author: Lowe, J.,

text:
    RICHARD F. WICKS et ux. v. P. STEELE HOWARD
    [No. 1223,
    September Term, 1977.]

      Decided July 17, 1978.

      The cause was argued before Moylan, Lowe and Wilner, JJ.

      Gloría M. Belgrad, with whom was Paul M. Vettori on the brief, for appellants.

      LeonardE. Wilson, with whom was Frank Thomas Howard on the brief, for appellee.
   Lowe, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Maryland, by common law rule, title to all navigable waters and to the soil below the mean high-water mark of those waters is vested in the State as successor to the Lord Proprietary who had received it by grant from the Crown; “and so it remains, unless it be included in some grant by the State, made prior to [March 3,] 1862”. Sollers v. Sollers, 77 Md. 148, 152. See Hawkins Point Light-House Case, 39 F. 77, 79-80 and Gould on Waters, §§ 32, 42 (3d ed. 1900). Waters are deemed navigable for these purposes if, and only if, they are subject to the ebb and flow of tides. Browne v. Kennedy, 5 H. & J. 195. This is still the law of Maryland, to the extent that it has not been modified or abrogated by statute. Van Ruymbeke v. Patapsco Ind. Park, 261 Md. 470; cf. Wagner v. City of Baltimore, 210 Md. 615, 622, 624. In the absence of specific statutory authority to the contrary, therefore, the right to extend permanent improvements into the waters in front of one’s land is not an inherent or common law riparian right. The inherent common law right is to the water’s use, and that, of course, presupposes the concomitant right of access.

The right to extend improvements such as wharves and piers into the water is a statutory one, granted by the State as successor to the Lord Proprietary to enhance the right of riparian access to the waters. The original grant of the right to make and hold title to improvements in the waters in front of one’s land gave title of such improvements, not necessarily to the adjacent landowner by virtue of his ownership, but rather to the “improvers, their heirs and assigns forever”, as “an encouragement for such improvers”. Ch. 9, Acts of 1745 (repealed 1860). Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Chase, 43 Md. 23, 32-33.

In 1862 the General Assembly enacted Ch. 129, because of the

“Doubts entertained in regard to the extent of the rights of proprietors bounding on navigable waters____”

The act subsequently codified as Md. Code, Art. 54, § 46 gave the “exclusive right” to make improvements into the waters in front of riparian land bounding on navigable waters to the “proprietor” of the land, and vested title to the improvements in the successive owners of the land as an incident of their ownership. No vested title either to the improvement or to the use of the submerged land upon which it was erected — or might rest — accrued to the riparian owner until the improvements had actually been completed. Bd. of Pub. Works v. Larmar Corp., 262 Md. 24, 46.

Similar principles of right to improve and ownership were carried over in the Wetlands Act of 1970. Md. Code, Nat. Res. Art., § 9-201 states in pertinent part that the owner of land bounding on navigable water

"... may make improvements into the water in front of his land to preserve his access to the navigable water or protect his shore against erosion. After an improvement has been constructed, it is the property of the owner of the land to which it is attached.”

There is no reason to believe that this restatement of the 1862 law carries with it any implication of such an interest vesting before an improvement is completed.

In the case at bar, the appellants prepared to assert their statutory right to erect a wharf or pier in front of their relatively recently purchased riparian property. They did not seek to construct a wharf perpendicular to their shoreline, nor even within the framework of an imaginary extension of their property lines into the water. They contend that their (statutory) right to extend improvements into the water so as to enhance their common law right of access carries with it an implied right to have the wharf extend in a straight line to the nearest point where it would meet the channel perpendicularly, notwithstanding that the wharf would not be perpendicular to their shoreline, but would create an angle nearer 45°.

Appellants complain that since .1959 (16 years before appellants took title to their lot in May, 1975) appellee has “encroached” upon the waters appurtenant to their lot, derogating their recently acquired riparian right to make improvements, by virtue of a dog-leg shaped wharf jutting out from the shoreline. Although constructed entirely in front of appellee’s own property (and within an imaginary extension of his boundary lines), it lay between appellants’ lot and the point on the river channel toward which they sought to aim their pier. Appellants would be unable to construct their wharf in a straight line for a sufficient distance to reach the channel without ramming appellee’s existing pier, because to reach the channel perpendicularly with a straight wharf from appellants’ lot, it must extend at an oblique angle with the shoreline, cross the imaginary extension of the boundary between the parties’ lands, and terminate at the channel directly in front of appellee’s land. As shown in the record with plats and other exhibits, the situation is something like this:

Claiming a right to so construct a wharf, they asked the Circuit Court for Cecil County to compel the removal of appellee’s pier or grant them money damages for having encroached upon their riparian “right”.

The trial judge carefully set forth the evidence, his findings of fact and some of the guiding equitable principles persuasive to him in arriving at his conclusion. Appellants pose four questions, three of which attack the sufficiency of the evidence, and another contending that the trial court erred “as a matter of law”.

“I. Whether the judgment of the trial court is erroneous as a matter of law because the Court failed to apportion riparian rights in the river in proportion to the shorefront dimensions of the riparian tracts.

II. Whether the Trial Court’s judgment is clearly erroneous, unsupported by the evidence and arbitrary and capricious because:

A. In determining Appellants’ riparian rights boundaries it unfairly took into consideration riparian rights areas properly appurtenant to other riparian tracts.
B. It is based upon an erroneous and inequitable formula for apportioning riparian rights in the circumstances of this case.

III. Whether the findings of the Trial Court as to estoppel and implied consent are unsupported by the evidence, clearly erroneous and arbitrary and capricious.

IV. Whether the Trial Court’s findings as to comparative hardship are unsupported by the evidence, clearly erroneous and arbitrary and capricious.”

Only if appellants could provide law holding that they have a right to construct a wharf in a direction from their land in such a way as to maximize their convenience in striking the channel perpendicularly, could we find error in the decision as a matter of law. But there is no such authority. That the trial judge was not persuaded by some evidence of appellants that such directions had been taken by others in the geographical vicinity does not constitute error as a matter of law. As noted, the applicable statute (which establishes the construction rights of appellants) is in fact simply a legislative attempt to guarantee each riparian owner his well established common law right of access to navigable waters by granting to him the exclusive privilege of making improvements in State-owned waters abutting his property. It need hardly be noted that geographic variables preclude complete equality of access on a formula basis. The nature of the right is such that the landowner is protected against encroachments on this right of some access; but until the right is exercised, and the improvements actually completed, he has no vested interest in any particular imagined, proposed, or even partially finished construction project. Williams v. Skyline Dev. Corp., 265 Md. 130, 155; Bd. of Pub. Works v. Larmar Corp., supra, at 44-50. There is no rigid method of apportioning the statutory riparian rights to construct improvements, the governing principle being merely that the division must be equitable, not necessarily equal. See Anno., Riparian Owners — Boundaries, 65 A.L.R.2d 143, 153, et seq., and cases cited therein. While it may be true that some courts in some cases have fashioned the remedy urged upon us by appellants (which cases, we note, have been few and far between), no court has ever held that such a method should always be applied as a matter of law. We unhesitatingly decline to be the first.

In response to questions II, III and IV, we find sufficient evidence in the record, or inferences legitimately drawable therefrom, to have permitted the chancellor to reach the conclusions he set forth. It is his judgment from which this appeal was taken (not his opinion) and we are convinced that his judgment was correct. We are additionally convinced that the factors he considered were proper under the circumstances, and that the result reached was eminently fair. As we are in accord with all of the reasons he ascribed, in affirming his judgments, we adopt his opinion as our own. A copy is appended herewith.

Judgment affirmed.

Costs to be paid by appellants.

APPENDIX

“MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a suit instituted by Complainants for injunctive relief or, in the alternative, damages, involving the erection and use of a dock or pier by Respondent, which facility is claimed to cross Complainants’ lot, thus blocking, obstructing and denying them of their riparian rights to the Sassafras River.

The bill seeks: (1) An injunction against Respondent requiring him to remove the docks which are allegedly obstructing and denying Complainants of their riparian rights; or (2) damages to Complainants for wrongful acts committed by Respondent; and (3) for such other and further relief as the case may require.

The following material facts have been established by a preponderance of the evidence, in the opinion of this Court:

That the parties hereto are abutting property owners. Respondent is the owner of the marina and restaurant known as The Granary. Respondent described his shoreline property as being 455 feet in length. Complainants’ abutting property is on the down-river or westerly side of the Granary property and measures 158 feet, more or less, along the river. Respondent Howard had obtained permission in 1959 from the Corps of Engineers to build the now-disputed pier. Limitations were placed on Respondent’s right to construct the pier in such manner as not to injure any private property or invade any private rights, or to infringe on any Federal, State or local laws or regulations. Complainants acquired their property in October 1974 from Karl and Olga Savard. The Savards were abroad when the pier permit was granted and did not return until November, when the construction of the pier was under way.

