author: CLARK, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. 2003 INFINITI G35 VIN # JNKCV51E93MO24167 and Kristofor Rebstock.
    No. 2009-CC-1193.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 20, 2010.

      James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Camille A. Morvant, II, District Attorney, Lisa Rouchell Pinho, Assistant District Attorney, for Applicant.
    Christopher John Boudreaux, Thibo-daux, for respondent.
   CLARK, Justice.

hWe granted a writ in this forfeiture proceeding to determine whether the courts below erred in their interpretation of La. R.S. 40:2610, a section of the Seizure and Controlled Dangerous Substances Property Forfeiture Act of 1989. This legislation established the requirements for an owner of, or interest holder in, seized property to file a claim with the appropriate seizing agency and district attorney to protect his alleged interest. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court’s ruling and remand the matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with the opinion below.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 16, 2008, the Lafourche Parish Drug Task Force (“Task Force”) seized the 2003 Infiniti G35 VIN # JNKCV51E93MO (“Infiniti”) at issue here from Kristofor Rebstock (“Reb-stock”). Judge John E. LeBlanc of the Louisiana District Court for the Seventeenth Judicial District signed a warrant of seizure, finding probable cause that the Infiniti was subject to forfeiture based on the averred facts in a Task Force agent’s supporting affidavit.

According to the affiant, agents of the Task Force conducted surveillance of Reb-stock’s residence for several months prior to the seizure date, due to suspicions |2of Rebstock’s upper-level involvement in a methamphetamine distribution ring operating within the parish. The agents conducted undercover purchases of methamphetamine from Rebstock, during which agents observed Rebstock leaving his residence in the Infiniti, driving to a shed located on a different street from his residence, remaining at the shed for a brief period of time, and then returning to his residence in the Infiniti shortly before the undercover transactions occurred. Based on the information provided by a cooperating defendant and a confidential informant, the Task Force agents believed that Reb-stock used the shed as a storage unit for methamphetamine. When the agents executed a search warrant of Rebstock’s residence, Rebstock himself confirmed this information by admitting to an agent that he used the Infiniti to transport methamphetamine from the shed to his residence. Furthermore, the agents received information from a documented confidential informant with the Louisiana State Police Department both that Rebstock had used the cash proceeds from the illegal sale of methamphetamine to purchase the Infiniti and that the Infiniti contained secret compartments that Rebstock used to hide the methamphetamines, the latter of which was confirmed by the agents during an inspection of the vehicle.

On the same day as the seizure, May 16, 2008, and in order to commence the forfeiture proceeding, the State served Reb-stock with a Notice of Pending Forfeiture. The Notice of Pending Forfeiture advised Rebstock of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture of the Infiniti, which included, inter alia: (1) an explanation of not only how the Task Force observed Rebstock using the Infiniti to transport methamphetamine for eventual distribution, but also how the Infiniti was confirmed to have been equipped with aftermarket, hidden compartments to conceal this activity; (2) an account of Rebstock’s confession confirming his use of the Infiniti in transporting methamphetamines for distribution; and (3) a description of why the State believed that the Infiniti was purchased with cash proceeds from the sale of 13methamphetamines. The State additionally informed Rebstock of the procedure to preserve any right that he may have in the Infiniti, and of the resulting consequences if such steps were not taken.

In response, Rebstock mailed what he captioned a “Notice of Claim” to both the Task Force and the district attorney. Within this document, Rebstock averred that he was the owner of the Infiniti and objected to any forfeiture proceeding for the following reasons:

1) my property has been unconstitutionally seized and specifically avers that La. R.S. 40:2601-2622 is unconstitutional under the 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws and Constitution of the State of Louisiana; and alternatively, that the State of Louisiana has failed to comply with the provisions of La. R.S. 40:2601-2622; 2) that the seizure of the vehicle in question was without legal consent and in violation of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Louisiana; and 3) that the assets in question were not “used or intended to be used in any manner to facilitate conduct giving rise to forfeiture” pursuant to La. R.S. 40:2604; 4) claimant contends said assets are exempt from forfeiture under the provisions of La. R.S. 40:2605; and alternatively, 5) the provisions of La. R.S. 40:2605 are ambiguous and irreconcilable thereby rendering the entire forfeiture provisions of La. R.S. 40:2601-2622 unconstitutional.

Rebstock further averred that “the automobile in question was acquired by claimant on or about 2007 act of exchange [sic] with a third party whereby claimant traded his Cheveronet [sic] Camaro for this vehicle with no additional cash being exchanged” and that “the vehicle was not used in any manner to facilitate conduct giving rise to forfeiture, contrary to the allegations made by law enforcement.”

On June 20, 2008, the State filed a motion to strike Rebstock’s Notice of Claim. The State also filed a rule to show cause why the State’s motion to strike claim should not be granted and why a judgment of forfeiture in favor of the State should not be granted. In support, the State submitted the warrant of seizure, the affidavit from the Task Force agent in support of the seizure warrant application, the Notice of Pending Forfeiture, and Reb-stoek’s Notice of Claim.

|4A hearing was held on the State’s rule to show cause before Judge Walter Lanier, III, a different judge than the one who signed the warrant of seizure. At the hearing, the State argued that Rebstock’s Notice of Claim was invalid for failing to aver the specific factual basis supporting each assertion required by La. R.S. 40:2610. Rebstock contended that his Notice of Claim was valid because it contained general factual assertions and a general denial of the State’s allegations of conduct giving rise to forfeiture, sufficient to put the State on notice that Rebstock intended to contest the forfeiture of the Infiniti. Judge Lanier agreed with Reb-stock, holding that the inclusion of a general denial and general factual assertions were sufficient to qualify as a valid claim. Judge Lanier, therefore, denied the State’s motion to strike the claim and the rule to show cause.

The State then applied for a supervisory writ to the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit. A five-judge panel considered the writ application, and a three-judge majority denied it, stating that the matter was not appropriate for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.- The two dissenting judges, however, would have granted the writ application and reversed the district court’s ruling on the ground that Rebstock’s Notice of Claim failed to provide the specific factual and legal aver-ments required by statute.

Following the denial, the State petitioned this Court for a supervisory writ, which was subsequently granted. In this Court, Rebstock neither appeared for oral argument nor submitted a written brief on the issue presented.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The precise issue that this Court must resolve is whether the district court erred in holding that the claimant satisfied the requirements delineated in La. R.S. 40:2610 for the filing of a claim by merely making general assertions that track the statutory language, without providing specific factual and legal contentions in support. In | ¡¡resolving this issue, we first note the general rules for statutory construction. La. R.S. 1:3 provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]ords and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language.” In addition, the statute directs that “the word ‘shall’ is mandatory and the word ‘may is permissive.” La. R.S. 1:4 directs that, “[w]hen the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursing its spirit.”

We are likewise cognizant of the principles for statutory interpretation found in the jurisprudence, particularly that “[t]he fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative intent.” Moss v. State, 2006-1963, p. 15 (La.4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1185, 1196. This legislative intent is to be determined “by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and by placing a construction on the law that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the law.” Id. In addition, “[a] statute must be applied and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed purpose and intent of the legislature.” Id.

Through the Seizure and Controlled Dangerous Substances Property Forfeiture Act of 1989 (“Act”), La. R.S. 40:2601-2622, the Louisiana Legislature established a civil system of expressly delineated procedures, which allow the State to seize and have forfeited property that is related to, is a proceed from, facilitates, or is itself a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, La. R.S. 40:961-995. As is apparent from its structure, language, and general tenor, the Act provides not only a process by which the State is able to have forfeited such property in a speedy, fair, and efficient manner, without the accumulation of litigation, storage, and maintenance costs, but also provides a means through which an innocent owner or interest holder can regain his property in a speedy and relatively inexpensive process. However, in order for the Act to function as intended, courts must ensure that both the 1¡¡State and the owner or interest holder strictly follow each of the Act’s detailed requirements for the various stages in the process.

