author: HIGGINS, J.

text:
    ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. v. STEVENS.
    (No. 644.)
    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.
    Jan. 25, 1917.
    On Rehearing, Feb. 15, 1917.)
    1. Courts <§=7 — Transitory Action — Personal Injuries.
    An action for damages for personal injuries is transitory, and may bo maintained wherever a court is found that has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 14, 16, 22-31.]
    2. Corporations <@=>669 — Foreign Corporations — Actions — General Appearance — Submission to Jurisdiction.
    Where a foreign corporation, after the suggestion as friends of the court of those' who had been served as its agents that they were not such agents had been overruled, appeared to claim its privilege to be sued in another county, and thereafter answered to the merits, it submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and eliminated any question of the sufficiency of the service.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2641, 2642.]
    3. Courts <@=97(6), — Rules op Decision — Decisions isr Federal Courts.
    Though the question of whether service was had on a foreign corporation so as to give the state court jurisdiction over an action against it is a federal question on which the decision of the United States Supreme Court is final, the question of the privilege of such corporation to be sued in a particular county is a state question on which the decisions of the state court are controlling, though contrary to those of the federal court.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 333.]
    4. Railroads <@=33(2) — Foreign Corporation — Venue of Actions.
    A foreign railway corporation may be sued in a county in which it is doing business through the instrumentality of a domestic corporation which operates a line of railway connecting with the foreign corporation’s line at the state boundary.
    [Ed. Note. — For other casa», see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 71.]
    5. Master and Servant <@=295(1) — Injuries to Servano^-Instructions — Applicability to Evidence — Assumption of Risk.
    In an action for personal injuries t® a fireman on a helper engine, who fell from the tender, where he had gone with the engineer’s knowledge to relight the markers, when the engine was started backwards without warning, a charge that an employé may assume that his fellow employés will exercise ordinary care in the discharge of their duties incident to their employment is not erroneous as disregarding the exception to the rule there stated, applying where the servant has knowledge of the negligence of his employer and of the danger created thereby, where the evidence, though it showed that the engine was moved in its customary manner, did not show that it was customary to move it without warning to the fireman if he was or might be in a position of danger.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and ■ Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1168, 1169, 1179.]
    6. Tbial <§=>296(6) — Instbuctions — Cube by Subsequent Instbuctions.
    If the giving of that charge was error, it was cured by a subsequent portion of the court’s charge that if plaintiff knew that the engineer intended to move the engine backward in the manner he did, or could have known it, and with such knowledge failed to protect himself, he assumed the risk, and by a charge given at defendant’s request that if-it was the custom to detach engines from the train without giving any signal to the fireman, and plaintiff knew of that custom, and the engine was moved in the usual and customary manner known to plaintiff, plaintiff could not recover.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 709.]
    7. Tbial <§=>295(1) — Instbuctions as a Whole.
    The instructions given at the trial must be considered as a whole.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 703, 704, 713, 714, 717.]
    8. Masteb and Seevant <§=>294(5) — Injubies to Sebvant — Instbuctions—Negligence-Knowledge or Plaintiff's Dangee.
    In an action for injuries to a fireman, who fell from the tender, where he had gone with the engineer’s knowledge to relight markers, when the engine was started backward without warning, an instruction which called attention to various features of the evidence and stated the facts the jury must find to render a verdict for plaintiff, but which omitted any reference to the question whether the engineer as an ordinarily prudent man ought to have known under the circumstances that the fireman was in a place of danger, was erroneous.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1164.]
    Appeal from District Court, EX Paso County ; Dan M. Jackson, Judge.
    Action by Ben Stevens against the Atchi-son, Topeka & Santa Fé Railway Company. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
    Reversed and remanded, and opinion modified on application for rehearing, but rehearing denied.
    Turney & Burges, of El Paso, and A. H. Culwell and Terry, Cavin & Mills, all of Galveston, for appellant. Geo. E. Wallace, P. E. Gardner, and W. S. Berkshire, all of El Paso, for appellee.
   HIGGINS, J.

Stevens filed suit against appellant in the district court of El Paso county, Tex., to recover damages arising from personal injuries. He alleged that he resided at Las Vegas, N. M., and that defendant was a foreign corporation duly incorporated and having a local agent and maintaining an office in El Paso county, Test; that it owned and operated a line of railroad extending from El Paso, Tex., northerly, through the state of New Mexico and from the state of New Mexico across the northerly part of Texas, where it maintained an office and had a local agent; that W. R. Brown and R. F. Goering were local agents of defendant in El Paso county, and F. C. Fox was its general manager and resided at Amarillo, Tex.; that it also had a number of conductors who were operating trains over defendant’s line of railway from San Marcial, N. M., to and into El Paso county, Tex.; that defendant was engaged in interstate commerce. The plaintiff further alleged that on August 22, 1914, he was in defendant’s employment as a locomotive fireman, and upon that date, while in the discharge of his duties, he sustained personal injuries in the state of New Mexico through defendant’s negligence, whereby he was damaged in the sum of $30,000, for which he sought judgment. Upon this petition, citations were issued and served in due form upon said Brown, Goering, Fox, and a conductor named Watlington, the same having been served in time to require answer to the May term, 1915. At the May term, Brown, Goering, Fox, and Watlington appeared as friends of the court, and for its information filed affidavits denying that they were agents of defendant. The affidavit of Fox further denied that the defendant owned or operated a line of railroad in Texas, and denied that it was doing business in Texas.

Upon hearing of the issues raised by the amici curise much evidence was offered which, under the view entertained by us, it is unnecessary to state in detail.

At the November term, on, to wit, December 18, 1915, the court entered an order that the affidavits of the amici curise—

“be overruled and held for naught, and that the defendant company be required to. appear and answer herein, to which action of the court the defendant, without waiving its rights to insist upon said affidavits, then and there in. open court excepted. It is further ordered by the court, for cause shown, that defendant be allowed sixty (60) days after the adjournment of this term of this court to prepare and file its statement of facts and bills of exceptions.” Italics ours.

By bill of exception, it is also shown that when the affidavits of the amici curise were overruled—

“defendant then and there in open court excepted and tenders this its bill of exception, and says that the court in not holding that it had no jurisdiction of this cause, as shown by the evidence and the affidavits of the amici curise, who were served as agents of defendant in this cause, and who appeared as friends of the court and filed their affidavits showing that at the time of the service, the defendant herein was not doing business in El Paso county, had no agent in El Paso county, Tex., upon whom proper service could be made, and that said parties so served were not such agents, and that service upon them would not require defendant to answer herein, all of which has been shown by the evidence offered on said hearing, and the court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the defendant, and in ruling that the defendant should answer herein, to all of which rulings of the court, the defendant having at the time excepted, here now presents this its bill of exception, and prays that the same be allowed and made a part of the record herein.”