It is also found as a fact that Complainants own the adjoining marina known as Duffy Creek Marina; that they purchased it in 1974; that this marina now has some 132-133 rental slips (according to the testimony of Mrs. Wicks on cross-examination at the trial); that one lot owned by the parents of Mrs. Wicks separates their residential property from their marina property; that they rent this property from her parents, the Eldridges; that the Eldridges built the marina in 1956 or 1957; that Duffy Creek where the marina is now located was not navigable in 1952; that it has been made navigable by the former owners of the marina, the Eldridges, and now the Complainants, the Wicks; that there has also been considerable bulkheading to prevent erosion and to provide more slips and space for rent for boats in that area; that there had been a bar on the mouth of Duffy Creek which had been dredged to the east so boats could come in and out without the problem of striking bottom; that the Duffy Creek channel does fill in in winter and has to be dredged out from time to time; that the traffic has increased in the Granary area of Respondent due to activity at Duffy Creek Marina.

Mr. C. R. Webb, a land surveyor and graduate civil engineer, was called as Complainants’ first witness. He testified as an expert. That his plat was introduced in evidence as Complainants’ Exhibit #7; that this plat clearly shows the location of the properties involved as well as the approximate channel in the Sassafras River and the depth of waters off the respective properties; that the channel is wide and follows an irregular course; that this Court finds as a fact that there is navigable water in front of Complainants’ property.

Mary Ross Eldridge was called upon to testify for Complainants. She is the mother of Complainant Carol E. Wicks. She stated that she developed the marina and dredged out the channel; that at one point a storm wiped out their slips in one area; that the sandspit on the property accreted toward the Granary dock.

Complainants also called as witnesses Mrs. Wicks’ father, Capt. Edward F. Eldridge, and Capt. Lewis G. Salomon. Capt. Eldridge testified on cross-examination that he started Duffy Creek Marina and that the marina has slips all up past his property next to his daughter’s property; that when he took over where the marina is now located in 1958 it was marsh and he dredged out the creek, an area 300 by 30 feet, with a dragline; that Capt. Eldridge had been a licensed pilot on local waters since 1957 for 40-ton vessels; that there used to be an old derelict schooner back of a sand bar on Duffy Creek property; that Duffy Creek is navigable because it is dredged to six (6) feet; that one has to go 125 feet off the Wicks property before reaching twelve (12) feet of water.

Capt. Salomon testified as an expert, captain of boats, navigator and compass adjuster; that he was to locate the Sassafras River channel and locate from the channel area to the dividing line of Wicks and Howard properties and the riparian rights of Complainants; and that he proceeded to do so in the manner testified to and found the Howard pier trespassing over the riparian rights of the Wicks property.

Carol E. Wicks, one of the Complainants, testified that she and her husband own the Duffy Creek Marina. They purchased it in September 1974 from the Eldridges; that two or three months after purchasing the property they decided they wanted a private dock for their boat, a workboat type which they now keep in the marina; that they sought the help and advice of a surveyor as to the location of their pier on the property purchased from the Savards adjoining Howard; that their surveyor found an existing pier where they wanted to locate theirs; that they have never applied for a permit to construct a pier in front of their property; that they rent 132-133 slips at Duffy Creek Marina; and that they do not want to interfere with Duffy Creek boat traffic.

There was also testimony from a Maurice Preston who had been in marine construction for 18 years, building piers, docks, dredging and removing piers and docks when they had outlived their usefulness. Mr. Preston testified it would cost around $11,000 to remove the 136 piles of the existing Howard pier or dock, if old piles broke off it would cost $2500 per week to rent an extractor and that the removing of the dock would cost about $7650, for a total of $21,030 a possible figure, which could be more or less.

This Court agrees that there is little case law in Maryland setting forth riparian rights law. However, the Court wishes to call attention to the law in Corpus Juris Secundum and the American Law Reports and some Maryland cases, old and new:

65 CJS defines riparian rights as follows: Sec. 64, p. 219:

64. Rights as between Different Owners
Riparian rights ordinarily are coextensive with the water frontage of the land and must be exercised by the owner without undue interference with the riparian rights of others.
In determining riparian or littoral rights of different owners of land abutting navigable waters, each case must be treated in an equitable manner so that, as far as possible, all property owners have access to the water and each shore line owner has his proportionate share of deep water frontage. Generally, the apportionment of riparian rights as between adjoining riparian owners is made by extending lines from the ends of the side lines at right angles to the line of the water front if the latter is straight or substantially so, subject to variation where the line of navigation is not parallel with the shore line, without regard to the direction of the dividing lines of the upland parcels.
In case of a decided convexity or concavity of the shore riparian rights are apportioned ratably between the riparian owners, as by straight lines drawn out to the line of navigability at such points as will divide the latter line proportionately to the several frontages on the shore, or by a line perpendicular to a tangent drawn on a circular shore. The rights of one owner as against others are not impaired by failure to exercise them.
Determination of boundaries
A riparian owner is entitled, in conformity with his lawful rights, to have extent of his enjoyment upon line of navigability of watercourse determined and marked and his boundaries defined, and the right is based upon principles of equity and a court of chancery is proper tribunal to make apportionment and to determine boundaries between coterminous owners.
Upland boundaries
(1) Riparian rights do not necessarily extend into the waters according to upland boundaries nor do such rights under all conditions extend at right angles to the shore line.

American Law Reports Annotated (65 A.L.R. 2d, 184) discusses the riparian rights of abutting property owners in the following language:

14. Proportionate frontage projection on curving or irregular shores or channels.
Where the shore is curving or irregular in front of the riparian tracts involved, or the line of the channel, thread of the stream, or other outer limit line in the river is irregular, curving, or, if straight, not parallel with the general course of the shore, the method of apportionment and division usually adopted is to give each of the riparian tracts fronting along the same shore an abutting area in the river having a width on the channel line or other outer boundary line in the river proportionate to such tracts’s frontage along the shore, the objective being to achieve an equitable apportionment of the available river area as between the riparian tracts fronting thereon.

Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 68, says atp. 231 in discussing remedies available to a property owner deprived of his riparian rights:

A riparian owner may pursue an appropriate remedy for the protection of his right of access, such as an action for damages or for injunctive relief to compel the removal of an obstruction.

and at Sec. 68, under Navigable Waters, it is said:

Inasmuch as the obstruction of riparian access produces a private injury different from that suffered by the public at large, any act which makes the front of the riparian owner’s land less accessible to the water is an injury for which an action for damages may be brought. Where the riparian owner is deprived of such right of access, he may also enjoin and abate the obstruction;....

In an interesting and important comparatively recent case involving a thorough and careful study of riparian rights law in Maryland, Owen v. Hubbard, 260 Md. 146, 271 A. 2d 672, the landowner secured the consent of his neighbor to construct part of a bulkhead in navigable waters on which the neighbor’s land bounded. The Court upheld a decree declaring that (1) the neighbor was a riparian owner, having title to that portion of the bulkhead in front of his property; and (2) the riparian owner had, by his consent, given the builder of the bulkhead an irrevocable license to use and maintain said bulkhead, backfill and supporting structures. In that case, Judge Digges said for the Court that

‘... we have often been called upon to determine the respective rights of riparian owners whose properties adjoined each other at right angles. In those cases except where consent or a prior patent is involved we have stood by the “rule that adjoining owners on a concave shore must share available space for wharfing.” ’

In Causey v. Gray, 250 Md. 380, 243 A. 2d 575, which is mentioned in the Owen case, supra, Judge Barnes for the Court said that when the lot owner makes improvements in front of his lot complete title then vests in him in the improvements provided it is in front of his lot and does not appropriate the riparian rights of his neighbors. See also B & O R.R. Co. v. Chase, 43 Md. at 36-37.

A very recent case in the Daily Record of October 18,1977, Department of Natural Resources v. Adams, although involving duck blind location, tells us again that a riparian owner to a body of water is a person who owns property bordering on that water.

In discussing riparian rights, a leading treatise states that:

‘The owner of land contiguous to a navigable body of water acquires by that ownership certain rights — termed riparian rights — which include, principally, the right of access to the navigable waters; the right to build piers, wharves, docks and other improvements to the line of navigation; the right to reclaim land; and the right to accretion to his lands. These rights do not depend on ownership of the soil under water but upon lateral contact with the water. It is a universal rule that for riparian rights to attach to a tract of land the water must form a boundary of the tract.’

See 2 Shalowitz, Shore and Sea Boundaries, 534, 1964. Also see other authorities cited in this ease. See also Classen v. Chesapeake Co., 81 Md. 258, involving wharves and piers and right to make improvements into navigable water. In this case, B & O R.R. v. Chase, supra, at 33, is discussed and it is said in that case:

‘... while the right of the shore owner to improve out from his property at a right angle to his shoreline is entirely just where the shoreline happens to be a straight line, it is manifestly unjust where the shore line is concave and if allowed might result in permitting the first occupant to encroach upon the natural boundary of his adjacent neighbor and crowd him out, leaving him without water rights, and thus depriving his property of its value.’