Initially, the Act establishes the proper jurisdiction and venue for all proceedings brought under the Act. The Act then details the specific conduct giving rise to forfeiture and the categories of property that are subject to seizure and forfeiture. In addition, the Act provides guidance to an innocent owner or interest holder about how he can establish that he is, indeed, an innocent owner or interest |7holder, and that the seized property is exempt from forfeiture under Act.

|sThe Act then describes the procedures that the parties must follow in a forfeiture proceeding. The initial stage is the State’s seizure of the property. The Act provides that any law enforcement agency designated by the pertinent district attorney may seize property that the agency believes, on probable cause, to be subject to forfeiture under the Act. Within seventy-two hours of the seizure, the agency “shall 13apply to the court for a warrant of seizure to hold the property pending forfeiture.” See La. R.S. 40:2606(A) and (C). The agency’s application must be in the form of a sworn affidavit that demonstrates the probable cause supporting the seizure of the property. The presiding court will then determine the application’s sufficiency in accordance with the law of search warrants,

If the presiding court grants the warrant of seizure, the State may continue to the next stage of the process and initiate a forfeiture proceeding. To begin the forfeiture process, the State must serve the owner of, or the interest holder in. the seized property with a “written assertion,” termed a “Notice of Pending Forfeiture,” within forty-five days of the seizure. The State can effectuate service on the owner or interest holder in several ways. The Notice of Pending Forfeiture must contain —ÜS a description of the property, the date an(^ Place °f seizure, the conduct giving rise forfeiture or the violation alleged, an<^ a summary of procedures and procedural rights applicable for the forfeiture action.”

The Act also provides the State with another option in this process. This second option aids in tunneling all the relevant information to and from the State and claimant and helps each party assess whether forfeiture proceedings should be pursued further. If the State chooses to do so, as it did here, the State may make available a stipulation of exemption in its Notice of Pending Forfeiture. Doing so provides the owner or |ninterest holder with a choice. Within thirty days of the State’s service of the Notice of Pending Forfeiture, he may either opt to file a claim in the manner detailed below or make a request for a stipulation of exemption. If he decides to pursue the latter and makes the request in a timely manner and in the proper form, the State is required, within 120 days after the effective date of the Notice of Pending Forfeiture, to provide the seizing agency and the requesting party with a written proposed stipulation of exemption and statement of nonexempt interests relating to any or all interest in the property. See La. R.S. 40:2609(B)(1). This extends the period of time during which the State must file a Petition for Forfeiture Proceeding from 90 days to “a total of one hundred eighty days after the service of Notice of Pending Forfeiture.” See La. R.S. 11¾40:2608(2). This extension of time provides the State with an opportunity to assess the validity of the owner’s or interest holder’s grounds for exemption, and to determine whether the property should be released or whether the state should proceed with a judicial proceeding, which could prove costly. In addition, the State’s required response to the owner or interest holder likewise assists him in deciding whether to pursue the matter further, a potentially costly decision given the mandate that the eventual presiding court “shall order a claimant who fails to establish that a substantial portion of the claimant’s interest is exempt from forfeiture ... to pay the reasonable costs and expenses of the state for the investigation and prosecution of the matter, including reasonable attorney’s fees, in connection with that claimant.” La. R.S. 40:2615(E).

Regardless of whether the State includes the stipulation of exemption in its Notice of Pending Forfeiture, the owner or interest holder in the property must take affirmative steps in order to preserve his interest in the property. When the State does include the stipulation, the Act provides specific steps that must be followed. The owner or interest holder must file either a claim or a request for stipulation that “shall be mailed to the seizing agency and to the district attorney by certified mail, return receipt requested.” La. R.S. 40:2610(A). This must be completed “within thirty | isdays after Notice of Pending Forfeiture,” and “[n]o extension of time for the filing ... shall be granted.” Id.

The Act also establishes the required form and content for the claim or request. The claim or request “shall be in affidavit form, signed by the claimant under oath and sworn to by the affiant before one who has authority to administer the oath, under penalty of perjury or false swearing.” This requirement and potential penalty aids in the filtering of legitimate and truthful assertions of fact, which, again, promotes a speedy, cost-efficient procedure that is beneficial to both the State and the innocent owner or interest holder. Finally, the Act requires that the claim or request “shall” include all of the following:

(1) The caption of the proceedings as set forth on the Notice of Pending Forfeiture or petition and the name of the claimant.
(2) The address where the claimant will accept mail.
(3) The nature and extent of the claimant’s interest in the property.
(4) The date, identity of the transferor, and the circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the property-
(5) The specific provision of this Chapter relied on in asserting that the property is not subject to forfeiture.
(6) All essential facts supporting each assertion.
(7) The specific relief sought.

See La. R.S. 40:2610(B)(l-7). These aver-ments likewise play an integral part in this 114second option. When properly provided, the required information affords the State an adequate basis to assess whether to release the property promptly without pursuing the forfeiture proceeding further.

The mandatory, plain-language requirements for the filing of a timely, valid claim or request for stipulation are clear and, if not met, carry significant consequences. La. R.S. 40:2610 clearly establishes a thirty-day filing deadline that cannot be extended under any circumstances; prescribes the necessary form of the claim; and sets forth the required content of the averments with unambiguous specificity. The failure to fulfill any of these requirements — whether it be missing the deadline, filing a claim not in affidavit form, or not setting forth the necessary aver-ments — precludes the owner or interest holder from further participation in the forfeiture proceeding. As the Act makes plain, when “no request for stipulation or claim is filed timely, the district attorney shall proceed as provided in Sections 2615 and 2616.” See La. R.S. 40:2609. La. R.S. 40:2615(A) provides in pertinent part: “If no claims are timely filed in an action in rem, the district attorney may apply for an order of forfeiture and allocation of forfeited property pursuant to Section 2616 of this Chapter. Upon a determination by the court that the district attorney’s written application established the court’s jurisdiction, the giving of proper notice, and facts sufficient to show probable cause for forfeiture, the court shall order the property forfeited to the state.”

In this case, the State complied with the requirements for commencing a forfeiture proceeding under the Act. The Task Force properly followed the requirements for seizing the Infiniti. On May 16, 2008, the Task Force seized the | ^vehicle, believing, on probable cause, that the vehicle was subject to forfeiture. On the same day, the Task Force applied for a seizure warrant; and its application was a sworn affidavit in the proper form. Moreover, on the same day as the seizure, the district attorney ensured that Rebstock was personally served with the Notice of Pending Service, which contained all the information required by statute. Finally, but critically, the State chose to make available a stipulation of exemption.

Upon receipt of the service of the Notice of Pending Forfeiture, Rebstock attempted to comply with the requirements of La. R.S. 40:2609 and La. R.S. 40:2610, but failed to do so. Pursuant to Section 2609, Rebstock had the option of either requesting a stipulation for exemption or filing a claim, and he chose the latter. Rebstock properly mailed the claim, by certified mail with return receipt requested, to both the Task Force and the district attorney. He did so on May 23, 2008, well within thirty days of service of the Notice of Pending Forfeiture. Moreover, the claim was in the required form, ie. an affidavit, signed by Rebstock under oath and sworn to before his attorney. However, Rebstock’s claim did not contain the delineated aver-ments, with the requisite specificity, to qualify as a valid claim under Section 2610.

Rebstock’s claim did not comply with La. R.S. 40:2610(B) in several respects. La. R.S. 40:2610(B)(6) puts the claimant on notice that he is required to support each of the delineated averments with a heightened level of factual specificity. The subsection states that, for every assertion made in the claim, “[a]ll essential facts supporting each” must be included. La. R.S. 40:2610(B)(4) and (B)(5) provide the precise content that Rebstock should have averred. Subsection (B)(4) required Reb-stock to provide “the date, identity of the transferor, and the circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the property.” Rebstock failed to comply with this subsection by generally averring that the Infiniti “was acquired by claimant on or about 2007 act of exchange [sic] with a third party whereby claimant traded his | KjChevronet [sic] Camaro for this vehicle with no additional cash being exchanged.” Rebstock failed to provide the required identity of the transferor. Generally stating that the transferor is a “third party” is not sufficient and falls well short of what is required by statute. Moreover, pursuant to subsection (B)(5), Rebstock was required to state “[t]he specific provision” of the Act “relied on in asserting that the property is not subject to forfeiture.” Rebstock averred that the Infiniti was “ ‘not used or intended to be used in any manner to facilitate conduct giving rise to forfeiture’ pursuant to La. R.S. 40:2604 ..., contrary to the allegations made by law enforcement” and that the Infiniti is “exempt from forfeiture under provisions of La. R.S. 40:2605.”

However, Rebstock did not explain any further. He neither clarified which exemption applied to his interest in the Infin-iti nor provided factual assertions that would support the basis for falling within one of the Act’s exemptions. Rebstock merely asserted a general denial of the allegations in the Notice of Pending Forfeiture and relied on a conclusory, unsupported assertion that his interest in the Infiniti is exempt. Rebstock’s failure to provide the essential and specific factual and legal assertions to support all of the necessary averments rendered his claim invalid under Section 2610.

