author: Wright, J.

text:
    157 A.3d 381
    William DABBS, et al. v. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD.
    No. 2653,
    Sept. Term, 2015
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    Filed: March 30, 2017

      John R. Greiber, Jr. (Roy L. Mason, Smouse & Mason, LLC, Robert H. B. Cawood, Cawood & Cawood, LLC, on the brief) Annapolis, MD, for Appellant
    Kurt J. Fischer (Venable, LLP, Baltimore, MD, Andrew Murray, Nancy Duden, County Attorney, Annapolis, MD) on the brief, for Appellee
    Wright, Graeff, Gary E. Bair (Specially Assigned), JJ.
   Wright, J.

This appeal arises from the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County’s entry of a declaratory judgment in favor of appellee, Anne Arundel County (the “County”), as to all counts and claims stated in a class action complaint filed against it on November 4, 2011, by appellants, William Dabbs, Sally Trapp, Samuel Craycraft, and Roberta Craycraft, “individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.” Appellants had sought refunds of impact fees that, following the fiscal year (“FY”) of collection, were not expended or encumbered within six FYs. Following a hearing on November 20, 2014, and after receiving memoranda from the parties, the circuit court entered judgment in the County’s favor on January 27, 2016, ordering that appellants “take nothing in this action.” The court also denied appellants’ motion to revise class definition, as well as their motion for an accounting of County impact fee collections, expenditures, and encumbrances. On February 11, 2016, appellants noted this appeal.

Questions Presented

For clarity, we have combined, renumbered, and rephrased the questions presented by appellants, as follows:

1. Did the circuit court err in concluding that the “rough proportionality” or “rational nexus” test established by the Supreme Court of the United States has no application to development impact fees?
2. Did the circuit court err in finding that the enactment of Bill No. 27-07 did not interfere with the vested rights of appellants to recover impact fee refunds?
3. Did the circuit court err in concluding that appellants could not recover as damages $9.9 million that the County transferred from the General Fund to the Impact Fee Special Fund in 2008?
4. In determining the appropriate use of impact fees under its Impact Fee Ordinance, is the County required to use the definition of “State Rated School Capacity” that the State applies for school construction funding purposes?
5. Did the circuit court err in denying appellants’ motion for an accounting of County impact fee collections, expenditures, and encumbrances?
6. Did the circuit court err in finding that the prospective repeal in Bill No. 71-08 of the County’s impact fee refund provision, codified in § 17-ll-210(b), had no effect on appellants’ vested rights to refunds?

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

Facts

I. The County’s Impact Fee Ordinance

Pursuant to the authority set forth in Chapter 350, Acts of 1986, and codified in Subtitle 2 of Title 11 of Article 17 (the “Impact Fee Ordinance”) of the Anne Arundel County Code (“County Code”), the County may impose impact fees for the purpose of requiring new development to pay its proportionate share of the costs for land and capital facilities necessary to accommodate development impacts on public facilities. § 17-11-202(1). Impact fees must be paid by any person who improves real property causing an impact on public facilities before a building permit for the improvement may be issued. §§ 17-11-203, 17-11-206.

Under § 17-ll-209(a), all funds collected from impact fees must be used for eligible capital projects, that is, capital projects for the “expansion of the capacity” of roads and schools, and not for replacement, maintenance, or operations. The County has been divided into impact fee districts and impact fees generally must be used for capital improvements within the “district from which they are collected.” § 17—11— 209(d). The County Planning and Zoning Officer (“PZO”) determines the extent to which capital projects are eligible for impact fee use. See generally Impact Fee Ordinance.

Section 17-ll-210(b) provides that, if the impact fees collected in a district are not expended or encumbered within six FYs following the FY of collection, the County Office of Finance must give notice to current property owners that impact fees are available for refund. Section 17-ll-210(e), however, allows the PZO to “extend for up to three years the date at which the funds must be expended or encumbered.” Such an extension may be made “only on a written finding that within a three-year period certain capital improvements are planned to be constructed that will be of direct benefit to the property against which the fees were charged.”

The County began imposing impact fees in FY 1988. On December 20, 2001, the County Council enacted Bill No. 96-01, which, effective February 3, 2002, authorized the County to use impact fees for temporary structures (classrooms) provided they expanded the capacity of the schools to serve new development. Then, on May 22, 2007, the County Council enacted Bill No. 27-07, which codified the procedures which the County had utilized to count impact fee expenditures and encumbrances for purposes of determining impact fee refunds under § 17-ll-210(b). Because Bill No. 27-07 did not effect a substantive change in policy, the County Council made Bill No. 27-07 retroactive to fees collected in FYs 1988-1996.

On November 6, 2008, the County Council enacted Bill No. 71-08 and repealed, prospectively, the impact fee refund provisions previously set forth in § 17-11-210. The repeal was effective on January 1, 2009, and barred claims that were not ripe as of the effective date of the repeal, that is, the repeal barred claims for refunds of fees collected after FY 2002.

II. Plaintiffs’ Claims

This action is the second lawsuit in which class plaintiffs have sought refunds of impact fees pursuant to § 17-11-210. In the first action, the circuit court ruled that it would only resolve claims for refunds of impact fees collected in FYs 1988-1996, namely the FYs that were ripe for review at that time. Halle Dev., Inc. v. Anne Arundel Cty., Case No. 02-C-01-069418. Thus, in 2011, appellants filed the present claim (“Dabbs”), seeking refunds of fees collected in and after FY 1997.

A. Halle

In 2008, this Court, in Halle, explained the manner in which § 17-11-210 should be applied to calculate whether impact fees are available for refund. Anne Arundel Cty. v. Halle Dev., Inc., No. 2552, Sept. Term, 2006 (Feb. 7, 2008, on reconsideration, May 7, 2008). We ruled that the County was entitled to count impact fee encumbrances in calculating refunds after the close of six FY periods and remanded the case to the circuit court for the purpose of recalculating refunds accordingly. Specifically, we rejected the County’s argument that the case should be remanded to the PZO for new extension decisions, and we ruled that the County Code required any decision by the PZO to extend the period for using impact fees be validly made before the end of the six FY period. However, we agreed with the County that (1) in applying its procedure to count impact fees encumbered for the purpose of determining refunds, the County was not attempting to encumber impact fees “retroactively,” and (2) the County Code did not require the County to count impact fee encumbrances as part of the annual budget process and within 'the six FY period. We stated:

Owners contend that the circuit court’s ruling is supported by the refund provisions in Code § 17-11-210. They argue that the County is attempting retroactively to encumber funds. They assert that the circuit court correctly ruled that for refund purposes a PZO determination that impact fee funds had been encumbered, must have been made within the six years following collection of the funds. This analysis confuses encumbrance with extension. As we have seen in Part I, supra, there was a time limit prior to which the fact-finding of extension must be made, and made in the required format, in order to effect an extension. Section 17-11-210 does not mandate any format for effecting an encumbrance.

Halle, Feb. 7, 2008 opinion at 19-20.

We also rejected the circuit court’s reliance on § 4-11-102(c)(ll) for the proposition that impact fee encumbrances had to be counted as a part of the annual budget process, stating:

Code § 4-ll-102(e)(ll), also cited by the court and requiring the capital budget and capital program to include “any amounts encumbered and expended by April 1 of the current and prior year,” is satisfied by the current format of that budget and program, as described above. That information advises the County Council of matters of historic fact. The section does not require that encumbrances be recorded in the accounts of a particular impact fee special fund when those encumbrances are made in the future, during the fiscal year that is the subject of a particular capital budget.

Id. at 19. In short, we ruled:

Accordingly, we shall remand on the encumbrance issue for a determination of the amount of impact fees that had been encumbered, but unexpended, within six years following their collection.

Id. at 20.

