author: GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT: CARLTON, J., DISSENTING:

text:
    Dennis THOMPSON a/k/a Nucy a/k/a Ray Ray a/k/a Dennis Ray Thompson, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, APPELLEE
    NO. 2015-KA-00748-COA
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    April 10, 2018 Rehearing Denied August 7, 2018
    DANIEL CHRISTOPHER JONES, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KAYLYN HAVRILLA MCCLINTON, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    EN BANC.
   GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Dennis Thompson appeals his conviction for murder; finding no reversible error, we affirm.

¶ 2. On December 8, 2009, Thompson was indicted for one count of conspiracy to commit robbery and one count of capital murder. On February 24, 2014, a jury trial commenced in the Circuit Court of Coahoma County. During trial, Thompson requested that the jury be instructed to consider simple murder in the event they found him not guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery. On the morning of February 27, 2014, the jury retired to deliberate. Following deliberations, the jury unanimously found Thompson not guilty for conspiracy to commit robbery. However, the jury was unable to reach a verdict regarding capital murder. While the jury was unanimous that Thompson was not guilty of the underlying felony of robbery, the jury was deadlocked on the lesser-included offense of murder, for which it was instructed to consider per Thompson's request. After ascertaining that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked, the trial court ordered a mistrial on count two and held that Thompson's retrial be limited to the lesser-included offense of murder.

¶ 3. Thompson's retrial commenced on July 29, 2014. After deliberating, the jury unanimously found Thompson guilty of murder. Thompson now appeals, asserting the weight and sufficiency of the evidence do not support his conviction; the trial court erred by admitting unreliable witness testimony; his retrial violated his protection against double jeopardy; and his indictment for capital murder was insufficient for the purpose of retrying him for murder.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 4. On December 8, 2009, a Coahoma grand jury indicted Thompson for count one, conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-73 (Rev. 2006), and count two, capital murder in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(2)(e) (Rev. 2006). During his first trial, Thompson requested that, "if the [c]ourt rules on behalf of [Thompson] that conspiracy has not been established by the State, then [he] would move that Count II, as far as capital murder, be downgraded to simple murder. Because the underlying felony is conspiracy to commit robbery." The jury was accordingly instructed that in the event they found Thompson not guilty of capital murder, they were to consider simple murder.

¶ 5. The jury found Thompson not guilty on count one, conspiracy to conspiracy to commit robbery. However, the jury was unable to reach an agreement on count two, capital murder. Although the jury was unanimous that Thompson was not guilty of the underlying felony of robbery, the jury was deadlocked on the lesser-included offense of murder. The trial court ordered a mistrial and held that the State "not be permitted to retry the [D]efendant on a charge of capital murder, but will be limited to the charge of murder."

¶ 6. On July 29, 2014, Thompson's retrial for the lesser-included offense of murder commenced. Shemeka Palmer was the State's first witness. Palmer testified that on November 30, 2008, she was visiting Clarksdale for work and had reserved a hotel room at the Comfort Inn. She stated that on that evening, Carlos Buford, with whom she was a childhood friend, was driving to meet her at the hotel. Palmer said Buford called her at approximately 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. from a Double Quick store in Clarksdale to ask her for directions to the hotel, but he never arrived at the hotel.

¶ 7. Next, Stephen Poer, a former Clarksdale Police Department patrolmen testified. Poer testified that while he was on duty on November 30, 2008, he was called to investigate a person sitting in a parked car near the Hicks Motel. Poer said that he arrived at the scene sometime between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. and that upon his arrival, he found the body of a deceased man, later identified as Buford, sitting in the driver's seat. Buford's head was against the headrest of the seat, and blood was coming from the back of his head. The driver's door was open, and the engine was still running. Poer testified he secured the scene without disturbing any evidence.

¶ 8. Captain Ulyda Johnson of the Clarksdale Police Department was the next State's witness to testify. Captain Johnson stated that in November 2008, she was a detective with the Clarksdale Police Department and was the chief investigator in Buford's case. She said that on November 30, 2008, at approximately 9:20 p.m., she responded to a dispatcher call in the area near the Hicks Motel. When she arrived, Captain Johnson said she saw Buford's body in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle. She photographed the scene and accompanied the Coahoma County Coroner to the morgue to photograph Buford's body. While at the morgue, the coroner gave Captain Johnson a phone number collected off Buford's body. Captain Johnson called the number and discovered it belonged to Palmer. She then met Palmer at the Comfort Inn, where Palmer was staying. Captain Johnson obtained a statement from Palmer and was headed back to the office when she received a call from an informant. The informant provided the names of several people: Isaiah Johnson, Eddie Johnson, and Cheesy Hollins. Isaiah, Eddie, and Cheesy gave Captain Johnson statements and information about a person of interest, Danny Starks. Cheesy provided a recorded phone call, from which Captain Johnson developed two suspects: David McLymont and Thompson. Captain Johnson also brought Starks in for questioning and asked him to look at two photo lineups she had prepared. Starks viewed the lineups and identified McLymont and Thompson as people he recognized. Under McLymont's photo, Starks wrote "front seat," and under Thompson's, he wrote "this is the guy I saw with the gun." As a result, warrants were issued for both McLymont and Thompson. Both men were arrested, and their fingerprints were sent to the crime lab.

¶ 9. Several experts testified for the State. Dr. Feng Li, an expert physician in the field of anatomical, clinical, and forensic pathology, testified that he performed Buford's autopsy and recovered a bullet from Buford's head. Dr. Li stated that Buford died of a penetrative gunshot wound to the head. Kristopher Wingert, an expert crime scene analyst with the Mississippi Bureau of Investigation, processed the finger prints and contents of the vehicle. Wingert stated that a copper jacket was found on the floorboards of Buford's car. Starks Hathcock, an expert forensic scientist specializing in firearms identification and examination, identified the copper jacket as bearing similar characteristics to a .40-caliber bullet. Hathcock also analyzed the bullet recovered from Buford's brain and determined it bore similar characteristics to a .38-caliber bullet. Mike Hood, an expert forensic scientist specializing in latent fingerprints, testified that McLymont's fingerprints were found on the front passenger's door of Buford's car.

¶ 10. Derrick Noah, a Coahoma County Jail inmate, also testified for the State. Noah testified that he was acquainted with Thompson prior to his imprisonment and had the opportunity to speak to Thompson while they were both housed in the Coahoma County Jail. Noah stated that in one conversation, Thompson told him he was in jail because of a gun he bought from a mutual acquaintance. Noah recalled that the gun Thompson bought from the acquaintance was a .38-caliber revolver. Noah said that in another conversation, Thompson told him that he, McLymont, and Starks were at a Double Quick and came across a man wearing a chain-link necklace with a medallion. Thompson told Noah he wanted the medallion and started talking to the man, who allegedly asked about purchasing some marijuana. Thompson responded that they could get the marijuana, but they needed a ride from the Hicks Motel to get it. Thompson, McLymont, and Starks got into the man's car. Thompson sat in the rear passenger seat, McLymont was in the front passenger seat, and Starks was seated behind the man. According to Thompson, as McLymont got out of the car, he reached for the man's necklace, and the man shot McLymont in the leg with a .40-caliber gun. Thompson told Noah that after the man shot McLymont, he shot the man in the back of the head. Thompson also told Noah that he was wearing gloves so as to not leave fingerprints at the scene. Thompson said that he hid in the bushes behind the Hicks Motel "until the coast was clear."

¶ 11. Following these conversations with Thompson, Noah wrote the district attorney's office. Noah said he decided to share the information with the State because Thompson had threatened him and his family.

¶ 12. Starks was the State's last witness. Starks testified that he met Thompson and McLymont (Thompson's cousin), while he was living in Clarksdale. He stated that on the evening of November 30, 2008, McLymont and Thompson met him at his house, and the three of them left to walk to a club together. On the way to the club, they came across a Double Quick. Thompson went into the store while Starks and McLymont waited outside. Thompson engaged in a conversation with another man (later determined to be Buford) inside the store. Starks said he heard Thompson ask Buford about a ride. Starks testified that he, Thompson, and McLymont got in Buford's car, and that as they were driving by the Hicks Motel, McLymont, who was seated in the front passenger seat, began wrestling with Buford. Starks said he was seated in the backseat, behind Buford, and Thompson was seated next to him. Starks stated that a shot rang off, and then he saw Thompson reach for his leg, pull out a gun, and shoot Buford in the back of the head. Starks confirmed he later spoke to law enforcement and that he identified McLymont as the front seat passenger, and Thompson as the man with the gun.

