text:
    In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Albert J. Armonda, Attorney at Law: Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant, v. Albert J. Armonda, Respondent.
    Supreme Court

      No. 03-1652-D.

      Decided October 28, 2003.

    2003 WI 136
    (Also reported in 670 N.W.2d 542.)
   PER CURIAM.

¶ 1. This case is before us under SCR 22.12 on a stipulation between the parties, Attorney Albert J. Armonda, and the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR). The stipulation consists of Attorney Armonda's admission of the facts and misconduct alleged by the OLR and his agreement to the level of discipline that the OLR is seeking.

¶ 2. We accept the stipulation and determine that the seriousness of Attorney Armonda's misconduct warrants the imposition of the recommended 60-day suspension.

¶ 3. Attorney Armonda was admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin in 1996. He has had four prior administrative suspensions for failing to comply with mandatory CLE reporting requirements and for nonpayment of State Bar dues.

¶ 4. The complaint against him which is the subject of this stipulation covers nine counts and involves six clients.

¶ 5. Count One concerns a grievance filed against Attorney Armonda by a client. Attorney Armonda failed to act on the OLR's request that he respond to that grievance, a violation of SCR 22.03(6).

¶ 6. Counts Two through Six concern Attorney Armonda's representation of a married couple. When he agreed to represent them he was under an administrative suspension and did not inform them of this fact. This constituted a violation of SCR 31.10(1), SCR 20:8.4(f), and SCR 20:8.4(c). Once he did begin to represent them, Attorney Armonda failed to take action on their claim, failed to communicate with them, and failed to return their documents and $750 retainer fee, all in violation of SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.4(a), and SCR 20:1.16(d).

¶ 7. Count Seven relates to Attorney Armonda's representation of a divorce client. He failed to appear at a pretrial conference and also to comply with opposing counsel's discovery requests, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.

¶ 8: Counts Eight and Nine pertain to Attorney Armonda's representation of another married couple in a bankruptcy matter. They filed a grievance against him and he attempted to have them withdraw the grievance. In addition, he failed to forward an $800 check to their mortgage company as they requested. These actions were in violation of SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.03(2), and SCR 20:1.15(a).

¶ 9. The parties advise the court that the terms of this stipulation were not bargained for or negotiated between the parties. Attorney Armonda admits the facts and misconduct alleged by the OLR and agrees to the level of discipline that the OLR seeks. He further indicates that he fully understands the misconduct allegations, the ramifications should the court impose the stipulated level of discipline, his right to contest the matter including consultation with retained counsel, and that his entry into the stipulation is knowing and voluntary.

¶ 10. The OLR submits that an appropriate level of discipline is a 60-day suspension. It notes that in similar cases, an example being In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Baehr, 2002 WI 17, 250 Wis. 2d 541, 639 N.W.2d 708, a longer suspension was ordered. However, the OLR believes a shorter suspension is warranted in this case because Attorney Armonda does not have any prior substantive suspensions, it accepts his explanation that during the time of these violations he was suffering from health problems, he is remorseful for his conduct, and he has cooperated with the OLR except as otherwise noted.

¶ 11. In conclusion, we accept the stipulation of the parties. Attorney Armonda's misconduct represents a serious failure to comply with the specified Rules of Professional Conduct. Furthermore, the level of discipline requested by the OLR is appropriate for this misconduct.

¶ 12. IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Armonda to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, effective December 2, 2003.

¶ 13. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Armonda comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended.

       SCR 22.12 provides: Stipulation.
      (1) The director may file with the complaint a stipulation of the director and the respondent to the facts, conclusions of law regarding misconduct, and discipline to be imposed. The supreme court may consider the complaint and stipulation without the appointment of a referee.
      (2) If the supreme court approves a stipulation, it shall adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of law and impose the stipulated discipline.
      (3) If the supreme court rejects the stipulation, a referee shall be appointed and the matter shall proceed as a complaint filed without a stipulation.
      (4) A stipulation rejected by the supreme court has no evidentiary value and is without prejudice to the respondent's defense of the proceeding or the prosecution of the complaint.

