text:
    John Poole, Cross-Defendant-Appellee, v. Anderson Lake, Counterplaintiff-Appellant, and Ida Thompson, and Mary Lake, Cross-Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Gen. No. 46,905.
    First District, Third Division.
    June 29, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.

      Jack B. Temple, Joseph. Krasner, Joseph P. Roth, and William D. O’Neill, all of Chicago, for appellants.
    Gariepy & Gariepy, of Chicago, for appellee; Fred Á. Gariepy, and John Spalding, both of Chicago, of counsel.
   JUDGE KILEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal by defendant-counter-plaintiff and by cross-plaintiffs from an order dismissing the counter suits for want of jurisdiction by the County Court over personal injury actions.

The accident involved a collision between the automobiles of plaintiff and Anderson Lake near 53rd and Dearborn streets in Chicago. Ida Thompson and Mary Lake were riding in the automobile of Anderson Lake. Plaintiff sued for damages to property and the' Lakes and Ida Thompson, referred to herein as counter-plaintiffs, sought damages for personal injuries. Plaintiff’s motion to strike the counterpleadings was overruled, but his subsequent motion tq vacate the overruling order and to dismiss' was sustained and judgment entered against counter-plaiptilfs.

The only question before us is .the'jurisdiction of the County Court in personal injury actions. The decision is one of first impression and requires a construction 'of the 1943 Amendment to Chapter 79, Paragraph 16, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1955.

“County courts are given certain jurisdiction by the constitution but all other jurisdiction must be conferred by statute, and if conferred by statute tbe jurisdiction is limited to sucb cases as are specified in tbe statute.” (People v. McWeeney, 259 Ill. 161, 170.) Tbe constitution does not give county courts jurisdiction in personal injury actions but provides that they shall have “such other jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law.”

The legislature has provided: “The County Courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Courts in all that class of cases wherein justices of the peace now have or may hereafter have jurisdiction, where the amount claimed . . . shall not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000), concurrent jurisdiction in all cases or appeals from justices of the peace . . .” (Chap. 37, Par. 177, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955.)

The jurisdiction of justices of the peace is conferred by Par. 16, Chap. 79. Before 1943 this section provided: “1. Justices of tlie peace have jurisdiction in their respective counties in the following actions, when the amount claimed does not exceed five hundred dollars.” There were, set forth thirteen “actions,” including, “Thirteenth — -In garnishment by attachment . . .” This “Thirteenth” provision was amended in 1943 by the addition of the following: “For trespass or trespass on the case.” It is this language about which the issues here revolve.

The parties agree that before 1943 county courts had no jurisdiction in personal injury cases (Schiller v. Nevius, 187 Ill. App. 485) because justices of the peace had none. (Western Union Tel. Co. v. Dubois, 128 Ill. 248; City of Robinson v. Hilderbrand, 71 Ill. App. 53.) At that time their jurisdiction in tort cases was limited to:

“Second — For damages for injury to personal property and real property, or for taking or detaining personal property.

“Fourth. — Against railroad companies . . . for killing or injuring horses, cattle . . . ; for loss of or injury to baggage or freight; and for injury or damage to real or personal property. . . .

U

“Sixth — For damages for fraud in the sale, purchase or exchange of personal property. . . .

“Eleventh — To assess damages for sheep killed by dogs.”

The parties are not in dispute upon the relevant rules of construction: The statute must be read as a whole; the amendment operates as if its subject-matter had been incorporated in the prior Act at the time of its adoption; and (Acme Fireworks Corp. v. Bibb, 6 Ill.2d 112, 117) the amendment must be considered purposeful and effect must be given the amended law in a manner consistent with the amendment.

Plaintiff, relying on the rule of ejusdem generis, contends that the only meaningful interpretation is that the legislature intended by the amendment to confer jurisdiction in trespass or case actions of the same kind as those already enumerated and particularly to rectify the defect shown in Deutsche v. Whitaker Farmers Elevator Co., 310 Ill. App. 226, in 1941. Counter-plaintiffs argue that that rule should be applied to aid in finding and giving effect to legislative intent, and not to defeat the evident purpose of the legislature in using plain terms which have a generally accepted meaning, and furthermore, that the preceding twelve grants are not of the same, but of different, kinds of action.

In the Deutsche case this court reversed a judgment for plaintiff by a county court on appeal from a judgment for defendant by a justice of the peace. The plaintiff argued that the suit for impairment of a landlord’s lien was in tort and the justice of the. peace had no jurisdiction. Defendant argued' that jurisdiction resided in the grant in class “Sixth — For damages for fraud in .the sale, purchase. . . of personal property, and where the action of debt or assumpsit lies.” Since Deutsche was neither seller, nor purchaser, on the facts, the court decided that the “Sixth” grant did not cover the case, and that the action was trespass on the case of which justices of the peace had no jurisdiction. ':

There is some basis for arguing that the amendment in question was intended to supply the deficiency in jurisdiction noted in the Deutsche case. On the other hand a persuasive argument could be advanced that the legislature need not have gone beyond a simple amendment to the “Sixth” grant in order to bring within its power actions by third person lienors where their liens have been impaired by a fraudulent sale or purchase. We think the words “trespass and trespass on the case” have such settled meanings that we must presume, absent very cogent reasons to the contrary, that the legislature intended their settled meanings to be understood. We find no reasons of sufficient cogency to justify taking these terms in a sense different from their settled meanings. i

Finally, we consider the argument that viewing the amendment as having been in the act at its adoption (People v. Boykin, 298 Ill. 11, 20), the “Second” and “Fourth” classes must be considered as surplusage and that we cannot assume the legislature intended surplusage. Counter-plaintiffs contend that “Second,” “Fourth,” “Sixth,” and “Eleventh” needed no enlargement to cover damage to personalty and “Second” and “Fourth” adequately covered damage to real estate, and therefore the amendment to “Thirteenth” was intended to enlarge the jurisdiction to include personal injury actions which had not already been covered. This argument does not exclude the possibility that the legislature intended also to include actions such as the’impairment of lien action in the Deutsche case.

We hold that ejusdem generis does not limit the breadth of the amendment to the kind of trespass or case actions previously enumerated. The amendment included the tort actions mentioned and the unmentioned common-law actions historically included in trespass and trespass on the case; and since it was made after the specific powers were granted, it is plain that the legislature, in the act as amended, did not intend the enumeration to be exclusive and therefore the amendment may be given full effect. (Shamel v. Shamel, 3 Ill.2d 425, 432.)

It is not the function of this court to inquire into the reason why the legislature enacted the amendment to “Thirteenth” instead of amending one or more of the classes which bear a closer relation than “Thirteenth” to the amendment; nor why the general terms “trespass or trespass on the case” were used instead of more specific terms. It may be that the legislature thought there would be other and further actions, beyond those of personal injury and impairment of lien, not yet enumerated specifically and not yet foreseen or foreseeable, which it might be well to include. We think whatever the reason, it used the terms intending that they be accepted in their ordinary meaning, even though this might result in overlapping or surplusage, and that the cross-actions and counter claim fall within that meaning.

But one of plaintiff’s contentions is that absurd consequences would follow the construction urged by counter-plaintiffs and he relies on the following rule stated in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 136, 140: “When great inconvenience or absurd consequences will result from a particular construction, that construction should be avoided unless the meaning of the legislature be so plain and manifest that avoidance is impossible.” He points to the absurdity of trying the complicated actions that are possible under trespass and case, such as conspiracy, libel and slander, wrongful death and malpractice. He says it would be absurd to have justices of the peace, who need not be lawyers, passing on these complex actions. Yet judges of many of our courts of record need not be lawyers. He argues also, to the same point, that there are no pleadings in a justice court. Since jurisdiction, however, is limited before justices of the peace to $500, this is not convincing. The legislature on the other hand may have foreseen the unlikely events of complicated actions being filed, without pleadings, to recover not more than $500; and classes “First,” “Sixth,” “Seventh,” and “Eighth” could involve very complicated actions. There is not sufficient merit in the contention.

For the reasons given the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to proceed in a manner consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

LEWE, P. J. and FEINBERGr, J., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JUSTICE EOVALDI

license: Public Domain

text:
    Mildred L. Arends, Town Collector, and City of Peoria, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Peter J. Naughton, Individually and as County Treasurer of County of Peoria, Defendant-Appellant.
    Gen. No. 10,962.
    Second District.
    August 29, 1956.
    Released for publication September 15, 1956.

      Cassidy, Sloan & Cassidy, of Peoria, for defendant-appellant.
    Max J. Lipldn, of Peoria, for plaintiffs-appellees.
   JUSTICE EOVALDI

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from an order for a temporary injunction restraining defendant Peter J. Naughton, individually, and as County Treasurer and Ex-Officio County Collector of Peoria County, from collecting real estate taxes from taxpayers of the Town of the City of Peoria unless and until such taxes were delinquent.