¶ 13. After Starks's testimony, the State rested, and Thompson moved for a directed verdict of acquittal, which the court denied. Next, Thompson's first witness, Andrinis Foster (Thompson's cousin), testified. Foster testified that in November 2008, she was in a romantic relationship with Starks, and that on the evening of November 30, 2008, Starks visited her home and told her he had "somebody else's blood" on him. Foster said she did not ask whose blood it was. Thompson's second witness was his sister, Denetria Thompson. Denetria testified that on the night of November 30, 2008, Thompson was with her and their father all night and therefore did not commit the charged crime. Thompson's final witness, Raechele Scott, was a jail administrator at the Coahoma County Sheriff's Department. Scott testified that Thompson and Noah were housed in separate parts of the jail. However, she also stated that during certain times, inmates are able to move around within their shared pod and speak with other inmates and that it was possible for an inmate assigned to a specific cell to visit another cell.

¶ 14. After Thompson presented his witnesses, he renewed his motion for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. Following closing arguments, the jury deliberated and unanimously found Thompson guilty of murder in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev. 2006). Thompson was sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Thompson timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Denial of Thompson's Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, Motion for a New Trial

¶ 15. On appeal, Thompson argues that the jury's verdict should not have been allowed to stand and that the trial judge should have granted either Thompson's judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or his motion for a new trial.

¶ 16. The denial of a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, while the denial of a motion for a new trial challenges the weight of the evidence. Brown v. State , 796 So.2d 223, 225 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2001).

a. Sufficiency of the evidence

¶ 17. In considering whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction, "the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed." Russell v. State , 924 So.2d 604, 608 (¶ 8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). "The key question in this analysis is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bush v. State , 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005) (abrogated on other grounds) ).

¶ 18. It is important to note that this review does not require the Court to

ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Bush , 895 So.2d at 843 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ) (emphasis in original). If the Court should determine that the facts are not sufficient to support the verdict, then the "proper remedy is for the appellate court to reverse and render." Id.

¶ 19. In order to prove Thompson committed murder, the evidence must show that Thompson: (1) killed Buford (2) without authority of law but with (3) the deliberate design to effect his death. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev. 2014); Brown v. State , 965 So.2d 1023, 1030 (¶ 27) (Miss. 2007). On appeal, Thompson argues he shot Buford in order to protect McLymont and that "at best[,] [he] should have been charged with manslaughter." Thompson did not raise these theories at trial and did not request a manslaughter instruction. Therefore, he cannot raise these issues on appeal. Ealey v. State , 158 So.3d 283, 293 (¶ 37) (Miss. 2015). Thompson also argues the State "did not offer any testimony as to the deliberate design of [his] actions."

¶ 20. "Deliberate design" is synonymous with "malice aforethought" and connotes an intent to kill. Wilson v. State , 936 So.2d 357, 363-64 (¶ 17) (Miss. 2006). "Deliberate design to kill a person may be formed very quickly, and perhaps only moments before the act of consummating the intent." Brown , 965 So.2d at 1030 (¶ 28) (quoting Windham v. State , 520 So.2d 123, 127 (Miss. 1987) ) ). It is well established that "[m]alice, or deliberate design, may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon." Anderson v. State , 79 So.3d 501, 507 (¶ 22) (Miss. 2012) (quoting Phillips v. State , 794 So.2d 1034, 1037 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2001) ).

¶ 21. During trial, Starks testified for the State. Starks said that he observed Thompson pull out a gun and shoot Buford in the back of the head. Starks stated that at the time of the shooting, Buford was sitting in the driver's seat, and Thompson was sitting in the back-right passenger seat. Experts for the State testified that Buford died of a penetrative gunshot wound to the right side of the back of his head, and that the bullet recovered from Buford's head was a .38-caliber bullet.

¶ 22. Noah, an inmate imprisoned with Thompson in the Coahoma County jail, also testified for the State. Noah testified that during his imprisonment, he had the opportunity to talk with Thompson; that Thompson told him he was in jail due to a .38-caliber gun, bought from a mutual acquaintance;

and that Thompson said he shot the victim in the back of the head.

¶ 23. In considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the evidence sufficient for the jury to conclude Thompson killed Buford with deliberate design. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

b. Weight of the evidence

¶ 24. "When reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial based on an objection to the weight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice." Bush , 895 So.2d at 844. In determining whether the weight of the evidence supports the verdict, this Court weighs the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. The motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the court; a new trial should be granted only in exceptional cases when the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. Id. (citing Amiker v. Drugs For Less, Inc. , 796 So.2d 942, 947 (¶18) (Miss. 2000) ).

¶ 25. Thompson argues that allowing his conviction to stand would be an unconscionable injustice because he was retried for simple murder on a capital murder indictment. As this argument challenges the sufficiency of Thompson's indictment, we address it below, under Thompson's third assignment of error. For the same reasons we found the evidence in this case to be sufficient, we also find that allowing Thompson's murder conviction to stand does not sanction an unconscionable injustice. Accordingly, this contention of error is without merit.

II. Starks's and Noah's testimonies

¶ 26. Thompson alleges the trial court erred by allowing Starks and Noah to testify because their testimonies were unreliable. To support his argument, Thompson cites a string of authority regarding the inherent unreliability of testimony given by accomplices and jailhouse snitches. In doing so, Thompson suggests a cautionary instruction should have been given to warn jurors that accomplice or snitch testimony should be viewed with suspicion.

¶ 27. We note, after thorough review of the record, that there is no evidence indicating that Starks was charged as an accomplice, nor is there any evidence suggesting Starks made any deals with law enforcement or prosecutors in exchange for his testimony. Further, Thompson did not request a cautionary instruction as to Starks's testimony, and his failure to do so serves as a bar to raising the point on appeal. Carr v. State , 655 So.2d 824, 837 (Miss. 1995). As to Noah's testimony, Thompson requested a cautionary instruction regarding "jailhouse informants." The trial court refused Thompson's requested instruction, but it gave the following instruction, C-20:

The law provides that testimony received from an inmate or jailhouse informant who has received some benefit by providing such testimony should be viewed with suspicion and distrust. If you find the witness Derrick Noah to be such an inmate or jailhouse informant, then, in determining what weight, if any, you will give such testimony, you should do so with great care and caution.

¶ 28. Jury instructions are not reviewed in isolation, but are read as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instructed. Milano v. State , 790 So.2d 179, 184 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2001). The instructions must fairly announce the law of the case and not create injustice. Id. "In other words, if all instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law, no error results." Id. While a defendant has a right to present his theory of the case, that right is not absolute, and trial courts "may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions[,] or is without foundation in the evidence." Davis v. State , 18 So.3d 842, 847 (¶ 15) (Miss. 2009).

¶ 29. Here, the trial court granted a cautionary instruction that advised the jury to view informant testimony with caution and suspicion. We find the instructions taken as a whole fairly announced the applicable law and sufficiently cautioned the jury. Further, any inherent unreliability in either Starks's or Noah's testimony was brought out on cross-examination by Thompson's attorney, and the jury was instructed to carefully weigh the credibility of all the witnesses. Thus, we find no error.

III. Retrial

¶ 30. Following Thompson's first trial, the jury found Thompson not guilty on count one, conspiracy to commit robbery. However, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on count two, capital murder. Although the jury was unanimous that Thompson was not guilty of the underlying felony of robbery, it was deadlocked on the lesser-included offense of murder. The trial court ordered a mistrial and held that the State "not be permitted to retry the defendant on a charge of capital murder, but will be limited to the charge of murder." After retrial, Thompson was convicted of murder in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev. 2006).

