author: ANDERSON, J.

text:
    State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joseph K. Bryant, Defendant-Appellant.

    Court of Appeals

      No. 00-0686-CR.

      Submitted on briefs November 22, 2000.

    Decided January 31, 2001.

    2001 WI App 41
    (Also reported in 624 N.W.2d 865.)

      On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Suzanne Hagopian, assistant state public defender of Madison.
    On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Lara M. Herman, assistant attorney general, and James E. Doyle, attorney general.
    Before Brown, P. J., Nettesheim and Anderson, JJ.

       Petition to review denied.

   ANDERSON, J.

¶ 1. A jury convicted Joseph K. Bryant of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within one thousand feet of a school zone in violation of WlS. STAT. §§ 961.41(lm)(cm) and 961.49(2)(a)2.f (1999-2000). Bryant presents a single issue on appeal: Whether the circuit court erred in failing to suppress statements he made in response to questions asked when the arresting detective was completing an "arrest report." We affirm given that the questioning falls under the "routine booking question" exception.

¶ 2. We will first recap the testimony significant to the single issue Bryant raises. Using evidence developed while conducting a "controlled buy" of rock cocaine from an individual residing in the lower apartment of 5712 - 19th Avenue in the city of Kenosha, the Kenosha County Controlled Substances Unit obtained a search warrant for that residence. The search warrant listed Bryant as residing at the address based upon information Detective Gregory Ollila obtained when he checked motor vehicle registration records for the license plate of a van that was seen parked outside of the residence. The van was registered in Bryant's name and listed the address as his residence. Ollila participated in the execution of the search warrant, and in searching a bookcase in the living room of the residence, he found a bag of rock cocaine. When Ollila showed the bag to Bryant, who was handcuffed and sitting on the couch, Bryant stated, "[I]t's not mine, I have no idea how it got there."

¶ 3. Ollila transported Bryant to the Kenosha County Sheriffs Department and took him to the detective bureau for interrogation. Ollila testified that it was his practice to complete the department's arrest report before giving a suspect his or her Miranda rights and beginning an interrogation. He first asked Bryant his name and Bryant replied, "Joseph Karrah Bryant." Ollila then asked Bryant his address. Bryant answered that it was the lower apartment located at 5712 - 19th Avenue and that he had just moved there from Illinois. Ollila also asked if Bryant had a record and he replied that he was on parole in Illinois for possession of heroin with intent to deliver and had not informed his parole agent of the change of address.

¶ 4. Ollila testified that sometime after he started to complete the arrest report Bryant asked for an attorney. Ollila then completed the arrest report. Rather than advise Bryant of his Miranda rights and attempt to interrogate him, Ollila took him to the jail within thirty minutes of their arrival at the detective bureau.

¶ 5. During the trial, the State sought to admit Ollila's testimony concerning statements Bryant made in response to questions asked to complete the arrest report. Bryant, in turn, sought to suppress the statements because he had not been given his Miranda rights. The circuit court held that when Bryant was in the detective bureau while Ollila asked questions to complete the arrest report, Bryant was in custody and had not been given his Miranda rights. However, citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), and State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994), the court held that Bryant's supplying of his name and address and volunteering that he had just moved from Illinois would be admissible under the routine booking question exception. The court further ordered that evidence that Bryant admitted to being on parole would be suppressed because any questions concerning his prior criminal record would be the result of interrogation.

¶ 6. While acknowledging that Wisconsin has adopted the routine booking question exception to Miranda, permitting law enforcement to ask suspects about biographical data, Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 433-34, Bryant asserts that it does not apply under the facts of this case. He argues that because he was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone, the autobiographical questions were designed to elicit incriminating statements to establish that he had dominion and control over the rock cocaine.

¶ 7. In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, a circuit court's findings will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. WlS. STAT. § 805.17(2); State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 207-08, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999). However, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found is a question of law that we decide without deference to the circuit court's decision. State v. Amos, 220 Wis. 2d 793, 797-98, 584 N.W.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1998).

¶ 8. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court concluded that where a defendant is subject to "custodial interrogation" certain procedural safeguards must be maintained to protect the defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980); State v. Leprich, 160 Wis. 2d 472, 476, 465 N.W.2d 844 (Ct. App. 1991). The Miranda Court was primarily concerned with "incommunicado [interrogation of individuals in a] police-dominated atmosphere," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456 (1966), where the police actively sought to induce a defendant's confession. The Court concluded that without certain warnings concerning the defendant's constitutional rights, a defendant's statements made during police custodial interrogation are inadmissible to establish his or her guilt. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 (1984). The Miranda Court reasoned that the interaction of custody and official interrogation "contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. Therefore, if the police take a suspect into custody and ask him or her questions without giving Miranda warnings, the responses cannot be used to establish guilt. Leprich, 160 Wis. 2d at 476 (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 429).

¶ 9. As noted, the United States Supreme Court directed in Miranda that all persons in custody must be advised of certain rights that spring from the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself. The United States Supreme Court first recognized the routine booking question exception to the admission of a statement given without Miranda rights in Muniz, 496 U.S. at 600-02. The Wisconsin Supreme Court followed suit in Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 434.

¶ 10. In Muniz, Justice Brennan, writing for a four-justice plurality, recognized a " 'routine booking question' exception which exempts from Mirandas coverage questions [designed] to secure the 'biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.' " Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601 (citation omitted). The plurality specified that questions posed by the police to the defendant regarding his or her name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth and current age did not qualify as "custodial interrogation." Id. Four justices concurred on other grounds without explicitly addressing the existence of a "routine booking question" exception. See id. at 608 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("it is unnecessary to determine whether the questions fall within the 'routine booking question' exception to Miranda Justice Brennan recognizes"). Only a single justice disagreed with the plurality's recognition of the exception. See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 608 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

¶ 11. In Stevens, the Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged the fractured nature of Muniz. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 433. Nevertheless, the supreme court adopted the routine booking question exception and held that Stevens's statements made about his name and residence at the time of his arrest and before booking were inadmissible. Id. at 434-35. The court limited the application of the exception to biographical questions asked "during the booking process at the police station." Id. at 435 n.10.