■ On December 18, 1915, and after the court had overruled the suggestions of the amici curiae, the defendant filed a plea of privilege claiming the right to be sued in either of the counties of Potter, Hemphill, Galveston, Johnson, or Cooke, admitting, for the purpose of that plea, that it was doing business in those counties, and that the district courts of said counties had jurisdiction over its person, and that it could be sued therein. On the date of its filing, the plea of privilege was overruled, to which action the defendant took an exception and was allowed 60 days in which to prepare its statement of facts and bills of exception.

The record does not contain the defendant’s first original answer, and is silent as to the date upon which it was filed; but on January 3, 1916, it filed its first amended original answer upon the merits.

The canse came on for trial at the January term, 1916, resulting in verdict and judgment for $7,500 in plaintiff’s favor, from which the defendant prosecutes this appeal.

Appellant first challenges the jurisdiction of the courts of Texas. The cause of action is transitory, and the district court of El Paso county had jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Railway Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 29 Sup. Ct. 397, 53 L. Ed. 695. In this ease Sowers, a citizen of Arizona, sued this same defendant in the district court of El Paso county, Tex., and obtained judgment for damages arising from personal injuries received by him iu the territory of New Mexico. In that case Mr. Justice Day said:

“An action for personal injuries is universally held to be transitory, and maintainable wherever a court may be found that has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter. Rorer, Interstate Law, 154, 155; McKenna v. Fesk, 1 How. 242, 11 L. Ed. 117; Dennick v. Central R. Co., 103 U. S. 11, 18, 26 L. Ed. 439, 441. Undoubtedly, where the cause of action is created by the state, as is the action to recover for death by wrongful injury, there is no objection to the enforcement of the law because it arose in another jurisdiction. Northern P. R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190, 14 Sup. Ct. 978, 38 L. Ed. 958; Stewart v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 168 U. S. 445, 449, 18 Sup. Ct. 105, 42 L. Ed. 537, 539.”

So there remains only to be determined whether the court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the defendant’s person. In the disposition of this question, it may be assumed, under the authority of the United States Supreme Court decisions, that the parties upon whom the citations were served were not agents of defendant, that defendant was not doing business in Texas, and therefore jurisdiction over the person of defendant was not acquired by the service of that process.

But under the authority of York v. State, 73 Tex. 651, 11 S. W. 869, it must be held that the defendant submitted its person to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts by its action in filing a plea of privilege and answer to the merits after the suggestion of the amici eurise had been overruled. If the action of the court in overruling the suggestion was erroneous, the defendant was under no obligation to appear. When it did appear it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court, and any question as to the sufficiency of the service and jurisdiction over the person was thereby eliminated. The plea of privilege having been filed and overruled at the November term, 1915, service was perfect at tiie January term, 1916. Railway Co. v. Blocker, 138 S. W. 156, and cases there cited. York y. State was carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, and it was there held that the construction by the state Supreme Court of the statutes upon which the ruling in the case was based must be accepted as correct, and that the only federal question involved was the power of the state in respect thereto. It was further held that the statutes did not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, and the judgment of the Texas court was upheld. York v. State, 137 U. S. 15, 11 Sup. Ct. 9, 34 L. Ed. 604. The Supreme Court of the United States in the very recent case of Western Life Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235 U. S. 261, 35 Sup. Ct. 37, 59 L. Ed. 220, reviewed and reaffirmed its previous holding in York v. State. So far as we are advised, the correctness of the ruling in the case has never been successfully challenged. The principle there announced has been applied in many cases subsequently arising, and was approved' in the recent case of Banco-Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S. W. 711.

Upon the jurisdictional question, Railway Go. 7. Blocker, supra, is parallel to this ease. In that case, in which a writ of error was denied, Judge Hodges said:

“The first assigned error complains of the ruling of the court upon the affidavit of Upton as amicus eurise in holding that the service upon him was sufficient, and in requiring the appellant to file an answer. This order was entered before any answer was filed or appeai-ance entered by the defendant for any purpose. It is not easily perceived how the defendant in that situation could have been injuriously affected by any action of the court in the ruling complained of. If Upton ■ at the time citation was served upon him was not the representative of the appellant, the service upon him was a nullity, and conferred no right upon the court to render a personal judgment against it. When called upon to make some order, or to render some judgment, that would affect the rights of the defendant in the suit, it became the duty of the court, without any suggestion from an amicus eurise, to ascertain whether by service of citation or otherwise it had acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. An amicus eurise is in no sense the representative of either party to the litigation, and an order which involves an adjudication opposed to his suggestions does not affect the rights of the parties for .whose benefit, they may have been in-' tended. Such suggestions do not authorize the court to do more than that which was its duty to do without them. Jones v. City of Jefferson, 66 Tex. 576, 1 S. W. 963. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the person of the defendant would be as vulnerable when preceded by an order like that here complained of as it would be without it. The defendant had the right, after this ruling, to answer or not, as it saw proper, and the utmost the court could have done in the absence of an answer would have been to render a judgment by default. If appellant’s rights were not affected by the order, then the making of the order furnishes no legal ground for complaint.
“The second error .assigned complains of the action of the court in overruling the appellant’s plea in abatement and to the jurisdiction. The proposition following that assignment is as follows: ‘The court had no jurisdiction over the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, and should have sustained defendant’s plea to jurisdiction and of privilege.’ If by this assignment it is meant to call in question the action of the court in denying the appellant the privilege of having this cause tried in another county of this state, it is a .sufficient answer to say that neither the pleadings nor the evidence disclosed the existence of facts upon which that statutory right .could be asserted. On the other hand, if it is meant to question the authority of the court below to assume jurisdiction and render a .personal judgment against the appellant, because it was a foreign corporation and not amenable to the processes of the courts of this state, the objection is equally untenable. The court inquired into the facts touching the validity of the service upon Upton as the agent of the appellant, and decided that it was binding. Instead of standing upon its plea to the jurisdiction and resting its defense upon that issue alone, appellant elected to plead to the merits of the controversy. Article 1243 of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1895 provides that an appearance for the purpose of quashing service shall operate as an appearance at the next term of the court. Whether the question as to the sufficiency of the service by which it is sought to bring the defendant into court be raised by motion or by plea, the legal effect of the appearance is the same. York v. State, 73 Tex. 651, 11 S. W. 869; Railway Co. v. Whitley, 77 Tex. 128, 13 S. W. 853; Insurance Co. v. Hanna, 81 Tex. 487, 17 S. W. 35; Lucas v. Patton, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 62, 107 S. W. 1143; York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15, 11 Sup. Ct. 9, 34 L. Ed. 604. The record shows that the trial occurred more than two years after the answer was filed. There was no error in the rulings complained of.”

Aside from the filing of the plea of privilege and answer to the merits, it may be that the defendant submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by its appearance and taking exception to the action of the court in overruling the suggestions made by the amici curias. Mueller v. Heidemeyer, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 109 S. W. 447 (writ of error refused); Railway Co. v. Shields, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 7, 120 S. W. 222 (writ of error refused); Railway Co. v. Scoggin, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 349, 123 S. W. 229; Degetau v. Mayer, 145 S. W. 1054; Railway Co. v. McCarty, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 616, 69 S. W. 229; Railway Co. v. Kiser, 136 S. W. 852 (writ of error refused). But as to this, no ruling is made, as we deem it clear that submission was made for the reason first indicated.

