered in bankruptcy," a statement contradicted by his own testimony. That statement is also contradicted by the statement in the husband's first letter brief to this court indicating that the amended bankruptcy action, when closed on July 10, 2017, had not made a determination regarding the alimony-in-gross obligation. Accordingly, we decline to hold that the November 29, 2016, judgment was void because of the husband's bankruptcy action.

With regard to the merits, the husband argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the provision at issue in the divorce judgment was one providing an award to the wife of alimony in gross, rather than periodic alimony.

"With regard to the characteristics of periodic alimony and alimony in gross, this court has stated:
" 'Our supreme court has explained the difference between periodic alimony and alimony in gross. Hager v. Hager, 293 Ala. 47, 299 So.2d 743 (1974). Alimony in gross is considered "compensation for the [recipient spouse's] inchoate marital rights [and] ... may also represent a division of the fruits of the marriage where liquidation of a couple's jointly owned assets is not practicable." [Hager v. Hager], 293 Ala. at 54, 299 So.2d at 749. An alimony-in-gross award "must satisfy two requirements, (1) the time of payment and the amount must be certain, and (2) the right to alimony must be vested." Cheek v. Cheek, 500 So.2d 17, 18 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986). It must also be payable out of the present estate of the paying spouse as it exists at the time of the divorce. [Hager v. Hager], 293 Ala. at 55, 299 So.2d at 750. In other words, alimony in gross is a form of property settlement. [Hager v. Hager], 293 Ala. at 54, 299 So. 2d at 749. An alimony-in-gross award is generally not modifiable. Id.
" 'Periodic alimony, on the other hand, "is an allowance for the future support of the [recipient spouse] payable from the current earnings of the [paying spouse]." [Hager v. Hager], 293 Ala. at 55, 299 So.2d at 750. Its purpose "is to support the former dependent spouse and enable that spouse, to the extent possible, to maintain the status that the parties had enjoyed during the marriage, until that spouse is self-supporting or maintaining a lifestyle or status similar to the one enjoyed during the marriage." O'Neal v. O'Neal, 678 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (emphasis added). Periodic alimony is modifiable based upon changes in the parties' financial conditions or needs, such as an increase in the need of the recipient spouse, a decrease in the income of the paying spouse, or an increase in the income of the recipient spouse. See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 762 So.2d 856, 858 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999). The paying spouse's duty to pay periodic alimony may be terminated by petition and proof that the recipient spouse has remarried or is cohabiting with a member of the opposite sex. Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-55.'
" TenEyck v. TenEyck, 885 So.2d 146, 151-52 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)."

Lacey v. Lacey, 126 So.3d at 1031.

The evidence pertaining to this issue is as follows. The wife testified that she understood the alimony award to be one for alimony in gross, and, she said, she believed that her right to enforce that obligation would not be affected by her remarriage. The wife testified that she was unaware whether the alimony had been listed as income on her tax returns and that she was unaware of the tax implications that arise depending on whether an alimony obligation is one for periodic alimony or alimony in gross. The wife stated that she hired an accountant to complete her income-tax returns and that she relied on his expertise to determine whether to include the alimony as income on her income-tax returns. The trial court noted that the manner in which the wife had treated the alimony on her tax returns could impact its determination, and it stated that it would allow the parties to submit their tax returns and a brief to the court after the close of the evidence. See, e.g., Rose v. Rose, 70 So.3d 429, 433 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) ("Periodic alimony is also distinguishable from alimony in gross because it is treated as taxable income to the party receiving the award."). The wife submitted her tax returns after the hearing, and those documents indicate that the alimony was included as income in the determination of the wife's income.

The husband testified that he had believed that the obligation was one for periodic alimony and that he had deducted his payments of that obligation on his tax returns. Similarly, the husband stated that he did not list the alimony obligation in his 2015 bankruptcy action because, he believed, such an obligation was not dischargeable in bankruptcy.

On appeal, the husband argues that the evidence, particularly the evidence regarding how the parties treated the alimony on their respective income-tax returns, indicates that the trial court erred in determining that the alimony obligation established in the parties' divorce judgment was one for alimony in gross. Indeed, it appears that the wife did treat the alimony obligation, at least for tax purposes, as one involving an award of periodic alimony. The trial court noted during the hearing that the parties' treatment of the alimony on their income-tax returns could provide evidence of the nature of the award.

In its judgment, the trial court noted that our supreme court has held that "[w]hen the type of award or awards intended is not particularly specified, the source of payment and the purpose are of prime importance." Hager v. Hager, 293 Ala. 47, 55, 299 So.2d 743, 750 (1974) (emphasis added); see also TenEyck v. TenEyck, 885 So.2d 146, 152 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (" 'When the type of award is not specifically stated in the divorce [judgment], the source of payment and its purpose are important factors in determining whether an award is periodic alimony or alimony in gross.' " (quoting Cheek v. Cheek, 500 So.2d 17, 19 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) )); and Lacey v. Lacey, supra (noting that the source of the payment and its purpose are important factors to resolve if there is no specification of the type of alimony award made in the judgment).

In this case, as the trial court found, the type of award was specified in the parties' divorce judgment, i.e., the divorce judgment specified that the alimony award was one for alimony in gross. See Bolling v. Bolling, 586 So.2d 225, 226 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) ("The intent to award alimony in gross should be necessarily inferred from the language used or should be unequivocally expressed."). The trial court also found that the award satisfied the two-part test explained in Lacey v. Lacey, supra, because the time and amount of the payments are certain and the wife's right to receive the payments is vested because there is no specification that the payments could be modified. See, e.g., Hager v. Hager, 293 Ala. at 54, 299 So.2d at 750 ("[T]he term 'vested' simply signifies that an award of 'alimony in gross' is not subject to modification."). Given the language of the alimony award in the parties' October 2, 2013, divorce judgment, we cannot say that the husband has demonstrated that the trial court erred in determining that that award was one for alimony in gross and, therefore, that it was nonmodifiable and due to be enforced.

AFFIRMED.

Pittman, Moore, and Donaldson, JJ., concur.

Thomas, J., dissents, with writing.

Timothy Andrews ("the husband") has appealed a judgment of the Houston Circuit Court ("the trial court") finding him in contempt of a 2013 judgment that had divorced him from Wanda Andrews ("the wife") and had required him to pay alimony. The majority affirms the trial court's judgment. I respectfully dissent.