       SCR 22.03(6) provides:
      "(6) In the course of the investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted in the grievance."

       SCR 31.10(1) provides:
      (1) If a lawyer fails to comply with the attendance requirement of SCR 31.02, fails to comply with the reporting requirement of SCR 31.03(1), or fails to pay the late fee under SCR 31.03(2), the board shall serve a notice of noncompliance on the lawyer. This notice shall advise the lawyer that the state bar membership of the lawyer shall be automatically suspended for failing to file evidence of compliance or to pay the late fee within 60 days after service of the notice. The board shall certify the names of all lawyers so suspended under this rule to the clerk of the supreme court and to each judge of a court of record in this state. A lawyer shall not engage in the practice of law in Wisconsin while his or her state bar membership is suspended under this rule.

       SCR 20:8.4(1) provides:
      "Misconduct. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (f) violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers."

       SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:
      "Misconduct. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."

       SCR 20:1.3 provides:
      "Diligence. A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."

       SCR 20:1.4(a) provides:
      "(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information."

       SCR 20:1.16(d) provides:
      (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.

       SCR 21.15(4) provides:
      (4) Every attorney shall cooperate with the office of lawyer regulation in the investigation, prosecution and disposition of grievances, complaints filed with or by the director, and petitions for reinstatement. An attorney's wilful failure to cooperate with the office of lawyer regulation constitutes violation of the. rules of professional conduct for attorneys.

       SCR 22.03(2) provides:
      (2) Upon commencing an investigation, the director shall notify the respondent of the matter being investigated unless in the opinion of the director the investigation of the matter requires otherwise. The respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a request for a written response. The director may allow additional time to respond. Following receipt of the response, the director may conduct further investigation and may compel the respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and present any information deemed relevant to the investigation.

       SCR 20:1.15(a) provides:
      (a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, that property of clients and third persons that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation or when acting in a fiduciary capacity. Funds held in connection with a representation or in a fiduciary capacity include funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal representative of an estate, or otherwise. All funds of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts as provided in paragraph (c). The trust account shall be maintained in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit union, savings and loan association or other investment institution authorized to do business and located in Wisconsin. The trust account shall be clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar import. No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to pay or avoid imposition of account service charges, may be deposited in such an account. Unless the client otherwise directs in writing, securities in bearer form shall be kept by the attorney in a safe deposit box in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit union, savings and loan association or other investment institution authorized to do business and located in Wisconsin. The safe deposit box shall be clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar import. Other property of a client or third person shall be idéntified as such and appropriately safeguarded. If a lawyer also licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or property in connection with an out-of-state representation, this provision shall not supersede the trust account rules of the other state.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Susan L. Schuster, Attorney at Law: Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant, v. Susan L. Schuster, Respondent.
    Supreme Court

      No. 03-1935-D.

      Decided October 28, 2003.

    2003 WI 135
    (Also reported in 670 N.W.2d 545.)
   PER CURIAM.

¶ 1. We review the stipulation filed by Attorney Susan L. Schuster and the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) pursuant to SCR 22.12. As part of the stipulation Attorney Schuster admits to engaging in professional misconduct involving the use of her office trust account, failing to take steps reasonably practicable to protect a client's interest, and making misrepresentations in a disclosure to the OLR. The parties stipulated that as a sanction for the misconduct Attorney Schuster's license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for 90 days and that, upon reinstatement of her license, she be required to submit quarterly trust account records to the OLR for review for a period of two years.

¶ 2. We approve the stipulation and conclude that the seriousness of Attorney Schuster's misconduct warrants a 90-day suspension of her license to practice law. We also agree that it is appropriate to impose conditions upon Attorney Schuster's practice following her reinstatement.

