author: Nazarian, J.

text:
    165 A.3d 525
    LAUREL RACING ASSOCIATION, L.P. v. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, Maryland
    No. 2413,
    Sept. Term, 2015
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    Filed: July 25, 2017

      Argued by: Thomas M. Buchanan (Andrew C. Nichols, William B. Jackson, William B. Jackson, Winston & Strawn, LLP, Washington, D.C.) (Harry C. Blumenthal, Blumenthal, Delavan, Powers & Palmer PA, Annapolis, MD), on the brief, for Appellant.
    Argued by: Kelly P. Kenney (Nancy McCuthan, County Attorney, Lori L. Blair, Deputy County Attorney, Anne Aran-del County Office of Law, on the brief), Annapolis, MD, for Appellee.
    Panel: Meredith, Nazarian, Charles E. Moylan Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
   Nazarian, J.

Back in the last decade, Laurel Racing Association (“Laurel Racing”) began planning to redevelop the Laurel Park horse racing complex. As part of that process, Laurel Racing reserved from Anne Arundel County (the “County”) the additional water and sewer capacity its new facilities would require. After reviewing the proposed plans, the County’s Office of Planning and Zoning (“OPZ”) approved, in 2008, the allocation Laurel Racing requested, and Laurel Racing never appealed that decision.

Reserving water and sewer capacity isn’t free, and when a substantial fee came due in 2013, Laurel Racing challenged the Department of Public Works’s (“DPW”) method of calculating the capacity the project needed, arguing that the long-ago-approved figure had overstated its incremental water and sewer needs by failing to credit the racetrack’s current usage. The parties exchanged data and studies, and DPW sent Laurel Racing a letter on February 25, 2014 offering to reduce the allocation. The question for us is whether this letter was an appealable agency action. It wasn’t.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2006, Laurel Racing submitted to OPZ a Development Application that proposed a wholesale renovation of the racing complex. The application included a sketch plan that included demolition of the existing grandstand and renovations to the site that would reduce the seating capacity for horse racing (which had become less popular) in favor of commercial and retail space and space for the long-awaited arrival of “video lottery terminals.” The sketch plan also included a required water and sewer capacity calculation worksheet that concluded that the project would require 1,501 equivalent dwelling units (“EDU”) of new water and sewer capacity. The EDU worksheet outlined future uses only because “[a]t the time of submission, the project engineer was unaware of any County policy or procedure where a developer could seek to offset proposed EDU usage with existing usage.”

The Anne Arundel County Code (the “AACC” or the “Code”) provides that “[f]or a property that is required to pass the test for adequate public water supply facilities or adequate public sewerage facilities, [DPW] shall make an allocation on the date of approval by [OPZ] for adequacy of public water supply facilities as provided in § 17-5-202 of this Code.” AACC § 13-5-402(b) (2005). An allocation, a “reservation, for use by a particular property, of available capacity,” AACC § 13-5-401, is required if, “due to development activity on the property, the property is required under Article 17 of th[e Code] to pass the test for adequate public water supply facilities or adequate public sewerage facilities; or the property is otherwise connecting to the County water or wastewater system,” AACC § 13-5-402(a). DPW does not analyze on its own whether a subdivision proposal adds to or displaces existing water and sewer facilities—it relies on the developer’s engineer to determine the project’s impact. In two letters dated November 21, 2008, OPZ approved Laurel Racing’s sketch plan and allocated 1,501 EDUs of water and sewer for the project. Laurel Racing did not appeal this decision.

Water and sewer capacity are finite resources, and the Code imposes charges on developers to reserve EDUs for future development. “For property receiving an allocation in conjunction with approval by [OPZ] for adequacy of public water supply facilities ..., the owner of the property shall pay, for each equivalent dwelling unit: (1) an allocation reservation charge ... as computed by [DPW] ...; and (2) [a] capital facility connection charge .... ” AACC § 13-5-403(a). Allocation reservation charges were due immediately, and Laurel Racing paid them. The capital facility connection charge (“CFCC”) and deferral fees did not come due until the fifth anniversary of the allocation, and on November 1, 2013, DPW sent Laurel Racing Allocation Billing Statements due on November 30—one for water EDUs totaling $19,974,600 and one for sewer EDUs totaling $4,328,640.

Sometime in 2013, though, Laurel Racing had learned that the County had, as the County’s Board of Appeals later put it in a Memorandum Opinion we discuss below, a “policy or procedure in effect at the time of the 2006 submission to provide EDU credits for existing facilities. That is, if a use had existing EDUs, the County requires that a developer reserve only the number of additional EDUs that would be required to serve the redevelopment.” (Emphasis in original.) The then-DPW Director explained to the Board that these credits were meant to ensure “that an owner doesn’t pay the [facility connection charge] for EDUs that they’ve paid to the County in the past,” and that DPW was responsible for calculating the new EDUs required. Accordingly, Laurel Racing “contacted the County about the concern that [it] w[as] being—flows were being double counted, and they were not being adequately considered for what existing flows [it] already had in the system, what existing capacity [it] had in the system.”

On December 12, 2013, Laurel Racing’s representatives met with DPW to discuss the possible double-counting. Rather than requiring a new EDU worksheet, the County asked “if [Laurel Racing’s] consultant could come up with a way to analytically compare the existing use, dis-aggregate ... what’s in the grandstand [a mix of retail and commercial space], to an existing use number so that [DPW could] compare it to what’s proposed.” DPW followed up on the meeting in a letter dated December 23, 2013:

As discussed during the meeting, [DPW] has agreed to give your engineers through January 31, 2014, to provide information regarding existing uses that may have been part of the EDU calculation previously provided. [DPW] will thereafter review the information and make a revised EDU calculation, if appropriate.
If the number of EDUs is revised, the original allocation date will still apply and all associated charges will be due in accordance [with] the County Code based on the original allocation date of November 21, 2008. Therefore, the [CFCCs] and the capital facility deferral fee for the adjusted number of EDUs will be due no later than April 30, 2014, or the allocation will lapse....
The County will stay the late interest on the outstanding [CFCCs] until February 28, 2014. This time was determined to be roughly 30 days for the new information to be provided to DPW and 30 days for review and final agreement.