The issue raised by the husband on appeal is whether the trial court's 2013 judgment required him to pay periodic alimony, which would have terminated upon the wife's remarriage, or alimony in gross, which would not have been subject to modification and for which the husband would have been responsible notwithstanding the wife's remarriage. As the majority notes, however, the record indicates that the husband initiated a bankruptcy case in 2015, which raises additional questions that must be answered. As to the threshold determination regarding the validity of the husband's notice of appeal, I agree with the majority's resolution of that issue for the reasons discussed in the main opinion, which distinguish this case from the cases noted and this court's recent opinion in Alt v. Alt, [Ms. 2160363, November 17, 2017] --- So.3d ----, ---- (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).

I believe, however, that the majority goes too far in deciding that the husband's alimony obligation was not discharged in bankruptcy, and I therefore dissent from the decision to affirm the trial court's judgment. First, in reaching its decision, the majority implicitly assumes that state courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide whether an alimony obligation has been discharged under federal bankruptcy law. Admittedly, other courts have reached that same determination. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis (In re Lewis ), 423 B.R. 742, 755 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) ("Under current law, state courts may decide nearly all divorce and domestic relations nondischargeability issues regardless of whether the obligation is for 'support' or for a 'property settlement.' "); Davidson v. Soelberg (In re Soelberg ), No. 15-01355, Oct. 7, 2016, 2016 WL 5874828, at n.6 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2016) (not published in the Bankruptcy Reporter)("[A]s the bankruptcy court explained in In re Lewis, 423 B.R. 742, 754-55 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010), the exclusivity over [ 11 U.S.C.] § 523(a)(15) matters that existed prior to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ('BAPCPA') was eliminated by the BAPCPA alterations to the language of [ 11 U.S.C.] § 523(c)(1), resulting in concurrent jurisdiction with state courts. In addition, even pre-BAPCPA, [ 11 U.S.C.] § 523(a)(5) adjudication-the matter most closely at issue here-was subject to concurrent jurisdiction."); Holland v. McCartney (In re Holland ), No. 12-11152, Nov. 26, 2012 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2015) (not published in the Bankruptcy Reporter); and In re Lemoine, No. 12-11152, 2012 WL 5906939 at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) (not published in the Bankruptcy Reporter). I am reluctant to conclusively resolve that question in this case, however, because the parties have provided no legal argument on that issue, as is demonstrated by its omission from the majority's analysis.

Similarly, even assuming that state courts have such jurisdiction, I would not attempt to decide whether the husband's alimony obligation was discharged in bankruptcy based on the meager relevant evidence contained within this record, especially because important aspects of federal bankruptcy law have been amended as recently as 2005. See William Houston Brown, Bankruptcy and Domestic Relations Manual §§ 1:2 & 1:3 (West 2017)(explaining the legislative histories of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), which govern, among other things, the nondischargeability of debts like alimony). Indeed, the analysis set out in main opinion regarding this question does not approximate the discussion that is devoted to similar inquiries by other state courts. See, e.g., Trimble v. Trimble, 511 S.W.3d 392 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016) ; Collins v. Collins, 136 A.3d 708 (Me. 2016) ; and In re Mason, 164 N.H. 391, 58 A.3d 1153 (2012).

The majority appears to skirt thorough consideration of the question by noting the brief trial testimony regarding the husband's bankruptcy and an absence of additional evidence or argument on that point; in essence, the majority appears to conclude that the husband has waived any argument regarding discharge of his alimony obligation in bankruptcy. In response, I first note that, as is further explained by the authority cited above, application of current bankruptcy law would seem to favor the wife under the circumstances presented in this case and would not appear to offer the husband any obvious advantage regarding a determination of the nondischargeability of his alimony obligation. I therefore see no inherent unfairness to the wife in considering the husband's bankruptcy more completely. Second, and more importantly, I note that the fundamental problem we face here is an inability to actually determine whether the husband's alimony obligation was discharged in bankruptcy because the record on appeal demonstrates that the parties did not actually litigate that issue in the trial court.

Thus, insofar as the majority bases its decision on an absence of relevant evidence and argument on that point, I agree with its assessment in that regard. I also agree that, under such circumstances, we should usually consider such arguments to have been waived. However, as the majority points out in the main opinion, if the husband's alimony obligation was discharged in bankruptcy, the trial court's judgment and, consequently, this court's judgment, could be void under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1). I therefore disagree that we should risk issuing a potentially void judgment based on a determination that the trial court's judgment is valid, when the evidence and arguments necessary to make that determination are absent from the record and briefs on appeal.

The problems that may arise as a result of a state court's failure to fully account for the effects of a discharge obtained through bankruptcy are not purely hypothetical. In Egleston v. Egleston (In re Egleston ), 448 F.3d 803, 807 (5th Cir. 2006), a case in which the parties had been divorced, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was left to consider whether two contempt judgments that had been entered by a state court in 1998 were void for violating 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) as a result of a bankruptcy case that had been initiated by the husband in that case in 1994. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit noted that the litigation following the state court's contempt judgments had produced "many additional orders from the state court," including another finding of contempt that had resulted in that husband's imprisonment for five months in 1999. Id. at 807. In 2001, the parties began to litigate in the relevant bankruptcy court the question whether the state court judgments were void, and the bankruptcy court's determination was ultimately appealed to the Fifth Circuit, resulting in its decision in Egleston. Id. at 807.

"Meanwhile, on September 17, 2003, the state court issued an order that finally acknowledged the 1994 bankruptcy and its effect on the earlier state court judgments." Id. at 808. The Fifth Circuit further explained: "As the state court noted, the parties failed to make the original bankruptcy proceedings part of the state court record. We agree with the state court's comment that much of the frustration and aggravation could have been avoided had the parties done so." Id. at 808 n.7. The Fifth Circuit ultimately determined that one of the state court's 1998 contempt judgments was void in its entirety and that the other judgment was void in part. Id. at 810-15.

The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Egleston illustrates the concerns I have about this case. I do not believe that the limited information available to this court regarding the husband's bankruptcy case is sufficient to determine whether his alimony obligation was discharged in bankruptcy, whether the trial court's judgment is void, or, consequently, whether this court's judgment is void. Moreover, failing to take adequate notice of the husband's bankruptcy at this stage could result in ongoing litigation, judgments, and perhaps even imprisonment-all of which may be predicated on a void judgment.

