author: MEREDITH, J.

text:
    134 A.3d 421
    Rashad Ahmad JASON v. NATIONAL LOAN RECOVERIES, LLC.
    No. 284,
    Sept. Term, 2014.
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    April 1, 2016.

      Scott C. Borison (Legg Law Firm, LLC, San Mateo, CA and Phillip R. Robinson, Consumer Law Center, LLC, Silver Spring, MD), on the brief, for Appellant.
    Brian L. Moffet (Zachary S. Schultz, Gordon, Feinblatt, LLC, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
    Panel: MEREDITH, GRAEFF, and FRIEDMAN, JJ.
   MEREDITH, J.

This appeal flows from a suit for damages and declaratory relief filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City by Rashad Ahmad Jason (“Jason”), appellant, against National Loan Recoveries, LLC (“National Loan”), appellee. Appellee moved to dismiss the complaint as time barred, and the circuit court granted that motion. Jason appealed.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The “Questions Presented” in Jason’s brief were framed as follows:

1. Did the Circuit Court err in holding that the Plaintiffs claims for declaratory relief were untimely when they sought a declaration that outstanding judgments obtained by Defendant were void?

2. Did the Circuit Court err in granting a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs declaratory judgment claims without entering a declaratory judgment?

3. Did the Circuit Court err in applying the three year limitation to Plaintiffs claims for unjust enrichment relating to judgments obtained by the Defendant?

4. Did the Circuit Court err in determining that the Plaintiffs claims under the [Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act] were time barred?

We answer “yes” to question 1, which obviates the need for us to address question 2. In response to question 3, we conclude that a claim of unjust enrichment is subject to the three-year statute of limitations, but, because the record was not clear as to the date of National Loan’s alleged enrichment, the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss on that count. We answer “no” to question 4. We will affirm in part and reverse in part, and we will remand the case for further proceedings.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In late 2008, National Loan, a “debt buyer,” purchased Jason’s credit card debt, as to which Jason was then in default. On January 29, 2009, National Loan filed a lawsuit against Jason in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City to collect that debt. At the time it filed suit against Jason, National Loan did not have a license to act as a debt collection agency in Maryland, and did not obtain a license in Maryland until September 10, 2010. The standing of National Loan to pursue collection of Jason’s debt was apparently never challenged in the District Court. On March 31, 2009, the District Court entered a judgment in favor of National Loan in the amount of $1,323.39 plus $60.00 in costs and $1,051.65 for pre-judgment interest, based upon an affidavit filed by National Loan. Notice of the judgment was mailed to Jason on March 31, 2009.

On April 16, 2009, the District Court issued a writ of garnishment that was served upon Jason’s bank. Jason moved to dismiss the garnishment on April 30, 2009, but assets sufficient to satisfy the judgment were paid through garnishment on a date that does not appear in the record. On December 13, 2011, the District Court clerk made a docket entry confirming that the judgment against Jason had been satisfied.

On July 30, 2013, Jason filed a complaint captioned “CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT” in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, seeking relief for actions taken by National Loan in Maryland prior to the date it became licensed as a debt collection agency on September 10, 2010. Although Jason was the sole plaintiff identified by name in the complaint, he claimed that he was filing the suit “On his Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Persons Similarly Situated.” He alleged in the complaint that, if the court certified the case to proceed as a class action pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-231, the proposed class would include “those persons sued by National Loan in Maryland state courts from October 30, 2007 through September 9, 2010 for whom National Loan obtained a judgment for an alleged debt, interest or costs, including attorney’s fees in its favor in an attempt to collect a consumer debt.” The circuit court never acted on Jason’s request to certify his case to proceed as a class action.

The complaint included five counts. In Count I, the complaint asserted that National Loan “is not entitled to any interest from the Plaintiff Class Members on the purported debts since it was acting unlawfully as an unlicensed collection agency.” The relief requested in this count included a declaration that National Loan was not entitled to interest on any judgment “obtained illegally,” and an injunction ordering National Loan “to disgorge all interest amounts collected from Plaintiff Class Members” based upon judgments that had been obtained while National Loan had acted as a collection agency without a Maryland license. Count II was similar to Count I, but sought relief relative to any costs and attorney’s fees National Loan had obtained as a result of judgments entered against Plaintiff Class Members during the time National Loan had acted as a collection agency without a Maryland license.

Count III sought a declaration that National Loan “did not have legal standing to obtain any judgment in Maryland Courts against [Jason] and Plaintiff Class Members,” as well as a declaration that the judgments it did obtain prior to being licensed were “void and unenforceable.” In addition to the request for declaratory relief, Count III included a request for injunctive relief requiring National Loan to “disgorge all judgment amounts” it had collected as a result of acting as an unlicensed collection agency.

Count IV alleged that National Loan had been unjustly enriched by the “acceptance and retention” of any sums it had received as a result of its actions to enforce void judgments. This count included a claim for a money judgment and attorney’s fees.

Count V asserted that the actions National Loan had taken to collect debts in Maryland before being licensed to do so constituted violations of Maryland Code (1975, 2005 RepLVol.), Commercial Law Article (“Comm.Law”), § 14-201 et seq. (also known as the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act), and Comm. Law § 13-101 et seq. (the Maryland Consumer Protection Act). Under the Consumer Protection Act, Comm. Law § 13 — 301(14)(iii), “[u]nfair or deceptive trade practices include any ... [violation of a provision of ... the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act.” Count V requested a money judgment for the violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act, and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses pursuant to Comm. Law § 13-408.

National Loan moved to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim, arguing that Jason’s complaint was filed after the three-year statute of limitations had expired. Suit was filed on July 30, 2013, and National Loan argued that all of the events that Jason complained of occurred more than three years before his complaint was filed. National Loan urged the court to find that Jason’s claims were therefore barred by the statute of limitations generally applicable to civil actions in Maryland. See Maryland Code (1973, 2013 RepLVol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), § 5-101. Following a hearing, the circuit court concluded that Jason’s claims all arose from conduct that occurred more than three years prior to the time he filed suit, and the court granted National Loan’s motion to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations. Jason filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Claims for declaratory relief.

