source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WRIGHT, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    133 A.3d 1254
    Jonathan Eugene BOWERS v. STATE of Maryland.
    No. 2719,
    Sept. Term, 2014.
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    March 30, 2016.

      Robert J. Feldman (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
    Jeremy M. McCoy (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief) Annapolis, MD, for Appellee.
    Panel: WRIGHT, KEHOE and NAZARIAN, JJ.
   WRIGHT, J.

Following a guilty plea in the Circuit Court for Somerset County on March 13, 2013, appellant, Jonathan Eugene Bowers, was sentenced to 10 years’ incarceration for one count of involuntary manslaughter. On December 10, 2014, Bowers filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Md. Rule 4-345 arguing that because the manslaughter sentencing statute, Md.Code (2002, 2012, RepLVol.), Criminal Law Article (“CR”) § 2-207, is ambiguous, he is subject to the rule of lenity which requires that CR § 2-207 be read in his favor. In this case, Bowers asserts that CR § 2-207 should be read as imposing two separate maximum sentences for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter; since he is convicted of involuntary manslaughter, he argues he should be subject to a maximum of 2 years in a local facility and, therefore, his 10-year sentence is illegal. Bowers’s motion was denied by the circuit court on January 20, 2015. This appeal follows.

On appeal, Bowers presents the following question for our review:

Did the circuit court properly deny Bowers’s motion to correct an illegal sentence?

After a careful consideration of Maryland criminal law cases, authority, and legislative history, we hold that Bowers’s 10-year sentence for involuntary manslaughter is not illegal.

BACKGROUND

On October 27, 2012, at approximately 3:52 a.m., officers from the Somerset County Sheriffs Department responded to a report of an unconscious individual. When they arrived, the officers saw Bowers seated on the side of the road with his hands in the air. The unconscious individual was Bowers’s father, Jonathan David Bowers. The senior Bowers was lying motionless and bleeding from his face.

When the officers returned to Bowers, he had his hands in the air, and said “he and his father [ ] were arguing and they had gotten into a fight and it happened real fast.” Witnesses on the scene reported that Bowers and his father were seen arguing earlier in the evening, and that later on, during the altercation, Bowers repeatedly kicked his father, uttering “in a distressed, emotional state that he hoped [his father] was dead.” Bowers was escorted to the officers’ patrol unit in handcuffs. Approximately an hour later, Bowers’s father was pronounced dead from “head and neck injuries as a result of multiple blunt force impact.”

Bowers is a former United States Marine and has completed two combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bowers suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of the numerous traumatic events his experienced in combat. He contends that at the time he killed his father, he “was in a dissociated rage state for the period following the initial blows ... [and] he was not consciously aware of his actions” as a result of the PTSD.

Bowers was originally indicted for first-degree murder and a series of lesser offenses. In exchange for the non-prosecution of the remaining charges, Bowers pleaded guilty to one count of involuntary manslaughter. Bowers received a 10-year sentence to be served in the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections. He filed this timely appeal arguing that the imposition of a 10-year sentence for involuntary manslaughter is illegal.

DISCUSSION

In Maryland, manslaughter remains a common law crime with a prescribed statutory penalty. State v. Gibson, 4 Md.App. 236, 241-44, 242 A.2d 575 (1968), aff'd, 254 Md. 399, 254 A.2d 691 (1969). In other words, the elements for the unlawful act of manslaughter have not been defined by the legislature but remain in its common law form. Moore v. State, 194 Md.App. 327, 370, 4 A.3d 96 (2010); rev’d, on other grounds, 422 Md. 516, 30 A.3d 945 (2011). The statutorily prescribed penalty for manslaughter is found in CR § 2-207 and provides, in pertinent part:

Penalty

(a) A person who commits manslaughter is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to:

(1) imprisonment not exceeding 10 years; or

(2) imprisonment in a local correctional facility not exceeding 2 years or a fine not exceeding $500 or both.

Bowers avers that the maximum penalty he should have received under the statute should have been 2 years and, therefore, his 10-year sentence for involuntary manslaughter is illegal. He argues that because the manslaughter statute provides what he considers to be two possible maximum penalties, the language of the manslaughter statute is inherently ambiguous. As a result of this ambiguity, Bowers argues that he is entitled to the application of the rule of lenity. He urges us to adopt a construction of the statute that places the 10-year maximum penalty provision on a voluntary manslaughter conviction and the 2-year maximum penalty on an involuntary manslaughter conviction.

I. Bowers did not waive his illegal sentence claim by failing to object or because he entered into a plea agreement.

In response to Bowers’s appeal, the State first argues that Bowers “waived his illegal sentence claim by consenting to the terms of the plea agreement with the State.” His knowing and voluntary plea agreement for involuntary manslaughter, the State explains, required that he expressly acknowledge his understanding that “the maximum penalty for involuntary manslaughter is 10 years in jail.” At sentencing, the State continues, Bowers not only failed to object to the legality of his sentencing, but he requested a sentence of up to 5 years’ imprisonment, which, while being within the sentencing guidelines, exceeds what Bowers now argues to be the “maximum” 2-year sentence for involuntary manslaughter. The State relies on Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 918 A.2d 506 (2007), for the proposition that a “sentence may not be attacked belatedly and collaterally through a motion under [Md.] Rule 4-345(a), and ... the defendant is not excused from having to raise a timely objection in the trial court.”

We disagree with the State and do not find that Bowers waived his appeal of his sentence. Md. Rule 4-345(a) permits the court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time.” Thus, an appellate court “may correct an illegal sentence on appeal even if no objection was made in the trial court,” Leopold v. State, 216 Md.App. 586, 609, 88 A.3d 860 (2014) (citations omitted), because “a defendant who fails to object to the imposition of an illegal sentence does not waive forever his right to challenge that sentence.” Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949 (1985) (citing Coles v. State, 290 Md. 296, 303, 429 A.2d 1029 (1981)). Further, contrary to the State’s assertion, “a guilty plea would not alter the illegality of the sentence imposed.” Stevenson v. State, 180 Md.App. 440, 447, 951 A.2d 875 (2008) (citations omitted). The State’s reliance on Chaney is misguided because the Chaney Court distinguished between deficient sentences and illegal sentences, limiting illegal sentences “to those situations in which the illegality inheres in the sentence itself.” Chaney, 397 Md. at 466, 918 A.2d 506. The Court held that deficient sentences, not illegal sentences, “may not be attacked belatedly and collaterally through a motion under [Md.] Rule 4-345(a).” Id. In the instant matter, Bowers, by questioning the interpretation of the statute as a whole, is challenging his sentence as one whose “illegality inheres in the sentence itself,” id., and thus, he is well within his rights to challenge it on appeal.

