author: Chief Justice Roberts

text:
    [563 U.S. 804]
    ERICA P. JOHN FUND, INC., fka ARCHDIOCESE OF MILWAUKEE SUPPORTING FUND, INC., Petitioner v HALLIBURTON CO. et al.
    563 U.S. 804, 131 S. Ct. 2179,
    180 L. Ed. 2d 24,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 4181
    [No. 09-1403]
    Argued April 25, 2011.
    Decided June 6, 2011.

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL ARGUING CASE
    David Boies argued the cause for petitioner.
    Nicole A. Saharsky argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court.
    David Sterling argued the cause for respondents.

      Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

[563 U.S. 807]

Chief Justice Roberts

delivered the opinion of the Court.

To prevail on the merits in a private securities fraud action, investors must demonstrate that the defendant’s deceptive conduct caused their claimed economic loss. This requirement is commonly referred to as “loss causation.” The question presented in this case is whether securities fraud plaintiffs must also prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification. We hold that they need not.

I

Petitioner Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (EPJ Fund), is the lead plaintiff in a putative securities fraud class action filed against Halliburton Co. and one of its executives (collectively Halliburton). The suit was brought on behalf of all investors who purchased Halliburton common stock between June 3, 1999, and December 7, 2001.

EPJ Fund alleges that Halliburton made various misrepresentations designed to inflate its stock price, in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. See 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (2010). The

[563 U.S. 808]

complaint asserts that Halliburton deliberately made false statements about (1) the scope of its potential liability in asbestos litigation, (2) its expected revenue from certain construction contracts, and (3) the benefits of its merger with another company. EPJ Fund contends that Halliburton later made a number of corrective disclosures that caused its stock price to drop and, consequently, investors to lose money.

After defeating a motion to dismiss, EPJ Fund sought to have its proposed class certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The parties agreed, and the District Court held, that EPJ Fund satisfied the general requirements for class actions set out in Rule 23(a): The class was sufficiently numerous, there were common questions of law or fact, the claims of the representative parties were typical, and the representative parties would fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a.

The District Court also found that the action could proceed as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), but for one problem: Circuit precedent required securities fraud plaintiffs to prove “loss causation” in order to obtain class certification. Id., at 4a, and n. 2 (citing Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269 (CA5 2007)). As the District Court explained, loss causation is the “ ‘causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the [economic] loss’ ” suffered by investors. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a, and n. 3 (quoting Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2005)). After reviewing the alleged misrepresentations and corrective disclosures, the District Court concluded that it could not certify the class in this case because EPJ Fund had “failed to establish loss causation with respect to any” of its claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. 54a. The court made clear, however, that absent “this stringent loss causation requirement,” it would have granted EPJ Fund’s certification request. Ibid.

[563 U.S. 809]

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of class certification. See 597 F.3d 330 (CA5 2010). It confirmed that, “ [i]n order to obtain class certification on its claims, [EPJ Fund] was required to prove loss causation, i.e., that the corrected truth of the former falsehoods actually caused the stock price to fall and resulted in the losses.” Id., at 334. Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals concluded that EPJ Fund had failed to meet the “requirements for proving loss causation at the class certification stage.” Id., at 344.

We granted EPJ Fund’s petition for certiorari, 562 U.S. 1127, 131 S. Ct. 856, 178 L. Ed. 2d 622 (2011), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits as to whether securities fraud plaintiffs must prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification. Compare 597 F.3d, at 334 (case below), with In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litigation, 544 F.3d 474, 483 (CA2 2008) (not requiring investors to prove loss causation at class certification stage); Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 687 (CA7 2010) (same); In re DVI, Inc. Securities Litigation, 639 F.3d 623, 636-637 (CA3 2011) (same; decided after certiorari was granted).

II

EPJ Fund contends that the Court of Appeals erred by requiring proof of loss causation for class certification. We agree.

A

As noted, the sole dispute here is whether EPJ Fund satisfied the prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3). In order to certify a class under that Rule, a court must find “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3). Considering whether “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate” begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of action. The elements of a private securities fraud claim based

[563 U.S. 810]

on violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are: “‘(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scien-ter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.’ ” Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, ante, at 37-38, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 179 L. Ed. 2d 398 (quoting Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157, 128 S. Ct. 761, 169 L. Ed. 2d 627 (2008)).

Whether common questions of law or fact predominate in a securities fraud action often turns on the element of reliance. The courts below determined that EPJ Fund had to prove the separate element of loss causation in order to establish that reliance was capable of resolution on a common, classwide basis.

“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action.” Id., at 159, 128 S. Ct. 761, 169 L. Ed. 2d 627. This is because proof of reliance ensures that there is a proper “connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury.” Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1988). The traditional (and most direct) way a plaintiff can demonstrate reliance is by showing that he was aware of a company’s statement and engaged in a relevant transaction—e.g., purchasing common stock—based on that specific misrepresentation. In that situation, the plaintiff plainly would have relied on the company’s deceptive conduct. A plaintiff unaware of the relevant statement, on the other hand, could not establish reliance on that basis.

We recognized in Basic, however, that limiting proof of reliance in such a way “would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market.” Id., at 245, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194. We also observed that “ [Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would” prevent such plaintiffs “from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues” would “overwhelm [ ] the common ones.”Id., at 242, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194.

