text:
    FRABIL PARTNERSHIP v. SUPERVISOR OF ASSESSMENTS OF QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY
    [No. 201,
    September Term, 1978.]

      Decided February 9, 1979.

      The cause was argued before Melvin, Liss and Wilner, JJ.

      Alan H. Fisher, with whom were Venable, Baetjer & Howard on the brief, for appellant.

      Kaye T. Brooks, Assistant Attorney General, with whom was Francis Bill Burch, Attorney General, on the brief, for appellee.
   Wilner, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The very narrow question before us is whether a certain tract of land owned by appellant should be assessed on the basis of agricultural use, rather than at its full cash value, for the taxable year commencing July 1, 1975. The question is one of statutory construction — the proper interpretation to be given to Md. Annot. Code art. 81, § 19 (b) (2) (A) (iii) as it existed in 1975. The relevant facts, set forth in the record made before the Maryland Tax Court, are not in dispute.

At some point not disclosed in the record appellant agreed to purchase an 874-acre tract of land in Queen Anne’s County. The tract appears to comprise all, or most, of Wye Island, an island located between the Wye and the Wye East Rivers. Appellant actually acquired title to the land by deed dated December 3, 1974. In June, 1974 (some six months before it acquired title to the property), J. R. McCrone, Jr., Inc., a surveyor commissioned by it for that purpose, prepared for appellant a plat, showing a subdivision of the entire tract into 35 lots, ranging in size from 74 ± acres to 15 ± acres. The plat showed three 50-foot roads or rights-of-way running through the property, plus an access road to the mainland, that, in effect, separated the lots into four groups. Each lot had substantial frontage on the water (ranging from 600 feet to 2,200 feet), and each had access to one of the rights-of-way depicted on the plat.

At the times relevant to this proceeding, the plat had not been recorded, none of the roads shown on it had been built, and no actual “development”, in terms of construction or public works agreements, had taken place. Indeed, it is conceded that, at all such relevant times, the land was used for agricultural purposes.

What triggered this dispute was the sale of two parcels of the tract in June 1975. One parcel, consisting of approximately 75 acres, was sold by appellant to a Laurence Leonard, and the other, consisting of some 52 acres, was sold to Larry and Esther Stanton. In each of the two deeds, the lot conveyed was described — i.e., its perimeter was determined — by courses and distances, and not by direct reference to any plat. In each case, however, the deed did refer to a McCrone survey. The last sentence of the description paragraph, following directly after the recitation of courses and distances, states:

(1) in the Leonard deed: “Containing in all 75.27 acres of land, more or less, as surveyed by J. R. McCrone, Jr., Inc., Registered Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors.”
(2) in the Stanton deed: “Containing in all 52.15 acres of land, more or less, as described by J. R. McCrone, Jr., Inc., Registered Engineers and Land Surveyors.”

The uncontradicted testimony of the Supervisor of Assessments for Queen Anne’s County, given before the Tax Court, was that in June 1975 “[t]here was a fairly active sales campaign” with respect to the overall tract, and that, in connection with that effort, the McCrone plat “was available, made available to the public, which described the individual parcels.” Gleaning from a somewhat imprecise record, what apparently occurred was that appellant conducted (or proposed to conduct) an auction of some type in order to sell off the various lots, as shown on the 1974 McCrone plat, and that Leonard and Stanton purchased their respective lots directly from appellant in advance of that auction.

When the two deeds in question were recorded, the Supervisor of Assessments, in the belief that the 874-acre tract had been “subdivided”, assessed all three parcels — the two conveyed and the remaining part of the tract — at full cash value rather than on the basis of agricultural use. The county property tax appeal board affirmed that determination; but, upon appellant’s appeal, the Maryland Tax Court reversed and directed that the lands in question be assessed “at the rates pertaining to farm and agricultural use in Queen Anne’s County”. On the Supervisor’s appeal from that determination, the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County reversed the Tax Court. We shall affirm the decision of the circuit court.

Section 19 (b) is a long and complex statute. The essence of it, in terms of this proceeding, is contained in the first sentence of subparagraph (b) (1) and in the first sentence of subparagraph (b) (2) (A) (iii). These provisions are (or, in 1975, were) as follows:

(b) (1): “Lands which are actively devoted to farm or agricultural use shall be assessed on the basis of such use, and shall not be assessed as if subdivided, it being the intent of the General Assembly that the assessment of farmland shall be maintained at levels compatible with the continued use of such land for farming and shall not be adversely affected by neighboring land uses of a more intensive nature.”
(b) (2) (A): “The following lands shall not be subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) hereof:
... (iii) Lands which, after July 1,1972, are subdivided into lots or parcels from and after the first day of the taxable year in which the subdivision occurs, as evidenced by a recorded plat or by a known unrecorded plat used for purposes of selling or conveying lots or parcels, even though the deed descriptions of the lots or parcels make no reference to any such plat; provided that lands which are subdivided in order to convey a single lot or parcel to a member of the immediate family of the owner for his residential purposes or in order to dedicate or convey one or more lots or parcels for public school or park purposes shall not thereby be excluded from the provisions of paragraph (1) hereof.”

As we noted in the opening paragraph of this opinion, the question here is solely one of statutory construction. More precisely, the question is whether this 874-acre tract was “subdivided” by reason of the sale (and the manner of sale) of the two lots. Initially, we observe that the word “subdivide” is not defined, either in § 19 or elsewhere in article 81, in any of its forms or tenses.

The Supervisor, urging that the word “subdivided” be given its “ordinary and accepted meaning”, points to Webster’s dictionary definition of “subdivide”, which he records as “to divide into several parts; esp.: lay out a subdivision on (unimproved land).” This, he says, is what the word means, and this, he says, is precisely what appellant did. Appellant, on the other hand, claims that this is too simplistic. It urges that we look to the various county planning and zoning regulations, all of which are different, but most of which consider the word “subdivide” or “subdivision” in the context of some minimum size lots, and that we construe the State law by reference to these varying local definitions.

We do not find the statute, as it existed in 1975, to be ambiguous, or to permit the interpretation suggested by appellant. Paragraph (b) (2) (A) (iii) excluded from the beneficial assessment lands which are “subdivided into lots or parcels.” It did not say physically staked out; it did not say subdivided into lots less than a certain size; it did not require the lots to be developed; it did not require public works agreements, or the building of roads, or the arrangement of construction financing. It sufficed if the subdivision was “evidenced by a recorded plat or by a known unrecorded plat used for purposes of selling or conveying lots or parcels.” The evidence before the Tax Court clearly established that this tract was subdivided, and that the subdivision was evidenced by a known plat used for purposes of selling the lots laid out on that plat. Had the General Assembly, when enacting paragraph (b) (2) (A) (iii) in 1972, intended to exclude or permit the exclusion from its purview subdivisions involving lots over a certain size, it could easily have so provided, as it purported to do when it amended the law in 1976.

Neither is there any basis in the statute itself, or in the legislative history of it, to suggest that the General Assembly intended the scope of this exclusion to be defined by reference to local regulations that vary from county to county. Not only would such a construction raise serious Constitutional questions under the uniformity requirement of Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights, but it would, in addition, be tantamount to a delegation of authority, sub silentio, for the county governments to determine the State property tax yield. The farmland assessment law is a uniform, State-wide law, and it is to be applied in like fashion throughout the State.

Judgment affirmed; appellant to pay the costs.

      . There is apparently some confusion with respect to this reference. In its “Memorandum of Grounds for Decision”, the Tax Court stated: “The deed descriptions of the property conveyed to Stanton and Leonard was in metes and bounds, and contained no reference to a plat." (Emphasis supplied.) This is literally true. However, in connection with each deed there was a plat of the particular lot conveyed, prepared by McCrone and dated May 1975. In the course of offering the plat attached to the Stanton deed into evidence, counsel for appellant noted that it was “parcel 34”. The lot shown on that plat, identified there as Farm # 34, appears to be the same lot described on the June 1974 plat as Lot No. 34. Similarly, the lot depicted on the McCrone plat attached to the Leonard deed, identified there as Farm # 3, appears to be the same lot described on the 1974 McCrone plat as Lot No. 3. The clear inference, which is nowhere challenged or contradicted, is that the lots conveyed by these two deeds were, in fact, those shown on the 1974 McCrone subdivision plat, and that the 1975 plat was but a more precise and detailed description of the lot.

      . Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Unabridged) provides this definition: “1. to divide further after previous division has been made. 2. to divide (land) into small parcels for ready sale.” Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary (Unabridged) states, in relevant part: “1. to further divide (what has already been divided): divide the parts of into more parts----2. to divide into several parts ...; esp.: to divide (a tract of land) into building lots: lay out a subdivision on (unimproved land).”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Davidson, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    MICHAEL C. FABER et ux v. DURWARD WOLFE et ux.
    [No. 398,
    September Term, 1978.]

      Decided February 9, 1979.

