author: WILLIAMS, J.

text:
    Carrie Kennedy SEMMES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Robert Keith SEMMES, IV, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 45,006-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 16, 2009.

      Chris L. Bowman, for Appellant.
    Donald L. Kneipp, for Appellee.
    Before BROWN, WILLIAMS and DREW, JJ.
   WILLIAMS, J.

hln this child custody dispute, the father, Robert Keith Semmes, IV (“Bobby”), appeals a trial court judgment granting primary domiciliary custody of 'the minor child to the mother, Carrie Kennedy Sem-mes (“Carrie”). He also challenges the lower court’s ruling with regard to visitation, child support and its designation of Carrie as the parent entitled to claim the income tax dependency deduction for the minor child. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

Bobby and Carrie were married on June 24, 1994. Of the marriage, one child, Emma, was born on December 21, 2000. Carrie filed a petition for divorce on June 7, 2005, requesting joint custody of Emma. While the divorce was pending, the parties entered into a joint stipulation/consent judgment whereby they agreed to be “co-domiciliary” parents. The custodial/visitation schedule read as follows:

1. RECURRING CUSTODIAL/VISITATION PERIODS: The parties will share custody of the [child] on an alternating basis wherein the parents will alternate the custody of the child on Monday-Tuesday and Wednesday-Thurs with the parent who has the child on Monday-Tuesday of week one to have [custody of the child] Wednesday-Thursday of week two. The parties will alternate the weekends, consisting of Friday through Sunday. The objective of the parties is that each parent will have alternate weekends with the child and neither parent will go more than three consecutive days without having physical custody of the child.

The parties also agreed to alternate holidays with the child, and Bobby | ¡.agreed to pay child support in the amount of $865.48 per month. Additionally, the parties agreed that Carrie would claim Emma as a dependent for state and federal income tax purposes in odd numbered years, and Bobby would claim Emma as a dependent in even numbered years. The trial court entered a consent judgment, ratifying the joint stipulation on September 21, 2005.

Thereafter, on January 14, 2008, Bobby filed a rule to modify child custody and child support. In the petition, Bobby requested that he and Carrie continue to “maintain the equal sharing of time with the minor child, with less transfer.” More specifically, Bobby requested the following: (1) a modification of the joint custody agreement, whereby Emma would spend one week with him and one week with Carrie, “alternating weeks thereafter;” (2) a modification of his child support obligation; and (8) the right to claim Emma as a dependent for federal and state income tax purposes every year.

Carrie filed a response to Bobby’s petition, alleging that an arrangement of alternating weekly custody of Emma, as proposed by Bobby, would “still cause turmoil and be disruptive for the child, who is only seven years of age.” Carrie also objected to Bobby’s request that he be allowed to claim Emma as a dependent for income tax purposes each year. In the same pleading, assuming the position of plaintiff-in-rule, Carrie filed a counter-rule to modify custody and increase child support. Carrie requested the following: (1) that she be designated primary domiciliary parent; (2) that Bobby be awarded visitation every other weekend during the school year |sand three weeks during the summer; and (3) that child support be increased according to the child support guidelines because Bobby “is making substantially more income than he was at the time the previous ‘Joint Stipulation and Consent Judgment’ was signed and filed.”

On February 25, 2008, Bobby filed a first supplemental and amended rule, requesting that he be named domiciliary parent “in the alternative, and solely in the alternative, in the event this Honorable Court finds that alternating weeks of custody is not in the best interest of the minor child, and that she should reside with one party during the school term....”

A hearing officer conference was held on March 10,2008. At the request of counsel, the trial court appointed a psychologist, Dr. John Simoneaux, to perform a custody evaluation in this case. Dr. Simoneaux evaluated Emma, the parties and the current spouses of the parties. Dr. Simo-neaux opined that a custody agreement, whereby the parents exchanged custody on a weekly basis, would not be disadvantageous to Emma. Dr. Simoneaux stated:

The advantage in this case is that Emma is such a resilient, happy, healthy child. She probably will do okay in any circumstance. It would be difficult to say that moving to her mother’s house would be so upsetting to Emma as to cause her extreme disruption. Emma is a bright child who will do well in any school; she will excel in any social environment, etc.
* * *
The best thing for children of divorce is to inject as much consistency and stability in their life [sic] as possible. Emma keeps up with the current custody regime better than her parents do. She knows where she should be from one day to the next and has adjusted fairly well. I will say, however, that the number of exchanges that take place is potentially problematic....
* * *
|4I do understand concerns about a 50/50 custody split with weekly exchanges. I do not think it is good for a child to go that long without seeing the other parent. Therefore, when weekly custody splits are part of a custody regime, I typically recommend that there be a mid-week visit with the other parent.
* * *
I do believe that this child could tolerate a seven day custody split.
⅜ * *

Another hearing officer conference was held on January 7, 2009. In accordance with Dr. Simoneaux’s report, the hearing officer issued a recommendation that Bobby and Carrie alternate custody of Emma every other week, with a midweek visit for the parent without physical custody for a particular week. The hearing officer also recommended that Bobby be ordered to pay child support in the amount of $183 per month. Additionally, the hearing officer recommended that each of the parties would claim Emma as a dependent for income tax purposes, on an alternating basis, every other year.

Carrie filed an objection to the hearing officer’s report. On January 29, 2009, the trial court signed an interim order, making the hearing officer’s report the interim order of the court pending final disposition.

Following a three-day hearing in April and May of 2009, the trial court granted the parties joint custody of Emma and designated Carrie as the primary domiciliary parent. Bobby was granted visitation every other weekend and approximately seven weeks during the summer. The court granted Carrie “the right to enroll [Emma] in Grace Episcopal School” at Carrie’s expense. The court also awarded Carrie the right to claim “the dependency exemption for the minor child on her income tax returns for |fieach and every year....” Additionally, the court ordered Bobby to pay child support in the amount of $687 per month, with a reduction in the child support obligation for the months of June and July to $350 per month. Bobby appeals.

DISCUSSION

Child Custody

Bobby contends the district court erred in awarding primary domiciliary custody to Carrie and in limiting his visitation to every other weekend and six weeks out of each summer. He also argues that the trial court disregarded Dr. Simoneaux’s opinion that “a 50/50 custody split with weekly exchanges,” and a midweek visitation, would be appropriate in this case.

It is well settled in our statutory and jurisprudential law that the paramount consideration in any determination of child custody is the best interest of the child. LSA-C.C. art. 131; Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La.2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731; Shivers v. Shivers, 44,596 (La.App.2d Cir.7/1/09), 16 So.3d 500. The court is to consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child. LSA-C.C. art. 134.

|fiThe trial court is not bound to make a mechanical evaluation of all of the statutory factors listed in LSA-C.C. art. 134, but should decide each case on its own facts in light of those factors. Robert v. Robert, 44,528 (La.App.2d Cir.8/19/09), 17 So.3d 1050, writ denied, 2009-2036 (La.10/7/09), 19 So.3d 1; Bergeron v. Bergeron, 44,210 (La.App.2d Cir.3/18/09), 6 So.3d 948. These factors are not exclusive, but are provided as a guide to the court, and the relative weight given to each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court. Id.

LSA-R.S. 9:335(A)(2)(b) provides that to the extent feasible and in the best interest of the child, physical custody of the child should be shared 17equally. Yet, when the trial court finds that a decree of joint custody is in the best interest of the child, the statute does not necessarily require an equal sharing of physical custody. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 37,323 (La.App.2d Cir.5/14/03), 827 So.2d 175; Hodnett v. Hodnett, 36,532 (La.App.2d Cir.9/18/02), 827 So.2d 1205. Substantial time, rather than strict equality of time, is mandated by the legislative scheme providing for joint custody of children. Id.

The trial court has vast discretion in deciding matters of child custody and visitation. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 44,056 (La.App.2d Cir.12/30/08), 1 So.3d 788; Gaskin v. Henry, 36,714 (La.App.2d Cir.10/23/02), 830 So.2d 471. This discretion is based on the trial court’s opportunity to better evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Slaughter, supra; McCready v. McCready, 41,026 (La.App.2d Cir.3/8/06), 924 So.2d 471. Therefore, the trial court’s determination will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193 (La.1986); Slaughter, supra; Cooper v. Cooper, 43,244 (La.App.2d Cir.3/12/08), 978 So.2d 1156. As long as the trial court’s factual findings are reasonable in light of the record when reviewed in its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse even though convinced it would have weighed the evidence differently if acting as the trier of fact. Id.

In the instant case, all of the witnesses testified that Emma is a bright, well-adjusted child and is flourishing academically and socially. Both Carrie and Bobby testified that they are good parents to Emma.

Carrie testified that the custody arrangement whereby she and Bobby ^exchanged custody of Emma several times a week had become increasingly difficult. She stated the frequent transfer of custody was causing turmoil for her, Bobby and Emma. Carrie opined that Emma’s needs and activities changed as she became older; therefore, the child’s need for structure and stability had increased. Carrie also testified that she is very active in Emma’s school-related activities as well as her extracurricular activities. She stated that she arranges most of Emma’s doctors’ appointments and extracurricular activities, with the exception of softball. She stated that she attends all of Emma’s school programs, field trips, cheerleading competitions, gymnastics events and softball games. Carrie was complimentary of Bobby’s relationship with Emma; however, she testified with regard to her frustration with Bobby’s frequent refusal to communicate with her concerning Emma. She stated that her attempts to communicate with Bobby via telephone, text messaging or email were largely ignored.