[563 U.S. 811]

The Court in Basic sought to alleviate those related concerns by permitting plaintiffs to invoke a re-buttable presumption of reliance based on what is known as the “fraud-on-the-market” theory. According to that theory, “the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.” Id., at 246, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194. Because the market “transmits information to the investor in the processed form of a market price,” we can assume, the Court explained, that an investor relies on public misstatements whenever he “buys or sells stock at the price set by the market.” Id., at 244, 247, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stoneridge, supra, at 159, 128 S. Ct. 761, 169 L. Ed. 2d 627; Dura Pharmaceuticals, 544 U.S., at 341-342, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577. The Court also made clear that the presumption was just that, and could be rebutted by appropriate evidence. See Basic, supra, at 248, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194.

B

It is undisputed that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove certain things in order to invoke Basic’s re-buttable presumption of reliance. It is common ground, for example, that plaintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known (else how would the market take them into account?), that the stock traded in an efficient market, and that the relevant transaction took place “between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was revealed.” Basic, 485 U.S., at 248, n. 27, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194; id., at 241-247, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194; see also Stoneridge, supra, at 159, 128 S. Ct. 761, 169 L. Ed. 2d 627.

According to the Court of Appeals, EPJ Fund also had to establish loss causation at the certification stage to “trigger the fraud-on-the-market presumption.” 597 F.3d, at 335 (internal quotation marks omitted); see ibid. (EPJ Fund must “establish a causal link between the alleged falsehoods and its losses in order to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption”). The court determined that, in order to invoke a rebuttable presumption of reliance, EPJ Fund needed to prove that the decline in Halliburton’s stock was

[563 U.S. 812]

“because of the correction to a prior misleading statement” and “that the subsequent loss could not otherwise be explained by some additional factors revealed then to the market.” Id., at 336 (emphasis deleted). This is the loss causation requirement as we have described it. See Dura Pharmaceuticals, supra, at 342, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u—4(b)(4).

The Court of Appeals’ requirement is not justified by Basic or its logic. To begin, we have never before mentioned loss causation as a precondition for invoking Basic’s rebuttable presumption of reliance. The term “loss causation” does not even appear in our Basic opinion. And for good reason: Loss causation addresses a matter different from whether an investor relied on a misrepresentation, presumptively or otherwise, when buying or selling a stock.

We have referred to the element of reliance in a private Rule 10b-5 action as “transaction causation,” not loss causation. Dura Pharmaceuticals, supra, at 341-342, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577 (citing Basic, supra, at 248-249, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194). Consistent with that description, when considering whether a plaintiff has relied on a misrepresentation, we have typically focused on facts surrounding the investor’s decision to engage in the transaction. See Dura Pharmaceuticals, supra, at 342, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577. Under Basic’s fraud-on-the-market doctrine, an investor presumptively relies on a defendant’s misrepresentation if that “information is reflected in [the] market price” of the stock at the time of the relevant transaction. See Basic, supra, at 247, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194.

Loss causation, by contrast, requires a plaintiff to show that a misrepresentation that affected the integrity of the market price also caused a subsequent economic loss. As we made clear in Dura Pharmaceuticals, the fact that a stock’s “price on the date of purchase was inflated because of [a] misrepresentation” does not necessarily mean that the misstatement is the cause of a later decline in value. 544 U.S., at 342, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577 (emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted). We observed that the drop could instead be the

[563 U.S. 813]

result of other intervening causes, such as “changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events.” Id., at 342-343, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577. If one of those factors were responsible for the loss or part of it, a plaintiff would not be able to prove loss causation to that extent. This is true even if the investor purchased the stock at a distorted price, and thereby presumptively relied on the misrepresentation reflected in that price.

According to the Court of Appeals, however, an inability to prove loss causation would prevent a plaintiff from invoking the rebuttable presumption of reliance. Such a rule contravenes Basic’s fundamental premise—that an investor presumptively relies on a misrepresentation so long as it was reflected in the market price at the time of his transaction. The fact that a subsequent loss may have been caused by factors other than the revelation of a misrepresentation has nothing to do with whether an investor relied on the misrepresentation in the first place, either directly or presumptively through the fraud-on-the-market theory. Loss causation has no logical connection to the facts necessary to establish the efficient market predicate to the fraud-on-the-market theory.

The Court of Appeals erred by requiring EPJ Fund to show loss causation as a condition of obtaining class certification.

C

Halliburton concedes that securities fraud plaintiffs should not be required to prove loss causation in order to invoke Basic’s presumption of reliance or otherwise achieve class certification. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-29. Halliburton nonetheless defends the judgment below on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not actually require plaintiffs to prove “loss causation” as we have used that term. See id., at 27 (“it’s not loss causation as this Court knows it in Dura”). According to Halliburton, “loss causation” was

[563 U.S. 814]

merely “shorthand” for a different analysis. Brief for Respondents 18. The lower court’s actual inquiry, Halliburton insists, was whether EPJ Fund had demonstrated “price impact”—that is, whether the alleged misrepresentations affected the market price in the first place. See, e.g., id., at 16-19, 24-27, 50-51; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 27 (stating that the Court of Appeals’ “test is simply price impact” and that EPJ Fund’s “only burden under the Fifth Circuit case law was to show price impact”).

“Price impact” simply refers to the effect of a misrepresentation on a stock price. Halliburton’s theory is that if a misrepresentation does not affect market price, an investor cannot be said to have relied on the misrepresentation merely because he purchased stock at that price. If the price is unaffected by the fraud, the price does not reflect the fraud.

We do not accept Halliburton’s wishful interpretation of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. As we have explained, loss causation is a familiar and distinct concept in securities law; it is not price impact. While the opinion below may include some language consistent with a “price impact” approach, see, e.g., 597 F.3d, at 336, we simply cannot ignore the Court of Appeals’ repeated and explicit references to “loss causation,” see id., at 334 (three times), 334, n. 2, 335 (twice), 335, n. 10 (twice), 335, n. 11, 336, 336, n. 19, 336, n. 20, 337, 338, 341 (twice), 341, n. 46, 342, n. 47, 343, 344 (three times).