¶ 31. On appeal, Thompson claims his second trial for simple murder violated double jeopardy. Thompson also argues his indictment for capital murder was not sufficient to try him for simple murder. Because a double jeopardy violation and the sufficiency of an indictment are separate issues, we address each in turn.

a. Double jeopardy

¶ 32. We note that Thompson makes his argument concerning double jeopardy for the first time on appeal. However, as the protection against double jeopardy is a fundamental right, we will not apply a procedural bar and will address the merits of Thompson's claim. Fuselier v. State , 654 So.2d 519, 522 (Miss. 1995) (holding that, while constitutional questions not raised at trial are generally deemed waived, errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights may be excepted from procedural bars which would otherwise prohibit consideration). We review claims of double jeopardy de novo. Goforth v. State , 70 So.3d 174, 187 (¶ 60) (Miss. 2011).

¶ 33. Article 3, section 22 of the Mississippi Constitution states, "[n]o person's life or liberty shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense; but there must be an actual acquittal or conviction on the merits to bar another prosecution." Miss. Const. art. 3, § 22 (1890). Thus, when a defendant has pled guilty, been convicted, or acquitted by a jury, his double jeopardy right has fully accrued. Beckwith v. State , 615 So.2d 1134, 1147 (Miss. 1992). However, when a mistrial is granted upon the court's own motion, or the state's motion, a second trial is not barred due to double jeopardy when, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there was a manifest necessity for the mistrial.

Watts v. State , 492 So.2d 1281, 1284 (Miss. 1986). "Manifest necessity" means that, following the attachment of double jeopardy, a "high degree" of necessity is required to conclude a mistrial is appropriate. Conwill v. State , 94 So.3d 1173, 1177 (¶ 19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). It is well settled that a hopelessly deadlocked jury is a manifest necessity for a mistrial. See, e.g. , Beckwith , 615 So.2d at 1148 ; Jones v. State , 398 So.2d 1312, 1315 (Miss. 1981).

¶ 34. Here, the judge granted a mistrial because the jury was hopelessly deadlocked. Accordingly, Thompson's subsequent retrial did not violate his right against double jeopardy.

b. Sufficiency of the indictment

¶ 35. The purpose of an indictment is to satisfy the constitutional requirement that a "defendant be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ...." U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26. See also URCCC 7.06 (An indictment must include a "plain[,] concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged and shall fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation."). Furthermore, "[a]n indictment must contain (1) the essential elements of the offense charged, (2) sufficient facts to fairly inform the defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and (3) sufficient facts to enable him to plead double jeopardy in the event of a future prosecution for the same offense." Davis v. State , 171 So.3d 537, 540 (¶ 11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Gilmer v. State , 955 So.2d 829, 836-37 (¶ 24) (Miss. 2007) ).

¶ 36. The record reflects that count two of Thompson's indictment for capital murder charged:

[O]n or about November 30, 2008 ... [Thompson] individually or while aiding and abetting and/or acting in concert with another and/or others, did unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously and without the authority of law and with or without the deliberate design to effect death, kill and murder Carlos Deon Buford, a human being, while [Thompson] and another or others were engaged in the commission of the crime of robbery as set forth in the Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated as amended, Section 97-3-73, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.

Thus, review of Thompson's indictment shows that (1) the essential elements of murder were encompassed within the capital murder charge; (2) Thompson was provided with sufficient facts to fairly inform him of the charge he had to defend against; and (3) Thompson was given sufficient facts enabling him to plead double jeopardy in a prosecution for the same offense.

¶ 37. Further, a defendant in a criminal case can be found guilty of a lesser-included offense, so long as it is necessarily a lesser-included offense of the offense charged. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-5 (Rev. 2007) provides:

On an indictment for any offense, the jury may find the defendant guilty of the offense charged, or any attempt to commit the same offense, or may find him guilty of an inferior offense, or other offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in the offense with which he is charged in the indictment, whether the same be a felony or misdemeanor, without any additional count in the indictment for that purpose .

Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-5 (Rev. 2007) (emphasis added).

¶ 38. It is well established that murder is a lesser-included offense of capital murder. See Spicer v. State , 921 So.2d 292 (Miss. 2006) ; Dockery v. State , 96 So.3d 759 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) ; see also Wheeler v. State , 536 So.2d 1341 (Miss. 1988). Thompson thus had statutory notice that his indictment for capital murder could result in a conviction for the lesser-included offense of murder. Moreover, section 99-19-5 provides that a jury may convict a defendant of a lesser-included offense without an additional count in the indictment. Therefore, Thompson's retrial and conviction of the lesser-included offense of murder was not reversible error. Nor was it even error.

¶ 39. The dissent compares this case to Ashwell v. State , stating, "without a prosecution on the indictment, the record on appeal lacks evidence in Thompson's second trial and resulting conviction to show that the prosecution was brought in the State of Mississippi's name and authority." However, the facts in Ashwell significantly differ from those in the case sub judice. In Ashwell , the record was completely devoid of any charging document for either of the crimes to which Ashwell pled guilty. Ashwell v. State , 226 So.3d 69, 73 (¶ 18) (Miss. 2017). The docket sheet in each criminal case reflected that no charging document was filed with the circuit court, and the criminal files themselves did not include any charging documents either. Id. at 72 (¶ 12). Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the State never charged Ashwell with a crime, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction and authority to accept Ashwell's guilty pleas. Id. at (¶ 14). Here, Thompson's indictment charging him with capital murder was filed on December 8, 2009. The dissent thus extends Ashwell 's holding by implying the record on appeal is lacking when a defendant is retried for a lesser-included offense that was not in a separate count of the indictment. Ashwell did not address that issue, and as discussed above, section 99-19-5 does not require that a lesser-included offense be charged in a separate count in the indictment.

¶ 40. The second case cited by the dissent, Decker v. State , is also distinguishable from the instant case. Decker was indicted under the Mississippi Vulnerable Adults Act of 1986 for using her mother's money "without her consent." Decker v. State , 66 So.3d 654, 654 (¶ 1) (Miss. 2011). But at trial, the evidence established that Decker had obtained her mother's consent to use the money, so the State requested-and the trial judge granted-a jury instruction that allowed the jury to find Decker guilty, even if her mother had given her permission to use the money. Id. The supreme court found the jury instructions, when taken as a whole "created injustice by expanding beyond the charges in the indictment, the bases on which Decker could be convicted." Id. at 657 (¶ 15). As the court explained, "the wording of the indictment suggest[ed] that the grand jury believed Decker's use of the money was improper only if the money was used without [her mother's] consent." Id. at 656 (¶ 9).

¶ 41. Here, there was no material deviation from the indictment. Thompson's capital murder charge notified him, for due process purposes, that he must also be prepared to defend against any lesser-included offense even if the lesser-included offense was not expressly set forth in the indictment. See Wallace v. State , 10 So.3d 913, 917 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2009) ("[B]y its very definition, a defendant is always on notice of a lesser-included offense.").

¶ 42. The dissent again cites Decker , stating, "once the grand jury hands down a true bill that alleges an accused committed a particular crime by engaging in certain conduct-absent waiver or a request for a lesser[-]included offense-the accused must be prosecuted for that crime, and no other." Decker , 66 So.3d at 656 (¶ 6). The dissent then states "[t]he facts here reflect that Thompson never requested the lesser-included offense during the subsequent trial." The facts do, however, reflect that Thompson requested consideration of the lesser-included offense during his first trial, and the jury was instructed thereon. Decker is silent on this issue, but Gangl v. State , 539 So.2d 132 (Miss. 1989) provides instruction.

¶ 43. Gangl considered whether a request for a lesser offense (rather than a request for a lesser-included offense) carries over to retrial. In Gangl , the Mississippi Supreme Court considered whether an indictment for armed robbery could support a conviction for accessory after the fact, when the defendant requested a lesser offense instruction on accessory after the fact. Id. The Court found that "[b]y requesting the instruction, Gangl waive[ed] any inadequacy or notice in the indictment," and thus, "the jury on retrial [could] convict [Gangl] of accessory after the fact even though that crime [was] not a lesser[-]included offense of the charge laid in the indictment." Id. at 136 (emphasis added). Because a request for a lesser offense instruction applies to retrial, it logically follows that a request for a lesser-included offense should also apply to this retrial on the lesser-included offense of murder. Thus, Thompson's request waived any inadequacy or notice in the indictment, and his conviction for murder was proper.