¶ 3. Attorney Schuster was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in March of 2000 and practices as a sole practitioner in Stoughton. She has not previously been the subject of a disciplinary action.

¶ 4. In July 2003 the OLR filed an order to answer and complaint. The complaint alleged four counts of misconduct related to Attorney Schuster's use of her client trust account and two counts of misconduct related to her representation of a client in a custody and child support matter.

¶ 5. On August 23, 2003, Attorney Schuster and the OLR entered into a stipulation whereby Attorney Schuster admitted the facts and misconduct alleged by the OLR in its complaint. The OLR's complaint alleged, and Attorney Schuster admitted, that she deposited personal funds into her trust account and paid both personal and business expenses out of the trust account, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a); that she wrote checks on her client trust account when she did not have sufficient funds on deposit to cover them, and that she wrote checks to both herself and payable to "cash" without determining the clients to whom the funds were attributable, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c); that she withdrew fees from her client trust account without first obtaining her clients' consent, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(d); and that she failed to create and maintain the required trust account records, including a receipts and disbursements journal, a subsidiary ledger for each client, and a reconciliation of the subsidiary ledgers to the monthly bank statements, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(e).

¶ 6. The OLR's complaint also alleged, and Attorney Schuster admitted, that she engaged in misconduct with respect to her representation of a client in a custody and child support matter. The client signed an agreement to pay Attorney Schuster an advance fee of $1500 against which hourly fees of $150 per hour would be drawn. The agreement provided that Attorney Schuster would bill the client on a monthly basis and it also provided that the client understood that the failure to make payments was sufficient reason for Attorney Schuster to withdraw as counsel. Contrary to the fee agreement Attorney Schuster did not routinely send the client monthly billing statements. Instead Attorney Schuster would call the client when she wanted a fee payment and would tell the client how much she expected the client to pay.

¶ 7. The $1500 advance fee covered Attorney Schuster's services for the client through early December 2001. Attorney Schuster prepared a bill covering the period from September 14, 2001, through December 13, 2001, showing that as of December 13, 2001, the client owed Attorney Schuster $91.25. As of January 8, 2002, Attorney Schuster's subsequent billing statement showed that the client owed a balance of $1004.75. On January 29, 2002, the client sent Attorney Schuster a check for $500. Attorney Schuster's subsequent billing statements failed to credit the client for this payment.

¶ 8. Between March 2002 and June 2002 the client made four additional payments to Attorney Schuster totaling $1250. These payments were credited to the client on the billing statements subsequently provided by Attorney Schuster to the OLR. At a pretrial conference held on May 16, 2002, the court scheduled a trial to begin on Friday, October 4, 2002. In a June 5, 2002, letter to Attorney Schuster the OLR staff pointed out Attorney Schuster's apparent failure to credit the client with the $500 payment in January 2002. The OLR requested a written response from Attorney Schuster.

¶ 9. On June 21, 2002, despite the OLR's inquiry, Attorney Schuster sent the client billing statements for April and May 2002 failing to credit the client with the $500 payment. In a cover letter Attorney Schuster informed the client she needed to make a $700 payment no later than July 3, 2002. In a June 28, 2002, letter to the OLR staff Attorney Schuster acknowledged that she had made an error on the client's bill and on July 1, 2002, Attorney Schuster sent the client a letter informing her of the oversight. The corrected balance the client then owed Attorney Schuster was $840.

¶ 10. Attorney Schuster stated she had telephone conversations with the client in July and August 2002 regarding payment of outstanding fees and she said the client promised to make payments but failed to do so. On September 24, 2002, Attorney Schuster telephoned the client and informed her if she did not make an additional fee payment, Attorney Schuster intended to withdraw as the client's counsel prior to the October 4, 2002, trial. The client promised to make a payment as soon as she received her next paycheck on September 27, 2002.