II. Bowers’s 10-year sentence for involuntary manslaughter is not illegal.

In order for Bowers to receive the benefit of the rule of lenity, the Maryland manslaughter statute must be considered ambiguous. See, e.g., Melton v. State, 379 Md. 471, 488, 842 A.2d 743 (2004) (noting that the rule of lenity applies to “ambiguous units of prosecution and penalty provisions in criminal statutes”). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the analysis of a statute is over. People’s Ins. Counsel Div. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 408 Md. 336, 351, 969 A.2d 971 (2009). A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning: if it is intrinsically unclear or if its application in a particular circumstance is uncertain. Webster v. State, 359 Md. 465, 480-81, 754 A.2d 1004 (2000). While the rule of lenity permits an ambiguity in a criminal statute to be construed against the State and in favor of the defendant, id., the rule of lenity cannot be used to “create an ambiguity where none exists.” Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204 (1994) (citations omitted). Only if the statutory language is ambiguous is this Court required to look “beyond the statute’s plain language in discerning the legislative intent.” Melton, 379 Md. at 477, 842 A.2d 743 (citing Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde’s of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471, 483, 833 A.2d 1014 (2003)).

Bowers argues that the manslaughter statute is ambiguous “because the words of the statute are susceptible to more than one interpretation.” Webster, 359 Md. at 480, 754 A.2d 1004. He posits three possible interpretations of the manslaughter statute: (1) the interpretation of the circuit court judge who heard Bowers’s case and sentenced him to 10 years, that there are two possible maximum sentences; (2) that the maximum 2-year sentence is “incorporated” into the provision authorizing a 10-year sentence, citing to advocates who argue that the 2-year sentence is obsolete; and (3) that the General Assembly intended to impose different maximum sentences for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Bowers urges us to adopt the third option: that the intent of the General Assembly in passing the manslaughter statute was to assign different penalties to the two classes of the crime. He urges us to accept his interpretation, that “the intent of [CR] § 2-207 was to impose a maximum sentence for involuntary manslaughter of no more than two years and/or a fine of up to $500” (emphasis added), while the penalty for voluntary manslaughter was intended to be “imprisonment not exceeding 10 years[.]” CR § 2-207. For the reasons laid out below, we do not find Bowers’s argument persuasive.

i. The Maryland manslaughter statute is not ambiguous.

In the order and memorandum opinion denying Bowers’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, the circuit court found that Bowers’s 10-year sentence was not illegal because the manslaughter statute is not ambiguous. The circuit court concluded:

Defendant is mistaken. First and foremost, courts only resort to legislative materials for statutory interpretation after courts have determined that the plain language of the statute itself lends itself to at least two possible reasonable interpretations. Webster v. State, 359 Md. 465, 480 [754 A.2d 1004] (2000). The manslaughter statute provides two possible penalties for manslaughter: up to ten (10) years in a penitentiary or up to two (2) years in a local facility and $500 fine. Md.Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-207(a). There is nothing on the face of this statute that lends itself to two possible interpretations. The meaning is clear. There are two possible penalties: 10 years in prison or 2 years in jail. The meaning of the statute itself is objectively clear, even if one finds the rationale, or perhaps lack thereof, behind the statute personally vexing.

(Emphasis added). We agree with the circuit court’s final decision but need to take the opportunity to answer some of the questions the circuit court judge found frustrating in deciding the issue presented in this appeal.

Bowers views the statute as providing two different sentences for manslaughter that are at odds with each other. But actually, a straightforward reading of the statute shows that it merely provides sentencing options that give a sentencing court broad discretion as to whether defendant should serve the sentence in the Department of Corrections or in a local facility and for how long. The statute makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter because the category of manslaughter has no bearing on the conviction or the ultimate sentence.

Legal authorities have consistently interpreted the manslaughter statute to carry one penalty for a conviction of either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. Highlighting the relatively inconsequential distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, Judge Charles E. Moylan, of this Court, explains in his authoritative treatise on criminal homicide that the qualifiers “voluntary” and “involuntary” are merely descriptive terms. Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Criminal Homicide Law § 8.5, at 155-56 (2002). Because manslaughter is an implicit, lesser included offense within murder, an “indictment or criminal information on which [the defendant] stood trial will never even have mentioned the word manslaughter, let alone have made some more subtle distinction between voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter.” Id. Even in the rare instances where manslaughter is alleged per se, the charging document “will not have made any distinction between voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter.” Id. With regard to sentencing, Judge Moylan explains:

If a defendant is convicted of manslaughter in Maryland, the maximum penalty provided by the Legislature is 10 years imprisonment and there is no distinction between whether the conviction was for a voluntary manslaughter or an involuntary one.

Id. Judge Moylan adds that the verdict in a manslaughter case will not, “nor should it,” have made a distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Id. Additionally, in his widely cited authority on Maryland criminal law, Maryland Criminal Jury Instructions and Commentary, Professor David E. Aaronson elucidates the manslaughter statute. He explains:

In terms of penalty, there is no distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Pursuant to [CR] § 2-207(a) (formerly art. 27, § 387), a person convicted of involuntary manslaughter or voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a felony and subject to a maximum of ten years imprisonment or imprisonment for two years and/or a maximum fine of $500.

1 David E. Aaronson, Maryland Criminal Jury Instructions and Commentary § 5.54(A), at 902 (2015) (emphasis added).

Maryland courts have also affirmed the absence of any distinction in sentencing between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. In Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 171 A.2d 699 (1961), the Court of Appeals reasoned that defendant Connor was not prejudiced by the circuit court’s failure to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter in the jury instruction because:

the penalty statute (§ 387)[] makes no distinction between the two, the penalty for both grades of manslaughter is the same; nor is there any distinction in the usual form of the possible verdicts in a homicide case ... between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.

Id. at 558-59, 171 A.2d 699. After Connor, this Court considered State v. Gibson, 4 Md.App. 236, 241, 242 A.2d 575 (1968), aff'd, 254 Md. 399, 254 A.2d 691 (1969), in which it reiterated that “manslaughter, whether voluntary or involuntary, is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years.” See also, e.g., Forbes v. State, 324 Md. 335, 340, 597 A.2d 427 (1991) (“Common law involuntary manslaughter carries a ten year maximum term of imprisonment and is a felony[.]”).

Bowers contends, however, that the discussion in Connor concerning the penalty for manslaughter is dicta because the differences in punishment of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter were not before the Court. It was dicta, Bowers argues, because the “Connor Court was not called upon to examine the construction of the manslaughter statute or opine whether there was a difference in the penalties for the two crimes.” Because Gibson relied on Connor for the premise that both types on manslaughter are punishable by the same maximum sentence, Bowers maintains that Gibson should not be relied upon either.

“Obiter dictum ” is typically a judicial comment “that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1240 (10th ed.2014). However, the Court of Appeals has previously explained that “[w]hen a question of law is raised properly by the issues in a case and the Court supplies a deliberate expression of its opinion upon that question, such opinion is not to be regarded as obiter dictum although the final judgment in the case may be rooted in another point also raised by the record.” Schmidt v. Prince George’s Hosp., 866 Md. 535, 551, 784 A.2d 1112 (2001) (citations omitted). A matter is not dictum if “the question was directly involved in the issues of law ... and the mind of the Court was directly drawn to, and distinctly expressed upon the subject.” Id. at 552, 784 A.2d 1112 (citing Carstairs v. Cochran, 95 Md. 488, 499, 52 A. 601 (1902)). Upon our review of Connor and Gibson, we find that their discussion of the manslaughter penalty “reflects the application of this Court’s judicial mind,” id., and we therefore disagree with Bowers’s contention that those cases are not to be relied upon.