The next ground of error presented relates to overruling the plea of privilege'. This presents a question of venue ,and privilege. No jurisdictional of federal question is involved in its consideration. Railway Co. v. Whitley, 77 Tex. 126, 13 S. W. 853.

Whether or not the courts of Texas had jurisdiction over the person of defendant by virtue of the service had in this case presented a federal question, and in' determining this question, the authority of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court is supreme, and it is the duty of the state courts to yield to this authority. Railway Co. v. Cox, 106 Tex. 74, 157 S. W. 745. But where rulings of the United States Supreme Court are not in harmony with decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas, and no federal question is involved, they are not binding on the courts of Texas, and the state courts will follow the decisions of its own Supreme Court. Railway Co. v. Kiser, 136 S. W. 852. 50, in determining whether or not the defendant could rightfully insist upon its plea of privilege to be sued in some county in the state other than El Paso county, we will follow the decision of our own Supreme Court.

Tested by the opinion rendered by Judge Brown in Buie v. Railway Co., 95 Tex. 51, 65 S. W. 27, 55 L. R. A. 861, there is ample evidence in this record to sustain a finding by the trial court that the defendant was doing business in El Paso county through the instrumentality of the Rio Grande, El Paso & Santa Eé Ry. Company, a Texas corporation, having offices and agents in El Paso county, and which owned and operated a line of railway from the city of El Paso in El Paso county, northwardly to the Texas-New’ Mexico boundary line, where it connected with the railway line of defendant. The facts are very similar to the Buie Case, and will sustain a finding that the Texas corporation was a mere mask and the instrument by which the defendant carried on its business in said state and county. Ás such, the defendant was really’represented by the agents of the Texas corporation, and venue was properly laid in El Paso county where such agents were stationed. Indeed,, 'appellant does not seem to seriously question that the facts in this case bring the same within the rule announced in the Buie Case, but it is asserted that case was overruled in the later case of Railway Company v. Cox, supra. The opinion in the Cox Case was also by Judge Brown, and it was said:

“That case (the Buie Case) was decided upon practically the same facts as the Peterson Case (205 U. S. 364) [27 Sup. Ct. 513, 51 L. Ed. 841], The Supreme Court of the United States did not mention the Buie Case in the Peterson Case, but the effect of the decision in the latter case is to overrule the other. Upon that class of questions the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States is superior, and this court acknowledges the decision in the Peterson Case as the law and will follow and enforce it.”

But it must be borne in mind that in this quotation a federal question was being discussed by Judge Brown, namely: . YVRether jurisdiction had been acquired over a nonresident railroad corporation which made no appearance and against whom a personal judgment had been rendered, based upon service had on one White, an alleged agent. White, as amicus curise, had filed an affidavit that he was not the agent of the nonresident corporation. The court required no proof of White’s agency, and submitted the cause against the nonresident as if it had been served and judgment was rendered against it. This, of course, raised a federal question, and in deciding the same, Judge Brown yielded to the superior authority of the United States Supreme Court, but we do .not understand that it was the purpose to recant the correctness of the views expressed in the Buie Case. And unless the rule announced in the Buie Case be overruled, for all purposes and held to be erroneous, then in deciding questions other than those of a federal nature, this case must be followed by the courts of Texas. In deciding such questions, this court will follow the Buie Case until the Supreme Court of the state shall hold that it is incorrect in principle, and not to be regarded as authority even in cases raising no federal question.

Furthermore, as is indicated above, the record affirmatively discloses that when the court overruled the suggestions of the amid curise, and prior to the filing of the plea of privilege, the defendant appeared 'and excepted to the action of the court in overruling the suggestion, and took a 60-day order in which to prepare and file a statement of facts and bills of exception.

As stated by Judge Hodges in the quotation above made from Railway Company v. Blocker, supra, the action of the court in overruling the suggestion did not injuriously affect the rights of defendant. It did not compel it to appear if the parties were in fact not its agents, and it was not doing business in Texas. It could have remained aloof, and when it saw fit to appear and except to the court’s action in making such order and obtained the 60-day order in which to prepare and file a statement of facts and bills of exception, it may well be considered that it waived its privilege that the case be tried on its merits in some county other than El Paso. Howe, etc., v. Taylor, 147 S. W. 656; Railway Co. v. Kiser; Mueller v. Heidemeyer; Railway Co. v. Scoggin; Degetau v. Mayer; Railway Co. v. McCarty, all supra.

We therefore conclude that no error is shown in overruling the plea of privilege.

The fourth assignment complains of an objectionable question asked by plaintiff’s counsel upon cross-examination of one of the defendant’s witnesses. The defendant promptly objected, and the objection was sustained, and the jury instructed by the court to disregard the question. Appellant contends that the question, in itself, was damaging and prejudicial to defendant’s defense, and was calculated to have a harmful effect upon the jury, and that the sustaining of the objection thereto and instructing the jury to not consider the same did nob destroy or remove the damaging effect of the question which it was intended by counsel it should have upon the jury. The question asked was very objectionable. Counsel must have known that it was an improper one, and it was doubtless intended to 'prejudice the jury against the witness. It is unnecessary for us to determine whether or not the asking of this question, of itself, constituted reversible error, since the case must be reversed upon another ground; but it is not improper to say that it may constitute reversible error and might necessitate a reversal of the case if there were no other error in the case.

The fifth and sixth assignments complain of improper argument by counsel for the plaintiff in addressing the jury. The argument was withdrawn and the jury instructed by the court to disregard the same. The same remarks made respecting the fourth assignment apply to the language complained of in the sixth assignment. The court charged the jury as follows:

“IV. You are instructed that railway companies are not to be regarded as insurers of the safety of their employés and that when one enters the employment of a railway company he assumes all the risks that are ordinarily incident to the business in which he is engaged, and all risks and dangers due to the negligence of the defendant or his fellow servants which are open and visible to his observation, as well as all the risks and dangers of which he knew, or in the ordinary discharge of his duties must necessarily have acquired the knowledge, hut he may assume that his fellow employés will exercise ordinary care in the discharge of their duties incident to their employment in-which they are engaged. * * *
“VI. Now, therefore, if you find and believe from the evidence and by a preponderance thereof, that on or about the 22d day of August, 1914, plaintiff was employed by the defendant at the time, place and in the capacity, as alleged, and that while so employed and engaged in the duties incident to his employment he met with an accident and was injured, as alleged by him, and you further find from a preponderance of the evidence that when the engine on which plaintiff was employed as fireman was stopped at Glorietta, N. M., the markers were not burning on the tender, and that when plaintiff discovered this fact, if it was a fact, he informed the engineer, if he did, and that thereafter he went to the rear of said tender for the purpose of relighting said markers and took a position on the rear end of said tender, ancf that while attempting to relight the markers, the engineer, without giving any notice or warning, moved or permitted the engine to move backward with a quick jerk or jar, if he did, and plaintiff, by reason thereof, was thrown or caused to fall from his then position, and his foot was caught by the wheels of the tender and injured to such an extent as to necessitate its amputation, and you further find that the engineer in charge of said engine was guilty of negligence, as that term has been heretofore defined and explained to you in causing or permitting said engine to move backward at the time and in the manner and way you find it was moved, if you find that the same was moved by the engineer, and you do not find that plaintiff assumed the risk, then, in that event, your verdict will be for plaintiff, but unless you do so find yon will return a verdict for the defendant. * * *
“VIII. You are instructed that if you find from the evidence that said engine was moved backward by said engineer suddenly and with a jerk, or moved without any notice or warning to plaintiff, but that plaintiff lmew_ that the engineer intended to move said engine bacJc-ward in the manner and way in which the same was moved, or by the exorcise of ordinary care on his part could have hnown of the same, and with such knowledge failed to protect himself, then in either of said events, you are instructed that plaintiff would assume the risk, and your verdict xoill be for the defendant." Italics ours.

