author: CONNER, C. J.

text:
    HAGOOD v. HAGOOD et al.
    (No. 8318.)

    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Ft. Worth.
    March 25, 1916.
    Rehearing' Denied April 29, 1916.)
    1. Wills <@=>439 — Construction—Intent op Testator.
    A cardinal rule in the interpretation of wills is that the intent of the testator is the object to be ascertained.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Gent. Dig. §§ 952, 955, 957; Dec. Dig. <@=439.]
    2. Wills <§=x441 — Construction—Extraneous Circumstances — Substitution op Terms.
    While the extraneous circumstances attending execution of a will may be considered, the principle is never so extended as to substitute new words for those used in the will, or to add terms not inferable from the writing as a whole.
    LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Gent. Dig. § 958; Dec. Dig. <@=>441.]
    3. Wills <@=487(3) — Intent op Testator — Parol Evidence.
    In the absence of ambiguity in the terms of a will, previous conversations and other matters in parol will not be considered to ascertain testator's intent.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 1027; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;4S7(3).]
    4. Wills <&wkey;86o(4) — Lapsed Devises — Predecease of Devisee.
    Where a devise is made to two or more persons, and one or more of them die before the testator, and there are no words of survivorship in the will, the property, which by the terms of the will goes to such deceased pez-son or persons, lapses and becomes a part of testator’s undevised estate, and descends to his heirs regardless of the terms of the will; the surviving legatees taking only such part of the estate as is specifically bequeathed to them.
    [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 2198; Dec. Dig. &wkey;865(4).]
    5. Wills <&wkey;547 — Devise to Class — Predecease op Part.
    Where a devise is made to two or more persons as a class_, and one or more die before testator, the surviving legatee or legatees take testator’s entire estate, including such part as by the will was bequeathed to the legatee who predeceased testator.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1179-1181, 1185; Dec. Dig. &wkey;547.]
    6. Wills <&wkey;522 — Construction—“Class.”
    A “class,” as the word is used in the law of wills, is where several persons answer the same description, and sustain the same relation to the legacy, so that one word describes them all; each take an equal share in the property originally, and not by way of substitution or derivatively, and each takes absolutely; the gift must be an aggregate sum to a body of persons uncertain at the time of the gift, as to children, grandchildren, nephews, brothers, or sisters. (Quoting Words & Phrases, “Class.”)
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1114, 1128; Dec. Dig. &wkey;522.]
    7. Wills <&wkey;523 — Construction—“Gift to a Class.”
    “Gifts to a class,” as the tenn is used and understood in the construction of wills, refers to persons in the aggregate bearing a certain relation to testator or to each other, and a devise to one or two members of the class will not constitute them a class in legal contemplation, unless the will expressly declares that the individuals so selected from the class are to enjoy the rights of survivorship in the case of the death of any of them; and, unless the will so provides, the legacy so given to one of such members will lapse on his death before the testator.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 1115; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>523.
    For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Sez-ies, Gift to a Class.]
    8. Wills <&wkey;C23 — Devise to Class.
    Where testator’s will read that it gave, devised, and bequeathed to his beloved brothers (naming two of them) all of the property, both real and personal, which testator might die seis-ed and possessed of, wherever situated and located. such will did not make a devise to a class, since it was not a devise to all of testatoz*’s brothers, but to two only; and, where one devi-see predeceased testator, the surviving brother did not take the entire property.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 1115; Dec. Dig. <S&wkey;523.]
    9. Evidence <§=>65 — Knowledge of Law by Testator — Presumption.
    It must be presumed that testator knew the legal effect of the provisions of his will when he executed it.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 85; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>65.]
    10. Pleading <&wkey;290(3) — Verieication — Repeal— Effect.
    Act March 3, 1913 (Acts 33d Leg. c. 127), providing that every allegation or fact relied upon as a cause of action or defense by either a plaintiff or defendant should be verified by affidavit, and that, in the absence of a verified denial of the facts so alleged, they should be considered as confessed, repealed 'by Act March 22, 1915 (Acts 34th Leg. c. 101), relating to a mere matter of procedure, is no longer available even on appeal.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 861, 886y2; Dec. Dig. &wkey;290(3)J
    11. Wills <&wkey;488 — Parol Evidence — Ambiguity.
    To the rule that parol proof will not be received to alter the terms of a will, an exception is made where there is ambiguity or uncertainty either in the terms, used in the writing itself or because of the existence of somo extraneous fact.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1024, 1025, 1033-1036; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 488.]
    12, Wills <&wkey;488 — Ambiguity.
    Where testator 'devised to two brothers named all of the property, both real and personal, which he might die seised and possessed of, wherever situated, and one of the named devisees predeceased testator, there was no ambiguity in the terms of the will or on account of the existence of extraneous facts.
    TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1024, 1025, 1033-1036; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 488.]
    13. Wills &wkey;481 — Date of Speaking.
    A will speaks from the death of testator, not as of the date of its execution.
    |Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1005-1007; Dec. Dig. &wkey;4Sl.]
    Dunklin, J., dissenting.
    Appeal from District Court, Tarrant County; Marvin H. Drown, Judge.
    Partition suit by R. K. Hagood and others against R. B. Hagood. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Capps, Cantey, Hanger & Short, of Ft. AVorth, for appellant. McLean, Scott & McLean, of Ft. AVorth, for appellees.

       Application for writ of error ponding in Supreme Court.

   CONNER, C. J.

This suit was instituted by R. K. Iiagood, Mrs. Elisabeth. R. Billing-ton, and Mrs. Emma King, joined by their1 husbands pro forma, against R. B. Hagood for a partition of the estate of R. L. Hagood, deceased. R. K. Hagood was a brother, and Mrs. Billington and Mrs. King daughters of another brother, of said R. L. Hagood. The defendant, R. B. Hagood, was also a brother of R. L. Hagood, deceased, and it was alleged that the several parties named were the sole surviving heirs of R. L. Hagood, and as such entitled to receive the property for which the suit was brought. It was alleged that the defendant, R. B. Hagood, was in possession of and claiming to own all of such property. The defendant answered, and, among other things, pleaded the last will and testament of R. L. Hagood by virtue of which the defendant claimed the entire estate in controversy. The trial was by the court without a jury upon an agreed state of facts, and resulted generally in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendant has appealed.

The facts as agreed upon by all parties are:

