author: Deborah S. Eyler, J.

text:
    163 A.3d 205
    Patricia LAMALFA v. Janis HEARN, et al.
    No. 87,
    Sept. Term, 2016
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    June 28, 2017

      Argued by: Ryan Richie (Wilson <& Parlett on the brief) all of Upper Marlboro, MD, for Appellant
    Argued by: George W. Fanshaw (Simmons, Fields & Fan-shaw PA on the brief) all of Timonium, MD, for Appellee
    Panel: Deborah S. Eyler, Kehoe, Lawrence A. Rodowsky (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
   Deborah S. Eyler, J.

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Patricia Lamalfa, the appellant, sued Janis Hearn, the appellee, for automobile negligence. The case was tried to a jury over two days. During the testimony of Ms. Hearn’s medical expert, the court admitted into evidence, over objection, four of Ms. Lamalfa’s post-accident medical treatment records that the expert relied upon in forming his opinions. At the close of all the evidence, the court granted a motion for judgment in favor Ms. Lamalfa on “negligence” and ruled that the case would go to the jury “for its determination as to the amount of damages, if any that should be awarded.” The jury deliberated and returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Lamalfa for $10,576.05, comprising the full amount of her medical bills and $650 for pain and suffering.

On appeal, Ms. Lamalfa presents two questions, which we have combined and rephrased as:

Did the circuit court err by admitting Ms. Lamalfa’s medical records into evidence?

For the following reasons, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On October 14, 2011, Ms. Lamalfa, who lives in Brooklyn, New York, was in Maryland to attend a family wedding. On the way to the wedding, she was sitting in the rear passenger seat of a small SUV, which was being driven by her son Steven Lamalfa (“Steven”). Steven drove the SUV southbound on Interstate 95, near Pulaski Highway, and onto an exit ramp, where it came to a complete stop because of heavy traffic. The SUV was rear-ended by a vehicle being driven by Ms. Hearn.

Police and ambulances responded to the scene. Ms. Lamalfa did not seek medical treatment. She and the other occupants of the SUV continued on to the wedding. They returned to their hotel in Baltimore that night. The next morning, Ms. Lamalfa went to the emergency room at Mercy Medical Center (“Mercy”) in Baltimore with complaints of low back pain and some tenderness in her left forearm. She was treated and released. She returned to New York that night.

A week after the accident, on October 21, 2011, Ms. Lamalfa sought treatment from Yury Royen, M.D., a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation who practices at Relief Medical, P.C., in Brooklyn. She complained of upper and lower back pain, pain in both arms, left hip pain, periodic numbness in her right hand, right shoulder pain, weakness in her left arm, tailbone pain, and emotional distress related to the accident. Dr. Koyen recommended that Ms. Lamalfa undergo physical therapy and chiropractic treatment, as well as diagnostic testing.

Also in October 2011, Ms. Lamalfa began experiencing severe abdominal pain. An October 31, 2011 CT scan of her abdomen was normal, however. In February 2012, Sampath Kumar, M.D., a general surgeon, diagnosed Ms. Lamalfa with an epigastric hernia. In March 2012, he operated on her to repair it. Ms. Lamalfa previously had surgery to repair an epigastric hernia in 1984.

Meanwhile, on November 7, 2011, Ms. Lamalfa underwent an MRI of her right shoulder that revealed a rotator cuff injury. More than three years later, in December 2014, Ms. Lamalfa went to see Jaspreet Sekhon, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Sekhon sent Ms. Lamalfa for another MRI, which revealed a rotator cuff tear. In 2015, Dr. Sekhon operated on Ms. Lamalfa’s right shoulder.

Ms. Lamalfa filed suit against Ms. Hearn on September 23, 2014. The case was tried to a jury from February 16 to 18, 2016. In the plaintiffs’ case, Ms. Lamalfa and Steven testified and the de bene esse depositions of Drs. Koyen, Kumar, and Sekhon were played for the jury.

Ms. Lamalfa, then age 54, testified about the accident and about her medical treatment following the accident. She had worked as a hairdresser from the age of 18 until about a year before the accident. Shortly after the accident, her abdomen began to feel “weak” and she noticed a “protrusion” between her stomach and her ribcage. She went to see Dr. Kumar and he diagnosed her with an epigastric hernia.

Ms. Lamalfa also began experiencing right shoulder pain in the weeks following the accident that got “progressively worse.” She could not hold her grandchildren, lift pots and pans, or reach up to high shelves. She had not experienced right shoulder pain prior to the accident. She did not seek immediate medical treatment for her shoulder pain, however, because she had moved in with her parents and her mother was already providing care for her father following a knee replacement surgery. In December 2014, she went to see Dr. Sekhon and he recommended surgery. Ms. Lamalfa described the recovery following her surgery as “[l]ong and arduous.” For more than three months, she had to wear a sling and a bolster on her arm at all times except when she bathed. This made “[sleeping ... horrendous.” She was still having difficulty sleeping and her shoulder movement remained “impaired.”

Dr. Koyen testified by video deposition that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty Ms. Lamalfa’s hernia and rotator cuff tear were caused by the October 14, 2011 accident. He opined that the rotator cuff tear to Ms. Lamalfa’s right shoulder, as seen on the November 7, 2011 MRI, was consistent with an acute traumatic injury. He acknowledged that the record of Ms. Lamalfa’s visit to the Mercy emergency room on October 15, 2011 (“Mercy record”), the day after the accident, did not include any notation of complaints of right shoulder pain or abdominal pain. Dr. Koyen testified that on November 22, 2011, he prepared a report of his treatment of Ms. Lamalfa on October 21, 2011, and up until the date of the report (“Koyen record”). In the report, he did not note that Ms. Lamalfa had complained of any abdominal pain during her initial appointment. His report reflected that she later complained of “severe pains in the abdominal and pelvis area” and, as a result, a CT scan of her abdomen was performed on October 31, 2011.

Dr. Kumar testified by video deposition that Ms. Lamalfa came to see him in February 2012 with complaints of abdominal pain. He palpated her abdomen and diagnosed her with a recurrence of an epigastric hernia. He opined that, given the location of the hernia, it was not surprising that the October 31, 2011 CT scan did not show it. He further opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Ms. Lamalfa’s epigastric hernia was caused by the pressure of the seat belt against her abdominal wall during the October 14, 2011 accident. After Dr. Kumar repaired the hernia, he saw Ms. Lamalfa for a routine follow-up appointment. He had not seen her since.

Finally, Dr. Sekhon testified in his video deposition that he met with Ms. Lamalfa for the first time in December 2014. He ordered an MRI, which revealed a rotator cuff tear. He did not review her prior MRI results or her other medical records from 2011.

In her case, Ms. Hearn testified and called Louis Halikman, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon practicing at Mercy. Dr. Halik-man had examined Ms. Lamalfa on December 28, 2015, relative to the instant litigation. He noted that she was left-handed and that her upper arms each measured the same girth. Dr. Halikman opined that he would have expected Ms. Lamalfa’s' right arm “to have been substantially smaller in girth than the left” given that it was not her dominant arm and because she recently had had surgery on that shoulder. The fact that Ms. Lamalfa’s arms were equal in girth was evidence that she was “using both of her arms in as close to natural fashion as possible.”

Dr. Halikman explained that in forming his opinions, he relied upon four of Ms. Lamalfa’s medical records: the Mercy record; the Koyen record; an “Initial Chiropractic Examination” report prepared by an unidentified practitioner on October 25, 2011 (“Chiropractic record”); and an “Initial Consultation Report” prepared by Alexsandr Levin, M.D., at Diagnostic Medicine, P.C., on December 13, 2011 (“Levin record”). When defense counsel moved to admit the Mercy record into evidence, plaintiffs counsel objected, arguing as follows:

The expert can certainly testify to [the content of the record] and obviously all his testimony is evidence in the case. However, the document itself is a hearsay document. It contains hearsay statements. It contains expert findings opinions [sic], and it contains secondary and probably even tertiary hearsay statements .... I would also, Your Honor, argue that in permitting some records in and not others also is far more prejudice [sic] than probative in that it’s going to allow certain documents to go back to the jury room without the benefit of having all of the documents. So on all of those grounds, Your Honor, I would object.

Defense counsel responded that the Mercy record was admissible because it was “a document that the Doctor relied on in forming his opinion ... [a]nd I believe that is, you know, allows it to come into evidence.” The court overruled the objection and admitted the Mercy record.