Whatever Halliburton thinks the Court of Appeals meant to say, what it said was loss causation: “[EPJ Fund] was required to prove loss causation, i.e., that the corrected

[563 U.S. 815]

truth of the former falsehoods actually caused the stock price to fall and resulted in the losses.” Id., at 334; see id., at 335 (“we require plaintiffs to establish loss causation in order to trigger the fraud-on-the-market presumption” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We take the Court of Appeals at its word. Based on those words, the decision below cannot stand.

Because we conclude the Court of Appeals erred by requiring EPJ Fund to prove loss causation at the certification stage, we need not, and do not, address any other question about Basic, its presumption, or how and when it may be rebutted. To the extent Halliburton has preserved any further arguments against class certification, they may be addressed in the first instance by the Court of Appeals on remand.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       Halliburton further concedes that, even if its conception of what the Court of Appeals meant by “loss causation’’ is correct, the Court of Appeals erred by placing the initial burden on EPJ Fund. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29 (“We agree . . . that the Fifth Circuit put the initial burden of production on the plaintiff and that’s contrary to Basic"). According to Halliburton, a plaintiff must prove price impact only after Basic's presumption has been successfully rebutted by the defendant. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28, 38-40. We express no views on the merits of such a framework.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Thomas

license: Public Domain

text:
    [563 U.S. 816]
    CLIFTON TERELLE McNEILL, Petitioner v UNITED STATES
    563 U.S. 816, 131 S. Ct. 2218,
    180 L. Ed. 2d 35,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 4180
    [No. 10-5258]
    Argued April 25, 2011.
    Decided June 6, 2011.

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL ARGUING CASE
    Stephen C. Gordon argued the cause for petitioner.
    Curtis E. Gannon argued the cause for respondent.

      Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

[563 U.S. 817]

Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a prior state drug-trafficking conviction is for a “serious drug offense” if “a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law” for the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The question in this case concerns how a federal court should determine the maximum sentence for a prior state drug offense for ACCA purposes. We hold that

[563 U.S. 818]

the “maximum term of imprisonment” for a defendant’s prior state drug offense is the maximum sentence applicable to his offense when he was convicted of it.

I

After an extended chase, police officers in Fayetteville, North Carolina, apprehended petitioner Clifton Te-relle McNeill. McNeill was caught with 3.1 grams of crack cocaine packaged for distribution and a .38-caliber revolver. In August 2008, he pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

At sentencing, the District Court determined that McNeill qualified for ACCA’s sentencing enhancement. Under ACCA, a person who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and “has three previous convictions ... for a violent felony or a serious drug offense” is subject to a 15-year minimum prison sentence. § 924(e)(1). McNeill conceded that two of his prior convictions—assault with a deadly weapon and robbery—were for “violent felonies.”

McNeill argued, however, that none of his six state drug-trafficking convictions were for “serious drug offense[s]” because those crimes no longer carried a “maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more.” § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). When McNeill committed those crimes between 1991 and 1994, each carried a 10-year maximum sentence, and McNeill in fact received 10-year sentences. See N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-1.1(a)(8), 90-95(a)(1) and (b)(1) (Michie 1993) (sale of cocaine and possession with intent to sell cocaine). But as of October 1, 1994, North Carolina reduced the maximum sentence for selling cocaine to 38 months and the maximum sentence for possessing cocaine with intent to sell to 30 months. See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 15A-1340.17(c) and (d), 90-95(a)(1) and (b)(1) (Lexis 2009).

The District Court rejected Mc-Neill’s request that it look to current state law and instead relied on the 10-year

[563 U.S. 819]

maximum sentence that applied to McNeill’s drug offenses at the time he committed them. No. 5:08-CR-2-D-1 (EDNC, Jan. 26, 2009), App. 118. Finding that McNeill therefore had three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, the court applied ACCA’s sentencing enhancement. The court then departed upward from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced McNeill to 300 months in prison in light of his “long and unrelenting history of serious criminal conduct” and “near certain likelihood of recidivism.” Id., at 119, 121.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Although the court consulted the maximum sentence under current state law, it reached the same conclusion as the District Court because North Carolina’s revised sentencing scheme does not apply to crimes committed before October 1, 1994. 598 F.3d 161, 165 (2010) (agreeing with United States v. Hinojosa, 349 F.3d 200 (CA5 2003), and disagreeing with United States v. Darden, 539 F.3d 116 (CA2 2008)). Thus, even if McNeill were convicted today for his 1991, 1992, and September 1994 drug offenses, he would still be subject to the old 10-year statutory maximum. 598 F.3d, at 165 (citing N. C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.10 and State v. Branch, 134 N.C. App. 637, 639-640, 518 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1999)). We granted certiorari, 562 U.S. 1128, 131 S. Ct. 856, 178 L. Ed. 2d 623 (2011), and now affirm, albeit for a different reason.

II

A

As in all statutory construction cases, we begin with “the language itself [and] the specific context in which that language is used.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S. Ct. 843, 136 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1997). ACCA’s sentencing enhancement applies to individuals who have “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” § 924(e)(1). As relevant here, the statute defines a “serious drug offense” as “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing,

[563 U.S. 820]

or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance . . . , for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).