Bobby testified that he was no longer satisfied with the frequent transfers of custody. He stated that Emma needed more stability, which he felt would be achieved if she was allowed to stay in each of her parents’ homes for longer periods of time. He also testified that Emma attends a school which is in close proximity to his home and he frequently visits the school to eat lunch with her. Bobby further testified that he attends Emma’s school programs, field trips, cheerleading competitions and gymnastics events and that he coaches her softball team. Bobby admitted that he often did not respond to Carrie’s telephone calls, text messages or emails because he did not feel they were important. Bobby admitted that he did not always 19know why Carrie was calling because he did not have a voice mailbox established on his cellular phone; therefore Carrie was not able to leave messages. Although Bobby complained about not being notified of all of Emma’s doctor’s appointments, he admitted that when he saw missed calls from Carrie on his cellular phone, he did not know whether or not the calls were attempts to notify him of those appointments.

The parties’ current spouses, Emma’s teacher and various family members, neighbors and friends also testified. The consensus of the testimony indicated that both parents love Emma and are very attentive to her needs. All of the witnesses expressed positive regard for Carrie’s maternal abilities and were complimentary of Bobby’s relationship with Emma. However, several witnesses testified that Emma’s demeanor changed and she seemed nervous and withdrawn when both of her parents and stepparents were present. Carrie, her current husband and her mother testified that they had observed that Emma was more reserved and less affectionate with them when Bobby was present.

After weighing the factors set forth in LSA-C.C. art. 134, the trial court concluded that Bobby and Carrie were both “fit and loving parents.” However, the court found that “shared custody is unworkable in light of the attitude of Mr. Semmes.” The court stated:

[T]he Court finds that the tie-breaker in this case has to do with the Court’s understanding of the attitude of the parents, as that attitude would impact the child’s upbringing.... Among the reasons for the Court reaching its conclusion is that its impression from the testimony, having to do with the father’s inflexibility concerning his rights of visitation causes him to appear to see Emma as property much in the nature of a trophy [ 1(lwhich he insists upon having on his shelf when he is due to have it, no matter what, but this child is not a thing — she is a living, breathing precious human being. Additionally, the Court accepts the testimony of Carrie that she has not been able to communicate effectively with Bobby, because he often will not respond to her communication efforts.... Bobby himself admits that he often does not respond to her attempts to communicate with him, but also says that he doesn’t respond to attempts by others to communicate with him at times. The Court hardly sees how his admission that he doesn’t return other people’s attempts to communicate with him helps him at all in this matter. The Court finds that the need for communication is great in light of the child’s age and activities....
The Court credits the testimony of the witnesses who testified that Emma appears to be ill-at-ease, nervous or withdrawn when Bobby, [his current wife], Carrie and [her current husband] are all together. From this Court’s study of Dr. Simoneaux’s report on these people, and the Court’s study of the evidence, the Court is of the view that a fair part of this child’s uneasiness is due to uncertainty about how her Dad will act on these occasions.
In observing the mother and father of this child during the court proceeding and during testimony, the Court is left with the distinct impression that shared custody is unworkable in light of the attitude of Mr. Semmes. Instead, one of the parents needs to be designated as the primary custodial parent, who will have the obligation of communicating with the other parent concerning all matters related to the child’s health, school, activities and the like. But one parent needs to be in a position to make a decision concerning matters if the other parent does not agree. Carrie will be that parent; she is clearly the best choice between the two.

Additionally, the court expressed its concern about Bobby’s behavior on occasions, describing Bobby’s conduct as “totally unreasonable.” The court also described Bobby as “very controlling” and stated, “[S]uch inflexibility is unhelpful and is indeed frustrating.”

InBased on the record before us, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary domiciliary custody of Emma to Carrie, or in failing to award Bobby “equal time” visitation. The trial court observed the demeanor of the parties and clearly concluded that Carrie was sincere with regard to her willingness to work with Bobby concerning Emma’s needs. Additionally, the court found that Carrie would be the parent who would ensure that Emma had significant and frequent contact with Bobby. The trial court expressly noted that Bobby had demonstrated an unwillingness to communicate with Carrie with regard to Emma’s needs throughout the shared custody arrangements.

We also find that Bobby’s argument that the trial court ignored Dr. Simoneaux’s recommendation is without merit. The trial court clearly considered the report, but noted that it is the court’s responsibility to make a custody determination based upon the best interest of the child. The court correctly stated, “Experts do not get to make such important decisions, but their recommendations are sometimes helpful.”

Designation of Elementary School

Bobby also contends the trial court erred in allowing Carrie to remove Emma from public school and enroll her in a private school which was affiliated with a religion that differs from that of the parties. Bobby argues that Emma has attended her current school since kindergarten and should not be enrolled in a different school.

When parties are awarded joint custody, the court shall designate a domiciliary parent unless the implementation order provides otherwise or | iafor other good cause shown. LSA-R.S. 9:335(B)(1). The domiciliary parent shall have authority to make all decisions affecting the child unless an implementation order provides otherwise. All major decisions made by the domiciliary parent are subject to judicial review upon motion by the nondomiciliary parent. LSA-R.S. 9:335(B)(3). During judicial review, it is presumed that all major decisions made by the domiciliary parent are in the best interest of the child and the burden of proving that they are not in the best interest of the child is placed on the non-domiciliary parent who opposes the decision.

The naming of a domiciliary parent in the joint custody decree, without more, produces three legal results: (1) the child shall primarily reside with that parent; (2) the other parent has physical custody during time periods that assure that the child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents; and (3) the decision making authority of LSA-R.S. 9:335(B)(3) applies. Stephenson, supra, citing Kenneth Rigby, 1993 Custody and Child Support Legislation, 55 La.L.Rev. 103 (1994).

In the instant case, the legal presumption that Carrie’s decision to enroll Emma in Grace Episcopal School, a private school, was in Emma’s best interest applies. Bobby submitted no proof to overcome this presumption. Although the evidence presented showed that Emma had thrived at Kiroli Elementary School, that school is not located within the school district in which Emma will be primarily living with Carrie. The evidence, including Dr. Simoneaux’s report, indicates that Emma is an intelligent child and could succeed at any school. Therefore, in the absence hsof evidence showing that Emma’s attendance at Grace Episcopal School is not in her best interest, we find that the legal presumption in favor of Carrie’s choice of school must prevail. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling granting Carrie the right to enroll Emma in Grace Episcopal School.

Child Support During Summer Months

Bobby also contends the trial court erred by failing to grant a proportionate reduction in the amount of child support owed during the summer. Bobby argues that the court ordered him to pay $350 per month for the months of June and July, an amount which is more than half of his monthly child support obligation.

The record reflects that the trial court granted Bobby visitation with Emma during the summer months as follows: “From the first Saturday in June at noon until the fourth Saturday in June at noon; from the third Saturday in July at noon until the second Saturday in August at noon.” Thus, pursuant to the court’s order, Bobby has visitation with Emma for three weeks in June, two weeks in July and two weeks in August. As stated above, the court ordered Bobby to pay child support in the amount of $687 per month and reduced that amount to $350 per month for the months of June and July.

LSA-R.S. 9:315.8(E) provides, in pertinent part:

(1) In cases of joint custody, the court shall consider the period of time spent by the child with the nondomiciliary party as a basis for adjustment to the amount of child support to be paid during that period of time.
(3) In determining the amount of credit to be given, the |14court shall consider the following:
(a) The amount of time the child spends with the person to whom the credit would be applied. The court shall include in such consideration the continuing expenses of the domiciliary party.
(b) The increase in financial burden placed on the person to whom the credit would be applied and the decrease in financial burden on the person receiving child support.
(c) The best interests of the child and what is equitable between the parties.
(4) The burden of proof is on the person seeking the credit pursuant to this Subsection.

An automatic deviation from the child support guidelines is not allowed. Guillot v. Munn, 99-2132 (La.3/24/00), 756 So.2d 290; Jones v. Jones, 38,790 (La.App.2d Cir.6/25/04), 877 So.2d 1061. All that is required by LSA-R.S. 9:315.8(E) is that the trial court consider the period of time spent with the nondomiciliary parent as a basis for adjustment of the child support obligation. Jones, supra; Falterman v. Fatterman, 97-192 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/8/97), 702 So.2d 781, writ not considered, 98-0076 (La.3/13/98), 712 So.2d 863. The statute does not mandate an adjustment for time spent, nor does it remove from the trial court the discretion to decide whether to make an adjustment. Id. There is no hard and fast rule to determine just how much, if any, to reduce the child support obligation based on the percentage of time the children live with either parent. Id.

In the instant case, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 9:315.8(E), the court was required to take into consideration the period of time Emma is in Bobby’s custody those months, as well as Carrie’s continuing expenses. However, |1Bthe court was not statutorily mandated to adjust Bobby’s support obligation at all; the statute expressly leaves it to the discretion of the trial court to make any adjustments. The trial court did not explain how it arrived at the calculation of Bobby’s child support obligation during the months of June and July. However, it appears that the court considered Bobby’s support obligation for the remaining months — $687 per month; divided that figure in half ($343.50), and rounded the figure up to $350. There is no showing that the court abused its discretion in doing so. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Bobby to pay $350 in child support for the months of June and July.

Expense Sharing

Bobby further contends the trial court failed to consider “additional income” that Carrie incurs by sharing household expenses with her current husband. Bobby argues that prior to her current marriage, Carrie paid a monthly house payment in the amount of $750, but her current housing expenses are paid by her current husband.