At the time of the accident, plaintiff was a fireman upon a helper engine which helped a train from Eamy, N. M., to Glorietta. When Glorietta was reached, the helper engine was disconnected from the train and the train proceeded. Plaintiff went to the rear of the tender to relight a marker upon the helper engine which had become extinguished. While so engaged, he claimed that the engine was suddenly moved by the engineer without warning to him, whereby he was thrown to the ground, the engine running over his leg and inflicting the injuries complained of. This was the ground of negligence submitted as a basis of the recovery. Appellant, contends that the italicized portion of paragraph 4 of the court’s charge was erroneous, and stated a positive misdirection of the law, in view of the evidence adduced that the movement of the engine at the time and place of the accident was made in the usual and customary way without any signal. In this connection, appellant invokes the rule announced in the Huyett Case, 99 Tex. 630, 92 S. W. 454, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 669, and the Bonnet Case, 59 Tex. 73, 33 S. W. 334, viz.: That while the servant does not assume the risk of dangers brought about by the negligence of the master, yet this general rule is qualified and is not applicable where the servant has knowledge, when he enters upon the work in which he is hurt, of the negligence of his employer, and of the danger created thereby, to which he, the servant, is to be exposed in doing such work. It is true the evidence in this case shows, according to the defendant’s viewpoint, that the engine was moved in the customary and usual manner when it was detached from1 the train which it was engaged in helping to Glorietta, and that plaintiff knew the customary and usual manner in which this was done; but this evidence all has reference to the usual and ordinary custom which obtained in detaching the helper engine from the helped train and returning to Lamy. There is no testimony showing or tending to show that it was usual and customary at the time and place of the accident for the engineer to move his engine without a warning signal to the fireman, if the fireman was or might be in a position of danger. Therefore the rule invoked has no application whatever to the state of facts here presented. But, if they have application, then the error in the court’s charge in paragraph 4 is cured by the italicized portion of paragraph 8 of the general charge, and by appellant’s special charge No. 2, which was given by the court and reads as follows:

“At the request of the defendant, you are instructed that if you find from the evidence in this cause that it was the practice and custom when using helper engines at Glorietta to disconnect the same from the train being helped and bapk away from the train being helped without giving any signal or notice to the fireman on said helper engine that said engine was going to b.e so moved, and that the plaintiff knew of such custom and practice, and you further find, from the evidence in this cause that at the time the plaintiff was injured said engine was so moved in the usual and customary manner, and that same was known to plaintiff, and that while making such movements in the usual and customary manner, if you find that same was done, the plaintiff was then injured as alleged by him, that then plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict should be for the defendant.”

The charge of the court is always to be considered as a whole; and, considered as a whole, and in connection with such special charge No. 2, it cured any error which might possibly have existed in that portion of paragraph 4 complained of.

Objection is made to the sixth paragraph of the charge upon the ground that the court, having called the jury’s attention to various features of the evidence and having undertaken to apply the law thereto, should have included as one of the elements of liability the question whether the engineer, as a man of ordinary prudence under a!ll of the circumstances, ought to have known the position or probable position plaintiff was in at or about the time the engineer moved the engine, for unless the engineer, as a reasonably prudent man, should have known that plaintiff was or probably was in a position where he might be injured by the movement of the engine, he was not at fault when he moved the engine without a warning signal.

The paragraph of the charge mentioned is objectionable in the particular noted, for which reason the cause must be reversed and remanded. It is so'ordered.

On Rehearing.

In the original opinion, in passing upon the assignment complaining of the overruling of the plea of privilege to be sued in either of the counties of Potter, Hemphill, Galveston, Johnson, or Cooke, it was said that when appellant—

“saw fit to appear and except to the court’s action in making such order, and obtained the 60-day order in which to prepare and file a statement of facts and bills of exception it may well be considered that it waived its privilege that the case be tried on its merits in some county other than El Paso.”

This expression of opinion was not necessary to a decision of the question of venue, and it is perhaps not altogether in harmony with Railway Company v. Whitley, 77 Tex. 126, 13 S. W. 853, Railway Company v. Childs, 40 S. W. 41, Railway Company v. Adams, 4 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 12, 14 S. W. 1015, and Callhan v. Pemberton, 38 S. W. 227.

We therefore withdraw the expression quoted, and base our action in holding that venue was .properly laid in El Paso county upon the other ground indicated in the opinion, namely: That under the authority of Railway Company v. Buie, 95 Tex. 51, 65 S. W. 27, 55 L. R. A. 861, the defendant was doing business in El Paso county through the instrumentality of a Texas corporation, and had a line of railway in said county with offices and agents therein, as is fully set forth in the original opinion.

What is said in this opinion upon rehearing refers exclusively to the assignment which complains of the overruling of the plea of privilege. It does not relate to the jurisdictional question.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.
      tteoFor other eases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