¶ 11. On September 25, 2002, Attorney Schuster wrote to the court, with a copy to opposing counsel and the guardian ad litem, listing five issues to be resolved at the October 4 trial, including attorney fees. On Friday, September 27, 2002, one week before the scheduled trial, the client met Attorney Schuster in a parking lot and gave her a $500 money order. The client said at no time during the meeting did Attorney Schuster indicate she intended to withdraw from the case. Attorney Schuster denied to the OLR that she met with the client on September 27 and denied receiving a $500 money order. The client provided the OLR with a copy of a $500 money order payable to Attorney Schuster dated September 27, 2002.

¶ 12. After sending a copy of the money order to Attorney Schuster, along with the OLR's investigative report, the OLR investigator was contacted by Attorney Schuster's counsel who requested a cancelled copy of the money order. The OLR subpoenaed and obtained the cancelled $500 money order which showed that Attorney Schuster had endorsed it and that it had cleared the credit union on October 3, 2002, the day before the client's trial. Only after receiving this evidence did Attorney Schuster acknowledge she had received the $500 from the client.

¶ 13. Despite receiving the $500 payment Attorney Schuster prepared a "notice of withdrawal as attorney," which she dated September 27, 2002. The notice cited the client's failure to substantially fulfill an obligation to the attorney, as set forth in an accompanying affidavit, as the basis for the withdrawal.

¶ 14. Attorney Schuster claimed to have mailed the notice of withdrawal to the client on September 27, 2002, asserting the client had a full week to retain new counsel. Contrary to Attorney Schuster's assertion the affidavit attached to the notice of withdrawal was not notarized until September 30, 2002, so the notice could not have been mailed on September 27. Attorney Schuster subsequently admitted she had not mailed the notice of withdrawal on September 27. Attorney Schuster hand-delivered the notice and affidavit to the circuit court on Monday, September 30, 2002. She claimed the circuit court clerk told her that a motion hearing would be scheduled for Wednesday, October 2, 2002. When the court issued a motion hearing notice it gave the motion date as Thursday, October 3.

¶ 15. The client's first notice of Attorney Schuster's withdrawal was through a telephone message left by Attorney Schuster on the client's answering machine at 6:40 p.m. on Monday, September 30, 2002. The notice of Attorney Schuster's withdrawal and accompanying affidavit were personally served on the client the following day, October 1, 2002. Attorney Schuster appeared in circuit court on October 2, 2002. The judge signed an order permitting withdrawal from the case. Attorney Schuster made no effort to contact the client about seeking a continuance of the trial.

¶ 16. On October 3, 2002, Attorney Schuster received a recommendation from the guardian ad litem that was highly relevant to the client's trial. Attorney Schuster did not contact the client or attempt to provide her with a copy of the guardian ad litem's recommendation prior to the trial. Pursuant to the hearing notice she had received the client appeared at the courthouse on October 3 and learned that the judge had signed an order the day before permitting Attorney Schuster's withdrawal from the case. All parties and counsel except for Attorney Schuster appeared for the October 4, 2002, trial. The guardian ad litem and four witnesses were also present. Upon learning of the scheduling confusion the court vacated its order allowing Attorney Schuster to withdraw. The court granted a continuance to allow the client time to retain new counsel. On October 7, 2002, pursuant to a directive from the court, Attorney Schuster sent the client a copy of her file. On October 8 the judge signed a new order permitting Attorney Schuster to withdraw.

¶ 17. In the stipulation Attorney Schuster admits that by notifying the client four days prior to the trial that Attorney Schuster was withdrawing from representation, without discussing with the client whether she wanted to seek a continuance of the trial and without providing the client with a copy of her file upon termination of representation, Attorney Schuster violated SCR 20:1.16(d). Attorney Schuster also admits that by falsely stating in writing to the OLR that the client had failed to meet with Attorney Schuster on September 27, 2002, and had failed to make a $500 payment when in fact Attorney Schuster had received and cashed a $500 money order from the client dated September 27, 2002, and by falsely stating to the OLR that she had mailed the notice of her intention to withdraw to the client a full week in advance of the trial when the evidence demonstrated that she did not mail a notice to the client on that date, Attorney Schuster admits that she violated SCR 22.03(6).