DPW explained that “[a]s th[e double counting issue] came to [its] attention after 2008, ... [DPW offered credits because it] was trying to reach a reasonable settlement of what the existing capacity in the system associated with Laurel [Racing] was.”

On January 29, 2014, Laurel Racing’s engineer sent a letter to DPW detailing its calculations: “the total existing flow equals 306,100 gallons, or 1,224 EDU’s” and the total proposed flow in accordance with this calculation is 261,030 gallons per day or 1,044 EDU’s.” As such, the engineer concluded that Laurel Racing’s water flow would not increase as a result of the redevelopment:

[W]e suggest that the Laurel [Racing] proposed plan, in fact, will not generate an increase in flow, and therefore not require additional EDU’s to be allocated and thereafter purchased. Had the existing uses been accounted for in the original computation from 2007, we believe this would have come to light, thereby avoiding the need to purchase additional capacity, paying the allocation reservation charges, and saving the owner significant expense.

In the engineer’s view, the numbers “basically show[ed] that there already is more capacity vested than what [Laurel Racing] need[s].”

DPW and OPZ staff reviewed the analysis and found “a lot of inconsistencies with how the comparison was done.” According to DPW staff, Laurel Racing’s EDU number resulted “[f|rom a new proposed scheme development configuration that [it] couldn’t corroborate.” So DPW responded, in a letter from its Director dated February 25, 2014, that the EDU calculations in Laurel Racing’s original application and the 2008 allocation of 1,501 EDUs did not account for Laurel Racing’s current water and sewer usage. The Director acknowledged receipt of Laurel Racing’s engineer’s January 29, 2014 letter, but expressed concern with the calculation of current usage, and concluded that the redevelopment would increase capacity needs by 470 EDUs for water and 954 EDUs for sewer. The letter noted that although Laurel Racing may have modified the project, “the recalculated EDUs discussed in this letter can only be based on the proposal that has been approved by [OPZ]. If the project is to be revised again, the proposal would be considered by [OPZ] during the course of the normal review process.” The Director concluded that OPZ would issue a revised allocation letter and that the revised capital facility connection and deferral fees would need to be paid by no later than May 5, 2014 to prevent the allocation from lapsing.

Laurel Racing received a revised Allocation Billing Statement on March 5, 2014 that reduced the total fees to $12,674,800. The new statement said that interest would be added to payments received after April 20, 2014, and that if the bill remained unpaid after May 5, 2014, the new allocation of 954 units of sewer and 470 units of water would lapse. Around this same time, Laurel Racing filed a Notice of Appeal with the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals (the “Board”) challenging DPW’s calculation of the EDUs required for the project and the resulting charges and fees.

Then, in response to OPZ’s concern that its engineers had submitted the proposed EDU worksheets with its sketch plan “and did not consider any flows/capacity of the existing development at the site,” Laurel Racing sent a letter to OPZ on April 17, 2014 that contained new EDU computations by different engineers. The new calculations included both existing and proposed water and sewer usage, and determined that “the total existing flow equated to .,. 1,225 EDU’s” and “the total proposed flow equates to ... 1,044 EDU’s.” (Emphasis omitted.) Laurel Racing’s engineers also asked OPZ and DPW to “re-evaluate the EDU worksheets for this project and issue a new revised corrected allocation letter” because, they argued, “[biased on [their] analysis ... the proposed Laurel Park project will not generate an increase in flow, and therefore should not have required additional EDU’s to be allocated and subsequently purchased/reserved. Had the existing uses and flows been accounted for in the original Sketch Plan and Allocation approvals in 2007, the track owners would have avoided the need to purchase additional capacity and pay for the reservation charges, saving the track a considerable unnecessary expense.”

The County responded by letter on May 2, The letter acknowledged that OPZ “ha[d] reviewed the revised EDU worksheet, but a revised allocation based on that c[ould] not be issued without a formal Pinal Plan being resubmitted.” It did, however, review archived records of Laurel Racing’s actual usage back to 2001 that showed peak daily usage of 1,162 EDUs for water and 674 EDUs for sewer. As such, the County “offer[ed] to revise the allocation set forth in the February 26, 2014 letter to 3S9 EDU’s for water (1501 minus 1162) and 827 EDU’s for sewer (1501 minus 674) based on the archived billing records.” The letter cautioned as well that “[t]his letter does not constitute a final, appealable decision; it is an offer to revise the EDU calculations.”

The County then moved in July 2014 to dismiss Laurel Racing’s appeal on the grounds that the appeal of the February 25 letter was untimely and that the Board lacked jurisdiction. After “meet[ing] in closed session to consult with counsel to obtain legal advice,” the Board denied the motion, concluding that the February 25 letter constituted a modification of a prior approval. In August 2014, the County submitted a Motion to Reconsider its Motion to Dismiss and the Board denied that motion too.

After seven evenings of hearings, the Board issued its decision in a Memorandum of Opinion on December 15, 2014. The Board found that the February 25 “letter represented] an approval (albeit not in the full amount) of [Laurel RacingJ’s request for EDU credits and contained] an ‘operative event’ from which a proper appeal may be noted to this Board,” (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Balt. Cty., Md., 336 Md. 569, 583-84, 650 A.2d 226 (1994)), and thus that the appeal was timely. On the merits, the Board granted Laurel Racing (1) a credit for 1,501 EDUs improperly reserved, (2) a credit of $2,592,839.15 for improperly assessed Allocation Reservation Charges to be applied towards future usage and facility charges at the Laurel Park location, (3) a waiver of all pending Allocation Reservation Charges, (4) a credit for existing capacity of 1,225 EDUs, and (5) a determination that the Laurel Park redevelopment will require only 1,044 EDUs.

