author: Moylan, J.,

text:
    BRUCE D. KIDD v. STATE OF MARYLAND
    [No. 45,
    September Term, 1976.]

      Decided November 3, 1976.

      The cause was argued before Moylan, Menchine and Lowe, JJ.

      Harriette Cohen, Assistant Public Defender, with whom was Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief, for appellant.

      Deborah K. Handel, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, William A. Sunsher, State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, and Wayne Cymek, Assistant State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellee.
   Moylan, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The root problem giving rise to the present appeal is the failure to appreciate that in 1966 the warning and waiver requirements mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, did not supersede preexisting constitutional law on the admissibility of confessions; the requirements of Miranda simply superimposed additional criteria for admissibility upon that preexisting law. Distracted by the glitter of this new surface layer of quasi-constitutionality, our case law has tended to ignore the substratum of pre-Miranda law which lies undisturbed in bedrock immutability beneath the more volatile overlay of Miranda.

The Factual Setting

The appellant, Bruce D. Kidd, was convicted by a Baltimore City jury of possessing heroin with intent to distribute it. Although the evidence against the appellant was legally sufficient to sustain the conviction, it was by no means overwhelming. At approximately 11 p.m. on May 9, 1975, plainclothes narcotics officers approached a large crowd in the 1700 block of Baker Street. That block was known as a “high-density narcotics area.” The appellant, upon whom investigation had not theretofore focused, quickly left the scene. The appellant testified that he was walking toward his car quickly because his daughter had hurt her knee and he was going to take her to the hospital. One of the arriving officers suspected that the appellant was “dirty” because he was observed running from the scene.' The officer testified, “If he wasn’t dirty, he wouldn’t have ran.” Another of the officers observed the appellant drop something. He searched the area and discovered 18 glassine bags of heroin. The appellant denied having discarded the glassine bags of heroin. Into this two-on-one credibility battle there intruded the damaging admission now in issue, made by the appellant to the police, that he was currently a narcotics addict. The error, if such be found, cannot be deemed harmless.

The incriminating statement was made by the appellant to Officer Winkler after the appellant had been arrested and was being booked. There was no testimony that any Miranda warnings had ever been given or that any rights had been waived. Such testimony would, indeed, have been superfluous since the State never offered the statement made to Officer Winkler during the course of its case in chief.

The issue first arose during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the appellant, while he was testifying in the course of his defense upon the merits. The triggering question was, “Did you ever tell Officer Winkler that you were a one bag habit man?” A timely objection was interposed. The objection was overruled. A bench conference ensued, at the end of which the trial judge ruled:

“If there is a confession or an admission or some statement by the defendant that does not comply with Miranda rules, you cannot introduce it on direct, but you can if the defendant takes the stand and denied it, then you can rebut his denial by putting on the statement that would not have been admissible had he not taken the stand.”

In response to the question, the appellant denied any such conversation with Officer Winkler. In rebuttal, the State called Officer Winkler. He testified, over objection, that the appellant admitted to him that he was an addict and that he had approximately “a one-bag-a-day habit.”

There was never a hearing, out of the presence of the jury or otherwise, on the voluntariness of this statement made to Officer Winkler. It is clear that the trial court, in making its ruling, was relying upon the case of Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 224, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4 (1971), which limited the impact of Miranda and held that a statement which might be excluded from the State’s case in chief because of a Miranda violation might nonetheless be received in rebuttal for purposes of impeaching the credibility of a defendant who takes the stand and testifies in a fashion contradicted by the Miranda-viol&tive statement:

“It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution’s case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.”

In 1975, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 722, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570, 577, reiterated this now undisputed limitation on the application of Miranda for purposes of total exclusion:

“As in Harris, it does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against Hass in the prosecution’s case in chief is barred for all purposes, always provided that ‘the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.’ ”

The Questions Before Us

We are called upon to decide whether the latitude countenanced by Harris v. New York with respect to a Miranda violation extends also to a violation of deeper import. What is meant by the qualifying phrase in Harris v. New York: “provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards”? If there is a deeper problem lurking beneath Miranda’s surface, how shall it be raised and litigated? Are a hearing and ruling required? What is the relevant test? What is the burden of proof? Who has the burden?

Earlier Intimations

On three earlier occasions, similar storm warnings were raised but the crisis passed over with no more than threatening skies. In Cooper v. State, 14 Md. App. 106, 110-116, 286 A. 2d 579, the issue first loomed (albeit in the context of the possible retroactivity of Harris v. New York) but it became unnecessary for us to resolve it because, notwithstanding having laid a foundation, the State never offered the arguably infirm prior inconsistent statement. In Layman v. State, 14 Md. App. 215, 224-231, 286 A. 2d 559, a question arose about using for impeachment purposes a prior inconsistent statement which allegedly ran afoul of traditional voluntariness requirements. The issue there arose, however, in the context of whether the judge was required to give a defendant an anticipatory ruling. We held that he was not so required. The present question was never faced. Finally, in Sabatini v. State, 14 Md. App. 431, 287 A. 2d 511, we did not have to face squarely the issue of whether a hearing is required when the challenged statement is offered for impeachment purposes. Although in that case a preliminary hearing was not held out of the presence of the jury, the evidence bearing on the question of traditional voluntariness was offered before the court and jury alike. We held that in ruling the statement admissible, the judge “at least implicitly” found traditional voluntariness. We further held, upon our independent, constitutional review, that the challenged statement was indeed voluntary. The risk that inheres when the matter is not explored preliminarily out of the presence of the jury did not, therefore, materialize under the circumstances of that case.

The Doctrinal Analysis of Harris v. New York

The issue now, however, is squarely before us. Indispensable to a principled resolution of the issue, and of the various sub-questions involved therewith, is an understanding of Harris v. New York not in terms of its surface operation but in terms of its doctrinal legitimacy.

If we were dealing with Miranda in a vacuum, the trial judge would be correct and we should affirm. As we pointed out in Bartram v. State, 33 Md. App. 115, 364 A. 2d 1119 (1976), “Miranda v. Arizona is in definite disfavor with the strong majority of the present membership of the institution charged with interpreting the law of the land,” and has been significantly eroded in a variety of ways by Harris v. New York, supra; by Oregon v. Hass, supra; by Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974); by Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96, 96 S. Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), and by United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 96 S. Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976). Miranda, however, is not coextensive with the fundamental constitutional right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments against compelled self-incrimination. The erosion or demeaning of Miranda by no means implies the erosion or demeaning of the fundamental constitutional right itself. That right stands as it stood before Miranda was ever promulgated. Neither Harris v. New York nor Oregon v. Hass has eroded it in any sense.

As limiting agents upon the exclusionary power of Miranda, Harris v. New York and Oregon v. Hass themselves have limitations. A Miranda-violative statement may, indeed, be used for impeachment purposes — “provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards. ’’The limitation has a limitation.

What is required conceptually is the appreciation of the difference between a “mere Miranda” violation and a more fundamental constitutional violation. See Bartram v. State, supra (Part 2A). To understand fully not only 1)' the correctness of the Harris v. New York limitation upon Miranda but also 2) the limited scope of that limitation, one must turn to the deeper doctrinal analysis of Michigan v. Tucker, supra.