On March 14, 1956, the City of Peoria, a municipal corporation, and Mildred L. Arends, Town Collector for the Town of the City of'Peoria, filed a complaint for a declaratory, judgment and other relief against Peter J. Naughton, individually, and as County Treasurer of the County of Peoria, asking for a declaration of the rights of the parties with respect to the collection of real estate taxes in the Town of the City of Peoria. The complaint prayed for an order of court declaring that the defendant did not have the power to collect taxes from the taxpayers of the Town of the City of Peoria unless and until such taxes were delinquent, and that the real estate tax hills with respect to the taxes for the year 1955, collectable in 1956, should contain no legend or wording thereon indicating that said taxes might be paid to the defendant or to his office prior to September 1, 1956. The complaint alleged that the defendant had caused tax bills to be printed containing a statement that real estate taxes for the Town of the City of Peoria could be paid at his office. The complaint further asked that after the court had declared plaintiffs’ rights as prayed for, and should the defendant fail to comply with the declaration of rights in favor of the plaintiffs, then that a temporary injunction be issued by the court restraining defendant, Peter J. Naughton, or any of his agents, servants, or employees, from collecting taxes as aforesaid. ■

Subsequently, on March 27, 1956, a notice of application for temporary injunction was served on the defendant, which said motion was heard on April 26. Previously, on April 13, 1956, the County of Peoria filed its petition for leave to intervene, setting forth that if the prayers of the complaint for declaratory judgment were granted or if an injunction were issued restraining defendant Naughton from collecting the taxes, the County of Peoria would lose revenues amounting to three per cent of any of said taxes which might be collected. There being no objection, the court granted the petition for leave to intervene.

The motion for temporary injunction was based on the verified complaint filed by the plaintiffs, and it asked: (1) that defendant be restrained from sending out tax bills to taxpayers of the Town of the City of Peoria containing the legend or wording indicating that taxpayers might pay their taxes to defendant before September. 1, 1956, and (2) that defendant be restrained from collecting real estate taxes from taxpayers of the Town of the City of Peoria unless and until such taxes were delinquent.

Verified answers having been filed, on April 26, 1956, the circuit court entered an order for temporary injunction denying the plaintiffs’ prayer for a writ of injunction restraining the defendant from mailing the real estate tax bills with respect to the taxes for the year 1955, payable in 1956, containing the legend or wording indicating that said taxes may be paid to the defendant or to his office prior to September 1, 1956, but granting a writ of injunction restraining and enjoining the defendant Peter J. Naughton, individually, and as County Treasurer of the County of Peoria, from collecting the real estate taxes from the taxpayers of the Town of the City of Peoria unless and until such taxes were delinquent. This appeal is brought by the defendant Naughton, individually, and as County Treasurer of the County of Peoria, but the intervening defendant, the County of Peoria, has not filed an appeal from the order granting the temporary injunction.

The County of Peoria, one of the thirteen counties in Illinois having over 100,000 inhabitants, is a county under township organization and is designated by statute as a county of the second class. It contains nineteen townships, in eighteen of which township collectors have always been and are still being elected. The nineteenth township is known as the Town of the City of Peoria, organized under the Act of May 23, 1877, now Section 127 of Chapter 139, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955. The boundaries of the City of Peoria and the Town of the City of Peoria are coextensive. The plaintiff, Mildred L. Arends, is the duly elected and acting •city treasurer of the City of Peoria and by virtue of the provisions of Section 131, of said Chapter 139, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, is also township collector of the Town of the City of Peoria, the said City of Peoria having adopted an ordinance designating the city treasurer as such township collector on February 11, 1908. Section 640, Chapter 120, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, provides that collector’s books for tbe collection of taxes be made up to correspond with the organized townships, and a separate book is made np for the Town of the City of Peoria. Section 653, of said Chapter 120, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, provides that the county clerk shall deliver the books for the collection of taxes to the county or town collectors. Section 671 of Chapter 120, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, provides that every town collector, and every county collector, in cases where there is no town collector, upon receiving the tax book or tax books, shall proceed to collect the taxes. Section 679 and 680 of said Chapter 120, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, provide that town collectors shall, every thirty days, render an accounting of taxes payable to the county collector and make final settlement for the amount of taxes placed in their hands for collection within sixty days after receiving the tax books; and said sections provide further, that town collectors in townships organized under the Act of May 23, 1877 (as was the Town of the City of Peoria), shall make a partial settlement with the county collector of all taxes collected at the expiration of sixty days from the day the tax books are received by such town collectors, but shall retain the tax books until on or before the first day of September at which time they shall make final settlement and return the tax books to the county collector. The provisions of Section 680, Chapter 120, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, permitting the plaintiff to retain the books until September 1 was incorporated in the statutes in 1939 at the time of the revision of the Chapter on Revenue. Prior to that time, town collectors returned the books to the county collector sixty days after receipt thereof.

In all of the townships in the County of Peoria outside the City of Peoria, the township collectors, prior to the year 1956, collected the taxes between May 1 and July 1 and the county treasurer collected said taxes after July 1. In the Town of the City of Peoria the plaintiff herein collected the taxes during the year 1955 until September 1, 1955, so that prior to the time of the filing of the complaint in this cause and prior to the time of the issuance of the injunction, the defendant Naughton had not collected real estate taxes in the Town of the City of Peoria during the previous year prior to September 1, 1955.

Section 55, Chapter 53, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, provides that town collectors shall be allowed a commission of two per cent on all monies collected by them, with the further requirement that in counties containing a population of not exceeding 300,000 inhabitants all excess of commissions and fees over $1,500 shall be paid into the town treasury (into the city treasury where a town and city have coextensive boundaries as does Peoria). Section 39, Chapter 53, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, provides that county collectors shall be allowed a commission of three per cent on all monies collected by them, which said commission is turned over to the counties and is an important source of revenue for them. The plaintiffs’ complaint sets out that in the event the defendant were to collect taxes for the Town of the City of Peoria, the City of Peoria would be deprived of the commissions and fees provided for, which during the year 1955 amounted to approximately $160,000, and furthermore, all of the taxing bodies of the County of Peoria, which during the year 1955 levied taxes collectable during the year 1956 in the amount of approximately $8,500,000, would receive from the collection of such taxes a sum equal to one per cent less than the amount they would receive if the taxes were collected by the plaintiffs; that the various taxing bodies as well as the plaintiff, City of Peoria, would be compelled to institute suit against the defendant to recover the sums of money due them by virtue of his actions, which would entail a large number of'separate law suits, which litigation and multiplicity of suits would be avoided if the court issued an injunction restraining defendant Naught on from attempting to collect such taxes. ■

It is the appellant’s' theory of the case that the temporary injunction was improvidently issued as: (1) there was no necessity for same — there was no irreparable injury threatened to plaintiffs, for if they were entitled to fees the fees could be calculated with' mathematical certainty from appellant’s records; (2) the interests of the taxpaying public would be better served by denying the injunction; and (3) the complaint on its face showed that there was no right in the plaintiffs to collect fees because the identical statute on which they relied as giving them that right was declared unconstitutional in 1934, in a case involving the City of Peoria — People v. Weston, 358 Ill. 610. It is contended by defendant (1) that the City of Peoria has no right to obtain any fees on the amount of taxes collected, as Section 55, Chapter 53, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, is unconstitutional, as said statutory fee is unreasonable compensation for services actually rendered; (2) that by virtue of the provisions of Section 60, Chapter 139, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, no township collectors are to be elected in Peoria County; and (3) said Section 55, Chapter 53, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, has been held unconstitutional in People v. Weston, supra.

The contention that the two per cent commission payable to plaintiff under the statute is unreasonable, and therefore void, is without merit when we consider that the same chapter of the statute under which the defendant claims his commission, provides him with a larger commission, namely, three per cent. The constitutional provision referred to, Section 12 of Article 10, specifically provides as follows:

“But the General Assembly may, by general law, classify the counties by population into not more than three classes, and regulate the fees according to class.” As tlie particular officer does not receive the two per cent, it is clear that the statutory commission is not compensation for the services actually rendered, hut same enures to the benefit of the governing body, the town, city, or county, as the case may be. Such provision has been held valid in the case of Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467, pages 472-473.

The next contention is that Section 60 of Chapter 139, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, has abolished the office of township collector in the Town of the City of Peoria. The particular statutory provision specifically relates to counties, not towns, wherein no township collectors were elected in 1937. Peoria County contains eighteen townships in which township collectors have always been elected and are still being elected, and the Town of the City of Peoria has elected a town collector by virtue of the election of Mildred L. Arends as city treasurer. This statute has been held constitutional in the case of the People v. Hazelwood, 116 Ill. 319. G-reat stress is placed by defendant on People v. Weston, supra. In that case, the City of Peoria filed a petition in mandamus against the Town of the City of Peoria to compel the town to pay to the City of Peoria the balance of the gross commissions after the payment of the $1,500 fee under the provisions of the Revenue Act. The court held that the city was not entitled to this money for the reason that by virtue of the amendment of July 2, 1931, there was created two additional classes of counties in addition to those provided by Section 13 of the Pees and Salaries Act [Ill. Rev. Stats. 1955, ch. 53, § 30]. It should be noted that the court did not hold that the two per cent commission was illegally collected, but merely held that because of the particular amendment, the City of Peoria was not entitled to receive the money from the Town of the City of Peoria. In two later cases, the Supreme Court considered the same statute. In People v. New York Cent. R. Co., 397 Ill. 50, the court had before it the interpretation of this section of the Statute. The court said, at page 57:

“The statutory provisions invoked are not divided into parts, and the exception to the effect that, in townships comprising only one village or city where the corporate limits are the same as those of the township, the excess of commissions and fees shall be paid into the village or city treasury applies alike to villages and cities in counties of under, as well as over, three hundred thousand population.”

