author: Justice Ginsburg

text:
    [565 U.S. 368]
    MARCUS D. MIMS, Petitioner v ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC
    565 U.S. 368, 132 S. Ct. 740,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 881,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 906
    [No. 10-1195]
    Argued November 28, 2011.
    Decided January 18, 2012.

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL ARGUING CASE
    Scott L. Nelson argued the cause for petitioner.
    Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for respondent.

      Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

[565 U.S. 370]

Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns enforcement, through private suits, of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA or Act), 47 U.S.C. § 227. Voluminous consumer complaints

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about abuses of telephone technology—for example, computerized calls dispatched to private homes— prompted Congress to pass the TCPA. Congress determined that federal legislation was needed because telemarketers, by operating interstate, were escaping state-law prohibitions on intrusive nuisance calls. The Act bans certain practices invasive of privacy and directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to prescribe implementing regulations. It authorizes States to bring civil actions to enjoin prohibited practices and to recover damages on their residents’ behalf. The Commission must be notified of such suits and may intervene in them. Jurisdiction over state-initiated TCPA suits, Congress provided, lies exclusively in the U. S. district courts. Congress also provided for civil actions by private parties seeking redress for violations of the TCPA or of the Commission’s implementing regulations.

Petitioner Marcus D. Mims, complaining of multiple violations of the Act by respondent Arrow Financial Services, LLC (Arrow), a debt-collection agency, commenced an action for damages against Arrow in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Mims invoked the court’s “federal question” jurisdiction, i.e., its authority to adjudicate claims “arising under the . . . laws ... of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The District Court, affirmed by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, dismissed Mims’s complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. Both courts relied on Congress’ specification, in the TCPA, that a private person may seek redress for violations of the Act (or of the Commission’s regulations thereunder) “in an appropriate court of [a] State,” “if [such an action is] otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of [that] State.” 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3), (c)(5).

The question presented is whether Congress’ provision for private actions to enforce the TCPA renders state courts the exclusive arbiters of such actions. We have long recognized

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that “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.” American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S. Ct. 585, 60 L. Ed. 987 (1916). Beyond doubt, the TCPA is a federal law that both creates the claim Mims has brought and supplies the substantive rules that will govern the case. We find no convincing reason to read into the TCPA’s permissive grant of jurisdiction to state courts any barrier to the U. S. district courts’ exercise of the general federal-question jurisdiction they have possessed since 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470; 13D C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, & R. Freer, Federal Practice and Procedure §3561, p. 163 (3d ed. 2008) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). We hold, therefore, that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over private suits arising under the TCPA.

I

A

In enacting the TCPA, Congress made several findings relevant here. “Unrestricted telemarketing,” Congress determined, “can be an intrusive invasion of privacy.” TCPA, § 2, ¶ 5, 105 Stat. 2394, note following 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Congressional Findings) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, Congress reported, “[m]any consumers are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance [telemarketing] calls to their homes.” ¶ 6, ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]utomated or prerecorded telephone calls” made to private residences, Congress found, were rightly regarded by recipients as “an invasion of privacy.” ¶¶ 10, 12, ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although over half the States had enacted statutes restricting telemarketing, Congress believed that federal law was needed because “telemarketers [could] evade [state-law] prohibitions through interstate operations.” ¶ 7, ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). See also S. Rep. No. 102-178,

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p. 3 (1991) (“[B]ecause States do not have jurisdiction over interstate calls [,] [m]any States have expressed a desire for Federal legislation . . . .”).

Subject to exceptions not pertinent here, the TCPA principally outlaws four practices. First, the Act makes it unlawful to use an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice message, without the prior express consent of the called party, to call any emergency telephone line, hospital patient, pager, cellular telephone, or other service for which the receiver is charged for the call. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). Second, the TCPA forbids using artificial or prerecorded voice messages to call residential telephone lines without prior express consent. § 227(b)(1)(B). Third, the Act proscribes sending unsolicited advertisements to fax machines. § 227(b)(1)(C). Fourth, it bans using automatic telephone dialing systems to engage two or more of a business’ telephone lines simultaneously. § 227(b)(1)(D).

The TCPA delegates authority to the FCC to ban artificial and prerecorded voice calls to businesses, § 227(b)(2)(A), and to exempt particular types of calls from the law’s requirements, §§ 227(b)(2)(B), (C). The Act also directs the FCC to prescribe regulations to protect the privacy of residential

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telephone subscribers, possibly through the creation of a national “do not call” system. § 227(c).

Congress provided complementary means of enforcing the Act. State Attorneys General may “bring a civil action on behalf of [state] residents,” if the Attorney General “has reason to believe that any person has engaged ... in a pattern or practice” of violating the TCPA or FCC regulations thereunder. § 227(g)(1) (2006 ed., Supp. IV). “The district courts of the United States . . . have exclusive jurisdiction” over all TCPA actions brought by State Attorneys General. § 227(g)(2). The Commission may intervene in such suits. § 227(g)(3).

Title 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), captioned “Private right of action,” provides:

“A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State—
“(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation,
“(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or
“(C) both such actions.
“If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an
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amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.”

A similar provision authorizes a private right of action for a violation of the FCC’s implementing regulations.