In Michigan v. Tucker, a statement had been taken from a defendant in clear violation of Miranda. That statement led the police to a witness ultimately used by the prosecution in proving its case. The Supreme Court had to come to grips with the problem of whether a Miranda violation could serve as the “primary illegality” which would trigger the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. In holding that a “mere Miranda” violation would not trigger the operation of that doctrine, it was necessary for the Supreme Court to hold that Miranda itself was not of constitutional dimensions. It denigrated the Miranda rules from the constitutional status of being part and parcel of the right against self-incrimination, treating them rather as “only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right,” 417 U. S. at 439; as a “series of recommended ‘procedural safeguards,’ ” 417 U. S. at 443; as “suggested safeguards,” 417 U. S. at 444; as “only ... the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege,” 417 U. S. at 446. The Supreme Court held, as was necessary to its decision, that the fundamental privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such had not been violated:

“The Court recognized that these procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.
[T]he police conduct here did not deprive respondent of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such, but rather failed to make available to him the full measure of procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda” 417 U. S. at 444.

It then raised the question of whether a “mere Miranda” violation would trigger the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, while suggesting strongly that a violation of the right against compulsory self-incrimination would most certainly trigger that doctrine:

“Our determination that the interrogation in this case involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right against compulsory self-incrimination does not mean there was not a disregard, albeit an inadvertent disregard, of the procedural rules later established in Miranda. The question for decision is how sweeping the judicially imposed consequences of this disregard shall be.” 417 U. S. at 445.

Although its holding dealt with the obverse side of the present coin, the holding necessarily implied that a violation of the basic constitutional privilege itself will bar not only the direct use but any indirect use — “the fruits” — of such unconstitutionality:

“This Court has also said, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963), that the ‘fruits’ of police conduct which actually infringed a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights must be suppressed. But we have already concluded that the police conduct at issue here did not abridge respondent’s constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.” 417 U. S. at 445-446.

In Bartram v. State, supra, we pointed out that “[t]he distinction between a ‘mere Miranda’ violation, the product of which may be used in rebuttal or for collateral purposes, and a ‘primary illegality’ of constitutional dimensions under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine is very clear.” See also Ryon v. State, 29 Md. App. 62, 349 A. 2d 393. In In Re Appeal No. 245, Term 1975, 29 Md. App. 131, 349 A. 2d 434, Chief Judge Orth wrote for this Court, at 29 Md. App. 149, 150:

“In both Harris and Tucker, the misconduct of the police violated only the prophylactic rules developed by Miranda to protect the right against self-incrimination.... In the instant case, we do not have official action pursued in complete good faith, with the confession rendered inadmissible by the mere inadvertent omission of one of the prophylactic Miranda warnings.... The rationale of the holdings in Harris and Tucker does not apply to make admissible the tangible evidence obtained here, any more than it would apply to make admissible evidence derived from a confession not voluntary in the traditional sense.”

In Re Appeal No. 245, supra, is a beacon light of precedential guidance in this regard because of the clear contrast contained within it. A contested statement was taken from a juvenile. That statement was found to be infirm by both the trial court and by this Court for two distinct reasons. In the first place, there was not an adequate waiver under Miranda. At an even more fundamental level, it was held to be involuntary in the constitutional sense because it was the direct and proximate effect of an illegal detention. Quite properly, the confession was suppressed. The confession, however, gave the police a lead to a pair of binoculars, which binoculars were ultimately recovered by them and offered in evidence.

We held that, under the teaching of Harris v. New York and Michigan v. Tucker, the “mere Miranda” violation would not prohibit the use of the Mmwda-violative statement to furnish informational leads to the police and that the binoculars would not be suppressed because of the Miranda violation. Moving on to matters of more constitutional magnitude, however, we held that when the raw nerve of the right against compulsory self-incrimination was improperly touched by unlawful police action, the gears of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine were fully engaged and that the binoculars must be suppressed for the basic constitutional violation, even where suppression was not called for for the “mere Miranda” violation.

It is now undisputed that a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination can trigger the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. Michigan v. Tucker, supra; In Re Appeal No. 245, supra; Ryon v. State, supra; Bartram v. State, supra. Cf. Garrison v. State, 28 Md. App. 257, 345 A. 2d 86; Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 337 A. 2d 100; Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 337 A. 2d 415. It is also undisputed that once the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine comes into play, the use of a tainted “fruit” would be barred for all purposes, for impeachment purposes in rebuttal just as surely as for more directly inculpatory purposes in the case in chief. The heart of the doctrine was expressed by Justice Holmes in the case that gave birth to the doctrine, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920):

“The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.”

See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The Court of Appeals spoke very clearly to this point in Everhart v. State, supra, at 274 Md. 481-482:

“The doctrine of the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ extends the scope of the exclusionary rule to bar not only evidence directly seized, but also evidence indirectly obtained as a result of information learned or leads obtained in the unlawful search; in its broadest sense it prohibits the prosecution from using in any manner, prejudicial to the accused, information derived from facts learned as a result of the unlawful acts of law enforcement agents.” (Emphasis supplied)

It follows ineluctably that if an involuntary statement cannot be used for even so remote a purpose as supplying a lead to further investigation, it may not be used more directly to impeach credibility. Harris v. New York and Oregon v. Hass do not, therefore, authorize such use of a questioned statement, even for the limited purpose of impeachment in rebuttal, when the initial infirmity is constitutional involuntariness itself and not mere non-compliance with the suggested prophylactic rules of Miranda.

The analysis has been pursued perhaps to the point of tedium. A conceptual grasp of the crucial distinction between the natures of the violations, however, is indispensable to a principled resolution of the attendant procedural questions. With the distinction now firmly fixed in mind, we are equipped to consider the procedural sequelae.

The Procedural Questions

Since Harris v. New York cannot immunize even for limited purposes a statement made to the police where the contagion is of constitutional virulence, attention must be focused upon the procedural requirements for diagnosing such constitutional contagion. When the State seeks to use a statement against a defendant, even for the more limited purpose of impeachment, must the State show anything absent an objection? Is more required of a defendant by way of challenge than a bare objection? Is a judicial determination required? Once the issue is raised, what is the test? What is the burden of proof? To whom is the burden allocated?

The clue to the solution is that we are not addressing a new problem but rather an old problem which we have tended to neglect in the rush of more topical recent events. We must look beneath the transient sod into the abiding subsoil. The answers are what they have always been since Maryland began litigating the subject of voluntariness in 1873 with Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140, and since the Supreme Court began litigating the subject of voluntariness in 1936 with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682. Upon this massive body of case law, Miranda was superimposed by the Supreme Court in 1966 as an additional set of “procedural safeguards.” Miranda was not a substitute for the earlier and more fundamental safeguards and did not work any change with respect to them. It simply superimposed a veneer of additional prophylaxis. The effect of Harris v. New York is simply upon that prophylactic layer and does not alter the constitutional substratum which remains, procedurally as well as substantively, what it has always been.

1. Must the Defendant Interpose an Objection? Yes.

With respect to that substratum, it is and always has been clear that no issue arising out of the admissibility of a confession, for any purpose, will be preserved for appellate review absent an objection by the defendant at the time the confession is offered. Maryland Rule 1085; Tucker v. State, 237 Md. 422, 425, 206 A. 2d 691; Gaudio and Bucci v. State, 1 Md. App. 455, 462-463, 230 A. 2d 700; Kleinbart v. State, 2 Md. App. 183, 209, 234 A. 2d 288; Bitzer v. State, 4 Md. App. 415, 419, 243 A. 2d 33; Hall v. State, 6 Md. App. 356, 360-361, 251 A. 2d 219. Neither Miranda nor the Harris v. New York limitation upon Miranda had any effect upon this basic procedural rule.