The court went on to say on the same page:

“Further fortifying the conclusion that the commissions were properly paid to the city treasury is the fact that the city treasurer is ex-officio town collector. The legislative intent is clearly to place all possible town powers in the hands of a village or city where coextensive with the town. It may well be that the excess commissions in townships having a population as large as East St. Louis would be double or even triple the total tax levy of the town for general corporate purposes. The tortuous construction of the statute urged by defendant would produce absurd consequences. A familiar rule of statutory construction is that where one of two constructions of a statute is reasonable and wholesome, and the other leads to mischievous, if not absurd, consequences, the latter construction should be avoided. People ex rel. Simpson v. Funkhouser, 385 Ill. 396; People v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank and Trust Co. 360 Ill. 454.”

The rule of law announced in the above case has further been carried out by the legislature, by the adoption of an amendment to the the township act, namely, Section 130, Chapter 139, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, providing that all powers vested in the Town and the Board of Town Auditors of such town shall be exercised by the city council. In this connection it should be noted that the City of Peoria would be entitled to the excess commissions, and could obtain the same, by virtue of the provisions of Section 39.18 of Chapter 139, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1955, which provides that in towns wholly within the limits of an incorporated city, any money in the treasury of the town may be transferred to the treasury of such city to be used by the city in its corporate capacity by action of the electors at the annual town meeting or by its board. In the case of Osborne v. City of Alton, 4 Ill.2d 605, the Supreme Court held that the duties of the office. of township collector in cities organized under the Act of 1877 are imposed upon the city treasurer and that the commissions are all properly paid into the treasury of the city, including the $1,500 referred to in said statute. The circuit court of Peoria county properly granted the temporary injunction in order to maintain the status quo pending the final detetrmination of the rights of the parties. The office of a temporary injunction is to preserve the rights of the parties and continue the property and the rights therein in statu quo until the cause can be disposed of on the merits or until further order. Almon v. American Carloading Corp., 380 Ill. 524; Nestor Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Goldblatt, 371 Ill. 570. Since the defendant Naughton did not collect real estate taxes in the Town of the City of Peoria during the year 1955 prior to September 1, 1955, the court preserved the status quo by issuing its injunction.

The law is well settled in Illinois that the trial court is vested with large discretionary power in granting or vacating an order for injunction, and unless the reviewing court finds that the discretion has been abused, the order will not he set aside. Bernard Bros., Inc. v. Deibler, 326 Ill. App. 538; Drainage Commissioners v. Russell, 336 Ill. App. 604, 84 N.E.2d 568.

Since the circuit court acted properly in issuing the order for temporary injunction, the judgment of the circuit court is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

DOVE, P. J., and CROW, J., concur.


author: PRESIDING JUSTICE LEWE.

text:
    Paul Pletke, Appellee, v. Frank D. Shobe, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 46,897.
    First District, Third Division.
    June 13, 1956.
    Rehearing denied July 31, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.
    Frank D. Shobe, pro se, appellant; Benjamin H. Vanderveld, for appellee.
   Opinion by

PRESIDING JUSTICE LEWE.

Not to be published in full.


author: JUDGE FEINBERG.

text:
    Phyllis J. Alaimo, as Administratrix of Estate of Robert C. Alaimo, Deceased, and Judge & Dolph, Ltd., for Use of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, Appellees, v. Henry F. Du Pont, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 46,805.
    First District, Third Division.
    June 13, 1956.
    Rehearing denied July 18, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.
    Eckert, Peterson & Lowry, for appellant; A. R. Peterson, Harold W. Huff, Herbert C. Loth, Jr., of counsel; Augustine J. Bowe, William J. Bowe, and John D. Casey, for appellees; John Bowe, of counsel.
   Opinion by

JUDGE FEINBERG.

Not to he published in full.


author: JUDGE KILET.

text:
    Hazel Dennis, Appellant, v. Otto Naegele and Frida Naegele, Appellees.
    Gen. No. 46,733.
    First District, Third Division.
    June 13, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.
    Knell & Lezak, for appellant; Morton A. Resniek, of counsel; Edward T. Howe, for appellees; Jerome H. Burns, of counsel.
   Opinion by

JUDGE KILET.

Not to be published in full.


author: PRESIDING JUSTICE FRIEND.

text:
    June Vivian McDonald, Appellee, v. Clyde D. McDonald, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 46,898.
    First District, First Division.
    June 21, 1956.
    Rehearing denied September 11, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.
    Nathan M. Gomberg, for appellant; Sidney D. Missner, and Seymour O. Lacob, of counsel; Philip J. Slotnikoff, for appellee.
   Opinion by

PRESIDING JUSTICE FRIEND.

Not to be published in full.


author: JUDGE BURKE.

text:
    Henry Slaboszewski and Anthony Patula, Surviving Partners of Harold F. Egan, Deceased, and Henry Slaboszewski, and Anthony Patula, d/b/a Builders Supply & Trucking Company, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Edmund J. Johnson and Eleanor B. Johnson, also Known as Eleanor Borgmeier, His Wife, and Katherine E. Nova, Defendants-Appellants. Eleanor B. Johnson, Counterplaintiff-Appellant, v. Henry Slaboszewski and Anthony Patula, Surviving Partners of Harold F. Egan, Deceased, and Henry Slaboszewski, and Anthony Patula, d/b/a Builders Supply & Trucking Company, Counter-defendants-Appellees. On Appeal of Eleanor B. Johnson also Known as Eleanor Borgmeier, Defendant-Counterplaintiff-Appellant.
    Gen. No. 46,786.
    First District, First Division.
    June 21, 1956.
    Rehearing denied September 11, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.
    Edmund J. Johnson & E. R. Borgmeier, for appellant; E. R. Borgmeier of counsel; Theodore Stone for appellees.
   Opinion by

JUDGE BURKE.

Not to be published in full.


text:
    Joseph Riccordino, Appellant, v. Mary Riccordino, Appellee.
    Gen. No. 46,832.
    First District, First Division.
    June 21, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.
    Sol R. Eriedman & I. S. Friedman, for appellant; Ehrlich and Cohn, for appellee; Aaron H. Cohn, of counsel.
   Opinion by

JUDGE BURKE.

Not to be published in full.


author: JUDGE NIEMETER.

text:
    Beth Rish, Plaintiff, v. George Rish, Defendant-Appellee, Bernard Sevin, Intervening Petitioner-Appellant.
    Gen. No. 46,870.
    First District, First Division.
    June 21, 1956.
    Rehearing denied September 11, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.
    Sol R. Friedman & I. S. Friedman, for Bernard Sevin, appellant; Ralph R. Levey, and Mortimer, Nolan, O’Malley & Dunne for George Rish, appellee; Robert J. Nolan, Patrick W. Dunne, and Ralph R. Levey, of counsel.
   Opinion by

JUDGE NIEMETER.

Not to be published in full.


author: JUDGE NIEMEYER.

text:
    Harry Bernier, Appellee, v. Carl D. Schaefer, Appellant, and Ralph B. Banderob, Intervening Petitioner-Appellant.
    Gen. No. 46,900.
    First District, First Division.
    June 21, 1956.
    Rehearing denied September 11, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.
    Harry G. Fins, and Nathan Gliek, for appellants; Stevenson, Conaghan, Velde and Haekbert, Werner W. Schroeder, and James E. Hastings, for appellee; Werner W. Schroeder, James E. Hastings, and Douglas F. Stevenson, of counsel.
   Opinion by

JUDGE NIEMEYER.

Not to be published in full.


text:
    Edward E. Raugstad, Appellant, v. Elizabeth L. Trocke, Appellee.
    Gen. No. 46,912.
    First District, First Division.
    June 21, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.
    Marvin Patrick Cohen, for appellant; David Larson, for appellee.
   Opinion by

JUDGE NIEMEYER.

Not to be published in full.


author: JUDGE KILEY.

text:
    Edward March, Appellant, v. Morry Hirshman, Appellee.
    Gen. No. 46,808.
    First District, Third Division.
    June 29, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.

      Peter S. Sarelas, for appellant; Berchem, Schwantes & Thuma, for appellee.
   Opinion by

JUDGE KILEY.

Not to be published in full.


text:
    Albin Kasper, Counterclaimant-Appellant, v. Richard Buelick, Counterdefendant-Appellee.
    Gen. No. 46,894.
    First District, Third Division.
    June 29, 1956.
    Released for publication September 12, 1956.
    William C. Jerome, for appellant; Vogel & Vogel, for appellee; Leslie H. Vogel, and Robert C. Vogel, of counsel.
   Opinion by

JUDGE KILEY.

Not to be published in full.


author: PRESIDING JUSTICE DOVE.

text:
    John T. Blincoe, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Curtis C. Miller, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.
    Gen. No. 10,871.
    Second District.
    July 9, 1956.
    Rehearing denied September 4, 1956.
    Released for publication September 8, 1956.
    Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann & Hoban, and Willard E. Cain, for appellant; Leonel I. Hatch, of counsel; Wyatt Jacobs, of Jacobs, Miller, Hopkins & Rooney, for appellee; Joseph B. Lederleitner, and Donna Simpson, of counsel.
   Opinion by

PRESIDING JUSTICE DOVE.

Not to be published in full.


text:
    Elizabeth Williams, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arthur Fredenhagen, Defendant-Appellee.
    Gen. No. 10,946.
    Second District.
    August 27, 1956.
    Released for publication September 13, 1956.