    The cause was argued before *Davidson, Couch and MACD ANIEL, JJ.

      Robert William Carney for appellants.

      Scott G. Patterson, with whom were William E. Kirk and Townshend & Kirk, P.A. on the brief, for appellees.
   Davidson, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On 20 February 1976, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Durward and Inell Wolfe, appellees, filed a bill of complaint for declaratory and injun< ive relief, alleging that Michael and Bonnie Faber, appellar ;s, were depriving them of the use of a right-of-way across appellants’ property. On 7 December 1977, at the close of a nonjury trial, Judge Raymond G. Thieme, Jr. found as a fact that an easement existed on appellants’ property. At that time, the appellants noted an “exception to that finding specifically... to have the Court sitting in banc ultimately decide the issue.” On 16 December 1977, Judge Thieme filed findings of fact in a decree which ordered appellants to provide a right-of-way for appellees.

On 5 January 1978, appellants filed a written “Bill of Exceptions Reserving Points for Consideration of Court In Banc.” The sole point reserved was “[d]id the Court err in its finding a right-of-way existing in favor of the plaintiffs and the location of said right-of-way.” On 9 January 1978, Judge Thieme approved the bill and ordered it and the papers in the case sent to the Judges of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, sitting in banc. On 12 January 1978, the appellees filed a motion to strike the bill of exceptions on the grounds that: 1) it was not timely entered during the sitting of the court; 2) it did not fully present the law and the facts; and 3) no transcript of the trial was attached.

On 23 January 1978, Judge Bruce C. Williams entered an order striking the appellants’ bill of exceptions. This appeal is from that order.

The appellants contend that their exception was entered of record during the sitting of court as required by Maryland Constitution, article IV, section 22, and was reduced to

writing within the time required by Maryland Rule 510. They conclude, therefore, that their exception was timely filed. In addition, they maintain that their bill of exceptions contained sufficient facts and materials to satisfy the requirements of Maryland Rule 510 § b. We agree.

Maryland Constitution, article IV, section 22, provides:

“Where any Term is held, or trial conducted by less than the whole number of said Circuit Judges, upon the decision or determination of any point, or question, by the Court, it shall be competent to the party, against whom the ruling or decision is made, upon motion, to have the point, or question reserved for the consideration of the three Judges of the Circuit, who shall constitute a court in banc for such purpose; and the motion for such reservation shall be entered of record, during the sitting, at which such decision may be made____” (Emphasis added.)

The term “sitting” has been construed as “the whole time until the Court adjourned for the day,” or “the very day on which the adverse ruling was made.”

Maryland Rule 510 § b provides:

“A point or question reserved for the court in banc shall be taken by means of exceptions, to be reduced to writing, and signed by the judge before whom the action may be tried, and so framed that the point or question may be fully presented as to both law and fact in case the action shall be transmitted to the appropriate appellate court instead of being heard by the court in banc."

4 Poe, Poe's Pleading and Practice, § 839A at 760-62 (6th ed. 1975) interprets these provisions as follows:

“As reference to the Constitution will disclose, the motion for the reservation of the point or question
shall be entered of record during the sitting at which such decision may be made. The ‘sitting’of the court limits the party to the adjournment of the court for the day and is not synonymous with the word ‘term,’ and probably is not inclusive of subsequent days of the trial if the matter should be held pending from one day to the next. Although the motion must be made and entered of record within the time indicated, there is no constitutional requirement that the motion need be in writing. Neither the Constitution nor the applicable rule qualifies the form in which the motion must be made, from which we may assume that the motion may be made orally and in open court during the trial of the case or immediately thereafter. In the alternative, it would seem, the exceptant may make his motion in writing. If the latter course of action is followed, the motion must be filed before the adjournment for the day and copies served upon adverse parties.
“Rule 510 b provides that the point or question reserved for the court in banc ‘shall be taken by means of exceptions, to be reduced to writing, ’ but the rule is silent as to when the exception shall be reduced to writing and it would appear that the court would allow a reasonable time in order to prepare the papers since the exception must be ‘so framed that the point or question may be fully presented as to both law and fact in case the action shall be transmitted to the appropriate appellate court instead of being heard by the court in banc.' Since formal exception to a ruling or order is unnecessary, it would appear that at this point of the proceeding the motion would be sufficient. The view has been expressed that the exception must be made at the time of the adverse ruling upon which the appeal is taken. It seems that this would be contrary to the intent of the rule last cited and would be regressive rather than following the generally progressive trend of practice today. A period of fifteen days would not seem to be unreasonable, especially if the exception must contain a statement of facts in the case. It may not always be necessary to set forth the facts for several reasons. Of these, the first is the fact that an exception and motion for hearing in banc may be upon a ruling of the court as to the pleadings. A second might be that the reservation may be to a point involving a pure question of law after a determination of fact by the finder of facts, that is, either by the court sitting as a jury or on issues framed and propounded to and answered by a jury.
“Bearing in mind that the exceptions shall be so framed that the appellate court or another circuit court sitting in banc may have to pass upon the question, it would not be amiss to include most of the information required by the Court of Appeals in formal briefs when appeals are taken directly to that court. It would seem that the proceedings being less formal than an appeal to the Court of Appeals, even though that court might actually pass upon the question, less formality would be required and the proceeding would be similar to that conducted by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City under section 33 of Article 4 of the Constitution prior to its amendment in 1870. That body heard appeals in banc from the law courts of Baltimore City on a transmittal of the record and without the necessity of a printed brief. It is suggested, therefore, that a reference to the pleadings in question would be sufficient.
“The general outline of the exception should be as follows:
The ruling of the court upon which the exception is made.
A reference to all of the pleadings involved in the ruling and exception.
A brief statement of the case setting forth the questions presented, separately numbered.
The legal propositions involved and the terms and circumstances of the case without unnecessary detail.
A brief statement of the findings of fact, if any have been made, or, in the alternative, a brief statement of facts relied upon by the exceptant (an example would be facts alleged in the plaintiff’s case, showing contributory negligence on his part; or facts in the plaintiff’s case sufficient to take the case to the jury if a motion for a directed verdict has been made and granted at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case).
The argument in brief form to be made at the time of the hearing, which argument should be supported by authorities, although for brevity quotations from the authorities are not generally desirable.
The exception should conclude with, needless to say, the conclusion or end sought to be achieved by the moving party.” (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)

We agree generally with Poe’s construction and interpretation of these provisions.

A motion to reserve a point or question for consideration by a court in banc, if made orally, in open court, before adjournment for the day, is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Maryland Constitution. Written exceptions, if filed within a reasonable time, satisfy the requirements of Maryland Rule 510 § b.

Less formality is required in an in banc proceeding than in an appeal to this Court or the Court of Appeals. An in banc proceeding may properly be heard on a transmittal of the record without a printed brief. Indeed, the written exceptions themselves need not include all of the information or material required in formal appellate court briefs. There is no requirement that a transcript be submitted.

Applying these principles to the instant case produces a clear result. Here the appellants’ exception, noted during trial, constituted an oral motion made in open court during the trial, to preserve a question concerning the trial court’s factual findings for consideration by a court in bane. This motion satisfied the requirement of the Constitution that the reservation of a point or question be entered of record during the sitting at which the trial court’s decision was made. Accordingly, the appellants’ motion was timely filed. Appellants’ written exceptions were filed on 5 January 1978, 20 days after the trial court entered itg decree. The period of 20 days, which elapsed between the entry of the trial court’s decree and the filing of the written exceptions, when compared to the period of 40 days accorded for the filing of appellate briefs, appears to be reasonable. Accordingly, the appellants satisfied the requirements of Maryland Rule 510 § b, and their written exceptions were timely filed.

Finally, the written exceptions contained sufficient information and material, if accompanied by a transmittal of the record including the pleadings and the exhibits, to apprise the court and the adverse party of the ruling of the court upon which the exceptions were made, the pleadings involved, the questions presented, the terms and circumstances of the case, the trial court’s findings of fact, the argument to be made at the time of the hearing, and the relief sought. Since the only questions reserved were questions of fact, and not questions of law, there was no need for legal argument or the citation of legal authority. Thus, even though a transcript was not provided, the information and materials contained in the exceptions, when combined with the materials contained in the transmitted record, were sufficient to permit either a court in bane or an appellate court to consider the question whether the trial court had erred in finding that an easement existed on the appellants’ property. Thus, the appellants again satisfied the requirements of Maryland Rule 510 § b.

Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in striking the appellants’ bill of exceptions reserving points for consideration of the Court in banc. Accordingly, we shall reverse.

Judgment reversed.

Case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Costs to be paid by appellees.

      . Costigin v. Bond, 65 Md. 122, 124, 3 A. 285, 285 (1886).

      . Andresen v. State, 24 Md. App. 128, 206, 331 A. 2d 78, 124, cert. denied, 274 Md. 725 (1975), aff’d, 427 U. S. 463 (1976).

