author: DIANE S. SYKES, J. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE

text:
    City of Madison, a municipal corporation of Dane County, Wisconsin, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, and IAFF Local 311, Respondents-Respondents.
    Supreme Court

      No. 99-0500.

      Oral argument September 17, 2002.

    Decided May 30, 2003.

    2003 WI 52
    (Also reported in 662 N.W.2d 318.)

      For the petitioner-appellant there were briefs and oral argument by Larry W. O'Brien, acting city attorney.
    For the respondent-respondent, Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, there was a brief (in the court of appeals) by David C. Rice, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.
    For the respondent-respondent, IAFF Local 311, there were briefs by John C. Tallis, Bruce E Ehlke, and Shneidman, Hawks & Ehlke, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Bruce F. Ehlke.

    Amicus curiae briefs were filed by Scott Herrick and Herrick, Kasdorf Dymzarov & Twietmeyer, Madison, on behalf of the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of the City of Madison.
    An amicus curiae brief was filed (in the court of appeals) by Curtis Witynski, Madison, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities.
   DIANE S. SYKES, J.

¶ 1. The issue in this case is whether a fire chiefs decision to return a firefighter promoted on a probationary basis to his previous rank for failure to successfully complete probation may be subjected to arbitration. We hold that it may not.

¶ 2. Given the statutory authority vested in the chief of the fire department under Wis. Stat. § 62.13 (1999-2000), as specifically recognized in the parties' collective bargaining agreement, an arbitrator may not substitute his judgment for the chiefs determination that a firefighter under his command has not successfully completed probation and is therefore not qualified to advance from probationary promotion status to the permanent rank.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. On December 6,1994, the chief of the City of Madison Fire Department promoted firefighter Chris Gentilli to the position of fire apparatus engineer, subject to the approval of the Madison Police and Fire Commission ("PFC") and subject to a one-year probationary period. The PFC approved the promotion, effective January 1, 1995, subject to Rule 5.04 of the PFC Rules and Regulations, which states:

All promotional appointments shall be probationary for [12] months unless extended by the appointing authority for a longer probationary period. During said probationary period, the Chief may reduce the person appointed to that person's former rank. The appointee shall not be entitled to an appeal to the Board from the termination of a probationary appointment or any reduction in rank which results therefrom.

Madison Police and Fire Commission Rule 5.04.

¶ 4. Eleven months into the probationary promotion, on November 29, 1995, the fire chief informed Gentilli that his probationary appointment as an apparatus engineer was revoked. On December 22, 1995, Gentilli, through his union, filed a grievance seeking reinstatement to the rank of fire apparatus engineer and back pay and benefits associated with that higher rank.

¶ 5. The City of Madison ("City") declined to arbitrate the grievance, asserting that the Wisconsin Statutes and the collective bargaining agreement prohibited arbitration of this management decision. Specifically, the City pointed to section 9.Q.2 of the collective bargaining agreement, which states that "[a]rbitration shall not apply where section 62.13 of the Wisconsin Statutes is applicable and where Management has reserved rights relating to arbitration. ... "

¶ 6. The union filed a prohibited practices complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission ("WERC"). WERC held that the City was obligated to arbitrate the grievance and that its refusal to do so violated Wis. Stat. § 111.70(3)(a)5. WERC ordered the City to arbitrate the grievance.

¶ 7. The City sought review in Dane County Circuit Court. The Honorable C. William Foust affirmed WERC's order. On review, the court of appeals certified the case to this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61, on two issues: 1) whether a firefighter who is promoted on a probationary basis but is returned to his or her former rank for failing to successfully complete probation for a non-disciplinary reason is entitled to the just cause protections of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em); and 2) whether the fire chiefs decision not to recommend successful completion of a probationary period for a promotion of a tenured firefighter to a higher position is subject to arbitration. We accepted the certification.

¶ 8. The court of appeals subsequently certified Kraus v. City of Waukesha Police and Fire Commission, No. 01-1106, which raised the threshold question of a chiefs authority to promote on a probationary basis, as well as the issue of the availability of the "just cause" hearing procedures of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) in cases of non-disciplinary reduction in rank for failure to successfully complete probation associated with promotion. We concluded in Kraus, released with this opinion today, that a police or fire chief may promote on a probationary basis, and that the "just cause" provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) are not available when an officer promoted on a probationary basis is returned to his or her prior rank for failing to successfully complete probation. Kraus, 2003 WI 51, ¶ 3, 261 Wis. 2d 485, 662 N.W.2d 294. Thus, the sole remaining issue in this case is the arbitrability of a dispute over this particular type of management decision by a fire or police chief.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9. This case involves consideration of the powers vested in police and fire chiefs and police and fire commissions by Wis. Stat. § 62.13, in light of the Municipal Employment Relations Act, Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70-77 ("MERA"), and the applicable collective bargaining agreement. We have previously held that de novo review is appropriate when the court must interpret a collective bargaining agreement in light of Wis. Stat. §§ 62.13 and 111.70:

In the typical case, the application of 111.70-77 to a particular labor dispute requires the expertise of the Commission [WERC], the agency primarily charged with administering it. Here the question does not concern the application of a labor statute but the Commission's power to enforce it in the first instance in the light of another state statute [Wis. Stat. 62.13], This issue, the relationship between two state statutes, is within the special competence of the courts rather than the Commission.

Glendale Prof'l Policemen's Ass'n v. Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 100-01, 264 N.W.2d 594 (1978). See also City of Brookfield v. WERC, 87 Wis. 2d 819, 827, 275 N.W.2d 723 (1979) ("We are persuaded by the Glendale reasoning that the WERC should not be accorded the authority to interpret the appropriate statutory construction to ch. 62.").

¶ 10. Thus, we "undertake an independent judicial inquiry into the proper construction of [§ 111.70] and its impact on the exercise of municipal powers enumerated in ch. 62." Brookfield, 87 Wis. 2d at 826; see also County of La Crosse v. WERC, 180 Wis. 2d 100, 107, 508 N.W.2d 9 (1993) (holding that de novo review is proper when considering the relationship between Wis. Stat. § 111.70 and another state statute).

¶ 11. Where a party has "challenged the arbitra-bility of [a] question and reserved the right to challenge in court an adverse ruling on arbitrability, the court [will] decide the issue of arbitrability de novo." City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Police Ass'n ("Milwaukee II"), 97 Wis. 2d 15, 21, 292 N.W.2d 841 (1980) (quoting Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 106, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977)). See also Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee I"), 92 Wis. 2d 145, 150, 285 N.W.2d 119 (1979) (the question of an arbitrator's jurisdiction is for the court); Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee III"), 113 Wis. 2d 192, 198, 335 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1983), rev. denied, 114 Wis. 2d 602, 340 N.W.2d 201, (arbitrability is a question of law for the courts).

¶ 12. Because this case requires us to interpret the arbitration language in the parties' collective bargaining agreement in light of the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.13, we review WERC's conclusion de novo.

III. THE APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES

¶ 13. Section 62.13 of the Wisconsin Statutes establishes a comprehensive system for the appointment of municipal firefighters and police officers. See Wis. Stat. § 62.13. It requires cities with populations of 4,000 or more to maintain a police and fire commission with jurisdiction over the hiring, promotion, and discipline of members of police and fire departments. This statutory grant of authority is shared by the chief and the board .of commissioners in the manner directed by the legislature. It is a legislatively designed system of accountability in the appointment of sworn officers, and it subjects the appointing authorities to mutual report, recommendation, and approval responsibilities. The statute provides:

The chiefs shall appoint subordinates subject to approval by the board. Such appointments shall be made by promotion when this can be done with advantage, otherwise from an eligible list provided by examination and approval by the board and kept on file with the clerk.

Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(a).

For the choosing of such list the board shall adopt, and may repeal or modify, rules calculated to secure the best service in the departments. These rules shall provide for examination of physical and educational qualifications and experience, and may provide such competitive examinations as the board shall determine, and for the classification of positions with special examination for each class. The board shall print and distribute the rules and all changes in them, at city expense.

Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(c).

¶ 14. The provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.13 "shall be construed as an enactment of statewide concern for the purpose of providing a uniform regulation of police and fire departments." Wis. Stat. § 62.13(12); see also Racine Fire and Police Comm'n v. Stanfield, 70 Wis. 2d 395, 398-99, 234 N.W.2d 307 (1975) (holding that the PFC may "assert its authority even when it may appear to be antagonistic to the policies of the city upon the overriding consideration that uniformity of management of fire and police affairs is a matter of statewide concern").

¶ 15. The statute gives the chiefs of fire and police departments the exclusive power to appoint subordinates. Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4) ("the chiefs shall appoint subordinates"). Such appointments "shall be made by promotion when this can be done with advantage" and are subject to approval by the board of police and fire commissioners, which has the power to adopt and modify "rules calculated to secure the best service in the departments." Id.

¶ 16. The Madison PFC has formalized the department's long-standing practice of requiring probationary periods as part of the appointment process by adopting various written rules, including Rule 5.04, which pertains to probation in the context of promotion:

All promotional appointments shall he probationary for [12] months unless extended by the appointing authority for a longer probationary period. During said probationary period, the Chief may reduce the person appointed to that person's former rank. The appointee shall not be entitled to an appeal to the Board from the termination of a probationary appointment or any reduction in rank which results therefrom.