Defense counsel subsequently moved to admit the other three medical records that Dr. Halikman had relied upon in forming his opinions. Plaintiffs counsel made the “same objection” to each one, and his objections were overruled.

The Mercy record included a narrative “History of Present Illness” section that related that Ms. Lamalfa had been involved in a “rear-ended motor vehicle crash” the day before; that upon impact, she had “immediately ... reached over to the left side of the car to secure her [infant granddaughter’s car seat]”; that “gradually over the course of the afternoon and evening,” she began experiencing “left-sided lower back pain”; and that she also “complain[ed] of a much lighter pain in the left forearm,” The “Physical Examination: General” section of the Mercy record stated that Ms. Lamalfa “ambulate[d]” with a “slight limp” but without “much difficulty” and did not appear to be in “acute distress.” Her abdomen was “[s]oft.” She exhibited “positive straight leg raising” on the left side and “difficulty with the lateral oblique motion.” She had “full range of motion of all joints.” She was discharged with instructions to rest, apply heat to the affected areas, and take over-the-counter pain medication.

The Koyen record, completed on November 22, 2011, was five pages long. In it, Dr. Koyen noted that he had examined Ms. Lamalfa for the first time on October 21, 2011, one week after the accident. At that time, she reported having sustained “injuries to the head, left shoulder and coccyx.” In a section entitled “Chief Complaints,” Dr. Koyen stated that Ms. Lam-alfa had reported

flashbacks of the accident; neck pains radiating to the right arm and upper back, and to the left arm and forearm; low back pains; left hip pains; periodical [sic] numbness in the right hand; right shoulder pains; weakness in the left arm; fear of sitting in a car; coccyx pains worsened by sitting; [and] claustrophobia after accident.

In the “Review of Systems” section, Dr. Koyen noted “sharp neck pains radiating to the left upper extremity and associated with numbness” and “sharp lumbosacral pains provoked by sitting.” Ms. Lamalfa was in “acute pain distress” and had pain upon getting on and off the exam table. Dr. Koyen’s examination of her shoulders revealed “[r]ight rotator cuff area tenderness” and “[r]ight shoulderf ] joint ... tenderness,” with pain upon motion. Her shoulder motion was more limited on the right side, and she was positive for several tests of nerve impingement in her right shoulder. Her abdomen was not tender.

As pertinent, Dr. Koyen recommended that Ms. Lamalfa begin physical therapy for her right shoulder pain; continue taking Aleve; have an x-ray taken of her right shoulder; and consider undergoing an MRI of her right shoulder if the problems persisted. In the “Treatment” section of the report, Dr. Koyen set out the various treatments, tests, and procedures Ms. Lamalfa had undergone following her initial appointment and the results. He noted that due to “severe pains in the abdominal and pelvis area,” he had ordered a CT scan; it revealed “no acute inflammatory processes.” Due to “severe pains in the right shoulder,” he had ordered an MRI; it revealed “possible impingement of the supraspinatus muscle and rotator cuff instrasubstance tear involving supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendons.” Dr. Koyen’s diagnoses were, as pertinent, “[r]ight shoulder trauma with rotator cuff tear and impingement” and “abdominal trauma.”

The Chiropractic record was completed on October 25, 2011. It is a five-page form document with handwritten notations detailing Ms. Lamalfa’s health history and the reason she was seeking chiropractic care. In the “Present Complaints” section, the chiropractor circled “Neck Pain & Stiffness Left/ Right” that “Radiates” to the “Left ... Shoulder,” as well as right shoulder pain and left arm pain, with numbness and tingling to the forearm. The “Orthopedic & Neurologic Tests” section reflects that the chiropractor did not perform a “Shoulder Depression Test,” or three other tests used to detect nerve impingement and tears in the shoulders. In the “Diagnosis” section, the chiropractor gives diagnoses of spinal radicu-lopathy, joint dysfunction in the spine; a whiplash injury; headaches; and spinal subluxation. The chiropractor did not circle the diagnostic codes for shoulder injury or shoulder pain.

The Levin record, completed on December 13, 2011, is a three-page initial consultation report addressed to Dr. Koyen. Dr. Levin noted that Ms. Lamalfa complained of “right shoulder pain, lower back pain radiating to the left leg, left knee pain, and weakness in the left leg.” On physical examination she was in “no acute distress.” She had “no tenderness on palpation or decreased range of motion” in her shoulders. Her abdomen was “[s]oft, not distended” and was not tender. Dr. Levin noted tenderness of the lumbar spine and diagnosed Ms. Lamalfa with “[p]ost-traumatic lumbosacral sprain/strain.” He recommended nerve conduction tests to rule out “lumbar radiculitis.”

Dr. Halikman opined, based upon a review of these records, his physical examination of Ms. Lamalfa, and his education and experience, that Ms. Lamalfa “did not sustain an injury to her right shoulder as a result of [the automobile accident].” He explained that if Ms. Lamalfa had torn her rotator cuff during the accident, she would have been in severe pain on October 14, 2011, and thereafter would not have waited more than three years to seek out a surgical consultation. He further opined that if she had complained of any shoulder pain at Mercy on October 15, 2011, x-rays would have been ordered. The fact that x-rays were not ordered confirmed the narrative aspects of the report, in his view, that reflected that Ms. Lamalfa did not complain of shoulder pain. He further opined that the October 2011 MRI of Ms. Lamalfa’s shoulder showed degenerative fraying of the tendons, not a tear consistent with an acute injury to the shoulder caused by an impact. The degeneration of the rotator cuff muscles was not unusual given that Ms. Lamalfa’s profession required her to hold her arms up continuously.

Dr. Halikman also commented that the medical records reflected that Ms. Lamalfa’s abdomen was soft and not tender in December 2011. He opined that had Ms. Lamalfa had a “problem referable to [that] area,” it “would have been evident” by December 2011, when she saw Dr. Levin.

As noted, the court granted a motion for judgment in favor of Ms. Lamalfa for “negligence” and sent the case to the jury on damages only, although the lawyers addressed causation in their closing arguments. Ms. Lamalfa’s lawyer asked the jurors to award her all of her past medical expenses ($9,926.05) and non-economic damages in the range of $50,000 to $150,000. Defense counsel argued that the evidence did not show that Ms. Lamalfa’s hernia and rotator cuff tear were caused by the accident. She pointed to the four medical records admitted into evidence to show that Ms. Lamalfa did not complain of right shoulder pain or abdominal pain during her Mercy visit; did not complain of abdominal pain during her initial visit to Dr. Koyen a week later; did not complain of right shoulder pain during her chiropractic visit in October 2011; and that her right shoulder was not tender and had full movement and her abdomen was soft and not tender during her' December 13, 2011 visit to Dr. Levin. Defense counsel argued that the evidence did not support a finding that the two surgeries were causally related to the accident and that the evidence also did not support a large award for pain and suffering.

The case was sent to the jury on a special verdict sheet asking the jurors to find “[w]hat measure of damages, if any, do you find that the Plaintiff, Patricia Lamalfa, is entitled?” followed by blanks for “Past Medical Expenses,” “Non-Economic Damages (Pain, Suffering, Physical Impairment, etc.),” and for the total damages. The jury awarded Ms. Lamalfa all her past medical expenses ($9,926.05) and $650 in non-economic damages, for a total award of $10,576.05. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Ms. Lamalfa contends the trial court erred as a matter of law by admitting into evidence the four medical records at issue and that she was prejudiced by their admission. First, and as a threshold matter, she argues that Ms. Hearn failed to authenticate the records pursuant to Rule 5-902. Second, she argues that the records were not admissible under Rule 5-703(b) or under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. She seeks a reversal and remand for a new trial on damages.

Ms. Hearn responds that Ms. Lamalfa failed to preserve her authentication challenge because she did not make that argument at trial. She maintains, moreover, that the admission of the medical records was proper under Rule 5—703(b), as “facts or data” relied upon by Dr. Halikman; under Rule 5-803(b)(3), as statements of Ms. Lamalfa’s then existing physical condition, specifically her bodily health; under Rule 5-803(b)(6), as business records; and under the catch-all exception to the rule against hearsay in Rule 5-803(b)(24). Finally, she asserts that even if the records were admitted in error, Ms. Lamalfa has failed to make any showing as to how she was prejudiced by their admission given that the jury found her (Ms. Hearn) responsible for damages related to Ms. Lamalfa’s shoulder injury and her hernia repair.