In addition, Rebstock’s constitutional challenge of the Act is likewise deficient and has no effect on the validity of the claim. Rebstock asserted the following general constitutional challenge: “my property has been unconstitutionally seized ... [because] La. R.S. 40:2601-2622 is unconstitutional under the 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws and Constitution of the State of Louisiana,” and “the provisions of La. R.S. 40:2605 are ambiguous and irreconcilable thereby rendering the entire forfeiture provisions of La. R.S. 40:2601-2622 unconstitutional.” Rebstock rested with these vague and general constitutional challenges. He did not provide any factual or legal support for his arguments that the |17seizure of his property was unconstitutional, that the Act as a whole is unconstitutional, or which specific exemptions listed in Section 2605 are ambiguous and irreconcilable.

Although this matter deals with a claim between potential parties, and is not a pleading, per se, this Court has long recognized that a constitutional challenge of a statute must be specifically pled and the grounds for the challenge particularized. See Unwired Telecom v. Parish of Calcasieu, 2003-0732, p. 6 (La.1/19/05), 903 So.2d 392, 399. The necessity for particularizing such claims was explained well in City of Shreveport v. Pedro, 170 La. 351, 353, 127 So. 865 (1930):

It is elementary that all laws are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is made clearly to appear, and that he who urges the unconstitutionality of a law must specially plead its unconstitutionality, and show specifically wherein it is unconstitutional.... [And, as regards a vague challenge, t]he court cannot be expected to make an examination to ascertain the various laws under which plaintiff may have acted and to ascertain wherein they violate the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States, or are otherwise unconstitutional, and, if they are, in what respect they are so, nor can the opposite party to the litigation, under these circumstances, be expected to meet the attack, for he is not sufficiently informed by the plea to undertake the task, and, moreover, the burden is not upon him to show that they are constitutional.

In the present context, where the Act establishes a speedy procedure which allows the State to make a relatively quick assessment whether to pursue the forfeiture proceeding further or to release the property to an innocent claimant, specificity of the constitutional claim similar to the rules of pleading are also required. Reb-stock’s constitutional challenge is the exact type of nebulous claim that this rule was intended to prevent. Simply asserting a vague, general constitutional attack in a claim, as Rebstock did here, does not provide the State with sufficient information to assess the merits of continuing with the forfeiture proceedings.

hsWith these considerations in mind, we hold that Rebstock did not file a valid claim within the thirty-day deadline pursuant to La. R.S. 40:2609-2610. Having made this finding, we note that the Act also directs what is the next step in the process. La. R.S. 40:2609(0 states that, “[i]f no request for stipulation or claim is timely filed, the district attorney shall proceed as provided in Sections 2615 and 2616 of this Chapter.” La. R.S. 40:2615(A), in pertinent part, directs that, “[i]f no claims are timely filed in an action in rem, the district attorney may apply for an order of forfeiture.”

By filing its motion to strike Rebstock’s “claim” and the rule to show cause why a forfeiture judgment should not be issued, the State acted in accord with Sections 2609(C) and 2615(A). The State sought a forfeiture judgment and submitted the seizing agent’s affidavit in support of the seizure warrant, the seizure warrant itself, the Notice of Pending Forfeiture, and Rebstock’s insufficient claim. The district court should have considered these submissions to determine whether to forfeit the Infiniti.

La. R.S. 40:2616(A) clearly delineates the proper method for reaching such a determination, and provides, in pertinent part, “[u]pon a determination by the court that the district attorney’s written application establishes the court’s jurisdiction, the giving of proper notice, and facts sufficient to show probable cause for forfeiture, the court shall order the property forfeited to the state.” Accordingly, if, based on the submissions by the state, the district court was satisfied that the court had proper jurisdiction, that the State’s Notice of Pending Forfeiture gave the proper notice, and that the facts asserted were sufficient to support a forfeiture under a probable cause standard, the Act mandates that the district court enter a forfeiture judgment.

However, because the district court found that Rebstock’s claim was valid and timely filed, the district court did not undergo the inquiry required by La. R.S. 11940:2615(A). Therefore, we will remand this matter to the district court in order to allow that court to determine, based solely on the submissions filed by the State, whether the court has jurisdiction, whether the State’s Notice of Pending Forfeiture gave sufficient notice under the Act, and whether the facts averred to and provided by the State were sufficient to show probable cause for forfeiture.

DECREE

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court’s ruling and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

       Retired Judge Moon Landrieu, sitting ad hoc for Weimer, J., recused. Chief Justice Kim-ball not participating in the opinion.

      . The Task Force also seized $1402.00 from Rebstock, but he did not contest the forfeiture of this currency.

      . R., p. 21.

      . Id.

        .State v.2003 Infiniti G35 VIN # JNKCVS1E93MO24167, 2009-1193 (La.9/25/09); 18 So.3d 98.

      . La. R.S. 40:2602 provides:
      § 2602. Jurisdiction and venue
      A. Except as provided in Subsection C, the appropriate district court has jurisdiction under the provisions of this Chapter if the property for which forfeiture is sought is within this state at the time the action is filed or the courts of this state have personal jurisdiction of an owner of or interest holder in the property.
      is. Except as provided in Subsection C, in addition to any venue otherwise provided under the provisions of this Chapter or any other provision of law, a proceeding for forfeiture under the provisions of this Chapter may be brought in the judicial district in which any part of the property is found or in the judicial district in which an owner or interest holder could be petitioned against civilly or criminally for the conduct alleged to give rise to the forfeiture.
      C. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter to the contrary, the criminal district court for the parish of Orleans shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all actions filed in the parish of Orleans seeking seizure or forfeiture of property or alleging conduct giving rise to forfeiture pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter.

      . La. R.S. 40:2603 provides:
      §• 2603. Conduct giving rise to forfeiture
      Any of the following conduct gives rise to forfeiture:
      (1) An act or omission punishable by confinement for more than one year under R.S. 40:961 et seq. whether or not there is a prosecution or conviction related to the act or omission.
      (2) An act or omission occurring outside this state, which would be subject to prosecution in the place of occurrence and would be described in Paragraph (1) of this Section if the act or omission occurred in this state, whether or not it is prosecuted in any state.
      3) Any act or omission committed in furtherance of any violation of R.S. 40:961 et seq. which is punishable by confinement with or without hard labor, including any inchoate or preparatory offense, regardless of whether there is a prosecution or conviction related to the act or omission.
      La. R.S. 40:2604 provides:
      § 2604. Property subject to forfeiture
      The following property is subject to seizure and forfeiture as contraband, derivative contraband, or property related to contraband under the provision of Section 4 of Article I of the Constitution of Louisiana:
      (1) All controlled substances, raw materials, or controlled substance analogues that have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, possessed, or acquired in violation of R.S. 40:961 et seq.
      (2) All property that is either:
      (a) Furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of R.S. 40:961 et seq.
      (b) Used or intended to be used in any manner to facilitate conduct giving rise to forfeiture, provided that a conveyance subject to forfeiture solely in connection with conduct in violation of R.S. 40:961 et seq. may be forfeited only pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter.
      (3) Proceeds of any conduct giving rise to forfeiture.
      (4) All weapons possessed, used, or available for use in any manner to facilitate conduct giving rise to forfeiture.
      (5) Any interest or security in, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of control over any enterprise that a person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of through conduct giving rise to forfeiture.

      . La. R.S. 40:2605 provides:
      § 2605. Exemptions
      A property interest is exempt from forfeiture under this Chapter if its owner or holder establishes all of the following:
      (1) That he is not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, did not consent to it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that it was likely to occur.
      (2) That he had not acquired and did not stand to acquire substantial proceeds from the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture other than as an interest holder in bona fide commercial transaction.
      (3) That with respect to conveyances for transportation only, he did not hold the property jointly, in common, or in community with a person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture.
      (4) That he does not hold the property for the benefit of or as an agent for any person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture, and, if the owner or interest holder acquired his interest through any such person, the owner or interest holder acquired it as a bona fide purchaser for value not knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction.
      (5) That no person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture had the authority to convey the interest to a bona fide purchaser for value at the time of the conduct.

        (6) That the owner or interest holder acquired the interest after the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture and that the owner or interest holder acquired the interest under all of the following conditions:
      (a) As a bona fide purchaser for value who was not knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction.
      (b) Before the filing of a forfeiture lien on it and before the effective date of a Notice of Pending Forfeiture relating to it, and without notice of its seizure for forfeiture under this Chapter.
      (c) At the time the interest was acquired, there was no reasonable cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture or likely to become subject to forfeiture under this Chapter.