Madison Police and Fire Commission Rule 5.04.

¶ 17. Probationary periods are a valuable part of the appointment process, as they allow fire and police chiefs an opportunity to assess a candidate's performance in the position, and thus better measure a candidate's qualifications prior to making a final decision on appointment. Kaiser v. Bd. of Police and Fire Comm'rs, 104 Wis. 2d 498, 504, 311 N.W.2d 646 (1981); see also Ratliff v. City of Milwaukee, 795 F.2d 612, 624—25 (7th Cir. 1986); Hussey v. Outagamie County, 201 Wis. 2d 14, 19-21, 548 N.W.2d 848 (Ct. App. 1996); Milwaukee III, 113 Wis. 2d at 196. In the context of new hires, this court has stated that "[tjhere is no doubt that the use of a probationary period is an excellent means of examining candidates and is well-suited to securing the best service available." Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 504.

¶ 18. Promotion decisions implicate these same managerial considerations and public safety policies. Accordingly, in Kraus, 2003 WI 51, ¶ 3, we have concluded that fire and police chiefs are authorized to impose probation when making promotions from within under Wis. Stat. § 62.13. Therefore, the Madison PFC's rule subjecting all promotions to a 12-month probationary period is valid, and Madison's fire chief had the authority to promote Gentilli to fire apparatus engineer on a probationary basis.

. ¶ 19. We have also concluded in Kraus that the "just cause" hearing provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) are not available to an officer who is returned to his or her prior rank for failure to successfully complete a probationary period associated with a promotion. Kraus, 2003 WI 51, ¶ 3. Here, in any event, neither Gentilli nor the City has asked that this matter be returned to the PFC for a "just cause" hearing under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em); they have instead focused their arguments on the arbitration issue.

IV ARBITRABILITY

¶ 20. The determination of whether an employment dispute is subject to arbitration centers on the arbitration language in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. " 'An order to arbitrate [a] particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive -assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.'" Milwaukee I, 92 Wis. 2d at 152 (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)). There is "a broad presumption of arbitrability," and courts are limited to determining whether the arbitration language in the contract encompasses the grievance in question and whether any other provision of the contract excludes arbitration. Milwaukee II, 97 Wis. 2d at 22. "When the court determines arbitrability, it is limited to considering whether the arbitration clause can be construed to cover the grievance on its face and whether any other provision of the contract specifically excludes it." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, 78 Wis. 2d at 111).

¶ 21. Thus, there are two relevant contractual inquiries in the analysis of arbitrability: 1) does the arbitration clause cover the grievance on its face; and 2) is there another provision of the collective bargaining agreement that specifically excludes arbitration? Milwaukee II, 97 Wis. 2d at 22; Milwaukee I, 92 Wis. 2d at 151; Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, 78 Wis. 2d at 111. The fact that the arbitration clause covers the grievance on its face does not end the inquiry; if another provision of the contract specifically excludes arbitration of the relevant dispute, then arbitration is unavailable. Milwaukee II, 97 Wis. 2d at 22; Milwaukee I, 92 Wis. 2d at 151; Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, 78 Wis. 2d at 111.

¶ 22. In Milwaukee I, the collective bargaining agreement at issue expressly commanded that "the arbitrator shall take into account the special statutory responsibilities granted to the Chief of Police." Milwaukee I, 92 Wis. 2d at 156 (emphasis added). Far from prohibiting arbitration, the collective bargaining agreement in Milwaukee I expressly required the arbitrator to evaluate the chiefs statutory powers.

¶ 23. In Milwaukee II, the collective bargaining agreement directed that "[i]n reviewing any difference over application of a departmental rule or regulation under this grievance and arbitration procedure the arbitrator shall take into account the special statutory responsibilities granted to the Chief of Police under the 1911 Special Laws of the State of Wisconsin, Chapter 586, and amendments thereto." Milwaukee II, 97 Wis. 2d at 28 (emphasis added). That provision specifically authorized the arbitrator to consider and review the statutory powers of the chief.

¶ 24. Similarly, in Glendale, the collective bargaining agreement explicitly provided that the "arbitrator shall have initial authority to determine whether or not the dispute is arbitrable." Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 95. The agreement also expressly required the chief to appoint the most senior qualified candidate. Id. at 101. It did not contain any other provision specifically excluding arbitration.

¶ 25. Here, the parties' collective bargaining agreement broadly recognizes and protects the management rights of the City and the chief of the fire department, including the right "[t]o hire, schedule, promote, transfer, assign, train or retrain employees in positions within the Fire Department." CBA, Article 5.C. The following additional provisions of the collective bargaining agreement are important here:

Any dispute with respect to Management Rights shall not in any way be subject to arbitration but any grievance with respect to the reasonableness of the application of said Management Rights may be subject to the grievance procedure contained herein.

CBA, Article 5.K.

Arbitration shall be limited to grievances over matters involving interpretation, application or enforcement of the terms of this Agreement.

CBA, Article 9.Q.I.

Arbitration shall not apply where Section 62.13 of the Wisconsin Statutes is applicable and where Management has reserved rights relating to arbitration in Article 5 of this Agreement.

CBA, Article 9.Q.2.

¶ 26. The first two sections quoted above might be read to generally permit arbitration of disputes regarding the reasonableness of individual applications of reserved management rights, as well as disputes regarding the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the terms of the agreement. The third quoted section, however, specifically and unequivocally excludes arbitration of matters falling within the chiefs or PFC's statutory authority under Wis. Stat. § 62.13: arbitration "shall not apply" when Wis. Stat. § 62.13 is applicable and management has reserved its rights in this regard. CBA, Article 9.Q.2.

¶ 27. Therefore, unlike the collective bargaining agreements at issue in Glendale, Milwaukee I, and Milwaukee II, which specifically granted arbitrators the authority to consider the chiefs statutory powers, the collective bargaining agreement at issue in this case specifically precludes arbitration of matters falling within the statutory authority of the chief and the PFC under Wis. Stat. § 62.13. Furthermore, neither Glendale, nor Milwaukee I, nor Milwaukee II permit the "transfer[ ] from the Chief or the Board the authority to determine who is qualified" or the "transfer [ ] away [of] the appointing authority." Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 107. And that is what WERC's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and the statutes effectively does here.

¶ 28. The Madison fire chief has determined that Gentilli failed to qualify for permanent promotion to fire apparatus engineer because he did not successfully complete his probationary promotion to that position. Gentilli's grievance seeks an arbitrator's reversal of the chiefs decision, restoration of the promotion, and back wages and benefits. The authority to determine who is qualified for appointment and promotion (and therefore who is entitled to wages and benefits associated with appointment or promotion) is statutorily vested solely with the chief and the PFC and may not be transferred to an arbitrator. See Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 106-07.

¶ 29. "[T]he chief is under no compulsion to promote an unqualified person," because a labor agreement may "not transfer[ ] from the Chief or the Board the authority to determine who is qualified" and must "preserve [ ] the statutory requirement that only qualified persons be appointed." Id.; see also Milwaukee I, 92 Wis. 2d at 158 (holding that an arbitrator has no authority to direct that a particular officer be given an assignment "since both the statutes and the collective bargaining agreement vest authority in the chief1 to make such decisions); Milwaukee II, 97 Wis. 2d at 26, 32 (holding that an arbitrator may not "substitute his own discretion for that vested in one or another of the parties" and vacating the arbitration award in light of the statutory obligations and prerogatives of a municipal officer). The relief Gentilli seeks cannot be granted by an arbitrator, because the power to evaluate qualifications, to appoint, and to promote belongs exclusively to the chief and the PFC under Wis. Stat. § 62.13. This dispute regarding the chiefs decision to return Gentilli to his previous rank for failure to successfully complete the probation promotion is not arbitrable.

¶ 30. The court of appeals has reached a similar conclusion in the context of probationary new hires. Milwaukee III, 113 Wis. 2d at 198. In Milwaukee III, the court of appeals considered whether a police chiefs decision to terminate a probationary police officer was arbitrable:

We believe that to make a probationary termination arbitrable is to wholly vitiate the significance of a probationary term. As our supreme court noted in Kaiser, In examining candidates the board may limit persons on the basis of 'residence, health, habits and character.' To allow an arbitrator to reinstate a terminated probationary officer destroys the board's power to limit the selection of police officers on statutorily founded bases. Were we to so read the collective bargaining agreement to allow such a termination to be arbitrable, we would be allowing a general contractual term to govern over an express power to select as vested in police chiefs and boards granted in sec. 62.13(4), Stats., and a clear manifestation of legislative intent that the standards for the training and education of police officers are matters of statewide concern, as evinced in sec. 165.85(1), Stats. That we cannot do. Where a contractual provision is in direct conflict with a statute, the statute governs.

Milwaukee III, 113 Wis. 2d at 196 (citations omitted).