In light of the complexities involved, I believe that the trial court should be afforded an opportunity to entertain the parties' arguments regarding whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the nondischargeability of the husband's alimony obligation and, if so, to consider any evidence that may be relevant to that determination, which, as noted by the Fifth Circuit in Egleston, 448 F.3d at 808 n.7, would ideally include the proceedings from the husband's bankruptcy case. Having not undertaken those inquiries, the trial court lacked sufficient evidence upon which to base a threshold determination regarding its ability to effectuate the relief requested in the wife's rule nisi petition. In other words, it is unclear, based on this record, whether applicable bankruptcy law, including the injunctive principles set out in 11 U.S.C. § 524, should have operated to prevent the trial court from enforcing the husband's alimony obligation upon the wife's request that it do so.

I would therefore vacate the trial court's judgment and remand this cause for the trial court to determine (a) whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the nondischargeability of the husband's alimony obligation and, if so, (b) whether it can properly enforce that obligation under relevant bankruptcy law. See, e.g., Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Friends of Hurricane Creek, 71 So.3d 673, 677-78 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). Moreover, should the parties decide that the bankruptcy court is better positioned to resolve this dispute than is the trial court, I would not purport to place any limitations on the bankruptcy court's ability to resolve any issue raised by this dispute, including the substantive questions addressed by the majority in the main opinion regarding the nature of the husband's alimony obligation. I would therefore not address those questions.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

      With regard to this assertion, the husband's second letter brief states, in its entirety:
      "Based on the relevant caselaw and governing statutes and regulations, it would appear that the Rule Nisi petition filed by [the wife] was due to be dismissed as her claims would have been covered in the bankruptcy and no stay was requested nor was any amended claim filed post petition when the bankruptcy was reopened or in the alternative, the Order issued by the [trial court] should be declared null and void."

      In his appellate brief, the husband references his own income-tax returns, which he attached to his appellate brief. The husband did not submit those income-tax returns to the trial court, and they are not contained in the record on appeal. This court may not consider attachments to an appellate brief that were not presented to the trial court. Roberts v. NASCO Equip. Co., 986 So.2d 379, 385 (Ala. 2007).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PITTMAN, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Wendy JACOBS v. Byron JACOBS
    2160340
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    December 15, 2017
    Amanda Mulkey of Smith & Staggs, L.L.P., Tuscaloosa.
    Rachel Cohen Blume of Blume & Blume, Attorneys at Law, P.C., Northport.
   PITTMAN, Judge.

Wendy Jacobs ("the mother") appeals from a judgment entered by the Hale Circuit Court ("the trial court") in a postdivorce action brought by the mother against Byron Jacobs ("the father"), her former husband. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts

The mother and the father married in 1990 and had four children during their marriage, a set of twins born in 1995 and a set of twins born in 2000. The parties divorced in February 2013. The divorce judgment incorporated an agreement entered into by the parties in January 2013 while the father was incarcerated. The divorce judgment awarded the mother sole physical and legal custody of the parties' four children and provided that the father would have no visitation or any contact whatsoever with the children during their minority. The agreement incorporated into the judgment further provided, in pertinent part:

"5. [The father] is self-employed and his income is variable. However, because of [the father's] actions, [he] presently has no income and has no anticipation of earning any income in the immediate future. Therefore, both parties agree that in lieu of current child support, [the mother] will continue to occupy the [parties'] residence located [in Moundville, Alabama], and [the mother] will continue to pay the mortgage on said property. When the younger children reach the age of majority, or if [the mother] remarries, the property will be listed for sale as soon as possible thereafter and the net proceeds of such sale, less one-half (½) of all payments made by [the mother] for principal, interest, insurance, and ad valorem taxes from October 2012 to the date of such sale, shall be divided between [the mother] and [the father]. [The father] agrees to immediately execute and deliver to [the mother] or her agent any and all documents that may be required to accomplish the intention of this paragraph and shall promptly do all things necessary to that end.
"6. When [the father] is gainfully employed, [he] shall pay to [the mother] an amount to be determined by the court based on the parties' incomes at that time as support for the minor children of the parties, said payments to be by income withholding order upon petition by [the mother] or [the father]. Further, when [the father] is gainfully employed, [the father] is to pay for and keep in force all available medical, optical, and dental insurance on the children during their minority. Additionally the parties agree that each party will pay one-half (½) of all medical, dental, prescription drug, and optical expenses not covered by insurance and one-half (½) of all insurance co-pays, school, and college expenses.
"7. All outstanding indebtedness of both [the mother] and [the father] as of the date of this Agreement will be paid by [the father], and [the father] will hold [the mother] harmless therefrom...."

After being released from jail in May 2013, the father was admitted to an alcohol-abuse-rehabilitation facility and remained there until August 2013. The father then held several jobs in the construction industry. His first job was working for Mike's Framing; that job began on August 30, 2013, and ended in May 2014. He worked full time for Mike's Framing; initially, he was paid $12.50 per hour but that was later increased to $14.25 or $14.50 per hour. After his job with Mike's Framing ended, the father was unemployed for several months while he looked for another job. In late August or early September 2014, the father began working for B & B Construction and was paid approximately $14.75 per hour; however, he lost that job in December 2014 when he was arrested on a charge of domestic violence. He was released from jail in January 2015 and applied to the Social Security Administration for disability benefits in February 2015; however, his application for disability benefits was denied after he accepted a job with Humphrey & Associates, another construction company, in March 2015. He was paid $18 per hour by Humphrey & Associates and worked for that company until he suffered an on-the-job injury in June 2015. The father testified that a load of 14 sheets of drywall had fallen on his leg, breaking his leg and damaging the soft tissue of his leg. He had to have surgery on his leg and received workers' compensation benefits in the amount of approximately $1,000 per month while he recovered from his injury. Since recovering from his injury, the father has successfully bid as a contractor on several construction jobs but has not held a full-time job. He testified that a second application to the Social Security Administration for disability benefits he had submitted a few months before trial had been denied because he was unable to submit all the necessary documents due to his having been incarcerated at the time.

After the father became gainfully employed, neither he nor the mother sought an order establishing the amount of his child-support obligation; however, between October 4, 2013, and May 12, 2015, the father made periodic payments to the mother in various amounts and on an irregular basis. The father introduced into evidence documents evidencing payments during that period totaling $10,300. He did not make any payments to the mother after May 2015.