Appellant’s first two questions relate to the claims for declaratory relief. In Counts I, II, and III, Jason asserted that the judgment entered against him on March 31, 2009, was void because National Loan was not licensed as a debt collector in Maryland as of the date of the judgment. In Finch v. LVNV Funding, LLC, [hereinafter “Finch ”], 212 Md.App. 748, 758, 71 A.3d 193, cert. denied, 435 Md. 266, 77 A.3d 1084 (2013), we observed that “Maryland law requires a debt collector to obtain a license.” We further noted that “[a] Consumer Debt Purchaser that collects consumer claims through civil litigation is a ‘collection agency’ under Maryland law and required to be licensed as such.” 212 Md.App. at 758, 71 A.3d 193 (quoting Md. State Collection Agency Licensing Bd. Advisory Notice 05-10, May 5, 2010). We held that “a judgment entered in favor of an unlicensed debt collector constitutes a void judgment as a matter of law.” 212 Md.App. at 764, 71 A.3d 193. We explained: “Much like a complaint filed by a non-lawyer, ‘a complaint filed by an unregistered collection agency is [ ] a nullity, and any judgment entered on such a complaint is void.’ ” 212 Md.App. at 761, 71 A.3d 193 (quoting LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 352 Ill.Dec. 6, 952 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Ill.App.2011)).

National Loan does not dispute that it was unlicensed in Maryland at the time it filed suit and obtained its judgment against Jason (although it argued in the circuit court that it did not need to be licensed at the time it pursued the collection suit against Jason because it was acting on its own behalf). Considering the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we shall assume for purposes of this appeal (without deciding) that National Loan’s judgment against Jason was a void judgment under our holding in Finch.

Pointing to language in Finch and cases cited therein, Jason asserts that a void judgment may be attacked through collateral proceedings “at any time.” 212 Md.App. at 765, 768, and 769, 71 A.3d 193. Based on such statements in Finch and other cases, Jason contends that there is no statute of limitations that limited the period of time during which he could assert that the judgment National Loan obtained against him is void.

National Loan does not dispute that void judgments may be collaterally attacked. But National Loan argues that void judgments must be attacked — and any civil action seeking affirmative legal relief relative to void judgments must be filed — within the three-year statute of limitations generally applicable to civil actions. National Loan argues that Jason’s reliance upon the “any time” language in Finch is misplaced because no statute of limitations defense was at issue in Finch, and, despite this Court’s quotation of the “any time” language from Tucker v. Tucker, 35 Md.App. 710, 712, 373 A.2d 16 (1977), neither Finch nor Tucker actually held that an offensive collateral attack upon a void judgment could be instituted by a judgment debtor after the statute of limitations had run. National Loan contends that Finch merely confirmed that a judgment debtor’s claim that a judgment is void and unenforceable may be raised as a defense at any time in “ ‘proceedings in which it [ie., the judgment] is sought to be enforced.’ ” (Quoting Cook v. Alexandria Nat’l Bank, 263 Md. 147, 153, 282 A.2d 97 (1971)).

We agree with National Loan’s assertion that Finch did not address the applicability vel non of statutes of limitation even though we said in Finch that “a void judgment may be assailed at all times and in all proceedings.” 212 Md.App. at 765, 71 A.3d 193. Jason has not presented a Maryland case that is directly on point, ie., a case in which a judgment debtor initiated a suit against the judgment creditor more than three years after the entry of the allegedly void judgment. But cases from other jurisdictions support Jason’s contention that a judgment debtor may seek to have a judgment declared void at any time. See, e.g., Brandt v. Brandt, 76 Ariz. 154, 159, 261 P.2d 978, 981 (1953) (“We hold that the statute of limitation does not operate to bar an attack upon a void judgment.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Khani, 75 Wash.App. 317, 326-27, 877 P.2d 724, 729 (1994) (“A party will not be deemed to have waived the right to challenge a default judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction merely because time has passed since the judgment was entered.”). See also Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343 (D.C.Cir.1962) (“[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) ] places no time limit on an attack upon a void judgment, nor can such a judgment acquire validity because of laches on the part of him who applies for relief from it.”).

Although, as we shall explain later in this opinion, it is possible that the passage of time could limit the remedies available to the judgment debtor who is the subject of a void judgment, there appears to be no time limit for asserting that a judgment is void. Consequently, the circuit court erred in dismissing Counts I, II, and III of the complaint. We shall reverse the order dismissing those three counts and remand the case for further proceedings.

We note, however, that, at this stage of the proceedings, we are addressing only the circuit court’s ruling that, as a matter of law, Jason’s complaint in the present case was barred by the statute of limitations. We agree with Jason that the statute of limitations did not preclude him from seeking a declaration that the judgment was void. But we express no opinion regarding the remedial relief he may be ultimately entitled to receive under Counts I, II, and III if he succeeds in persuading the court that National Loan’s judgment was void. In United, States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir.2000), the court observed:

Though we hold that laches is not available to preclude a claimant from attacking a void judgment, our holding is not to be construed as allowing a petitioner to sit on his or her rights. It is true that if a court is able to determine that a prior judgment is indeed void, it should declare it as such, but that does not mean that other remedies, such as the actual return of property or its cash value, are immune from defenses of waiver or laches.[]

The nature and extent of any ancillary equitable remedy that might be ordered by a court that declares a judgment void remains an open issue for the court to determine on remand upon consideration of all of the facts and equities in the aggregate. Other than the applicability of the statutes of limitation, no issues in this case are ripe for appellate review, and we need not consider further in this appeal the theoretical possibility that there may be facts that could have an impact upon the availability of ancillary equitable relief.

II. Unjust enrichment

In support of Jason’s third question on appeal, he asserts that his claim for damages for National Loan’s unjust enrichmént (Count IV) should not have been subject to a three-year statute of limitations, but should have been subject to either no statute of limitations or, at a minimum, the twelve-year period that is applicable to actions on a judgment. We disagree.

Jason argues in his brief in this Court that “there may not \ie., cannot] be any limitation on an action pertaining to a void judgment,” and, in support of this argument, Jason quotes Finch, 212 Md.App. at 765, 71 A.3d 193, for the principle that “[a] judgment which is void may be collaterally attacked at any time.” In the alternative, he asserts: “If Plaintiffs claims are subject to a statute of limitations, it can be no shorter than the one applicable to actions on judgments. [CJP] § 5-102(a)(3).” Although Finch states that “a judgment which is void may be collaterally attacked at any time,” that proposition does not support Jason’s argument that there is no statute of limitation applicable to any “action pertaining to a void judgment.” The mere fact that Jason’s claim of unjust enrichment pertains to his claim that there was a void judgment does not mean the unjust enrichment claim could be filed at any time irrespective of statutes of limitation.