¶ 12. Neither Muniz nor Stevens provides direction on the application of the exception. Nevertheless, directions for the application of the exception can be found in the decisions of the state and federal courts that recognized and applied the routine booking question exception before Muniz and Stevens. See State v. Smith, 203 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. 1972) ("booking questions have value to the criminal process independent of any tendency to uncover admissions" and "police have a legitimate interest in orderly records identifying the names, addresses and places of employment of those arrested"); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[c]ertainly not every question is an interrogation. Many sorts of questions do not, by their very nature, involve the psychological intimidation that Miranda is designed to prevent"); United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Ordinarily, however, the routine gathering of biographical data for booking purposes should not constitute interrogation under Miranda." (citation omitted)); United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546 (1st Cir. 1989); State v. Foster, 562 So. 2d 808, 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) ("the routine gathering of biographical data for booking purposes cannot be characterized as an inherently coercive custodial interrogation").

¶ 13. ' The routine booking question exception has its origin in Innis where the United States Supreme Court considered what sort of words or conduct on the part of law enforcement would constitute "interrogation." In Innis, the Court held that interrogation is either express questioning or its functional equivalent, defined to include any statements or actions that the "police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. The Innis Court tracked the concern expressed in Miranda that custodial interrogation contains a measure of psychological pressures beyond those pressures inherent in custody itself. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300.

¶ 14. Drawing on the concerns the United States Supreme Court has expressed about "interrogation," courts recognizing the routine booking question exception theorize that not every question asked a suspect is an interrogation. Booth, 669 F.2d at 1237. "Many sorts of questions do not, by their very nature, involve the psychological intimidation that Miranda is designed to prevent." Booth, 669 F.2d at 1237. Thus, the routine booking question exception is limited to routine questions asked to assist in the gathering of background biographical data. Id. at 1238.

¶ 15. To qualify for the application of the exception, the questions must be asked by an agency ordinarily involved in booking suspects, must be asked during a true booking and must be asked shortly after the suspect has been taken into custody. United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983). Questions serving an administrative need may be considered routine booking questions. Doe, 878 F.2d at 1551. In Muniz, the plurality specified that questions regarding name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth and current age qualified as routine booking questions. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601. Other courts sanction questions concerning the suspect's educational background, marital status and other information needed to complete an arrest report. See Franks v. State, 486 S.E.2d 594, 597 (Ga. 1997).

¶ 16. However, these questions are not accorded a blanket exception to Miranda. Writing for the Muniz plurality, Justice Brennan warned:

As amicus United States explains, "[r]ecognizing a 'booking exception' to Miranda does not mean, of course, that any question asked during the booking process falls within that exception. Without obtaining a waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights, the police may not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions."

Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602 n.14 (citations omitted). Police may not use routine biographical questioning as a guise for obtaining incriminating information. If investigative questions are asked while routine information is being obtained, answers to such questions are inadmissible if the suspect has not been read his or her Miranda rights. Even questions that usually are routine must be preceded by Miranda warnings if they are intended to produce answers that are incriminating. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1280.

¶ 17. The test of whether questioning constitutes interrogation and is not entitled to the routine booking question exception is if, in light of all the circumstances, the police should have known that a question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Booth, 669 F.2d at 1238. "The test is objective. The subjective intent of the [police officer] is relevant but not conclusive. The relationship of the question asked to the crime suspected is highly relevant." Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1280 (citations omitted).

¶ 18. Using these principles to construct his argument, Bryant asserts that when Ollila asked him biographical questions while completing the arrest report, the detective intended to elicit incriminating responses that Bryant lived in the residence where the cocaine was found. The State must prove that the cocaine was found in an area that Bryant exercised dominion and control over in order to secure a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone. WlS JI — CRIMINAL 920 and 6030. Bryant contends that his admission that Re lived at the residence provided the State with evidence imputing that the drugs were found in a place accessible to Bryant and subject to his "exclusive or joint dominion and control." Schmidt v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 370, 379, 253 N.W.2d 204 (1977).

¶ 19. Bryant relies upon Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 410, and United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1986), to support his argument. However, both cases are easily distinguishable. In Stevens, the police submitted an affidavit in support of a search warrant for a suspected drug house that identified one of the suspected drug dealers as "Zeke." Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 434. After the police gained entry to the residence, all of the individuals were handcuffed. A police lieutenant approached Stevens and asked him if he lived there, to which Stevens responded that he did. Id. at 419. The lieutenant next asked Stevens his name. He at first responded, "Zeke," and then changed his answer to "Bruce Stevens." Id. The supreme court suppressed Stevens's answers to the biographical questions holding first that the questions were asked during the arrest and not during booking. Id. at 434. The supreme court also held that Stevens's answer that his name was "Zeke" confirmed the affidavit's reference to one suspected drug dealer being named "Zeke" and identified him as the drug dealer in the affidavit. Id.

¶ 20. In contrast to Stevens, in this case the police submitted an affidavit in support of a search warrant that identified Bryant as residing at 5712 - 19th Avenue, the address of the suspected drug house. The police obtained this information two days prior to executing the search warrant by checking the registration for a vehicle parked in front of the residence when they conducted a controlled buy. Also in contrast to Stevens, although Bryant was handcuffed in the residence during the execution of the search warrant, he was not asked any biographical questions at the residence or when he was arrested after discovery of the cocaine. Finally, in contrast to Stevens, Bryant was asked biographical questions in the station house, a location the majority in Stevens approved as the locale to ask biographical questions. Id. at 435 n.10.