The plain text of ACCA requires a federal sentencing court to consult the maximum sentence applicable to a defendant’s previous drug offense at the time of his conviction for that offense. The statute requires the court to determine whether a “previous con-victio[n]” was for a serious drug offense. The only way to answer this backward-looking question is to consult the law that applied at the time of that conviction. We did precisely that in United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 128 S. Ct. 1783, 170 L. Ed. 2d 719 (2008), where we addressed whether the “maximum term of imprisonment” includes recidivism enhancements. In assessing the “maximum term of imprisonment” for Rodriguez’s state drug offenses, we consulted the version of state law “that [he] was convicted of violating,” that is, the 1994 statutes and penalties that applied to his offenses at the time of his state convictions. Id., at 380-381, 128 S. Ct. 1783, 170 L. Ed. 2d 719.

Use of the present tense in the definition of “serious drug offense” does not suggest otherwise. McNeill argues that the present-tense verb in the phrase “is prescribed by law” requires federal courts to determine the maximum sentence for a potential predicate offense by looking to the state law in effect at the time of the federal sentencing, as if the state offense were committed on the day of federal sentencing. That argument overlooks the fact that ACCA is concerned with convictions that have already occurred. Whether the prior conviction was for an offense “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance” can only be answered by reference to the law under which the defendant was convicted. Likewise, the maximum sentence that “is prescribed by law” for that offense must also be determined according to the law applicable at that time.

[563 U.S. 821]

McNeill’s interpretation contorts the plain meaning of the statute. Although North Carolina courts actually sentenced him to 10 years in prison for his drug offenses, McNeill now contends that the “maximum term of imprisonment” for those offenses is 30 or 38 months. We find it “hard to accept the proposition that a defendant may lawfully [have] be[en] sentenced to a term of imprisonment that exceeds the ‘maximum term of imprisonment. . . prescribed by law.’ ” Id., at 383, 128 S. Ct. 1783, 170 L. Ed. 2d 719.

B

The “broader context of the statute as a whole,” specifically the adjacent definition of “violent felony,” confirms this interpretation. Robinson, supra, at 341, 117 S. Ct. 843, 136 L. Ed. 2d 808. ACCA defines “violent felony” in part as a crime that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” or “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

Despite Congress’ use of present tense in that definition, when determining whether a defendant was convicted of a “violent felony,” we have turned to the version of state law that the defendant was actually convicted of violating. In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 109 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1990), the Court held that whether Taylor’s 1963 and 1971 convictions were for a crime that “is burglary” depended on the “former Missouri statutes defining second-degree burglary” that “were the bases for Taylor’s prior convictions.” Id., at 602, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 109 L. Ed. 2d 607; see id., at 578, n. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 109 L. Ed. 2d 607 (noting a subsequent change in state law, but relying on the burglary statutes in force “ [i]n those years” in which Taylor was convicted). Similarly, in James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 127 S. Ct. 1586, 167 L. Ed. 2d 532 (2007), this Court looked to the versions of Florida’s burglary and criminal attempt statutes that were in effect “at the time of James’ [1993 state] conviction.” Id., at 197, 127 S. Ct. 1586, 167 L. Ed. 2d 532; see ibid. (quoting the 1993 versions of the Florida statutes). The present-tense verbs in the

[563 U.S. 822]

definition of “violent felony” did not persuade us to look anywhere other than the law under which the defendants were actually convicted to determine the elements of their offenses.

Having repeatedly looked to the historical statute of conviction in the context of violent felonies, we see no reason to interpret “serious drug offense[s]” in the adjacent section of the same statute any differently. In both definitions, Congress used the present tense to refer to past convictions. Cf. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 39, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 174 L. Ed. 2d 22 (2009) (“Where, as here, Congress uses similar statutory language ... in two adjoining provisions, it normally intends similar interpretations”).

C

This natural reading of ACCA also avoids the absurd results that would follow from consulting current state law to define a previous offense. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334, 112 S. Ct. 1351, 117 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1992) ( “[A]bsurd results are to be avoided”).

For example, McNeill concedes that under his approach, a prior conviction could “disappear” entirely for ACCA purposes if a State reformulated the offense between the defendant’s state conviction and federal sentencing. Tr. of Oral Arg. 12-13. The Sixth Circuit confronted a similar scenario in Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491 (2003), where Ohio had substantially changed how drug quantities were measured since Mallett’s state drug conviction. Id., at 502 (addressing this issue in the context of the career offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines). The Sixth Circuit could not “determine how Mallett would now be sentenced under Ohio’s revised drug laws” because the offense for which he had been convicted “no longer exist[ed] and no conversion between the former and amended statutes [wa]s facially apparent.” Ibid. The court therefore was compelled to look to state law “as of the time of the state-court

[563 U.S. 823]

conviction” to determine the maximum possible sentence for Mallet’s prior offense. Id., at 503.

It cannot be correct that subsequent changes in state law can erase an earlier conviction for ACCA purposes. A defendant’s history of criminal activity—and the culpability and dangerousness that such history demonstrates—does not cease to exist when a State reformulates its criminal statutes in a way that prevents precise translation of the old conviction into the new statutes. Congress based ACCA’s sentencing enhancement on prior convictions and could not have expected courts to treat those convictions as if they had simply disappeared. To the contrary, Congress has expressly directed that a prior violent felony conviction remains a “conviction” unless it has been “expunged, or set aside or [the] person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 491, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 128 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1994) (explaining that § 921(a)(20) “creates a clear negative implication that courts may count a conviction that has not been set aside”).

In addition, McNeill’s interpretation would make ACCA’s applicability depend on the timing of the federal sentencing proceeding. McNeill cannot explain why two defendants who violated § 922(g) on the same day and who had identical criminal histories—down to the dates on which they committed and were sentenced for their prior offenses—should receive dramatically different federal sentences solely because one’s § 922(g) sentencing happened to occur after the state legislature amended the punishment for one of the shared prior offenses. In contrast, the interpretation we adopt permits a defendant to know even before he violates § 922(g) whether ACCA would apply.