In determining income, the court may consider as income the benefits a party derives from expense-sharing or other sources; however, in determining the benefits of expense-sharing, the court shall not consider the income of another spouse, regardless of the legal regime under which the remarriage exists, except to the extent that such income is used directly to reduce the cost of a party's actual expenses. LSA-R.S. 9:315(C)(5)(c). The language of the statute is permissive, not mandatory. As such, it is within the trial court’s discretion to include or disallow alleged expense-sharing | , (¡benefits. Such determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Evans v. Evans, 36,731 (La.App.2d Cir.11/6/02), 830 So.2d 591; Hutto v. Kneipp, 627 So.2d 802 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993).

The above mentioned statute provides that a trial court is not required to consider the benefits a party receives from expense sharing. There was no direct evidence in this case to indicate the extent to which the income of Carrie’s current husband may have allegedly reduced her actual expenses. Carrie testified that she and her current husband do not have a joint bank account. She also testified her husband writes the checks for their monthly mortgage payments from his separate account and she pays some of the bills of the household from her separate account. Rick, Carrie’s current husband, testified that although he writes the checks for their household expenses from his personal account, Carrie reimburses him for expenses from her separate funds. He testified as follows:

Q: What, if any, contribution to the household expenses does Carrie make?
A: Well, it depends on what’s up on that month. She’ll — I’ll normally tell her that I need X number of dollars to take care of something. ... You know, when I was looking at the budget to see if we could afford the house that we were looking at, I put everything down and I knew that she was paying rent and things in West Monroe. So, I utilized kind of that money. And it’s almost transferred, if you will. But, you know, that’s just kind of the way we do it.
Q: [Jjust generally speaking, you were aware of what expenses your wife had before you married?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did that factor in the budget that you set up 117when you decided to buy the house and borrow the money you borrowed and set up the payment plan?
A: You better believe it.
Q: And so does she make a contribution to the household expenses?
A: Absolutely.

The trial court elected not to impute additional income to Carrie because of any alleged shared expenses with her current spouse. Likewise, we must point out that the court did not impute any additional income to Bobby because of any alleged shared expenses with his current spouse. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. This assignment lacks merit.

Income Tax Dependency

Bobby next contends the trial court erred in awarding the dependency deduction for income tax purposes to Carrie. He argues that he pays 53% of the total child support obligation, and the dependency deduction would benefit him greater than it would Carrie because his income is greater than hers.

LSA-R.S. 9:315.18 provides, in pertinent part:

A. The amounts set forth in the schedule in R.S. 9:315.19[] presume that the custodial or domiciliary party has the right to claim the federal and state tax dependency deductions and any earned income credit. However, the claiming of dependents for federal and state income tax purposes shall be as provided in Subsection B of this Section.
|18B. (1) The non-domiciliary party whose child support obligation equals or exceeds fifty percent of the total child support obligation shall be entitled to claim the federal and state tax dependency deductions if, after a contradictory motion, the judge finds both of the following:
(a) No arrearages are owed by the obli-gor.
(b) The right to claim the dependency deductions or, in the case of multiple children, a part thereof, would substantially benefit the non-domiciliary party without significantly harming the domiciliary party.

In this case, the trial court determined that Bobby pays 53% of the child support obligation. However, the statute clearly states that Bobby, the nondomiciliary parent, would be entitled to claim the dependency deduction if the court had found that the right to claim the deduction would substantially benefit Bobby without significantly harming Carrie. Bobby presented no evidence to prove that the income tax deduction would substantially benefit him, without substantially harming Carrie. See, Neill v. Neill, 33,398 (La.App.2d Cir.6/21/00), 764 So.2d 235. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s allocation of the tax deductions to Carrie.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are assessed to the appellant, Robert Keith Sem-ines, IV.

AFFIRMED.

      . The judgment of divorce was signed on January 30, 2006.

      . LSA-C.C. art. 134 provides, in pertinent part:
      Such factors may include:
      (1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child.
      (2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.
      (3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
      (4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.
      (5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.
      (6) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child.
      (7) The mental and physical health of each parly.
      (8) The home, school, and community history of the child.
      (9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.
      (10) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party.
      (11) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
      (12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.

      . The schedule of support to be used for determining the basic child support obligation is set forth in LSA-R.S. 9:315.19.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DREW, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Carolyn FORTNER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. GUIDE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 44,849-WCA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 16, 2009.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 21, 2010.

      Law Office Of Louis G. Scott by: Louis Granderson Scott, for Appellant.
    Hudson, Potts & Bernstein, L.L.P. by: Brian Paul Bowes, for Appellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, PEATROSS and DREW, JJ.
   DREW, J.

|) Carolyn Fortner appeals a judgment dismissing her workers’ compensation claim in which she alleged that she suffered an occupational disease while employed at Guide Corporation’s plant in Monroe, where she worked until the plant closed in December of 2006.

We affirm.

FACTS

Fortner began working at the Guide plant in April of 2000 as a machine operator whose job was to assemble automobile headlamps. In the plant area where she initially worked, the Fast Assembly Area, there were seven different stations on the line, and she had to change stations each hour. In her last two years working at the plant, Fortner primarily worked as an inspector looking for defects in the finished products.

In January of 2004, Fortner and other employees were shifted to different areas of the plant. She began working in the sonic weld area, where she had to pull molds off the line and break them apart. She asserted that after she moved to this area, she became nauseated, was short of breath, and began coughing often.

2004 Medical History

On January 9, Fortner went to the on-site Guide Medical Department (“Department”) with complaints of chest tightness, which she reported that she experienced when her blood pressure was elevated. Fortner, who has hypertension, wanted her blood pressure checked. Fortner told the attending nurse that she thought her condition might be caused by having |2been moved to a new area of the plant. Fortner went to Glenwood Regional Medical Center (“Glenwood”), where a single chest x-ray was negative.

Dr. Alyce Adams, whose specialties are internal medicine and cardiology, was Fortner’s regular physician. Fortner told Dr. Adams that she had recurrent asthma with exacerbations while at work. When Dr. Adams examined Fortner on January 21, her chief complaint was chest tightness.

Fortner told Dr. Adams on February 4 that she had been coughing all day and night and was having nasal congestion. When Fortner met with Dr. Adams on February 11, she told Dr. Adams that she had been coughing since breathing a chemical at work one month earlier. Dr. Adams again treated Fortner for her persistent cough two days later.

Fortner went to the Department on February 17 with complaints of coughing and nausea from inhalation of fumes. She was brought to the emergency room at Glenwood, where she reported that she had been experiencing intermittent shortness of breath since being exposed to a chemical at work one month earlier.

Dr. Adams treated Fortner the following day for wheezing, and her assessment was new onset asthma. Fortner came to Dr. Adams with more complaints of wheezing and persistent cough on February 20. Because Dr. Adams thought the asthma might have been caused by an allergy to something with which she came into contact, Dr. Adams referred Fortner to Dr. Benjamin Oyefara, an allergist, and to Dr. Scott Irby, whose specialty |swas pulmonary medicine. Once Dr. Adams referred Fortner, she mostly left it up to the other doctors to treat Fortner’s asthma.

Dr. Irby first treated Fortner on February 25. Fortner told Dr. Irby that Guide had moved her to a different room where she was exposed to harsh chemicals that caused her to cough, and that she would not stop coughing until 5-10 minutes after she left the plant. Fortner denied a history of asthma. A pulmonary function test was normal. At the time, Dr. Irby doubted that Fortner had occupational asthma. He thought her cough may be related to acid reflux, or medication that she was taking for hypertension, or could be psychogenic.

On February 27, Fortner told Dr. Adams that her cough had gotten somewhat better. Dr. Adams noted that one possible cause of the cough, Fortner’s hypertension medicine, had been discontinued.

Fortner went to the Department on March 4 with concerns about her breathing. An ambulance transported her to the emergency room. Dr. Irby’s office performed a pulmonary function test the next day. Dr. Irby examined Fortner on March 8. She told him that she had returned to work on the prior Monday, but had an asthmatic attack on Thursday. Fortner thought that she might be over the attack, but she was unsure. She described her asthmatic episodes as consisting of only coughing and wheezing, and said the episodes did not scare her. Dr. Irby’s impression was that it was difficult to say whether or not there was a problem. He thought Fortner should see an occupational physician, Dr. Katherine Rathbun, and should avoid her workplace until cleared by Dr. Rathbun.

|4On March 19, Dr. Adams treated Fort-ner, whose chief complaint was intermittent symptoms of coughing and asthma.

Fortner was first examined by Dr. Rath-bun on March 31. She told Dr. Rathbun that she had no history of asthma, she worked in a chemical plant, and had suffered 14 severe asthma attacks in the plant in three months that were triggered by specific chemicals in one area, namely UV acrylic adhesive, n-butyl acetate, and iso-propanol. Two x-rays of the chest taken on April 5 did not show any active disease.

Dr. Rathbun next examined Fortner on April 12. Fortner told her that she had not been back to work since her last visit, and had not had an asthma attack since leaving work. Dr. Rathbun’s assessment was that Fortner had asthma from sensitization to “specific chemicals.” It was recommended that she be restricted from working in areas of the plant where there was any possibility of exposure to acrylic adhesive. Following this visit, Dr. Rath-bun completed a return to work certificate on which she wrote that Fortner was permanently restricted from exposure at any level to UV acrylic adhesive as she was sensitized.

