text:
    No. 11-6878.
    Timothy Harris, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1043, 132 S. Ct. 597,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 437,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8116.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 429 Fed. Appx. 543.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 11-6879.
    Anthony Steven Aguilar, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1043, 132 S. Ct. 597,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 438,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8238.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-6880.
    Rodney Lavell Booker, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1043, 132 S. Ct. 597,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 438,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8102.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 639 F.3d 1115.


text:
    No. 11-6883.
    Christopher Booker, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 597,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 438,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8177.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-6892.
    Shon Jefferson, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 597,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 438,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8168.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 432 Fed. Appx. 382.


text:
    No. 11-6894.
    Oscar Rene Munoz, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 597,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 438,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8262.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 430 Fed. Appx. 495.


text:
    No. 11-6900.
    Adán Gil Miranda, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 598,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 438,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8251.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 433 Fed. Appx. 866.


text:
    No. 11-6902.
    Curtis Owens, Petitioner v. Kelly Van Cleave Harrington.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 598,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 438,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8108.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 414 Fed. Appx. 980.


text:
    No. 11-6906.
    Marco Dewayne Smith, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 598,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 438,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8182.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 432 Fed. Appx. 413.


text:
    No. 11-6907.
    Moises Carbajal Sanchez, aka Moises Carbajal Sanchez, aka Juan Tapia, aka Arturo Martinez-Ruiz, aka Moises Sanchez-Carbajal, aka Moises Carbajal, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 598,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 439,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8109.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 438 Fed. Appx. 253.


text:
    No. 11-6909.
    Noble L. Bennett, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 598,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 439,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8118.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-6910.
    Derek Benton, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 599,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 439,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8110.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 639 F.3d 723.


text:
    No. 11-6911.
    Darryl Buck, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 599,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 439,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8270,
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Same case below, 437 Fed. Appx. 202.


text:
    No. 11-6915.
    Clarence Allen Torres, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 599,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 439,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8122.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 439 Fed. Appx. 241.


text:
    No. 11-6916.
    Kane Christopher Wheeler, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 599,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 439,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8171.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 434 Fed. Appx. 831.


text:
    No. 11-6920.
    Godwin Asifo, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 599,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 439,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8111.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 445 Fed. Appx. 625.


text:
    No. 11-6921.
    Escanio Bicuna-Rios, aka Escanio Rios Bicuna, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 599,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 439,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8154.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-6924.
    Willie Mitchell, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1044, 132 S. Ct. 600,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 440,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8160.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 435 Fed. Appx. 174.


text:
    No. 11-6926.
    Kevin McDonald, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 600,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 440,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8212,
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 442 Fed. Appx. 75.


text:
    No. 11-6929.
    Oscar Francisco Macias-Ovalle, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 600,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 440,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8192.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 432 Fed. Appx. 710.


text:
    No. 11-6930.
    Steve Nathaniel Jackson, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 600,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 440,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8158.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 429 Fed. Appx. 757.


text:
    No. 11-6940.
    Elveria Rodriguez-Quiros, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 600,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 440,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8165.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 442 Fed. Appx. 347.


text:
    No. 11-6951.
    Ricky Gene Minor, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 601,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 440,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8131.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 439 Fed. Appx. 233.


text:
    No. 11-6953.
    Segun Waldron, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 601,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 440,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8159.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 449 Fed. Appx. 680.


text:
    No. 11-6956.
    Michael Maier, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 601,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 440,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8194.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 646 F.3d 1148.


text:
    No. 11-6966.
    Manuel Borja-Vega, aka Samuel Vega, aka Carlos Ortega, aka Miguel Gomez-Borja, aka Andres M. Orrostieta, aka Bertin Aveja Granados, aka Nau Berduzco-Pena, aka Navor Reynosa Vega, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 601,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 441,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8254.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 425 Fed. Appx. 373.


text:
    No. 11-6968.
    Martin M. Gevers, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 602,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 441,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8162.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-6970.
    Donnie Wayne Sheffield, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 602,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 441,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8135.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 372 Fed. Appx. 364.


text:
    No. 11-6972.
    Ray Blanks, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 602,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 441,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8205.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 439 Fed. Appx. 228.


text:
    No. 10-1519.
    Florida, Petitioner v. David Lamar Garland.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 574,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 441,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8125.
    November 14, 2011.
   Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris granted. Petition for writ of certio-rari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, denied.

Same case below, 70 So. 3d 609.


text:
    No. 11-293.
    Jussi K. Kivisto, Petitioner v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, PLC, et al.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 577,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 441,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8100.
    November 14, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 413 Fed. Appx. 136.


text:
    No. 11-299.
    West Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C., Petitioner v. City of West Linn, Oregon, et al.
    565 U.S. 1045, 132 S. Ct. 578,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 441,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8250.
    November 14, 2011.
   Motion of National Association of Home Builders, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of New England Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 428 Fed. Appx. 700.


text:
    No. 11-359.
    Miracle Star Women’s Recovering Community, Inc., Petitioner v. Katherine Jett, et al.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 589,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 442,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8103,
    November 14, 2011.
   Motion of National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Antelope Valley Branch Unit #1023 for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Petition for writ of certio-rari to the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, denied.


text:
    No. 11-475.
    Gene A. Tyrrell, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 596,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 442,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8145.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 11-6836.
    Ronald Dawson, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 594,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 442,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8138.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Same case below, 433 Fed. Appx. 151.


text:
    No. 11-6938.
    Steven J. Smith, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 600,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 442,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8214.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Same case below, 433 Fed. Appx. 891.


text:
    No. 11-7012.
    In re Daniel Doyle Ben-ham, Petitioner.
    565 U.S. 1032, 132 S. Ct. 602,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 442,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8090.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 11-6406.
    In re Helen M. Harris-Scott, Petitioner.
    565 U.S. 1032, 132 S. Ct. 587,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 442,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8178.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 11-6593.
    In re William Chapman Mach, Petitioner.
    565 U.S. 1032, 132 S. Ct. 591,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 442,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8140.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 11-6417.
    In re Keith Thomas, Petitioner.
    565 U.S. 1033, 132 S. Ct. 588,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 442,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8101.
    November 14, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and petition for writ of mandamus dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petition in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S. Ct. 397, 121 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992) (per curiam).


text:
    No. 11-6532.
    In re Angel Ruiz Rivera, Petitioner.
    565 U.S. 1033, 132 S. Ct. 590,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 443,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8129,
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 11-6961.
    In re Lester Jon Ruston, Petitioner.
    565 U.S. 1033, 132 S. Ct. 601,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 443,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8231.
    November 14, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and petition for writ of mandamus dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petition in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S. Ct. 397, 121 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992) (per curiam). Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.


text:
    No. 10-8903.
    Sofia T. Güilas, Petitioner v. Tom Brauer, et al.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 605,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 443,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8120.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 563 U.S. 922, 131 S. Ct. 1823, 179 L. Ed. 2d 780, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2765.


text:
    No. 10-9837.
    Levi A. Wilson, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1047, 132 S. Ct. 607,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 443,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8082.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 931, 132 S. Ct. 370, 181 L. Ed. 2d 235, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7049.


text:
    No. 10-10659.
    Detelin Draganov, Petitioner v. Washington.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 605,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 443,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8246.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 843, 132 S. Ct. 156, 181 L. Ed. 2d 72, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 5993.


text:
    No. 10-10688.
    Norman Eugene Lamkin, Petitioner v. Texas.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 605,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 443,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8104.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 844, 132 S. Ct. 159, 181 L. Ed. 2d 74, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 6197.


text:
    No. 10-10757.
    Leroy Hefley, Petitioner v. Delaware.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 605,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 444,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8263.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 848, 132 S. Ct. 168, 181 L. Ed. 2d 81, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 6238.


text:
    No. 10-10791.
    Arthur D. Jackson, Petitioner v. J. P. Gonzalez, et al.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 606,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 444,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8240.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 849, 132 S. Ct. 172, 181 L. Ed. 2d 84, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 6165.


text:
    No. 10-11157.
    John McDowell, Petitioner v. Jerome W. Walsh, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 606,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 444,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8121.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 870, 132 S. Ct. 222, 181 L. Ed. 2d 123, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 6577.