¶ 21. Disla is also of no help to Bryant. The police in Disla were executing a search warrant for an illegal electronic device in an apartment when they discovered a quantity of cocaine and related material including Disla's passport and alien registration card that listed the address as his residence. Disla, 805 F.2d at 1342-43. Disla was not present when the search warrant was executed. However, while the police were still at the apartment, Disla drove up, parked on the street and started to walk toward the apartment. The arresting officer testified that when he made eye contact with Disla, Disla turned and started to walk away. At that time, the officer arrested Disla. Id. at 1343. Disla was handcuffed and taken into the apartment; before being advised of his Miranda rights, Disla was asked to complete a form on which he admitted to residing in the apartment. Id. Based on these facts, the Ninth Circuit held that the routine booking question exception did not apply and suppressed Disla's admissions on the form.

The facts here indicate that [the officer] should have known that the question regarding Disla's residence was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. [The officer] knew that a large quantity of cocaine and cash had been found at the apartment and that the resident(s) of the apartment had not been identified. After the cocaine and cash were discovered, [the officer] asked neighbors for a description of the persons who lived at the apartment and observed Disla and his brother approach the apartment building. [The officer] arrested Disla, asked him several investigative questions, and then requested that Disla answer the name, age, residence, and employment status questions from the [form]. The questioning here did not arise in a routine "booking" setting. Further, the question as to where Disla lived was related to an element (possession) of the crime that [the officer] had reason to suspect Disla committed. In light of both the context of the questioning and the content of the question, we must conclude that Disla was subjected to interrogation.

Id. at 1347 (citations omitted).

¶ 22. In contrast to Disla, in this case the police had identified Bryant as a resident of the apartment at 5712 - 19th Avenue before applying for a search warrant. Further, in contrast to Disla, the biographical questioning of Bryant occurred at the police department and not at the scene of the arrest.

¶ 23. Having distinguished the two cases that Bryant contends support his proposition that the routine booking question exception does not apply to the biographical questions asked when the arrest report was being completed, we will now apply the tests that we have previously set forth. Bryant does not dispute that the Kenosha sheriffs department is an agency that is involved in booking suspects, that the questions were asked during a true booking or that the questions were asked shortly after he was taken into custody. We are left to consider if, in light of all the circumstances, Ollila should have known that the question of where Bryant resided was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Booth, 669 F.2d at 1238.

¶ 24. The facts here confirm that when Ollila asked Bryant the biographical questions at the detective bureau, he was not engaged in "interrogation." Nothing in the record supports a conclusion that the question about Bryant's residence was intended to elicit an incriminating response. Several days before the search warrant was executed, Ollila observed a controlled drug buy take place at 5712 - 19th Avenue. Ollila observed a car parked in front of that address at the time of the controlled buy and when he checked the vehicle's registration he found out that it was registered to Bryant at the 5712 - 19th Avenue address. Although Bryant's residence is relevant to the charge of possession with intent to deliver, Ollila's knowledge that Bryant was residing at 5712 - 19th Avenue when he applied for the search warrant greatly diminishes the relevancy of Bryant's admission of residing at that address. Unlike the officer in Disla who wanted to determine the identity of the apartment residents, here Ollila already had sufficient evidence connecting Bryant to the residence.

¶ 25. We conclude that the circuit court properly applied the routine booking question exception to the biographical questions asked of Bryant and properly admitted his responses into evidence. Therefore, we affirm.

By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.

      All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted.

        Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

       Contrary to Bryant's assertion that the exception only applies when a suspect is asked biographical questions when he or she is being processed for admission to a jail, the exception might apply — subject to the tests discussed in this opinion — whenever biographical information is sought. See Franks v. State, 486 S.E.2d 594, 597 (Ga. 1997) (the exception is confined to information required to complete an arrest report); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1981) (questioning during an investigative stop); United States v. Dista, 805 F.2d 1340, 1343 (9th Cir. 1986) (questioning to complete an agency form).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nicholas C. Grapas, Attorney at Law. Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, Complainant, v. Nicholas C. Grapsas, Respondent.
    Supreme Court

      No. 00-1599-D.

      Filed March 7, 2001.

    2001 WI 14
    (Also reported in 622 N.W.2d 750.)
   PER CURIAM.

¶ 1. We review the stipulation filed by Attorney Nicholas C. Grapsas and the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (Board). Pursuant to SCR 21.09(3m) and the report and recommendations of the referee, Cheryl Rosen Weston, setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning Attorney Grapsas' professional misconduct for failing to provide competent representation to a client; failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; making false and misleading statements to a client; making false statements to Board staff; failing to promptly notify a court of a prior suspension of his license to practice law; engaging in the practice of law while suspended; and failing to respond to letters from the Board; the parties stipulated, and the referee recommended, that Attorney Grapsas' license to practice law be revoked as a discipline for that misconduct.

¶ 2. We approve the stipulation and determine that the seriousness of Attorney Grapsas' misconduct warrants revocation of his license to practice law in Wisconsin.

¶ 3. Attorney Grapsas was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 1970 and practiced in Madison, primarily in the area of immigration law. In 1993 this court publicly reprimanded him for failing to provide prompt and diligent representation to a client applying for U.S. citizenship, failing to keep that client reasonably informed of the status of the application and comply with her reasonable requests for information concerning it, refusing to return her unearned retainer when she terminated his representation, misrepresenting to his client, the Board, and the District Professional Responsibility Committee that he had acted in the client's matter, and failing to respond timely to the Board's request for information concerning the client's grievance. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grapsas, 174 Wis. 2d 816, 498 N.W.2d 400 (1993).