Similarly, the fact that his claim for unjust enrichment pertains to his claim that he paid a void judgment does not mean that his claim for money damages is an “action on” a judgment within the scope of CJP § 5-102(a)(3). Section 5-102(a) provides:

(a) Twelve-year limitation. — An action on one of the following specialties shall be filed within 12 years after the cause of action accrues, or within 12 years from the date of the death of the last to die of the principal debtor or creditor, whichever is sooner:

(1) Promissory note or other instrument under seal;

(2) Bond except a public officer’s bond;

(3) Judgment;

(4) Recognizance;

(5) Contract under seal; or

(6) Any other specialty.

Although several specialties are listed in CJP § 5-102(a), Jason’s argument that a twelve-year time limit is applicable to his claims focused exclusively upon the specialty addressed in CJP § 5-102(a)(3), i.e., an “action on” a judgment. Pursuant to CJP § 5-102(a)(3), the twelve-year statute of limitations has been applied in cases where the holder of a judgment has sought to enforce a judgment. E.g., O’Hearn v. O’Hearn, 337 Md. 292, 301, 653 A.2d 446 (1995) (“As [plaintiff] sued on a judgment, the twelve-year limitation period of CJ § 5-102(a) was properly applied to the action on that specialty.”) (emphasis added). But, in our view, the limitation period applicable to an action “on” a “[jjudgment” (pursuant to CJP § 5-102(a)(3)) is not applicable to Jason’s action to recover money or other remedial relief based upon the allegedly wrongful collection actions undertaken by National Loan. Cf. Wellington Co., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan and Trust v. Shakiba, 180 Md.App. 576, 603, 952 A.2d 328 (2008) (“[I]n determining whether [CJP] § 5-102 applies to a contract claim, a two-step inquiry is required: (1) Is the contract a specialty? (2) Is the cause of action ‘on’ the specialty?”). See Sheng Bi v. Gibson, 205 Md.App. 263, 266, 45 A.3d 305 (2012) (holding that “courts will decline to apply strained construction [to statutes of limitation].”).

The twelve-year statute of limitations, therefore, is not applicable to the unjust enrichment claim. Instead, the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CJP § 5-101 controls. AGV Sports Group, 417 Md. at 392, 10 A.3d 745; Greene Tree Homeowners, 358 Md. at 460-61, 749 A.2d 806.

This conclusion is supported by the Court of Appeals’s application of CJP § 5-101 to a claim that was alleged to be a statutory specialty in Master Financial, Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51, 73, 972 A.2d 864 (2009). In Master Financial, addressing alleged violations of Maryland’s Secondary Mortgage Loan Law, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs’ claims for civil penalties under Comm. Law § 12-413 met the test for qualifying as an “other specialty,” subject to a twelve-year period of limitations under CJP § 5-102(a)(6). Id. at 72, 972 A.2d 864. But the Court held that the plaintiffs’ claims to declare their mortgage loans void because of the statutory violations were not entitled to the longer limitation period because those claims were not actions “under” the statutory specialty. The Court explained the basis for applying different periods of limitation to these related claims:

Unlike the claims based on [Comm. Law] § 12-413, the actions to declare the mortgage loans void or voidable because of SMLL [Secondary Mortgage Loan Law] violations are not based solely on the statute. Although the basis for the relief sought arises from the statutory requirements, obligations, and prohibitions, the remedy is purely a common law one, to invalidate a contract or other instrument on the ground of illegality. Under the standard enunciated above, a statutory claim does not constitute an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102 unless the remedy sought for the violation is available only under the statute, or a related statute. As that condition is not met, the actions to invalidate the loans are subject to the three-year period of limitations set forth in CJP § 5-101 and are therefore barred. Subject to proving their SMLL claims through evidence, plaintiffs may recover the statutory civil penalties but are no longer entitled to have the loans declared invalid.

409 Md. at 73, 972 A.2d 864 (emphasis added).

The claim for relief asserted in Count IV is not a claim under the judgment Jason seeks to invalidate. Rather, as National Loan points out, in Maryland, a claim for unjust enrichment that seeks the remedy of restitution of money is subject to the general three-year statute of limitations, citing Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 379 Md. 669, 698, 843 A.2d 758 (2004), and Baltimore City Bd. of School Com’rs v. Koba Institute, Inc., 194 Md.App. 400, 418, 5 A.3d 60 (2010) (“If sovereign immunity were not in the picture, we believe that the three-year period set forth in CJP § 5-101 would control an unjust enrichment claim.”). In Ver Brycke, 379 Md. at 698 n. 13, 843 A.2d 758, the Court of Appeals quoted Professor Dan Dobbs’s observation that actions seeking restitution for money lost by the plaintiff “ ‘are claims at law in every sense, first because they seek simply money relief, and second because they were historically brought in the separate law courts.’ ” (Quoting Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.6(3) (2d ed.1993).) We relied on Ver Brycke to hold that a claim of unjust enrichment was barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Ahmad v. Eastpines Terrace Apartments, Inc., 200 Md.App. 362, 376, 28 A.3d 1 (2011). The claim asserted in Count IV for money damages falls in this category, and is therefore subject to the general three-year statute of limitations.

As CJP § 5-101 makes plain, a three-year statute of limitations is applicable to actions in the absence of another statute to the contrary. Section 5-101 mandates that — unless there is a specific exception under another provision of the Maryland Code — any civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues. The statute provides:

A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.

See also AGV Sports Group, Inc. v. Protus IP Solutions, Inc., 417 Md. 386, 392, 10 A.3d 745 (2010) (noting that the default statute of limitations in Maryland is three years); Greene Tree Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Greene Tree Assoc., 358 Md. 453, 459-61, 749 A.2d 806 (2000) (noting that, when CJP § 5-101 was revised in 1974, it was intended to establish a blanket statute of limitations generally applicable to all civil actions, and any exceptions must be specifically granted by the legislature). We know of no other Maryland statute providing for a longer statute of limitations for asserting claims for money damages based upon unjust enrichment.

Under the discovery rule, Jason’s claim of unjust enrichment “accrued” when he “knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong.” Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677 (1981) (extending the discovery rule to all civil actions). But the evidence in the record at the time the circuit court granted National Loan’s motion to dismiss does not clearly establish the date on which National Loan was allegedly enriched. We know the date judgment was entered against Jason (March 31, 2009, which was more than three years before Jason filed suit), and we know the date the judgment against Jason was declared satisfied (December 13, 2011, which was less than three years before Jason filed suit on July 30, 2013), but the record does not reflect the date on which National Loan received any funds attributable to its judgment against Jason.