text:
    No. 11-5074.
    Gordon Kirk Kemppainen, Petitioner v. Texas.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 606,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 444,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8107.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 888, 132 S. Ct. 265, 181 L. Ed. 2d 156, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 5255.


text:
    No. 11-5177.
    Robert M. Hendricks, et ux., Petitioners v. Robert Stepp, et al.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 606,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 444,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8081.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 893, 132 S. Ct. 278, 181 L. Ed. 2d 165, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 5503.


text:
    No. 11-5201.
    George W. Pitts, Petitioner v. Belinda Davis, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 606,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 444,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8087.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 894, 132 S. Ct. 281, 181 L. Ed. 2d 167, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 5676.


text:
    No. 11-5344.
    Inetha M. Carr, Petitioner v. H.O.P.E. Community Service, Inc.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 606,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 444,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8084.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 902, 132 S. Ct. 299, 181 L. Ed. 2d 182, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 5548.


text:
    No. 11-5451.
    Derek N. Jarvis, Petitioner v. Staples, Inc.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 606,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 445,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8083.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 908, 132 S. Ct. 313, 181 L. Ed. 2d 193, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 5765.


text:
    No. 11-5452.
    Abdel Eltayib, Petitioner v. Stephen M. DeWalt, Warden, et al.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 606,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 445,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8088.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 908, 132 S. Ct. 314, 181 L. Ed. 2d 193, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 6148.


text:
    No. 11-5555.
    In re Joseph G. Dunbar, Petitioner.
    565 U.S. 1046, 132 S. Ct. 607,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 445,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8085.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 813, 132 S. Ct. 392, 181 L. Ed. 2d 246, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 6367.


text:
    No. 11-5740.
    Gary Melton, Petitioner v. Ger Taylor Gardens, LLC.
    565 U.S. 1047, 132 S. Ct. 607,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 445,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8080.
    November 14, 2011.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 565 U.S. 950, 132 S. Ct. 412, 181 L. Ed. 2d 270, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7285.


text:
    No. D-2590.
    In the Matter of Disbarment of Ruth Marie Pollack.
    565 U.S. 1032, 132 S. Ct. 607,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 445,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8086.
    November 14, 2011.
   Disbarment entered.

Former order, 564 U.S. 1016, 131 S. Ct. 3052, 180 L. Ed. 2d 869, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4571.


text:
    No. 11A480.
    Reginald Brooks, Applicant v. Ohio.
    565 U.S. 1047, 132 S. Ct. 608,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 445,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8291.
    November 15, 2011.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the Court, denied.

Same case below, 130 Ohio St. 3d 1432, 957 N.E.2d 37.


text:
    No. 11A485.
    Reginald Brooks, Applicant v. David Bobby, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1047, 132 S. Ct. 608,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 445,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8290.
    November 15, 2011.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 11-7307 (11A471).
    Oba Chandler, Petitioner v. Florida.
    565 U.S. 1047, 132 S. Ct. 607,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 445,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8288.
    November 15, 2011.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida denied.

Same case below, 75 So. 3d 267.


text:
    No. 11-7324 (11A479).
    Reginald Brooks, Petitioner v. David Bobby, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1047, 132 S. Ct. 607,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 446,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8292.
    November 15, 2011.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 660 F.3d 959.


text:
    No. 11-7342 (11A484).
    Reginald Brooks, Petitioner v. Ohio.
    565 U.S. 1047, 132 S. Ct. 607,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 446,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8289.
    November 15, 2011.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, denied.


text:
    No. 11-7463 (11A496).
    Paul Ezra Rhoades, Petitioner v. Brent Reinke, Director, Idaho Department of Corrections, et al.
    565 U.S. 1047, 132 S. Ct. 608,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 446,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8294.
    November 17, 2011.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 671 F.3d 856.


text:
    No. 11-7466 (11A497).
    Paul Ezra Rhoades, Petitioner v. Randy Blades, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1048, 132 S. Ct. 608,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 446,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8293.
    November 17, 2011.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-393.
    National Federation of Independent Business, et al., Petitioners v. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. Florida, et al., Petitioners v. Department of Health and Human Services, et al.
    No. 11-400.
    565 U.S. 1048, 132 S. Ct. 608,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 446,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8296.
    November 18, 2011.
   H. Bartow Farr, III, Esquire, of Washington, D.C., is invited to brief and argue these cases, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, is severable from the entirety of the remainder of the Act.


text:
    No. 11-398.
    Department of Health and Human Services, et al., Petitioners v. Florida, et al.
    565 U.S. 1048, 132 S. Ct. 609,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 447,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8295.
    November 18, 2011.
   Robert A. Long, Esquire, of Washington, D.C., is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the position that the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars the suit brought by respondents to challenge the minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.


author: Justice Alito,

text:
    No. 11A501.
    John Doe #1, et al., Applicants v. Sam Reed, Secretary of State of Washington, et al.
    565 U.S. 1048, 132 S. Ct. 449,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 447,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8298.
    November 21, 2011.
   Application for injunction, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.

Opinion by

Justice Alito,

dissenting.

In Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 177 L. Ed. 2d 493 (2010), the Court rejected applicants’ facial challenge to the Washington law authorizing the disclosure of referendum petitions but assured applicants that the disclosure could be blocked if a proper party could show that compelled disclosure would result in “ ‘threats, harassment, or reprisals.’ ” Id., at 201, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 177 L. Ed. 2d 493. Today’s order reveals that this assurance was empty.

On remand, the District Court rejected applicants’ as-applied challenge, relying primarily on a highly questionable interpretation of our precedents. The District Court reasoned that only a select few organizations—what the court termed “minor” political parties and “fringe” groups—may challenge the disclosure of the names of persons who sign a referendum petition. Case No. C09-5456, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119814 (WD Wash., Oct. 17, 2011), pp. 13-15. If a referendum succeeds or nearly succeeds (or if the referendum supports a position that has not been historically vilified), then, according to the District Court, disclosure of the names of the citizens who signed the petition cannot be shielded no matter how strong the evidence of threatened retaliation or how severe the nature of the threats. Id., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119814, at 15. Whether this is a correct interpretation of our cases presents an important question that merits serious appellate review.

The alternative basis for the District Court’s holding—that applicants did not present sufficient evidence of threatened harm—also presents an important legal issue, namely, the type and quantity of proof that persons objecting to disclosure must adduce. As Judge N. R. Smith observed below, applicants adduced evidence that some supporters of the referendum “received death threats,” “had their children threatened,” and suffered various indignities, Case No. 11-35854 (CA9, Nov. 16, 2011), p. 8 (dissenting opinion), but according to the District Court, this was not enough. Whether the standard of proof applied by the District Court provides any real protection for persons who are threatened with retaliation for asserting their First Amendment rights is an important issue that merits considered appellate review.

There has been no such review in this case. When applicants took an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the panel denied the stay application over Judge Smith’s protest that the majority had “race[d] to decide the case at [a] preliminary stage based on incomplete information and without even reviewing the record.” Id., at 3.

This Court now takes a similar approach. Particularly since the referendum at issue went down to defeat more than two years ago, the Court’s haste is hard to understand. I would grant a stay at least until the Court has had an opportunity to review the record and to consider the parties’ arguments.


text:
    No. 10-218.
    PPL Montana, LLC, Petitioner v. Montana.
    565 U.S. 1050, 132 S. Ct. 609,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 448,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8300.
    November 22, 2011.
   Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 10-1150.
    Mayo Collaborative Services, dba Mayo Medical Laboratories, et al., Petitioners v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
    565 U.S. 1050, 132 S. Ct. 609,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 448,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8302.
    November 22, 2011.
   Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 10-1293.
    Federal Communications Commission, et al., Petitioners v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al.; and Federal Communications Commission, et al., Petitioners v. ABC, Inc., et al.
    565 U.S. 1050, 132 S. Ct. 609,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 448,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8304.
    November 22, 2011.
   Motion of respondents for divided argument granted. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 10-1399.
    Dana Roberts, Petitioner v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., et al.
    565 U.S. 1050, 132 S. Ct. 610,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 448,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8301.
    November 22, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 10-8505.
    Sandy Williams, Petitioner v. Illinois.
    565 U.S. 1050, 132 S. Ct. 610,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 448,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8303.
    November 22, 2011.
   Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


author: Justice Kagan

text:
    [565 U.S. 42]
    JOEL JUDULANG, Petitioner v ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL
    565 U.S. 42, 132 S. Ct. 476,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 449,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 9018
    [No. 10-694]
    Argued October 12, 2011.
    Decided December 12, 2011.