When the parties' divorced, they owed approximately $4,000 on a Visa credit card and owed their bank approximately $250 for an overdraft on their checking account. The father neither paid the debts the parties owed when they divorced nor provided medical, dental, and optical insurance for the children. The mother paid the $250 debt the parties owed their bank for an overdraft and paid approximately $2,000 of the debt the parties owed on their Visa credit card. In addition, the mother provided the children's medical, dental, and optical insurance. When this action was tried in August 2016, the mother had incurred total costs of $13,381 to provide the children's insurance. In addition, when this action was tried, the mother had paid a total of approximately $750 in medical expenses incurred for treatment of the children that were not covered by insurance, and the father had not reimbursed her for his one-half share of those expenses.

The mother testified that, shortly after the divorce, she and the father had agreed that she would assume sole liability for the debt secured by a mortgage on the parties' residence in exchange for the father's conveying his interest in the residence to the mother and that the father had executed a quitclaim deed conveying his interest in the residence to her.

Procedural History

In May 2015, the mother filed a petition alleging that, despite his having had several jobs since the entry of the divorce judgment, the father had willfully refused to pay the mother child support on a regular basis; had willfully failed to pay the debts the parties owed when the divorce judgment was entered; had willfully failed to pay for the children's medical, dental, and optical insurance; and had willfully failed to pay one-half of the children's medical, dental, and optical expenses that were not covered by insurance. As relief, the mother sought a judgment finding the father in contempt and modifying the divorce judgment so as to establish the amount of child support the father was required to pay.

Answering the mother's petition, the father admitted that he had had several jobs since the entry of the divorce judgment; however, he denied her allegations that he had willfully failed to pay his obligations under the divorce judgment.

After several continuances, the action was tried in August 2016. In October 2016, the trial court entered a judgment. In pertinent part, that judgment states:

"1. The [mother] and [the father] submitted an agreement to this Court in settlement of their then pending divorce case and this Court adopted said Agreement of the Parties as its own order and divorced the parties on or about February 11, 2013.
2. In the parties' agreement the [father] agreed to undertake the following obligations:
"a. The payment of child support.
"b. The payment of medical, optical, and dental insurance of the parties' minor children.
"c. The payment of ½ of the uninsured medical expenses for the minor children.
"d. The payment of all outstanding indebtedness of both the [father] and [the mother] as of the date of the parties' agreement.
"3. At the time of the parties' agreement, the [father] was incarcerated and was unable to fulfill the obligations referenced above. As such, the parties agreed that those obligations would not be triggered until the [father] was released from incarceration and became gainfully employed. After release from incarceration, the [father] was in [an] inpatient alcohol rehabilitation facility until August 2013.
"4. After leaving the alcohol rehabilitation facility, the [father] became gainfully employed. This employment did not lead to the level of earnings that the [father] had previously achieved. From the time that the [the father] became gainfully employed in August 2013, the [father's] rate of pay has ranged from $12.00 per hour to $20.00 per hour. Also, such employment was intermittent and not continuous. As of the date of this hearing, the [father] has twice sought to obtain disability status through the Social Security Administration[;] those efforts have not yet been successful.
"5. The [father] asserted, under oath, that he has been unable to work since at least sometime in 2015 due to injuries sustained on the job.
"6. The Court finds that the [father] became gainfully employed in August 2013 and has been able to work since that time in the construction trades and has an ability to make at least $12.00 per hour. However, the Court finds that the [father] has not been able to secure a forty (40) hour work week at this rate of pay.
"7. This Court finds that the [father's) child-support obligation began on August 1, 2013 and is due to be reduced from that date forward to the amount of $200.00 per month.
"8. Between August 1, 2013 and November 1, 2014 (15 months), the [father's] child-support obligation to the [mother] for four children is $425.00 per month. The [father's] total child-support obligation for said period totals $6,375.00.
"9. Between December 1, 2014 and August 1, 2016 (21 months), the [father's ] child-support obligation to the [mother] for two children is $225.00 per month. The [father's] total child-support obligation for said period totals $4,725,00.
"10. The [father] was able to produce receipts for approximately $10,750.00 as payments to the [mother] on behalf of the minor children from August 2013 through the present. The Court hereby finds that the [father] is entitled to a credit for said payments, leaving a total outstanding back child-support balance of $350.00 plus interest from August 1, 2016.[ ]
"11. The Court finds that the [father's] failure to pay child support was not willful and as such, the [father] is not found in contempt.
"12. The Court further finds that the [mother] paid $13,381.00 for the provision of medical and dental insurance for the minor children. The Court finds that the [mother] is entitled to reimbursement for said amount. However, inasmuch as the [father] quit claimed his one-half (½) interest in the marital residence to the [mother], during the period of his incarceration, the Court finds that he is entitled to an off-set against the health-insurance obligation in the amount of $13,381.00.
"13. The Court further finds that the [father] did not willfully fail to pay said health and dental insurance. Therefore, the Court finds that the [father] is not in contempt. Prospectively, beginning October 1, 2016, the [father] is also ordered to pay the [mother] the sum of $200.00 per month toward the health and dental expenses of the two (2) remaining minor children.
"14. The Court further finds that the [father's] current child-support obligation shall be $225.00 per month beginning September 1, 2016.
"15. The Court further finds that the [mother] has paid $2,000.00 toward a VISA account that was due to be paid by the [father] according to the terms of the parties' agreement. The Court hereby finds that the [mother] is entitled to reimbursement for said amount and is hereby granted a judgment against the [father] in the amount of $2,000.00. The Court further finds that the [father] shall either extinguish the current outstanding balance of $2,213.00 on said account within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the date of this Order or the [father] shall begin making monthly payments to the [mother] in the amount of $100.00 toward said payment and said payment shall continue until such time as the outstanding balance has been paid in full.
"16. The Court further finds that the [mother] has paid uninsured medical bills for the minor children in the amount of $750.00. The Court finds that the [mother] has made demand on the [father] for payment of ½ of said uninsured medical bill[s] and that the [father] has failed to pay his portion of the medical bill[s]. The Court finds that the [mother] should be reimbursed for ½ of the amount she expended for the medical bill[s] and hereby grants a judgment against the [father] in the amount of $375.00."