¶ 4. In March of 1999 this court again publicly reprimanded Attorney Grapsas for not explaining an immigration matter to a client to the extent reasonably necessary to permit her to make informed decisions regarding the representation and not informing her and her employer of substantial risks to the client's ability to work after the expiration date of the visa, failing to make reasonable inquiries to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) concerning his attempt to file a petition to change the client's status, not refiling the petition in a timely manner, and not responding to inquiries from the Board concerning the client's grievance. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grapsas, 225 Wis. 2d 411, 591 N.W.2d 862 (1999).

¶ 5. In December of 1999 this court suspended Attorney Grapsas' license to practice law in Wisconsin for six months, commencing January 10, 2000, for failing to file a client's application with INS in a timely manner, failing to keep the client adequately informed of the status of that application and respond promptly to her reasonable requests for information concerning it, misrepresenting to the client on numerous occasions over an extended period that he had filed the application, altering the dates of the signature of the client and her employer on the application without obtaining their authorization to do so, failing to advise the client of the steps necessary to continue her daughter's non-immigrant status and notify the client and her daughter promptly of the denial of the application to extend the daughter's visa, failing to return the balance of the client's retainer, and failing to timely respond to letters from the Board inquiring into his conduct in the matter. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grapsas, 230 Wis. 2d 751, 602 N.W.2d 526 (1999).

¶ 6. The Board's most recent complaint against Attorney Grapsas involves two of his former clients. In 1995 the first client, a native and citizen of the African nation of Cameroon, retained Attorney Grapsas to assist him in applying for political asylum in the United States. On December 28,1995, INS granted the client's application for political asylum and, as a result, the client was granted status as an asylee in the United States. Subsequent to INS granting the client's application for political asylum, Attorney Grapsas also assisted the client in obtaining employment authorization from INS, pursuant to which the client was authorized to be employed in the United States for a one-year period. As an alien admitted to the United States under asylee status, the client could not lawfully be employed in the United States except under an employment authorization. The unlawful employment of an alien such as the client, even if otherwise lawfully admitted to the United States, provides legal grounds for deportation.

¶ 7. In June of 1996 the client traveled to Canada to investigate possible employment opportunities. Upon his re-entry into the United States in August of 1996 INS issued an "Order to Appear Deferred Inspection" and admitted the client to return into the United States under "parolee" status. The order required the client to appear before INS for a hearing in Milwaukee on September 16,1996. This matter is called an "exclusion proceeding."

¶ 8. Attorney Grapsas appeared as counsel for the client at the September 1996 hearing in the exclusion proceeding. Following the hearing INS notified the client that a further hearing would be conducted before an immigration judge at a time and date to be set. While this matter was pending Attorney Grapsas told the client he could be lawfully employed in the United States and assisted the client in applying to seek renewal of his employment authorization. As a result of a renewal application filed with Attorney Grapsas' assistance, INS renewed the client's employment authorization card for a one-year period extending from February 13,1997, to February 13,1998, and INS issued the client an employment authorization card to evidence his employment authorization for that period.

¶ 9. In December of 1997 while the exclusion proceeding was still pending Attorney Grapsas advised the client to apply to INS to renew his employment authorization. Attorney Grapsas prepared an application for renewal of employment authorization, which the client executed in late December 1997. In the renewal application, Attorney Grapsas described the client's current immigration status as an "asylee." The client paid Attorney Grapsas for legal services rendered in connection with the renewal application. Following the execution of the renewal application Attorney Grapsas informed the client that the application had been sent to INS by Federal Express.

¶ 10. On January 6,1998, the immigration judge entered an order terminating the exclusion proceeding. Following the entry of that order, Attorney Grapsas informed the client that he was free to file for admission to the United States as a permanent resident. In late April 1998 the client executed an application for permanent residence status which Attorney Grapsas had prepared. The client paid Attorney Grapsas $175 for the filing fee and $50 for attorney fees for his services. Attorney Grapsas told the client the permanent residence application would be filed immediately. Beginning in the summer of 1998 the client attempted to contact Attorney Grapsas to request information about the status of the renewal application and the permanent residence application, but Attorney Grap-sas did not respond to the client's requests for information.

¶ 11. During 1998 because he did not have a current employment authorization card issued by INS, the client was unable to obtain employment in the United States since the card in his possession had expired February 13, 1998. During the fall of 1998 a prospective employer of the client had contact with Attorney Grapsas regarding the client's immigration status. In an October 1998 letter to the prospective client, Attorney Grapsas said the client had been granted the immigration status of an asylee and that any person with that status was authorized to work. Attorney Grapsas also informed the prospective employer that the client had applied to INS for renewal of the document to evidence his employment authorization.

¶ 12. In early November 1998 the client sent Attorney Grapsas a letter by certified mail inquiring about the status of his employment authorization application. Although Attorney Grapsas received the letter on November 12, 1998, he failed to respond. In early December 1998 the client faxed Attorney Grapsas a letter saying he needed help because his employer had asked for proof of his employment authorization. Attorney Grapsas again failed to respond.

¶ 13. In late December 1998 Attorney Grapsas finally telephoned the client and told him he had filed another application to renew the client's employment authorization. Attorney Grapsas provided no information concerning what had happened to the purported December 1997 renewal application. In early January 1999 the client faxed Attorney Grapsas a letter asking for a copy of the most recent renewal application. The client also inquired about the status of the permanent residence application. Attorney Grapsas failed to respond. In March of 1999 the client learned that, contrary to his prior representations, Attorney Grapsas had not filed the renewal application or the permanent residence application.

¶ 14. The client was required to obtain new counsel to assist him in filing a new renewal application and a new permanent residence application. On July 8, 1999, the client received from INS a one-year employment application authorization and employment authorization card. Because the permanent residence application had not been timely filed by Attorney Grap-sas, the client was required to incur additional costs of $237 for a medical examination, fingerprinting and a photograph.

¶ 15. In his communications with the Board, Attorney Grapsas claimed he did not file the renewal application and permanent residence application because the client's immigration status was unsettled, despite the termination of the exclusion proceeding in January of 1998.