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL ARGUING CASE
    Mark C. Fleming argued the cause for petitioner.
    Curtis E. Gannon argued the cause for respondent.

      Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

[565 U.S. 45]

Justice Kagan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA or Board) policy for deciding when resident aliens may apply to the Attorney General for relief from deportation under a now-repealed provision of the immigration laws. We hold that the BIA’s approach is arbitrary and capricious.

The legal background of this case is complex, but the principle guiding our decision is anything but. When an administrative agency sets policy, it must provide a reasoned explanation for its action. That is not a high bar, but it is an unwavering one. Here, the BIA has failed to meet it.

I

A

Federal immigration law governs both the exclusion of aliens from admission to this country and the deportation of aliens previously admitted. Before 1996, these two kinds of action occurred in different procedural settings, with an alien seeking entry (whether for the first time or upon return from a trip abroad) placed in an “exclusion proceeding” and an alien already here channeled to a “deportation proceeding.” See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-26, 103 S. Ct. 321, 74 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1982)

[565 U.S. 46]

(comparing the two). Since that time, the Government has used a unified procedure, known as a “removal proceeding,” for exclusions and deportations alike. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229, 1229a. But the statutory bases for excluding and deporting aliens have always varied. Now, as before, the immigration laws provide two separate lists of substantive grounds, principally involving criminal offenses, for these two actions. One list specifies what kinds of crime render an alien excludable (or in the term the statute now uses, “inadmissible”), see § 1182(a) (2006 ed., Supp. IV), while another—sometimes overlapping and sometimes divergent—list specifies what kinds of crime render an alien deportable from the country, see § 1227(a).

An additional, historic difference between exclusion and deportation cases involved the ability of the Attorney General to grant an alien discretionary relief. Until repealed in 1996, § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 187, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994 ed.), authorized the Attorney General to admit certain ex-cludable aliens. See also § 136(p) (1926 ed.) (predecessor provision to § 212(c)). The Attorney General could order this relief when the alien had lawfully resided in the United States for at least seven years before temporarily leaving the country, unless the alien was excludable on one of two specified grounds. See § 1182(c) (1994 ed.). But by its terms, § 212(c) did not apply when an alien was being deported.

[565 U.S. 47]

This discrepancy threatened to produce an odd result in a case called Matter of L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (1940), leading to the first-ever grant of discretionary relief in a deportation case. L- was a permanent resident of the United States who had been convicted of larceny. Although L-’s crime made him inadmissible, he traveled abroad and then returned to the United States without any immigration official’s preventing his entry. A few months later, the Government caught up with L- and initiated a deportation action based on his larceny conviction. Had the Government apprehended L- at the border a short while earlier, he would have been placed in an exclusion proceeding where he could have applied for discretionary relief. But because L- was instead in a deportation proceeding, no such relief was available. Responding to this apparent anomaly, Attorney General Robert Jackson (on referral of the case from the BIA) determined that L-could receive a waiver: L-, Jackson said, “should be permitted to make the same appeal to discretion that he could have made if denied admission” when returning from his recent trip. Id., at 6. In accord with this decision, the BIA adopted a policy of allowing aliens in deportation proceedings to apply for discretionary relief under § 212(c) whenever they had left and reentered the country after becoming deportable. See Matter of S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392, 394-396 (1954).

But this approach created another peculiar asymmetry: Deportable aliens who had traveled abroad and returned could receive § 212(c) relief, while those who had never left could not. In Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (1976), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that this disparity violated equal protection. Id., at 273 (“[A]n alien whose ties with this country are so strong that he has never departed after his initial entry should receive at least as much consideration as an individual who may leave and return from time to time”). The BIA acquiesced in the Second Circuit’s decision, see Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26 (1976), thus applying § 212(c) in deportation proceedings regardless of an alien’s travel history.

[565 U.S. 48]

All this might have become academic when Congress repealed § 212(c) in 1996 and substituted a new discretionary remedy, known as “cancellation of removal,” which is available in a narrow range of circumstances to excludable and deportable aliens alike. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. But in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2001), this Court concluded that the broader relief afforded by § 212(c) must remain available, on the same terms as before, to an alien whose removal is based on a guilty plea entered before § 212(c)’s repeal. We reasoned that aliens had agreed to those pleas with the possibility of discretionary relief in mind and that eliminating this prospect would ill comport with “ ‘familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.’” Id., at 323, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1994)). Accordingly, § 212(c) has had an afterlife for resident aliens with old criminal convictions.

When the BIA is deciding whether to exclude such an alien, applying § 212(c) is an easy matter. The Board first checks the statutory ground that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified as the basis for exclusion; the Board may note, for example, that DHS has charged the alien with previously committing a “crime involving moral turpitude,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Unless the charged ground is one of the pair falling outside § 212(c)’s scope, see n. 1, supra, the alien is eligible for discretionary relief. The Board then determines whether to grant that relief based on such factors as “the seriousness of the offense, evidence of either rehabilitation or recidivism, the duration of the alien’s residence, the impact of deportation on the family, the number of citizens in the family, and the character of any service in the Armed Forces.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 296, n. 5, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347.

By contrast, when the BIA is deciding whether to deport an alien, applying § 212(c) becomes a tricky business. Recall

[565 U.S. 49]

that § 212(c) applies on its face only to exclusion decisions. So the question arises: How is the BIA to determine when an alien should receive § 212(c) relief in the deportation context?

One approach that the BIA formerly used considered how the alien would fare in an exclusion proceeding. To perform this analysis, the Board would first determine whether the criminal conviction making the alien deportable fell within a statutory ground for exclusion. Almost all convictions did so, largely because the “crime involving moral turpitude” ground encompasses so many offenses. Assuming that threshold inquiry were met, the Board would mimic its approach in exclusion cases—first making sure the statutory ground at issue was not excepted from § 212(c) and then conducting the multi-factor analysis. See Matter of Tanori, 15 I. & N. Dec. 566, 567-568 (1976); In re Manzueta, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ], 2003 WL 23269892 (BIA, Dec. 1, 2003).

A second approach is the one challenged here; definitively adopted in 2005 (after decades of occasional use), it often is called the “comparable-grounds” rule. See, e.g., De la Rosa v. United States AG, 579 F.3d 1327, 1332 (CA11 2009). That approach evaluates whether the ground for deportation charged in a case has a close analogue in the statute’s list of exclusion grounds. See In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728 (2005); In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766, 772-773 (2005). If the deportation ground consists of a set of crimes “substantially equivalent” to the set of offenses making up an exclusion ground, then the alien can seek § 212(c) relief. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec., at 728. But if the deportation ground

[565 U.S. 50]

charged covers significantly different or more or fewer offenses than any exclusion ground, the alien is not eligible for a waiver. Such a divergence makes § 212(c) inapplicable even if the particular offense committed by the alien falls within an exclusion ground.

Two contrasting examples from the BIA’s cases may help to illustrate this approach. Take first an alien convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine, whom DHS seeks to deport on the ground that he has committed an “aggravated felony” involving “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Under the comparable-grounds rule, the immigration judge would look to see if that deportation ground covers substantially the same offenses as an exclusion ground. And according to the BIA in Matter of Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. 257 (1991), the judge would find an adequate match—the exclusion ground applicable to aliens who have committed offenses “relating to a controlled substance,” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and (a)(2)(C).

Now consider an alien convicted of first-degree sexual abuse of a child, whom DHS wishes to deport on the ground that he has committed an “aggravated felony” involving “sexual abuse of a minor.” §§ 1101(a)(43)(A), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). May this alien seek § 212(c) relief? According to the BIA, he may not do so—not because his crime is too serious (that is irrelevant to the analysis), but instead because no statutory ground of exclusion covers substantially the same offenses. To be sure, the alien’s own offense is a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and so fits within an exclusion ground. Indeed, that will be true of most or all offenses included in this deportation category. See supra, at 49, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 458. But on the BIA’s view, the “moral turpitude” exclusion ground “addresses a distinctly different and much broader category of offenses than the aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor charge.” Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec., at 728. And the much greater sweep

[565 U.S. 51]

of the exclusion ground prevents the alien from seeking discretionary relief from deportation.