The mother timely filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., postjudgment motion on November 15, 2016. Among other things, the mother asserted that the trial court had erred by failing to calculate the father's child-support obligations in accordance with Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.; by awarding the father a setoff against his obligation to provide medical, dental, and optical insurance for the children based on his conveyance of his interest in the marital residence in the absence of any evidence establishing the value of his interest in the marital residence; by failing to award the mother $250 for the checking-account-overdraft debt she had paid the parties' bank; by granting the father the option to pay the mother for the approximately $2,213 still owed on the parties' credit-card debt in installments of $100 per month; by ordering the father to pay prospectively only $200 per month for medical, dental, and optical insurance despite the undisputed evidence establishing that the mother was paying $710 per month for such insurance; and by failing to award the mother an attorney's fee. The trial court held a hearing regarding the mother's postjudgment motion on January 31, 2017. At the end of the hearing, the following colloquy occurred regarding the father's child-support obligations:

"THE COURT: Y'all can do the [child-support] calculations based on the [Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.,] guidelines and the formulas and submit it to me.
"[The father's counsel]: All I can do is impute for him minimum wage.
"THE COURT: You can impute your [sic] salary and minimum wage. Just do them both so I can look at them.
"[The mother's counsel]: So you want us to use minimum wage imputed full time?
"THE COURT: Right. You can do both."

On February 2, 2017, the mother filed two CS-42 forms, one showing what the father's child-support obligation would be if it were calculated on the basis of imputing the income he would earn if he were working full time for $17 per hour, and the other showing what the father's child-support obligation would be if it were calculated on the basis of imputing the income he would earn if he were working full time for the minimum wage. The father did not file a CS-42 form or any other document showing a proposed calculation of his child-support obligation. The trial court did not enter an amended judgment before 90 days had elapsed since the filing of the mother's postjudgment motion, and, consequently, that motion was denied by operation of law pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. Thereafter, the mother timely filed a notice of appeal.

Standard of Review

" ' " '[W]hen a trial court hears ore tenus testimony, its findings on disputed facts are presumed correct and its judgment based on those findings will not be reversed unless the judgment is palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.' " ' Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd. v. Parks, 977 So.2d 440, 443 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Fadalla v. Fadalla, 929 So.2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2005), quoting in turn Philpot v. State, 843 So.2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002) ). " 'The presumption of correctness, however, is rebuttable and may be overcome where there is insufficient evidence presented to the trial court to sustain its judgment.' " Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So.2d 1083, 1086 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Dennis v. Dobbs, 474 So.2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1985) ). 'Additionally, the ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak with a presumption of correctness a trial judge's conclusions of law or the incorrect application of law to the facts.' Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So.2d at 1086."

Retail Developers of Alabama, LLC v. East Gadsden Golf Club, Inc., 985 So.2d 924, 929 (Ala. 2007).

Analysis

The mother first argues that the trial court erred in failing to calculate the father's child-support obligation in accordance with Rule 32. The only child-support forms in the record are the two CS-42 forms filed by the mother after the hearing on her postjudgment motion. Neither of those CS-42 forms conforms to the calculations contained in the trial court's judgment. Thus, the record contains no CS-42 form showing how the trial court calculated the father's child-support obligations as established in its judgment, and we cannot tell from the judgment itself how the trial court calculated those obligations. Paragraph 7 of the judgment states that "the [father's) child-support obligation began on August 1, 2013 and is due to be reduced from that date forward to the amount of $200.00 per month." However, paragraph 8 calculates the father's child-support obligation for the 15-month period between August 1, 2013, and November 1, 2014, based on a child-support obligation of $425 per month, and paragraph 9 calculates his child-support obligation for the 20-month period between December 1, 2014, and August 1, 2016, based on a child-support obligation of $225 per month. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, the trial court found that the father "has an ability to make at least $12.00 per hour" but "that the [father] has not been able to secure a forty (40) hour work week at this rate of pay." That finding together with the finding in paragraph 7 that the father's child-support obligation should be reduced to $200 per month indicates that the child-support obligations established by the judgment are downward deviations from the Rule 32 guidelines; however, the judgment does not indicate the amount of the gross monthly income the trial court imputed to the father. Paragraph 6 implies that the trial court imputed income of $12 per hour to the father but does not indicate how many hours of work per month the trial court imputed to the father. Without knowing the amount of gross monthly income the trial court imputed to the father, we have no way of knowing how the trial court calculated the child-support obligations established in its judgment.

"This court has held that if the record does not reflect compliance with Rule 32(E), Ala. R. Jud. Admin. (which requires the filing of 'Child Support Obligation Income Statement/Affidavit' forms (Forms CS-41) and a 'Child Support Guidelines' form (Form CS-42)), and if child support is made an issue on appeal, this court will remand (or reverse and remand) for compliance with the rule. See Martin v. Martin, 637 So.2d 901, 903 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). On the other hand, this court has affirmed child-support awards when, despite the absence of the required forms, we could discern from the appellate record what figures the trial court used in computing the child-support obligation. See, e.g., Dunn v. Dunn, 891 So.2d 891, 896 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) ; Rimpf v. Campbell, 853 So.2d 957, 959 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) ; and Dismukes v. Dorsey, 686 So.2d 298, 301 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). Nevertheless, without the child-support-guidelines forms, it is sometimes impossible for an appellate court to determine from the record whether the trial court correctly applied the guidelines in establishing or modifying a child-support obligation. See Horwitz v. Horwitz, 739 So.2d 1118, 1120 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)."

Hayes v. Hayes, 949 So.2d 150, 154 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006). Because the record does not contain the requisite forms and because we cannot discern from the record how the trial court calculated the child-support obligations established in its judgment, we reverse the judgment insofar as it established those child-support obligations.

The mother also argues that the trial court erred in granting the father a setoff against his obligation to pay the children's medical, dental, and optical insurance based on his conveyance of his interest in the marital residence to the mother because, the mother says, the debt the father owed for failing to provide such insurance was a component of his child-support obligation and, therefore, could not be offset by the conveyance of his interest in the marital residence. However, we cannot consider that argument because it was not presented to the trial court. See Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So.2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992) ("[An appellate court] cannot consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal; rather, [an appellate court's] review is restricted to the evidence and arguments considered by the trial court.").

The mother next argues that the trial court erred in granting the father a setoff based on his conveyance of his interest in the marital residence to the mother because, the mother says, the record contains no evidence establishing the value of the father's interest in the marital residence. We agree. The record contains no evidence indicating the value of the father's interest in the marital residence; therefore, the trial court erred in granting the father a setoff equal to $13,381, the debt he owed for failing to provide insurance for the children. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted the father such a setoff.