Our review of case law and legal authority on Maryland criminal law indicates a consistent and uniform understanding of the manslaughter sentencing statute. Accordingly, we disagree with Bowers that the manslaughter statute is capable of more than one interpretation and is, therefore, ambiguous. Webster, 359 Md. at 480, 754 A.2d 1004. “Because the text of the statute is unambiguous, we need not look beyond the plain language of the statute to discern the intent of the Legislature.” Dixon v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 175 Md.App. 384, 412, 927 A.2d 445 (2007) (citation omitted). However, even if we were to determine that the statute is ambiguous and would then necessarily review the legislative history of the manslaughter statute, the legislative history would support our position that a penalty under the statute is the same whether the conviction was for voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.

ii. The history of the Maryland manslaughter statute does not support Bowers’s construction.

Legislation is created with a particular objective or purpose. Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628 (1987). In order to determine the purpose of the statute, we “may and often must consider other ‘external manifestations’ or ‘persuasive evidence,’ including a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material.” Id. at 515, 525 A.2d 628.

a. Early history of Maryland’s manslaughter statute.

English Common Law defined manslaughter generally as the unlawful killing of a person without the express or implied malice found in murder and split the crime into two degrees: voluntary and involuntary. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Book 1±: Public Wrongs, Homicide (1770). While murder and many other crimes were punishable by death at common law, manslaughter was a crime that had the “benefit of clergy,” a form of relief available to mitigate penalties if the accused repented. The punishment would then change from death to a lesser penalty, such as branding of the hand or forfeit of certain possessions, after which the accused would be released after being pardoned. Jeffrey K. Sawyer, “Benefit of Clergy” in Maryland and Virginia, 34 Am. J. Legal Hist. 50-54 (1990).

In 1809, Maryland enacted the first piece of legislation to systematically deal with the punishment of crimes (the “1809 Act” or the “Act”). John Brumbaugh, A New Criminal Code for Maryland?, 23 Md. L.Rev. 1, 2 (1963). The 1809 Act abolished the benefit of clergy and replaced the flexibility in punishment it offered with sentencing range guidelines for judges, who could now sentence convicted individuals to workhouses and penitentiaries. 1809 Md. Laws, Chap. 138 § 11, p. 468. The Act imposed a 10-year imprisonment as a maximum penalty for manslaughter. Md. Laws 1809, Chap. 138, § 4(3), at 460. It read, in pertinent part: “Every person duly convicted of the crime of manslaughter, shall be sentenced to undergo a confinement in the said penitentiary for a period not more than ten years, to be dealt with as herein after directed.” Id. For most common law crimes, the 1809 Act declared the penalty for the particular crime without defining the crime itself. Id.; see Brumbaugh, 23 Md. L.Rev. at 3 (“The act is concerned primarily with the problem of punishment. In many cases the statute, when it deals with particular crimes, does nothing more than refer to a common law crime, without defining it, and announce a penalty.”). Thus, the Act did not define manslaughter nor did it distinguish between voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. 1809 Md. Laws, Ch. 138, § 4(3), at 460. In 1860, the manslaughter sentencing law was changed to read:

Every person convicted of the crime of manslaughter, shall be sentenced to the penitentiary for not more than ten years nor less than eighteen months.

This version of the statute is noteworthy, as it provides for the court, both upper and lower bounds, affording ample discretion.

In the same year, Maryland Governor Thomas H. Hicks delivered a Message of the Governor to the Maryland General Assembly calling for shorter minimum sentences in State penitentiaries for certain crimes because of “unjust, indiscriminating severity” of previous minimum mandatory penalties. He stated, “I see no reason why there should not be shorter terms of service in the Penitentiary than two years or eighteen months, the minimum allowed by law; at least as long as we have no House of Correction for the offenses of lighter grade.” Message of the Governor to the Maryland General Assembly, January Session 1860, Maryland Senate Journal of Documents, 1860, at 7-8. Shortly thereafter, however, Maryland realized the financial burden that shorter sentences in the State penitentiary placed on the State budget. As a result, Governor Hicks called for the shorter sentences to be served in local jails rather than the State penitentiary:

In my communication to the General Assembly at its session in January, 1860, I suggested the propriety of punishing crimes of lesser grade by confinement in the Penitentiary for a shorter period than the minimum then allowed by law. The experiment has been made, and has not met my expectation. The large number of criminals of this class sentenced to the Penitentiary has imposed upon its finances a bur[d]en which they cannot well endure....

Perhaps the ends of justice might be fully attained by punishing this class of offenders by short terms of imprisonment in the jails or almshouses, at hard labor. In this way they might, at least, under an efficient system, earn sufficient to pay the cost of maintaining them. If not, the expense could be lightly borne by the several counties and the city of Baltimore, and thus the resources of the Penitentiary be relieved from a heavy charge.

Message of the Governor to the Maryland General Assembly, January Session 1862, Maryland Senate Journal of Documents, 1863, at 6-7. Following the Message of the Governor, the Maryland legislature changed the manslaughter penalty in 1865 to language substantially similar to the current CR § 2-207. It read:

Every person convicted of the crime of manslaughter shall be sentenced to the penitentiary for not more than ten years, or in the discretion of the court may be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or be imprisoned in jail for not more than two years, or be fined and imprisoned in jail.

Md. Laws 1864, Ch. 39. The courts, thus, had broad discretion in sentencing individuals convicted of manslaughter, a crime which itself varied in offensiveness based on the facts of individual cases, to imprisonment in either the State correctional facility or in the local jail.

We further note that the judicial discretion in sentencing seen in the manslaughter statute was similarly applied in other offenses at the time. A conviction for rogues and vagabonds carried a sentence “to the penitentiary for not less than one month nor more than two years, or to imprisonment in jail, at the discretion of the court, for a like term.” Md. Code of Public Gen. Laws (1862) Art. 72, § 187. Likewise, a conviction for treason carried a sentence to “penitentiary for a term not less than six months or more than two years, or to a fíne not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars, at the discretion of the court.” Md.Code of Public Gen. Laws (1862) Art. 72, § 130; see also 1888 Md.Code of Public General Laws, Art. 27, § 156 (the penalty for larceny required a sentence to penitentiary “for not less than one year nor more than fifteen years,” but where the value of the stolen goods was less than fifty dollars, the court had discretion to sentence to “imprisonment in jail or in the house of correction instead of the penitentiary”). Because this discretion existed for other crimes that are not necessarily split like manslaughter, it reinforces our view that there was no legislative intent to differentiate sentencing between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.

b. Recent attempts by the Maryland General Assembly to change or modify the manslaughter statute.