Those mathematically inclined might think of the comparable-grounds approach as employing Venn diagrams. Within one circle are all the criminal offenses composing the particular ground of deportation charged. Within other circles are the offenses composing the various exclusion grounds. When, but only when, the “deportation circle” sufficiently corresponds to one of the “exclusion circles” may an alien apply for § 212(c) relief.

B

Petitioner Joel Judulang is a native of the Philippines who entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight. Since that time, he has lived continuously in this country as a lawful permanent resident. In 1988, Judulang took part in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Judulang was charged as an accessory and eventually pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter. He received a 6-year suspended sentence and was released on probation immediately after his plea.

In 2005, after Judulang pleaded guilty to another criminal offense (this one involving theft), DHS commenced an action to deport him. DHS charged Judulang with having committed an “aggravated felony” involving “a crime of violence,” based on his old manslaughter conviction. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) The Immigration Judge

[565 U.S. 52]

ordered Judulang’s deportation, and the BIA affirmed. As part of its decision, the BIA considered whether Judulang could apply for § 212(c) relief. It held that he could not do so because the “crime of violence” deportation ground is not comparable to any exclusion ground, including the one for crimes involving moral turpitude. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang’s petition for review in reliance on circuit precedent upholding the BIA’s comparable-grounds approach. Judulang v. Gonzales, 249 Fed. Appx. 499, 502 (2007) (citing Abebe v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 1092 (2007)).

We granted certiorari, 563 U.S. 935, 131 S. Ct. 2093, 179 L. Ed. 2d 889 (2011), to resolve a circuit split on the approach’s validity. We now reverse.

II

This case requires us to decide whether the BIA’s policy for applying § 212(c) in deportation cases is “arbitrary [or] capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The scope of our review under this

[565 U.S. 53]

standard is “narrow”; as we have often recognized, “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971). Agencies, the BIA among them, have expertise and experience in administering their statutes that no court can properly ignore. But courts retain a role, and an important one, in ensuring that agencies have engaged in reasoned decisionmaking. When reviewing an agency action, we must assess, among other matters, “ ‘whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.’ ” State Farm, 463 U.S., at 43, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285, 95 S. Ct. 438, 42 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1974)). That task involves examining the reasons for agency decisions—or, as the case may be, the absence of such reasons. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 173 L. Ed. 2d 738 (2009) (noting “the requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action”).

The BIA has flunked that test here. By hinging a deportable alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief on the chance correspondence between statutory categories—a matter irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to reside in this country—the BIA has failed to exercise its discretion in a reasoned manner.

A

The parties here spend much time disputing whether the BIA must make discretionary relief available to deportable and excludable aliens on identical terms. As this case illustrates, the comparable-grounds approach does not do so. If Judulang were seeking entry to this country, he would be

[565 U.S. 54]

eligible for § 212(c) relief; voluntary manslaughter is “a crime involving moral turpitude,” and so his conviction falls within an exclusion ground. But Judulang cannot apply for relief from deportation because the “crime of violence” ground charged in his case does not match any exclusion ground (including the one for “turpitu-dinous” crimes). See infra, at 57, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 463. Judulang argues that this disparity is impermissible because any disparity between excludable and deportable aliens is impermissible: If an alien may seek § 212(c) relief in an exclusion case, he also must be able to seek such relief in a deportation case. See Brief for Petitioner 47-51. But the Government notes that the immigration laws have always drawn distinctions between exclusion and deportation. See Brief for Respondent 51. And the Government presses a policy reason for making § 212(c) relief more readily available in exclusion cases. Doing so, it argues, will provide an incentive for some resident aliens (i.e., those eligible for a waiver from exclusion, but not deportation) to report themselves to immigration officials, by applying for advance permission to exit and reenter the country. In contrast, applying § 212(c) uniformly might lead all aliens to “try to

[565 U.S. 55]

evade immigration officials for as long as possible,” because they could in any event “seek [discretionary] relief if caught.” Id., at 52.

In the end, we think this dispute beside the point, and we do not resolve it. The BIA may well have legitimate reasons for limiting § 212(c)’s scope in deportation cases. But still, it must do so in some rational way. If the BIA proposed to narrow the class of deportable aliens eligible to seek § 212(c) relief by flipping a coin— heads an alien may apply for relief, tails he may not—we would reverse the policy in an instant. That is because agency action must be based on non-arbitrary, “ ‘relevant factors,’ ” State Farm, 463 U.S., at 43, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (quoting Bowman Transp., 419 U.S., at 285, 95 S. Ct. 438, 42 L. Ed. 2d 447), which here means that the BIA’s approach must be tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration system. A method for disfavoring de-portable aliens that bears no relation to these matters—that neither focuses on nor relates to an alien’s fitness to remain in the country—is arbitrary and capricious. And that is true regardless whether the BIA might have acted to limit the class of deportable aliens eligible for § 212(c) relief on other, more rational bases.

The problem with the comparable-grounds policy is that it does not impose such a reasonable limitation. Rather than considering factors that might be thought germane to the deportation decision, that policy hinges § 212(c) eligibility on an irrelevant comparison between statutory provisions. Recall that the BIA asks whether the set of offenses in a particular deportation ground lines up with the set in an exclusion ground. But so what if it does? Does an alien charged with a particular deportation ground become more worthy of relief because that ground happens to match up with another? Or less worthy of relief because the ground does not? The comparison in no way changes the alien’s prior offense or his other attributes and circumstances. So it is difficult to see why that comparison should matter. Each

[565 U.S. 56]

of these statutory grounds contains a slew of offenses. Whether each contains the same slew has nothing to do with whether a deportable alien whose prior conviction falls within both grounds merits the ability to seek a waiver.

This case well illustrates the point. In commencing Judulang’s deportation proceeding, the Government charged him with an “aggravated felony” involving a “crime of violence” based on his prior manslaughter conviction. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 11a-12a. That made him ineligible for § 212(c) relief because the “crime of violence” deportation ground does not sufficiently overlap with the most similar exclusion ground, for “crime[s] involving moral turpitude.” The problem, according to the BIA, is that the “crime of violence” ground includes a few offenses—simple assault, minor burglary, and unauthorized use of a vehicle—that the “moral turpitude” ground does not. See Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec., at 772-773; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29, 40-41. But this statutory difference in no way relates to Judulang—or to most other aliens charged with committing a “crime of violence.” Perhaps aliens like Judulang should be eligible for § 212(c) relief, or perhaps they should not. But that determination is not sensibly made by establishing that simple assaults and minor burglaries fall outside a ground for exclusion. That fact is as extraneous to the merits of the case as a coin flip would be. It makes Judulang no less deserving of the opportunity to seek discretionary relief—just as its converse (the inclusion of simple assaults and burglaries in the “moral turpitude” exclusion ground) would make him no more so.

[565 U.S. 57]

Or consider a different head-scratching oddity of the comparable-grounds approach—that it may deny § 212(c) eligibility to aliens whose deportation ground fits entirely inside an exclusion ground. The BIA’s Blake decision, noted earlier, provides an example. See supra, at 50, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 458-459. The deportation ground charged was “aggravated felony” involving “sexual abuse of a minor”; the closest exclusion ground was, once again, a “crime [of] moral turpitude.” 23 I. & N. Dec., at 727. Here, the BIA’s problem was not that the deportation ground covered too many offenses; all or virtually all the crimes within that ground also are crimes of moral turpitude. Rather, the BIA objected that the deportation ground covered too few crimes—or put oppositely, that “the moral turpitude ground of exclusion addresses a . . . much broader category of offenses.” Id., at 728. But providing relief in exclusion cases to a broad class of aliens hardly justifies denying relief in deportation cases to a subset of that group. (The better argument would surely be the reverse—that giving relief in the one context supports doing so in the other.) Again, we do not say today that the BIA must give all deportable aliens meeting § 212(c)’s requirements the chance to apply for a waiver. See supra, at 55-56, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 461-462. The point is instead that the BIA cannot make that opportunity turn on the meaningless matching of statutory grounds.