Here, Jason’s complaint — filed on July 30, 2013 — included the following allegation in Paragraph 29 regarding the date on which his claim against National Loan accrued: “Without the legal right or Collection Agency license to do so, on January 29, 2009, [National Loan] continued its business of collecting debts when it filed a consumer debt collection action in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City against Mr. Jason styled as National Loan Recoveries, LLC v. Rashad Ahmad Jason, Case No. 010100040112009 (‘Jason Action’).” The complaint further alleged in Paragraph 33 that, “in the Jason Action, a judgment was entered against Mr. Jason in the total sum of $2,633.55.” In Paragraph 36 of the complaint, Jason alleged that National Loan “sought and obtained a Writ of Garnishment against Mr. Jason’s property based upon its bogus and illegal judgment.”

In support of National Loan’s motion to dismiss, appellee filed with the court a copy of the docket entries from the Jason Action in the District Court. See Maryland Rule 5-201(d) (“A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.”). See also Maryland Rule 2-322(c) (“... If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 2-501, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 2-501.”).

The District Court’s docket entries confirmed the allegations made in Jason’s complaint regarding the timing of National Loan’s collection suit: National Loan filed suit against Jason on January 29, 2009. According to the docket entries, judgment upon affidavit was entered against Jason on March 31, 2009, and notice was mailed to him on that date. A writ of garnishment was issued in April 2009, and Jason moved to dismiss the garnishment on April 30,2009.

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, counsel for National Loan argued that Jason’s causes of action all accrued when suit was filed on January 29, 2009, but counsel reiterated that the District Court judgment against Jason was entered on March 31, 2009, and a writ of garnishment was issued in April 2009. Counsel for National Loan argued that either the initiation of the collection suit, or the entry of judgment in the collection action, or the issuance of a garnishment on the judgment put Jason on inquiry notice of his claims against National Loan for wrongfully pursuing collection of a debt, and all of those events occurred more than three years before Jason filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

But, even if Jason was on inquiry notice no later than April 30, 2009, that National Loan was attempting to enforce a judgment against him, Jason could not pursue a claim of unjust enrichment until National Loan actually took possession of his funds. In Paul Mark Sandler & James K. Archibald, Pleading Causes of Action in Maryland, § 2.37 at 166 (5th ed.2013), the authors state:

To sustain a claim based upon unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must establish:

1) A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;

2) Appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and

3) Acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its value or the return of money, if money is improperly withheld.

Accord Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 295, 936 A.2d 343 (2007); Mohiuddin v. Doctors Billing & Mgmt. Solutions, 196 Md.App. 439, 449, 9 A.3d 859 (2010).

Here, no benefit was conferred upon National Loan by Jason until funds were transferred from Jason to National Loan. Because the record does not disclose that date, we cannot determine whether the unjust enrichment claim was timely filed. Consequently, the circuit court erred in dismissing Count IV as time-barred. We reverse that judgment and remand for further proceedings.

III. Statutory claims

Jason also contends that the circuit court erred in holding that his claims in Count V for relief under the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act were time barred. National Loan responds that the claims were time-barred because all of the alleged violations occurred more than three years before Jason’s complaint was filed. In his brief in our Court, Jason argued that, because of National Loan’s failure to disclose that it did not hold a license, the discovery rule should extend the time for filing claims for relief under the consumer protection statutes. National Loan points out that Jason has provided no case supporting a duty to disclose a lack of debt collection license. But, even if we assume arguendo that National Loan had a duty to disclose its licensing status to Jason, he would have nevertheless been on inquiry notice of the fact that this company was pursuing a collection action against him at some point early in 2009. If not when he was served with the District Court complaint, and if not when he received notice of the judgment that had been entered against him on March 31, 2009, Jason certainly was on inquiry notice to investigate potential legal actions against National Loan when they garnished his bank account in April 2009. Because Jason waited more than three years to file his complaint seeking relief under the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, the claims asserted in Count V were barred by limitations. We shall affirm that portion of the judgment entered by the circuit court.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID ONE-THIRD BY APPELLANT AND TWO-THIRDS BY APPELLEE.

      . An unreported opinion was previously filed in this case on December 15, 2015. That opinion is withdrawn and is superseded by this reported opinion.

      . As we observed in Cutler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 175 Md.App. 177, 188, 927 A.2d 1 (2007), "there is no statutory or constitutional right to pursue by way of a class action the various claims that were the subject of appellants’ complaint. Rather, a class action is a procedural device, created by the judiciary's adoption of a court rule to facilitate management of multiple similar claims. Maryland Rule 2-231 provides that the circuit court may order pursuit of claims by way of a class action if certain requirements are met.” (Footnote omitted.)

      . National Loan made two additional arguments that were not the basis of the circuit court’s dismissal, and are therefore not before us. National Loan asserted that it was not required to be licensed as a debt collector in order to file suit against Jason on a debt that National Loan "owned." And National Loan also asserted that there was no justiciable controversy because its claim against Jason had been satisfied.

      . Although Section 18 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) recognizes "a claim in restitution as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment” that may result if monies are paid "as a consequence of a judgment that is subsequently reversed or avoided,”
        Comment e points out that "[a]n invalid or erroneous judgment that gives effect to a valid liability does not create unjust enrichment: the ensuing transfer has a sufficient legal basis in the underlying liability, notwithstanding the deficiencies of the judgment." Illustration 6 provides this example:
      A sues B to enforce a $5000 debt, obtaining a judgment that B satisfies. The judgment is subsequently determined to be void for want of jurisdiction. Before another court having jurisdiction over the parties, B seeks restitution of $5000; A establishes that the underlying $5000 debt was and remains legal, valid, and enforceable. B is not entitled to restitution.

      . See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 74 (1982), Comment c, stating, with respect to circumstances that might support denial of relief from a void judgment:
      In the articulation of rules for dealing with this problem, no success has been achieved in attempts to state definitively the equities sufficient to overcome a prima facie case for equitable relief----But there is solid authority for the proposition that relief should be denied from a judgment that is "void” if the equities are compelling enough.... The more reflective decisions recognize that the considerations stated in this Section [74] have to be considered in aggregate.