¶ 31. The court of appeals further noted that "[i]f an arbitrator may reverse the board's or chiefs exercise of discretion in terminating a probationary employe and reinstate him, the board's or chiefs decision becomes meaningless; it may then always be overridden by an arbitrator." Id. at 197. The court concluded that "[b]ecause the strong public policy behind secs. 62.13 and 165.85, Stats., would be thwarted if the broad, general, and not express language of the collective bargaining agreement were read to make probationary terminations arbitrable, we reject so broad a reading and hold that the question is not arbitrable." Id. at 198.

¶ 32. WERC's arbitration order, affirmed by the circuit court, would transfer to WERC and an arbitrator the statutory authority of the chief and the PFC to determine whether an employee is qualified to hold a particular position. Nothing in MERA authorizes WERC or an arbitrator to displace the authority of the chief or the PFC to make the difficult judgments regarding hiring and promotion that they are statutorily entitled and uniquely qualified to make.

¶ 33. Fire chiefs, police chiefs, and police and fire commissions are exclusively empowered to make, and are responsible for, appointment and promotion decisions under Wis. Stat. § 62.13, in order to "secure the best service" in their respective departments. Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(c). This statutory scheme does not contemplate that an arbitrator may overrule decisions that are specifically entrusted to the chief and the PFC; nothing in Wis. Stat. § 111.70 requires such an interpretation of § 62.13. Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement in this case specifically excludes disputes regarding management rights under § 62.13 from arbitration, and any interpretation of the agreement that would effectively transfer to an arbitrator the statutory authority of the chief and the PFC to make appointment and promotion decisions would clearly conflict with § 62.13. Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court affirming WERC's order to arbitrate Gentilli's grievance must be reversed.

By the Court. — The order of the Dane County Circuit Court is reversed.

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE

¶ 34. (dissenting). This case implicates the relationship between a statute governing terms and conditions of employment and a public sector bargaining agreement, one of the most difficult issues in public sector labor law. A rule that gives automatic priority to a statute can render the duty to bargain insignificant while a rule giving automatic priority to an agreement can result in effective repeal of state law. This court has thus demanded that "collective bargaining agreements and statutes also governing conditions of employment must be harmonized whenever possible."

¶ 35. I dissent because the majority opinion fails to harmonize Wis. Stat. §§ 62.13(5)(em) and 111.70 and thus contravenes both. I would affirm the decisions of the circuit court and the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission that ordered the City to proceed with arbitration on the union's grievance.

¶ 36. In Kraus v. City of Madison, 2003 WI 51, 261 Wis. 2d 485, 662 N.W.2d 294, this court effectively held that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) does not protect municipal employees who are promoted subject to successful completion of a period of probation when they are denied that promotion during the period of probation for nondisciplinary reasons. In the present case, this court now holds that the same statute bars those same municipal employees from collectively bargaining with a municipality under Wis. Stat. § 111.70 to require that a chiefs or police and fire commission's decision to deny a promotion be reasonable.

¶ 37. When read together, these two decisions hold that when a police officer or firefighter is promoted contingent upon the successful completion of a period of probation, his promotion may be denied for a completely false, irrational, or unsubstantiated reason before the end of his probationary period, even if:

(1) the actual reason for denying his promotion is disciplinary and is subject to the just cause provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em); and
(2) a collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 111.70 requires that the denial he reasonable.

¶ 38. I disagree with this interpretation of the statutes. The legislature did not intend § 62.13(5)(em) to be both a sword and a shield for municipalities, allowing them to fend off all requests for just cause hearings and deflect any efforts to negotiate alternative protections for officers promoted subject to a period of probation. Nor did the legislature intend to leave police officers and firefighters helpless in the face of arbitrary and capricious personnel decisions when it enacted § 111.70, codifying the right of municipal employees to collectively bargain over their wages, hours, and conditions of employment.

¶ 39. The majority opinion here narrowly construes the collective bargaining agreement in order to create conflict between the agreement and Wis. Stat. § 62.13, contravening the rule that collective bargaining agreements and statute's must be harmonized whenever possible. The collective bargaining agreement at issue here can, I conclude, be reasonably construed to limit, not replace, the chiefs discretion to return a firefighter to his prior rank during a period of probation, thereby giving effect to both the chiefs power under § 62.13 and the municipality's duty to bargain under § 111.70. Under this interpretation of the statutes and the agreement, the grievance is arbi-trable.

¶ 40. The majority opinion errs in two respects. First, it changes the two-prong test to determine arbi-trability. Second, it erroneously applies the test of arbitrability.

I — I

¶ 41. To determine arbitrability in the present case, I, like the majority, must apply the two-prong test set forth in City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Police Ass'n, 97 Wis. 2d 15, 292 N.W.2d 841 (1980) ("Milwaukee II"). Milwaukee II states the test as follows: "When the court determines arbitrability, it is limited to considering [1] whether the arbitration clause can be construed to cover the grievance on its face and [2] whether any other provision of the contract specifically excludes it." A similar test was set forth in Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 2d 145, 285 N.W.2d 119 (1979) ("Milwaukee I"). This two-prong test was set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960), which this court has frequently quoted with approval.

¶ 42. The majority opinion correctly and approvingly announces this oft-repeated two-prong test as the one to be applied in the present case to determine arbitrability. Yet while pretending to follow this test, the majority opinion restates and changes the test. The majority opinion declares a new two-prong test for determining arbitrability as follows: "[TJhere are two relevant contractual inquiries in the analysis of arbi-trability: 1) does the arbitration clause cover the griev-anee on its face; and 2) is there another provision of the collective bargaining agreement that specifically excludes arbitration?"

¶ 43. Gone from the first prong of the test is the concept of liberal construction embodied in the phrase "whether the arbitration clause can be construed to cover the grievance." The newly stated test requires the arbitration clause to cover the grievance on its face, rather than being capable of a construction that covers the grievance. The majority opinion reveals this sleight of hand when it states:

There is no conflict between the holding of [Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 113 Wis. 2d 192, 335 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Milwaukee ///")] that a dispute is not arbitrable if the collective bargaining agreement does not expressly make it arbitrable, and the holdings of Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II that require the arbitration clause to "cover the grievance on its face." See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 609 (7th ed. 1999) (equating "on the 'face'" with the "explicit part of writing").

¶ 44. In short, the long-standing Wisconsin/U.S. Supreme Court test requires that arbitration provisions are to be liberally and generously construed to cover an asserted dispute; that there is "a broad presumption of arbitrability"; and that an issue should be found arbi-trable if "the arbitration clause can be construed to cover the grievance on its face." Arbitration is denied only when, as the court stated in Milwaukee I, "it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."

HH I — I

¶ 45. When the long-standing two-prong test of arbitrability is properly applied in the present case, rather than the new test set forth by the majority opinion, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the grievance is arbitrable.

¶ 46. As to the first prong of the test, the arbitration clause in the present case "can be construed to cover the grievance." The applicable provisions in Articles 5 and 9 of the collective bargaining agreement are as follows:

ARTICLE 5
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Union recognizes the prerogative of the City and the Chief of the Fire Department to operate and manage its affairs in all respects, in accordance with its responsibilities and the powers or authority which the City has not officially abridged, delegated or modified by this Agreement and such powers or authority are retained by the City.
These management rights include, but are not limited to the following:
A. To utilize personnel, methods, procedures, and means in the most appropriate and efficient manner possible.
B. To manage and direct the employees of the Fire Department.
C. To hire, schedule, promote, transfer, assign, train or retrain employees in positions within the Fire Department.
D. To suspend, demote, discharge, or take other appropriate disciplinary action against the employees for just cause.
K. Any dispute with respect to Management Rights shall not in any way be subject to arbitration but any grievance with respect to the reasonableness of the application of said Management Rights may be subject to the grievance procedure contained herein.
ARTICLE 9
GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
A. Only matters involving interpretation, application, or enforcement of the terms of this Agreement shall constitute a grievance under the provision set forth herein.
I. ARBITRATION may be resorted to only when issues arise between the parties hereto with reference to the interpretation, application or enforcement of the provisions of this Agreement.

CBA (emphasis added).

¶ 47. Article 5.C. provides that the management rights are reserved to the City and Chief. These management rights include the rights to "hire, schedule, promote, transfer, assign, train or retain employees in positions with the fire department" and "to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other appropriate disciplinary action against the employee for just cause." Article 5.K. further provides, however, that "any grievance with respect to the reasonableness of the application of said Management Rights may be subject to the grievance procedure contained herein."

¶ 48. Gentilli's grievance involves the reasonableness of the application of the management right to promote him. Thus, as the majority opinion correctly explains, Article 5.K. "might be read to generally permit arbitration of disputes regarding the reasonableness of individual applications of reserved management rights."

¶ 49. I turn now to the second prong of the test: Does any provision of the collective bargaining agreement expressly exclude arbitrability of the grievance?

¶ 50. The collective bargaining agreement places two relevant limits on the arbitrability of disputes in Article 9. No other provision of the collective bargaining agreement specifically excludes this grievance.

¶ 51. First, Article 9.Q.1 of the agreement states, "Arbitration shall be limited to grievances over matters involving interpretation, application or enforcement of the terms of this Agreement." Gentilli's grievance implicates the application of a term of the agreement, namely application of the management right to promote. Thus Gentilli's grievance falls within the express terms of an arbitrable issue and is not excluded by Article 9.Q.I.