      ©=sFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. v. AYERS.
    (No. 657.)
    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.
    Feb. 1, 1917.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 15, 1917.)
    1. Corporations <&wkey;669 — Foreign Corporations — Actions — General Appearance— Submission to Jury.
    Where a foreign corporation, after the suggestion as friends of the court of those who had been served as its agents that they were not such agents had been overruled, appeared to claim its privilege to be sued in another county, and thereafter answered to the merits, it submitted to the jurisdiction of the -.001114; and eliminated any question of. the sufficiency of the service.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2641, 2642.]
    2. Courts •<&wkey;97(6). — Rules op Decision-Decisions In Federal Courts.
    Though the question of whether service was had on a foreign corporation so as to give the state court jurisdiction over an action against it, is a federal question on which.the decision of the United States Supreme Court-is final; the question of the privilege of such corporation to be sued in a particular county is a state question on which the decisions of the state court are controlling, though contrary to those of the federal court.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 333.]
    3. Railroabs <&wkey;33(2) — Foreign Corporation — Venue op Actions'.
    A foreign railway corporation may be sued in a county in which it is doing business through the instrumentality of a domestic corporation which operates a line of railway .connecting with ,the foreign corporation’s line at the state boundary.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, CenfcDig. § 71; Corporations, Cent.Dig. § 2601.]
    4. Master and Servant <&wkey;297(3) — Injuries to Servant — Evidence — Assumption op Risk — Violation op Rule.
    In an action for injurj.es to a car inspector while he was coupling the air hose between two cars on a train being made ready to go out when other cars'were coupled to the string so as to move it upon plaintiff, special findings by the jury that plaintiff did not know of the risks, and could not by the exercise of ordinary care have known them, were not contrary to evidence which showed that the company had a printed rule requiring the inspector to place a blue flag at the end of the string on which he was working, where there was other evidence that the rule was not observed, and that the inspectors had verbal orders not to observe it when they were coupling the air hose on trains being made up for departure.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1197.]
    5. Master and Servant <§=^295(2) — Injuries to Servant — Instructions — Assumption op Risk.
    In connection with the special issues submitted in that action, a portion of the charge held not objectionable as misleading the jury into thinking that plaintiff did not assume the ordinary risks of his employment as well as those which he knew or should have known, or as an incorrect statement of the law applicable to the facts in the case.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cfent. Dig. § 1170.]
    Appeal from District Court, El Paso County; Ballard Coldwell, Judge.
    Action by A. E. Ayers against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railway Company. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Turney & Burges, of El Paso, A. H. Cul-well and Terry, Cavin & Mills, all of Galveston, for appellant. Geo. E. Wallace, P. ■E. Gardner, and Wi S. Berkshire, all of El Paso, for appellee.
   HIGGINS, J.

Ayers filed this suit against appellant in the district court of El Paso county, Tex., to recover damages arising from personal injuries. He alleged, that he resided in the state of Oklahoma, and that the defendant was a foreign corporation, duly incorporated, owning and operating a line of railroad extending from Barstow, Cal., through the states of California, Arizona, and New Mexico, to and into the city and county of El Paso in the state of Texas, Where it maintained offices and agents who were engaged in carrying on the business of defendant in said El Paso county, pertaining to the operation of its line of railroad; that W. R. Brown was its general agent in said county, R F. Goering its local agent, and J. S. Morrison is ticket agent; that each of said parties resided in El Paso county and maintained their offices there, and were engaged in selling tickets and making contracts for the transportation of goods and merchandise over defendant’s different lines of railroad; that in addition to said named agents, the defendant had other agents who resided in said El Paso county, to wit, conductors of its trains that ■ were run and operated into .El Paso, Tex., and into Albuquerque and San Marcial, N. M.; that s.aid'conductors operated said trains from San Marcial and Albuquerque across the state line into El Paso county,. Tex. It was alleged that defendant also operated one of its lines of railway in Potter county, Tex., where it maintained an office and local agency, and where its general manager, P. C. Pox, resided and had his office.

Plaintiff further alleged that on April 15, 1915; he was in defendant’s employment as a car inspector at Barstow, in the state of California, and upon that date, and at said place, while in the discharge of his duties he sustained personal injuries through defendant’s negligence whereby he was damaged in the sum of $25,000, for which he sought judgment. Upon this petition, citations were issued and served in due form, upon R. P. Goering, J. S. Morrison, P. C. Pox, and a conductor named Bittrein, the same having been served in time to require answer to the November term, 1915.

At said term the parties upon whom the citations had been served appeared as friends of the court, and for its information filed affidavits denying that they were agents of defendant. The affidavit of Pox further denied that defendant owned or operated a line of railroad in Texas, and denied that it was doing business in Texas.

Upon hearing of issues raised by the amici curise, much evidence was offered, which it is unnecessary to state in detail. At said November term, on, to wit, December 18, 1915, the court entered an order that the affidavits of the amici curise—

“be overruled and held for naught, and that the defendant company be required to appear and answer herein, to which action of the court the defendant without waiving its right to insist upon said affidavits then and there excepted. It is further ordered by the court, for cause shown, that defendant be allowed sixty (60) days after the adjournment of this term of tins court to prepare and file its statement of facts and bills of exceptions.” Italics ours.

B'y bill of exception, it is also shown that when the affidavits of the amici curise were overruled — ■

“defendant then and there in open court excepted and tenders this its bill of exception, and says that the court in holding that it had no jurisdiction of this cause, as shown by the evidence and the affidavits of the amici curise, who were served as agents of defendants in this cause, and who appeared as friends of the court and filed their affidavits showing that at the time of the service the defendant herein was not doing business in El Paso county, had no agent in El Paso county, Tex., upon whom proper service could be made, and that said parties so served were not such agents, and that service upon them would not require defendant to answer herein, all of which has been shown by the evidence offered on said hearing, and the court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the defendant, and in ruling that the defendant should answer herein, to all of which rulings of the court, the defendant having at the time excepted, here now presents this its bill of exception, and prays that the same be allowed and made a part of the record herein.”

On December 18, 1915, and after the court bad overruled the suggestion of the amici curb®, the defendant filed a plea of privilege claiming the right to be sued in either of the counties of Potter, Hemphill, Galveston, Johnson, or Cooke, admitting, for the purpose of that plea, that it was doing business in those counties, and that the district courts thereof had jurisdiction over its person, and that it could be sued therein.

On the date of its filing, the plea of privilege was overruled, to which action the defendant in open court excepted and was allowed 60 days after adjournment in which to prepare its statement of facts and bills of exception. The record does not contain the defendant’s first original answer, and is silent as to the date upon which it was filed, but on April 6, 1916, it filed its first amended, original answer to the merits. The case came on for trial at the March term, 1916, resulting in verdict and judgment for $9,000 in plaintiff’s favor, rendered April 19,. 1916, from which the defendant prosecutes this appeal.

Appellant first challenges the jurisdiction of the courts of Texas. In the disposition of this question, it is assumed, under authority of the United States Supreme Court decisions, that the parties upon whom the citations were served were not agents of defendant ; that defendant was not doing business in Texas, and therefore jurisdiction -over the person of defendant was not acquired by service of that process. But under the authority of York v. State, 73 Tex. 651, 11 S. W. 869, Id., 137 U. S. 15, 11 Sup. Ct. 9, 34 L. Ed. 604, and Western Life Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235 U. S. 260, 35 Sup. Ct. 37, 59 L. Ed. 220, it is held that the defendant submitted its person to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts by its action in filing a plea of privilege and answer to the merits after the suggestion of the amici curise had been overruled. And it may be, aside from the filing of the plea of privilege and answer to the merits, that the defendant submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by its appearance and taking exception to the action of the court in overruling the suggestions made by the amici curise.

The next ground of error presented relates to overruling the plea of privilege. This presents a question of venue and privilege. No jurisdiction or federal question is involved in its consideration. Railway Co. v. Whitley, 77 Tex. 126, 13 S. W. 853.