And underneath this layer of arbitrariness lies yet another, because the outcome of the Board’s comparable-grounds analysis itself may rest on the happenstance of an immigration official’s charging decision. This problem arises because an alien’s prior conviction may fall within a number of deportation grounds, only one of which corresponds to an exclusion ground. Consider, for example, an alien who entered the country in 1984 and committed voluntary

[565 U.S. 58]

manslaughter in 1988. That person could be charged (as Judulang was) with an “aggravated felony” involving a “crime of violence,” see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). If so, the alien could not seek a waiver because of the absence of a comparable exclusion ground. But the alien also could be charged with “a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of admission,” see § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). And if that were the deportation charge, the alien could, apply for relief, because the ground corresponds to the “moral turpitude” ground used in exclusion cases. See In re Salmon, 16 I. & N. Dec. 734 (1978). So everything hangs on the charge. And the Government has provided no reason to think that immigration officials must adhere to any set scheme in deciding what charges to bring, or that those officials are exercising their charging discretion with § 212(c) in mind. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34-36. So at base everything hangs on the fortuity of an individual official’s decision. An alien appearing before one official may suffer deportation; an identically situated alien appearing before another may gain the right to stay in this country.

In a foundational deportation case, this Court recognized the high stakes for an alien who has long resided in this country, and reversed an agency decision that would “make his right to remain here dependent on circumstances so fortuitous and capricious.” Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391, 68 S. Ct. 10, 92 L. Ed. 17 (1947). We think the policy before us similarly flawed. The comparable-grounds approach does not rest on any factors relevant to whether an alien (or any group of aliens) should be deported. It instead distinguishes among aliens—decides who should be eligible for discretionary relief and who should not—solely by comparing the metes and bounds of diverse statutory categories into which an alien falls. The resulting Venn diagrams have no connection to the goals of the deportation process or the rational operation of the immigration laws. Judge Learned Hand wrote in

[565 U.S. 59]

another early immigration case that deportation decisions cannot be made a “sport of chance.” See Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (CA2 1947) (quoted in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 455, 83 S. Ct. 1804, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1963)). That is what the comparable-grounds rule brings about, and that is what the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard is designed to thwart.

B

The Government makes three arguments in defense of the comparable-grounds rule—the first based on statutory text, the next on history, the last on cost. We find none of them persuasive.

1

The Government initially contends that the comparable-grounds approach is more faithful to “the statute’s language,” Brief for Respondent 21—or otherwise said, that “lifting that limit ‘would take immigration practice even further from the statutory text,’ ” id., at 22 (quoting Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 287 (1990)). In the Government’s view, § 212(c) is “phrased in terms of waiving statutorily specified grounds of exclusion”; that phrasing, says the Government, counsels a comparative analysis of grounds when applying § 212(c) in the deportation context. Brief for Respondent 21; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 34 (“[T]he reason [the comparable-grounds approach] makes sense is because the statute only provides for relief from grounds of . . . exclusion”).

The first difficulty with this argument is that it is based on an inaccurate description of the statute. Section 212(c) instructs that certain resident aliens “may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General” notwithstanding any of “the provisions of subsection (a) . . . (other than paragraphs (3) and (9)(C)).” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994 ed.). Subsection (a) contains the full list of exclusion grounds; paragraphs (3) and (9)(C) (which deal with national security

[565 U.S. 60]

and international child abduction) are two among these. What § 212(c) actually says, then, is that the Attorney General may admit any excludable alien, except if the alien is charged with two specified grounds. And that means that once the Attorney General determines that the alien is not being excluded for those two reasons, the ground of exclusion no longer matters. At that point, the alien is eligible for relief, and the thing the Attorney General waives is not a particular exclusion ground, but the simple denial of entry. So the premise of the Government’s argument is wrong. And if the premise, so too the conclusion—that is, because § 212(c)’s text is not “phrased in terms of waiving statutorily specified grounds of exclusion,” Brief for Respondent 21, it cannot counsel a search for corresponding grounds of deportation.

More fundamentally, the comparable-grounds approach would not follow from § 212(c) even were the Government right about the section’s phrasing. That is because § 212(c) simply has nothing to do with deportation: The provision was not meant to interact with the statutory grounds for deportation, any more than those grounds were designed to interact with the provision. Rather, § 212(c) refers solely to exclusion decisions; its extension to deportation cases arose from the agency’s extra-textual view that some similar relief should be available in that context to avoid unreasonable distinctions. Cf., e.g., Matter of L-, 1 I. & N. Dec., at 5; see also supra, at 47, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 457. Accordingly, the text of § 212(c), whether or

[565 U.S. 61]

not phrased in terms of “waiving grounds of exclusion,” cannot support the BIA’s use of the comparable-grounds rule—or, for that matter, any other method for extending discretionary relief to deportation cases. We well understand the difficulties of operating in such a text-free zone; indeed, we appreciate the Government’s yearning for a textual anchor. But § 212(c), no matter how many times read or parsed, does not provide one.

2

In disputing Judulang’s contentions, the Government also emphasizes the comparable-grounds rule’s vintage. See Brief for Respondent 22-23, 30-43. As an initial matter, we think this a slender reed to support a significant government policy. Arbitrary agency action becomes no less so by simple dint of repetition. (To use a prior analogy, flipping coins to determine § 212(c) eligibility would remain as arbitrary on the thousandth try as on the first.) And longstanding capriciousness receives no special exemption from the APA. In any event, we cannot detect the consistency that the BIA claims has marked its approach to this issue. To the contrary, the BIA has repeatedly vacillated in its method for applying § 212(c) to deportable aliens.

Prior to 1984, the BIA endorsed a variety of approaches. In Matter of T-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 389, 390 (1953), for example, the BIA held that an alien was not eligible for § 212(c) relief because her “ground of deportation” did not appear in the exclusion statute. That decision anticipated the comparable-grounds approach that the BIA today uses. But in Tanori, the BIA pronounced that a deportable alien could apply for a waiver because “the same facts”—in that case, a marijuana conviction—would have allowed him to seek § 212(c) relief in an exclusion proceeding. 15 I. & N. Dec., at 568. That approach is more nearly similar to the one Judulang urges here. And then, in Matter of Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728 (1979), the BIA tried to have it both ways: It denied § 212(c) eligibility both because the deportation ground charged did not correspond to, and because the alien’s prior

[565 U.S. 62]

conviction did not fall within, a waivable ground of exclusion. In short, the BIA’s cases were all over the map.

The Government insists that the BIA imposed order in Matter of Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 185-186 (1984), when it held that a deportable alien could not seek § 212(c) relief unless the deportation ground charged had an “analogous ground of inadmissibility.” See Brief for Respondent 40-41. But the BIA’s settlement, if any, was fleeting. Just seven years later, the BIA adopted a new policy entirely, extending § 212(c) eligibility to “aliens deportable under any ground of de-portability except those where there is a comparable ground of exclusion which has been specifically excepted from section 212(c).” Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec., at 266. That new rule turned the comparable-grounds approach inside-out, allowing aliens to seek § 212(c) relief in deportation cases except when the ground charged corresponded to an exclusion ground that could not be waived. To be sure, the Attorney General (on referral of the case from the BIA), disavowed this position in favor of the more standard version of the comparable-grounds rule. Id., at 287. But even while doing so, the Attorney General stated that “an alien subject to deportation must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien . . . subject to exclusion.” Ibid. That assertion is exactly the one Judulang makes in this case; it is consonant not with the comparable-grounds rule the BIA here defends, but instead with an inquiry into whether an alien’s prior conviction falls within an exclusion ground.

Given these mixed signals, it is perhaps not surprising that the BIA continued to alternate between approaches in the years that followed. Immediately after the Attorney General’s opinion in Hernandez-Casillas, the BIA endorsed the comparable-grounds approach on several occasions. See Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec., at 259; Matter of Montenegro, 20 I. & N. Dec. 603, 604-605 (1992); Matter of Gabryelsky, 20 I. & N. Dec. 750, 753-754 (1993); In re Esposito, 21 I. & N.