See also Freed v. Miami Beach Pier Corp., 52 A.L.R. 1177. This case involves the erection of a pier by a riparian lot owner upon submerged lands of the State, not at right angles with the shore line of the lots, and will not be enjoined at the suit of an adjoining lot owner, when the pier does not materially obstruct or impede access to the adjoining riparian lot, though the pier does obstruct distinct view, where the complainant did not promptly act while larger expenditures were being made in the construction of the pier under governmental authority. The case also discusses, and seems to conclude, that riparian rights do not necessarily extend into the waters according to land boundary lines, nor do such rights, under all conditions, extend at right angles with the shoreline; also, that riparian rights extend to owners to erect wharves and piers in front of their riparian holdings to facilitate access to and the use of the navigable waters.

See also list of plats and exhibits filed by both Complainants and Respondent which this Court feels important and has given proper consideration to, as follows:

Complainants’ Exhibit 7 — Plat of Wicks property (1975 or 1976) by Webb which shows Howard wharf is approximately 50 feet from the Wicks property line extended and does not encroach on the riparian rights of Wicks; also shows that water in front of Wicks property is 12 to 15 feet.
Complainants’ Exhibit 8 — Wetlands boundaries map. Shows properties including Duffy Marina and boat slips.
Respondent’s Exhibit 2 — Aerial map, 1938. No development where marina is now located.
Respondent’s Exhibit 3 — Aerial map, 1952. No pier built by Howard. No development of Duffy Creek.
Respondent’s Exhibit 4 — Aerial map, 1964. Shows location of Howard pier and development of Duffy Creek.
Respondent’s Exhibit 5 — Aerial map, 1972. Shows further development and extension of Duffy Creek Marina and boats in slips. Also shows Howard pier in controversy.
Respondent’s Exhibit 6 — 1959 drawing dated October 1, of proposed piers and slips, showing proposed Howard pier to be 50 feet from Wicks property line extended.

CONCLUSION

It is the opinion of this Court after careful review of the evidence presented, arguments of counsel, the exhibits filed in the case and the very able and helpful briefs filed by counsel for the parties, that Respondent Howard is not trespassing on the riparian rights of Complainants Carol E. and Richard F. Wicks.

Mrs. Wicks testified that they wanted to build a dock for their boat for their own use and, after getting their deed, they consulted a surveyor who after his survey informed them that Respondent’s pier was in their riparian rights area. The Wicks made no further move until they filed suit after communicating with Respondent. The Wicks had never sought a permit to build the pier which they said they wanted for their boat.

It appears to this Court that Respondent’s pier is in front of his lot. See Respondent’s Exhibit #6, which indicates the pier to be 50 feet from the Wicks property line extended and at no point, in its entire length, toward navigable water, does it infringe on the Wicks’ riparian rights.

It is also clear, to this Court, from Complainants’ own Exhibit #7, a plat done by their own witness, Mr. C. B. Webb, that Respondent’s pier is in front of his own lot and does not interfere with Complainants in the least. This plat also makes it obvious that Complainants have ample room to construct a dock or pier in front oí and from their property to navigable water — which is shown on the plat to be 12 to 15 feet in depth.

It is naturally the conclusion of the Court under the law and facts in this case that Complainants do have a right to access to the channel. They do not have a right to the channel across the Howard property riparian rights and dock as testified to by Capt. Saloman. The exhibits clearly show and so does the evidence, that, if they wish, they could build a pier in front of their property to navigable water and from there to the channel.

This Court, sitting in equity, must also consider the financial impact on Respondent if he were required to remove his dock, which it must be recalled was built some 50 feet from the adjoining property line, now Complainants’ property. It is my opinion that the apparent benefits to Complainants are so disproportionate to the injury and expense Defendant would suffer that an Equity Court would not be justified to grant an injunction under the law and facts here before the Court.

It is my further view of the facts that the Savards had a duty to bring an action to prevent the erection of this dock or wharf by Howard before he had expended large sums in erecting that part of his marina. The evidence leads this Court to conclude that after Howard agreed to not build and use slips next to the Savard land there was an implied assent to its present location by the Savards.

As for the Complainants, they purchased the property knowing, or charged with knowledge, that the Howard dock was where it had been for some eighteen years. Their parents, who sold them the marina and were property owners in the immediate vicinity, had never objected to the Howard pier; nor had any State or Federal authorities ever objected to the location or the area appropriated by the wharf.

Lastly, but certainly very important in this Court’s opinion, the success of Duffy Creek Marina and the popularity of boating in that area has brought about a proliferation of successful marinas in that part of the Sassafras River. Their only problem, as can be seen from the shore, is lack of slip space for boats.

The plats and testimony in the case confirm the conclusion that if the Court were to accept Complainants’ theory of the law there would be less impact or interference with Duffy Creek boat traffic for some 132 customers than if Complainants were to build a dock or pier in front oí their lot for their personal, private workboat. However, it is to be noted and recalled that Mrs. Wicks said words to the effect that they did not want to interfere with ‘Duffy Creek boat traffic

ORDER OF COURT

In conformity with the aforegoing Memorandum Opinion, It Is Thereupon ORDERED, this _ — 12_th- day of November, 1977, by the Circuit Court for Cecil County, in Equity, that the Bill of Complaint filed by Complainants seeking Injunctive Relief be and the same is hereby DISMISSED, with costs to be paid by Complainants.

B. Hackett Turner Jr. JUDGE”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Moore, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    BETTIE RUTH ORY, Personal Representative of the Estate of Valerie James Ory, Jr. v. ANTHONY LIBERSKY, Personal Representative of the Estate of Kenneth Wesley Holden et al.
    [No. 1261,
    September Term, 1977.]

      Decided July 17, 1978.

      The cause was argued before Moore, Lowe and Mason, JJ.

      William A. Franeh, with whom were Goldsborough, Franch & Collett on the brief, for appellant.

      David M. Williams, with whom were James J. White, III, and Alexander P. Rasin, ill, on the brief, for appellees.
   Moore, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are here presented with an appeal and a cross-appeal in a wrongful death action in which liability was admitted and the jury awarded damages of $50,000 to each of three minor children, and $10,000 to the estate of the decedent for conscious pain and suffering and for medical and funeral expenses. The defendant below (appellant and cross-appellee, Bettie Ruth Ory, Personal Representative) moved for a new trial, arguing prejudicial error in permitting the jury to consider: (a) contributions from the father toward the cost of the children’s higher education as evidence of economic loss and (b) the entitlement of the estate to damages for conscious pain and suffering. The trial court granted the motion with respect to conscious pain and suffering, holding that the evidence on that issue was insufficient to constitute a jury question.

The central questions raised on this appeal are the two issues which were involved in the motion for a new trial. There are also related subsidiary questions pertaining to the trial court’s denial of two motions in limine filed by appellant; and claims of error in permitting expert testimony based upon an allegedly improper hypothetical question and in the jury’s rendition of lump sum verdicts for the children in identical amounts. The appellee, Anthony Libersky, by a cross-appeal, claims that the court erred in finding no evidence of conscious pain and suffering, and in granting summary judgment for the appellant on that issue. Finding no error, we affirm.

I

On Christmas eve 1975, at approximately 8:30 p.m., there was a head-on collision between two automobiles on Maryland Route 213, approximately one mile south of Chestertown in Kent County. Valerie James Ory, Jr., who negligently crossed into the opposite lane causing the fatal accident, was killed instantly. Kenneth Wesley Holden, operator of the other vehicle, was pinned behind the wheel, mortally injured. He was taken to the Kent and Queen Anne’s Hospital by the Kent and Queen Anne’s Rescue Squad. All appropriate emergency treatment, including cardiac massage, was administered but he was pronounced dead at 9:30 p.m.

At the time of his death, Mr. Holden was 38 years of age and the father of three children — a daughter Linda, then 14, and two sons, Martin and Gary, then 12 and 10, respectively. He and the children’s mother, Mary T. McClements, had been divorced in 1971 after ten years of marriage and she received custody pursuant to the terms of a separation agreement and subsequent decree. She thereafter remarried. The uncontradicted testimony disclosed an unusually amicable relationship between Mr. Holden and his former spouse and her second husband, and close, warm, and constant contact between the deceased and his children.

With respect to his personal history, the evidence revealed that Kenneth Holden grew up on a farm and his formal education terminated at age 16. At 22, he married Mary, then 19 and a high school graduate. In the early years of their marriage, he was a farmer. Later he became a farm equipment mechanic and at the time of his death was employed by a farm implement dealership at $3.75 per hour. His life expectancy was 33.2 years.

The declaration filed by appellee Libersky, personal representative of Mr. Holden’s estate, sought in count one recovery of damages for conscious pain and suffering, medical and funeral expenses, and property damage to his vehicle, as authorized by Md. Est. & Trusts Code Ann. § 7-401 (1974). Count two asserted a cause of action on behalf of the surviving children, by their mother and next friend, pursuant to Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-904 (1974). Appellant filed two motions in limine which were heard in open court prior to the trial date. The first' attempted to preclude testimony concerning educational expenses of the children beyond high school on the ground that the deceased had no legal obligation to share in the expenses of higher education. The purpose of the second motion was to exclude testimony concerning conscious pain and suffering on the ground that pretrial depositions of all competent witnesses did not show a sufficient basis for allowing the jury to consider this element of damage. Both motions were denied. Objections to the challenged testimony were reasserted at the trial of the action, and, at the conclusion of all the evidence, instructions precluding consideration of these elements of damages were requested but denied.

