author: NAZARIAN, J.

text:
    142 A.3d 602
    In re W.Y.
    No. 2726,
    Sept. Term, 2014.
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    July 26, 2016.

      Brian M. Saccenti (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
    Mary Ann Ince (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
    Panel: BERGER, NAZARIAN, and ROBERT A. ZARNOCH (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
   NAZARIAN, J.

Section 5-607 of the Family Law Article (“FL”) of the Maryland Code allows a court to order an out-of-state placement for a child who has been adjudicated delinquent so long as the child is given a hearing with notice to his parent or guardian and, after that hearing, the juvenile court makes specific findings. W.Y. (“W”) was a juvenile (he’s now over 18) who pled involved to his most recent set of charges and was adjudicated delinquent. Using a form order edited by hand, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County ordered W placed in a facility in Pennsylvania; he contends on appeal that the process and findings underlying the placement decision failed to comply with FL § 5-607. In the time since the court entered its order, W completed the out-of-state program, and we agree with both parties that the case is moot. Nevertheless, there are no reported Maryland appellate opinions to guide the juvenile courts in their application of this statute, and because the issues are important and likely to evade review, we find this an appropriate case to exercise our discretion to address the merits of W’s contentions.

I. BACKGROUND

W has a long history with the juvenile justice system. He was first adjudicated delinquent on March 13, 2012, also by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, after pleading involved to a count of robbery. While wearing a black ski mask and wielding what the victim believed to be a handgun (later found to be a BB gun), W demanded the victim’s book bag and laptop. The victim recognized W from prior encounters, and even called W by name during the robbery. When police officers stopped him shortly after the incident, W admitted to the robbery and consented to a search of his home, during which the victim’s property was recovered. The court, sitting as a juvenile court, committed W to the Department of Juvenile Services (“DJS”) and recommended a Level B placement, which in Prince George’s County meant a staff-secured, non-community residential facility. DJS placed W at the Victor Cullen Center in Sabillasville, Frederick County, Maryland, where he remained from May 2, 2012 until he was successfully discharged on October 17, 2012. Upon discharge, the juvenile court rescinded the commitment order and placed W on probation.

W was arrested again in the early hours of May 26, 2014. Police found W sitting on the steps of a townhome in Land-over, Maryland, and approached him because he matched the description of the suspect in a nearby robbery. As they neared, W stood up, drew a .38 caliber handgun (containing three live rounds) from the waistband of his pants, threw the gun to the ground, and began to walk away. When questioned by the officers, W said the weapon was his, but “[he] wasn’t going to do anything with it” and further stated that he had no knowledge of or involvement in the robbery. He was indicted as an adult, but his case was waived to the juvenile court. W again admitted to his actions, and again pled involved, this time to possession of a regulated firearm by a person under age 21. The court also found W in violation of his probation.

The court held a hearing on October 20, 2014 to review W’s detention status; W was present with his attorney. The judge told W’s attorney to “let [W] know he may not be going home.” W then interjected: “And I’m getting a lot better, out of the prison.” The court turned its attention to the attorneys to schedule a hearing for the following month, then adjourned.

At an adjudicatory hearing on November 18, 2014, the court accepted W’s plea of involved, and asked him to explain his actions:

THE COURT: Okay. Young man, why did you do this?
[W]: It was an honest mistake, Your Honor. I really - shouldn’t have done this.
THE COURT: Okay. So, why did you do this?
[W]: There is no explanation for why I did it.
THE COURT: Okay. So, why did you do it?
[W]: I just — I made an honest mistake. I tell you the reason why I did it would be an excuse ... and there is no excuse for that.
THE COURT: So, why did you do it?
[W]: I was being a bonehead.
THE COURT: Pardon me?
[W]: I was being a knucklehead, thinking that I could get away with things I can’t get away with.
THE COURT: Well, so why did you do it? You already had a robbery with a deadly weapon charge.... Now you [have] possession of a gun. Another one.
[THE STATE]: There was not a gun in the prior—
[W]: I understand, Sir. I understand what I done. I apologize for—
THE COURT: No, I am just asking why did you do it. Because you are going to — you went to a placement, didn’t you?
[W]: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: How can I release you back into the community?
THE COURT: No, let me stop you. I just asked — because if you don’t change your lifestyle in what you are doing, you will end up dead out here____Or you going to end up killing somebody____ [L]ast time I asked you the same thing, why you walking around with a ski mask in the middle of the summer ... with a deadly weapon. I am just saying — you got to change. Would I give you a break and put you back in the community—
[W]: If I could say one thing on my behalf is that this charge and that I went to [detention] and understand that I could have faced even wors[e] charges and time for it. I[’m] really mature, and my age and I know that it’s time to stop playing games and do something with my life or I’m going to throw it away. And I really don’t — I’m not ready for my life — I got dreams and goals and things that I need to do. And with the support from my family that — I can’t keep doing this.

The judge then scheduled a December hearing with counsel and ordered W’s detention in the interim.

W’s disposition hearing — the purpose of which was to determine W’s level of placement, ie., whether he should remain in a level B facility or move to level A — took place on December 11, 2014. After an inaudible bench conversation, the State and W’s attorney agreed that W should maintain his level B placement, while DJS requested a level A commitment. The judge questioned W about the incident, again emphasizing the similarities between his two arrests:

THE COURT: I am asking him a question because when is he going to learn his lesson.
[W]: I mean I can’t make you believe me but — I honestly feel like that the lesson I learned when I was up in [detention] facing that—
THE COURT: Wait, whoa, whoa, wait, how long were you gone the other time?
[W]: Eight months.
THE COURT: And you didn’t learn you lesson then?
[W]: I did. I just — I am telling you — I made a mistake, I—
THE COURT: No, no, no. It is not a mistake when you ... put a gun in your hand. That’s not a mistake.
[W]: It wasn’t a mistake, it was more of a defense. But I should have went about it differently than what I did. And I can’t really take it back now, I mean.
THE COURT: So, what am I supposed to do with — the mistakes that you keep making?
[W]: I accept any consequences, Sir. (Inaudible) on behalf of the mistakes that I know that (Inaudible).
THE COURT: You have any — the problem is you are putting yourself in harm’s way.
[W]: Exactly.
THE COURT: I am not asking for a response. I am just— this is ridiculous.
[W]: I am ashamed of myself, too, Sir.
THE COURT: Madam Clerk, the Court will in fact commit [W] to Level A. I agree, you got to stop this, young man. You are going to wind up getting yourself killed out here.
And since he has already been at Victor [Cullen Center] he is not going back to Victor [Cullen Center].
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, can we have a review [hearing] for placement, it is just today — I am sorry, I just realized that—
THE COURT: No problem. You got [January 13, 2015].

After the hearing, the court issued a written Disposition Order, dated December 11, 2015, which ordered that W “be and hereby is placed in Level A____” The Order consisted of a template that stated the three classification levels for placement facilities — level A, B, and C — into which the judge inserted an additional limitation (which we have italicized):

A — Secured Facility — [W] is not be placed at Victor Cullen because he was placed there in 2012.
* ^Equivalent facilities for the juvenile are not available in the State of Maryland; and institutional care in the other jurisdiction is in the best interest of the juvenile and will not produce undue hardship.* *

At the follow-up hearing on January 13, 2015, in a broken and mostly inaudible transcript, the court confirmed that DJS had not yet placed W, and the case was continued until January 20, 2015. On January 16, W filed a Motion to Modify Court Order and Request for a Hearing pursuant to Md. Rule 11-116, asking the court to strike the language italicized above from the Disposition Order. In this sixteen-page Motion, W asked the court to place him at the Victor Cullen Center, disputed the findings in the juvenile judge’s Disposition Order, and asked to be heard regarding his placement. We will discuss the facts and arguments set forth in this Motion in greater detail in the Discussion.

At the January 20 hearing, counsel for W obtained a continuance to provide the juvenile judge an opportunity to review the January 16 motion. After agreeing on a hearing date, counsel for the State initiated another broken and inaudible— yet seemingly important — conversation regarding W’s placement:

[THE STATE]: Your Honor, may I ask a quick question. It is about, [W] is likely to be placed at Mid-Atlantic prior to that, would he need to appear for [the next] hearing or if he can—
THE COURT: If he is placed, no.
[THE STATE]: So, no.
THE COURT: Counsel, would you approach?
(Whereupon, a Bench Conference [begins].)
THE COURT: Well, frankly I (Inaudible) placement. Anything?
MS.: (Inaudible)
THE COURT: I know.
MS.: (Inaudible)
THE COURT: Yes. I will probably rule on it some time this week.
MS.: Okay.
THE COURT: Yes. And that (Inaudible) do whatever they want to do?
[THE STATE]: (Inaudible)
THE COURT: Okay.
[THE STATE]: (Inaudible)
MS.: (Inaudible)
THE COURT: No, (Inaudible). Somebody, it looked like it was filed late Friday, yes. Okay. Thank you.
MS.: (Inaudible)
THE COURT: Yes.
(Whereupon, the Bench Conference was concluded.)
THE COURT: I am going to have it sent to Chambers today, [counsel].
[COUNSEL FOR W]: Thank you.
(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.)