¶ 16. The Board's complaint also alleged that Attorney Grapsas engaged in misconduct with respect to an immigration hearing that took place in January 2000. After this court issued its December 3, 1999, decision suspending Attorney Grapsas' license for six months, Attorney Grapsas filed a motion for reconsideration. By letter dated January 12, 2000, the Board reminded Attorney Grapsas that his filing of the reconsideration motion did not stay the enforcement of this court's disciplinary order, pursuant to which Attorney Grapsas’ license to practice law was suspended for six months effective January 10, 2000. On January 13, 2000, this court issued an order denying Attorney Grapsas' motion for reconsideration.

¶ 17. On January 18, 2000, Attorney Grapsas spoke by telephone with the Board's litigation counsel inquiring about a client matter scheduled for an immigration hearing in Chicago on January 20, 2000. Board counsel reminded Attorney Grapsas that because of the suspension order he could not appear at the hearing, could not practice law in any way, and could not engage in any work activity customarily done by law students, law clerks, or other legal personnel. Board counsel further advised Attorney Grapsas that it appeared the January 20, 2000, hearing would have to be adjourned and that, in any event, the court and his client would have to be notified of the suspension and his client should be given the opportunity to retain new counsel.

¶ 18. Despite his conversation with Board counsel, Attorney Grapsas appeared before the immigration court on January 20, 2000, as counsel representing an alien client. At that time in response to a motion filed by Attorney Grapsas, the immigration court entered an order terminating deportation proceedings against the client.

¶ 19. On February 3, 2000, the Board notified Attorney Grapsas that it had received information concerning his appearance before the immigration court. Attorney Grapsas represented to Board counsel that his only activity before the immigration court had consisted of his notifying the court and his client of his license suspension. By letter dated February 18, 2000, the Board provided Attorney Grapsas with notice of the commencement of an investigation based upon information received from the immigration judge about Attorney Grapsas' appearance before the immigration court on January 20,2000. The letter directed Attorney Grapsas to provide a written response to the issues raised by the submission received from the immigration judge within 20 days of his receipt of the letter. Attorney Grapsas failed to respond to the Board's letter. In a certified letter dated March 21, 2000, the Board again notified Attorney Grapsas of its commencement of an investigation about his appearance before the immigration court and directed Attorney Grapsas to provide a written response no later than March 31, 2000. Again, Attorney Grapsas failed to respond.

¶ 20. In the stipulation, Attorney Grapsas represented to the Board, the referee, and this court that he had retired from the practice of law and had no intention of resuming the practice of law; that he did not contest the allegations of professional misconduct set forth in the complaint; and that he knowingly and voluntarily stipulated to the revocation of his license to practice law.

¶ 21. The referee found that by failing to take action to promptly file the renewal application and the permanent residence application for the first client, or by failing to promptly take action to resolve any issues as to that client's allegedly unsettled immigration status, so that the applications could be promptly filed and acted upon by government authorities, Attorney Grap-sas violated SCR 20:1.1 and 20:1.3.

¶ 22. The referee also concluded that by failing to respond to the first client's reasonable request for information about the status of the renewal application and the permanent residence application, Attorney Grapsas violated SCR 20:1.4(a). The referee also found that by making false and misleading statements to the first client about the renewal application and permanent residence application; by falsely stating to the client's prospective employer that the client had filed with INS an application for renewal of his employment authorization; and by falsely stating to the Board's counsel that his only activity before the immigration court on January 20, 2000, consisted of notifying the court and his client of the license suspension, Attorney Grapsas violated SCR'20:8.4(c).

¶ 23. The referee also found that by falsely stating to Board staff that the renewal application and the permanent residence application had been filed with INS and by failing to respond to the Board's letters and by falsely stating that his only activity before the immigration court consisted of notifying the court and his client of the license suspension, Attorney Grapsas violated SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(3). In addition, the referee found that by failing to promptly notify the immigration court of his suspension and of his inability to act as counsel for a client at the January 20, 2000, hearing, and by engaging in the practice of law while suspended, Attorney Grapsas violated SCR 22.26.

¶ 24. In addition to the license revocation, the parties stipulated and the referee recommended the entry of an order of restitution to the first client in the sum of $574. The parties noted that Attorney Grapsas has transmitted such funds to the Board's counsel and the funds are being held in the trust account of Lee Kilkelly Paulson & Younger, S.C., to be distributed to the former client from such account upon this court's final disposition in the matter.

¶ 25. We accept the parties' stipulation and adopt the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Attorney Grapsas' pattern of misconduct in the handling of his client's immigration matters warrants the revocation of his license to practice law in Wisconsin.

¶ 26. It Is Ordered that the license of Nicholas C. Grapsas to practice law in Wisconsin is revoked effective the date of this order.

¶ 27. It Is Further Ordered that Nicholas C. Grapsas comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been revoked.

¶ 28. It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $574 which is held in the trust account of Lee Kilkelly Paul-son & Younger, S.C. be disbursed to Nicholas C. Grapsas' former client.

¶ 29. It Is Further Ordered that within 60 days of the date of this order Nicholas C. Grapsas pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation the sum of $200 as the costs of this proceeding.

¶ 30. WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J., did not participate.

       Effective October 1, 2000, Wisconsin's attorney disciplinary process underwent a substantial restructuring. The name of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases involving attorney, misconduct was changed to the Office of Lawyer Regulation and the supreme court rules applicable to the lawyer regulation system were also revised. Since the conduct underlying this case arose prior to October 1, 2000, the body will be referred to as "the Board" and all references to supreme court rules will be to those in effect prior to October 1, 2000.