B

Mims, a Florida resident, alleged that Arrow, seeking to collect a debt, repeatedly used an automatic telephone dialing system or prerecorded or artificial voice to call Mims’s cellular phone without his consent. Commencing suit in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Mims charged that Arrow “willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA.” App. 14. He sought declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, and damages. Id., at 18-19.

The District Court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Mims’s TCPA claim. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, the District Court explained, federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was unavailable “because Congress vested jurisdiction over [private actions under] the TCPA exclusively in state courts.” Civ. No. 09-22347 (SD Fla., Apr. 1, 2010), App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a-5a (citing Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287 (CA11 1998)). Adhering to Circuit precedent, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 421 Fed. Appx.

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920, 921 (2011) (per curiam) (“Congress granted state courts exclusive jurisdiction over private actions under the [TCPA].” (quoting Nicholson, 136 F.3d, at 1287-1288)).

We granted certiorari, 564 U.S. 1036, 131 S. Ct. 3063, 180 L. Ed. 2d 884 (2011), to resolve a split among the Circuits as to whether Congress granted state courts exclusive jurisdiction over private actions brought under the TCPA. Compare Murphey v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911, 915 (CA9 2000) (U. S. district courts lack federal-question jurisdiction over private TCPA actions), ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 519 (CA3 1998) (same), Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications Premium Servs., Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 434 (CA2 1998) (same), Nicholson, 136 F.3d, at 1287-1288 (same), Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 514 (CA5 1997) (same), and International Science & Technology Inst. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1158 (CA4 1997) (same), with Charvat v. EchoStar Satellite, LLC, 630 F.3d 459, 463-465 (CA6 2010) (U. S. district courts have federal-question jurisdiction over private TCPA actions), Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447 (CA7 2005) (same), and ErieNet, 156 F.3d, at 521 (Alito, J., dissenting) (same). We now hold that Congress did not deprive federal courts of federal-question jurisdiction over private TCPA suits.

II

Federal courts, though “courts of limited jurisdiction,” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994), in the main “have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given,” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821). Congress granted federal courts general federal question jurisdiction in 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. As now codified, the law provides: “The district

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courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The statute originally included an amount-in-controversy requirement, set at $500. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Recognizing the responsibility of federal courts to decide claims, large or small, arising under federal law, Congress in 1980 eliminated the amount-in-controversy requirement in federal question (but not diversity) cases. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 2369 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331). See also H. R. Rep. No. 96-1461, p. 1 (1980) Apart from deletion of the amount-in-controversy requirement, the general federal question provision has remained essentially unchanged since 1875. See 13D Wright & Miller 163.

Because federal law creates the right of action and provides the rules of decision, Mims’s TCPA claim, in 28 U.S.C. § 1331’s words, plainly “aris[es] under” the “laws ... of the United States.” As already noted, supra, at 371, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 889, “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.” American Well Works, 241 U.S., at 260, 36 S. Ct. 585, 60 L. Ed. 987. Although courts have described this formulation as “more useful for inclusion than for . . . exclusion,” Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809, n. 5, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 92 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1986) (quoting T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (CA2 1964)), there is no serious debate that a federally created claim for relief is generally a “sufficient condition for federal-question jurisdiction,” Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 317, 125 S. Ct. 2363, 162 L. Ed. 2d 257 (2005).

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Arrow agrees that this action arises under federal law, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, but urges that Congress vested exclusive adjudicatory authority over private TCPA actions in state courts. In cases “arising under” federal law, we note, there is a “deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction,” rebuttable if “Congress affirmatively ousts the state courts of jurisdiction over a particular federal claim.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-459, 110 S. Ct. 792, 107 L. Ed. 2d 887 (1990). E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . .”). The presumption of concurrent state-court jurisdiction, we have recognized, can be overcome “by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.” Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478, 101 S. Ct. 2870, 69 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1981).

Arrow readily acknowledges the presumption of concurrent state-court jurisdiction, but maintains that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 creates no converse presumption in favor of federal-court jurisdiction. Instead, Arrow urges, the TCPA, a later, more specific statute, displaces § 1331, an earlier, more general prescription. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29; Brief for Respondent 31.

Section 1331, our decisions indicate, is not swept away so easily. As stated earlier, see supra, at 377, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 893, when federal law creates a private right of action and furnishes the substantive rules of decision, the claim arises under federal law, and district courts possess federal-question jurisdiction

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under § 1331. That principle endures unless Congress divests federal courts of their § 1331 adjudicatory authority. See, e.g., Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 152 L. Ed. 2d 871 (2002) (Nothing in 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) “divestfs] the district courts of their authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to review the [state agency’s] order for compliance with federal law.”); K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 182-183, 108 S. Ct. 950, 99 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1988) (“The District Court would be divested of [§ 1331] jurisdiction ... if this action fell within one of several specific grants of exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of International Trade [under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) or § 1581(i)(3)].”).

“[D]ivestment of district court jurisdiction” should be found no more readily than “divestmen[t] of state court jurisdiction,” given “the longstanding and explicit grant of federal question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” ErieNet, 156 F.3d, at 523 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Gonell, Note, Statutory Interpretation of Federal Jurisdictional Statutes: Jurisdiction of the Private Right of Action Under the TCPA, 66 Ford. L. Rev. 1895, 1929-1930 (1998). Accordingly, the District Court retains § 1331 jurisdiction over Mims’s complaint unless the TCPA, expressly or by fair implication, excludes federal-court adjudication. See Verizon Md., 535 U.S., at 644, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 152 L. Ed. 2d 871; Gonell, supra, at 1929 (Jurisdiction over private TCPA actions “is proper under § 1331 unless Congress enacted a partial repeal of § 1331 in the TCPA.”).