Tested by the opinion rendered by Judge Brown in Buie v. Railway Co., 95 Tex. 51, 65 S. W. 27, 55 L. R. A. 861, which we follow as our guide in determining the question of venue, there is ample evidence in this record to sustain a finding by the trial court that the defendant was doing business in El Paso county through the instrumentality of the Rio Grande, El Paso & Santa Fé Railway Company, a Texas corporation having offices and agents in El Paso county, and which owns and operates and did own and operate upon all of the dates mentioned-' herein a line of railway from the city of El Paso in El Paso county northwardly to the Texas-New Mexico boundary line, where it connected with the railway line of defendant, and that this Texas corporation was a mere mask and the instrument by which the defendant carried on its business in said El Paso county. As such, the defendant was really represented by the agents of the Texas corporation, and the venue was properly laid in El Paso county, where said agents were stationed.

Our views upon the question of jurisdiction as well as of venue or privilege are set forth at length in an opinion rendered by this court upon a former day of this term and not yet reported in the companion case of Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railway Co. v. Stevens, 192 S. W. 304, to which we here refer. Upon those questions the essential facts in both cases are precisely the same. It will serve no purpose to restate our views at length, and we simply refer to the opinion rendered in the Stevens Case for the reasons upon which our action is based in overruling the appellant’s contentions.

Plaintiff was a car inspector, and at the time of the accident .was engaged in coupling the air hose on a string of 17 cars. These cars were a part of a train which was then being made up in the Barstow yards. He was in between two of the cars in a kneeling position and in the act of coupling the hose. While so engaged, another string of cars was switched against the string where plaintiff was working and the impact moved the two between which he was kneeling, knocking him down and inflicting severe personal injuries.

It is contended there is no actionable negligence upon the part, of defendant shown by the evidence; further, that the evidence discloses the accident resulted from a danger, the risk of which was assumed by plaintiff, and also that the accident was due solely to plaintiff’s own negligence. It is úseles to detail the evidence. It amply and abundantly supports the findings favorable to plaintiff upon these issues. The court submitted these two issues:

“Question No. 8: Did the plaintiff, at the time he made or attempted to make the connection between the cars on which he was working, know of the risks and dangers of going between the ears as he did?
“Question No. 9: Could the plaintiff, by use of ordinary care incident to his employment, know of the risks and dangers of going between the cars as he did?”

Both questions were answered in the negative. In connection with these questions, this instruction was given:

“In connection with your answers to questions 8 and 9, you are instructed as follows: That the plaintiff on entering the employment of the defendant assumed all risks ordinarily incident to the business in which he was engaged, as well as such risks and dangers of which he knew, or in the ordinary discharge of Ms duties incident to Ms employment must necessarily have acquired the knowledge, hut you are further instructed that plaintiff did not assume. the risks and dangers, if any, due to the negligence of his eoemjñoyés, if any, unless he knew of such negligence and attendant risks, or in the ordinary discharge of Ms duties incident to his employment, must necessarily have acquired the knowledge." Italics ours.

It is asserted that the answers to these questions are contrary to the evidence because the plaintiff knew it was dangerous to go in between the cars without protecting the string from movement by placing a blue flag at each end thereof. This is predicated upon the fact that a printed rule of the company provided that when making repairs to, or inspecting and supplying, cars standing on the main or side tracks, inspectors must protect themselves by placing a blue signal on the drawhead, on the platform or step of the cars at each end of the train, to prevent the cars from being coupled to or moved while they are making repairs. But there is testimony to show that this rule was not observed, and that inspectors had verbal orders not to observe the same when they were coupling the air hose on cars in trains being made up for departure as the plaintiff was doing when he was injured. In response to other issues, the jury found that defendant was negligent in failing to notify or warn plaintiff of the approach of the cars which struck the string he was working on, and that it was also negligent to connect the two strings in such a way as to move the one where plaintiff was working. In the light of the instruction given for its guidance in answering the questions noted, and under the evidence adduced amply supporting the indicated findings of negligence, the jury’s answers to questions 8 and 9 are not contrary to the evidence.

The italicised portion of the instruction given in connection with questions 8 and 9 is objected to—

“because it put a limitation on the balance of the said special charge that might lead the jury to think that plaintiff did not, on entering the employment of the defendant, assume all risks ordinarily incident to the business in which he was engaged, as well as such risks and dangers of which he knew, or in the ordinary discharge of his duties incident to his employment must necessarily have acquired the knowledge; and that said special charge of the plaintiff should not have been given for the reason that it was not a correct expression of law applicable to the facts in this case, and was a misleading charge on t,he doctrine of assumed risks, as applicable to the facts in this case.”

The charge is not subject to ‘the criticisms urged against it.

It is also complained that the verdict of $9,000 is excessive. The verdict appears to-be liberal in amount, but we are not prepared to say that it is so much so as to require a remittitur. Railway Co. v. Bartlett, 162 S. W. 1039.

Finding no error, the judgment is affirmed.
      other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes


author: SWEARINGEN, J.

text:
    GARRETT v. FIRST STATE BANK OF KINGSVILLE et al.
    (No. 5790.)
    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.
    Feb. 14, 1917.)
    1. Venue <&wkey;22(l) — Codeeendants—Nature oe Relief — Injunction.
    In a suit against a bank and two individuals, residents of other counties, seeking injunc-tive relief, if no cause of action against the bank was stated and the injunctive relief was ancillary to the real cause of action based on a contract, the plea of the individual defendants of privilege to be sued in their own county must be sustained.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Venue, Cent. Dig. § 35.]
    2. Venue &wkey;>22(l) — Codeeendants—Injunction.
    In action by stockholder of bank, who alleged that certificates of stock were unlawfully taken from his possession by an individual defendant, and who sought injunction against the bank and the individuals to restrain transfer of the stock to their names, and to require the bank to issue new certificates to plaintiff, the injunc-tive relief asked was not merely ancillary to the chief cause of action, and therefore the plea of privilege of the individuals to be sued in their own county should have been overruled.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Venue, Cent. Dig. § 35.]
    Appeal from District Court, Kleberg County; W. B. Hopkins, Judge.
    Suit by J. E. Garrett against the First State Bank of Kingsville and others. From an order transferring cause to another county, plaintiff appeals.
    Reversed, and cause remanded.
    Pollard & Crenshaw, of Kingsville, and E. B. Ward, of Corpus Christ!, for appellant. W. R. Perkins, of Alice, and H. S. Bonham, of Beeville, for appellees.
   SWEARINGEN, J.