¶ 18. The parties agree that an appropriate level of discipline to impose in response to Attorney Schuster's misconduct is a 90-day suspension of her license to practice law in Wisconsin. The parties also agree that, upon reinstatement of her Wisconsin law license, Attorney Schuster be required to submit quarterly trust account records to the OLR for review for a period of two years.

¶ 19. We approve the parties' stipulation and adopt the stipulated facts set forth therein. We also impose the stipulated discipline.

¶ 20. IT IS ORDERED that the license of Susan L. Schuster to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 90 days effective December 2, 2003.

¶ 21. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Susan L. Schuster comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.

¶ 22. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon reinstatement of Wisconsin law license Susan L. Schuster submit quarterly trust account records to the OLR for review for a period of two years.

       SCR 22.12 provides: Stipulation.
      (1) The director may file with the complaint a stipulation of the director and the respondent to the facts, conclusions of law regarding misconduct, and discipline to be imposed. The supreme court may consider the complaint and stipulation without the appointment of a referee.
      (2) If the supreme court approves a stipulation, it shall adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of law and impose the stipulated discipline.
      (3) If the supreme court rejects the stipulation, a referee shall be appointed and the matter shall proceed as a complaint filed without a stipulation.
      (4) A stipulation rejected by the supreme court has no evidentiary value and is without prejudice to the respondent's defense of the proceeding or the prosecution of the complaint.

       SCR 20:1.15(a) provides:
      (a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, that property of clients and third persons that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation or when acting in a fiduciary capacity. Funds held in connection with a representation or in a fiduciary capacity include funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal representative of an estate, or otherwise. All funds of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts as provided in paragraph (c). The trust account shall be maintained in a hank, savings bank, trust company, credit union, savings and loan association or other investment institution authorized to do business and located in Wisconsin. The trust account shall be clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar import. No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to pay or avoid imposition of account service charges, may be deposited in such an account. Unless the client otherwise directs in writing, securities in bearer form shall be kept by the attorney in a safe deposit box in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit union, savings and loan association or other investment institution authorized to do business and located in Wisconsin. The safe deposit box shall be clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar import. Other property of a client or third person shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. If a lawyer also licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or property in connection with an out-of-state representation, this provision shall not supersede the trust account rules of the other state.

       SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "Misconduct. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."

       SCR 20:1.15(d) provides:
      (d) When, in the representation, a lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be treated by the lawyer as trust property until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall continue to be treated as trust property until the dispute is resolved.

       SCR 20:1.15(e) provides:
      (e) Complete records of trust account funds and other trust property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least six years after termination of the representation. Complete records shall include: (i) a cash receipts journal, listing the sources and date of each receipt, (ii) a disbursements journal, listing the date and payee of each disbursement, with all disbursements being paid by check, (iii) a subsidiary ledger containing a separate page for each person .or company for whom funds have been received in trust, showing the date and amount of each receipt, the date and amount of each disbursement, and any unexpended balance, (iv) a monthly schedule of the subsidiary ledger, indicating the balance of each client's account at the end of each month, (v) a determination of the cash balance (checkbook balance) at the end of each month, taken from the cash receipts and cash disbursement journals and a reconciliation of the cash balance (checkbook balance) with the balance indicated in the bank statement, and (vi) monthly statements, including canceled checks, vouchers or share drafts, and duplicate deposit slips. A record of all property other than cash which is held in trust for clients or third persons, as required by paragraph (a) hereof, shall also be maintained. All trust account records shall be deemed to have public aspects as related to the lawyer's fitness to practice.

       SCR 20:1.16(d) provides:
      (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.

       SCR 22.03(6) provides: "(6) In the course of the investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted in the grievance."


text:
    In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Warren L. Brandt, Attorney at Law: Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant, v. Warren L. Brandt, Respondent.
    Supreme Court

      No. 02-1525-D.