      Carl O. Bue, for plaintiff-appellant; George H. Bunge, for defendant-appellee.
   Opinion by

PRESIDING JUSTICE DOVE.

Not to be published in full.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Glenn H. Sunderland, doing business as Ambraw Finance Company, a Licensee under Small Loans Act, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Cross-Appellant, v. J. Edward Day, Director of Insurance of State of Illinois, and Director of Department of Insurance of State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant, and Cross-Appellee.
    Gen. No. 10,072.
    Third District.
    August 13, 1956.
    Rehearing denied October 2, 1956.
    Released for publication October 2, 1956.

      Latham Castle, Attorney General, State of Illinois, John L. Davidson, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General, Mark O. Roberts, Special Assistant Attorney General, Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, all of Springfield, for appellant-cross appellee.
    Chapman and Cutler, of Chicago, and Gillespie, Burke & Gillespie, of Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee and cross-appellant; Roscoe C. Nash, and William J. Hurley, both of Chicago, and Hugh J. Dobbs, and Frank W. Young, both of Springfield, of counsel.
    Edward A. Dunbar, of New Jersey, and Giffin, Winning, Lindner & Newkirk, of Springfield, for Beneficial Management Corp. as amicus curiae.
   PER CURIAM.

On December 6, 1951, plaintiff Glenn H. Sunderland d/b/a ,Ambraw Finance Co., a licensee under the Small Loans Act, filed a suit for a declaratory judgment pursuant to Sec. 57% of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Chapter 110, paragraph 181.1) against the Director of the Department of Insurance of the State of Illinois. In his third amended complaint, upon which the case was finally heard, he alleged in substance, that he was a licensee under the Small Loans Act conducting a business in Jasper County; that he has from time to time made loans secured by chattel mortgages on personal property; that he has required borrowers, as a condition precedent to making such loans, to provide adequate insurance on said personal property with an appropriate loss payable clause; that to assist the borrower, he desires to use a requisition for insurance on such property to be signed by the borrower specifying the amount and kind of insurance and the name of the insurance company through whom the borrower desires the insurance to be issued; that he is prevented from using said requisition form by reason of Rule 15 of the Rules and Regulations effective October 1, 1950 governing the execution and enforcement of the Small Loans Act; that plaintiff has not directly or indirectly received any part of any insurance premium paid by a borrower for insurance on personal property. The third amended complaint also alleges that plaintiff desires to use credit life insurance as security for small loans and to require prospective borrowers to purchase, at their expense, as a condition precedent to the making of the loan, credit life insurance of either full coverage level term life or monthly decreasing term life in an amount equal to the principal of the loan and for a term co-extensive with the term of the loan; that he desires to use a requisition form similar to that above mentioned; that he is prevented from requiring credit life insurance as security or from taking the requisition by Rule 15 above. The complaint further alleges that pursuant to Section 21 of the Small Loans Act the Department of Insurance of Illinois on October 1, 1950 promulgated Rule 15 which is as follows :

“(a) No licensee shall solicit insurance nor take any application, requisition or request for insurance in connection with any loans to borrowers.

“(b) No insurance premium may be taken, contracted for or received by tbe licensee in connection with any loans to borrowers.

“(c) No borrower shall be required to purchase life insurance as a condition precedent to a loan, and no borrower shall be required to purchase any policy of insurance from any certain company, agent, broker, or person as a condition precedent to a loan.”

and is enforcing said rule against him; that paragraph (c) of Rule 15 is unwarranted by any provision of the Small Loans Act and that said act does not prohibit plaintiff from requiring a borrower to furnish either property or credit life insurance as a condition precedent to making a loan and that said paragraph violates various sections of the State and Federal Constitutions. The complaint prays that paragraphs (a), and that portion of paragraph (c) which prohibits requiring a borrower to purchase life insurance as a condition precedent to a loan, of Rule 15 be declared invalid and of no force and effect; in the alternative, that if Rule 15 be adjudged to be authorized by the fourth paragraph of Section 12 of the Small Loans Act that then in that event said paragraph of Section 12 be declared unconstitutional; and that an injunction issue against the Department of Insurance enjoining the enforcement of the portions of Rule 15 above.

The Attorney General, answering for defendant, put in issue the sole questions as to the validity of paragraph (a) of Rule 15 and that part of paragraph (c) which prohibits credit life insurance as a condition precedent to a loan.

Plaintiff was the only witness who testified and his testimony tends to support the ¿negations of his complaint not otherwise admitted by answer. Since we deem the question involved to be largely one of law a more detailed statement of plaintiff’s testimony is not considered necessary.

The Circuit Court entered a final decree adjudging paragraph (a) of Eule 15 to be valid and within the power vested in the Department of Insurance; adjudging that plaintiff was entitled as a matter of right to require a borrower to purchase credit life insurance, as a condition precedent to making a loan, and that that portion of paragraph (c) of Eule 15 prohibiting such practice was invalid and beyond the power vested in the Department of Insurance; adjudging the fourth paragraph of Section 12 of the Small Loans Act to be constitutional; and ordering a permanent injunction against enforcement of that portion of paragraph (c) above of Eule 15. The defendant has appealed from that portion of the decree declaring part of paragraph (c) of Eule 15 invalid and plaintiff has cross-appealed from that portion of the decree declaring paragraph (a) of Eule 15 valid.

We have been furnished with exhaustive briefs by both appellant and appellee. In addition we have granted Beneficial Management Corp. leave to file a brief as Amicus Curiae. Household Finance Corp. has filed a brief in Cause No. 10064 pending in this court covering, among other matters, the matters here involved and the Attorney General appearing for defendant and appellant has adopted the pertinent portions of said brief. These briefs have all been considered by this court.

,The sole question before this court is whether those parts of Eule 15 providing that

(a) No licensee shall solicit insurance nor take any application, requisition or request for insurance in connection with any loans to borrowers, and

(c) No borrower shall be required to purchase life insurance as a condition precedent to a loan

are within the powers vested in the Department of Insurance under the Small Loans Act.

Section 21 of the Small Loans Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Chap. 74) provides in part as follows:

“The Department is authorized and empowered to make and enforce such reasonable relevant rules, regulations, directions, orders, decisions, and findings as may be necessary for the execution and enforcement of the provisions of this Act and the purposes sought to be attained herein, in addition thereto and not inconsistent therewith.”

Thus at the outset it will be noted that the Department has power to make rules and regulations

(a) To carry out the express provisions of the act, and in addition thereto

(b) To attain the purposes sought to be attained therein.

In People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. 159, 118 N. E. 87, the court adopting the language of State v. Sherman [105 Pac. 299] said:

“ ‘It is a matter of common knowledge, upon which the legislature is to be presumed to have acted, that in this State, at least, the taking of interest much in excess of the rate allowed by law was customarily practiced by those engaged in the business of making small loans, usually made under such circumstances to persons of small means, who by reason of their actual or supposed necessities are compelled to deal with and yield to the demands of those engaged in that business. And it may be the fact, — at least we are not advised to the contrary, — that the practice of exacting such oppressive rates of interest is very largely, if not entirely, confined to the class of persons and transactions referred to. . . . The business is so well advertised and known that the legislature, we think, was justified in regarding and treating it, and the persons engaged •in it, as constituting a distinct class in the field of financial operations, and had the power to enact the statute here in question to suppress the practice, coneeived by the legislature to be oppressive and extortionate, growing out of the conduct of such business and such transactions.’ ”

and further,

“The object of the law is not to regulate the rate of interest, but, on the contrary, is to regulate the business of making loans of small sums of money to wage earners and salaried people, . . . .”

And in Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Jones, 384 Ill. 248, 51 N.E.2d 256, the court said:

“The object of the act seems to be to regulate those engaged in making small loans to necessitous borrowers for the protection of the borrowers.”

See also Solomon v. Dunne, 264 Ill. App. 415.

In Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395, the court said:

“Usury laws proceed upon the theory that the lender and the borrower of money do not occupy towards each other the same relations of equality that parties do in contracting with each, other in regard to the loan or sale of other kinds of property, and that the borrower’s necessities deprive him of freedom in contracting, and place him at the mercy of the lender.”

The legislative purpose and intent in enacting this legislation is apparent from the four corners of the act namely: to remedy an iniquitous situation under which necessitous borrowers of small amounts were required to pay excessive rates of interest to unscrupulous lenders, — in short, to relieve the burden of the indigent borrower against oppressive interest exactions and other charges, made under one subterfuge or another.

It is a well established rule that the legislature, having declared its policy and purpose and provided standards for the exercise of the power, may confer upon administrative authorities the power to enact rules and regulations to promote the purpose and spirit of the legislation and carry it into effect. People ex rel. Mosco v. Service Recognition Board, 403 Ill. 442, 86 N.E.2d 357.

Aside from a general consideration of the purpose of the act there are important express provisions of the Small Loans Act which are contained in Sec. 13 as follows:

“Every licensee hereunder may lend . . . money . . . and may charge, contract for, and receive thereon interest . . . etc.

“In addition to the interest herein provided for no further or other charge or amount whatsoever for any examination, service, brokerage, commission, expense, fee, insurance premium, or bonus or other thing, or otherwise, shall be directly or indirectly charged, contracted for, or received, except when a chattel mortgage is recorded, the actual recorder’s fee for same may be paid by the borrower.”