Ill

Arrow’s arguments do not persuade us that Congress has eliminated § 1331 jurisdiction over private actions under the TCPA.

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The language of the TCPA—“A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring [an action] in an appropriate court of that State,” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)—Arrow asserts, is uniquely state-court oriented. See Brief for Respondent 13. That may be, but “ [i] t is a general rule that the grant of jurisdiction to one court does not, of itself, imply that the jurisdiction is to be exclusive.” United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 479, 56 S. Ct. 343, 80 L. Ed. 331 (1936).

Nothing in the permissive language of § 227(b)(3) makes state-court jurisdiction exclusive, or otherwise purports to oust federal courts of their 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction over federal claims. See, e.g., Verizon Md., 535 U.S., at 643, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 152 L. Ed. 2d 871 (“[Nothing in 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) purports to strip [§ 1331] jurisdiction.”). Cf. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 108 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1990) (Title VIPs language—“[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchap-ter,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)—does not “ous[t] state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Congress may indeed provide a track for a federal claim exclusive of § 1331. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (“No action . . . shall be brought under [§ 1331] to recover on any claim arising under [Title II of the Social Security Act].”); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756-757, 95 S. Ct. 2457, 45 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1975). Congress has done nothing of that sort here, however.

Title 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) does not state that a private plaintiff may bring an action under the TCPA “only” in state court, or “exclusively” in state court. The absence of such a statement contrasts with the Act’s instruction on suits instituted by State Attorneys General. As earlier noted, see supra, at 374, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 891, § 227(g)(2) (2006 ed., Supp. IV) vests “exclusive jurisdiction over [such] actions” in “[t]he district courts of the United States.” Section 227(g)(2)’s exclusivity prescription

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“reinforce [s] the conclusion that [§ 227(b)(3)’s] silence . . . leaves the jurisdictional grant of § 1331 untouched. For where otherwise applicable jurisdiction was meant to be excluded, it was excluded expressly.” Verizon Md., 535 U.S., at 644, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 152 L. Ed. 2d 871; see ErieNet, 156 F.3d, at 522 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Section [227(g)(2)] reveals that, while drafting the TCPA, Congress knew full well how to grant exclusive jurisdiction with mandatory language. The most natural interpretation of Congress’ failure to use similar language in section 227(b)(3) is that Congress did not intend to grant exclusive jurisdiction in that section.”); Brill, 427 F.3d, at 451 (“[Section 227(g)(2)] is explicit about exclusivity, while § 227(b)(3) is not; the natural inference is that the state forum mentioned in § 227(b)(3) is optional rather than mandatory.”).

Arrow urges that Congress would have had no reason to provide for a private action “in an appropriate [state] court,”

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§ 227(b)(3), if it did not mean to make the state forum exclusive. Had Congress said nothing at all about bringing private TCPA claims in state courts, Arrow observes, those courts would nevertheless have concurrent jurisdiction. See supra, at 378, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 893. True enough, but Congress had simultaneously provided for TCPA enforcement actions by state authorities, § 227(g) (2006 ed., Supp. IV), and had made federal district courts exclusively competent in such cases, § 227(g)(2). Congress may simply have wanted to avoid any argument that in private actions, as in actions brought by State Attorneys General, “federal jurisdiction is exclusive.” Brill, 427 F.3d, at 451 (emphasis deleted) (citing Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. 820, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 108 L. Ed. 2d 834 (holding, after 26 years of litigation, that claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be resolved in state as well as federal courts), and Tafflin, 493 U.S. 455, 110 S. Ct. 792, 107 L. Ed. 2d 887 (holding, after 20 years of litigation, that claims under RICO may be resolved in state as well as federal courts)). Moreover, by providing that private actions may be brought in state court “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of [the] State,” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), Congress arguably gave States leeway they would otherwise lack to “decide for [themselves] whether to entertain claims under the [TCPA],” Brill, 427 F.3d, at 451. See Brief for Respondent 16 (Congress “le[ft] States free to decide what TCPA claims to allow.”).

Making state-court jurisdiction over § 227(b)(3) claims exclusive, Arrow further asserts, “fits hand in glove with

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[Congress’] objective”: enabling States to control telemarketers whose interstate operations evaded state law. Id., at 15. Even so, we have observed, jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 should hold firm against “mere implication flowing from subsequent legislation.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 808, 809, n. 15, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976) (quoting Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257, 262, 17 S. Ct. 302, 41 L. Ed. 708 (1897)).

We are not persuaded, moreover, that Congress sought only to fill a gap in the States’ enforcement capabilities. Had Congress so limited its sights, it could have passed a statute providing that out-of-state telemarketing calls directed into a State would be subject to the laws of the receiving State. Congress did not enact such a law. Instead, it enacted detailed, uniform, federal substantive prescriptions and provided for a regulatory regime administered by a federal agency. See 47 U.S.C. § 227. TCPA liability thus depends on violation of a federal statutory requirement or an FCC regulation, §§ 227(b)(3)(A), (c)(5), not on a violation of any state substantive law.