“That R. 11. Hagood, R. B. Hagood, and J. O. Hagood were brothers, the said R. B. Hagood being at the time of the execution of the wills hereinafter mentioned, and for a long time prior thereto, married and having a family. The said R. L. Hagood and J. O. Hagood were never married, hut were bachelors at the time of their decease, and R. B. Hagood, J. O. ilagood, and R. L. Hagood owned an equal interest in the land and house where they all made their home, R. B. Hagood defraying the living expenses of himself and family and the two bachelor brothers, all. residing together in the same house for several years prior to the execution of the wills, and up to the time of the decease of both J. 0. and R. L. Hagood. All property owned by the three were acquired jointly and owned in equal shares, except the 241 acres of land owned by J. O. Hagood and R. B. Hagood, as hereinafter shown.
“That on October 31, 1902, J. O. Hagood and R. L. Hagood simultaneously executed, declared, and published the following wills, respectively:
“ ‘State of Texas, County of Tan-ant.
“ ‘X, J. O. Hagood, of said county and state, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, and being desirous to settle my worldly affairs while I have strength so to do, do make this my last will and testament hereby revoking all others heretofore by me made.
“ ‘Item 1. I desire and direct that my body be buried in a decent and Christian-like manner suitable to my circumstances and conditions in life.
“ ‘Item 2. I desire and direct that my just debts be paid without delay by my executors to be hereinafter appointed.
“ ‘Item 3. I give, bequeath and devise to my beloved brothers, R. B. Hagood and R. L. Hagood, all of the property both real and personal which I may die seised and possessed of wherever situated and located.
“ ‘Item 4. I hereby appoint my said brothers R. B. Ilagood, R. L. Ilagood, citizens of Tar-rant county, Texas, my executors and I desix-e that no bond be required of them, and that upon my death they or either of them have this will probated and that they file an inventory and appraisement of my estate, and that no other action be had in the probate court in reference to my estate except as heiein px-ovided.
“ ‘In testimony whereof I hereunto set my hand this the 31st day of October, 1902.
“ ‘[Signed] J. O. Hagood.
“ ‘Signed, declared and published by J. O. Hagood as his last will and testament in the presence of us the attesting witnesses, who have hereunto subscribed our names in the presence of each other, and in the presence of said J. O. Hagood at his special instance and request this the 31st day of October, 1902.
“ ‘Witnesses: S. B. Canty.
“ ‘Wm. Capps.’
“ ‘Will.
“ ‘State of Texas, County of Tarrant.
“ T, R. L. I-Iagood, of said county and state, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, and being desirous to settle my worldly affairs, while I have the strength to do so, do make this my last will and testament, hereby revoking all others heretofore by me made.
“ ‘Item 1. I desire and direct that my body be buried in a decent and Christian-like manner suitable to my circumstances and conditions in life.
“ ‘Item 2. I desire and dii-ect that my just debts be paid without delay by my executors to be hereinafter appointed.
“ ‘Item 3. I give, devise and bequeath to my beloved brothers, R. B. Hagood and J. 0. Ha-good all of the property both real and personal which I may die seised and possessed of where-ever situated and located.
“ ‘Item 4. I hei-eby appoint my said brothers, R. B. Hagood and J. O. Hagood, citizens of Tar-rant county, Texas, my executors, and I desire that no bond be required of them, and that upon my death they or either of them have this will probated and that they file an inventory and ap-praisement of my estate, and that no other action be had in the probate court in reference to my estate except as herein provided.
“ ‘In testimony whereof, I hereunto set my hand this the 31st day of October, 1902.
“ ‘[Signed] R. L. Hagood.
“ ‘Signed, declared and published by R. L. Hagood as his last will and testament in the presence of us the attesting witnesses, who have hereunto subscribed our names in the px-esence of each other and in the pi-esence of said R. Ij. Hagood at his special instance and request, this the 31st day of October, 1902.
“ ‘Witnesses: S. B. Canty.
“ ‘ÁVm. Capps.’
“That, at the time of the execution of the aforesaid wills by J. O. Hagood and R. L. Ha-good, they were of the ages respectively of 58 and 66 years, and were consumptives and anticipated death thei-efrom within the course of a few years, and did each actually die from said disease. That the said R. B. Hagood was, on the contrary, in robust health, was married and had a family, and the said R. L. Hagood and J. O. Hagood lived with Mm and his family and were cared for by them. That said wills were execxxted with the intention upon the part of J. O. Hagood and R. L. Hagood that all the property owned by them at their death should finally pass to the survivor of the beneficiaries named in said wills respectively, and that they so instructed the attorneys who drafted the wills and understood the wills to so px-ovide when they were executed and published, and that the attorneys drafting the wills intended to so provide, and said attorneys fui-ther believed, and now believe, that the wills as drafted cai-ried out of the expressed intention of the said J. O. Hagood and R. E. Hagood. That J. O. Hagood died on the 17th day of June, 1909, and his will hereinbefoi-e set out was duly probated in the county court of Tarrant county, Tex., and the said R. L. Hagood and R. B. Ilagood qualified as executoi-s under said will, .and received all the property and estate of the said J. O. Hagood thereunder. That at the time of the death of the said J. O. Hagood the said R. L. Hagood, R. B. Hagood, and J. O. Hagood owned the following real estate which had been acquii-ed by their joint efforts while living and working together, and in which each of the three owned an undivided one-third interest, viz.: Situated in Tan-ant county, Tex., and being:
160 acres of Wilcox Survey No. 7.
160 acres of Wilcox Survey No. 3.
160 acres of Peri-y Suxrvey No. 9.
44% acres Smallwood Survey.'
49 acres of Arc Survey.
320 acres of A. Stallons Survey.
80 acres of McHorse Survey.

Total 973% acres.

“That R. I». Hagood died on the 3d day of October, 1912, and at his death the will here-inbefore set out was px-obated by the said R. B. Hagood, who qualified as executor thereunder; and that the said R. B. Hagood had gone into possession of all the property and estate left by the said R. L. Hagood, claiming to own same in his own right under and by virtue of the aforesaid will of the said R. U. Hagood. That at the time of the death of the said R. L. Ha-good the said R. B. Hagood, defendant herein, and the said R. L. Hagood owned jointly the 973% acres of land hereinbefore described, each of them being entitled by virtue of their original one-third interest therein and the will of the said J. O. Hagood to an undivided one-half interest in said property. That at the time of the death of the said J. O. Hagood he and the said R. B. Hagood owned equally the following real estate, situated in Tarrant county, Tex., viz.:
160 acres out of the Wilcox Survey No. 7.
40 acres out of the B. B. & R.- Survey.
41 acres out of the A. S. Haynes Survey.

Total 241 acres,

—one-fourth of which, by the terms of the will of the said J. O. Hagood, became the property of the said R. L. Hagood; and that this one-fourth interest in and to the said 241 acres of land next above described was owned and held by the said R. L. Hagood at the time of his death.
“(2) That at the time of his death R. L. Ha-good and R. B. Hagood owned equally the following personal property which had been acquired by the joint efforts of himself and the said R. B. Hagood after the death of J. O. Ha-good, viz.: 3 mules, 3 mares, 1 mule colt, and 6 head of cattle of the present total value of $700.
“(3) That at the time of his death the said R. L. Hagood, together with the said R. B. Hagood, had cash on hand the said R. L. Ha-good’s part of which amounted to $5,137.13. That'at the time of his death R. L. Hagood owned, together with the said R. B. Hagood, certain notes amounting to the said R. L. Ha-good’s part of $1,101. That for a period of three years prior to his decease R. L. Hagood was an invalid afflicted with tuberculosis as aforesaid, and was waited upon and cared for by R. B. Hagood and family, and the reasonable value of such care and attention so shown R. L. Hagood by the said R. B. Hagood is the sum of $50 per month for the first two of the aforesaid three last years of his life, and $65 per month for the last year of his life. That at the time of his death R. L. Hagood left surviving the following relatives, viz.: R. B. Hagood, defendant and brother, R. K. Hagood, one of the plaintiffs and brother, Elizabeth Billington, née Ha-good, and Emma R. King, née Hagood, nieces, the sole and only children and heirs of W. T. Hagood, a deceased brother, who died many years prior to the making of the wills. That the said R. K. Hagood, Elizabeth Billington, and Emma R. King are each and all adults, and were living long prior to the execution of the wills of J. O. Hagood and R. L. Hagood hereinbefore set out, of which facts the said R. L. Hagood and J. O. Hagood were each aware.
“If plaintiffs are entitled to recover at all, they are entitled to recover the following: (a) An undivided interest in the 973 % acres herein-before set out, amounting to 162% acres; (b) an undivided interest in the 241 acres herein-before set out, amounting to 20 acres; (c) an interest in the mules, mares, mule colt, and cattle hereinbefore mentioned, aggregating -at the present time $117; (d) of R. L. Hagood’s interest in the cash on hand $1,712.37; (e) of R. L. Hagood’s interest in the notes hereinbefore mentioned, $367. Less the aforesaid sum of $660, being the pro rata amount of plaintiffs’ part of the claim due R. B. Hagood for care and attention shown R. L. Hagood during the time which he was an invalid preceding his decease as aforesaid, if the court should hold that such sum is properly an offset. R. B. Hagood paid $270 for funeral expenses of R. L. Hagood, and plaintiffs owe % of that sum, viz., $90.
“In making the foregoing agreement plaintiffs do not waive any legal objection they may have to the admissibility. of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will of R. L. Ha-good; but specifically object to the admission and consideration by the court of any extrinsic evidence to show the intention of the testator, R. L. Hagood, on the ground that the testator’s intention should be ascertained from his will alone, or their right to object that R. B. Ha-good cannot offset the sum hereinabove agreed upon as the reasonable value of his services in waiting upon, caring for, and attending the said R. L. Hagood during his last illness, against their right to recover, if any.”