[565 U.S. 63]

Dec. 1, 6-7 (1995); In re Jimenez-Santillano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 567, 571-572 (1996). But just a few years later, the BIA issued a series of unpublished opinions that asked only whether a deportable alien’s prior conviction fell within an exclusion ground. See, e.g., In re Manzueta, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ], 2003 WL 23269892 (Dec. 1, 2003). Not until the BIA’s decisions in Blake and Brieva-Perez did the pendulum stop swinging. That history hardly supports the Government’s view of a consistent agency practice.

3

The Government finally argues that the comparable-grounds rule saves time and money. The Government claims that comparing deportation grounds to exclusion grounds can be accomplished in just a few “prec-edential decision [s],” which then can govern broad swaths of cases. See Brief for Respondent 46. By contrast, the Government argues, Judulang’s approach would force it to determine whether each and every crime of conviction falls within an exclusion ground. Further, the Government contends that Judulang’s approach would grant eligibility to a greater number of deportable aliens, which in turn would force the Government to make additional individualized assessments of whether to actually grant relief. Id., at 47.

Once again, the Government’s rationale comes up short. Cost is an important factor for agencies to consider in many

[565 U.S. 64]

contexts. But cheapness alone cannot save an arbitrary agency policy. (If it could, flipping coins would be a valid way to determine an alien’s eligibility for a waiver.) And in any event, we suspect the Government exaggerates the cost savings associated with the comparable-grounds rule. Judulang’s proposed approach asks immigration officials only to do what they have done for years in exclusion cases; that means, for one thing, that officials can make use of substantial existing precedent governing whether a crime falls within a ground of exclusion. And Judulang’s proposal may not be the only alternative to the comparable-grounds rule. See supra, at 55-56, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 461-462. In rejecting that rule, we do not preclude the BIA from trying to devise another, equally economical policy respecting eligibility for § 212(c) relief, so long as it comports with everything held in both this decision and St. Cyr.

Ill

We must reverse an agency policy when we cannot discern a reason for it. That is the trouble in this case. The BIA’s comparable-grounds rule is unmoored from the purposes and concerns of the immigration laws. It allows an irrelevant comparison between statutory provisions to govern a matter of the utmost importance—whether lawful resident aliens with longstanding ties to this country may stay here. And contrary to the Government’s protestations, it is not supported by text or practice or cost considerations. The BIA’s approach therefore cannot pass muster under ordinary principles of administrative law.

The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is hereby reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

      . The relevant part of § 212(c), in the version of the exclusion statute all parties use, reads as follows:
      “Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelin-quished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section (other than paragraphs (3) and (9)(C)).’’ 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994 ed.).

        The parenthetical clause of this section prevented the Attorney General from waiving exclusion for aliens who posed a threat to national security, § 1182(a)(3), and aliens who engaged in international child abduction, § 1182(a)(9)(C).

      . Firearms offenses are the most significant crimes falling outside the statutory grounds for exclusion. See Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 282, n. 4 (1990).

      . Blake and Brieva-Perez clarified a 2004 regulation issued by the BIA stating that an alien is ineligible for § 212(c) relief when deportable “on a ground which does not have a statutory counterpart in section 212.’’ 8 CFR § 1212.3(f)(5) (2010).

      . Careful readers may note that the example involving controlled substances offered in the last paragraph also involves an exclusion ground that sweeps more broadly than the deportation ground charged. The deportation ground requires “trafficking” in a controlled substance, whereas the exclusion ground includes all possession offenses as well. The BIA nonetheless held in Meza that the degree of overlap between the two grounds was sufficient to make the alien eligible for § 212(c) relief. That holding reveals the broad discretion that the BIA currently exercises in deciding when two statutory grounds are comparable enough.

      . DHS also charged two other grounds for deportation, but the BIA did not rule on those grounds and they are not before us.

      . Compare Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 103 (CA2 2007) (rejecting the BIA’s approach and holding instead that “[i]f the offense that renders [an alien] deportable would render a similarly situated [alien] excludable, the deportable [alien] is eligible for a waiver of deportation”), with Koussan v. Holder, 556 F.3d 403, 412-414 (CA6 2009) (upholding the comparable-grounds policy); Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 162-163, 168 (CA3 2007) (same); Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58, 62-63 (CA1 2006) (same).

      . The Government urges us instead to analyze this case under the second step of the test we announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984), to govern judicial review of an agency’s statutory interpretations. See Brief for Respondent 19. Were we to do so, our analysis would be the same, because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is “ ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’ ” Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53, 131 S. Ct. 704, 178 L. Ed. 2d 588 (2011) (quoting Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242, 124 S. Ct. 1741, 158 L. Ed. 2d 450 (2004)). But we think the more apt analytic framework in this case is standard “arbitrary [or] capricious” review under the APA. The BIA’s comparable-grounds policy, as articulated in In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (2005), and In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (2005), is not an interpretation of any statutory language—nor could it be, given that § 212(c) does not mention deportation cases, see infra, at 60-61, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 464-465, and n. 11.

      . Judulang also argues that the BIA is making an impermissible distinction between two groups of deportable aliens—those who have recently left and returned to the country and those who have not. According to Judulang, the BIA is treating the former as if they were seeking admission, while applying the “comparable grounds’’ approach only to the latter. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 16-18. That is the kind of distinction the Second Circuit held in Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (1976), violated equal protection. See supra, at 47, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 457. But the Government contends that it is drawing no such line—that it is applying the comparable-grounds policy to all deportable aliens. Brief for Respondent 29. We think the available evidence tends to support the Government’s representation. See In re Meza-Castillo, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ], 2009 WL 455596 (BIA, Feb. 9, 2009) (applying comparable-grounds analysis to a deportable alien who had left and returned to the country); In re Valenzuela-Morales, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ], 2008 WL 2079382 (BIA, Apr. 23, 2008) (same). But in light of our holding that the comparable-grounds approach is arbitrary and capricious, we need not resolve this dispute about the BIA’s practice.

      . The case would be different if Congress had intended for § 212(c) relief to depend on the interaction of exclusion grounds and deportation grounds. But the Government has presented us with no evidence to this effect, nor have we found any. See Blake, 489 F.3d, at 102 (Congress never contemplated, in drafting the immigration laws, “that its grounds of deportation would have any connection with the grounds of exclusion’’ in the application of § 212(c)); see also infra, at 60-61, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 464-465.

      . Perhaps that is why the BIA declined to apply similar reasoning in Meza—a case also involving an exclusion ground that sweeps more broadly than a deportation ground (although not to the same extent as in Blake). See supra, at 50, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 458-459.

      . Congress amended § 212(c), just five months before repealing it, to include a first-time reference to deportation cases. That amendment prohibited the Attorney General from granting discretionary relief to aliens deportable on several specified grounds. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1277 (effective Apr. 24, 1996). The change does not affect our analysis, nor does the Government argue it should. As the Government notes, the amendment “did not speak to the viability of the Board’s’’ comparable-grounds rule, but instead made categorically ineligible for § 212(c) relief “those deportable by reason of certain crimes.’’ Brief for Respondent 20. Presumably, Congress thought those crimes particularly incompatible with an alien’s continued residence in this country.

      . Because we find the BIA’s prior practice so unsettled, we likewise reject Judulang’s argument that Blake and Brieva-Perez were impermissibly retroactive. To succeed on that theory, Judulang would have to show, at a minimum, that in entering his guilty plea, he had reasonably relied on a legal rule from which Blake and Brieva-Perez departed. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1994) (stating that retroactivity analysis focuses on “considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations’’). The instability of the BIA’s prior practice prevents Judulang from making this showing: The BIA sometimes recognized aliens in Judulang’s position as eligible for § 212(c) relief, but sometimes did not.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    [565 U.S. 65]
    MARCUS HARDY, WARDEN, Petitioner v IRVING L. CROSS
    565 U.S. 65, 132 S. Ct. 490,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 468,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 9019
    [No. 11-74]
    Decided December 12, 2011.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

[565 U.S. 66]

Per Curiam.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 179 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the Court of Appeals departed from this standard, and we therefore grant certiorari and reverse.