On April 19, Dr. Irby treated Fortner. Dr. Irby learned that Dr. Rathbun thought Fortner was allergic to UV acrylic adhesive and was never to be exposed to it again. Fortner told Dr. Irby that she had been exposed to the adhesive only after being moved to another department, but was now breathing fine. His impression was asthma secondary to allergy to UV acrylic adhesive, which she was to avoid at the plant in the future.

| Jn May, Dr. Rathbun explained to Fortner over the phone that she was not disabled and could return to work immediately, but could not be exposed to the chemical to which she was sensitized as it could kill her.

The Department’s records reflect an entry on June 2 stating that it had been provided with a doctor’s authorization for Fortner to return to work with the restriction that she not work in or around n-butyl acetate fumes.

On June 3, Fortner informed the Department that a fan was blowing fumes off a lamp on which she was working, causing her to have difficulty breathing. Fortner was sent to the hospital. Later that month, Fortner again complained to the Department about breathing difficulties.

Dr. Rathbun’s conclusions about Fort-ner’s condition changed dramatically in June. The doctor’s notes from June 21 reflect that she had spoken with the plant’s safety director, who told Dr. Rath-bun that Fortner reacts to something else every time they move her. Dr. Rathbun believed that Fortner had probable panic attacks, and not asthma or sensitization by current tests. Dr. Rathbun wanted to stop her asthma medications and refer her to a psychiatrist. Dr. Rathbun recommended that Fortner have a pulmonary function test at the plant before work and then anytime she felt short of breath at work, and was not to go to the doctor with an “asthma attack” unless the pulmonary function test was abnormal. This was discussed at length with Fortner. Dr. Rath-bun also noted that she received a call from Debra Benton, the union safety inspector, and told her that Fortner appeared to have panic attacks and not asthma attacks, and explained how she wanted a pulmonary function test done before Fortner |fiwent into the plant and then at any time at the plant when she felt short of breath. On July 19, Dr. Rathbun noted that Fortner had anemia, mild asthma, and resolving anxiety attacks. Fortner’s physicians were not made aware of Dr. Rath-burn’s change of diagnosis.

On August 17, Fortner complained to the Department that she suffered an asthma attack when she was exposed to strong fumes as she walked past an open door near the lens mold area after a break. Ten days later, Fortner returned to the Department with the complaint that her breathing had been compromised when she was exposed to fumes from a welder truck that passed her as she was returning from her break.

Dr. Irby treated Fortner on August 24. She reported a couple of asthma attacks at the plant, but that none of the attacks had been serious or lasted more than 20 minutes. She told Dr. Irby that the attacks occurred only at work.

Dr. Rathbun met with Fortner for the last time on September 21. Dr. Rathbun noted that Fortner had either mild asthma or panic attacks, and it was not clear which one it was, but her condition was probably a mixture of both.

On September 29, Fortner asserted that a disinfectant used in the Department caused her asthma to flare up. Fortner went to the Department on October 5, with complaints of respiratory distress caused by diesel fumes coming from a welder truck that passed her work station.

Dr. Irby treated Fortner on October 18. She reported having experienced a little wheezing over the weekend. She also told Dr. Irby that |7she felt she was having an asthma attack during a pulmonary function test. The test levels were entirely normal, although it was noted that she responded to a bronchodilator challenge on the test, which could indicate asthma.

On October 22, Fortner reported to the Department that she was short of breath and was having difficulty breathing after smelling something similar to enamel in the air near her work area.

Fortner’s work-related complaints were not limited to the respiratory system. She came to the Department on November 19 with a rash on her cheeks and neck that developed while working. Her supervisor was instructed to move her. Dr. Adams treated Fortner on November 24, when she complained of asthma as well as irritation on her face from contact with an allergen at work.

On December 1, Fortner developed a rash on her face and cheeks while working a different line. Her supervisor was instructed to move her again. The next day, Fortner complained to the Department about burning and stinging of her face. Dr. Adams treated Fortner on December 3, when her chief complaint was multiple allergies. Fortner also reported abdominal discomfort due to gastroesophageal reflux disease.

Dr. Benjamin Oyefara, the allergist recommended by Dr. Adams, treated Fortner on December 7. His assessment was gas-trolaryngeal reflux disease. Dr. Oyefara wrote a note to Guide on December 9, stating that Fortner’s condition was consistent with contact dermatitis triggered by |schemical exposure at work. Dr. Oye-fara recommended that she be restricted to an area where she was not exposed to certain chemicals.

The Department’s records reflect that on December 9, Guide was provided with a doctor’s authorization for Fortner to return to work with the restriction that she work in an area free of n-butyl acetate fumes and UV coating and adhesive.

On December 31, Fortner complained to the Department about feeling a burning sensation on her face while working.

2005 Medical History

On January 8, Fortner went to the Department complaining of difficulty when breathing. When Dr. Oyefara treated her on January 13, she gave him a history of suffering acute exacerbation of asthma five days earlier, and that she got better after going home. His assessment was moderate persistent asthma, contact dermatitis, and gastroesophageal reflux disease. Dr. Oyefara again recommended that she be restricted at work to areas where she would not be exposed to certain chemicals.

On March 2, Fortner complained to the Department about an asthma attack. On March 9, she showed up at the Department with a rash on the side of her neck that she asserted was caused by glue that happened to be near a vent. Fortner claimed the rash did not develop until she was moved out of her department, and that she was always being moved despite restrictions to avoid fumes. She was treated at Glenwood.

On March 11, Fortner reported to the Department that she had an asthma attack that was caused by dust from sweeping being done by another |9employee in her department. Fortner complained to the Department of breathing difficulties on March 23, chest tightness on April 11, and wheezing and shortness of breath seven days later.

Dr. Irby treated Fortner on April 19. It was noted that Fortner was doing well, had returned to work, and had to use a respiratory treatment only one time that past week.

Fortner went to the Department twice in May. On May 10, she felt hot and dizzy. On May 13, she reported a sudden asthma attack, and left the plant in an ambulance. She was treated at Glenwood for respiratory distress.

Dr. Adams treated Fortner on June 3. Her chief complaint was asthma. Fortner also reported having multiple allergies.

Fortner went to the Department on August 26 complaining of diesel fumes from a truck that had been in the plant.

Dr. Irby treated Fortner on October 18. It was noted that Fortner was doing very well, and that her asthma had been very well controlled. Fortner was reporting only occasional difficulty at work. Dr. Irby’s impression was that her asthma from an allergy to UV acrylic adhesive was much improved. On November 18, Fort-ner complained to the Department that she was having difficulty breathing from asthma and because of smoke in the plant from a Dumpster fire.

2006 Medical History

On January 14, Fortner was treated for chest pain and shortness of breath at Glen-wood.

11ftThe Department’s records reflect it was provided on March 10 with a doctor’s authorization for Fortner to return to work with the restriction that she not be exposed to chemicals.

Fortner was treated for asthma and shortness of breath at Glenwood on March 29. Dr. Adams examined Fortner the next day, when she reported acute asthma exacerbation while at work.

On April 1, Fortner went to Glenwood complaining of a cough and a sore throat. Dr. Adams treated Fortner two days later. She complained mainly of coughing, and told Dr. Adams about her recent visit to the emergency room. His assessment included chronic bronchitis.

Dr. Irby’s clinic performed a pulmonary function test on April 17. Fortner had moderate airway obstruction, which meant significant wheezing. This was the first time that she had an abnormal pulmonary function test. Dr. Irby thought this test result was a very significant finding. Fortner reported to Dr. Irby that she felt pretty good at the time. His impression was asthma that appeared to be work-related with an allergy to UV acrylic adhesive.

Fortner reported to the Department on September 18 that she had shortness of breath and had started coughing when she returned to her line after a break and smelled an ammonia-like odor. On September 27, Fortner complained to the Department about fumes and smoke from the sonic weld area.

Dr. Irby treated Fortner on October 18. She reported for the first time that she always has wheezing, even when she had been away from work for ^several months. Dr. Irby testified that on a blowing test, her FEV1, which measures the degree of wheezing, had worsened a bit despite her medications being increased. His impression was occupational induced asthma that now appeared to be lifelong even though she had been away from her exposure, and that it appeared to be worsening.

When Dr. Adams examined Fortner on October 30, her primary complaint was asthma from job exposure.

Dr. Irby next treated Fortner on December 13. Dr. Irby recalled that Fort-ner complained of a little wheezing. His impression was occupational asthma gradually worsening over the years despite absence of exposure. No tests were performed during this visit.

2007 and 2008 Medical History

Dr. Irby’s clinic performed a pulmonary function test on June 6, 2007. Fortner had severe obstructive airways disease. According to Dr. Irby, her FEV1 was down to 36%, and a person with that reading would generally become out of breath walking to the bathroom, and would be more susceptible to pneumonia, and that it was a debilitating condition.

Dr. Irby also examined Fortner on June 6. He noted that except for steroids, she had been maximally treated. She had shortness of breath with minimal exertion. Her condition appeared to Dr. Irby to be much worsened. His impression was severe obstructive ventilator defect secondary to occupational asthma secondary to UV adhesive and butyl acetate exposure at the plant.

112Pr. Irby treated Fortner on January 7, 2008. He noted that she was doing as well as could be expected, and that she had shortness of breath with minimal exertion. She continued being maximally treated for her asthma except for taking a daily oral steroid. His impression remained occupational asthma with severe obstructive defect as per the test in June.

Procedural History

Fortner filed her disputed claim for compensation form in May of 2006. She contended that she suffered an occupational disease caused by chemical exposure beginning in January of 2004. Guide denied that Fortner’s condition was work-related or that she was disabled.