      . Md. Rule 830 § a (1) provides:
      “Within forty days after the filing of the record in this Court, appellant shall file ... a printed brief____”
      Md. Rule 1030 § a (1) provides:
      “Within forty days after the filing of the record in this Court, appellant shall file ... a printed brief____”


author: Couch, J.,

text:
    BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND v. XEROX CORPORATION
    [No. 653,
    September Term, 1978.]

      Decided February 9, 1979.

      The cause was argued before Melvin, Liss and Couch, JJ.

      John A. Austin, Assistant County Solicitor for Baltimore County, with whom was J. Carroll Holzer, County Solicitor, on the brief, for appellant.

      Benjamin R. Goertemiller and Charles C. Shelton, with whom were Semmes, Bowen & Semmes on the brief, for appellee.
   Couch, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In February 1978 appellee, Xerox Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Xerox), filed this action for injunctive and declaratory relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to determine its liability to Baltimore County (hereinafter referred to as the County), appellant, for personal property taxes due on Xerox duplicating machines located in the County for fiscal years 1974 through 1977. The trial judge granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the County from bringing a tax collection suit against Xerox for its 1974 through 1976 taxes prior to final adjudication of the rights of the parties in the declaratory action. Following a hearing on Xerox’s motion for summary judgment on May 31, 1978, the trial judge entered a judgment nisi in favor of Baltimore County in the amount of $256,598.70. After correction of mathematical errors, judgment absolute was entered in the amount of $270,064.82 in favor of the County, with costs assessed against the County.

Some discussion of Xerox’s previous litigation with the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (hereinafter the “Department”), which precipitated the present controversy, is necessary to a full understanding of the present posture of this case. Xerox, having paid the full amount of taxes assessed against it to the Counties and the State for tax years 1970 through 1973, protested the Department’s personal property tax assessment on its duplicating machines for those years. During that time the Department had assessed duplicating machines located with Xerox’s customers throughout the State at sales price, which resulted in a higher assessment than the previous years’ (up to and including 1969) assessment based on Xerox’s manufacturing costs. Xerox’s protest was the subject of proceedings in the Maryland Tax Court, which issued an opinion in favor of Xerox. The Department appealed to the Court of Appeals in State Department of Assessments & Taxation v. Greyhound Computer Corp., 271 Md. 575, 320 A. 2d 40 (1974). The Court of Appeals remanded for further evidence, which was taken by the Tax Court on March 17, 1976. Before a second opinion could be issued by the Tax Court, Xerox and the Department entered into a settlement agreement which acknowledged the Department’s overassessment of Xerox’s duplicating machines throughout the State. Based upon this agreement the Tax Court issued orders for each year in controversy reducing the assessment for Xerox’s machines throughout the State. During the pendency of the former litigation the Department withheld its assessments for tax years 1974 through 1976. As a result, Xerox’s payment of its 1974 through 1976 Baltimore County and State personal property taxes was also suspended. Final assessments for the period 1970 to 1976 were not certified by the Department to Baltimore County until April 18, 1977.

The events which precipitated the present controversy revolve around the Baltimore County tax bills for 1974-1976, amounting to $601,302.07, sent to appellee following the certification. The County gave no indication to Xerox as to how it proposed to handle the refund of excess tax money it had collected from Xerox attributable to the overassessment for the earlier years. On May 20, 1977, Xerox tendered payment of the County’s 1974-1976 tax bills by taking credit for the refund with interest and remitting to the County a check for the amount of tax bills in excess of the refund. The County returned the check and requested that Xerox pay the gross amount. The County advised Xerox that a “formal request” was necessary before it would refund the money on deposit. The County took the position that refunds for prior years could not be offset against valid tax bills for later years and that, upon payment of the full amount due for outstanding bills, the County would review the request for a refund “in accordance with the law”. According to the County, the formal refund procedures of Md. Ann. Code, Art. 81, §§ 213-219 (1975 Repl. Yol.), applied to the refund of excess tax money pursuant to the Tax Court order. Xerox made its request by letter, simply asking that the County make provision to repay Xerox the excess tax money. Xerox also advised the County that the tender remained open and available to the County.

In January, 1978, the County informed Xerox that a delinquent notice would be sent for tax years 1974-1976 and that a collection suit would be brought if not honored. The County subsequently issued a delinquent notice, dated February 1, 1978.

Also in January, 1978, the tax bill for 1977 was sent to Xerox, which promptly tendered payment. The County notified Xerox that it would not accept payment until all open tax matters for previous years were resolved.

Xerox then filed the present action. On its motion for summary judgment the trial court ruled as follows:

i. The final Maryland Tax Court orders of March 7, 1977 were a ‘final determination’ of Xerox’s tax liability and binding on Baltimore County.
ii. Baltimore County was obligated under Article 81, § 261, to return to Xerox excess tax money which Xerox had paid, as determined under the Maryland Tax Court order.
iii. The refund provisions of Art. 81, §§ 213 and 214 do not apply to those excess taxes to be returned to Xerox under § 261.
iv. Xerox could not be liable for interest on taxes until it received a tax bill and was delinquent in payment of the bill.

The County, on appeal, presents the following issues for our consideration:

I. Whether the lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction over a Bill of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief pertaining to property tax refunds and collections in the face of specific statutory language establishing exclusive administrative procedures concerning such refunds?
II. Whether the lower court erred in granting an Interlocutory Injunction" which enjoined the executive branch of government from performing its statutory mandate in connection with tax refunds and collections?
III. Whether the judgment rendered by the lower court was procedurally defective and in error when it failed to include interest on taxes for prior years; whether the lower court’s conduct of the proceedings at the trial level were such as to deny Appellant substantial fairness and procedural due process?

I

A.

The core of this controversy is the County’s contention that Xerox’s only recourse for a refund of tax money, following a final Tax Court order, is through the statutory refund procedures set forth in Art. 81, §§ 213-219, inclusive. According to the County, Xerox’s failure to exhaust these procedures precludes it from invoking the jurisdiction of the circuit court. We disagree with the County’s position. Xerox has received the benefit of a final determination of overassessment by the Maryland Tax Court and, upon that determination, the refund must be paid immediately by the local taxing jurisdiction. Article 81, § 261 provides in pertinent part:

“Upon final determination of any appeal [to the Maryland Tax Court], any money paid [by the taxpayer] in excess of the amount properly chargeable under such determination, shall be refunded with interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from the date of payment to the date of refund...

Ordinarily the word “shall” is mandatory when used in a statute, unless the context in which it is used indicates otherwise, and thus leaves little room for discretion on the part of the County taxing authorities. See Bright v. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund, 275 Md. 165, 169, 338 A. 2d 248 (1974); Ginnavan v. Silverstone, 246 Md. 500, 505, 229 A. 2d 124 (1967).

The County cannot escape the mandate of Art. 81, § 261 by resorting to the argument that the use of the term “refund” in § 261 is made with reference to the refund procedures of § 213 etseq. Under Art. 81, § 229 (i), an order of the Maryland Tax Court is “final and conclusive”.

The Court of Appeals recently examined the effect of a Tax Court order and concluded:

“The Tax Court is an administrative agency performing a quasi judicial function ... under the provisions of Art. 81, §§ 224-231, it functions in many respects as a court ... its ‘order is final and conclusive’. ... Particularly in light of this latter provision, we believe that the decisions of the Tax Court have res judicata effect.”

White v. Prince George’s Co., 282 Md. 641, 658, 387 A. 2d 260 (1978). See generally Woodlawn Ass’n. v. Board, 241 Md. 187, 194-6, 216 A. 2d 149 (1966). Keeping in mind the admonishment that “results that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided whenever possible consistent with the statutory language,” Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 438-39, 374 A. 2d 347 (1977), we do not believe the General Assembly intended appellee to exhaust two separate and distinct administrative procedures to recover the excess personal property tax which the Tax Court has finally determined to be due and owing by each taxing jurisdiction in the State.

Additional support for our resolution of this issue can be found in the language of Art. 81, § 214:

“Whenever any person shall claim to have erroneously or mistakenly paid to the county commissioners of any county, or to the collector of such county ... more money for ordinary county or city taxes than was properly and legally chargeable to or collectible from such person, he may file with the collector in any county ... a written application for the refund thereof, and if approved by such collector•,... the said county commissioners ... shall levy and pay to such person any money that was so paid.” (Emphasis supplied.) Art. 81, § 214 (a).

Section 214 (a) contemplates some discretion in the collector and, as we previously observed, § 261 permits no such exercise of discretion. Were Xerox to pursue this avenue it would be a useless exercise since the final Tax Court orders would have a res judicata effect, White, supra, upon any determination which might be made by the collector. By virtue of the Tax Court orders, Baltimore County is under a present obligation to refund to Xerox all money it has on deposit attributable to the overassessments for 1970-1973.

B.