2. Is a Bare Objection Enough? Yes.

With further respect to that substratum, it is and always has been clear “that general objection ... to the admission of the confession, is sufficient . . . and that grounds for the objection need not be stated unless requested by the court, Maryland Rule 522 d 1, made applicable to criminal causes by Rule 725 f.” Bates v. State, 32 Md. App. 108, 112-113, 359 A. 2d 106. See also Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159, 167-168, 151 A. 2d 737, 741; Giles v. State, 10 Md. App. 593, 598, 271 A. 2d 766, 769. Neither Miranda nor the Harris v. New York limitation upon Miranda had any effect upon this basic procedural rule.

3. Area Hearing and a Judicial Ruling Required? Yes.

With further respect to that substratum, it is and always has been clear that when a defendant makes timely objection to the admission of a statement taken from him by the police, the trial judge must conduct a hearing and must determine as a matter of law whether the challenged statement will or will not be admitted into evidence. As we said in Mulligan v. State, 10 Md. App. 429, 432, 271 A. 2d 385:

“The trial judge’s conclusion that the confession was voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity.”

We spoke to a similar effect in Barnhart v. State, 5 Md. App. 222, 226, 246 A. 2d 280:

“A defendant’s constitutional rights are violated when his challenged confession is introduced without the preliminary decision by the trial judge of its voluntariness after an adequate hearing. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368.”

As Chief Judge Murphy very forcefully said for this Court in the appropriately named case of Murphy v. State, 8 Md. App. 430, 436-437, 260 A. 2d 357:

“But, as heretofore indicated, the appellant later entered a timely general objection to the admissibility of the confession which had the effect of challenging the confession on the broader constitutional ground that it was not freely and voluntarily made. See Maryland Rules 522 and 725f. Under Jackson v. Denno, supra, it was incumbent upon the trial judge to make a preliminary finding of voluntariness before admitting the confession in evidence, and that finding must, under Sims v. Georgia, supra, ‘appear from the record with unmistakable clarity.’ The rationale of these cases is plainly such that the trial judge must do more than, as here, .simply overrule the objection — his conclusion that the confession was voluntary must, we repeat, appear from the record ‘with unmistakable clarity.’ And this is so even where, as here, the only evidence in the case pertaining to the voluntariness of the statement showed that it was freely and voluntarily made; the trial judge still must indicate ‘with unmistakable clarity,’ that he believes such evidence and therefore finds the confession to be a voluntary one.”

See also Lynch v. State, 9 Md. App. 441, 443, 265 A. 2d 283.

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), is the constitutional wellspring for the procedural requirements surrounding the issue of voluntariness. That a hearing is required is clear:

“Equally clear is the defendant’s constitutional right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession.” 378 U. S. at 376-377.

In Sims v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 538, 87 S. Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967), the trial judge there, as the trial judge here, overruled a defense objection and admitted a confession into evidence. There, as here, there was no determination of the question of voluntariness. In reversing, the Supreme Court said, at 385 U. S. 544:

“Although the judge need not make formal findings of fact or write an opinion, his conclusion that the confession is voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity. Here there has been absolutely no ruling on that issue . . .”

See also Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U. S. 43, 85 S. Ct. 174, 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964). And see Mulligan v. State, 10 Md. App. 429, 432, 271 A. 2d 385.

In Jackson v. Denno, the Supreme Court pointed out that a fair hearing and a judicial ruling are required both to insure that the jury never hears the substance of or knows of the existence of an involuntary confession and to put upon the record the necessary material for later judicial review:

“In jurisdictions following the orthodox rule, under which the judge himself solely and finally determines the voluntariness of the confession, or those following the Massachusetts procedure, under which the jury passes on voluntariness only after the judge has fully and independently resolved the issue against the accused, the judge’s conclusions are clearly evident from the record since he either admits the confession into evidence if it'is voluntary or rejects it if involuntary. Moreover, his findings upon disputed issues of fact are expressly stated or may be ascertainable from the record.” 378 U. S. at 378-379.

Neither Miranda nor the Harris v. New York limitation upon Miranda had any effect upon this basic procedural requirement.

4. What is the Constitutional Test1 Voluntarmess.

With further respect to that substratum, it is and always has been clear that, above and beyond any lattef-day catechism of explicit warnings, a statement made by a defendant to the authorities must be voluntary, to wit, not “compelled” within the contemplation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Maryland test for voluntariness was well stated by the Court of Appeals in Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 603-604, 56 A. 2d 818:

“The law regarding the admissibility of a concession has been stated by this court many times. We will restate the rule. Before a confession can be admitted in evidence, the State must show, to the satisfaction of the court, that it was the free and voluntary act of an accused; that no force or coercion was exercised by the officers obtaining the confession, tp cause the accused to confess; that no hope or promise was held out to an accused for the purpose of inducing him to confess.”

See also Linkins v. State, 202 Md. 212, 222, 96 A. 2d 246; Hall v. State, 223 Md. 158, 169, 162 A. 2d 751; Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 487, 174 A. 2d 163. The same test was well articulated for this Court by then Chief Judge Murphy in Robinson v. State, 3 Md. App. 666, 670-671, 240 A. 2d 638:

“It is well settled that in order for a confession to be admissible into evidence against an accused, the State must prove that it was voluntary and not the product of force, threats, promises or inducements. Abbott v. State, 231 Md. 462; Cooper v. State, 1 Md. App. 190. Otherwise stated, to be voluntary, a statement cannot be ‘extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.’ Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 7; Lyter v. State, 2 Md. App. 654.”

See also Wiggins v. State, 4 Md. App. 95, 105-106, 241 A. 2d 424; Barnhart v. State, supra, at 5 Md. App. 224-225; Bates v. State, supra, at 32 Md. App. 113-114.

Federal constitutional law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, points unmistakably in the same direction. A voluntary statement (subject only to the additional requirements of Miranda when offered in chief) is always admissible for all purposes. The pivotal criterion of voluntariness was always rooted in the Fifth Amendment proscription against compulsory self-incrimination in cases arising in the federal courts. In state cases, there has been an evolution in the constitutional predicate for applying the test but no fundamental change in the test itself. Beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682, in 1936, and continuing over the course of some 28 years involving the consideration of some 35 cases, constitutional review of the admissibility of confessions in state cases was grounded in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision of the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), that the right to counsel provision of the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the states through the due process clause presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to shift its review of confession cases in state courts to a more specific launching pad. For a brief period in 1964, it experimented with the right to counsel provision of the Sixth Amendment as the appropriate constitutional lever in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 84 S. Ct, 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). That experiment was short-lived. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, also decided in 1964, held for the first time that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment was also binding upon the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. With that far more appropriate point of departure then available, coupled with the opportunity to base the federal and the state confession cases upon the same constitutional footing, the Supreme Court by 1966 began grounding its review of confession cases in state courts in the compulsory self-incrimination clause specifically rather than in the due process clause generally or in the now abandoned ground of the right to counsel clause. Throughout all of the shifts in the basis for review, however, the criterion upon review remained “voluntariness.” See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 223-227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 860-862 (1973).

There can be no doubt that the crucial constitutional standard is voluntariness. Some of the very early case law, in the Supreme Court and locally, did speak of untrustworthiness as the thing to be feared and guarded against when heavy-handed methods of interrogation were employed. See Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 172, 73 S. Ct. 1077, 97 L. Ed. 1522, 1536 (1953). On some occasions, the terms “voluntariness” and “trustworthiness” were used with loose and uncritical interchangeability. Indeed, the critical qualifying phrase for present purposes from Harris v. New York uses “trustworthiness” — “. . . provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.” Notwithstanding semantic lapses, it is inescapably clear that to the extent to which there is any difference between “voluntariness” and “trustworthiness,” the indisputable and inescapable constitutional standard is “voluntariness.” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 602, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961), was unequivocal:

“The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.”