Appellant presents the controlling question in the case in his first assignment of error and in the proposition thereunder, which read:

Assignment of error: “The district court erred in holding that the legal effect of the will of R. L. Hagood, deceased, was not a gift of all his estate, remaining after the payment of his debts, to his brothers, R. B. Hagood and J. O. Hagood, as a class, and that R. B. TIagood, who alone survived R. L. Hagood, did not take the entire estate of R. L. Hagood, deceased, as a surviving member of such class.”
Proposition: “The will of R. L. Hagood plainly providing that ‘all of the property, both real and personal, which I may die seised and possessed of, wherever situated and located,’ should go to his beloved brothers, R. B. Hagood and J. 0. Hagood, clearly evidenced" an intention to devise and bequeath the whole of his estate to his said two brothers, to the exclusion of every one (although he was aware of the existence of his brother R. K. Hagood, and the children of the deceased W. T. Hagood), and the agreed facts showing that the three brothers had made their home together for many years prior to the execution of the will, the defendant defraying the living expenses of the three; that practically all the property acquired by the three was owned jointly, except about 200 acres of land which was owned jointly by the defendant and J. O. Hagood (an undivided interest in which R. L. Hagood took under J. O. Hagood’s will); that the two wills, identical in form and substance, making R. B. Hagood a common beneficiary, were executed at the same time; that, at the time of the execution of the wills, J. O. and R. L. Hagood were bachelors and well along in years, afflicted with consumption, and anticipating death therefrom; that they were cared for by the defendant and his family; that they desired that all of the property owned by them should finally pass to the survivor, necessarily the defendant; and the language of the will being consistent with such intention, and being such language as necessarily must have been used by testator in creating a class of his two brothers, to the exclusion of others similarly related, the trial court erred in not holding that testator by his will created a class composed of his two brothers, J. O. Hagood and R. B. Hagood, and, upon the death of J. O. Hagood prior to the testator, defendant R. B. Hagood took the entire property devised, as surviving member of such class, and in not thereupon rendering judgment for defendant.”

It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of wills that the intent of the testator is the object to be sought; and if we could but give effect to the instructions to the attorneys who reduced the will to writing and to their purpose in doing so, and read into the will under consideration the terms of the admitted facts, that at the time of its execution R. L. Hagood intended “that all the property owned” by him at the time of his death “should finally pass to the survivor of the beneficiaries named in” the will, then indeed there would be no difficulty. In such event it would be clear that the judgment should be reversed and here rendered for appellant ; but no such terms, or terms of like import, are to be found in the will as actually written, and under well-settled rules of construction we cannot import them into tiie will. While in construing a will the extraneous circumstances attending its execution may be considered so as to place the court as nearly as possible in the situation of the testator at the time, the principle is never so extended as to substitute new words for those used in the will, or to add thereto terms not inferable from the writing as a whole.' As said in a recent discussion of the Supreme Court of Missouri (Mudd v. Cunningham, 181 S. W. 386):

“It must stand conceded that courts of equity cannot correct wills under the mere guise of a mistake. Courts cannot and do not reform wills. The learned annotator of the case of Lomax v. Lomax (218 Ill. 629, 75 N. E. 1076), in 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) loc. cit. 945, says:
“ ‘The reason, why the chancery powers of a court cannot be invoked to reform a will is that an action tO' reform a written instrument is essentially one for a specific performance. A devisee is a mdre volunteer; the making of a will being a voluntary act, there is, therefore, no consideration to support the action, as in actions to reform deeds or contracts. Volunteers under wills have no equity whereon to found a suit for specific performance. Sturgis v. Work, 122 Ind. 134, 22 N. E. 996, 17 Am. St. Rep. 349.’ ”

Hence-it is that in order to close the door to mistake and uncertainty as to the precise terms used, faults of memory, erroneous inferences from circumstances happening at the time, and even to perjuries, it is firmly established that, in the absence of ambiguity in the terms of a will, previous conversations and other things lying in parol will not be considered for the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the testator whose lips have been closed by death. 1-Iis words, Unless ambiguous as expressed in the solemn instrument executed under the formalities required by law, must alone afford the light by which the mind is to be guided in the ascertainment of the testators’ intent. To illustrate: It is said in the case of Lenz v. Sens, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 442, 66 S. W. 110:

“The intention of the testator, as gathered from the will, must control in the construction of a will. Parol evidence of the circumstances attending the testator and the objects of his bounty, and of the condition and character of the estate, is admissible to throw light upon the will, so as to get at the intention of the testator ambiguously expressed, but not to vary the terms themselves of the will. The intention cannot be shown by parol evidence.”

In Schouler on Wills, § 567, it is said:

“The maxim hardens into a truism, in modem times, that the written will must speak for itself; that the testament shall afford its own testimony. Hence the modern interpretation of wills becomes subject to rules much the same as apply to written contracts; and eminent jurists assert that there is no material difference of principle between the two classes of writings, except what naturally arises from the different ciremnstances of the parties; yet in those differing circumstances appears no little ground of variance. Where,_ therefore, the language employed in the will is clear and of well-defined force and moaning, extrinsic evidence of what was intended in fact cannot be adduced to qualify, explain, enlarge, or contradict this language, but the will must stand as it was written. To insert or substitute in effect that which the will never contained our courts have stubbornly refused, and decline, to their honor, the insidious temptation of shaping men’s wills for them. Par safer it is, as they deem it, to adhere to general limits prescribed by general rules. And if written testimony dehors the will should be rejected from this point of view, much more should be that looser and less credible parol proof which is purely oral. In. short, extrinsic evidence is incompetent to show the intention of a testator, where the will speaks for itself with a clear and unambiguous meaning; nor can it be received to show a different intention from that which the instrument discloses; nor can it esilarge or diminish by construction the disposition as written out and executed, or supply any omissions or defects which may have occurred through mistake or inadvertence. That which a testator executes as his will must so operate, notwithstanding Ms mistake of law; nor can it be set up> from drafts, from contemporaneous memoranda, or even from the direct testimony of one’s own scrivener or copyist, still less that loose hearsay which is always untrustworthy, that one mistook in fact what was written out.”

Mr. Jarman in his treatise on Wills says:

“As the law requires wills, both of real and personal estate, to be in writing, it cannot, consistently with this doctrine, permit parol evidence to be adduced either to contradict, add to, or explain the contents of such will, and the principle of this rule evidently demands an inflexible adherence to it, even where the consequence is the partial or total failure of the testator’s intended disposition; for it would have been of little avail to require that a will ab origine should be in writing, or to fence a testator round with a guard of attesting witnesses, if, when the written instrument failed to make a full and explicit disclosure of his scheme of disposition, its deficiencies might be supplied, or its inaccuracies corrected, from extrinsic sources. No principle ' connected with the law of wills is more firmly established or more familiar in its application than this; and it seems to have been acted upon by the judges as well as of later times, with a cordiality and steadiness which show how entirely it coincided with their views.”