      . La. R.S. 40:2606 provides:
      § 2606. Seizure of property
      A.Property that is not evidence of a criminal violation may be seized for forfeiture by any law enforcement agency designated by the district attorney, with or without process issued by any district court, on probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture under this Chapter. Within seventy-two hours, exclusive of holidays or weekends, after actual or constructive seizure, the seizing agency shall apply to the court for a warrant of seizure to hold the property pending forfeiture, unless such warrant has been previously obtained. Such application shall be on an affidavit under oath demonstrating that probable cause exists for seizure of the property, regardless of whether the proceedings to forfeit property are brought pursuant to federal or state action and regardless of whether the property has been the subject of a previous final judgment of forfeiture in the courts of any state or of the United States. The sufficiency of the warrant of seizure and affidavit under oath shall be determined in accordance with the law on search warrants. The court may order that the property be held pending forfeiture, on such terms and conditions as are reasonable in the discretion of the court. Upon a finding of no probable cause, the property shall be released to the established owner.
      B. A seizure for forfeiture without process is reasonable if made under circumstances in which a warrantless seizure or arrest would be reasonable in accordance with law.
      C. Property that is alleged to be evidence of a criminal violation may be seized for forfeiture by any law enforcement agency designated by the district attorney, with or without process issued by any district court, on probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture under this Chapter. Within seventy-two hours, exclusive of holidays or weekends, after service of notice of pending forfeiture, the seizing agency shall apply to the court for a warrant of seizure to hold the property pending forfeiture, unless such warrant has been previously obtained. Such application shall be on an affidavit under oath demonstrating that probable cause exists for seizure of the property, regardless of whether the proceedings to forfeit property are brought pursuant to federal or state action and regardless of whether the property has been the subject of a previous final judgment of forfeiture in the courts of any state or of the United States. The sufficiency of seizure and affidavit under oath shall be determined in accordance with the law on search warrants. The court may order that the property be held pending forfeiture, on such terms and conditions as are reasonable in the discretion of the court.
      D. Any'seizing agency designated by the district attorney to make seizures for forfeiture shall notify the district attorney within ten days after such seizure.

      . La. R.S. 40:2608(l)(a) provides:
      § 2608. Commencement of forfeiture proceedings; property release requirements
      Forfeiture proceedings shall be commenced as follows:
      (l)(a) When the district attorney intends to forfeit property, pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter, he shall provide the owner and interest holder with a written assertion within forty-five days after actual or constructive seizure, except in cases in which the property is held for evidentiaiy purpose, the district attorney shall institute forfeiture proceedings within forty-five days after the final disposition of all criminal proceedings associated with the conduct giving rise to forfeiture. If the district attorney fails to initiate forfeiture proceedings against property seized for forfeiture by serving Notice of Pending Forfeiture within one hundred twenty days after its seizure for forfeiture or if the state fails to pursue forfeiture of die property upon which a timely claim has been properly served by filing a Petition for Forfeiture proceeding within ninety days after Notice of Pending Forfeiture, or if the district attorney fails to provide a written assertion, pursuant to the provisions of this Paragraph, the property shall be released from its seizure for forfeiture on the request of an owner or interest holder, pending further proceedings pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter.

      . La. R.S. 40:2608(3) provides:
      (3) Whenever Notice of Pending Forfeiture or service of an in rem petition is required under the provisions of this Chapter, notice or service shall be given in accordance with one of the following:
      (a)If the owner's or interest holder’s name and current address are known, by either personal service or by mailing a copy of the notice by certified mail to that address.
      (b) If the owner's or interest holder's name and address are required by law to be recorded with the parish clerk of court, the motor vehicle division of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, or another state or federal agency to perfect an interest in the property, and the owner’s or interest holder's current address is not known, by mailing a copy of the notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to any address of record with any of the described agencies.
      (c) If the owner’s or interest holder's address is not known and is not on record as provided in Subparagraph (b) of this Paragraph, or the owner or interest holder’s interest is not known by publication in one issue of the official journal in the parish in which the seizure occurs.
      La. R.S. 40:2608(5) also provides a procedure for the filing of a lien for the forfeiture of property upon the initiation of any civil or criminal proceeding under this Chapter or upon seizure for forfeiture. In such a circumstance, "the filing constitutes notice to any person claiming an interest in the seized property or in property owned by the named person.” Id.

      .La. R.S. 40:2608(4) provides:
      (4) Notice is effective upon personal service, publication, or the mailing of a written notice, whichever is earlier, and shall include a description of the property, the date and place of seizure, the conduct giving rise to forfeiture or the violation of law alleged, and a summary of procedures and procedural rights applicable to the forfeiture action.

      . La. R.S. 40:2609 provides:
      § 2609. Stipulation of exemptions
      A. The district attorney may make a stipulation of exemption available in the following manner:
      (1) If the district attorney makes a stipulation of exemption available, the district attorney shall so indicate in the Notice of Pending Forfeiture as provided in Section 2608 of this Chapter.
      (2) An owner of or an interest holder in the property may elect to file a claim within thirty days after the Notice of Pending Forfeiture or a request for a stipulation of exemption with the district attorney within thirty days after the notice, but no request may be filed after a court action has been commenced by the state. The claim or request shall comply with the requirements for claims in Section 2610 of this Chapter.
      B. The following shall apply if an owner or interest holder timely requests a stipulation of exemption:
      (1) The district attorney shall provide the seizing agency and the requesting party with a written proposed stipulation of exemption and statement of nonexempt interests relating to any or all interest in the property in response to each requesting party within one hundred and twenty days after the effective date of the Notice of Pending Forfeiture.
      (2) An owner of or interest holder in any property declared nonexempt may file a claim as described in Section 2610 of this Chapter within thirty days after notice pursuant to Paragraph (3) of Section 2608 of this Chapter of the statement of nonexempt interests.
      (3) The district attorney may elect to proceed as provided herein for judicial forfeiture at any time.
      (4) If no requesting party files a claim within thirty days after notice pursuant to Paragraph (3) of Section 2608 of this Chapter, of the statement of nonexempt interest, the stipulation of exemption and statement becomes final, and the district attorney shall proceed as provided in Sections 2615 and 2616 of this Chapter.
      (5) If a judicial forfeiture proceeding follows a Notice of Pending Forfeiture which provides for the availability of stipulation of exemption:
      (a) No duplicate or repetitive notice or claim is required. If a claim has been timely filed pursuant to Paragraph (2) of this Subsection, the claim shall be determined in a judicial forfeiture proceeding after the commencement of such a proceeding under the provisions of Sections 2612 and 2613 of this Chapter.
      (b) The proposed stipulation of exemption and statement of nonexempt interest responsive to all requesting parties who subsequently filed claims are void and will be regarded as rejected offers to compromise.
      C.If no request for stipulation or claim is timely filed, the district attorney shall proceed as provided in Sections 2615 and 2616 of this Chapter.

      . La. R.S. 40:2608(2) provides:
      (2) If, after Notice of Pending Forfeiture, a claimant files a request for stipulation of exemption pursuant to R.S. 40:2610, the district attorney may delay filing the judicial forfeiture proceeding for a total of one hundred eighty days after the service of Notice of Pending Forfeiture.

      . La. R.S. 40:2611(L) provides, in pertinent part, "[i]f a claimant whose property has been seized for forfeiture is successful in obtaining the return of the property in a civil proceeding, the court may award the claimant reasonable attorney fees, to be paid by the seizing agency, and the claimant shall also be exempt from any storage fees, or other costs incurred in the seizure, preservation, storage, or return of such seized property."

      . La. R.S. 40:2610(A) provides:
      § 2610. Claims
      A. Only an owner of or interest holder in property seized for forfeiture may file a claim, and shall do so in the manner provided in this Section. The claim shall be mailed to the seizing agency and to the district attorney by certified mail, return receipt requested, within thirty days after Notice of Pending Forfeiture. No extension of time for the filing of a claim shall be granted.
      Further, La. R.S. 40:2609(A)(2) provides that both the claim or the request for stipulation of exemption must comply with La.Rev.Stat. § 40:2610:
      (2) An owner of or an interest holder in the property may elect to file a claim within thirty days after the Notice of Pending Forfeiture or a request for a stipulation of exemption with the district attorney within thirty days after the notice, but no request may be filed after a court action has been commenced by the state. The claim or request shall comply with the requirements for claims in Section 2610 of this Chapter.