Authentication is a “condition precedent to admissibility” and may be “satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Md. Rule 5-901(a). Ms. Lamalfa asserts for the first time on appeal that Ms. Hearn failed to have the medical records at issue certified as business records under the self-authentication provisions of Rule 5-902(b). She did not make this argument when defense counsel moved for the admission of the Mercy record or the other three records. Rather, she argued that the records were inadmissible because they were “hearsay document[s]” and because any probative value they might have was outweighed by their prejudicial impact. Having failed to object below on the basis of authentication, she has not preserved that issue for appeal. Md. Rule 8-131(a).

Ms. Hearn moved for the admission of the medical records pursuant to Rule 5-703, entitled “Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts.” Section (a) of that rule provides generally that the “facts or data” on which an expert witness bases his opinion may be those made known to him before trial. Subsection (b) of the rule is captioned “Disclosure to Jury.” It states:

If determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged, facts or data reasonably relied upon by an expert pursuant to section (a) may, in the discretion of the court, be disclosed to the jury even if those facts and data are not admissible in evidence. Upon request, the court shall instruct the jury to use those facts and data only for the purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert’s opinion or inference.

In Alban v. Fiels, 210 Md.App. 1, 21, 61 A.3d 867 (2013), we explained the effect of Rule 5-703(a) and (b) as follows:

Most certainly, “[a]n expert may give an opinion based on facts contained in reports, studies, or statements from third parties, if the underlying material is shown to be of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.” United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 176, 647 A.2d 405 (1994). The focus of the language in Rule 5-703(a) that facts or data forming the basis for an expert’s opinion may be relied on if “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field” ordinarily relates to hearsay evidence. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Nothstein, 300 Md. 667, 682, 480 A.2d 807 (1984). If such information received from others is inadmissible hearsay, “it ordinarily comes in not as substantive evidence but only to explain the factual basis for the testifying expert’s opinion.” United States Gypsum Co., 336 Md. at 176 n. 10, 647 A.2d 405. Regardless of why the facts or data within the meaning of Rule 5-703(a) are not admissible as substantive evidence, when they are permitted for Rule 5-703(a) purposes, they are not admitted as substantive evidence. Thus, “[u]pon request, the court shall instruct the jury to use those facts and data only for the purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert’s opinion or inference.” Rule 5—703(b).
In other words, Rule 5-703(a) does not operate to admit as substantive evidence facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible. The facts or data relied upon are admissible, if at all, only to explain how the expert reached an opinion. Thus, unless inadmissible as a matter of law, inadmissible evidence, if it satisfies Rule 5-703, may be admitted, in the court’s discretion, to explain the factual basis for an expert’s opinion.

As the rule itself makes clear, for “facts or data” to qualify, they “must be (1) trustworthy, (2) unprivileged, (3) reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming her or his opinion, and (4) necessary to illuminate that expert’s testimony.” Brown v. Daniel Realty Co., 409 Md. 565, 601, 976 A.2d 300 (2009). Ms. Lamalfa concedes that the medical records were not privileged and that Dr. Halikman reasonably relied upon them. She argues that Ms. Hearn failed to establish the trustworthiness of the medical records or that they were necessary to illuminate Dr. Halikman’s testimony. Ms. Lamalfa did not make either such argument below, even though she did offer reasons for her objection. This argument is not preserved for review.

The argument lacks merit in any event because it is plain that medical records prepared by Ms. Lamalfa’s treating health care providers in the immediate aftermath of the accident were sufficiently trustworthy to satisfy Rule 5-703. Moreover, because Dr. Halikman relied upon those records to form his opinion that Ms. Lamalfa was not exhibiting symptoms of an acute traumatic injury to her right shoulder or to her abdomen immediately after the accident or, with respect to her abdomen, months later, they were necessary to aid the jurors in understanding that opinion.

Ms. Lamalfa further argues that the court abused its discretion by admitting the medical records into evidence because Rule 5-703(b) permits disclosure of records within its ambit to the jury, not admission of such records. She maintains that if the court merely had disclosed the medical records to the jury, the records would not have been with the jurors during deliberation and they could not have used them substantively in reaching their verdict.

To be sure, section (b) of the rule permits “disclosure” to the jurors, not “admission,” of “facts or data” reasonably relied upon by a testifying expert witness. In cases in which the facts or data the expert relied upon are contained in a written document, the Court of Appeals and this Court have not drawn a distinction between disclosing the writing to the jury and admitting the writing in evidence. In Brown, 409 Md. 565, 976 A.2d 300, the Court upheld a ruling by the circuit court admitting in evidence a lead inspection report of the subject property in a lead paint case that had been relied upon by a testifying expert witness in forming his opinions. The Court explained that “four elements must be satisfied for a document to be admissible under [Rule 5-703].” Id. at 601, 976 A.2d 300 (emphasis added). Likewise, in Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md.App. 146, 166, 47 A.3d 1018 (2012), we held, in a custody case, that the “circuit court was permitted to admit” under Rule 5-703, a report documenting a psychiatric evaluation of the mother because a testifying expert had relied upon it in forming her opinions.

There is no significant difference between disclosure and admission of a writing under Rule 5-703 because to be able to use the writing to assess the credit, if any, to be accorded the opinion of the expert witness who relied upon it, the fact finder must be able to read the document, not just glance at it in passing. What is significant is that the writing is not to be used substantively (unless otherwise admissible for its substance). It is for that reason that the rule directs that, “[u]pon request, the court shall instruct the jury to use th[e] facts and data [relied upon by the testifying expert] only for the purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert’s opinion or inference.” Md. Rule 5-703(b).

Here, the essence of Ms. Lamalfa’s complaint is that the jurors could have misused the contents of the medical reports because the reports were with them in the jury room during deliberations. Any problem with how the jurors might have used the reports was not a function of their being in the jury room but of Ms. Lamalfa’s failure to request a limiting instruction under Rule 5-703(b) either upon their admission, at the close of the evidence, or during defense counsel’s closing argument. Had she done so, the court would have been required to instruct the jurors not to use the medical reports substantively—the very concern she now raises on appeal. Thus, her failure to request a limiting instruction is a waiver of this issue on appeal. See Brown, 409 Md. at 603-04, 976 A.2d 300 (plaintiff waived challenge to the manner in which defendants used lead paint report when she failed to request a limiting instruction or to object to allegedly improper closing argument).

For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the medical records in evidence under Rule 5-703. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT.

      . Ms. Lamalfa states her questions presented as follows:
      1. Were Defense Exhibits 2-5 inadmissible hearsay due to the failure of authentication as a condition precedent to the business records exception to the hearsay rule?
      2. Did the trial court err by admitting medical records pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-703 without an appropriate foundation for establishing the truthfulness of the records?

      . The record does not reveal the date of the rotator cuff surgery.

      . Steven and a passenger named Bridgitte Rivera also were plaintiffs. Ms. Rivera settled her claim before trial and dismissed it with prejudice. Steven’s claim was tried with his mother’s and resulted in a judgment for $8,575.66. He has not joined in this appeal.
      The plaintiffs originally included John B. Hearn, Jr., Ms. Hearn’s husband, as a defendant, suing him for negligence and negligent entrustment. Those claims were dismissed with prejudice on the first day of trial.

      . The video depositions were not transcribed and the DVD recordings are not in the record. Thus, we summarize the expert testimony based only upon the excerpts provided by Ms. Hearn in the appendix to her brief.

      . For this reason it is not necessary for us to address the hearsay arguments.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Berger, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    163 A.3d 214
    MANEKIN CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES
    No. 600,
    Sept. Term, 2016
    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
    June 28, 2017

      Argued by: Brian S. Jablon (Wellens & Jablon, LLC on the brief) all of Severna Park, MD, for Appellant.
    Argued by: Kerry B. Fisher (Alice M. Somers, Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General on the brief) all of Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
    Panel: Woodward, C.J., Berger, James A. Kenney, III (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
   Berger, J.

This appeal arises from the circuit court’s order affirming the decision of the Maryland Board of Contract Appeals (the “Board”) to grant summary decision in favor of the Department of General Services of Maryland (“DGS”), appellee. On June 9, 2010, appellant Manekin Construction, LLC (“Mane-kin”) was awarded a contract with DGS to construct a two-story barrack and a one-story garage for the Maryland State Police in Hagerstown, Maryland. The contract price totaled more than eight million dollars and was subject to mutually agreed upon Proposed Change Orders (“PCOs”). As we discuss in detail below, Manekin submitted PCO No. 68 to DGS requesting additional compensation during the construction of the project. After the project was complete, Manekin submitted a “Request for Equitable Settlement” on March 18, 2013. After DGS’s procurement officer denied Manekin’s claim for compensation, Manekin appealed to the Board. On September 17, 2016, during a hearing on the merits of the claim, the Board stopped the proceedings and granted DGS’s Third Motion for Summary Decision. The Circuit Court for Howard County affirmed the Board’s decision. This appeal followed.