      Decided October 30, 2003.

    2003 WI 138
    (Also reported in 670 N.W.2d 552.)
   PER CURIAM.

¶ 1. We review the recommendation of the referee that Attorney Warren L. Brandt be publicly reprimanded for professional misconduct. That misconduct consisted of failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and failing to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; failing to cooperate with the investigation into a grievance filed by his client; making false or misleading communications about himself and his services; and failing to identify on his office letterhead the jurisdictional limitation of an attorney not licensed to practice law in Wisconsin, who is listed as being "of counsel." Neither Attorney Brandt nor the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) has appealed from the referee's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended discipline.

¶ 2. We conclude that Attorney Brandt's professional misconduct warrants a public reprimand for his violation of various supreme court rules. We also determine that Attorney Brandt shall pay the costs and fees for these disciplinary proceedings totaling $9694.19.

¶ 3. Attorney Brandt was admitted to practice law in this state in 1978 and currently practices in Prescott, Wisconsin. He has not previously been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding.

¶ 4. The amended disciplinary complaint filed against Attorney Brandt alleged four counts of misconduct. The first involved the grievance filed by Attorney Brandt's former client, T.K., who had retained him in December of 1998 to recover money her credit union had confiscated from her account as consequence of an alleged forgery. T.K. made an appointment to meet with Attorney Brandt after seeing his advertisement in the yellow pages of a local telephone directory. She paid him a $1500 retainer fee and signed a legal representation agreement.

¶ 5. After being rebuffed in his initial contact with the credit union that T.K. believed had wrongly retained her money, Attorney Brandt did nothing else on her behalf.

¶ 6. Beginning in March of 1999 T.K. repeatedly called Attorney Brandt to ask about the status of her case; he never returned her calls. According to T.K. she never spoke with Attorney Brandt at all from March 1999 through January of 2000. Ultimately, she spoke with Attorney Brandt by telephone in April of 2000 at which time he told her that he had done some research and that she did not have a claim against the credit union.

¶ 7. In June 2000 T.K. filed a grievance against Attorney Brandt with the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR). A staff investigator subsequently wrote two letters to Attorney Brandt requesting his written response to T.K.'s grievance. Attorney Brandt did not respond to the two letters. In November of 2000, while the Office of Lawyer Regulation's (OLR) investigation into the grievance was pending, Attorney Brandt returned to T.K. the $1500 retainer fee she had paid and the documents she had given him.

¶ 8. During the OLR's investigation, it was discovered that Attorney Brandt had placed advertisements in the local telephone directories for the years 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99. Those advertisements were entitled "Brandt & Associates" with the name "Warren Lee Brandt, Esquire" appearing in italics beneath the name of the firm. The advertisements also contained the phrases "Former District Attorneys Pierce & St. Croix Counties," "Aggressive Trial Lawyers," and "Experienced Criminal Defense Attorneys." (Emphasis added.) These advertisements used plurals even though Attorney Brandt had been a sole practitioner since July 1996.

¶ 9. The OLR investigation further revealed that the office stationery letterhead used by Attorney Brandt in his practice during this period until May of 2000, identified one Joseph B. Marshall as being "of counsel" to Attorney Brandt's firm. During the time Attorney Brandt used this letterhead, Joseph Marshall was licensed to practice law in Minnesota but not in Wisconsin. Attorney Brandt's stationery letterhead did not note that fact.

¶ 10. The OLR misconduct complaint alleged the following four counts of misconduct by Attorney Brandt in violation of several rules of professional responsibility.