The County sought judicial review in the circuit court and Laurel Racing cross-appealed. The parties submitted memo-randa and the court held a hearing on May 11, 2015. In an Order and Memorandum Opinion entered on January 8, 2016, the circuit court reversed and remanded to the Board with directions to grant the County’s Motion to Dismiss. The circuit court addressed sua sponte the need for a final administrative order before a party may resort to judicial review, and determined that the February 25 letter was not a final administrative decision:

[The February 25 letter wa]s at most a statement of intention that the County will modify and recalculate the EDUs, but only after pending actions such as, a “Final Plan” was submitted, payments were made by Laurel Racing and an agreement was executed between the parties. The Director of DPW in his February 25, 2014, letter did not grant, deny, decide or approve anything. The required plan had not yet been submitted. The Director’s letter simply explained the County’s intention to review and recalculate EDUs per the request of Laurel Racing.

Laurel Racing filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

Laurel Racing raises the single issue of whether DPW’s February 25, 2014 letter constituted an appealable decision. It argues that the February 25 letter was a final approval and modification that left nothing further for OPZ to do beyond a “merely ministerial” task, and that even if the February 25 letter was not final, it was still appealable as an “interlocutory administrative decision ha[ving] immediate legal consequences causing irreparable harm.” (quoting Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E. Church, 375 Md. 59, 75, 825 A.2d 388 (2003)). Ultimately, though, there is no getting around the fact that the February 25 letter was not a final administrative decision.

When reviewing appeals from circuit court orders reviewing administrative agency actions, we review the decision of the agency, not the circuit court:

When we review the decision of an administrative agency or tribunal, “we [assume] the same posture as the circuit court ... and limit our review to the agency’s decision.” Anderson v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 402 Md. 236, 244, 935 A.2d 746 [ ] (2007) (internal citation omitted). The circuit court’s decision acts as a lens for review of the agency’s decision, or in other words, “we look not at the circuit court decision but through it.” Amps. Ret. Sys. of Balt. Cnty. v. Brown, 186 Md.App. 293, 310, 973 A.2d 879 [ ] (2009) [ ] (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
We “review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to the agency” because it is “prima facie correct” and entitled to a “presumption of validity.” Anderson v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 330 Md. 187, 213, 623 A.2d 198 [ ] (1993) (internal citation omitted).
The overarching goal of judicial review of agency decisions is to determine whether the agency’s decision was made “in accordance with the law or whether it is arbitrary, illegal, and capricious.” Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Prigel Family Creamery, 206 Md.App. 264, 274, 47 A.3d 1087 [] (2012) (internal citation omitted). With regard to the agency’s factual findings, we do not disturb the agency’s decision if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. See id. (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 569, 709 A.2d 749 [] (1998) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are not bound, however, to affirm those agency decisions based upon errors of law and may reverse administrative decisions containing such errors. Id.

Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Appeals, 227 Md.App. 536, 546, 135 A.3d 509 (2016).

At the outset, we need to identify the final agency action before us. Holiday Spas v. Montgomery Cty. Human Relations Comm’n, 315 Md. 390, 395-96, 554 A.2d 1197 (1989) (“As a general rule, an action for judicial review of an administrative order will lie only if the administrative order is final.” (citing Md. Comm’n on Human Relations v. BG & E Co., 296 Md. 46, 459 A.2d 205 (1983))); see also Dorsey, 375 Md. at 74-75, 825 A.2d 388 (citing cases regarding judicial review of a final administrative decision). “Generally, to be final, an administrative order must also ‘leave nothing further for the agency to do.’” Holiday Spas, 315 Md. at 396, 554 A.2d 1197 (quoting BG & E Co., 296 Md. at 56, 459 A.2d 205). The Board found that the February 25 letter from DPW to Laurel Racing qualified as an appealable decision of approval and that the resulting appeal was timely. The circuit court disagreed, and Laurel Racing argues first that the court erred by failing to recognize DPW’s February 25 letter as an “approval” and “modification” of OPZ’s original allocation.

With all of the focus on the more recent administrative process, it can be easy to lose sight of the project’s history. The starting point isn’t the current dispute, but rather is the existing allocation, which was approved when OPZ approved Laurel Racing’s sketch plan in 2008. Importantly, OPZ, not DPW, is the deciding agency: “[f]or a property that is required to pass the test for adequate public water supply facilities or adequate public sewerage facilities, [DPW] shall make an allocation on the date of approval by [OPZ] for adequacy of public facilities as provided in § 17-5-202 of this Code.” AACC § 13-5-402(b) (emphasis added). Although the DPW Director determines a property’s EDU calculation, that calculation is not official until OPZ sends a letter approving the property’s “initial application for approval of a sketch plan or preliminary plan, or during review of the application for final plan or site development plan approval.” AACC § 17—5— 202(a); see also AACC § 13-5-804(a) (“[Wjhenever a charge is set based on [EDUs], the property owner shall provide all information required by the Director [of DPW] and the Director shall reasonably determine, based on that information and any other information that the Director deems appropriate, the number of [EDUs] for a property based on peak daily usage.”); § 17-5-202(b) (“Approval for adequacy of public facilities ... occurs on the date of a letter from [OPZ] approving a sketch plan.”). Put another way, the ultimate decision is embodied in OPZ’s approval of the sketch plan.

Laurel Racing did not appeal any element of the approved sketch plan. The status quo, then, is that five years after approval, November 1, 2013, Laurel Racing owed the balance of the deferred allocation fee, ie., $24,303,240, if it wished to maintain the allocation. Since that allocation became final long ago, Laurel Racing needs to effect a post hoc modification of that long-sinee-final decision in order to reduce the amount it owes or otherwise to maintain the allocation without making the full payment. The question for us is whether anything that has happened to date modified the status quo.