Since the act in question is primarily for the benefit and protection of the borrower we think that in construing these provisions stress should be laid on “the borrower” and not “the lender.” If the words “the borrower” are interpolated in the above no violence is done to the meaning nor can it be said that such was not the basic purpose of the legislature. Thus in the first quoted portion of Section 13 “Every licensee hereunder may lend . . . money . . . and may charge ‘the borrower,’ contract for ‘with the borrower,’ and receive thereon ‘from the borrower’ interest etc.” Since the same phraseology is used in the second quoted portion of Section 13, a similar interpolation carries out the intent of the legislature i.e., “no . . . insurance premium . . . shall be directly or indirectly charged ‘the borrower,’ contracted for ‘with the borrower,’ or received ‘from the borrower.’ ” This seems particularly appropos when it is noted with reference to the recording fee which may be paid “by the borrower.” Thus the meaning of Section 13 is clear and obvious.

In addition it should be noted that these provisions are in the nature of prohibitions on the actions of the lender. They are broad in scope. The primary purpose of Section 13, in our opinion, is to place limitations upon the lender so as to protect the borrower from additional charges over and above those specifically authorized. To permit the lender to “require” credit life insurance as a prerequisite to a loan is to permit him to contract with the borrower, as a part of the contract for loan, that such insurance be furnished.

We think this court should look beyond the mere form of the transaction and to its substance. Stripped of all legal niceties credit life insurance is basically intended for the protection of the lender’s principal and interest. As observed in Jernigan, Bank Commissioner v. Loid Rainwater Co., 196 Ark. 251, 117 S.W.2d 18, where the court said :

“. . . the fact cannot be disguised that it is not insurance which the borrower wants. His pressing need is for a small loan, which he accepts upon any terms that may be imposed, and it is no service to the borrower to require him to take something he may not want and can ill afford to have, but which he accepts because his necessity permits no alternative.”

Counsel for defendant and Amicus Curiae cite a number of cases from foreign jurisdictions wherein the courts have concluded that a requirement of insurance as a condition precedent to a loan does not violate the provisions of the particular Small Loans Act under consideration. None of these acts have the phrase “insurance premium” in them. This phrase is peculiar to the Illinois Act. Many of the Small Loans Acts of other states differ in other particulars of importance. Be this as it may, these cases place emphasis on the lender rather than on the borrower and proceed upon the narrow theory that because the lender does not profit in dollars and cents the practice is not objectionable albeit the borrower is put to additional expenses, burdens and charges. We believe that this concept overlooks the basic purpose generally of the legislation in question. These cases certainly do not apply in view of the express provisions of the Illinois Act.

In passing, we call attention to the fact that in the New York case of Martorano v. Capitol Finance Corp., 289 N. Y. 21, 43 N.E.2d 705, strongly relied upon by counsel for defendants, there is a strong and persuasive dissenting opinion by three of the seven Justices. Also the lower court in passing on the question arrived at the opposite conclusion. And in Maellaro v. Madison Finance Co. of Jersey City, 130 N. J. L. 140, 31 A.2d 485, one of the three Justices based his dissent entirely on the dissent in the New York case.

In the final analysis Small Loans licensees may settle the problem through legislative enactment specifically authorizing them to require life insurance on the life of the borrower in an amount not to exceed the amount of the loan and to receive and transmit the premiums therefore, as was done in the State of Maryland.

We conclude that Rule 15 is valid in its entirety. It prevents the identical practices which the act prohibits and therefore carries out the legislative policy and purpose of the act itself. The Circuit Court was in error in holding any part of this rule invalid.

Accordingly the injunction issued by the Circuit Court is dissolved and paragraphs (a) and (c) of Rule 15 of the Rules and Regulations issued by Department of Insurance, Division of Small Loans, effective October 1, 1950, governing the execution and enforcement of the Small Loans Act of Illinois are declared to be valid and enforceable and within the provisions of Sections 13 and 21 of the Small Loans Act of Illinois.

Decree reversed in part and affirmed in part.

HIBBS, J., took no part in this opinion.


author: PRESIDING JUSTICE DOVE

text:
    John J. Werner, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. International Association of Machinists, a Voluntary Association, P. L. Siemiller, General Vice President, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    Gen. No. 10,904.
    Second District.
    August 20, 1956.
    Rehearing denied October 2, 1956.
    Released for publication October 2, 1956.

      Charles H. Atwell, of Aurora, and Carbary & Carbary, of Elgin, for plaintiff-appellant; George D. Carbary, of Elgin, of counsel.
    Roy J. Solfisburg, Jr., David H. Armstrong, and Robert E. Dolph, all of Aurora, and George W. Christensen, of Chicago, for defendants-appellees.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE DOVE

delivered the opinion

of the court.

On April 2, 1954 John J. Werner filed his verified-complaint in the circuit court of Kane County against International Association of Machinists, a voluntary association or union; P. L. Siemiller, the general vice-president of this union; Local Lodge No. 1202.District 108 of said union; Nicholas Bury, president of said Local Lodge No. 1202; and V. J. Mazzacano, individually, and as an officer of said union and the highest officer of said Local No. 1202 and its representative in the Grand Lodge of said union. The defendants appeared and filed a verified motion to dismiss the complaint. This motion was heard on June 24, 1954 and taken under advisement. On July 1, 1954 an order was entered sustaining the motion of defendants to dismiss and granting leave to plaintiff to file an amended complaint within twenty days.

The record discloses that an amended complaint was filed on July 20, 1954, and on July 26, 1954 defendants filed a motion to expunge from the order of July 1, 1954 the portion thereof which granted leave to plaintiff to file an amended complaint in twenty days and to strike the amended complaint from the files. This motion was heard and sustained on the same day and an order entered striking the amended complaint from the files and directing the- clerk to strike from his docket the portion of the order of July 1, 1954 which granted leave to the plaintiff to file an amended complaint in twenty days. On the same day, July 26,1954, an order was entered reciting that plaintiff tendered, in open court, a complaint as amended, that plaintiff submitted a copy thereof to counsel for defendants and moved for leave to file the same. Subsequently this motion was heard and on October 11,1954 an order was entered denying plaintiff leave to file the tendered amended complaint and rendered judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.

Thereafter and on October 19,1954 notice was served on counsel for defendants that plaintiff would appear before the trial court on October 22, 1954 and move the court to reconsider this cause and upon such reconsideration, vacate the several orders entered on July 1, 1954, July 26, 1954, and October 11, 1954. In response to this motion, defendants moved to strike the same. On October 22,1954 these motions were set for hearing for November 9, 1954. A hearing was had which was concluded on February 9, 1955 and the motions were, by the court, taken under advisement. On February 17,1955 the court announced his decision in open court, overruling plaintiff’s motion and entered an order continuing the cause for the preparation of a written order. This written order was entered by the trial court denying plaintiff’s motion to vacate the previous orders and rendering judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff for costs on March 3, 1955. At this same time, the court fixed the amount of an appeal bond and on March 9,1955 plaintiff filed his notice of appeal to the Supreme Court and on March 12, 1955 the appeal bond was filed.

By his notice of appeal, plaintiff sought to have the Supreme Court reverse (a) that portion of the order of July 1, 1954 dismissing plaintiff’s complaint; (b) that portion of the order of July 26,1954 striking plaintiff’s amended complaint from the files and that portion of the same order which struck from the order of July 1, 1954 leave to file said amended complaint; (c) the order of October 11,1954 dismissing plaintiff’s complaint and denying him leave to file an amended complaint; and (d) the order of March 3,1955 which denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate the previous orders and rendered judgment against the plaintiff for costs.

In the Supreme Court, the defendants appeared and filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, or, in the alternative, to transfer this cause to this court. The Supreme Court, without opinion, transferred the cause to this court and on October 29, 1955 appellees filed their brief and argument in this court.

Counsel for defendant suggest that the order of October 11, 1954, denying plaintiff leave to file the tendered amended complaint, was a final judgment and this appeal should be dismissed, inasmuch as the notice of appeal was filed on March 9, 1955, which was more than ninety days after the entry of the order of October 11,1954. There is no merit in this contention. The record discloses that on October 22, 1954 the plaintiff filed his motion to vacate and set aside the order of October 11, 1954. This motion of October 22, 1954 was heard and taken under advisement and not disposed of until March 3, 1955. The judgment of October 11, 1954 was therefore suspended until March 3, 1955 and the time in which to file a notice of appeal did not begin to run until the latter date. (Corwin v. Rheims, 390 Ill. 205, 216; Lenhart v. Miller, 375 Ill. 346, 351.)

The trial court held that the original complaint set forth insufficient facts to entitle the plaintiff to the relief which he sought. Thereafter, the plaintiff, in apt time, submitted his amended complaint to the court and to opposing counsel and sought leave to file it. The trial court examined it, held that when plaintiff became a member of the union he agreed to abide by all the rules and regulations of the organization and not having exhausted all his remedies within the union, his submitted amended complaint did not state a cause of action and denied plaintiff leave to file it. It is elementary that if a complaint does not state a cause of action, the court may dismiss it upon motion. (Deasey v. City of Chicago, 412 Ill. 151, 153, 154.) In our opinion, the sufficiency of the submitted amended complaint to state a cause of action is presented to this court by this appeal.