CONCLUSION

¶ 44. We find that the evidence was sufficient to convict Thompson of murder and the jury's verdict is not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Taken as a whole, the jury instructions fairly announced the applicable law and sufficiently cautioned the jury. Any unreliability in Starks's or Noah's testimonies was brought out on cross-examination, and the jury was instructed to carefully weigh the credibility of all of the witnesses. Thompson's retrial for murder following a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury did not violate double jeopardy. Thompson's request for a lesser-included offense instruction during his first trial waived any inadequacy or notice in his indictment. Further, section 99-19-5 put Thompson on statutory notice that the jury could convict him of any lesser-included offense, even if the lesser-included offense was not listed in a separate count of the indictment.

¶ 45. AFFIRMED.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, FAIR, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. CARLTON, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY IRVING, P.J.

CARLTON, J., DISSENTING:

¶ 46. I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion finding no error by the circuit court in allowing the State to prosecute Thompson for first-degree, or deliberate-design, murder in violation of section 97-3-19(1)(a) without also prosecuting Thompson on the indicted offense of capital murder (felony murder) in violation of section 97-3-19(2)(e). Finding error by the circuit court, I would reverse Thompson's conviction and vacate his sentence.

¶ 47. On December 8, 2009, a grand jury indicted Dennis Thompson for Count I, conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-73 (Rev. 2006), and Count II, capital murder in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19 (2)(e), with the underlying predicate felony of robbery. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-1-1 (Rev. 2006) & 97-3-19(2)(e) (Rev. 2006). In Thompson's first trial, a jury found him not guilty of Count I, conspiracy to commit robbery, but deadlocked on Count II, capital murder (felony murder). The circuit court declared a mistrial as to the capital-murder charge. The circuit court also provided that the State could retry Thompson on the offense of deliberate-design murder but not the indicted offense of capital murder (felony murder). The instant appeal addresses Thompson's subsequent trial, wherein Thompson was tried for the offense of deliberate-design murder but not prosecuted or retried on the indicted offense. During the second trial, where the State prosecuted only deliberate-design murder and not the offenses charged in Thompson's indictment, a jury found Thompson guilty of first-degree (deliberate-design) murder in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev. 2006).

¶ 48. Following the circuit court's denial of his motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial, Thompson appeals. On appeal, he asserts the following issues: (1) the circuit court erred by denying his motion for a JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial; (2) the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence threatening pretrial statements he made; and (3) the circuit court erred by allowing the State to retry him on the charge of simple murder without a new indictment.

¶ 49. I find dispositive Thompson's third assignment of error. The circuit court erred by allowing the State to prosecute Thompson for first-degree, or deliberate-design, murder in violation of section 97-3-19(1)(a) without also prosecuting Thompson on the indicted offense of capital murder (felony murder) in violation of section 97-3-19(2)(e). I would therefore reverse Thompson's conviction and vacate his sentence. As previously addressed, pursuant to a multicount indictment, a grand jury indicted Thompson on December 8, 2009, for Count I, conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of section 97-3-73, and Count II, murder during the commission of a robbery, in violation of section 97-3-19(2)(e) (felony murder). At the conclusion of Thompson's first trial, the circuit court entered an order declaring a mistrial as to Count II. However, the circuit court prohibited the State from retrying Thompson on Count II of the indictment and provided that the State could only prosecute Thompson for a lesser-included offense of Count II. The State thereafter prosecuted Thompson for a lesser-included offense rather than for the offense in Count II of the indictment. The circuit court's order is contained in the record before us on our review of Thompson's second trial. I now turn to the relevant facts set forth in the record before us, including the circuit court's order declaring a mistrial.

¶ 50. At Thompson's first trial in February 2014, the circuit court instructed the jury on the indicted offenses of conspiracy and capital murder as well as the lesser-included offense of murder. The record reflects that, during its deliberations, the jury reported to the bailiff that it was unable to reach a decision. The court called the jury back into the courtroom to ask about the jury's numerical division. In response, the jury stated it was split 9-2, with one juror undecided. However, the record indicates that the jury did not specify whether the split applied to one or both counts charged in the indictment. After finding the jury's "split was not so divisive as to suggest that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked," the circuit court administered a Sharplin charge and instructed the jury to continue deliberations.

¶ 51. The record establishes that the jury once again reported that it remained unable to agree. The circuit court recalled the jury to the courtroom a second time and, through questioning, determined that the jury had reached a unanimous verdict of "not guilty" as to Count I, conspiracy to commit robbery. The foreperson informed the circuit court that the split within the jury as to Count II now totaled 10-2.

¶ 52. The record shows that the jury once more returned to its deliberations as to Count II. For the third time, however, the jury reported that it remained unable to reach an agreement. Although the jury did not report a verdict as to Count II, the circuit court surmised from its colloquy with the jury that the jury's finding as to the capital-murder charge was adverse to the State. The circuit court also surmised that the jury was divided as to the lesser-included offense of murder. The circuit court directed the jury to continue its deliberations regarding Count II. After further deliberations, the jury yet again reported to the bailiff that it remained unable to reach agreement. The circuit court then declared a mistrial as to Count II.

¶ 53. The circuit court's order declaring a mistrial provided that, although the jury did not actually report a verdict as to Count II, based on the court's conversation with the jury and the difficulty the jury experienced in reaching a determination regarding the lesser-included offense of murder, the circuit court concluded that the jury's finding as to the capital-murder charge was adverse to the State. The circuit court's order declaring a mistrial provided the following directive: "As such, while the State will be permitted to retry the [D]efendant, such retrial will be limited to the charge of 'murder[,]' and the State will not be permitted to retry the [D]efendant on a charge of 'capital murder.' " Thus, as the record reflects, the circuit court declared a mistrial as to the indicted offense of Count II, capital murder, and the circuit court directed that the State could retry Thompson only on the lesser-included offense of murder.

¶ 54. The record further shows that, upon Thompson's subsequent trial in July 2014, in accordance with the circuit court's prior instruction, the State prosecuted Thompson only for the lesser-included offense of first-degree (deliberate-design) murder in violation of section 97-3-19(1)(a) and not for the actual indicted charge of felony murder in violation of section 97-3-19(2)(e). Thus, the record shows that, in the subsequent trial, Thompson was not prosecuted for the offenses charged in the indictment. After the jury found Thompson guilty of first-degree murder, the circuit court sentenced him to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with the sentence to run consecutively to any and all sentences previously imposed. Thompson filed an unsuccessful motion for a JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, Thompson appeals.

¶ 55. In his recent concurrence in Ashwell v. State , 226 So.3d 69, 77 (¶ 27) (Miss. 2017), Justice Kitchens explicitly stated that an indictment is essential to show a prosecution is carried out in the State of Mississippi's name and authority. See also Miss. Const. art. 6, § 169 ("[A]ll prosecutions shall be carried on in the name and by authority of the 'State of Mississippi[.]' "). Justice Kitchens further explained that "[t]he charging document in a criminal case establishes that the prosecution is brought in the name of the State, an indispensable prerequisite" to a felony prosecution. Ashwell , 226 So.3d at 77 (¶ 27) (Kitchens, J., concurring). In the present case, as in Ashwell , without a prosecution on the indictment, the record on appeal lacks evidence in Thompson's second trial and resulting conviction to show that the prosecution was brought in the State of Mississippi's name and authority. In the subsequent trial, the State failed to prosecute Thompson for the crime charged in Count II of the indictment. Instead, the State prosecuted Thompson only for a lesser-included offense. As Justice Kitchens acknowledged in Ashwell , the indictment's absence leaves a defendant unable to plead double jeopardy in a future prosecution for the same or similar offenses. Id. Justice Kitchens also explained that an indictment constitutes a prerequisite to the State's ability to prosecute a felony unless the defendant waives the indictment and consents to proceeding by information. Id. at 75 (¶ 24).