The jury was presented with a form of verdict calling for a finding of damages on behalf of the personal representative and on behalf of each of the surviving children by name. Following the return of verdicts in favor of the personal representative and children, appellant moved for a new trial. The court agreed that the question of conscious pain and suffering should not have been submitted to the jury because the evidence was insufficient. The motion was therefore granted as to count one unless appellee filed a remittitur in the amount of $8,048.40 (the amount of the verdict less funeral, hospital and medical expenses of $1,951.60). The motion was denied, however, with respect to the verdicts for the children.

No remittitur was filed. Libersky then moved for summary judgment and filed therewith a formal proffer of the same evidence on the issue of conscious pain and suffering as had been presented at the trial. The court granted summary judgment under count one, awarding Libersky special damages in the amount of $1,951.60, but ordered summary judgment in favor of Ory under the claim for conscious pain and suffering. Ory’s appeal and Libersky’s cross-appeal were then taken.

II

The statutory remedy of the three children of Kenneth Holden for the wrongful death of their father derives from Maryland’s version of Lord Campbell’s Act, Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-901 et seq. (1974, 1977 Cum.Supp.). Subsections (c) and (d) of § 3-904 are particularly applicable:

“(c) Damages to be divided among beneficiaries. — In an action under this subtitle, damages may be awarded to the beneficiaries proportioned to the injury resulting from the wrongful death. The amount recovered shall be divided among the beneficiaries in shares directed by the verdict.
“(d) Damages if spouse or minor child dies. — For the death of a spouse, minor child, or parent of a minor child, the damages awarded under subsection (c) are not limited or restricted by the ‘pecuniary loss’ or ‘pecuniary benefit’ rule but may include damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education where applicable.” (Emphasis added.)

The jury awards of lump sums in the amount of $50,000 to each of the children are first assailed by appellant on the ground that “it was error to permit evidence of educational expenses based on [an] unenforceable separation agreement and without a demonstrated foundation as to the ability, age, and certainty of each child to attend college.”

An agreement of separation between the children’s mother and the decedent, dated May 11, 1970, provided in paragraph 11 that the father would contribute $15 per week as child support and share the medical expenses until each child attained the age of 21 years. The last sentence of the paragraph further provided:

“The parties hereto further agree that they will share equally in expenses of higher education of any of said three children in the event they desire to continue their education beyond high school.”

Pointing to precedents in the field of family law, Rhoderick v. Rhoderick, 257 Md. 354, 263 A. 2d 512 (1970), Wooddy v. Wooddy, 258 Md. 224, 265 A. 2d 467 (1970), Kramer v. Kramer, 26 Md. App. 620, 339 A. 2d 328 (1975), McClure v. McClure, 15 Md. App. 226, 289 A. 2d 610 (1972), appellant argues that the obligation of the deceased father was unenforceable, and that any award based upon his assumed contributions to the higher education of his surviving children was entirely speculative. The difficulty we find with appellant’s position stems precisely from the fact that this is not a matrimonial cause but a wrongful death action; and we find altogether inapposite the general guiding principles in the cases cited by appellant that a college education is a necessity if the station in life of the infant justifies a college education and the father is able to pay or contribute to the payment for such education. See Rhoderick v. Rhoderick, supra, 257 Md. at 367-68, 263 A. 2d at 519. Similarly beside the mark is appellant’s contention that the provision for educational expenses in the separation agreement is ambiguous in that the time for termination of the obligation and the types of expenses to be included as “expenses of higher education” are not expressly set forth. See Kramer v. Kramer, supra; McClure v. McClure, supra.

In a wrongful death action, the test of the propriety of an award of damages for loss of educational benefits is not the existence or not of an enforceable legal obligation of the divorced non-custodial parent to contribute to post-high school educational obligations. It is rather the existence or not of a reasonable expectation on the part of the surviving child or children of educational benefits they might properly have expected to receive from their deceased father but for his wrongful death. Strahan v. Webb, 330 S.W.2d 291 (Ark. 1959) (circumstances indicated that, in natural course of events, father would have contributed, to best of his ability, to children’s college education expenses); see Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 249 A. 2d 449 (1969); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State ex rel. Castranda, 194 Md. 421, 71 A. 2d 442 (1950); State ex rel. Bowman v. Wooleyhan Transport Co., 192 Md. 686, 65 A. 2d 321 (1949); State ex rel. Strepay v. Cohen, 166 Md. 682, 172 A. 274 (1934); 25A C.J.S. Death § 26 (1).

The real significance of the separation agreement in this case was correctly evaluated by the trial judge in his instructions to the jury when he stated:

“The separation agreement which is in evidence, and only paragraph 11 concerns the amount of support and contribution for higher education if the children pursue that, is not a binding contract that affects the children. It is merely a piece of evidence for you to consider as to what the father would have done, or was likely to do, or would probably do for his three children had he lived.” (Emphasis added.)

In addition to the agreement, other evidence of record in this case clearly establishes a jury question on the issue of loss of educational benefits. This evidence includes:

(1) expert testimony from an economist relating to the cost of a public college education and the deceased’s projected earnings;
(2) testimony of the mother that a savings account had been established for the children’s higher education and that both she and the father encouraged the children to aspire to a college education;
(3) testimony of the daughter Linda that she was a member of the honor society at Kent County High School, had definite plans to attend college, and wished ultimately to study law;
(4) testimony of the boys, Martin and Gary, then in only sixth and seventh grades, respectively, that they “hoped” to go to college;
(5) the father’s regularity in making support payments and his general disposition to be of fatherly assistance to his children.

We also reject the related contention of the appellant that the evidence must disclose the certainty that each child would attend college. Again, matrimonial law precedents are inapposite. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 1207 (1957); Pincus v. Pincus, 197 A. 2d 854 (D.C. 1964). In such cases, the ability and capacity of a child for higher education may be demonstrated with some certainty in subsequent proceedings. In a wrongful death action, it can only reasonably be required that the evidence at the time of trial be sufficient to show a probability that the children would pursue higher education. We think the evidence in this case met that requirement.

Our determination of this fundamental issue is also dispositive of appellant’s contention that a hypothetical question presented to the economic expert improperly elicited a legal interpretation of the separation agreement and was improper because it did not include evidence concerning the type of education each child would “certainly” pursue after high school.

Ill

Under well-settled principles of Maryland law relative to the issue of recovery for conscious pain and suffering, it was incumbent upon Libersky, under count one of the declaration, to establish by a preponderance of the evidence (a) that the deceased Ory’s negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the accident, (b) that the deceased Holden lived after the accident, and (c) that between the time of the accident and the time of death, Holden suffered conscious pain. Tri-State Poultry Cooperative, Inc. v. Carey, 190 Md. 116, 125, 57 A. 2d 812, 817 (1948). Liability was here admitted and it was uncontroverted that Mr. Holden survived for approximately one hour. The issue which the court decided as a matter of law, adversely to Holden’s estate, was whether the deceased suffered conscious pain before he died.

The primary evidence came from the deposition read at trial of Charles Carter, a member of the Kent and Queen Anne’s Rescue Squad who, with two other persons, initially responded to the scene of the accident. Carter was the first member of the team to reach Mr. Holden and was the only member who ministered closely to him while he was trapped inside the vehicle. Carter also accompanied the deceased in the ambulance to the hospital. In the course of his deposition, he testified that the victim had sustained a “tear type” wound to the right side of his face, extending “from the chin to about the top of the cheek,” and that there was “a large amount of torn loose flesh.” In addition, Carter noticed that the victim’s left arm was bleeding and was fractured. He believed Mr. Holden might also have sustained a leg wound, but of that he was uncertain “because he was pinned at the time.”

Mr. Carter’s testimony bearing on the issue of the victim’s consciousness and vital signs was as follows:

“Q From what you could observe, was he conscious?
“A Yes. I would say he was.
“Q During the time that you were in the immediate presence of Mr. Holden, did you hear any sounds or noises coming from his body?
“A Yes. He was breathing rather laborly [sic] and he apparently had swallowed some blood because there was a gurgling sound in breathing, and he made no moans as such, other than this common gasping sound for breath, which was usually a normal reaction.
“Q Mr. Carter, did you have an occasion to make any determination as to whether or not he had a pulse?
“A At the scene? Yes, I did.
“Q What did that investigation result in your determining?
“A As to whether or not he had a pulse?
“Q Yes.
“A It was a wrist pulse, and I believe it was, yes, but I can’t be positive at this point. I don’t remember.
A lot of things happened quickly.
“Q Did this appear to be a strong pulse or a weak pulse?
“A It would have been weak.”

Mr. Carter further testified that, on the way to the hospital, Mr. Holden’s eyes were open as if in a stare, but that he made no movements and did not respond orally to Carter at any time.