Justice Frankfurter was equally explicit in pinpointing the standard in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 540-541, 81 S. Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961):

“Our decisions under that Amendment have made clear that convictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system — a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth.”

The notion that the relevant concern might be trustworthiness rather than voluntariness was met squarely in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 383-386, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 919-921 (1964), and was buried:

“[T]he premise underlying the Stein opinion that the exclusion of involuntary confessions is constitutionally required solely because of the inherent untrustworthiness of a coerced confession. It followed from this premise that a reliable or true confession need not be rejected as involuntary and that evidence corroborating the truth or falsity of the confession and the guilt or innocence of the accused is indeed pertinent to the determination of the coercion issue... .
This underpinning of Stein ... was unequivocally put to rest in Rogers v. Richmond, supra, where it was held that the reliability of a confession has nothing to do with its voluntariness — proof that a defendant committed the act with which he is charged and to which he has confessed is not to be considered when deciding whether a defendant’s will has been overborne....
It is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of involuntary confessions not only because of the probable unreliability of confessions that are obtained in a manner deemed coercive, but also because of the ‘strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will’...” (Citations omitted)

As recently as 1972, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 484-485, 92 S. Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618, 624-625, spoke to the same point:

“We noted in Jackson that there may be a relationship between the involuntariness of a confession and its unreliability. But our decision was not based in the slightest oh the fear that juries might misjudge the accuracy of confessions and arrive at erroneous determinations of guilt or innocence. That case was not aimed at reducing the possibility of convicting innocent men.
Quite the contrary, we feared that the reliability and truthfulness of even coerced confessions could impermissibly influence a jury’s judgment as to voluntariness. The use of coerced confessions, whether true or false, is forbidden because the method used to extract them offends constitutional principles. Rogers v. Richmond .. . The procedure we established in Jackson was designed to safeguard the right of an individual, entirely apart from his guilt or innocence, not to be compelled to condemn himself by his own utterances.”

Neither Miranda nor the Harris v. New York limitation upon Miranda had any effect upon this basic formulation of the applicable test.

5. What is the Burden of Proof? A Preponderance of the Evidence.

With further respect to that substratum, it is and always has been clear (at least since Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 92 S. Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618, in 1972) that the burden of proof on the admissibility issue, either pretrial or during trial in or out of the presence of the jury, is that of a preponderance of the evidence. Mulligan v. State, 18 Md. App. 588, 597-602, 308 A. 2d 418; Ponds v. State, 25 Md. App. 162, 335 A. 2d 162; Felde v. State, 26 Md. App. 15, 20-23, 336 A. 2d 823; Hebb v. State, 31 Md. App. 493, 356 A. 2d 583; Bates v. State, supra, at 32 Md. App. 113. Neither Miranda nor the Harris v. New York limitation upon Miranda had any effect upon this basic procedural rule.

6. To Whom is the Burden Allocated? The State.

With final respect to that substratum, it is and always has been clear that the burden of proving voluntariness is allocated to the State. In the archetypal case of Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140, the Court of Appeals said as early as 1873, at 153:

“The law is also well settled that the onus is upon the prosecutor, to show affirmatively, that the confession proposed to be offered was not made in consequence of an improper inducement.”

The allocation was clearly stated by the Court of Appeals in Peters and Demby v. State, 187 Md. 7, 14, 48 A. 2d 586:

“The burden of proof is, of course, upon the State to show that any confession is freely and voluntarily made, and is not obtained by threats or inducements.”

The Court of Appeals restated the allocation of the burden, as it had stated it many times before and has restated it many times since, in Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 270, 52 A. 2d 484:

“In Maryland the burden of proof is on the State to show affirmatively that a confession was freely and voluntarily made, and was not obtained by any improper inducements. Hammond v. State, 174 Md. 347, 198 A. 704; Wright v. State, 177 Md. 230, 9 A. 2d 253; Taylor v. State, 187 Md. 306, 49 A. 2d 787.”

This Court has consistently followed suit. See, among many others, Robinson v. State, supra, at 3 Md. App. 670-671; Wiggins v. State, supra, at 4 Md. App. 105; Barnhart v. State, supra, at 5 Md. App. 224; Edwards v. State, infra, at 7 Md. App. 113; Murphy v. State, supra, at 8 Md. App. 434.

With respect to that hearing on voluntariness mandated by Jackson v. Denno, Lego v. Twomey, supra, went on to establish that the burden of proof is that of a preponderance of the evidence and furthermore that the burden is allocated to the state, holding at 404 U. S. 489:

“To reiterate what we said in Jackson: when a confession challenged as involuntary is sought to be used against a criminal defendant at his trial, he is entitléd to a reliable and clear-cut determination that the confession was in fact voluntarily rendered. Thus, the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.” (Emphasis supplied)

Neither Miranda nor the Harris v. New York limitation upon Miranda had any effect upon this basic allocation of the burden of proof.

Voluntariness Hearing Not Obviated by Miranda

It is furthermore clear that the demonstration of voluntariness as a prerequisite to the admission of a challenged statement was not obviated by the additional “warning and waiver” examination mandated by Miranda nor was the more basic test superseded by or subsumed into its implementary additive. Judge Powers well articulated the distinctness of the criteria in Greenwell v. State, 32 Md. App. 579, 363 A. 2d 555, 557:

“Two different constitutional principles may bear, simultaneously, or independently of each other, on the question of admissibility of that evidence. One is that it must be shown that the statement was not induced by force, threats, or promises, but was made freely and voluntarily. The other is that when the statement stems from a custodial interrogation, it must be shown that the accused knew and understood that he had a constitutional right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights.”

We made it clear in Edwards v. State, 7 Md. App. 108, 113, 253 A. 2d 764, that even following an examination under Miranda, the more basic issue must still be addressed as a precondition for admissibility:

“Of course, when a confession is challenged, the State is additionally required to adduce proof of traditional voluntariness, viz., that the statement was not obtained by force, violence, threats, inducements or promises.”

See also Robinson v. State, supra, at 3 Md. App. 671; Wiggins v. State, supra, at 4 Md. App. 105; Barnhart v. State, supra, at 5 Md. App. 224-225; Murphy v. State, supra, at 8 Md. App. 434-435. As Judge Singley pointed out for this Court in Bates v. State, supra, the satisfaction of Miranda is by no means all that is required by way of legitimating a challenged statement, saying at 32 Md. App. 113-114:

“At the suppression hearing, the trial court determined, from a preponderance of the evidence, that Bates was given his Miranda warnings and the confession to the Weaver’s Texaco break-in was voluntary. There was, however, no finding that the illegal arrest did or did not taint the confession.
The trial court’s inquiry at the suppression hearing, however, is not completed upon a finding that Miranda warnings were given and the confession was voluntarily made. . . .
What we propose to do in the present case is to reverse Bates’ conviction, for we are convinced that the State failed to satisfy its burden of showing, at the suppression hearing, that the confession did not result from exploitation of the illegal arrest....”

No Distinction Between Using a Statement Upon the Merits and Using it to Impeach Credibility

In the present case, it is undisputed that a statement made by the appellant to the police was received in evidence against him at his trial for the purpose of impeaching his credibility. It is undisputed that he objected to the introduction of that statement and that his objection was overruled. It is undisputed that he was afforded no hearing whatsoever upon the issue of voluntariness. It is undisputed that the trial judge did not rule, and indeed had nothing upon which to rule, on the subject of voluntariness. It is undisputed that the State did not carry its burden of proving voluntariness by any standard.