On the same subject, Redfield on Wills, vol. 1, p. 621, uses the following language:

“In all this class of cases it is entirely obvious, upon principle, that neither the expressed intention of the testator shown by extrinsic evidence, nor his conjectural expectation, in the event of death of the legatee, an event not specifically provided for by him, and not shown, by anything in the will, to have been in his mind, can be allowed to control the legal and established construction, or the natural import, of the words used in the will. The only advantage which in such cases can be derived from extrinsic evidence is to enable the court to place themselves in the precise position of the testator, with his knowledge of extraneous facts and circumstances, so as to enable them to give such a construction to the words as the testator Mmself would have done; i. e., such as will carry out his intention in using them, as far as that can be clearly gathered from the words of the will.” (Italics ours.)

See, also, Philleo v. Holliday, 24 Tex. 38; Hunt v. White, 24 Tex. 643; Cleveland v. Cleveland, 89 Tex. 445, 35 S. W. 145; Underhill on Wills, vol. 1, p. 444; Herzog v. Title Guarantee, etc., Co., 177 N. Y. 86, 69 N. E. 283, 67 L. R. A. 146; Remson Preparation of Wills, pp. 343 and 344.

In accord with the foregoing princi-pies, appellant cannot reasonably bope to overturn the trial court’s judgment by a direct reading of the agreement as to the testator’s intent into the will under consideration. Indeed, there is no such contention seriously made. The contention, as will be seen by an examination of appellant’s assignment and proposition which we have quoted, seeks to obtain the same result by an indirect method. In other words, the contention is that we should construe the bequest of R. L. Hagood to his brothers J. O. Hagood and R. B. Ha-good as a devise to a “class.” The authorities are uniform to the effect that where a dévise is made to two or more named persons, and one or more of such persons die before the testator, and there are no words of survivorship in the will, the property, which by the terms of the will goes to such deceased person or persons, lapses and becomes a part of the testator’s undevised estate and descends to his or her heirs, regardless of the terms of the will. In such eases the legatees who survive the testator take only such part of the testator’s estate as is specifically bequeathed to them. It is otherwise, however, when the devise is to two or more persons as a “class.” In cases of this character the surviving legatee or legatees take the testator’s entire estate, including such part as by the terms of the will had been bequeathed to legatees whose decease preceded that of the testator. The very able counsel who have argued this case pro and con have cited us to numerous cases which discuss the question of whether a given devise was to a class instead of to named persons. They are too' numerous to discuss separately. Entire consistency and harmony among them, perhaps, cannot be affirmed. But appellees have presented in concrete form substantially correct definitions of the terms “class,” and “gifts to a class,” that we think fairly reflect the state of the authorities on the subject, viz.:

“A ‘class,’ as used in the .law of wills, is where several persons answering the same description sustain the same relation to the legacy so that one word describes them all; each takes an equal share in the property, and each takes originally, and not by way of substitution or derivatively, and each takes absolutely. A number of persons are said to form a ‘class’ when they can be designated by the same general name as ‘children,’ ‘grandchildren,’ ‘nephews,’ ‘brothers,’ or ‘sisters.’ The gift must be an aggregate sum to a body of persons uncertain in number at the time of the gift.”
“Gifts to a ‘class,’ as that term is used and understood in the construction of wills, refers to persons in the aggregate bearing a certain relationship to the testator or to each other; and a devise to one or two members of that class will not constitute such favored members a class in legal contemplation, unless a testator, by the terms of his will, expressly declares that such individuals so selected from a class are to enjoy the rights of survivorship in case of the death of one of them, and unless the will so provides’the legacy so given to one of such members will lapse on his death before the testator.”

As illustrating these definitions, it will not be improper to cite a few authorities. Thus, ’ we find in 1 Words & Phrases, under the title of “Class,” p. 732, the following definitions, with authorities cited:

“A ‘class’ is a number of persons or things ranked together for some common purpose (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary), and when a legacy is to a class all those will take who are embraced in the class at the time the legacy takes effect in point of enjoyment.”

The same authority defines a “gift to a class” as — *

“a gift of an aggregate sum to a body of persons uncertain in number at the time of the gift, to be ascertained at a future time, who are all to take in equal or in some other definite proportion; the share of each being dependent for its amount upon the ultimate number.” Herzog v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 177 N. X. 86, 69 N. E. 283, 67 L. R. A. 146.

Again, in volume 2 of the same authority, page 740, a gift to a class is again defined as—

“a gift of an aggregate sum to a body of persons uncertain in number at the time of the gift, to be ascertained at a future time, and who are to take in equal or in some other definite proportion; the share of each being dependent for its amount on the ultimate number of persons,” citing numerous authorities. But “a devise to two persons, naming them, ‘with whom I live and whom I regard and treat as my adopted daughters,’ is not a devise to a ‘class,’ entitling one to the entire devise on the death of the other before the death of the testator.” In re Hittell’s Estate, 141 Cal. 432, 75 Pac. 53, 54.

Again, in tbe case of Melton v. Sellars, 181 S. W. 346, by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, it is said:

“Under Thomas v. Thomas, 149 Mo. 426, 51 S. W. 111, 73 Am. St. Rep. 413, and Jarman on Wills, p. 232, cited by appellants, the devise is to a class and not to individuals, if the gift is ‘to a body of persons uncertain in number at the time of the gift, to be ascertained at a future time.’ ”

In Ritch v. Talbot, 74 Conn. 137, 50 Atl. 42, a testator devised the balance of the proceeds of a sale of realty and the residue of his personal estate to two brothers, naming them; one of the brothers died before the testator, leaving a number of heirs. It was held that the bequest was not to a class, but to the brothers individually, and that the legacy did not lapse on the death of the legatee, but descended to "the legatee’s children by virtue of a statute quoted. And in 20 Decennial Edition of the American Digest it is stated, quoting an Ohio case not available to us, that “when the devise is made to persons designated by name, it is an individual devise, and is a gift to them as individuals and not as a class, though the persons designated may constitute a class.”

See, also, other cases cited' under section 523 of the Decennial mentioned above; and Farnam v. Farnam, 53 Conn. 261, 2 Atl. 325, 5 Atl. 682; Dulany v. Middleton, 72 Md. 67, 19 Atl. 146; In re Russell, 168 N. Y. 169, 61 N. E. 166; In re Harrison, 202 Pa. 331, 51 Atl. 976; Watkins v. Blount, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 460, 94 S. W. 1116; Bill v. Payne, 62 Conn. 140, 25 Atl. 354; Coleman v. Jackson, 126 S. W. 1178; Underhill on Wills, vol. 2, p. 798, § 599.

Prom the authorities as a whole, we are of the opinion that the trial court correctly construed the will we have under consideration, and that it cannot be properly construed as a devise to a “class.” It was not a devise to “all of the brothers” of R. L. Hagood, but to two only. As used in the will, the term “brothers,” as it seems to us, is but descriptive in its effect. In addition to the names given, it serves to further identify the individuals to whom the testator intended his bequest to go. No other terms in the will indicate that the question of classification was in the mind of the testator, or that it was his purpose to form a “class,” or that his bequests were intended to go to a “class,” as contradistinguished from the individuals specifically named. Of his brothers he named J. O. and R. B. Hagood, and the addition of the term “brothers” can no more make 'of the two brothers named a class, as it seems to us, than it could be so said if, in a given case, a testator residing in a community of different nationalities should devise property to the Americans, John Doe and Richard Roe, or to two named individuals “colored.” Such terms by no means could be reasonably construed as intending a devise to “all of the Americans” or “all of the colored persons,” as the case might be, in the community.