Bowers supports his notion that “the Legislature intended to impose different maximum sentences for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter” by referencing the Revisor’s Note on CR § 2-207 in which the Criminal Law Article Review Committee (“the Committee”) notes:

the distinction between the general term of imprisonment available for a manslaughter conviction under subsection (a)(1) of this section and the term for imprisonment in a local correctional facility under subsection (a)(2) of this section is substantial, perhaps reflecting an implicit distinction between sentencing for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Generally, distinctions between imprisonment in a State or local correctional facility have been eliminated in light of [Md.Code (1999, 2008 Repl.Vol.) Correctional Services (“CS”) ] §§ 9-104 and 9-105, which govern the place of custody based on the length of imprisonment imposed. The General Assembly may wish to clarify which situations warrant sentencing to a longer term in a State correctional facility or for a shorter term to a local correctional facility.

CR § 2-207 (emphasis added). We find this Note to be much less decisive than Bowers maintains. The language itself is inconclusive; the Committee indicates that the two sentencing máximums in local correctional facilities and in the Department of Corrections are “perhaps” indicative of a bifurcated manslaughter statute. The speculation by the Committee alone, particularly in light of the strong history to the contrary, is not enough to convince us that the Legislature intended to impose different penalties for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Moreover, as the circuit court points out, the Note appears to focus on the location of the incarceration (local facility or a penitentiary), rather than the length of the sentence.

In 2009, in a bill endorsed by the Office of the Attorney General and the Office of the Public Defender, the General Assembly re-examined the manslaughter sentencing statute in an attempt to codify the common law offenses of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter as separate offenses with separate penalty provisions. S.B. 105, 2009 Leg., 426th Sess. (Md.2009). The General Assembly, however, declined to pass the bill, and the law remains unchanged.

In the 2009 bill hearing, one senator discussed the value of maintaining the court’s discretion in sentencing. His perspective was that judges have discretion on the bench because they are the ones hearing the facts of each individual case. Accordingly, if a judge determines that an individual who committed a crime that falls under the involuntary manslaughter category is deserving of more than 2 years in a local correctional facility, then the judge is in the best position to make that determination.

As Bowers points out, there have been three unsuccessful attempts to change the manslaughter statute in the last 17 years. He, nevertheless, argues that the Legislature’s failure to change the statute is not “evidence of the Maryland General Assembly’s tacit approval of a 10-year maximum sentence for involuntary manslaughter.” We disagree. While we acknowledge that a bill may fail to pass through the General Assembly for many reasons, in some instances, “the failure to enact legislation is persuasive evidence of legislative intent.” Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 641, 882 A.2d 256 (2005) (citing Stearman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 381 Md. 436, 455, 849 A.2d 539 (2004) (“The refusal of the Legislature to act to change a [statute] ... provides ... support for the Court to exercise restraint and refuse to step in and make the change”); State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 723, 720 A.2d 311 (1998) (“Therefore, by declining to adopt the proposed language of the amending bill, the Legislature clearly did not intend” to adopt the result being urged) (additional citations omitted)). Where the General Assembly has time and again refused to enact bills that aim to change something specific, legislative inaction becomes “very significant.” Id. (citations omitted). This Court will not adopt a position that the legislature has repeatedly rejected. Id. (citing Holliday v. Sturm, 368 Md. 186, 209, 792 A.2d 1145 (2002) (additional citations omitted)). The legislative history of the manslaughter sentencing statute provides no evidence that the present statute distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.

III. Conclusion

Bowers will not be able to receive the benefit of the rule of lenity because the Maryland manslaughter statute is not ambiguous. The General Assembly has, throughout the years, been presented with several opportunities to change the language of the statute but has time and again kept the same words and phrasing. This indicates to us that the Legislature had no intent, in the current manifestation of CR § 2-207, to differentiate punishment between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. As a result, Bowers’s 10-year sentence for involuntary manslaughter is within the limits of the statute and, therefore, not illegal.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR SOMERSET COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

      . Bowers was also sentenced to 3 years' consecutive incarceration for one count of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled dangerous substance, but that conviction is not part of this appeal.

      . Bowers framed the question as follows:
      Did the [c]ircuit [c]ourt err as a matter of law by denying Bowers's [mjotion when there is no binding judicial precedent holding the maximum sentence for involuntary manslaughter is ten years, Crim. Law § 2-207 is ambiguous, and Maryland’s [[legislature has failed to remedy the ambiguity in the law? '

      . PTSD is a mental health condition that can develop in "people who have seen or lived through a shocking, scary, or dangerous event" and who fail to recover after the trauma. The National Institute of Mental Health, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/ health/topics/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-ptsd/index.shtml (last accessed Feb. 16, 2016). Those with PTSD may continue to feel stress and fear even when they are not in any danger. Id. Individuals diagnosed with PTSD experience symptoms such as "re-experiencing,” which includes flashbacks of the trauma and frightening thoughts, and "arousal and reactivity,” which includes being easily startled, angry outburst, and feeling "on edge.” Id.

        . Involuntary manslaughter is a common law felony defined as an unintentional killing done without malice. State v. Pagotto, 361 Md. 528, 548, 762 A.2d 97 (2000). The elements of involuntary manslaughter have been set forth in the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions ("MPJI-Cr”), as follows:
      INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER — UNLAWFUL ACT
      The defendant is charged with the crime of involuntary manslaughter. In order to convict the defendant of involuntary manslaughter, the State must prove:
      (1) that [[the defendant] [another participating in the crime with the defendant]] [[committed] [attempted to commit]] a (unlawful act(s)); (2) that [the defendant] [another participating in the crime] killed (name); and

        (3) that the act resulting in the death of (name) occurred during the [commission] [attempted commission] [escape from the immediate scene] of the (unlawful act(s)).
      MPJI-Cr 4:17.9B (brackets and parenthesis in original).
      Voluntary manslaughter, on the other hand, is defined as "an intentional homicide, done in a sudden heat of passion, caused by adequate provocation, before there has been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool.” Cox v. State, 311 Md. 326, 331, 534 A.2d 1333 (1988) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

      . The rule of lenity is a judicial doctrine that guides statutory construction, requiring that when construing an ambiguous criminal statute, a court should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Moore v. State, 163 Md.App. 305, 320, 878 A.2d 678 (2005). The caritas awarded by the rule of lenity "is particularly appropriate where legislative history of a statute or the relationship between two statutory provisions is not clear.” Id. While “the rule of lenity does not shed light on legislative intentf] ... [it] provides a mechanism for resolving ambiguity when legislative intent cannot be determined to any degree of certainty.” Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 17, 20 A.3d 801 (2011) (citations omitted).

      . Bowers was indicted for murder, but pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense.