And to this point, there is no superseding decision from DPW. Laurel Racing argues first, though, that the February 25 letter constituted an “approval” and “modification” of OPZ’s original allocation. That letter stated the number of EDUs that “the project should have been allocated,” that “[a]t this point, however, the recalculated EDUs discussed in this letter can only be based on the proposal that has been approved by [OPZ],” and that “[OPZ] will issue a revised allocation letter setting forth the change in EDU calculations as described in this letter.” (Emphasis added.) But putting aside the fact that the letter merely states an intention to act, only OPZ, the body that approved the development in the first instance, can modify its earlier decision. DPW’s revised allocation numbers might well ripen into the new allocation once OPZ approves a new final sketch plan. But that hasn’t happened, and DPW’s calculation is not embodied in an appeal-able agency decision until OPZ approves the final sketch plan.

The process here is distinguishable from a confirmatory statement, like the one in United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 584, 650 A.2d 226, or a reconsideration, like that in National Institutes of Health Federal Credit Union v. Hawk, 47 Md.App. 189, 196, 422 A.2d 55 (1980). In United Parcel Service, Inc., the Court of Appeals held that a confirmatory statement regarding a license or permit that was issued in the past was not an appealable event, and that the appealable event is “the issuance, renewal, revocation, etc. of the license or permit.” 336 Md. at 584, 650 A.2d 226. Similarly, in Hawk, we held that “an administrative decision concerning reconsideration of zoning is not an appealable final order.” 47 Md.App. at 196, 422 A.2d 55. In Montgomery County v. Longo, in which a decision “based on new factual information presented and submission of a revised building permit application” was “not merely a reaffirmation of the prior issuance of a building permit,” and thus was appealable. 187 Md.App. 25, 54-55, 975 A.2d 312 (2009). But again, there’s a step missing here: the actual decision by OPZ to modify Laurel Racing’s sketch plan with a new EDU allocation.

And that step awaits submission by Laurel Racing of a revised sketch plan. See AACC § 17-3-303 (stating the need for an applicant to submit a new application for sketch plan approval after receiving a report from OPZ providing the “findings, comments, and recommendations of the County through its reviewing agencies”). According to the Board, a final sketch plan had not been approved as of December 2014, and Laurel Racing’s most recent submission was made in May 2014. The February 25 letter from DPW is not an administrative action that “leave[s] nothing further for the agency to do.” Dorsey, 375 Md. at 75, 825 A.2d 388 (quoting BG & E Co., 296 Md. at 56, 459 A.2d 205). By its own terms, the letter details additional steps required by the AACC, and we agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that there was no appealable agency action.

Laurel Racing argues next that even if we determine that the February 25 letter was not final, as we have, it was appealable under an exception to the finality requirement in which “parties need not ‘await a final administrative decision before resorting to the courts’ if the ‘interlocutory administrative decision has immediate legal consequences causing irreparable harm.’” (quoting Dorsey, 375 Md. at 75, 825 A.2d 388). We see no such irreparable harm here.

It’s true that an order may be deemed final if it inflicts “sufficient irreparable injury” by affecting a party’s business in ways that could not be remedied at a later date. Holiday Spas, 315 Md. at 399, 554 A.2d 1197. Laurel Racing conflates its efforts to reduce its EDU obligation with circumstances that led the Laurel Park property to be advertised for a tax sale, but even if money owed in error qualified as irreparable harm, these developments are only indirectly related. The tax sale proceeding flowed from Laurel Racing’s failure to pay the deferred allocation fees due on anniversary of the allocation. The amount due had been determined in 2008 and was never appealed, and Laurel Racing didn’t attempt to reduce the EDU allocation until after the fees came due. Had Laurel Racing paid the amount due, it would have received a credit for any amount it paid above any revised amount. And as we have already determined, Laurel Racing has not established, in the administrative arena or here, any right to relief from the original allocation fees.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.

      . In calculating these numbers, the Director used “the proposed EDUs [of] 1,501 because ... that’s what matched the sketched plan submittal that [DPW] had received at the time” and the highest actual peaked usage numbers because "it’s more representative that [Laurel Racing] could have a peak use time .... It is high, but I thought it was representative of their usage in the system.” Between 2009 and 2013, the highest water systems reading was 1,031 EDUs and the highest sewer system reading was 547 EDU. The incremental EDUs needed for the new project should equal the proposed 1,501 EDUs minus the highest actual usage.

      . Laurel Racing phrased its sole Question Presented as follows:
      Did the Circuit Court err in holding that a County decision revising Laurel Racing's water and sewer allotment, and assessing almost $12 million in fees on Laurel Racing to be paid on a date certain, was not final or otherwise appealable—even though the County attempted to collect the fees by selling Laurel Racing’s property at a tax sale, and the Circuit Court itself enjoined that sale so that Laurel Racing could appeal the decision?

      . For that reason, we need not consider the timeliness of Laurel Racing’s appeal, which is governed by Rule 2-101 (a) in Appendix B of the Code ("All appeals from orders or decisions from which an appeal is authorized by law shall be taken within 30 days of the date of such order or decision, except where a different period is proscribed by law or rule, by the filing of a notice of appeal with the County Board of Appeals.”). Whether or not the appeal was timely, the Board should have granted the County’s Motion to Dismiss because the letter appealed here was not a final appealable decision.

      . See AACC § 1-9-101 ("When an owner of property is responsible to the County for the payment of money, the amount shall be levied, collected, and enforced in the same manner as County real property taxes and have the same priority rights, bear the same interest and penalties, constitute a lien on the real property so assessed, and be treated the same as County real property taxes.”). The County initiated the process of selling the property at a tax sale while the Board was conducting hearings. Laurel Racing brought an emergency action in the circuit court for a temporary restraining order ("TRO”) to stop the tax sale. At the TRO hearing, the circuit court dismissed all defendants except the County, granted Laurel Racing’s TRO, and stayed the tax sale because it found that "immediate and irrepairable [sic] harm will occur.” This immediate and irreparable harm, however, is separate from the calculation of EDUs at issue in this appeal.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Arthur, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    165 A.3d 534
    Valerie TRIM, et al. v. YMCA OF CENTRAL MARYLAND, INC.
    No. 494,
    Sept. Term, 2016
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    July 25, 2017

      Argued by: Keith D. Forman (Christopher T. Casciano, Wais, Vogelstein, Forman & Offutt, LLC, on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
    Argued by: Andrew J. Marcus (Bonner, Kieman, Trebach & Crociata, LLP, on the brief) Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
    Panel: Deborah S. Eyler, Arthur, Alan M. Wilner (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
   Arthur, J.