Another rescue squad member, William Reed, testified that Mr. Holden appeared to be unconscious, and the emergency room nurse at the hospital, Kathleen Clothier, stated that upon his arrival he had no blood pressure, that medication was administered and he was placed on a cardiac monitor to determine whether or not he had a pulse. The nurse further testified that “[h]e might have had a very few beats on the monitor when they brought him in but he didn’t have it too long.”

In ruling on the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the conscious pain and suffering count, Judge Rasin commented: “I don’t think there was any evidence sufficient for a jury to find that there was any conscious pain and suffering in this case.” Our review of the record confirms that, although there was some evidence in the case as to the consciousness of Mr. Holden following the accident, there was no evidence as to whether he suffered any pain or was, indeed, capable of sensory perception.

The word “conscious” has been defined as: “[ajware or sensible of an inward state or outward fact” or “mentally awake, physically active or acute; in a state of consciousness; knowing.” 15A C.J.S. Conscious 571 (1967). The mere fact of consciousness after an accident causing bodily injury does not inescapably lead to a conclusion that pain is being experienced. Additional evidence must be presented on this question in order for an award of damages for conscious pain and suffering to be upheld. Whalen v. Daugherty, 290 N.Y.S.2d 3, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1968).

Evidence as to body sounds, such as moaning, gurgling, and heavy breathing, is insufficient to show consciousness or suffering on the part of the victim. Fialkow v. De Voe Motors, Inc., 270 N.E.2d 798, 802 (Mass. 1971); Ghiz v. Wantman, 149 N.E.2d 595, 597 (Mass. 1958); Carlisle v. Duncan, 461 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970). On the other hand, exclamations from the victim may establish both consciousness and suffering. Knight v. Overman Wheel Co., 54 N. E. 890, 893 (Mass. 1899) (victim hollered and groaned, stating, “Oh! I am gone,” and “I am done for.”); Boyd Construction Co. v. Bilbro, 210 So. 2d 637, 640 (Miss. 1968) (victim remarked, “Oh, me!”); Tichenor v. Little, 279 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Tex. Ct. App. 1955) (victim was “ ‘attempting to say something, more than once’ ” and trying to clean mouth of blood so he could speak).

In the instant case, the only sounds testified to by Carter were labored breathing and gurgling, resulting from the swallowing of blood. There was no verbal communication from the victim, and no movement of his arms or other parts of his body to signify the sensation of pain. Moreover, Carter’s statement that he was “conscious” was not explained. Even assuming that Carter’s experience in rendering first aid qualified him to express an opinion as to the victim’s state of consciousness, his statement that Holden .was conscious was insufficient to justify a finding of conscious pain and suffering because (1) there was no testimony from Carter as to whether Holden was experiencing pain, and (2) there was no testimony to show that Holden was capable of experiencing pain if he was, indeed, conscious — testimony which only a medical expert could render. In Plank v. Heirigs, 156 N.W.2d 193, 203 (S.D. 1968), it was held in this respect that an award of damages for conscious pain and suffering was justified in the light of testimony from the decedent’s physician as to her capacity to experience pain and expressions of discomfort:

“We believe the evidence is sufficient to show that [the decedent] was conscious a substantial portion of the time ... and capable of experiencing pain and suffering.” (Emphasis added.)

See also Jines v. City of Norman, 351 P. 2d 1048, 1052 (Okla. 1960) (recovery for severe and excruciating conscious pain and suffering improper where evidence showed that decedent was conscious, but not that he was experiencing pain); Wilson v. Pittman, 307 So. 2d 804, 808 (La. App. 1975).

The decision of the Court of Appeals in Tri-State Poultry Cooperative, Inc. v. Carey, supra, upon which appellant relies, is not supportive of her position in this case. In Tri-State, there was expert medical testimony from a physician accompanying the victim to the hospital to the effect that the victim was conscious and that he suffered pain before his death. 190 Md. at 125-26, 57 A. 2d at 817. A second expert disputed these conclusions and a genuine issue of fact for jury determination was held to be presented as to whether there could be recovery for conscious pain and suffering. Id. at 126, 57 A. 2d at 817.

Therefore, we hold that the lower court properly granted a new trial on the issue of conscious pain and suffering based on insufficiency of the evidence to sustain a jury verdict, and that summary judgment was correctly entered thereafter in favor of the defendant Ory on this question. The court had full knowledge of the testimony which would have been presented if a new trial were held, and could well conclude, in accordance with Md. Rule 610, that there was no genuine issue as to a material fact. The facts before the court were undisputed, and there remained for resolution only the question of whether, as a matter of law, the evidence supported a claim for conscious pain and suffering. Under the authorities here reviewed, it did not. We find no error.

IV

Appellant has contended that there was reversible error when the trial court denied her motion to preclude testimony concerning conscious pain and suffering; and that the court also erred in the denial of her motion to limit evidence of educational expenses. These motions were made in limine. Our disposition of appellant’s contention with respect to evidence bearing upon educational expenses reflects our conclusion that the denial of the second motion in limine was, as a matter of substantive law, eminently correct. On the other hand, it is not to be inferred that because we agree that the evidence was insufficient to constitute a cause of action for conscious pain and suffering, the denial of the first motion in limine necessitates a finding of reversible error.

Motions in limine are not commonly resorted to as a procedural device in Maryland and there is a dearth of appellate comment with respect to their use. Decisions elsewhere, however, clearly .indicate that such motions are of limited utility and, indeed, there is substantial authority for the proposition that the denial of a motion in limine cannot in and of itself constitute reversible error. State v. Garrett, 183 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 1971). The court there stated:

“It may be error [to deny a motion in limine] but cannot be reversible error. The reason is simple. The objectionable material has not yet reached the jury’s ears. It may never reach the jury .... It is only when the [objectionable] material is offered in the jury’s presence that the harm or error, if any, has been done. Then of course, the movant, having made the motion in limine is in a much stronger position to claim error.”

See also Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 311 (1975); Burrus v. Silhavy, 293 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. App. 1973); Twyford v. Weber, 220 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa 1974); Lewis v. Buena Vista Mutual Insurance Assoc., 183 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1971); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1963); Zoner v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp., 523 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).

It is also abundantly clear from the cases cited that the use .of a motion in limine “should be exceptional rather than general.” Lewis v. Buena Vista Mutual Insurance Assoc., supra, 183 N.W.2d at 201. It is essentially aimed at material which is inadmissible and prejudicial. In the instant case, the evidence adduced by the appellee on the question of conscious pain and suffering was indeed admissible. That it was insufficient to constitute a cause of action is another matter. A motion in limine may not perform the function of a motion for directed verdict. We find no support, upon principle or authority, for appellant’s proposition that the denial of her motions in limine constituted reversible error.

V

Appellant has also challenged the awards to each of the minor children on grounds that the lump sum verdicts for each child were defective. This contention is based in part upon the submission to the jury of loss of educational benefits as an element of damages, a claim of error which we have heretofore rejected. In addition, it is argued that the testimony at trial bearing upon the deceased’s conscious pain and suffering was prejudicial error which unduly influenced the awards to each of the children. We also reject this contention.

The authorities on which appellant relies, primarily from other jurisdictions, are based upon the proposition that erroneously-admitted “sympathy-producing” evidence requires reversal of a verdict. See, e.g., Larson v. Meyer, 135 N.W.2d 145, 158 (N.D. 1965). Such authorities, however, are inapposite in a situation where, as here, the evidence relating to pain and suffering was admissible. Its only infirmity was its insufficiency.

We must also reject the suggestion contained in appellant’s brief that because the awards to each of the children were identical, they are suspect or, indeed, invalid. We observe that the court carefully instructed the jury with respect to the damages which might appropriately be considered for the personal representative, under count one, and the children, under count two. Thus, in the case of the personal representative, the jury was instructed that it should allow the medical and hospital bills as well as the funeral expenses, the amount of which had been stipulated. In addition, the court explained that the personal representative was entitled to their consideration of any conscious pain and suffering that the deceased experienced as a result of the accident from the time of the injury to the time of death. The court stated:

“You shall allow such sums as in your opinion would have compensated Mr. Holden for conscious pain and suffering had he lived.”

With respect to the damages to which the children were entitled, the court instructed that the jury must first consider any financial loss. This was defined to mean any contribution toward their support, whether by way of court order or voluntary payment, until each child attained the age of 21. Also included, the court instructed, was whatever contribution the jury should find “the father would have contributed to higher education for each child [who]... would be likely to seek higher education.” In addition to this economic loss, the jury was also instructed to consider “without regard to the children’s 21st birthday” damages for “the mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance and education the children have lost as a result of the death of their father.”

In the absence of prejudicial error in the trial court’s instructions, the amounts of the verdicts are not reviewable on appeal. Johnson v. Zerivitz, 234 Md. 113, 118, 198 A. 2d 254, 257 (1964); Sun Cab Co. v. Walston, 15 Md. App. 113, 160, 289 A. 2d 804, 829 (1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 267 Md. 559, 298 A. 2d 391 (1973); see B. & O. Railroad v. State ex rel. Hauer, 60 Md. 449, 469 (1883). Here, there was no error. Furthermore, the general rule in wrongful death cases is that the award of damages is within the sound discretion of the jury. Dropo v. City of San Francisco, 334 P. 2d 972 (Cal. App. 1959); Flynn v. Vancil, 242 N.E.2d 237 (Ill. 1968); Hoffman v. Rengo Oil Co., 174 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. App. 1969); Aubuchon v. LaPlant, 435 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1968).