The primary issue we must decide on appeal is whether the Board erred when it stopped the evidentiary hearing and granted summary decision in favor of DGS. More specifically, we must decide whether the Board improperly made findings of fact on disputed issues, including whether Manekin knew or should have known that DGS disputed or rejected Manekin’s request for compensation detailed in PCO No. 68. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the Board erred in its decision to grant summary decision in favor of DGS.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Construction of the barrack and garage took place from June 21, 2010 until the project was substantially complete on or around July 26, 2012. Approximately every two weeks throughout the construction process, Manekin and DGS officials held meetings (“Progress Meetings”) to discuss Mane-kin’s progress and other issues. During performance of the construction, Manekin encountered certain difficulties that it attributed to delays caused by DGS (among other reasons) and submitted numerous PCOs, thereby requesting additional compensation. On November 2, 2011, Manekin notified DGS of the “cumulative impact and ripple effect of’ certain factors. On December 7, 2011, Manekin submitted PCO No. 68, requesting compensation for the “additional time, and associated general conditions costs resulting from changes” discussed in the November 2, 2011 letter. A letter attached to PCO No. 68 detailed the changes requested, including the five “impact factors” that affected the cost of the project. Manekin and DGS discussed PCO No. 68 at three Progress Meetings, during which the issue was designated as “void” in the minutes for Progress Meetings and in the “PCO Log.”

After the completion of the project, on or around March 18, 2013, Manekin sent a “Request for Equitable Settlement” to DGS requesting compensation for additional time caused by the same five impact factors as outlined in PCO No. 68. DGS denied the request in a letter dated April 3, 2013. DGS indicated in its letter, “if you wish to further pursue this matter, you may do so in accordance with COMAR [Code of Maryland Regulations] 21.10.04 and the Contract Documents, General Conditions, Section 6.13, ‘Disputes and Contract Claims.’ ” On April 10, 2013, Manekin submitted its notice of claim, and on April 29, 2013, submitted its formal claim to the procurement officer. The procurement officer denied Mane-kin’s claim on November 12, 2013, finding that the notice of claim was not submitted within thirty days of when Manekin knew or should have known of the basis of a claim. Manekin timely appealed to the Board.

On September 17, 2016, the Board stopped the proceedings and granted DGS’s pending Third Motion for Summary Decision, finding that Manekin knew of the basis of its claim by no later than March 1, 2012, which was more than thirty days before Manekin submitted its notice of claim. On September 21, 2015, the Board issued a written order. Manekin filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Howard County. After a hearing on April 21, 2016, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s grant of summary decision in a written opinion issued on April 27, 2016.

DGS Contract & Relevant COMAR Provisions

The “Department of General Services General Conditions for Construction Contracts (Revised March 2007)” contains the conditions of the contract between DGS and Manekin. As required, the contract incorporates the language of COMAR 21.07.02.05-1. Under a section of the contract entitled “6.13 Disputes and Contract Claims (COMAR 21.07.02.05-1),” the contract provides that it is “subject to the provisions of State Finance and Procurement Article, Title 15, Subtitle 2, Annotated Code of Maryland, and COMAR 21.10.” The following are other pertinent provisions incorporated in the contract from COMAR 21.07.02.05-1:

B. Except as otherwise provided in this contract or by law, all disputes arising under or as a result of a breach of this contract that are not disposed of by mutual agreement shall be resolved in accordance with this clause.
C. As used herein, claim means a written demand or assertion by one of the parties seeking, as a legal right, the payment of money, adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief, arising under or relating to this contract. A voucher, invoice, or request for payment that is not in dispute when submitted is not a claim under this clause. However, if the submission subsequently is not acted upon in a reasonable time, or is disputed as to liability or amount, it may be converted to a claim for the purpose of this clause.
D. Within 30 days after Contractor knows or should have known of the basis for a claim relating to this contract, Contractor shall file a written notice of claim with the procurement officer.
⅜ * *
F. The claim shall set forth all the facts surrounding the controversy. Contractor, at the discretion of the procurement officer, may be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of the claim.

PCO No. 68

On December 7, 2011, Manekin submitted PCO No. 68 providing two methods for calculating the amount of compensation it asserted to be due for the five impact factors discussed in PCO No. 68—a “Change Order Analysis” and a “Measured Mile Approach.” Manekin notes in the PCO that, although these two methods produced two different time calculations, they were intended to provide a basis for further negotiations. Manekin relied on its “General Requirements Costs” of $1,315.00 per day, as provided in the original contract with DGS, and requested 96 days of “Contract Time Extension” plus other expenses, for a total of $128,134.00. Within the PCO, however, Manekin “reserve[d] the right to request compensation for all direct and indirect costs attributable to this delay impact.” At the end of PCO No. 68, Manekin added, “We believe our calculations to be reasonable and an appropriate representation of the impacts to Manekin on this project. However, we are willing to meet and negotiate an acceptable compromise without this matter escalating to another level.” Thereafter, the parties’ representatives discussed PCO No. 68 at multiple Progress Meetings.

PCO Log

The PCO Log is a record of all PCOs as well as each PCO’s status. The status of each PCO is indicated in the “Remarks/Days” column. Some of these status designations include “VOID,” “REJECTED,” “CREDIT,” and various phrases such as “No charge VOID,” “Located in PCO # 13 VOID,” or “G.C. agrees to amt.” Additionally, in the date column, either the date of the action is indicated or, if the PCO’s status is ‘VOID,” only the word ‘VOID” is listed in place of the date. A column labeled “PCO AMT.” lists the amount requested for each PCO, and a column labeled “DGS EST.” lists the amount to be added to the total amount due to Manekin. For any item designated as “VOID,” the “DGS EST.” is either blank or has a value of “$0.00.” At the end of the PCO Log, the total “DGS EST.” indicated is $1,232,918.00.

For PCO No. 68, which is described as “Time Extension Request to justify new schedule,” the table indicates a “PCO AMT.” of $128,134.00, and the term ‘VOID” is included under the “REMARKS/DAYS” column and in the date column. For comparison purposes, PCO No. 22 (“Soil Fill Material Phase # 1), which had a “PCO AMT.” of $117,642.00, is recorded as “REJECTED” in the “REMARKS/DAYS” column. PCO No. 70 (“Revise Membrane @ Phse Chimney Caps”), on the other hand, is listed as “No charge VOID” and no amount was added to the total.

Progress Meetings

The record before the Board contained the minutes for each relevant Progress Meeting, including Progress Meetings 37, 38, and 39. The minutes for each Progress Meeting include the names of persons attending, who would receive a copy of the minutes, a synopsis of the progress of the project as of that date, and notes of the topics discussed at the meeting. The minutes from Progress Meeting 37, held on January 5, 2012, include a section entitled “Time Extension PCO Discussion” containing eighteen points of discussion. The relevant portion of the minutes from Progress Meeting 37 includes the following:

14. J. Rohrbach tentatively said that with correct back-up:

a. PCO 63—6 days
b. PCO 68—VOID
c. PCO 73—10 days

16. Dan Sharpe offered March 1, 2012 and leave open on compensational [sic].

⅜ ⅜

18. Tentative Schedule:

—February 15, 2012—Develop ‘work list’
—March 1, 2012—Substantial Completion Punch List and begin Barrack move
—Within 60 days (May 1, 2012) the following items will be placed on punch list and complete:
—Abatement
—Demo
—Landscape
—Paving
—Fuel System

The revised minutes for Progress Meeting 38, which was held on January 19, 2012, reference the need for “fragnets” for PCO No. 68. A fragnet is a detailed analysis of how particular factors impacted the construction project, such as when and how the contractor lost scheduled time. The minutes indicate that the parties continued to discuss PCO No. 68, referenced by the following notation:

VOIDED AA. PCO 068—Rock extension is not approved to April 14, 2012.
Day after Jan. 27, 2012 Liquidated Damages will be accessed [sic].
Fragnets must be submitted and part of the time extension.
01-05-12 VOIDED.