      .La. R.S. 40:2610(B) provides, in pertinent part: ‘‘B. The claim shall be in affidavit form, signed by the claimant under oath, and sworn to by the affiant before one who has authority to administer the oath, under penalty of perjury or false swearing ...".

      . When the forfeited property in an in rem forfeiture proceeding is a motor vehicle, La. R.S. 40:2616(A)(2) provides for the use of the vehicle for a period of time:
      If the property seized is a motor vehicle, the seizing agency may retain use of the motor vehicle for use in the course and scope of undercover surveillance and investigation of violations of the Louisiana Controlled Dangerous Substances Law for a period not to exceed six months. After six months, the motor vehicle shall be sold at public sale ... and the proceeds allocated as otherwise provided by this Chapter.

      . We note parenthetically that this Court has previously considered, and upheld, the constitutionality of this Act against a claim of double jeopardy under the 5th Amendment. In State v. Johnson, 1994-1077, p. 13 (La.1/16/96), 667 So.2d 510, 518), we held that “the civil forfeiture of contraband per se or derivative contraband is not punishment' for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis” and that "[t]he government's taking of property in which the ‘owner’ has never actually had a legal interest does not deprive the individual of property or any other rights without just compensation and thus is not deemed 'punishment' within the ambit of double jeopardy provisions.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Teddy CHESTER.
    No. 2009-OK-1019.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 10, 2010.
   PER CURIAM.

|, Granted in part; case remanded. In his original application to this Court, relator sought review of the district court’s order denying his motion to discharge pro bono and appointed counsel for more diligent counsel to pursue post-conviction proceedings initiated in 2001 after this Court affirmed his conviction for first degree murder and sentence of death. State v. Chester, 97-2790 (La.12/1/98), 724 So.2d 1276. We find no error in that ruling insofar as the court applied settled jurisprudence that an indigent defendant does not have the right to have a particular attorney appointed to represent him. State v. Harper, 381 So.2d 468, 470 (La.1980); State v. Rideau, 278 So.2d 100, 103 (La.1973).

However, relator subsequently filed in this Court a motion to waive counsel altogether and to represent himself during post-conviction proceedings in the district court. Relator did not file his motion in the district court and this Court is not in a position to rule on it in the first instance. We note that in principle, while an indigent |2inmate on death row has a statutory right to appointed counsel to pursue post-conviction relief “if appropriate,” La. R.S. 15:178, he may knowingly and intelligently waive that purely statutory right, just as he may waive statutory post-conviction remedies altogether. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990); cf. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10-11, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2770-71, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)(“State collateral proceedings are not constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings and serve a different and more limited purpose than either the trial or appeal - direct appeal is the primary avenue for review of capital cases as well as other sentences [and a state] may quite sensibly decide to concentrate the resources it devotes to providing attorneys for capital defendants at the trial and appellate states of a capital proceeding.”); Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2261(c)(2)(states may satisfy the “opt in” provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 by providing a mechanism for appointment of counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings generally and specifically in a given case for a court order appointing counsel or finding “after a hearing if necessary, that the prisoner rejected the offer of counsel and made the decision with an understanding of its legal consequences.”); Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So.2d 482, 483 (Fla.1993)(“Competent defendants have the constitutional right to refuse professional counsel and to represent themselves, or not, if they so choose.... If the right to representation can be waived at trial, we see no reason why the statutory right to collateral counsel [pursuing post-conviction remedies] cannot also be waived [in a capital ease].”)(citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)(a defendant has the constitutional right to represent himself at trial if he makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel).

| ¡Accordingly, this case is remanded to the district court with directions to consider relator’s request to discharge counsel and to represent himself during post-conviction proceedings, ie., whether relator maintains his desire to represent himself and does so knowingly and intelligently with the understanding of the legal consequences of such a decision, and to determine the status of his original and supplemental applications filed in 2001 which apparently remain pending.

KIMBALL, C.J., not participating.

VICTORY, J., would deny the application.

      . In its order denying relator’s request to discharge his present counsel and to obtain new and more diligent counsel, the district court observed that relator’s application for post-conviction relief had been denied on July 31, 2001. However, from our review of the record, it appears that the judgment of July 31, 2001 pertains not to relator’s application but to the application for post-conviction relief filed by his co-defendant, Mr. Ratcliff, who was tried separately and convicted of second degree murder. See State v. Ratcliff, 98-0101 (La.App. 5th Cir.2/23/99), 731 So.2d 356. It further appears that shortly after the district court denied Ratcliff’s application, the state filed its answer and procedural objections to relator’s original application and that relator then filed an amending supplemental application. No further action relator's case appears to have occurred before he filed his motion to discharge counsel in 2009. Thus, it seems that relator’s applications remain pending in the district court.


author: WEIMER, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael ANDERSON.
    No. 2010-KK-0292.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2010.
   In re Anderson, Michael; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 472-217; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0170.

Stay Denied; Writ Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the stay and writ, and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J.,

concurs in part and dissents in part.

I concur in the denial of the requested stay, but dissent from the denial of the defendant’s writ application. I would grant that application and order the trial court to conduct an in camera inspection to determine if there is additional undisclosed Brady material in the District Attorney’s file.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James C. WILLIAMS.
    No. 2010-KK-0054.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 10, 2010.
   In re Williams, James C.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 459-614; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1615.

Not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, Section 6.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Maryln A. LEBLANC.
    No. 2009-K-1355.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 116138; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 08-1533.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kathryn GOPPELT.
    No. 2009-KP-0549.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Goppelt, Kathryn; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 2Srd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 359,903; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 2377R.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Calvin MITCHELL.
    No. 2009-KP-0718.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Mitchell, Calvin; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 208,525; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 44,-008-KW.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher O’NEAL.
    No. 2009-KO-1243.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re O’Neal, Christopher; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 251,395; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 44,-067-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kedarius A. LATHERS.
    No. 2009-K-1341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Lathers, Kedarius A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 07-5963; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-20.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Calvin COLEMAN.
    No. 2009-OK-1360.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Coleman, Calvin; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 416-083; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-0483.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clarence W. SANDERS, III.
    No. 2009-K-1368.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Sanders III, Clarence W.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 422,047; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KA 2190.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Steven M. CAMPBELL.
    No. 2009-KO-1385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Campbell, Steven M.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 05-578; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-KA-1226.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Barry D. McCRAY.
    No. 2009-KO-1400.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re McCray, Barry D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 67,659, 67,660; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 44,142-KA, 44,143-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Elvis McGARY.
    No. 2009-KO-1402.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re McGary, Elvis; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 701675; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KA 2366.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jonathan Lee BLACK.
    No. 2009-KO-1403.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Black, Jonathan Lee; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 262099; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 44,-214-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Raymundo FRANCO.
    No. 2009-KO-1439.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Franco, Raymundo; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 114,909; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 08-1071.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronnie ALLEN.
    No. 2009-KO-1440.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Allen, Ronnie; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 701318; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KA 2271.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Harold GREEN.
    No. 2009-KK-2615.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 317-575; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1239.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David P. SAMPOGNARO.
    No. 2009-KK-2627.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Sampognaro, David; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 06-0066; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KH-810.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mark CEDOTAL.
    No. 2009-KK-2631.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Cedotal, Mark; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 28747; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW1872.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony LONDO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-CI-0880.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Londo, Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 08-CR-2279; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-00325.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dalbert ADAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0902.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Adams, Dalbert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, Nos. 97-5088, 97-4568, 98-0768; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KH-120.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andrew Milson THIBODEAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0906.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Thibodeaux, Andrew Milson;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 33135.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Victor JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0907.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Johnson, Victor; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B; No. 50,494; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 44,-511-KH.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darron MALTEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0909.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Maltee, Darron; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 05-F-002050; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 44,571-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rodrick Deon WARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0910.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Ward, Rodrick Deon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. CR1181-05; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 08-01067.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Frederick VERREN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0913.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Verren, Frederick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 897-821; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-K-0956.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Earnest FONTENOT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0914.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Fontenot, Earnest; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 20289, 20290; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 1868.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry HARRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0925.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Harris, Larry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 00-2434; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 08-WR-943, 05-KH-1025.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rodney Wayne MACON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-1010.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Macon, Rodney Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 112,549.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony LONDO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-CI-1120.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Londo, Anthony; — -Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 08-CR-2279; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-00368.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    CHL ENTERPRISES, LLC, d/b/a Loewer Lawn & Cycle v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE.
    No. 2009-C-2613.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Bridges, Cynthia; Department of Revenue; Louisiana State of; — Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 231,257; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-487.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    Mary J. PERRIN and Hunter Perrin v. RANDY TUPPER HOMES, et al.
    No. 2009-C-2465.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re EMC Insurance Co.; Fantasy Homes Inc.; Randy Tupper Homes d/b/a et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cal-casieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2007-0957; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 08-1418.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    Monica F. COVINGTON v. KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN.
    No. 2009-C-2616.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Kentucky Fried Chicken; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 4, No. 05-06067; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-428.