Appellant contends that the refund provisions of § 213 et seq. are the exclusive procedure for a recovery of a refund pursuant to § 261 and, as a result, the circuit court had no jurisdiction to entertain an action for declaratory relief because this case falls within the proscription of § 3-409 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (1974). Section 3-409 (b) provides that, “If a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy shall be followed in lieu of a proceeding under this subtitle.” Appellee, in the original proceedings against the State Department of Assessments and Taxation, exercised its right to protest the reevaluation of its personal property before the Department (Art. 81, § 29); appealed to the Maryland Tax Court pursuant to § 258; and then, following the previously existing procedure, appealed to the Court of Appeals, who remanded the case to the Tax Court. Upon the entry of the final Tax Court orders, appellee exhausted the “exclusive” statutory remedy available to it, thus the circuit court had jurisdiction over the present action. Cf. Reiling v. Comptroller, 201 Md. 384, 94 A. 2d 261 (1953) (taxpayer failed to pursue statutory remedy).

Appellee’s prayer for a declaration as to the proper construction of Art. 81, § 261 comes well within the ambit of § 3-406 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 3-406 provides:

“Any person ... whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... statute ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it.”

Moreover, a refund proceeding would simply not be appropriate in this case. The jurisdiction of the tax agencies is limited to assessment, valuation, and classification of real and personal property for tax purposes. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Washington National Arena, 282 Md. 588, 597, 386 A. 2d 1216 (1977). The statutory interpretation of Art. 81, § 261 is a proper subject for judicial construction in a declaratory relief action. Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 3-406. It is not a matter which falls within the purview of a refund proceeding under Art. 81, § 213 et seq.

C.

Appellant offers another jurisdictional attack upon the judgment entered below. According to the County the filing of the appeal from the grant of the interlocutory injunction divested the lower court of jurisdiction. We see no merit in this contention. As a general matter the filing of a notice of appeal in a case deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed further. However, there is a well established exception which permits the trial court to proceed with any other matter or issue when the appeal is taken from an interlocutory injunction. Mangum v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 273 Md. 176, 179-80, 328 A. 2d 283 (1974); Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md. App. 543, 549-51, 280 A. 2d 277, aff’d. 265 Md. 129, 287 A. 2d 770 (1972) (per curiam). The trial court in this case retained jurisdiction to proceed with the case while the appeal on the interlocutory injunction was pending.

II.

During the course of the proceedings below, the trial court granted an interlocutory injunction preventing the County from filing a tax collection suit against Xerox until the lower court could hear the bill for declaratory judgment and render a judicial determination of the rights of the parties. On March 7, 1978, Baltimore County appealed the grant of the interlocutory injunction to this Court in Baltimore County, Maryland v. Xerox, C.S.A., No. 238 (September Term, 1978). The trial court rendered a judgment nisi on May 31, 1978 which by its terms dissolved the interlocutory injunction. Of our own motion we dismissed Appeal No. 238 as moot on July 31, 1978, and have been given no reason by appellant to reconsider that dismissal now.

III.

A

Appellant claims that the “summary fashion in which the lower court conducted the hearings held in connection with these proceedings constituted a pervasive denial of procedural due process to the appellant.” Generally, due process requires that a party to a proceeding is entitled to both notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issues to be decided in a case. See Blue Cross of Md., Inc. v. Franklin Square Hospital, 277 Md. 93, 101, 352 A. 2d 798 (1976) and cases cited therein.

We have no difficulty deciding that the County was afforded due process in the proceedings below. Appellant’s grievance focuses upon appellee’s motion for summary judgment and amended bill of complaint, both of which were filed on May 1, 1978. The bill of complaint was amended to conform with the posture of the case after the agreement between Xerox and the Comptroller’s office was finalized, settling the State’s portion of the 1974-1977 taxes owed by Xerox. According to the appellant, the time had not yet expired for filing its answers to the amended bill of complaint and the motion for summary judgment when the trial judge, on May 23, 1978, scheduled the hearing on the motion for summary judgment for May 31, 1978.

On May 24,1978, the appellant moved for a continuance on the grounds set out above. The motion was properly denied by the trial judge. Under the Maryland Rules of Procedure, appellant was permitted fifteen days within which to file its response to the amended bill of complaint. Md. R. 320, § d 7. Since service was accomplished by mail within the same county, Md. R. 306, § c 3, the time for filing an answer to the amended bill of complaint, Md. R. 320, § d 6, or a motion to strike, Md. R. 320, § d 5, had passed when appellant filed its motion for a continuance. A motion for continuance on an amended bill of complaint should not be granted “unless the court is satisfied that the ends of justice so require.” Md. R. 320, § e 1.

We find no denial of due process on the part of the trial judge in refusing to grant the motion for a continuance, particularly in light of Md. R. 320, § d 8 (b):

“If an original party who has responded shall fail to file an additional response [to the amended bill of complaint] within the time allowed, the case shall proceed and the response previously filed shall be deemed to be a response to the amended pleading.”

The County may not now complain of a denial of due process when its own lack of attention to the time requirements of the Rules of Procedure prevented it from responding to the amended bill of complaint.

Appellant’s claim that the time had not yet expired for the filing of its answer to the motion for summary judgment is equally ill-fated. Preliminarily, we observe that appellant filed its answer to the original bill of complaint on March 7, 1978 and thus Rule 610, § c 2, governing the time of hearing of the motion for summary judgment, applies. The rule provides, in pertinent part:

“Where a motion is filed after the adverse party has filed his initial pleading to such claim, the motion, upon not less than ten days' notice by either party, may be heard at any time.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The appellee’s motion for summary judgment, in compliance with the rule, was accompanied by a notice to appellant that the motion may be heard by the court at any time after May 12,1978. We conclude that appellant was afforded, within the confines of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, notice and an opportunity to be heard. Blue Cross of Md. v. Franklin Square Hospital, Inc., supra,

Appellant also raises procedural defects with reference to the issuance of the interlocutory injunction. As stated previously, the issue is moot and we will not discuss it.

Appellant contends further that the assessment of the costs of the proceeding against it was contrary to Rule 604 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure. Rule 604 a states:

“Unless otherwise provided by law, or ordered by the court, the prevailing party shall be entitled to the allowance of court costs, which shall be taxed by the clerk and embraced in the judgment.. ..”

Although a prevailing party is generally entitled to the allowance of court costs, Urquhart v. Alexander, 218 Md. 405, 147 A. 2d 213 (1958), the court may properly order the prevailing party to pay the costs under Rule 604 a. See Hoffman v. Glock, 20 Md. App. 284, 293, 315 A. 2d 551 (1974). The allowance of costs is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion has been abused. Sinclair Estates v. Guthrie, 223 Md. 572, 575, 165 A. 2d 775 (1960) (per curiam); 20 Md. App. at 293. Our review of the record persuades us that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The entry of the monetary judgment in favor of the County belies the fact that Xerox was successful on the merits. Judgment was entered upon the grant of Xerox’s motion for summary judgment. We believe Rule 604 a permits the trial judge to take into account the actual circumstances under which judgment is entered in assessing costs against a party.

B

The trial court ruled that Xerox could not be liable for interest on unpaid personal property taxes for tax years 1974 through 1976 until it received a tax bill and was delinquent in payment of the bill. Appellant questions both the amount of interest which should be included in its refund to Xerox and the trial court’s ruling that Xerox owed no interest on its 1974-76 personal property taxes. Since we are in agreement with the trial court that Art. 81, § 261 requires an automatic refund of the excess tax money to Xerox, the trial court was correct in taking into account six per cent interest on the amount of the refund in accordance with the terms of § 261 in arriving at the sum which constituted its final judgment.

Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in not allowing it interest on back taxes is similarly unavailing. Article 81, § 48 (c) is clear on the subject of when interest begins to accrue on unpaid personal property taxes:

“On the day taxes are due, liability for taxes and a first lien for their payment attach to the property. No interest or penalties may be charged or collected on any taxes covered by this section until at least thirty days after the bill for the taxes has been mailed to the taxpayer’s address----” (Emphasis supplied.)

While a taxpayer’s obligation to pay his taxes is not suspended or postponed because of the pendency of a protest or an appeal, the personal property must be legally assessed and the tax legally billed before that obligation attaches. See Brown v. Montgomery Co., 30 Md. App. 107, 112-13, 351 A. 2d 156 (1976), cert. den., 277 Md. 735 (1976).

The Baltimore County tax bills for tax years 1974-76 were mailed to Xerox on or about May 6, 1977. The appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling centers upon interest allegedly accumulated before that date. It is evident that Art. 81, § 48 (c) is controlling and that Xerox, therefore, incurred no liability for interest on back taxes since no interest was chargeable before the tax bills were mailed.

Appellant’s final claim is that the lower court denied it substantive due process by preventing it from litigating the underlying basis for the Department’s revised assessments upon which the final Tax Court orders were based. Appellant states that without litigating this issue it could not determine the amount of interest allegedly due on Xerox’s unpaid 1974-76 taxes.