Thereafter, the County filed a motion for reconsideration requesting that this Court rule that the County was also entitled to count impact fees encumbered in connection with plaintiffs’ claims for refunds of school impact fees. We granted the motion in a May 7, 2008 opinion, stating:

[In our February 7, 2008 opinion,] we held that the circuit court erred in failing to include in the six-year test encumbrances made within a six-year period after the year of receipt in computing the debit against fee receipts.
This Court’s rationale in its February 7, 2008 opinion with respect to transportation project encumbrances, argues the County, is equally applicable to the accounting record for encumbrances for school projects. Because we held in our February 7, 2008 opinion that the ground on which the circuit court relied in rejecting encumbrances as a setoff under the six-year test was erroneous, the court, on remand, should consider not only encumbrances for transportation projects, but for school projects as well when applying the six-year test.

Halle, May 7, 2008 opinion at 7-8.

Although Bill No. 27-07, which codified the County’s procedure for counting impact fee encumbrances, had been enacted prior to this Court’s 2008 opinion and was retroactive, we ruled that the amended ordinance did not modify the concept of encumbrance which had been in the County Code from the enactment of Bill 58-87 in 1988, and thus, it was unnecessary to address the retroactivity of the legislation because it did not change law or policy.

Following this Court’s 2008 decision in Halle, both the County and the class plaintiffs filed petitions for a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The County requested that the Court review the Court of Special Appeals’ ruling that the case could not be remanded to the PZO to make new extension decisions. The class plaintiffs, on the other hand, requested that the Court of Appeals review the Court’s ruling that the County was not “retroactively encumbering” impact fees by utilizing the procedure (subsequently codified in Bill No. 27-07) to count them after the case had been filed. Plaintiffs argued that they had vested rights to an accrued cause of action to recover refunds after they filed suit on February 21, 2001, and thus, the case could not be remanded to permit the County to either grant new extensions, or count encumbrances.

The Court of Appeals granted the County’s petition. Anne Arundel v. Halle, 405 Md. 350, 952 A.2d 225 (2008). However, it denied plaintiffs’ cross-petition, thus declining to review the encumbrances issue. The Court of Appeals then affirmed this Court on all issues for which it granted certiorari and explained that the class plaintiffs did not have vested rights which would preclude the County from counting encumbrances after the close of the six FY periods. Anne Arundel Cty. v. Halle Dev., Inc., 408 Md. 539, 971 A.2d 214 (2009). It stated:

This case is not about vesting. It is about the PZO’s lack of authority under the impact fee ordinance to go back and make administrative decisions that it failed to effectively execute when permitted. Indeed, the Owners may not be vested in their right to a refund. Whether they are entitled to a refund and in what amount it will be determined by the Circuit Court on remand. The full refund amount determined by the Circuit Court may be reduced if the County is able to prove that it, in fact, encumbered the impact fee funds within six years.

Id. at 559, 971 A.2d 214. In an accompanying footnote, the Court of Appeals explained:

The Court of Special Appeals held in its May 7, 2008 unreported opinion that the Circuit Court, on remand, should re-determine the amount that the County had timely encumbered for eligible capital improvements, and in doing so, “should consider not only encumbrances for transportation projects, but for school projects as well when applying the six-year test.” We did not grant certiorari as to this issue, and thus the decision of the intermediate appellate court is law in this case. Accordingly, the determination by the Circuit Court as to the amount of the refund may be modified on remand, and the Owners’ rights in any specific refund award are not vested.

Id. at 559, 971 A.2d 214 n.7.

On remand, the circuit court stated that this Court’s 2008 opinion in Halle was the law of the case and, in applying our mandate, reduced the amount of refunds from $4.7 million to $1.3 million. The circuit court, however, stated that it disagreed with part of our opinion, and instead it expressed continued belief that the County was not entitled to count encumbrances because the County was required to do so during the FYs under review as a part of the annual budget process. To that end, the circuit court invited the Court of Appeals to review the issue of encumbrances. The circuit court then made certain “alternate findings” in the event that the Court of Appeals decided to review the case.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certio-rari, asking the Court of Appeals to again review whether the enactment of Bill No. 27-07 interfered with their vested rights. The Court of Appeals, however, declined to do so, and this Court, in 2013, affirmed the circuit court’s final judgment ruling that our 2008 opinion was the law of the case. Halle Dev., Inc. v. Anne Arundel Cty., No. 0327, Sept. Term, 2011 (July 29, 2013). We stated:

In its March 25, 2011 opinion, the circuit court correctly ruled that our prior holdings in this case—and the prior holdings of the Court of Appeals in this case—are the law of the case which are binding on the circuit court.
The circuit court ruled in its December 30, 2004 opinion that the definition of impact fees encumbered, and the County’s procedure for counting encumbrances was reasonable and lawful. The circuit court, however, also ruled that the County could not retroactively count encumbrances because the impact fees must be counted “as part of the annual budget process, no later than the sixth fiscal year.”
On appeal, we held that the County was not “attempting retroactively to encumber funds.” Accordingly, we ordered “remand on the encumbrance issue for a determination of the amount of impact fees that had been encumbered, but unexpended, within six years following their collection.” Similarly, in remanding the case to the circuit court, the Court of Appeals observed that:
[T]he circuit court’s task on remand will only require that the court determine whether and how much refund is due, in total, after considering all impact fee amounts that the County has timely encumbered for eligible capital projects.
Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Halle Dev., Inc., 408 Md. 539, 571-72, 971 A.2d 214 (2009). The Court of Appeals also pointed out that:
The Court of Special Appeals held in its May 7, 2008 unreported opinion that the Circuit Court, on remand, should re-determine the amount that the County had timely encumbered for eligible capital improvements, and in doing so, “should consider not only encumbrances for transportation projects, but for school projects as well when applying the six-year test.” We did not grant certiorari as to this issue, and thus the decision of the intermediate appellate court is law in this case. Accordingly, the determination by the Circuit Court as to the amount of the refund may be modified on remand, and the Owners’ rights in any specific refund award are not vested.
Id. at 559, 971 A.2d 214, n.7 (emphasis added).
Here, Owners raise issues relating to the determination of impact fee encumbrances to determine refunds. As set forth, swpra, our comprehensive 2008 opinion addressed this issue as a question of law. Accordingly, the circuit court was bound by the law of the case as to this legal issue.

Id. at 4-6.

We also determined that plaintiffs’ argument that the retro-activity provision in Bill No. 27-07 unconstitutionally interfered with their vested rights was barred by the law of the case doctrine:

Next, Owners argue that Bill 27-07 “operates retrospectively to divest and adversely affect vested rights, impacts the obligation of contracts, and violates the due process clause.” Owners further argue at length that the County Council “was not permitted to retroactively modify the County’s impact fee ordinance, by design, and reduce the amount of impact fees refunded 20 years after the events here have occurred.” The County argues that these arguments are barred under the law of the case doctrine. We agree with the County that the law of the case doctrine precludes re-litigation of these issues. The circuit court, therefore, did not err in applying the law of the case in determining impact fee encumbrances.
* * *
We also observed in our prior opinion that the retroactivity provision of Bill No. 27-07 was not relevant to the case. In particular, we cited the definition of an “encumbrance” as set forth in § 17-11-201(2) of the County Code. At that time we observed that, “[although this statutory definition, enacted by Council Bill No. 27-07, was not effective until May 22, 2007, long after the events with which we are concerned here, the definition conforms to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).” Further, we pointed out that we had no occasion to consider the validity of the retroactivity provision of the amended ordinance because the only relevant issue was the definition of “encumbrance,” and the ordinance was cited “simply to state the pre-existing, generally accepted meaning of the term, ‘encumbrance[.]’ ”
Thus, we have already defined—as a matter of law—the definition of “encumbrance” that governs this case. Additionally, we have previously held that the retroactivity provision of Bill 27-07 is not implicated, and does not alter how impact fee encumbrances are counted for purposes of this case.

Id. at 11-12.