      . Md.Code, Art. 27, §§ 387-388C were repealed by Acts in 2002 and replaced with CR § 2-207. The Revisor’s Notes for CR § 2-207 indicate that the "new language [is] derived without substantive change from former Art. 27, §§ 387 and 387A." Some of the reasoning behind the changes includes:

        [I]n subsection (a) of this section, the former phrase "in the discretion of the court” is deleted as implicit in setting a maximum penalty. In subsection (a)(1) of this section, the former reference to a person being subject to imprisonment "in the penitentiary" is deleted for consistency within this article. Currently, inmates are sentenced to the custody of a unit such as the Division of Correction and then are placed in a particular facility. See [Md.Code (1999, 2008 Repl.Vol.), Correctional Services Article] § 9-103.
      In subsection (a)(2) of this section, the defined term “local correctional facility” is substituted for the former term “jail” for consistency with the Correctional Services Article.
      CR § 2-207.

      . The first draft of the Maryland bill abolishing clergy makes very clear the connection between the new sentencing procedures and the abolition of clergy. "And be it enacted that all claims to dispensation from punishment by benefit of clergy, (in as much as they are compatible with the principle of strict justice) shall be and hereby are forever abolished.” Sawyer, p. 68. Md.Code Ann., Art. 27, sec. 626 (1957, 1952 Repl.Vol.) currently restates the abolishing of clergy.

      . The Note highlights the discrepancy caused by CS § 9-105, which mandates that an individual’s sentence to a local correctional facility must be "for a period of not more than 18 months[J” Whether CS § 9-105 conflicts with CR § 2-207 is not at issue in this case because Bowers was sentenced to 10 years in a State correctional facility, and thus the 18-month maximum sentence in a local facility has no application to him.

      . Bowers also discusses two more bills that came before the General Assembly. First, a 1998 bill sought to specify different maximum punishments for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The bill proposed a conviction for "involuntary manslaughter ... is subject to imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $5,000 or both,” and for "voluntary manslaughter ... is subject to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than $10,000 or both.” Md. S.B. 347-1998(B)(l) and (2). The bill failed to pass both houses of the General Assembly.
      Second, a 2012 bill was presented before the General Assembly to clarify CR § 2-207. The bill sought to bridge the difference between the 2-year maximum in a local facility provided by CR § 2-207 and the 18-month maximum provided in CS § 9-105. As we discussed previously, there is no need for us to reach this question today.


text:
    133 A.3d 1266
    Justin T. ANDERSON v. STATE of Maryland.
    No. 2487,
    Sept. Term, 2014.
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    March 30, 2016.

      Wyatt Feeler (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellant.
    Carrie J. Williams (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellee.
    Panel: DEBORAH S. EYLER, ARTHUR and JAMES A. KENNEY, III (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
   JAMES A. KENNEY, III, J. (Retired, Specially Assigned).

Following a trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, a jury convicted appellant, Justin T. Anderson, of attempted first-degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony and/or crime of violence, wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun about his person, and possession of a handgun by a prohibited person. The trial court sentenced appellant to a total prison term of thirty years, after which he filed a timely notice of appeal.

Appellant presents the following questions for our consideration:

1. Did the trial court err by not allowing the defense to impeach a State’s witness on a prior conviction for a crime that was relevant to the witness’s credibility?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing two State’s witnesses to testify after a violation of the sequestration rule?

3. Was the evidence insufficient to convict Mr. Anderson of attempted murder?

For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgments of the trial court.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

On October 30, 2012, Cariol “Jeff’ Toliver was home at 1092 West Side Drive, in Gaithersburg, with his mother Theresa Toliver, his sister Celestine “Tina” Toliver, his son Pierre Toliver, and Pierre’s live-in girlfriend, Edwerta Hughes. That evening, Emmanuel Gbadyu, a childhood friend of Pierre’s whom the Tolivers had not seen for several months, arrived at the West Side Drive house with two other men— appellant and a man later identified as Russell Bass.

Gbadyu told Jeff he wanted to see Pierre. Something in appellant’s “out there” demeanor made Jeff uncomfortable, but he permitted Gbadyu to go down to Pierre’s basement bedroom. Appellant, wearing what Jeff remembered as a red winter hat and black boots, remained in the hallway. While Gbadyu was in the basement, Pierre gave him a polo shirt, which may have been in lieu of $20 that Pierre owed him.

Theresa, also having “vibes” and not wanting the men in her house, told Pierre that the three men had to leave. They left through the front door and walked to a white Cadillac parked in front of the house.

Jeff exited the house to make sure the men left and saw appellant pointing a small gun at Gbadyu, who was sitting in the driver’s seat of the car. Shots were fired, some toward Gbadyu. He identified appellant, who had been standing by the open front passenger door of the Cadillac, as the shooter.

Afraid of being shot, Jeff ran and tried to enter his house as appellant “took off.” The front door was locked, so he ran to the back of the house and entered through the basement door. Meanwhile, Theresa had dialed 911.

Theresa testified that she saw a man she believed to be appellant standing outside the car, holding something in his hand. Although she could not identify what he was holding, she heard two gunshots. During her call to the 911 operator, which was played for the jury, she identified the shooter as a black man wearing a red cap.

Tina, looking out an upstairs window, saw Gbadyu get into the Cadillac. When she heard a pop, she realized that he was being shot by appellant. Although she did not see a gun, she said she knew appellant shot Gbadyu because she heard a shot and then saw Gbadyu fall. Thereafter, she said, appellant walked around to the back of the house and returned a few minutes later.

Jeff and Pierre went outside, and they, along with Bass, who had been in the back seat of the car during the shooting, tried to help Gbadyu out of the car. A few minutes later, Jeff and Pierre saw appellant walking back from the same direction in which he had left. Although he said that appellant had been holding a gun when he ran away, Jeff did not see a weapon when he returned. Afraid that appellant might still have the weapon, Bass (the individual who arrived at the Toliver house with Gbadyu and appellant) and Pierre ran toward a nearby park, and Jeff ran the other way.

When Pierre heard the police sirens, he returned to his house to find appellant “holding” Gbadyu. The responding police officers described appellant, who was wearing a black jacket and red hat, as “standing over” Gbadyu when they arrived at the scene. Because appellant told the officers that Gbadyu had a gun, the officers handcuffed Gbadyu, appellant, and Pierre for safety reasons. An unidentified person appeared and informed the police that appellant was the person who had shot Gbadyu; when appellant heard that statement, he began to laugh.

Gbadyu was removed to the closest trauma center with life-threatening injuries. He suffered several gunshot wounds to his lower back, abdomen, and face. A bullet fragment was recovered from his body.

The police found no weapon on appellant or in the Cadillac. They did recover two .380 caliber handgun shell casings from the ground nearby and another from the interior of the Cadillac.

On November 4, 2012, a neighbor of the Tolivers, Alvaro Correa, notified the police that he had found a handgun under an overturned trashcan in his backyard. It was a Walther PPK semi-automatic, which fired .380 bullets and was later determined to be operable. The State’s firearms examiner concluded that the shell casings recovered from the scene of the shooting were fired from the Walther. There were not enough individual characteristics present in the bullet fragment removed from Gbadyu’s person to either identify or eliminate it as having been fired by that gun.