The mother next argues that the trial court erred by ordering the father to pay prospectively only $200 per month for medical, dental, and optical insurance because, the mother says, "it appears that the court may have modified the medical support obligation so that the [f]ather became responsible for only $200.00 toward health insurance premiums, rather than including the premiums in an appropriate calculation [of child support]." Although the mother argued before the trial court that it had erred by ordering the father to pay prospectively only $200 per month for medical, dental, and optical insurance despite the undisputed evidence establishing that the mother was paying $710 per month for such insurance, the mother did not argue before the trial court that it had erred by modifying the father's obligation to provide the children with insurance by reducing that obligation to $200 per month or by failing to include the premiums for such insurance in its calculation of his child-support obligation. Therefore, we will not consider those arguments. See Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., supra.

The mother next argues that the trial court erred by failing to award the mother $250 for the checking-account-overdraft debt she paid. The undisputed evidence indicated that the father was obligated to pay that $250 debt, that he had failed to pay it, and that the mother had paid it. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to award the mother $250 to reimburse her for paying that debt. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as it omitted an award of $250 to reimburse the mother for paying that debt.

The mother next argues that the trial court erred by granting the father the option to pay the mother the approximately $2,213 still owed on the parties' credit-card debt by paying her in installments of $100 per month. However, the mother has cited no legal authority holding that the trial court's granting the father that option was an impermissible exercise of the trial court's discretion. "When a litigant fails to support h[er] argument with proper authority, we have no choice but to affirm." Pierce v. Helka, 634 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994).

Finally, the mother argues that the trial court erred in failing to find the father in contempt for his failure to discharge his obligations under the divorce judgment.

" 'Absent an abuse of discretion, or unless the judgment of the trial court is unsupported by the evidence so as to be plainly and palpably wrong, the determination of whether a party is in contempt is within the sound discretion of the trial court.' Shonkwiler v. Kriska, 780 So.2d 703, 706 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (citing Shellhouse v. Bentley, 690 So.2d 401 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) ). In order to find [a party] guilty of contempt under either Rule 70A(a)(2)(C)(ii) (criminal contempt) or Rule 70A(a)(2)(D) (civil contempt), Ala. R. Civ. P., [a] trial court would have ... to determine that the [party] had willfully failed or refused to comply with a court order. See T.L.D. v. C.G., 849 So.2d 200, 205 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)."

Carnes v. Carnes, 82 So.3d 704, 715 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

In the present case, the undisputed evidence indicated that, beginning in October 2013 and ending in May 2015, the father had paid the mother child support in the amount of $10,300. The trial court expressly found that the father's failure to pay the mother more than $10,300 in child support was not willful. Moreover, the trial court implicitly found that the father's failure to discharge his other obligations under the divorce judgment was not willful.

"In ore tenus proceedings, the trial court is the sole judge of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses, and the trial court should accept only that testimony it considers to be worthy of belief. Ostrander v. Ostrander, 517 So.2d 3 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). Further, in determining the weight to be accorded to the testimony of any witness, the trial court may consider the demeanor of the witness and the witness's apparent candor or evasiveness. Ostrander, supra.... It is not the province of this court to override the trial court's observations. Brown [v. Brown, 586 So.2d 919 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) ]."

Woods v. Woods, 653 So.2d 312, 314 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). The trial court apparently found that the father's testimony, which tended to prove that his failure to discharge his obligations under the divorce judgment was the result of financial inability to pay those obligations rather than a willful refusal to do so, was credible, and we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See Woods. Therefore, the trial court's declining to find the father in contempt is supported by credible evidence in the record, and, consequently, we cannot reverse that aspect of the trial court's judgment.

Conclusion

In summary, we reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it established the father's child-support obligations, insofar as it granted the father a setoff against the debt he owed the mother for her providing the children with insurance, and insofar as it failed to award the mother $250 to reimburse her for paying the checking-account-overdraft debt the parties owed their bank, and we remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

Thompson, P.J., and Thomas, Moore, and Donaldson, JJ., concur.

      The record indicates that the father introduced receipts totaling $10,600; however, two of the receipts document the same $300 payment. Thus, the receipts evidence payments totaling $10,300.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Giradeau WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1237
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 6, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 22, 2018
    Giradeau Wilson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Bilbrey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    John Wayne BLACKMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4964
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    August 21, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 30, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Lori A. Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Ray, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Horace YOUNG, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Julie L. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellees.
    No. 1D18-483
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    August 21, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 22, 2018
    Horace Young, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee; Kenneth S. Steely, General Counsel, Gayla Grant, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellees.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Osterhaus and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Terry Dewayne GIDEON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3557
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    August 17, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 22, 2018
    Terry Dewayne Gideon, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Makar and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Corry MENCY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0979
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 27, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 30, 2018
    Corry Mency, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Lewis, and Rowe, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ralph GOLDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2241
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 18, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 30, 2018
    Ralph Golden, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Bilbrey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Pedro Andres BRAVO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1057
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 18, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 23, 2018
    Pedro Andres Bravo, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia C. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Makar, Osterhaus, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jeffery GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0251
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 14, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 30, 2018
    Deana K. Marshall, Riverview, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia C. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Bilbrey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Norman HAYES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1010
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Norman Hayes, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Wetherell and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Antwione HICKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0130
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Antwione Hicks, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Osterhaus, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Albert WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2159
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 5, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 30, 2018
    Albert Williams, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Osterhaus, and KElsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Vyruss HAYES, Appellant, v. DIGESTIVE DISEASE ASSOCIATES OF NORTH FLORIDA, INC., a Florida Corporation, and Gabu Bhardwaj, M.D., individually, and Renata Wajsman, M.D., individually, and North Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Appellees.
    No. 1D17-3048
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    September 28, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 30, 2018
    N. Albert Bacharach, Jr., N. Albert Bacharach, Jr., P.A., Gainesville, for Appellant.
    Jenifer S. Worley and William T. Stone of Saalfield Shad, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee North Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc..
    Jamie L. White and John D. Jopling of Dell Salter, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellees Digestive Disease Associates of North Florida, Inc, Gabu Bhardwaj, M.D., and Renata Wajsman, M.D..
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Lewis, and Rowe, JJ., concur.