The final Tax Court orders are res judicata upon appellant and, as a result, it may not relitigate the underlying basis of the orders. White v. Prince George’s Co., supra. More importantly, the General Assembly has placed within the exclusive province of the Department the assessment of tangible personal property belonging to a corporation for both State and local taxing purposes. Art. 81, § 13 (b) (5). Appellant was not denied substantive due process by the trial court.

Judgment affirmed.

Costs to be paid by appellant.

      . The question of Xerox’s liability as to the State’s portion of the taxes, due through the County as the collection agent for the State, was resolved by a separate agreement between the State and Xerox.

      . All references are to fiscal years.

      . The County appealed the interlocutory injunction to this Court in Baltimore County, Md. v. Xerox Corp., C.S.A., No. 238, Sept. Term, 1978. While the appeal was pending, the lower court rendered a final determination of the rights of the parties, which caused the interlocutory injunction to dissolve by its own terms. We dismissed the appeal as moot on July 31,1978.

      . Art. 81, § 13 (b) (5) of the Maryland Code provides that tangible personal property of a corporation shall be valued and assessed for purposes of State and County taxation by the State Department of Assessments and Taxation.

      . This appeal was taken pursuant to the procedures existing prior to the Court of Appeals decision in Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 343 A. 2d 521 (1975).

      . Four orders were issued covering fiscal years 1970-71,1971-72,1972-73, 1973-74.

      . An affidavit submitted by Xerox informs us that all other counties in the State resolved the refund after the Department’s final assessment by either (1) sending Xerox a check for excess taxes Xerox had paid, and Xerox’s sending a check to the County or Baltimore City for taxes owed, or (2) retaining excess tax money belonging to Xerox as a partial payment of current taxes and Xerox submitting a check for the balance.

      . Art. 81, § 261, governing refunds after entry of a Tax Court order, allows 6% interest to be collected on refunds.

      . We have consolidated appellant’s last two issues into one.

      . The order becomes final thirty days after its entry provided no appeal to the circuit court is taken by either party. Md. R. B4.

      . See n. 5, infra.

      . A second hearing was held to correct a mathematical error which had no substantive effect on the judgment nisi. Judgment absolute was entered on June 23, 1978.

      . Under Art. 81, § 51, the county is responsible for the collection of both State and county taxes. The County’s refusal to accept tender of payment Íirevented the State from collecting the taxes due on duplicating machines ocated in the County. The agreement effectively removed the State from the present controversy.

      . Appellant has not challenged the constitutionality of the time requirements of the Rules of Procedure.

      . The delay in sending out the bills was attributable to the Department’s suspension of its assessment of Xerox’s duplicating machines during the course of its litigation with Xerox. Baltimore County could have availed itself of the procedure set forth in Art. 81, § 49B, by which it is authorized to send a taxpayer an estimated bill based upon the previous year’s assessment.

      . The revised assessments were contained in the first agreement between Xerox and the State, upon which the final Tax Court orders were based.


author: MacD aniel, J.,

text:
    FRANCIS H. GOSMAN, t/a Dawnrose Dipper v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND
    [No. 657,
    September Term, 1978.]

      Decided February 9, 1979.

      The cause was argued before Thompson, Moore and MacD aniel, JJ.

      Phillip R. Zuber, with whom were Richard I. Kovelant and Goldman, Nichols, Kovelant, Pendersen &Hurtton the brief, for appellant.

      Alan E. D’Appolito, Associate County Attorney for Prince George’s County, with whom were James C. Chapin, County Attorney, and Michael O. Connaughton, Deputy County Attorney, on the brief, for appellee.
   MacD aniel, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1977 the appellee, Prince George’s County, brought a Petition for Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to enforce an order of the Zoning Inspection Division of the Prince George’s County Department of Licenses and Permits against the appellant, Francis H. Gosman, t/a Dawnrose Dipper. The order required the appellant to remove a sign allegedly in violation of the Prince George’s County zoning ordinance. This appeal is from the circuit court’s decision dated June 15, 1978, to enforce that order.

The pertinent provisions of the Prince George’s County Code are as follows:

“SEC. 27-101. DEFINITIONS.
(134) Sign, Outdoor Advertising: Sign including billboard which directs attention to a business, commodity, service, entertainment, or other activity conducted, sold, or offered elsewhere than on the premises upon which the sign is located____”
“SEC. 27-427. PURPOSE OF DIVISION.
For the purpose of promoting the health, safety, and general welfare; conserving the natural, landscaped, and improved scenery; encouraging and protecting the appropriate uses of land, buildings, and structures; regulating and restricting unsightly and detrimental signs tending to depreciate the values of property and hindering progressive improvements in the Regional District; and for the purpose of lessening, eliminating, and regulating signs constituting an actual or potential hazard to safe motor vehicle operation and general traffic on the highways____”
“SEC. 27-455. BUSINESS SIGNS, FREESTANDING.
... free-standing business signs are allowable under the following conditions and restrictions:
(2) In any Commercial Zone other than the C-0 Zone and in any Industrial Zone, a free-standing or ground-supported sign identifying an integrated shopping center or integrated industrial center may be erected, subject to the following conditions and requirements:
(a) Total Street Frontage on Number of Signs
All Streets of Center Permitted
0 to less than 100 feet......None
100 to 1,100 feet........... One
Each additional 1,000 feet or fraction thereof........One
(C) An individual business, not located in an integrated shopping or industrial center but located in any of the Zones specified in Subsection (2), may erect a free-standing or ground-supported sign, subject to the requirements of Subsection (2) applied on an individual basis; except that the minimum frontage for one (1) sign shall be forty (40) feet; and provided further that the main building on such premises is set back a minimum of forty (40) feet from the front property line and that the area of such sign shall not exceed one (1) square foot for each four (4) lineal feet of street frontage.”
“SEC. 27-459. AMORTIZATION OF NONCONFORMING SIGNS.
(b) Any sign or other advertising structure or device in existence on the effective date of this Section which: (1) violates or does not conform to the provisions of Division 32 of this Subtitle but (2) was constructed, erected, or maintained in accordance with the requirements of previously existing ordinances, shall be regarded as a nonconforming sign which may be continued for a period to be determined by the table as provided in this Code and if in conformance with other ordinances of the County. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 27-101, 27-482 ancT 27-553 relating to nonconforming uses, and in order to provide for a reasonable standard of amortization and to prevent an unreasonable loss, all nonconforming signs other than outdoor advertising signs as defined in Section 27-101 shall be removed in accordance with the table below. The provisions of Sections 27-101, 27-482 and 27-553 shall apply to outdoor advertising signs. Nonconforming signs which are structurally altered (excluding a change in the message or lettering), relocated, or replaced shall comply immediately with all provisions of this Ordinance and shall not be permitted to be amortized.

Original Cost of Sign Continuance Period

$1 —$300 ........ .......6 months

$301 —$1,000 ____ .........1 year

$1,001 — $3,000 . . . ......... 2 years

$3,001 — $5,000 . . . ......... 3 years

$5,001 — $10,000 . . ......... 4 years

Original Cost of Sign Continuance Period

$10,001 — $15,000 . . . . 5 years

$15,001 — $20,000 . . . . 6 years

Over $20,000 ........ 7 years”

(Emphasis added.)

Under Sections 27-482 and 27-553, “outdoor advertising signs” may remain as prior nonconforming uses.

The appellant’s property is located on Baltimore Avenue (Route 1) in Beltsville and is zoned C-2 (general commercial, existing), with 256 feet of street frontage. There are two free-standing signs on the property. One is 40 square feet in area and is not in issue in this case. The other sign, which is the subject of this dispute, is 128 square feet in area, and it stands 20 feet high. The top of the sign indicates “Dawnrose Dipper” and the bottom of the sign states “LIQUOR BEER ON-OFF.” The major portion of the sign prominently advertises the Maryland State Lottery. The sign has been on the property since 1941.

In the court below, the appellant conceded that the sign in dispute does not conform to the present zoning requirements. He feels, however, that the lower court erred in ordering that the sign be removed.

The appellant argues, first, that the sign in question is an “outdoor advertising sign” as defined in the County Code and, hence, that it is not subject to amortized removal. We disagree and completely concur with the following analysis of the lower court judge:

“Defendant contends that his billboard is an ‘outdoor advertising sign’ as defined in the ordinance because the billboard advertises the Maryland Lottery Numbers Game, which is sold and offered elsewhere than on the premises. While the fact is certainly true, we do not agree with defendant’s view. The definition of ‘outdoor advertising sign’, reads [sic] as a whole, does not mean that any part of the sign that refers to a business, commodity, service, etc. offered elsewhere than on the premises will bring that sign within the scope of the definition. Rather, the definition, read as a whole, is clearly to be interpreted as referring to the general character of the entire sign, not merely any one of its component parts. The corollary to exempting ‘outdoor advertising signs’ from the operation of Sec. 27-459(b) is obviously to disallow signs or billboards advertising a business, commodity, service, etc. conducted, sold or offered on the premises upon which the sign is located. The clear intention of the billboard in question is not to send people elsewhere to play the Maryland Lottery, but instead, to draw people into the establishment being advertised, i.e. Dawnrose Dipper. Note further the other wording upon the sign, i.e. ‘Dawnrose’ and ‘Liquor-Beer, On-Off’. It is quite clear, therefore, that viewing the billboard in its totality, it is not an ‘outdoor advertising sign’ within the meaning of the ordinance, but a sign intended to attract people in the establishment on which location it is situated. Thus, the billboard is not exempted from the operation of Sec. 27-459(b), and it must comply with its requirements.”