       Former SCR 21.09(3m) provided:
      (3m) The board may file with a complaint a stipulation by the board and the respondent attorney to the facts, conclusions of law and discipline to be imposed. The supreme court may consider the complaint and stipulation without appointing a referee. If the supreme court approves the stipulation, it shall adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of law and impose the stipulated discipline. If the supreme court rejects the stipulation, a referee shall be appointed pursuant to sub. (4) and the matter shall proceed pursuant to SCR chapter 22. A stipulation that is rejected has no evidentiary value and is without prejudice to the respondent's defense of the proceeding or the board's prosecution of the complaint.

       Although former SCR 21.09(3m) did not seem to contemplate that a stipulated matter be referred to a referee unless the supreme court rejected the stipulation, the stipulation entered into between the Board and Attorney Grapsas did provide that the matter be referred to a referee for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the allegations of the Board's complaint.

       SCR 20:1.1 provides:
      Competence
      A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
      SCR 20:1.3 provides:

        Diligence
      A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

       SCR 20:1.4(a) provides:
      (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

       SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:
      It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
      (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

       Former SCR 21.03(4) provided:

        (4) Every attorney shall cooperate with the board and the administrator in the investigation, prosecution and disposition of grievances and complaints filed with or by the board or administrator.
      Former SCR 22.07(3) provided:
      (3) The administrator or committee may compel the respondent to answer questions, furnish documents and present any information deemed relevant to the investigation. Failure of the respondent to answer questions, furnish documents or present relevant information is misconduct. The administrator or a committee may compel any other person to produce pertinent books, papers and documents under SCR 22.22.

       Former SCR 22.26 provided:
      Activities on revocation or suspension of license
      (1)(a) A disbarred or suspended attorney on or before the effective date of disbarment or suspension shall:
      1. Notify, by certified mail, all clients being represented in pending matters of the disbarment or suspension and consequent inability to act as an attorney after the effective date of the disbarment or suspension.
      2. Advise the clients to seek legal advice of the client's own choice elsewhere.
      (b) A disbarred or suspended attorney with a matter pending before a court or administrative agency shall promptly notify the court or administrative agency and the attorney for each party of the disbarment or suspension and consequent inability to act as an attorney after the effective date of the disbarment or suspension.
      The notice must identify the successor attorney or, if there is none at the time of the notice, state the place of residence of the client of the disbarred or suspended attorney.
      (2) A suspended or disbarred attorney may not engage in the practice of law or in any law work activity customarily done by law students, law clerks or other paralegal personnel, except that he or she may engage in law related work for a commercial employer not itself engaged in the practice of law.

        (3) A suspended or disbarred attorney shall make within the first 15 days after the effective date of disbarment or suspension, all arrangements for the permanent or temporary closing of or winding up of the attorney's practice and may only aid in having others take over clients' work in process. If a suspended or disbarred attorney disappears or dies and the attorney has failed to comply with this subsection and no partner, personal representative or other responsible party capable of conducting the attorney's affairs is known to exist, a judge of a court of record in a county in which the attorney maintained an office shall appoint an attorney to enter the former offices of the disbarred or suspended attorney or other location as may be necessary for the sole purpose of protecting the client's rights, the clients' files and the clients' property, and the delivery thereof to the clients or their successor counsel. The appointed attorney may be compensated out of the assets of the suspended or disbarred attorney in the amount approved by the judge.
      (4) The disbarred or suspended attorney shall file with the administrator within 25 days after the effective date of the disbarment or suspension order, an affidavit showing:
      (a) Full compliance with the provisions of the order and with the rules and procedures.
      (b) All other state, federal and administrative bodies before which the attorney is admitted to practice.
      (c) A list of all clients in pending matters, and a list of all matters pending before any court or administrative agency and the case number.
      (d) A disbarred or suspended attorney shall maintain records of the various steps taken under the rules and these procedures so that, upon any subsequent proceeding instituted by or against the attorney, proof of compliance with the rules and these procedures and with the disbarment or suspension order is available. Proof of compliance with these procedures is a condition precedent to reinstatement.
      (5) The administrator shall have published a notice of the suspension or disbarment in the Wisconsin bar bulletin and in a newspaper of general circulation in each county in which the disbarred or suspended attorney maintained an office for the practice of law.
      (6) The administrator shall notify all judges in this state of the order of suspension or disbarment.

        (7) Nonpermitted activities of other lawyers. A member of the bar of this state may not use the name of a disbarred or suspended lawyer and may not authorize or knowingly permit a disbarred or suspended lawyer to:
      (a) Interview clients or witnesses or participate therein, except that in the course of employment by a commercial employer he or she may interview witnesses and participate in the investigation of claims;
      (b) Prepare cases for trial;
      (c) Do any legal research or other law work activity in a law office;
      (d) Write briefs or trial memoranda; or
      (e) Perform any services for him or her either on a salary or a percentage or a fee-splitting basis, except that he or she may share attorney fees on a quantum meruit basis only for services performed prior to disbarment or suspension;
      (f) An attorney shall not permit a disbarred or suspended attorney to engage in any activity prohibited by this rule.

       Although the stipulation and the referee's report both provided that costs be waived, this court has determined that the seriousness of Attorney Grapsas' misconduct warrants the imposition of some amount of costs.


author: Cornelia G. Clark

text:
    In the Matter of Medical Incapacity Proceedings Against John F. Kerscher, Attorney at Law. Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant, v. John F. Kerscher, Respondent.
    Supreme Court

      No. 01-0217-D.

      Filed March 9, 2001.

    2001 WI 18
    (Also reported in 623 N.W.2d 94.)
   ORDER

On January 23, 2001, Attorney John F. Kerscher filed a request pursuant to SCR 22.34(11), for the indefinite suspension of his license to practice law in this state due to his medical incapacity. The Office of Lawyer Regulation filed a response supporting that request and a summary of its investigation into the medical incapacity allegations against Attorney John R. Ker-scher. Attorney Kerscher acknowledges that he cannot successfully defend himself against the medical incapacity allegations. Based upon these considerations,

IT IS ORDERED that the request is granted and, effective the date of this order, Attorney John F. Ker-scher's license to practice law in this state is indefinitely suspended.