We would also observe that no request was made by the appellant for a separation by the jury of damages to be awarded to the children with respect to financial loss and solatium. Maryland law clearly permits lump sum verdicts in wrongful death actions. Sun Cab Co. v. Walston, supra, 15 Md. App. at 154, 289 A. 2d at 826 (1972). In our judgment, it is mere speculation that the awards to the children were affected by conscious pain and suffering evidence, and we find no other support for appellant’s contention that the lump sum verdicts in this case were defective.

Judgments affirmed; three-fourths of the costs to be paid by appellant and one-fourth by appellees.

      . As disclosed infra, a new trial did not take place. The personal representative of the deceased father filed a motion for summary judgment, upon which the trial court awarded judgment to the estate for the special damages but held against the estate on the claim for damages for conscious pain and suffering.

      . Wenote from the ¡joeord that judgment absolute in the amount of " against Ory on August 24,1977. By Order of the court 2. We ..... ......... 85150,000 was entered ¡ „ dated September 6,1977, amending the Order of August'24,1977, a new trial was granted unless the plaintiff filed a remittitur on or before September 22, 1977. Under date of September 15,1977, Ory’s counsel filed an Order for Appeal. The plaintiff moved to strike it on the ground that it was not timely fifed and was violative of Md. Rule 605 a. No remittitur was filed as of September 22, 1977. Rather, on September 27, 1977, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, and, on October 4,1977, a proffer of evidence in support of the motion. (The proffer was of the evidence received at the trial on the issue of conscious pain and suffering.) At a hearing on October 24, 1977, the court acted upon plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in the manner indicated in the text. On the same date, the court considered the motion to strike Ory’s Order for Appeal and denied the motion. Thereafter, on November 1, 1977, Ory filed another Order for Appeal, stating:
      “As all claims have now been adjudicated in this proceeding as a result of Judge Rasin’s Order of October 24, 1977, please enter an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from the judgment entered in this action on August 24, 1977.’’
      Mr. Libersky’s Order of Appeal “from the judgment and rulings against him” was filed on November 2, 1977.
      There is no Memorandum Opinion in the record pertaining to the trial court’s hearing of October 24, 1977 on the motion to strike Ory's Order for Appeal. An appeal at that juncture of the proceedings would have been premature under Md. Rule 605 a, and, although not stricken, the first Order for Appeal appears to have been abandoned in the light of Ory’s new Order for Appeal filed November 1, 1977, quoted above. We are satisfied that the appeal and cross-appeal were timely filed.


author: Melvin, J.,

text:
    CATHERINE B. WOLFF v. FREDERICK WOLFF
    [No. 1274,
    September Term, 1977.]

      Decided July 17, 1978.

      The cause was argued before Thompson, Davidson and Melvin, JJ.

      Harold Buchman, with whom was Barbara Mello on the brief, for appellant.

      Steven A. Skalet, with whom was E. David Harrison on the brief, for appellee.
   Melvin, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, dated November 14, 1977, sustaining the preliminary objection of Frederick Wolff (appellee) to the Bill of Complaint to Enforce Foreign Decree filed by Catherine B. Wolff (appellant). The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the lower court was correct in sustaining the preliminary objection. We think the lower court erred, and will reverse and remand with instructions that the preliminary objection be overruled.

On August 4, 1977, appellant, a resident of London, England, filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County a Bill of Complaint to Enforce Foreign Decree, praying that the court assume jurisdiction and enforce the alimony provisions of an English divorce decree dated April 14, 1976. On September 26, 1977, appellee, a resident of Montgomery County, Maryland, filed a preliminary objection to the bill of complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the person and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. See Md. Rule 323 a. On November 14, 1977, the court found that it “lacks both subject matter and personal jurisdiction” and sustained the preliminary objection, dismissing the bill of complaint without leave to amend. Appellant noted a timely appeal to this Court.

We reiterate that the sole issue for our consideration is whether the lower court was correct in determining .that it lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and thus whether it was correct in sustaining appellee’s preliminary objection which raised those defenses. We specifically do not consider the sufficiency of the substance of the bill of complaint, see Md. Rule 345, or whether the relief prayed in the bill should ultimately be granted.

. Turning first to the issue of whether the Circuit Court for Montgomery County had jurisdiction over appellee’s person, we think it clear that the court had such jurisdiction. Appellee was personally served with process in Maryland and there is no allegation that such service was procured by fraud, trickery or artifice. These facts alone are sufficient to overcome a defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. In re Karol, 11 Md. App. 400, 274 A. 2d 407 (1971). See also Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 386 A. 2d 766 (1978). See generally 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §§ 1061 et seq. (1969). The real issue in this case is whether the Montgomery County Circuit Court had jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed in appellant’s bill of complaint; that is, whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject matter. We turn, then, to that issue.

In facing this issue, we look first to the statute upon which the lower court based its opinion that it lacked both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Md. Ann. Code, Cts. & J. Proc. Art., § 10-703 (1974) (entitled the “Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act”) provides that:

“Except as provided in § 10-704, a foreign judgment meeting the requirements of § 10-702 is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. The foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit.”

“Foreign judgment” is defined in § 10-701 (b) as “any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money. It does not mean a judgment for taxes, fine, or penalty, ora judgment for support in matrimonial or family matters.” (Emphasis supplied). Because the bill of complaint in the instant case seeks enforcement of the alimony provisions of a foreign divorce decree, and because the Act specifically excludes from the definition of foreign judgments, judgments for support in matrimonial or family matters, the lower court apparently concluded that the legislature intended that the court lack jurisdiction to recognize or enforce the alimony provisions of a foreign divorce decree. We do not believe the legislature intended such a result.

In our view, because judgments for support in family or matrimonial matters are excluded from the definition of judgments to which the Act applies, the Act neither provides a jurisdictional basis for the recognition or enforcement of the alimony provisions of foreign divorce decrees, nor prevents such recognition or enforcement on a jurisdictional basis other than that provided for in the Act. This is so because the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act is not a statute which purports to apply to all foreign money-judgments and then allow for recognition of only some. Rather, the Act, by its definition of “foreign judgment”, applies only to certain types of foreign money-judgments, and does not apply to others. To those foreign money-judgments which are excluded from the scope of the Act, the legislature simply has not spoken. We do not think this silence can be construed as evidencing an intent that such judgments never, under any circumstances, be accorded recognition.

We note that § 10-707 of the Act provides that “[t]his subtitle does not prevent the recognition of a foreign judgment in situations not covered by this subtitle.” While this “saving clause” must be construed as applying only to foreign judgments as defined in the Act (i.e., not to judgments for support in family or matrimonial matters), it does evidence an intent that the Act be expansive rather than limiting in scope. Thus, in his article on the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Professor A. Homburger of the State University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, states:

“The act applies ‘to any foreign country judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal.’ Judgments for taxes, fines and penalties, and for support in matrimonial or family matters are excluded from the scope of the Act. However, the Act contains a general saving clause which provides that ‘[t]his Act does not prevent the recognition of a foreign judgment in situations not covered by this Act.’ Despite the obscure wording of the clause, its intent is clear. The draftsmen did not wish to fetter the requested court’s power to recognize judgments which fall outside the scope of the Act; nor did they wish to discourage the application of more liberal standards than those prescribed for judgments within its scope. As the Commissioner’s Prefatory Note to the Uniform Act states: ‘the Act makes clear that a court is privileged to give the judgment of the court greater effect than it is required to do by the provisions of the Act.’ Reading the saving clause broadly, it follows that New York, for example, could continue its current practice of recognizing foreign support decrees which are excluded from the scope of the Act; but it could also, in a proper case, give foreign judgments within the scope of the Act a more extensive res judicata effect than the Act requires.” A. Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments. A New Yorker Reflects on Uniform Acts, 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 367, 370-71 (1970) (Emphasis in original).

The non-limiting intent of the Act is also emphasized by Professor B. Kulger, Rutgers School of Law, in her article in the Buffalo Law Review:

“Subsection 2 limits, rather than defines, the word ‘judgment’ as it is used in the act, so that recourse to existing law is necessary. The Act is restricted to certain ‘judgments’ which grant or deny recovery for . a sum of money to the exclusion of fines, taxes, penalties, or support in matrimonial or family matters. Although New York does not enforce foreign fiscal and penal judgments, it has granted recognition and enforcement to foreign support decrees. The Act will not prevent continued recognition and enforcement of judgments not covered by its provisions.” B. Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New York: The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, 18 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, 9 (1969).

See also Ernster, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments: A Clear Position for New Jersey, 22 Rutgers L. Rev. 327, 330 (1968).