I

II

The appellant argues, next, that the difference of treatment in Section 27-459 between nonconforming signs advertising the business on the premises and nonconforming “outdoor advertising signs” is arbitrary and capricious and is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We disagree.

For a zoning ordinance to be upheld, it must be a valid exercise of the “police power.” In Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 564, 214 A. 2d 775, 779 (1965), the Court of Appeals said:

“For present purposes, the following observations with reference to the police power will suffice. Such power is broad in scope; it is an inherent attribute and prerogative of sovereignty, and has been described as essentially ‘no more than the power to govern.’ Allied Amer. Co. v. Comm’r, 219 Md. 607. It has long been recognized in this State, as established by a long line of decisions of this Court, that the Legislature has an inherent right to prescribe, within constitutional limitations, reasonable regulations, which are necessary to protect the public health, comfort, order, safety, convenience, morals and general welfare. And this right may be delegated to the municipalities of the State.”

In City of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, 268 Md. 79, 86, 299 A. 2d 828, 832 (1973), the Court held that a zoning ordinance may not have “as its sole purpose the achievement of an aesthetically pleasing result.” However,

“ ... aesthetic goals may legitimately serve as an additional legislative purpose, if health, morals or safety or other ends generally associated with the concept of public welfare are being served ....” (Citations omitted.) 268 Md. at 87, 299 A. 2d at 832.

Legitimate zoning ordinance objectives include:

“... the elimination of signs or pennants which distracted motorists, Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969) or the promotion of highway safety, Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 567-68, 214 A. 2d 775 (1965); see E. B. Elliott Adv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F. 2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. dismissed, 400 U. S. 805, 27 L.Ed.2d 35, 91 S. Ct. 12; Village of Larchmont v. Sutton, 30 Misc. 2d 245, 217 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1961); approved and followed in, Village of Larchmont v. Levine, 225 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1961).” 268 Md. at 87, 299 A. 2d at 832-33.

As the appellant concedes, numerous Maryland cases have made it clear that ,signs may be separately classified as “outdoor advertising signs,” on the one hand, and, on the other hand, signs advertising the business on the premises. See Donnelly Adv. Corp. v. City of Balto., 279 Md. 660, 370 A. 2d 1127 (1977); Grant v. City of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A. 2d 363 (1957). See also Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 69 S. Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 533 (1949); 2 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 15.83 at 764-65 (1976). In addition, the cases have held that:

“Because neither fundamental rights nor suspect classifications are involved, only a rational relationship [of the classification] to a permissible state objective need be shown. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976); Governor of the State of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 372 A. 2d 237 (1977).” Donnelly Adv. Corp., supra, at 669 [1132-33].

The appellant argues, however, that there is no rational relationship between the separate classifications in this case and a permissible objective under the “police power.” We disagree.

We find, first, that there is a permissible objective for the regulation of free-standing signs which is, as suggested in the “preamble,” Sec. 27-427, the elimination of distractions to motorists and the promotion of highway safety.

We hold, further, that the requirement of a rational relation between the separate classification of signs and the above objective has been satisfied. We feel that the Prince George’s County Council may well have concluded that the “outdoor advertising signs” do not present the same traffic and other problems as on-premises signs. We adopt the language of Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. at 110, 69 S. Ct. at 465-66, 93 L. Ed. at 539, which is dispositive of this case:

“We cannot say that that judgment is not an allowable one. Yet if it is, the classification has relation to the purpose for which it is made and does not contain the kind of discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection. It is by such practical considerations based on experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of equal protection is to be answered. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 US 138, 144, 58 L ed 539, 543, 34 S Ct 281; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 US 170, 198, 199, 65 L ed 877, 888, 41 S Ct 465; Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 US 580, 585, 586, 79 L ed 1070, 1073, 55 S Ct 538.”

While it is possible that “outdoor advertising signs” also present highway safety problems, legislated remedies are not required to be all-embracing:

“It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.” 336 U. S. at 110, 69 S. Ct. at 466, 93 L. Ed. at 539.

In Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 160, 33 S. Ct. 66, 57 L. Ed. 164, 169 (1912), the Supreme Court said that a legislative body

“ ... may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 US 61, 81, 55 L ed 369, 378, 31 Sup Ct Rep 337, Ann Cas 1912C, 160; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 US 205, 32 L ed 107, 8 S Ct Rep 1161.”

In conclusion, the appellant has conceded that the separate classification of “outdoor advertising signs,” on the one hand, and, on the other hand, on-premises advertising signs is not, per se, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the case law indicates, a legislative body may validly regulate a class of signs causing a particular problem without regulating all other classes of signs which may also cause problems. Such legislation enjoys a presumption of validity, City of Balto. v. Charles Center Parking, 259 Md. 595, 598, 271 A. 2d 144, 145 (1970), and cases cited therein. The appellant, to prevail against this presumption, must have produced evidence that the legislative distinction had no valid basis in fact. Because the appellant failed to produce any such evidence, we hold that the circuit court acted properly in enforcing the administrative order requiring the appellant to remove the offending advertising sign.

Judgment affirmed.

Costs to be paid by appellant.

      . Outdoor advertising signs may remain as prior nonconforming uses while signs advertising the business on the premises must be made to conform to the zoning requirements of Sec. 27-455 within the period indicated in the amortization table in Sec. 27-459.

      . U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part:
      “... nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

      . This ease was cited with approval in Donnelly Adv. Corp. v. City of Balto., supra, at 669.


author: Liss, J.,

text:
    GEORGE ROSCOE SUMMERS v. STATE OF MARYLAND
    [No. 682,
    September Term, 1978.]

      Decided February 9, 1979.

    The cause was submitted on briefs to Thompson, Liss and WlLNER, JJ.
    Submitted by Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, and Arthur A. DeLano, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Submitted by Francis Bill Burch, Attorney General, Stephen Rosenbaum, Assistant Attorney General, Robert S. Rothenhoefer, State’s Attorney for Frederick County, and Mary Ann Stepler, Assistant State’s Attorney for Frederick County, for appellee.
   Liss, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On April 7, 1978, George Roscoe Summers, the appellant, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Frederick County (Barrick, J.), of larceny and a pre-sentence investigation report was requested by the appellant. On May 8, 1978, the appellant was committed to the custody of the Division of Correction by the Circuit Court for Frederick County (Clapp, J.), for a period of five years for the larceny. On appeal the appellant contends that:

1. his five year sentence was imposed in violation of Maryland Rule 772.
2. the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for grand larceny.

The record before us shows that at about 2:00 P.M., on January 25, 1978, Mary A. Hoffman hired the appellant to clean the snow from a walk in front of her home on West Third Street in Frederick. After the appellant finished cleaning the walk, Mrs. Hoffman invited him into her home to warm himself. While inside she showed him a jewelry box and he handled several of the items in it. After the appellant left, Mrs. Hoffman checked the jewel box. She found three rings and a watch were missing.

Mrs. Hoffman called the police. In the meanwhile the appellant came into the Olde Town Tavern where he sold or gave away various items of jewelry. He then returned to the Hoffman residence. Upon arrival he was arrested by the police officers investigating the theft. The police then proceeded to the tavern where they recovered the jewelry disbursed by the appellant and which Mrs. Hoffman subsequently identified as coming from the jewel box. Testifying on his own behalf, the appellant denied being involved in any wrongdoing and claimed he had found the jewelry in a purse in the snow five feet from Mrs. Hoffman’s house.

On May 8, 1978, Judge Clapp commenced the sentencing proceedings by announcing that Judge Barrick “had to be away today”. He then stated that he had reviewed the pre-sentence report and was prepared to entertain argument for sentencing. Without entering any objection or making any inquiry as to the cause for Judge Barrick’s absence, the appellant’s trial counsel proceeded with his argument. The State submitted on the pre-sentence report. The court then invited the appellant to present allocution. The appellant addressed the court and asked to be placed on probation. At the completion of the hearing, Judge Clapp sentenced the appellant to five years imprisonment.