Cornelia G. Clark

Clerk of Supreme Court


text:
    In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against James W. Snyder, Attorney at Law. Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant, v. James W. Snyder, Respondent.
    Supreme Court

      No. 01-0387-D.

      Filed March 9, 2001.

    2001 WI 17
    (Also reported in 623 N.W.2d 512.)
   ORDER

Upon consideration of the petition filed pursuant to SCR 22.19 by Attorney James W. Snyder requesting the consensual revocation of his license to practice law in this state, and upon consideration of the summary of misconduct allegations against petitioner being investigated by the Office of Lawyer Regulation, and that Office's recommendation in support of the request for consensual license revocation (documents attached and incorporated by reference),

IT IS ORDERED that the license of James W. Snyder to practice law in this state is revoked as of the date of this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that James W. Snyder comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose license to practice law has been revoked.

BRADLEY and PROSSER, J.J., did not participate.

Cornelia G. Clark

Clerk of Supreme Court

STATE OF WISCONSIN — IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against:

JAMES W. SNYDER,

Attorney at Law,

Petitioner.

CASE CODE: 30912

CASE NO.: 01-0387-D

OFFICE OF LAWYER REGULATION'S RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR CONSENSUAL LICENSE REVOCATION

TO: THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE WIS CONSIN SUPREME COURT

The Office of Lawyer Regulation ("OLR") respectfully recommends that the Court grant the Petition of James W. Snyder ("Petitioner"), and revoke Petitioner's license to practice law in Wisconsin.

Petitioner's Petition for Consensual License Revocation and the Birector's Summary of Misconduct Allegations Being Investigated are attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

Petitioner was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin on May 18,1981 (Wisconsin State Bar No. 1014652) and practiced in the Appleton area. Petitioner's license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended since October 12, 2000.

Petitioner acknowledges that he cannot successfully defend himself against serious professional misconduct allegations that are summarized in an attachment to his Petition. Petitioner has had the benefit of legal representation in this matter.

Petitioner admits his inability to defend against misconduct allegations in an estate matter. The misconduct under investigation includes allegations that Petitioner made more than one dishonest, deceitful filing to the probate court, that he offered false evidence to that court, that he lied to two charitable beneficiaries in the matter about funds to which they were entitled and that he accepted payments for his firm that amounted to more than a tenfold increase over the amount he had claimed in a filing to the court that his firm had received.

Petitioner filed a compliance affidavit pursuant to SCR 22.26 in which he indicated that he discontinued the practice of law, effective September 5, 2000, and that he represents no clients in pending matters. Petitioner's former firm has made full restitution to the two beneficiaries (the American Lung Association and the American Cancer Society). The OLR is not requesting a restitution order in connection with the proposed revocation of Petitioner's law license.

Under the circumstances, a formal order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court revoking Petitioner's license to practice law in Wisconsin is warranted. The OLR respectfully files this Recommendation in support of Mr. Snyder's Petition for Consensual License Revocation, and recommends to the Court that it grant the petition and order the immediate revocation of Petitioner's license to practice law in Wisconsin.

The OLR does not seek an assessment of costs in this matter.

Dated this 6th day of February, 2001.

OFFICE OF LAWYER REGULATION

By: /s/ William J. Weigel

WILLIAM J. WEIGEL,

Litigation Counsel

State Bar No. 1010549

ADDRESS:

110 East Main Street, Room 315

Madison, WI 53703

Telephone: (608) 267-7274

Fax: (608)267-1959

STATE OF WISCONSIN — IN SUPREME COURT

IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JAMES W. SNYDER, ATTORNEY AT LAW

OFFICE OF LAWYER REGULATION,

Complainant,

JAMES W. SNYDER,

Respondent.

CASE CODE: 30912

CASE NO.: 01-0387-D

PETITION FOR CONSENSUAL LICENSE REVOCATION

TO: THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE WIS CONSIN SUPREME COURT

Pursuant to SCR 22.19,1, Attorney James W. Snyder, hereby petition the Court as follows:

1. I became licensed to practice law in the State of Wisconsin on May 18,1981 (State Bar No. 1014652). On October 12, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered my law license temporarily suspended, effective October 12, 2000 (Exhibit 1 to Appendix A, attached). My current address is 2942 West Hiawatha Drive, Appleton, Wisconsin 54914-6708.

2. I am the subject of an Office of Lawyer Regulation ("OLR") misconduct investigation.

3. A summary of the misconduct allegations is attached hereto as Director's Summary of Misconduct Allegations Being Investigated (Appendix A).

4. I acknowledge that I cannot successfully defend myself against the professional misconduct allegations in Appendix A.

5. I am filing this Petition freely, voluntarily and with the benefit of the advice of counsel.

ACCORDINGLY, I hereby petition this Court for consensual license revocation, pursuant to SCR 22.19. Respectfully submitted, this 17th day of January, 2001.

/s/ James W. Snyder

JAMES W. SNYDER,

Petitioner

P.O. Address:

James W. Snyder

c/o Atty. Joseph J. Beisenstein

Menn, Teetaert & Beisenstein, Ltd.

222 North Oneida Street

P.O. Box 785

Appleton, WI 54912-0785

(920)731-6631

STATE OF WISCONSIN — IN SUPREME COURT

IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINARY

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JAMES W.

SNYDER, ATTORNEY AT LAW

OFFICE OF LAWYER REGULATION,

Complainant,

JAMES W. SNYDER,

Respondent.

CASE CODE: 30912

CASE NO.: 01-0387-D

DIRECTOR'S SUMMARY OF MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS BEING INVESTIGATED

BACKGROUND

On October 12, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered the law license of James W. Snyder ("Petitioner") temporarily suspended, effective October 12, 2000 (Exhibit 1). That temporary suspension, sought by the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility ("BAPR"), predecessor-in-interest to the Office of Lawyer Regulation ("OLR"), was not opposed by Petitioner.