This matter was tried in September of 2008. The WCJ concluded that even though Fortner has asthma that was often triggered and/or aggravated by conditions at work, there was insufficient evidence demonstrating causation and a resulting disability. The WCJ additionally noted that even if the asthma had been caused by conditions at the plant, Fortner stopped working not because of any disability, but because the plant closed. Fortner has appealed.

DISCUSSION

Factual findings in workers’ compensation cases are subject to the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of appellate review. Banks v. Industrial Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 96-2840 (La.7/1/97), 696 So.2d 551. In applying the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, the appellate court must determine not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the fact finder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Id. When there |13is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed even though the appellate court may feel that its own inferences and evaluations are as reasonable. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978). Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).

In reference to workers’ compensation claims for occupational diseases, La. R.S. 23:1031.1 states, in part:

A. Every employee who is disabled because of the contraction of an occupational disease as herein defined, or the dependent of an employee whose death is caused by an occupational disease, as herein defined, shall be entitled to the compensation provided in this Chapter the same as if said employee received personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
B. An occupational disease means only that disease or illness which is due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment in which the employee is exposed to such disease. Occupational disease shall include injuries due to work-related carpal tunnel syndrome. Degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis, arthritis of any type, mental illness, and heart-related or perivascular disease are specifically excluded from the classification of an occupational disease for the purpose of this Section.

The claimant asserting an occupational disease must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, a disability related to an employment-related disease, that it was contracted during the course of employment, and that it is the result of the work performed. J.P. Morgan Chase v. Louis, 44,309 (La.App.2d Cir.5/13/09), 12 So.3d 440; Lee v. Schumpert, 36,733 (La.App.2d14 Cir.1/29/03), 836 So.2d 1214. The causal link between the claimant’s illness and the work-related duties must be established by a reasonable probability. Seal v. Gaylord Container Corp., 97-0688 (La.12/2/97), 704 So.2d 1161; Shields v. GNB Technologies, Inc., 38,911 (La.App.2d Cir.10/4/00), 768 So.2d 774. The claimant will fail if there is only a possibility that the employment caused the disease, or if other causes not related to the employment are just as likely to have caused it. Lee, supra. Expert testimony is required to support a finding of an occupational disease. Id.

Dr. Irby agreed that his diagnosis of an occupational disease was based on a process of elimination. Since there was no scientific evidence showing it was caused by conditions at work, he depended on history provided by Fortner, who was claiming the onset of asthma in her early 40s, to relate her asthma to the plant.

The three tests that Dr. Irby performed on Fortner were pulmonary function tests, chest x-rays, and exercise oximetry tests. Dr. Irby agreed that these tests were not designed to detect what chemical compound may have caused the symptoms; rather, they are intended to prove the existence of a pulmonary problem, the degree of the problem, and if the problem will progress. Her first several pulmonary function tests were normal, but eventually the results became abnormal enough that he could measure the asthma, and her asthma gradually worsened until it became severe.

11sDr. Irby stated that based upon his visits with Fortner, he was confident that her difficulties were most likely caused by her sensitivity to a chemical at work because other potential causes were removed by a process of elimination. He recalled that when he saw first saw her, she had just been taken off the hypertension medication Lotrel, which can cause a dry cough. She had also just start taking an acid reflux medication, and acid reflux is the top cause of asthma in adults. Dr. Irby reasoned that the Lotrel, the acid reflux or a panic attack could have been the cause of her cough.

Dr. Irby stated that although he did not define a particular chemical that caused her problem, he had a particular place that caused her problem, at least according to Fortner. But he believed that she was telling the truth because she told the truth from the beginning about her asthma symptoms even when the tests originally came back normal and he was doubtful that she even had asthma. He simply could not find any other reason for Fort-ner to develop asthma other than the chemicals she was exposed to while employed at the plant.

But the record is clear that Fortner’s asthma attacks were not limited to the workplace. Fortner has had asthma attacks when she came into contact with chemicals outside of work such as smoke, air fresheners, aerosol cleaners, perfumes, and colognes. Pumping gas can trigger an attack according to Fortner. Nevertheless, Fortner contends that her episodes of asthma are not as severe since she stopped working at the plant, although she still has to take daily medications for her asthma.

| KjWhen Dr. Irby noted on April 19, 2004, that Fortner’s asthma was secondary to allergy to UV acrylic adhesive, he was relying on Dr. Rathbun’s assessment on April 12, 2004, that she was sensitized to UV acrylic adhesive. This was in a note that Fortner had from Dr. Rathbun.

Dr. Irby did not know what tests Dr. Rathbun performed to come to her conclusion of an allergy to UV acrylic adhesive. He also did not have any records from Dr. Rathbun other than the note that he referred to on April 19. Dr. Irby thought that Dr. Rathbun’s conclusion of allergy to UV acrylic adhesive was based upon what Fortner had told her.

For all her supposed candidness, Fort-ner never provided Dr. Irby with Dr. Rathbun’s later assessments that doubted sensitization and suspected panic attacks, much less told him about them. Dr. Irby was ultimately dismissive of any findings made by Dr. Rathbun because he believed that she was too quick to jump to conclusions.

Fortner insisted that prior to seeing Dr. Rathbun, she had no idea what chemical was causing her asthma attacks. She contended it was Dr. Rathbun who first mentioned UV acrylic adhesive, n-butyl acetate, and isopropanol. She denied telling Dr. Rathbun about these chemicals, which were present at the plant.

Nevertheless, when Fortner first met with Dr. Rathbun, she brought along Material Data Safety Sheets for isopropanol anhydrous and n-butyl acetate. Fortner insisted that she could not recall who in the plant’s Health 117and Safety Area gave these sheets to her. She denied that Debra Benton, her sister-in-law, who was also the UAW Safety Representative at the plant, told her to take the sheets to Dr. Rathbun and say she was exposed to n-butyl acetate.

For her part, Benton admitted assisting Fortner in getting the sheets. Benton already had the n-butyl acetate sheet in her possession, but the other one was provided by the industrial hygienist. Benton testified that Fortner had asked her to get it, so she got it from the hygienist and gave it to Fortner.

Fortner denied that she asked Benton to call Dr. Rathbun. She added that she did not know why Benton called Dr. Rathbun, and that Benton never talked to her about calling Dr. Rathbun.

Benton testified in detail about the air testing procedures at the plant. She explained that scheduled and unscheduled air samples were taken, and the unscheduled ones were generally taken when someone complained about conditions at the plant. The air at the plant was tested mostly for styrene, n-butyl acetate, methyl alcohol, ethyl methylene, and for dust particles. If an air reading was above certain levels, they would normally shut down the machinery and search for the source of the problem. Benton had access to the results of any testing, yet none were introduced to support her statement that breathing problems were a' regular occurrence at the plant. No air sample records were submitted showing levels of chemicals on specific days when Fortner complained of breathing difficulties.

1 ,sDr. William George is a pharmacologist and a toxicologist. He served as Director of the Drug Analysis Lab at Tulane University, as well as the Director of Toxicology at Tulane. Dr. George testified that n-butyl acetate has a fairly high threshold limit value, permissible exposure level, and short-term exposure level, and a very low odor threshold; he explained this meant that the chemical could be easily smelled, but was not necessarily harmful when smelled. He noted that he did not believe that exposure to n-butyl acetate fumes could cause contact dermatitis.

Dr. George testified that he could not find a causal relationship between asthma and n-butyl acetate in the literature on asthma that he examined. Dr. George noted that he could find nothing in the records where there was a measurement of or an indication of any specific exposure to n-butyl acetate at levels that would have produced effects on the body. He opined that it was unlikely that exposure to n-butyl acetate would have caused Fortner’s asthma. Further, he explained that asthma could be caused by exposure to allergens, pollens, dust, a variety of compounds, and even temperature changes.

Accordingly, based upon our review of this record, we find that the WCJ was not clearly wrong in denying Fortner’s claim.

CONCLUSION

At Fortner’s cost, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

Before WILLIAMS, STEWART, CARAWAY, PEATROSS and DREW, JJ.

Rehearing denied.

      . In 2002, Fortner had complained of tightness in her chest and had become faint after she took a shortcut through the BAT room, which is where the molds were made.

      . Dr. Adams began treating Fortner in 2002.

      . Dr. Adams testified that he would refer a patient in order to determine the existence of occupational induced asthma through scientific methods. He followed Dr. Irby's diagnosis of occupational induced asthma.

      . Fortner denied that Dr. Rathbun discussed the diagnosis of probable panic attack with her. Fortner contended that Dr. Rathbun came up with the panic attack diagnosis after a nurse from the Department had called Dr. Rathbun and said Fortner had mental problems.

      . Sometimes these air readings would be below levels required by the government and Guide, but would be above nuisance or irritant levels.

      . Dr. George testified that the levels at which effects are seen are higher than the levels used as standards. This also takes into account differences among individuals.

      . The presence of n-butyl acetate can be detected through blood and urine tests.


author: GASKINS, J.

text:
    Vickie FUENTES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. CELLXION, INC., The Gray Insurance Company and American Interstate Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants.
    No. 44,914-WCA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 16, 2009.

      Mayer, Smith & Roberts, L.L.P., by John Turnage, for Defendants Appellants, Cellxion, Inc. and The Gray Insurance Co.
    Jack M. Bailey and Associates, by Mary Lou Salley Bylsma, Jack M. Bailey, Jr., for Plaintiff Appellee, Vickie Fuentes.
    Law Office of William A. Jones, by William A. Jones, for Defendant Appellee, American Interstate Insurance Co.
    Before GASKINS, DREW and MOORE, JJ.
   GASKINS, J.