¶ 52. Second, Article 9.Q.2 of the agreement states, "Arbitration shall not apply where Section 62.13 of the Wisconsin Statutes is applicable and where Management has reserved rights relating to arbitration in Article 5." According to the majority opinion, this provision "specifically and unequivocally excludes arbitration of matters falling within the chiefs or PFC's statutory authority under Wis. Stat. § 62.13" and the power to evaluate qualifications, to appoint, and to promote belongs exclusively to the chief and the PFC under § 62.13. Thus, the majority opinion concludes, Gentilli's grievance is not arbitrable.

¶ 53. The majority opinion suffers from two flawed arguments. First, the majority opinion incorrectly argues that the collective bargaining agreement at issue in this case does not grant an arbitrator the authority to consider the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 62.13. The majority opinion notes that the arbitration agreements in Milwaukee I, Milwaukee II, and Glendale Professional Policemen's Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 264 Wis. 2d 594 (1978), expressly granted arbitrators the power to consider the chiefs statutory authority, while Article 9.Q.2 here expressly excludes arbitration where Wis. Stat. § 62.13 applies. The majority opinion suggests that this distinction eliminates an arbitrator's authority to determine whether § 62.13 applies in the first place.

¶ 54. The majority's conclusion, however, ignores Article 9.Q.I. Article 9.Q.1 states that arbitration is available for grievances involving "interpretation ... of the terms of this Agreement." Article 9.Q.2, excluding arbitration where § 62.13 applies, is, of course, a term of the agreement. Thus, the collective bargaining agreement at issue here, like those in Milwaukee I, Milwaukee II, and Glendale, authorizes arbitrators to consider whether the chiefs statutory powers under § 62.13 are applicable to a particular grievance.

¶ 55. Second, and more importantly, the majority opinion improperly compares the collective bargaining agreement in this case to the broad agreement in Milwaukee III and not the more limited agreement at issue in Glendale.

¶ 56. The crux of the majority opinion is that arbitration of the decision to deny a promotion during a period of probation directly conflicts with the chiefs authority under Wis. Stat. § 62.13 and is therefore invalid. Resting heavily on the court of appeals' decision in Milwaukee III, the majority opinion concludes, "any interpretation of the agreement that would effectively transfer" the chiefs right to promote officers under § 62.13 "would clearly conflict with § 62.13."

¶ 57. The majority opinion's conclusion, however, fails to account for this court's decision in Glendale. The collective bargaining agreement in Glendale required that the chief promote the most senior qualified candidate. When a vacancy opened up, however, the chief promoted the officer who received the highest test score on a qualifying examination, despite the fact that of the three officers identified with the highest qualifying test scores, the selected officer was not the most senior. The promotion decision was submitted to arbitration, and the arbitrator ordered the City to promote the most senior officer among the three highest scoring officers.

¶ 58. This court approved the order of the arbitrator, concluding that the collective bargaining agreement's requirement to promote based on seniority did not "take away power expressly conferred by law"; rather, it "merely restricts the discretion that would otherwise exist."

¶ 59. The Glendale court explained that a collective bargaining agreement may restrict the promotional authority of the PFC and the chief as long as it does not transfer or displace that promotional authority in violation of Wis. Stat. § 62.13. The court stated as follows:

Although by entering into the collective bargaining agreement the City relinquished some of the discretion the Chief and the Board enjoyed previously concerning appointments and promotions, it has not transferred from the Chief or the Board the authority to determine who is qualified, and it has not transferred away the appointing authority.

¶ 60. The collective bargaining agreement in the present case is analogous to the agreement in Glendale. It does not transfer the chiefs authority to promote (or demote) officers under Wis. Stat. § 62.13 to an arbitrator. Rather, it simply limits the chiefs authority by requiring that the chief be reasonable in the application of this management right.

¶ 61. The majority opinion mischaracterizes the scope of the restriction placed on the chiefs promotion and demotion authority under the collective bargaining agreement in the present case by framing the dispute based on the relief sought in Gentilli's grievance, not the agreement itself. The majority writes, "Gentilli's grievance seeks an arbitrator's reversal of the chiefs decision, restoration of the promotion, and back wages and benefits." The grievance, according to the majority, therefore seeks an arbitrator's determination as to who is qualified for appointment and promotion — a power statutorily vested solely with the chief and the PFC.

¶ 62. The fact that Gentilli wishes to have his promotion restored does not mean that the collective bargaining agreement transfers the authority to decide who is qualified for a promotion to an arbitrator. In Glendale, the grievance of the most senior officer seeking promotion sought the same relief: order the Chief to promote the grieving officer despite the Chiefs decision to the contrary.

¶ 63. Yet this court correctly interpreted the grievance in Glendale not as a request to displace the Chiefs authority to determine qualified officers under Wis. Stat. § 62.13 but as a request to enforce the limitation on that authority bargained for under the collective bargaining agreement. The Glendale decision explained: "Under the labor agreement, the chief is under no compulsion to promote an unqualified person or a person determined solely by the union. The seniority restriction operates only where there is more than one qualified candidate."

¶ 64. The same conclusion must be reached in the present case. The collective bargaining agreement does not compel the chief to promote an unqualified person or a particular person. It requires only that the chiefs discretion to promote qualified people be exercised reasonably.

¶ 65. Gentilli alleges that "the Madison Fire Department arbitrarily and capriciously revoked [his] status as an Apparatus Engineer." He believes that he was denied his promotion eleven months into a twelvemonth period of probation because of a heated discussion with a senior officer despite receiving satisfactory marks on his performance evaluation, and that this decision was unreasonable and therefore subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement.

¶ 66. As the hearing examiner properly concluded, "whether the revocation of Gentilli's probationary status in the Apparatus Engineer position constituted appropriate discipline for the violation of a work rule, a demotion, or the unreasonable application of certain management rights are issues that are to be decided by an arbitrator."

¶ 67. The majority opinion avoids a thorough discussion of this court's decision in Glendale by following the decision of the court of appeals in Milwaukee III instead. Milwaukee III, however, is inapposite.

¶ 68. In Milwaukee III, the court of appeals refused to permit arbitration of a probationary termination, in part, because the collective bargaining agreement used broad and general terms to describe the arbitrator's authority and the court was reluctant to craft those terms into a mere limitation, not usurpation, of a chiefs statutory authority. The Milwaukee III collective bargaining agreement generically provided for arbitration whenever there were "differences" involving the "interpretation, application or enforcement of the provisions" of the agreement. It also granted an arbitrator the authority to hear "matters of departmental discipline involving application of the rules or regulations of the Chief' whenever those matters were not subject to appeal to the PFC.

¶ 69. The Milwaukee III decision, however, expressly distinguished the broad, general terms in the agreement before it from the agreement at issue in Glendale, which, "by express terms, merely required the chief'to appoint the most senior qualified candidate.' " The same distinction is properly drawn in this case. The collective bargaining agreement here provides, in express terms, that the encroachment on a chiefs statutory authority to promote is limited. Under Article 5.K., the agreement authorizes grievances "with respect to the reasonableness of the application" of management rights.

¶ 70. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.

¶ 71. I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.

       All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 version.

       This case also presents a threshold question regarding the chiefs authority to promote on a probationary basis in the first instance. In Kraus v. City of Waukesha Police and Fire Commission, 2003 WI 51, ¶ 3, 261 Wis. 2d 485, 662 N.W.2d 294, also released today, we concluded that police and fire chiefs may promote officers on a probationary basis, and also held that the "just cause" hearing procedures of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) are not available in cases of non-disciplinary reductions in rank for failure to successfully complete a probationary period associated with a promotion.

       Wisconsin Statutes § 62.13(4)(a) provides that "[t]he [police and fire] chiefs shall appoint subordinates subject to approval by the board. Such appointments shall be made by promotion when this can be done with advantage, otherwise from an eligible list provided by examination and approval by the board and kept on file with the clerk." The statute further provides:
      For the choosing of such list the board shall adopt, and may repeal or modify, rules calculated to secure the best service in the departments. These rules shall provide for examination of physical and educational qualifications and experience, and may provide such competitive examinations as the board shall determine, and for the classification of positions with special examination for each class. The board shall print and distribute the rules and all changes in them, at city expense.
      Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4) (c).

       The Municipal Employment Relations Act, Wis. Stat. § 111.70(3)(a)5, provides:
      It is a prohibited practice ....
      [t]o violate any collective bargaining agreement previously agreed upon by the parties with respect to wages, hours and conditions of employment affecting municipal employees, including an agreement to arbitrate questions hrising as to the meaning or application of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or to accept the terms of such arbitration award ....

        See also Crawford County v. WERC, 177 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 501 N.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1993).
      [Wlhether the proposal is bargainable turns on whether it abrogates or impermissibly interferes with the legal right of the three officials to appoint the designated subordinates. That is a question involving the interpretation of statutes outside the area of labor relations and the relationship of these sections to the applicable provisions of the Municipal Employment Relations Act. The issue is thus one of law 'within the special competence of the courts rather than the Commission.... As a result, we do not defer to the commission's decision.

        Id. (quoting City of Brookfield v. WERC, 87 Wis. 2d 819, 826-28, 275 N.W.2d 723 (1979), and Glendale Prof'l Policemen's Ass'n v. Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 100-01, 264 N.W.2d 594 (1978)).

       By requiring the chief to "appoint the most senior qualified candidate," the agreement in Glendale only permitted appointment of those candidates found to be qualified by the chief, and did not transfer to an arbitrator the chiefs statutory power to decide which candidates were qualified in the first instance. That is, it did not allow an arbitrator to decide, contrary to the decision of the chief, that a candidate was qualified to hold a particular position. Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 106-07.

         Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II came before this court after arbitration had already taken place, and in each case this court vacated the relief granted by the arbitrator, holding that it violated the chiefs statutory powers. See City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Police Ass'n ("Milwaukee II"), 97 Wis. 2d 15, 292 N.W.2d 841 (1980), and Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee I"), 92 Wis. 2d 145, 285 N.W.2d 119 (1979). The court did not vacate the award and then proceed to order the arbitrator to craft a new measure of relief. Had those cases come before the court in the posture of this case, it is doubtful that the court would have remanded for an arbitration which the court had already declared could not be given effect.

       WERC argues, and the circuit court held, that the court of appeals in Milwaukee III failed to engage in the arbitrability analysis employed in Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II. In Milwaukee III, the court of appeals discussed this court's decision in Glendale and noted that that case involved a collective bargaining agreement which "by express terms" had required the chief "to appoint the most senior qualified candidate." Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee III"), 113 Wis. 2d 192, 197, 335 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1983), rev. denied, 114 Wis. 2d 602, 340 N.W.2d 201. In contrast, the agreement at issue before the court of appeals in Milwaukee III
        was "without any such express term." Id. at 197 (emphasis in original). Therefore, as we have noted, the court concluded that "the strong public policy behind secs. 62.13 and 165.85, Stats., would be thwarted if the broad, general, and not express language of the collective bargaining agreement were read to make probationary terminations arbitrable." Id. at 198 (emphasis added). There is no conflict between the holding oí Milwaukee III that a dispute is not arbitrable if the collective bargaining agreement does not expressly make it arbitrable, and the holdings of Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II that require the arbitration clause to "cover the grievance on its face." See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 609 (7th ed. 1999) (equating "on the 'face'" with the "explicit part of a writing").

        Glendale Prof'l Policemen's Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 105, 264 Wis. 2d 594 (1978).

       June Weisberger, The Appropriate Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector: The Continuing Controversy and the Wisconsin Experience, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 685, 740 (1977).

        Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 106.

       The court of appeals certified the following question to this court: "Is a firefighter promoted on a probationary basis but returned to his former rank for failing to successfully complete probation for an allegedly non-disciplinary reason entitled to the just cause protections of § 62.13(e)(em)?"
      This court's decision in Kraus v. City of Madison, 2003 WI 51, 261 Wis. 2d 485, 662 N.W.2d 294 answered this question in the negative. If Kraus had concluded that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) applies to non-disciplinary demotions, a question would arise whether a just cause hearing under § 62.13(5) is the exclusive remedy and trumps arbitration of grievance in a collective bargaining agreement. The parties do not brief or argue this point, and I do not address it directly. For a discussion of exclusivity, see City of Madison v. Dept. of Workforce Development, 2003 WI 76, City of Janesville v. WERC, 193 Wis. 2d 492, 535 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995).

        City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Police Ass'n ('Milwaukee II'), 97 Wis. 2d 15, 22, 292 N.W.2d 841 (1980) (citing to Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 111, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977)) (emphasis added).

       Majority op., ¶ 20.

         Id.

         Id., ¶ 21.

        Id., ¶ 31 n.8.

        See majority op., ¶ 20 (quoting Milwaukee II, 97 Wis. 2d at 22).

        See majority op., ¶ 20 (quoting Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 2d 145, 152, 285 N.W.2d 119 (1979) (Milwaukee I) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960))).

        See CBA, Articles 5.E., 5.E.

        See CBA, Article 5.K. (emphasis added).

        See majority op., ¶ 26.

       See CBA, Article 9.Q.1 (quoted in majority op., ¶ 25).

       See CBA, Article 9.Q.2 (quoted in majority op., ¶ 25).

       See majority op., ¶¶ 26-27.

       Majority op., ¶¶ 30-32.

       Majority op., ¶ 33.

        Glendale Prof'l Policemen's Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 102-03, 264 Wis. 2d 594 (1978).

        Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 107.

       Majority op., ¶ 28.

        Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d at 106.

       Gentilli was apparently the only officer among 54 who did not successfully complete the probationary period.

       Majority op., ¶¶ 30-32.

        Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 113 Wis. 2d 192, 197, 335 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1983) CMilwaukee III).

       The Milwaukee III decision is distinguishable for other reasons as well. Milwaukee III involved an initial probationary period, while this case involves a promotional probationary period. Milwaukee III involved the application of Wis. Stat. § 165.85, which applies to law enforcement officers, while this case involves firefighters.

       The majority opinion also misreads the holding of Milwaukee III. The majority opinion states that Milwaukee III concluded the grievance was not arbitrable because" 'the strong public policy behind secs. 62.13 and 165.85, Stats., would be thwarted if the broad, general, and not express language of the collective bargaining agreement were read to make probationary terminations arbitrable.1" Majority op., ¶ 31 n.8 (quoting
        Milwaukee III, 113 Wis. 2d at 198). While Milwaukee III may plausibly be read to rest on this conclusion, the language of the decision is confused and such a reading violates the two-prong test for arbitrability announced in Milwaukee I. the Milwaukee III decision actually concluded that whenever a provision of a collective bargaining agreement is in direct conflict with a statute, the statute governs. See Milwaukee III, 113 Wis. 2d at 196. It is this latter reading of the decision that should be followed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DAVID T. PROSSER, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Elaine J. Hamilton, Petitioner v. Walter Junior Hamilton, Respondent: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Walter Junior Hamilton, Respondent-Appellant.
    Supreme Court

      No. 01-1014.

      Oral argument November 6, 2002.

    Decided May 30, 2003.

    2003 WI 50
    (Also reported in 661 N.W.2d 832.)

      For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner the cause was argued by Stephen J. Nicks, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.
    For the respondent-appellant there were briefs (in the court of appeals) by Robert A. Ramsdell, Madison, and oral argument by Robert A. Ramsdell.

   DAVID T. PROSSER, J.

¶ 1. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, which reversed a Dane County Circuit Court decision denying Walter Junior Hamilton's (Walter) motion to dismiss the State's action to collect unpaid child support.

¶ 2. Walter was divorced in 1970 and ordered to pay child support for his two children. The child support judgment was amended in 1977. The State filed an independent action to collect Walter's child support arrearages in 2000, almost 30 years after the original judgment, more than 20 years after the amended judgment, and more than 15 years after Walter's youngest child reached the age of majority.

¶ 3. Walter's case raises questions about the application of statutes of limitations to child support collection actions. The issue presented is whether the State, as an assignee of Walter's deceased former wife, filed a timely action to collect child support arrearages in 2000. Payments missed between 1970 and June 30, 1980, are not at issue. See infra ¶ 13, n.8. Thus, the specific questions of law are: (1) Does Wis. Stat. § 893.40 (2Q01-2002) apply to independent actions to collect child support not paid after July 1, 1980, and (2) if § 893.40 applies, when does the 20-year limitations period in the statute begin to run?

¶ 4. We hold that Wis. Stat. § 893.40, which became effective on July 1, 1980, governs the time within which a party may bring an independent action to collect child support arrearages that accumulated after the statute's effective date. In addition, we conclude that, under the statute, an action brought to enforce a child support judgment must be commenced within 20 years of the date when the judgment is entered. The period of limitation begins to run upon entry of judgment, irrespective of whether any payment under that judgment has been missed.

¶ 5. The last judgment ordering Walter to pay child support was entered on November 9, 1977. Consequently, the State had until November 9, 1997, to commence an action against Walter to collect arrears that accrued after July 1, 1980. Because the State's action to collect arrearages was not initiated until May 2000, it must be deemed untimely and barred under Wis. Stat. § 893.40.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

¶ 6. The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute. Walter and Elaine Hamilton were divorced in Grant County on June 22, 1970, after approximately five years of marriage. The divorce judgment required Walter to make payments to Elaine every two weeks: $10.00 as alimony and $20.00 for each of their two children as child support. By 1977 Walter was residing in Dane County. On November 9, 1977, the Dane County Circuit Court entered an order amending the judgment, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties. This order expunged all alimony arrearages and eliminated Walter's future obligation to pay alimony, but it revised Walter's child support payments to a fixed sum of $50.00, to be paid every two weeks until further ordered by the court. The 1977 order was the last court order regarding child support directed at Walter prior to the commencement of this action.

¶ 7. The youngest Hamilton child reached the age of majority on April 4, 1985. From the date of the original divorce judgment in 1970 through April 1985, Walter failed to make a substantial number of child support payments.

¶ 8. Elaine died on June 7, 1989. She did not file any enforcement actions to collect on Walter's child support arrears before her death.

¶ 9. On May 22, 2000, the State filed a motion in Dane County Circuit Court requesting the court to order Walter to pay the child support arrearages and interest that had accumulated as of January 12, 2000. Specifically, the State sought $15,501.85 in child support arrearages and $10,948.50 in interest. In an accompanying affidavit, the State alleged that it was a real party in interest under Wis. Stat. § 767.075. Documents in the record show that the State was acting in part to recoup AFDC payments made to Elaine during periods when Walter was failing to pay child support.

¶ 10. In response to the State's motion, Walter argued that the statute of limitations for actions on judgments had expired and thus barred the State's action. A family court commissioner and the Dane County Circuit Court, Gerald C. Nichol, Judge, agreed that the 20-year statute of limitations in Wis. Stat. § 893.40 applied. Relying on case law interpreting and applying earlier statutes, the circuit court determined that the State's cause of action did not accrue until the date Walter and Elaine's youngest child reached the age of majority. This ruling made the State's action in 2000 timely, on the theory that the State had 20 years from April 4, 1985, the accrual date, to commence an action.

¶ 11. The circuit court remanded the matter to the family court commissioner, who ordered Walter to pay $15,024.85 in arrearages and $7,944.39 in interest. When the matter returned to the circuit court, the court affirmed the arrearage amount but expunged all existing and future interest because of the State's unreasonable delay in seeking enforcement. Walter was ordered to pay $100 per month toward the arrears, as well as an annual receiving and disbursement fee. The circuit court rejected Walter's renewed motion that it had lost jurisdiction because the State's claim had expired under the statute of limitations. Walter appealed.

¶ 12. On March 28, 2002, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's decision. State v. Hamilton, 2002 WI App 89, ¶ 1, 253 Wis. 2d 805, 644 N.W.2d 243. Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 893.40, the court noted that a substantive change had been made in the law regarding the starting date of the 20-year time limit for actions on a judgment or decree. Id., ¶ 15. The court asserted that two distinct groups of missed child support payments were at issue in the case. Id., ¶¶ 7, 16. The court reasoned that § 893.40 applied to arrearages arising after its effective date of July 1, 1980, and that the statute of limitations began to run on these missed payments upon the entry of the last judgment in 1977. Id., ¶ 18. The court concluded that two former sections, Wis. Stat. §§ 893.14 and 893.16(1) (1977), governed the arrearages arising before July 1, 1980, inasmuch as the State had acquired a vested right "in the prior statute of limitations at the time the new statute became effective." Id., ¶¶ 17, 21. Hence, the 20-year-period in which to bring an action to collect the arrear-ages arising before July 1, 1980, did not end until June 30, 2000 — a little more than one month after the State filed its action. Id., ¶ 17. Accordingly, the court of appeals found the State's action timely with respect to the pre-July 1, 1980, arrearages but untimely with respect to the arrearages accruing after that date. Id., ¶¶ 17, 19.

¶ 13. The State petitioned this court for review of that portion of the court of appeals' decision barring it from seeking payment on arrearages accumulating after July 1, 1980. We granted review to address this important, recurring issue in child support enforcement.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 14. This case involves a determination of the appropriate statute of limitations to apply to an independent action to collect child support arrearages, as well as the interpretation and application of that statute. These matters present questions of law that we review de novo. Construction of a statute is a question of law that this court decides independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals, benefiting from their analyses. See Meyer v. School Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999). Whether a statutory limitations period requires dismissal of an action where the underlying facts are not in dispute is also a question of law. See Smith v. Milwaukee County, 149 Wis. 2d 934, 937, 440 N.W.2d 360 (1989).

III. ANALYSIS

¶ 15. When the State filed its May 22, 2000, motion to order Walter to pay child support arrearages and interest, it was commencing an action on a judgment. The original judgment was the June 22, 1970, divorce judgment. The modified judgment was the November 9, 1977, order amending the original judgment.

¶ 16. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.40 prescribes the time within which a party may bring an action on a judgment:

Action on judgment or decree; court of record. Except as provided in s. 846.04(2) and (3), action upon a judgment or decree of a court of record of any state or of the United States shall be commenced within 20 years after the judgment or decree is entered or be barred.

¶ 17. This statute was enacted in 1980. See § 28, Ch. 323, Laws of 1979 (effective July 1, 1980). There is no dispute between the parties that § 893.40 applies to arrearages that occurred after July 1, 1980, because these arrearages accrued subsequent to the time when the old statute of limitations was repealed and the new statute took effect. Applying § 893.40 to the payments missed after July 1, 1980, conforms to Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 991.07, first, because the limitation under the former statute had not yet "begun to run" before it was repealed, and, second, because a cause of action on payments not yet missed had not accrued under the former statute. The dispute in this case is about when the new statute began to run.

¶ 18. The statute's answer is seemingly clear: any action upon a judgment of a court of record must be commenced within 20 years after the judgment is entered. The statute is not limited to child support enforcement actions; it is much broader. Conversely, it does not except child support enforcement actions, as it excepts certain real estate foreclosures. See Wis. Stat. § 846.04(2), (3). No other statute sets time limitations for independent actions to collect arrearages on child support judgments. Thus, an independent action for child support arrearages is an action upon a judgment, governed by this statute of limitations. Kroeger v. Kroeger, 120 Wis. 2d 48, 52, 353 N.W.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Miller v. Miller, 17 B.R. 717, 719 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982).

¶ 19. Prior to July 1, 1980, the limitations period within which to bring actions upon a judgment was prescribed by the interaction of two statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 893.14 and 893.16(1) (1977).

¶ 20. The first of these two statutes, § 893.14, formerly served as an umbrella provision for most statutes of limitations in Chapter 893. It read:

Actions, time for commencing. The following actions must be commenced within the periods respectively hereinafter prescribed after the cause of action has accrued except that the period shall not be considered to have expired when the court before which the action is pending shall be satisfied that the person originally served knowingly gave false information to the officer with intent to mislead him in the performance of his duty in the service of any summons or civil process. In the event the court so finds the period of limitation shall be extended for one year.

Wis. Stat. § 893.14 (1977) (emphasis added). This statute introduced the question of when a cause of action accrues into the determination of limitations.

¶ 21. In Halmu v. Halmu, 247 Wis. 124, 134, 19 N.W.2d 317 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Griffin v. Reeve, 141 Wis. 2d 699, 416 N.W.2d 612 (1987), this court said that the applicable statute of limitations for independent actions on child support arrearages did not begin to run until after the youngest child had reached majority. The court recognized the authority to seek enforcement of alimony and child support provisions of a divorce judgment through contempt proceedings in the divorce court at any time, so long as the divorce court retained jurisdiction to revise its judgment. But it declared that an independent action to enforce the judgment would result in overlapping and confusion if it were permitted to go forward before the divorce court lost its jurisdiction. Halmu, 247 Wis. at 134-35. Inasmuch as the continuing jurisdiction of the divorce court over child support terminated at the youngest child's majority, the court decided that the statute of limitations "begins to run upon attainment of majority by the children." Id. (citing Beck v. First Nat'l Bank of Oshkosh, 244 Wis. 418, 12 N.W.2d 665 (1944); Ashby v. Ashby, 174 Wis. 549, 554, 183 N.W 965 (1921); Yates v. Yates, 157 Wis. 219, 147 N.W. 60 (1914)). In short, the youngest child's age of majority was the date when the independent cause of action was said to "accrue."

¶ 22. The second statute, § 893.16(1), established a 20-year statute of limitations, which applied to "(1) An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of record of this state ...." Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1) (1977).

¶ 23. These provisions, read together in the context of state-ordered child support judgments, created a 20-year statute of limitations period for independent actions on child support arrearages that began to run on the date of the youngest child's majority. See Kroeger, 120 Wis. 2d at 50 (citing Halmu, 247 Wis. at 134).

¶ 24. Sections 893.14 and 893.16(1) were repealed in 1980 as part of the repeal and recreation of Chapter 893, § 28, ch. 323, Laws of 1979, and new provisions, including Wis. Stat. §§ 893.04 and 893.40, were created.

¶ 25. In the present case, the circuit court focused exclusively on the new § 893.40. It nonetheless relied upon the language and rationale from Halmu and Kroeger in reaching its conclusion that the 20-year limitations period of the new statute did not begin to run until Walter's youngest child reached majority in 1985. The State continues to plug the rationale of Halmu and Kroeger, noting that, under Wis. Stat. § 767.32(l)(a), courts possess continuing jurisdiction to modify child support judgments and that such revisions are common. These points merge into the proposition that the total amount of arrears owing under a judgment ordering child support cannot be known and fixed until the youngest child receiving support reaches majority. That, the State argues, is when the cause of action accrues.

¶ 26. This argument downplays the fact that the statutory language has changed, altering the substance of the law.

¶ 27. In 1977 § 893.16 provided simply that "[a]n action upon a judgment or decree of any court of record of this state" had a 20-year statute of limitations. Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1) (1977). By comparison, current § 893.40 reads: "Action on judgment or decree; court of record. Except as provided in s. 846.04(2) and (3), action upon a judgment or decree of a court of record of any state . . . shall be commenced within 20 years after the judgment or decree is entered or be barred." The new statute is explicit in asserting that an action upon a judgment shall be commenced "within 20 years after the judgment... is entered." Wis. Stat. § 893.40 (emphasis added). It leaves no room for an interpretation that the statute begins to run when the cause of action accrues.

¶ 28. This clear directive is significant because of the language in another statute created in 1980, § 893.04, which reads: "Unless otherwise specifically prescribed by law, a period of limitation within which an action may be commenced is computed from the time that the cause of action accrues until the action is commenced." Wis. Stat. § 893.04 (emphasis added). The language in this section is substantially the same as the language in former § 893.14 (1977), except that the new statute adds the clause "[u]nless otherwise specifically prescribed by law." In our view, current § 893.40 specifically prescribes an alternative to the time "the cause of action accrues," namely, the date "the judgment... is entered," and that specific statutory alternative makes § 893.04 inapplicable.

¶ 29. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.40 is different from its predecessor, § 893.16(1) (1977), in another way. The new statute is a statute of repose. Statutes of repose operate differently from statutes of limitations. A statute of limitations usually establishes the time frame within which a claim must be initiated after a cause of action actually accrues. Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶ 26, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849. A statute of repose, by contrast, limits the time period within which an action may be brought based on the date of an act or omission. Id. A statute of repose does not relate to the accrual of a cause of action. In fact, it may cut off litigation before a cause of action arises. In this case, the "act" that triggers the statute of repose is the entry of the judgment.

¶ 30. In short, § 893.40 is plain and unambiguous in its declaration that the statute of limitations begins to run upon the entry of judgment.

¶ 31. The State refrains from arguing that the language of § 893.40 is ambiguous or that an action to collect child support arrearages is not an "action upon a judgment." Instead, it asserts that a literal reading of § 893.40 will lead to absurd and unreasonable results, and it offers several suggestions on how to avoid them.

¶ 32. One option is to have this court construe "entry" of judgment to include the expiration of the child support order when the youngest child reaches majority. The State reasons that a support judgment is not really "entered" until the court ordering child support loses revision jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 767.32. Only then do we see the finality typical of other types of judgments. However, this suggestion is a mere restatement of the Halmu rule in a manner amenable to § 893.40's replacement of accrual with entry of judgment as the event triggering the period of limitation.

¶ 33. There are at least two reasons why construing "entry" of judgment to include the final total arrear-age upon expiration of the support order would be problematic.

¶ 34. First, the legislature is clear as to when a judgment of a court of record is entered. Wisconsin Stat. § 806.06(1) provides:

Rendition, perfection and entry of judgment. (l)(a) A judgment is rendered by the court when it is signed by the judge or by the clerk at the judge's written direction.
(b) A judgment is entered when it is filed in the office of the clerk of court.
(c) A judgment is perfected by the taxation of costs and the insertion of the amount thereof in the judgment.
(d) A judgment is granted when given orally in open court on the record.

Wis. Stat. § 806.06(1) (emphasis added). The State's construction would require us to disregard or rewrite § 806.06(1)(b) to facilitate a rewriting of § 893.40.

¶ 35. Second, deviation from the statutory definition of when a judgment is entered might impact other situations in which actions on judgments are pursued. We doubt that judgments directing periodic child support payments are the only judgments involving periodic payments, or the only judgments potentially affected by the proposed interpretation. In fact, many civil judgments are not completely "final" at the time they are entered. See Wis. Stat. § 806.07 (permitting a party to move for relief from a judgment or order).

¶ 36. Another option suggested by the State is to define "judgment" as not including child support judgments or orders and to then blend the 20-year limitation period of § 893.40 with the accrual rule of § 893.04. The State premises this suggestion on the reality that few judgments are of such a continuing nature as child support judgments. We agree that the type of judgment generating an ongoing child support obligation is not typical of the judgments to which § 893.40 applies. Nevertheless, Wisconsin courts have held that an action to collect child support arrears is an action upon a judgment. See Kroeger, 120 Wis. 2d at 52; see also Miller, 17 B.R. at 719; cf. Schafer v. Wegner, 78 Wis. 2d 127, 131-32, 254 N.W.2d 193 (1977) (holding that an action to recover household furniture awarded to former wife under a divorce judgment falls under the 20-year limitation on judgments); Zellmer v. Sharlein, 1 Wis. 2d 46, 52, 82 N.W.2d 891 (1957) (holding that an action to enforce a life insurance provision that was part of a divorce judgment involves the 20-year limitation on judgments).

¶ 37. In truth, the State's suggestions are nothing but creative efforts to resurrect the law that existed for actions on child support judgments prior to enactment of § 893.40. However desirable this might be as a matter of public policy, it is simply not the outcome engineered by the legislature in its 1980 revisions of Chapter 893. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.40 clearly and unambiguously specifies that the date when a cause of action to collect past-due child support payments begins to run is the date when a judgment ordering such payments is entered.

¶ 38. Our goal in statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Patients Comp. Fund v. Lutheran Hosp.-La Crosse, 223 Wis. 2d 439, 455-56, 588 N.W.2d 35 (1999). Our first resort is to the plain language of the statute. Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996). If the language is plain and unambiguous, we normally apply it without further inquiry into extrinsic interpretation aids. State v. T.J. Int'l, Inc., 2001 WI 76, ¶ 20, 244 Wis. 2d 481, 628 N.W.2d 774 (citing UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996)). If we go beyond unambiguous text and inquire into legislative history, our investigation should serve the purpose of showing how the legislative history supports our interpretation of a statute that is clear on its face. Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶ 52, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659. The court should not search for ambiguity. It should enforce a clear statute.

¶ 39. One of the few exceptions to this sound principle is that the court will seek to avoid a truly absurd or unreasonable result. See State v. Burkman, 96 Wis. 2d 630, 642, 292 N.W.2d 641 (1980); State v. Mendoza, 96 Wis. 2d 106, 115, 291 N.W.2d 478 (1980); Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 732, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967).

¶ 40. Here, the State contends that its proffered alternatives must be embraced to avoid the purportedly unreasonable and absurd results of strictly applying § 893.40 in the context of child support judgments. These unreasonable results are asserted to be (1) the inequality of treatment among beneficiaries of child support orders, stemming from widely different time limits depending on when a couple divorces in relation to the ages of the children and whether an amended judgment is entered; (2) the difficulty imposed on the State and others in collecting child support from hard-to-find parents; (3) the unfairness that results from extinguishing the collection rights of those who have relied upon prior published decisions; and (4) contravention of the vital public policy of requiring parents to support their children.

¶ 41. As examples of the inequality and unfairness flowing from a literal interpretation of the statute, the State provides the following hypotheticals: Couple A divorces when their youngest child is one year old, but the obligated parent makes support payments for the child until the child is 16. Couple B divorces when their child is 16, and the obligated parent never pays the child support that is ordered. The effect of applying § 893.40 as written is that the limitations period for collection against a delinquent parent in the Couple A context is effectively 5 years, while the collection period in the Couple B context is 20 years.

¶ 42. The inconsistent results in these hypotheti-cals are merely the consequence of modifying a statute of limitations in the manner the legislature did when it created the present § 893.40. Limitation periods for causes of action are legislative pronouncements of policy barring actions for various policy reasons regardless of the merit of the action. See Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 230 Wis. 2d 212, 240, 601 N.W.2d 627 (1999) (citing State v. Chrysler Outboard Corp., 219 Wis. 2d 130, 580 N.W.2d 203 (1998)). In § 893.40, the legislature is not silent on the issue of when the limitations period commences for actions on judgments; it is quite explicit as to when suits must be brought in order not to be time-barred. While the time in which to bring actions to collect arrearages is shorter and more variable under § 893.40 than under prior §§ 893.14 and 893.16(1) (1977), it is not so absurdly short and variable as to compel going beyond the plain language of the statute. We see no instance in which the time to bring an independent collection action after a child reaches majority will be less than one year. At any earlier time, a parent may bring an enforcement action when the obligated parent fails to make timely payment. See Wis. Stat. § 767.30(3).

¶ 43. The facts of this case illustrate the ample time the State had to bring its action. Because Walter's missed support payments after July 1, 1980, were in violation of the November 1977 amended judgment, the State had more than 12 years from the time the youngest Hamilton child reached majority to commence a timely action. It had more than eight years after Elaine Hamilton passed away to commence an action. Even if there had not been any amended judgment and the original 1970 divorce judgment served as the trigger to the limitations period, the State would still have had a little more than five years to act after the youngest child reached majority.

¶ 44. Finally, the State argues that legislative intent, reflected in part by revisions to the Family Code in the 1977 Divorce Reform Act, has consistently been to expand judicial means of enforcing financial orders entered in divorce actions. See Griffin, 141 Wis. 2d at 704. The State asserts, therefore, that interpreting § 893.40 to shorten the limitations period for collecting support obligations in actions for money judgment is unreasonable. We disagree. While this result may be contrary to the trend in favor of collection rights and may reflect that the legislature did not contemplate child support judgments under § 893.40, it is not such an unreasonable outcome that it significantly subverts existing policy.

¶ 45. Although a strict application of § 893.40 in the context of child support obligations runs counter to the desire previously expressed by the legislature and courts to ensure that parents do not shirk their duty of child support, this inconsistency does not rise to the level of absurdity or utter contravention of public policy. Without such an effect, this court is bound to apply the language of § 893.40 as plainly directed. See UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 281-82. We exceed our authority when we ignore the clear language of a statute and attempt to surgically reconstruct the statute to accommodate alternative public policies. See State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 907, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991); State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985). Consequently, we decline to adopt the State's creative interpretations.

¶ 46. We also note that there are several aspects of the enforcement of child support obligations that mitigate any seemingly harsh result from applying § 893.40 in the context of child support judgments. First, it is no longer true that an independent action for money judgment seeking child support arrearages cannot be brought until the child reaches majority. See Wis. Stat. § 767.30(3). A party to whom child support is owed need not wait until the youngest child reaches majority before going to court to enforce collection.

¶ 47. Second, contempt proceedings remain a viable option for persons aggrieved by a parent's refusal to pay child support. In Griffin, we explained that the contempt sanction remains available "after the child reaches majority, and so long as that obligation imposed by court order continues." Griffin, 141 Wis. 2d at 708. This is because a "parent's failure to pay child support after the child reaches majority is a continuing disobedience of a court order." Id.

¶ 48. Finally, it is well established that laches is not a viable defense for actions to recoup child support arrearages. Paterson v. Paterson, 73 Wis. 2d 150, 155, 242 N.W.2d 907 (1976); see also Douglas County Child Support Enforcement Unit v. Fisher, 185 Wis. 2d 662, 669, 517 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, parties with a valid interest in unpaid child support arrearages may utilize as much of the 20-year limitations period to bring an independent action as their circumstances permit.

¶ 49. To the extent that this court's application of § 893.40 in the context of actions upon judgments involving child support payments represents an unintended and undesired result, the legislature may rectify the situation in new legislation. Cf. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d at 11-13 (calling upon the legislature to address policy issues raised and to remedy questionable statutory framework). In the meantime, the State may not sleep on Walter's arrearages longer than Rip Van Winkle slept in the Catskill Mountains and still retain its right to go to court.

IV CONCLUSION

¶ 50. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 governs the time within which a party may bring an independent action to collect child support arrearages that have amassed after July 1, 1980. The clear language of this section requires that actions brought in Wisconsin courts on entered judgments, including child support judgments, be commenced within 20 years of when the judgments are entered (or when the judgments are amended and entered).

¶ 51. Applying these principles, the State had until November 9,1997, to file an independent action to collect the child support arrearages. That was 20 years after the last amended judgment ordering Walter to pay child support was entered on November 9, 1977. Because the State did not initiate this action until May 2000, it is properly barred. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision and remand the action for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.

        State v. Hamilton, 2002 WI App 89, 253 Wis. 2d 805, 644 N.W.2d 243.

       All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-2002 volumes unless otherwise indicated.

       Elaine and Walter had only two children together, both of whom were ordered to receive support payments from Walter. As a matter of grammatical purity, the second child should be referred to as the "younger" child, not the "youngest" child. However, since the principle of law at issue is concerned only with the child who is the youngest among whatever pool of children are receiving support, we will refer to the Hamiltons' second child as their "youngest" child.

       The court of appeals noted that both Walter and the State agree that the State's motion is an "independent action" upon the judgment. Hamilton, 253 Wis. 2d 805, ¶ 3 n.2. Apparently, neither party argues that the State could not bring a motion within the context of the original action. Id. We do not address this issue because it has no bearing on our present decision.

       The State has not appealed the circuit court's ruling denying interest on the arrearage.

       The circuit court expressly found that the action was an action on a judgment and that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 applied to the matter. Nonetheless, it held that the cause of action did not accrue until April 4, 1985, for all of Walter's arrears.

       The court of appeals applied Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 991.07, explaining that
      when a statute of limitations is replaced or amended, a cause of action that has accrued prior to the effective date of the new statute or amendment is governed by the prior statute, unless the legislature specifies otherwise. Conversely, a cause of action that has not yet accrued prior to the effective date of the new statute or amendment is governed by the new language, unless otherwise specified.

        Hamilton, 253 Wis. 2d 805, ¶ 11.

       Walter did not cross-petition the court of appeals' decision that the State's action was timely with respect to the arrears that accumulated prior to July 1, 1980. In oral argument, Walter's counsel theorized that, because an independent cause of action to collect child support arrears under the prior statutory scheme did not fully accrue until the youngest child reached majority, the pre-1980 arrears never actually "accrued." This was a renewal of his earlier argument, rejected by the court of appeals, that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 applies to bar all the arrears he owed. See Hamilton, 253 Wis. 2d 805, ¶ 21.
      The court of appeals pointed to Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 991.07 to support the proposition that the former statute of limitations applied to pre-July 1, 1980, arrears. It rejected the argument that the accrual date for a cause of action for child support arrearages always is the date of the youngest child's majority. Id., ¶ 25. "[Tjhere are other events that can and do give rise to a last-cause-of-action date in child support arrearage cases ...." Id. The court went on to say that "Walter's analysis fails to take into account the vested right the State had in the prior statute of limitations at the time the new statute became effective." Id., ¶ 21.

        There is no challenge before this court concerning the arrears that Walter accumulated prior to July 1, 1980. Therefore, we do not consider the court of appeals' analysis or decision relating to these arrears.

       The Halmu court also held that the circuit court did not have "jurisdiction to enforce its order to pay child support by contempt proceedings on accrued unpaid instalments [sic] commenced after the child has reached majority." Halmu v. Halmu, 247 Wis. 124, 132, 19 N.W.2d 317 (1945) (quoting Lowry v. Lowry, 118 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Okla. 1941)). This holding regarding contempt proceedings after the age of majority was overruled by this court in Griffin v. Reeve, 141 Wis. 2d 699, 704, 416 N.W.2d 612 (1987).

       Similarly, an order of a circuit court is entered when it is filed in the office of the clerk of court. Wis. Stat. § 807.11(2).

       As noted in ¶ 28, Wis. Stat. § 893.04 provides: "Unless otherwise specifically prescribed by law, a period of limitation within which an action may be commenced is computed from the time that the cause of action accrues until the action is commenced." Wis. Stat. § 893.04 (emphasis added).

       The State points to Alberte v. Anew Health Care Services, Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515, and cases cited therein, to support its proposition that the plain meaning maxim of statutory construction can be overcome in this case. In Alberte, we held that that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1994), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), did not subject employers' agents to personal liability for their discriminatory acts. Id., ¶ 11. We reached this conclusion by reasoning that Congress did not intend to hold agents personally liable under the statutes, because to do so would be inconsistent with the entire remedial scheme of Title VII and the ADA and would produce unreasonable results. Id., ¶¶ 1,11. Straightforward interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 893.40 does not "thwart the obvious purpose of the statute," as was found in Alberte. Id., ¶ 10.

        See also Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 350, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996) (quoting William B. Tanner Co. v. Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 448, 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981)); Ortman

        v. Jensen & Johnson, Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 508, 522, 225 N.W.2d 635 (1975) ("periods of limitation are subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control").

       There would only be a year in the rare circumstance where the sole judgment or order demanding support occurs on the date of the child's birth and the child is in a program pursuing a high school diploma (or its equivalent) up until the date of his 19th birthday.
      Wisconsin Stat. § 767.25(4) (child support pursuant to a judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation, or an order or a judgment in a paternity action) and Wis.'Stat. § 767.51(3) (for paternity judgments) each limit child support payments to "child[ren] of the parties who is less than 18 years old, or any child of the parties who is less than 19 years old if the child is pursuing an accredited course of instruction leading to the acquisition of a high school diploma or its equivalent." See generally Roberta Jo W. v. Leroy W., 218 Wis. 2d 225, 578 N.W.2d 185 (1998) (discussing the history and operation of these sections).

       Wisconsin Stat. § 767.30(3) provides:
      (3) If the party fails to pay a [child support] payment ordered under sub. (1) or to give security under sub. (2), the court may by any appropriate remedy enforce the judgment, or the order as if it were a final judgment, including any past due payment and interest. Appropriate remedies include but are not limited to:
      (c) Money judgment for past due payments.
      Wis. Stat. § 767.30(3).

       The State correctly argues that there does not appear to be any legislative history to suggest that the legislature considered the uniqueness of child support judgments when it switched the beginning of the limitations period for an action upon a judgment from the moment of accrual to the entry of judgment. However, the State has not offered, nor have we independently found, any legislative history to suggest that child support judgments were to be treated differently.
      The most pertinent statement of legislative intent comes from the 1979 Judicial Council Committee's Note on the revision of Chapter 893. It reads in part:
      This section has been created to combine the provisions of repealed ss. 893.16(1) and 893.18(1). A substantive change from prior law results as the time period for an action upon a judgment of a court of record sitting without this state is increased from 10 years to 20 years and runs from the time of entry of a judgment.

      Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979, § 893.40, Stats, (emphasis added).