Of immediate concern to us is the question of whether this constitutional criterion of voluntariness applies to all statements taken from a defendant by the police rather than to only those statements offered in chief upon the issue of guilt or innocence. Miranda itself is instructive here. Although its recommended procedural safeguards to defang the potentially deadly element of compulsion have been significantly neutralized, its definition of what constitutes self-incrimination stands undisturbed. In this regard, it said at 384 U. S. 477:

“[N]o distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely ‘exculpatory.’ If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word. . . .”

What is there made explicit in Miranda is implicit in the clear command of Jackson v. Denno, at 378 U. S. 376:

“It is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession, Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 81 S. Ct. 735, and even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction.” (Emphasis supplied)

The federal constitutional law has never drawn a distinction between using an unconstitutionally obtained statement on the merits of guilt or innocence and using it tangentially to influence that decision upon the merits. The massive and immemorial body of Maryland common law — much of it grounded directly in Article 22 of the Declaration of Rights proscribing compelled self-incrimination and the remainder of it interpreting and applying parallel federal provisions — has never drawn a distinction between using an unconstitutionally obtained statement on the merits of guilt or innocence and using it tangentially to influence that decision upon the merits. When the basic constitutional right is involved, we see no logical distinction that could be drawn.

Nor do we see anything logically persuasive in the suggestion by the State that the appellant must specify that he is objecting on the grounds of traditional involuntariness before he is entitled to a hearing on that issue. Although the case law, here and elsewhere, has of late been almost totally monopolized by Miranda considerations, the more basic criteria have not been superseded or obliterated. When a defendant objects to a statement offered against him in chief, he is not required to specify that he is objecting on basic constitutional grounds rather than objecting exclusively upon Miranda grounds. A general objection has always been enough to put the State to its burden of proving admissibility. Miranda has not preempted the field when a statement is offered upon the merits; neither has it preempted the field when a statement is offered for impeachment purposes. An objection to admissibility is all that is required to put the State to its proof.

The State’s effort to disengage the statement here in question from the constitutional obligations otherwise binding on statements made to the police is unavailing for two reasons.

1. Differing Uses of the Statement Do Not Support Differing Examinations of the Privilege

The State would have us believe that because a prior inconsistent statement is considered by the jury for the limited purpose of impeaching credibility, there is not inherent in the jury’s hearing of the statement that same potential for residual harm as when they hear an involuntary statement upon the merits. This argument attributes more sophistication to the jury than the Supreme Court is willing to credit. Jackson v. Denno discounted the ability of a jury to factor out an involuntary confession even under clear instructions from the Court to do so, saying at 378 U. S. 388:

“Under the New York procedure, the fact of a defendant’s confession is solidly implanted in the jury’s mind, for it has not only heard the confession, but it has been instructed to consider and judge its voluntariness .... If it finds the confession involuntary, does the jury — indeed, can it — then disregard the confession in accordance with its instructions? If there are lingering doubts about the sufficiency of the other evidence, does the jury unconsciously lay them to rest by resort to the confession? Will uncertainty about the sufficiency of the other evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt actually result in acquittal when the jury knows the defendant has given a truthful confession.”

Indeed, in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the Supreme Court recognized “the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner’s guilt,” and held that instructions from the court cannot cure the judicial harm flowing from a jury’s knowledge of a defendant’s confession. The Court said at 391 U.S. 128-129:

“Delli Paoli assumed that this encroachment on the right to confrontation could be avoided by the instruction to the jury to disregard the inadmissible hearsay evidence. But, as we have said, that assumption has since been effectively repudiated. ... [W]e expressly rejected the proposition that a jury, when determining the confessor’s guilt, could be relied on to ignore his confession of guilt should it find the confession involuntary.”

It went on to hold at 391 U. S. 135:

“[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”

Both Jackson v. Denno and Bruton quoted with approval from the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232, 248, 77 S. Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278, 289 (1957), where he put the proposition squarely:

“The Government should not have the windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not consider but which they cannot put out of their minds.”

Both Jackson v. Denno and Bruton also quoted with approval from the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 453, 69 S. Ct. 716, 93 L. Ed. 790, 799 (1949), where he stated even more forcefully:

“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”

As recently as Lego v. Twomey, supra, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its conviction that a jury could not be relied upon to factor out of its decision-making process a confession which may have been constitutionally tainted, saying at 404 U. S. 483:

“Precisely because confessions of guilt, whether coerced or freely given, may be truthful and potent evidence, we did not believe a jury could be called upon to ignore the probative value of a truthful but coerced confession ....”

We hold that the mere fact that a challenged admission has been offered for impeachment purposes rather than upon the merits does not diminish its potential for harm. It is now firmly established, under our own case law as well as that of the Supreme Court, that if a jury even hears of the fact of a confession which the judge rules inadmissible, a judge’s instructions to them to disregard it entirely cannot be relied upon to vitiate the potential taint. A judge’s instructions to disregard utterly the confession of a non-testifying codefendant similarly may not be relied* upon. A fortiori, an instruction to consider a possibly unconstitutional admission for limited purposes of impeaching credibility cannot be relied upon as a guarantee that the unconstitutional taint will not affect the judgment upon the merits. If an instruction to disregard utterly will not suffice, an instruction to compartmentalize and disregard in part is even more clearly ineffectual.

In Hutchinson v. State, 9 Md. App. 41, 45-47, 262 A. 2d 321, we held that neither a jury nor a judge sitting as a jury could be relied upon to disregard an unconstitutionally obtained confession. In overturning that decision, the Court of Appeals in State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227, 271 A. 2d 641, did not disagree with our statement that a jury could not so be relied upon, but proceeded to distinguish a judge as fact finder from a lay jury of fact finders. Although dealing with the other side of the coin, the full import of the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Hutchinson is that a lay jury, unlike a legally trained judge, cannot factor out of its decision-making process the knowledge of a constitutionally tainted confession.

Indeed, in Franklin v. State, 6 Md. App. 572, 578, 252 A. 2d 487, we refused to distinguish between what is required for offering an admission upon the merits and what is required for offering it for the limited purpose of impeachment:

“The fact that appellant’s admissions may have been used for the purpose of impeaching his credibility as a witness, rather than as substantive evidence of his guilt, does not, in our judgment, dispense with the requirement that the State affirmatively show on the record that the statement was in compliance with the requirements of [the Constitution].”

In Franklin, to be sure, we were relying upon the mandate of Miranda. If, however, even the prophylactic command of Miranda compelled such a conclusion on our part, how infinitely more so would the underlying constitutional verity of which Miranda is but a surface guarantee. And see Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 606, 56 A. 2d 818.

2. The Harris v. New York Distinction Has No Constitutional Footing

The second thrust of the State’s argument that the full procedural safeguards are not mandated when the challenged statement is offered for the more limited purpose is a straight and uncritical reliance upon Harris v. New York. The argument, based upon analogy, is that if a statement which offends Miranda may nonetheless be used to impeach credibility, so may a statement which offends the traditional voluntariness requirement. The argument ignores the doctrinal underpinnings of Harris v. New York, more fully explained in Michigan v. Tucker. As we have already more fully discussed, Michigan v. Tucker predicates the Harris v. New York limitation on Miranda upon the fact that a “mere Miranda” violation is not constitutional in dimension. It is the unmistakable import of Michigan v. Tucker that if a challenged statement failed to pass basic constitutional muster, it could not be offered even for the limited purpose of impeaching credibility. If the Constitution itself were offended, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine would be fully operational. If a constitutional issue were involved, all of the procedural guarantees of Jackson v. Denno and Lego v. Twomey would be fully applicable. That distinction is the sine qua non of Harris v. New York. Notwithstanding a surface similarity, the analogy of the present case, involving a possible constitutional violation, to a Harris v. New York situation, involving a “mere Miranda” violation, is simply inapt. See Bartram v. State, supra; Ryon v. State, supra; In Re Appeal No. 245, September Term, 1975, supra.