      . Because the circuit court agreed with National Loan’s contention that Jason’s claims of unjust enrichment are barred by the statute of limitations, the court did not consider whether there might be any claim preclusion arising from Jason’s failure to raise the licensing issue in the District Court at the time he challenged the garnishment. Cf. Mostofi v. Midland Funding LLC, 223 Md.App. 687, 701, 117 A.3d 639 (2015) (collateral attack was not permitted where jurisdictional argument had been raised and decided in the litigation leading to the judgment; we stated: "Having failed to convince one trial court that jurisdiction was a problem, and having failed to appeal, Mr. Mostofi does not get another bite at the apple, even if we were to assume that he was right (and we do not) about who owned his debt. His collateral attack on the underlying debt judgment, then, is barred under res judicata." But we further stated in Mostofi, 223 Md.App. at 703, 117 A.3d 639: "When a party tries to use one of these [consumer protection statutes such as the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act] to attack a judgment against him or her collaterally, ... res judicata /claim preclusion normally bars the attack.”). Accord Tucker, supra, 35 Md.App. at 712, 373 A.2d 16 (“If there has been a judicial determination that the court rendering a judgment has jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata applies and precludes a collateral attack upon that judgment.”).

      . Jason did not argue that his claims in Count V qualified for the twelve-year statute of limitations applicable to "other specialties” pursuant to CJP § 5-102(a)(6). The test for "determining when a statutory action falls within CJP § 5-102(a)(6)” was set forth in Master Financial, supra, 409 Md. at 70, 972 A.2d 864. As the Court noted in Master Financial: "It is evident ... from our cases that the ‘other specialty' [provision] stated in CJP § 5-102(a)(6) is a relatively narrow catchall that does not suffice to exempt from the three-year period every claim that happens to be based in some way on a statute.” Id. See also NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc. v. Carlsen, 439 Md. 427, 429, 96 A.3d 202 (2014) (holding that "an alleged violation of [Comm. Law] § 12-805(d) is not an 'other specialty’ under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), and thus is subject to CJP § 5-101, which is the default three-year statute of limitations.”); AGV Sports Group, supra, 417 Md. at 401, 10 A.3d 745 ("[W]e hold that a claim brought under the MTCPA [i.e., the Maryland Telephone Consumer Protection Act] is not a specialty within the meaning of CJP § 5-102(a)(6) '[a]ny other statutory specialty.' ”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: REED, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    135 A.3d 509
    SUGARLOAF CITIZENS ASSOCIATION, et al., v. FREDERICK COUNTY BOARD OF APPEALS, et al.
    No. 2621,
    Sept. Term, 2013.
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    April 26, 2016.

      Michele Rosenfeld, Potomac, MD, for appellant.
    Kathy L. Mitchell (John S. Mathias, Co. Atty., Frederick, MD), See Lee-Cho (Miller, Miller & Canby, Chtd., Rockville, MD), on the briefs, for appellee.
    Panel: WOODWARD, LEAHY, REED, JJ.
   REED, J.

This appeal arises from an order of the Circuit Court for Frederick County affirming an administrative decision made by appellee, the Frederick County Board of Appeals (the “Board”). Appellants, the Sugarloaf Citizens’ Association, Inc., Montgomery Countryside Alliance, Inc., Christopher and Sandra Sappe, and Gary Noubarian, seek our review of that Board decision, in which it declined to review appellants’ administrative appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

Appellants raise two questions for our consideration. We rephrase those questions for clarity and reorder them as follows:

I. Whether the Board erred where it declined to review the Frederick County Health Department’s determination of “septic system adequacy” on the grounds it lacked jurisdiction;

II. Whether the Board erred where it determined the site plan as amended was not subject to Frederick County’s current site plan review criteria.

We answer these questions in the negative. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court and shall explain.

Factual and Procedural Background

This dispute arises out of the ongoing efforts of appellee, the Global Mission Church of Greater Washington (“GMC”), to build a 138,027 square foot place of worship in Frederick County, Maryland.

These efforts began in 2009 when GMC submitted Site Development Plan SP 92-37 (“SP 92-37”) for consideration by the Frederick County Planning Commission (the “Commission” or “Planning Commission”). SP 92-37 described GMC’s plan to build a large-scale place of worship, which would include the sanctuary itself, dining and kitchen facilities, offices, meeting rooms, and a multi-purpose hall. The plan also included the installation of a septic tank with a total loading capacity of 4,999 gallons per day.

GMC held several meetings with both Commission staff and Frederick County staff during the first half of 2009. As the site plan made its way through the review process, two significant issues arose — the adequacy of the septic system and the need for a secondary emergency access to the property. Despite these two issues, SP 92-37 was brought before the Commission for consideration, and public hearings regarding the site plan were held on July 8 and July 15, 2009.

A Commission staff report recommended the conditional approval of SP 92-37. This approval was drawn from the recommendations of the Engineering, Planning, and Life Safety Sections of the Frederick County Planning Department, as well as the Frederick County Health Department. The Health Department recommended approval of the site plan after a series of negotiations between GMC and the Department regarding proposed water and septic facilities.

The July 15, 2009 hearing turned out to be a watershed moment in the life of SP 92-37. The Commission heard from GMC, county staff, and individual citizens and citizen groups with regard to the site plan. The septic system emerged as a significant concern for the Commission, and it granted a ninety-day continuance in the proceedings in order to give GMC and County staff an opportunity to address the septic system and other issues raised during the hearing.

During that ninety-day period, the County sought additional information from GMC regarding the issues raised at the July 15, 2009 hearing, which GMC provided on September 14, 2009. After that, no additional information was requested and no further meetings were scheduled. Rather, another public hearing was scheduled for October 14, 2009.

A week before the scheduled hearing, Commission staff released another Staff Report, in which it changed positions and recommended denial of SP 92-37. This new recommendation was based on a review by the Health Department and the Life Safety Section of the new information GMC submitted. The Health Department was concerned that the proposed building capacity would lead to an average septic discharge that would exceed the septic system’s loading capacity. The County Life Safety Section determined the proposed building’s occupant capacity would be four times the number it originally anticipated, and, accordingly, it determined the site plan would need a secondary emergency access road.

This new recommendation created an additional hurdle for GMC. In an effort to avoid denial of its proposed site plan, GMC sought to hold additional discussions with County staff regarding the revised recommendation. GMC was able to meet only with the Health Department before the hearing, where a Department staff member suggested GMC seek a continuance. Two days before the hearing, on October 12, 2009, GMC requested a continuance, and again, at the October 14 hearing, it reiterated that request before the full Commission. Despite the multiple requests, the Commission denied a continuance and proceeded with the hearing. The Commission heard testimony and received evidence from GMC and the public. Many members of the public objected to the site plan, citing the potential negative impact of the project on the area’s rural and scenic nature, as well as environmental concerns. Notwithstanding GMC’s proffered concessions to address these concerns, the Commission denied SP 92-37 on the basis of the revised Staff Report, the lack of adequate septic capacity, and GMC’s failure to provide for a secondary access road.