The federal interest in regulating telemarketing to “protec [t] the privacy of individuals” while “permit[ting] legitimate [commercial] practices,” § 2, ¶ 6, 105 Stat. 2394, note following 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Congressional Findings) (internal quotation marks omitted), is evident from the regulatory role Congress assigned to the FCC. See, e.g., § 227(b)(2) (delegating to the FCC authority to exempt calls from the Act’s reach and prohibit calls to businesses). Congress’ design would be less well served if consumers had to rely on “the laws or rules of court of a State,” § 227(b)(3), or the accident of diversity jurisdiction, to gain redress for TCPA violations.

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Arrow emphasizes a statement made on the Senate floor by Senator Hollings, the TCPA’s sponsor:

“Computerized calls are the scourge of modern civilization. They wake us up in the morning; they interrupt our dinner at night; they force the sick and elderly out of bed; they hound us until we want to rip the telephone right out of the wall.
“The substitute bill contains a private right-of-action provision that will make it easier for consumers to recover damages from receiving these computerized calls. The provision would allow consumers to bring an action in State court against any entity that violates the bill. The bill does not, because of constitutional constraints, dictate to the States which court in each State shall be the proper venue for such an action, as this is a matter for State legislators to determine. Nevertheless, it is my hope that States will make it as easy as possible for consumers to bring such actions, preferably in small claims court. . . .
“Small claims court or a similar court would allow the consumer to appear before the court without an attorney. The amount of damages in this legislation is set to be fair to both the consumer and the telemarketer. However, it would defeat the purposes of the bill if the attorneys’ costs to consumers of bringing an action were greater than the potential damages. I thus expect that the States will act reasonably in permitting their citizens to go to court to enforce this bill.” 137 Cong. Rec. 30821-30822 (1991).

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This statement does not bear the weight Arrow would place on it.

First, the views of a single legislator, even a bill’s sponsor, are not controlling. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118, 100 S. Ct. 2051, 64 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1980). Second, Senator Hollings did not mention federal-court jurisdiction or otherwise suggest that 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) is intended to divest federal courts of authority to hear TCPA claims. Hol-lings no doubt believed that mine-run TCPA claims would be pursued most expeditiously in state small-claims court. But one cannot glean from his statement any expectation that those courts, or state courts generally, would have exclusive jurisdiction over private actions alleging violations of the Act or of the FCC’s implementing regulations. Third, even if we agreed with Arrow that Senator Hollings expected private TCPA actions to proceed solely in state courts, and even if other supporters shared his view, that expectation would not control our judgment on 28 U.S.C. § 1331’s compass. Cf. Yellow Freight, 494 U.S., at 826, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 108 L. Ed. 2d 834 (“persuasive showing that most legislators, judges, and administrators ... involved in the enactment, amendment, enforcement, and interpretation of Title VII expected that such litigation would be processed exclusively in federal courts” did not overcome presumption of concurrent state-court jurisdiction).

Among its arguments for state-court exclusivity, Arrow raises a concern about the impact on federal courts were we to uphold § 1331 jurisdiction over private actions under the TCPA. “[G]iven the enormous volume of telecommunications

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presenting potential claims,” Arrow projects, federal courts could be inundated by $500-per-violation TCPA claims. Brief for Respondent 33. “Moreover, if plaintiffs are free to bring TCPA claims in federal court under § 1331, then defendants sued in state court would be equally free to remove those cases to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.” Id., at 22-23. Indeed, Arrow suggests, defendants could use removal as a mechanism to force small-claims-court plaintiffs to abandon suit rather than “figh[t] it out” in the “more expensive federal forum.” Id., at 23.

Arrow’s floodgates argument assumes “a shocking degree of noncompliance” with the Act, Reply Brief 11, and seems to us more imaginary than real. The current federal district court civil filing fee is $350. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). How likely is it that a party would bring a $500 claim in, or remove a $500 claim to, federal court? Lexis and Westlaw searches turned up 65 TCPA claims removed to federal district courts in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin since the Seventh Circuit held, in October 2005, that the Act does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on state courts. All 65 cases were class actions, not individual cases removed from small-claims court. There were also 26 private TCPA claims brought initially in federal district courts; of those, 24 were class actions.

IV

Nothing in the text, structure, purpose, or legislative history of the TCPA calls for displacement of the federal question jurisdiction U. S. district courts ordinarily have

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In the absence of direction from Congress stronger than any Arrow has advanced, we apply the familiar default rule: Federal courts have § 1331 jurisdiction over claims that arise under federal law. Because federal law gives rise to the claim for relief Mims has stated and specifies the substantive rules of decision, the Eleventh Circuit erred in dismissing Mims’s case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

      . In general, the Communications Act of 1934 grants to the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) authority to regulate interstate telephone communications and reserves to the States authority to regulate intrastate telephone communications. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360, 369-370, 106 S. Ct. 1890, 90 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1986).

      . In 2010, Congress amended the statute to prohibit an additional practice: the manipulation of caller-identification information. See Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-331, 124 Stat. 3572. This legislation inserted a new subsection (e) into 47 U.S.C. § 227 and redesignated the former subsections (e), (f), and (g) as subsections (f), (g), and (h), respectively. Ibid. While the new subsection (e) does not bear on this case and is not here discussed, our citations of subsection (g) refer to the current, redesignated statutory text.