“An automated external defibrillator (AED) is a portable device that checks the heart rhythm and can send an electric shock to the heart to try to restore a normal rhythm.” What is an Automated External Defibrillator?, National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/aed (last viewed July 25, 2017).

“AEDs are used to treat sudden cardiac arrest,” which is “a condition in which the heart suddenly and unexpectedly stops beating.” Id. When a person suffers sudden cardiac arrest, “blood stops flowing to the brain and other vital organs.” Id.

Sudden cardiac arrest “usually causes death if it’s not treated within minutes.” Id. Consequently, “[ujsing an AED on a person who is having [sudden cardiac arrest] may save the person’s life.” Id.

Maryland Code (1978, 2014 Repl. Vol.), § 13-517 of the Education Article establishes a public access program for AEDs in this State. In brief summary, the statute is designed to encourage the installation of AEDs in places of business and public accommodation, but to ensure that the devices are operable and are to be used by people who are properly trained to use them.

This case principally concerns whether § 13-517 of the Education Article or its accompanying regulations prescribe a duty of care that requires a business to use an AED to provide cardiac defibrillation to someone who has suffered or reasonably appears to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest. We hold that they do not.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Incident at the YMCA

On November 12, 2014, Vincent Trim, age 53, suddenly collapsed while he was playing basketball at a YMCA in Ellicott City. Julie Heard, a YMCA fitness instructor, was near the doors to the basketball court at the time. Ms. Heard had 20 years of training and experience in administering life support and resuscitation measures, including the use of an AED.

According to Ms. Heard, several people ran out of the court, asking someone to call 911. Ms. Heard heard that someone had fainted. Another YMCA employee heard that a person was having a seizure. Yet another employee ran to the front desk to call 911.

Ms. Heard ran onto the court. She saw Mr. Trim lying unconscious on the floor. He had no pulse and was gasping (exhibiting “agonal breathing”), which is a potential sign of cardiac arrest. Ms. Heard began to administer cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”), and she directed a bystander to go to the front desk to call 911. While she was administering CPR, another member told her that she was already calling 911. Although the YMCA had an AED that was just outside the doors of the basketball court, Ms. Heard did not retrieve it or ask anyone to retrieve it for her.

As a result of Ms. Heard’s efforts, Mr. Trim began to breathe on his own, but his breathing stopped again after a few seconds. With the assistance of another employee, Ms. Heard continued to administer CPR until the Howard County paramedics arrived, about five minutes after they were first called.

When the paramedics entered the court, a YMCA employee heard one of them say that he needed to go back to the ambulance to retrieve his AED. The employee told the paramedic that the YMCA’s AED was just outside the doors of the basketball court. The paramedic instructed the employee to retrieve the AED, which he did.

The paramedics used the AED, but were unsuccessful in resuscitating Mr. Trim. He died a few days later as a result of a cardiac arrest and the consequent cessation of blood flow to his brain and other vital organs.

B. Wrongful Death Action

On April 27, 2015, Mr. Trim’s widow, appellant Valerie Trim, filed a wrongful death and survival action against the YMCA. Citing the COMAR regulations that were propounded to implement § 13-517 of the Education Article, appellant principally alleged that the YMCA “had a statutory and/or regulatory duty to utilize the AED on its premises ... after [Mr. Trim’s] collapse in the gymnasium.” Because it did not comply -with that alleged duty, appellant alleged that the YMCA was negligent per se.

The YMCA moved to dismiss the complaint, or alternatively, for summary judgment. It advanced three grounds: (1) that § 13-617 does not impose an affirmative duty to use an AED; (2) that the statute contains an immunity provision, which shields it from liability “for any act or omission in the provision of automated external defibrillation”; and (3) that an exculpatory clause within YMCA’s membership agreement, which was signed by Mr. Trim, released it from liability.

After a hearing on April 28, 2016, the Circuit Court for Howard County granted the YMCA’s motion. Appellant noted a timely appeal.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Appellant presents three issues, which we have rephrased as follows:

1. Did the circuit court err in determining that § 13-517 of the Education Article or its implementing regulations do not establish a statutory duty of care by the YMCA and its employees?
2. Did the circuit court err in determining that the YMCA and its employees were immune from civil liability under § 13-517 of the Education Article?
3. Did the circuit court err in determining that the YMCA membership agreement exculpated the YMCA and its employees from civil liability?

In response to the first question, we hold that the statute and regulations do not establish a statutory duty of care that required the administration of automated external defibrillation in the circumstances of this case. In view of our answer to the first question, it is unnecessary to address the second and third questions. We shall affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In its dispositive motion, the YMCA included materials outside of the pleading. The circuit court did not exclude those materials. Hence, the court was required to treat the motion, and did in fact treat it, as a motion.for summary judgment. Md. Rule 2-322(c) (“[i]f, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment”); see also Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 93 Md. App. 772, 782, 614 A.2d 1021 (1992).

On a motion for summary judgment, the court “shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2—501(f).

The propriety of a grant of summary judgment is a question of law. Butler v. S & S P’ship, 435 Md. 635, 665, 80 A.3d 298 (2013) (citation omitted). In an appeal from the grant of summary judgment, this Court conducts a de novo review to determine whether the circuit court’s conclusions were legally correct. See D’Aoust v. Diamond, 424 Md. 549, 574, 36 A.3d 941 (2012).

In this case, unlike many summary judgment cases, there was no real dispute of fact: the dispute involved the purely legal question of whether § 13-517 of the Education Article or its implementing regulations imposed a duty of care on the YMCA to use an AED when Mr. Trim exhibited signs of sudden cardiac arrest. We conduct a de novo review of that exercise in statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 142, 46 A.3d 443 (2012); Sail Zambezi, Ltd. v. Md. State Highway Admin., 217 Md. App. 138, 150, 90 A.3d 592 (2014).