At the conclusion of this January 20 hearing: (1) W had yet to be placed; (2) the juvenile judge had not reviewed W’s Motion, nor addressed the requested hearing; (3) the parties agreed to return on February 2, 2015; and (4) the State indicated that W would be placed prior to the hearing.

On January 28, 2015, W was placed by DJS at the Mid-Atlantic Youth Service’s Secure Male Program (“MAYS”) in Pittston Township, Pennsylvania. Two days later, the juvenile judge ruled on W’s Motion to Modify Court Order and Request for a Hearing. When W filed the Motion on January 16, he had included a proposed order; the judge used the proposed order as a template, but modified it by crossing out portions shown below:

Having reviewed Respondent’s Motion to Modify Court Order and Request For A Hearing and that Motion having merit, Respondent’s Motion is hereby GRANTED. The following language shall be stricken from this Court’s [Disposition Order]: “Respondent not to be placed in Victor Cullen.”

The court signed the area indicated by the gray circle and at the bottom of the page, then dated the order January 30, 2015; it was entered on the docket on February 5, 2015.

As directed, the parties reconvened on February 2. By this point, W was in Pennsylvania, but his counsel was present. After the State disclosed that W had been placed at MAYS, the court reset the case for October 15, 2015 for a permanency hearing. W filed a timely notice of appeal. Then, on October 7, 2015, the court rescinded the December 11, 2014 commitment order and placed W on probation, with conditions, and ordered him released on electronic monitoring.

II. DISCUSSION

W does not dispute the finding of delinquency. Instead, he challenges his out-of-state placement, and specifically whether the disposition proceedings complied with FL § 5-607 and afforded him due process before the court placed him out of state. First, W argues that he was denied due process because the court failed to notify him or his parents that it was contemplating an out-of-state placement, and thus denied him and his parents a meaningful opportunity to be heard on whether the contemplated placement was in his best interest or would pose an undue hardship on his family. Second, W claims that the juvenile court ignored the requirements of FL § 5-607 when it did not hear evidence or consider any facts before concluding that there was no equivalent facility in Maryland, that the MAYS placement was in his best interest, and that sending him to MAYS would not cause any undue hardship for his family.

In reviewing the circuit court’s decision in a juvenile delinquency matter, “[w]e review any conclusions of law de novo, but apply the clearly erroneous standard to findings of fact.” In re Elrich S., 416 Md. 15, 30, 5 A.3d 27 (2010). A decision regarding disposition is committed to the discretion of the trial judge and will be reversed only if there has been an abuse of discretion. In re Hamill, 10 Md.App. 586, 592, 271 A.2d 762 (1970). An abuse of discretion occurs “ “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,’ or when the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding rules or principles.’ ” Pickett v. State, 222 Md.App. 322, 331, 112 A.3d 1078 (2015) (quoting Nash v. State, 439 Md. 53, 67, 94 A.3d 23 (2014)).

A. This Appeal Is Moot.

Initially, though, we have to confront the ongoing justiciability of the case in light of the fact that the order from which W appeals is no longer in force. The State filed its brief in this Court on October 13, 2015, six days after the circuit court rescinded the commitment order, and argues that this development mooted W’s appeal. W acknowledges that the appeal is moot, but urges us to “address the merits of the issues raised because they are unresolved issues of important public concern on which guidance would be helpful,” and because the error he asserts “is not merely capable of repetition; it has been repeated in numerous cases.”

Courts decide live disputes, and we normally should decline to address the merits of a moot case. Lloyd v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections of Balt. Cty., 206 Md. 36, 41, 111 A.2d 379 (1954) (citations omitted). “A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties at the time it is before the court so that the court cannot provide an effective remedy.” Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250, 674 A.2d 951 (1996). And that is the case here: the juvenile court’s partial denial of W’s motion to modify that Order was effectively granted at the time of rescission, so there is no relief for us to grant him.

In rare instances, however, courts can decide to address the merits of a moot case when the issues concern matters of great importance, the public interest will be affected, or there is a likelihood that the wrongdoing will soon be repeated if not immediately resolved. Lloyd, 206 Md. at 42-43, 111 A.2d 379 (requiring a “concurrence in sufficient weight of the[se] factors which together add up to the exception”). And this is such a case.

First, this case raises matters of great public importance. “This Court ... may address the merits of a moot case if we are convinced that the case presents unresolved issues in matters of important public concern that, if decided, will establish a rule for future conduct.” Coburn, 342 Md. at 250, 674 A.2d 951 (citing State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 82-83, 553 A.2d 672 (1989)). Section 5-607 involves critical due process and liberty interests for juvenile defendants and their families. Although the language of FL § 5-607 seems straightforward, no Maryland appellate court has interpreted or applied it. And the allegations underlying this case — that the mandatory findings required by FL § 5-607 are being inserted verbatim into form orders and juveniles placed out-of-state without the required findings — are serious. W argues that “the effect of these boilerplate findings is that they pave the way for DJS to place a child out-of-state, even though the issue was never raised in the hearing.” If true, such a practice raises due process concerns that deserve appellate attention.

Second, this issue is likely to recur, but will escape appellate review due to the limited duration of most juvenile commitments and the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court to modify or rescind commitment orders. Secure residential treatment programs, including the programs at Victor Cullen Center and MAYS, typically last six to nine months. See DJS: Victor Cullen Center, www.djs.maryland.gov/victor-cullen. asp; MAYS: Secure Residential Treatment, www.mid atlanticyouth.com/programs/ residentialshtml. We agree with W that “[bjetween the time it takes for the record to be compiled and transmitted, the time involved in briefing and argument, and the time necessary for the Court to generate its opinion and mandate, the appellate process will often last longer than the juvenile commitment.” We have, in fact, seen this issue present itself repeatedly in recent months, and we are persuaded it is worthy of a reported appellate opinion.

B. The Juvenile Court Abused Its Discretion By Limiting The Commitment Beyond The Type Of Facility.

W does not challenge his level A placement, a decision grounded in and supported by the evidence and testimony the court considered during the December 11, 2014 hearing. Both W and the State accepted a level B commitment, but DJS pressed for a level A commitment, not least because W had previously completed a level B commitment at Victor Cullen for eight months. The court gave W an opportunity to speak about the incident underlying these charges and his prior commitment, and concluded that W had been insufficiently rehabilitated after eight months in a level B commitment at Victor Cullen and should be sent to a level A facility.

That’s fine as far as it went. But accompanying the level A indication on the Disposition Order was a direction that W was “not to be placed at Victor Cullen because he was placed there in 2012.” Relying on In re Demetrius J., 321 Md. 468, 583 A.2d 258 (1991), W argues that the juvenile court “exceeded its authority and interfered with a prerogative of DJS when it prohibited placing [him] at the Victor Cullen facility.” The State does not address this contention. We agree with W that the juvenile court abused its discretion by limiting the commitment beyond the type of facility.

Pursuant to the Juvenile Cases subtitle of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), a juvenile court may place a child on probation, under supervision in his own home, or in custody or care outside of his home “upon terms the court deems appropriate____” Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.), § 3-8A-19(d)(l)(i) of the CJP Article. If committing the child to custody or guardianship outside of his own home, the court may assign the child to DJS, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH”), or an agency “to meet the priorities set forth in CJP § 3-8A-02 of this subtitle, including designation of the type of facility where the child is to be accommodated.... ” Id., (d)(1)(h). But the precise scope of the juvenile court’s authority under this subtitle has received little appellate attention.

In the consolidated appeal of In re Demetrius J., 321 Md. 468, 583 A.2d 258 (1991), a juvenile court committed three delinquent juveniles to DJS, and further directed that they be placed at a specific private Pennsylvania facility. At the bottom of each disposition order was a handwritten command: “Respondent to be placed at the Glen Mills School.” Id. at 477, 583 A.2d 258. In the lead case, the court was expressly aware that it did not have the authority to direct placement in a specific facility. Id. at 480, 583 A.2d 258. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that it was not actually directing DJS to place the juveniles in that particular facility, but rather named that facility as an example of the “type of facility” where DJS was to place the juvenile:

[I]t’s always been my understanding as a juvenile judge and as the administrative judge of this court that I had the authority to designate the type of institution that a juvenile was to be committed to and the statute confirmed that and that’s all I have done here. By using the key words, Glen Mills, I have designated a bundle of characteristics of an institution, which I felt, after everyone agreed, had the appropriate characteristics for Demetrius, for his well-being, his best interest, for society’s best interest, for Juvenile Services’ best interest.

Id.

DJS noted that “[t]he court, however, neither described nor made any findings of fact as to this ‘bundle of characteristics.’ ” Id. And after analyzing the text of the statute and the legislative intent, the Court of Appeals concluded that the juvenile court lacked authority to order placement of a committed child at a specific facility:

The question concerning the authority to designate a specific facility resulted in a compromise reflected in the present statute. The statute, as we have seen, permits the court to name the type of facility but generally bestows no authority on the court to specify a particular facility. The compromise was encouraged in significant part by the hope that it would avoid [separation of powers] considerations.