Confining ourselves to the will itself, it manifests the intention at the time it was written that his (R. L. Hagood’s) property at his decease should go to J. O'. Hagood and R. B. Hagood. By no reasonable construction can it be said that the words are to be construed as an intention to devise the whole of his property to R. B. Hagood, the appellant in this ease. The evident purpose, within the meaning Of the terms used, was that R. B. Hagood should have one-half only, the other half to' go to his brother J. O. Hagood. Nothing on the face of the will indicates that the testator contemplated the contingency that actually thereafter happened, to wit, the contingency of J. O. Hagood’s death prior to that of the testator, and that the testator in that event desired the whole of his property to go to R. B. Hagood. Had such been the purpose, it would have been easy to have provided for the contingency by inserting terms of survivorship. In other words, it would have been easy for the testator to have referred to such a possible contingency, and to have directed, in the event of its happening, that his property should go to the survivor. This was not done, and we do not feel that we can by implication insert such words in the will, and thereby cast one-half of R. D. Hagood’s estate at the time of his death from the appellees in this case, to whom, if the will be given its legal effect, it properly descended, and vest it wholly in appellant. To do so, as it seems to us, is in effect to make a will not executed under the formalities of the law, rather than to declare the legal effect of a will as actually made.

It is urged that the testator’s failure to change his will after the death of his brother is to be construed as an intention on his part that R. B. Hagood should take all of his property to the exclusion of his surviving brother and the children of another deceased brother, the appellees in this case; but we do not think this inference is necessarily to be indulged. While it is evident that at the time of the execution of his will he had the purpose that the whole of his property should go to the two brothers named therein, there is nothing in the will, nor in the agreed statement in this case, that indicates any hostility to his 'other brother not named, or to the children of his brother then deceased; and we think quite as reasonable an inference, under all the circumstances, is that upon the death of J. O. Hagood he felt contented to lot his property go as the law and the terms 'of his will provide. It must be presumed that he then knew the law to be that, in the absence of words of survivorship in his will, but one half of his property under its terms would go to R. B. Hagood, and that the other half would descend to the appellees under our statutes of descent and distribution, and his failure to change the terms of his will rather favors the construction that he so intended it; there being .nothing, as before stated, in the will or in the circumstances, indicating any animosity whatever to the appellees in this case, who were his heirs, and, in the absence 'of a will otherwise providing, entitled to a share of his undevised estate. The agreed statement shows that the will under consideration was executed on the 31st day of October, 1902. Both J. O. Hagood and R. E. I-Iagood remained living until on the 17th day of June, 1909, when J. O. Hagood died. R. D. Hagood thereafter lived until the 3d day of October, 1912. It thus appears that R. Ij. Ilagood lived some ten years after the execution of his will and some three years after the death of his brother, J. O. Hagood; and, if it be conceded that at the time of the execution of the will R. L. Hagood then had the specific purpose of excluding the unnamed appellees in this case, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the original purpose had been qualified, particularly in view of a knowledge of the law that must be imputed to him and his failure to make any change in his will.

It is urged that, inasmuch as appellant in his answer substantially alleged the same facts, circumstances, and intent in making the will under Consideration as are contained in the agreed statement upon which the case was tried, and inasmuch as there was no special denial of the facts alleged, they must be taken as confessed under the operation of the act approved March 3, 1913 (Acts 33d Leg. c. 127). This act, among other things, provided, in substance, that every allegation or fact relied upon as a cause 'of action or defense by either a plaintiff or defendant should be verified by affidavit, and that, in the absence of a verified denial of the facts so alleged, they should be considered as confessed. The trial in this case proceeded as if all issues had been properly joined, and no request was made of the trial court that the whole, or any part, of appellant’s answer should be taken as “confessed” ; and, even during the continuance of the operation of the act referred to, it was several times held that under such circumstances the designated provision of the act was waived. See G. H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Pennington, 166 S. W. 465; T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Tomlinson, 169 S. W. 217. Moreover, the act of 1913 referred to was repealed in the particular under consideration by act of March 22, 1915 See General Raws 1915, p. 155. The statute of 1913, relating, as it does in the respect now relied upon, to a mere matter of procedure, is, because of its repeal, no longer available even on appeal. See Etter v. M. P. Ry. Co., 2 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 60, and authorities therein cited. See, also, 36 Cyc. p. 1228, par. G.

Except as embodied in the agreed statement, appellees offered no objection to the admission of evidence or to the consideration of the court, and it was suggested upon the oral submission that, because of this fact and because of a recitation in the court’s judgment, we should consider the conversations and expressed intent of the testator made at the time of the execution of the will. The recitation in the court’s judgment referred to is that: “The court, after hearing the issues of law discussed by counsel for both sides and having considered the facts as agreed upon by the parties, and filed in the cause,” etc. We think it evident, however, that appellees at all times vigorously protested that the conversations, etc., immediately preceding the execution of the will were incompetent, and that the court in considering the agreed facts evidently coincided with appellees’ contention in this respect; otherwise he would not, as was done, have followed the recitation with the conclusion “that the devise and bequest contained in the will of R. L. Hagood, deceased, in favor of J. O. Hagood, one of the beneficiaries in said will, lapsed and became void by reason of the death of J. O. Hagood before the death of the testator R. L. Hagood, and that the property devised and bequeathed to J. O. Hagood by said will became a part of the estate of R. L. Hagood until the death of R. L. Hagood and descended and vested in the heirs of said R. L. Hagood.” The conclusion so stated cannot be reconciled with the view that the trial court in his determination gave effect to the agreement that R. L. Ha-good’s intention at the time of the execution of his will was that the survior of the beneficiaries named should take the entire property.

It has been suggested that we may look to the conversations and agreed intent referred to for the purpose of determining whether it was R. L. Hagood’s intention in naming the brothers R. B. Hagood and J. O. Hagood to constitute a class; the suggestion embodying the idea that the will in this respect is ambiguous. But we think the suggestion ingenious rather than sound. It is true that to the general rule stated in the beginning of this opinion, that parol proof will not be received to alter the terms of a will, an exception is made in cases where there is an ambiguity or uncertainty, either in the terms used in the writing itself, or because of the existence of some extraneous fact. But to adopt the suggestion would be, we think, to do but indirectly what must be conceded cannot be done directly. In the case before us we think there is no ambiguity. The will upon its face, as it seems to us, is plain and simple, and it is none the less so, as'we think, because of any extraneous fact appearing in the agreement. In the law the will speaks from the death' of the testator, not as of the date of its execution, and, as before indicated, we think the trial court gave a construction to the will by no means necessarily in conflict with the intent in the mind of the testator at the time of his death.

Appellant’s appeal is based on purely technical rules of construction that we do not feel impelled to apply. No natural right or equity of appellant has been invaded. By virtue of his brothers’ wills and of the judgment below appellant becomes invested with one-half of the estate of J. O. Hagood as it existed at the time of his death, and one-half of the estate of R. L. Hagood, augmented as it was with one-half of J. O. Hagood’s estate that went to R. L. Hagood by the terms of J. O. Hagood’s will. Appellant also was awarded a one-third interest in that part of R. L. Hagood’s estate that lapsed and descended to his heirs generally. Appellant was also allowed to recover the just proportion of the expenses of R. L. Hagood’s last sickness and death that of right should be borne by appellees, so that on the whole we find no reason, technical or otherwise, for disturbing the trial court’s judgment. All assignments of error are accordingly overruled, and the judgment affirmed.