Finally, we noted that the Court of Appeals had rejected the class plaintiffs’ claim that they had obtained vested rights in impact fee refunds by bringing their lawsuit in 2001:

Moreover, the Court of Appeals has made clear that the retroactivity provision of Bill 27-07 is of no consequence here. As a threshold matter, we point out that, as the circuit court aptly observed, the key issue in a retroactivity analysis is whether Owners have “vested rights” in their claims for impact fee refunds. “If the legislature intends a law affecting substantive matters to operate retroactively and the law does not offend constitutional limitations or restrictions, it will be given the effect intended.[”] State Comm’n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 278 Md. 120, 123, 360 A.2d 1 (1976). In conducting the retroactivity analysis, a court must determine whether the retroactive application of the statute or ordinance would interfere with vested rights. Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 766 A.2d 98 (2001).
Here, the Court of Appeals held that the instant case was not about vested rights, and that Owners had no vested rights in impact fee refunds:
This case is not about vesting. It is about the PZO’s lack of authority under the impact fee ordinance to go back and [make] administrative decisions it failed to effectively execute when permitted. Indeed, the Owners may not be vested in their right to a refund. Whether they are entitled to a refund and in what amount will be determined by the Circuit Court on remand. The full refund amount determined by the Circuit Court on remand may be reduced if the County is able to prove that it, in fact, encumbered the impact fee funds within six years.
Anne Arundel County v. Halle Dev., Inc., 408 Md. 539, 971 A.2d 214; id. at 559, n.7, 971 A.2d 214 (emphasis added).

Id. at 12-13.

B. Dabbs

In the present case, involving impact fees collected in FYs 1997-2002, appellants sought refunds on the ground that the impact fees were not expended or encumbered in a timely manner under § 17-ll-210(b). Appellants also argued that the amendments to the Impact Fee Ordinance in Bill No. 27-07 and Bill No. 71-08 unconstitutionally interfered with their vested rights in refunds. After hearing from the parties, the circuit court ruled that the County had applied the Impact Fee Ordinance as required by this Court’s 2008 opinion and found that there are no impact fees available for refund under § 17-11-210. Further, the circuit court rejected appellants’ constitutional and state law challenges to the Impact Fee Ordinance, finding that most of the challenges had already been resolved against the class plaintiffs in Halle.

More specifically, the circuit court found that the County prepared the six FY charts in the format approved by the Halle courts, properly comparing the amount of impact fees collected in each FY and district under review to the amount of impact fees expended (disbursed) and encumbered as of the end of the sixth FY following the FY of collection. Kurt Svendsen, the County’s Assistant Budget Officer, who had been employed by the County since September 1, 1997, was responsible for (a) the preparation of the County’s Capital Budget portion of the Annual Budget and Appropriation Ordinance, and (b) the monitoring of encumbrances and expenditures recorded in connection with appropriations for capital projects. Because Svendsen monitored expenditures and encumbrances recorded against appropriations of capital projects on an almost daily basis, he was delegated the responsibility for conducting the six FY test under § 17-l-210(b).

In the present case, the County prepared six FY charts for FYs 1997-2002 in the same manner as the charts prepared in Halle for FYs 1988-2002, but also included impact fee expenditures on temporary classrooms. The charts indicated that all impact fees collected in FYs 1997-2002 were expended or encumbered within six FYs following the FY of collection and, thus, no impact fees collected in these FYs were available for refund.

Lastly, the circuit court found that, in applying the six FY test, the County properly interpreted the term “impact fees encumbered” in § 17-ll-210(b) to mean:

(1) the amount of impact fees collected in a district account in a FY which have not been expended on June 30 of the sixth FY following the FY of collection, for which there is
(2) as of the same date, an encumbrance (purchase order) on an impact fee eligible capital project in the district.

According to the circuit court, this definition is the only logical one based on GAAP, the applicable provisions of the County Charter, and Annual Budget and Appropriation Ordinances. Under GAAP, an appropriation states the legal authority to spend or otherwise commit a government’s resources. See Stephen Gauthier, Governmental Accounting Auditing and Financial Reporting at 305 (Government Finance Officers Ass’n 2001). Meanwhile, § 715(a) of the County Charter provides that County officials and employees may not spend or commit funds in excess of appropriations, and § 17-11-201(2) defines an encumbrance as “a legal commitment for the expenditure of funds, chargeable against the applicable appropriation for the expenditure, that is documented by a contract or purchase order.” Thus, the court concluded that when determining the amount of “impact fees encumbered,” the County was correct in comparing the amount of unexpended impact fees in the district account at the end of the relevant FY to the encumbrances entered in relation to capital projects in the district that have been determined by the PZO to be eligible in the district.

Additional facts will be included as they become relevant to our discussion, below.

Discussion

Md. Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol), § 3-409(a) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article provides that “a court may grant a declaratory judgment or decree in a civil case, if it will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding, and if ... [a]n actual controversy exists between contending parties.” (Emphasis added). “It follows that ‘declaratory judgment generally is a discretionary type of relief.’ ” Sprenger v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 400 Md. 1, 20, 926 A.2d 238 (2007) (quoting Converge Servs. Grp. v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 477, 860 A.2d 871 (2004)). “Thus, we generally review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny declaratory judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. at 21, 926 A.2d 238.

The Court of Appeals has “defined abuse of discretion in numerous ways, but has always enunciated a high threshold.” Sumpter v. Sumpter, 436 Md. 74, 85, 80 A.3d 1045 (2013) (citations omitted). Previously, this Court has stated:

“Abuse of discretion” is one of those very general, amorphous terms that appellate courts use and apply with great frequency but which they have defined in many different ways. It has been said to occur “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,” or when the court acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” It has also been said to exist when the ruling under consideration “appears to have been made on untenable grounds,” when the ruling is “clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court,” when the ruling is “clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result,” when the ruling is “violative of fact and logic,” or when it constitutes an “untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an injustice.”
There is a certain commonality in all of these definitions, to the extent that they express the notion that a ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling. The decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.

North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 13-14, 648 A.2d 1025 (1994) (internal citations omitted).

I. “Rough Proportionality” or “Rational Nexus” Test

Appellants first argue that the circuit court erred in determining that the rough proportionality test, or the rational nexus test, has no application to the development impact fees in this case. Rather, according to appellants, the County must demonstrate that “its expenditure of impact fees was reasonably attributable to new development and each such expenditure reasonably benefitted ‘new development’ and/or individual ‘against whom the fee was charged.’ ” (Citations omitted). In advancing their argument, appellants assert that the circuit court’s decision runs contrary to Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994), Waters Landing, Ltd. P’ship. v. Montgomery Cty., 337 Md. 15, 650 A.2d 712 (1994), Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2586, 186 L.Ed.2d 697 (2013), and several out-of-state cases.

In response, the County avers that, “[ujnder settled law, the rough proportionality or rational nexus test does not apply to legislatively enacted fees or taxes of general application, such as the County’s impact fees” in this case.

The United States Supreme Court established the “rough proportionality” test in Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309. In that case, a property owner applied for a building permit to construct a commercial building, and the City of Tigard conditioned the issuance of the permit on the dedication of (1) a portion of the property for a “greenway” to control flooding, and (2) another portion for a pedestrian and bicycle path. Id. at 379-80, 114 S.Ct. 2309. Although the Supreme Court found that an “ ‘essential nexus’ exists between the ‘legitimate state interest’ and the permit condition exacted by the city,” pursuant to Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), it nonetheless ruled that the City of Tigard failed to demonstrate that the required dedications were consistent with the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment because the extent of the exaction was not roughly proportional to “the impact of the proposed development.” Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-96, 114 S.Ct. 2309.