Denied.


text:
    Jeanette HERNANDEZ, et al. v. DIVERSIFIED HEALTHCARE-ABBEVILLE, LLC d/b/a Maison Du Monde Living Center.
    No. 2009-C-2629.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Hernandez Jr., Alvin; Hernandez Sr. Estate of, Alvin; Hernandez, Jeanette et al.; Hernandez, Kansas A.; Hernandez, Matthew D.; Hernandez, Shawn P.;— Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 88592-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 09-546.


text:
    Chermaine DIBARTOLO, et ux. v. STAGE ONE—The HAIR SCHOOLS.
    No. 2009-C-2630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Stage One — The Hair Schools;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2007-001310; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-511.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Natalie Jeanne Edmonds LORD v. Brett Kenneth LORD.
    No. 2009-C-2634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Lord, Brett Kenneth; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. C-2004-1100; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-457.

Denied.


text:
    Wilma Young BAKER, et al. v. John Burr BAKER, Jr., et al.
    No. 2009-C-2640.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Baker Jr., John Burr; Baker, Alta; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. C-662-06; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 09-507.

Denied.


text:
    Henry Leon SARPY v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION.
    No. 2009-CC-2641.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Sarpy Jr., Robert Henry; Sarpy, Henry Leon et al.; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2005-4929; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-C-0945.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Raquel Antoinette Landry AUZENNE v. Scott Douglas AUZENNE.
    No. 2009-C-2644.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Auzenne, Raquel Antoinette Landry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 2006-0219 M3; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-312.

Denied.


text:
    Johnny and Florita WHITE v. CLECO CORPORATION and/or Cleco Power, L.L.C.
    No. 2009-CC-2648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re White, Florita; White, Johnny et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rap-ides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 221,256; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 09-01048.

Denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 09-PDB-035.
    No. 2009-OB-2282.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Ash, Patrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 09 PDB-035.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    Frederick DEMARTRA, Jr. v. LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2009-C-2649.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, et al.; Tynes, Janna; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rap-ides, Alexandria City Court, Nos. 108,241, 109,060; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 09-469, 09-470.

Denied.


text:
    Brock DORE v. S & S COATING SPECIALTIES, INC.
    No. 2009-C-2650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Dore, Brock; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 4, No. 07-07236; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-455.

Denied.


text:
    De Rome A. SEALS v. PEGGY EDWARDS LRA-CAM & LGD RENTAL 1 LLC d/b/a River Garden Apartments.
    No. 2009-C-2651.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Seals, De Rome A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2008-13077; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-CA-0932.

Denied.


text:
    Kelvin WELLS v. GENEVA BANKS.
    No. 2009-CJ-2653.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Wells, Kelvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Family Court of East Baton Rouge, No. 135511; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 09-CW-1755, 09-CW-1756.

Denied.


text:
    U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. Alice Mae Higgins WASHINGTON and Elfreda (Elfrida) Johnson.
    No. 2009-C-2675.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Johnson, Elfreda; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 30,947; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 0465.

Denied.


text:
    Michelle DUFRENE, et al. v. GAUTREAU FAMILY, LLC, Gulf South Management, Inc. & Lafayette Insurance Company.
    No. 2009-C-2678.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Lafayette Insurance Company;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 581-128; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-CA-153.

Denied.


text:
    Aaron Lee SHIPLEY v. Carmen SHIPLEY, Nee Cavalier.
    No. 2009-C-2688.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Shipley, Carmen; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 18606; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 0235.

Denied.


text:
    Clarence HENRY, et al. v. SBA SHIPYARD, INC., et al.
    No. 2009-CC-2693.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Wise, Henry; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. C-55-98; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 09-426.

Denied.


text:
    Keoka POWELL v. Brian SMITH, et al.
    No. 2009-CC-2694.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re American Home Assurance Company; Smith, Brian et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, New Orleans First City Court, No. 09-50284; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-C-1298.

Denied.


text:
    Aaron Lee SHIPLEY v. Carmen SHIPLEY, Nee Cavalier.
    No. 2009-C-2766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Shipley, Carmen; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 18606; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 0235.

Denied.


text:
    Walter M. SMITH, Jr. v. Theresa D. SMITH.
    No. 2010-C-0073.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Smith Jr., Walter M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 229,341; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-0902.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    Robert Earl Lee BICKHAM, et al. v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2010-CC-0127.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Stebbins Engineering & Manufacturing Co.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 70,760, 72,154, 72,986, 89,864; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CW1863.

Denied.


text:
    Phillip ROBERSON, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Brenda B. Roberson v. Romalis GORDON, Jr., Lucky’s Casino, American Guard Security Company, ABC Insurance Company, and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2009-C-2563.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Roberson, Phillip et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 149504; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 0472.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Jake John SCHIRO, Sr., individually and as Administrator of the Estates of Dolores Schulte Schiro, Jake John Schiro, Jr. and Cynthia Ann Schiro v. ACADIAN AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., ABC Ins. Co., et al.
    No. 2009-C-2617.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Schiro, Cynthia Ann Estate of; Schiro, Dolores Schulte Estate of; Schiro, Jake John Jr. Estate of; Schiro, Sr., Jake John et al.; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 105-856; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-CA-0606.

Denied.


text:
    Elliot A. MISTICH, Jr., et al. v. Diedra R. WEEKS, et al. Judith Langlinais Mistich v. Louisiana Farm Bureau and State Farm Insurance.
    No. 2009-C-2628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co.; Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 2005-2134 c/w 2005-2147; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-517 c/w 09-518.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    James O’PRY, Jeff Mallett and Michael Mallett v. CHRISTUS HEALTH SOUTHWESTERN LOUISIANA d/b/a St. Patrick’s Hospital.
    No. 2009-CC-2633.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Christus Health Southwestern Louisiana d/b/a; St. Patrick Hospital;— Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calca-sieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2008-6361-G; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 09-00944.

Denied.


text:
    CAPITOL HOUSE PRESERVATION COMPANY, L.L.C. v. PERRYMAN CONSULTANTS, INCORPORATED; Mr. M. Ray Perryman, XYZ Insurance Company and TUV Insurance Company.
    No. 2009-C-2638.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Capitol House Preservation Company, L.L.C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 418,525; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 CA 0367.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    Bill PARROTT and Lynette Parrott v. DALLAS AIRMOTIVE, INC., Gulf South Aviation, L.L.C., Longvue Properties, L.L.C. Raytheon Aircraft Services, Inc., Pratt & Whitney Canada Corporation.
    No. 2009-CC-2639.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Dallas Airmotive Inc. et al.;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Helena, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 19250; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CW 1568.

Denied.


text:
    TOURO INFIRMARY v. AMERICAN MARITIME OFFICER, Amerihealth Administrators, Amerihealth New Jersey, Benefit Planners Limited, L.L.P., Brokerage Concepts Inc./Universal Health, Coresource Inc./Susquehanna Health, Coresource Inc./Formosa Plastics, Golden Rule Insurance Company, et al.
    No. 2009-C-2661.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Touro Infirmary; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 07-1716; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-CA-0697.

Denied.


text:
    Rev. James SMART, III, Eugene Smart, Janis Boatner Furbush and Justin Smart v. WEST JEFFERSON MEDICAL CENTER, Ebony Dickerson, RN, Deborah Rodrigue, RN, Mary Turner, RN, Eloise Buras, LPN, Brigetta Yancy, M.D. and Billy R. Procell, M.D.
    No. 2009-C-2673.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re Furbush, Janis Boatner; Smart III, Rev. James; Smart, Eugene; Smart, Justin; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 644-155; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-CA-366.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph RECILE.
    No. 2009-OK-576.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiffs Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated December 18, 2009; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. G. No. 10-06-0474; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008-KA-1010.

Reconsideration denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


author: JUDE G. GRAVOIS, Judge.

text:
    Sheri NEWCOMER v. Jeffrey BENNETT and Irene Antoinette Noel.
    No. 09-CA-27.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    Oct. 13, 2009.