This is a suit, in the district court of Kleberg county, by appellant, J. E. Garrett, against the First State Bank of Kingsville, with business domicile in Kleberg county, Tex., and J. E. Orfila and Leo Rosenfield, residents of Webb and El Paso counties, respectively, for cancellation of lost certificates of stock of the defendant bank and for reissue to appellant of new certificates in lieu of those lost. J. E. Orfila and Leo Rosenfield filed pleas of privilege to be sued in the county of their residence. The court sustained the plea of J. E. Orfila, and ordered the cause transferred to Webb county. Appellant made timely exception to the order of the court. The cause of action alleged is, briefly, that appellant was the owner of certain certificates of stock of the First State Bank of Kingsville, a banking corporation having its business domicile in Kleberg county, Tex.; that without his consent or knowledge these certificates unindors-ed were unlawfully abstracted from his possession by Orfila and Rosenfield at a time and in a manner unknown to appellant; that possession thereof was still wrongfully withheld from him; that the bank would be compelled to trans'fer the stock on the books of the bank at the demand of wrongful holders of the certificates, causing great inconvenience and loss to appellant. Wherefore appellant prayed that the • lost certificates be canceled and new ones issued to him in lieu of those lost. The petition also prayed that Orfila and Rosenfield be required to surrender the lost certificates, and that they be restrained from demanding a transfer on the books of the bank and a reissue to them or their transferees. The court found that the petition did not state a cause of action against the bank, but merely sought an injunction in aid of or ancillary to the cause of action against Orfila and Rosenfield growing out of the rights, duties, and obligations of a certain contract, a- copy of which was attached to appellant’s petition.

Appellant’s three assignments all relate to and depend upon the one question of law, which is: Does appellant’s petition state a cause of action against the bank, or does it merely seek injunctive relief ancillary to the real cause of action based upon a certain contract? If the latter, the plea of privilege must be sustained. Royal Amusement Co. v. Columbia Piano Co., 170 S. W. 278; I. & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Anderson County, 150 S. W. 239; Thos. Goggan & Bros. v. Morrison, 163 S. W. 119. If a cause of action is alleged against the bank and Orfila was a proper party to the suit, the plea of privilege should have been overruled. R. C. Stat. art. 1830, § 4.

We are of the opinion that the cause alleged is to cancel the last certificates, prevent the bank from issuing new certificates of its capital stock to Orfila and Rosenfield or their transferees, and to require the bank to issue new certificates to appellant in lieu of those lost. The rule upon this subject is stated in State v. Bank of Baton Rouge, 125 La. 146, 51 South. 98, 136 Am. St. Rep. 332, in a quotation from an English court, as follows:

“The issuance by a corporation of a certificate for its shares of capital stock is a declaration by the company to all the world that the person in whose name the certificate is made out, and to whom it is given, is a shareholder in the company, with the intention that it shall be so used by the person to whom it is given, and acted upon in the sale and transfer of shares.” In re Bahia v. Railway Co. L. R. 32, Q. B. 584.

This supports the conclusion that appellant has a substantial right to prevent the bank from issuing certificates to those wrongfully presenting the lost certificates, and appellant also has a substantial right to have reissued to him, by the bank, certificates in lieu of those lost, in order that he might enjoy the commercial evidences of his ownership.

The opinion in the case of State v. Bank of Baton Rouge, supra, was carefully prepared after extensive research, and contains citation of the following authorities:

“Chapman v. N. O. Gaslight & B. Co., 4 La. Ann. 153; Smith v. Cres. City & Co., 30 La. Ann. 1378; Factors’ & Ins. Co. v. Marine, etc., Co., 31 La. Ann. 149; Reid v. Commercial Ins. Co., 32 La Ann. 546; Pitot v. Johnson et al., 33 La. Ann. 1286; De St. Romes v. Levee Steam Cotton Press, 34 La. Ann. 419; Woodhouse v. Insurance Co., 35 La. Ann. 238; Fee v. N. O. Gaslight Co., 35 La. Ann. 413; Ribet v. Bataille et al., 35 La. Ann. 1171; Mineral, etc., Co. v. Deblieux & Letory, 40 La. Ann. 155, 3 South. 726; Kern v. Day, 45 La. Ann. 74, 12 South. 6; State v. N. O. Cotton Exchange, 114 La. 324, 38 South. 204.”

It has frequently been held that the owner of stock in a corporation can maintain a suit against the corporation to compel the issuance to him of certificates of stock'as evidence of his ownership, and may join in that suit those parties who claim or assert ownership. This is announced in Marshall on Corporations (1902) 844, 321, from which the following paragraph is quoted in State v. Bank of Baton Rouge, supra:

“When certificates of stock have been transferred under a forged assignment and power of attorney, or when they have been lost or stolen, without negligence, after having been indorsed or assigned in blank, and have been transferred to the finder or thief, the true owner may recover the certificate from the transferee, or any subsequent transferee; or he may join him in a suit against the corporation to compel a transfer, or retransfer, on its books, according to the circumstances; or he may. maintain an action for conversion against the transferee to recover the value of the stock even after the latter has sold and transferred the same to another. But the owner of shares which have been transferred by the corporation on its books under a forged power of attorney has no right of action against a bona fide purchaser of the shares, who purchased not the original certificates, but a new certificate issued by the corporation.” 2 Cook on Corporations (7th Ed.) §§ 358, 359; 7 Ruling Case Law, §§ 185-187.

We conclude that a cause of action against defendant bank was alleged, and Orfila was a proper party.

It will doubtless be contended by counsel for appellee Orfila that the foregoing is in direct conflict with the opinion of the Third Court of Civil Appeals, speaking through Justice Rice in the Thos. Goggan & Bros. Morrison Case, 163 S. W. 119. We do not think there is any conflict. The allegations in that case are entirely different from those in the case before us, which cleaidy and substantially distinguishes the Morrison Case from this one. The facts alleged in the Morrison Case disclose a suit by Morrison in Cameron county to cancel a contract of purchase from Gog-gan Bros, of Galveston county and an injunction to prevent the bank, which had its business domicile in Cameron county, from paying a check drawn by Morrison against his deposit in the bank in favor of Goggan Bros. It was held that the check passed no funds until presented, and that the drawer had entire control of the payment of the check prior to its acceptance by the bank. By simply notifying the bank not to pay the check, his legal rights would be preserved, and this had already been accomplished. If the bank, after notice, paid the check, it became liable for the amount to the maker of the check. No cause of action against the bank was alleged.

In the case at bar, it is a certificate of stock that is lost. A simple order of the appellant will not prevent or authorize the bank to refuse to issue a duplicate certificate to the holder of the original. On the contrary, the bank can be compelled by suit to issue a duplicate to the holder of the original. Then again, if appellant is the real owner of the certificates lost, as he alleged, he can compel the issuance of duplicates to himself by suit against the bank.

Orfila and Rosenfield were proper parties to this suit, because it was alleged that one or both had unlawful possession of the lost certificates. They did not deny this.

We conclude that the court erred in its order sustaining Orfila’s plea of privilege and in transferring the cause to the district court of Webb county, Tex.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded for trial in Kleberg county, Tex.
      <®=5>For other cases see saíne topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes


author: PLY, O. J.

text:
    SEABROOK et al. v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF PORT LAVACA.
    (No. 5788.)
    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.
    Feb. 7, 1917.)
    1. Bills and Notes <&wkey;473 — Defenses -r-Agreements for Payment.
    In action by bank on note, an answer demanding accounting and alleging agreement of payee to deposit with plaintiff bank moneys realized upon sale of lands in which maker was interested, such moneys to be applied on note, held to state good defense as against general demurrer;_ such agreement being part of same transaction with the execution of the note, and not objectionable as tending to vary terms of note.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. §§ 1503-1507, 1555.]
    2. Bills and Notes <&wkey;459 — Action—Join-der — Cross-Defendants.
    In action by bank on note, where maker defended under agreement with payees for deposit with plaintiff bank of moneys realized from sale of lands out of which note was to be paid, the payees of such note were proper par: ties to be impleaded as cross-defendants.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. §§ 1424^-1433.]
    Appeal from District Court, Calhoun County; W. W. McCrory, Judge.
    Action by the First National Bank of Port Lavaca against L. Seabrook and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
    Reversed and remanded.
    See, also, 171 S. W. 247.
    R. L. Daniel, of Victoria, for appellants. Wilson & Hamilton, of Port Lavaca, for ap-pellee.
   PLY, O. J.