This amended complaint alleged that the defendant, International Association of Machinists, hereinafter referred to as “International,” was a voluntary association of individuals with a total dues-paying membership in excess of 600,000 residing and employed throughout the United States, Canada, Hawaii, the Canal Zone and Alaska; that the territory serviced by International is divided into 157 districts with 1900 local lodges; that defendant, Local Lodge No. 1202, is a subordinate lodge of International and located in District 108, which has in excess of 2000 members with headquarters in Aurora, Illinois; that defendant, P. L. Siemiller, was the general vice-president of International and the titular head of District 108; that defendant, Nicholas Bury, was the president of Local No. 1202, and defendant, Y. J. Mazzacano, was the highest ranking union official of Local No. 1202 and its representative to the Grand Lodge of International; that plaintiff had been associated with unionism for 25 years and had been a member in good standing of Local Lodge No. 1202 since September 1,1942, attended meetings, paid his dues and had held many offices in said union during his years of membership therein.

The amended complaint then alleged that said union and its members are governed by a constitution and rules of order published in booklet form, a copy of which was attached to and made a part of the amended complaint. It was further alleged that at the time plaintiff filed his complaint, he was employed by Stoner Manufacturing Corporation of Aurora, Hlinois, then affiliated with International; that on August 12, 1953 defendant, International, and the membership of Local Lodge No. 1202, were negotiating a contract with Stoner Manufacturing Corporation involving wages, hours and working conditions; that on August 12,1953 a meeting of the employees of the Stoner company was held; that this meeting was in charge of and dominated by defendant, Mazzacano, who demanded that a vote be taken on the proposition of whether or not to strike; that plaintiff requested Mazzacano to conduct the meeting in accordance with the constitution and rules of the order, but Mazzacano refused to do so; that following the union meeting of August 12,1953 the conduct of Mazzacano was generally discussed by tbe members of Local No. 1202 and a petition was circulated among and signed by forty members, directed to tbe president of District 108, requesting that defendant, Mazzacano, be informed bis services were no longer desired and be be excused from further participation in tbe negotiations then going on; that plaintiff refused to sign this petition, but defendant, Mazzacano, became incensed at plaintiff because of bis insistence at tbe meeting of August 12, 1953, that tbe constitution and rules of International be followed and Mazzacano then determined upon a plan and scheme to penalize tbe plaintiff and make an example of him before tbe membership and expel him therefrom.

It further appears, from tbe amended complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, that the plaintiff, on September 4, 1953, received a registered letter from the president of Local No. 1202, notifying him that charges “of improper conduct,” violative of Section I of Article 24 of the constitution had been filed against him and notifying him to appear before a trial committee of Lodge 1202 on Tuesday, September 8, 1953, at 7:30 P. M. at District No. 108 office, 100 Main Street, Aurora, Illinois; that on September 8, 1953 plaintiff sent a registered letter to the president of Local No. 1202, requesting a copy of the charges filed against him and asking for a continuance of his trial. This request for a continuance was denied and the charges proceeded to a hearing before a trial committee, which, on September 8, 1953, found plaintiff guilty and recommended that he be expelled from the lodge. On September 16, 1953 the trial committee submitted its report and recommendation to the regular meeting of Lodge 1202 and, after hearing the report, the membership of the lodge who were present, 45 in number, voted by secret ballot, unanimously, that plaintiff was guilty as charged and that he should be expelled. Plaintiff was promptly advised of the results of the trial and informed that if he desired to appeal from the action of the lodge, his appeal should be directed to International President, A. J. Hayes, Machinists Building, Washington, D.C. and be taken within thirty days from September 10, 1953. Plaintiff did appeal and his appeal was received by the president of International on October 1, 1953, who advised plaintiff of that fact and that a transcript of the trial of plaintiff’s case had been received and would be given careful consideration and a decision rendered according to Section 9 of Article K of the Constitution of the Grand Lodge.

It further appears that the president of International reviewed the record furnished to him on the appeal and concurred in the decision of the lodge and found plaintiff guilty of conduct unbecoming a member, but found the penalty of expulsion too severe and that penalty was set aside. Plaintiff, however, was directed to appear before the membership of Lodge 1202 at its December meeting to be openly reprimanded for his misconduct by the president of the Lodge and that he send a written apology to defendant, Mazzacano, and that a copy thereof be sent to the local lodge, to the general vice-president and to the president’s office. The decision of the International president further provided that if the plaintiff failed to appear for reprimand and failed to submit an apology as directed, the financial secretary of the lodge was instructed to refuse to accept any further dues from plaintiff. Plaintiff was promptly notified of this decision.

Thereafter on December 8, 1953 plaintiff, by letter, requested the president of International to (a) reopen the case and permit him to defend the charges, or (b), that the Grand Lodge itself investigate the truth of the charges, or, (c) if neither of said requests be granted, that plaintiff be given such further appeal as was available. In this letter, plaintiff stated that he could not submit to an open reprimand when he had done no wrong, nor could he send a written apology to Mazzacano as he had “never attacked his character.” Mr. Hayes, president of International, acknowledged receipt of this letter and advised plaintiff that his decision was based on the record and other pertinent information; that the record indicated that he had been served with adequate notice of his trial in the local lodge held on September 8, 1953 and, for that reason, his request that the hearing be reopened would be denied. The president of International treated the plaintiff’s letter of December 8, 1953 as an appeal from his decision to the executive council as provided by the Grand Lodge constitution and that council reviewed the case and voted to sustain the decision of the International president and advised the plaintiff that the decision of the president becomes the decision of the executive council.

The amended cdmplaint then alleged that by reason of said appeal of December 8,1953, and the decision of the executive council as aforesaid, the plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies within the framework of the constitution and rules of order of International ; that Article 24, Section 6 of said constitution and rules provides that appeals may be taken from the decision of the executive council to the Grand Lodge in convention or an appeal may be made to the membership at large of International through a referendum; that neither of said methods of appeal was reasonably open to the plaintiff for the reason that no Grand Lodge convention would occur until 1956 and that plaintiff was unable to cause, or cause to be conducted, a referendum of more than 600,000 members of International because of the expense and time involved in conducting such a referendum.

It was then alleged that Section 6 of Article 24 of said constitution further provides that before any appeals can be taken from an executive council decision, the decision and all orders of the executive council in relation thereto must be fully complied with by all parties concerned therein, in order to entitle them to enter an appeal; that if plaintiff complied with said decision and said order, the subject matter of said appeal would be rendered moot.

The prayer of plaintiff’s amended complaint was that a decree be entered finding (a) that plaintiff’s expulsion from Lodge 1202 is null and void and that the defendants be directed to reinstate plaintiff as a member of said lodge; (b) that defendants be enjoined from preferring charges against plaintiff or expelling him or attempting to expel him from said lodge or taking any punitive action against him by reason of any of the matters alleged in his amended complaint; (c) that defendants be directed to show cause why plaintiff should not be permitted to pay dues from the date of his expulsion and attend meetings as a member of Lodge 1202; and (d) that he recover a money judgment against defendant, Mazzacano, in the sum of $7,500.

Section 6 of Article 24 of the constitution of International provides that before any appeal can be taken from an executive council decision, all orders of the executive council in relation thereto must be fully complied with by all parties concerned therein in order to entitle them to enter an appeal. The same section further provides that in no case shall any member appeal to the civil courts for redress until after having exhausted all rights of appeal under the provisions of the constitution. After the decision of the executive council, plaintiff took no further steps within his union, but instituted the instant proceeding.

Counsel for appellees insist that as appellant had not exhausted all the remedies provided in the framework of the union’s constitution and rules, he cannot maintain this suit. Counsel for appellant call our attention to the fact, in excuse for his failure to take any further steps within the union, that before plaintiff’s appeal from the order of the executive council would be considered, plaintiff was obliged, under tbe rules of tbe union, to submit to the penalty imposed, wbicb was a public reprimand and a written apology to appellee, Mazzacano. Had plaintiff done this, be would have fully complied with tbe order of tbe executive council and, having so complied, there would be no reason why bis appeal should be entertained. Had bis appeal then been successful, it would have afforded him no relief. Had tbe plaintiff complied with tbe order of tbe executive council, plaintiff would have been restored to membership in the union. By submitting to tbe penalty imposed, bis appeal would present no question for decision or determination.

In view of our conclusion, it is not necessary for us to determine whether plaintiff exhausted all bis remedies within tbe union. Assuming, however, that be did and that nothing further could be done by him after tbe executive council bad made tbe decision of tbe president of International its final judgment, tbe question then presented is whether tbe allegations of tbe amended complaint are sufficient to warrant a civil court to grant plaintiff tbe relief and redress wbicb was denied him by bis union.

According to tbe complaint, tbe inception of plaintiff’s difficulty with bis organization arose when bis local lodge met on August 12, 1953 while negotiations were in progress between tbe union and tbe Stoner Manufacturing Corporation, by wbicb plaintiff was employed. These negotiations bad to do with a contract involving wages, hours, and working conditions. Mr. Mazzacano was in charge of that meeting and demanded that a vote be taken to determine whether tbe employees should strike. Plaintiff requested Mr. Mazzacano to conduct tbe meeting in accordance with tbe constitution and rules of tbe order, but Mr. Mazzacano declined. Just what Mazzacano did or said in conducting tbe meeting wbicb was not in accordance with the constitution and rules of tbe order is not alleged, but following the meeting of August 12, 1953 it is averred that a petition was circulated, addressed to the president of District No. 108.