DUNKLIN, J., dissenting.
      ignwFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

      igcsPor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: HODGES, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    MANGUM v. THURMAN et al.
    (No. 1627.)
    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.
    April 20, 1916.)
    Appeal and Error <@=5753(2), 773(4) — Af-firmance-Assignments op Error^-Briefs —Necessity.
    Where appellant filed no brief or assignments of error, and respondents filed briefs and prayed affirmance, under court rule 42 (142 S. W. xiv), declaring that where an appellant or plaintiff in error has failed to prepare the ease for submission the appellee or defendant in error may file a brief in the manner required of the appellant, except that his propositions will be shaped to show correctness of judgment, and the court may, in its discretion without further examination of the record, affirm the judgment, judgment will be affirmed: there being no fundamental error which could be considered in the absence of assignments.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3088, 30S9, 3104, 3109; Dec. Dig. &wkey;753(2), 773(4).]
    Appeal from District Court, Hunt County; Wm. Pierson, Judge.
    Action by J. M. Thurman against E. P. Mangum and Roy Shoemake. From a judgment for plaintiff against the several defendants, and for the last-named defendant against defendant Mangum, the latter appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Wm. E. Sayle, of Commerce, for appellant. O. C. Mulkey, of Commerce, and Crosby, Hamilton & Harrell, of Greenville, for appel-lees.
   HODGES, J.

This suit was brought by the appellee J. M. Thurman against appellee Roy Shoemake and the appellant, E. P. Mangum, upon four promissory notes of $500 each. It is alleged that the notes were given by Shoemake to Thurman as a part of the consideration for the sale of a tract of land, and that a vendor’s lien was reserved in each of them. It appears from the record that Shoemake after his purchase sold the land to the appellant, Mangum, and that the latter assumed the payment of the notes sued on and also executed another note to Shoe-make as additional consideration. Shoemake answered by a general demurrer and general denial, and by pleading over against his co-defendant, Mangum, asking for judgment against the latter in the event judgment should be rendered against him at the instance of Thurman. Mangum answered, alleging that neither of the parties should recover against him, because of certain misrepresentations which induced him to purchase from Shoemake. It is unnecessary to reproduce the facts. The court instructed a verdict in favor of the appellee Thurman against both Shoemake and Mangum, and in favor of Shoemake against Mangum according to the pleadings. The appellant Mangum has filed no briefs, and there are no assignments of error to be considered in determining the correctness of the judgments rendered. The appellees Thurman and Shoemake have both filed briefs setting out the pleadings and facts, and have asked for an affirmance of the judgment under the provisions of rule 42 (142 S. W. xiv).

There appears to be no fundamental error of which this court can take cognizance in the absence of specific assignments. The judgment will therefore be affirmed.
      ©=»For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes


author: WILLSON, O. J.

text:
    MALONEY v. GREENWOOD et al.
    (No. 1638.)
    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.
    May 4, 1916.)
    1. SUBROGATION <&wkey;7(7) — PRINCIPAL AND Surety.
    Plaintiff, the surety on a note made by defendant to a third party and secured by the defendant’s mortgage on certain mules, one of them described in the mortgage as a “bay horse mule, 15 hands high, five years old,” which was the only one left after the defendant had sold the others and applied the proceeds to the debt, on payment of the balance of the debt was sub-rogated to such rights as the creditor would have had against the defendant and the purchasers of such mules from him, if the debt had remained unpaid.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Subrogation, Cent. Dig. §§ 26, 77, 92; Dec. Dig. &wkey;7(7).]
    2. Chattel Mortgages <&wkey;150(l) — Description of Animal — Notice.
    The registration of a chattel mortgage, in which a mule was described only as a “liny horse mule, 15 hands high, five years old,” without stating its situs, was not sufficient to charge third persons with notice of the mortgagee's rights.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 246-248, 252; Dec. Dig. &wkey;350(l).]
    3. Chattel Mortgages <&wkey;150(l) — Description of Animal — Notice.
    A chattel mortgage of several mules, one of which was described as a “black horse mule, 15 hands high, three years old.” which was in fact not black, but of a dark brown or dark blue color, did not put purchasers from the mortgagor upon inquiry to ascertain, when they dealt with it, whether it was the identical black mule described in the mortgage or not.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 246-248, 252; Dec. Dig. &wkey;150(l).]
    4. Chattel Mortgages &wkey;>157(2) — Purchase from Mortgagor — Burden of Proof — Statute.
    In view of Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5655, relating to record of liens, the burden was on the purchasers from a mortgagor of mules to show that their dealing with the mortgaged property was in good faith.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Dec. Dig. <&wkey;157(2).]
    Appeal from Ellis County Court; W. M. Tidwell, Judge.
    Action by J. M. Maloney against W. L. Greenwood and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
    Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
    Appellant was surety o-n a note for $625 made by appellee Greenwood to E. C. Cantrell. Payment of the note was further secured by a mortgage from Greenwood to Cantrell on certain mules, among them one described in said mortgage as a “bay horse mule, 15 hands high, 5 years old, owned by Greenwood.” All the mules except the one just described were sold by Greenwood; and the proceeds of the sale, having been turned over to Cantrell, were by Mm credited as a payment on the note, leaving due thereon a balance of $203.95, which appellant was compelled to pay. Cantrell, at the time appellant paid his balance, assigned the note to him “without recourse.” Besides the $203.95 so paid by appellant for Greenwood, the latter owed the former sums aggregating, with the $203.95, $400. To secure the payment of the $400, and to indemnify appellant against liability he had incurred as surety for Greenwood on debts the latter owed to various other parties, Greenwood mortgaged certain personal property to appellant, including several mules, described in said mortgage as situated on his (Greenwood’s) premises five miles east of Italy, and “known as the Malone mules,” and one of them further described as a “black horse mule, 1514 hands high, 3 years old.” This suit was by appellant against Greenwood and the other ap-pellees, T. P. Crayton and Charles Gammell. Appellant sought as against Greenwood judgment for the-sum the latter owed him and a foreclosure of the mortgage, and as against Crayton, who, he alleged, had purchased the mules at a sale thereof by virtue of an execution against Greenwood in his (Crayton’s) favjr, and as against Gammell, who, he alleged, had purchased the animals of Crayton, he sought a foreclosure of the mortgage, or in the alternative, if the mules were dead or could not be found, judgment for their value, alleged to be $185 and $175, respectively. It appears from the record that the mortgage to Cantrell was dated October 28, 1912, and filed for registration October 29, 1912; that the one to appellant was dated April 12, 1913, and filed for record May 23, 1913; and that the levy on the mules by virtue of the execution in Crayton’s favor was made January 6, 1914. In accordance with a verdict returned by the jury in obedience to peremptory instructions given them by the court, judgment was rendered that appellant recover of Greenwood $911.11, and that he take nothing as against Crayton and Gam-mell.
    W. H. Pears, of Waxahachie, for appellant. J. T. Spencer, J. C. Lumpkins, and J. T. Gill, all of Waxahachie, for appellees.
   WILLSON, O. J.

(after stating the facts as above). The grounds upon which the trial court instructed the jury to find in favor of Crayton and Gammell are stated in qualifications made by him to bills of exception in the record. He was of opinion that appellant, by paying, as he was bound to, the $203.95 due on the note to Cantrell, did not become subrogated to the latter’s right to enforce the mortgage on the bay mule as against Crayton and Gammell, because they “had purchased the animal sought to be foreclosed for value or were lienholders,” and that appellant was not entitled to enforce the mortgage made to him against the other mule levied upon, because it appeared from testimony heard that same was not a black mule, 3 years old, 15% hands high, as described in the mortgage, but was a blue horse mule, 3 or 4 years old, 15 hands high.