Irving Cross was tried for kidnap-ing and sexually assaulting A. S. at knifepoint. Cross claimed that A. S. had consented to sex in exchange for money and drugs. Despite her avowed fear of taking the stand, A. S. testified as the State’s primary witness at Cross’ trial in November 1999 and was cross-examined by Cross’ attorney. According to the trial judge, A. S.’s testimony was halting. The jury found Cross not guilty of kidnaping but was unable to reach a verdict on the sexual assault charges, and the trial judge declared a mistrial. The State decided to retry Cross on those counts, and the retrial was scheduled for March 29, 2000.

On March 20, 2000, the prosecutor informed the trial judge that A. S. could not be located. A week later, on March 28, the State moved to have A. S. declared unavailable and to introduce her prior testimony at the second trial.

The State represented that A. S. had said after the first trial that she was willing to testify at the retrial. The State said that it had remained in “constant contact” with A. S. and her mother and that “[e]very indication” had been that A. S., “though extremely frightened, would be willing to again come to court and testify.” Record, Exh. J, p. 111 (hereinafter Exh. J). On March 3, however, A. S.’s mother and brother told the State’s investigator that they did not know where she was, and A. S.’s mother reported that A. S. was “very fearful and very concerned” about testifying again. Record, Exh. K, p. E-9 (hereinafter Exh. K); id., at E-14. On March 9 or 10, the investigator interviewed

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A. S.’s father, who also had “no idea where [A. S.] was.” Id., at E-12. The father’s only suggestion was to refer the investigator back to the mother.

On March 10, the State learned from A. S.’s mother that A. S. had run away from home the day before and had not returned. Exh. J, at 111. Thereafter, “efforts began by members of the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office and by law enforcement personnel to locate” A. S. Id., at 112. The State averred that its efforts included the following:

“Constant personal visits to the home of [A. S.] and her mother, at all hours of the day and night. This is where the victim has lived since the sexual assault occurred.
“Personal visits to the home of [A. S.’s] father. This is where the victim lived when the sexual assault occurred.
“Personal conversations, in English and in Spanish, with the victim’s mother, father, and other family members.
“Telephone calls, in English and in Spanish, to the victim’s mother, father, and other family members.
“Checks at the Office of the Medical Examiner of Cook County.
“Checks at local hospitals.
“Checks at the Cook County Department of Corrections.
“Check at the victim’s school.
“Check with the family of an old boyfriend of the victim.
“Check with the Illinois Secretary of State’s Office.
“[Department of] Public [A] id check.” Id., at 112-113.

The State also inquired at the Department of Public Health, the morgue, the Cook County Jail, the Illinois Department

[565 U.S. 68]

of Corrections, the Immigration Department, and the post office. See Exh. K, at E-14 to E-17, E-21; App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. The State’s investigator was assisted in the search by a police detective and a victim’s advocate. The detective visited A. S.’s father’s home once and went to A. S.’s mother’s home—A. S.’s last-known residence—on numerous occasions, approximately once every three days, at different hours of the day and night. Exh. K, at E27 to E29, E35. On one visit, A. S.’s mother told the victim’s advocate that A. S. could be staying with an ex-boyfriend in Waukegan, Illinois, 40 miles away. Id., at E42 to E43. The police detective visited the Waukegan address but was informed by the ex-boyfriend’s mother that she had not seen A. S. in several months and that A. S. was not staying with her or her son. Id., at E33 to E34. The efforts to find A. S. continued until March 28, the day of the hearing on the State’s motion. Id., at E30.

On a final visit to A. S.’s mother on the morning of March 28, the mother informed the police detective that A. S. had called approximately two weeks earlier and had said that she did not want to testify and would not return to Chicago. See id., at E-30; 632 F.3d 356, 359 (CA7 2011). A. S.’s mother told the detective that she still did not know where A. S. was or how to contact her. Exh. K, at E30. The trial court granted the State’s motion and admitted A. S.’s earlier testimony.

The trial court concluded that the State had “expended efforts that go way beyond due diligence,” id., at E-65, and that A. S. “ha[d] made it impossible for anybody to find where she is ... in spite of what I think are superhuman efforts to locate [her],” id., at E-67. At Cross’ retrial, a legal intern from the State’s attorney’s office read A. S.’s prior, cross-examined testimony to the jury. According to the opinion below, the clerk’s reading of the prior testimony did not include the long pauses that occurred at the first trial, and the clerk read the transcript with a slight inflection. See 632 F.3d, at 359. The jury acquitted

[565 U.S. 69]

Cross of aggravated sexual assault but found him guilty of two counts of criminal sexual assault.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed that A. S. was unavailable because “[i]t is clear from her telephone conversation with her mother that she was not in the city” and “also evident that she was in hiding and did not want to be located.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a. The court found that the State had conducted a good-faith, diligent search to locate A. S., and that the trial court had properly allowed the introduction of A. S.’s cross-examined testimony from the first trial. The court, therefore, affirmed Cross’ convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Cross’ petition for leave to appeal, and we denied Cross’ petition for a writ of certiorari.

Cross then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Cross argued, among other things, that the state court had unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedents holding that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment precludes the admission of the prior testimony of an allegedly unavailable witness unless the prosecution made a good-faith effort to obtain the de-clarant’s presence at trial. The District Court denied Cross’ petition, but the Seventh Circuit reversed. According to the Seventh Circuit, the Illinois Appellate Court was unreasonable in holding that the State had made a sufficient effort to secure A. S.’s presence at the retrial. The Seventh Circuit stressed the importance of A. S.’s testimony and the manner of her testimony at the first trial.

In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968), we held that “a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of the . . . confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” Id., at 724-725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255. In Barber, we held that a witness had not been unavailable for Confrontation Clause purposes because the

[565 U.S. 70]

State, which could have brought the witness to court by seeking a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, had “made absolutely no effort to obtain [his] presence ... at trial” apart from determining that he was serving a sentence in a federal prison. Id., at 723, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255; see also id., at 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255.

We again addressed the question of witness unavailability in Ohio v. Rob erts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980). In that case, we held, the State had discharged its “duty of good-faith effort.” Id., at 75, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597. We noted that the prosecutor had spoken to the witness’ mother, who reported that she had no knowledge of her daughter’s whereabouts and “knew of no way to reach [her] even in an emergency.” Ibid. We also noted that the State had served five subpoenas in the witness’ name to her parents’ residence over a 4-month period prior to the trial. “ ‘The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness,’ ” the Court made clear, “ ‘is a question of reasonableness.’ ” Id., at 74, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189, n. 22, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). We acknowledged that there were some additional steps that the prosecutor might have taken in an effort to find the witness, but we observed that “[o]ne, in hindsight, may always think of other things.” 448 U.S., at 75, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597. But “the great improbability that such efforts would have resulted in locating the witness, and would have led to her production at trial, neutralizes any intimation that a concept of reasonableness required their execution.” Id., at 76, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597.

In the present case, the holding of the Illinois Appellate Court that the State conducted the requisite good-faith search for A. S. did not represent an unreasonable application of our Confrontation Clause precedents. Whether or not the state court went too far in characterizing the prosecution’s efforts as “superhuman,” the state court identified the correct Sixth Amendment standard and applied it in a reasonable manner.

The Seventh Circuit found that the State’s efforts were inadequate for three main reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit

[565 U.S. 71]

faulted the State for failing to contact “A. S.’s current boyfriend—whom she was with just moments before the alleged assault—or any of her other friends in the Chicago area.” 632 F.3d, at 362. But the record does not show that any of A. S.’s family members or any other persons interviewed by the State provided any reason to believe that any of these individuals had information about A. S.’s whereabouts.