Id. at 476, 583 A.2d 258. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order. Id. at 481, 583 A.2d 258. Cf. In re Appeal No. 653, 277 Md. 212, 219, 352 A.2d 845 (1976), superseded by statute, CJP 3-8A-19, as recognized in Demetrius, 321 Md. at 476, 583 A.2d 258 (affirming a juvenile court’s commitment to DHMH but reversing the court’s command to place the child in a treatment facility “separate from adult patients” because mandating separation was the prerogative of DHMH); In re George G., 64 Md.App. 70, 81-82, 494 A.2d 247 (1985) (reversing a disposition order that sentenced the juvenile to a “court-controlled commitment” and further specified that the child was not to receive leave of any kind for six months); Md. DHMH v. Prince George’s Cty. DSS, 47 Md.App. 436, 445, 423 A.2d 589 (1980) (reversing juvenile court’s order that DHMH pay the cost of a child’s placement, stating that our disposition statute “empowers the court to commit a child to the custody of DHMH; it does not confer upon the court any right to mandate the specific terms of the commitment”).

This separation of powers concern re-emerges in a later provision of the Juvenile Cases subtitle that addresses the transfer of juveniles already committed to D JS:

(1) When necessary to appropriately administer the commitment of the child, the [DJS], on approval of the Director of Behavioral Health, may transfer a child committed for residential placement from one facility to another facility that is operated, licensed, or contracted by [DJS].

(2) A facility to which a child is transferred under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be:

(i) Consistent with the type of facility designated by the court under subsection (d)(l)(ii) of this section; or
(ii) More secure than the type of facility designated by the court under subsection (d)(l)(ii) of this section.

CJP § 3 — 8A—19(Z )(1) — (2). Again, DJS controls the specific placement of delinquent juveniles and the constraints on the court’s authority: the court may designate the type of facility, but DJS handles the details. And once the court designates the type of facility, that disposition serves as a starting point, or floor, from which DJS assumes monitoring and control— DJS can, by statutory design, increase the restrictiveness of the child’s placement without consulting the court.

Demetrius compels the conclusion that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it ordered that “[W] is not to be placed at Victor Cullen because he was placed there in 2012.” We see no principled distinction between a court that designates a particular facility — e.g., ordering a juvenile to Glen Mills School — and a court that excludes a particular facility — e.g., precluding a juvenile from going to Victor Cullen Center. As the Court of Appeals held in Demetrius and we restated in In re Julianna B., juvenile courts may only designate the type of facility; the specific assignment within that type remains the prerogative of DJS. 179 Md.App. 512, 562, 947 A.2d 90 (2008), vacated as moot, 407 Md. 657, 967 A.2d 776 (2009) (citing Demetrius, 321 Md. at 475-76, 583 A.2d 258) (explaining that the General Assembly intended that the particular facility in which a delinquent child may be placed is •within the exclusive discretion of DJS). The court was well within its authority to commit W to a level A, or hardware-secure, placement, but exceeded its statutory authority in excluding him from the Victor Cullen Center. The court is, of course, free to offer recommendations, and the suggestion that W would be better off not returning to the site of his last placement could be a sensible one. But the statute gives DJS, not the court, the ultimate authority to place the child so long as the facility was of the same (or more restrictive) type of placement as the judge ordered.

C. The Disposition Proceedings And Order Did Not Comply With FL § 5-607.

FL § 5-607 is part of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”), which was enacted in Maryland by Chapter 266 of the Acts of 1975 and is codified now in Md. Code (1984, 2012 Repl. VoL), §§ 5-601 to 5-611 of the Family Law Article (“FL”). The ICPC is a platform for “the party states to cooperate with each other in the interstate placement of children,” such that:

(1) Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment and with persons or institutions having appropriate qualifications and facilities to provide a necessary and desirable degree and type of care.
(2) The appropriate authorities in a state where a child is to be placed may have full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the proposed placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applicable requirements for the protection of the child.
(3) The proper authorities of the state from which the placement is made may obtain the most complete information on the basis of which to evaluate a projected placement before it is made.

FL § 5-602. The juvenile court’s authority to place delinquent children outside of Maryland arises from FL § 5-601(7): “Any court having jurisdiction to place delinquent children may place such a child in an institution of or in another state pursuant to § 5-607 of the [ICPC].” And FL § 5-607 defines the procedural safeguards and factual findings that must be satisfied before ordering such a placement. These lie at the substantive heart of this case.

FL § 5-607 contains a notice requirement and a findings requirement, discrete prerequisites separated by the conjunctive “and”:

A child adjudicated delinquent may be placed in an institution in another party jurisdiction pursuant to [the ICPC] but no such placement shall be made unless the child is given a court hearing on notice to the parent or guardian ivith opportunity to be heard, prior to the child being sent to such other party jurisdiction for institutional care and the court finds that:
(1) equivalent facilities for the child are not available in the sending agency’s jurisdiction; and
(2) institutional care in the other jurisdiction is in the best interest of the child and will not produce undue hardship.

(Emphases added.)

We review a court’s factual findings as to the § 5-607 factors for clear error, In re Shirley B., 419 Md. 1, 11, 18, 18 A.3d 40 (2011), and “if there is any competent, material evidence to support the factual findings below, we cannot hold those findings to be clearly erroneous.” Cannon v. Cannon, 156 Md.App. 387, 404, 846 A.2d 1127 (2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted), aff'd 384 Md. 537, 865 A.2d 563 (2005). W argues that the juvenile court failed to comply both with the notice and the findings requirements, and we agree.

The requirement that the juvenile and his parent must have notice and an opportunity to be heard is rooted in the principle that out-of-state placements of delinquent children “are similar to probation or parole supervision,” and thus a restriction on liberty that cannot be imposed without due process. Sinhogar v. Parry, 98 Misc.2d 28, 412 N.Y.S.2d 966, 973 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1979) (in decisions separating the parent and child, “there is a legally recognizable interest to which the due process requirement of the Constitution attaches”). The State maintains that “[W] and his counsel and family were apprised ... of the time of his various adjudicatory, disposition and review hearings,” and that they “had an opportunity to appear and be heard” at each of his proceedings. The State also refers to the (mostly inaudible) bench conference at the January 20 hearing, and contends that no one opposed W’s potential commitment to MAYS. But the record contains no evidence that W or his family were notified of the potential out-of-state placement in advance of the hearing, and the State cites no authority for the proposition that being told at the hearing satisfies due process.

At the December 11, 2014 disposition hearing, the judge discussed with W the reasons for his delinquent actions and asked whether he had learned his lesson. But that was the extent of W’s communication with the court regarding his disposition. After hearing from W, the judge ordered level A placement and announced that Victor Cullen could not be an option, after which the State requested a subsequent hearing to discuss W’s placement. The court set the review hearing for January 13, but that was continued to January 20, and then that hearing was postponed to February 2, by which time W was at MAYS. This left no opportunity for W or his family to be heard on this issue before the placement occurred.

Although the judge stated in open court during the December 11 hearing that W was committed to a level A placement other than Victor Cullen, this declaration could not serve as notice to W and his family because that information doesn’t mean to them what it does to the court: W’s family can’t be charged with knowing that the only in-state level A facility is Victor Cullen. And nothing in the record prior to the December 11 hearing put W or his family on notice that W might be sent to another state — to the contrary, at his November 18, 2014 adjudication hearing, W signed an “Admission (Plea) Under Rule 11-107” agreement, which stated, “I fully understand that the worst the Court can do to me is send me to a State juvenile institution until I turn 21.” Merely apprising the family of the hearing dates does not provide notice of the possibility that a juvenile faces an out-of-state placement, nor does it afford the juvenile or his family an opportunity to be heard. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (due process requires adjudication “preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case”). The record in this case reflects that neither W nor his family was given an opportunity to address his exclusion from Victor Cullen or the appropriateness of the intended out-of-state placement because he was placed at MAYS before the scheduled hearing, and this lack of notice failed to comply with FL § 5-607.

From there, the commitment decision itself suffers from a lack of evidence bearing on the issues one way or the other. The commitment hearing addressed only W’s delinquent act, and the commitment order consists of a form list that includes the statutory language for Type A, B, and C commitments and inserts only language designating Level A. The record contains nothing relating to the presence or absence of equivalent facilities, W’s best interests, or the potential hardship to him or his family from an out-of-state placement.

We are not saying that an out-of-state placement in this case was per se improper, nor are we saying that Victor Cullen Center was the best placement for W, nor are we saying that MAYS was an inappropriate placement — the record contains no facts or testimony to support any of these possible conclusions. Nor are we saying that courts cannot use form orders to streamline the process of documenting its decisions. We are saying, however, that a juvenile court must establish an affirmative factual record that supports the FL § 5-607 findings that justify an out-of-state placement for the particular juvenile, and that the court’s order, however generated, must reflect those findings.

APPEAL DISMISSED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

      . Level B and level A placements are non-community residential facilities, with level B being staff-secure and level A hardware-secure.

      . At the time of W's first disposition, Victor Cullen only provided level B services; by the time W was adjudicated delinquent in the case before us, Victor Cullen offered both level B and level A facilities. In fact, Victor Cullen is the only level A facility for boys in Maryland. See http://www.oag.state.md.us/JJMU/reports/15_Quarter2.pdf; http://www. djs.maryland.gov/victor-cullen.asp.