• By making only four calls to his client, T.K., during the one and one-half years he represented her, and by failing to respond to her inquiries and communicate with her, Attorney Brandt violated SCR 20:1.4(a) which requires a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
• By failing to respond to two requests from the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility staff to respond to the T.K. grievance, Attorney Brandt violated former SCR 21.03(4) and SCR 22.07(2).
• By placing advertisements in the 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 telephone directories suggesting that his firm included attorneys who were former district attorneys in two counties, aggressive trial lawyers, and experienced criminal defense attorneys, when in fact Attorney Brandt was the only attorney in his firm, Attorney Brandt violated SCR 20:7.1(a) which provides that a lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.
• By listing a lawyer as being "of counsel" on Attorney Brandt's letterhead stationery without identifying the jurisdictional limitation on the lawyer, who is not licensed to practice in Wisconsin, where Attorney Brandt's office is located, Attorney Brandt violated SCR 20:7.5(a); by failing to identify on his letterhead the jurisdictional limitation of an attorney not licensed to practice law in Wisconsin, Attorney Brandt violated SCR 20:7.5(b); and by falsely stating or implying that he practices in a partnership or other type of organization, Attorney Brandt violated SCR 20:7.5(d).

¶ 11. After the OLR's complaint was filed and Attorney Brandt filed his answer, Attorney Janet Jenkins was appointed as referee in this matter. Referee Jenkins subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the OLR with respect to several counts of misconduct that had been alleged. After hearing testimony on the remaining issues, the referee determined that Attorney Brandt had violated the various rules of professional conduct as alleged in the amended complaint.

¶ 12. We have reviewed the referee's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation for discipline. We conclude that the findings are supported by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence as required by SCR 22.16(5). Accordingly, we adopt those findings of fact and conclusions set forth in the referee's report and we accept the referee's recommendation that Attorney Brandt's professional misconduct warrants a public reprimand.

¶ 13. In addition, we conclude pursuant to our authority in SCR 22.24, that all the costs and fees incurred in this disciplinary proceeding shall be assessed against Attorney Brandt. We have reviewed the OLR's detailed itemization of its requested costs and fees and we conclude that under the circumstances of this case, those costs and fees totaling $9694.19 are reasonable. We believe those reasonable costs and fees should be borne by the attorney whose misconduct prompted the BAPR/OLR investigation which ultimately resulted in the referee's adverse determinations following an evidentiary hearing. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pangman, 216 Wis. 2d 440, 574 N.W.2d 232 (1998).

¶ 14. We conclude that a public reprimand and requiring Attorney Brandt to bear the costs and fees of this disciplinary proceeding is an appropriate discipline for his professional misconduct.

¶ 15. IT IS ORDERED that Attorney Warren L. Brandt is publicly reprimanded for his professional misconduct.

¶ 16. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order, Attorney Warren L. Brandt pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs and fees incurred in this proceeding totaling $9694.19.

       Effective October 1, 2000, Wisconsin's attorney disciplinary process underwent a substantial restructuring. The name of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases involving attorney misconduct was changed to the Office of Lawyer Regulation and the supreme court rules applicable to the lawyer regulation system were also revised. All of the events alleged in the OLR's four counts of misconduct in its disciplinary complaint occurred before the lawyer regulation system was restructured.

       As noted all of the events alleged in the misconduct complaint occurred before the restructuring of the lawyer regulation system effective October 1, 2000. Supreme Court Rule 20:1.4(a) was not affected by that restructuring and currently remains the same as it was during the time Attorney Brandt represented T.K.

       Former SCR 21.03(4) has been recreated and as modified now is found as SCR 21.15(4). Former SCR 22.07(2) now appears in substantially the same form as SCR 22.03(2).

       SCR 20:7.1(a) remains the same.

       All of the provisions in SCR 20:7.5(a), (h), and (d), currently remain the same.

       We reject Attorney Brandt's objection to the OLR's statement of costs and fees. We also reject his suggestion that the issue of whether these are reasonable costs and fees should be submitted to mediation. We find nothing in the supreme court rules indicating that mediation is available to resolve a dispute over the reasonableness of the costs and fees assessed against a respondent in a disciplinary proceeding.


text:
    In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against George W. Lyons, Attorney at Law: Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant, v. George W. Lyons, Respondent.
    Supreme Court

      No. 03-2080-D.