This petition referred to the lodge meeting on August 12, 1953 and stated that it was dominated by Grand Lodge Bepresentative Mazzacano whose remarks were made in an “insulting and rabble-rousing-manner, leaving the membership with the impression that his prime purpose is to incite a strike rather than negotiate a peaceful settlément between labor and management.” This petition then concluded: “We, the undersigned, consider that we are the union and it is our opinion that the representative sent here to negotiate with the company is to represent us and what we want. That a labor union is to bring labor and management closer together, not farther apart. Therefore, we are requesting that Brother Mazzacano be informed that his type of services is not desired and he be excused from taking any further part in our negotiations or making reports thereof to the membership. We sincerely hope you take immediate action on this and give us a representative who will conduct our negotiations in a constructive and intelligent manner. Otherwise it may become necessary to seek assistance from other sources.”

The amended complaint alleged that plaintiff did not sign this petition, but averred that the effect thereof was to so incense Mr. Mazzacano that he determined to expel plaintiff from the lodge and, to that end, filed the charges against him. It is then alleged that a copy of the charges preferred against plaintiff was not contained in the letter sent to him dated September 4,1953. It further alleged that no investigating committee was ever appointed and no preliminary recommendation of the guilt or innocence of the accused established.

The constitution and rules of the union were made a part of the amended complaint. They provide that if any member circulates or causes to be circulated any false or malicious statement reflecting upon the private or public conduct, or attacking tbe character, impugning the motives, or questioning the integrity of any officer or member of the lodge, such member shall be guilty of unbecoming conduct, and any member found guilty shall be subject to a fine or expulsion from the lodge or both. (Art. 24, Sec. 1.)

Section 4 of the same article makes it the duty of any member who has information of the violation of any provisions of the constitution by another member to immediately prefer charges in writing against such member by filing the same with the president of the local lodge of which the accused is a member and makes it the duty of the president of the local to forthwith bring the accused to trial under the provisions of Article K of International’s Rules of Order which outlines the procedure to be followed. It provides that upon the receipt of written chárges against a member, the president of his local must appoint a trial committee and turn over the original written charges to that committee. It also provides that the president shall supply the accused member with a copy of the charges preferred against him. Section 2 of the same article outlines the procedure to be followed by the committee and Section 3 affords the accused the privilege of presenting evidence and, either by himself or by attorney, grants him the right to cross-examine all witnesses appearing for the prosecution. Section 4 then provides that if the member fails to appear for trial when notified to do so, the trial shall proceed as though the member was, in fact, present.

While the amended complaint alleges that no copy of the charges preferred against plaintiff was enclosed in the letter he received on September 4, 1953, it made a copy of that letter a part of the amended complaint and that letter advised plaintiff that charges had been filed and that the charges preferred against him were “improper conduct etc. under Section 1 of Article 24 of the Grand Lodge Constitution.” This letter directed plaintiff to appear and specifically designated the time and place and concluded: “The trial committee, the appointment thereof, notification and procedure, are in accordance with Article ‘K’ Code of the Grand Lodge Constitution.”

In disposing of the plaintiff’s appeal on November 20, 1953 the appeal officer, A. J. Hayes, International President, stated that it appeared from the record of the proceedings which he received from plaintiff’s local lodge that with the notice, which was sent the plaintiff on September 4th by registered mail, and which was received by the plaintiff on September 4, 1953, there were two copies of the charges filed against the plaintiff. “If,” continued the appeal officer in overruling the contention of the plaintiff, “he (plaintiff) was of the opinion that the details of the charges were insufficiently described in the notice, it was his duty to appear at the hearing and request a continuance.”

It also appears from the allegations of the amended complaint that the International president, acting as appeal officer under the provisions of the constitution, reviewed the evidence which appeared in the transcript of the proceedings had by plaintiff’s local union on September 8, 1953. This transcript set forth, in detail, the evidence of three of plaintiff’s fellow employees and, from the evidence, the appeal officer found that plaintiff participated in circulating the petition, addressed to the president of District No. 108 herein referred to, and held that the object of said petition was to discredit Mazzacano and thus to disrupt the negotiations for a renewal contract. This finding was approved by the executive council, which reviewed the record upon the further appeal of the plaintiff.

In 7 C. J. S. Associations, sec. 26, p. 67, it is stated that where a member of an association has been lawfully expelled he is entitled to reinstatement only on compliance with applicable conditions imposed by the association. On page 68 of the same article it is said that in the matter of the expulsion of a member, the association acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and where the society acts within its powers, fairly and in good faith and in accordance with its laws and the law of the land, its decision is conclusive and a court of equity will not interfere to compel the member’s reinstatement and that it is only where the association acted unfairly or in bad faith or beyond its powers and not in accordance with its laws or the law of the land that a court of equity will reinstate a member.

In 4 Am. Jur. Associations and Clubs, sec. 22, p. 469, it is said that membership in an association or society is based upon implied, if not express, condition of loyalty; that the power of expulsion is included in what may be denominated the police power of such organization, which is derived from the law of self-preservation; that such an organization is not vested with the right of expulsion by the general law of the land, but by the agreement of the members as expressed in the charter or constitution and the bylaws establishing that right and denial of guilt by the expelled member does not affect the right of a voluntary association to proceed to try one of its members for an alleged offense which is in violation of its laws. Section 23 of the same article states that where the bylaws of such a society provide for the expulsion of members guilty of acts or conduct which are deemed disorderly or injurious to the interests or hostile to the objects of the organization, such bylaws are not unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive or violative of any principle of natural justice.

It is the law of this jurisdiction that a court of equity will not interfere to control the enforcement of the constitution, rules of order and bylaws of a voluntary association, such as a labor union, church or lodge, or to prevent such an association from expelling members for an alleged violation of some of its rules or regulations unless some special ground for equitable intervention is alleged. (Engel v. Walsh, 258 Ill. 98.)

The Engel case, supra, was a proceeding filed by Charles F. Engel to restrain a labor union from enforcing or attempting to enforce a fine which had been imposed upon him by his union for an alleged violation of the rules of the union in the misuse of the union label on non-union furnace stacks. The chancellor sustained a demurrer to the bill and dismissed it and the Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the decree of the circuit court, stated that the position of the plaintiff was that he sought to retain his status as a member of the union, with all right incident thereto, without the payment of a fine which had been imposed upon him by the legally constituted authorities of his union. The court then said (p. 103): “The courts have frequently been called upon to restrain voluntary associations, such as churches, lodges of various kinds, boards of trade and the like from expelling members for an alleged violation of some rule or regulation of the association and in such cases this court has uniformly refused to sanction the practice of calling on a court of equity to adjust disputes arising between such associations and its members and in the board of trade cases that have come before this court it has refused jurisdiction of the controversy on the ground that the remedy of such member, if he has any, is in a court of law.” After citing cases and quoting from People v. Chicago Board of Trade, 80 Ill. 134, on page 137, the court continued (p. 103): “In churches, lodges, labor unions and other voluntary associations, each person on becoming a member, either by express stipulation or by implication, agrees to abide by all rules and regulations adopted by the organization. (Bostedo v. Chicago Board of Trade, 227 Ill. 90.) Courts will not interfere to control the enforcement of by-laws of such associations, but they will he left free to enforce their own rules and regulations by such means and with such penalties as they may see proper to adopt for their government.” The court then referred to Ryan v. Cudahy, 157 Ill. 108, where it was held that in extreme cases of unfairness and gross injustice inflicted upon a member, a court of equity would take jurisdiction. People v. The Women’s Catholic Order of Foresters, 162 Ill. 78, was also referred to where it was said that courts are always reluctant to interfere with the disciplinary powers of voluntary associations and that such interference will never be justified unless the exercise of the power “has been without jurisdiction or marked by gross injustice and unfairness.”

Green v. Chicago Board of Trade, 174 Ill. 585, was a suit by a member of the Board of Trade of Chicago, a voluntary corporation, to enjoin the association from trying him for an alleged violation of its bylaws. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was a member in good standing and innocent and not guilty of the charges made against him and that he had been summoned to appear and stand trial before its board of directors on three-days’ notice when he was sick and unable to attend. It was further alleged that one of the rules of the defendant denied him the right to have professional counsel at the trial and charged that such rule was unreasonable and void and if plaintiff was expelled, the injury to him would be irreparable. The chancellor granted a temporary injunction, which, upon a hearing, was dissolved and the suit dismissed. In affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the decree of the circuit court, the Supreme Court, in overruling the contentions of the plaintiff, stated that the offense charged was one that was clearly in violation of the bylaws of the defendant and although the complaint averred that the plaintiff was not guilty of the offense charged, that fact could not affect the right of procedure. The opinion then con-tin lies (pp. 592, 593): “When it is considered that, as a rnle, the body of the board of directors is composed of men not conversant with forms of procedure and technical rules of law, but are organized into a corporation or association for business purposes and the governing body before whom trials are to be had is circumscribed by no technical rules of law and that the purpose is to investigate whether there has been a violation of the rules of that body — rules with which they, as well as the accused, are familiar — it will be seen the employment of professional counsel would not be calculated to expedite business or advance the interest of the accused, because the judges are unacquainted with technical rules of law. With such a body to try the accused under its own rules, subscribed to by the accused, the exclusion of professional counsel does not violate our sense of right, is not against public policy or unreasonable. The manner of investigation to determine whether charges shall be preferred, the manner of trial, the body before whom the trial is to take place and the exclusion of professional counsel, are all provided for by the by-laws and are methods of discipline. They infringe no rule of law and are not unreasonable. They provide a tribune and procedure voluntarily chosen to determine questions arising between the association and its members, according to rules to which the members assented on being admitted. As heretofore said, where such by-laws infringe no public policy or rule of law and are not unreasonable, courts will never interfere to control their enforcement, but such corporations or associations will be left to enforce their rules and regulations in the manner they have adopted for their own government and methods of discipline.” The court then concluded (p. 594): “To allow an injunction in cases of this character would result in transferring offenses against the rules of clubs, societies, churches, corporations and associations of this character to courts of chancery for trial, where it was alleged the membership was of pecuniary value and that the complaining member could not- have a fair trial under the rules of the organization to which he belonged.”