Our conclusion that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act does not prevent the courts of this State from recognizing or enforcing the alimony provisions of a foreign divorce decree is also fortified by the Commissioner’s Prefatory Note to the Act:

“In most states of the Union, the law on recognition of judgments from foreign countries is not codified. In a large number of civil law countries, grant of conclusive effect to money-judgments from foreign courts is made dependent upon reciprocity. Judgments rendered in the United States have in many instances been refused recognition abroad either because the foreign court was not satisifed that local judgments would be recognized in the American jurisdiction involved or because no certification of existence of reciprocity could be obtained from the foreign government in countries where existence of reciprocity must be certified to the courts by the government. Codification by a'state of its rules on the recognition of money-judgments rendered in a foreign court will make it more likely that judgments rendered in the state will be recognized abroad.
“The Act states rules that have long been applied by the majority of courts in this country. In some respects the Act may not go as far as the decisions. The Act makes clear that a court is privileged to give the judgment of the court of a foreign country greater effect than it is required to do by the provisions of the Act. In codifying what bases for assumption of personal jurisdiction will be recognized, which is an area of the law still in evolution, the Act adopts the policy of listing bases accepted generally today and preserving for the courts the right to recognize still other bases. Because the Act is not selective and applies to judgments from any foreign court, the Act states that judgments rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law shall neither be recognized nor enforced.” 13 Uniform Laws Annotated 269.

Thus the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act was intended to promote principles of international comity by assuring foreign nations that their judgments would, under certain well-defined circumstances, be given recognition by courts in states which have adopted the Uniform Act. As reciprocity is generally an important consideration in determining whether the courts of one country will recognize the judgments of the courts of another, see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113 (1895); C. Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 72 Col. L. Rev., 220, 233-36 (1972); J. Wigmore, The Execution of Foreign Judgments: A Study in the International Assimulation of Private Law, 21 111. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1926); E. Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad, 29 Yale L. J. 188 and 268 (1919-20), the certainty of recognition of those judgments provided for by the Act will hopefully facilitate recognition of similar United States’ judgments abroad. Note, Reciprocal Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments: The Canada-United States Example, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1456,1489 n. 196 (1977). Note, The Uniform Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 308, 316-17 (1965). The Act, therefore, delineates a minimum of foreign judgments which must be recognized in jurisdictions which have adopted the Act, and in no way constitutes a maximum limitation upon foreign judgments which may be given recognition apart from the Act.

The reason for the exclusion of judgments for support in matrimonial or family matters from the scope of the Act is clear. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, like any other uniform act, must necessarily be limited in scope to those areas upon which there is likely to be a consensus of opinion and hence uniformity. The area of foreign support decrees is simply not an area which lends itself to uniformity of treatment — either in this country or abroad. As noted by Professor Homburger:

“Foreign support decrees have been the subject of several international efforts toward uniformity, all of which have treated them separately from money judgments. The widely divergent national laws relating to marital decrees of all kinds — as contrasted to other civil and commercial matters as to which there is a reasonable degree of similarity — are reason enough for separate treatment. Homburger, supra at 13.

Given the divergent state and foreign laws relating to marital decrees of all kinds (including, of course, alimony), uniformity simply could not be achieved if the scope of the Act were enlarged to encompass such decrees. Rather than abandon any hope of uniformity, the drafters of the Act limited its scope to those foreign money-judgments as to which there already existed a reasonable degree of similarity of treatment. Thus, the exclusion of judgments for support in matrimonial or family matters from the scope of the Act evidences not an intent that these judgments never be recognized, but rather a pragmatic approach to a difficult problem: that of drafting a statute which is likely to be adopted, without substantial modification, in a large number of jurisdictions.

There appears to be only one reported decision dealing with the effect of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act on the question of the jurisdiction of a state court to enforce the support provisions of a foreign divorce decree. Appellee contends that this case, Nardi v. Segal, 90 Ill. App. 2d 432, 234 N.E.2d 805 (1967), stands for the proposition that the Act prevents a state court from exercising jurisdiction to enforce the support provisions of a foreign decree. In our view, Aara&’holds only that the Act does not confer jurisdiction to enforce (either in equity or at law) the support provisions of foreign divorce decrees. 234 N.E.2d at 807-08. At any rate, as noted infra, we decline to follow Nardi.

In sum, we hold that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Md. Ann. Code, Cts. & J. Proc. Art., §§ 10-701 through 10-709 (1974)) neither provides for the recognition or enforcement of the alimony provisions of the English divorce decree, nor precludes such recognition or enforcement on a basis other than that set out in the Act.

While we have held that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act does not provide a basis for the recognition or enforcement of the alimony provisions of the English divorce decree, we think the decree (including the provisions dealing with alimony) may be entitled to recognition under general principles of comity. The rule is well stated in Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540, 295 A. 2d 519, 521-22 (1972) that:

“The full faith and credit clause of the constitution of the United States does not apply to a divorce obtained in a foreign country. Courts of the United States are not required by federal law to give full force and effect to a judgment granted in a foreign nation. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 16 S. Ct. 139, 40 L. Ed. 95; Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N. Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N. Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60; Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818; 33 Fordham L. Rev. 449; 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 802. On the other hand, judgments of courts of foreign countries are recognized in the United States because of the comity due to the courts and judgments of one nation from another. Such recognition is granted to foreign judgments with due regard to international duty and convenience, on the one hand, and to rights of citizens of the United States and others under the protection of its laws, on the other hand. This principle is frequently applied in divorce cases; a decree of divorce granted in one country by a court having jurisdiction to do so will be given full force and effect in another country by comity, not only as a decree determining status, but also with respect to an award of alimony and child support. The principle of comity, however, has several important exceptions and qualifications. A decree of divorce will not be recognized by comity where it was obtained by a procedure which denies due process of law in the real sense of the term, or was obtained by fraud, or where the divorce offends the public policy of the state in which recognition is sought, or where the foreign court lacked jurisdiction. 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 964.”

See also Hilton v. Guyot, supra at 202; Growe v. Growe, 2 Mich. App. 25, 138 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1965); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 866-67 (1950); Bates v. Bates, 53 Nev. 77, 292 P. 298 (1930), rehearing denied, 53 Nev. 77, 296 P. 1112 (1931); Restatement of the Law (Second), Conflicts § 98, comment c.; 3 W. Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, §§ 33.11 and 33.12 at 439-42 (1945); C. Peterson, supra at 248-59. See generally, J. Wigmore, supra at 8; Note, Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 802 (1965); 27B C.J.S., Divorce §§ 329 and 373 at 790-91 and 863-66. Moreover, while the cases are legion which refuse to recognize a foreign decree when it is shown that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction; that the foreign proceedings violated due process of law; or that, for some other reason, the decree offends the public policy of the state in which recognition is sought, see e.g. Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, supra; Butler v. Butler, 239 A. 2d 616 (D.C. App. 1968); Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 N. J. 531, 64 A. 2d 436 (1949); and see Annot., Divorce Decree of Foreign Country, 13 A.L.R. 3d 1419 and cases cited therein, a foreign decree is presumed valid until some evidence to the contrary is presented. 3 W. Nelson, supra at 442-43.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the 1976 divorce decree (including the alimony provisions contained therein) was subject to recognition by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County under principles of comity. Having found that the decree was subject to recognition by the circuit court, we turn next to the question of whether the court, sitting in equity, had jurisdiction to enforce the alimony provisions of that decree.

In McCabe v. McCabe, 210 Md. 308, 318, 123 A. 2d 447 (1956), the Court of Appeals held that in Maryland, equity courts have jurisdiction to enforce a decree of another state, both as to alimony accrued and to accrue, and may use for its enforcement the same equitable remedies and sanctions it could use to enforce a decree it had duly entered in the first instance. We think the rationale of McCabe equally applicable to foreign country decrees, and hold that in Maryland, equity courts have jurisdiction to enforce the alimony provisions of a foreign country decree which is subject to recognition in this State.

The decision in McCabe was bottomed upon the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Barber v. Barber, 62 U. S. 582 (1858) that the United States District Court for the District of Wisconsin, sitting in equity, had jurisdiction to enforce the alimony provisions of a New York decree. The court in Barber made one point crystal clear at the outset:

“Our first remark is — and we wish it to be remembered — that this is not a suit asking the court for the allowance of alimony. That has been done by a court of competent jurisdiction. The court in Wisconsin was asked to interfere to prevent that decree from being defeated by fraud.” Id. at 584.

The Court in Barber went on to hold that in England, courts of equity would enforce the alimony provisions of decrees of the ecclesiastical courts, and that the reason for the exercise of equity jurisdiction in such cases was equally applicable to courts of equity in the United States:

“There is, too, another ground of jurisdiction in equity, just as certainly established as that is of which we have just spoken. It comprehends the case before us. It is, that courts of equity will interfere to compel the payment of alimony which has been decreed to a wife by the ecclesiastical court in England. Such a jurisdiction is ancient there, and the principal reason for its exercise is equally applicable to the courts of equity in the United States. It is, that when a court of competent jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties decrees a divorce, and alimony to the wife as its incident, and is unable of itself to enforce the decree summarily upon the husband, that courts of equity will interfere to prevent the decree from being defeated by fraud.” Id. at 590-91.
“We have already shown, by many authorities, that courts of equity have a jurisdiction to interfere to enforce a decree for alimony, and by cases decided by this court; that the jurisdiction of the courts of equity of the United States is the same as that of England, whence it is derived. On that score, alone, the jurisdiction of the court in the case before us cannot be successfully denied.” Id. at 592.