      Karl Wiedemann, Attorney at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Jeffrey W. Bennett, Attorney at Law, Harahan, LA, for Defendani/Appellee.
    Panel composed of Judges MARION F. EDWARDS, SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, and JUDE G. GRAVOIS.
   JUDE G. GRAVOIS, Judge.

| gPlalntiff, Sheri Newcomer, appeals the trial court judgment granting defendant, Jeffrey Bennett’s, exception of no cause of action. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff was represented by attorney Lawrence Wiedemann in a personal injury action. This representation took place while Mr. Wiedemann was married to Irene Wiedemann . Defendant represented Irene Wiedemann in her divorce from Mr. Wiedemann.

On October 23, 2007, plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging that the defendant repeatedly alleged that plaintiff had an adulterous relationship with Mr. Wiede-mann during his representation of her. Plaintiff further alleged that statements of the adulterous conduct continued to be made after defendant’s receipt of plaintiffs affidavit denying the adulterous relationship.

IsDefendant filed exceptions of vagueness and no cause of action on December 14, 2007. However, before the exception was heard, on March 31, 2008, plaintiff filed an amended petition alleging that defendant knowingly made statements of the adulterous relationship with Mr. Wiede-mann, which by their nature were designed to injure her reputation, and that in doing so, defendant waived any privilege with regard to these statements because he knew they were false. This amended petition goes on to allege that at the time defendant answered interrogatories on behalf of his client Irene Wiedemann, stating that plaintiff had “affairs with Mr. Wiede-mann,” defendant had been suspended from practicing law thus did not enjoy any type of immunity with regard to these statements.

On May 13, 2008, the trial court granted defendant’s exception of no cause of action, giving plaintiff fifteen days to amend her petition. On May 22, 2008, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Amended Suit For Damages” alleging that defendant falsely accused plaintiff of an adulterous relationship with Mr. Wiedemann, defendant waived any qualified attorney privilege due to his knowledge that the statements were false, and that the defamatory statements of adultery by plaintiff were made on the public record. On May 23, 2008, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Second Supplemental Suit For Damages” alleging defendant was ineligible to practice law in Louisiana and did not enjoy immunity during the time he answered interrogatories on behalf of Irene Wiedemann stating plaintiff had “affairs with Mr. Wiedemann.” Defendant filed a motion to re-urge his exceptions of vagueness and no cause of action. The exception of no cause of action was granted on August 18, 2008. Plaintiff filed a timely devolutive appeal from this judgment.

J¿LAW AND DISCUSSION

On appeal, plaintiff argues that an attorney ineligible to practice law has no immunity to defamatory statements in pleadings. In the alternative, plaintiff argues that in order for the privilege to apply, the statement must be material, made with probable cause, and without malice. Plaintiff contends that probable cause for making a non-liable defamatory statement in pleadings entails an honest belief in the truth of the defamatory statements and an investigation into the accuracy. Plaintiff further argues actual malice is not necessary to sustain an action for libel.

Defendant responds that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed because statements made during litigation are afforded a qualified privilege, plaintiff’s petition must allege facts to show malice outside of the context of the divorce proceeding, and the plaintiff’s suit for damages fails to allege any facts showing malice.

A peremptory exception of no cause of action tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. Donnaud’s Inc. v. Gulf Coast Bank and Trust Co., 03—427 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/16/03), 858 So.2d 4, 6, writ denied, 03-2862 (La.1/9/04), 862 So.2d 985. In deciding whether a petition states a cause of action, the court must accept well-pleaded allegations of fact as true without reference to any extraneous supporting or controverting evidence. Montalvo v. Sondes, 93-2813 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 127, 131. The issue to be determined is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought. Id. A cause of action is not set forth by the mere conclusions of the pleader that are unsupported by facts. Arledge v. Hendricks, 30,588 (La.App.2d Cir.6/26/98), 715 So.2d 135, 138.

When the trial court grants an exception of no cause of action, the appellate court reviews the matter de novo, because the exception raises a question of law Land the lower court’s decision is based only on the sufficiency of the plaintiffs petition. August v. Grand Lake Construction, 02-632 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/30/02), 837 So.2d 78, 81.

Defamation is a tort which involves the invasion of a person’s interest in his reputation and good name. Huxen v. Villasenor, 01-288 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/25/01), 798 So.2d 209, 212. To maintain an action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove four elements: 1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; 2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; 3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and 4) resulting injury. Singleton v. St. Charles Parish, 02-590 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/26/02), 833 So.2d 486, 496, writ denied, 02-3234 (La.3/14/03), 839 So.2d 44. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with actual malice or other fault, published a false statement with defamatory words which caused the plaintiff damages. Id. If even one of the required elements of the tort of defamation is lacking, the cause of action fails. Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146 (La.1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129, 140.

As explained in Miskell v. Ciervo, 557 So.2d 274 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990) a defamation action is barred by a qualified privilege in favor of attorneys regarding the pleadings and briefs which they file. The court went on to state:

The reasoning for such a holding has not altered: to allow any defamation action based upon potentially offensive, albeit justifiable, statements would serve to invite a flood of litigation. Any such statement, whether proven or not, would become actionable. Comment I to Rule 1.3 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that “[A] lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interest of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.” If an attorney is afraid of the consequences which may flow from using possibly offensive statements, he can no longer represent his client with the “zeal” called for in the Model Rules, (emphasis in original).

Id. at 275.

lr,This privilege does not give the attorney freedom to make outlandish and superfluous statements. The jurisprudence has outlined criteria to be used when deciding whether a statement is defamatory. The falseness of the statement is one such criterion. Cangelosi v. Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets, Inc., 390 So.2d 196 (La.1980). Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that “an attorney in Louisiana cannot make disparaging statements, either in pleadings, briefs or arguments, if the defamatory statements are not pertinent to the case or are made maliciously or without reasonable basis.” Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So.2d 355, 359 (La.1982).

In the case before us, the petition alleges that the defendant “repeatedly alleged in Court filings, Court arguments, Court conferences, and correspondence” that plaintiff had an adulterous relationship with Lawrence Wiedemann. The amended petition filed March 31, 2008 states that these statements were made in answers to interrogatories on behalf of Irene Wiedemann. The amended petition filed on May 22, 2008 states that the defendant “made the defamatory statements of adultery by Plaintiff on the public record.” The second supplemental petition filed on May 23, 2008 states the defendant made these statements when answering interrogatories on behalf of Irene Wiedemann. A plaintiff alleging a cause of action for defamation must set forth in the petition with reasonable specificity the defamatory statements allegedly published by the defendant. Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 98-2313 (La.6/29/99), 737 So.2d 706, 713. Thus, a review of the four petitions filed by plaintiff indicate the only specific allegation of publication of these statements is in an answer to interrogatories on behalf of his client in a divorce proceeding. The statement that plaintiff had an adulterous relationship with Mr. |7Wiedemann was certainly relevant to the issue of fault in the Wiedemann divorce and the statement was made upon the belief by defendant’s client that such a relationship took place. Although the petitions allege the statements regarding the adulterous relationship were made with malice towards the plaintiff, these are merely conclusionary statements on the part of the plaintiff, and as such do not support a cause of action for defamation. There is nothing in any of the petitions to indicate the statement made by defendant in the answer to interrogatories on behalf of Irene Wiedemann that an adulterous affair existed between plaintiff and Mr. Wiedemann were made with malice towards the plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

We have carefully reviewed the original and amended petitions. Accepting the well-pleaded factual allegations as true, we find that the plaintiff has failed to state a valid cause of action against the defendant for defamation. Accordingly, we conclude that the facts alleged by the plaintiff do not state a cause of action for defamation, and the trial court correctly granted defendant’s exception of no cause of action. All costs of this appeal are to be paid by the appellant.

AFFIRMED.

      . Irene Wiedemann was named as a party to the lawsuit. She is not, however, a party to this appeal.

      . While plaintiff urges this court to find defendant had no qualified immunity during the time he answered the interrogatories due to his being suspended from the practice of law for failure to pay his bar dues, we decline to make such a finding based on the facts in this case. The only specific allegation with regard to publication of the adulterous affair is in the answers to interrogatories. For the purposes of the qualified immunity, at the time the interrogatories were answered, defendant was acting as an attorney to his client regardless of whether his license was suspended.


author: EDWARD A. DUFRESNE, JR., Chief Judge.

text:
    Jack McCLANAHAN, et al v. Susan Folse McCLANAHAN.
    Nos. 09-CA-182, 09-C-426.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    Oct. 13, 2009.
    Writ Denied Jan. 29, 2010.