      Decided October 30, 2003.

    2003 WI 139
    (Also reported in 670 N.W.2d 550.)
   PER CURIAM.

¶ 1. We review the stipulation filed by Attorney George W Lyons and the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) pursuant to SCR 22.12.

¶ 2. On August 6, 2003, the OLR filed a complaint in this court alleging one count of misconduct against Attorney Lyons. Lyons did not file an answer, but instead, he and the OLR filed a stipulation in which Lyons admitted the facts and misconduct as alleged in the OLR complaint and agreed to the level of discipline the OLR sought in this disciplinary matter — a six-month suspension of Lyons' license to practice law in this state.

¶ 3. We approve the stipulation and adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions regarding Lyons' misconduct as alleged in the OLR's complaint. We determine that the seriousness of Attorney Lyons' misconduct warrants suspension of his license to practice law for a period of not less than six months.

¶ 4. George W Lyons was born on June 18, 1924, and was admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin in 1952. Lyons' license to practice law has been suspended for nonpayment of mandatory bar dues since October 31, 2002.

¶ 5. The OLR complaint asserted that in 1991, Lyons was convicted on two felony counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child; sentencing was withheld and Lyons was placed on probation for 11 years. However, prior to the expiration of his probation, revocation proceedings were commenced based on Lyons' admission that he had had inappropriate contact with two minors while he was on probation. As a result, Lyons' probation was revoked and on November 21, 2002, he was sentenced to two consecutive five-year prison terms for the underlying 1991 convictions. Lyons currently remains incarcerated on those sentences.

¶ 6. Neither the OLR, its predecessor (the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility), nor this court were informed of Lyons' 1991 conviction and sentence or the subsequent revocation of his probation and sentencing. In June 2002 a citizen sent a letter to the state bar questioning why a convicted child molester remained a member of the bar. That inquiry was referred to the OLR who then commenced this investigation leading to the misconduct complaint.

¶ 7. The OLR complaint alleged, and Lyons now agrees and stipulates, that his conduct involving the inappropriate touching of two children which resulted in the revocation of his probation and subsequent incarceration, violated SCR 20:8.4(b). Specifically it was alleged that Lyons had committed a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(b).

¶ 8. Lyons admits to the facts as alleged in the OLR complaint and agrees with the OLR that his misconduct warrants a suspension of his license to practice law in this state for a period of six months.

¶ 9. The memorandum in support of the stipulation jointly filed by the OLR and Lyons, notes that a six-month suspension of Lyons' license would require him to petition for reinstatement should he ever seek to do so. Lyons would then be required to affirmatively prove by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, his fitness to resume practice pursuant to SCR 22.31.

¶ 10. We believe a six-month suspension is an appropriate sanction in light of the egregious nature of Lyon's misconduct; moreover, as noted, a suspension of that length will require him to petition for reinstatement. SCR 22.28(3). It is also generally consistent with the level of discipline imposed in similar prior cases. Accordingly, we approve the stipulation, adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of law, and impose the stipulated discipline. See SCR 22.12(2). We determine, under these particular facts and circumstances, that Lyons' license to practice law be suspended for a minimum period of six months as discipline for his admitted violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct governing lawyers in this state.

¶ 11. IT IS ORDERED that the license of George W. Lyons to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six months, effective the date of this order.

¶ 12. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that George W Lyons comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.

       Effective October 1, 2000, Wisconsin's attorney disciplinary process was substantially restructured. The name of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases involving attorney misconduct was changed from the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility to the Office of Lawyer Regulation and the supreme court rules applicable to the lawyer regulation system were also revised in part. Some of the conduct underlying this case arose prior to October 1, 2000. However, the complainant in this case will be referred to as the OLR. All references to supreme court rules will be to the current version of the supreme court rules unless otherwise noted.