      . The National Do Not Call Registry is currently managed by the Federal Trade Commission. See 15 U.S.C. § 6151 (2006 ed., Supp. IV); 16 CFR § 310.4(b)(1)(iii) (2011).

      .  The TCPA envisions civil actions instituted by the Commission for violations of the implementing regulations. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(g)(7) (2006 ed., Supp. IV). The Commission may also seek forfeiture penalties for willful or repeated failure to comply with the Act or regulations. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2006 ed. and Supp. IV), § 504(a) (2006 ed.).

      . Title 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), also captioned “Private right of action,’’ provides:
      “A person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State bring in an appropriate court of that State—
      “(A) an action based on a violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation,
      “(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive up to $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or
      “(C) both such actions.’’

      . Congress had previously granted general federal-question jurisdiction to federal courts, but the grant was short lived. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464, n. 14, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 39 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1974) (describing Midnight Judges Act of 1801, § 11, 2 Stat. 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, § 1, 2 Stat. 132).

      . At the time it was repealed, the amount-in-controversy requirement in federal-question cases had reached $10,000. See Act of July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415. Currently, the amount in controversy in diversity cases must exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

      . For a rare exception to the rule that a federal cause of action suffices to ground federal-question jurisdiction, see Shoshone Milling Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 20 S. Ct. 726, 44 L. Ed. 864 (1900), discussed in R. Fallon, J. Manning, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 784-785 (6th ed. 2009). In Shoshone Mining, we held that a suit for a federal mining patent did not arise under federal law for jurisdictional purposes because “the right of possession’’ in controversy could be determined by “local rules or customs or state statutes,’’ 177 U.S., at 509, 510, 20 S. Ct. 726, 44 L. Ed. 864, or “may present simply a question of fact,’’ id., at 509, 20 S. Ct. 726, 44 L. Ed. 864. Here, by contrast, the TCPA not only creates the claim for relief and designates the remedy; critically, the Act and regulations thereunder supply the governing substantive law.

      . Even when a right of action is created by state law, if the claim requires resolution of significant issues of federal law, the case may arise under federal law for 28 U.S.C. § 1331 purposes. See Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312, 125 S. Ct. 2363, 162 L. Ed. 2d 257 (2005).

      . “How strange it would be,’’ the Seventh Circuit observed, “to make federal courts the exclusive forum for suits by the states, while making state courts the exclusive forum for suits by private plaintiffs.’’ Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 451 (2005).

      . [20] For TCPA actions brought by State Attorneys General, or “an[other] official or agency designated by a State,’’ 47 U.S.C. § 227(g)(1) (2006 ed., Supp. IV), Arrow points out, Congress specifically addressed venue, service of process, § 227(g)(4), and potential conflicts between federal and state enforcement efforts, § 227(g)(7). No similar prescriptions appear in the section on private actions, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), for this obvious reason:
      “[As] the general rules governing venue and service of process in the district courts are well established, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 4, 4.1, there was no need for Congress to reiterate them in section 227(b)(3). The fact that venue and service of process are discussed in section [227(g)(4) (2006 ed., Supp. IV)] and not section 227(b)(3) simply indicates that Congress wished to make adjustments to the general rules in the former section and not the latter. As for the conflict provision that appears in section 227(g) (2006 ed., Supp. IV)] but not section 227(b)(3), it is hardly surprising that Congress would be concerned about agency conflicts in the section of the TCPA dealing with official state enforcement efforts but not in the section governing private lawsuits.’’ ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 523 (CA3 1998) (Alito, J., dissenting).

      .  The Supremacy Clause declares federal law the “supreme law of the land,’’ and state courts must enforce it “in the absence of a valid excuse.’’ Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 370, n. 16, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1990). “An excuse that is inconsistent with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse: The Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from federal law because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its source.’’ Id., at 371, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332. Without the “if otherwise permitted’’ language, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), there is little doubt that state courts would be obliged to hear TCPA claims. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394, 67 S. Ct. 810, 91 L. Ed. 967 (1947).

      . Although all Courts of Appeals to have considered the question have held that the TCPA does not bar district courts from exercising diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, see, e.g., Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335 (CA2 2006), at oral argument, Arrow’s counsel maintained that diversity jurisdiction “should go, too,’’ Tr. of OralArg. 39. Were we to accept Arrow’s positions that diversity and federal question jurisdiction are unavailable, and that state courts may refuse to hear TCPA claims, residents of States that choose not to hear TCPA claims would have no forum in which to sue.

      . The complaint in this very case, we note, could not have been brought in small-claims court. Mims alleged some 12 calls, and sought treble damages ($1,500) for each. See App. 9-14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 12. The amount he sought to recover far exceeded the $5,000 ceiling on claims a Florida small-claims court can adjudicate. See Fla. Small Claims Rule 7.010(b) (rev. ed. 2011).