III

Applying our holding to this case, we conclude that the District Court properly applied ACCA’s sentencing enhancement

[563 U.S. 824]

to McNeill. In light of his two admitted violent felony convictions, McNeill needed only one conviction for a “serious drug offense” to trigger ACCA, but we note that all six of his prior drug convictions qualify.

In November 1992, McNeill pleaded guilty and was sentenced in a North Carolina court for five offenses: selling cocaine on four separate occasions in October 1991 and possessing cocaine with intent to sell on one occasion in February 1992. At the time of McNeill’s November 1992 conviction and sentencing, North Carolina law dictated that the maximum sentence for selling cocaine in 1991 and the maximum sentence for possessing cocaine with intent to sell in 1992 was 10 years in prison. See N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-1.1(a)(8), 90-95(a)(1) and (b)(1) (Michie 1993). McNeill’s 1992 convictions were therefore for “serious drug offense [s]” within the meaning of ACCA.

McNeill’s sixth drug offense was possessing cocaine with intent to sell in September 1994. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced in a North Carolina court in April 1995. By April 1995, North Carolina had changed the sentence applicable to that type of drug offense but still provided that the maximum sentence for possessing cocaine with intent to sell in September 1994 was 10 years in prison. See 1993 N. C. Sess. Laws, ch. 538, § 2 (repealing N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-1.1); 1993 N. C. Sess. Laws, ch. 538, § 56 (as modified by Extra Session 1994 N. C. Sess. Laws, ch. 24, § 14(b)) (“This act becomes effective October 1, 1994, and applies only to offenses occurring on or after that date. Prosecutions for, or sentences based on, offenses occurring before the effective date of this act [are controlled by] the statutes that would be applicable to those prosecutions or sentences but for the provisions of this act”). Therefore, McNeill’s 1995 conviction was also for a “serious drug offense.”

[563 U.S. 825]

We conclude that a federal sentencing court must determine whether “an offense under State law” is a “serious drug offense” by consulting the “maximum term of imprisonment” applicable to a defendant’s previous drug offense at the time of the defendant’s state conviction for that offense. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

       As the Government notes, this case does not concern a situation in which a State subsequently lowers the maximum penalty applicable to an offense and makes that reduction available to defendants previously convicted and sentenced for that offense. Brief for United States 18, n. 5; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We do not address whether or under what circumstances a federal court could consider the effect of that state action.


author: Justice Kagan

text:
    [563 U.S. 826]
    RICKY D. FOX, Petitioner v JUDY ANN VICE, as executrix of the ESTATE OF BILLY RAY VICE, et al.
    563 U.S. 826, 131 S. Ct. 2205,
    180 L. Ed. 2d 45,
    2011 U.S. LEXIS 4182
    [No. 10-114]
    Argued March 22, 2011.
    Decided June 6, 2011.

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL ARGUING CASE
    E. Joshua Rosenkranz argued the cause for petitioner.
    Mark T. Stancil argued the cause for respondents.

      Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

[563 U.S. 829]

Justice Kagan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Federal law authorizes a court to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in certain civil rights cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We have held that a defendant may receive such an award if the plaintiffs suit is frivolous. In this case, the plaintiff asserted both frivolous and non-frivolous claims. We hold today that a court may grant reasonable fees to the defendant in this circumstance, but only for costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims. A trial court has wide discretion in applying this standard. But here we must vacate the judgment below because the court used a different and incorrect standard in awarding fees.

I

This case arises out of an election for chief of police in the town of Vin-ton, Louisiana. The candidates were petitioner Ricky Fox (the challenger) and respondent Billy Ray Vice (the incumbent). By Fox’s account, Vice resorted to an assortment of dirty tricks to try to force Fox out of the race. In particular, Vice sent an anonymous letter to Fox threatening to publish damaging charges against him if he remained a candidate. Vice also arranged for a third party to publicly accuse Fox of using racial slurs and then to file a criminal complaint against Fox repeating those allegations. And when prosecutors ignored that faux complaint, Vice leaked it to the press. Yet all of these machinations failed; Fox won the election. And Vice got an even greater comeuppance: He was subsequently convicted of criminal extortion for his election-related conduct.

[563 U.S. 830]

Fox, however, chose not to let the matter rest; he filed this suit in Louisiana state court against Vice and the town of Vinton, also a respondent here. Fox’s complaint asserted both state-law claims, including defamation, and federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including interference with his right to seek public office. Vice and the town (Vice, for short) removed the case to federal court on the basis of the § 1983 claims.

At the end of discovery in the suit, Vice moved for summary judgment on Fox’s federal claims. Fox conceded that the claims were “no[t] valid,” App. 169, and the District Court accordingly dismissed them with prejudice. In the same ruling, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Docket No. 2:06-cv-135 (WD La., Oct. 16, 2007), App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a-40a. The court instead remanded the now slimmed-down case to state court for adjudication. In doing so, the District Court observed that “[a]ny trial preparation, legal research, and discovery may be used by the parties in the state court proceedings.” Id., at 40a.

Vice then asked the federal court for an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988, arguing that Fox’s federal claims were “baseless and without merit.” App. 198. Vice stated that his lawyers had had to participate in five lengthy depositions and review numerous records to defend against Fox’s charges. Id., at 199. In support of his fee request, Vice submitted attorney billing records estimating the time spent on the whole suit, without differentiating between the federal and state-law claims. See Supp. App. 8-67.