See also McCabe v. McCabe, supra at 312-18.

Having determined from Barber that the equity courts of this State have jurisdiction to enforce the alimony provisions of a decree of another court of competent jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals in McCabe, based on principles of comity, see McCabe v. McCabe, supra at 316, held that it would permit the use of such equitable jurisdiction to enforce the alimony provisions of sister-state divorce decrees. Id. at 318.

In our view, the same principles of comity which produced the result in McCabe are equally applicable to decrees of foreign nations which are subject to recognition in this State. In McCabe, of course, the sister-state decree was entitled (absent a showing of lack of jurisdiction) to recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, see Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945), whereas foreign country decrees are not. But once it is determined under principles of comity that a foreign country decree will be recognized in this State, the question of enforcement becomes identical to that presented in McCabe: should the equity courts of this State compel obedience to a valid decree of a court of competent jurisdiction? We think the answer is yes. To recognize a foreign country decree as valid, but then to leave a litigant without a remedy for the enforcement of such a decree would, in our view, render comity a rather meaningless concept.

In his brief, appellee attempts to demonstrate the inapplicability of McCabe to the instant case by noting that the McCabe Court emphasized that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act and the Maryland Constitution all supported the result reached therein. While it is true that the McCabe Court relied on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, that clause was relied on only to establish that the Maryland courts must recognize (but not, necessarily, enforce) sister-state decrees. As previously noted, the decree in the case sub-judice was subject to recognition under the doctrine of comity. That the Court in McCabe was not relying on the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a basis for enforcement is made clear by its statement that:

“The genera] view of these courts [allowing equitable enforcement of sister-state decrees] is that the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause are a minimum, not a maximum, a command to do so much and not a prohibition against doing more, and that the enforcing state may give recognition and effect to decrees of a sister-state above and beyond that required by the Constitution of the United States, particularly as to the matter of remedies.” Id. at 313.

The Court went on to note that “. . . states offering local equitable enforcement as to future payments do so on the ground of comity or the public policy of the state.” Id. at 316.

Similarly, the McCabe Court’s reliance on the Maryland Constitution does not render that case inapposite. The Court merely noted that, “Since the 1950 amendment of Art. Ill, Sec. 38, Constitution of Maryland, and the decision in Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285, obligation of support of minor children under a decree would, like alimony, be considered a duty, not a debt.” Id. at 314. (Emphasis supplied). Thus, the McCabe Court found inapposite cases denying equitable relief on the ground that accrued alimony is but a debt and, as such, is entitled to be collected only in the way any other debt is collected. Id. at 313. See generally Annot., Foreign Alimony Decree-Enforcement, 18 A.L.R. 2d 862. The fact that Maryland considers the obligation to pay alimony a duty, resting upon sound public policy, and not merely a debt collectible in an action at law, supports, we think, our holding that equity courts have jurisdiction to enforce the alimony provisions of foreign country decrees when such decrees are subject to recognition in this State.

Our enforcement of the alimony provisions of foreign country decrees will render more likely foreign country enforcement of the alimony provisions of decrees of the courts of this State. This, in turn, will render less likely incidents where Maryland spouses, unable to enforce the alimony provisions of Maryland decrees abroad, are dependent upon public assistance for support. Thus, as the State of Maryland clearly has a legitimate interest in the enforcement of the alimony provisions of foreign country decrees where such decrees are subject to recognition in this State, our holding that equity courts have jurisdiction to compel obedience to such decrees is supported by sound public policy.

We note next that while the McCabe Court mentioned the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, see Md. Ann. Code, Art. 89C, the decision was in no way dependent upon the application of that Act. In reference to the Act, the Court merely stated that, “... if she [the wife] were residing in another state and proceeding under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act against her husband who was in this State, the husband could be made to obey orders to support by sanctions available to equity.” Id. at 315 (Emphasis supplied). The Court went on to state that it saw no reason why the same sanctions may not be made available to compel the husband to obey the decree of another state. Id. The McCabe Court mentioned the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act not as a jurisdictional basis for the equitable enforcement of sister-state alimony decrees, but rather to show a public policy in favor of.the use of equitable remedies to compel obedience to decrees for support. As previously noted, such a public policy clearly supports our holding in the case at bar.

Appellee contends that we should follow Nardi v. Segal, supra, holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to enforce a judgment of a foreign country [Israel] decree for child support. The court in Nardi followed a statement in Clubb v. Clubb, 402 Ill. 390, 84 N.E.2d 366, 371 (1949), that “jurisdiction of courts of equity to determine divorce cases and all matters relating thereto is conferred only by statute”, and, finding no Illinois statute providing for the recognition or enforcement of the Israel decree, held that the lower court had no jurisdiction to enforce it.

We decline to follow Nardi or any of the other progeny of Clubb v. Clubb, supra. The decision in Clubb has been criticized on the ground that while divorce proceedings in Illinois are purely statutory, “all matters relating thereto” are not. Note, Domestic Relations Denial of Equitable Enforcement of Foreign Alimony Decree, 1 De Paul L. Rev. 147, 148-49 (1951). We agree with this criticism, and think the court in Clubb (and hence Nardi) failed to keep in mind the admonition of the Supreme Court in Barber v. Barber, supra at 584, that an action for the enforcement of the alimony provisions of a foreign decree is not an action for divorce or alimony: that has already been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. See McCabe v. McCabe, supra at 312. It is simply an action to enforce a foreign decree. The fact that the decree happens to deal with matters relating to divorce is of no consequence. That equitable jurisdiction in all matters which may relate to divorce is not purely statutory in Maryland is made clear by the Court of Appeals holding in McCabe v. McCabe, supra.

We conclude as we began: by emphasizing that we hold only that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County erred in sustaining appellee’s preliminary objection on grounds of lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. We think courts of equity have jurisdiction to enforce the alimony provisions of foreign country decrees which are subject to recognition in this State. That is not to say that the decree in the case sub judice should be accorded such recognition. Appellee is certainly free to show (if he can) the illegality of the English decree. But we think the circuit court hás jurisdiction to determine whether the English decree (including the alimony provisions contained therein) will be recognized as valid in this State, and, if it determines that the decree shall be accorded such recognition, to use equitable remedies to compel obedience to the terms of the decree.

Judgment reversed; case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Costs to be paid by appellee.

       Note: Certiorari granted, Court of Appeals of Maryland, September 26,1978.

      . Jurisdiction over the person involves, “[T]he court’s ability to exercise ■ its power over an individual for the purpose of adjudicating his rights and liabilities stemming from a particular transaction or event____”4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1350 at 543 (1969).

      . We think valid the assumption implicit in the trial judge’s ruling that the word “support” as used in the Act means both support for the child (i.e., child support) and support for the wife (i.e., alimony). Thus a judgment for alimony is also excluded, by the terms of the Act, from the definition of “foreign judgment".

      . The questions of whether a court should recognize a foreign decree, and whether it should go further and use equitable remedies to enforce a decree once recognized are, of course, two separate and distinct lines of inquiry. Clubb v. Clubb, 402 Ill. 390, 399, 84 N.E.2d 366, 371 (1949). See also McCabe v. McCabe, 210 Md. 308, 312, 123 A. 2d 447 (1956); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill. App. 3d 849, 4 Ill. Dec. 450, 360 N.E.2d 386, 390 (1977); McElroy v. McElroy, 256 A. 2d 768 (Del. Ch. 1969); Golomb, Recognition of Foreign Money Judgments: A Goal-Oriented Approach, 43 St. Johns L. Rev. 604, 607 (1969). Enforcement, however, necessarily comprehends recognition. See Note, Reciprocal Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments: The Canada-United States Example, 45 Pordham L. Rev. 1456, 1457 n. 6 (1977).

      . The actual holding in Litvaitis was that the lower court properly refused to recognize a Mexican divorce decree where the defendant was not a domiciliary of the Mexican state. 295 A. 2d at 522.

      . Md. Ann. Code, Cts. & J. Proc. Art., § 1-501 (1974) vests the circuit courts of this state with “full common law and equity powers and jurisdiction”.

      . The court in Nardi noted that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act specifically excludes enforcement of a judgment for support of a foreign country in matrimonial or family matters. 234 N.E.2d at 808.

      . Maryland, of course, has no statute conferring specific authority on the equity courts of this State to enforce the alimony provisions of sister-state decrees. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals in McCabe held that equity courts have such authority. Compare Tailby v. Tailby, 342 Ill. App. 664, 97 N.E.2d 611, 615 (1951) with McCabe v. McCabe, supra. But see Roberts v. Roberts, 11 Ill. App. 2d 86, 136 N.E.2d 590, 593 (1956) criticizing the holding in Tailby..