      .  When Congress wants to make federal claims instituted in state court nonremovable, it says just that. See Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 696-697, 123 S. Ct. 1882, 155 L. Ed. 2d 923 (2003) (quoting, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (“A civil action in any State court against a railroad or its receivers or trustees, [arising under §§ 51-60 of Title 45,] may not be removed to any district court of the United States.”) and 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (“[N]o case arising under this subchapter and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.”)).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam. Justice Thomas,

license: Public Domain

text:
    [565 U.S. 388]
    RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, et al., Appellants v SHANNON PEREZ et al. RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, et al., Appellants v WENDY DAVIS et al. RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, et al., Appellants v SHANNON PEREZ et al.
    (No. 11-713)
    (No. 11-714)
    (No. 11-715)
    565 U.S. 388, 132 S. Ct. 934,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 900,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 908
    Argued January 9, 2012.
    Decided January 20, 2012.

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL ARGUING CASE
    Paul D. Clement argued the cause for appellants.

      Sri Srinivasan argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court.
    Jose Garza argued the cause for appellees.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

[565 U.S. 390]

Per Curiam.

The 2010 census showed an enormous increase in Texas’ population, with over four million new residents. That growth required the State to redraw its electoral districts for the United States Congress, the State Senate, and the State House of Representatives, in order to comply with the Constitution’s one-person, one-vote rule. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 488, n. 2, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 156 L. Ed. 2d 428 (2003). The State also had to create new districts for the four additional congressional seats it received.

Texas is a “covered jurisdiction” under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See 79 Stat. 437, 439, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a); 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (2011). Section 5 suspends all changes to a covered jurisdiction’s election procedures, including district lines, until those changes are submitted to and approved by a three-judge United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or the Attorney General. See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 198, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 174 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2009). This process, known as pre-clearance, requires

[565 U.S. 391]

the covered jurisdiction to demonstrate that its proposed change “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” § 1973c(a). This Court has been emphatic that a new electoral map cannot be used to conduct an election until it has been precleared. See, e.g., Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652, 111 S. Ct. 2096, 114 L. Ed. 2d 691 (1991).

The day after completing its new electoral plans, Texas submitted them to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for preclearance. The preclearance process remains ongoing. Texas was unsuccessful in its bid for summary judgment, and a trial is scheduled in the coming weeks. Meanwhile, various plaintiffs—appellees here—brought suit in Texas, claiming that the State’s newly enacted plans violate the United States Constitution and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Appellees alleged, inter alia, that Texas’ enacted plans discriminate against Latinos and African-Americans and dilute their voting strength, notwithstanding the fact that Latinos and African-Americans accounted for three-quarters of Texas’ population growth since 2000. A three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas was convened. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284. That court heard argument and held a trial with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims, but withheld judgment pending resolution of the preclearance process in the D. C. court. Cf. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 283-285, 123 S. Ct. 1429, 155 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

As Texas’ 2012 primaries approached, it became increasingly likely that the State’s newly enacted plans would not receive preclearance in time for the 2012 elections. And the State’s old district lines could not be used, because population growth had rendered them inconsistent with the Constitution’s

[565 U.S. 392]

one-person, one-vote requirement. It thus fell to the District Court in Texas to devise interim plans for the State’s 2012 primaries and elections. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-415, 97 S. Ct. 1828, 52 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1977). After receiving proposals from the parties and holding extensive hearings, that court issued its interim plans. The court unanimously agreed on an interim State Senate plan, but Judge Smith dissented with respect to the congressional and State House plans. Texas asked this Court to stay the interim plans pending an appeal, arguing that they were unnecessarily inconsistent with the State’s enacted plans. This Court granted the stay and noted probable jurisdiction. Post, at 1090, 132 S. Ct. 842, 181 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2011).

Redistricting is “primarily the duty and responsibility of the State.” Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 95 S. Ct. 751, 42 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1975). The failure of a State’s newly enacted plan to gain preclearance prior to an upcoming election does not, by itself, require a court to take up the state legislature’s task. That is because, in most circumstances, the State’s last enacted plan simply remains in effect until the new plan receives preclearance. But if an intervening event— most commonly, as here, a census— renders the current plan unusable, a court must undertake the “unwelcome obligation” of creating an interim plan. Connor, supra, at 415, 97 S. Ct. 1828, 52 L. Ed. 2d 465. Even then, the plan already in effect may give sufficient structure to the court’s endeavor. Where shifts in a State’s population have been relatively small, a court may need to make only minor or obvious adjustments to the State’s existing districts in order to devise an interim plan.

But here the scale of Texas’ population growth appears to require sweeping changes to the State’s current districts. In areas where population shifts are so large that no semblance of the existing plan’s district lines can be used, that plan offers little guidance to a court drawing an interim map. The problem is perhaps most obvious in adding new congressional districts: The old plan gives no suggestion as to where those new districts should be placed. In addition,

[565 U.S. 393]

experience has shown the difficulty of defining neutral legal principles in this area, for redistricting ordinarily involves criteria and standards that have been weighed and evaluated by the elected branches in the exercise of their political judgment. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-916, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 132 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1995); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795-796, 93 S. Ct. 2348, 37 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1973). Thus, if the old state districts were the only source to which a district court could look, it would be forced to make the sort of policy judgments for which courts are, at best, ill suited.