Finally, the minutes from Progress Meeting 39, held on February 2, 2012, included the same notations under points 14, 15, and 18 as the minutes from Progress Meeting 37, with the addition of the following notes added to point 18:

01-19-12 52 days currently being allowed for extension.
02-02-12 Substantial Complete is now May 1st (Added 131 days)

Hearing Before the Board and the Board’s Decision

In a letter dated August 7, 2015 from Board Member Dana Dembrow, the Board notified the parties of the trial date for Manekin’s appeal of the procurement officer’s denial of its claim. The brief letter included the following:

As you know, there are three (3) Motions pending for Partial Summary Decision in this matter, which is currently scheduled for trial on September 14, 2015.
Counsel understand that the pending Motions must be based on factual matters as to which there is no genuine dispute, and that all factual inferences must be resolved in favor of the adverse party at this point in the proceeding.
At the present time, the Board does not anticipate making any decision on the pending Motions until after evidence is presented at trial. Of course, counsel are also free to renew Motions during the course of trial as evidence is adduced.
We hope this correspondence is useful to your trial preparation.

Hearings before the Board were held on September 14, 16, and 17, 2016. The only witness to testify before the Board ended the proceedings by granting DGS’s motion for summary decision was Daniel Sharpe, Vice President and Project Manager for Manekin. Sharpe testified regarding when he became aware that DGS had denied the request contained in PCO No. 68. The following colloquy between the Presiding Member of the Board and counsel for DGS ensued:

PRESIDING MEMBER DEMBROW: ... Now, frankly, ... there’s nothing in this affidavit that says what Mr. Rohrbach intended by the word void or voided. And that’s the crux of the issue. [... ] We’re still trying to figure out what was meant by void. So hopefully we’ll get to that point. [...] [YJou’ve made a very effective point that the State told the Appellant this PCO 68 was void. Okay.
[COUNSEL FOR DGS]: Mr. Dembrow, ... I gave you a Daniel Webster’s Dictionary definition of the word void. [...] You’re not going to get anything more from the State. We just—we use English words .... And [counsel for Manekin] will agree with me, the word void isn’t defined anywhere in the contract.
PRESIDING MEMBER DEMBROW: ... I’ve been waiting to hear from Mr. Rohrbach. In this affidavit he ... reiterates that he uses the word void. It seems odd that he doesn’t say PCO 68 was rejected. What it says is it was void. And it further says that it was void with the opportunity to submit or the request and requirements to submit fragnets. And Mr. Sharpe, if we can [direct] your attention to the progress meeting on January 5, 2012 ... that’s where the progress meeting reports say, quote, Dan Sharpe offered March 1, 2012 and leave discussion open on compensational. Whatever that means ....

Counsel for DGS returned to questioning Sharpe and asked whether his belief “in his mind” that the issue in PCO No. 68 was left open had been documented. After Sharpe pointed to the Progress Meeting minutes notation “leave open on com-pensational [sic],” Presiding Member Dembrow added the following:

PRESIDING MEMBER DEMBROW: I think he has ... I think that the progress meeting notes are consistent with what he said. He’s saying that he asked for the compensation to be left open, and the minutes of the progress meeting say leave discussion open.

Thereafter, Presiding Member Dembrow interrupted cross-examination to ask a question directed at counsel for DGS:

PRESIDING MEMBER DEMBROW: ... Mr. Rohrbach is not going to testify, is that correct?
[COUNSEL FOR DGS]: I haven’t made that decision yet, sir.
PRESIDING MEMBER DEMBROW: I’m curious to know why it says in the affidavit that he never told anyone that they could wait until a later date, but all the notes reflect that they’re asking for fragnets. They’re requiring fragnets. They want proof that it’s on the critical path. Obviously there was an anticipation that [Manekin was] going to submit something or [DGS] wouldn’t have required and requested it. And ... that’s sort of a mystery at this point. [.,. ] [H]e voided and asked for fragnets. That’s the dilemma. That’s the dichotomy.
[COUNSEL FOR DGS]: No, no, no, that’s not what his ... if you .., Mr. Dembrow, it says that he repeatedly had questions—conversations with Chris Mentó where Dan Sharpe was not present and he repeatedly said this is what I need, and they never came forward. [...]
PRESIDING MEMBER DEMBROW: That makes your claim clearer. I’m sure [counsel for Manekin] has a different point of view. We’re going to hear evidence about that. [,..] I interjected. I’m putting the State on fair notice where we need, where at least I need clarification. And that goes to the question of what they meant when they said voided give us fragnets. We’re trying to get to that, and the parties have opposite points of view. So let’s just try to go through the ... evidence as we should with the next, with another question of Mr. Sharpe.
[Redirect by counsel for Manekin]
Q. ... Your request for payment ... for ripple effects, was that in dispute at the time you submitted it?
A. No.
Q. Was PCO 68 in dispute at the time you submitted it?
A. No.

Chairman Collins interjected during redirect with additional questions directed at Sharpe, which were focused primarily on why Sharpe had not filed a claim after PCO No. 68 was marked “VOID.”

A. ... I didn’t feel that I had any claim or anything at the time when I was going through these things initially ‘cause we were trying to work through them.
* * *
CHAIRMAN COLLINS: ... Because you thought in your mind we can do it all at the end. When in reality the general conditions said you had to do it within 30 days of when you should have known. [...] That’s the trouble I’m having as a Board Member here—
A. But Mr. Collins, what I would like to answer back— CHAIRMAN COLLINS: Yeah, [pjlease do.
A. —is I really ... didn’t know ... I had a dispute going on. I was asked to try to produce a fragnet which I worked vigorously to try to do, and I was—because I never could really produce that fragnet that stated all these different things, that’s the reason why I felt that ... I wasn’t like in a ... claim mode or this major dispute mode ‘cause I was still trying to figure a way to produce the evidence or the backup that the State was asking for. [... ]
CHAIRMAN COLLINS: Yeah, but even though you knew, you knew that it was gone.
A. Well, it wasn’t ... really gone.
CHAIRMAN COLLINS: Well, yeah, it was really gone. Mr. Mentó acknowledged it was really gone, and so did Mr. Rohrbaeh in this deposition say it was really gone. What he did say, so we are going to void this, and you can come back later. This is null and void. This is gone. But you know if you can produce that fragnet down the road show me another PCO. Well when someone says that to me ... you got to say to yourself at that point, there’s a potential claim.
[By counsel for Manekin]
Q. ... [The] question to you is was there a dispute that had arisen during this process that you could file a notice of claim?
A. Not at the time ...
Q. Why not?
A. Because we didn’t receive any official thing. Except I understand the conversations that were had, but we were still having basically ongoing meetings, ongoing discussions about a lot of different things on the project, and I didn’t get, until I got that letter slammed back at me[,] that was when I realized I didn’t really have a—
Q. Which letter?
A. ... It was a letter that came back from the State which was from DGS that basically denied ... everything,...
Q. ... Mr. Collins’ point was that you knew that there was at least that PCO 68 was void. [... ]
A. Well it didn’t mean to me it was off the table. It meant to me that I still had to come back, ... and once I produced the additional backup that I could bring that thing back up.

Near the conclusion of Sharpe’s testimony, the Board stopped the proceedings and granted DGS’s Third Motion for Summary Decision. Presiding Member Dembrow provided the following rationale for the Board’s Decision:

Okay. At this time there will not be a need for recross-examination because the Board has unanimously determined to grant the State’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Number 3. After listening carefully to the testimony of Mr. Sharpe, who is the Vice President of the Appellant Construction Company, Manekin, and the Project Manager on this job, it is clear that even giving the Appellant the benefit of all doubt the ripple effect claim was first raised to the State by correspondence November 2, 2011. It was formally submitted as a proposed change order on December 7, 2011. And the very next day the State indicated to Appellant that that PCO was, quote, void, end quote. Now that was clear in the mind of some of the Members of the Board that that meant reject. But giving Appellant the benefit of all doubt, because there is a bit of a nuance in that DGS also noted on that voiding of that PCO that they wanted fragnets. The Board notes that the last request, and there are a couple of them at least, that the State made of the Appellant to submit the fragnets needed to support PCO 68, the last reference to fragnet was made on January 19, 2012.
There was a progress meeting on February 2, 2012, and in the minutes of that progress meeting, the minutes being dated February 7, 2012, there is reference that Mr. Sharp[e] stated or at least the minutes state, quote, Dan Sharpe offered March 1, 2012 and leave discussion open on compen-sational, period. That’s certainly not an example of the greatest grammar because it’s somewhat difficult to know what that even means. But it does appear beyond a shadow of a doubt that on February 2, 2012, when PCO 68 was marked void there was no reference to fragnets at that point. There had not been a reference for the need for further documentation by way of fragnets since January 19, 2012. At least as of February [2nd] Mr. Sharpe was saying we’ll do this by March 1, 2012.
[COMAR 21.10.04.02] says ... a contractor shall file a written notice of a claim relating to a contract with the appropriate procurement officer within 30 days after the basis for the claim is known or should have been known. It appears that the basis of the claim was initially known back in November of 2011. It certainly was known as of February 2012. But this claim was not filed until a year later. So even if we give the ... Appellant the benefit of all doubt and give them [until] March 1, 2012, as the trigger date for the beginning of that 30-day statute of limitations, we’re still a year late. And the Board is directed by [COMAR 21.10.04.02C], quote, a notice of a claim or a claim that is not filed within the time prescribed shall be dismissed. Emphasis on the word shall.
Fair or unfair, that [is] what the regulation requires. [...] The Board has no choice but to not address the substantive merits of a claim that is filed a year late. And the Board concludes that that is the correct categorization of this appeal. Therefore, it will be dismissed at this time without the necessity of further testimony.