11 This is a workers’ compensation dispute between American Interstate Insurance Company (AI) and The Gray Insurance Company (Gray), the insurers of Cellxion, Inc. (Cellxion). AI insured Cellx-ion until September 27, 2000, and Gray insured Cellxion thereafter. Cellxion’s employee, Vickie Fuentes, suffered a shoulder injury in June 2000. She had two surgical procedures on the shoulder. In 2002, Ms. Fuentes developed carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) and later had surgery for that condition. She then developed reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) in the arm. Fuentes sued Cellxion, AI, and Gray for workers’ compensation benefits. She settled with AI, releasing AI, Cellxion, and Gray. Gray and AI filed various cross-claims for recovery of amounts paid to Fuentes. Cellxion/Gray contended that all Ms. Fuentes’ problems arose from the shoulder injury. AI claimed that some of the problems were caused by CTS and Cellxion/Gray should reimburse it for a portion of the medical expenses and indemnity paid to Ms. Fuentes, as well as one-half the amount of the settlement.

The Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) found that the CTS was a separate injury and not related to the shoulder injury. It also found that the RSD was caused by both the shoulder injury and the CTS. The OWC denied Cellxion/Gray’s claim against AI to recover amounts paid to Ms. Fuentes arising from the CTS. AI’s third party demand for all indemnity benefits paid to Ms. Fuentes during the recovery period for the CTS surgery was granted. The OWC also ordered Cellxion/Gray to pay one-half of the indemnity payments and medical benefits made to Ms. Fuentes for her RSD. AI’s claim to recover one-half of the settlement amount from Cellx-ion/Gray |2was denied. Cellxion/Gray appealed and AI has answered the appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part, the judgment of the OWC.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Vickie Fuentes, began working at Cellxion on July 11, 1999, as a mechanical technician. Cellxion manufactures telecommunications buildings. On June 9, 2000, she injured her left shoulder. At that time, Cellxion was insured by AI. On February 20, 2001, Ms. Fuentes had surgery, performed by Dr. Michael Aeurio, on the shoulder for a torn rotator cuff. She continued to have problems with the left shoulder.

On April 2, 2001, Ms. Fuentes returned to work as a quality control inspector. This was light duty work. In July or August 2002, she changed jobs to a position that was considered even lighter duty. At some point, she moved to another position which required the repetitive use of small hand tools.

On December 17, 2002, Ms. Fuentes injured her left wrist and was diagnosed with CTS. On June 30, 2003, Ms. Fuentes had a second surgery on her left shoulder performed by Dr. Neil Maki. In July 2003, Ms. Fuentes was terminated by Cellxion. On November 17, 2004, Ms. Fuentes had surgery for CTS by Dr. John Ferrell. Ms. Fuentes then developed RSD in the left arm and was treated by a pain management physician, Dr. Randall Brewer.

|aAI paid medical and indemnity benefits for the left shoulder surgeries. Gray paid for the CTS surgery. However, AI paid indemnity benefits during the recuperative period for the CTS surgery.

Ms. Fuentes filed a disputed claim for workers’ compensation in January 2004. Cellxion/Gray filed a third party demand against AI to recover for amounts paid for the CTS surgery, contending that the CTS was caused by the shoulder injury. AI filed a reconventional demand against Cellxion/Gray claiming that the CTS was a separate injury, denying liability, and seeking reimbursement for indemnity and medical amounts paid for the CTS. AI later filed a supplemental and amended reconventional demand claiming that Ms. Fuentes’ disability was caused by a combination of the shoulder injury and CTS; therefore, AI and Cellxion/Gray should pay their proportional share of all the workers’ compensation benefits paid by AI.

The matter was heard by the OWC on March 12, 2008. At the hearing, AI and Ms. Fuentes entered into a settlement for $120,000. Cellxion, as Ms. Fuentes’ employer, approved the settlement. The hearing continued on the cross-claims between AI and Cellxion/Gray. On April 18, 2008, the OWC entered an oral ruling on the record. It found that the CTS was a separate injury which occurred in 2002 while Cellxion was insured by Gray. The RSD which Ms. Fuentes developed after the CTS surgery was found to be a result of both the shoulder and the CTS injury. The OWC found that AI paid all it owed for the shoulder injury. Cellxion/Gray paid for the CTS surgery, but not the post-surgery indemnity. Therefore, it owed | reimbursement to AI for that expense. The OWC found that Cellxion/Gray owes AI 50 percent of the indemnity, medical and rehabilitation benefits paid for the RSD. According to the OWC, the settlement was a compromise and not a lump sum settlement; therefore it had no authority to order Cellxion/Gray to reimburse AI for one-half of the $120,000 compromise settlement.

On July 11, 2008, the OWC entered judgment denying the third party demand by Cellxion/Gray against AI. The third party demand by AI against Cellxion/Gray was granted, ordering Cellxion/Gray to pay $2,896.80 in indemnity for the recovery period following the CTS surgery; $25,036.63, which is one-half the indemnity payments arising from the RSD; $16,083.45, which is one-half of the medical benefits attributable to the RSD; $1,415.65, which is one-half the vocational rehabilitation, as well as costs and interest from the date of judicial demand, April 6, 2006. AI’s demand for reimbursement for one-half of the settlement with Ms. Fuentes was denied. Cellxion/Gray appealed and AI answered the appeal.

CELLXION/GRAY’S APPEAL

Cellxion/Gray alleges that the OWC erred in denying its third party demand against AI for reimbursement for medical expenses paid by Cellxion/Gray on behalf of Ms. Fuentes arising from CTS. Cellx-ion/Gray also maintains that the OWC erred in ruling that Cellxion/Gray is responsible for indemnity benefits paid to Ms. Fuentes for the 12 weeks following the CTS surgery. These arguments are without merit.

| ¡¡CTS Medical and Indemnity Benefits

Cellxion/Gray argues that Ms. Fuentes’ shoulder injury caused her CTS and therefore, AI should reimburse Cellx-ion/Gray for medical benefits it paid for Ms. Fuentes’ CTS surgery. Cellxion/Gray contends that the OWC erred in ruling otherwise. Cellxion/Gray also objects to the OWC ruling ordering it to reimburse AI for the 12 weeks of indemnity benefits AI paid while Ms. Fuentes was recuperating from CTS surgery. Cellxion/Gray claims that when Ms. Fuentes had CTS surgery, she was under a light duty work restriction due to her shoulder. She was drawing workers’ compensation benefits from AI at that time for her shoulder disability. Cellxion/Gray claims that it should not be required to pay indemnity benefits for a time when Ms. Fuentes was already off work for her shoulder condition. Decision of these issues turns on an examination of the testimony, both medical and nonmedical, in this case concerning whether the shoulder injury caused the CTS.

In a workers’ compensation case, as in other cases, the appellate court’s review is governed by the manifest error or clearly wrong standard. Whether the claimant has carried his burden of proof and whether testimony is credible are questions of fact to be determined by the OWC judge. Unless shown to be clearly wrong, the trial court’s factual findings of work-related disability will not be disturbed where there is evidence which, upon the trier of fact’s reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnishes a reasonable, factual basis for those findings. Where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be | (¡disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Gilbert v. Willis-Knighton Workkare Clinic, 44,628 (La.App.2d Cir.9/2/09), 20 So.3d 1149; Kendrick v. Solo Cup, 44,303 (La.App.2d Cir.6/3/09), 15 So.3d 295.

Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Read v. Pel-State Oil Company, 44,218 (La.App.2d Cir.5/20/99), 13 So.3d 1191; Koenig v. Christus Schumpert Health System, 44,244 (La.App.2d Cir.5/13/09), 12 So.3d 1037; Lemons v. Georgia Pacific Corporation, 42,950 (La.App.2d Cir.2/13/08), 976 So.2d 307, writs denied, 2008-0587 (La.5/2/08), 979 So.2d 1288, 2008-0590 (La.5/2/08), 979 So.2d 1289. The courts have consistently held that the manifest error standard applies upon appeal in workers’ compensation actions, even though the evidence before the trier of fact may consist solely of written reports, records, and depositions. Alexander v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 42, 855 (La.App.2d Cir.1/9/08), 975 So.2d 100, writ denied, 2008-0503 (La.4/25/08), 978 So.2d 367.

Ms. Fuentes testified that she injured her left shoulder in June 2000. She had physical therapy for the shoulder. At that time, the notes of the physical therapist, Mark Hart, indicate that, among her symptoms, Ms. Fuentes complained of numbness and tingling in her fingers. However, in her testimony at the hearing, Ms. Fuentes said that in 2001, when she had her first shoulder surgery, she had pain from her shoulder, but not from her wrist.

|7Ms. Fuentes had surgery for a torn rotator cuff in February 2001, performed by Dr. Michael Acurio. She was off work for about six weeks. After she returned to work at Cellxion in 2002, following the first shoulder surgery, Ms. Fuentes was eventually placed in a job which required her to use her wrist more. While working in this job, she suffered an injury to her left hand. Ms. Fuentes stated that on December 17, 2002, she picked up a drill and lost feeling in her left hand. She was then moved to a lighter duty job.

After the initial shoulder surgery, the shoulder continued to hurt. Dr. Acurio opined that she had some instability in the shoulder. In February 2003, Ms. Fuentes was referred to Dr. John Ferrell for a second opinion. It was determined that a second shoulder surgery was necessary and Ms. Fuentes was referred to Dr. Neil Maki for the surgery.