The District Court granted the motion for attorney’s fees on the ground that Fox’s federal claims were frivolous. Although the state-law allegations had not been found frivolous (and indeed remained live), the court did not require Vice to separate out the work his attorneys had done on the two sets of claims. Docket No. 2:06-cv-135 (WD La., Sept. 22, 2008), App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. According to the court, such

[563 U.S. 831]

“segregation” was unnecessary because the “various claims arose out of the same transaction and were so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entailed proof or denial of essentially the same facts.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the court declined to reduce the fee award to reflect the surviving state-law claims. “[T]hroughout the litigation,” the court stated, both sides “focus [ed]” on Fox’s frivolous § 1983 claims. Id., at 32a-33a. The court therefore concluded that Vice should receive all of the fees he reasonably incurred in defending the suit—a total of $48,681. Id., at 34a.

A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. 594 F.3d 423 (CA5 2010). The majority first rejected Fox’s contention that all claims in a suit must be frivolous for the defendant to recover any fees. That rule, the court explained, would “ ‘allow plaintiffs to prosecute frivolous claims without consequenc[e]’ ” so long as they added a single non-frivolous claim. Id., at 428 (quoting Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1064 (CA9 2006)). The Court of Appeals then turned to the District Court’s decision that Vice was entitled to fees for all time thus far spent on the case, even though state-law claims remained un-adjudicated. Repeating the trial court’s view that the whole litigation had focused on the frivolous federal claims, the Fifth Circuit upheld the fee award. See 594 F.3d, at 428.

Judge Southwick dissented. He agreed that Vice was entitled to some reimbursement for fees. Id., at 430. But he thought the District Court had erred in declining to “allocate the fees separately between the successful claims and the unsuccessful” ones just because all of them were “interrelated.” Ibid. “[W]hen some claims are dismissed as frivolous and others are not,” he stated, the defendants should receive fees only for “the legal work allocable solely or dominantly to the dismissed” claims. Id., at 431. Because in this case “almost all of the defendant[s’] discovery and factual analysis would have been necessary even if no federal

[563 U.S. 832]

claims had been brought,” he concluded, the fee award should have been much smaller. Ibid.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision deepened a Circuit split about whether and to what extent a court may award fees to a defendant under § 1988 when a plaintiff asserts both frivolous and non-frivolous claims. One Court of Appeals has forbidden any compensation unless all of the plaintiffs claims are frivolous. See Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423 F.3d 606, 617 (CA6 2005). Others have rejected this approach, but struggled with how to allocate fees in a suit that involves a mix of frivolous and non-frivolous claims. Compare, e.g., 594 F.3d 423 (CA5 2010) (opinion below), with Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 132 (CA2 1985) (declining to award fees when the frivolous claim “added no additional testimony or expense to the trial”). We granted certiorari to resolve these questions. 562 U.S. 1002, 131 S. Ct. 505, 178 L. Ed. 2d 369 (2010).

II

Our legal system generally requires each party to bear his own litigation expenses, including attorney’s fees, regardless whether he wins or loses. Indeed, this principle is so firmly entrenched that it is known as the “American Rule.” See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975). But Congress has authorized courts to deviate from this background rule in certain types of cases by shifting fees from one party to another. See Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 120 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1992) (listing federal fee-shifting provisions).

The statute involved here, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, allows the award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to “the prevailing

[563 U.S. 833]

party” in various kinds of civil rights cases, including suits brought under § 1983. Most of our decisions addressing this provision have concerned the grant of fees to prevailing plaintiffs. When a plaintiff succeeds in remedying a civil rights violation, we have stated, he serves “as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1263 (1968) (per curiam). He therefore “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee” from the defendant—the party whose misconduct created the need for legal action. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). Fee-shifting in such a case at once reimburses a plaintiff for “what it cos[t] [him] to vindicate [civil] rights,” Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 577-578, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 91 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted), and holds to account “a violator of federal law,” Christiansburg, 434 U.S., at 418, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648.

In Christiansburg, we held that § 1988 also authorizes a fee award to a prevailing defendant, but under a different standard reflecting the “quite different equitable considerations” at stake. Id., at 419, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648. In enacting § 1988, we stated, Congress sought “to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis.” Id., at 420, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648. Accordingly, § 1988 authorizes a district court to award attorney’s fees to a defendant “upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id., at 421, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648; see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, n. 9, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985).

These standards would be easy to apply if life were like the movies, but that is usually not the case. In Hollywood, litigation most often concludes with a dramatic verdict that leaves one party fully triumphant and the other utterly prostrate. The court in such a case would know exactly how to award fees (even if that anticlimactic scene is generally left on the cutting-room floor). But in the real world, litigation is more complex, involving multiple claims for relief that implicate

[563 U.S. 834]

a mix of legal theories and have different merits. Some claims succeed; others fail. Some charges are frivolous; others (even if not ultimately successful) have a reasonable basis. In short, litigation is messy, and courts must deal with this untidiness in awarding fees.

Given this reality, we have made clear that plaintiffs may receive fees under § 1988 even if they are not victorious on every claim. A civil rights plaintiff who obtains meaningful relief has corrected a violation of federal law and, in so doing, has vindicated Congress’s statutory purposes. That “result is what matters,” we explained in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983): A court should compensate the plaintiff for the time his attorney reasonably spent in achieving the favorable outcome, even if “the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention.” Ibid. The fee award, of course, should not reimburse the plaintiff for work performed on claims that bore no relation to the grant of relief: Such work “cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). But the presence of these unsuccessful claims does not immunize a defendant against paying for the attorney’s fees that the plaintiff reasonably incurred in remedying a breach of his civil rights.