      . Many hearings were scheduled between May and October. Most of these were short hearings to address W's needs for the period between his arrest and DJS placement, such as establishing GPS monitoring, placing him in a community support program, and confirming his detention status. The rest of the hearings were postponed, bringing us to October 20.

      . There is no name for the inaudible speaker in the transcript; it appears here just as it does in the record. The only females present (according to the record) at this hearing were W’s co-counsel. Both of his attorneys spoke on the record and are referred to earlier in the transcript by name. We suspect that one of W’s attorneys was inquiring as to the status of his Motion to Modify Court Order and Request for a Hearing, which was filed on a Friday.

      . In his Notice of Appeal, W refers to the January 30 Order as granting in part and denying in part the January 16 Motion. In his brief, W interprets the blue pen marks as denying his requests to strike the language regarding the availability of equivalent facilities in Maryland and to schedule a hearing, but granting his first request, i.e., to strike the limitation on placement at the Victor Cullen Center. W takes the position that the partial denial creates a final, appealable order, and the State does not contest this interpretation.

      . W phrased his Questions Presented as follows:
      1. Did the juvenile court violate Family Law Article § 5-607 and due process of law by failing to notify [W.Y.] and his parents that it was considering authorizing out-of-state placement and to give them a meaningful opportunity to be heard before finding in its December 11, 2014 disposition order that "[e]quivalent facilities for the juvenile are not available in the State of Maryland; and institutional care in the other jurisdiction is in the best interest of the juvenile and will not produce undue hardship”?
      2. Were the juvenile court’s findings regarding out-of-state placement premature, unsupported by the record, and clearly erroneous?

      . At the time the briefs were filed, at least three other such cases were pending in this Court: In re Alante B., Sept. Term 2014, No. 2724 (decided December 15, 2015); In re James W., Sept. Term 2014, No. 1278 (disposition pending as of this publication); In re Malik L., Sept. Term 2014, No. 1500 (decided September 1, 2015); In re Shane M., Sept. Term 2014, No. 2414 (decided September 2, 2015).

      8. These priorities are set forth in CJP § 3-8A-02:

        (a) The purposes of this subtitle are:
      (1)To ensure that the Juvenile Justice System balances the following objectives for children who have committed delinquent acts:
      (1) Public safety and the protection of the community;
      (ii) Accountability of the child to the victim and the community for offenses committed; and
      (iii) Competency and character development to assist children in becoming responsible and productive members of society;
      (2) To hold parents of children found to be delinquent responsible for the child's behavior and accountable to the victim and the community;
      (3) To hold parents of children found to be delinquent or in need of supervision responsible, where possible, for remedying the circumstances that required the court's intervention;
      (4) To provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this subtitle; and to provide for a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with the child's best interests and the protection of the public interest;
      (5) To conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties and to separate a child from his parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety;
      (6) If necessary to remove a child from his home, to secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents;
      (7) To provide to children in State care and custody:
      (i) A safe, humane, and caring environment; and
      (ii) Access to required services; and
      (8) To provide judicial procedures for carrying out the provisions of this subtitle.

      9. The "type of facility” refers to its level of security. Although the labels vary by county (e.g., levels I, II, II or levels A, B, C), DJS defines hardware-secure, staff-secure, and community detention as the three most restrictive types of out-of-home commitments:
      Hardware Secure Facility: A facility that relies primarily on the use of construction and hardware such as locks, bars, and fences to restrict freedom.
      Staff Secure Facility: Programs where a youth’s movement is controlled by staff supervision rather than by restrictive architectural features.
      Community Detention (CD): The supervision and guidance of juveniles under court ordered placement to the DJS Community Detention Program. DJS ensures youth compliance with the terms and conditions of community detention through supervision, field visits, surveillance, and electronic monitoring.
      The State has at least one facility available within each classification type. For example, Victor Cullen Center is the only state-operated hardware-secure facility for males. Males sent to hardware-secure facilities are usually repeat and/or violent offenders. There are at least five State-operated staff-secure facilities that house non-violent or non-chronic offenders. Secure facilities also feature addiction programs, behavioral programs, and group homes with schools on-site. Community detention encompasses many less restrictive community-based placements, including foster care, group homes, and independent living programs. DJS: Residential and Community-Based Services Gap Analysis, http://www.djs.state.md.us/docs/2013_GAPánalysis.pdf; DJS: Data Resource Guide FY 2012, http://www.djs.maryland.gov/drg/DRG_2012_ Whole_book_with_Pullouts_updated_recidivism_data.pdf.

      . These three latter cases spurred passage of CJP § 3-8A-19, the current disposition statute. See Demetrius, 321 Md. at 476, 583 A.2d 258.

      . All fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted the ICPC. See American Public Human Services Association, Association of Administrators of the ICPC, http://icpc.aphsa.org/content/ AAICPC/en/about.html (last visited May 17, 2016).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GRAEFF, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    142 A.3d 616
    Terrence ROGERS v. HOME EQUITY USA, INC.
    No. 164,
    Sept. Term, 2015.
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    July 26, 2016.

      Robert J. Leonard, Scott E. Nevin (Law Office of Peter T. Nicholl, Suzanne C. Shapiro, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
    Ava E. Lias-Booker (Craig R. Haughton, McGuire Woods LLP, Baltimore, MD, Patrick M. Meacham, Justin T. Yedor, McGuire Woods LLP, Raleigh, NC), on the brief, for Appellee.
    Panel: WRIGHT, GRAEFF, JAMES R. EYLER (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
   GRAEFF, J.

This appeal arises out of a complaint filed by Terrence Rogers, appellant, alleging that he suffered damages from exposure to lead while living at 3738 Towanda Avenue, in Baltimore, Maryland (the “Towanda Property”). In this Court, he challenges the order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granting summary judgment in favor of the owner of the Property, Home Equity USA, Inc. (“Home Equity”), appellee, on the ground that Mr. Rogers did not have sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Towanda Property was the source of his lead exposure and elevated lead levels in 1997.

On appeal, Mr. Rogers presents one question for our review, which we have rephrased slightly, as follows:

Did the circuit court err in granting Home Equity’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that Mr. Rogers failed to establish that the Towanda Property contained lead-based paint, and therefore, he failed to meet his burden to show that the Property was a substantial factor in causing his injuries?
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Rogers was born on February 28,1994. From his birth until March 1998, when he moved to New York with his mother, Toni Rogers-Coy, Mr. Rogers lived in numerous locations in Baltimore, often staying at each location for very brief periods of time.

For the first “couple months” after Mr. Rogers was born, he lived at 2828 Nevada Street in Baltimore. Later in 1994, after temporarily residing at various other locations, Mr. Rogers moved to 6149 Chinquapin Parkway in Baltimore (“6149 Chinquapin”), where he lived until approximately October 1996. For at least the first year of his residence at 6149 Chinquapin, the windows, doors, and radiators were in poor condition, with “broken pieces of paint.”

Following his residence at 6149 Chinquapin, Mr. Rogers moved to the Towanda Property, which was built in 1920. He lived at that residence for approximately six months.

With respect to the presence of lead in the Towanda Property, Mr. Rogers admitted evidence that, in 1976, 20 years prior to his residency, the Baltimore City Health Department (“BCHD”) required a lead abatement of the Towanda Property (the “1976 Abatement”) after an inspection and analysis showed that certain areas tested positive for lead in paint-chip sampling, and eight areas of flaking paint were in need of corrective action. In October 1976, the BCHD issued an abatement card, indicating that abatement work had been completed.

Subsequently, additional improvements were made to the property. In 1979, the Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community Development (“DHCD”) issued a building permit for a new gas boiler. In 1983, the DHCD issued a rehab permit, which involved roofing, carpentry, plumbing repairs, and painting. In February 1994, DHCD issued a permit for $19,000 worth of rehabilitation work, which included re-stuccoing the home and repairing the rear decks.

Ms. Rogers-Coy moved to the Towanda Property when “[s]omeone told [her] about it,” and she paid rent to another tenant who was “just trying to help [her] out until [she] got where [she] was trying to go.” Because she was not a party to the lease, she had no evidence of chipping, flaking, or peeling paint at the inception of the lease. She did not know if the tenant owned the property, and she paid him “what [she] could.” In her deposition, Ms. Rogers-Coy described the windows in the Towanda Property as having “really bad” chipping and flaking paint, and she stated that they “were actually more flaky than Chinquapin was.” Ms. Rogers-Coy testified in her deposition that she left the Towanda Property between March and April 1997, after residing there for approximately six months. At that point, she and Mr. Rogers moved to 2534 Loyola Northway.

Mr. Rogers was tested for elevated lead levels on multiple occasions. His medical records show the following results, which the parties do not dispute:

Blood Lead
Date Level Address
6/29/95 7 |xg/dL 6149 Chinquapin
3/25/96 14 |xg/dL 6149 Chinquapin
1/8/97 21 |xg/dL 3738 Towanda
3/26/97 20-21 fxg/dL 3738 Towanda
4/30/97 17-18 (xg/dL 2534 Loyola Northway
8/22/97 13 ]xg/dL Foster care/2534 Loyola Northway

Following his test on January 8, 1997, Mr. Rogers was referred to the Community Health Nurse for evaluation. On March 17, 1997, a caseworker from the Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention Program met with Ms. Rogers-Coy at the Towanda Property. The caseworker noted that the house was “in very [] dilapidated condition.” Mr. Rogers, who was three years old at the time, was observed “mouthing the window sills in the house.” The property had flaking paint “inside and outside,” but Mr. Rogers was “listed as playing indoors and not outdoors.”