text:
    Willie JOHNIGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2153
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Willie Johnigan, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Amy Lynn HIGHSMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0667
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Amy Lynn Highsmith, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Kelsey and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Robert Joseph RYAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0470
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Bilbrey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kay-ron MILLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2010
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Kay-ron Mills, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Renardo A. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-464
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Renardo A. Smith, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Amanda D. Stokes, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Ray, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gerard L. BROOKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2423
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Gerard L. Brookins, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Osterhaus, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Earl James RAY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3370
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Earl James Ray, Jr., pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Kelsey and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Montinace NORMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3322
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Montinace Norman, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Barbara Debelius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wetherell, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Johneka JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2405
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Johneka Johnson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Osterhaus, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Julius Tawun SLEDGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2313
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Julius Tawun Sledge, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Rowe, Osterhaus, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Arick Lamont BURKETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2843
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Arick Lamont Burkett, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Holly N. Simcox, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Benjamin L. CHAPPELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2152
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Benjamin L. Chappell, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Samuel Steinberg, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Leo AIKENS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2058
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Leo Aikens, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Sean SPENCER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1754
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Sean Spencer, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Laundrel Lamar HONESTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1465
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Laundrel Lamar Honester, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Wetherell and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael COPPAGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1062
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Michael Coppage, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Wetherell and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    M.J.D., A Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1347
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Jasmine Russell, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Makar, Osterhaus, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jennifer Lorena SPARACINO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1078
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Robin B. Rogers, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Ray, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Darryll MACK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1964
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Darryll Mack, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Barbara Debelius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jarvis Quintray BAKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1508
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Laurel Cornell Niles, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    T.W., Natural Father of S.W., E.W., A.W., and T.H., Minor Children, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2059
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Gregory P. Farrar of Farrar Law Firm and Mediation Group, Pensacola, for Appellant.
    Sarah J. Rumph, Appellate Counsel, Department of Children and Families, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    Thomasina F. Moore, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Sara E. Goldfarb, Appellate Counsel, Guardian ad Litem Program, Sanford, for Guardian ad Litem Program.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Wetherell and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Demetrius Laredo WALKER, Appellant, v. Julie JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2631
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 19, 2018
    Demetrius Laredo Walker, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Christan STARKES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1739
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 19, 2018
    Christan Starkes, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Frank Xavier Moehrle, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Dennis A. BARNES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-2598
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 16, 2018
    Dennis A. Barnes, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Osterhaus, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0355
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Michael Green, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Lewis, Ray, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kevin MCLEMORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4056
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Makar and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Christopher Lamont DOUGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3678
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Wetherell and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Dexter FARMER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5098
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Dexter Farmer, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Ray, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nathaniel Raheem CHAPMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3590
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nathaniel Raheem CHAPMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3589
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Marquis Ajonte WILLIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-1952
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kevin P. Steiger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Kaitlin Weiss, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    David MINCEY, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-5081
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    David Mincey, pro se, for Appellant.
    Eric Salvatore Giunta of the Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wetherell, Bilbrey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Bubba HURLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-4577
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Bubba Hurley, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Makar and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nathaniel Raheem CHAPMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3592
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nathaniel Raheem CHAPMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3591
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nathaniel Raheem CHAPMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3588
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nathaniel Raheem CHAPMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3587
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jeremiah Benjamin STANLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3411
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Robin B. Rogers, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wetherell, Rowe, and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Derrick GRAHAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2558
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Derrick Graham, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Holly N. Simcox, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Makar, Winokur, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Diego MEJIA-MACH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-643
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 23, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Ray, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Vincent JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-0813
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    Vincent Jones, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Ray, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    James IVERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1844
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    James Iverson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    R.F.C., Minor Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 1D17-5254 1D18-0577 1D18-0579 1D18-0580
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Lori A. Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Kelsey and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Charles E. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1045
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    Charles E. Smith, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf, Lewis, and Rowe, JJ., concur.


text:
    James Clearance MCCRAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1671
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    James Clearance McCray, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Ray, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Robert Stephen WALKER III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1337
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    Robert Stephen Walker III, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Tabitha Herrera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Ray, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Richard D. ROGERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1067
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    Richard D. Rogers, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Kelsey and Winokur, JJ., concur.


text:
    Charles J. LENTON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3544
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    Charles J. Lenton, Jr., pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Makar and Winsor, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nicholas SCHEIDEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1553
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    Nicholas Scheideman, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Roberts, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Christopher Michael ARGUELLES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3445
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    Bruce A. Miller, Public Defender, and Kimberly A. Reece, Assistant Public Defender, Pensacola, for, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED .

Makar, Winsor, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jennifer SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3163
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    Jennifer Smith, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

DISMISSED .

Makar, Winsor, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Terrance HARTLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1211
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 24, 2018
    Terrance Hartley, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Ray, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    V.P., Father of T.P. and M.P., Minor Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-3583
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 31, 2018
    Lara A. Mason of Mason Law Firm, P.A., Ponte Vedra Beach, for Appellant.
    Ward Metzger, Department of Children and Families, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
    Joanna Summers Brunell and Thomasina F. Moore, Guardian Ad Litem Program, Tallahassee, for Guardian Ad Litem Program.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Wolf, Lewis, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.


text:
    Donald OSTERBYE, Former Husband, Appellant, v. Karen CROSS f/k/a Karen Osterbye, Former Wife, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-3014
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 31, 2018
    William E. Whitlock III of William E. Whitlock III, PLLC, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Linda A. Bailey, Rachel H. Borntreger, and Hunter J. Hendrix of Law Office of Linda Bailey, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts, Wetherell, and Osterhaus, JJ., concur.


text:
    Steven MCBRIDE, Appellant, v. Abdalla ADAM, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1108
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 26, 2018
    Steven McBride, pro se, Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Makar, Osterhaus, and Jay, JJ., concur.


text:
    FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, INC., Appellant, v. FLORIDA BUILDING COMMISSION, Appellee.
    No. 1D18-1122
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 26, 2018
    J. Michael Huey, D. Ty Jackson, Allison G. Mawhinney, and Andy Bardos of GrayRobinson, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    W. Justin Vogel, Chief Legal Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf, Jay, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.