Analogous principles indicate that a defendant may deserve fees even if not all the plaintiffs claims were frivolous. In this context, § 1988 serves to relieve a defendant of expenses attributable to frivolous charges. The plaintiff acted wrongly in leveling such allegations, and the court may shift to him the reasonable costs that those claims imposed on his adversary. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S., at 420-421, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648. That remains true when the plaintiffs suit also includes non-frivolous claims. The defendant, of course, is not entitled to any fees arising from these non-frivolous charges. See ibid. But the presence of reasonable allegations in a suit does not immunize the plaintiff against paying for the fees that his frivolous claims imposed.

[563 U.S. 835]

Indeed, we have previously said exactly this much. In Hensley, we noted the possibility that a plaintiff might prevail on one contention in a suit while also asserting an unrelated frivolous claim. In this situation, we explained, a court could properly award fees to both parties—to the plaintiff, to reflect the fees he incurred in bringing the meritorious claim; and to the defendant, to compensate for the fees he paid in defending against the frivolous one. See 461 U.S., at 435, n. 10, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40. We thus made clear that a court may reimburse a defendant for costs under § 1988 even if a plaintiffs suit is not wholly frivolous. Fee-shifting to recompense a defendant (as to recompense a plaintiff) is not all-or-nothing: A defendant need not show that every claim in a complaint is frivolous to qualify for fees.

The question then becomes one of allocation: In a lawsuit involving a mix of frivolous and non-frivolous claims, what work may the defendant receive fees for? Vice concedes, as he must, that a defendant may not obtain compensation for work unrelated to a frivolous claim. Brief for Respondents 42, n. 13. Similarly, we think Fox would have to concede (once he has lost the argument that the presence of any non-frivolous claim precludes a fee award) that the defendant may receive reasonable fees for work related exclusively to a frivolous claim. The question in dispute concerns work that helps defend against non-frivolous and frivolous claims alike—for example, a deposition eliciting facts relevant to both allegations.

Vice proposes authorizing the trial court to award fees for work that is “fairly attributable” to the frivolous portion of the lawsuit. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 45. But that standard is in truth no standard at all. The very question under consideration is: What fees may be fairly attributed to frivolous claims under § 1988? To answer “Those that are fairly attributable to frivolous claims” is just to restate this question. And that non-response response would leave to each and every trial court not only the implementation, but

[563 U.S. 836]

also the invention, of the applicable legal standard. We do not think trial courts would appreciate that lack of guidance. And yet more important, we do not think such an empty and amorphous test would ensure that all fee awards to defendants comport with Congress’s purpose in enacting § 1988.

That congressional policy points to a different and more meaningful standard: Section 1988 allows a defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees incurred because of, but only because of, a frivolous claim. Or what is the same thing stated as a but-for test: Section 1988 permits the defendant to receive only the portion of his fees that he would not have paid but for the frivolous claim. Recall that the relevant purpose of § 1988 is to relieve defendants of the burdens associated with fending off frivolous litigation. See supra, at 833, 180 L. Ed. 2d, at 54. So if a frivolous claim occasioned the attorney’s fees at issue, a court may decide that the defendant should not have to pay them. But if the defendant would have incurred those fees anyway, to defend against non-frivolous claims, then a court has no basis for transferring the expense to the plaintiff. Suppose, for example, that a defendant’s attorney conducts a deposition on matters relevant to both a frivolous and a non-frivolous claim—and more, that the lawyer would have taken and committed the same time to this deposition even if the case had involved only the non-frivolous allegation. In that circumstance, the work does not implicate Congress’s reason for allowing defendants to collect fees. The defendant would have incurred the expense in any event; he has suffered no incremental harm from the frivolous claim. In short, the defendant has never shouldered the burden that Congress, in enacting § 1988, wanted to relieve. The basic American Rule thus continues to operate.

[563 U.S. 837]

A standard allowing more expansive fee-shifting would furnish windfalls to some defendants, making them better off because they were subject to a suit including frivolous claims. For under any more permissive test, the simple presence of a frivolous claim would allow the court to shift to the plaintiff some of the costs of defending against regular, non-frivolous charges. So two defendants (call them Vice and Rice) could face identical non-frivolous allegations, but because Vice also confronted a frivolous claim, he might end by paying less than Rice to his attorneys. The chance assertion—for Vice, the downright lucky assertion—of the frivolous claim could relieve him not only of the incremental costs of that claim but also of costs that he, like Rice, would have had to pay in its absence. Section 1988 provides no warrant for that peculiar result; that statute was “never intended to produce windfalls” for parties. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115, 113 S. Ct. 566, 121 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

At the same time, the “but-for” standard we require may in some cases allow compensation to a defendant for attorney work relating to both frivolous and non-frivolous claims. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff asserts one frivolous and one non-frivolous claim, but that only the frivolous allegation can legally result in a damages award. If an attorney performs work useful to defending against both, but did so only because of the defendant’s monetary exposure on the frivolous charge, a court may decide to shift fees. Or similarly, imagine that the frivolous claim enables removal of the case to federal court, which in turn drives up litigation expenses. Here too, our standard would permit awarding fees

[563 U.S. 838]

for work relevant to both claims in order to reflect the increased costs (if any) of the federal forum. And frivolous claims may increase the cost of defending a suit in ways that are not reflected in the number of hours billed. If a defendant could prove, for example, that a frivolous claim involved a specialized area that reasonably caused him to hire more expensive counsel for the entire case, then the court may reimburse the defendant for the increased marginal cost. As all these examples show, the dispositive question is not whether attorney costs at all relate to a non-frivolous claim, but whether the costs would have been incurred in the absence of the frivolous allegation. The answers to those inquiries will usually track each other, but when they diverge, it is the second that matters.