      W. Christopher Beary Cassie E. Felder Orrill, Cordell & Beary, L.L.C. New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    David M. Prados Lowe, Stein, Hoffman, Allweiss & Hauver, L.L.P. New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
    Panel composed of Judges EDWARD A. DUFRESNE, JR., WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD, and MARC E. JOHNSON.
   EDWARD A. DUFRESNE, JR., Chief Judge.

I ¿This is an appeal by Jack McClanahan, personally, and McClanahan Contractors, Inc., Arkansas Drilling & Workover, Inc., International Rental Tools, L.L.C., and Delta Pipe & Supply Co. (the McClanahan companies), plaintiffs-appellants, from a judgment sustaining an exception of no right of action urged by Susan Folse McClanahan, defendant-appellee, as to the four McClanahan companies in this malicious prosecution action. Plaintiffs also filed a writ application from a trial court ruling regarding discovery issues. These two matters were consolidated by this court. For the following reasons we affirm the judgment sustaining the exception of no right of action, and deny plaintiffs’ application for a supervisory writ.

APPEAL ISSUES

The prior litigation, which plaintiffs here allege constituted malicious prosecution, was an action to partition community property following a divorce. In that proceeding Susan Folse McClanahan asserted claims for reimbursement of |8alleged community funds transferred to the various companies. See McClanahan v. McClana-han, 03-CA-1178 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/28/04), 868 So.2d 844; writ denied 2004-1175 (La.9/3/04), 882 So.2d 609. In the present suit Jack McClanahan and the companies allege that because of the claims regarding reimbursement in the partition suit, two banks called notes. They further allege that to satisfy these obligations assets had to be sold at substantial losses. It is these losses for which they seek recovery in the present suit.

The defendant in the present action urged an exception of no right of action arguing that the plaintiff companies were not defendants in the community partition suit, and therefore could not have a cause of action for malicious prosecution. The trial judge agreed and entered judgment dismissing the companies from the suit. This appeal followed.

There are six elements necessary to support a claim for malicious prosecution, and the lack of any one of these factors is fatal to such a claim. They are: 1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding; 2) its legal causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding; 3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; 4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; 5) the presence of malice therein; and 6) damage conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff. Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, 2005-1418 (La.7/10/06), 935 So.2d 669. Further, although the action exists, it has never been favored in Louisiana law. Kennedy, supra; Johnson v. Pearce, 313 So.2d 812 (La.1975).

In the present case, it is acknowledged that the companies were not defendants in the original proceeding, the second required element above. They therefore are not proper parties plaintiff in the present action, and the exception of no right of action was properly sustained.

|4Appellants argue that although not named in the original suit, they were nonetheless “virtual” parties because their interests were allegedly damaged by that action. They cite several cases from other jurisdictions which appear to recognize such a principle. However, as shown above, the action for malicious prosecution has never been favored, and it has always been applied only where there has been strict compliance with all essential elements. Kennedy, supra; Johnson, supra. We therefore decline to expand this jurisprudence to permit parties not named in the original action to bring such suits.

Appellee asserts here that this appeal is frivolous, and seeks sanctions. Article 863 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an attorney signing a pleading certifies, inter alia, that it is “warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law....” Here, appellants have cited several cases from other jurisdictions supporting their position that our law should likewise be extended to include what they refer to as “virtual” parties. Although we reject this argument, we do not deem it to be a frivolous one.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment sustaining the peremptory exception of no right of action as to the four companies is hereby affirmed.

WRIT ISSUES

On September 16, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a Notice of Deposition for Records Only and Subpoena Duces Tecum to Robert C. Lowe and the firm of Lowe, Stein, Hoffman, Allweiss & Hauver, L.L.P. requesting all materials used in reference to McClanahan v. McClanahan, No. 522-207 in the trial court. On | r,October 15, 2008, the defendant filed a Motion to Quash the Notice of Deposition citing that it failed to comply with Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 508. In response, the plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to Compel Deposition and Issue Subpoena Duces Te-cum on November 24, 2008.

The trial court held a hearing on the Motions on May 11, 2009 and granted the defendant’s Motion to Quash and denied the plaintiffs’ Motion to Issue Subpoena Duces Tecum. However, the trial court did allow the plaintiffs to depose Mr. Lowe. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a Notice of Intent to Apply for Supervisory Writ.

In writ application number 09-C^426, the plaintiffs requested supervisory review of the trial court’s rulings by alleging that it erred by not ruling as follows:

1.The plaintiffs’ records request complies with La. C.E. art. 508;
2. The attorney-client privilege and work product privilege have been waived by the defendant;
3. Neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product privilege may be invoked during the deposition of Mr. Robert Lowe, insofar as the Partition Proceeding is concerned; and,
4. Mr. Robert Lowe must produce his client file, insofar as the Partition Proceeding is concerned.

In response to the writ application, the defendant filed an Opposition to the Request for Supervisory Review. In the Opposition, the defendant requested that this Court stay the malicious prosecution suit and require the plaintiffs to file a | ^Request for Sanctions under Louisiana Civil Code of Procedure Article 863. All of these issues will now be addressed by this Court.

Whether the defendants’ Subpoena Duces Tecum Request Complies with La. C.E. art. 508

La. C.E. art. 508 provides, in pertinent part,

“Neither a subpoena nor a court order shall be issued to a lawyer or his representative to appear or testify in civil or juvenile proceeding, ..., where the purpose of the subpoena or order is to ask the lawyer or his representative to reveal information about a client or former client obtained in the course of representing the client unless, after a contradictory hearing, it has been determined that the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege or work product rule; and all of the following ...” (Emphasis added).

Here, the trial court held a hearing on the Motion to Quash and the Motion to Compel. As provided in the transcript of the hearing, the trial court stated that “... the subpoena is overly broad and seeks to elicit information that might be subject to the attorney-client privilege ...” (Emphasis added). However, the trial court did not issue a definitive ruling as to whether or not the information requested by the plaintiffs is protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege or work product rule. A contradictory hearing must be held to determine whether or not the requested information by the plaintiffs is protected before the subpoena duces tecum can be found as proper.

Therefore, we find that the Subpoena Duces Tecum filed by the plaintiffs does not comply with La. C.E. art. 508.

Whether the attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege have been waived by the defendant

These issues have not been presented to the trial court for determination. Therefore, this Court declines to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction on the issues.

|7Whether the attorney-client privilege or the work product privilege may be invoked during the deposition of Mr. Robert Lowe, insofar as the Partition Proceeding is concerned

The deposition of Mr. Robert Lowe has not yet occurred. In addition, the issues as to whether or not the attorney-client privilege and work product privilege have been waived have not been determined by the trial court. Therefore, this Court declines to issue an advisory opinion as to what Mr. Lowe may or may not say during the deposition.

Whether Mr. Robert Lowe is required to produce his client file, insofar as the Partition Proceeding is concerned

The issues as to whether or not the attorney-client privilege and work product privilege have been waived have not been determined by the trial court. Therefore, this Court declines to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction on this issue.

Whether the malicious prosecution suit filed by the plaintiffs should be stayed, and, in turn, be filed as a Request for Sanctions under La. C.C.P. art. 863

The plaintiffs filed writ application number 08-C-281 with this Court requesting similar relief. In following that writ disposition, we, too, decline to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment sustaining the exception of no right of action as to the McClanahan companies is affirmed. Further, writ application 09-C-426 on behalf of the plaintiffs is denied, and the requests raised in Opposition to writ application 09-C-426 by the defendant are also denied.

AFFIRMED.

WRIT DENIED.

      . Mr. Robert C. Lowe and his firm represented the defendant in the trial court case McClanahan v. McClanahan, No. 522-207. Following the Motion to Disqualify filed by the plaintiffs to remove Mr. Lowe as attorney of record for the malicious prosecution suit, the trial court granted the Motion. On writs, this Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.

        . Because the issues raised in this appeal and writ application number 09-C-426 are interrelated and arising out of the same district court case, writ application number 09-C-426 was consolidated with this appeal. The issues that were raised in the writ application will be addressed in this opinion.

      .Although the plaintiffs, except Mr. McClana-han, were dismissed from the malicious prosecution suit through the trial court's granting of the defendant's Exception of No Right of Action by the time the writ was filed, all of the plaintiffs were classified as “Petitioners/Rela-tors'' in the writ.