A gunshot residue test revealed one particle of one-component gunshot residue on one of Bass’s hands, which could have come from the discharge of a firearm or from “other sources in the environment.” Eight particles of three-component gunshot residue were found on appellant’s right hand that, in the gunshot residue expert’s opinion, could only have come from the discharge of a firearm. The expert explained, however, that did not necessarily mean that appellant was the person who pulled the trigger; he could have obtained the residue by being in close proximity to another person firing a gun.

At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, appellant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had failed to adduce any evidence that appellant possessed the necessary specific intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to support a charge of attempted murder. Because the State presented no evidence of any planning by appellant or a disagreement between appellant and Gbadyu, the most it had shown was that appellant was standing by his car and fired two shots into it while the victim was inside. And, in the absence of a predicate violent crime, he could not be convicted of the use of a firearm charge. Defense counsel also argued that the remaining firearm charges could not stand because no evidence sufficiently established that appellant carried or possessed a handgun. In support of that argument, he stated that no witness except Jeff saw a gun in his hand, and that Jeff had a motive to lie because his son, Pierre, may have been the shooter. The court denied the motion.

Appellant presented no evidence, and at the close of all the evidence he renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal for the reasons previously asserted. The court again denied the motion.

DISCUSSION

I.

Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in declining to permit him to impeach Pierre Toliver with a prior conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. He contends that, information regarding that conviction would have served to impeach Pierre’s credibility because carrying a concealed weapon is a crime involving deception and shows a willingness to lie under oath.

During a bench conference, there was the following exchange:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He has a prior conviction for carrying a concealed weapon.

[PROSECUTOR]: I don’t think he actually has that conviction.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He has the conviction.

[PROSECUTOR]: He had the conviction but it’s not impeachable.

THE COURT: Well, he does not have the conviction?

[PROSECUTOR]: He does have the conviction.

THE COURT: He does have the conviction but—

[PROSECUTOR]: It’s not impeachable, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And we maintain that it is, Your Honor, the test for when a conviction is impeachable is whether it shows hiding or deception, or attempting to hide or deceive. By definition, if someone is concealing a weapon, they have the propensity to deceive and to hide things. THE COURT: Okay. As far as the time, 15 years, it’s within 15 years?

[PROSECUTOR]: It is, Your Honor, but it’s not one of the enumerated—

THE COURT: No I understand it’s not. I know your objection.

[PROSECUTOR]: Oh yeah, I’m sorry. I think it was—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It was in 2006.

THE COURT: 2006, okay. Yes, it is not. It is not and I am going to rule that it not [sic] an impeachable offense.

Maryland Rule 5-609 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Generally. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record during examination of the witness, but only if (1) the crime was an infamous crime or other crime relevant to the witness’s credibility and (2) the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or objecting party.

(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this Rule if a period of more than 15 years has elapsed since the date of the conviction.

We employ a three-part test under Rule 5-609 to determine whether a witness may be impeached with evidence of a prior conviction. See King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 967 A.2d 790 (2009). First, the court determines whether the conviction sought to be used to impeach a witness’s credibility falls within the “eligible universe” of crimes, which consists of two categories, “infamous crimes” and “other crimes relevant to the witness’s credibility.” Id. at 698-99, 967 A.2d 790. “Infamous crimes include treason, common law felonies, and other crimes classified as crimen falsi.” Id. at 699, 967 A.2d 790. To fall into the category of “other crimes relevant to the witness’s credibility,”

the crime itself, by its elements, must clearly identify the prior conduct of the witness that tends to show that he is unworthy of belief. Moreover, a crime tends to show that the offender is unworthy of belief, if the perpetrator “lives a life of secrecy” and engages in “dissembling in the course of [the crime], being prepared to say whatever is required by the demands of the moment, whether the truth or a lie.”

Washington v. State, 191 Md.App. 48, 82, 990 A.2d 549 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 484, 947 A.2d 519 (2008)).

If the prior crime is not within either of the two categories, “it is inadmissible, and the analysis ends.” West- point, 404 Md. at 477, 947 A.2d 519 (quoting State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 213, 642 A.2d 870 (1994)). If the crime does fall within one of the two categories, the burden is on the proponent (in this case, appellant) “to establish that the conviction was not more than 15 years old, that it was not reversed on appeal, and that it was not the subject of a pardon or a pending appeal.” Westpoint, 404 Md. at 477-78, 947 A.2d 519. If that burden is satisfied, the trial court, before admitting the prior conviction for impeachment purposes, must determine that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or objecting party. Id. at 478, 947 A.2d 519. That balancing is a matter of trial court discretion. Id. By requiring the trial court to weigh probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice, “Rule 5-609 attempts ‘to discriminate between the informative use of past convictions to test credibility, and the pretextual use of past convictions where the convictions are not probative of credibility but instead merely create a negative impression’ of the witness.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 716, 668 A.2d 8 (1995)); see also King, 407 Md. at 700, 967 A.2d 790.

Appellant and the State agree that Maryland’s appellate courts have not specifically determined whether carrying a concealed weapon is an offense that may be admissible for impeachment purposes pursuant to Rule 5-609. In our view, the trial court correctly determined that it is not.

Maryland law prohibits a person from “wearing] or carrying] a dangerous weapon of any kind concealed on or about the person.” Md.Code (2002, 2012 Repl.Vol., 2015 Supp.), § 4-101(c) of the Criminal Law Article. To be sure, the crime requires concealment of the weapon, but there is nothing inherent in the elements of the offense that bears directly on the likelihood that the offender would lie under oath.

In Westpoint, the Court of Appeals explained that a person who has committed a third-degree sexual offense usually acts in secrecy, but acting in secrecy, “in and of itself, is not sufficient to render the prior conviction admissible for the purpose of impeachment.” 404 Md. at 486, 947 A.2d 519. Similarly, the Westpoint Court added that convictions for simple possession of controlled dangerous substances, which “by their nature” involve secrecy, are not admissible as impeachment evidence. Id. In Correll v. State, 215 Md.App. 483, 506-07, 81 A.3d 600 (2013), this Court determined that failure to register as a sex offender did “not include an intent to deceive,” and therefore, was not a crime admissible for impeachment because an offender “can knowingly fail to register, thus committing the crime, for reasons that are not deceptive.”

We are not persuaded that the elements of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon clearly identify conduct indicating that Pierre was unworthy of belief. That is, by carrying a concealed weapon he lives a life of secrecy, engages in dissembling, and is prepared to lie if required by the demands of the moment. Westpoint, 404 Md. at 484, 947 A.2d 519. Because the crime of carrying a concealed weapon is neither an infamous crime nor a crime relevant to his credibility, we hold that the trial court correctly precluded appellant from using Pierre’s conviction for that offense to impeach him.