Dr. Maki first saw Ms. Fuentes on May 14, 2003. He recommended surgery to stabilize and debride the shoulder. This surgery was performed on June 30, 2003. In August 2003, Dr. Maki saw Ms. Fuentes for a follow-up visit and found that her range of motion was less than expected at that time. He noted that she also had CTS. In August 2003, Dr. Maki released Ms. Fuentes to light duty work, noting that she had atypical forearm pain which was probably not related to CTS.

In his deposition, Dr. Maki was questioned about the tingling and paresthesia with regard to whether it was attributable to the shoulder or to |8CTS. Dr. Maki stated that occasionally, if a patient has an unstable shoulder, it can cause pulling and irritation on the nerve roots. However, in Ms. Fuentes’ case, it was difficult to delineate. Dr. Maki stated that paresthesia can be caused by CTS, but most people just have pain up and down the arm. He said that Ms. Fuentes was doing fine after the second shoulder surgery, so he did not think that the shoulder instability was causing her pain complaints.

Dr. Maki was asked to assume that Ms. Fuentes had no problems with her wrist after the first shoulder surgery and developed problems with the wrist after she was assigned a job requiring the use of small hand tools. He was then asked whether, under those circumstances, the CTS was caused by the repetitive movements of her job or by her shoulder injury. Dr. Maki said that if Ms. Fuentes had no problems or complaints with her wrist until 2002, then more likely than not, the CTS was related to her job activities which began about that time. Dr. Maki also said that he did not find anything with regard to the present condition of Ms. Fuentes’ shoulder that could be causing her problems with CTS. Dr. Maki noted that Ms. Fuentes continues to have swelling, clunking, and ganglion cysts in her wrist. He said that these symptoms would not have been caused by the shoulder injury.

Dr. John Ferrell saw Ms. Fuentes in February 2003 for a second opinion after she continued to have pain following her initial shoulder surgery. He later treated her for CTS. He performed surgery on her wrist on | ¡¡November 17, 2004. She was not able to work for several weeks following the surgery. Dr. Ferrell noted that, after the surgery, Ms. Fuentes continued to have “popping, clunking, and swelling” of the wrist. An MRI performed in 2005 revealed a healthy median nerve with a lot of fluid in the distal radial ulnar joint. Dr. Ferrell observed that Ms. Fuentes first began having pain and numbness in her upper arm and hand in October and November 2000, shortly after the initial shoulder injury. He opined that the CTS was related to the original shoulder injury. However, he also stated in an early doctor’s note in 2004 that the second lighter duty job performed by Ms. Fuentes caused the CTS.

The record shows that, following the shoulder surgery, Ms. Fuentes denied having symptoms of CTS until the specific accident at work in December 2002 when she was using small hand tools. Dr. Maki, who performed her second shoulder surgery, did not think the shoulder injury caused the CTS. Dr. Ferrell stated in his deposition that he thought there was a connection between the shoulder injury and the CTS. However, earlier he had stated that he felt that the CTS was caused by Ms. Fuentes’ repetitive use of small hand tools in a job different from the one she was doing when she injured her shoulder.

The record is sufficient to support the conclusion of the OWC that the shoulder injury and the CTS were two separate and unrelated injuries. Because the CTS occurred while Celbdon was insured by Gray, the OWC was not manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in denying Cellxion/Gray’s claim to recover medical benefits paid for the CTS surgery and in ordering | mCellxion/Gray to pay for Ms. Fuentes’ indemnity benefits during her recuperation from the CTS surgery.

RSD Benefits

Cellxion/Gray claims that the OWC erred in taxing them with one-half of the indemnity, medical and vocational rehabilitation benefits AI paid Ms. Fuentes arising from her RSD, based upon the finding that the shoulder injury and the CTS combined to cause the RSD. This argument is without merit.

Following her surgeries, Ms. Fuentes continued to complain of diffuse pain in the upper left extremity. A functional capacity evaluation (FCE) was done on Ms. Fuentes by Dr. Austin Gleason on July 12, 2005. He noted weakness in her shoulder and wrist. According to Dr. Gleason, he could not determine whether the weakness in Ms. Fuentes’ arm was due to her shoulder or CTS. Dr. Gleason assigned an impairment rating to Ms. Fuentes for her shoulder and wrist injuries. Dr. Gleason split her impairment rating in half, giving 3 percent impairment rating to the total body for weakness due to the shoulder and 3 percent for weakness secondary to CTS. He assigned a 1 percent impairment to the body as a whole for loss of motion of the shoulder, giving her a 4 percent impairment to the body as a whole for her shoulder injury.

On September 30, 2005, Dr. Benjamin Nguyen, a neurologist, did a nerve conduction study on Ms. Fuentes at the request of Dr. Ferrell. This test of the left upper extremity showed mild prolonged distal latency of the median sensory response across the wrist. Other motor and sensory nerve ^conduction studies on the left arm were found to be normal. Dr. Nguyen’s findings were consistent with a mild CTS with no significant evidence of dener-vation.

Dr. Ferrell’s notes show that in October 2005, Ms. Fuentes was diagnosed with RSD. Dr. Ferrell stated that the problems Ms. Fuentes is currently having with RSD are caused by her shoulder and not by her wrist. According to Dr. Ferrell, the CTS does not have anything to do with the RSD. He claimed that the popping, clunking, and swelling that Ms. Fuentes is currently experiencing in her left arm is due to RSD and not CTS.

Regarding the RSD, Dr. Maki stated that most dystrophy involves swelling, col- or and temperature change and loss of motion. Ms. Fuentes did not have the classic symptoms of dystrophy. She had complaints of paresthesia and nerve pain. According to Dr. Maki, when a patient experiences pain out of proportion to what is appropriate for the pathology, it is felt to be related to the transmission of and perception of nerve pain syndrome. Ms. Fuentes had deltoid atrophy indicating that she may not have had full rehabilitation or a full recovery from her shoulder problem.

Dr. Ferrell referred Ms. Fuentes to Dr. Randall Brewer, a pain management specialist, for a cervical sympathetic nerve block. In Dr. Brewer’s deposition, he noted that he first saw Ms. Fuentes on December 1, 2005. Dr. Brewer stated that Ms. Fuentes had left wrist pain radiating to the shoulder and independent shoulder pain. Ms. Fuentes stated that she had a work-related shoulder injury and later developed CTS. After CTS surgery, she continued to have shooting and stabbing pain in her arm. According to |12Pr. Brewer, the left wrist was the source of Ms. Fuentes’ predominant complaint of pain.

Dr. Brewer stated that he did not find significant problems with skin sensitivity in the left arm. Ms. Fuentes was protective of the arm. However, her reflexes were normal. She had mild loss of sensation over the index finger of the left hand. Dr. Brewer did not detect that movement of Ms. Fuentes’ neck caused pain and passive motion of the shoulder did not reproduce her symptoms of pain.

He did note that there was a discrepancy in the temperature of the arms with the left arm being colder than the right. Dr. Brewer stated that if one is looking at a diagnosis of nerve pain and one is thinking about RSD, which is known as complex regional pain syndrome, the difference in temperatures implies that the sympathetic nerves in the left arm are slightly more active than the nerves in the right. Dr. Brewer noted that the nerve conduction test done by Dr. Nguyen indicated a problem with the median nerve in Ms. Fuentes’ wrist. Dr. Brewer thought that the most disabling part of Ms. Fuentes’ neuropathic pain was coming from the wrist. On three separate occasions, Dr. Brewer administered injections into Ms. Fuentes’ neck to block the sympathetic nerves in her arm. He stated that she had good response to the nerve blocks.

When questioned about his statement that Ms. Fuentes’ pain began in the wrist and radiated up the arm, Dr. Brewer said that he thought Ms. Fuentes may have concomitant pain in the shoulder, not coming from the wrist, that was more mechanical in quality. According to Dr. Brewer, | ^patients can develop RSD because of CTS. In Ms. Fuentes’ case, Dr. Brewer stated that her pain could be coming from the wrist or shoulder, or both.

An electrodiagnostic examination performed by Dr. David N. Adams on November 12, 2007, revealed no nerve abnormalities or CTS in the upper left extremity.

Although there is conflicting medical testimony as to the cause of Ms. Fuentes’ RSD, the bulk of the testimony supports the conclusion by the OWC that the RSD was caused by a combination of the shoulder and wrist injuries. Dr. Gleason attributed Ms. Fuentes’ disability one-half to the shoulder injury and one-half to the wrist. Dr. Maki outlined the symptoms of the nerve pain that Ms. Fuentes has. He noted that she did not have the classic symptoms of dystrophy and that she continues to have problems with her wrist that are not caused by the shoulder injury.

Dr. Ferrell, who operated on Ms. Fuentes’ wrist, insisted that the RSD was completely caused by the shoulder and not the wrist. However, the record is clear that, even after the CTS surgery, Ms. Fuentes continued to have difficulty with her wrist. She complained of swelling, popping, and clunking.

Dr. Brewer, who treated Ms. Fuentes for her RSD pain, felt that the cause of this problem was a combination of the wrist and the shoulder.