Presiding Member Dembrow confirmed that the other Board Members concurred in the decision before adding the following:

We wanted to hear testimony from Mr. Sharpe and give the Appellant the benefit of all doubt. We are comfortable that we’ve done that now. So this was not a decision made in haste, but one that we’ve been thinking about for a long time. And the testimony ... confirmed the view of some of the Board Members a long time ago.

The Circuit Court’s Affirmance of the Board’s Decision

On April 27, 2016, the Circuit Court for Howard County affirmed the Board’s decision to grant summary decision. The written opinion of the circuit court provides, in pertinent part:

The parties’ first dispute is over the standard of review to be applied by the Circuit Court in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency.... Specifically, Manekin argues that the VOID notation indicated it was to provide more documentation or information, and that it’s right to appeal did not attach until its more formal claim letter was denied 14 months later. [... ]
DGS reminds the Court that because of the MSBCA members’ familiarity with the subject matter, state procurement law, and expertise in that area, the appellate decisions and statutes allow the Court a very limited scope of review. [...]
When the Court is reviewing a final decision of an administrative agency, the Court determines the legality of the decision and whether there was “substantial evidence” from the record as a whole to support the decision. [...]
Case law is clear that the Circuit Court[ ] is not to make findings of fact. That function is entirely within the realm of the agency, as is determining the inferences to be drawn from those facts. [...] Even though the final decision was reached by way of a ruling on a motion for summary decision, and not as the result of a contested hearing, the analysis is the same.... The Court must determine if the findings of fact are supported in the record by substantial evidence, and if so, whether the decision of the agency was legally correct.

(Citations omitted).

After articulating this standard of review, the circuit court analyzed the Board’s decision and characterized the Board’s findings regarding notice as a “finding of fact.”

The [Board] made a finding of fact that Manekin was on notice of DGS’s denial of its requests under PCO 68 by the end of February 2012 when Presiding Member Dana Dem-brow stated, “It appears that the basis of the claim was initially known back in November of 2011. It certainly was known as of February 2012. But this claim was not filed until a year later. So even if we give the [ ] Appellant the benefit of all doubt and give them [until] March 1, 2012, as the trigger date for the beginning of that 80-day statute of limitations, we’re still a year late.” [...] This finding of fact was supported in the record by the Progress Meeting Notes for January 5, 2012, January 19, 2012, and February 2, 2012 which were received as evidence at the [Board] hearing. Reasoning minds examining this evidence could reasonably reach the conclusion that Manekin was on notice (knew or should have known) that DGS denied its claim for costs under PCO 68 by the end of February 2012. Inferences were resolved in Manekin’s favor when the Presiding Member gave Manekin until March 1, 2012.

Thereafter, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s determination finding that DGS was entitled to summary decision as a matter of law.

DISCUSSION

I. Judicial Review of an Agency’s Conclusions of Law

The Court of Appeals has explained that we “look[ ] through the circuit court’s ... decision[ ], although applying the same standards of review, and evaluate[ ] the decision of the agency.” People’s Counsel for Baltimore Cnty. v. Surina, 400 Md. 662, 681, 929 A.2d 899 (2007). In other words, we “review! ] the agency’s decision, not the circuit court’s decision.” Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Prigel Family Creamery, 206 Md.App. 264, 273, 47 A.3d 1087 (2012) (citation omitted). We review questions of law de novo. See Assateague Coastkeeper v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 200 Md.App. 665, 690, 28 A.3d 178 (2011).

We note that “[a]n administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts,” Piney Orchard Cmty. Ass’n v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 231 Md.App. 80, 92, 149 A.3d 1175 (2016) (citation omitted); however, we owe no deference to an agency’s erroneous conclusions of law. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for St. Mary’s Cnty. v. S. Res. Mgmt., Inc., 154 Md.App. 10, 34, 837 A.2d 1059 (2003) (citations omitted) (“[W]here an administrative agency renders a decision based on an error of law, we owe the agency’s decision no deference.”). “In contrast to administrative findings of fact, questions of law, including the proper construction of a statute, are subject to more plenary review by the courts.” Md. Office of People’s Counsel v. Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 226 Md.App. 483, 501, 130 A.3d 1061 (2016) (quoting Office of People’s Counsel v. Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 355 Md. 1, 14, 733 A.2d 996 (1999)).

Although we “review[ ] the agency’s decision, not the circuit court’s decision,” Long Green Valley, supra, 206 Md.App. at 273, 47 A.3d 1087, we note that the circuit court’s recitation of the “substantial evidence” standard of review as the appropriate review of an administrative agency’s summary decision was incorrect. The circuit court noted that the Board’s “finding of fact that Manekin was on notice of DGS’s denial of its requests under PCO 68 by the end of February 2012 .... March 1, 2012 at the latest” was supported by “substantial evidence.” Further, the circuit court found the Board's finding of March 1, 2012 as an “inference[ ] ... resolved in Manekin’s favor.” The circuit court, therefore, erred in determining whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s findings of fact. That error compounded the Board’s error in making findings of fact on disputed issues prior to the conclusion of Manekin’s presentation of evidence on the issue. Although DGS attempts to provide us with support for the circuit court’s review and argues that “this Court should apply a more deferential ‘substantial evidence’ standard of review,” we reject this assertion. The correct standard of review, at both the circuit court level as well as for this Court, is whether the Board’s decision to grant summary decision in favor of DGS was correct as a matter of law. See Eng’g Mgmt. Servs. v. State Highway Admin., 375 Md. 211, 228-29, 825 A.2d 966 (2003) (citations omitted) (“The standard for appellate review of a summary judgment is whether it is “legally correct. [...] This is the same standard of review we apply to the question of the legal correctness of an administrative agency’s decision.”). Because the Board made its decision on a motion for summary decision, we examine whether the Board’s decision was correct as a matter of law.

II. Summary Decision Standard & State Procurement Contract Framework

Critically, only when there is no genuine dispute of material fact may the Board determine whether a party is entitled to summary decision as a matter of law. COMAR 21.10.05.06D provides the following:

(1) A party may move for summary decision on any appropriate issue in the case.
(2) The Appeals Board may grant a proposed or final summary decision if the Appeals Board finds that:
(a) After resolving all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion is asserted, there is no genuine issue of material fact; and
(b) A party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.

The Board’s two-step process in deciding a motion for summary decision begins with the determination of whether there is any “genuine issue of material fact.” COMAR 21.10.05.06D(2)(a). If the moving party is unable to demonstrate that no material fact is in dispute, the analysis ends and summary decision is not appropriate. Only “[a]fter resolving all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion is asserted” and finding that “there is no genuine issue of material fact” should the Board determine whether the moving “party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” COMAR 21.10.05.06D(2). Put differently, the Board is not authorized to make findings of fact on material issues that remain in dispute. To the extent the court considers a disputed fact, the court must view that fact in favor of the nonmoving party and determine whether the moving party is entitled to summary decision.