GMC sought review of the Commission’s denial from the County Board of Appeals. The Board held a hearing on January 20, 2010, in which it decided to proceed with a de novo review, and heard a significant amount of testimony for and against SP 92-37. The Board issued its decision on March 25, 2010, in which it vacated and remanded the decision of the Commission. The Board explained that the Commission had denied GMC due process because GMC was not afforded a “meaningful and adequate opportunity” to address the concerns of the Health Department and the County with regard to the septic system and secondary access road, respectively.

Of particular significance to the present appeal, the Board’s opinion resolved a jurisdictional issue that arises in this case. The Board explained that the Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”), acting via the Health Department, possesses the sole authority to certify or approve proposed septic systems. According to the Frederick County Code, before the Commission can approve a proposed site plan, the Health Department must approve the site plan’s proposed water and sewer facilities. See Frederick County Code of Ordinances (“F.C.C.”) § 1-19-3.300.4 (2014). Accordingly, without MDE’s approval of the proposed septic system, the Board determined the Commission lacked the authority to consider SP 92-37 at that time and should have granted GMC’s request for a continuance.

Appellees, the Frederick County Board of County Commissioners (the “County Commissioners”), were aggrieved by the Board’s March 25, 2010, decision and sought judicial review from the circuit court. The County Commissioners, in their petition, claimed the Board’s decision was erroneous because it considered evidence outside the record, and acted in excess of its powers by remanding the site plan application to the Planning Commission. The circuit court agreed with the Board that GMC was denied due process and the reasonable opportunity to obtain the Health Department’s approval for its septic system, and, accordingly, affirmed the Board’s decision.

With this new opportunity in hand, GMC proceeded to revise SP 92-37 to address the concerns raised about the site plan, including those concerns regarding the septic system and the secondary access road. GMC submitted a revised version of SP 92-37 in July 2012, and the site plan once again went before the Planning Commission at a November 14, 2012 hearing.

This hearing was attended by both County staff and the appellants, where appellants registered their opposition to the site plan. County staff recommended approval, however, because it determined the site plan was in compliance with all applicable county regulations and the Health Department concluded that the septic system was of adequate capacity. Satisfied with the site plan’s progress, the Planning Commission conditionally approved SP 92-37.

Appellants believed the Commission’s conditional approval was in error and appealed the decision to the Board on December 14, 2012. Appellants contested the Commission’s approval on two grounds: 1) the Health Department underestimated the maximum daily septic discharge; and 2) the Commission failed to consider adequately SP 92-37’s compliance with the criteria of F.C.C. § 1-19-3.300.4(A). The Board held a hearing to consider appellants’ case and denied the appeal on jurisdictional grounds. The Board first explained it lacked the authority to review the Health Department’s determination because, as a State agency, the Department possesses the authority to consider septic system adequacy pursuant to the Environment Article of the Maryland Code. The Board then explained that appellants’ second assignment of error failed as a matter of law because § 1-19-3.300.4(A) was enacted after SP 92-37 was filed, and could not apply to the site plan. After denying appellants’ requests for reconsideration of its decision in March 2013, the Board adopted its findings in a written decision on April 30, 2013.

Appellants petitioned the circuit court on May 30, 2013, for judicial review of the Board’s dismissal of its administrative appeal. The circuit court heard the matter on December 16, 2013, and affirmed the Board’s decision in a written opinion on January 24, 2014.

Appellants timely noted their appeal to this Court on February 24, 2014.

Discussion

A. Parties’ Contentions

Appellants present two sets of grounds for appeal. First, they argue that the Board had the jurisdiction to consider the Health Department’s decision regarding GMC’s proposed septic system because it already did so in the 2010 appeal. Next, appellants argue in effect that, because Lot 4 was added to GMC’s site plan, updating the plan changes the date of filing. F.C.C. § 1-19-3.300.3 was amended in 2009, and the amending ordinance included a grandfathering clause that made the new version of the statute applicable to all site plans filed after July 24, 2009. Appellants contend that because GMC added Lot 4 to the site plan after July 24, 2009, the filing date of SP 92-37 has changed and the grandfathering clause is inapplicable, making the site plan subject to the current version of § 1-19-3.300.3.

The Board and Commissioners (the “County appellees”) collectively counter and state, first, that appellants’ Lot 4 issue is not preserved for our review. In the event that the issue is preserved, however, the County appellees explain that, despite the revisions to the site plan, review of the plan is according to the version of § 1-19-3.300.3 in effect at the time of the original submission. Second, they argue the Board cannot review decisions of the Health Department, because it is a State agency acting under the authority of the Environment Article of the Maryland Code.

GMC substantially agrees with the County appellees’ contentions regarding Lot 4 and § 1-19-3.300.3, and regarding the Board’s lack of jurisdiction to review the Health Department’s decision on GMC’s proposed septic system.

B. Standard of Review

This case comes to us on appeal from an order of a circuit court regarding a petition for the judicial review of a decision of an administrative agency. Our standard of review for such cases is well-established.

When we review the decision of an administrative agency or tribunal, “we [assume] the same posture as the circuit court ... and limit our review to the agency’s decision.” Anderson v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 402 Md. 236, 244, 935 A.2d 746 (2007) (internal citation omitted). The circuit court’s decision acts as a lens for review of the agency’s decision, or in other words, “we look not at the circuit court decision but through it.” Emps. Ret. Sys. of Balt. Cnty. v. Brown, 186 Md.App. 293, 310, 973 A.2d 879 (2009), cert. denied, 410 Md. 560, 979 A.2d 708 (2009) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).

We “review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to the agency” because it is “prima facie correct” and entitled to a “presumption of validity.” Anderson v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 330 Md. 187, 213, 623 A.2d 198 (1993) (internal citation omitted).

The overarching goal of judicial review of agency decisions is to determine whether the agency’s decision was made “in accordance with the law or whether it is arbitrary, illegal, and capricious.” Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Prigel Family Creamery, 206 Md.App. 264, 274, 47 A.3d 1087 (2012) (internal citation omitted). With regard to the agency’s factual findings, we do not disturb the agency’s decision if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. See id. (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 569, 709 A.2d 749 (1998) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are not bound, however, to affirm those agency decisions based upon errors of law and may reverse administrative decisions containing such errors. Id.

C. Analysis

(i) The Board’s Appellate Jurisdiction over Decisions of the Frederick County Health Department

Appellants essentially seek to have this Court order the Board to review a decision of the Health Department regarding GMC’s proposed septic system because it purportedly did so in 2009. We shall not do so because the Maryland Code, Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”), and the F.C.C. set up a regulatory scheme that places matters related to septic systems within the sole purview of the Health Department — a State agency.