Cellxion/Gray contends that Dr. Ferrell was Ms. Fuentes’ treating physician and his opinion should be given more weight than that of the other doctors. The general rule is that the testimony of a treating physician should be accorded greater weight than that of a physician who examines a patient |14only once or twice. However, the treating physician’s testimony is not irrebuttable, and the trier of fact is required to weigh the testimony of all medical witnesses. Kendrick v. Solo Cup, supra, Frye v. Olan Mills, 44,192 (La.App.2d Cir.4/8/09), 7 So.3d 201. Dr. Ferrell treated Ms. Fuentes’ -wrist and Dr. Maki was the treating physician for Ms. Fuentes’ shoulder. Dr. Brewer was the treating physician for the symptoms of RSD. Under these facts and the record before us, we find that the OWC was not clearly wrong in holding that the RSD was caused by both the shoulder and the wrist injury and in dividing the indemnity, medical, and vocational rehabilitation benefits equally between AI and Cellxion/Gray. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of Dr. Maki and Dr. Brewer. It is corroborated by Dr. Gleason’s finding that Ms. Fuentes’ disability is attributable one-half to her shoulder and one-half to her wrist. It is further supported by Dr. Nguyen’s nerve conduction study which found some mild continuing problems -with Ms. Fuentes’ wrist.

Cellxion/Gray objects to the view that there is a solidary obligation between it and AI for benefits arising from RSD. If an employee in a workers’ compensation claim suffers disability due to the combination of two incidents or by virtue of the second incident aggravating the injury suffered in the first incident, both the subsequent compensation insurer and the insurer at the time of the first incident are solidarity liable for compensation benefits and medical expenses. Rave v. Wampold Companies, 2006-978 (La.App. 3d Cir.12/6/06), 944 So.2d 847; Abadie v. Marsiglia Construction Company, 2002-2108 (La.App. 4th Cir.4/9/03), 845 So.2d 564, writ denied, 2003-1182 (La.6/20/03), 847 So.2d 1233; Daigle v. Lajet, Inc., 504 So.2d 1126 (La.App. 5th Cir.1987). See also Tron v. Little Italiano, Inc., 38,556 (La.App.2d Cir.6/25/04), 877 So.2d 1055.

Therefore, because there was a showing that the RSD was attributable to both the wrist and shoulder injuries, the OWC did not err in finding that AI and Cellx-ion/Gray were each responsible for the indemnity, medical benefits, and vocational rehabilitation arising from the RSD. Further, we reject Cellxion’s argument that AI could not recover from Cellxion because AI is Cellxion’s insurer. Cellxion was not insured by AI for the wrist injury. As stated above, the wrist injury was separate from the shoulder injury. This injury occurred while Cellxion was insured by Gray and had a $50,000 deductible. The OWC property found that AI and Cellx-ion/Gray were each liable for one-half of the benefits attributable to Ms. Fuentes’ RSD.

ATS ANSWER TO THE APPEAL

AI answered the appeal, arguing that the OWC erred in refusing to require that Cellxion/Gray reimburse AI for one-half of the settlement paid to Ms. Fuentes. AI contends that the counsel for Cellx-ion/Gray took part in the settlement negotiations and, as a result of the settlement, Cellxion/Gray was released from liability to Ms. Fuentes. AI points out that the OWC made a distinction between a lump sum settlement and a compromise settlement. The OWC then determined that, because this was a compromise, it had no authority to order Cellxion/Gray to reimburse AI for one-half of the settlement amount. AI argues that this distinction is immaterial and no statutory authority exists to support the conclusion that the OWC is without | ¶(¡authority to order reimbursement for one-half of the settlement. AI contends that, because the OWC found that Cellxion/Gray was responsible for one-half of the indemnity and other benefits for Ms. Fuentes’ condition, it should also be liable to AI for one-half of the settlement. According to AI, under ordinary notions of equity, Cellxion/Gray should pay one-half of the settlement. This argument has merit.

The Louisiana Civil Law Treatise on Workers’ Compensation explains the distinction between a lump sum settlement and a compromise:

A “lump sum settlement” (which probably should have been called a “lump sum payment”) is not a compromise of disputed issues between the employee and the employer. Rather, it is an agreement between them to pay sums admittedly due — and otherwise payable in weekly amounts — in a lump sum discounted to present value within statutory restrictions. A “compromise”, on the other hand, is an agreement between the employee and the employer to resolve disputes between them (such as work-relation of the injury or extent of disability) by the payment of compensation, very often in a single amount. Due to the fact that their dispute is being resolved by compromise, the agreed amount — though paid in a lump sum — is not subject to the restrictions placed on “lump sum settlements.”
La. R.S. 23:1274 provides a method by which the employer and employee may agree that compensation which is admitted to be due shall be paid in a lump sum rather than distributed over a period of weeks. This section contemplates that the employee shall receive the full amount of compensation to which he is entitled under the Act, subject only to a discount not in excess of 8%. The agreement is not valid until it has been approved by a “hearing officer” (presumably now the workers’ compensation judge). Thereafter, upon payment of the sum agreed to, the liability of the employer is satisfied.
As we have noted earlier, though both require judicial approval, the compromise is not to be confused with the lump sum |17settlement. Whenever there exists a bona fide dispute, the parties are authorized to enter into a compromise agreement which, upon being approved by the workers’ compensation judge, is reduced to judgment. When this has been done, the judgment cannot be set aside except for fraud or misrepresentation. The cases, however, have given this rule a rather narrow interpretation, declining to extend a compromise to future accidents or injuries, or when the six-month period after the termination of temporary total disability had not been respected, or when there are other problems.
The compromise derives its validity from the existence of differences between the parties, and its purpose is to offset the fear of loss by the chance of gain. The lump sum settlement, on the other hand, is proper when there are no differences between the parties; and the sole purpose of the arrangement is to avoid continuous weekly payments. [Footnotes omitted.]

14 H. Alston Johnson, III, Workers’ Compensation Law and Practice (Louisiana Civil Law Treatise) § 387 (4th ed. 2002).

We have established that the defendants are solidarily liable in that each is responsible for the indemnity, medical benefits, and vocational rehabilitation arising from the K.SD. La. C.C. art. 1804 provides:

Among solidary obligors, each is liable for his virile portion. If the obligation arises from a contract or quasi-contract, virile portions are equal in the absence of agreement or judgment to the contrary. If the obligation arises from an offense or quasi-offense, a virile portion is proportionate to the fault of each obli-gor.
A solidary obligor who has rendered the whole performance, though subrogated to the right of the obligee, may claim from the other obligors no more than the virile portion of each.
If the circumstances giving rise to the solidary obligation concern only one of the obligors, that obligor is liable for the whole to the other obligors who are then considered only as his sureties.

118Since AI and Cellxion/Gray are solidary obligors and AI rendered the whole performance, AI may claim the virile portion, or one-half, from Cellxion/Gray.

The case of Maryland Casualty v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 254 La. 489, 224 So.2d 465 (La.1969), addressed the question of whether a workers’ compensation compromise settlement can form the basis for fixing the indebtedness of a third party as a solidary obligor. The court concluded that the settlement by the general employer’s insurer may be the basis for a demand for contribution under a solidary obligation against the insurer of a special employer.

In Maryland Casualty, the employee worked for a company that leased equipment and workers to other companies. The employee was injured while working for the special employer. The insurer of the general employer settled with the employee and sought to recover one-half of the settlement from the special employer. The supreme court found that the demand was proper and held that the general employer and the special employer were soli-dary obligors. The insurer of the general employer was allowed to claim contribution of one-half of the settlement from the special employer.

The settlement entered into by AI and Ms. Fuentes was for future medical expenses. The record shows that all parties agreed to split the cost of an expert to create a cost projection for future medical expenses. Based upon Ms. Fuentes’ life expectancy of 38 years, there was a projection of $45,395 in routine physician visits, $11,666 for x-rays and lab work, $85,141.44 for medication, and $252,622 for a lifetime total if a spinal 119stimulator is used. Correspondence between the various attorneys shows that Ms. Fuentes would likely not consider having the spinal cord stimulator implanted. Without this element, her lifetime medical expense projection was $142,202.44.

The compromise settlement was for $120,000. In exchange for the settlement, Ms. Fuentes released not only AI, but also Cellxion/Gray. Cellxion/Gray participated in the settlement negotiations and paid a portion of the cost for the lifetime medical expense projection. Cellxion approved the settlement as Ms. Fuentes’ employer. Settlement was for all future medical expenses that might be due from both AI and Cellxion/Gray. The settlement was not excessive and no real issue about fairness of the settlement amount has been raised. AI and Cellxion/Gray are solidarily liable for Ms. Fuentes’ RSD condition. Therefore, we find that AI is entitled to recover from Cellxion/Gray for one-half of the settlement proceeds paid to Ms. Fuentes. We reverse that portion of the OWC ruling to the contrary.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm that portion of the ruling by the OWC finding that the shoulder and wrist injuries were separate, denying Cellxion/Gray’s claim to recover amounts paid to Ms. Fuentes for CTS and ordering Cellx-ion/Gray to reimburse AI for all benefits paid to Ms. Fuentes arising from CTS. We also affirm that portion of the judgment finding that the RSD is attributable to both the shoulder and wrist injuries and ordering Cellxion/Gray to pay one-half of the medical, indemnity and vocational rehabilitation benefits arising from it. We reverse that portion of the OWC’s | ¡^judgment denying AI’s claim for one-half of the compromise paid to Mr. Fuentes for future medical expenses. In addition to the amounts the OWC ordered that Cellx-ion/Gray was to pay AI in the judgment below, we order Cellxion/Gray to pay AI $60,000, representing one-half of the compromise settlement for future medical expenses. Costs in this court are assessed to Cellxion/Gray.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; RENDERED.

      . Cellxion has a $50,000 deductible with Gray.

      . Paresthesia is defined as morbid or perverted sensation; an abnormal sensation, as burning, prickling, formication, etc. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, pg. 1139 (25th ed. 1974).