DISCUSSION

“[I]n some instances, the duty of care in a negligence action may arise from statute or regulation.” Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 103, 90 A.3d 464 (2014). “[W]here there is an applicable statutory scheme designed to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff,” a “defendant’s duty ordinarily is ‘prescribed by the statute’ or ordinance[,J and ... the violation of the statute or ordinance is itself evidence of negligence.” Brooks v. Lewin III Realty, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 78, 835 A.2d 616 (2003) (quoting Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358-59, 744 A.2d 47 (2000)); accord Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. at 111, 90 A.3d 464; Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 755, 955 A.2d 769 (2008); Pendleton v. State, 398 Md. 447, 466, 921 A.2d 196 (2007); Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 584, 831 A.2d 18 (2003).

“Under this principle, in order to make out a prima facie case in a negligence action, all that a plaintiff must show is: (a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of.” Brooks v. Lewin III Realty, Inc., 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d 616; accord Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. at 112, 90 A.3d 464; Kiriakos v. Phillips, 448 Md. 440, 457, 139 A.3d 1006 (2016); Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass’n, 421 Md. 355, 388, 26 A.3d 931 (2011); C & M Builders, LLC v. Strub, 420 Md. 268, 281-82, 22 A.3d 867 (2011).

Appellant contends that § 13-517 and its accompanying regulations were designed to protect a class of persons who, like her late husband, have suffered or reasonably appear to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest. She contends further that the statute and the regulations prescribe a duty of care that requires entities such as the YMCA to use an AED when a person has suffered or reasonably appears to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest. Finally, she contends that her husband died as a proximate result of the YMCA’s breach of that alleged duty.

We need not decide whether the General Assembly passed § 13-517 for the protection of the particular class that appellant has identified, whether Mr. Trim was a member of that class, or whether the failure to administer automated external defibrillation was a proximate cause of Mr. Trim’s death. In this case, the decisive question is whether § 13-517 or the implementing regulations mandate that an entity like the YMCA use an AED when a person suffers or appears to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest.

To answer that question of statutory interpretation, we first examine the ordinary meaning of the enacted language. Peters v. Early Healthcare Giver, Inc., 439 Md. 646, 665, 97 A.3d 621 (2014) (quoting Nichols v. Suiter, 435 Md. 324, 339, 78 A.3d 344 (2013)). “If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the language[.]” Windesheim v. Larocca, 443 Md. 312, 341, 116 A.3d 954 (2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[A] court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.” Stickley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 431 Md. 347, 359, 65 A.3d 141 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, to understand the meaning of statutory language, we must look beyond individual words and clauses to the larger context, including other surrounding provisions and the apparent purpose of the enactment. See, e.g., Williams v. Peninsula Regional Med. Ctr., 440 Md. 573, 580-81, 103 A.3d 658 (2014).

I. The Language of the Statute

Section 13-517(b)(l) of the Education Article establishes “a Public Access Automated External Defibrillator Program”— i.e., a program concerning public access to AEDs. The program is administered by the Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) Board. Id. § 13-517(b)(3).

The EMS Board has the power to adopt regulations to administer the program; to issue and renew certificates to “facilities” that meet the statutory requirements; and to deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew a facility’s certificate if it fails to meet the statutory requirements. Id. § 13-517(c)(l)-(3). The statute defines the term “facility” to mean “an agency, association, corporation, firm, partnership, or other entity.” Id. § 13-517(a)(4). The YMCA is a “facility.”

Subject to a few exceptions that are inapplicable to this case, “[e]ach facility that desires to make automated external defibrillation available shall possess a valid certificate from the EMS Board.” Id. § 13-517(d)(l). To qualify for a certificate, a facility must:

(1) Comply with the written protocol approved by the EMS Board for the use of an AED which includes notification of the emergency medical services system through the use of the 911 universal emergency access number as soon as possible on the use of an AED;
(2) Have established automated external defibrillator maintenance, placement, operation, reporting, and quality improvement procedures as required by the EMS Board;
(3) Maintain each AED and all related equipment and supplies in accordance with the standards established by the device manufacturer and the federal Food and Drug Administration; and
(4) Ensure that each individual who is expected to operate an AED for the registered facility has successfully completed an educational training course and refresher training as required by the EMS Board.

Id. § 13-517(e)(1)-(4).

A certificate is valid for three years {id. § 13—517(h)(3)), and the EMS Board must issue a “renewed certificate to a facility that meets” the statutory requirements. Id. § 13—517(h)(1).

There is no dispute that, at the time of the events that gave rise to this case, the YMCA had a valid certificate. In the language of the statute, therefore, the YMCA was a “registered facility.” Id. § 13-517(a)(10).

II. Duties Under the Statute

In her brief, appellant acknowledges that “[t]he AED Statute and related COMAR regulations are silent as to whether or not a registered facility like the YMCA has an affirmative duty to provide and render automated external defibrillation in the event of a sudden cardiac arrest.” In our view, the legislative and regulatory silence establish that § 13-517 imposes no affirmative duty on a registered facility like the YMCA.