text:
    Sharmon TRAWICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D17-2468
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    October 31, 2018
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Lori A. Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Makar, Winokur, and Winsor, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Matthew SALLA, Appellant, v. PNC BANK, National Association, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1052
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 11, 2018
    Mark P. Stopa of Stopa Law Firm, LLC, Tampa, and Latasha Scott of Lord Scott, PLLC, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Kimberly Held Israel, N. Mark New, II, and William L. Grimsley of McGlinchey Stafford, Jacksonville; and Joseph A. Apatov of McGlinchey Stafford, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, VILLANTI, and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Bobby Jermaine TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1559
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 11, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender and Pamela H. Izakowitz, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CRENSHAW, LUCAS, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Johnny TYSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D16-5634
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 23, 2018 Rehearing Denied May 11, 2018
    Johnny Tyson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Lewis, Osterhaus, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gloria Y. FOSTER, Appellant, v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING LLC., a Delaware Limited Liability Company, substituted as plaintiff for Bank of America, N.A., Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-2381
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 11, 2018
    Gloria Y. Foster, pro se.
    Matthew A. Ciccio, of Aldridge Pite, LLP, Delray Beach, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CRENSHAW, LUCAS, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Reginald KELLUM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4055
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 11, 2018
    Reginald Kellum, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KHOUZAM, CRENSHAW and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Sean Allan ODEGAARD, Appellant, v. Tawna Francine ODEGAARD, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3771
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 11, 2018
    T.W. Weeks, III, of Law Office of Ted W. Weeks, III, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CRENSHAW, LUCAS, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Justin FORD, a/k/a Justin Arnulfo Ford, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-794
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 11, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, MORRIS, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Andre MCPHERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3507
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 13, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Carol J. Y. Wilson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KHOUZAM, CRENSHAW, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Robin STEELE and Scott Steele, Appellants, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as trustee FOR CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP., Home Equity Asset Trust 2004-7, Home Equity Pass-Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-7, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1530
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 13, 2018
    Mark P. Stopa of the Stopa Law Firm, LLC, Tampa; and Latasha Scott of Lord Scott PLLC, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Alana Zorrilla-Gaston, Dean A. Morande, and Michael K. Winston of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and CASANUEVA and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    U.S. BANK, N.A., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Viviane PATTERSON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    Case No. 2D17-117
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 13, 2018.
    Bart Heffernan and Andrew Arias of Marinosci Law Group, P.C., Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
    Mark P. Stopa of Stopa Law Firm, Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and CASANUEVA and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Armando P. CHAVEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-5092
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 13, 2018
    Armando P. Chavez, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, MORRIS, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Gregory MYERS, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as trustee for Credit Suisse First Boston CSFB 2005-11, Appellee.
    Barbara Ann Kelly, Appellant, v. U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee for Credit Suisse First Boston CSFB 2005-11, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-4521 Case No. 2D15-4836
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 27, 2018
    Charles F. Beall, Jr. of Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellants.
    Dean A. Morande and Michael K. Winston of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, VILLANTI, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Johnston HAYWOOD, DOC #R46512, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-218
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 27, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and BLACK and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Christine K. BRYANT, Appellant, v. S & J SPORTS, INC. d/b/a Play It Again Sports, a Florida Corporation, Fortin Holdings, Inc., a Florida Corporation, and Stamina Products, Inc., a Foreign Corporation, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D16-4159 2D17-328 CONSOLIDATED
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 25, 2018.
    Christine K. Bryant, pro se.
    Robert Aranda of Valenti, Campbell, Trohn, Tamayo & Aranda, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellees S & J Sports, Inc. d/b/a Play It Again Sports and Fortin Holdings, Inc.
    No appearance for remaining Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SALARIO, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Tisen K. WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-859
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 25, 2018.
    Tisen K. Washington, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Ratliff v. State, 914 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2005) ; Williams v. State, 707 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1998) ; Enriquez v. State, 885 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).

CRENSHAW, LUCAS, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Melissa CAMP-MORGENSTEIN, Petitioner, v. Theresa CAMP-MORGENSTEIN, Respondent.
    Case No. 2D18-898
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 10, 2018.
    Paul F. Grondahl of Paul F. Grondahl, P.A., Bradenton, for Petitioner.
    Kristin A. Norse and Stuart C. Markman of Kynes, Markman & Feldman, P.A., Tampa, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Dismissed.

KELLY, MORRIS, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Ernest HARRINGTON, DOC #H26139, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-4289
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 3, 2018
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, SLEET, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Kalvin Devon PRINGLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-112
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 3, 2018
    Kalvin Devon Pringle, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. James Allen OLLINS, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1211
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 1, 2018
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wendy Buffington, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Luke Newman of Luke Newman, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Wilfredo FELICIANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1216
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 22, 2018.
    Richard C. Klugh, Miami; and Marc David Seitles and Ashley Litwin of Seitles & Litwin, Miami, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Johnny T. Salgado, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and BLACK and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Anne M. NOYOLA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-471
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 15, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Anne M. Noyola, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Jerry Ray WEEKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-121
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 15, 2018
    Jerry Ray Weeks, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and SLEET and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Michael J. KING, Appellant, v. Sharon I. KING, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-1108
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 15, 2018
    Arnold D. Levine and Robert H. MacKenzie of Levine & Sullivan, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Elaine L. Thompson, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and SLEET and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Mohammad MOSTAJABIAN, Appellant, v. SEGAL & SCHUH LAW GROUP, P.L.; Lee Segal ; Jill A. Schuh; and Behrokh Ahmadi, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D17-3002
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 29, 2018
    Jane H. Grossman, St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
    Robert E. Biasotti of Biasotti Law, St. Petersburg, for Appellees Segal & Schuh Law Group, P.L.; Lee Segal ; and Jill A. Schuh.
    No appearance for Appellee Behrokh Ahmadi.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Christina PAYLAN, M.D., Appellant, v. Brian BISHOP, in his individual capacity, and Mark Detrio, in his individual capacity, Appellees.
    Case No. 2D18-186
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 24, 2018
    Christina Paylan, M.D., pro se.
    Andrew I. Dayes of Dayes Law Firm, PLLC, Clearwater, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, SLEET, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Andres ADORNO, DOC #889538, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-3639
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 22, 2018
    Andres Adorno, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan M. Shanahan, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and BLACK and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Eric Robert PLUM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D18-265
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 22, 2018
    Eric Robert Plum, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, BLACK, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Larry Donell BROWN, DOC #T90380, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D16-1941
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 31, 2018.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Mark J. O'Brien, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jason M. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (withdrew after briefing); Andrew Tetreault, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Tyrese FREEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D17-3102, 2D17-3103
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 31, 2018
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Timothy J. Ferreri, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, CRENSHAW, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.