Appellee sued L. Seabrook and J. J. Randle on a promissory note for $1,-500. Appellants answered admitting the execution of the note, but further answered as follows:

“These defendants say that at the time of the execution of said note, prior thereto and subsequent thereto, that these defendants and W. O. Noble and Willett Wilson of Calhoun county, Tex., were engaged in the purchase, subdivision, and sale of several tracts of land situated in Calhoun county, Tex., and adjoining the town of Port Lavaca, Tex., portions of which are .now known as Oak Grove Heights addition and the Groom’s addition to said town; and also another tract consisting of 30% acres out of the A. Esparza grant, situated in said county, fully described in the deed from Wilson and Noble to Gottlieb Remmele and Minnie Remmele, dated May 30, 1912, and recorded in volume Y, pages 367 and 368, Deed Records of Calhoun county, Tex.
“That the note herein sued upon grew out of and is part of a transaction between these defendants, the said W. C. Noble and Willett Wilson, and the said First National Bank of Port Lavaca, which acted in said transaction by and through the said W. C. Noble, its cashier, and Willett Wilson, its president, which transaction was a part of and connected with the purchase, sale, subdivision, and development of said subdivisions and said lands above referred to.
“That after purchasing said lands and making considerable improvements and expenditures on the same in the subdividing and preparing the same for market and selling the same as town lots and otherwise, that the said Willett Wilson and W. C. Noble represented to these defendants that they owed the said Wilson, and Noble the sum of $1,500, being their portion of the expenses incurred in making said improvements on said lands and in advertising and preparing said lands for sale, and the said Wilson and Noble presented the note herein sued upon to these defendants for their signature representing to them that they (defendants) were indebted to the said Wilson and Noble in said amount.
“That while said note appears as payable to the First National Bank of Port Lavaca, that as a matter of fact the same represents and was given for an indebtedness that the said Wilson and Noble claimed these defendants were due to them, and these defendants allege and believe that the same is still the property of and belongs to the said W. C. Noble and Willett Wilson, and that said bank in fact has no interest whatever therein.
“That after the acquisition of said property now constituting Grove Heights addition and the Groom’s addition, and the 30%-acr'e tract above referred to, and the conveyance of some portions thereof to the purchasers, the said W. C. Noble and Willett Wilson induced these defendants to convey said property to them, and in consideration of which they agreed to enter into a written contract showing the relation of all the parties to said property, as well'as their interest therein, which contract they agreed to immediately execute, and said Wilson and Noble further agreed with these defendants that they would at a very early date, which is now long past, convey to these defendants a one-fourth undivided interest each in and to said property, which was in fact the interest owned by these defendants, and to which they were justly entitled.
“That at the time of the execution of said note, it was agreed between these defendants, W. O. Noble and Willett Wilson, acting for themselves, and said bank, which acted in said transaction by and. through its president and cashier aforesaid, which was within the scope of their authority as such officers, that the proceeds of all the sales of lots or parcels of land situated in the Oak Grove Heights addition or the Groom’s addition, or any parcel of land acquired by them and herein mentioned, should be deposited in’the First National Bank of Port Lavaca in the name of J. J. Randle, special account, and all vendor lien notes and other securities received from such source and belonging to said parties should also be deposited and held by said bank in the same manner.
“And that all funds and notes which represented the proceeds of sales aheady made by these defendants or by said Wilson and Noble should also be deposited in said bank. And it was further agreed by and between all of said parties that the first money received from the sale of any of said lots or parcels of real estate should be deposited in said bank as aforesaid, and applied by said bank to the payment and discharge of the note herein sued on, and the said W. O. Noble and Willett Wilson, in whom the title to said property was vested by these defendants, agreed to undertake to see that said money and funds were so deposited and applied upon said note, and said bank agreed and accepted the promise and obligation and undertaking of the said Wilson and Noble to see that said' moneys and funds were so deposited and applied upon the payment of said note as collected.
“These defendants say that said bank and the said W. O. Noble and Willett Wilson were parties ■ to said agreement; that in fact said bank acted in the premises by and through the said Noble and Wilson, who were cashier and president respectively of said bank; and that said bank agreed to the arrangement made between these defendants and the said Wilson and Noble, and was a party to said agreement and arrangement.
“These defendants further say that said bank received the funds arising from the sale of various portions of said property, both moneys and vendor lien notes, which came into its hands after said agreement and understanding, and after the execution of said note and during the existence of said agreement and understanding and during the existence of the note herein sued upon, which moneys and notes are hereinafter more particularly set out.
“These defendants say that in pursuance to said agreement, there has been numerous sums of money and numerous vendor lien notes passed into the hands of the said Wilson and Noble who had agreed with these defendants and with said bank to deposit the same in said bank under the agreement hereinbefore set out, and these defendants believe and állege that said money was so received and deposited in said bank, and said notes received and collected by said bank, the same amounting to a large sum, the exact amount of which these defendants are unable to tell for the reason that the said Wil-lett Wilson and W. O. Noble and said bank have handled and controlled the same and collected said notes, and have not rendered these defendants any account thereof, and have each failed and refused to account to these defendants for the same or render any account thereof to these defendants, and these defendants have no means of ascertaining the exact amount of money which has been collected and paid into said bank by the said Wilson and Noble, or collected by the said Wilson and Noble under and by virtue of the agreement aforesaid, to which said bank was a party.”

A general demurrer was sustained to the answer, and the court rendered judgment for appellee for the amount evidenced by the note.

If the facts set out in the answer are true, a good defense was presented to the claim of appellee. The alleged agreement in no wise varied or sought to vary the terms of the note. It merely showed an agreement of all the parties that Noble and Wilson would deposit with appellee sums to be obtained from the sale of certain lands, in which appellants owned an interest, and that the said sums were to be applied to the payment of the note. The deposits were made, but none of the money was applied to the debt. That money was a payment on the note under the agreement. Noble and Wilson were proper parties] Adams v. Bank, 178 S. W. 993. The answer may have been open to attach through special exceptions, which, however, we do not decide, but it was good as against a general demurrer. The agreement set up in the answer was a part of the same transaction with the execution of the note, and showed a good defense.

This is a second appeal of this case; the judgment on the former appeal having been reversed on account of the disqualification of the trial judge. 171 S. W. 247. The judgment from which this appeal was taken was rendered by a special judge.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
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