Approximately six months following the Dolan decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the rough proportionality test did not apply to a “development impact tax [imposed] by legislative enactment, not by adjudication.” Waters Landing, 337 Md. at 40, 650 A.2d 712. The Court reasoned:

We think Dolan, which concerned the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, is irrelevant to the issue of special benefit assessments and generally inapplicable to this case. While the facts in Dolan are somewhat similar to the facts before us, the Court, in reaching its holding, specifically relied on two distinguishing characteristics that are absent in the instant case. First, the Court mentioned that instead of making “legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city,” the City of Tigard “made an adjudicative decision to condition [the landowner’s] application for a building permit on an individual parcel.” Id. at 385, 114 S.Ct. at 2316, 129 L.Ed.2d at 316. Second, the Court noted that “the conditions imposed were not simply a limitation on the use [the landowner] might make of her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of the property to the city.” Id. In contrast, Montgomery County imposed the development impact tax by legislative enactment, not by adjudication, and furthermore, the tax does not require landowners to deed portions of their property to the County.
Furthermore, Dolan is inapplicable because it concerns the Takings Clause, which is not implicated in the case before us. To the extent that this tax is a regulation on the development of land, it is not a regulation that “ ‘goes too far’ ” so as to be “ ‘recognized as a taking.’ ” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2893, 120 L.Ed.2d 798, 812 (1992) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922)). A regulation does not “go too far” unless it either “compel[s] the property owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property,” or “denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.” Id. at 1015, 112 S.Ct. at 2893, 120 L.Ed.2d at 812-13[.]

Id.

Like in Waters Landing, the impact fees at issue here were imposed by legislative enactment, and do not require landowners to deed portions of their property to the County. Moreover, appellants cannot claim “that the impact tax” here “compel[s] the property owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property,” or “denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.” Id. at 40-41, 650 A.2d 712. Therefore, as the Court of Appeals concluded in Waters Landing, we similarly hold that “the Takings Clause being inapplicable, Dolan does not affect our decision.” Id. at 41, 650 A.2d 712.

We disagree with appellants’ assertion that Koontz runs contrary to this conclusion. In that case, the development exactions at issue involved discretionary exactions made on the basis of an individualized determination; it did not involve a legislatively imposed tax of general application. See Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2591. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the “so-called ‘monetary exactions’ must satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.” Id. at 2599. The Koontz Court clarified, however, that “[i]t is beyond dispute that [t]axes and user fees ... are not takings,” and that its decision should not be read to “affect the ability of governments to impose property taxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens on property owners.” Id. at 2600-01 (internal citation omitted).

For these reasons, the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in declining to apply the rough proportionality or rational nexus test to the County’s impact fees.

II. Effect of Bill No. 27-07

Next, appellants argue that Bill No. 27-07 cannot be applied retroactively. In support of their argument, appellants aver that “[n]o Court of Appeal has determined [this issue],” and they further contend that “completed capital projects are not subject to retroactive legislation.” In sum, appellants believe that the retroactivity of Bill 27-07 interfered with their vested rights, and that impact fee refunds are due.

In response, the County asserts that “[t]his Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the Halle case that the retroactivity of Bill 27-07 did not interfere with any vested rights ... because the bill did not effect a change in policy.” We agree with the County.

As we outlined above, in Halle, we ruled that Bill No. 27-07 did not modify the concept of encumbrance, which had been in the County Code from the enactment of Bill 58-87 in 1988, and thus, it was unnecessary to address the retroactivity of the legislation in our 2008 opinions because it did not change law or policy. Thereafter, upon granting the Halle plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals explained that the class plaintiffs did not have vested rights which would preclude the County from counting encumbrances after the close of the six FY periods. Then, in 2013, we reiterated that the retroactivity provision of Bill No. 27-07 was not implicated in Halle, that it did not alter how impact fee encumbrances were counted, and that Halle was not about vesting. We fail to see how we can reach a different conclusion here, especially when we have previously made clear that the holdings in our 2008 opinion and the subsequent holdings of the Court of Appeals in Halle are the law of the case as to this very issue.

Appellants’ reliance on Dua v. Comcast Cable of Maryland, Inc., 370 Md. 604, 805 A.2d 1061 (2002) is misplaced. Dua involved challenges to two retroactive laws, regarding refund of late fees associated with cable contracts, passed by the General Assembly during its 2000 session. 370 Md. 610-11, 805 A.2d 1061. There, the Court of Appeals stated that neither law could be applied retroactively, as “they represented major changes of legislative policy.” Id. at 643, 805 A.2d 1061. In addition, at the time the legislation took effect in Dua, the petitioners’ ability to recover the refunds was not subject to any future review, act, contingency, or decision to make it secure and, therefore, the Court concluded that “there is a vested right in an accrued cause of action and that the Maryland Constitution precludes the impairment of such right.” Id. at 632, 805 A.2d 1061.

By contrast, here, Bill No. 27-07 did nothing more than codify the County’s procedure; it did not retroactively change County law or policy, nor did it purport to take away an accrued cause of action for refunds. See id. at 643, 805 A.2d 1061; Cf. Prince George’s Cty. v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 500, 19 A.3d 859 (2011) (holding that retroactive application of damages cap constituted a substantive change in law and policy that occurred after the cause of action had fully accrued, and would thus violate the Maryland Declaration of Rights). Accordingly, the calculation of refunds with consideration of encumbrances pursuant to the County’s procedure in Bill No. 27-07 did not interfere with vested rights.

III. $9.9 Million

Appellants argue that the County knowingly violated the Impact Fee Ordinance by denying them a refund of $9.9 million, which is the amount the County transferred from the General Fund to the Impact Fee Fund to replace fees that were improperly spent on ineligible projects. In response, the County avers that this Court had already ruled, in Halle, that class plaintiffs are not entitled to “dollar for dollar” refunds of impact fees spent on ineligible projects. The County is correct.

The impact fee refund at issue here stems from appellants’ claim concerning the impact fees collected in FYs 1997-2002. At the time of appellants’ original claim, however, those impact fees were expended or encumbered within six FYs following the FY of collection and, as such, no impact fees were available for refund. § 17-11-201.

Thereafter, the circuit court determined that the County funded certain projects with money from the Impact Fee Fund and that those projects were ineligible from impact fee use. According to the court, the County should have used the General Fund or another source instead. As a result, in FY 2008, the County credited the Impact Fee Fund for the expenditures that the circuit court had determined were improperly spent on projects ineligible for impact fee use, totaling $9.9 million.

As the County correctly states, this accounting adjustment does not violate any County or State law, and does not constitute a basis for a refund. In Maryland, a taxpayer is entitled to a refund where the refund is specifically authorized by statute. Bowman v. Goad, 348 Md. 199, 202, 703 A.2d 144 (1997) (“any statutorily prescribed refund remedy is exclusive”). No statute authorizes a refund of money transferred from the General Fund to the Impact Fee Fund to replace funds erroneously expended. Therefore, we reject appellants’ contention that they are now entitled to a $9.9 million refund.

IV. “State Rated School Capacity”

In late 2001, the County Council enacted Bill No. 96-01, which, effective February 3, 2002, authorized the County to use impact fees for temporary classroom structures provided they expanded the capacity of the schools to serve new development. Appellants argue that this change in policy was simply “the County’s attempt to prevent the refund of impact fee expenditures.” In addition, they contend that Bill No. 96-01 violates the rational nexus doctrine, effects a taking, and is preempted by State regulation.

As we explained in detail above, neither the rational nexus doctrine nor the takings clause applies here. With regard to appellants’ contention that impact fees cannot be expended for temporary classrooms because movable structures do not expand the capacity of schools as measured by the Maryland State Department of Education’s (“MSDE”) State Rated Capacity (“SRC”), we conclude that nothing in MSDE’s definition of SRC was intended to preempt the County’s authority.

Under Maryland law, “State law may preempt local law in one of three ways; (1) preemption by conflict, (2) express preemption, or (3) implied preemption.” Worton Creek Marina, LLC v. Claggett, 381 Md. 499, 512, 850 A.2d 1169 (2004) (quoting Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481, 487-88, 620 A.2d 880 (1993)) (footnote omitted). Here, appellants assert that there is conflict preemption. Under that theory, “when a local government ordinance conflicts with a public general law enacted by the General Assembly, the local ordinance is preempted by the State law and is rendered invalid.” Id. at 513, 850 A.2d 1169 (citations omitted).

As the circuit court ruled, there is nothing in the State definition of SRC that prohibits the County from applying a definition of capacity for purposes of determining the scope of its use of impact fees broader than the definition used by MSDE for school finance purposes. The County’s definition of capacity is consistent with the enabling law for the impact fees (1986 Md. Laws Ch. 350, § 1, codified in § 17-11-214), and it is the County, not the State, that determines the scope of its Impact Fee Ordinance. As such, appellants’ challenge to Bill No. 96-01 fails.