To avoid being compelled to make such otherwise standardless decisions, a district court should take guidance from the State’s recently enacted plan in drafting an interim plan. That plan reflects the State’s policy judgments on where to place new districts and how to shift existing ones in response to massive population growth. This Court has observed before that “faced with the necessity of drawing district lines by judicial order, a court, as a general rule, should be guided by the legislative policies underlying” a state plan— even one that was itself unenforceable—“to the extent those policies do not lead to violations of the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act.” Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 79, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 138 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1997) (holding that the District Court properly declined to defer to a precleared plan that used race as a predominant factor). For example, in White, supra, an equal population challenge, this Court reversed a District Court’s choice of interim plan and required the District Court to choose a plan more closely resembling an enacted state plan, even though the state plan itself had been held to violate the one-person, one-vote principle. Similarly, in Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 102 S. Ct. 1518, 71 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1982) (per curiam), although the state plan as a whole had been denied § 5 preclearance, this Court directed a District Court to “defer to the legislative judgments the [state] plans reflect,” insofar as they involved districts found to meet the preclearance standard. Id., at 40-41, 102 S. Ct. 1518, 71 L. Ed. 2d 725. See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160-161, 91 S. Ct. 1858, 29 L. Ed. 2d 363 (1971) (equal protection challenge).

[565 U.S. 394]

Section 5 prevents a state plan from being implemented if it has not been precleared. But that does not mean that the plan is of no account or that the policy judgments it reflects can be disregarded by a district court drawing an interim plan. On the contrary, the state plan serves as a starting point for the district court. It provides important guidance that helps ensure that the district court appropriately confines itself to drawing interim maps that comply with the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, without displacing legitimate state policy judgments with the court’s own preferences.

A district court making such use of a State’s plan must, of course, take care not to incorporate into the interim plan any legal defects in the state plan. See Abrams, supra, at 85-86, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 138 L. Ed. 2d 285; White, supra, at 797, 93 S. Ct. 2348, 37 L. Ed. 2d 335. Where a State’s plan faces challenges under the Constitution or § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a district court should still be guided by that plan, except to the extent those legal challenges are shown to have a likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction of a statute must normally demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to that law. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008). There is no reason that plaintiffs seeking to defeat the policies behind a State’s redistricting legislation should not also have to meet that standard. And because the local district court—here, the District Court for the Western District of Texas—will ultimately decide the merits of claims under § 2 and the Constitution, it is well equipped to apply that familiar standard.

The calculus with respect to § 5 challenges is somewhat different. Where a State has sought preclearance in the District Court for the District of Columbia, § 5 allows only that court to determine whether the state plan complies with § 5. Consistent with that design, we have made clear that other district courts may not address the merits of § 5 challenges. See, e.g., Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 385, 91 S. Ct. 431, 27 L. Ed. 2d 476

[565 U.S. 395]

(1971). The local district court drafting an interim plan must therefore be careful not to prejudge the merits of the preclearance proceedings. The court should presume neither that a State’s effort to pre-clear its plan will succeed nor that it will fail.

The need to avoid prejudging the merits of preclearance is satisfied by taking guidance from a State’s policy judgments unless they reflect aspects of the state plan that stand a reasonable probability of failing to gain § 5 preclearance. And by “reasonable probability” this Court means in this context that the § 5 challenge is not insubstantial. That standard ensures that a district court is not deprived of important guidance provided by a state plan due to § 5 challenges that have no reasonable probability of success but still respects the jurisdiction and prerogative of those responsible for the preclearance determination. And the reasonable probability standard adequately balances the unique preclearance scheme with the State’s sovereignty and a district court’s need for policy guidance in constructing an interim map. This Court recently noted the “serious constitutional questions” raised by § 5’s intrusion on state sovereignty. Northwest Austin, 557 U.S., at 204, 198, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 174 L. Ed. 2d 140. Those concerns would only be exacerbated if § 5 required a district court to wholly ignore the State’s policies in drawing maps that will govern a State’s elections, without any reason to believe those state policies are unlawful.

Appellees, however, contend that § 5 demands exactly that. In their view, this Court’s precedents require district courts to ignore any state plan that has not received § 5 preclearance. But the cases upon which appel-lees rely hold only that a district court may not adopt an unprecleared plan as its own. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 117 S. Ct. 340, 136 L. Ed. 2d 273 (1996); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 101 S. Ct. 2224, 68 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1981). They say nothing about whether a district court may take guidance from the lawful policies incorporated in such a plan for aid in drawing an interim map. Indeed, in Upharn this Court ordered

[565 U.S. 396]

a District Court to defer to the unobjectionable aspects of a State’s plan even though that plan had already been denied preclearance.

In this litigation, the District Court stated that it had “giv[en] effect to as much of the policy judgments in the Legislature’s enacted map as possible.” 1 App. 182. At the same time, however, the court said that it was required to draw an “independent map” following “neutral principles that advance the interest of the collective public good.” Id., at 169-170. In the court’s view, it “was not required to give any deference to the Legislature’s enacted plan,” and it instead applied principles that it determined “place the interests of the citizens of Texas first.” Id., at 171. To the extent the District Court exceeded its mission to draw interim maps that do not violate the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act, and substituted its own concept of “the collective public good” for the Texas Legislature’s determination of which policies serve “the interests of the citizens of Texas,” the court erred.

In proclaiming its ability to draw an interim map “without regard to political considerations,” the District Court relied heavily on Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01cv158, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740 (ED Tex., Nov. 14, 2001) (per curiam), summarily aff'd, 536 U.S. 919, 122 S. Ct. 2583, 153 L. Ed. 2d 773 (2002). 1 App. 182. But in Balderas there was no recently enacted state plan to which the District Court could turn. Without the benefit of legislative guidance in making distinctly legislative policy judgments, the Balderas court was perhaps compelled to design an interim map based on its own notion of the public good. Because the District Court here had the benefit of a recently enacted plan to assist it, the court had neither the need nor the license to cast aside that vital aid.