III. The Board Erred In Granting DGS’s Third Motion for Summary Decision.

We have explained that contract claims arising out of state procurement contracts are subject to statutorily-prescribed administrative procedures. See McLean Contracting Co. v. Md. Transp. Auth., 70 Md.App. 514, 523-24, 521 A.2d 1251 (1987). The mandatory claims process is set forth in Maryland Code (2009, 2015 Repl. Vol.), State Finance & Procurement Article (SFP), Title 15 and COMAR 21.10. COMAR 21.07.02.05-ID provides, “[wjithin 30 days after contractor knows or should have known of the basis for a claim relating to this contract, contractor shall file a written notice of claim with the procurement officer.” Further, “[a] notice of claim or a claim that is not filed within the time prescribed in Regulation .02 of this chapter shall be dismissed.” COMAR 21.10.04.02C.

A. Knowledge Of A Basis For Submitting A “Request for Payment” That Is Not In Dispute When Submitted Does Not Establish Knowledge Of “A Basis For A Claim.”

To determine whether Manekin failed to comply with the timing requirements, the Board was required to consider whether Manekin “[knew] or should have known of the basis for a claim” more than thirty days before it submitted its notice of claim to the procurement officer on April 10, 2013. See COMAR 21.07.02.05-ID. To apply this provision correctly, therefore, the Board was required to make a finding of fact, accurately identifying “a basis for a claim” pursuant to CO-MAR 21.07.02.05-1. A “claim” is defined in the following provision:

As used herein, claim means a written demand or assertion by one of the parties seeking, as a legal right, the payment of money, adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief, arising under or relating to this contract. A voucher, invoice, or request for payment that is not in dispute when submitted is not a claim under this clause. However, if the submission subsequently is not acted upon in a reasonable time, or is disputed as to liability or amount, it may be converted to a claim for the purpose of this clause.

COMAR 21.07.02.05-1C (emphasis added).

Pursuant to COMAR 21.07.02,05-lC, a contractor’s knowledge of the basis for “requesting] payment that is not in dispute when submitted” is not the same as having knowledge of the basis of a “claim.” Manekin’s submission of a PCO, therefore, is not dispositive evidence of having knowledge of the basis for a claim. Once a request for payment is disputed, however, a claim arises. The thirty-day limitations period under COMAR 21.07.02.05-ID would begin, therefore, once the contractor knows or should have known of a dispute or denial of its request.

As we have explained supra, although we attribute some weight to an agency’s expertise and its interpretation of a statute that it administers, we review questions of law de novo. See Assateague Coastkeeper, supra, 200 Md.App. at 690, 28 A.3d 178. Here, however, the Board in its decision provided no interpretation of COMAR 21.07.02.05-1. Indeed, in explaining the Board’s decision, Presiding Member Dembrow stated, “[i]t appears that the basis of the claim was initially known back in November of 2011,” referring to the date that Manekin first raised the issues contained in PCO No. 68 in a letter to DGS prior to submitting PCO No. 68. It is not clear, therefore, whether the Board equated having knowledge of a basis for submitting a request for payment that was not in dispute when submitted with a ‘Toasis for a claim.”

Although the Board’s prior interpretations of a statute do not create mandatory authority for this Court, we note that the Board’s application of the timing provisions in COMAR 21.07.02.05-1 in this case is inconsistent with the Board’s own interpretations in some of its prior decisions. For example, in Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., MSBCA No. 2225 (March 4, 2004), the Board found that the thirty-day limitations period began upon the appellant’s receipt of the procurement officer’s letter denying the appellant’s change order request (i.e. a “PCO”). On January 22, 1999, after the parties had contemplated an increase to the contract ceiling during weekly progress meetings, the appellant submitted a formal request for a change order. Thereafter, the appellant sent the agency two follow-up requests for a decision on its January 22, 1999 request and did not receive a response until the procurement officer’s July 23, 1999 denial letter. The Board concluded that the thirty-day limitations period did not begin until the appellant received the procurement officer’s denial letter. Id. at 13. In its written decision, the Board reached the following conclusions:

Until [the procurement officer’s] letter of July 23, 1999 rejecting Appellant’s change order request, Appellant had no reason to believe that its change order was in dispute. Appellant timely filed a notice of claim and claim regarding the Procurement Officer’s ... July 23, 1999 rejection of its change order request, which was confrontational and put Appellant on notice that it must file a claim.

Id.

Similarly, in David A. Bramble, Inc., MSBCA No. 2823 (July 5, 2013), the Board found that the contractor’s notice of claim was not timely because the contractor admitted that he had actual notice of the agency’s rejection of his proposal more than thirty days before filing a notice of claim. In Syscom, Inc., MSBCA No. 2268 (July 5, 2002), the Board found that a dispute triggering the limitations period did not arise prior to the procurement officer’s decision that the agency’s additional reporting directives to the contractor were within the scope of the underlying contract. Id. at 8. Notably, in that case, the contractor had previously sent a letter to the agency, refusing to carry out the directives without an approved change order. Id. at 2.

In these decisions, the Board’s findings are consistent with our interpretation in this case of COMAR 21.07.02.05-1C and D—that the thirty-day limitations period begins when the contractor has notice that the agency disputes the contractor’s request. In determining whether Manekin complied with the timing requirements, the Board was charged with deciding whether Manekin had notice from DGS that DGS disputed or denied its request contained in PCO No. 68 more than thirty days before Manekin filed its notice of claim,

B. The Board Made Findings of Fact on Disputed Issues by Determining the Meaning of “Void” and that Manekin was to Provide Additional Information by March 1,2012.

In addition to finding that Manekin knew of the issues raised in PCO No. 68 as early as November 2, 2011, the Board found, alternatively, that Manekin should have known that DGS disputed the request contained in PCO No. 68 by February 2012. In so doing, the Board relied primarily on notations in the PCO Log and Progress Meeting minutes to make at least two improper findings of fact prior to a full hearing on the merits. Critically, both of these factual conclusions were determinative in its decision.

First, the Board relied, in part, upon the fact that PCO No. 68 was designated as “VOID” in the PCO Log to conclude that Manekin knew or should have known of the basis of a claim by December of 2011, and “certainly ... as of February 2012.” Presiding Member Dembrow explained the Board’s reliance on the “VOID” notation in the following portion of the Board’s decision:

[I]t is clear that even giving the Appellant the benefit of all doubt the ripple effect claim was first raised to the State by correspondence November 2, 2011". It was formally submitted as a proposed change order on December 7, 2011. And the very next day the State indicated to Appellant that the PCO was, quote, void, end quote. Now that was clear in the mind of some of the Members of the Board that that meant reject. [...]
* * *
It appears that the basis of the claim was initially known back in November of 2011. It certainly was known as of February 2012. But this claim was not filed until a year later.

At various points during the evidentiary hearing, however, Presiding Member Dembrow emphasized the need for additional clarification. Presiding Member Dembrow found the term “void” particularly troubling in relation to the undisputed fact that the minutes from Progress Meetings 37 and 39 reference a comment by Sharpe to “leave discussion open on compensational [sic],” which the Board acknowledged is difficult to interpret. Further, in addition to the term “void,” the PCO Log included the term “rejected” as the status for other PCOs. Presiding Member Dembrow pointed out that Rohr-bach admitted during his deposition that there was a difference between the terms “void” and “rejected, explaining that “void” meant “you can come back later.” During the evidentia-ry hearing, Presiding Member Dembrow stated to counsel for DGS, “I’ve been waiting to hear from Mr. Rohrbach. In this affidavit he ... reiterates that he uses the word void. It seems odd that he doesn’t say PCO 68 was rejected.” He later added, “Now, frankly, ... there’s nothing in this affidavit that says what Mr. Rohrbach intended by the word void .... ” Thereafter, Presiding Member Dembrow informed counsel for DGS, “I’m putting the State on fair notice where we need, where at least I need clarification. And that goes to the question of what they meant when they said voided give us fragnets. We’re trying to get to that, and the parties have opposite points of view.” As Presiding Member Dembrow stated, “[Tjhat’s the crux of the issue. [...] We’re still trying to figure out what was meant by void.”

The only evidence presented at trial that was relevant to the meaning of the term “void,” however, was Sharpe’s testimony concerning his understanding of the term. Sharpe testified that he interpreted “void” to mean that the issue would be left open to raise again at a later date, and in this case, not until Manekin had compiled and submitted the information requested. Further, Sharpe testified that he was not aware that DGS disputed Manekin’s request until DGS denied Manekin’s “Request for Equitable Settlement” on March 18, 2013.