V. Motion for Accounting

Next, appellants continue to challenge the retroactivity of Bill No. 27-07 and to assert their right to a refund of the $9.9 million replenishment, by arguing that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for an actual accounting by the County. Specifically, appellants assert that the County should have been ordered to provide an accounting of the impact fees “without the new accounting procedures in retroactive Bill 27-07 and the 2008 replenishment.” (Emphasis in original). This is because, according to appellants, the County’s records governing impact fee collections, expenditures, encumbrances, and eligibility are complicated, unorganized, and solely in the County’s possession.

Contrary to appellants’ assertion, our opinion in Alternatives Unlimited, Inc. v. New Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 155 Md.App. 415, 843 A.2d 252 (2004), squarely addresses this issue. In that case, we explained that the traditional criteria for an accounting in equity were as follows:

The general rule is that a suit in equity for an accounting may be maintained when the remedies at law are inadequate.
The instances in which the legal remedies are held to be inadequate are said to be as follows; First, where there are mutual accounts between the plaintiff and the defendant; second, where the accounts are all on one side, but there are circumstances of great complication, or difficulties in the way of adequate remedy at law; and third, where a fiduciary relation exists between the parties, and a duty rests upon the defendant to render an account.

Id. at 508-09, 843 A.2d 252 (internal citations and emphasis omitted). With regard to the second instance, which applies to appellants’ complaint here, we clarified:

[W]hereas an equitable claim for an accounting once served a necessary discovery function, that function has been superseded by modern rules of discovery.
[W]here there is no other ground of equity jurisdiction, a bill for discovery alone has been practically superseded by an adequate, complete and sufficient remedy at law.
... [I]t is sufficient that the new rules furnish means for discovery, at law or in equity, which are broader than the former inherent equity jurisdiction.

Id. at 510, 843 A.2d 252 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).

In this case, not only was discovery a fully effective means for appellants to obtain the information they sought in their motion for an accounting, but the County also provided them with the six FY charts and documents necessary for appellants to determine whether impact fees were available for refund. As the County notes, appellants have not pointed to a single piece of information relevant to the calculation that they were not provided. The circuit court, therefore, properly denied appellant’s motion.

YI. Effect of Bill No. 71-08

Finally, appellants contend that Bill No. 71-08, which prospectively repealed the impact fee refund provisions previously set forth in § 17-11-210, interfered with their vested rights to impact fee refunds in violation of the contracts clause and takings clause of the United States Constitution. According to appellants, Bill No. 71-08 “operates as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship between the County and special taxpayers” and “is facially unconstitutional for it violates the rational nexus doctrine by eliminating the County’s burden to demonstrate a need for the collection of [impact] fees.”

“As a general rule, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively and are to be construed accordingly.” Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co. Inc., 308 Md. 556, 560, 520 A.2d 1319 (1987) (citations omitted). A legislative body is authorized to “amend, qualify, or repeal any of its laws, affecting all persons and property which have not acquired rights vested under existing law.” Dal Maso v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Prince George’s Cty., 182 Md. 200, 206, 34 A.2d 464 (1943). “Thus many courts adhere to the proposition that in the absence of a contrary expression of intent, a cause of action or remedy dependent upon a statute falls with the repeal of a statute.” State v. Johnson, 285 Md. 339, 344, 402 A.2d 876 (1979) (citations omitted). In sum, “rights which are of purely statutory origin and have no basis at common law are wiped out when the statutory provision creating them is repealed, regardless of the time of their accrual, unless the rights concerned are vested.” Beechwood Coal Co. v. Lucas, 215 Md. 248, 256, 137 A.2d 680 (1958) (citations omitted).

Appellants suggest that prospective application of the repeal in this case applies only to impact fees collected after Bill No. 71-08’s effective date of January 1, 2009. Appellants are mistaken. As explained above, the repeal of a statute creating a right purely of statutory origin, such as § 17-11-210, wipes out the right unless the right is vested. Stated differently, the prospective repeal of the substantive right to assert a claim means that the repeal bars any claim that could not have been made (ie., not ripe) as of the effective date of the repeal. See McComas v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd., 88 Md.App. 143, 148, 594 A.2d 583 (1991) (“Because the rights and obligations created [at issue] originated with the statute itself, amendments apply to all claims to which the Board has not granted an award.”); Aviles v. Eshelman Elec. Corp., 281 Md. 529, 533, 379 A.2d 1227 (1977) (restating the “well established” principle that “[ajbsent a contrary intent made manifest by the enacting authority, any change made by statute or court rule affecting a remedy only (and consequently not impinging on substantive rights) controls all court actions whether accrued, pending or future”) (footnote and citations omitted).

In this case, § 17-11-210 originally required the County to refund fees that had not been expended or encumbered within six FYs following the FY of collection. Pursuant to § 17—11— 210(b), the County was required to determine whether impact fees were available for refund within 60 days following the end of the FY. Thus, a claim for a refund of impact fees collected in FY 2003 could not be ripe until August 29, 2009. Because this date is after the effective repeal date of January 1, 2009, the circuit court correctly ruled that appellants were barred from claiming fees collected after 2002 and that they have no vested right that precludes the repeal.

Finding no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the circuit court, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.

      . In their brief, appellants presented six questions, but their argument consisted of 15 subparts.

      . Unless otherwise specified, all citations will be to the County Code. The code has since been amended numerous times. The language of the relevant sections at the pertinent times is undisputed by the parties.

      . As previously stated, prior to the enactment of Bill No. 96-01, the County was prohibited from expending impact fees to pay for temporary classrooms. Bill No. 96-01 authorized such expenditures provided they expanded the capacity of the schools to serve new development, but it was given only prospective effect, so it applied only to expenditures on and after February 3, 2002.

      . Notwithstanding Bill No. 96-01, appellants argued that impact fees cannot be used to fund temporary classrooms because they are excluded from “State Rated Capacity” as defined by the State for school funding purposes, and impact fees can only be used for projects that expand school capacity. Appellants also argued that the “rough proportionality” or “rational nexus” test prohibits the use of impact fees to fund temporary classrooms.

        The County disagreed with appellants' arguments, contending that the use of impact fees to fund temporary classrooms on and after February 3, 2002, was expressly authorized by law and that the rational nexus test does not apply to the County's impact fees. Alternatively, the County prepared six FY charts that excluded all expenditures on temporary classrooms in calculating whether impact fees were available for refund in FYs 1997-2002. Those charts demonstrated that, even if all expenditures on relocatable classrooms were excluded, there would still be no impact fees available for refund.

      . This scholarly treatise has been relied upon repeatedly throughout the related proceedings by this Court and by the circuit court.

      . According to the County, in the Annual Budget and Appropriation Ordinances, the County Council appropriated only sums of money for capital projects, and did not appropriate from a specific funding source. The County states that there are numerous sources for the funds disbursed to pay invoices relating to capital projects, including impact fees, general funds, federal grants, state grants, and developer contributions. It also notes that funding sources for County capital projects are identified by the County's Office of Finance after invoices are paid from the Central Cash Fund.

      . Because the test does not apply to the impact fees in this case, we need not address the merits of whether the County complied with the test’s requirements.

      . Bill No. 78-01 was not given express retroactive effect, and therefore, the repeal of § 17-11-210 was prospective. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 582, 219 A.2d 820 (1966) ("The general presumption is that all statutes, State and federal, are intended to operate prospectively and the presumption is found to have been rebutted only if there are clear expressions in the statute to the contrary.”) (Citations omitted). Accordingly, unlike fees collected in FY 2003, claims for refunds of impact fees collected in FYs 1997-2002, which were not expended or encumbered within six FYs following the year of collection, were ripe prior to the repeal and may be pursued in this case.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Arthur, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    157 A.3d 398
    Harold Eugene WILLIAMS v. STATE of Maryland
    No. 537,
    Sept. Term, 2016
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    March 30, 2017

      Wyatt Feeler (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for Appellant
    Gary E. O’Connor (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for Appellee
    Arthur, Reed, Robert A. Zarnoch (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
   Arthur, J.