Petitioner has indicated his intent to file a Petition for Consensual License Revocation acknowledging his inability to successfully defend against the misconduct allegations being investigated by the OLR.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS

1. OLR staff investigator, Melody Rader-J ohnson began conducting an investigation of Petitioner following the filing of a grievance against him by successor counsel in an Outagamie County estate matter. Petitioner had been the original attorney for the estate, but was removed by the Court after failing to appear at the last of a string of status hearings ordered by the court. The grievance investigation originally concerned Petitioner's possible neglect of this and other Outagamie County estates. Moreover, successor counsel in the estate informed BAPR that the file for the estate contained a check payable to a beneficiary of the estate which had been written more than a year earlier, but had not yet been sent, even though Petitioner had informed the court that the check had been forwarded to that beneficiary.

2. In December 1998, Petitioner filed with the Register in Probate an Amended Final Account for the Estate of Pearl Domke (Outagamie County Probate Case No. 95-IN-239) which indicated that distributions had been paid out from the Domke Estate as follows: $235,012.21 to the personal representative, $39,168.71 to the American Cancer Society and $39,168.71 to the American Lung Association. The Amended Final Account also indicated that Petitioner's firm had received $7,000 in attorneys fees.

3. On December 14, 1998, Petitioner filed with the Register in Probate, Receipts and Releases purportedly signed by representatives from the American Lung Association and the American Cancer Society indicating that each charity had received a distribution of $39,168.71 from the Domke Estate. After receiving the executed Receipts and Releases, the Probate Court closed their file for the Domke Estate. In fact, however, as of December 14, 1998, neither the Lung Association nor the Cancer Society had received any distribution from the Domke Estate.

4. During 1999, after Petitioner received several requests from the charities as to when they might expect to receive their distributions from the Domke Estate, Petitioner forwarded trust account checks to the charities in the amount of $13,968.71 each. Petitioner informed the charities that these checks were for partial distributions from the estate and that the charities could expect to receive their final distribution after the remainder of the bequest was liquidated. The charities, however, received no further distribution from the estate.

5. In May 2000, Investigator Rader-Johnson received information from the American Lung Association that they had not received their final distribution from the Pearl Domke Estate. The Lung Association also indicated that they had recently learned that the Outagamie County probate file contained a Receipt and Release purportedly executed by an employee of the Lung Association acknowledging receipt of the final distribution. The Lung Association asserted that the signature on the Receipt was probably forged since the Receipt contained a signature of an employee who left their employment in August 1998.

6. On or about August 3, 2000, Investigator Rader-Johnson received information from the American Cancer Society alleging that they had not received their final distribution from the Pearl Domke Estate and that the Receipt and Release on file with the probate court acknowledging receipt of the final distribution contained a forged signature.

7. Upon receiving this information from the Lung Association and the Cancer Society, Investigator Rader-Johnson reviewed Outagamie County probate files, met with and obtained sworn testimony from the Petitioner and reviewed bank records and other materials.

8. Based on the figures contained in the Amended Final Account from the Domke Estate, the Lung Association and the Cancer Society should have received a total of approximately $78,300. As of the spring of 2000, the charities had received only approximately $27,500, rendering the Amended Final Account filed by Petitioner to be grossly inaccurate by leaving approximately $50,700 unaccounted for.

9. Additionally, bank records from the Domke Estate show that between April 27, 1996 and November 24, 1998, there were 14 checks made payable to Petitioner's firm totaling $72,000 purportedly written by the estate's personal representative. Petitioner reported on the Amended Final Account that his firm had only received $7,000 in legal fees. The Amended Final Account does not disclose the additional $65,000 in disbursements from the estate to Petitioner's firm.

10. The investigation of Petitioner's conduct has to date revealed that Petitioner engaged in the following misconduct:

a) In filing the Amended Final Account for the Pearl Domke Estate in December, 1998, which indicated that final disbursements had been made from the Estate to all of the beneficiaries, including the American Lung Association and the American Cancer Society, when Petitioner knew that final disbursements had not been made from the Domke Estate to those charities, Petitioner engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).
b) In preparing and filing the Receipts and Releases dated December 14, 1998 which contained forged signatures of representatives from the American Lung Association and the American Cancer Society indicating that each charity had received their final distribution of approximately $39,000 from the Pearl Domke Estate, when Petitioner knew that neither charity had received any distribution from the Domke Estate as of that date, Petitioner knowingly offered evidence that he knew to be false, contrary to SCR 20:3.3(a)(4), and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).
c) In stating to the American Lung Association and the American Cancer Society in October 1999, that the remainder of the bequests to the charities would be forthcoming, when Petitioner knew the Domke Estate had been closed since December 1998, Petitioner engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).
d) In accepting payments of $72,000 to his firm from the Domke Estate, but filing an Amended Final Account showing that the firm had received only $7,000 from the Domke Estate, Petitioner engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).

Dated this 9th day of January, 2001.

OFFICE OF LAWYER REGULATION

By: /s/ Keith L. Sellen

KEITH L. SELLEN

Director

State Bar No. 1001088

ADDRESS:

110 East Main Street, Room 315

Madison, WI 53703

Telephone: (608) 267-7274

Fax: (608) 267-1959

       The Court's October 12, 2000 temporary suspension order is provided as Exhibit 1 to Appendix A, as attached to Mr. Snyder's Petition.

       The misconduct is more specifically described in the Director's Summary of Misconduct Allegations Being Investigated, at paragraph 10(a)-(d).

      The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) submitted a letter dated February 27, 2001, noting that restitution was actually made by Mr. Snyder's family and not his former law firm.