In Sanders v. International Ass’n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, 130 F. Supp. 253, three cases were consolidated for trial and determination. The issues arose out of a controversy between the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers and its local union of Paducah, Kentucky and sought to have adjudicated the rights of W. B. Sanders and other deposed and disciplined officers of Local Union 595 of the International Association and to determine the rights of said local union and a Kentucky corporation, Iron Workers Association, Incorporated. The record disclosed that on September 26, 1953 written charges were preferred against Sanders and seven other members and officers of Local Union 595. They were charged with causing and continuing a strike at the Joppa, Illinois, Steam Electric Station Project contrary to a no-strike agreement which had been entered into between the contractor of certain construction work at said project, the International Association and Local Union 595. They were also charged with issuing illegal orders to picket, strike and barricade the project and refusing to comply with the orders of the general president and general secretary of the International Association. Trials were had before the general executive board at which the defendants were present, evidence was introduced and the trials were conducted according to the rules and practices of the International Association. The general executive board, on December 9, 1953, found the defendants guilty and expelled Sanders as a member of the International Association and of Local Union 595, and forever debarred him from becoming a member of the International Association or any of its affiliated local unions. Percy Cloud, another member, was debarred for a period of ten years and the other officers and members were debarred for seven years. This action and judgment of tbe general executive board were affirmed by the general executive council of tbe International Association and, according to tbe constitution of tbe International Association, appeals may be taken from tbe decisions of tbe grand executive council to tbe regular convention, wbicb would not convene until 1956. Under tbe constitution, however, no appeal will be considered by tbe regular convention unless it is shown that there has been a compliance with tbe decisions of tbe general executive council. This was, as in tbe instant case, a jurisdictional fact and a condition precedent to any bearing of such an appeal by tbe regular convention.

Sanders and tbe other officers and members of Local Union 595 declined to recognize tbe ruling of tbe general executive council of tbe International Association and continued to operate and conduct tbe affairs of this local union by collecting dues and attending to all matters pertaining to its operating functions. Tbe court, in its opinion, stated that tbe officers of tbe International Association followed tbe prescribed procedure in making tbe charges, in considering tbe charges made, in tbe trial and throughout tbe bearings, with meticulous care and that they reached their conclusions and based their findings on facts presented by tbe evidence wbicb amply justified tbe decisions. Tbe court held that there was nothing in tbe record that would justify a court of law in setting aside tbe findings of fact of this governing body of tbe union on tbe ground that tbe findings were either irregular, unfair or without basis of fact. Tbe opinion then continues (p. 257): “A labor union, like any other voluntary society that bolds out plans and programs of mutual benefit to its members, has a right and a duty to tbe members to set up regulatory tribunals in order to discipline those who accept tbe privileges but ignore tbe obligations of membership and to protect tbe members who have subscribed to and are attempting to fulfill the precepts and principles of the organization. So long as these rules are reasonable and not contrary to public policy and the procedure may be simply adapted to the determination of complaints, they are entitled by law to be respected and upheld. In the instant case, in reviewing the whole proceedings before the general executive board, this court cannot substitute its judgment on the facts for the judgment of the board, nor lightly set aside decisions of the general executive board and the general executive council which careful scrutiny indicates were clearly in conformity with the accepted procedure of the union as set out in the constitution of the organization.” The court then went on to say that bar associations and courts have a right to discipline the members of the legal profession; that medical associations may expel their members; that other voluntary societies have a legal right to discipline their members and to deny them membership for infringement of rules and disregard of regulations; that this right to exclude or expel applies to labor unions and organizations and is generally upheld as the constitution and bylaws of the union are a contract and agreement with each individual member.

While recognizing that, in order to fulfill its functions and protect the rights of its members, a labor union must have authority to classify and discipline its membership and that the constitution of the association placed no limit upon the authority of the general executive board to punish its members, the trial court, while sustaining the sentences imposed upon the several members for a certain number of years, held that the expulsion of Sanders for life was not a reasonable exercise of the authority vested in the general executive board. Upon appeal of this case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, that court, in an opinion filed July 13, 1956, affirmed the findings of the district court to the effect that Sanders and the other officers and members of the union had been given proper bearings and trials in accordance with tbe constitution of tbe International Association by which the local union and the members thereof were governed. The circuit court of appeals further concurred in the conclusion arrived at by the district court that the charges against the individual members were lawful and justified and that disciplinary action was proper, but refused to concur in the holding of the district court that the expulsion of Sanders was not a reasonable exercise of the authority of the general executive board and held that the constitution of the union clearly authorized the action taken by that board. In the course of its opinion, the court said: “The expulsion and debarment of appellant Sanders for life was a valid exercise by the union of its powers under its constitution and a legal exercise of its rights under the pertinent statute. As has been well said, ‘A union must have authority to discipline its members, otherwise it will have no power to bargain effectively. Expulsion of an offending member is not so much a matter of discipline as it is of protection of the union. The preservation of an organization whose constitution and by-laws are lawful, by allowing it to expel those who seek to undermine it, is a stronger basis for public policy than the possible inability of the resurgent member to subsequently gain employment in his present occupation.’ ”

While all of the authorities are to the effect that a court will not reverse the expulsion of a member of a union for an infringement of its rules where it appears that the expulsion is ordered in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the union, it is also equally well settled that courts will interfere with the decision of an association expelling one of its members if it appears that the rules of the association governing expulsion have not been observed or if the accused member has not been afforded those rudimentary rights which will give him an opportunity to defend against the charges made. These rights include

notice to the accused of the charges made against him, an opportunity to he present and confront and cross-examine his accusers and an opportunity to make a defense and refute the evidence produced in support of the charges. (Carson v. Class Bottle Blowers Ass’n of United States & Canada, 37 Cal.2d 134, 231 P.2d 6, 21A.L.R.2d 1387.)

In Morgan v. Local 1150, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, 331 Ill. App. 21, it was said that a labor; union had inherent power to adopt a method of procedure for the trial and punishment of its members provided the method adopted was not in conflict with the letter or spirit of the constitution of the parent organization and was in conformity with standards usually afforded for a fair trial. The court went on to say that the essential requirements of such a trial are (a)'that the nature of the offense be presented in writing to the . union and to the member charged; (b) that the member be notified of the hearing; (c) that the member has the right to appear at the hearing and participate in the trial; and (d), that he have the right to appeal from any adverse decision.

In the instant case counsel for appellant insist that plaintiff was expelled from the union through false and fictitious charges and that his lodge proceeded to try him without specifying those charges and without furnishing to him a copy thereof as the constitution provides and that his request for a continuance of the hearing had on September 8,1953 was unceremoniously refused.

We do not think there is any merit in these contentions. The letter directing appellant to appear for trial on September 8, 1953 advised plaintiff of the nature of the charges. Furthermore, the transcript of the record furnished to the president of International, as appeal officer, disclosed he had been furnished with a cqpy of the charges. The appeal officer found appellant was fully apprised of the nature of the charges. The law does not require technical accuracy to be observed in a trial for expulsion of a member from a voluntary-association and such matters of procedure will not be reviewed by a court. (Yeomans v. Union League Club of Chicago, 225 Ill. App. 234; Morgan v. Local 1105, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, 331 Ill. App. 21.)

As to the contention that appellant’s request for a continuance should have been granted, it was held in Robinson v. Yates City Lodge No. 448, A. F. & A. M., 86 Ill. 598, that the Masonic Lodge, of which plaintiff was a member, had jurisdiction to try him for unmasonic conduct in his absence notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff had advised the presiding officer of the lodge that other duties would prevent him from being present at the time appointed for his trial.

Counsel have not pointed out where any provisions of International’s constitution or bylaws are unreasonable or in contravention of public policy. Nor does it appear that any right given appellant, under its constitution or bylaws to which he assented, has been infringed. He was informed of the nature of the charges and was tried according to the procedure outlined in the constitution and rules governing the organization of which he became a voluntary member. He delayed until the day when he was to be tried and then informed the president of his union that his work made it impossible for him to attend. The trial was had and he was promptly notified of the result and appealed from the decision of the trial tribunal.

Under the authorities, there is nothing alleged in his amended complaint that would confer jurisdiction upon the trial court to redress his grievances. The chancellor, therefore, did not err in his rulings and the orders and judgment of the circuit court of Kane County are, therefore, affirmed.

Orders and judgment affirmed.

EOVALDI and CROW, JJ., concur.