Appellant Harold Eugene Williams had an altercation with his girlfriend, Angela Swan, after reading a series of text messages between her and other men. An Anne Arundel County jury convicted Williams of second-degree assault, but he was acquitted of first-degree assault, reckless endangerment, a number of weapons offenses, and posting revenge porn in violation of Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), § 3-809 of the Criminal Law Article.

In Williams’s timely appeal, he complains of the trial court’s admission of his prior conviction for battery on cross-examination of his character witnesses and of the court’s response to a jury question. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Williams and Swan were involved in an intimate relationship from 2012 to October of 2015. Although they did not live together, Swan had a key to Williams’s house, often stayed overnight, and kept her belongings there. Swan testified that in the last few months of their relationship they had argued frequently.

On October 23, 2015, Swan stayed at Williams’s house at his request. The next morning, while Swan was in the bathroom, wearing only a shirt, her cell phone started ringing.

Williams was near her phone at the time. He noticed a text message from a man whom Swan had denied knowing only days earlier. Williams read the man’s text messages, along with messages from three other men. He saw that Swan had sent a nude photograph to someone. Williams grabbed Swan’s cell phone and confronted her in the bathroom.

Swan claimed that Williams called her a “bitch,” accused her of cheating on him, shoved her against the bathroom wall, threw her phone towards her, hit her upper body, pushed her to the floor, and kicked her while she was on the floor on her back, all the while demanding that she leave. According to Swan, she said that she would leave, and Williams backed away, but continued yelling at her. After a few moments, she went upstairs to gather her clothes and belongings. She claimed that Williams threw her pants down the stairs and held a gun to her head while he was using her phone to tell someone to come and get her before he killed her. She also claimed that he pushed her down the stairs as she begged him to let her leave. After Williams allegedly pushed her into a closet and took her purse, she claimed that she was able to escape, with a towel wrapped around herself, and with some of his possessions (which she said she intended to trade for hers). She said that she found her pants and some of her belongings outside of the house.

After the confrontation, Swan drove to a nearby convenience store to call 911. She told the operator that Williams had attacked her and held a gun to her head, but that she did not need medical attention.

A police officer arrived. He spoke to Swan, who was “visibly upset,” “shaking,” and “crying a lot.” She told the officer that Williams had physically assaulted her, pulled a gun on her, and pushed her down the stairs. The officer requested emergency medical services, but Swan refused treatment.

The officer went to Williams’s house and retrieved Swan’s phone. After he returned it to her, Swan received a call on her cell phone from a friend. The friend told Swan to check her Facebook account because nude photographs of her had been posted on her Facebook page. The officer showed Swan how to delete the posting.

Testifying in his own defense, Williams denied punching or kicking Swan or threatening her with a gun. He claimed that after looking at the information in her phone and discovering evidence of her infidelity, including the nude picture that she had sent to another man, he had ordered her out of his house. He admitted that he had "tried to grab the towel" that she had around her waist and that he "tried to push her out the front door." Williams denied that he owned a gun.

Williams called Arkina Taylor, his former neighbor, as a character witness. Taylor said she had known Williams for ten years and that he was her "best friend." Taylor offered her opinion that Williams was a "hard-working fun-loving guy that just likes to have a good time." She testified that he had a reputation in the community as being a "[pleaceful" person and that she had "never" seen him with a firearm or become violent.

When given the opportunity to cross-examine Taylor, the State asked to approach the bench, and the following colloquy occurred:

[STATE]: Now that she has said he's a peaceful person-
[COURT]: Uh-huh.
[STATE]: -the State is entitled to rebut that by asking her if she's aware that he has a prior conviction for battery.[ ]
[COURT]: Uh-huh. I think you are, too. Do you want to say anything about it?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I do. I think that the State should not be allowed to do that. If the State knew the specific facts of what that battery is, they-
[COURT]: Well, why would that be, because I don’t think the State is allowed to get into the facts; all they’re allowed to do is ask that single question. Remember, they’re not allowed to say or ask for their—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would think at this point, that they’re referring to a conviction back in 1990 and I think it’s certainly more prejudicial than probative and I don’t think the State should be allowed—
[STATE]: It is 1990, Your Honor.
[COURT]: 1990. If she’s known him for 10 years—
[STATE]: But they’re—it’s her best friend, so it’s very relevant if she [sic] ever told him if she is aware of his prior convictions—
[COURT]: Uh-huh.
[STATE]: —that he’s a peaceful and non-violent man. I mean it’s completely relevant, Your Honor.
[THE COURT]: Uh-huh. I think it is, too.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And I would just argue that this is a conviction that dates back 25 years.
[THE COURT]: Uh-huh.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It dates a full 16 years prior to her knowing him.
[THE COURT]: Does that make any difference?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think it does. I think it’s certainly more prejudicial than probative.
[COURT]: Well, here’s the problem I’m having and maybe you can help me with this; there’s a difference between admitting it (indiscernible—10:52:04) and admitting it because it may not be a true fact, if he’s always been a peaceful man, right?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Uh-huh.
[THE COURT]: And I think the State is trying to get it in to show that he’s not peaceful. And so there’s no requirement that it did not date back to at least—you know, even in 15 years.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think there is. I specifically-asked whether or not, based upon her knowledge of him and the length of time that she knew him, that he was peaceful, and based upon that, her knowledge, and those ten years of his reputation in the community, I think unless the State has some other hinge of evidence that he’s gotten a reputation, based upon that past prior for being not peaceful or being violent, it shouldn’t be allowed.
⅜ * ⅜ *
[STATE]: They opened the door. They put his peacefulness in evidence.
[THE COURT]: Uh-huh.
[STATE]: Whether—and I’m not going to do this—first off, I do it (indiscernible—10:53:03) how well she knows him, because if she doesn’t know about this, then she really doesn’t know him that well, and if she does know about this, then he’s not a peaceful—his reputation is in question. They’ve completely opened this door—
[COURT]: I think it comes in and the [State] will be entitled to say, knowing that, does that change your opinion of his peaceful character.

Over a defense objection, the State asked Taylor if she was aware of Williams’s prior conviction for battery and, if she was not, whether this knowledge would cause her to change her opinion of him. She answered “no” to both questions.

After the court had permitted the State to impeach Williams’s first character witness with evidence of his 1990 conviction for battery, Williams called two more character witnesses: Dana Webb, a former girlfriend; and Kamran Jones, a coworker. They had known Williams for six and 15 years, respectively. They testified that Williams had a reputation for peacefulness and that they had never seen him with a firearm or become violent. On direct examination, Williams’s attorney asked both of them whether they knew of Williams’s 1990 battery conviction and, if they did not, whether it would change their opinion of him. Both said, “no.” The State revisited that topic on cross-examination, and the witnesses reiterated their earlier answers.

At the end of the State’s case-in-chief, the court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of posting revenge porn. The State entered a nolle prosequi on the charge of use of a handgun in a felony.

The court submitted the remaining counts to the jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the second-degree assault count and acquitted Williams of the four remaining counts. The court imposed a sentence of three years’ imprisonment, with all but six months suspended, to be followed by two years of probation.

Williams filed this timely appeal.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Williams presents two issues on appeal, which we quote:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to ask a witness about Mr. Williams’s prior battery conviction?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to give a complete response to jurors’ question about second-degree assault?

For the reasons that follow, we answer both questions in the negative. Consequently, we shall affirm Williams’s conviction.

DISCUSSION

I. The Admission of Williams’s Prior Conviction for Battery

In general, “evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that the person acted in accordance with the character or trait on a particular occasion.” Md. Rule 5-404(a)(l). In a criminal case, however, “[a]n accused may offer evidence of the accused’s pertinent trait of character.” Md. Rule 5—404(a)(2)(A). “If the evidence is admitted, the [State] may offer evidence to rebut it.” Id.

In Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948), the Supreme Court explained: “The price a defendant must pay for attempting to prove his good name is to throw open the entire subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit and to make himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields him.” If a defendant’s character witness is unaware of information bearing on the defendant’s character, “the jury may doubt whether [the witness] is capable of giving any very reliable conclusions as to [the defendant’s] reputation.” Id. at 483, 69 S.Ct. 213.

Williams contends that his prior conviction was “too remote in time to be relevant.” Alternatively, he contends that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We disagree that the court erred or abused its discretion in permitting the State to question the character witnesses about the conviction.

A. Relevance

A court may admit relevant evidence, but it has no discretion to admit evidence that is irrelevant. Smith v. State, 218 Md.App. 689, 704, 98 A.3d 444 (2014). A ruling that evidence is legally relevant is a conclusion of law, which we review de novo. See id. A prior conviction is relevant to impeach character testimony if it “impugns the particular character trait or traits in issue.” State v. Watson, 321 Md. 47, 55, 580 A.2d 1067 (1990).

Williams relies on Watson to establish that his prior conviction was “too remote in time to be relevant” on cross-examination of his character witnesses. Watson is inapposite.

In Watson, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. Id. at 49, 580 A.2d 1067. In his defense, he “called eight character witnesses, all of whom testified to their opinions as to [his] peaceful and non-violent character.” Id. at 50, 580 A.2d 1067. The State countered by cross-examining the character witnesses about their knowledge of the defendant’s prior conviction for second-degree rape. The circuit court allowed the cross-examination over the defendant’s objection that the offense “did not involve force” and that “the conviction was for having sexual intercourse with a consenting 13-year-old girl.” Id. at 51, 580 A.2d 1067.

On appeal, the Court concluded that the circuit court erred in allowing the State to use the conviction for second-degree rape in cross-examining the character witnesses, because “having sexual intercourse with a consenting 13-year-old girl [bore] little, if any, relationship to the defendant’s character for peacefulness and non-violence.” Id. at 56, 580 A.2d 1067. Because the prior conviction was irrelevant to the character trait at issue, the Watson Court did not consider whether the conviction for second-degree rape was “too remote in time to be relevant.”

In reaching its decision, the Watson Court referred to a multi-volume treatise on federal evidence, which, the Court said, “suggest[s]” that the trial judge should take the following steps when the State seeks to cross-examine a character witness about a defendant’s prior misconduct:

1) determine that there is a good faith basis for the inquiry; 2) determine that the acts or events about which the [State] proposes to inquire are relevant to the particular character trait testified to by the witness on direct examination; 3) determine that the acts are not too remote in time to be relevant cross-examination of the character witness-, 4) reject any inquiry where the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value; and 5) if requested, instruct the jury that the purpose of the question is only to test the basis for the character witness’ testimony.

Id. at 54, 580 A.2d 1067 (quoting 2 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 138, at 152 (1985)) (emphasis added).

Nonetheless, Watson did not explore when a conviction is “too remote in time to be relevant” on cross-examination of character witnesses. Nor has any subsequent Maryland decision. Williams himself offers no guidance as to when a defendant’s conviction might be so old and stale that, as a matter of law, it is irrelevant to impeach a witness’s testimony about a defendant’s character. Instead, Williams concedes that, “there is no hard-and-fast time limit for convictions to be subject to cross-examination of a character witness.”

Although Williams cites no authority besides the dicta in Watson, we have examined the treatises of Professor McLain, Judge Murphy, Judge Weinstein, McCormick, and Wigmore to see if they shed any light on when a conviction might be so remote that it becomes legally irrelevant for purposes of impeaching a character witness’s credibility. None do. McCormick does, however, state that “most courts” adopt the “practical solution” of “accept[ing] testimony about reputation as of any pretrial time period which the judge in his discretion finds is not too remote.” McCormick on Evidence § 43, at 282-88 (7th ed. 2013). Similarly, in Michelson, 335 U.S. at 484, 69 S.Ct. 213, the Supreme Court wrote that “[t]he court, in its discretion, may well exclude inquiry about rumors of an event so remote, unless recent misconduct revived them.” In other words, although some convictions might be so old that they no longer have any conceivable bearing on the character of the person whom the defendant has become (see, e.g., Victor Hugo, Les Miserables (1862)), the question of whether a conviction is too remote to be used to impeach a character witness’s testimony is typically one for the trial court, in its discretion, to resolve. State v. Cummings, 332 N.C. 487, 422 S.E.2d 692, 703 (1992) (it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether a past instance of conduct should be excluded after weighing its probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice).

Williams’s 1990 battery conviction was not so old that, as a matter of law, it no longer had any conceivable relevance to his character for peacefulness. Evidence is “relevant” if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Md. Rule 5-401. Williams’s character for peacefulness was a “fact that [was] of consequence to the determination of the action,” and we cannot say that Williams’s battery conviction was too remote to have any bearing on whether he was a peaceful person or whether his character witnesses had a sound basis for their testimony. Even though the conviction was not particularly fresh, the jury might arguably have gotten an incomplete impression of Williams’s character for peacefulness if it heard only the favorable accounts from his character witnesses and did not hear of his conviction for a violent act at an earlier stage in his life. The circuit court, therefore, did not err in concluding that the battery conviction was relevant for purposes of impeaching the character witnesses.

B. Probative Value vs. Danger of Unfair Prejudice

Even if evidence is relevant, a court may exclude it “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Md. Rule 5-403. The trial court declined to exclude the evidence of Williams’s prior battery conviction on this ground. We review that decision for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 374 Md. 693, 705, 824 A.2d 123 (2003).

When weighing the probative value of proffered evidence against its potentially prejudicial nature, a court abuses its discretion “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court, or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Webster v. State, 221 Md.App. 100, 112, 108 A.3d 480 (2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted). For the court to have abused its discretion, “[t]he decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.” King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 697, 967 A.2d 790 (2009). The decision “will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling.” Id.

Williams claims that the battery conviction was “hardly probative at all” because it occurred a decade or more before any of the character witnesses knew him. Neither the circuit court nor the jury, however, was required to give the conviction the weight that Williams assigns to it. Even though the conviction predated their friendship or association with Williams, the jury could have discounted the witnesses’ testimony about his character for peacefulness because they did not know of a violent incident in his past. See Watson, 321 Md. at 53, 580 A.2d 1067. Alternatively, because the witnesses said that they maintained their good opinion of Williams after becoming aware of his conviction, the conviction may have led the jury to question the soundness of their judgment. See id.

Williams cites Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981), for the proposition that once the jurors were “informed that [Williams] had been previously convicted of the same [sic] crime in the past,” they were “seriously prejudiced” against him. His reliance on Ricketts is misplaced.

Ricketts concerns the State’s misuse of a prior conviction to impeach a defendant’s own credibility. Id. at 714, 436 A.2d 906. In this case, however, no such risk existed. In closing, the State argued:

I want to talk briefly about the Defense witnesses you heard from. You heard from a parade of the Defendant’s friends who talked about how he was a peaceful or a non-violent person. Well, you know, when I asked them, were you aware the Defendant had ever been previously convicted of battery, none of them knew. None of them knew. Then I asked them if it would change their opinion. All of them: No, it wouldn’t change my opinion. Are you kidding me? It’s not going to change your opinion of this person that you know has been previously convicted of assaultive behavior. Are you kidding me? Friends are friends, but that doesn’t make sense.

The State’s use of Williams’s prior conviction to challenge the reliability of the character witnesses’ testimony was unequivocal. Unlike Ricketts, where the prior conviction “shed[ ] no light” upon the defendant’s veracity (id. at 713-14, 436 A.2d 906), knowledge of Williams’s prior conviction in this case “sheds light” upon the soundness of the character witnesses’ judgment. See Watson, 321 Md. at 53, 580 A.2d 1067.

Furthermore, even if the evidence of Williams’s prior conviction was prejudicial, it was not unfairly prejudicial, because the State’s questions were not “an inquiry specifically directed to a prior bad act” (Winters v. State, 301 Md. 214, 232, 482 A.2d 886 (1984)), but an “effort to probe the veracity of the opinions offered and the witnesses’ basis of knowledge in formulating those opinions.” Id. at 233, 482 A.2d 886.