Moreover, had we concluded that the court erred in declining to permit the defense to impeach Pierre with the prior conviction, we would hold any such error to be harmless. See id. at 487, 947 A.2d 519 (concluding that a conviction can stand if upon independent review of the record, we are able to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict). At trial, the State’s witnesses all presented virtually the same testimony, that is, that Gbadyu and appellant came to the Tolivers’ house and spoke with Pierre for a short period of time before leaving. After Gbadyu and appellant left the house, Jeff, Theresa, and Tina witnessed the shooting, and all three identified appellant as the shooter, but only Jeff testified that he saw appellant with a gun. Pierre, however, did not witness the shooting, and, therefore, could not testify to it. Even if Pierre was impeached for carrying a concealed weapon, he was not a material witness to the charged crimes.

II.

Appellant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to impose a sanction for a violation of the court’s sequestration rule committed by Pierre Toliver, who was observed speaking to Tina Toliver and Edwerta Hughes about the case prior to their testimony. Appellant asserts that Pierre’s violation of the rule “could well have influenced the testimony of the later witnesses,” and therefore, the court should have excluded Tina’s and Ms. Hughes’s testimony.

Following Theresa’s testimony, the prosecutor asked to approach the bench, advising the court she had been handed a note by another Assistant State’s Attorney (“ASA”), who had been involved in the first trial and was familiar with the witnesses. In the note, that ASA, Morgan Zander, indicated that, as she was walking toward the courtroom, she heard Pierre talking to Tina and Ms. Hughes.

In response to the court’s inquiry of Ms. Zander about what she had heard, she testified that she had seen Pierre speaking to both women about

giving somebody $20 and then something to the effect that he gave him a shirt and that he didn’t give the other person a shirt because he didn’t want one, or something to that effect. And then I heard him say wrong, as I heard him testify earlier this morning in response to defense counsel’s questions, wrong. And so based on my knowledge of the case of seeing Mr. Toliver testify earlier, I surmised it was related to this case.

She did not hear Tina or Ms. Hughes say anything to Pierre in response, nor did she observe any non-verbal responses from either of them that indicated a two-sided conversation. She added that the prosecutor had asked her to tell the witnesses to stop speaking about the case, and when she returned to do so, their conversation had moved on to another topic unrelated to the case.

Defense counsel asked for some time to contemplate what, if any action, to request of the court. The State stated it still intended to call Tina and Ms. Hughes to testify, as it did not appear that they had reciprocated in any conversation with Pierre, and the matter that he had verbalized regarded a “collateral matter.”

The court questioned Tina and Ms. Hughes. When asked if Pierre had had a conversation with her or anyone else about the testimony in the case, Tina said, “[n]ot exactly his testimony. He said it was a lot more than last time.” In response, she said only, “oh God, we’re going to be in here long.” She denied any further discussion about anything related to the trial. Ms. Hughes denied any conversation with Pierre regarding his testimony or the shirt or $20. The court advised both women not to discuss any aspect of the case with other witnesses.

The court stated that “there was a violation of the order by the excused witness, Pierre Toliver, in his communications to or in the presence of Tina Toliver and Edwerta Hughes.” Defense counsel argued that the sequestration rule had been violated not only by Pierre, but also by Tina and Ms. Hughes, because all three witnesses had been admonished not to speak ■with each other. Counsel sought exclusion of Tina’s and Ms. Hughes’s testimony, as well as an instruction to the jury that Pierre had violated the rule and it could take that into account in assessing his credibility. The State argued that Ms. Zander had not overheard a conversation, but rather a one-sided complaint by Pierre that defense counsel had the facts wrong and that the trial was “much harder than last time.” And, given the State’s knowledge of Tina’s and Ms. Hughes’s testimony from the first trial, it was unlikely that any statement by Pierre would affect their testimony at the trial in progress.

The court reiterated its ruling that the sequestration rule had been violated only by Pierre, who had already testified and been excused, and that Pierre appeared to have done nothing more than vent about the trial being harder than last time, which was not likely intended to coach or sway the testimony of the two women. The court found no indication that the severe sanction sought by the defense was justified, given the case law that exclusion of a witness’s testimony for a violation of the sequestration rule should not be lightly imposed and the fact that the parties had the benefit of the witnesses’ testimony in the first trial. Because the violation, in the court’s view, was not substantiated, the court found it unnecessary to alert the jury to the violation.

The exclusion of -witnesses is governed by Rule 5-615, which states, in pertinent part:

(a) In General. Except as provided in sections (b) and (c) of this Rule, upon the request of a party made before testimony begins, the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. When necessary for proper protection of the defendant in a criminal action, an identification witness may be excluded before the defendant appears in open court. The court may order the exclusion of a witness on its own initiative or upon the request of a party at any time. The court may continue the exclusion of a witness following the testimony of that witness if a party represents that the witness is likely to be recalled to give further testimony.

(d) Nondisclosure. (1) A party or an attorney may not disclose to a witness excluded under this Rule the nature, substance, or purpose of testimony, exhibits, or other evidence introduced during the witness’s absence.

(2) The court may, and upon request of a party shall, order the witness and any other persons present in the courtroom not to disclose to a witness excluded under this Rule the nature, substance, or purpose of testimony, exhibits, or other evidence introduced during the witness’s absence.

(e) Exclusion of Testimony. The court may exclude all or part of the testimony of the witness who receives information in violation of this Rule.

The object of the rule “ ‘is to prevent one prospective witness from being taught by hearing another’s testimony; its application avoids an artificial harmony of all the testimony; it may also avoid the outright manufacture of testimony.’ ” Tharp v. State, 362 Md. 77, 95, 763 A.2d 151 (2000) (quoting Redditt v. State, 337 Md. 621, 629, 655 A.2d 390 (1995)).

When a witness violates a sequestration order, “whether there is to be a sanction and, if so, what sanction to impose, are decisions left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Redditt, 337 Md. at 629, 655 A.2d 390. “We will not reverse a trial court’s decision regarding whether sanctions should be imposed absent an abuse of discretion.” Lupfer v. State, 194 Md.App. 216, 251, 4 A.3d 32 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, 420 Md. 111, 21 A.3d 1080 (2011).

The sanction requested by appellant, the exclusion of witness testimony, is considered a harsh one. Id.; see also Redditt, 337 Md. at 629, 655 A.2d 390 (quoting Frazier v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 206 Md. 434, 446, 112 A.2d 221 (1955) (“[Because] ‘the ascertainment of the truth is the great end and object of all the proceedings in a judicial trial,’ ... the complete exclusion of the testimony of witnesses for a violation of the sequestration rule is not lightly to be imposed as a penalty upon even an offending party.”)). Critical to the court’s exercise of its discretion of what, if any, sanction should be imposed, is the consideration of “the degree of schooling in the details of the evidence obtained by the potential witness as a result of the sequestration order violation.” Redditt, 337 Md. at 632, 655 A.2d 390.