In summation, the law is:

1. When a defendant makes a general objection to the admission of a statement by him to the police, whether offered upon the merits or for a more limited purpose, the State has the affirmative burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement is admissible. Prudence would dictate that a hearing on the issue of admissibility be conducted out of the presence of the jury, but a reversal will not be called for, notwithstanding the risk, if the statement is ultimately ruled to be admissible.

2. With respect to the variety of determinations that may be made by the judge at the admissibility hearing, the following results are possible:

a. If the State has demonstrated compliance with Miranda as well as compliance with traditional voluntariness standards, the challenged statement will be admitted upon the merits or for any other relevant purpose;

b. If the State has failed to demonstrate compliance with Miranda but has demonstrated compliance with traditional voluntariness standards, the statement will not be admitted upon the merits but may under appropriate circumstances, as outlined in Harris v. New York, be admitted for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of a defendant who testifies in a manner contradicted by the statement;

c. If the State has failed to demonstrate compliance with traditional standards of voluntariness, the statement will not be admitted for any purpose, regardless of whether Miranda has been complied with or not.

Under the command of Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 289 A. 2d 575, we must reverse the conviction in this case and remand for a new trial. But see Jackson v. Denno, supra, at 378 U. S. 394-96 and Boles v. Stevenson, supra, at 379 U. S. 45-46. Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to deal with the other contention raised by the appellant.

Judgment reversed: case remanded for new trial.

Costs to be paid by Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.

      . “[W]e can only conclude that the deputies were led to the binoculars by what appellant told them. There was no evidence sufficient to establish that the deputies learned of the binoculars from a source independent of the confession.” 29 Md. App. at 146.

      . “[T]he detention led to the confession and the confession led to the binoculars. Each was the immediate, direct and proximate cause of the other with no break in the causal connection by time or circumstances. The primary taint flowed down to the confession and from it to the binoculars. The State did not establish that the binoculars were come at by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Under the Wong Sun doctrine, the binoculars were inadmissible in the hearing on the delinquency of appellant, and we so hold.” 29 Md. App. at 147.

      . “We think _ that the objection may be regarded as encompassing 'both the voluntariness of the confession and the taint derived from the illegal arrest.” Judge Singley (specially assigned), speaking for this Court, at 32 Md. App. 113.

      4. It is now, of course, clear since Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 92 S. Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), that the burden is that of a preponderance of the evidence and not that of demonstrating to the satisfaction of the court.

      . The status of Massiah and Escobedo as evolutionary relics that were tried and failed is clear from an overview of subsequent Supreme Court activity in the area. They are like the mother’s two proverbial sons, one of whom ran off to sea and the other of whom became Vice-President and neither of whom was ever heard from again. Neither Massiah nor Escobedo, to be sure, was ever cleanly overruled. They did not have to be. Like Japanese garrisons bypassed in the leapfrogging strategy in the South Pacific, they simply withered upon an untended vine. Or they sleep, like Dracula, not alive but yet undead. When they arise periodically in lonely juridical byways, they are very disturbing. One longs for a clean stake to the heart.

        Massiah has never been mentioned again. Fate has not been so kind to Escobedo. “[T]he Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its own facts.” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411, 417 (1972). “As we have noted previously, Escobedo is not to be broadly extended beyond the facts of that particular case.” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 438, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182, 189 (1974). See also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 733-734, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, 892 (1966), and Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731, 739, 89 S. Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969). Appropriate is the comment of Professor Max Radin that when courts note that another case “stood on its own facts,” the courts are “administering euthanasia to their nonviable progeny.” 6 St. John’s Law Qu. Rev. 157.

      . See Bailey v. State, 263 Md. 424, 428, 283 A. 2d 360.

      . As to the inefficacy of instructions to foreclose the damage when a sensitive constitutional nerve has been touched, Bruton quoted with approval several judicial observations of Judge Learned Hand. In Nash v. United States, 54 F. 2d 1006, 1007, Judge Hand referred to a limitjng instruction as a “recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody else’s.” In Delli Paoli v.

        United States, 229 F. 2d 319, 321, Judge Hand referred to a limiting instruction as a “placebo,” medically defined as “a medicinal lie.”
      In “Some Problems of Proof under the Anglo-American System of Litigation,” (1956), Professor Edmund Morgan suggests, at 105, that the use of limiting instructions fosters an inconsistent attitude toward juries by “treating them at times as a group of low-grade morons and at other times as men endowed with a superhuman ability to control their emotions and intellect.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Powers, J,,

license: Public Domain

text:
    JOSEPH ERNEST GLENN v. STATE ROADS COMMISSION OF THE STATE HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION
    [No. 40,
    September Term, 1976.]

      Decided November 4, 1976.

    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Harford County (Higinbothom, J.).
    Petition for condemnation instituted by the State Roads Commission of the State Highway Administration against the personal representatives of the estate of Anna J. Mc-Cleary, Sun Oil Company, lessee, Ernest Glenn, sub-lessee and Harford County, Maryland. From an order declaring Ernest Glenn had no compensable interest in the subject property and dismissing him as a party to the proceedings, he appeals.
    The cause was argued before Powers, Moore and Liss, JJ.

      Herbert E. Witz, with whom was Bowen P. Weisheit on the brief, for appellant.

      Herbert L. Cohen, Special Attorney, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, Nolan H. Rogers, Special Assistant Attorney General, Robert H. Archer and Judith A. Armold, Special Attorneys on the brief, for appellee.
   Powers, J,,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appeal in this ease is docketed under the name of Joseph Ernest Glenn v. State Roads Commission of the State Highway Administration. The ease began with a petition for condemnation, filed in the Circuit Court for Harford County, by the State Roads Commission of the State Highway Administration against two individuals as personal representatives of the estate of Anna I. McGleary, Sun Oil Company, Ernest Glenn, and Harford County, Maryland.

The petition, seeking condemnation of a parcel of land in the town of Bel Air in Harford County, containing 10,609 square feet or 0.288 of an acre, alleged that the property had been acquired by Mrs. McGleary in 1944, and that she had since departed this life. It further alleged’ that Sun Oil Company was a tenant of said property under a recorded lease, and that Glenn was a sublessee under an agreement with Sun Oil, the terms of which were unknown to the petitioner. The petition also recited that the property was subject to such liens, assessments, or charges as may be due the Town or the State of Maryland, and subject to the lien of real estate taxes levied by Harford County.

With the petition the State Roads Commission deposited with the Clerk of the Circuit Court a check in the amount of $67,300.00, alleging that sum to be the fair value of the land and improvements taken, and purporting to proceed pursuant to the quick-take provisions of the Constitution of Maryland and the implementing statutes, and the Maryland Rules. The petitioner prayed that the described property may be condemned so that it may acquire a fee simple title thereto, together with all other rights therein described.

The docket and the record show rather extensive proceedings between 14 March 1975, when the petition was filed, and 4 February 1976, when the court, Edward D. Higinbothom, J., entered the order from which this appeal was taken. The order itself was brief. It said:

“It is ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1976, by the Circuit Court for Harford County, that the Defendant, Joseph Ernest Glenn, has no interest in the subject property which is compensable in an eminent domain proceeding, and accordingly said Defendant, Joseph Ernest Glenn, is hereby dismissed as a party to this proceeding.
“Cost to be paid by State Roads Commission.”