¶ 56. With regard to the present case, no dispute exists that deliberate-design murder constitutes a lesser-included offense of capital murder. However, prosecution on the indictment is a prerequisite to obtaining a conviction for a lesser-included offense. Of course, the jury may be instructed upon all lesser-included offenses of that indicted offense that are supported by the evidence. The majority relies on Gangl v. State , 539 So.2d 132 (Miss. 1989), for its position that Thompson waived any challenges to notice or inadequacy in the indictment. However, Gangl is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In Gangl , the State prosecuted the defendant on the charged indictment. Id. at 134. At trial, Gangl then requested a lesser-nonincluded-offense instruction, which the trial court refused. Id. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court found Gangl waived any challenges to the inadequacy or notice in the indictment by requesting the lesser-nonincluded-offense instruction. Id. at 136. By contrast, in the present case, Thompson never requested a lesser-included-offense instruction or a lesser-nonincluded-offense instruction during his subsequent trial.

¶ 57. Our supreme court recognizes that, "once the grand jury hands down a true bill that alleges an accused committed a particular crime by engaging in certain conduct-absent waiver or a request for a lesser[-]included offense-the accused must be prosecuted for that crime, and no other." Decker v. State , 66 So.3d 654, 656 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2011). As set forth in Decker , upon retrial, the State was required to prosecute Thompson for the offense charged in the indictment absent a waiver or a request for a lesser-included offense. See id. The facts here reflect that Thompson never requested the lesser-included offense during the subsequent trial. Furthermore, the record shows no waiver of the indictment.

¶ 58. The circuit court instructed the jury during Thompson's subsequent trial on the lesser-included offense without an instruction or prosecution on Count II of the indictment. The jury should have been instructed to first consider the offense charged in Count II and that, after full and careful consideration of the evidence, the jury could then proceed to arrive at a verdict on a lesser-included crime. Cf. Fulgham v. State , 46 So.3d 315, 329-30 (¶ 40) (Miss. 2010) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's grant of an "acquit-first" lesser-included-offense instruction); see also Jones v. State , 142 So.3d 420, 425 (¶ 17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court instructed the jury that the State carried the burden to prove every element of the offense charged in the indictment count and that, if the State failed to prove all the elements, then the jury could consider the lesser-included offense). Clearly, the jury should be instructed on the charged offense and should be instructed to consider the charged offense before considering a verdict on a lesser-included offense.

¶ 59. As discussed, Decker provides that, "once the grand jury hands down a true bill that alleges an accused committed a particular crime by engaging in certain conduct-absent waiver or a request for a lesser[-]included offense-the accused must be prosecuted for that crime, and no other." Decker , 66 So.3d at 656 (¶ 6). Furthermore, challenges to the substantive sufficiency of an indictment are not waivable and may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Berryhill , 703 So.2d 250, 254 (¶ 16) (Miss. 1997) ; Johnson v. State , 94 So.3d 1209 (¶ 21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). Therefore, based on the foregoing, I would reverse Thompson's conviction and remand the case for the trial court to reinstate the charged indictment to the active trial docket.

IRVING, P.J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

      Some bullets have an outer copper jacket that encases the projectile (the part of the bullet expelled from the gun). Wingert stated copper jackets tend to peel apart from the projectile.

      We note that the text of Thompson's proposed instruction does not appear in the record.

      See Hall v. State , 127 So.3d 202, 207 (¶ 17) (Miss. 2013) (reversing the defendant's conviction and vacating his sentence where he was convicted of a crime for which he was never indicted).

      See Hall , 127 So.3d at 207 (¶ 17).

      See Sharplin v. State , 330 So.2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976) (identifying the instructions a trial court may give upon learning that a jury cannot reach a unanimous verdict).

      See Annotation, When Should Jury's Deliberation Proceed from Charged Offense to Lesser-Included Offense , 26 A.L.R. 603 (5th ed. 1995) (providing that the jury should be instructed to first discuss whether the elements of the indicted or main offense are satisfied before turning to consider the lesser offenses).

      I acknowledge that, in Hye v. State , 162 So.3d 750, 751 (¶ 2) (Miss. 2015), the supreme court held "a criminal defendant no longer has the unilateral right under Mississippi law to insist upon an instruction for lesser-related offenses [that] are not necessarily included in the charged offense(s), i.e., so-called lesser-nonincluded-offense instructions."

      Compare Burgess v. State , 210 So.3d 569, 577-78 (¶¶ 32-34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's grant of an "acquit-first" lesser-included-offense instruction) with White v. State , 149 So.3d 556, 559-60 (¶¶ 10-12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court instructed the jury on both the crime charged in the indictment and on a lesser-included offense).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: FAIR, J., FOR THE COURT:

license: Public Domain

text:
    Sarah HODNETT, Individually and as Trustee of the Hodnett Land Trust, and Bank of Anguilla, a Mississippi Banking Corporation, Appellants v. Tim HODNETT, Appellee
    NO. 2016-CA-00885-COA
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    April 17, 2018 Rehearing Denied August 28, 2018
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: OLIVER E. DIAZ JR., Jackson, DAVID NEIL MCCARTY, BENJAMIN MCRAE WATSON, JOHN C. HENEGAN, Ridgeland
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: PHILIP MANSOUR JR., Greenville
    BEFORE LEE, C.J., FAIR AND GREENLEE, JJ.
   FAIR, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Tim Hodnett sued his sister, Sarah Hodnett, to set aside a deed to the family farm from their mother to a revocable trust. The trust named Sarah as the sole beneficiary upon her mother's death. The chancery court found that Sarah, who had acted as her parents' attorney for many years and had prepared all of the various instruments involved in these transactions, had been in a confidential relationship with her mother when the deed was executed, raising the presumption that it was the product of undue influence. Sarah failed to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence, and thus the chancellor set aside the deed.

¶ 2. On appeal, Sarah contends that Tim lacked standing to challenge the deed, that the statute of limitations had run at the time this suit was filed, and that the chancery court employed an incorrect legal standard in reaching its finding of a confidential relationship. The Bank of Anguilla also appeals, challenging the trial court's conclusion that Tim's claim had priority over some of the Bank's security interests in the deeded property, which were acquired by the Bank after a lis pendens was filed. We affirm the chancery court's judgment in its entirety.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 3. A chancellor's factual findings will not be reversed unless they are manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Paw Paw Island Land Co. v. Issaquena & Warren Ctys. Land Co. , 51 So.3d 916, 923 (¶ 26) (Miss. 2010). However, a chancellor's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

1. Standing

¶ 4. Sarah contends that Tim lacks an interest in the deeded property and therefore does not have standing to pursue any claims relating to its disposition.

¶ 5. "In Mississippi, parties have standing to sue when they assert a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise provided by law." In re City of Biloxi , 113 So.3d 565, 570 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "A party's claim must be grounded in some legal right recognized by law, whether by statute or by common law and that party must be able to show that it has a present, existent actionable title or interest." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 6. It is undisputed that Tim is one of his mother's heirs at law. See Miss. Code Ann. § 91-1-3 (Rev. 2013). If the conveyance of the property from his mother to the trust is set aside, Tim presumptively stands to inherit a child's share of the property. Id. He clearly has standing to challenge the transfer on the basis of undue influence.

2. Statute of Limitations

¶ 7. Tim filed suit shortly after his mother's death, but Sarah and the Bank point out that this was more than three years after the deed transferring the property to the Trust was executed. Both assert that the three-year "catch all" statute of limitations bars this suit, though they offer little argument as to why.

¶ 8. It is apparent to us that the applicable statute of limitations is actually ten years under Mississippi Code Annotated sections 15-1-7 (Rev. 2012) and 15-1-9 (Rev. 2012), for actions to recover land. See In re Estate of Reid , 825 So.2d 1, 6 (¶¶ 16-19) (Miss. 2002) ; see also Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2012). Sarah cites O'Neal Steel Inc. v. Millette , 797 So.2d 869, 872-75 (¶¶ 10-20) (Miss. 2001), for the proposition that a possessory interest in the land is required for the ten-year statute of limitations to apply. That is an accurate statement of the law, but Millette involved a judgment creditor seeking to set aside an allegedly fraudulent conveyance, and the creditor sought "neither title nor possession of the property." See id. at 874 (¶ 15). Here, Tim is an heir at law who seeks a child's share of the real property deeded away by his mother, allegedly as a result of undue influence. On this point, Estate of Reid is illustrative: Reid's potential heir at law brought an undue influence suit to set aside her transfers of real property to Reid's adopted son, including a deed that had been executed and recorded before her death. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the ten-year statute of limitations applied. See Estate of Reid , 825 So.2d at 6 (¶¶ 16-19).