Second, the Seventh Circuit criticized the State because it did not make inquiries at the cosmetology school where A. S. had once been enrolled, ibid., but the court’s own opinion observed that the information about A. S.’s enrollment at the cosmetology school after the mistrial was not “noteworthy” or “particularly helpful,” ibid. Since A. S. had not attended the school for some time, Exh. K, at E-42, there is no reason to believe that anyone at the school had better information about A. S.’s location than did the members of her family.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that the State’s efforts were insufficient because it had neglected to serve her with a subpoena after she expressed fear about testifying at the retrial. A. S., however, had expressed fear about testifying at the first trial but had nevertheless appeared in court and had taken the stand. The State represented that A. S., although fearful, had agreed to testify at the retrial as well. 632 F.3d, at 362. We have never held that the prosecution must have issued a subpoena if it wishes to prove that a witness who goes into hiding is unavailable for Confrontation Clause purposes, and the issuance of a subpoena may do little good if a sexual assault witness is so fearful of an assailant that she is willing to risk his acquittal by failing to testify at trial.

As we observed in Roberts, when a witness disappears before trial, it is always possible to think of additional steps that the prosecution might have taken to secure the witness’ presence, see 448 U.S., at 75, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, but the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust every avenue of inquiry,

[565 U.S. 72]

no matter how unpromising. And, more to the point, the deferential standard of review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not permit a federal court to overturn a state court’s decision on the question of unavailability merely because the federal court identifies additional steps that might have been taken. Under AEDPA, if the state-court decision was reasonable, it cannot be disturbed.

The petition for a writ of certiorari and Cross’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is reversed.

       The State’s motion does not mention the investigator’s March 3 visit with A. S.’s mother and brother, and the record in this case does not make entirely clear when A. S. disappeared and when the State’s attorney actually became aware of this fact. In any event, the parties do not dispute the facts in this case regarding the State’s efforts to locate A. S. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a.


text:
    No. 10-11113.
    Nicholas Bernard Fuller, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1050, 132 S. Ct. 755,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 475,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8466.
    November 28, 2011.
   On petition for writ certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 180 L. Ed. 2d 60 (2011).

Same case below, 419 Fed. Appx. 655.


text:
    No. 11-6476.
    Patricia J. Curto, Petitioner v. Donald W. Smith, et al.
    565 U.S. 1051, 132 S. Ct. 767,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 475,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8338.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and petition submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S. Ct. 397, 121 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992) (per curiam). Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.


text:
    No. 11-6498.
    Dale Maisano, Petitioner v. Arizona.
    565 U.S. 1051, 132 S. Ct. 768,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 475,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8414.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 11-6521.
    Assem A. Abulkhair, Petitioner v. Menelaos Toskos, et al.
    565 U.S. 1051, 132 S. Ct. 771,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 475,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8361.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

Same case below, 430 Fed. Appx. 98.


text:
    No. 11-6534.
    Raymond Engle, Petitioner v. Mary L. Wiseman, Judge, Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Montgomery County, et al.
    565 U.S. 1051, 132 S. Ct. 771,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 475,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8365.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S. Ct. 397, 121 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992) (per curiam). The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.


text:
    No. 11-6573.
    Donald G. Jones, Petitioner v. Whitney Holding Corporation, et al.
    565 U.S. 1051, 132 S. Ct. 773,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 476,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8453.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 11-6616.
    Paul Blackmer, Petitioner v. Social Security Administration.
    565 U.S. 1051, 132 S. Ct. 799,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 476,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8445.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 11-6617.
    Larry Lee Butler, Petitioner v. Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
    565 U.S. 1051, 132 S. Ct. 776,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 476,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8319.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 11-6645.
    Maxwell R. Joelson, Petitioner v. Department of Justice, et al.
    565 U.S. 1052, 132 S. Ct. 777,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 476,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8347.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 11-6806.
    Daniel L. Spuck, Petitioner v. Ammerman Fredric.
    565 U.S. 1052, 132 S. Ct. 781,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 476,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8380.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S. Ct. 397, 121 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992) (per curiam).

Same case below, 415 Fed. Appx. 358.


text:
    No. 11A363.
    Paul A. Gargano, Applicant v. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    565 U.S. 1052, 132 S. Ct. 794,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 477,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8545.
    November 28, 2011.
   Application for stay, addressed to Justice Scalia and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 11M45.
    Brian Keith Waugh, Petitioner v. Anheuser-Busch Inbev, et al.
    565 U.S. 1054, 132 S. Ct. 794,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 477,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8577.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file a petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. 10-10325.
    Howard Ellis, Petitioner v. Nevada.
    565 U.S. 1055, 132 S. Ct. 795,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 477,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8591.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 10-10726.
    David L. Green, Petitioner v. Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy.
    565 U.S. 1055, 132 S. Ct. 795,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 477,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8465.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 10-10921.
    William Clayton Mc-Kinnedy, III, Petitioner v. Cecilia R. Reynolds, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1055, 132 S. Ct. 795,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 477,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8533.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 10-10941.
    Thelma Williams, Petitioner v. Correctional Officer Moore.
    565 U.S. 1055, 132 S. Ct. 795,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 477,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8509.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 10-11038.
    Kevin E. Burns, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Revenue of Minnesota.
    565 U.S. 1055, 132 S. Ct. 795,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 477,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8611.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 10-11039.
    In re Kevin E. Burns, et ux., Petitioners.
    565 U.S. 1055, 132 S. Ct. 795,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 477,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8553.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioners for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 10-11235.
    Harold H. Hodge, Jr., Petitioner v. Board of County Commissioners, et al.
    565 U.S. 1055, 132 S. Ct. 796,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 478,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8516.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 11-5218.
    In re Maurice Grayton, Petitioner.
    565 U.S. 1055, 132 S. Ct. 796,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 478,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8645.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 11-5707.
    Jeffrey Sanders, Petitioner v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
    565 U.S. 1055, 132 S. Ct. 796,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 478,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8650.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 11-5792.
    Albert Morgan, Jr., Petitioner v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
    565 U.S. 1055, 132 S. Ct. 796,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 478,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8468.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 11-5954.
    Cheryl J. Latos, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
    565 U.S. 1055, 132 S. Ct. 796,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 478,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8548.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 11-6147.
    John Ernest Dade, Petitioner v. United States District Court for the District of Idaho.
    565 U.S. 1056, 132 S. Ct. 796,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 478,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8632.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 11-6439.
    John Richard Eby, Petitioner v. Arizona.
    565 U.S. 1056, 132 S. Ct. 797,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 478,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8478.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied. Petitioner is allowed until December 19, 2011, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

Same case below, 226 Ariz. 179, 244 P.3d 1177.


text:
    No. 11-6460.
    Rosie Washington, et vir, Petitioners v. Louisiana, et al.
    565 U.S. 1056, 132 S. Ct. 797,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 478,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8536.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until December 19, 2011, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

Same case below, 425 Fed. Appx. 330.


text:
    No. 11-6587.
    Roger J. Day, Petitioner v. Minnesota, et al.
    565 U.S. 1056, 132 S. Ct. 797,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 479,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8511.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied. Petitioner is allowed until December 19, 2011, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 11-6711.
    Angeliki Papadimitriou, Petitioner v. John Papadimitriou.
    565 U.S. 1056, 132 S. Ct. 797,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 479,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8646.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied. Petitioner is allowed until December 19, 2011, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

Same case below, 417 Md. 502, 10 A.3d 1181.


text:
    No. 11-6898.
    William E. Leventhal, Petitioner v. Daniel Schaffer, et al.
    565 U.S. 1056, 132 S. Ct. 797,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 479,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8476.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied. Petitioner is allowed until December 19, 2011, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

Same case below, 418 Fed. Appx. 588.


text:
    No. 11-7000.
    William M. Windsor, Petitioner v. United States, et al.
    565 U.S. 1056, 132 S. Ct. 798,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 479,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8579.
    November 28, 2011.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied. Petitioner is allowed until December 19, 2011, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 11-94.
    Southern Union Company, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1057, 132 S. Ct. 756,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 479,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8595.
    November 28, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted.

Same case below, 630 F.3d 17.


text:
    No. 11-199.
    Alexander Vasquez, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1057, 132 S. Ct. 759,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 479,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8484.
    November 28, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted.

Same case below, 635 F.3d 889.


text:
    No. 11-204.
    Michael Shane Christopher, et al., Petitioners v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation, dba GlaxoSmithKline.
    565 U.S. 1057, 132 S. Ct. 760,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 480,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 8505.
    November 28, 2011.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted.

Same case below, 635 F.3d 383.