Although the court held by its order of 4 February 1976 that Glenn had no compensable interest in the property or in the proceedings, several interlocutory rulings in the case are interpreted by Glenn as holding that he did have a compensable interest, and he is understandably disappointed in losing what he felt was in his grasp. We think that his expectations were never more than illusory, and that the final order did not deny him any rightful claim.

The estate of Mrs. McCleary owned fee simple title to the entire property, including the reversion after the termination of the rights of Sun Oil Company under its lease. With options, the Sun Oil Company lease was said to run until 1992. The sublease between Sun Oil Company and Glenn, which superseded an earlier arrangement of some years standing between them, provided for a term of one year, commencing on 28 November 1973, and from year to year thereafter, but that either party could terminate at the end of the initial term or any yearly extension by giving at least sixty days prior written notice to the other. It appears that the sublease automatically renewed itself for another year on 28 November 1975, while this condemnation proceeding was pending, and that Glenn was occupying the premises at the time of the order of 4 February 1976.

The portion of the sublease which contains the provisions critical to Glenn’s rights in this case is Paragraph 3. We set it out in full:

“3. CONDEMNATION; TITLE: If all or any part of said Premises shall be condemned or otherwise taken for public or quasi-public use, or shall an action therefor be instituted by an appropriate authority or agency, Company shall have the right, at anytime thereafter, to terminate this Lease upon giving Lessee written notice. Lessee hereby waives any right to claim any portion of the award or damages due Company made or arising out of the condemnation or taking of the Premises. Company makes no warranty of title to the Premises, expressed or implied, and Lessee hereby waives any right to recover damages from Company arising by reason of Company’s loss or failure of title or loss of the right to possession of the Premises, including loss or disposition of the Premises by reasons of condemnation or taking. Notwithstanding any other provisions herein, if the right of Company to title or possession of the Premises shall cease or terminate for any reason whatsoever, this Lease shall automatically terminate five (5) days prior thereto.”

All respondents answered the petition. Numerous interrogatories were propounded and answered. Glenn petitioned for a pre-trial conference, to consider the applicability of Maryland’s recently enacted Gasoline Products Marketing Act having to do with payment by a distributor to a dealer for good will, and to consider the report of an expert to be proffered as evidence of the damage sustained by loss of good will. A pre-trial conference was held with Judge Albert P. Close on 15 October. Memoranda of Law were filed by the parties. On 25 November 1975 Judge Close filed an Opinion, constituting his rulings on the questions raised.

So that later developments in the case may be understood in a broad context, we shall refer to a few of the points dealt with by Judge Close in that Opinion. He quoted the paragraph of the sublease dealing with condemnation, which we have quoted. He noted that Sun Oil had the right to terminate the lease upon giving written notice, but that it had not chosen to exercise that right. Judge Close said that if the lease were already terminated, the issues raised by Glenn would be moot. The value of his sublease would be measured at the time of trial, and would have no value. Since Glenn would be entitled to nothing, he would not be entitled to present any witnesses.

On the other hand, said Judge Close, if the sublease has value at the time of trial, Glenn would have a right to be compensated for its value. He also pointed out that this would be Glenn’s value, and would not be a claim by him of a portion of any award of damages due Sun Oil. The Opinion noted that because of the Gasoline Products Marketing Act, one could not necessarily expect that Sun Oil would exercise its option to terminate the sublease by giving written notice.

The judge then proceeded to discuss the nature of the damages that Glenn would be entitled to claim at the trial if his sublease was still in effect at that time. He summarized:

“In short, before the Gasoline Products Marketing Act was enacted, a condemnation proceeding took only the land under a business and therefore no compensation was awarded for the business or business goodwill. Nothing in the Gasoline Products Marketing Act changes this situation. Glenn may not offer evidence of the value of his goodwill since it is not being taken.
“Although Glenn may take the other elements of his business goodwill with him when he moves, he cannot take the value of being located on the condemned property with him. Insofar as that location is an element of his business goodwill, he should be compensated for it.”

Before Judge Close’s Opinion was filed, Sun Oil filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that Glenn would have no compensable interest in the condemnation proceeding, and should be dismissed as a party defendant. Glenn responded to that motion by asserting that he still had a valid sublease, which Sun Oil had not attempted to terminate,, and had a compensable interest in the condemnation proceedings. The docket records that on 8 December 1975 the Motion for Summary Judgment was argued before Judge Higinbothom, and was denied.

The State Roads Commission and Sun Oil filed a stipulation and petition, in which they agreed that the damage sustained by Sun Oil Company as a result of the taking was $23,500.00. They petitioned the court to return an inquisition in that amount. A week later Glenn filed a motion to dismiss Sun Oil as a defendant, reciting that Sun Oil had reached an agreement as to the amount of its damage, and had no further interest in the case. At the same time, Glenn filed a motion that the stipulation and petition of Sun Oil and the State Roads Commission not be received. Sun Oil responded to the Motion to Dismiss by admitting the allegations, and agreeing that it was not a proper party. Sun Oil opposed the motion ne recipiatur.

Promptly thereafter the State Roads Commission filed opposition to Glenn’s motion ne recipiatur, and to Glenn’s motion to dismiss Sun Oil as a party. It pointed out that Sun Oil must remain a party until an inquisition is returned. At the same time the State Roads Commission filed a motion to dismiss Glenn as a party. A show cause order was entered on that motion. On 31 December 1975 Glenn filed an answer and requested a hearing.

The State Roads Commission and Sun Oil filed further stipulations waiving a jury, and waiving a view of the property by the judge. Hearings were held before Judge Higinbothom on 5 January 1976 on the various pending matters. On 13 January 1976 the inquisition fixing the damages for the taking from Sun Oil was filed. Also filed was a Memorandum Opinion by Judgg Higinbothom. He said that his signing of the inquisition effectively took Sun Oil out of the case. He denied the motion to dismiss Glenn as a party, saying that Glenn was still there under his sublease, and would still be entitled to claim at the trial, as ruled previously by Judge Close in his Opinion of 25 November 1975, that portion of the goodwill of his business which is attributable to the existence of the business at its particular location.

The posture of the case was radically changed by several events of 80 January 1976. Sun Oil Company filed a petition for leave to withdraw funds in the amount of the damages awarded to it by the inquisition. Judge Close signed an order directing the Clerk to deliver to Sun Oil Company a check in the amount of $23,500.00, and upon doing so, to mark these proceedings “Settled and Off’ as to Sun Oil Company, only. The docket entries record that the check was delivered, and the case was entered Settled and Off as to Sun Oil Company only.

On the same day the State Roads Commission filed a motion for determination of a question of law, as permitted by Maryland Rule 502. It asserted that whatever interest Glenn theretofore had in the property was through Sun Oil Company, whose interest had been legally terminated. It stated that Glenn had continued in occupancy of the premises, but no longer had the right of possession, and was, at most, a tenant at will or a tenant by sufferance. The docket shows that the Motion was heard by Judge Higinbothom on 3 February. An answer by Glenn in opposition to the motion was filed on that day. The docket shows the entry of judgment on that day in favor of the State Roads Commission against Joseph Ernest Glenn, and dismissal of the case with an order to be submitted. The written order was entered the next day.