Some specific aspects of the District Court’s plans seem to pay adequate attention to the State’s policies, others do not, and the propriety of still others is unclear. For example, in drawing State House districts in north and east Texas, the

[565 U.S. 397]

District Court closely followed the State’s policies. See 1 App. 173; 5 id., at 25-26. Although Texas’ entire State House plan is challenged in the § 5 proceedings, there is apparently no serious allegation that the district lines in north and east Texas have a discriminatory intent or effect. 1 id., at 187, n. 4. The District Court was thus correct to take guidance from the State’s plan in drawing the interim map for those regions. But the court then altered those districts to achieve de minimis population variations—even though there was no claim that the population variations in those districts were unlawful. Id., at 171, and n. 8. In the absence of any legal flaw in this respect in the State’s plan, the District Court had no basis to modify that plan.

The District Court also erred in refusing to split voting precincts (called “voter tabulation districts” in Texas) in drawing the interim plans. Id., at 90, 102-103. That choice alone prevented the District Court from following the lead of Texas’ enacted plan—which freely splits precincts— in many areas where there were no legal challenges to the plan’s details. See id.., at 102-103, 116, n. 24. The District Court was apparently motivated by a well-intentioned desire to save Texas the time and expense of reconfiguring precincts, and to ensure that the court’s interim plan could be implemented in time for the upcoming election. Id., at 90, 102-103, 109. But the State’s plan accepted the costs of splitting precincts in order to accomplish other goals, and Texas law expressly allows recasting precincts when redistricting. See Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 42.032 (West 2010). If a State has chosen to accept the burden of changing its precincts,

[565 U.S. 398]

and its decision to do so is otherwise lawful, there is no warrant for a district court to ignore the State’s decision. Of course, in these cases it may well be that Texas will reexamine this issue in light of the exigencies caused by the impending election.

The District Court also appears to have unnecessarily ignored the State’s plans in drawing certain individual districts. For example, the District Court drew an interim District 77 that resembles neither the State’s newly enacted plan, nor the previous plan in effect prior to the 2010 census. The court said that it did so in response to alleged constitutional violations. 1 App. 174-175. But the court did not say that those allegations were plausible, much less likely to succeed. Nor did the District Court rely on a finding that the relevant aspects of the state plan stood a reasonable probability of failing to gain § 5 preclearance, see supra, at 395, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 907. Without such a determination, the District Court had no basis for drawing a district that does not resemble any legislatively enacted plan.

The court’s approach in drawing other districts was unclear. The interim plan’s Congressional District 33, for example, disregards aspects of the State’s plan that appear to be subject to strong challenges in the § 5 proceeding. See 3 App. 600-601; 5 id., at 12-14. That much seems appropriate, but there are grounds for concern with the path the District Court followed from there. The court’s order suggests that it may have intentionally drawn District 33 as a “minority coalition opportunity district” in which the court expected two different minority groups to band together to form an electoral majority. 1 id., at 147. The order is somewhat ambiguous on this point—some portions suggest that the court deliberately designed such a district, other parts suggest that it drew the district solely as a response to population growth in the area. Compare id., at 146-147 (“Because much of the growth that occurred in the Dallas-Fort Worth me-troplex was attributable to minorities, the

[565 U.S. 399]

new district 33 was drawn as a minority coalition opportunity district”), with id., at 144 (“The Court has nowhere expressly sought to increase the performance of any opportunity district above benchmark”). If the District Court did set out to create a minority coalition district, rather than drawing a district that simply reflected population growth, it had no basis for doing so. Cf. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13-15, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 173 L. Ed. 2d 173 (2009) (plurality opinion).

Because it is unclear whether the District Court for the Western District of Texas followed the appropriate standards in drawing interim maps for the 2012 Texas elections, the orders implementing those maps are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The judgment shall issue forthwith.

It is so ordered.

SEPARATE OPINION

Justice Thomas,

concurring in the judgment.

The Court proceeds from the premise that court-drawn interim plans are necessary in part because Texas’ newly enacted redistricting plans are unenforceable for lack of preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Ante, at 390-392, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 904-905. In my view, Texas’ failure to timely obtain § 5 preclearance of its new plans is no obstacle to their implementation, because, as I have previously explained, § 5 is unconstitutional. See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 212, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 174 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2009) (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Although Texas’ new plans are being challenged on the grounds that they violate the Federal Constitution and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, they have not yet been found to violate any law. Accordingly, Texas’ duly enacted redistricting plans should govern the upcoming elections. I would therefore vacate the interim orders and remand for the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas to consider appellees’ constitutional and § 2 challenges in the ordinary course.

      . Section 2 prohibits “any State or political subdivision’’ from imposing any electoral practice “which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).

      . This Court has stated that  court-drawn maps are held to a higher standard of acceptable population variation than legislatively enacted maps. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 138 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1997). But this Court has also explained that those “stricter standard[s]’’ are not triggered where a district court incorporates unchallenged portions of a State’s map into an interim map. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 42-43, 102 S. Ct. 1518, 71 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1982) (per curiam).