The legislative silence in this statute stands in contrast to the affirmative obligations that were enunciated in statutes or ordinances that have been found to prescribe a duty of care towards members of a specific class. In each of those cases, the statute, ordinance, or regulation employed mandatory language to define what a person had a duty to do or to refrain from doing. See, e.g., Kiriakos v. Phillips, 448 Md. at 495, 139 A.3d 1006 (concluding that a social host owes a duty to persons injured as a result of a minor’s underage drinking, where a statute provided that “an adult may not knowingly and willfully allow an individual under the age of 21 years actually to possess or consume an alcoholic beverage at a residence”); Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. at 125, 128, 90 A.3d 464 (concluding that an apartment complex owes a duty to unsupervised children where a regulation stated that “an owner shall ensure that a recreational pool ... is completely surrounded by a barrier that ... does not allow the passage of a sphere 4 inches in diameter,” the size a young child’s head); Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass’n, 421 Md. at 392-95, 26 A.3d 931 (concluding that a landowner owes a duty to its neighbors where an ordinance stated that “[a] person must not engage in any land-disturbing activity or by any action cause or permit any soil, earth, sand, gravel, rock, stone, or other material, to be deposited upon or to roll, flow, or wash upon or over the premises of another in a manner to cause damage”); Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. at 83, 89, 835 A.2d 616 (concluding that a landlord owed a duty to the occupants of a rental unit where ordinances stated that “[a]ll walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors and windows shall be kept clean and free of any flaking, loose, or peeling paint” and that “[a]ll interior loose or peeling wall covering or paint shall be removed”); Moore v. Myers, 161 Md.App. 349, 364, 868 A.2d 954 (2005) (concluding that owners of pit bull terriers owed a duty to persons attacked by their dogs where an ordinance stated that “[t]he owner shall maintain the dog within a building or a secure kennel” and that “[wjhenever the dog is removed from the building or kennel it shall be secured by an unbreakable or unseverable leash and maintained under the control of an adult”); compare Pace v. State, 425 Md. 145, 169-70, 38 A.3d 418 (2012) (concluding that a federal statute did not impose a statutory duty of care on the defendant, where the petitioner “could not ‘identify ... specific words and phrases in the [statute] that ... obligated the ... State defendants to take some specific action”) (internal quotation omitted).

Nothing in § 13-517 obligated the YMCA to take any specific action when Mr. Trim exhibited signs of sudden cardiac arrest. The statute, therefore, does not impose an affirmative obligation on the YMCA to use the AED.

III. The Implementing Regulations

In arguing that a registered facility has an affirmative duty to use an AED whenever a person suffers or reasonably appears to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest, appellant relies largely on the implementing regulations that the EMS Board adopted, not on the language of the statute itself. Appellant incorrectly refers to the regulations as “the words utilized by the Legislature,” which they are not.

Nonetheless, assuming that the EMS Board could prescribe a duty of care on registered facilities like the YMCA, its regulations do not, in our view, impose an affirmative duty to use an AED when a person suffers or reasonably appears to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest.

Among other things, the regulations require a facility to designate an AED coordinator who has received CPR and AED training and who must ensure that the AED equipment is regularly inspected (presumably to ensure that it works). See COMAR 30.06.02.01(A). They require a facility to inform its employees and volunteers about the operation, maintenance, and location of its AEDs. See id. 30.06.02.01(B). They require a facility to place its AEDs in locations that are visible and readily accessible to anyone who might be willing to operate them in case of an instance of cardiac arrest. See id. 30.06.02.01(C). They require a facility to have a telephone or “other communication service” to notify public safety officials in case of an emergency. See id. 30.06.02.01(D). They require the facility to submit data to the Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems. See id. 30.06.02.01(E). They require the facility to ensure that all “expected operators,” which are defined as “individual[s] identified by a registered facility to operate an AED at a registered facility” (see id. 30.06.01.01(B)(3)), have completed CPR and AED training. See id. 30.06.02.01(F). Finally, in a section titled “Protocol,” they state that “[a]ll personnel who are expected to operate an AED” must “utilize the AED in accordance with their training.” See id. 30.06.02.02.

Nothing in these regulations imposes an affirmative duty to .use an AED whenever a person suffers or reasonably appears to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest. The regulations simply require a facility to obtain training for the persons who may operate the device, to take steps to ensure that the device will work if it is needed, to inform employees and volunteers about where the devices are located and how they work, to have a means of communicating with the authorities in case of an emergency, and to make reports to the governing body. Most of the regulations are concerned only with what a facility must do in order to obtain a certificate. Neither the statute nor the regulations, therefore, creates the duty that appellant seeks to enforce.

IV. Legislative History of the Statute

Appellant goes on to argue that the drafting history of § 13-517 reveals a legislative intention to require registered facilities to use AEDs whenever a person suffers or reasonably appears to have suffered sudden cardiac arrest. Although Maryland courts ordinarily do not look to legislative history if, as in this case, the meaning of a statute is clear on its face (see W.R. Grace & Co. v. Swedo, 439 Md. 441, 453-55, 96 A.3d 210 (2014)), we have considered appellant’s arguments and found them wanting.

The General Assembly enacted the original version of § 13-517 in 1999. Appellant focuses on amendments that occurred in 2008.

Before the 2008 amendments, the statute contained the following language:

(c) The EMS board may: ... (5) Approve educational and training programs required under this section that ... (ii) Include training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation ....
* * * *
(f) To qualify for a certificate a facility shall: ... (6) Ensure that each individual who operates an automated external defibrillator for the authorized facility has successfully completed an education training course and refresher training as required by the EMS Board.
* * * *
(j) An individual who is authorized to operate an automated external defibrillator at an authorized facility may administer automated external defibrillation to an individual who is reasonably believed to be a victim of sudden cardiac arrest if physician services or emergency medical services are not immediately available.

Md. Code (1978, 2006 Repl. Vol), § 18-617 of the Education Article.

In 2008 the General Assembly altered those provisions in the following manner:

(c) The EMS board may: ... (6)(4) Approve educational and training programs required under this section that ... (ii) Include training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation AND AUTOMATED EXTERNAL DEFIBRILLATION ....
* * * *
(£>(e) To qualify for a certificate a facility shall: ... (6) (4) Ensure that each individual who operates IS EXPECTED TO OPERATE an automated.external-defibrillator AED for the authorized REGISTERED facility has successfully completed an education training course and refresher training as required by the EMS Board.
* * * *
(j) An individual who is authorized to operate an automated external defibrillator at an authorized facility may administer automated external defibrillation to an individual who is reasonably believed to be a victim of sudden cardiac arrest if physician services or emergency medical services are-not immediately available»

2008 Md. Laws, ch. 593, § 1.

Appellant focuses, first, on the removal of former subsection (j), which said that an “authorized” person at an “authorized facility” “may administer automated external defibrillation[.]” (Emphasis added.) She argues that by deleting the paragraph that contained the permissive verb “may,” the legislature “essentially endorsed an implicit reading and interpretation,” under which a facility “shall” provide automated external defibrillation if a person suffers (or reasonably appears to have suffered) sudden cardiac distress.