¶ 9. The statute of limitations does not bar this suit.

3. Laches

¶ 10. Sarah also contends that Tim's claim should be barred by laches, but laches is precluded by our prior decision on the statute of limitations issue. "A delay short of the statutory period of limitations does not bar recovery." Greenlee v. Mitchell , 607 So.2d 97, 111 (Miss. 1992). "The doctrine of laches is simply inapplicable where a claim has not yet been barred by the applicable statute of limitations." Id.

4. Venue

¶ 11. Next, we address Sarah's contention that the only proper venue for this suit was in Humphreys County, where the farm is located. She points to Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-5-1 (Rev. 2014), which provides in relevant part that "[s]uits to confirm title to real estate, and suits to cancel clouds or remove doubts therefrom, shall be brought in the county where the land, or some part thereof, is situated."

¶ 12. Sarah concedes, however, the venue issue was never pursued to a ruling in the chancery court. This operates as a waiver of the issue except in those rare cases where venue is also jurisdictional. "It is an appellant's duty to secure a ruling on a motion before the failure to grant it can be contested on appeal." Ford v. Magnolia Franchise Holdings Inc. , 112 So.3d 467, 471 (¶ 14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

¶ 13. Aware of the potential waiver, Sarah contends that the particular defect she alleges is jurisdictional and therefore can be raised for the first time on appeal. She cites Donald v. Amoco Production Company , 735 So.2d 161, 181-82 (¶¶ 73-78) (Miss. 1999), which involved the local action doctrine. But Donald was founded on section 11-11-3 of the Mississippi Code, which at that time expressly limited circuit courts' jurisdiction over "actions of trespass on land, ejectment and actions for the statutory penalty for cutting and boxing trees" to the county in which the affected land was situated. Donald , 735 So.2d at 181 (¶ 73) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (Supp. 1998) ). The court noted that in Mississippi the local action doctrine was limited to that statute and those causes of action. See id. at (¶ 74) (quoting City of Jackson v. Wallace , 189 Miss. 252, 263, 196 So. 223, 226 (1940) (McGowen, J., dissenting) ). "The only local actions with us are ejectment and trespass on land." Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also noted that "Mississippi has rejected the common law local action doctrine" and that the statute "alone determines whether a court can exercise jurisdiction over a 'local' cause of action." Trust Co. Bank v. U.S. Gypsum Co. , 950 F.2d 1144, 1149-50 (5th Cir. 1992).

¶ 14. Sarah also cites Belk v. State Department of Public Welfare , 473 So.2d 447, 449 (Miss. 1985), where the supreme court stated in dicta that unspecified "actions dealing with property" were an exception to the general rule that challenges to venue can be waived. But this statement appears to just refer to our limited, statutory implementation of the local action doctrine previously discussed.

¶ 15. In Ravesies v. Martin , 190 Miss. 92, 99-101, 199 So. 282, 284-85 (1940), the Mississippi Supreme Court directly addressed the question of whether venue was jurisdictional in suits to confirm title. It held that "[t]he jurisdiction of the chancery court to cancel a claim as a cloud upon the title of the real owner of any real estate is conferred by Section 404 of the Code of 1930, and this statute does not prescribe that jurisdiction of the subject matter shall be dependent upon the land being situated in the county where the suit is filed." Section 404 of the Code of 1930 is currently codified as Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-17-31 (Rev. 2004) and appears to be unchanged since the Ravesies decision in 1940. Sarah dismisses Ravesies as an "ancient case," but it appears to be controlling precedent nonetheless.

¶ 16. We conclude that venue was not jurisdictional in this case, and Sarah waived any objection to the suit being heard in Sharkey County.

5. Presumption of Undue Influence

¶ 17. Finally, Sarah challenges the chancery court's finding that there was a presumption of undue influence in various transfers related to the property because of a confidential relationship between Sarah and her mother and father. See generally Madden v. Rhodes , 626 So.2d 608, 618-19 (Miss. 1993). Sarah does not challenge the chancellor's finding that she failed to rebut that presumption.

¶ 18. Sarah's argument on appeal is based on the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.8(c), which states that "[a] lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee." She points out that the chancellor, when announcing his decision from the bench, was very critical of Sarah's drafting the instruments that ultimately transferred her parents' property to her and appeared to assume her actions were a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

¶ 19. First of all, it is not clear that Sarah complied with Rule 1.8(c). On its face, the rule does not prohibit an attorney from preparing an instrument effecting a gift from a client to the attorney when the attorney and client are related, but the comment to the rule notes the caveat that such gifts are permissible only "if the transaction meets general standards of fairness." The Supreme Court of South Dakota, considering a similar case, held that "Rule 1.8(c) cannot be used to excuse substantial gifts which are facially disproportionate to gifts made to other relatives in the same class." In re Discipline of Mattson , 651 N.W.2d 278, 288 (¶ 50) (S.D. 2002) (citing Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 127(1) (1998) ). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin similarly held that the gift must be "reasonable and natural under the circumstances or no more than would be received by law." State v. Horan , 21 Wis.2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1963). The California Supreme Court has opined that "[t]here is nothing improper in an attorney's drawing wills for his family or for relatives, provided the gift to him is reasonable under the circumstances." Magee v. State Bar of Cal. , 58 Cal.2d 423, 24 Cal.Rptr. 839, 374 P.2d 807, 845 (1962).

¶ 20. We also note that Rule 1.8(c) is part of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, not substantive law. It is well established in Mississippi that an attorney-client relationship is a per se confidential one. See Hitt v. Terry , 92 Miss. 671, 710-11, 46 So. 829, 840 (1908) ("[T]he law presumes deeds or wills made by the client to the attorney ... to be prima facie void, and therefore requires such beneficiary under the will to show the absence of undue influence ...."); Meek v. Perry , 36 Miss. 190, 245 (1858) ("[T]he law, upon grounds of great public policy, utility, or necessity, presumes the existence of undue influence from the known confidential relations of ... client and attorney ...." (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) ); see also Lowrey v. Will of Smith , 543 So.2d 1155, 1160-62 (Miss. 1989) ; Estate of McRae v. Watkins , 522 So.2d 731, 737-38 (Miss. 1988). As the supreme court stated in Estate of McRae :

[T]he law declares that when there is a fiduciary or confidential relation, and there is a gift or conveyance of dubious consideration from the subservient to the dominant party, it is presumed void. This is not because it is certain the transaction was unfair; to the contrary, it is because the Court cannot be certain it was fair . As stated in Meek v. Perry , 36 Miss. at 246, "if the court does not watch these transactions with a jealousy almost invincible, in a great majority of cases, it will lend its assistance to fraud." Further, this is a "policy of the law, founded on the safety and convenience of mankind ... preventing acts of bounty." And, the Court will not permit such a transaction to stand, "... though the transaction may be not only free from fraud, but the most moral in its nature." Id. at 247. "The rule of law in these cases is not a rule of inference, from testimony, but a rule of protection, as expedient for the general good." Id. at 244.

Id. at 737 (emphasis omitted in part).

¶ 21. The challenged transfers are inter vivos, and for inter vivos gifts where there is a confidential relationship between the donor and the donee, a presumption of undue influence arises even without a showing that the recipient played an active part in the preparation or execution of the instrument. See In re Will of Moses , 227 So.2d 829, 835 (Miss. 1969).