Here, there was no evidence that Pierre’s lamentation about the difficulty of the second trial or his concern regarding a shirt given to Gbadyu would have influenced either Tina’s or Ms. Hughes’s testimony about the events surrounding Gbadyu’s shooting. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of appellant’s request to exclude their testimony.

III.

Finally, appellant claims that the evidence adduced by the State was insufficient to sustain a conviction of attempted first-degree murder because the State failed to prove that he had a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to kill Gbadyu. In his view, merely shooting into the car where Gbactyu was sitting, in the absence of evidence of an argument or disagreement between the men, was not enough to establish the requisite intent to kill.

We recently set forth the applicable standard for reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court determines “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have .found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 129, 73 A.3d 254 (2013); Painter v. State, 157 Md.App. 1, 11, 848 A.2d 692 (2004) (“[t]he test is ‘not whether the evidence should have or probably would have persuaded the majority of fact finders but only whether it possibly could have persuaded any rational fact finder’ ”) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

The appellate court thus must defer to the factfinder’s “opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and resolve conflicts in the evidence^]” Pinkney v. State, 151 Md.App. 311, 329, 827 A.2d 124 (2003); see also State v. Mayers, 417 Md. 449, 466, 10 A.3d 782 (2010) (“[w]e defer to any possible reasonable inference the jury could have drawn from the admitted evidence and need not decide whether the jury could have drawn other inferences from the evidence, refused to draw inferences, or whether we would have drawn different inferences from the evidence”) (citations omitted). Circumstantial evidence, moreover, is entirely sufficient to support a conviction, provided that the circumstances support rational inferences from which the trier of fact could be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. See, e.g., State v. Manion, 442 Md. 419, 431-32, 112 A.3d 506 (2015); Painter, 157 Md.App. at 11, 848 A.2d 692.

Benton v. State, 224 Md.App. 612, 629-30, 121 A.3d 246 (2015).

First-degree murder requires “a deliberate, premeditated, and willful killing.” Morris v. State, 192 Md.App. 1, 31, 993 A.2d 716 (2010). As defined by Maryland Pattern Jury Instruction — Criminal 4:17,

[w]illful means that the defendant actually intended to kill [the victim]. Deliberate means that the defendant was conscious of the intent to kill. Premeditated means that the defendant thought about the killing and that there was enough time before the killing, though it may have only been brief, for the defendant to consider the decision whether or not to kill and enough time to weigh the reasons for and against the choice. The premeditated intent to kill must be formed before the killing.

See also Pinkney v. State, 151 Md.App. 311, 331-32, 827 A.2d 124 (2003). To prove, as in this case, attempted first-degree murder, the State must adduce evidence “ ‘that the defendant possessed] the intent to kill [in this case, Gbadyu] (willful), that the defendant ha[d] conscious knowledge of that intent (deliberate), and that there [was] time enough for the defendant to deliberate, i.e., time enough to have thought about that intent (premeditate).’ ” Morris, 192 Md.App. at 31, 993 A.2d 716 (alterations in original) (quoting Willey v. State, 328 Md. 126, 133, 613 A.2d 956 (1992)).

Because few defendants announce to witnesses their intent to kill, we most often have to look to other factors to discern whether the defendant had a specific intent to kill. Pinkney, 151 Md.App. at 332, 827 A.2d 124. Our courts have held that a jury is justified in finding that a defendant had a specific purpose to kill when he shot the victim several times at point blank range. Id. at 333, 827 A.2d 124 (citing Cummings v. State, 223 Md. 606, 165 A.2d 886 (1960)). And, when a defendant’s actions so clearly involve actions that are likely to bring about death, they speak for themselves with regard to willfulness. Pinkney, 151 Md.App. at 333, 827 A.2d 124. Here, there was evidence that appellant fired a deadly weapon several times directly at Gbadyu from a distance of only several feet. One shot hit Gbadyu in the face. The jury rationally could have concluded that this demonstrated a specific purpose and intent to kill Gbadyu. See id.

The evidence also provides support for the conclusion that the evidence supported a finding of deliberation and premeditation. The test for first-degree murder is whether there was deliberation and premeditation — sufficient time to reflect — although the deliberation or premeditation need not exist for any particular length of time and can be very brief. Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 717-18, 415 A.2d 830 (1980). Although he claims that “the firing of multiple shots alone is not sufficient proof of premeditation,” it is well established in Maryland that “the firing of two or more shots separated by an interval of time may be viewed as evidence of premeditation.” Id. at 701, 719, 415 A.2d 830 (affirming the jury’s first-degree murder conviction when a witness heard “a burst of shots, followed by a split second pause, the sound of tires spinning and a simultaneous second burst of shots”); see Pinkney, 151 Md.App. at 338, 827 A.2d 124 and cases cited therein; Chisum v. State, 227 Md.App. 118, 132 A.3d 882 (2016).

In sum, the evidence, which included multiple shots fired at and striking Gbadyu from close range (with at least one at a vital part of the anatomy), was legally sufficient to support a conviction for attempted first-degree murder. It was the jury’s function to decide which inferences to draw from proven facts, and the jury in this case could have found that appellant took a substantial step, beyond mere preparation, had the ability to murder Gbadyu, and willfully, and with premeditation and deliberation intended to do so.

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

      . The matter had been tried previously, ending in a mistrial.

      . The court imposed a twenty-five-year sentence for the attempted murder charge, along with a consecutive five years for the handgun use charge and a concurrent one year for the handgun possession charge. The court merged the wearing, carrying, and transporting charge into the handgun use charge for sentencing purposes.

      . Because several witnesses share a surname, and Cariol Toliver commonly goes by the name "Jeff,” and Celestine Toliver commonly goes by the name "Tina,” we will refer to them as such for clarity.

      . Pierre testified that appellant appeared to be on drugs.

      . It was stipulated that the Cadillac was registered to appellant.

      . Gbadyu, although subpoenaed and given immunity by the State, refused to testify during the trial. He was held in criminal contempt and sentenced to 90 days.

      . After the shooting, police recovered suspected PCP and drug paraphernalia from the basement of the Toliver home. Pierre denied knowledge of that evidence, but one theory advanced by the defense was that it may have been Pierre who shot Gbadyu over a “drug deal gone bad.” At trial, Tina testified that some of the drug paraphernalia belonged to her. The drug evidence was not tested by the police and was later destroyed by the State.

      . "Crimen falsi offenses 'include crimes in the nature of perjury, false statements, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretense, or any other offense involving some element of deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the witness's propensity to testily truthfully.’” Fulp v. State, 130 Md.App. 157, 164, 745 A.2d 438 (2000) (quoting State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 213 n. 5, 642 A.2d 870 (1994)).

      . Appellant does not appear to dispute that he shot Gbadyu, and he makes no specific claim of insufficiency of the evidence relating to the remainder of the crimes of which he was convicted.

      . The lead paramedic responding to the scene testified at trial that Gbadyu had seven gunshot wounds: one on each side of his jaw, three in the lower back and left side of the abdomen, and two on the right shoulder.