Appellant tacitly concedes the case with the equivocal language about “implicit” readings. To ascertain what a statute means, a court looks at the actual language of the statute and does not add language that the legislature did not include. Nothing in the actual language states or even implies that a facility has an affirmative obligation to use an AED in any circumstance.

Appellant goes on to cite the amendment to what is now subsection (e)(4). In that amendment the legislature changed the phrase “an individual who operates an automated external defibrillator” to “an individual who is expected to operate an AED.” In her view, the change “establishes an affirmative and ‘expected’ duty on the part of a registered facility.”

Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive. In full, subsection (e)(4) states that “[t]o qualify for a certificate a facility shall: ... (4) Ensure that each individual who is expected to operate an AED for the registered facility has successfully completed an educational training course and refresher training as required by the EMS Board.” In context, this language means that a facility can obtain a certifícate only if the person who is expected (i.e. anticipated) to use its AED has the proper training to use the AED. This language does not create a duty to use an AED in any specific set of circumstances; it simply creates a condition precedent for the acquisition of a certificate. The legislature did not surreptitiously incorporate an affirmative duty to use an AED when it required an expected (or anticipated) operator to receive training before a facility could receive a certificate.

Appellant concludes with a rhetorical question about why the legislature would establish a statewide program for public access to AEDs unless it intended that registered facilities would have an affirmative obligation to use them. The short answer is that the legislature wanted to encourage businesses, public facilities, and places of public accommodation to make these life-saving devices available, while ensuring that the devices would work, that people knew where they were located, and that they would be used by persons with proper training if they are used at all.

The Court of Appeals of New York has expressed a similar insight. In Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 342, 961 N.Y.S.2d 364, 985 N.E.2d 128 (2013), that court held that even though a statute required a fitness club to install an AED and to have at least one employee or volunteer who held a valid certification in the use of the device, the club had no affirmative duty to use the AED when a member suffered sudden cardiac arrest. Id. at 349, 961 N.Y.S.2d 364, 985 N.E.2d 128. In rejecting the contention that its interpretation rendered the statute meaningless, the court stated, “[T]here is nothing meaningless or purposeless about a statute that seeks to insure the availability of AEDs and individuals trained in their use at locations—-i.e., health clubs—where there is a population at higher risk of sudden cardiac arrest.” Id. “A law that mandates the presence of AEDs and trained individuals at health clubs is easy to obey and enforce,” the court added. Id. By contrast, an affirmative duty to employ the device in specific circumstances “would engender a whole new field of tort litigation, saddling health clubs with new costs and generating uncertainty.” Id. at 349-50, 961 N.Y.S.2d 364, 985 N.E.2d 128. The court concluded that “[t]he legislature is unlikely to have imposed such a new duty absent an express statement.” Id. at 350, 961 N.Y.S.2d 364, 985 N.E.2d 128. We agree.

CONCLUSION

In summary, we hold that § 13-517 of the Education Article and its implementing regulations do not impose an affirmative obligation on registered facilities, like the YMCA, to use an AED when a person suffers, or reasonably appears to have suffered, sudden cardiac arrest. Consequently, we affirm the grant of the YMCA’s dispositive motion.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

      . Maryland Code (1978, 2014 Repl. Vol.), § 13-517(a)(2) of the Education Article contains the following definition:
      (2) "Automated external defibrillator (AED)” means a medical heart monitor and defibrillator device that:
      (i) Is cleared for market by the federal Food and Drug Administration;
      (ii) Recognizes the presence or absence of ventricular fibrillation or rapid ventricular tachycardia;
      (iii) Determines, without intervention by an operator, whether defibrillation should be performed;
      (iv) On determining that defibrillation should be performed, automatically charges; and
      (v) 1. Requires operator intervention to deliver the electrical impulse; or
      2. Automatically continues with delivery of electrical impulse.

      . In recounting the factual background in this case, we rely on the allegations of the complaint, as well as the undisputed factual assertions in connection with a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.

      . Contrary to that allegation, the violation of a statutory duty may afford evidence of negligence under Maryland law, but it does not establish negligence per se. See, e.g., Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 126, 90 A.3d 464 (2014); Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547, 557, 831 A.2d 6 (2003).

      . Appellant presented the questions as follows:
      1. Whether the circuit court erred in determining that the Maryland Public Access Automated External Defibrillator Program Does Not Establish a Statutory Duty of Care Requiring Registered Facilities and Their Employees to Affirmatively Utilize the Onsite Automated External Defibrillator Device and Render Defibrillation to Individuals Suffering a Sudden Cardiac Arrest?
      2. Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Determining that the YMCA and its Employees Were Immune from Civil Liability for Alleged Acts and/or Omissions of Negligence in Failing to Provide Automated External Defibrillation to Vince Trim Following His Sudden Cardiac Arrest?
      3. Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Determining that the Language Contained in the YMCA Membership Agreement Exculpated the YMCA and its Employees from Civil Liability Stemming from Allegations of Negligence?

      . It is trae that, insofar as a regulation illustrates an agency's understanding of the authority that the legislature has delegated to it, the regulation may supply some indirect evidence of the meaning of a statute. See Christ by Christ v. Md. Dep't of Nat. Res., 335 Md. 427, 437, 644 A.2d 34 (1994). But to understand what a statute means, we typically look to the statutory language itself, not to the implementing regulations. Again, it is telling that appellant does not base an argument on the statutory language itself.

      . The 2008 legislation is accessible through the General Assembly’s website, http://mgaleg.maryland.gov.

      . In view of our decision, it is unnecessary to decide whether the failure to use the AED at all amounts to an "omission in the provision of automated external defibrillation,” which would render the YMCA immune from civil liability under § 13-517(j)(l) of the Education Article, It is also unnecessary to decide whether the exculpatory language in the YMCA's membership agreement operates as a prospective release of the claims in this case.