Maryland Rule 772 a, adopted July 1, 1977, provides:

“Except as provided by Rule 750 (Disability of Judge),the judge who presides at trial shall sentence the defendant However, in a case where a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and no trial has commenced, any judge may sentence the defendant unless incident to accepting a directing entry of such plea, the judge has received any matter, other than a statement of the mere facts of the offense, which would be relevant to the determination of the proper sentence to be imposed. In such a case, except as provided in Rule 750, that judge shall sentence the defendant. The sentence shall be imposed without reasonable delay.” (emphasis supplied)

Maryland Rule 750 b provides:

“If, by reason of termination of office, death, sickness or other disability, the judge before whom a defendant has been tried or by whom a plea of guilty or nolo contendere has been accepted is unable to perform the functions of the court after verdict or after acceptance of a plea, any other judge who is a member of the court or assigned thereto may sentence the defendant and perform those functions.”

The appellant first contends that Maryland Rules 750 and 772 mandate that the sentence must be imposed by the trial judge who heard the case unless that judge cannot pass sentence because “of termination of office, death, sickness or other disability”. In this case the only reason given why Judge Barrick was unavailable was Judge Clapp’s statement that Judge Barrick “had to be away.” The appellant concedes that no objection was noted to proceeding with the sentencing before Judge Clapp but argues that his failure to object did not act as a waiver of the right.

As we read Maryland Rule 772 a, it is mandatory in that it requires that the judge who presides at trial shall impose sentence unless excused by the provisions of Rule 750. The statement that Judge Barrick “had to be away” on the day of sentencing does not, we think, amount to such “other disability” as would excuse the trial judge from his obligation to impose sentence. We believe that the Court of Appeals when it adopted Maryland Rule 772 a recognized that the judge who presides at the trial of a criminal case has the unique opportunity to form conclusions as to the severity of the crime, the veracity of the witnesses, the demeanor of the defendant and the truthfulness of the defendant where he chooses to testify, all of which are important to the imposition of a just sentence. The usefulness of those incidents of trial ought not to be sacrificed unless required by the exigencies of Rule 750. We feel that the failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Rule 772 a amounted to plain error material to the rights of the appellant.

The appellant secondly complains that the evidence was insufficient because Mrs. Hoffman did not see him actually remove the rings and watch from her jewelry box. In finding the appellant guilty the court said:

“... the evidence in this case clearly shows that the jewelry ended up with Mr. Summers. Now, the only thing for the Court to decide, really, is whether or not he found the jewelry as he testified, or whether it was taken from the jewelry box as was indicated from the other evidence. Quite frankly, I don't believe his story at all, as far as finding this jewelry, and therefore the evidence I think proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he did actually steal the jewelry from Mrs. Hoffman,....”

In Anderson v. State, 9 Md. App. 532, 541 (1970), we said:

“His conviction was proper under the rule that one in exclusive possession of recently stolen goods, in the absence of reasonable explanation can be found to be the burglar, the thief, or if others are shown to be involved, the receiver.”

In the instant case the appellant was in the Hoffman home looking at and touching Mrs. Hoffman’s jewelry. Shortly after he left, she discovered the jewelry missing. Half an hour later the appellant was trying to sell or give away this jewelry. We believe these facts established sufficient proof to warrant the presumption, arising from the appellant’s possession of the stolen jewelry, that he was guilty of the larceny.

Conviction affirmed but sentence vacated and case remanded for imposition of sentence in conformity with this opinion.

Costs to be paid by Frederick County.

      1. The factual situation in this case is to be distinguished from the provisions of Art. 27, Sec. 642 which provides:
      Whenever any person is convicted of any offense in any of the courts of record of this State, having criminal jurisdiction, and the judge presiding does not impose sentence or suspends sentence generally or for a definite time places the offender upon probation, or makes another order and imposes other terms as she or he may deem proper, and that person at any time thereafter is brought before the court to be sentenced upon the original charge of his conviction, or for a violation of the terms and conditions of the order of probation in the case, the judge who then is presiding in that particular court may proceed to sentence the person to serve the period of imprisonment prescribed in the original sentence or any portion thereof, or if no sentence was imposed, any sentence provided for by law for the crime for which that person was originally convicted. (An. Code, 1951, § 727; 1939, § 681; 1927 ch. 398; 1978, ch. 626).
      For cases applying this section see Costello v. State, 240 Md. 164, 213 A. 2d 739 (1965); State v. Fisher, 204 Md. 307; 104 A. 2d 403 (1954); Rake v. State, 175 Md. 691, 2 A. 2d 26 (1939); Jordan v. State, 5 Md. App. 520; 248 A. 2d 410 (1968); Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 255 A. 2d 441 (1969).

      . Although in this case we recognize plain error, it is normally necessary for an appellant to enter an objection at trial to preserve an issue for appeal. Maryland Rule 1085.


text:
    JOSEPH D. STEPHANS et ux. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CARROLL COUNTY, MARYLAND MAURICE B. RIDENOUR et al. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CARROLL COUNTY, MARYLAND AMERICAN STORES COMPANY v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CARROLL COUNTY, MARYLAND
    [No. 692,
    [No. 694,
    [No. 695,
    September Term, 1978.]
    September Term, 1978.]
    September Term, 1978.]

      Decided February 9, 1979.

      The cause was argued before Thompson, Mason and Couch, JJ.

      Charles M. Preston, with whom were Hoffman, Stoner & Preston on the brief, for appellants Stephans and Ridenour. G. Warren Mix on the brief for appellant Stephans. Rob Ross Hendrickson, with whom was J. Cookman Boyd, Jr., on the brief, for appellant American Stores Company.

      John C. Murphy for appellee.
   Couch, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

With this appeal we are, for the first time, called upon to determine what the Legislature intended when, in 1975, it repealed and reenacted, with amendments, Article 66B, § 4.08 (a) of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Prior to 1975 it was provided that in zoning and planning matters, appeals could be taken from any decision of the board of appeals or a reclassification of zoning by the local legislative body. By the 1975 legislative action, “reclassification of zoning” was deleted and “zoning action” was inserted in its place. Therein lies the genesis of this appeal. Appellants argue that the Circuit Court for Carroll County was in error in concluding that they had no right to appeal from the action of the County Commissioners of Carroll County approving and adopting a Comprehensive Mini Plan and a Zoning Ordinance Text Amendment. The trial court’s ruling was based upon its determination that the actions of the County Commissioners were not “zoning actions”. We agree in part with appellants and shall reverse. Our reasons follow.

The record demonstrates that in 1965 the County Commissioners of Carroll County adopted a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance pursuant to the authority granted it in Article 66B, Annotated Code of Maryland (1957), following a comprehensive study of present conditions and the expected growth of the county, and the adoption of a Master Plan for the county. By this Ordinance the unincorporated area of the county was divided into districts, set out specifically therein and depicted on the zoning maps of the county.

In 1977 the County Commissioners received a Comprehensive “Mini” Plan for the Freedom Area and Environs from the Carroll County Planning and Zoning Commission. Following a study of the plan, and after a public hearing thereon, the County Commissioners adopted the plan with modifications. The Commissioners also adopted a Text Amendment to the Zoning Ordinance whereby a new district, “R-40,000”, was created. The stated purpose of this district was

“to provide a location for single family residential development, the individual lots of which contain a minimum of 40,000 square feet____The district would generally coincide with areas designated for low density residential development on the County Master Plan.”

The County Commissioners also adopted, along with the above, Rezoning Ordinance No. MA-76 which caused certain zoning maps to be amended to implement the adopted “Mini” Plan. Thereafter appellants, who are alleged to be property owners in the Freedom District and environs, timely noted an appeal to the Circuit Court for Carroll County, followed by their respective petitions pursuant to Md. Rule B2 e.

Appellee, the Board of County Commissioners, demurred to the petitions stating several grounds therefor, including an allegation that there is no basis for appeal as an appeal is not authorized by § 4.08 of Art. 66B. Following a hearing on the demurrers, the trial court held the matter sub curia and subsequently rendered a “Memorandum Order” sustaining the demurrers as to the first two actions of the County Commissioners in adopting the “Mini Plan” and the Text Amendment. A demurrer to the third action, map amendment ordinance, which was challenged by appellants below, was sustained with leave to amend and is not before us because the trial court granted a motion for entry of final judgment upon less than all claims presented and an express determination that there was no just reason for delay. Judgment was thereafter duly entered. See Md. R. 605 a. With respect to the appeal from the action of the County Commissioners in adopting the “Mini Plan”, the trial court sustained the demurrers because it concluded such action was not a “zoning action” and therefore no appeal would lie. So far as the appeal on the adoption of a Text Amendment to the County Zoning Ordinance is concerned, the trial court found that this was not appealable as well, stating:

“The Text Amendment T-41 does not change a zoning classification but rather adds an additional residential district to the text of Zoning Ordinance IE.”

Again, the trial court’s decision appears to be based on its conclusion that such action was not a zoning action.