The law being that “a surety who has paid the debt of the principal is at once sub-rogated to all the rights, remedies, securities, liens and equities of the creditor, for the purpose of obtaining reimbursement from the principal debtor” (37 Cyc. 402; Cleveland v. Carr, 40 S. W. 410; Faires v. Cockerell, 88 Tex. 428, 31 S. W. 190, 639, 28 L. R. A. 528; Beville v. Boyd, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 491, 41 S. W. 670, 42 S. W. 318), it is clear that, unless he had waived it, and it was not pretended in the pleading of Crayton and Gammell that he had, appellant was subrogated to such rights as Cantrell, under the circumstances shown, would have had against appellees had the debt to him remained unpaid. That, as to the bay mule, Cantrell would have been entitled to a foreclosure of the mortgage, is plain; and he would have been entitled to the relief appellant sought against Crayton, unless the latter was without notice of the mortgage at the time his execution against Greenwood was levied on the mule and to the relief appellant sought against Gammell, unless Crayton .was without such notice, or he, Gammell, when he purchased the mule of Crayton, paid a valuable consideration for same and was without such notice.

It seems, therefore, that the correctness of the charge complained of, so far as it required the jury to find in favor of Crayton and Gammell as to the bay mule, depends upon whether they occupied the positions suggested, in their dealings with that animal. And the correctness of the charge as to the other depends upon the answers which should be made as to like inquiries with reference to their dealings with it, to wit, as to Crayton, was he chargeable with notice of the mortgage to appellant at the time the execution was levied on this mule? and as to Gammell, if Crayton at that time had notice of the miortgage, did he, Gammell, also have notice thereof when he purchased of Cray-ton, and did he pay Crayton a valuable consideration for the animal?

We are of opinion it appears as a matter of law that neither Crayton nor Gam-mell was chargeable .with notice because of the fact that the mortgages were duly registered before the' time they dealt with the mules. The bay mule was not otherwise described in the mortgage to Cantrell than as set out in the statement above. The situs of the animal was not stated in the mortgage. The authorities are to the effect that the registration of a mortgage in which an animal is described only by its color, age and height, is not sufficient to charge third persons with notice of the mortgagee’s rights. 6 Cye. 1129-1131; Bank v. Bank, 166 S. W. 499. The other animal levied upon was described in the mortgage to appellant as a Mach mule. It seems to be conceded in the evidence that the color of that mule was not black, but was “smutty,” “dark brown,” or “dark blue.” There was nothing in the mortgage suggesting that the color of the mule might not be black, as same was described therein to be, and therefore it should not be said that Cray-ton and Gammell were put on inquiry to ascertain, when they dealt .with the “blue,” “smutty,” or “brown” mule, whether it was identical with the black mule described in the mortgage or not. Pitluk v. Butler, 156 S. W. 1136.

But it did not follow, because the registration of the mortgages did not operate to charge Crayton and Gammell with notice of appellant’s rights, that they were without notice thereof. They might have acquired such notice in other ways. The burden was on them to show that they did not, and that their dealings with the mortgaged property were in good faith. Article 5655, Vernon’s Statutes; Oak Cliff College v. Armstrong, 50 S. W. 610. Neither of them testified as a witness, and neither offered testimony showing he acted in good faith' in his dealing .with the mules. Therefore it is thought the peremptory instruction to the jury to find in their favor was unauthorized.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
      @=»For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and.indexes


author: LEVY, J.

text:
    MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. OF TEXAS v. BAILEY.
    (No. 1601.)

    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.
    April 14, 1916.
    Rehearing Denied May 27, 1916.)
    1. Carriers c&wkey;31S(2) — Duties to Invitees— Obstructions at Stations — Negligence —Evidence.
    Evidence held to show that defendant railway negligently failed to have station platform sufficiently lighted to enable passengers to use same with reasonable safety.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 1307; Dec. Dig. &wkey;318(2).]
    2. Carriers <&wkey;318(2) — Duties to Invitees— Obstructions at Stations — Negligence —Evidence.
    Evidence held to show that defendant railway company’s negligence in failing to have its station platform properly lighted was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff’s wife.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 1307; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>318(2).]
    3. Carriers <&wkey;304(l) — Duties to Invitees.
    In the absence of regulation to the contrary, a person who goes to the depot of a railway for the purpose of accompanying a departing passenger is deemed as going upon the premises of the company under an implied invitation of the company.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 1110; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>304(l).]
    4. Carriers <&wkey;304(2) — Duties to Invitees— “Invitee.”
    Where a woman hotel keeper at the request of a guest accompanied her to the station for the purpose of assisting her, the railway company was liable for negligence in failing to properly light the platform, by reason of which the hotel keeper was injured, since she was, under the circumstances, an “invitee.”
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 1110; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;304(2).
    For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Invitation.]
    Appeal from District Court, Hunt County; A. P. Dolioney, Judge.
    Action by J. W. Bailey against the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company of Texas. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    C. C. Huff, of Dallas, and Dinsmore, McMahon & Dinsmore, of Greenville, for appellant. Sherrill & Starnes and J. P. Yates, all of Greenville, for appellee.

       Application for writ of error pending in Supreme Court.

   LEVY, J.

Appellee’s wife, a hotel proprietress at Celeste, at nighttime accompanied a lady guest of the hotel, at the request of such guest, to appellant’s passenger depot; the guest intending to take the incoming passenger train at the depot. When they reached the depot the appellee’s wife stepped on some round substance, probably a corn cob, on the platform, between the waiting room and the track, and was caused to fall backwards upon the platform, and was injured. The appellee sues to recover damages for such injuries to his wife, alleging that the appellant was negligent in failing to have its depot platform sufficiently and properly lighted.

According to the evidence, at about 5 o’clock p. m. on March 7, 1914, Mrs. Henninger, a lady 62 years of age and traveling alone, arrived at Celeste over the Santa Fé Railway. She was en route to Denison on appellant’s railway line, and the train was not due, under schedule, until 9:50 o’clock p. m. Mrs. Henninger then went to the hotel owned by appellee and his wife, to get supper and remain there until the time for departure to her destination. Appellee’s wife managed the hotel and looked after the comfort of the guests; and her husband, a carpenter, followed his trade. When the time arrived for Mrs. Henninger’s departure from the hotel to the depot to take passage on appellant’s train, she requested appellee’s wife to accompany her to the depot. Appellee's wife testifies:

“I went to the depot that night with the old lady, just because she asked me to go with her; that is the only reason I went I had no business in the world there, other than she asked me to go and see her get there. She was not a strong woman. Of course, my husband could have seen that she got there; but she asked me to go with her. Certainly I was not afraid but what my husband would take the old lady to the depot. I went with her, because she asked me to, and to assist her, if nothing else. I did assist her. I assisted her in getting out of the door at home. I could have assisted her out of the door, without going to the depot with her. I did not assist her any after that. She was a large, fleshy woman.”

This testimony shows the purpose of ap-pellee’s wife in going to the depot, and shows all the assistance rendered by her to Mrs. Henninger. An oil lamp had been provided by appellant for lighting the platform and premises. There is some evidence showing that the lamp globe was smoked on the Inside, and the light shone dimly.

The jury made the findings of fact, which have evidence to support them, that appellant railway company negligently failed to have the station platform sufficiently lighted to enable passengers to use the same with reasonable safety, as alleged, and that such negligence prosimately caused the injury to appellee’s wife. The evidence' warrants the amount of damages awarded by the jury.

After Stating the Case.