The general responsibilities of county health officers are set forth in the Environment Article (“Envir.”) of the Maryland Code. Among those responsibilities is the inspection of and reporting on “sewerage facilities in the county.” Envir. § 9-102. In Frederick County, those responsibilities extend to the evaluation of proposed water and sewer facilities in site plans. Where a site plan includes service by non-publicly owned community water and sewer utilities, approval of the plan is conditioned on whether “the facilities [] meet the requirements of and receive approval from the Maryland Department of the Environment/the Frederick County Health Department.” F.C.C. § 1-19-3.300.4(0 (emphasis added).

COMAR sets forth the technical requirements for the approval of septic systems by MDE. That Department has promulgated regulations for the approval of septic systems by health officers pursuant to its statutory authority. See CO-MAR 26.04.02 References & Annotations (2014) (citing Envir. §§ 9-216, 9-217, 9-223, 9-252, 9-319, 9-510, 9-1108, 10-103, 10-301, and 10-304 as the statutory authority for regulation of septic systems). According to these regulations, the Health Department, as the responsible health officer for Frederick County, is tasked with approving septic systems of less than 5,000 gallons. See COMAR 26.04.02.05. We think this statutory and regulatory framework makes clear that the authority to approve septic systems such as the one proposed by GMC is a function of MDE, delegated to appropriate county authorities throughout the State.

With regard to zoning decisions, the Frederick County Code delineates the responsibilities of the Commission and the Board. F.C.C. Chapter 1-19, which contains Frederick County’s zoning laws, lists the powers of the Board in F.C.C. § 1-19-2.150(D). Those powers include, in part:

(1) [The power] [t]o hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is error in any order, requirement, decision or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of this chapter;

(2) [The power] [t]o hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the chapter upon which the Board is required to pass under this chapter;

(3) [The power] [t]o authorize upon appeal in specific cases a variance from the terms of this chapter, subject to the Board’s administrative procedures[.]

F.C.C. § 1-19-2.150(D). These provisions are, in fact, an adaptation of the provisions of § 4-305 of the Land Use Article (“L.U.”) of the Maryland Code. Section 4-305, which is part of the division of the statute entitled “Single-Jurisdiction Planning and Zoning,” states that county boards of appeal may:

(1) hear and decide appeals when it is alleged that there is an error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative officer or unit under this division or of any local law adopted under this division;

(2) hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of a local law on which the board is required to pass under the local law; and

(3) authorize on appeal in specific cases a variance from the terms of a local law.

(Emphasis added).

We think the language of the F.C.C. and L.U. § 4-305 makes clear that the Board’s jurisdiction in zoning cases is limited to the review of any decisions made by the Commission under Chapter 1-19. Moreover, as discussed extensively supra, F.C.C. § 1-19-3.300.4(0 expressly states that septic system decisions must be made by the State via its agents. (“[T]he facilities shall meet the requirements of and receive approval from the Maryland Department of the Environment/the Frederick County Health Department.”) Reading the statute to include septic system decisions within the Board’s jurisdiction would lead to a result in contravention of the plain language of the statute. The statute’s language clearly excludes approval of septic systems from the authority of the Commission and the Board. Furthermore, L.U. § 4-305 contemplates the review of decisions made according to local law, whereas septic system decisions are matters of state law and regulations.

We think the F.C.C. makes clear that a person aggrieved by the decision of the Frederick County Health Department must follow the appropriate State-wide statutory and regulatory procedures for review of those decisions. The decision of the local health officer on a septic system is not a matter of county authority, but State-delegated authority. Similarly, decisions of the Commission and the Board are matters of county authority, as stated in both the F.C.C. and the Maryland Code. We hold that the Board did not err where it found it lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to review the Frederick County Health Department’s decision on GMC’s septic system.

Appellants’ additional contention that because the Board considered the substantive determination of the Health Department in the 2010 appeal, it must do so again in the present appeal is unpersuasive because of its inaccuracy. The Board explicitly stated in its March 2010 decision that GMC

may have to appeal the decision of the Health Department pursuant to the applicable regulations set forth in [CO-MAR]. Neither the Planning Commission nor the Board of Appeals is the appropriate body to hear an appeal of the decision of the Health Department to deny an applicant’s septic system plan or the manner in which the Health Department made its decision.

(Emphasis added). The Board did not decide anything substantive with regard to the proposed septic system and made absolutely clear it lacked jurisdiction. We hold, in light of the discussion supra, the Board did not violate appellants’ due process rights because it has consistently declined to exercise jurisdiction over matters within the purview of the Frederick County Health Department, a State agency.

(ii) SP 97-32’s Compliance with F.C.C. § 1-19-3.300.3

We disagree with appellants’ second assignment of error that the Board committed an error of law where it approved SP 97-32. According to appellants, SP 97-32 as submitted does not meet the requirements for the site plans in F.C.C. § 1-19-3.300.3 because it did not include Lot 4, where the proposed access road would be built.

Appellants effectively argue that the addition of Lot 4 to the site plan is not an amendment of the plan, but, rather, a new site plan application subject to the post-July 24, 2009, requirements of § 1-19-3.300.3. This would require the Commission and the Board to treat each amendment to a site plan as a brand new plan — a result we think unnecessary.

A close examination of the Frederick County Code provisions on the review of site plans, F.C.C. §§ 1-19-3.300 to 1-19-3.300.4, reveals that the statute possesses no language requiring the Commission to treat amended site plans as new site plans. First of all, this would create an unnecessary backlog of zoning applications, particularly where the amendments are minor. The statute already contemplates the necessity of amendments where the submitted information is somehow deficient. See F.C.C. § 1-19-3.300.3(G)(3) (“The submitted information, if found deficient or in error, may be required to be resubmitted over the certification of an engineer, architect, landscape architect, land surveyor or other certified professional.” (emphasis added)). It bears noting that there is nothing following this language in § 1.19-3.300.3 that indicates that an applicant must start the approval process from scratch where information is resubmitted.