¶ 22. We are aware of no Mississippi authority making an exception to this general rule for an attorney who is a relative of the grantor, but we recognize that there are solid reasons for such an exception to exist, and other states have allowed attorneys to prepare wills and deeds for family members to the attorney's benefit without an automatic presumption of undue influence. See, e.g. , Krischbaum v. Dillon , 58 Ohio St.3d 58, 567 N.E.2d 1291, 1296-97 (1991). But if we were to adopt such an exception, it would be subject to the same limitations as the ethical rule. It is true that the purpose of the Rules of Professional Conduct is generally to provide for "lawyer's self-assessment" and "structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies." See Turner v. Turner , 73 So.3d 576, 580 (¶ 17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). But based on our survey of the law, it is clear that courts recognize a great overlap between ethical rules and the substantive law when evaluating gifts to an attorney-draftsman. While Horan was an attorney discipline case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the same standard applied to undue influence: "if the attorney acted as draftsman of the will and there are any circumstances either because of preferential treatment in relationship to others or if the bequest is more than a token or modest bequest from a personal friend or the attorney suggested the bequest to himself or to a member of his family, or any other somewhat persuasive circumstances, the inference [of undue influence] arises ...." Horan , 123 N.W.2d at 492. Even if we were to accept that the chancellor erred in not recognizing a general exception to a per se presumption of undue influence when attorneys draft instruments for relatives, it is apparent to us that any error as to the legal standard would have been harmless given the particular facts of this case.

¶ 23. The nature of Sarah's relationship with her parents clearly supports the chancellor's finding of a confidential relationship, even if there was no per se rule based on her status as their attorney. While there was little evidence of incapacity or physical dependency of her parents, a confidential relationship can be founded on trust just as it can upon physical weakness or dependence. See, e.g. , Norris v. Norris , 498 So.2d 809, 812 (Miss. 1986). The proof showed that Sarah did not just prepare the deeds, wills, and trust documents that resulted in her inheriting their entire estate; she had a longstanding attorney-client relationship with both of her parents and was also the attorney-in-fact for both. Sarah executed the deed from her father to her mother on his behalf using the power of attorney, at a time when he was dying of cancer. She also admitted she had not advised her parents to seek advice from outside counsel, at any point, and there is no evidence her parents ever received such outside counsel. The chancellor further found that Sarah had concealed the terms of the trust-if not its existence-from her brother, whom she had previously represented as an attorney. The ultimate result of this series of transactions was that Sarah received her parents' entire estate, to the exclusion of her brother.

¶ 24. Attorneys should be held to a higher standard than laymen, to protect both the general good and integrity and reputation of the legal profession. See Estate of McRae , 522 So.2d at 737 ; Lowrey , 543 So.2d at 1161-62. We find no error in the chancellor's findings regarding the presumption of undue influence.

6. Priority of Liens

¶ 25. Finally, the Bank contends that the chancellor erred in finding that the Bank's liens acquired after the filing of the lis pendens in this suit did not have priority over Tim's claim. The Bank points to the former Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-9-115 (2013), since repealed, which was in effect at the relevant time and provided:

With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or assisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the existence of trust powers and their proper exercise by the trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The third person is not bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to act or is properly exercising the power; and a third person, without actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee as if the trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers he purports to exercise. A third person is not bound to assure the proper application of trust assets paid or delivered to the trustee.

¶ 26. We find no merit to this contention. The statute spoke to a third party's reliance on the "existence of trust power[s] and their proper exercise by the trustee"; it "abolish[ed] the common law broad duty of inquiry of third parties dealing with a trustee." Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Hanney , 262 P.3d 406, 410-11 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (considering Utah's identical analogue to the Mississippi statute). The judgment below set aside the deed to the trust; the issue was not the exercise of trust powers by the trustee but whether the trust actually owned the property in the first place. The statute simply has no application to this judgment.

¶ 27. AFFIRMED.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, CARLTON, WILSON, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR.


author: WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT:

text:
    John BATTLE, Jr. a/k/a John Battle a/k/a John Westley Battle, Jr., Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
    NO. 2016-KA-00534-COA
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    April 17, 2018 Rehearing Denied August 28, 2018
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: AZKI SHAH
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
    BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, JJ.
   WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. John Battle was convicted of deliberate design murder and sentenced to life imprisonment following a jury trial in the Coahoma County Circuit Court. On appeal, Battle argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction, that the jury's verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. We find no error and affirm Battle's conviction and sentence. We decline to address his ineffective assistance claim because the record is not sufficient to address the claim on direct appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Around 9 p.m. on March 27, 2012, Patrick Williams and his girlfriend, Tanedra Christian, were sitting on the porch of Christian's home in Jonestown in Coahoma County. A white car, later identified as belonging to Clyde Chatman Jr., drove past Christian's house, turned around, and drove by again. Chatman had bought Christian gifts in the past, and she knew that he was interested in her romantically. Christian testified that Williams watched the car drive by, stood up, and walked toward the street. Williams then said, "[T]hey won't stop playing with me." After the car passed by, Williams left Christian's porch and began walking toward his home nearby. As Christian started to walk back inside her home, she heard gunshots. She ran inside and told her sister to go look for Williams. Christian did not see who fired the shots and had not seen anyone nearby except for the white car.

¶ 3. Byron and Toshemah Cosby own a nearby gas station. They heard the gunshots, but they did not go outside immediately because customers were waiting on them. When they went outside a few minutes later, they found Williams lying on the ground. Toshemah testified that Williams called to her for help and said that "those motherfuckers from Friars Point" had shot him. Williams had been shot three times in the back. He died at the scene a few minutes later.

¶ 4. Deputy Myette Dawson of the Coahoma County Sheriff's Department testified that within about an hour he had received tips identifying Chatman, Battle, and Reginald Cox as potential suspects. All three were brought in for questioning, and Dawson obtained gunshot residue samples from each man.

¶ 5. Chief Deputy Fernando Bee testified that prior to Williams's murder, he saw Chatman driving his white Crown Victoria in Jonestown. Bee initially testified that he thought he saw Chatman around 6 p.m., but he later acknowledged that he was uncertain of the time and that it could have been later. Bee could see two more people inside Chatman's car, but he could not identify them. Bee knew that Chatman was from Friars Point, and he wondered what he was doing driving around Jonestown. Later that evening, Bee heard gunshots, and someone flagged him down near the gas station where Williams had been shot. Williams had lost consciousness by the time Bee arrived.

¶ 6. After Battle was arrested, he asked to speak to Bee. Bee testified that he gave Battle a Miranda warning, and Battle then gave a voluntary statement. According to Bee, Battle admitted that he was in a car in Jonestown with Chatman and Cox on the night that Williams was killed. Battle claimed that Williams reached inside their car and hit Chatman. Battle then "heard a gunshot," and Williams ran away. Battle admitted that he then "reached out of the car and ... took a couple of shots at Williams" as Williams fled. Battle stated that he, Chatman, and Cox then drove back to Friars Point, and he tossed the gun into a field along the way. Deputies were unable to locate the gun. Bee testified that two or three tractors were in the process of disking the field that Battle had described to him.

¶ 7. Bee's testimony was the only evidence of Battle's confession. Bee testified that he recorded the confession, and he gave the audiotape to the deputy in charge of the case file. However, the State was unable to find the tape later, and Bee did not know what happened to it. Battle never provided a written statement.

¶ 8. Shannon Roy testified for the State as an expert on latent prints. She testified that a print lifted from the front passenger quarter panel of Chatman's car matched Battle's left palm print. She acknowledged that she could not say when the print was made. She also acknowledged that there were sixteen unidentified prints in and on the car.

¶ 9. Samuel Suggs, a forensic trace evidence specialist with the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory, testified as an expert about the results of tests of gunshot residue kits collected during the investigation.

A sample collected from Battle's right palm revealed a particle with an elemental composition of barium and antimony that was "indicative of" gunshot residue. Suggs testified that the sample was only "indicative of" gunshot residue-and not a "positive" test result-because the third element of gunshot residue, lead, was not present in the sample. Suggs also acknowledged that it is possible for a sample to test positive for, or indicative of, gunshot residue because the person recently handled fireworks or brake pads. Suggs testified that the other three samples obtained from Battle-from his left palm, the back of his left hand, and the back of his right hand-all tested negative for gunshot residue. Suggs testified that washing one's hands and various other activities can remove gunshot residue particles. In this case, gunshot residue kits were obtained from Battle about two hours after the shooting.