The Motion to Dismiss

Before considering the merits of this appeal, we are compelled, by reason of appellee’s motion to dismiss, to decide whether appellants had standing to participate in the proceedings below and thus have standing to maintain this appeal. Appellee argues that appellants have not shown they are aggrieved, or are taxpayers, and that even if it can be assumed they are taxpayers from their allegations of property ownership, there is no allegation that they will be affected by the adoption of the R-40,000 zoning district.

In Clise v. Phillips Coal Co., 40 Md. App. 609, 392 A. 2d 1177 (1978), we said:

“A party has standing if he is aggrieved ... or if he is a taxpayer. Section 4.08 (a) apparently does not require that a taxpayer be aggrieved in order to maintain an appeal.” 392 A. 2d at 1179-80.

We do not retreat from that holding. See also Improvement Ass’n. v. Raine, 220 Md. 213, 151 A. 2d 734 (1959); Windsor Hills Imp. Ass’n. v. Balto., 195 Md. 383, 73 A. 2d 531 (1950); Largo Civic Ass’n. v. Prince George’s County, 21 Md. App. 76, 80, 318 A. 2d 834 (1974).

The respective appellants have alleged in their petitions that they are property owners and appellee has not refuted these statements. We can only infer that appellants, being property owners, are also taxpayers. See generally, Md. Code (1957), Art. 81, § 8 et seq. The motion to dismiss is denied.

Appealability

In sum the trial court held, and appellee argues here, that the action of the County Commissioners in (1) adopting the Comprehensive Mini Plan, and (2) implementing that plan by the passage of a “Text Amendment” ordinance, did not constitute either a decision of the board of appeals or a zoning action by the local legislative body and, therefore, under Art. 66B, § 4.08 (a), no appeal is allowed. Obviously then, since it is undisputed that there was no board of appeals involvement in the present case, the issue comes down to what is a “zoning action” by the local legislative body.

Because the Legislature did not define “zoning action” when it substituted that phrase for “reclassification” in 1975, we must rely on the ordinary rules of statutory construction to determine what was intended. It has been said consistently for many years that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent and, in ascertaining that intent, courts consider the language of the enactment in its natural and ordinary signification. A corollary to this rule is that if there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. See generally, Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 3961 A. 2d 255 (1979); Harden v. Mass Transit Administration, 277 Md. 399, 354 A. 2d 817 (1976); Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 341 A. 2d 789 (1975), cert. den., 423 U. S. 1076; Maryland-Nat. Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Mayor and Council of Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 325 A. 2d 748 (1974); Central Credit Union v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 243 Md. 175, 220 A. 2d 568 (1966). We follow that well-settled rule.

In Applestein v. Baltimore, 156 Md. 40, 143 A. 666 (1928), Judge Offutt, speaking for the Court of Appeals, stated:

“The term ‘zoning’ has come to have a technical and artificial meaning, which is different from its literary and etymological significance. And while in its literary sense it signifies a belt or girdle more or less symmetrical in outline, it is also used to describe the process of setting aside disconnected tracts of land varying in shape and dimensions, and dedicating them to particular uses designed in some degree to serve the interests of the whole territory affected by the plan.” Id. at 51.

The Court of Appeals in Huff v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 58, 133 A. 2d 83 (1956), described comprehensive zoning as “a general plan to control and direct the use of land and buildings by dividing the governmental area into use districts according to present and planned future conditions, so as to accomplish, as far as possible, the most appropriate uses of land consistent with the public interest and the safeguarding of the- interests of the individual property owners.”

Action has been defined as “the state or process of acting or doing, ... an act or deed”, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. Webster’s Collegiate Thesaurus, 1976, describes “action” as “something done or effected ... act, deed, doing....”

Thus we have no difficulty concluding, after viewing the wording of § 4.08 (a) of Art. 66B and giving the particular words involved here — “zoning action” — their natural and ordinary signification, the Legislature intended the phrase to encompass any act or deed of the local legislative body that controls or directs the use of land and buildings by dividing the governmental area into use districts according to present and planned future conditions. We find no ambiguity or obscurity in this language and therefore need not look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, supra.

We agree with the trial judge when he concluded that the actions of the County Commissioners were not zoning actions, at least insofar as the adoption of the “Mini Plan” is concerned. However, we disagree with his conclusion that the Text Amendment was also not a zoning action. In Washington County Taxpayers Ass’n. v. Board, 269 Md. 454, 306 A. 2d 539 (1973), Judge Smith, speaking for the Court, stated:

“We suspect that a part of the problem in this case may be some confusion relative to the terms planning and zoning. On this subject 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 4 (1958), states:
‘While “zoning” and “planning” have been considered so closely akin as to constitute a single concept, and there is a definite and harmonious relationship between them, they do not cover identical fields of municipal endeavor, and the terms are not synonymous or interchangeable, although they are sometimes used interchangeably. They are not identical in concept, although closely related therein and there is a distinction, as well as a difference, between them, zoning being concerned primarily with the use of property.
‘So, zoning may not entirely exclude planning; planning embraces zoning, in a general way, but the converse is not true, municipal “planning” being a term of broader significance than “zoning.” ’ Id. at 671-72.
See also E. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 1-2 (3rd ed. 1965), and Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 149, 198 A. 225 (1938), where it is said that planning ‘connotes a systematic development contrived to promote the common interest in matters that have from the earliest times been considered as embraced within the police power,’ or State v. Ohio Power Co., 163 Ohio St. 451, 460, 127 N.E.2d 394 (1955), stating that planning ‘embraces the systematic and orderly development of a community with particular regard for streets, parks, industrial and commercial undertakings, civic beauty and other kindred matters properly included within the police power.’ ” Id. at 455-56.

This distinction between zoning and planning has been followed in many of our sister states. See Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 271 Or. 500, 533 P. 2d 772, 775 (1975); Shelton v. City of Bellevue, 73 Wash. 2d 28, 435 P. 2d 949, 953 (1968); Fornaby v. Feriola, 18 A.D.2d 215, 239 N.Y.S.2d 185, 189 (1963); Roselle v. Wright, 21 N. J. 400, 122 A. 2d 506, 510 (N.J. 1956); see also Goldstein v. Lincoln Park Planning Board, 52 N.J. Super. 44, 144 A. 2d 724 (N.J. 1958).

It seems patent that in adopting the “Mini Plan” the legislative body did nothing more than adopt a plan which, in and of itself, did nothing, nor would it do anything until it was implemented by the Zoning Ordinance Text Amendment and Zoning Map Amendment. Thus we conclude the trial court to have been correct in sustaining appellee’s demurrer to the petition so far as the “Mini Plan” was concerned.

We believe the trial court erred in determining that the Text Amendment to the Zoning Ordinance was not a “zoning action”. The Text Amendment, by creating a new district, “R-40,000”, constituted an implementation of the Mini Plan. The action of the Commissioners in adopting the Text Amendment falls within the term “zoning action” as we believe that term was used by the Legislature.

As was the case in Pattey v. Board of County Comm’rs., 271 Md. 352, 317 A. 2d 142 (1974), we conclude that, “[T]he trial judge fell into error by ignoring the basic distinction between a master plan, on the one hand, and a zoning map, comprehensive zoning, or zoning classification, on the other____As we have said, a master plan is only a guide and is not to be confused with a comprehensive zoning, zoning map, or zoning classification____” (Citations omitted). Id. at 360 (emphasis in original).

Thus, we hold that the adoption of the Text Amendment was an act of the Commissioners which controls or directs the use of land and buildings by dividing the governmental area into use districts according to present and planned future conditions, and was, therefore, appealable as a zoning action under Article 66B, § 4.08 (a).

Judgment reversed.

Case remanded for further proceedings.

Costs to be paid by appellee.

      . “Sec. 3.0. Districts established.
      For the purpose of these regulations, the unincorporated area of Carroll County is hereby divided into districts as follows:
      ‘C’ — Conservation District.
      ‘A’ — Agriculture District.
      ‘R-40,000’ — Residence District. (Added 12-14-77)
      ‘R-20,000’ — Residence, Suburban District.
      ‘R-10,000’ — Residence, Urban District.
      ‘R-7,500’ — Residence, Multi-Family District.
      ‘B-Li — Local Business District.
      ‘B-G’ — General Business District.
      ‘I-R’ — Restricted Industrial District.
      ‘I-G’ — General Industrial District.
      ‘H’ — Historic Zoning District (Added 11-12-70)
      ‘MHP’ — Mobile Home Park District. (Added 6-25-71)”

      . While Daniel S. Dulany, et at, were parties below and original appellants here, they dismissed their appeal on the day of oral argument, 1/23/79.

      . “ Who may appeal;procedure. — Any person or persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved by any decision of the board of appeals, or by a zoning action by the local legislative body, or any taxpayer, or any officer, department, board, bureau of the jurisdiction, may appeal the same to the circuit court of the county. Such appeal shall be taken according to the Maryland Rules as set forth m Chapter 1100, Subtitle B. Nothing in this subsection shall change the existing standards for review of any zoning action.”