Glenn presents these questions on appeal:

“1. Did Appellant, Joseph Ernest Glenn, have a compensable interest in the subject property on March 14,1975, the date Petition for condemnation was filed?
“2. Did Appellant, Joseph Ernest Glenn, have a compensable interest in the subject property on February 3,1976, the date set for trial herein?
A. Was the sub-lease to Appellant in effect on the 3rd day of February, 1976, the date assigned for trial of this case, and the date of valuation of Appellant’s interest?
B. If the sub-lease to Appellant was not in effect on February 3,1976, was its termination the result of the action of Appellee subsequent to the filing of this proceeding, or as a result of the filing thereof?”

Arguments in both briefs range widely over many legal principles involved in the field of eminent domain. Appellant’s argument in support of the first question he presents is, in essence, that he had a compensable interest in the property when the condemnation petition was filed; that when there are multiple interests in property taken by eminent domain the jury makes a separate award to the holder of each interest; and that there are recognized exceptions to the general rule that the sum of the separate interests may not exceed the value of the whole.

It is true that in Heritage Realty v. City of Baltimore, 252 Md. 1, 248 A. 2d 898 (1969), the Court of Appeals recognized that, under certain circumstances, the total cost of the acquisition of separate interests in property by the City could, in the aggregate, be greater than the value of the property. The situation in that case was somewhat unusual because of a perpetual leasehold interest in the property and because the City separately acquired the reversion and the leasehold interest. It may be, also, that the peculiar incidence of the ground rent system in Maryland gave rise to the holding of the Court of Appeals in Mayor & C. C. of Balto. v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 61 A. 203 (1905), which involved the question of the amount of ground rent attributable to the residue of a lot after a portion of the lot was taken by eminent domain.

The cases referred to by the appellant in this phase of his argument include Mayor, etc. v. Rice, 73 Md. 307, 21 A. 181 (1891), which recognized the interest of a year-to-year tenant as a compensable interest in property being taken by eminent domain, and which also said that under the circumstances in that case the jury had a right to consider the probability of renewal of the term as affecting its market value. In Sholom, Inc. v. S.R.C., 246 Md. 688, 229 A. 2d 576 (1967), the Court of Appeals held that a tenant was entitled to have the jury consider the value to it of options to extend its lease for two additional five-year terms after the current terms, even though the time had not yet arrived for it to exercise those options.

It may be that the main fallacy in appellant’s argument is that he refers to an interest he had on the date the petition for condemnation was filed. If we assume that he did, indeed, have a compensable interest in the property on that date, an interest which was recognized by several subsequent interlocutory rulings in the lower court, the critical time for determining whether the appellant had a compensable interest was the date of the taking of the property.

Although the State Roads Commission contends that it acted in this case in the exercise of the quick-take rights permitted by law, Judge Higinbothom held in his Memorandum Opinion of 13 January 1976 that the State had not taken under the quick-take procedures. Whether those procedures were or were not complied with, it seems to be irrelevant because if they were, the taking had not yet occurred on 3 February 1976.

The Court of Appeals said in LaFontaine’s Heirs, 205 Md. 311, 107 A. 2d 653 (1954), at 320:

“We think that where the State Roads Commission is entitled to act under Section 40B of Article 3 of the Constitution and Section 9 of Article 89B of the Code, and complies with all their requirements, the taking occurs when there is an actual appropriation of the land to highway purposes.”

Since an earlier date of taking did not come about in this case because of the quick-take procedure, we turn to Code, Real Property Art., Title 12, Eminent Domain, § 12-102, which says:

“In this title, property is deemed to be taken:
(1) If the plaintiff lawfully is authorized to take the property before trial pursuant to Article III of the Constitution of the state, or any amendment to it, and the required payment has been made to the defendant or into court, any required security has been given, and the plaintiff has taken possession of the property and actually and lawfully appropriated it to the public purposes of the plaintiff.
(2) In every other case, if the plaintiff pays the judgment and costs pursuant to Subtitle U of the Maryland Rules.”

and to § 12-103, which says:

“Unless an applicable statute specifies a different time as of which the value is to be determined, the value of the property sought to be condemned and of any adjacent property of the defendant claimed to be affected by the taking shall be determined as of the date of the taking, if taking has occurred, or as of the date of trial, if taking has not occurred.”

Maryland Rule U22 a. provides:

“Upon the entry of final judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the property condemned and certification by the plaintiff that the award has been paid or payment of the award into court, the clerk shall record the inquisition among the land records of the county in the same manner in which deeds are recorded.”

With the payment of the amount of the inquisition on 30 January 1976, and the docket entry that the case was Settled and Off as to Sun Oil Company, the taking of the entire interest of Sun Oil Company was complete. From that moment, the right of Sun Oil to title or possession of the premises ceased and terminated. The taking which was said in LaFontaine’s Heirs, supra, to occur in a quick-take case when there is an actual appropriation of the land to highway purposes, is a taking prior to passage of title. When legal title actually passes by deed, or its equivalent — inquisition and payment of the damages — the time of physical appropriation to highway purposes is irrelevant.

When Sun Oil Company’s right to title or possession ceased and terminated, Glenn’s sublease automatically terminated five days prior thereto, under the provisions of the very agreement under which Glenn occupied the premises.

The answers to appellant’s questions are that he did have a compensable interest in the property when the condemnation petition was filed on 14 March 1975, but that on and after 30 January 1976 he had no compensable interest in the property.

Appellant argues two other points. We have considered them fully, and we conclude that neither of them is well taken.

He points out that the automatic termination of his sublease could be triggered only if Sun Oil’s right to title or possession of the premises ceases or terminates. He contends that Sun Oil did not have title to the premises and was not in possession of the premises. Therefore, appellant argues, it was impossible for the automatic termination clause to become operative.

Glenn knew, or was charged with knowledge, that Sun Oil did not have fee simple title to the premises, but did have title to the leasehold interest. The word “title” as used in Paragraph 3 of the sublease to Glenn must be taken to refer to the leasehold title which both parties knew was the nature of the title held by Sun Oil. Likewise it would be illogical to say that the word “possession” as used in the same clause was rendered meaningless by the very nature of the instrument in which it was used. We apply here the rule expressed by the Court of Appeals in Bernstein v. Merkel, 126 Md. 454, 95 A. 55 (1915), when the Court said, at 460:

“The complete answer to this contention is that it is well settled in this State that the possession of the tenant is the possession of the landlord. Stewart v. May, 111 Md. 162, and the cases there cited.

We hold that Sun Oil Company had a sufficient right to both title and possession that the termination of those rights automatically terminated Glenn’s sublease.

Appellant also argues that no action taken by the State Roads Commission after filing the condemnation petition can increase or depress the value of his interest in the property condemned. He relies upon Code, Real Property Art., § 12-105 (b), which defines fair market value, and excludes any increment or diminution in value proximately. caused by the public project.

In this case the question of whether the value of Glenn’s interest was enhanced or depressed by the proposed public project became irrelevant when, before the time its value would have been determined, his interest was completely extinguished by operation of the instrument under which it was created.

The situation which Judge Close postulated in his opinion of 25 November 1975 became a fact on 30 January 1976. Glenn’s sublease had been terminated. Any value it had would be measured at the time of trial. There had been no trial. The sublease had no value. There was no issue to be tried.

Order affirmed.

Appellant to pay costs.

      . This Court was informed at oral argument that Glenn was still occupying the premises. The State had become the owner of the property, but had not yet taken possession.

      . By a similar procedure of stipulation, inquisition, and payment the State Roads Commission acquired the fee simple interest of the McCleary estate.

      . It is of no significance in this case, and there is no issue here, whether Glenn’s rights terminated with the termination of Sun Oil’s rights, or five days earlier. We express no opinion on the retrospective aspect of the automatic termination clause.