We emphasize, as we have before, that the determination of fees “should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley, 461 U.S., at 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40. The fee applicant (whether a plaintiff or a defendant) must, of course, submit appropriate documentation to meet “the burden of establishing entitlement to an award.” Ibid. But trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time. And appellate courts must give substantial deference to these determinations, in light of “the district court’s superior understanding of the litigation.” Ibid.; see Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Ed., 471 U.S. 234, 244, 105 S. Ct. 1923, 85 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1985). We can hardly think of a sphere of judicial decisionmaking in which appellate micromanagement has less to recommend it.

But the trial court must apply the correct standard, and the appeals court must make sure that has occurred. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 548, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 176 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2010) (“Determining a ‘reasonable attorney’s fee’ is a matter that is committed to the sound discretion of a trial judge,.. . but the judge’s

[563 U.S. 839]

discretion is not unlimited”); cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 135 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law”). That means the trial court must determine whether the fees requested would not have accrued but for the frivolous claim. And the appeals court must determine whether the trial court asked and answered that question, rather than some other. A trial court has wide discretion when, but only when, it calls the game by the right rules.

III

The task remains of applying these principles to the fee award Vice received. The District Court’s analysis suggests that Vice’s attorneys would have done much the same work even if Fox had not brought his frivolous claims. As noted earlier, see supra, at 830-831, 180 L. Ed. 2d, at 52, the court acknowledged that Fox’s federal and state-law claims were “interrelated,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a (internal quotation marks omitted). The charges “arose out of the same transaction”—Vice’s conduct in the campaign—and their “defense entailed proof or denial of essentially the same facts.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). It therefore seems likely that Vice’s attorneys would at least have conducted similar fact-gathering activities—taken many of the same depositions, produced and reviewed many of the same documents, and so forth. Indeed, the District Court highlighted the usefulness of the attorneys’ work to defending against the state-law claims: In its order remanding those claims, the court noted that the “trial preparation, legal research, and discovery” done in the federal court could “be used by the parties in the state court proceedings.” Id., at 40a.

The District Court’s decision to award full attorney’s fees to Vice failed to take proper account of this overlap between the frivolous and non-frivolous claims. Rather than apply the but-for standard we have set out, the court indicated that the paramount factor was the parties’ “focus” in the litigation. Id., at 33a. The court did not address whether the

[563 U.S. 840]

“interrelated [ness]” of the claims meant that Vice would have incurred part or most of his fees even if Fox had asserted only the non-frivolous state-law claims. To the contrary, the court suggested that the close relationship between the federal and state-law claims supported Vice’s request to recover all of his attorney’s fees. See id., at 28a; supra, at 830-831, 180 L. Ed. 2d, at 52. That reasoning stands the appropriate analysis on its head. It cannot be squared with the congressional policy of sparing defendants from the costs of frivolous litigation.

Nor did the Court of Appeals uphold the award of fees on the ground that we would require. The majority articulated a standard that, taken alone, might be read as consistent with our opinion; according to the court, a defendant should receive fees for “work which can be distinctly traced to a plaintiffs frivolous claims.” 594 F.3d, at 429. But the court seemed to think that its test permitted awarding Vice fees for any work useful to defending against a frivolous claim, even if lawyers would have done that work regardless. Indeed, this very point divided the majority and the dissent. Judge South-wick objected to the fee award on the ground that “almost all [of] the defendant[s’] discovery and factual analysis would have been necessary even if no federal claims had been brought.” Id., at 431. But the majority never responded to that argument or otherwise engaged this crucial question. The majority instead merely reiterated the District Court’s reasoning that the parties had principally “focus [ed]” on the § 1983 allegations. That finding, as we have explained, is irrelevant if Vice’s attorneys would have performed the same work to defend against the state-law claims.

On this record, we must return the case to the lower courts. See, e.g., Perdue, 559 U.S., at 557-560, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 176 L. Ed. 2d 494; Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 566-568, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 92 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1986); Hensley, 461 U.S., at 438-440, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40. In a suit of this kind, involving both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, a defendant may recover the reasonable attorney’s

[563 U.S. 841]

fees he expended solely because of the frivolous allegations. And that is all. Consistent with the policy underlying § 1988, the defendant may not receive compensation for any fees that he would have paid in the absence of the frivolous claims. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

      . Vice died during the course of this litigation. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 35.1, we substituted the executor of his estate as respondent. 562 U.S. 1282, 131 S. Ct. 1672, 179 L. Ed. 2d 522 (2011). But for the sake of clarity, we refer to the respondent as Vice.

      . The parties do not dispute for purposes of argument here that this case involves both kinds of claims. The District Court deemed the federal claims frivolous, and Pox has not asked us to disturb that ruling. See Brief for Petitioner 26, and n. 2. The court remanded the state-law claims to state court, and Vice has assumed in this Court that they are not frivolous. See Brief for Respondents 8, n. 5.

      . The test set out here differs from the one we adopted in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983), to govern fee awards to plaintiffs in cases involving both successful and unsuccessful claims. See supra, at 834, 180 L. Ed. 2d, at 54. That difference reflects the disparate legislative purposes we have recognized in the two settings. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419-420, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978); supra, at 833, 180 L. Ed. 2d, at 54. Congress authorized fees to plaintiffs to compensate them for the costs of redressing civil rights violations; accordingly, a plaintiff may receive fees for all work relating to the accomplishment of that result, even if “the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised." Hensley, 461 U.S., at 435, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40. By contrast, Congress authorized fees to defendants to remove the burden associated with fending off frivolous claims; accordingly, a defendant may recover for fees that those claims caused him to incur. In each context, the standard for allocating fees in “mixed’’ cases matches the relevant congressional purpose.