The appellant contends that, under the facts of the case, it did not owe appel-lee’s wife the duty to keep its depot platform lighted and in a safe condition, because she was! not at its depot and upon its premises as an invitee. It is the rule that, in the absence of any regulation to the contrary, a person who goes to the depot of a railway for the purpose of accompanying a departing passenger is deemed as going upon the premises of the company under an implied invitation of the railway company. Hamilton v. Railway Co., 64 Tex. 251; Railway Co. v. Best, 66 Tex. 117, 18 S. W. 224; Railway Co. v. Phillio, 96 Tex. 18, 69 S. W. 994, 59 L. R. A. 392, 97 Am. St. Rep. 868;. Railway Co. v. Williams, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 469, 51 S. W. 653; Hutchingson v. Railway Co., 55 Tex. Civ. App. 229, 118 S. W. 1123; 3 Elliott on Railroads (2d Ed.) § 1256. And classing as invitees those persons upon the premises of the railway company who sustain the relation to the departing passenger of assistant, attendant, member of the family, host, or the like, the ease of Railway Co. v. Matzdorf, 102 Tex. 42, 112 S. W. 1036, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 833, 132 Am. St. Rep. 849, excludes those persons who sustain no relation to the departing passenger but that of mere friendship or acquaintanceship. There the court distinguishes a ease of bare license from one of invitation, by the evidential test, it seems, as quoted with approval in Bennett v. Railway Co., 102 U. S. 577, 26 L. Ed. 235, that:

“Invitation is inferred where there is a common interest or mutual advantage, while a license is inferred where the object is the mere pleasure or benefit of the person using it.”

And the plaintiff, Matzdorf, in that case was classed as a licensee, because it appeared she went to the depot merely as an acquaintance of Mrs. Simpson, and to say good bye to her, and not as an attendant, or to assist her. The plaintiff, Matzdorf, was on the railway premises, as seen, for her “mere pleasure or benefit.” In the instant case, though, it is not thought that it could properly be said that the appellee’s wife was at the depot under circumstances from which a license only could be inferred. The appel-lee’s wife went from the hotel to the depot with Mrs. Henninger, who was 62 years old and traveling alone, at nighttime, because, as testified, “she [Mrs. Henninger} asked me to go and to see her get there. She. was not a strong woman. I went with her because she asked me to, and to assist her, if nothing else.” As Mrs. Henninger was alone in a strange town at nighttime, it may well have been a convenience and a service to her to have a female attendant en route to the depot, and to remain with her at the depot while and during the time until the arrival of the train. It. often becomes proper and necessary for a female passenger to have one of her own sex accompany her to the station and remain with her until the departure of the train.

In view of these facts it is believed that it may be held that the appellee’s wife was at the depot as an attendant, in the sense of being present with as a companion, and was thus performing a service in the common interest of the passenger and the company, entitling her to demand ordinary care of the appellant. Therefore assignments of error Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9, which present the question above, are each overruled.

It is not believed that this court, considering the record, may disturb the verdict of the jury respecting the amount of damages; and assignment of error No. 10 is overruled.

We conclude that assignments of error Nos. 5 and 6 afford no ground for reversal of the judgment, and they are both overruled.

Affirmed.
      <&=»For other cases see sama topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes


author: RAINEY, O. J.

text:
    BONNER v. PITTS.
    (No. 7529.)
    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.
    May 13, 1916.)
    1. Boundaries <§=>42 — Establishment—1Tei-An — Verdict.
    In a boundary suit, the jury is required definitely to locate the line by its verdict.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Boundaries, Cent. Dig. § 208; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;42; Trial, Cent. Dig. § 787.]
    2. Boundaries <&wkey;42 — Establishment—1Trial-Verdict.
    In a boundary suit, description of a line in the verdict as being the south line of a certain survey, such south line not being otherwise located, is not such definite location as is required in a verdict.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Boundaries, Cent. Dig. § 208; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;42; Trial, Cent. Dig. § 787.]
    3. Judgment «&wkey;25G(l) — Conformity to Verdict — B OUND ARIES.
    In a boundary suit, where the jury by its verdict does not definitely locate a boundary line, it is error for the court to do so by its judgment.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 446, 454; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;256(l).]
    Appeal from District Court, Freestone County; A. M. Blackmon, Judge.
    Action by I. H. Bonner against Robert Pitts.' From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
    Reversed, and judgment entered for appellant.

      W. W. Ballew, of Corsicana, and II. L. Williford and T. H. Bonner, both of Fairfield, for appellant. Geo. W. Fryer and Jas. Macintosh, both, of Fairfield, for appellee.
   RAINEY, O. J.

This suit was brought in the ordinary form of an action of trespass to try title, but on the trial it resolved itself into a boundary suit, to fix the line between a tract of land containing 5414 acres owned by appellant and a tract owned by appellee. Both tracts are out of junior surveys in the M. Riondo 11-league grant in Freestone county. The trial court instructed the jury that there were three questions of fact for their determination, as follows:

“(1) Is the 54% acres of land in controversy a portion of the P. W. Patton or Rich survey; that is, is same included, and embraced by the boundary lines of the said Patton or Rich survey, as originally surveyed?
“(2) Is the 54%-acre tract in controversy a part of, and embraced by the lines of the 492-acre tract as originally surveyed and set out in the deed from J. W. Zachary to F. J. Satter-white?
“(3) Has the defendant any portion of the 54%-acre tract of land in controversy in actual possession, under fence; and, if so, how much of same, and when was same actually inclosed by the defendant, or those under whom he claims?”

The verdict of the jury returned was:

“We, the jury, find for the defendant.
“B. B. Boyd, Foreman.”

The judgment as entered, after reciting the verdict, then adds:

“Wherefore, the jury having determined the true boundary line between plaintiff and defendant to be the south line of the Joel Olapp survey and its extension to the river, and having determined this line to be the north line of the Patton, or Patterson, or Rich survey, of which this defendant and his tenant in common are the owners”

—and then decrees the 54% acres sued for to appellee as a part of the Patton or Rich survey, this being the survey claimed by ap-pellee.

Appellant complains, in effect, that the verdict was not responsive to the charge of the court, and that answers should have been returned to each of the “special issues of fact” submitted by the charge. The court did not submit special issues, but merely stated certain facts necessary to consider in arriving at their verdict, and the general verdict would have been sufficient on the general issue of trespass to try title; but, the case having resolved itself into one of boundary, the verdict of the jury was not sufficient upon which to fix the true location of the line in question. In such cases the law requires that the jury by its verdict shall definitely locate the line. Reed v. Cavett, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 154, 20 S. W. 837; Farnandes v. Schiermann, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 343, 55 S. W. 378; Merrell v. Kenney, 45 S. W. 423. The jury by their verdict did not locate the boundary line between the surveys claimed by the respective parties, and it was error for the court to do so by its judgment.

Complaint is made that the verdict and judgment are contrary to and not supported by the evidence. We think the evidence does not justify the verdict, or warrant the judgment. The appellee’s claim is to land lying in the Patton or Rich survey, and the appellant’s claim is to 54% acres lying just to the north of the IPhtton or Rich survey. The north line of the Patton or Rich survey is not found, nor identified by establishing marks, but governed by the original field notes as surveyed, and thus located by the original field notes it is at least 30 varas south of the south line of the 54%-acre tract claimed by appellant, and is about 380 varas south of the Joel Clapp survey, which lies north of the Patton survey. As we view the evidence, the southwest corner of the Patton or Rich survey is the northwest corner of the Hunt survey, which corner is plainly marked and identified by bearing trees; and, there being no marks or monuments on the north line of the Patton survey, nor anything more than course and distance to govern the true line, it must be fixed and determined by course and distance from the said northwest corner of the Hunt survey of 640 acres. The 54% acres being tied to the Clapp survey on the north and to the Patton or Rich survey on the south, the distance being 350 varas from north to south, the location of the boundary line in dispute is hereby located and fixed at a point 1,230 varas from the northwest corner of said Hunt 640-acre survey, and at a point 350 varas from the Joel Clapp survey; said line to run east and west and to constitute the south line of the 54%-acre survey and the north line of Patton or Rich survey as between the said two tracts.

The judgment is reversed, and judgment here rendered for appellant.
      <g=»For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes