author: Justice Kagan

text:
    [565 U.S. 452]
    NATIONAL MEAT ASSOCIATION, Petitioner v KAMALA D. HARRIS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, et al.
    565 U.S. 452, 132 S. Ct. 965,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 950,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 1062
    [No. 10-224]
    Argued November 9, 2011.
    Decided January 23, 2012.

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL ARGUING CASE
    Steven J. Wells argued the cause for petitioner.
    Benjamin J. Horwich argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court.
    Susan K. Smith argued the cause for respondents.

      Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

[565 U.S. 455]

Justice Kagan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA or Act), 21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., regulates the inspection, handling, and slaughter of livestock for human consumption. We consider here whether the FMIA expressly preempts a California law dictating what slaughterhouses must do with pigs that cannot walk, known in the trade as nonambulatory pigs. We hold that the FMIA forecloses the challenged applications of the state statute.

I

A

The FMIA regulates a broad range of activities at slaughterhouses to ensure both the safety of meat and the humane handling of animals. First enacted in 1906, after Upton Sinclair’s muckraking novel The Jungle sparked an uproar over conditions in the meatpacking industry, the Act establishes “an elaborate system of inspecti[ng]” live animals and

[565 U.S. 456]

carcasses in order “to prevent the shipment of impure, unwholesome, and unfit meat and meat-food products.” Pittsburgh Melting Co. v. Totten, 248 U.S. 1, 4-5, 39 S. Ct. 3, 63 L. Ed. 97 (1918). And since amended in 1978, see 92 Stat. 1069, the FMIA requires all slaughterhouses to comply with the standards for humane handling and slaughter of animals set out in the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958 (HMSA), 72 Stat. 862, 7 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., which originally applied only to slaughterhouses selling meat to the Federal Government.

The Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has responsibility for administering the FMIA to promote its dual goals of safe meat and humane slaughter. Over the years, the FSIS has issued extensive regulations to govern the inspection of animals and meat, as well as other aspects of slaughterhouses’ operations and facilities. See 9 CFR § 300.1 et seq. (2011). The FSIS employs about 9,000 inspectors, veterinarians, and investigators to implement its inspection regime and enforce its humane-handling requirements. See Hearings on 2012 Appropriations before the Subcommittee on Agriculture of the House Committee on Appropriations, 112th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. IB, p. 921 (2011). In fiscal year 2010, those personnel examined about 147 million head of livestock and carried out more than 126,000 “humane handling verification procedures.” Id., at 942-943.

The FSIS’s inspection procedure begins with an “ante-mortem” examination of each animal brought to a slaughterhouse. See 9 CFR § 309.1. If the inspector finds no evidence of disease or injury, he approves the animal for slaughter. If, at the other end of the spectrum, the inspector sees that an animal is dead or dying, comatose, suffering from a high fever, or afflicted with a serious disease or condition, he designates the animal as “U. S. Condemned.” See § 309.3; § 311.1 et seq. (listing diseases requiring condemnation). A condemned animal (if not already dead) must be

[565 U.S. 457]

killed apart from the slaughtering facilities where food is produced, and no part of its carcass may be sold for human consumption. See § 309.13(a); 21U.S.C. § 610(c).

The inspector also has an intermediate option: If he determines that an animal has a less severe condition—or merely suspects the animal of having a disease meriting condemnation—he classifies the animal as “U. S. Suspect.” See 9 CFR § 309.2. That category includes all nonambu-latory animals not found to require condemnation. See § 309.2(b). Suspect livestock must be “set apart,” specially monitored, and (if not reclassified because of a change in condition) “slaughtered separately from other livestock.” § 309.2(n). Following slaughter, an inspector decides at a “post-mortem” examination which parts, if any, of the suspect animal’s carcass may be processed into food for humans. See 9 CFR pts. 310, 311.

The regulations implementing the FMIA additionally prescribe methods for handling animals humanely at all stages of the slaughtering process. Those rules apply from the moment a truck carrying livestock “enters, or is in line to enter,” a slaughterhouse’s premises. Humane Handling and Slaughter of Livestock, FSIS Directive 6900.2, ch. II(I) (rev. Aug. 15, 2011). And they include specific provisions for the humane treatment of animals that cannot walk. See 9 CFR § 313.2(d). Under the regulations, slaughterhouse employees may not drag conscious, nonambula-tory animals, see § 313.2(d)(2), and may move them only with “equipment suitable for such purposes,” § 313.2(d)(3). Similarly, employees must place nonambulatory animals, as well as other sick and disabled livestock, in covered pens sufficient to protect

[565 U.S. 458]

the animals from “adverse climatic conditions.” See § 313.2(d)(1); § 313.1(c).

The FMIA contains an express preemption provision, at issue here, addressing state laws on these and similar matters. That provision’s first sentence reads:

“Requirements within the scope of this [Act] with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any establishment at which inspection is provided under . . . this [Act], which are in addition to, or different than those made under this [Act] may not be imposed by any State.” 21 U.S.C. § 678

B

In 2008, the Humane Society of the United States released an undercover video showing workers at a slaughterhouse in California dragging, kicking, and electroshocking sick and disabled cows in an effort to move them. The video led the Federal Government to institute the largest beef recall in U. S. history in order to prevent consumption of meat from diseased animals. Of greater relevance here, the video also prompted the California legislature to strengthen a preexisting statute governing the treatment of nonambulatory animals and to apply that statute to slaughterhouses regulated under the FMIA. See National Meat Assn. v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1096 (CA9 2010).

As amended, the California law— § 599f of the state penal code—provides in relevant part:

“(a) No slaughterhouse, stockyard, auction, market agency, or dealer shall buy, sell, or receive a nonambulatory animal.
[565 U.S. 459]
“(b) No slaughterhouse shall process, butcher, or sell meat or products of nonambulatory animals for human consumption.
“(c) No slaughterhouse shall hold a nonambulatory animal without taking immediate action to humanely euthanize the animal” Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 599f (West 2010).

The maximum penalty for violating any of these prohibitions is one year in jail and a $ 20,000 fine. See § 599f(h).

Petitioner National Meat Association (NMA) is a trade association representing meatpackers and processors, including operators of swine slaughterhouses. It sued to enjoin the enforcement of § 599f against those slaughterhouses, principally on the ground that the FMIA preempts application of the state law. The District Court granted the NMA’s motion for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that § 599f is expressly preempted because it requires swine “to be handled in a manner other than that prescribed by the FMIA” and its regulations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a. But the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction. According to that court, the FMIA does not expressly preempt § 599f because the state law regulates only “the kind of animal that may be slaughtered,” and not the inspection or slaughtering process itself. 599 F.3d, at 1098.

We granted certiorari, 564 U.S. 1036, 131 S. Ct. 3083, 180 L. Ed. 2d 884 (2011), and now reverse.

II

The FMIA’s preemption clause sweeps widely—and in so doing, blocks the applications of § 599f challenged here. The clause prevents a State from imposing any additional or different—even if non-conflicting—requirements that fall

[565 U.S. 460]

within the scope of the Act and concern a slaughterhouse’s facilities or operations. And at every turn § 599f imposes additional or different requirements on swine slaughterhouses: It compels them to deal with nonambulatory pigs on their premises in ways that the federal Act and regulations do not. In essence, California’s statute substitutes a new regulatory scheme for the one the FSIS uses. Where under federal law a slaughterhouse may take one course of action in handling a nonambulatory pig, under state law the slaughterhouse must take another.

Consider first what the two statutes tell a slaughterhouse to do when (as not infrequently occurs) a pig becomes injured and thus nonambulatory sometime after delivery to the slaughterhouse. Section 599f(c) prohibits the slaughterhouse from “hold[ing]” such an animal “without taking immediate action to humanely euthanize” it. And § 599f(b) provides that no part of the animal’s carcass may be “process[ed]” or “butcher[ed]” to make food. By contrast, under the FMIA and its regulations, a slaughterhouse may hold (without euthanizing) any nonambulatory pig that has not been condemned. See supra, at 457, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 958. And the slaughterhouse may process or butcher such an animal’s meat for human consumption, subject to an FSIS official’s approval at a post-mortem inspection. See ibid. The State’s proscriptions thus exceed the FMIA’s. To be sure, nothing in the federal Act requires what the state law forbids (or forbids what the state law requires); California is right to note that “[t]he FMIA does not mandate that TJ. S. Suspect’ [nonambulatory] animals ... be placed into the human food production process.”

[565 U.S. 461]

Brief for State Respondents 31. But that is irrelevant, because the FMIA’s preemption clause covers not just conflicting but also different or additional state requirements. It therefore precludes California’s effort in §§ 599f(b) and (c) to impose new rules, beyond any the FSIS has chosen to adopt, on what a slaughterhouse must do with a pig that becomes nonambulatory during the production process.

Similarly, consider how the state and federal laws address what a slaughterhouse should do when a pig is nonambulatory at the time of delivery, usually because of harsh transportation conditions. Section 599f(a) of the California law bars a slaughterhouse from “receiv[ing]” or “buy[ing]” such a pig, thus obligating the slaughterhouse to refuse delivery of the animal. But that directive, too, deviates from any imposed by federal law. A regulation issued under the FMIA specifically authorizes slaughterhouses to buy disabled or diseased animals (including nonambulatory swine), by exempting them from a general prohibition on such purchases. See 9 CFR § 325.20(c). And other regulations contemplate that slaughterhouses will in fact take, rather than refuse, receipt of nonam-bulatory swine. Recall that the FMIA’s regulations provide for the inspection of all pigs at delivery, see supra, at 456, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 956-957—in the case of nonambulatory pigs, often right on the truck, see Humane Handling and Slaughter of Livestock, FSIS Directive 6900.2, ch. II(I). They further instruct slaughterhouses to kill and dispose of any

[565 U.S. 462]

nonambulatory pigs labeled “condemned,” and to slaughter separately those marked “suspect.” See supra, at 456-457, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 957-958. In short, federal law establishes rules for handling and slaughtering non-ambulatory pigs brought to a slaughterhouse, rather than ordering them returned to sender. So § 599f(a) and the FMIA require different things of a slaughterhouse confronted with a delivery truck containing nonambula-tory swine. The former says “do not receive or buy them”; the latter does not.

The Humane Society counters that at least § 599f(a)’s ban on buying non-ambulatory animals escapes preemption because that provision applies no matter when or where a purchase takes place. The argument proceeds in three steps: (1) Section 599f(a)’s ban covers purchases of nonambula-tory pigs made prior to delivery, away from the slaughterhouse itself (say, at a farm or auction); (2) the State may regulate such offsite purchases because they do not involve a slaughterhouse’s “premises, facilities and operations,” which is a condition of preemption under the FMIA; and (3) no different result should obtain just because a slaughterhouse structures its swine purchases to occur at delivery, on its own property. See Brief for Non-State Respondents 43-45.

But this argument fails on two grounds. First, its preliminary steps have no foundation in the record. Until a stray comment at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 50, neither the State nor the Humane Society had disputed the NMA’s assertion that slaughterhouses buy pigs at delivery (or still later, upon successful ante-mortem inspection). See Brief for Petitioner 46, n. 18; Brief for Non-State Respondents 44; Brief for State Respondents 16, n. 5. Nor had the parties presented evidence that a significant number of pigs become non-ambulatory before shipment, when any offsite purchases would occur. The record therefore does not disclose whether § 599f(a)’s ban on purchase ever applies beyond the slaughterhouse gate, much less how an application of that kind would affect a slaughterhouse’s operations. And because

[565 U.S. 463]

that is so, we have no basis for deciding whether the FMIA would preempt it. Second, even assuming that a State could regulate offsite purchases, the concluding step of the Humane Society’s argument would not follow. The FMIA’s preemption clause expressly focuses on “premises, facilities and operations”—at bottom, the slaughtering and processing of animals at a given location. So the distinction between a slaughterhouse’s site-based activities and its more far-flung commercial dealings is not, as the Humane Society contends, an anomaly that courts should strain to avoid. It is instead a fundamental feature of the FMIA’s preemption clause.

For that reason, the Humane Society’s stronger argument concerns California’s effort to regulate the last stage of a slaughterhouse’s business—the ban in § 599f(b) on “sell-ting] meat or products of nonambula-tory animals for human consumption.” The Government acknowledges that the FMIA’s preemption clause does not usually foreclose “state regulation of the commercial sales activities of slaughterhouses.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17. And the Humane Society asserts, in line with that general rule, that § 599f(b)’s ban on sales does not regulate a slaughterhouse’s “operations” because it kicks in only after they have ended: Once meat from a slaughtered pig has passed a post-mortem inspection, the Act “is not concerned with whether or how it is ever actually sold.” Brief for Non-State Respondents 45. At most, the Humane Society claims, § 599f(b)’s ban on sales offers an “incentiv[e]” to a slaughterhouse to take nonambulatory pigs out of the meat production process. Id., at 46. And California may so “motivate” an operational choice without running afoul of the FMIA’s preemption provision. Ibid, (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 443, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 161 L. Ed. 2d 687 (2005)).

But this argument mistakes how the prohibition on sales operates within § 599f as a whole. The sales ban is a criminal proscription calculated to help implement and enforce

[565 U.S. 464]

each of the section’s other regulations—its prohibition of receipt and purchase, its bar on butchering and processing, and its mandate of immediate euthanasia. The idea—and the inevitable effect—of the provision is to make sure that slaughterhouses remove nonambulatory pigs from the production process (or keep them out of the process from the beginning) by criminalizing the sale of their meat. That, we think, is something more than an “incentiv[e]” or “motivat[or]”; the sales ban instead functions as a command to slaughterhouses to structure their operations in the exact way the remainder of § 599f mandates. And indeed, if the sales ban were to avoid the FMIA’s preemption clause, then any State could impose any regulation on slaughterhouses just by framing it as a ban on the sale of meat produced in whatever way the State disapproved. That would make a mockery of the FMIA’s preemption provision. Cf. Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 255, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529 (2004) (stating that it “would make no sense” to allow state regulations to escape preemption because they addressed the purchase, rather than manufacture, of a federally regulated product). Like the rest of § 599f, the sales ban regulates how slaughterhouses must deal with nonambulatory pigs on their premises. The FMIA therefore preempts it for all the same reasons.

Ill

California’s and the Humane Society’s broadest argument against preemption maintains that all of § 599f s challenged provisions fall outside the “scope” of the FMIA because they exclude a class of animals from the slaughtering process. See 21 U.S.C. § 678 (preempting certain requirements “within the scope of this [Act]”). According to this view, the Act (and the FSIS’s authority under it) extends only to “animals that are going to be turned into meat,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28—or to use another phrase, animals that will “be slaughtered . . . for purposes of human food production,”

[565 U.S. 465]

Brief for State Respondents 19 (emphasis deleted). Section 599f avoids the scope of the Act, respondents claim, by altogether removing nonambulatory pigs from the slaughtering process. The Ninth Circuit accepted this argument, analogizing § 599f to state laws upheld in two other Circuits banning the slaughter of horses for human consumption. 599 F.3d, at 1098 (discussing Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551 (CA7 2007), and Ernpacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S. A. de C.V. v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326 (CA5 2007)). According to the Court of Appeals, “states are free to decide which animals may be turned into meat.” 599 F.3d, at 1098, 1099.

We think not. The FMIA’s scope includes not only “animals that are going to be turned into meat,” but animals on a slaughterhouse’s premises that will never suffer that fate. The Act’s implementing regulations themselves exclude many classes of animals from the slaughtering process. Swine with hog cholera, for example, are disqualified, see 9 CFR § 309.5(a); so too are swine and other livestock “affected with anthrax,” § 309.7(a). Indeed, the federal regulations prohibit the slaughter of any nonambulatory cattle for human consumption. See § 309.3(e). As these examples demonstrate, one vital function of the Act and its regulations is to ensure that some kinds of livestock delivered to a slaughterhouse’s gates will not be turned into meat. Under federal law, nonambulatory pigs are not among those excluded

[565 U.S. 466]

animals. But that is to say only that § 599fs requirements differ from those of the FMIA—not that § 599f s requirements fall outside the FMIA’s scope.

Nor are respondents right to suggest that § 599f s exclusion avoids the FMIA’s scope because it is designed to ensure the humane treatment of pigs, rather than the safety of meat. See, e.g., Brief for State Respondents 29; Brief for Non-State Respondents 39-40. [12] That view misunderstands the authority—and indeed responsibility—that the FMIA gives to federal officials. Since 1978, when Congress incorporated the HMSA’s standards, the FMIA has required slaughterhouses to follow prescribed methods of humane handling, so as to minimize animals’ pain and suffering. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 603(b), 610(b); supra, at 456-458, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 957-959. A violation of those standards is a crime, see § 676, and the Secretary of Agriculture can suspend inspections at—and thus effectively shut down—a slaughterhouse that disobeys them, see §§ 603(b), 610(c). To implement the Act’s humane-handling provisions, the FSIS has issued detailed regulations, see 9 CFR pt. 313, including some specifically addressing animals that cannot walk, see §§ 313.2(d), 313.1(c). Those rules, as earlier noted, apply throughout the time an animal is on a slaughterhouse’s premises, from the moment a delivery truck pulls up to the gate. See supra, at 456-458, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 957-959. So the FMIA addresses not just food safety, but humane treatment as well. Even California conceded at oral argument that the FSIS could issue regulations under the FMIA, similar to § 599f, mandating the euthanasia of nonambula-tory swine. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 46-47. If that is so—and it is, because of the FSIS’s authority over humane-handling methods—then § 599fs requirements must fall within the FMIA’s scope.

[565 U.S. 467]

The Circuit decisions upholding state bans on slaughtering horses, on which the Ninth Circuit relied, do not demand any different conclusion. We express no view on those decisions, except to say that the laws sustained there differ from § 599f in a significant respect. A ban on butchering horses for human consumption works at a remove from the sites and activities that the FMIA most directly governs. When such a ban is in effect, no horses will be delivered to, inspected at, or handled by a slaughterhouse, because no horses will be ordered for purchase in the first instance. But § 599f does not and cannot work in that way. As earlier noted, many non-ambulatory pigs become disabled either in transit to or after arrival at a slaughterhouse. See supra, at 460-463, and nn. 5-6, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 960-962. So even with § 599f in effect, a swine slaughterhouse will encounter nonambulatory pigs. In that circumstance, § 599f tells the slaughterhouse what to do with those animals. Unlike a horse slaughtering ban, the statute thus reaches into the slaughterhouse’s facilities and affects its daily activities. And in so doing, the California law runs smack into the FMIA’s regulations. So whatever might be said of other bans on slaughter, § 599f imposes requirements within—and indeed at the very heart of—the FMIA’s scope.

[565 U.S. 468]

IV

The FMIA regulates slaughterhouses’ handling and treatment of nonambulatory pigs from the moment of their delivery through the end of the meat production process. California’s § 599f endeavors to regulate the same thing, at the same time, in the same place except by imposing different requirements. The FMIA expressly preempts such a state law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand this case for further proceedings tent with this opinion. consis-

It is so ordered.

      .  The FMIA applies to all slaughterhouses producing meat for interstate and foreign commerce. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 601(h), 603(a). The FMIA also regulates slaughterhouses serving an exclusively intrastate market in any State that does not administer an inspection system with “requirements at least equal to those’’ of the Act. § 661(c)(1). Because California has chosen not to adopt such an inspection program, the FMIA governs all slaughterhouses in the State (except for any limited to “custom slaughtering for personal, household, guest, and employee uses,’’ § 623(a)).

      .  The PSIS’s regulations define “non-ambulatory disabled livestock’’ as “livestock that cannot rise from a recumbent position or that cannot walk, including, but not limited to, those with broken appendages, severed tendons or ligaments, nerve paralysis, fractured vertebral column, or metabolic conditions.’’ § 309.2(b).

      . The preemption provision also includes a saving clause, which states that the Act “shall not preclude any State . . . from making requirement[s] or taking other action, consistent with this [Act], with respect to any other matters regulated under this [Act].’’ 21 U.S.C. § 678; see n. 10, infra.

      . The Humane Society intervened to defend § 599f in the District Court. See Motion To Intervene in No. 08-1963 (ED Cal.), Record, Doc. 46. The organization continues as a respondent in this Court.

      . The percentage of pigs becoming nonambulatory after delivery varies by slaughterhouse from 0.1 percent to over 1 percent. See McGlone, Fatigued Pigs: The Final Link, Pork Magazine 14 (Mar. 2006). About 100 million pigs are slaughtered each year in the United States, see Dept. of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, Livestock Slaughter 13 (Jan. 2011), so those percentages work out to between 100,000 and 1,000,000 pigs.

      . According to one estimate, almost one-half of 1 percent of the pigs slaughtered annually in the United States become nonambulatory during the trip from farm to slaughterhouse. See National Pork Board, Transport Quality Assurance Handbook 25 (Version 4, 2008) (updated 2010). About half that many die during transport. See ibid.

      . Section 599f(a) also bans “sell[ing]” nonambulatory animals. But because slaughterhouses (unlike other entities referenced in the provision) do not typically sell live animals, that prohibition is not at issue in this case. The statute’s distinct ban on selling meat from nonambulatory animals that have been slaughtered is discussed infra, at 463-464, 181 L. Ed. 2d, at 962.

      . California’s brief sometimes casts its argument in terms of the “operations” language of the FMIA’s preemption clause (although the State appeared to abandon this phrasing at oral argument). In this version of the claim, California contends that the “operations” of a slaughterhouse are only those “of federal concern,” and that excluding a class of animals from the slaughtering process does not impinge on such operations. Brief for State Respondents 20, n. 9; see also id., at 20-21. We see no real difference between saying that a categorical exclusion of animals does not implicate “ ‘operations’ of federal concern” and saying that it does not fall within the scope of the Act. Accordingly, our answer to both forms of the argument is the same.

      . Indeed, the FSIS recently solicited comment on a rulemaking petition that would require all nonambulatory disabled livestock, including swine, to be humanely euthanized. See 76 Fed. Reg. 6572 (2011). The FSIS has taken no further action on that petition.

      . We finally reject California’s argument, see Brief for State Respondents 20, that our reading of the FMIA’s preemption provision renders its saving clause insignificant.  That clause provides that States may regulate slaughterhouses as to “other matters,’’ not addressed in the express preemption clause, as long as those laws are “consistent with’’ the FMIA. 21 U.S.C. § 678. So, for example, the Government acknowledges that state laws of general application (workplace safety regulations, building codes, etc.) will usually apply to slaughterhouses. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. Moreover, because the FMIA’s express preemption provision prevents States from imposing only “additional]’’ or “different” requirements, § 678, States may exact civil or criminal penalties for animal cruelty or other conduct that also violates the FMIA. See § 678; cf. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 161 L. Ed. 2d 687 (2005) (holding that a preemption clause barring state laws “ ‘in addition to or different’ ” from a federal Act does not interfere with an “equivalent” state provision (emphasis deleted)). Although the FMIA preempts much state law involving slaughterhouses, it thus leaves some room for the States to regulate.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    [565 U.S. 469]
    DARIN RYBURN, et al., Petitioners v GEORGE R. HUFF, et al.
    565 U.S. 469, 132 S. Ct. 987,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 966,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 910
    [No. 11-208]
    Decided January 23, 2012.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

[565 U.S. 470]

Per Curiam.

Petitioners Darin Ryburn and Ed-mundo Zepeda, along with two other officers from the Burbank Police Department, responded to a call from Bellarmine-Jefferson High School in Burbank, California. When the officers arrived at the school, the principal informed them that a student, Vincent Huff, was rumored to have written a letter threatening to “shoot up” the school. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2. The principal reported that many parents, after hearing the rumor, had decided to keep their children at home. Ibid. The principal expressed concern for the safety of her students and requested that the officers investigate the threat. Id., at 42, 54-55.

In the course of conducting interviews with the principal and two of Vincent’s classmates, the officers learned that Vincent had been absent from school for two days and that he was frequently subjected to bullying. Id., at 2. The officers additionally learned that one of Vincent’s classmates believed that Vincent was capable of carrying out the alleged threat. Id., at 44. The officers found Vincent’s absences from school and his history of being subjected to bullying as cause for concern. The officers had received training on targeted school violence and were aware that these characteristics are common among perpetrators of school shootings. Id., at 56-58, 63.

The officers decided to continue the investigation by interviewing Vincent. When the officers arrived at Vincent’s house, Officer Zepeda knocked on the door and announced several times that the officers were with the Burbank Police

[565 U.S. 471]

Department. No one answered the door or otherwise responded to Officer Zepeda’s knocks. Sergeant Ryburn then called the home telephone. The officers could hear the phone ringing inside the house, but no one answered. Id., at 2.

Sergeant Ryburn next tried calling the cell phone of Vincent’s mother, Mrs. Huff. When Mrs. Huff answered the phone, Sergeant Ryburn identified himself and inquired about her location. Mrs. Huff informed Sergeant Ryburn that she was inside the house. Sergeant Ryburn then inquired about Vincent’s location, and Mrs. Huff informed him that Vincent was inside with her. Sergeant Ryburn told Mrs. Huff that he and the other officers were outside and requested to speak with her, but Mrs. Huff hung up the phone. Id., at 2-3.

One or two minutes later, Mrs. Huff and Vincent walked out of the house and stood on the front steps. Officer Zepeda advised Vincent that he and the other officers were there to discuss the threats. Vincent, apparently aware of the rumor that was circulating at his school, responded, “I can’t believe you’re here for that.” Id., at 3. Sergeant Ryburn asked Mrs. Huff if they could continue the discussion inside the house, but she refused. Ibid. In Sergeant Ryburn’s experience as a juvenile bureau sergeant, it was “extremely unusual” for a parent to decline an officer’s request to interview a juvenile inside. Id., at 3, 73-74. Sergeant Ryburn also found it odd that Mrs. Huff never asked the officers the reason for their visit. Id., at 73-74.

After Mrs. Huff declined Sergeant Ryburn’s request to continue the discussion inside, Sergeant Ryburn asked her if there were any guns in the house. Mrs. Huff responded by “immediately turn[ing] around and r[unning] into the house.” Id., at 3. Sergeant Ryburn, who was “scared because [he] didn’t know what was in that house” and had “seen too many officers killed,” entered the house behind her. Id., at 75. Vincent entered the house behind Sergeant Ryburn, and Officer

[565 U.S. 472]

Zepeda entered after Vincent. Officer Zepeda was concerned about “officer safety” and did not want Sergeant Ryburn to enter the house alone. Id., at 3. The two remaining officers, who had been standing out of earshot while Sergeant Ryburn and Officer Zepeda talked to Vincent and Mrs. Huff, entered the house last, on the assumption that Mrs. Huff had given Sergeant Ryburn and Officer Zepeda permission to enter. Id., at 3-4.

Upon entering the house, the officers remained in the living room with Mrs. Huff and Vincent. Eventually, Vincent’s father entered the room and challenged the officers’ authority to be there. The officers remained inside the house for a total of 5 to 10 minutes. During that time, the officers talked to Mr. Huff and Vincent. They did not conduct any search of Mr. Huff, Mrs. Huff, or Vincent, or any of their property. The officers ultimately concluded that the rumor about Vincent was false, and they reported their conclusion to the school. Id., at 4.

The Huffs brought this action against the officers under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleges that the officers violated the Huffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by entering their home without a warrant. Following a 2-day bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the officers. The District Court resolved conflicting testimony regarding Mrs. Huffs response to Sergeant Ryburn’s inquiry about guns by finding that Mrs. Huff “immediately turned around and ran into the house.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 3. The District Court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because Mrs. Huffs odd behavior, combined with the information the officers gathered at the school, could have led reasonable officers to believe “that there could be weapons inside the house, and that family members or the officers themselves were in danger.” Id., at 6. The District Court noted that “[w]ithin a very short period of time, the officers were confronted with facts and circumstances giving rise to grave concern about the

[565 U.S. 473]

nature of the danger they were confronting.” Id., at 6-7. With respect to this kind of “rapidly evolving incident,” the District Court explained, courts should be especially reluctant “to fault the police for not obtaining a warrant.” Id., at 7.

A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court as to the two officers who entered the house on the assumption that Mrs. Huff had consented, but reversed as to petitioners. Huff v. Burbank, 632 F.3d 539 (2011). The majority upheld the District Court’s findings of fact, but disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity. The majority acknowledged that police officers are allowed to enter a home without a warrant if they reasonably believe that immediate entry is necessary to protect themselves or others from serious harm, even if the officers lack probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Id., at 547. But the majority determined that, in this case, “any belief that the officers or other family members were in serious, imminent harm would have been objectively unreasonable” given that “[Mrs. Huff] merely asserted her right to end her conversation with the officers and returned to her home.” Ibid.

Judge Rawlinson dissented. She explained that “the discrete incident that precipitated the entry in this case was Mrs. Huffs response to the question regarding whether there were guns in the house.” Id., at 500. She faulted the majority for “recit[ing] a sanitized account of this event” that differed markedly from the District Court’s findings of fact, which the majority had conceded must be credited. Ibid. Judge Rawlinson looked to “cases that specifically address the scenario where officer safety concerns prompted the entry” and concluded that, under the rationale articulated in those cases, “a police officer could have reasonably believed that he was justified in making a warrantless entry to ensure that no one inside the house had a gun after Mrs. Huff ran

[565 U.S. 474]

into the house without answering the question of whether anyone had a weapon.” Id., at 551, 552-553.

Judge Rawlinson’s analysis of the qualified immunity issue was correct. No decision of this Court has found a Fourth Amendment violation on facts even roughly comparable to those present in this case. On the contrary, some of our opinions may be read as pointing in the opposite direction.

In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006), we held that officers may enter a residence without a warrant when they have “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is . . . imminently threatened with [serious injury].” We explained that “ ‘[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.’” Id., at 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978)). In addition, in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208 (2006), the Court stated that “it would be silly to suggest that the police would commit a tort by entering [a residence] ... to determine whether violence ... is about to (or soon will) occur.”

A reasonable police officer could read these decisions to mean that the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to enter a residence if the officer has a reasonable basis for concluding that there is an imminent threat of violence. In this case, the District Court concluded that petitioners had such an objectively reasonable basis for reaching such a conclusion. The District Court wrote:

“[T]he officers testified that a number of factors led them to be concerned for their own safety and for the safety of other persons in the residence: the unusual behavior of the parents in not answering the door or the telephone; the fact that Mrs. Huff did not inquire about the reason for their visit or express concern that they were investigating her son; the fact that she hung up the telephone on the officer; the fact that she refused to tell them whether there were guns in the house; and
[565 U.S. 475]
finally, the fact that she ran back into the house while being questioned. That behavior, combined with the information obtained at the school—that Vincent was a student who was a victim of bullying, who had been absent from school for two days, and who had threatened to ‘shoot up’ the school— led the officers to believe that there could be weapons inside the house, and that family members or the officers themselves were in danger.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 6.

This belief, the District Court held, was “objectively reasonable,” particularly since the situation was “rapidly evolving” and the officers had to make quick decisions. Id., at 6-7.

The panel majority—far removed from the scene and with the opportunity to dissect the elements of the situation—confidently concluded that the officers really had no reason to fear for their safety or that of anyone else. As the panel majority saw things, it was irrelevant that the Huffs did not respond when the officers knocked on the door and announced their presence and when they called the home phone because the Huffs had no legal obligation to respond to a knock on the door or to answer the phone. The majority attributed no significance to the fact that, when the officers finally reached Mrs. Huff on her cell phone, she abruptly hung up in the middle of their conversation. And, according to the majority, the officers should not have been concerned by Mrs. Huffs reaction when they asked her if there were any guns in the house because Mrs. Huff “merely asserted her right to end her conversation with the officers and returned to her home.” 632 F.3d, at 547.

Confronted with the facts found by the District Court, reasonable officers in the position of petitioners could have come to the conclusion that there was an imminent threat to their safety and to the safety of others. The Ninth Circuit’s contrary conclusion was flawed for numerous reasons.

First, although the panel majority purported to accept the findings of the District Court, it changed those findings in

[565 U.S. 476]

several key respects. As Judge Rawlinson correctly observed, “the discrete incident that precipitated the entry in this case was Mrs. Huffs response to the question regarding whether there were guns in the house.” Id., at 550. The District Court’s finding that Mrs. Huff “immediately turned around and ran into the house” implicitly rejected Mrs. Huffs contrary testimony that she walked into the house after telling the officers that she was going to get her husband. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3. The panel majority upheld the District Court’s findings of fact and acknowledged that it could not reverse the District Court simply because it “may have weighed the testimony of the witnesses and other evidence in another manner.” 632 F. 3d, at 543. But the panel majority’s determination that petitioners were not entitled to qualified immunity rested on an account of the facts that differed markedly from the District Court’s finding. According to the panel majority, Mrs. Huff “merely asserted her right to end her conversation with the officers and returned to her home” after telling the officers “that she would go get her husband.” Id., at 547, 542.

Second, the panel majority appears to have taken the view that conduct cannot be regarded as a matter of concern so long as it is lawful. Accordingly, the panel majority concluded that Mrs. Huffs response to the question whether there were any guns in the house (immediately turning around and running inside) was not a reason for alarm because she was under no legal obligation to continue her conversation with the police. It should go without saying, however, that there are many circumstances in which lawful conduct may portend imminent violence.

Third, the panel majority’s method of analyzing the string of events that unfolded at the Huff residence was entirely unrealistic. The majority looked at each separate event in isolation and concluded that each, in itself, did not give cause for concern. But it is a matter of common sense that a combination

[565 U.S. 477]

of events each of which is mundane when viewed in isolation may paint an alarming picture.

Fourth, the panel majority did not heed the District Court’s wise admonition that judges should be cautious about second-guessing a police officer’s assessment, made on the scene, of the danger presented by a particular situation. With the benefit of hindsight and calm deliberation, the panel majority concluded that it was unreasonable for petitioners to fear that violence was imminent. But we have instructed that reasonableness “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” and that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). Judged from the proper perspective of a reasonable officer forced to make a split-second decision in response to a rapidly unfolding chain of events that culminated with Mrs. Huff turning and running into the house after refusing to answer a question about guns, petitioners’ belief that entry was necessary to avoid injury to themselves or others was eminently reasonable.

In sum, reasonable police officers in petitioners’ position could have come to the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permitted them to enter the Huff residence if there was an objectively reasonable basis for fearing that violence was imminent. And a reasonable officer could have come to such a conclusion based on the facts as found by the District Court.

The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for the entry of judgment in favor of petitioners.

It is so ordered.


text:
    No. 10-9236.
    Tony Stevenson Johnson, Petitioner v. McKither Bodison, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1153, 132 S. Ct. 1088,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 973,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 720.
    January 17, 2012.
   On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 132 S. Ct. 641, 181 L. Ed. 2d 619 (2012).

Same case below, 398 Fed. Appx. 927.


text:
    No. 11-6912.
    William C. Breland, Jr., Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1153, 132 S. Ct. 1096,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 973,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 766.
    January 17, 2012.
   On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General in his brief for the United States filed on December 19, 2011.

Same case below, 647 F.3d 284.


text:
    No. 11-7234.
    John Miles Foster, Petitioner v. Ralph Kemp, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1153, 132 S. Ct. 1099,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 973,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 695.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed. See Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 11-7343.
    Natalya Hampel, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1153, 132 S. Ct. 1105,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 973,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 595.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

Same case below, 429 Fed. Appx. 995.


text:
    No. 11-7344.
    Matthew L. Faison, Jr., Petitioner v. Thurman Weaver, et al.
    565 U.S. 1153, 132 S. Ct. 1105,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 973,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 700.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 11M59.
    Maher El Falesteny, Petitioner v. Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, et al.
    565 U.S. 1154, 132 S. Ct. 1132,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 973,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 838.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion for leave to file a petition for writ of certiorari under seal denied without prejudice to filing a renewed motion together with either a redacted petition, or an explanation as to why the petition may not be redacted, within 30 days.

Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 11-393.
    National Federation of Independent Business, et al., Petitioners v. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. Department of Health and Human Services, et al., Petitioners v. Florida, et al. Florida, et al., Petitioners v. Department of Health and Human Services, et al.
    No. 11-398.
    No. 11-400.
    565 U.S. 1154, 132 S. Ct. 1133,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 974,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 777.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of the National Federation of Independent Business, et al. for leave to add Dana Grimes and David Klemencic as additional petitioners in No. 11-393 and additional respondents in Nos. 11-398 and 11-400 granted.


text:
    No. 11-460.
    Los Angeles County Flood Control District, Petitioner v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.
    565 U.S. 1154, 132 S. Ct. 1133,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 974,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 743.
    January 17, 2012.
   The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.

Same case below, 673 F.3d 880.


text:
    No. 11-604.
    EM Ltd., et al., Petitioners v. Republic of Argentina, et al.
    565 U.S. 1154, 132 S. Ct. 1133,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 974,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 875.
    January 17, 2012.
   The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.

Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Same case below, 652 F.3d 172, 414 Fed. Appx. 514.


text:
    No. 11-5721.
    Corey A. Hill, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1154, 132 S. Ct. 1133,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 974,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 804.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel granted. Stephen E. Eberhardt, Esquire, of Tinley Park, Illinois, is appointed to serve as counsel for the petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 11-5731.
    Assem A. Abulkhair, Petitioner v. Edward W. Boehm, et al.
    565 U.S. 1154, 132 S. Ct. 1134,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 974,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 794.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 11-6616.
    Paul Blackmer, Petitioner v. Social Security Administration.
    565 U.S. 1155, 132 S. Ct. 1134,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 974,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 800.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 11-7241.
    Javier Ochoa Canales, Petitioner v. Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
    565 U.S. 1155, 132 S. Ct. 1134,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 975,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 748.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until February 7, 2012, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 11-7255.
    In re Elliotte P. Coleman, Petitioner.
    565 U.S. 1155, 132 S. Ct. 1134,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 975,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 771.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until February 7, 2012, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 11-7445.
    Robert Schmidt, et ux., Petitioners v. New Century Mortgage Corporation, et al.
    565 U.S. 1155, 132 S. Ct. 1134,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 975,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 736.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners allowed until February 7, 2012, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 11-7688.
    Joseph Kamau Christopher Bey, Petitioner v. North Carolina, et al.
    565 U.S. 1155, 132 S. Ct. 1135,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 975,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 796.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until February 7, 2012, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

Same case below, 411 Fed. Appx. 643.


text:
    No. 11-7787.
    Victor Vevea, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1155, 132 S. Ct. 1135,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 975,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 855.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until February 7, 2012, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

Same case below, 446 Fed. Appx. 63.


text:
    No. 11-7999.
    In re Cynthia Driver, Petitioner.
    565 U.S. 1155, 132 S. Ct. 1135,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 975,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 741.
    January 17, 2012.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until February 7, 2012, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 10-760.
    Madeline Weishuhn, Petitioner v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, et al.
    565 U.S. 1155, 132 S. Ct. 1088,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 976,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 865.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Michigan denied.

Same case below, 287 Mich. App. 211, 787 N.W.2d 513.


text:
    No. 10-769.
    Monica Maria Skrzypczak, Petitioner v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, et al.
    565 U.S. 1155, 132 S. Ct. 1088,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 976,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 780.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 611 F.3d 1238.


text:
    No. 10-1488.
    Todd Jason Derry, Petitioner v. Florida.
    565 U.S. 1155, 132 S. Ct. 1089,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 976,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 761.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, denied.

Same case below, 56 So. 3d 774.


text:
    No. 10-8952.
    Cyril Innis, Petitioner v. Kenneth S. Tucker, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
    565 U.S. 1155, 132 S. Ct. 1135,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 976,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 724.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 10-11180.
    Christela Neal, Petitioner v. Ford Motor Company.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1089,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 976,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 839,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 10-11209.
    Lucio Mora-Tarula, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1089,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 976,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 750.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 415 Fed. Appx. 813.


text:
    No. 11-84.
    Michelle Alvis, et al., Petitioners v. Kathleen Espinosa, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Decedent Asa Sullivan, et al.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1089,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 976,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 867.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 598 F.3d 528.


text:
    No. 11-257.
    Mark Henry Pantle, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1091,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 976,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 858.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 637 F.3d 1172.


text:
    No. 11-290.
    Rick Charles Delacy, Petitioner v. California.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1092,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 977,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 779.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, denied.

Same case below, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1481, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216.


text:
    No. 11-296.
    Scott Gustin, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1092,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 977,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 790.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 642 F.3d 573.


text:
    No. 11-397.
    Rickie Dawson York, Petitioner v. Texas.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1093,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 977,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 759.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas denied.

Same case below, 342 S.W.3d 528.


text:
    No. 11-425.
    Applebee’s International, Inc., Petitioner v. Gerald A. Fast, et al.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1094,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 977,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 709.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 638 F.3d 872.


text:
    No. 11-427.
    Philip A. Downey, Petitioner v. Nicholas Knopick.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1094,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 977,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 784.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Same case below, 639 F.3d 600.


text:
    No. 11-437.
    Donald E. Bitzer, Petitioner v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1094,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 977,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 879.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied.

Same case below, 429 Fed. Appx. 984.


text:
    No. 11-441.
    Myrna Malaterre, et al., Petitioners v. Amerind Risk Management Corporation.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1094,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 977,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 737.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 633 F.3d 680.


text:
    No. 11-451.
    Connecticut, Petitioner v. Patrick J. Lenarz.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1095,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 977,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 723.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Connecticut denied.

Same case below, 301 Conn. 417, 22 A.3d 536.


text:
    No. 11-459.
    Prime Healthcare Services Los Angeles, LLC, Petitioner v. Brotman Medical Center, Inc.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1095,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 978,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 812.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 442 Fed. Appx. 317.


text:
    No. 11-502.
    Blue Mountain School District, et al., Petitioners v. J. S., a Minor, Through Her Parents, Terry Snyder and Steven Snyder, et al.
    565 U.S. 1156, 132 S. Ct. 1097,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 978,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 726.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Same case below, 650 F.3d 915.


text:
    No. 11-546.
    Forsyth County, North Carolina, Petitioner v. Janet Joyner, et al.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1097,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 978,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 893.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 653 F.3d 341.


text:
    No. 11-557.
    Richard G. Renzi, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1097,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 978,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 852.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 651 F.3d 1012.


text:
    No. 11-558.
    Bud Lee, et al., Petitioners v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, et al.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1135,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 978,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 816.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 432 Fed. Appx. 435.


text:
    No. 11-569.
    Indian River School District, et al., Petitioners v. Jane Doe and John Doe, Individually and as Parents and Next Friends of Jordon Doe and Jamie Doe.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1097,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 978,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 768.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Same case below, 653 F.3d 256.


text:
    No. 11-573.
    K2 America Corporation, Petitioner v. Roland Oil & Gas, LLC.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1098,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 978,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 756.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 653 F.3d 1024.


text:
    No. 11-576.
    Pedro Jose Tartak Del Palacio, Petitioner v. Catalina Tartak Michael, et al.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1098,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 979,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 716.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico denied.


text:
    No. 11-579.
    Jacqueline Rigaud, Petitioner v. Broward General Medical Center, et al.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1100,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 979,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 895.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida denied.

Same case below, 65 So. 3d 516.


text:
    No. 11-585.
    Brand Technologies, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Mavrix Photo, Inc.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1101,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 979,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 746.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 647 F.3d 1218.


text:
    No. 11-587.
    Brian J. Glenn, Petitioner v. Valero Energy Corp., et al.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1101,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 979,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 803.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas denied.


text:
    No. 11-588.
    Global Santa Fe Drilling Company, et al., Petitioners v. Apache Corporation.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1101,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 979,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 892.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 435 Fed. Appx. 322.


text:
    No. 11-590.
    Phillip C. Engers, et al., Petitioners v. AT&T, Inc., et al.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1101,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 979,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 787.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Same case below, 466 Fed. Appx. 75.


text:
    No. 11-592.
    The Peterson Law Firm, et al., Petitioners v. City of Los Angeles, California.
    565 U.S. 1157, 132 S. Ct. 1101,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 979,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 869.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, denied.


text:
    No. 11-593.
    TI Pneumotive, Inc., aka Thomas Industries, Petitioner v. Yasunaga Corporation.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1101,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 979,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 733.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, denied.


text:
    No. 11-595.
    Life Partners, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1104,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 980,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 711.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 650 F.3d 1026.


text:
    No. 11-618.
    City of Newkirk, Oklahoma, et al., Petitioners v. Kay Electric Cooperative, et al.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1107,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 980,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 849.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 647 F.3d 1039.


text:
    No. 11-620.
    Forsyth Memorial Hospital, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1107,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 980,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 899.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied.

Same case below, 395 U.S. App. D.C. 41, 639 F.3d 534.


text:
    No. 11-624.
    Attila Hegyi, Petitioner v. Washington State Department of Transportation.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1107,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 980,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 728.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Washington denied.


text:
    No. 11-631.
    Vernice Wessman, et al., Petitioners v. City of Mankato, Minnesota.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1107,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 980,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 713.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Minnesota denied.


text:
    No. 11-633.
    Sharon Ann Anderson, Petitioner v. JPMorgan Chase and Company, et al.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1108,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 980,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 798.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 418 Fed. Appx. 881.


text:
    No. 11-635.
    Francesk Ujka, et al., Petitioners v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1108,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 980,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 904.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 423 Fed. Appx. 960.


text:
    No. 11-665.
    Richard Hirschfield, Petitioner v. California, et al.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1116,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 981,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 808.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Third Appellate District, denied.


text:
    No. 11-669.
    Mary Kate Breeden, Petitioner v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1116,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 981,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 853.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied.

Same case below, 396 U.S. App. D.C. 170, 646 F.3d 43.


text:
    No. 11-707.
    William E. Ruhaak, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1117,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 981,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 884.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 422 Fed. Appx. 530.


text:
    No. 11-710.
    Deborah A. Barczyk, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1118,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 981,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 819.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 434 Fed. Appx. 488.


text:
    No. 11-712.
    EchoStar Satellite L.L.C., nka Dish Network, L.L.C., et al., Petitioners v. NDS Group PLS, nka NDS Group Limited, et al.
    565 U.S. 1158, 132 S. Ct. 1118,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 981,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 751.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 390 Fed. Appx. 764.


text:
    No. 11-727.
    Louis F. Dietz, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1119,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 981,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 845.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces denied.

Same case below, 70 M.J. 347.


text:
    No. 11-764.
    Thomas D. King, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1128,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 981,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 872.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 364 Fed. Appx. 568.


text:
    No. 11-5024.
    Tommy D. Alcorn, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1090,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 981,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 831.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 420 Fed. Appx. 393.


text:
    No. 11-5192.
    Thomas S. Pendleton, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1090,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 982,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 877.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Same case below, 636 F.3d 78.


text:
    No. 11-5241.
    Samuel Lowery, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1090,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 982,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 708.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied.

Same case below, 3 A.3d 1169.


text:
    No. 11-5357.
    Darious M. Bowens, Petitioner v. Illinois.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1090,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 982,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 854.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, denied.

Same case below, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 348 Ill. Dec. 339, 943 N.E.2d 1249.


text:
    No. 11-5382.
    William Vance Turner, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1090,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 982,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 903.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 427 Fed. Appx. 604.


text:
    No. 11-5525.
    Keith Taskey, Petitioner v. Massachusetts.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1090,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 982,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 754.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appeals Court of Massachusetts denied.

Same case below, 78 Mass. App. 787, 941 N.E.2d 713.


text:
    No. 11-5738.
    Duane Milton McClain, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1091,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 982,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 889.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 429 Fed. Appx. 538.


text:
    No. 11-5858.
    Aaron Bruns, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1091,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 982,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 714.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied.

Same case below, 395 U.S. App. D.C. 189, 641 F.3d 555.


text:
    No. 11-5980.
    Steve Starbala, et ux., Petitioners v. Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1091,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 983,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 718.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of Connecticut denied.

Same case below, 125 Conn. App. 901, 10 A.3d 1109.


text:
    No. 11-6018.
    Robert Boehm, et ux., Petitioners v. Andrea Evans, Chairperson, New York State Division of Parole.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1091,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 983,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 775.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, Third Judicial Department, denied.

Same case below, 79 App. Div. 3d 1445, 914 N.Y.S.2d 318.


text:
    No. 11-6095.
    Israel Gonzales, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1159, 132 S. Ct. 1091,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 983,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 848.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 642 F.3d 504.


text:
    No. 11-6314.
    Terrance Lewis, Petitioner v. Harry Wilson, et al.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1092,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 983,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 762.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Same case below, 423 Fed. Appx. 153.


text:
    No. 11-6351.
    James Kane, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1092,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 983,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 823.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 434 Fed. Appx. 175.


text:
    No. 11-6463.
    Robert Mann, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1092,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 983,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 731.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 435 Fed. Appx. 254.


text:
    No. 11-6626.
    Mario Arthur Garcia, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1093,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 983,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 810.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 432 Fed. Appx. 248.


text:
    No. 11-6647.
    Derrick Rayshawn Parks, aka Bam Parks, aka Rayshawn Parks, Petitioner v. United States. Tremayne Kendrick Blackwell, Petitioner v. United States.
    No. 11-7068.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1093,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 984,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 758.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petitions for writs of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same cases below, 436 Fed. Appx. 192.


text:
    No. 11-6711.
    Angeliki Papadimitriou, Petitioner v. John Papadimitriou.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1094,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 984,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 749,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland denied.

Same case below, 194 Md. App. 733.


text:
    No. 11-6779.
    Dennis L. Gil Bernardez, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1094,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 984,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 817.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 439 Fed. Appx. 209.


text:
    No. 11-6809.
    Kenneth Harry Justus, Petitioner v. South Carolina.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1095,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 984,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 825.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied.

Same case below, 392 S.C. 416, 709 S.E.2d 668.


text:
    No. 11-6820.
    Ronnie Paul Threadgill, Petitioner v. Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1095,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 984,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 871.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 425 Fed. Appx. 298.


text:
    No. 11-6898.
    William E. Leventhal, Petitioner v. Daniel Schaffer, et al.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1095,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 984,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 747.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 418 Fed. Appx. 588.


text:
    No. 11-6914.
    Tyquann Brown, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1096,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 984,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 847.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Same case below, 438 Fed. Appx. 75.


text:
    No. 11-6936.
    Roderick Nunley, Petitioner v. Missouri.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1096,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 985,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 821.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri denied.

Same case below, 341 S.W.3d 611.


text:
    No. 11-6942.
    Alex Enrique Sanchez-Brenez, Petitioner v. United States.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1096,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 985,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 857.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 434 Fed. Appx. 388.


text:
    No. 11-7129.
    Charles Jones, Petitioner v. Kansas.
    565 U.S. 1160, 132 S. Ct. 1097,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 985,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 734,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kansas denied.

Same case below, 292 Kan. 910, 257 P.3d 268.


text:
    No. 11-7139.
    Michael Anthony Taylor, Petitioner v. Troy Steele, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1097,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 985,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 791,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri denied.

Same case below, 341 S.W.3d 634.


text:
    No. 11-7212.
    Christopher J. Emerson, Petitioner v. Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1098,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 985,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 752,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7213.
    Luis R. Cotto, Petitioner v. Linda Kelly, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, et al.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1098,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 985,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 832.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7222.
    Kenneth Hayes, Petitioner v. Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1098,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 985,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 880.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7227.
    Michael Hense, Petitioner v. Latia W. Martin, et al.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1098,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 985,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 835.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.

Same case below, 417 Fed. Appx. 83.


text:
    No. 11-7230.
    James Garrett Freeman, Petitioner v. Texas.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1099,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 986,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 834.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas denied.

Same case below, 340 S.W.3d 717.


text:
    No. 11-7235.
    Christopher Nolen, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1099,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 986,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 861.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg Office, denied.

Same case below, 24 A.3d 464.


text:
    No. 11-7242.
    Michael W. Moton, Petitioner v. Ohio.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1099,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 986,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 801.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Summit County, denied.


text:
    No. 11-7244.
    Victor Verdun, Jr., Petitioner v. Burl Cain, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1099,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 986,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 776.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7246.
    John Guzman, Petitioner v. Greg McQuiggin, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1099,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 986,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 814,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7247.
    Robert A. Griffin, Petitioner v. Robert Kirkpatrick, Superintendent, Wende Correctional Facility.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1100,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 986,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 710,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7248.
    Kevin M. Gibbons, Petitioner v. Hugh Wolfenbarger, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1100,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 986,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 828.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7251.
    Dawn Kelley, Petitioner v. Joseph J. Bruzzese, et al.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1100,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 986,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 781,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7252.
    MaxMillian Kunitz, Sr., Petitioner v. Ken Clark, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1135,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 987,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 721.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7263.
    Phillip Wood, Petitioner v. John Main.
    565 U.S. 1161, 132 S. Ct. 1100,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 987,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 881,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7264.
    Steven J. Pape, Petitioner v. Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1100,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 987,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 863.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 645 F.3d 281.


text:
    No. 11-7273.
    Harold L. Morris, Petitioner v. New Mexico.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1102,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 987,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 783.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New Mexico denied.


text:
    No. 11-7276.
    Michael Perkins, Petitioner v. Lieutenant Quinn, et al.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1102,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 987,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 707.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7277.
    Michael Perkins, Petitioner v. David Rock, Superintendent, Upstate Correctional Facility, et al.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1102,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 987,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 763.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7282.
    Duvallon C. Parker, Petitioner v. Tim Lally Chevrolet.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1102,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 987,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 900,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7287.
    Ismail Shabazz, Petitioner v. Kenneth S. Tucker, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1102,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 987,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 729,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7293.
    Stephanie Shackleford, Petitioner v. Ron Havner. Javier Diaz-Bey, Petitioner v. Ron Havner.
    No. 11-7317.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1102,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 988,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 712.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petitions for writs of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same cases below, 435 Fed. Appx. 229.


text:
    No. 11-7295.
    James Will Bonham, Petitioner v. United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1136,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 988,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 827.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7297.
    Jamal D. Strickland, Petitioner v. Richard Gansheimer, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1103,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 988,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 727.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7298.
    Derrondas M. Reed, Petitioner v. David Rednour, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1103,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 988,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 725.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7301.
    Hashibo Dewitt Lacy, Petitioner v. Mark Nooth, Superintendent, Snake River Correctional Institution.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1103,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 988,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 806.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 441 Fed. Appx. 472.


text:
    No. 11-7303.
    David Lynn Scott, Petitioner v. California.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1103,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 988,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 793.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of California denied.

Same case below, 52 Cal. 4th 452, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 91, 257 P.3d 703.


text:
    No. 11-7309.
    Margaret Zoellick, Petitioner v. Lee Zoellick.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1103,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 988,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 717.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia denied.


text:
    No. 11-7310.
    Dolly G. Teters, Petitioner v. Nellie Flores.
    565 U.S. 1162, 132 S. Ct. 1103,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 988,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 774.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division Two, denied.


text:
    No. 11-7311.
    Soton Chan, Petitioner v. Robert H. Trimble, Acting Warden.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1104,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 989,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 836.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 449 Fed. Appx. 614.


text:
    No. 11-7316.
    Sean Casey, Petitioner v. Florida Department of Corrections.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1136,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 989,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 815.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7319.
    Michael Madayag, Petitioner v. Michael S. Evans, Warden, et al.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1104,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 989,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 897.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 442 Fed. Appx. 354.


text:
    No. 11-7326.
    Edward Goldwater, Petitioner v. Arizona.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1104,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 989,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 769.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One, denied.


text:
    No. 11-7333.
    Angela Denise Nails, Petitioner v. Ultimate Business Solutions.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1104,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 989,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 805,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7347.
    Devaughn Jherelle Hall, Petitioner v. Harold W. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1105,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 989,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 802.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 429 Fed. Appx. 354.


text:
    No. 11-7348.
    Francis Hannon, Petitioner v. Jeffrey Beard.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1105,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 989,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 833.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied.

Same case below, 645 F.3d 45.


text:
    No. 11-7350.
    Richard Earl George, Petitioner v. V. M. Almager, Warden, et al.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1105,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 989,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 891.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 432 Fed. Appx. 683.


text:
    No. 11-7351.
    Robert L. Hillman, Petitioner v. Robin Knab, Warden
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1105,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 990,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 851.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7353.
    Enver Karafili, Petitioner v. James E. Tilton, Warden, et al.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1106,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 990,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 882.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 449 Fed. Appx. 633.


text:
    No. 11-7357.
    David Matthew Kurtzemann, Petitioner v. Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1106,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 990,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 722,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7358.
    Jerome Greene, Petitioner v. Harold W. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1106,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 990,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 860.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 435 Fed. Appx. 289.


text:
    No. 11-7363.
    William Hudson, Petitioner v. Michigan Department of Corrections, et al.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1136,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 990,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 745.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7370.
    Hamed Chowdhury, Petitioner v. City of Missoula, Montana.
    565 U.S. 1163, 132 S. Ct. 1106,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 990,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 797.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Montana denied.

Same case below, 361 Mont. 537, 264 P.3d 518.


text:
    No. 11-7373.
    Matthew D. Reason, Petitioner v. Rick Coursey, Superintendent, Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1106,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 990,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 902.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7378.
    Willie Dorsey Cantrell, Petitioner v. L.S. McEwen, Acting Warden, et al.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1106,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 990,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 778.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 449 Fed. Appx. 698.


text:
    No. 11-7384.
    Jose Boanerge Zavala, Petitioner v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1107,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 991,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 755.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 436 Fed. Appx. 276.


text:
    No. 11-7388.
    Mark Anthony Flores, Petitioner v. California.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1108,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 991,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 874,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of California denied.


text:
    No. 11-7390.
    Rodolfo I. Gonzalez, Petitioner v. Randy Grounds, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1108,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 991,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 876.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7391.
    Nathaniel Harvey, Petitioner v. Chris Christie, Governor of New Jersey, et al.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1108,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 991,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 730.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Same case below, 433 Fed. Appx. 73.


text:
    No. 11-7392.
    Willie Foster Haynes, Petitioner v. Texas.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1108,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 991,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 878,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, denied.


text:
    No. 11-7393.
    Bruce Monroe Greer, Petitioner v. Cynthia Nelson, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1109,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 991,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 886.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7394.
    Robert Hoyer, Petitioner v. Tom Horne, Attorney General of Arizona, et al.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1109,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 991,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 887.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7395.
    Kevin Hollingshead, Petitioner v. Kansas.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1109,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 991,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 807.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Kansas denied.

Same case below, 243 P.3d 1113.


text:
    No. 11-7397.
    Eric A. Graham, Petitioner v. A. J. Padula, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1109,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 992,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 770.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 415 Fed. Appx. 477.


text:
    No. 11-7398.
    Danielle Biton, Petitioner v. United Airlines, et al.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1109,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 992,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 859.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7402.
    Abo Obaida Hussein, Petitioner v. Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1109,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 992,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 830.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7403.
    Monte L. Haney, Petitioner v. Carol Yaggy, Judge, Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, et al.
    565 U.S. 1164, 132 S. Ct. 1110,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 992,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 809.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7404.
    Loy C. Hudson, Petitioner v. Department of the Treasury Financial Management Service.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1110,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 992,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 760,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7406.
    Larry E. Hendricks, Petitioner v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1136,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 992,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 822,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied.


text:
    No. 11-7407.
    Michael Anthony Harris, Petitioner v. Larry Small, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1110,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 992,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 788.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7408.
    Richard Grande, Petitioner v. Linda Kelly, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, et al.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1110,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 992,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 773.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7409.
    Anthony Fox, Petitioner v. Thomas Inserra, Superintendent, Mid-Orange Correctional Facility.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1110,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 993,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 868.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7410.
    Edward D. Smith, Petitioner v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, et al.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1136,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 993,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 738,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 442 Fed. Appx. 966.


text:
    No. 11-7417.
    Michael Thomas Weaver, Petitioner v. Kenneth S. Tucker, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1110,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 993,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 837.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7421.
    James Earl Brewster, Petitioner v. Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1111,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 993,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 888.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7429.
    Michael Lindner, Petitioner v. Arizona.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1111,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 993,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 824.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One, denied.

Same case below, 227 Ariz. 69, 252 P.3d 1033.


text:
    No. 11-7431.
    Jon James, Petitioner v. Renee Townsley.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1111,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 993,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 901.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7434.
    Ross Killian, Petitioner v. California.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1111,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 993,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 742.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Sixth Appellate District, denied.


text:
    No. 11-7435.
    Reza Conwell Tatum, Petitioner v. Gregory McQuiggin, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1111,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 993,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 866.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7436.
    Kenneth Thornton, Petitioner v. Cheryl Price, Warden, et al.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1111,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 994,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 843.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7438.
    Joe Clark Mitchell, Petitioner v. John Rees, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1165, 132 S. Ct. 1111,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 994,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 786.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 651 F.3d 593.


text:
    No. 11-7439.
    Phillippe Padieu, Petitioner v. Texas.
    565 U.S. 1166, 132 S. Ct. 1112,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 994,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 898.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, denied.


text:
    No. 11-7440.
    Arlene Katai, Petitioner v. New Jersey.
    565 U.S. 1166, 132 S. Ct. 1112,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 994,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 799.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, denied.


text:
    No. 11-7442.
    Derrick Phillip Ervin, Petitioner v. Alabama.
    565 U.S. 1166, 132 S. Ct. 1112,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 994,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 753.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama denied.

Same cases below, 84 So. 3d 1016.


text:
    No. 11-7444.
    Toby Page, Petitioner v. Steve Rader, Warden.
    565 U.S. 1166, 132 S. Ct. 1112,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 994,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 818.
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 11-7446.
    Kevin Ricardo Morley, Petitioner v. Florida, et al.
    565 U.S. 1166, 132 S. Ct. 1136,
    181 L. Ed. 2d 994,
    2012 U.S. LEXIS 896,
    January 17, 2012.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.