In summary, although a different judge might have reached a different conclusion, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, was not required to prohibit the State from impeaching the character witnesses with evidence of Williams’s 25-year-old battery conviction. Because the character witnesses testified to Williams’s reputation for peacefulness based on their experiences over as much as 15 years, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to permit the State to use Williams’s conviction to challenge the basis for the witnesses’ testimony. Cf. Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 722, 668 A.2d 8 (1995) (concluding that it would be “patently unfair” to permit defendant to present a “stellar” picture of himself to the jury, but preclude the State to impeach him -with evidence of a prior conviction that contradicts this image).

II. Jury Instruction on Defense of Property

During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court for the definition of second-degree assault. At that time, defense counsel asked the court to include a reinstruction on the defense of property, which Williams says was one of his defenses. The court refused to “highlight” it and, instead, recited the second-degree assault instruction that it had given earlier. See Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions (“MPJI-Cr”) 4:01 (2d ed. 2013). The court apparently agreed with the State that reinstructing the jury on defense of property “would emphasize a particular instruction that they have not inquired about.”

Williams complains that the court’s refusal “left jurors with an incomplete instruction and inhibited Williams’s defense.” We disagree.

Under Maryland Rule 4-325(a), “[t]he court shall give instructions to the jury at the conclusion of all the evidence and before closing arguments and may supplement them at a later time when appropriate.” “ ‘The main purpose of a jury instruction is to aid the jury in clearly understanding the case, to provide guidance for the jury’s deliberations, and to help the jury arrive at a correct verdict.’ ” Appraicio v. State, 431 Md. 42, 51, 63 A.3d 599 (2013) (quoting Chambers v. State, 337 Md. 44, 48, 650 A.2d 727 (1994)). “Supplemental instructions can include an instruction given in response to a jury question.” Id.

“We review a trial court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. The court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction will not be disturbed on review except on a clear showing that it was manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons. Id.; see also Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 653-60, 702 A.2d 261 (1997) (suggesting that the refusal to given an instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Had the jury inquired about the effect of Williams’s claim of defense of property on the second-degree assault charge, then reinstruction on defense of property might have been necessary. See, e.g., State v. Baby, 404 Md. 220, 263-64, 946 A.2d 463 (2008) (when jurors inquired about the effect of withdrawing consent during vaginal intercourse, it “was not sufficient” simply to refer the jury to the legal definition of rape); Lovell, 347 Md. at 659-60, 702 A.2d 261 (concluding that where the jury’s question indicated concern about youthful age as a statutory mitigating circumstance, the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to provide further guidance on the term “youthful age”).

In this case, however, the jury had asked only for the definition of second-degree assault, not for any further information concerning defense of property or its relation to second-degree assault. The trial court, therefore, was not required to reinstruct the jury on the defense of property.

CONCLUSION

In both of the rulings challenged by Williams, the trial court acted within its discretion. “[Wjhile the law gives [Williams] the option to show as a fact that his reputation reflects a life and habit incompatible with commission of the offense charged, it subjects his proof to tests of credibility designed to prevent him from profiting by a mere parade of partisans.” Michelson, 335 U.S. at 479, 69 S.Ct. 213. Moreover, the jury’s request for the definition of second-degree assault required only one answer.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

      . Because Williams was acquitted of most of the charges against him (including the most serious charges), we do not view the facts, as we normally would, in the light most favorable to the State. In recounting the factual background in this case, we largely recount the evidence that the jury heard, and not necessarily the facts that the jury found.

      . On the day after the altercation, Swan did go to a hospital to seek treatment for a bruise on her leg, which she attributed to the assault.

      . The record contains a certified copy of a document from the District Court of Maryland for Prince George's County (District 5). The document indicates that on April 25, 1990, Williams pleaded guilty to battery, which was a common-law offense at the time. See Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 694, 728 A.2d 698 (1999). Williams paid a $75.00 fine and court costs and was placed on probation for one year.

      . Before calling the character witness and eliciting her opinion, Williams did not move in limine for a ruling concerning whether the State could impeach her with the battery conviction. Nor did Williams request a cautionary instruction to the effect that the jury should consider the conviction only insofar as it bore on the witness’s testimony about his character. See generally State v. Watson, 321 Md. 47, 58, 580 A.2d 1067 (1990).

      . Although Williams himself raised the issue of the conviction with the second and third character witnesses, the State does not argue that he has waived his challenge to the court's ruling. See Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 433, 583 A.2d 218 (1990) (quoting Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144, 202 A.2d 585 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001, 85 S.Ct. 721, 13 L.Ed.2d 702 (1965)) (“[t]he general rule is that a party waives his objection to testimony by subsequently offering testimony on the same matter' ”); compare Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 305, 26 A.3d 899 (2011) (holding that when court has ruled in limine that State may impeach defendant with prior conviction, defendant does not necessarily waive the ability to challenge that ruling by bringing up the prior conviction while testifying on direct examination in order to "draw the sting” out of the conviction). Because the State does not argue waiver, we do not decide that issue.

      . Despite the references by Court and counsel to the 13-year-old victim’s “consent,” today we would recognize that she was legally incapable of consenting.

      . Williams does not argue that a court must apply the 15-year time limit that Rule 5-609 imposes on the use of convictions to impeach the credibility of a witness. In decisions concerning the analogous federal rule, courts have refused to apply that time limit to restrict the use of defendant's convictions to cross-examine a character witness. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 549 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 828, 98 S.Ct. 107, 54 L.Ed.2d 87 (1977); State v. Hart, 72 Ohio App.3d 92, 593 N.E.2d 463, 467 (1991) ("Courts have previously rejected the notion that the ten-year limitation under Evid. R. 609, concerning impeachment by prior conviction, should be construed in conjunction with Evid. R. 405(A)”) (quoting Edwards).

      . The Louisell treatise, which the Court of Appeals quoted in Watson, no longer appears to be in print. A successor treatise asserts that the probative value of a conviction is doubtful if it concerns events that occurred more than 10 years in the past. See 2 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4.43, at 33 (4th ed. 2013). Nonetheless, the treatise cites no case for the proposition that such a conviction is irrelevant as a matter of law. Instead, the treatise cites a number of cases, including the Supreme Court's decision in Michelson, in which courts have permitted the prosecution to cross-examine character witnesses with convictions that are more than 10, or even 20, years old. Id. at 33 n.41 (citing Michelson, 335 U.S. at 484, 69 S.Ct. 213 (permitting inquiry about arrest 27 years earlier, where some acquaintances had known defendant for 30 years, and defendant had volunteered information about another arrest 20 years earlier)); United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719, 722 n.1 (3d Cir. 1971) (permitting inquiry about conviction 13 years earlier); United States v. Edwards, 549 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1977) (affirming court’s exercise of discretion to permit inquiry about 25-year-old conviction, and rejecting argument that court should have applied 10-year limit contained in rule concerning impeachment of defendant with prior convictions bearing on character for truthfulness); Harbin v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99, 106 (6th Cir. 1978) (permitting inquiry about 13- and 15-year-old convictions); Cummings, 422 S.E.2d at 703 (affirming discretionary decision to permit inquiry about 23-year-old conviction); see also United States v. Spero, 625 F.2d 779, 780 (8th Cir. 1980) (district court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s 22-year-old prior conviction where credibility of witnesses’ testimony was crucial).

      . Although the court instructed the jury on defense of property, the State argues that Williams did not generate the defense (and hence that the court could not have erred in declining to reinstruct the jury on that defense). In particular, the State argues that Williams adduced no evidence of his belief that Swan was illegally interfering with his property. See Maryland Criminal Jury Instructions and Commentary § 8.04 (2014-2015 ed.). In view of Swan’s testimony that she absconded with some of Williams’s belongings in the hope that she could trade them for her phone, we assume for the sake of argument that Williams satisfied his minimal burden of generating some evidence to support an instruction on this defense. See, e.g., Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 216-17, 571 A.2d 1251 (1990).