The blurring of the line between a hearing on the motion for summary decision and the evidentiary hearing, during which testimony had already begun, presents procedural challenges. Without hearing Rohrbach’s testimony on the merits of the claim, certain Board Members found his deposition testimony and affidavit convincing enough to draw conclusions of fact regarding the meaning of the “void” notation. For instance, Chairman Collins stated to Sharpe during his cross-examination, “Mr. Rohrbach in this deposition [said PCO No. 68] was ... gone.” Chairman Collins paraphrased his understanding of Rohrbach’s deposition testimony, in which Rohrbach explained his interpretation of the meaning of “void,” in the following way: “[W]e are going to void this, and you can come back later. This is null and void. This is gone. But you know if you can produce that fragnet down the road show me another PCO.” Based, in part, on Rohrbach’s explanation, Chairman Collins added that Manekin should have known there was a dispute. This factual finding, however, was not permitted at this stage of the proceeding. The parties disputed the meaning of the term “void,” which was not defined in relevant statutes or the parties’ contract. The Board erred, on a motion for summary decision, in determining whether the notation of “void” indicated that Manekin knew or should have known that DGS had rejected PCO No. 68, and thus, that the basis of a claim had arisen more than thirty days before Manekin submitted its notice of claim.

The Board further erred in finding that Manekin had committed to providing the fragnets for PCO No. 68 by March 1, 2012. The Board reached this finding based on a vague notation contained in the minutes from Progress Meeting 39 held on February 2, 2012. Presiding Member Dembrow stated as follows:

[I]n the minutes being dated February 7, 2012, there is [a] reference that Mr. Sharpe stated or at least the minutes state, quote, Dan Sharpe offered March 1, 2012 and leave discussion open on compensational, period.... [I]t’s somewhat difficult to know what that even means. [... ] [But] [t]here had not been a reference for the need for further documentation by way of fragnets since January 19, 2012. At least as of February 2nd, Mr. Sharpe was saying we’ll do this by March 1, 2012.
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So even if we give the, the Appellant the benefit of all doubt and give them [until] March 1, 2012[ ] as the trigger date for the beginning of that 30-day statute of limitations, we’re still a year late.

During the hearing, however, the Board raised questions regarding why DGS continued to ask for fragnets while designating PCO No. 68 as void. Indeed, Presiding Member Dem-brow acknowledged during Sharpe’s testimony that, although Rohrbach stated in his affidavit that he did not tell Manekin that they could later return to PCO No. 68, the minutes reflect that DGS had continued to ask for fragnets while simultaneously marking it as “void.” Presiding Member Dembrow stated, “They’re requiring fragnets. They want this information. [... ] Obviously there was anticipation that they were going to submit something or they wouldn’t have ... requested it.”

The Board’s conclusion that Manekin’s Vice President had offered March 1, 2012 as the deadline by which Manekin would provide the fragnets involves a finding of fact on a disputed issue. The Board acknowledged during the proceedings that the notation “Dan Sharpe offered March 1, 2012 and leave discussion open on compensational [sic]” required further clarification. Manekin did not concede that the parties had discussed a particular deadline for Manekin’s submission of the fragnets for PCO No. 68. Instead, Sharpe explained during his testimony only that he had requested that the parties leave the issue open. Additionally, other notations within the minutes for Progress Meeting 39, under the same points of discussion, refer to “March 1, 2012” in relation to the notation “Substantial Completion Punch List and begin Barrack move.” In other words, whether the notation indicated that Sharpe had agreed to a March 1, 2012 deadline to produce fragnets for PCO No. 68 was not a permissible finding at this stage of the proceedings.

Furthermore, although March 1, 2012 is later than the other dates considered by the Board as potentially starting the limitations period, the finding that the thirty-day period began on March 1, 2012 was not sufficient to “resolv[e] all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion is asserted.” COMAR 21.10,05.06.D(2)(a). Manekin argued that the limitations period did not begin until April 3, 2013, when DGS denied Manekin’s “Request for Equitable Settlement.” The Board inferred that Manekin was required to provide fragnets by March 1, 2012, and therefore, that Manekin knew or should have known of a dispute on that date. This inference was not permitted since the relevant COMAR provision directed the Board to resolve all inferences at this stage of the proceeding in favor of Manekin. Based on the Board’s determination of March 1, 2012 “as the trigger date for the beginning of [the thirty-day] statute of limitations,” however, the Board concluded that Manekin had submitted its notice of claim more than a year late. The Board’s conclusion that Sharpe was required to provide the fragnets for PCO No. 68 by March 1, 2012 was, therefore, an improper finding of fact at this stage of the proceeding.

The point at which the thirty-day limitations period began, as the Board has indicated in several prior decisions noted supra, is the moment Manekin knew or should have known that DGS rejected or denied the request contained in PCO No. 68. The point in time when Manekin should have known of a denial of its request involves a disputed material fact, which the Board was not authorized to resolve via summary decision. The Board’s task was, first, to determine if there existed any “issue[s] of material fact,” after resolving all reasonable inferences in favor of Manekin. The Board, therefore, was required to hear the merits of the case and apply the appropriate meaning of “a basis for a claim” under COMAR 21.07.02.05-1 in its final determination.

The Board erred by terminating the proceedings after hearing from only one of Manekin’s witnesses. The Presiding Member of the Board stated:

At this time there will not be a need for recross-examination because the Board has unanimously determined to grant the State’s Motion for Partial Summary [Decision] Number 3. After listening carefully to the testimony of Mr. Sharpe, ... it is clear that even giving the Appellant the benefit of all doubt the ... claim was first raised to the State by correspondence November 2, 2011.

Presiding Member Dembrow concluded, “We wanted to hear testimony from Mr. Sharpe and give [him] the benefit of all doubt. We are comfortable that we’ve done that now.” Presiding Member Dembrow added that “the testimony ... confirmed the view of some of the Board Members a long time ago.” Sharpe made no explicit concession during his testimony, however, that was dispositive on the issue of when Manekin knew or should have known that DGS disputed Manekin’s request for additional compensation contained in POO No. 68.

The Board’s error in this case stems, primarily, from its failure to adhere to procedural processes. The standards for summary decision as opposed to a merits hearing are fundamentally different. The Board should not consider a motion for summary decision during an evidentiary hearing, unless the rules expressly provide for it. The only evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing at the time the Board stopped the proceedings was testimony that served to confirm that the parties disputed a material fact. The Board, however, made findings of fact on those disputed issues and then granted summary decision. In doing so, the Board blurred the line between determining whether a disputed fact existed and making findings of fact based on the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. The Board’s consideration of whether to grant summary decision during the proceedings on the merits creates confusion and, as shown here, increases the chance for error by both the Board and the circuit court.

Accordingly, we hold that the Board erred in its decision to terminate the proceedings and grant summary decision in favor of DGS. We, therefore, remand to the Board to decide, after hearing all of the evidence, when DGS communicated a dispute or denial of PCO No. 68 to Manekin such that it knew or should have known that it was required to submit a notice of claim to DGS within 80 days.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THE BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

      . Similarly, COMAR 21.10.04.02 provides the following:
      Unless a lesser period is prescribed by law or by contract, a contractor shall file a written notice of a claim relating to a contract with the appropriate procurement officer within 30 days after the basis for the claim is known or should have been known, whichever is earlier.

      . As we discuss infra, whether the notation indicated that Manekin had committed to providing the fragnets by March 1, 2012 was not established at the evidentiary hearing as an undisputed fact.

      . We note, preliminarily, that the circuit court relied upon an incorrect standard of review, as we discuss in further detail below.

      4. This standard for summary decision in administrative decisions provided by COMAR 21.10.05.06D is similar to the standard for summary judgment, as provided by Maryland Rule 2-501(a): “Any party may file a written motion for summary judgment on all or part of an action on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

      . The Board itself acknowledged these criteria in its letter of August 7, 2015, reminding the parties that "the pending Motions must be based on factual matters as to which there is no genuine dispute, and that all factual inferences must be resolved in favor of the adverse party at this point in the proceeding.” Thereafter, the letter provides that the parties should prepare for trial accordingly.

      . The circuit court’s review of the Board’s decision supports our finding that the Board made findings of fact that were material to the Board's decision to grant summary decision in favor of DGS. Indeed, we agree with the circuit court that “[t]he [Board] made a finding of fact that Manekin was on notice of DGS’s denial of its requests under PCO 68 by the end of February 2012,” because Manekin had not produced the requested fragnets.

      7. The minutes for Progress Meeting 39 were finalized on February 7, 2012.

      . Additionally, when the notation was raised during the cross-examination, Presiding Member Dembrow agreed that Sharpe’s testimony—that he had requested the parties keep the issue of PCO No. 68 open—was consistent with his own interpretation of the meeting minutes.