As a result of Mr. Rogers’ increased blood lead level test on January 8, 1997, he was referred to the Kennedy Krieger Institute Lead Poisoning Prevention Clinic. On March 26, 1997, Ms. Rogers-Coy took Mr. Rogers to Kennedy Krieger, and his blood lead level tested 20, 21 |xg/dL. Ms. Rogers-Coy reported at that time that Mr. Rogers was at the Towanda Property “[a]ll the time,” and there was interior flaking paint on the ceiling, walls, window frame, windowsills, window wells, and woodwork. She reported exterior flaking paint on the front porch and window frames. There were no replacement windows. During a follow-up appointment on April 30, 1997, while Mr. Rogers was living at 2534 Loyola Northway, his blood lead levels were 17,18 |xg/dL.

On May 29,2013, Mr. Rogers filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Home Equity and the owners of 6149 Chinquapin, asserting claims of negligence and unfair trade practices relating to his alleged exposure to lead: (1) between 1994 and 1996 at 6149 Chinquapin, and (2) between 1996 and 1997 at the Towanda Property, which was owned by Home Equity. He alleged that, at all times during his tenancies, the properties contained lead-based paint in such a deteriorated condition that it was peeling, chipping, and flaking from the walls, baseboards, windowsills, and other areas of the premises, and that Home Equity and the owners of 6149 Chinquapin knew or had reason to know of the hazardous conditions. He alleged that, as a consequence of his exposure to lead-based paint, Mr. Rogers “suffered permanent brain damage resulting in developmental and behavioral injuries.”

On February 12, 2014, Home Equity answered the complaint, and discovery commenced. Dr. Robert Simon, a Ph.D. with ETI Environmental Laboratory (“ETI”), provided a report including the following conclusions:

It was my conclusion, to a reasonable degree of scientific probability, that [the Towanda Property] was a pre-1950 house confirmed with the presence of lead based paint by BCHD testing in 1976. The presence of lead based paint hazards was confirmed by BCHD in 1976 and on 03/17/97. The need for continuing abatement of lead based paint hazards from 2008 to 2013 was listed in the [housing authority] records.
It was my conclusion, to a reasonable degree of scientific probability, that the 21 gg/dL elevated blood lead levels of the plaintiff on 01/08/97 and 03/26/97 both occurred while he was living at [the Towanda Property]. The documented presence of lead based paint hazards and his [elevated blood levels] while residing there led me to conclude that [the Towanda Property] was a substantial contributing source of his lead exposure and lead poisoning during his early childhood.

On December 8, 2014, Home Equity moved for summary judgment. In its motion, Home Equity asserted that, throughout his life, Mr. Rogers lived in, and was exposed to, lead in multiple residences, and therefore, he was unable to draw a causal relationship between his residence at the Towanda Property and any alleged damages. Further, Home Equity asserted that Mr. Rogers’ expert witnesses, Arc Environmental, Inc. (“Arc”) and Dr. Simon, acknowledged that Mr. Rogers was exposed to lead at other residences and could not eliminate the other properties as the cause of his alleged injuries.

Home Equity attached to the motion for summary judgment a November 1, 2013, report prepared by Arc, which showed that Arc tested the interior and exterior of 6149 Chinquapin and found lead-based paint above the Maryland standard. An October 15, 2014, report issued by Arc with respect to the Towanda Property, however, indicated that Arc tested only the exterior of the Towanda Property, and Home Equity asserted that mere testing of the exterior of a home is not sufficient to establish that the home was a substantial contributing source of alleged lead exposure.

With respect to Dr. Simon, Mr. Rogers’ causation expert, Home Equity stated that, although Dr. Simon asserted in his report, which was attached to the motion for summary judgment, that the Towanda Property was a substantial contributing source of Mr. Rogers’ lead exposure, he conceded in his subsequent deposition that multiple properties likely contributed to Mr. Rogers’ lead exposure, and based on an elevated blood lead level of 14 p,g/dL on March 25, 1996, “there existed a substantial contributing factor to [Mr. Rogers’] lead exposure before he ever lived at the Towanda Property.” Dr. Simon admitted that he was not qualified to testify as to the specific causation of any injury to Mr. Rogers because he was not a medical doctor. He stated that he did not collect or analyze any samples in forming his opinion that the Towanda Property was a contributing cause of Mr. Rogers’ alleged injuries.

Home Equity asserted that Dr. Simon’s conclusion that the Towanda Property was a substantial contributing cause of Mr. Rogers’ alleged lead exposure was based solely on the age of the property, the deposition testimony of Ms. Rogers-Coy, documentation of the 1976 Abatement, which he opined was a “limited abatement,” and the lack of information that any flaking paint at the Towanda Property in the 1990s was not lead-based. Home Equity asserted that Dr. Simon’s assertions “flatly contradict” Mr. Rogers’ burden of proving all facts essential to the cause of action, and Mr. Rogers had “put forth no affirmative evidence to show that lead paint at the Towanda Property — and not at some other property — caused his alleged injuries.”

On December 29, 2014, Mr. Rogers filed a response to Home Equity’s motion for summary judgment, asserting that he presented both

direct and circumstantial evidence of the existence of lead-based paint at [the Towanda Property] as well as expert toxicological and medical testimony opining that there was more likely than not lead-based paint exposure at [the Towanda Property] and that [he] was injured as [a] result of that exposure.

Mr. Rogers stated that he was not required to present direct evidence, “by way of interior testing,” to prove that his blood lead levels were caused by exposure to lead at the Towanda Property because there was evidence of deteriorated paint located in areas that were easily accessible to him at the property during his tenancy, and he experienced his “highest elevated blood lead levels while living” at the property. He stated that he “had access to areas with chipping and flaking paint and was seen mouthing windowsills that tested positive for lead-based paint in 1976,” and he was not required to “rule out all possible sources of lead” exposure because there “can be multiple causes of injury.”

In addition to Dr. Simon’s report indicating that the Towanda Property was a substantial source of Mr. Rogers’ lead exposure, Mr. Rogers attached an October 24, 2014, report from his medical expert, Dr. Jeanette R. McDaniel, in which she concluded that, based on the age of the property, the condition of the property during Mr. Rogers’ residency as described by Ms. Rogers-Coy, the home visit conducted by the BCHD in 1997, Mr. Rogers’ blood lead levels, his age and risk factors, the 1976 positive lead-testing of the property, the 2014 Arc testing, and the absence of gut rehabilitation, Mr. Rogers was exposed to lead at the Towanda Property. Mr. Rogers argued that, because he lived at the Towanda Property for six months, had access to areas of deteriorated paint at the property, and had his “highest sustaining elevated blood lead levels while he lived at the property,” the evidence was sufficient for a trier of fact to conclude that the Towanda Property was a substantial contributing source of his lead exposure.

In opining that Mr. Rogers’ exposure to lead at the Towanda Property was a “substantial contributing factor to his elevated lead levels,” Dr. McDaniel stated that “Chinquapin may have also contributed to his exposure but to a lesser degree.” She concluded that Mr. Rogers “sustained injuries to his central nervous system from his lead exposure.” Although he was functioning in society and school, “his test scores and his ADHD as well as his executive function and working memory skills may have been affected by his lead exposure.”

Dr. McDaniel stated that it typically takes 30-45 days after lead ingestion for blood lead levels to increase, and it takes the same amount of time for blood lead levels to decrease. She agreed that, if Mr. Rogers began living in the Towanda Property on January 1, 1997, a blood draw on January 8,1997 could not be a result of exposure at Towanda, but rather, it “would probably be more a reflection on where he left.” She also agreed that, because the previous blood lead level he had was 14 gg/dL in March 1996, it was possible that Mr. Rogers’ 21 gg/dL blood lead level in January 1997 reflected a decrease in blood lead levels from what it was before he moved into the Towanda Property. She further testified that an increase in blood lead level from 14 |xg/dL to 21 [xg/dL did not change the impact of Mr. Rogers’ injuries, but rather, the numbers were “just a reflection of his exposure of the lead load — lead load level — lead load at that residence, so he’s still suffering the same damages.”

On January 23, 2015, the court held a hearing. Home Equity argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on two bases: (1) there was no evidence of medical causation; and (2) Mr. Rogers could not eliminate other sources of exposure to lead-based paint. With respect to causation, Home Equity argued that Mr. Rogers had not established that the increase in his blood lead levels were substantial enough to contribute to his injuries, noting that Dr. McDaniel testified that the increase in blood lead level from 14 pg/dL to 21 (xg/dL did not change the impact of Mr. Rogers’ injuries.

With respect to Mr. Rogers’ inability to eliminate other sources of lead paint exposure, counsel argued that there was direct evidence of lead-based paint at 6149 Chinquapin, but there was no direct evidence of any lead-based paint in the interior of the Towanda Property. To “connect the dots between a defendant’s property and plaintiffs exposure to lead” in a lead exposure case involving circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must “rule out other reasonably probable sources” of lead exposure, which Mr. Rogers had not done, given the testimony that the Chinquapin property was a source of his lead exposure.

Counsel for Mr. Rogers argued that the evidence showed that Mr. Rogers lived at the Towanda Property from October 1996 through April 1997, a period of approximately six months, and Dr. McDaniel opined that Mr. Rogers’ blood lead levels of 21 [xg/dL were attributable, to a substantial degree, to his residence at the property. Mr. Rogers asserted that there was “direct evidence of lead in the interior of the property” based on the 1976 lead testing and the lack of subsequent records showing “gut rehabilitation or significant rehab of the house.” Thus, he argued, the “same components that were tested positive with lead in 1976 were still there” during Mr. Rogers’ tenancy at the property. Moreover, in March 1997, the house was in a dilapidated condition, Mr. Rogers was seen chewing on the windowsills, and his blood lead levels were elevated. Counsel stated that Mr. Rogers did not dispute that other properties contributed to his elevated blood lead levels, but he asserted that the evidence indicated that the Towanda Property was a “direct, actual, substantial contributing factor of those blood lead levels.” And recent testing of the Towanda Property showed “multiple areas of lead on the exterior of the property.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted Home Equity’s motion for summary judgment. Initially, it noted that it rejected Home Equity’s argument that Mr. Rogers could not prove medical causation “because of Dr. McDaniel’s testimony that the level of 21, as opposed to 14, did not cause any additional injury to Mr. Rogers.” The court explained:

I’m aware from other cases with testimony concerning cumulative levels and increased levels, and in addition, I think that the testimony at deposition of Dr. McDaniel is not conclusive. There is the reference ... suggesting that she would attribute additional injury to the higher level. And while there’s certainly grist for cross-examination in her later statement as well, I don’t find that that creates an undisputed state of facts that warrant summary judgment on that argument.

The court than addressed Home Equity’s second argument, that there was “insufficient evidence of the presence of lead paint as a source of exposure for Mr. Rogers in the Towanda Road property.” With regard to that contention, the court concluded “that the Plaintiffs in this case do not have sufficient evidence to proceed on those issues of source and source causation.” The court explained:

The Plaintiffs in this case explicitly disavow any reliance on [Dow v. L & R Properties, 144 Md.App. 67, 796 A.2d 139 (2002)] in a purely circumstantial theory[,] emphasizing the evidence that they have that a lead-paint hazard was present in this property in the mid 1970s. That certainly is evidence that the Plaintiffs can use, and I agree with Plaintiffs that that moves the ball beyond any presumption from the age of the house to actual evidence that lead paint existed in the house at one point. But I think the causal dots that are not connected for the Plaintiffs case are then the supporting evidence from which a jury could conclude that the same lead paint, which was present in the house in 1976 or the mid 1970s, remained in the house in 1996 and 1997 when Mr. Rogers was allegedly exposed.
And I think the Plaintiff would have to rely on some other circumstantial theory to support those issues concerning the actual exposure in — alleged exposure in the 1990s. Because they’ve disavowed any reliance on Dow, and because their experts have not purported to exclude other sources or circumstantially demonstrate that the Towanda Road property was the source of both lead exposure and the elevated levels measured in 1997, I will grant summary judgment for this Defendant on that issue.

Following the hearing, the court issued an order granting Home Equity’s motion.

On February 2, 2015, Mr. Rogers filed a motion for reconsideration. In his Motion for Reconsideration, Mr. Rogers argued, inter alia, that an inspection certificate filed by the owner of the Towanda Property in 2007 indicated that the property was not free of lead paint, showing that the lead paint found in 1976 had not been removed. He attached an inspection certificate issued by the Maryland Department of the Environment, which included the following five categories: (1) Lead Free; (2) Full Risk Reduction; (3) Modified Risk Reduction; (4) Lead Safe Qualified Offer; and (5) Lead Safe Not Qualified Offer. The inspector checked the category “Full Risk Reduction.” A Full Risk Reduction certificate indicates that there is a reduced risk of lead exposure in a rental unit, and this standard is met by “passing the test for lead-contaminated dust, provided that that any chipping peeling, or flaking paint has been removed or repainted on interior and exterior of the rental dwelling unit.” Maryland Department of the Environment, Lead Poisoning Prevention Program: Lead Paint Certificates for Rental Housing (Rev. Jan. 2015). https://perma.cc/AAQ5-UHHP.

In its opposition, Home Equity argued that this exhibit was “previously admissible as evidence,” but Mr. Rogers chose not to admit it, and reconsideration of summary judgment was not merited. On March 31, 2015, the circuit court issued an order declining to reconsider its decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Maryland Rule 2 — 501(f) governs motions for summary judgment and provides that a trial court “shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Accord Reiter v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 417 Md. 57, 67, 8 A.3d 725 (2010). A determination “[w]hether a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment is proper in a particular case is a question of law, subject to a non-deferential review on appeal.” Tyler v. City of College Park, 415 Md. 475, 498, 3 A.3d 421 (2010). Thus, the standard of review of a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment on the law is de novo. D'Aoust v. Diamond, 424 Md. 549, 574, 36 A.3d 941 (2012).

When we consider a circuit court’s order granting summary judgment, we “review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving party.” Rhoads v. Sommer, 401 Md. 131, 148, 931 A.2d 508 (2007). Accord Reiter, 417 Md. at 67, 8 A.3d 725 (“ ‘[W]e independently review the record to determine whether the parties properly generated a dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ”) (quoting Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 1, 10, 862 A.2d 33 (2004)). We review “the same information from the record and decide[ ] the same issues of law as the trial court.” Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chem., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591-92, 578 A.2d 1202 (1990). If the facts in the record “ ‘are susceptible to inferences supporting the position of the party opposing summary judgment, then a grant of summary judgment is improper.’ ” Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59, 72, 904 A.2d 511 (2006) (quoting Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 533, 836 A.2d 655 (2003)).

“ ‘[T]he purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual disputes, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact, which is sufficiently material to be tried.’ ” Id. (quoting Sadler, 378 Md. at 534, 836 A.2d 655). For summary judgment purposes, “ ‘[a] material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.’ ” Pence v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 363 Md. 267, 279, 768 A.2d 639 (2001) (citation omitted). “ ‘[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs’ claim is insufficient to preclude the grant of summary judgment; there must be evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.’ ” Crickenberger v. Hyundai Motor America, 404 Md. 37, 45, 944 A.2d 1136 (2008) (quoting Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 738-39, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993)). “[W]hile a court must resolve all inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, those inferences must be reasonable ones.’ ” Id. (quoting Beatty, 330 Md. at 739, 625 A.2d 1005).

Generally, we limit our review to the grounds relied upon by the trial court. Benway v. Maryland Port Admin., 191 Md.App. 22, 46, 989 A.2d 1239 (2010). Accord PaineWebber Inc. v. East, 363 Md. 408, 422, 768 A.2d 1029 (2001) (“In appeals from grants of summary judgment, Maryland appellate courts, as a general rule, will consider only the grounds upon which the lower court relied in granting summary judgment.”). We may, however, affirm the grant of summary judgment on a ground not relied upon by the circuit court if “the alternative ground is one upon which the circuit court would have no discretion to deny summary judgment.” Warsham v. James Muscatello, Inc., 189 Md.App. 620, 635, 985 A.2d 156 (2009) (quoting Dixon v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 175 Md.App. 384, 418 n. 19, 927 A.2d 445 (2007)), cert. denied, 414 Md. 332, 995 A.2d 298 (2010).

DISCUSSION

Mr. Rogers contends that the circuit court erred in granting Home Equity’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that he had not presented sufficient evidence that the Towanda Property was the source of his lead exposure or his elevated blood lead levels. In support, he states:

[Mr. Rogers] put forth direct evidence of the existence of lead-based paint in the house in 1976, and evidence that the original lead paint components that were dilapidated and contained many layers of old deteriorated paint remained in the house during [his] residency. [He] has also put forth evidence of building and renovation permits establishing a reasonable inference that there was no lead abatement or removal of all the leaded components prior to 1996. Absent evidence of complete lead abatement to contradict these facts, [he] has put forth sufficient evidence for a jury to logically infer the likely existence of lead-base[d] paint during his residency in 1996-97.

Mr. Rogers asserts that, based on the “totality of the facts, a fact finder could reasonably infer the existence of deteriorate[d] lead-based paint at the [Towanda Property] that substantially contributed to [his] lead exposure, elevated blood lead levels and resulting injuries.” He lists those facts as follows:

1) the house was an older house built in 1920 at a time when 95 percent of homes contained lead-based paint; 2) the home was found to contain lead paint throughout the interior in 1976; 3) these lead paint components were not completely abated in 1976; 4) the home was found to contain lead paint in 2014 on the exterior porch and adjacent exterior window where [he] spent significant time; 5) [t]he house contained many areas of deteriorated paint in the interior and exterior during [his] residency and these areas match areas found to contain lead-based paint; 6) [he] had frequent hand to mouth activity, and mouthed the windows in the home ...; 7) [he] was of a tender age when he spent all of his time in the home containing deteriorated paint; 8) [he] had his highest sustained elevated blood lead levels while residing at [the Towanda Property], that increased rather than declined as would be expected if he were removed from a lead paint source; 9) [t]he home was not certified lead free by a Maryland Department of the Environment certified inspector in 2007; 10) there is no evidence in the record that the home was gut renovated prior to residency, and to the contrary, the home was described as old, dilapidated and condemned; 11) the windows in the home were original to the home and not replacement windows during [Mr. Rogers’] residency; 12) [t]here is no evidence in the record, other than pure speculation, that [Mr. Rogers] was exposed to any other probable sources of exposure while residing at [the Towanda Property].

Accordingly, he concludes, “it was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment and deny the motion for reconsideration.”

Home Equity responds that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in its favor because Mr. Rogers did not put forth sufficient evidence that the Towanda Property proximately caused his alleged injuries. It asserts that Mr. Rogers failed to “demonstrate the presence of lead at the Towanda Property, let alone his exposure to lead there or any additional injury from such exposure,” and therefore, he could not “establish that the Towanda Property proximately caused his injuries.” Home Equity contends that a “[p]laintiff cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact by pointing to the presence of lead paint that was detected and remediated twenty years prior to his alleged residence at the Towanda Property, especially where renovation, repair, and repainting took place in the intervening decades.” It asserts that Mr. Rogers “seeks to invert the burden of proof,” arguing that he should be able to submit his claim to a jury unless Home Equity can show “by testimony, or other evidence” that the lead paint discovered in the Towanda Property in 1976 had been remediated, a standard not supported by Maryland law. In any event, it asserts that the record shows that the lead paint found in 1976 was abated.

Additionally, Home Equity asserts that the Arc report showing lead paint on the exterior of the Towanda Property in 2014 does not “save [Mr. Rogers] from the lack of causation evidence.” It contends that “[m]erely testing the exterior of a home is not sufficient to establish that the home was a substantial contributing source of ... alleged lead exposure.” Moreover, it argues that, to the extent that Mr. Rogers argues on appeal that he was exposed to lead paint while spending time on the front porch, this argument is not properly before this Court because it was not raised in or decided by the trial court. In any event, it asserts, there is “no evidence that [Mr. Rogers] engaged in any hand-to-mouth activity on the porch ... or that [he] otherwise ingested paint from the outside of the home.” Thus, “[t]o the extent [Mr. Roger’s] new theory is even plausible, he failed to develop sufficient facts to support it.”

Home Equity further argues that, even if Mr. Rogers could show the presence of lead at the property, “he lacks sufficient evidence to submit to a jury the question of whether this lead caused him harm because he cannot eliminate other properties as the source of his exposure.” In that regard, it asserts that Dr. Simon “conceded that there existed at least one other substantial contributing factor to [Mr. Rogers’] lead exposure before he lived at the Towanda Property.” In sum, Home Equity argues that, because Mr. Rogers cannot “put forth sufficient evidence to show the presence of deteriorated lead paint at the Towanda Property during his residence there,” and he cannot show that the Towanda Property, and not some other property, caused his alleged injuries, summary judgment was proper.

A plaintiff alleging negligence has the burden of proving “1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, 2) that the defendant breached that duty, 3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and 4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty.” Rowhouses, Inc. v. Smith, 446 Md. 611, 631, 133 A.3d 1054 (2016). Accord Taylor v. Fishkind, 207 Md.App. 121, 148, 51 A.3d 743 (2012), cert. denied, 431 Md. 221, 64 A.3d 497 (2013). Where a plaintiff bases his negligence claim on an alleged violation of a statute or ordinance governing lead paint, the plaintiff must prove “(a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of.” Brooks v. Leivin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 79, 835 A.2d 616 (2003).

Although not specifically identified in the complaint, we presume that Mr. Rogers premised his negligence action on the Housing Code of Baltimore City (1997), Art. 13 §§ 702-703, 706 (“Housing Code”). Section 702 requires that “[ejvery building ... occupied as a dwelling shall ... be kept in good repair, in safe condition, and fit for human habitation.” Section 708 provides, in relevant part, that “[g]ood repair and safe condition shall include ... the following standards; ... [a]ll walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors and windows shall be kept clean and free of any flaking, loose, or peeling paint.” Section 706 requires that “[a]ll interior loose or peeling wall covering or paint shall be removed and the exposed surface shall be placed in a smooth and sanitary condition,” and that “[n]o paint shall be used for interior painting of any dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming house or rooming unit unless the paint is free from any lead pigment.”

If the plaintiff satisfies the first prong of the claim, the violation of a statute or ordinance, he or she still must show that violation proximately caused his or her injury. Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d 616. “To be a proximate cause for an injury, ‘the negligence must be 1) a cause in fact, and 2) a legally cognizable cause.’ ” Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, 243, 973 A.2d 771 (2009) (quoting Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135, 156-57, 642 A.2d 219 (1994)).

The circuit court here granted summary judgment on the ground that Mr. Rogers had not produced evidence that any negligence by Home Equity was the “cause in fact” of Mr. Rogers’ injuries. “Causation-in-fact concerns the threshold inquiry of ‘whether defendant’s conduct actually produced an injury.’ ” Id. at 244, 973 A.2d 771 (quoting Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 16-17, 264 A.2d 851 (1970)). Accord Kiriakos v. Phillips, 448 Md. 440, 465, 139 A.3d 1006 (2016). When, as here, there may be two or more independent negligent acts bringing about an injury, “causation-in-fact may be found if it is ‘more likely than not’ that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiffs injuries.” Pittway, 409 Md. at 244, 973 A.2d 771.

The Court of Appeals has explained the evidence necessary to establish causation in a lead-based paint case, as follows:

To connect the dots between a defendant’s property and a plaintiffs exposure to lead, the plaintiff must tender facts admissible in evidence that, if believed, establish two separate inferences: (1) that the property contained lead-based paint, and (2) that the lead-based paint at the subject property was a substantial contributor to the victim’s exposure to lead. At times, these separate inferences may be drawn from the same set of facts, but parties would do well to remember that these inferences are separate and often will require different evidentiary support.

Hamilton v. Kirson, 439 Md. 501, 529-30, 96 A.3d 714 (2014).

A plaintiff may show causation through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 527, 96 A.3d 714. Circumstantial evidence may satisfy the plaintiffs burden of proof if it demonstrates that the property is a reasonable probable source of lead exposure. Rowhouses, 446 Md. at 654-57, 133 A.3d 1054. The evidence is sufficient if it “ ‘creates a reasonable likelihood or probability rather than a possibility supporting a rational inference of causation, and is not wholly speculative.’ ” Hamilton, 439 Md. at 529, 96 A.3d 714 (quoting West v. Rochkind, 212 Md.App. 164, 170-71, 66 A.3d 1145 (2013)). In other words, the plaintiff must show that “there is a fair likelihood that the subject property contained lead-based paint and was a source of the lead exposure.” Rowhouses, 446 Md. at 657-59, 133 A.3d 1054.

Causation in a lead paint case involves “a series of links: (1) the link between the defendant’s property and the plaintiffs exposure to lead; (2) the link between specific exposure to lead and the elevated blood lead levels[;] and (3) the link between those blood lead levels and the injuries allegedly suffered by the plaintiff.” Hamilton, 439 Md. at 529, 96 A.3d 714 (quoting Ross v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore City, 430 Md. 648, 668, 63 A.3d 1 (2013)). Thus, to be a substantial factor in causing a plaintiffs alleged injuries, the home in question must have been a source of the plaintiffs exposure to lead, the “exposure must have contributed to the elevated blood lead levels, and the associated increase in blood lead levels must have been substantial enough to contribute to [plaintiffs] injuries.” Id.

Here, with respect to the first link, Mr. Rogers contends that he had both direct and circumstantial evidence showing that the Towanda Property was a reasonable probable source of his lead exposure. Although there was no testing of the residence during the time that he lived there, Mr. Rogers asserts that there was direct evidence that the Towanda Property contained lead-based paint in the interior of the home in 1976, which he asserts “was not completely removed based on the abatement standard in effect during that time, and direct evidence of lead-based paint still remaining in 2014 on the exterior porch and windows.”

Home Equity argues, and the circuit court found, that evidence of the existence of lead paint in the residence in 1976 was not “direct evidence” of the presence of lead paint during Mr. Rogers’ residency, 20 years later. We agree.

In State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 547 n. 8, 823 A.2d 664 (2003), the Court of Appeals defined “direct evidence” as “ ‘[e]vidence, which if believed, proves existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption.’ ” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 461 (6th ed. 1990)). Evidence of the presence of lead paint in the Towanda Property in 1976 is not direct evidence of lead paint in the property in 1996-97. As the circuit court noted, Mr. Rogers’ theory requires a fact finder to presume the presence of lead paint in 1996-97 in the absence of specific evidence that the lead paint found in 1976 was removed. To allow Mr. Rogers to go to the jury on the argument that, because the house contained lead paint at one time, 20 years earlier, and “[n]o one has ever determined” that the interior was lead-free after that time, would ignore Mr. Rogers’ burden to show a reasonable probability, not a possibility, that lead paint existed at the property during the time he lived there.

We agree with the circuit court that evidence of lead paint in the house 20 years before Mr. Rogers resided there is not direct evidence of lead paint in the property during his residency, and it is not sufficient to satisfy Mr. Rogers’ burden and get the case to the jury. Although it may establish a “possibility” of causation, it does not satisfy Mr. Rogers’ burden to show that the Towanda Property was a “reasonable probable source” of his lead exposure. Rowhouses, 446 Md. at 654-57, 133 A.3d 1054.

That is not to say that this evidence could not be considered, with other evidence, as circumstantial evidence showing that the Towanda Property was a reasonable probable source of lead exposure. Mr. Rogers argues that there was such evidence, citing to evidence that he asserts provided an inference that lead remained in home during his residency, such as the “lack of evidence of any gut renovations” prior to his residency and the evidence that, during his tenancy, the original windows remained, the property was dilapidated, as well as evidence that lead paint was found on the exterior porch in 2014.

Home Equity disagrees. It argues that Mr. Rogers “cannot put forth sufficient evidence to support his proposed inferences that deteriorated lead paint remained at the Towanda Property after the 1976 Abatement and that further repair work did not take place,” noting that the record reflects that the Towanda Property had significant renovations during the 20 years after the 1976 finding that lead was present, an abatement card was issued in 1976, and the Baltimore City Code in effect in 1976 required the removal of lead paint.

Because Home Equity relies heavily on the abatement card issued in 1976, we address that issue first. In Dr. Simon’s report, admitted below, Dr. Simon stated that the abatement in 1976 was a limited abatement, which corrected the flaking paint found, but did not address other areas that tested positive for lead paint. Although Home Equity did not challenge this conclusion below, in this Court, Home Equity asserted that the issuance of the abatement card established as a matter of law that all lead paint was removed from the Property because an abatement, under the law at that time, required the removal of all interior lead paint. Our review of the Baltimore City Code in effect in 1976, Art. 13 §§ 703, 703, reveals a requirement that all peeling or flaking paint be removed, and that no new painting be done with lead-based paint. We did not find, however, a requirement to remove all lead-based paint, as Home Equity alleges, even if it was not flaking or peeling. Similarly, Md.Code (1976 Supp.), Art. 43, § 117A, permitting tenants to put rent in escrow if a landlord failed to remove lead paint from surfaces easily accessible to children, did not require the removal of all lead-based paint, but merely removal from surfaces easily accessible to children. On the record presented here, we are not persuaded that the mere existence of the abatement card shows, as a matter of law, that there was a “full abatement” in 1976, as opposed to a “limited abatement,” as Dr. Simon opined.

Although the abatement in 1976 does not resolve the issue, that is not the end of the inquiry. As indicated, Mr. Rogers has the burden to show that it was reasonably probable that lead-based paint found in 1976 still existed during his residency at the Towanda Property 20 years later, and this lead paint substantially contributed to his lead exposure, his elevated blood lead levels, and his injuries. We need not resolve whether Mr. Rogers met his burden in this regard because, even assuming, arguendo, that the other evidence was sufficient to create an inference that the Towanda Property contained lead-based paint in 1996-97, we conclude that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on the ground that Mr. Rogers has not adequately demonstrated “that the Towanda Road property was the source of both lead exposure and the elevated levels measured in 1997.”

In this regard, Mr. Rogers asserts that he presented evidence that he “had his highest sustained elevated blood lead levels while residing at [the Towanda Property], that increased rather than declined as would be expected if he were removed from a lead paint source.” Although the record does support his assertion that his blood lead levels were highest at the Towanda Property, the record does not support his assertion that his blood lead levels increased after moving to the Towanda Property.

With respect to the lead levels at various residences, the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Rogers, reveals the following:

Date_Blood Lead Level_Address_
06/29/1995 7 gg/dL 6149 Chinquapin Park_way_
03/25/1996 14 (xg/dL
October 1996 3738 Towanda Avenue
01/08/1997 21 (xg/dL
03/26/1997 20-21 |xg/dL
April 1997 2534 Loyola Northway
04/30/1997 17-18 (xg/dL
08/22/1997 13 (xg/dL_

As the chart reflects, Mr. Rogers’ blood lead level was elevated, at 14 [xg/dL, on March 25, 1996, before he moved to the Towanda Property. Given this evidence of Mr. Rogers’ elevated blood lead level when he lived at 6149 Chinquapin Parkway, Mr. Rogers’ expert, Dr. McDaniel, agreed that Chinquapin was a source of Mr. Rogers’ lead exposure. She also testified that there were no additional blood tests before January 8, 1997, approximately 10 months later, and because there were no blood tests administered before Mr. Rogers moved to the Towanda Property in October 1996, the 21 |xg/dL blood lead level recorded on January 8, 1997, could reflect a decrease in his blood lead levels from what it was before he moved into the Towanda Property. Under these circumstances, the record does not reflect, as Mr. Rogers asserts, evidence that his blood lead levels increased while he was residing at the Towanda Property.

Given this evidence, Mr. Rogers did not produce evidence that created a reasonable probability that he was exposed to lead at the Towanda Property that caused his alleged lead-exposure injuries. Although his factual allegations supported a possibility that he was exposed to lead there, he did not show a reasonable probability that the Towanda Property was a substantial contributor to his elevated blood lead levels. Accordingly, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Home Equity.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

      . Home Equity states that Mr. Rogers did not respond to its requests for admissions until after it filed its motion for summary judgment. It argues that, pursuant to Md. Rule 2-424(b), which provides that "[ejach matter of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted” if not answered within 30 days, Mr. Rogers’s failure to timely respond to Home Equity’s request for admissions results in his admitting that he lived in multiple residences, both before and after he lived at the Towanda Property, and he was exposed to lead at those residences. Mr. Rogers did not specifically contest this assertion. We note, however, the circuit court’s comment that, even if the matters requested were deemed admitted, it was of no moment because Mr. Rogers’ position was that there was enough direct evidence of exposure at the Towanda Property that "could be a substantial factor in addition to those other properties.”

      . There does appear to be a factual dispute regarding when Mr. Rogers moved to the Towanda Property. Mr. Rogers asserts that, in a light most favorable to him, the evidence showed that he began living at the Towanda Property in October 1996, "based on information in Kennedy Krieger Institute medical records, Maryland Department of Social Services records, as well as statements from Ms. Rogers-Coy.” As Home Equity points out, however, some of the records indicate that the date was in 1997. If this fact was critical, we could not affirm the grant of summary judgment. Home Equity argues, however, that even relying on the October 1996 date, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment. We will proceed using the October 1996 date.

      . Blood lead levels are measured in micrograms per deciliter.

      . On October 22, 2014, Mr. Rogers voluntarily dismissed his claims against the owners of 6149 Chinquapin, and they are not parties to this appeal.

      . Again, Home Equity is relying on Maryland Rule 2-424(b), relating to the failure to respond to requests for admissions, to argue that Mr. Rogers lived in multiple residences where he was exposed to lead. As Home Equity points out, Mr. Rogers does not contest this assertion.

      . Dr. Simon explained that most houses built before 1950 "would most likely contain lead-based paint ... unless proven negative by testing.”

      . On October 7, 2014, when Dr. Simon issued his report, Arc had not yet issued a report of its findings from the exterior testing of the Towanda Property. After receiving a copy of the Arc report relating to the finding of lead on the exterior of the Towanda Property, Dr. Simon issued an addendum to his report, restating his previous conclusion that the Towanda Property was a substantial contributing source of Mr. Rogers' alleged injuries.

      . At her deposition, Dr. McDaniel agreed that 6149 Chinquapin “was a source of exposure.”

      . The transcript states July, but in context, it is clear that the reference was to January 8, 1997.

      10. During the hearing, the court repeatedly asked Mr. Rogers’ counsel how evidence of lead in the interior of the residence in 1976 supported an inference that there was lead in the interior in 1996, noting that Mr. Rogers had the burden to produce evidence of lead in the premises when he lived there, and the law did not permit a presumption that once there was lead in the house it remained, unless the defendant rebutted the presumption with evidence that it was gone. The court stated that Mr. Rogers had the burden to show that the lead paint was not removed.

      . Mr. Rogers does not make any argument of error in denying the motion for reconsideration that is different from the argument of error in denying the motion for summary judgment. Thus, we will focus our analysis on the initial ruling granting the motion for summary judgment.

      . Home Equity further argues that, if this Court concludes that Mr. Rogers did present a question of material fact regarding the presence of deteriorated lead paint at the Towanda Property and link that lead paint to his elevated blood lead levels, his "claim still fails as a matter of law because [he] lacks evidence to link his alleged harm to any increased blood lead levels he attributes to the Towanda Property.” It asserts that Mr. Rogers’ sole medical expert, Dr. McDaniel, testified that she did not have sufficient evidence to conclude that an increase in blood lead level from 14 (tg/dL to 21|xg/dL necessarily resulted in greater injury to Mr. Rogers. That testimony, argues Home Equity, ”show[s] that [her] opinion is insufficient to link [Mr. Rogers'] alleged exposure at the Towanda Property to any injury over and above what he already sustained.” Therefore, Home Equity asserts, even if Mr. Rogers "could show the presence of lead hazards at the Towanda Property and link these lead hazards to an increased blood lead level, he cannot link his blood lead levels during the alleged time period of his residence to any additional or separate injury.” Based on our resolution of this case, we need not address Home Equity's argument in this regard.