Moreover, we defer to the Board’s interpretation of its statute. The Board is the administrative body authorized to hear appeals on matters related to the application of the Zoning chapter of the County Code. See F.C.C. § 1-19-2.150. Given this subject matter expertise, we defer to the Board’s interpretation of the Zoning chapter. See Marriott Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 455 (1997); Haigley v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 128 Md.App. 194, 216, 736 A.2d 1185 (1999) (“To be sure, the consistent construction by an agency responsible for administering a statute is entitled to considerable weight. That deference is premised on the notion that the agency has particular expertise in the area governed by the statute.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Board, in arguing for the date of filing to remain fixed with the date the original site plan was filed, examines and interprets Frederick County Ordinance No. 09-22-526 (“F.C.O. 09-22-526”). That ordinance amended the Zoning chapter of the County Code, specifically § 1-19-3.300.4 — the main provision at issue here. Of critical importance to this dispute is the grandfathering clause in F.C.O. 09-22-526: “[T]his Ordinance shall take effect on and apply to site plan applications filed after July 2b, 2009.” (emphasis added). The Board’s interpretation of this clause considers the filing date to be the date the original site plan application was filed, and not when an amendment is filed. The Board explains that if it were to interpret the clause otherwise, the Board would be reading verbiage into the plain language of F.C.O. 09-22-526 that is non-existent. Cf Marriott Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d 455 (explaining that courts will not insert terms to make a statute express an intent not reflected in statute’s original form). We agree.

A site plan filed pursuant to the Zoning chapter of the County Code retains the date of its original filing. We are in accord with the Board’s reading of its statute and defer to its interpretation, especially in light of the plain language of F.C.O. 09-22-526. We think that, if a new filing date controlled for each amendment of a site plan, a certain amount of administrative discord would be introduced into the zoning process. • The Board, tasked with maintaining its administrative efficiency, is in the best position to determine how the grandfathering clause will apply to extant site plan applications. See, e.g., Cowles v. Montgomery Cnty., 123 Md.App. 426, 437, 718 A.2d 678 (1998) (citing administrative efficiency as a persuasive factor in accepting interpretation of statute by Board of Appeals for Montgomery County in a zoning matter). Having a new filing date apply each time an amended site plan is filed would be grossly inefficient. The Commission would need to constantly update records to reflect new filing dates. Moreover, those site plans filed before July 24, 2009, would have to comply with the new version of § 1-19-3.300.3. This would unnecessarily extend the approval process for existing site plans because the review process would begin anew for these plans. This would create a wholly unnecessary backlog. Avoiding unnecessary delays and administrative inefficiency commands a common sense reading of the statute. The plain language of F.C.O. 09-22-256 and the Board’s interpretation of that ordinance are persuasive that the original filing date of a site plan should control with regard to the application of the grandfathering clause.

In light of these considerations, we determine the Board committed no error in considering SP 97-32 — which includes Lot 4 after amendment of that plan — under the pre-July 27, 2009 requirements. The Board was not required to consider the site plan under the new requirements, and did not err where it found appellants had no grounds for appeal.

The Board’s declination of appellants’ administrative appeal was not erroneous. The Board’s jurisdiction to consider the decision of the Health Department with regard to GMC’s proposed septic system was necessarily limited by statute, and the grandfathering clause in F.C.O. 09-22-256 does not contemplate a new filing date for each site plan application. We hold the Board’s decision to dismiss appellants’ appeal was not arbitrary and capricious and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.

      . Appellants originally presented the following two questions in their brief:
      I. Did the Board of Appeals err as a matter of law in affirming the Planning Commission’s site plan approval, which failed to apply Frederick County's current site plan review criteria to Lot 4?
      II. Did the Board of Appeals err as a matter of law in affirming the Planning Commission's site plan approval without considering evidence that could have required joint review of the proposed septic system by the local health department and by Maryland's Department of the Environment?

      . GMC offered to place additional restrictions on the site plan, including:
      • no school on the property;
      • no daycare on the property;
      • metering and monitoring of water usage, with regular reports to be submitted to the health Department;
      • reduction of the building's height from 85 to 70 feet;

        • a maximum number of users at any one time of 2,320 people;
      • reducing the building’s size by 28,000 square feet;
      • constructing the requested secondary emergency access road; and
      • use of water-efficient fixtures.

      . At the time SP 92-37 was under review by the Commission in 2009, the water and sewer approval provisions were codified at F.C.C. § 1-19-3.300.1(B). That provision stated: "The Health Department shall certify that the proposed water and sewage facilities are adequate to service the proposed development."
      The present-day version of the statute now states:
      Where the proposed development will be served by publicly owned community water and sewer, the facilities shall be adequate to serve the proposed development. Where proposed development will be served by facilities other than publicly owned community water and sewer, the facilities shall meet the requirements of and receive approval from the Maryland Department of the Environment/the Frederick County Health Department.
      F.C.C. § 1-19-3.300.4(0.

      . The revised plan included the following changes:
      1) Reduction of the building size from 138,027 square feet to 118,530 square feet;
      2) Reduction of the sanctuary's seats from 1,160 to 800;
      3) Reduction of the dining hall’s seats from 500 to 320;
      4) Addition of a secondary emergency access road to Dr. Perry Road, in compliance with the requirements of Frederick County's Office of Life Safety.

      . F.C.C. § 1-I9-3.300.4(A) states:

        Site development. Existing and anticipated surrounding land uses have been adequately considered in the design of the development and negative impacts have been minimized through such means as building placement or scale, landscaping, or screening, and an evaluation of lighting. Anticipated surrounding uses shall be determined based upon existing zoning and land use designations.
      (Emphasis in original).

      . COMAR 26.04.02.02 sets forth the general requirements for "new on-site sewage disposal systems and non-community water supply systems, replacements, additions to existing systems, repair or replacement of an existing system and any potential changes in the strength or volume of the sewage entering an on-site sewage disposal system.” Approval of these systems is granted by what COMAR terms the "Approving Authority.” An Approving Authority is defined by COMAR as "the Secretary of the Department of the Environment or the Secretary’s designee.” COMAR 26.04.02.01(B)(1).

      . The appellees collectively argue that appellants' arguments regarding Lot 4 are not preserved for our review. Our review is limited to the record made before the administrative agency and we cannot pass upon issues presented to us for the first time on appeal. See Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Campbell, 364 Md. 108, 123, 771 A.2d 1051 (2001); Halici v. City of Gaithersburg, 180 Md.App. 238, 248, 949 A.2d 85 (2008), cert. denied, 406 Md. 113, 956 A.2d 202 (2008). On pages 47-48 of the transcript of the Board's proceedings on February 28, 2013, appellants' counsel clearly raises the Lot 4 issue and the applicability of the revised ordinance to SP 92-37. Although the argument was, perhaps, not as detailed before the Board as it is before this Court, we think the issue was brought to the Board’s attention sufficiently before it rendered the decision before us. Accordingly, we determine appellants have preserved this question for this Court's review.