¶ 10. Suggs also testified that four samples obtained from Chatman's car-from the rear driver's side window, behind the driver's seat headrest, the front interior passenger door, and the rear driver's side interior door-all tested positive for gunshot residue. Two samples obtained from Chatman were indicative of gunshot residue, and two were negative. Three samples obtained from Cox were indicative of gunshot residue, and the other sample was negative.

¶ 11. Battle did not testify, but he called nine friends and family members as witnesses. Several friends testified that they were with Battle or saw him in Friars Point on March 27, 2012; however, their testimony was not entirely consistent, and none of them testified that they saw Battle after 7:30 or 8 p.m. that evening. Battle's mother testified that he was at her house beginning at around 8 p.m. and never left until the police came to her house to arrest him later that night. Battle's sister testified that Battle answered the phone when she called her mother's house around 9:20 p.m. Battle's half-brother testified that he saw Battle at their mother's house from around 8:15 to 8:45 p.m. Battle's half-brother then left the house briefly, but he testified that Battle was still at their mother's house when he returned around 9:30 p.m. Deputy Bee testified in rebuttal that he had lived in Friars Point for most of his life; that he had known Battle's mother, sister, and half-brother for many years; and that none of them had ever contacted him to offer an alibi for Battle.

¶ 12. The jury found Battle guilty of deliberate design murder, and the circuit court sentenced him to life imprisonment. Battle filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which the circuit court denied, and a notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 13. When we address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is not whether this Court "believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Bush v. State , 895 So.2d 836, 843 (¶ 16) (Miss. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. State , 233 So.3d 288 (Miss. 2017).

¶ 14. When we review the denial of a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence, we similarly consider "the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict," and we will not reverse unless the "verdict ... is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice." Little , 233 So.3d at 292 (¶ 21). "We do not make independent resolutions of conflicting evidence. Nor do we reweigh the evidence or make witness-credibility determinations." Id. at (¶ 20) (citation omitted). "Instead, 'when the evidence is conflicting, the jury will be the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight and worth of their testimony.' " Id. at (¶ 20) (quoting Gathright v. State , 380 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Miss. 1980) ). We review the trial judge's decision to deny a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Id. at (¶ 21).

¶ 15. Battle argues that Deputy Bee's testimony that Battle confessed to shooting Williams is not credible because the State failed to produce a recording of the confession and because Battle never gave a written statement. Battle also argues that his family's testimony that he was at home at the time of the shooting is more credible than Deputy Bee's testimony that he confessed to the shooting. Based on these assertions, Battle argues that he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal or at least a new trial. We disagree.

¶ 16. The evidence in this case is sufficient to support the conviction because Deputy Bee's testimony that Battle confessed, together with the physical evidence, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the evidence in this case was clearly conflicting, so the jury must "be the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and worth of their testimony." Id. at (¶ 20). "[W]e do not resolve conflicts between evidence." Id. at 289 (¶ 1). "Additionally, it is well-established that a person may be found guilty based on nothing more than the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness." Graves v. State , 216 So.3d 1152, 1161 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2016). Here, Deputy Bee's testimony that Battle confessed supports the verdict, and his testimony was not inherently "implausible or so substantially impeached as to be unworthy of belief." Brown v. State , 764 So.2d 463, 467 (¶ 9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). The jury could have concluded that Battle's friends and relatives, who never contacted law enforcement about Battle's alleged alibi, were not credible. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion by denying Battle's motion for a new trial.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 17. Battle also claims he did not receive effective assistance of counsel at trial.

Battle alleges that he was arrested and interrogated without probable cause, but his trial attorney failed to file a motion to suppress his confession or other evidence. We decline to address this claim on direct appeal, as there is nothing in the record to support it.

¶ 18. To prove that his trial counsel was ineffective, Battle "must show both (1) 'that counsel's performance was deficient'-i.e., 'that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment'-and (2) that he was prejudiced as a result-i.e., 'that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.' " Wilson v. State , 198 So.3d 408, 414 (¶ 22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ). "If either prong is not met, the claim fails." Havard v. State , 928 So.2d 771, 781 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2006).

¶ 19. Ordinarily, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised in a motion for post-conviction relief, not on direct appeal. Pinter v. State , 221 So.3d 378, 386 (¶ 17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). As this Court has summarized,

It is unusual for this Court to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when the claim is made on direct appeal because there is usually insufficient evidence within the record to evaluate the claim. Because an appellate court is limited to the trial record on direct appeal, issues of ineffective assistance of counsel are more appropriate in a motion for post-conviction relief. We may address such claims on direct appeal only if the issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record. If the record is not sufficient to address the claims on direct appeal, the Court should dismiss the claims without prejudice, preserving the defendant's right to raise the claims later in a properly filed motion for post-conviction relief.

Johnson v. State , 191 So.3d 732, 735-36 (¶ 13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied , 202 So.3d 209 (Miss. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 670, 196 L.Ed.2d 556 (2017) (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).

¶ 20. Consistent with this Court's usual practice, we decline to address Battle's ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. The record reveals little of the circumstances of Battle's arrest. Deputy Dawson and Deputy Bee testified that unspecified tips led them to identify Chatman, Battle, and Cox as suspects. Chatman turned himself in voluntarily, and Bee's testimony suggests that Chatman then implicated Battle and Cox. As noted above, Bee testified that Battle gave a voluntary statement after receiving a Miranda warning. That is all that the present record reveals. Battle's trial counsel may have foregone a motion to suppress because probable cause for the arrest was evident. In any event, the record is insufficient for us to determine why trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress or whether there would have been a legal or factual basis for such a motion. We therefore dismiss this claim without prejudice. Battle may raise the issue in a motion for post-conviction relief, provided he first obtains permission from the Mississippi Supreme Court. See Pinter , 221 So.3d at 386 (¶ 19) & n.2 ; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2015).

CONCLUSION

¶ 21. The State presented sufficient evidence to convict Battle of deliberate design murder, and the jury's verdict is not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We decline to address Battle's claim of ineffective assistance because the present record is not sufficient to address the claim.

¶ 22. AFFIRMED.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR.

      Battle, Chatman, and Cox were indicted together. The circuit court subsequently granted motions to sever filed by both Battle and Cox. Chatman was tried separately and convicted of deliberate design murder, and this Court affirmed his conviction on appeal. See Chatman v. State , No. 2016-KA-01285-COA (Miss. Ct. App. April 17, 2018) (modified opinion on motion for rehearing). To the extent that the State's theory in this case differed from its theory of the case in Chatman , our law "allows the State to argue alternate theories of the case when prosecuting separate individuals." Carr v. State , 655 So.2d 824, 835 (Miss. 1995).

      Much of Suggs's testimony is missing from the trial transcript because, for reasons that are not clear, the court reporter failed to transcribe or record a significant part of Suggs's testimony. The State described the missing portion of Suggs's testimony in a statement of the evidence filed pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c). Battle's retained appellate counsel did not object or otherwise respond to the State's Rule 10 statement. The Rule 10 statement's description of the testimony concerning tests of samples obtained from Battle's hands is also consistent with statements made by Battle's trial counsel during her closing argument. In addition, part of the transcript of the State's opening statement is gibberish. The State also raised this issue with the court reporter, but apparently she was unable to correct it. In any event, the State's opening statement is not material to any issues raised on appeal.

      The State correctly argues that Battle's appeal was untimely because the order denying his post-trial motion was entered on March 2, 2016, so his notice of appeal should have been filed no later than Friday, April 1, 2016. See M.R.A.P. 4(e). Battle's notice of appeal, which his retained appellate counsel sent to the circuit clerk via regular mail, was not filed until Monday, April 4, 2016. Rather than penalize Battle for his attorney's poor choice of filing methods, we suspend the rules and allow the appeal. See M.R.A.P. 2(c).

      See Stevenson v. State , 738 So.2d 1248, 1252 (¶ 19) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing "to disturb the verdict of [the] jury," as the jury was entitled to find "the State's witnesses more credible than [the defendant] and his three witnesses who, on the face of it, were subject to claims of bias by virtue of their family and emotional ties to the defendant"); see also Bergmann v. McCaughtry , 65 F.3d 1372, 1380 (7th Cir. 1995) ("family members can be easily impeached for bias").